

# Revolution and Evolution 1848 in German-Jewish History

Herausgegeben von  
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# Revolution and Evolution 1848 in German-Jewish History

edited by

WERNER E. MOSSE, ARNOLD PAUCKER,  
REINHARD RÜRUP



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*Robert Weltsch*  
*on his 90th birthday*  
*in*  
*grateful appreciation*



## Preface

In traditional accounts of German-Jewish history as well as to some extent in the more recent historiography of the subject, the Revolution of 1848 has, as a rule, received a particularly positive evaluation. Frequently, the year 1848 has been considered as a watershed in the emancipation and integration of German Jewry, a turning point in the sense of a fundamental switch from the older Jewish policy (“Judenpolitik”) of the German states to the legal and social equality of Jews in a new society reflecting bourgeois norms and interests. The German National Assembly in the *Paulskirche* in Frankfurt in its Fundamental Laws of the German Nation (“Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes”) proclaimed the equality of the Jewish population and forbade all further discrimination on the grounds of religious confession. Liberal and democratic bourgeois Germany thus professed its faith in the fundamental ideas of the Enlightenment, the rights of the man and the citizen of the American and French revolutions and in the establishment of a liberal order of society and state. The ages when there existed a “Jewish Question” – oppression, persecution, even expulsion of the Jewish population – appeared to have been finally left behind.

We know now that the history of the Jews in Germany in fact took a turn very different from that hoped for and expected by the men in the *Paulskirche*. The subsequent emergence of modern antisemitism, the eventual cancellation of emancipation by the so-called Jewish policy (“Judenpolitik”) of Nazi Germany and, ultimately, the “Holocaust”, genocide committed against European Jews, make the achievements of 1848 appear in a different light. It is not accidental, that in more recent research some doubts have begun to be cast on the justification for the highly positive evaluation of the Revolution in German-Jewish historiography. Instead – and without any direct reference to the events of 1848 – attention has increasingly been focused on developments within the Jewish community, debates over religious reform, social differentiation, the search for a new Jewish identity within non-Jewish society. No longer is the integration of the Jewish minority through social and cultural assimilation to the majority accepted as axiomatic, assimilation as both pre-condition and consequence of emancipation has become problematical. This realisation, in the field of historiography, seems to invite a change of perspective or, at any rate, an enlargement of perspectives and a greater degree of sophistication of approach to wider areas of social and cultural history.

In the perspective of social history in particular, social developments which took place in the main irrespective of the success or failure of the Revolution,



appear increasingly important. In fact the nascent bourgeois society which broke the bonds of feudal structures and estate privileges, shook off the tutelage of the Church and set free an industrial-capitalist economy, also modified profoundly the relations of Jew and non-Jew. Indeed that modification was so basic that, at least in this respect, the Revolution could at most have exercised a supporting or retarding effect. The long-term processes of *embourgeoisement* operating on the Jewish minority in Germany, clearly reflecting both secular trends in modern society and specific aspects of the Jewish minority situation, can be linked directly with the dramatic confrontations of a period of revolution only with difficulty.

On closer examination, moreover, the significance of modern revolution for Jewish history is less clear than might appear at first sight. It does indeed remain true that it was the French Revolution of 1789 which, for the first time in modern history, gave Jews full legal equality with all other citizens and that it was the Russian Revolution of 1917 which at long last brought full legal equality also to Russian Jews. But even in revolutions which apparently broke an old crust of legal discrimination, legal equality did not necessarily involve the disappearance either of administrative discrimination or of popular and religious prejudice. Already from the French Revolution it is known that revolutionary upheavals might be accompanied by mass excesses against Jews which, by comparison with such events in early modern times, possessed an entirely new quality. Similar phenomena are to be observed in the course of subsequent European revolutions down to the Russian Revolution. Where theoreticians and leaders of revolutions sought to introduce policies of equality, tolerance and integration, significant sections of the population would seek to "wreak vengeance" on Jews whether as deicides, revolutionaries or, more often, moneylenders and creditors. Revolutions, in fact, could worsen as well as improve relations between Jew and non-Jew.

In these circumstances and given the uncertain or ambivalent impact of revolutions in general on the position of Jews, it appeared reasonable to explore the question of the concrete significance of the Revolution of 1848 for Jews living in Germany. This was an investigation in which scholars from Great Britain, the United States, Israel, Germany and Canada participated. For the Leo Baeck Institute the undertaking meant, at the same time, the possibility of attempting to fill a gap between the three great symposia on the history of Jews in Germany between 1890 and 1933 and the volume devoted to the situation of Jews in the time of German *Vormärz*. The present volume is the fruit of a conference on the same subject held in Oxford in the summer of 1979. It contains, in a revised and sometimes expanded form, the papers read at that conference together with the comments of the discussants. Two papers, not read at the conference for lack of time are also included, without comments from discussants. Both in the planning of the conference and in preparing the present volume, the editors were guided by the consideration that, from the viewpoint of current interest and approaches, the detailed examination of

internal Jewish development should supplement the study of relations between Jew and non-Jew. Only the juxtaposition of both aspects appeared capable of producing a sufficiently differentiated and factually accurate picture.

While the authors, in their essays, have expressed their thanks to the many Institutes, Universities, Foundations, Libraries, Archives and individuals in England, Germany, the United States, Canada and Israel who assisted them, the Editors on their own behalf and that of their colleagues wish to make the following acknowledgments.

Our thanks are due above all to the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk which by a generous grant made it possible for the Seminar, from which this volume derives, to take place in Oxford in the summer of 1979; and to the Memorial Foundation of Jewish Culture for a contribution towards the printing costs.

Dr. Lux Furtmüller, Reading, has again translated the essays of the German contributors except for one which has been rendered into English by Hanna Gunther, New York. Sylvia Gilchrist and Annette Pringle of the London Leo Baeck Institute, Pauline Paucker and Ilse Shindel have seen the volume through the various stages of its production. Janet Langmaid has not only been of great help with the proof-reading but is also responsible for the Indexes.



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REINHARD RÜRUP

## The European Revolutions of 1848 and Jewish Emancipation

### I

In attempting to assess the significance of the events of 1848 and 1849 for the emancipation of European Jewry, we are faced with a twofold difficulty. Two basic questions have to be answered: first, are we at all justified in treating the various revolutionary ebullitions of those years as a single, uniform process? Secondly, can we look upon European Jewry as a single entity in order to arrive at valid conclusions about the state of the Jews and Jewish emancipation, or must we study the problem in the context of each individual state or possibly of each regional subdivision?<sup>1</sup>

That there was a close link between the revolutionary struggles in the various countries is beyond dispute. The political dynamic of revolution and counter-revolution cannot be fully understood apart from the framework of European development as a whole. It is not possible to understand the origins, the course and the results of revolution in any European country, except in the context of international developments. Yet, the question remains as to whether there was just one revolution or a number of revolutions in 1848/1849, whether a common denominator can be found for the February Revolution in France and the national-revolutionary risings in Italy or Hungary.<sup>2</sup> If we determine the

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<sup>1</sup> The first, and so far only attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the Revolutions of 1848 from the angle of their importance for Jewish emancipation was carried out in the essay by Salo W. Baron, 'The Impact of the Revolution of 1848 on Jewish Emancipation', in *Jewish Social Studies*, 11 (1949), pp. 195–248. Notwithstanding some differences of approach and of judgement, the present study is indebted to this erudite and wide-ranging paper. Useful material can still be found in the instructive account by Simon Dubnow, *Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, vol. 9, *Das Zeitalter der ersten Reaktion und der zweiten Emanzipation*, Berlin 1929, pp. 319ff. Dubnow, however, did not devote a separate chapter to the Revolution, but dealt with the revolutionary events in the context of the history of each country (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Russia, and "minor centres of Jewry").

<sup>2</sup> While it is almost impossible to keep track of the plethora of investigations and accounts dealing with the Revolutions of 1848/1849 from the aspect of the national history of individual countries, the European perspective of the revolutionary era has received very little attention. A useful survey and starting point for comparative studies is provided by François Fejtő (ed.), *The Opening of an Era: 1848. A Historical Symposium*, London 1948. For general accounts and interpretations, see Priscilla Robertson, *Revolutions of 1848. A Social History*, Princeton 1952; William L. Langer, *The Revolutions of 1848*, New York 1971, representing an extract (chapters 10–14) of the same author's *Political and Social Upheaval 1832–1852*, Paris 1971; Peter N. Stearns, *The Revolutions of*

character of the Revolutions of 1848 in the light of the part they played in ushering in and promoting the growth of modern society, it then becomes apparent that the events witnessed in France in 1848, following in the wake of the successful Revolutions of 1789 and 1830, were different in kind from those in Germany, Austria or Italy, in countries, that is to say, which had not yet experienced a successful bourgeois revolution. Whereas in France the question was one of power struggles within a society firmly cast in the bourgeois mould, in the other countries the very foundations of bourgeois supremacy or even bourgeois participation had yet to be laid.

Differences between the political systems, however, were outweighed in importance by the underlying differences of social development, for in the general process of transition from corporate-feudal to bourgeois-capitalist society, the Europe of 1848 displayed the entire gamut of intermediate stages, ranging from countries where the process of defeudalisation had barely started, or had been blocked, to others where social structure had come to be largely dominated by the bourgeois pattern. Another important distinction relates to the national question, which had ceased to be of relevance in the French February Revolution, while in all the subsequent revolutionary risings of 1848 it was of fundamental significance, in some cases to the point of overlaying and transforming the problems of social restructuring. Nevertheless, it can be said that the element common to all the revolutionary movements of 1848/1849 was the fact that social forces inspired predominantly by the ideas of Liberalism and the Enlightenment were on the attack, seeking to overcome the pre-bourgeois power relations and legal order. Yet, at the same time anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist tendencies were already in evidence, dramatically in the

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1848, London 1974. For the current state of research see the comprehensive bibliography in Horst Stuke and Wilfried Forstmann (eds.), *Die europäischen Revolutionen von 1848*, Königstein/Taunus 1979. Apart from these general accounts, only a few papers have adopted a comparative approach, e.g.: Charles H. Pouthas, 'Complexité de 1848', *1848. Revue des révolutions contemporaines*, 184 (1949), pp. 1–13 (German version in Stuke/Forstmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–29); William L. Langer, 'The Patterns of Urban Revolution 1848', in Evelyn M. Acomb and Martin L. Brown (eds.), *French Society and Culture since the Old Regime*, New York 1966, pp. 90–118. For accounts placing the Revolutions of 1848 in a wider context, in particular from the angle of social history, see Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, London 1962, and *The Age of Capital. 1848–1875*, London 1975; Louis Bergeron *et al.*, *Das Zeitalter der europäischen Revolution 1780–1848*, Frankfurt a. Main 1969; Manfred Kossok (ed.), *Studien zur vergleichenden Revolutionsgeschichte 1500–1917*, Berlin 1974; *idem*, *Rolle und Form der Volksbewegung im bürgerlichen Revolutionszyklus*, Berlin 1976. The participation of Jews in revolutionary activities, the struggle for Jewish emancipation and the anti-Jewish disturbances are given at best passing mention in most of these accounts as well as in the literature concentrating on the revolutionary events in a single country or region. (Valentin is a significant exception.) Up till now neither Jewish historiography nor the specialised study of the nature of revolutions have integrated the "Jewish Question" with the general historiography of revolutions. The present essay can do little more than try to throw out ideas that might be worth following up.

Paris rising of June 1848, less conspicuously elsewhere in Europe at that stage. These tendencies should not be ignored; indeed, as will be seen, they came to play a not unimportant part in the context of our subject.

A similarly variegated picture is presented by the development of Jewish emancipation. From about 1780 on it was possible in Europe to speak of an "Age of Jewish Emancipation".<sup>3</sup> Emancipation was an issue which of necessity concerned the individual states, their policies and legal systems, but it was also from the outset a European phenomenon. To begin with, in the decade preceding the French Revolution, the emancipation debate spread across the frontiers of Germany, into France as well as then on into Austria, Tuscany, and temporarily even into Russia. The victory of the French Revolution and the conquests of Napoleon's armies secured equality of legal status for the Jews in France and the territories dominated by her. In several other states at least some of the legal disabilities imposed on the Jews were abolished. In those years there clearly existed a European trend towards emancipation, a climate of opinion strong enough to prevail even on reluctant states to take at least some initial steps – such as the abolition of the *Leibzoll*, a discriminatory toll levied by some principalities on Jews passing through their territory – towards the granting of equality of legal status to the Jewish population.

The beginning of the period of Restoration marked the end of this state of affairs. The pressure was lifted. Only in France and the newly founded Kingdom of the Netherlands did the complete equality of legal status for Jews endure, and at the Congress of Vienna it proved impossible to hammer out a uniform legal framework for emancipation even for the member states of the German Confederation. Jewish emancipation thus remained the concern of the individual European states, which approached the issue with vastly differing degrees of zeal and correspondingly varying rates of progress. Nevertheless, even in the decades after 1815, the European aspect of the problem was ever existent. Progress and delays in other states were carefully registered, and

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<sup>3</sup> On the history and problems of Jewish emancipation, see Salo W. Baron, 'Étapes de l'émancipation juive', *Diogenes*, 29 (1960), pp. 69–94; Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto. The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation 1770–1870*, Cambridge, Mass. 1973; *idem*, *Emancipation and Assimilation. Studies in Modern Jewish History*, Westmead 1972; Léon Poliakov, *Le développement de l'anti-sémitisme aux temps modernes (1700–1850)*, Paris [1968], pp. 227–318 (Book 2, *L'Émancipation*); Reinhard Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus. Studien zur "Judenfrage" der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Göttingen 1975; *idem*, 'Emanzipation und Krise. Zur Geschichte der "Judenfrage" in Deutschland vor 1890', in *Juden im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890–1914. Ein Sammelband herausgegeben von Werner E. Mosse unter Mitwirkung von Arnold Paucker*, Tübingen 1976 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 33) pp. 1–56; as surveys still useful: Salo W. Baron, 'Jewish Emancipation', in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7, 1932, pp. 394–399, and Raphael Mahler, *Jewish Emancipation. A Selection of Documents*, New York 1941. Very valuable is, for the early phase of emancipation: Raphael Mahler, *A History of Modern Jewry, 1780–1815*, New York 1971; for the phase after 1848: Ismar Elbogen, *Ein Jahrhundert jüdischen Lebens. Die Geschichte des neuzeitlichen Judentums*, Frankfurt a. Main 1967, pp. 37–149.



European comparisons played a prominent part in the debates on Jewish emancipation well into the second half of the century. Thus the effects of decisions concerning emancipation – whether positive or negative – were invariably felt beyond the frontiers of the state concerned.

On the other hand, it was frequently and emphatically pointed out in the course of the emancipation debate that general conditions, and in particular the conditions of the Jewish population, varied greatly from state to state, and even within the individual states, so that it was hardly possible to formulate the problem of emancipation in simple terms. Thus, the striking contrasts setting apart the Jewish population in Paris from that in Alsace, or the Jews of the Rhine Province from those of Poznań indicate the need for great caution in uttering generalisations about “the” French or Prussian Jews without taking specific regional developments into account. To look upon the history of European Jewry in the age of emancipation as a unitary development is a fruitful approach, so long as the very marked and growing diversity of that Jewry – its increasing differentiation in the religious, economic, social and cultural spheres – is not neglected. Jewry was no exception in that the conditions of European Jews in 1848 presented a variegated picture of many hues and shades, ranging from life in the traditional Jewish milieu scarcely touched by modern developments to a degree of assimilation and integration with the non-Jewish world, in which religion was relegated to a matter of private concern for each individual.

## II

Before setting out to survey the state of affairs in respect of Jewish emancipation in Europe on the eve of the Revolution, it will be useful to present at least a preliminary outline of the various aspects of the concept of emancipation. In a liberal encyclopaedia, published in 1837, “Emancipation of the Jews” is defined as “giving them equality of status with the rest of the citizens of the State in respect of political and civic rights”.<sup>4</sup> Emancipation was thus considered a legal process involving the abolition of existing disabilities or special “Jew Laws”. This could be effected either in a single step, by which the Jews’ equality of

<sup>4</sup> K. Steinacker, ‘Emancipation der Juden’, in Karl von Rotteck and Karl Theodor Welcker (eds.), *Staatslexikon oder Enzyklopädie der Staatswissenschaften*, vol. 5, Altona 1837, p. 22. On the concept of emancipation, see above all Reinhart Koselleck and K.M. Graß, ‘Emanzipation’, in O. Brunner *et al.* (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. 2, Stuttgart 1975, pp. 153–197; Ulrich Herrmann, ‘Emanzipation. Materialien zur Geschichte eines politisch-sozialen und politisch-pädagogischen Begriffs der Neuzeit, vornehmlich im 19. Jahrhundert’, in *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, 18 (1974), pp. 85–143; Jacob Katz, ‘The Term “Jewish Emancipation”’: Its Origin and Historical Impact’, in Katz, *Emancipation and Assimilation*, *op. cit.* 1972, pp. 21–25; Reinhard Rürup, ‘Emanzipation – Anmerkungen zur Begriffsgeschichte’, in Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*, *op. cit.* 1975, pp. 126–132.

status was established, or else by way of a series of partial improvements in the legal situation. In contemporary usage, then, the term “emancipation” denoted either a gradual process of levelling up or the transition at a stroke to the status of legal equality. Frequently, a distinction was drawn in 1848 between “emancipation” and “full emancipation”. Both types were represented in Europe, and in the light of contrasting national developments the single-step transformation may aptly be described as the French, the gradual process as the German model. The distinction can be observed as a feature of the history of Jewish emancipation in Europe down to the 1860s and 1870s. The majority of European states followed the German rather than the French model.

The legal aspect did by no means exhaust the meaning attached from the outset of the European debate to the concept of emancipation. The goal was the abolition of social discrimination as well as of the legal disabilities of the Jews, the breaking down of their social isolation, their integration in the nascent modern society. These aims were variously summed up by non-Jewish quarters as the “civic betterment” of the Jews, their “melioration and amalgamation”, the “remoulding of a people and its national spirit, its mode of thinking and acting”.<sup>5</sup> Jewish emancipation thus could only be conceived in terms of integration, and integration in turn only in terms of assimilation, that is to say, the adaptation of the minority to the ways of the majority. Even the unconditional granting of equality of status to the French Jews in 1791 was based on the implicit belief that the Jews would be transformed as a result, so as to be eventually indistinguishable from other citizens, except for their religious faith.<sup>6</sup> In nearly all other countries – in the German states in particular – the legislators did not share this confidence in the effectiveness of the promulgation of legal equality as an instrument promoting integration and assimilation. Instead, emancipation was envisaged as a long-term process of education to be directed and supervised by the State, with the aim of assimilation in mind. The successful conclusion of this educational process was held to be a prerequisite of the final admission of the Jews to complete equality under the law.

Thus, however different the paths that were chosen by different nations, they

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<sup>5</sup> These comments are quoted from departmental records and reports of Diet proceedings prior to 1848; see Rürup, ‘Emanzipation und Krise’, *loc. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> For the granting of legal equality to Jews in France in 1791, and for the French debate on emancipation, see the collection of contemporary publications in *La Révolution française et l’émancipation des Juifs*, 8 vols., Paris 1968; see furthermore Bernhard Blumenkranz and Albert Soboul (eds.), *Les Juifs et la Révolution française. Problèmes et aspirations*, Toulouse 1976; Zosa Szajkowski, *Jews and the French Revolutions of 1789, 1830 and 1848*, New York 1970; Arthur Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews. The Origins of Modern Antisemitism*, New York 1968, pp. 314–368; David Feuerwerker, *L’émancipation des Juifs en France de l’Ancien Régime à la fin du Second Empire*, Paris 1976, pp. 3–445; Patrick Girard, *Les Juifs en France de 1789 à 1860. De l’émancipation à l’égalité*, Paris 1976, pp. 21–60; Phyllis Cohen Albert, *The Modernization of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth Century*, Hanover, New Hampshire 1977.

were meant to lead in the end to the same destination. The individual Jew was to be offered the opportunity of emerging from the state of legally enforced isolation and becoming a member of the new civil society. Yet, collectively the Jews were expected to relinquish their traditional identity as a religious-ethnic-social group – as a “nation” or “people”, as contemporary usage had it – and to let Judaism, on the analogy of the Christian Churches, dwindle into a “denomination”.<sup>7</sup> Integration and assimilation, then, constituted throughout Europe the explicit or implied conditions of enlightened-liberal emancipation policy, conditions – it should be noted – that were not challenged on grounds of principle by the majority of Jews at that time, or at any rate by the majority of publicly articulate Jews. In these circumstances, the crucial question on which the Jewish future would depend was whether new forms of Jewish identity could be developed under the conditions of emancipation, or whether emancipation must spell the dissolution of traditional Judaism and thus the end of Jewish history.<sup>8</sup>

On the eve of the Revolution of 1848 the state of Jewish emancipation in Europe presented a picture of striking contrasts as regards both legal and social aspects. Only the French and Dutch Jews enjoyed unqualified equality of legal status.<sup>9</sup> To arrive at a proper assessment of the development in France, it must be borne in mind that as far as the vast mass of rural Jewry in Eastern France was concerned, complete emancipation was a long time in coming, for the legislation of 1791 was partly reversed by a Napoleonic Decree of 13th July 1808, which once again subjected them to discriminatory restrictions of their civic rights. Legal emancipation finally came in 1818, when the validity of the discriminatory Decree was not extended. Two further steps were taken during the reign of Louis-Philippe, when in 1831 the Judaic religion was granted equality of status with the Christian Churches, followed in 1846 by the

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<sup>7</sup> It is worth noting in this connection that attempts were made in a number of European states as tokens of their emancipation policy to replace the term “Jew” by alternative designations, such as “Israelite” or “citizen (inhabitant, subject) of the Mosaic faith”.

<sup>8</sup> It seems to me that in order to arrive at an appropriate understanding of Jewish history from the beginning of emancipation, it is important to clarify the problems linked with the loss and possible re-establishment of a Jewish identity in a non-Jewish environment. Neither a restatement of contemporary liberal ideas nor a naive acceptance of Zionist assumptions can do justice to these problems. Cf. Inge Fleischhauer and Hillel Klein, *Über die jüdische Identität. Eine psycho-historische Studie*, Königstein/Taunus 1978, and the literature cited there.

<sup>9</sup> On 9th September 1796, the National Assembly of the Batavian Republic voted unanimously for the granting of complete equality before the law to the Dutch Jews. This measure was not revoked by the regime of the restoration. According to Dubnow, a Jewish jurist, who at the same time was president of the Central Executive of the Jewish Communities of the Netherlands, took a part in the drafting of the Constitution of 1814. In Belgium, which seceded from the Netherlands in 1830/1831, the equality of legal status for the Jews was also preserved. In 1850, over 62,000 Jews lived in the Netherlands, but only close on 4,000 in Belgium (Dubnow, *op. cit.*, p. 280).

abolition of the traditional "Jewish oath". After that, nothing more was left for the February Revolution to accomplish in this field.<sup>10</sup>

Jewish emancipation in Britain constituted a special case.<sup>11</sup> Although the legal disabilities dating from the Middle Ages were not formally abolished till 1846, they had not been applied for a long time before then. "Economic prosperity, social assimilation, religious freedom were achieved almost without legislation."<sup>12</sup> In effect, the problem of emancipation boiled down to the

<sup>10</sup> According to David Cohen, 'L'image du Juif dans la société française en 1843. D'après les rapports des préfets', *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, 55 (1977), pp. 84ff., the Law of 8th February 1831, which made the payment of rabbis a responsibility of the State, thus bringing them into line with Christian clergy, was an event of decisive importance, especially for the Jews of Eastern France to whom it had for the first time given the substance of equality before the law. In the words of the Prefect of Bas-Rhin, "la véritable émancipation des Israélites ne date pas de la loi qui a proclamé leur égalité civile et politique avec les Chrétiens, mais de celle par laquelle l'État a reconnu leur culte et déclaré que ses ministres seraient salariés par la loi (loi du 8 février 1831) ... lorsque les Israélites virent leur culte et ses ministres mis sous la protection de l'État et traités à l'égal des cultes chrétiens, ils commencèrent seulement à croire à l'étendue de leur liberté civile et religieuse. Cette croyance les releva à leur propres yeux, leur donna de l'assurance et les conduisit à se dépouiller dans leurs relations avec leurs concitoyens des autres cultes, de cette humilité rampante, résultat de leur longue oppression. La nouvelle loi ne manque pas non plus son effet sur la population chrétienne à qui cet acte législatif apprit à accepter une égalité plus positive, avant l'objet de son dédain. Alors une nouvelle ère commença pour les Juifs." (*Ibid.*, pp. 84f.) The conclusion that in 1843 the Jews of Bas-Rhin had been emancipated not for fifty but only for twelve years is open to doubt; nevertheless, this observation may result in more attention being given in future to the significance of religious factors during the process of emancipation, at any rate for rural Jewish communities in which the influence of religion had remained strong. For the abolition of the oath *more judaico* see the detailed account by Feuerwerker, *op. cit.*, pp. 565–650. – According to Doris Bensimon, 'Mutations socio-démographiques aux XIXe et XXe siècles', *H-Histoire*, No. 3 (*Les juifs en France*), 1979, pp. 186ff., 73,965 Jews lived in France in 1851, including 11,164 in Paris and environs, and about 56,500 in Alsace and Lorraine.

<sup>11</sup> For Jewish emancipation in Britain, see especially U. R. Q. Henriques, 'The Jewish Emancipation Controversy in Nineteenth-Century Britain', *Past and Present*, 40 (1968), pp. 126–146; V. D. Lipman, 'The Age of Emancipation 1815–1880', in Lipman (ed.) *Three Centuries of Anglo-Jewish History*, Cambridge 1961, pp. 69–106; Israel Finstein, 'Anglo-Jewish Opinion during the Struggle for Emancipation (1828–1858)', *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, 20 (1959–1961), pp. 113–143; Cecil Roth, *History of the Jews in England*, Oxford 1964. Cf. also Abraham Gilam, 'A Reconsideration of the Politics of Assimilation', *Journal of Modern History*, 50 (1978), pp. 103–111. Interesting light on the problems of emancipation in Britain in the nineteenth century is thrown by a recent account of an abortive attempt made in the eighteenth century to enable Jews to become naturalised: T. W. Perry, *Public Opinion, Propaganda and Politics in 18th Century England. A Study of the Jew Bill of 1753*, Cambridge, Mass. 1962. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Jewish population of Britain remained numerically small, rising from some 25,000 in 1815 to some 35,000 in 1851. About two-thirds of this population lived in London, where they played a prominent part in banking, insurance and commerce (cf. Lipman, *loc. cit.*, pp. 69–77).

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

struggle of a socially integrated Jewish bourgeoisie – in the first place the rich Jews of London, represented by the Montefiore, Goldsmid, Salomons and Rothschild families – for the right to be eligible for political offices and election to Parliament. It was a protracted struggle against stubborn opposition. Beginning after the granting of equal political rights to the Protestant dissenters in 1828 and to the Catholics in 1829, it was conducted in the course of countless parliamentary debates and initiatives. It proceeded in stages as more and more important offices came to be held for the first time by Jews: thus the Shrievalty of the City of London in 1835; the office of Alderman in 1847; the dignity of Lord Mayor of the City of London in 1855 (David Salomons). The battle was concluded only in 1858, when Baron Lionel de Rothschild was at last admitted to the House of Commons, after having won every election since 1847. The year 1848 was of no particular significance in that fight; the emancipation debate in Britain was hardly affected by the revolutionary storms that shook the European continent in that year.

It is not possible within the scope of this paper to give a detailed description of the state of the emancipation movement at the beginning of 1848 for each individual European state. With the weighty exception of Russia, nearly all states had taken at least the first tentative steps along the path of emancipation.<sup>13</sup> In Italy, it is true, the relevant regulations dating from the Napoleonic period had been repealed; the Jews of Rome were confined within the Ghetto walls up to 1848 and again from 1849 to 1870.<sup>14</sup> In the countries of the

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<sup>13</sup> The history of Jews in Russia, including the Kingdom of Poland (“Congress Poland”) lies outside the scope of this study. General accounts in Salo W. Baron, *The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets*, New York 1964; Louis Greenberg, *The Jews in Russia*, 2 vols., New Haven 1944/1951 (both volumes deal with emancipation problems from the beginnings until 1917); Jacob Frumkin *et al.* (eds.), *Russian Jewry (1860–1917)*, New York 1966; Elbogen, *op. cit.*, pp. 69–88; Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, *Antisemitismus und reaktionäre Utopie. Russischer Konservatismus im Kampf gegen den Wandel von Staat und Gesellschaft*, Hamburg 1978, pp. 30ff. (‘Der Sonderfall Rußlands: die vorenthaltene Emanzipation’; ‘Russia as a Special Case – Emancipation Withheld’); for Poland: Artur Eisenbach, *Kwestia równouprawnienia Żydów w Królestwie Polskim*, (Questions of Equal Rights for the Jews in the Kingdom of Poland), Warsaw 1972. According to Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 147f., about 2 million Jews lived in the Tsarist Empire in 1848, of whom less than one third were in Poland (about 558,000 in 1846 – *ibid.*, p. 231). However, little reliance can be placed on these estimates for Russia and Poland. They can give no more than rough indications (see also Baron, ‘The Impact of the Revolution of 1848’, *loc. cit.*, p. 205).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Cecil Roth, *The History of the Jews in Italy*, Philadelphia 1969. For the problems of emancipation, see Andrew M. Canepa, ‘L’atteggiamento degli ebrei italiani davanti alla loro seconda emancipazione: Premesse e analisi’, *La rassegna mensile di Israel*, 1977, pp. 419–436. About 10,000 to 12,000 Jews lived in the Papal State around 1845; cf. Domenico Demarco, ‘Eine soziale Revolution – Der Kirchenstaat im Jahre 1849’, in Stuke/Forstmann, *op. cit.*, p. 201. According to Dubnow, *op. cit.*, p. 282, the Jewish population of Italy between 1815 and 1848 was about 40,000, of which about 10,000 in Austria Lombardo-Venetia, under 10,000 in the Papal State, 7,000 in Tuscany, 6,750 in Piedmont, 3,250 in Modena and Parma, 2,000 in Naples.

Habsburg Monarchy no significant progress had been made in legal terms since the Reform Edicts of Joseph II, so that Jews were liable for military service, yet denied citizens' rights both at State and parish level; they had unhindered access to the established trades and educational institutions, yet were debarred from master status in any trade and from acquiring real property; they were allowed to trade and set up factories, yet were still subject to the "Jew tax".<sup>15</sup> In Bohemia, Galicia and Hungary, conditions tended to be even more oppressive than in Lower Austria, Tyrol or Austrian Silesia.<sup>16</sup> In some parts, Jews were not tolerated at all, and the right of Jews to stay in Vienna was curtailed by rigorous restrictions.<sup>17</sup> In the Habsburg Monarchy, as elsewhere, demands for

<sup>15</sup> On Austria, the older works of Sigmund Mayer, *Die Wiener Juden. Kommerz, Kultur, Politik 1700–1900*, Vienna 1918, and Hans Tietze, *Die Juden Wiens. Geschichte, Wirtschaft und Kultur*, Leipzig 1933, are still useful. In addition above all *Studia Judaica Austriaca*, vol. 1, *Das Judentum im Revolutionsjahr 1848*, Vienna 1974, in particular the three contributions by Wolfgang Häusler: 'Die Revolution von 1848 und die österreichischen Juden. Eine Dokumentation', pp. 5–63; 'Konfessionelle Probleme in der Wiener Revolution von 1848', pp. 64–77; 'Demokratie und Emanzipation 1848', pp. 92–111; furthermore Häusler, 'Toleranz, Emanzipation und Antisemitismus. Das österreichische Judentum des bürgerlichen Zeitalters (1782–1918)', in Anna Drabek *et al.*, *Das österreichische Judentum. Voraussetzungen und Geschichte*, Wien 1974. See also William A. Jenks, *The Jews in Austria*, New York 1960, and Josef Fraenkel (ed.), *The Jews of Austria. Essays on their Life, History and Destruction*, London 1967. According to Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 136f., the Austrian lands affiliated to the German Confederation had a Jewish population of about 115,000 around 1840, while for the Austrian Empire as a whole (including Hungary, Galicia and Italy) he estimated a figure of no less than 1 million. Only about 10,000 Jews lived in Lower Austria, including Vienna. Gustav Adolf Schimmer, *Statistik des Judenthums in den im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern*, Vienna 1873, p. 2, gave the figure of 448,123 for Austria without Hungary and the Italian possessions for the year 1846.

<sup>16</sup> For the Bohemian lands, see Ruth Kestenberg-Gladstein, *Neuere Geschichte der Juden in den Böhmisches Ländern*, Part I, *Das Zeitalter der Aufklärung 1780–1830*, Tübingen 1969 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 18/1), and Meir Lamed, 'Gesetz und Wirklichkeit. Zur Lage der Juden in Böhmen und Mähren in der Zeit des Vormärz', in *Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts*, VIII, No. 32 (1965), pp. 302–314. – For Hungary, see above all Wolfgang Häusler, 'Assimilation und Emanzipation des ungarischen Judentums um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts', in *Studia Judaica Austriaca*, vol. 3, Eisenstadt 1976, pp. 33–79, and Wolfdieter Bihl, 'Das Judentum Ungarns 1780–1914', *ibid.*, pp. 17–31. Still useful: J. Einhorn, *Die Revolution und die Juden in Ungarn. Nebst einem Rückblick auf die Geschichte der Letzteren*, Leipzig 1851. For Galicia see the comprehensive study by Filip Friedmann, *Die galizischen Juden im Kampfe um ihre Gleichberechtigung (1848–1868)*, Frankfurt a. Main 1929. According to Schimmer, *op. cit.*, p. 2, the Jewish population of Bohemia in 1846 was 70,037, in Moravia 40,064. In 1850, 339,816 Jews lived in Hungary (Häusler, 'Assimilation und Emanzipation', *loc. cit.*, p. 1). According to Friedmann, p. 1, the regional distribution of the Jewish population in Austria (without Hungary and the Italian possessions) in 1857 was as follows: Galicia 72.5 per cent, Bohemia 14 per cent, Moravia 6.7 per cent, Bukovina 4.7 per cent, Lower Austria (including Vienna) 1.1 per cent, etc.

<sup>17</sup> On the strength of corporate privileges, no Jews were tolerated in Upper Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Krain (Carniola). Up to 1848, there were only 197 "tolerated" Jewish families in Vienna, but many more stayed in the town with the tacit approval of

emancipation were made with increasing urgency in the 1840s, but no substantial changes were introduced before the outbreak of the Revolution.

With the notable exception of Austria, nearly all states of the German Confederation had prior to 1848 passed "Jew Laws" or Decrees by which some of the former legal disabilities had been abolished.<sup>18</sup> But the uniform legislation envisaged in the Confederate Constitution of 1815 did not materialise. Even within Prussia, up to the promulgation of the Law on the Conditions of the Jews in 1847, the status of the Jews was regulated by no less than eighteen different regional codes, ranging from the formerly French territories of the Rhine Province to the East Elbian lands of "inner Prussia", where the Edict of 1812 was in force, and on to the Province of Poznań, where the position of the Jews was governed by a special statute, which even in 1847 was not superseded by the new legislation.<sup>19</sup> In most states of the German Confederation the Jews were recognised as citizens, yet were deprived of some, or all, political rights. The issue of citizens' rights at commune level remained a key problem above all

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the authorities, although without official permit. Estimates of their number ranged as high as 10,000, but Dorothea Weiss, *Der publizistische Kampf der Wiener Juden um ihre Emanzipation in den Flugschriften und Zeitungen des Jahres 1848*, philosophical dissertation (typescript), Vienna 1971, put the figure at only 4,000. According to Mayer, *op. cit.*, p. 245, the Jews of Vienna at that time "dominated trade, the most important part of economic life".

<sup>18</sup> The history of the Jews and of Jewish emancipation in Germany prior to 1848 is the subject of a vast literature. Only a few more recent contributions will be mentioned here: *Das Judentum in der deutschen Umwelt 1800–1850*. Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Emanzipation, herausgegeben von Hans Liebeschütz und Arnold Paucker, Tübingen 1977 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 35); Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1847–1871*, Düsseldorf 1977; *idem*, *Der Eintritt der Juden ins deutsche Bürgertum. Eine Dokumentation*, Tel-Aviv 1972; *idem*, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden in Deutschland. Von Jena bis Weimar*, Tübingen 1966 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 15); Monika Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1780–1871*, Stuttgart 1976, Veröffentlichung des Leo Baeck Instituts; Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*, *op. cit.* Examples of regional historical studies: Arno Herzig, *Judentum und Emanzipation in Westfalen*, Münster 1973; Rürup, 'Die Judenemanzipation in Baden', in *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, 114 (1966), pp. 241–300 (also in Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–73, 135–166). Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–17, gives the following figures for the number of Jews and their percentage shares of the population in Germany and the German states: German Confederation (without Austria) in 1848/1849 410,000 (1.23 per cent); Prussia 1848/49 – 218,998 (1.34 per cent), of which (in 1846) 81,299 in Poznań, and 8,285 in Berlin; Bavaria 1844 – 62,830 (1.4 per cent); Hesse-Darmstadt 1849 – over 20,000 (3.43 per cent); Baden 1849 – 23,547 (1.73 per cent); Württemberg 1849 – 11,974 (0.69 per cent); Hannover 1849 – 11,562 (0.64 per cent). Data for the smaller states are appended in a Table (*ibid.*, p. 19).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Vollständige Verhandlungen des Ersten Vereinigten Preußischen Landtages über die Emanzipationsfrage der Juden*, Berlin 1847, p. LIII. – The proceedings of the United Diet of 14th to 17th June 1847 constitute an outstanding source for the state of the emancipation debate and the actual process of emancipation on the eve of the Revolution. It is a source still awaiting a critical analysis and constructive interpretation.

in the South and South West German states, since these rights involved many aspects of communal life, notably the benefits of communal resources as well as contribution to poor relief, the right to settle and opportunities of earning a livelihood. In nearly all states the Jews had been admitted to the established trades, while continued engagement in the traditional itinerant trades was discouraged. It must be borne in mind, however, that access to the established trades was often restricted by the absence of freedom of movement and settlement.

In the same way as their legal position, the social position of European Jews was characterised by a lack of uniformity that was manifested in marked differences not only between different states, but also within each state between regions and between social groupings.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, the period from the Congress of Vienna to the Revolution of 1848 has come to be known both as the “age of Metternich” and the “age of Rothschild”.<sup>21</sup> The first half of the nineteenth century saw the heyday of the private banks, with Jewish firms playing an important, and in some places and regions even a dominant part. Jewish banks participated in the large state loans, in financing domestic and international trade transactions and in launching manufacturing enterprises during the early stages of industrialisation. While not the “kings of the era” – as anti-Jewish

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<sup>20</sup> A comparative study of the social history of European Jews in the nineteenth century is still outstanding, and so are investigations of the development of social strata or occupational groups among the Jewish population. A starting point is provided by some of the older works on social statistics, notably Arthur Ruppin, *Soziologie der Juden*, 2 vols., Berlin 1930/1931 (vol. 1, *Die soziale Struktur der Juden*), and Jakob Lestschinsky, ‘Die Umsiedlung und Umschichtung des jüdischen Volkes im Laufe des letzten Jahrhunderts’, *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 30 (1929), pp. 123–156 and 32, 1930, pp. 563–599. For Germany, cf. Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, and Henry Wassermann, *Jews, Bürgertum and bürgerliche Gesellschaft in a Liberal Era (1840–1880)*, philosophical dissertation (typescript, in Hebrew, with English summary), Jerusalem 1979. I am not aware of comparable studies for other European countries.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Jean Bouvier, *Les Rothschild*, Paris 1967; Bertrand Gille, *Histoire de la maison Rothschild*, 2 vols., Paris 1967; Egon Caesar Conte Corti, *Der Aufstieg des Hauses Rothschild*, Vienna <sup>2</sup>1953; Frederic Morton, *Die Rothschilds. Portrait einer Familie*, Vienna 1963; Heinrich Schnee, *Rothschild. Geschichte einer Finanzdynastie*, Göttingen 1961. For a general account of European banking see Karl Erich Born, *Geld und Banken im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart 1977, esp. pp. 48ff. Studies of the role of Jews in banking during the first half of the nineteenth century are still missing. It is worth noting that Jewish authors, too, took part in the polemic against the power of the House of Rothschild; for examples cf. Häusler, ‘Demokratie und Emanzipation 1848’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 95–99, in particular (p. 95) a bitter outburst by Ludwig Börne in his 72nd letter from Paris, dated 28th May 1832, castigating the conjunction of “money power” and reactionary policies: “Rothschild called on the Pope and kissed hands. On leaving, he expressed in the most gracious terms his serene satisfaction with the successor of Peter. ... How noble the Rothschilds are by comparison with their ancestor, Judas Iscariot! He sold Christ for thirty little pieces of silver, the Rothschilds would buy him today, if money could buy him. All this I find most charming. Louis Philippe, if he is still King in a year’s time, will be crowned, but not at Rheims at St. Remi, but in Paris in Notre Dame de la bourse, with Rothschild officiating as Archbishop.”



authors made out<sup>22</sup> – they were undoubtedly prominent representatives of the capitalist development that had begun to stamp its imprint more and more decisively upon economic and social relations in all European countries.

In the large capitals and commercial centres of Europe – in London, Paris, Vienna, Milan, Naples, Berlin, Frankfurt a. Main or Hamburg – an affluent and economically influential Jewry had become established by the eve of the Revolution. These Jews no longer led a marginal existence, but held important and conspicuous positions at the centre of the new civil society. In addition, there were the constantly growing ranks of the Jewish bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, whose ambitions centred on the acquisition of wealth and cultural attainments, and who managed at least to some extent to convert economic success into social recognition on the part of the non-Jewish environment. Whereas the narrow group of the Jewish “aristocracy of money” – not a few of them had actually been ennobled<sup>23</sup> – was mostly descended from the stratum of Court Jews who had risen to prominence during the age of absolutism, the nascent Jewish bourgeoisie profited above all from the fact that under the emancipation policies adopted in most states the obstacles to Jewish engagement in economic activities had been removed while other legal disabilities were still in force. The resulting discrepancy between economic success and second-class legal status had a disturbing effect on the self-awareness of the Jews as well as on the minds of their Christian neighbours. The discrepancy was particularly marked in the case of the small, but rapidly growing stratum of Jews with academic qualifications, who found themselves as a rule debarred both from the civil service and from an academic career, and had to contend with discrimination in the professions as well.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> E.g. Alphonse Toussenel, *Les juifs, rois de l'époque. Histoire de la féodalité financière*, Paris 1845; Pierre Leroux, 'Les Juifs, rois de l'époque', *Revue sociale*, January 1846; Poliakov, *Le développement de l'antisémitisme*, *op. cit.*, pp. 383ff.; Edmund Silberner, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Sozialismus vom Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts bis 1914*, Berlin 1962, pp. 29ff.

<sup>23</sup> According to Heinrich Schnee, *Die Hoffinanz und der moderne Staat*, vol. 4, Berlin 1963, p. 345, between 1787 and 1847 about one third of the Jewish families officially “tolerated” in Vienna were ennobled; three quarters of these became converts to Christianity. There were some other states in which Jews were ennobled, but not on a comparable scale.

<sup>24</sup> For Germany, see Monika Richarz, *Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe. Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678–1848*, Tübingen 1974 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 28). Even in France Jewish candidates were frequently excluded from academic posts during the period of the Restoration (cf. Girard, *op. cit.*, p. 121). In Vienna, the poor career prospects of Jewish students and young graduates were of some significance in prompting the active support of those groups for the Revolution. In 1837, Ludwig Philippson, editor of *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, pointed to scientists and scholars, physicians and students as the groups suffering most acutely under the existing legislation (cf. Johanna Philippson, 'Ludwig Philippson und die Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums', in *Das Judentum in der deutschen Umwelt*, *op. cit.* 1977, p. 253).

Yet, the vast majority of the Jewish population in Europe – and, indeed, in every one of the European states – did not belong to the ranks of the big, middle or petty bourgeoisie, but lived in the villages or in small country towns, largely untouched by industry and other than local trade. They were petty traders or hawkers and existed at a level near, and often below, the minimum of subsistence.<sup>25</sup> It is true that even among rural Jewry – outside Russia and “Congress Poland” at any rate – there was a gradual broadening of vocational qualifications and occupational patterns, but the pre-bourgeois – or, in other words, pre-emancipation – earning opportunities and living conditions continued to predominate. No doubt, there were individual instances of successful Jewish traders or tenants, yet for the mass of rural Jews, the freeing of access to the established trades and educational institutions offered only hypothetical opportunities, which – with the exception of some isolated individuals – could not transform the living conditions of the Jewish population.

As regards the problems of social emancipation, it will be instructive to contemplate the course of events in France. Recent research findings have suggested that the granting of equality of legal status in 1791 marked only the beginning of the advance from emancipation to equality – “*cette lente marche vers l'égalité*” – and that by the middle of the nineteenth century the process of assimilation and integration had still not been completed.<sup>26</sup> Prejudices about the Jews and reservations on the part of non-Jewish society proved as obstinately enduring as did the group loyalty of the Jews, transcending the sphere of religious convictions. In the early 1840s it was still customary, when referring to a prominent contemporary figure who happened to be a Jew, to make special mention of that fact.<sup>27</sup> In general usage, French Jews were known as “*Israélites français*” rather than “*Français israélites*”, so that in practice – as also in Germany and other states – the idea of the equality of all citizens irrespective of their religious faith was undermined.<sup>28</sup>

The progress of the social integration of the French Jews was reflected in the decline of the Jewish languages: “Judaeo-Spanish” and “Judaeo-Provençal” had disappeared from everyday life by 1840, whereas Yiddish proved far more

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<sup>25</sup> Systematic and comparative investigations of the history of rural Jewry during the first half of the nineteenth century are still outstanding. Some indication of the research required may be found in Werner J. Cahnman, ‘Village and Small-Town Jews in Germany. A Typological Study’, in *Year Book XIX of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1974, pp. 107–130; *idem*, ‘Agenda für das Studium des Landjudentums’, *Emuna-Israel Forum*, No. 5/6 (1977), pp. 5–10; see also the paper on rural Jewry by Monika Richarz in this volume.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. in particular Girard, *op. cit.*; the phrase quoted in the text *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>27</sup> Girard, *op. cit.*, p. 128, with a telling quotation from *Les archives israélites*, 3 (1842), p. 148.

<sup>28</sup> The reverse usage had often been demanded, e.g. by Léon Halévy, *Résumé de l'histoire des Juifs modernes*, Paris 1828, p. 260 (“... le nom de Juif devienne l'accessoire et celui de Français le principal”). However, even emancipated Jews referred to themselves mostly as “French Jews” rather than “Jewish Frenchmen”; cf. Girard, *op. cit.*, pp. 151f.

enduring, especially in the *départements* of Eastern France. Although the French language carried the day in all official spheres – beginning in the 1840s, even the rabbis used the French language, and the big Jewish journals (*Les Archives israélites* and *L'Univers israélite*) were of course written in French – Yiddish continued to hold its own in Jewish everyday life.<sup>29</sup> Undoubtedly, the existence in Eastern France of a numerically relatively strong Jewish population and a more or less compact Jewish environment played an important part. Generally, it was above all the social position of Jews which dictated the speed and intensity of assimilation and integration.<sup>30</sup> The Jewish aristocracy and big bourgeoisie in Paris, Bordeaux, Bayonne and Marseille had become largely integrated in the society of its environment, and differed only to a minor degree from the non-Jewish world at the same social level. But in the middle and lower social groups of those towns the gap between Jew and non-Jew was very much wider, while the world of the poor rural Jews continued to be determined in the main by tradition.

The state of social emancipation in the *départements* of Eastern France, in which the vast majority of French Jews lived at the time, was the subject of detailed reports made by the regional authorities in 1843.<sup>31</sup> They revealed a clear distinction between three principal groups: the wealthy Jews, who had become assimilated to a high degree and had earned social recognition on the part of their non-Jewish environment; the *classe moyenne* which, though assimilated, still showed marked Jewish group characteristics in its social relations; finally, the poor Jews living in a basically unchanged religious and social environment of their own, separated from the outside world by boundaries which generally both sides continued to maintain. Of course, even in the third group a trend towards emancipation was discernible, but it was a slow process: in Paris a person's Jewishness might have been his private affair, but in the milieu of rural Jewry in Alsace this was not yet the case in the middle of the nineteenth century. On both sides – among Jews and non-Jews alike – the course of events showed that changes in attitudes and behaviour need time, far more time in fact than the champions of emancipation had foreseen.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> On the language question, *ibid.*, pp. 152f. See also Laurent Bensaid, 'Cent ans de fidélité à la république', *H-Histoire*, No. 3 (1979), p. 42, referring to the instruction issued to French rabbis by the Central Consistory to preach in French rather than Yiddish.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. in particular Girard, *op. cit.*, pp. 152ff., on social integration.

<sup>31</sup> See Cohen, *loc. cit.*, pp. 70–91.

<sup>32</sup> The emancipation debate suffered from the outset as a result of the excessive impatience of the emancipators. It was a rare exception when a well-reputed German encyclopaedia pointed out in 1848 that the assimilation that was hoped for, the overcoming of the "ossification of Jewish life, dictated by self-defence" and the discarding of a separate Jewish "nationality", were bound to take a long time, so that the fifty years that had elapsed since the passing of the French emancipation Laws could not be said to prove the impossibility of complete integration: see 'Die bürgerlichen Verhältnisse der Juden in Deutschland', in *Die Gegenwart. Eine encyclopädische Darstellung für alle Stände*, vol. 1, Leipzig (F. A. Brockhaus) 1848, p. 395.

In the other European states – Britain, the Netherlands and Belgium excepted – assimilation and integration had to contend with substantially greater obstacles than was the case in France, since inequality of legal status perpetuated objective barriers to social fusion, and tended at the same time to reinforce the traditional image of the Jews as human beings of lower legal standing, hence of lower worth. In view of the continuing legal disabilities, there was even less chance than in France of overcoming prejudices derived from centuries of a tradition deeply rooted in religion and culture, and of fashioning new relations between Jews and non-Jews, freed of the burden of the past. These were factors militating against change. Yet, at the same time a process of *embourgeoisement* in both the economic and cultural spheres was clearly at work among the Jewish populations of Germany, Austria and Italy during the decades leading up to the Revolution of 1848. Thus, in some Prussian towns Jews were elected to positions in local government, in many places they joined various associations and acted as spokesmen for common economic or cultural objectives.<sup>33</sup> A number of Jews played a leading part in intellectual and artistic life, not only at local level, but in the context of German cultural life as a whole.<sup>34</sup>

This development, however, proceeded in nearly all countries at a very different rate in the country-side, as compared to the towns. Rural Jewry, with little opportunity for social betterment, had preserved its group solidarity and continued much longer to accept a state of segregation from the non-Jewish environment which, though imposed, was felt to afford some protection, whereas the urban Jewish population, especially in the large cities, loosened the bonds of Jewish solidarity, seized the opportunities of upward social mobility open to the individual, and worked vigorously to promote the process of assimilation.<sup>35</sup> In these circumstances it was only natural that the Jewish religious Reform movement derived its impulses from the towns, while the majority of the rural Jews remained for a long time Orthodox, or at least conservative in religious matters. This discrepancy between town and country was most acute in Austria with its enormous contrast between a numerically small, economically influential and socially assimilated Jewish population in

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. in particular Toury, *Der Eintritt der Juden*, *op. cit.*, and *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.* For the participation of Jews in local self-government, see also Stefi Wenzel, *Jüdische Bürger und kommunale Selbstverwaltung in preußischen Städten 1808–1848*, Berlin 1967, and Toury, 'Der Anteil der Juden an der städtischen Selbstverwaltung im vormärzlichen Deutschland', *Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts*, VI, No. 23 (1963), pp. 265–286. Examples of Jewish membership of voluntary associations and interest groups in Rürup, *Emancipation und Antisemitismus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 49, 147, 151. For more details, see Wassermann, *op. cit.*, Chapter I (or pp. Xff. of English summary).

<sup>34</sup> See, for instance, H. G. Reissner, 'Begegnung zwischen Deutschen und Juden im Zeichen der Romantik', in *Das Judentum in der deutschen Umwelt*, *op. cit.*, pp. 325–357.

<sup>35</sup> For an understanding of Jewish history during the age of emancipation it seems to me that a comparative study of urban-rural problems is urgently needed and promises to be rewarding.

Vienna and the large Jewish communities of Galicia where the old traditions governing life had been preserved virtually unchanged. Similar contrasts can be noted between, say, Berlin and the Province of Poznań, or between Mannheim and the poor villages of the Odenwald. Yet, however wide the gap, by the middle of the nineteenth century it had become obvious that the general trend of modern social development was bound throughout Europe to work in favour of the process of assimilation and integration, so that in this as in other respects the towns merely held up to the country-side a picture of its own, not too distant, future.

The stage reached by Jewish emancipation on the eve of the Revolution was reflected also in the character of the political debate on the subject, which, beginning in 1830, had gained increasingly not only in intensity, but also in quality. Public opinion, moulded in the main by the spokesmen of the middle-class opposition, had come round to the cause of emancipation. The demand for emancipation, raised by Christians and Jews alike, was clearly in agreement with the *Zeitgeist*, and thus, the ambiguous attitude of a number of bourgeois politicians notwithstanding, Jewish emancipation became an important plank in the political programmes of the Liberal and Democratic movement.<sup>36</sup> On the eve of the Revolution it was therefore to be expected that any forcible change of political regime in line with the aspirations of the middle-class opposition would at the same time bring the chapter of emancipation legislation to a positive conclusion.

### III

Given the pre-revolutionary starting situation, the question arises as to the nature of the legislative advances achieved in 1848/1849 in the cause of Jewish emancipation. In Germany – that is, in our terminology, the states of the German Confederation without Austria – the so-called March demands clearly showed at the very outset that freedom of religion and of conscience as well as the granting of civil and political rights irrespective of religious affiliation figured among the central programmatic demands of the Liberal and Democratic movement.<sup>37</sup> So strong was the pressure of Liberal ideas that it seemed

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<sup>36</sup> See Rürup, 'German Liberalism and the Emancipation of the Jews', in *Year Book XX of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1975, pp. 59–68.

<sup>37</sup> On the Revolution in Germany, including in part the events in Austria, see – in addition to the general accounts cited above – in particular Veit Valentin, *Geschichte der deutschen Revolution 1848–1849*, 2 vols., Berlin 1930/1931 (reprint Cologne 1971); Rudolf Stadelmann, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Revolution von 1848*, Munich 1948; Wilhelm Mommsen, *Größe und Versagen des deutschen Bürgertums*, Munich 1964; Jacques Droz, *Les Révolutions Allemandes de 1848*, Paris 1957; Otto Vossler, *Die Revolution von 1848 in Deutschland*, Frankfurt a. Main 1967; Ernst Rudolf Huber, 'Die deutsche Revolution', in Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789*, vol. 2, Stutt-

hardly necessary to state a reasoned case in support of the demand for emancipation. Petitions – mostly from Jews, though occasionally from Christians as well – and motions submitted to the new parliaments and governments called unanimously for the granting of political equality to the Jews as well as to Christian minority groups such as the Liberal *Deutschkatholiken* and the Protestant *Lichtfreunde*, “Friends of Light”.<sup>38</sup> The parliaments unhesitatingly endorsed these demands, and the governments – the so-called “March Ministries” – as a rule announced appropriate constitutional or legislative measures. Full-dress parliamentary debates on emancipation, of the kind that had characterised the pre-revolutionary period, were no longer held in 1848.<sup>39</sup>

Yet, that first impression of smooth progress is not borne out by a closer look at the actual course of events in Germany as well as in the majority of other European states. Thus, the Constitution promulgated in Austria as early as 25th April 1848 provided equality of status for all religions, but refrained from abolishing the existing legal disabilities of the Jews – a task which it assigned instead to the *Reichstag*.<sup>40</sup> Even before then, in March 1848, a vehement and protracted public discussion had started in Vienna on the issue of Jewish emancipation in which opponents of emancipation, too, put their

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gart 1960, pp. 502–935; Karl Obermann, ‘Die Revolution von 1848/49’, in Obermann, *Deutschland von 1815 bis 1849*, Berlin 1976, pp. 243–425; *Illustrierte Geschichte der deutschen Revolution 1848/49*, Berlin 1975; *Die bürgerlich-demokratische Revolution von 1848/49 in Deutschland. Studien zu ihrer Geschichte und Wirkung*, 2 vols., Berlin 1972 (*Jahrbuch für Geschichte*, vols. 7 and 8); W. Klötzer et al. (eds.), *Ideen und Strukturen der deutschen Revolution 1848*, Frankfurt a. Main 1974; Karl Georg Faber, ‘Die Revolution von 1848/49’ in Faber, *Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert: Restauration und Revolution. Von 1815 bis 1851*, Wiesbaden 1979, pp. 208–283.

<sup>38</sup> As for Christian minorities, see Jörn Brederlow, “*Lichtfreunde*” und “*Freie Gemeinden*”. *Religiöser Protest und Freiheitsbewegung im Vormärz und in der Revolution von 1848/49*, Munich 1976, and F. W. Graf, *Die Politisierung des religiösen Bewußtseins. Die bürgerlichen Religionsparteien im deutschen Vormärz: Das Beispiel des Deutschkatholizismus*, Stuttgart 1978. See now also the contribution of Hermann Greive, ‘Religious Dissent and Tolerance’, in the present volume.

<sup>39</sup> In Baden, for instance, the competent Commission of the Second Chamber of the State Diet recommended the adoption of an Emancipation Bill with the rider that to give detailed reasons for this step would be “a waste of time”, since “there are no longer any obstacles to overcome: the mighty clarion call of our age has swept them away”. *Verhandlungen der Zweiten Kammer der Ständeversammlung des Großherzogtums Baden, Kommissionsbericht vom 7. 4. 1848*, 7. Beilagenheft, pp. 103f.

<sup>40</sup> For the development in Austria, see in particular *Studia Judaica Austriaca*, op. cit., vol. 1 1974; for general accounts, see – in addition to the works previously cited – Joseph Alexander Freiherr von Helfert, *Geschichte der österreichischen Revolution im Zusammenhang mit der mitteleuropäischen Bewegung der Jahre 1848–1849*, 2 vols., Freiburg – Vienna, 1907–1909; Rudolf Kiszling, *Die Revolution im Kaiserreich Österreich 1848–1849*, 2 vols., Vienna 1948; and R. John Rath, *The Viennese Revolution of 1848*, New York 1969. The stimulating study by Wolfgang Häusler, *Von der Massenarmut zur Arbeiterbewegung. Demokratie und soziale Frage in der Wiener Revolution von 1848*, Vienna 1979, with its wealth of material, was only at my disposal after the completion of this manuscript.

views emphatically on record.<sup>41</sup> The Austrian Government's policy was clearly revealed in a letter from the hand of Emperor Ferdinand I. announcing new regulations for the Kingdom of Bohemia. The letter, published on 8th April, conceded to the Jews the "right to practise their religion", but did not go further, merely adding: "A decision concerning the civic position of the Jews in Bohemia, appropriate to the present time and to local conditions, shall be a subject for mature consideration by the Bohemian Diet."<sup>42</sup> At its meeting on 5th October 1848, the Austrian *Reichstag* did in fact vote with a large majority for the abolition of the "Jew taxes", but did not see its way to adopting comprehensive emancipation laws as envisaged by the Constitution. It was left to the Imperial Government, then, in the imposed Constitution promulgated on 4th March 1849 – after the Revolution had been crushed – to introduce complete equality before the law for the Austrian Jews. In Hungary, the "Jewish Question" was ignored by the Liberal legislation of April 1848, and the Diet actually annulled the earlier decision to enfranchise the Jews. Neither did the newly elected Constituent Diet see fit to adopt a consistent line; a majority favoured the gradual progress towards emancipation. Not until the end of July 1849 – a fortnight before the final defeat of the Hungarian Revolution – did the Diet vote for the granting of complete and unqualified equality of legal status to the Jews, but in the circumstances the decision never took effect.<sup>43</sup>

In Italy, events took a far more favourable course.<sup>44</sup> The Constitution of the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont, promulgated at the beginning of March 1848, made provision only for the toleration of non-Catholic religious denominations, but later in the same month the Jews were granted civil and in June of the same year political rights. The provisional government of Lombardy abolished all legal disabilities of the Jews immediately after the victory of the insurrection, and the Venetian Republic followed suit by declaring equality before the law for the adherents of all religious faiths. The Liberal Constitutions of the Grand-Duchy of Tuscany and the Duchy of Modena similarly included emancipatory measures. In Rome, the Ghetto walls were demolished

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<sup>41</sup> In its intensity and growing vehemence, this debate has no parallel in other centres of revolutionary struggles in 1848. See in particular Weiss, *op. cit.*; also Gustav Otruba, 'Die "Judenfrage" im Revolutionsjahr 1848 im Spiegel der Flugschriften', *Wiener Geschichtsblätter*, 32 (1977), pp. 201–205.

<sup>42</sup> Quoted by Friedrich Prinz, *Prag und Wien. Probleme der nationalen und sozialen Revolution im Spiegel der Wiener Ministerratsprotokolle*, Munich 1968, p. 116.

<sup>43</sup> See Einhorn, *op. cit.*, pp. 129f., for the text of the Emancipation Act of 28th July 1849; see also Häusler, 'Assimilation und Emanzipation', *loc. cit.*, pp. 57ff., and Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 370ff. In the Principality of Wallachia, the programme of the Revolution in June 1848 included the emancipation of both Jews and gipsies. Cf. Langer, *Political and Social Upheaval*, *op. cit.*, pp. 466f., and Stearns, *op. cit.*, p. 173. Dubnow, *op. cit.*, p. 483, put the Jewish population of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia – i.e. the territory of what was to become the State of Romania – at about 130,000 around the middle of the nineteenth century.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 460ff.; Roth, *History of the Jews in Italy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 460ff.

on 17th April 1848; later, after the proclamation of the Republic of Rome in February 1849, the Jews were granted equality of legal status. Jewish emancipation had become an integral part of the programme of Italy's Liberal and national movement, a movement of the middle class to which a substantial section of the Jewish population had become assimilated. Accordingly, the Jews came to share the fate of the revolutionary movement: when the Revolution had been crushed and the old authorities were back in power, the emancipation laws were repealed throughout Italy, with the exception of Sardinia-Piedmont. Even the Ghetto walls were re-erected in papal Rome.

Events in Switzerland deserve special mention in this context. There was no Swiss Revolution in 1848, yet the repercussions of the revolutionary tremors were felt in the country.<sup>45</sup> Up to 1848, Jewish emancipation had made little progress in Switzerland. As late as May 1848, the Jews were advised in the course of a debate in the cantonal legislature (*Großer Rat*) to "become worthy of emancipation" – an argument recalling the mood of pre-revolutionary debates in German Parliaments – and at a meeting of the confederate assembly of cantonal delegates in the same month one speaker warned his colleagues: "Let us not be deluded by certain philanthropic ideas into shutting our eyes to reality, to practical considerations".<sup>46</sup> The advice was heeded, and the new Confederate Constitution of 12th November 1848 continued to reserve important rights, including the right of settlement, to Christians. As a Jewish petition rightly pointed out in February 1849: "Of all the constitutions introduced in the last year, the Swiss Confederate Constitution is the only one that stipulates profession of the Christian faith as a condition for the enjoyment of full civil rights."<sup>47</sup> It took more years of patient campaigning until complete equality before the law was finally established in Switzerland through the constitutional amendments of 1866 and 1874.

In Germany, full emancipation was achieved in March 1848 in several of the minor principalities. A few medium-sized states followed suit.<sup>48</sup> Prussia, on the other hand, in a Decree on the Foundations of the Future Constitution, dated 6th April 1848, merely foreshadowed equality of civic rights, and it was only the imposed Constitution of December 1848 which actually introduced equali-

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<sup>45</sup> The basic source for events in Switzerland is Augusta Weldler-Steinberg, *Geschichte der Juden in der Schweiz vom 16. Jahrhundert bis nach der Emanzipation* (bearbeitet und ergänzt von F. Guggenheim-Grünberg), 2 vols. Zürich 1966/1969. In 1848, only about 2,000 Jews were living in Switzerland, most of them in two communes in the Canton of Aargau.

<sup>46</sup> Quotations *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 29, 32.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>48</sup> For legislation on emancipation in Germany, see in particular Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 291ff. (giving details for the individual German states); cf. also Rürup, 'Emanzipation und Krise', *loc. cit.*, pp. 11ff. At the beginning of April the *Vorparlament* granted the Jews the franchise for the elections of the National Assembly: cf. Manfred Botzenhart, *Deutscher Parlamentarismus in der Revolutionszeit 1848–1850*, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 125.



ty of legal status for the Jews.<sup>49</sup> As in Austria, it was not the revolutionary forces but the counter-revolution which completed the process of emancipation, even though Prussia's Constituent Assembly had intended to grant the Jews equality before the law. A similar pattern of events unfolded in Bavaria. In June 1848 the Jews were granted political rights but no other legal improvements. Not until May 1849, when the Revolution had spent its force, did the Government suddenly come out with a constitutional amendment providing for complete Jewish emancipation. This measure was carried by the Second Chamber of the State Diet, but rejected by the First Chamber in a vote that was certainly influenced by a forceful mass campaign culminating in a spate of petitions bearing some 80,000 signatures.<sup>50</sup> The development in Baden, considered the most progressive state from the point of view of the Liberal-Democratic movement, was typical of the ambiguity of some emancipation measures: the emancipation law, hurriedly adopted by the Second Chamber of the State Diet in the spring of 1848, was systematically delayed by the First Chamber in collusion with the Government and eventually promulgated in February 1849; but it provided only for equal political rights, while omitting equality of rights at commune level, far more important from the point of view of material advantage. And this happened not by accident but reflected a deliberate policy: the Liberal Government – not without reason – was afraid of a popular protest movement that might have led to serious disturbances, and chose to play safe rather than make a firm stand on its principles.<sup>51</sup>

Some other German states had decided from the outset to avoid any legislative action of their own, leaving the initiative to the Frankfurt National Assembly. In the National Assembly, where Gabriel Riesser acted as an effective spokesman for the cause of emancipation, there was virtually no opposition to the principle of equality of legal status, although in the Constitu-

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<sup>49</sup> For the text of the Decree of 6th April 1848, see Ernst Rudolf Huber (ed.), *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, vol. 1, Stuttgart 1961, pp. 367f. (§ 5: "The exercise of civic rights is henceforth independent of religious faith.") Clause 11 of the Constitution of 5th December 1848 runs as follows (*ibid.*, pp. 385–394): "Freedom of religious faith, of the formation of religious societies ... and of public worship is guaranteed. The rights enjoyed by citizens at local and state level are independent of religious faith and membership of religious bodies. The discharge of duties incumbent on citizens at local and state level must not be affected by the exercise of the freedom of religion."

<sup>50</sup> For events in Bavaria, see Rürup, 'Emanzipation und Krise', *loc. cit.*, pp. 16f. Opposition to emancipation of the Jews was expressed in 600 petitions with 79,321 signatures collected in 1,688 communes (*Verhandlungen der Kammer der Reichsräte der Ständeversammlung des Königreichs Bayern, Bericht vor dem III. Ausschuss, 3. Februar 1850, III. Beilagen-Band*, p. 352).

<sup>51</sup> See Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 66f., 160f. on emancipation policy in Baden during the Revolution. For anti-Jewish disturbances in Baden, see pp. 32f. below.

tional Committee some Deputies ventilated serious misgivings.<sup>52</sup> Accordingly, the Basic Rights of the German People – proclaimed as a *Reich* Law on 27th December 1848, in anticipation of an all-German Constitution – provided for the emancipation of the Jews without any qualification.<sup>53</sup> But after the defeat of the Revolution, the legal force of those basic rights was no longer assured. Eventually, on 23rd August 1851, the German Confederate Diet formally repealed the Act incorporating the basic rights.

Drawing up an interim balance at this point, we find that, as far as legislative emancipation measures are concerned, the achievement of the revolutionary period is far more modest than one might have expected. Apart from Sardinia-Piedmont – as well as Denmark, it may be noted<sup>54</sup> – the revolutionary gains

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<sup>52</sup> The debate in the National Assembly was on 1st September 1848. According to the official minutes (*Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen constituierenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main*, edited by Franz Wigard, vol. 3, Leipzig 1848, pp. 1749–1770), the most important speakers were Moritz Mohl, who opposed complete equality of legal status for the Jews (pp. 1754f.) and Gabriel Riesser, who followed Mohl, and in his reply made a convincing case for the justice of the Jewish claim to emancipation (pp. 1755ff.). Whereas in the Plenum no other speaker supported Mohl, strong misgivings were expressed in committee. The following account is quoted from the official minutes (*Die Verhandlungen des Verfassungsausschusses der deutschen Nationalversammlung*, edited by J.G. Droysen, Part 1, Leipzig 1948, pp. 8f.): “In respect of *equality before the law*, Waitz pointed out that this was tantamount to the granting of full emancipation to the Jews, and one ought to be aware of the decisive manner in which the proposed wording announced that fact; personally, he did not object to emancipation, but he was certain that it would not be welcomed everywhere in Germany. Schreiner, while agreeing in principle, drew attention to the difficulties which this particular aspect of the problem was bound to cause in a number of Austrian territories; the measure would not only offend many prejudices, but also have an adverse effect on practical conditions. Römer, too, thought that Jewish emancipation would not be popular in all quarters; many Christians discovered their Christianity only when it was a matter of turning against the Jews; yet, emancipation was the only way to overcome the difficulties of the latter. Von Beckerath argued in favour of supplementing the equality of civic and political rights by assuring equality of employment prospects. Jürgens warned against a hasty emancipation of the Jews, much as he supported emancipation in principle; it was not so much the difference of religion, but the difference of nationality that accounted for the antagonism that had struck deep roots in the life of the people and was fostering resentments that could not be dispelled at a moment’s notice. Gagern emphasised that the proposed measure did not explicitly declare the emancipation of the Jews, and that the Jews themselves would feel ill at ease if such an explicit declaration were made at the present moment. In conclusion, the question ‘as to whether equality before the law is to apply for members of all religious faiths’ was answered in the affirmative.” On the emancipation issue in the National Assembly, see also Herbert Arthur Strauss, *Staat, Bürger, Mensch. Die Debatten der deutschen Nationalversammlung 1848/1849 über die Grundrechte*, Aarau 1947, pp. 112–115.

<sup>53</sup> Clause V of the Basic Rights of the German People was incorporated in §§ 144–151 of the Constitution of the German *Reich* of 28th March 1849, for the text of which see Huber, *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 304–324.

<sup>54</sup> Clause 79 of the Danish Constitution of 5th June 1849. There were about 4,000 Jews in Denmark at the time of the Revolution. In Sweden, Jews were allowed to settle only in a few towns, while up till 1851 they were debarred from entering Norway at all,

were shortlived or limited in scope. Even in Austria, the repeal in 1851 of the imposed Constitution of 4th March 1849 left the Jews again in a state of legal insecurity that was not remedied until the adoption of the Constitution of 1867.<sup>55</sup> In Prussia the Jews' equality before the law was confirmed in Clause 12 of the revised Constitution of 31st January 1850; yet, that affirmation lost much of its effect through Clause 14 of the same Constitution, which – in keeping with the principle of a “Christian state” – proclaimed the Christian religion as the state religion.<sup>56</sup> Only a few of the minor German states upheld the full equality of the Jews.<sup>57</sup>

It appears, then, that in Germany, as in most European states, the Revolutions of 1848/1849 failed to carry the legislative programme to its expected conclusion, but left the matter at an intermediate stage that was not free of ambiguities. True, it was often said after 1848/1849 that the cause of Jewish emancipation had been settled in principle;<sup>58</sup> nevertheless, the Jews had to wait till the 1860s or even the 1870s before the relevant legislation was completed in the various European states. Only then did the “Age of Emancipation” come to

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even for a temporary stay. In both countries, the granting of equality before the law was a slow process, beginning in the middle of the century. Around 1848, the number of Jews in Norway was negligible, while about 3,000 were living in Sweden. Cf. Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 480ff.; Elbogen, *op. cit.*, pp. 65f.

<sup>55</sup> For the events in Austria, see – in addition to the four papers by Häusler listed in note 15 and ‘Assimilation und Emanzipation’, *loc. cit.* – in particular Tietze, *op. cit.*, pp. 200ff.; cf. also Rürup, ‘Emanzipation und Krise’, *loc. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>56</sup> For the text of the Constitution, see Huber, *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, *op. cit.*, pp. 401–414. Clause 14: “Without prejudice to the freedom of religion guaranteed in Clause 12, the Christian religion shall serve as a foundation for all institutions of the state with a bearing on religious practices.”

<sup>57</sup> According to Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 306, these states were Oldenburg, Braunschweig, Hesse-Homburg, Nassau und Lübeck. Yet, during the revolutionary era, twenty German states had granted the Jews complete equality before the law, and another four had gone nearly as far (listed by Toury, *ibid.*, p. 299). In eight German states – Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Coburg-Gotha, Reuß, Saxony-Altenburg, Meiningen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt – the legal position of the Jews was not improved at all in 1848/1849. It must be borne in mind, however, that some of these small principalities had only negligible or even non-existing Jewish populations (cf. Toury, *ibid.*, p. 295).

<sup>58</sup> Thus, the Bavarian Minister of the Interior wrote in a letter to the Bavarian King, dated 24th May 1849, that the complete emancipation of the Jews was “an article of faith of the present age”, and that it was “no longer possible to make any exceptions” (see Rürup, ‘Emanzipation und Krise’, *loc. cit.*, p. 17 for the full quotation). In the early days of the Revolution, the radical theologian David Friedrich Strauß protested against the regimentation of public opinion by liberal principles. In an article ‘Judenverfolgung und Judenemanzipation’, *Jahrbücher der Gegenwart*, No. 30 (April 1848), p. 118, he wrote: “Deny the divine right of the powers that be, deny even the divinity of Christ: people may not approve, but they will still accept you. But try to argue against the emancipation of the Jews or against the abolition of capital punishment, and people will turn their backs on you as a medieval barbarian.”

an end in Europe – that is to say, in Europe apart from Russia, where only the February Revolution of 1917 established equality of legal status for the Jewish population.

#### IV

One thing which emerged clearly in the course of the events of 1848 and 1849 was the fact that the issue of emancipation had long ceased to turn exclusively or even predominantly on the question of legislation. It was on the political and social rather than on the legal plane that the cause of emancipation received a decisive impulse from the Revolution. Since about 1830, leading representatives of Jewry in the various German states had pleaded with increasing emphasis for Jewish rights, stressing the linkage between the long-standing demands of the Liberal and Democratic movement and the Jewish aspiration for emancipation. The Hamburg lawyer Gabriel Riesser came to be considered the living embodiment of that linkage and of the self-assurance that grew out of it. In the German states in particular, Jews began to use journals, pamphlets and petitions as vehicles to press the claim for emancipation, which was no longer craved as a gift but demanded as a right, in keeping with the idea of the Rights of Man.<sup>59</sup> They were not opposed either to integration or to assimilation, but they rejected the notion of emancipation as something that had yet to be earned, to be bestowed eventually as a reward for good conduct or as an act of grace.

An entirely new phenomenon appeared with the onset of the first revolutionary movements, a phenomenon that profoundly affected the position of the Jews in the individual states. Jews emerged for the first time, and in considerable numbers, as political activists, in many cases even as political leaders. In Vienna and in Berlin Jews were among those who fought on the barricades in the decisive clashes of March 1848; out of five victims killed in these clashes in Vienna, two were Jews, one a student at the *Polytechnikum*, the other a journeyman weaver.<sup>60</sup> The precise number of Jews among the “March victims” in Berlin is not known, but there were at least ten of them, equivalent to between 4 and 5 per cent of those killed, which compares with the figure of 2 per

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<sup>59</sup> For an extensive bibliography, see Volkmar Eichstädt, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Judenfrage*, vol. 1: 1750–1848, Hamburg 1938.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Häusler, ‘Toleranz, Emanzipation und Antisemitismus’, *loc. cit.*, p. 98; Schmeril Czaczkes-Tissenboim, *Der Anteil der Juden an der Wiener Revolution 1848*, philosophical dissertation (typescript), Vienna 1926, pp. 51f.; Mayer, *op. cit.*, p. 311. According to Häusler, ‘Die Revolution von 1848 und die österreichischen Juden’, *loc. cit.*, p. 40, thirteen victims of the Revolution, among them the two Jews, were buried on 13th March.

cent for the proportion of Jews among the population of Berlin at the time.<sup>61</sup> The memorial functions for the victims, held in Vienna on 17th March and in Berlin on the 20th, turned into demonstrations for the removal of religious barriers. In both towns Christian clergymen and rabbis addressed the crowds.<sup>62</sup>

In France, the February Revolution completed the full integration of Jews in the sphere of politics. This was clearly manifested in the composition of the provisional Government, which included among its nine members two Jews, Adolphe Crémieux and Michel Goudchaux, who held the portfolios respectively of Justice and Finance. Crémieux, who collaborated closely with Lamartine, was a highly reputed lawyer and politician who did not hesitate to stand up openly for specific Jewish interests – in 1860 he was to found the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, an organisation promoting equality of political and social rights for the Jews – while Goudchaux was a banker who apparently enjoyed the confidence of the commercial and financial bourgeoisie.<sup>63</sup>

Outside France Jews attained ministerial rank only in the Republic of Venice. The provisional Government formed at the end of March 1848 was headed by Daniele Manin, who was descended from a Jewish family, and included Leone Pincherle (Agriculture and Commerce) and Isaac Pesaro Maurogonato (Finance). In addition, Jewish politicians worked closely together with Cavour and King Victor Emanuel II of Sardinia-Piedmont. Jews participated in the armed clashes in the ranks of the insurgents, and were elected to Parliament in a number of Italian states. In Venice, the first Parliament of the Revolution numbered three, the second as many as seven Jewish Deputies. In Rome three Jews were elected to the National Assembly after the proclamation of the Republic in the spring of 1849; others sat on the City Council and took over

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<sup>61</sup> Cf. Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 55f.; Adolf Kober, 'Jews in the Revolution of 1848 in Germany', *Jewish Social Studies*, 10 (1948), pp. 135–164, in particular pp. 140f. For a general account of the March victims, see Ruth Hoppe and Jürgen Kuczynski, 'Eine Berufs- bzw. Klassen- und Schichtanalyse der Märzgefallenen 1848 in Berlin', in *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 1964, Part IV, pp. 200–275. – Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 47, stated that he had been able to identify the names of 130 Jews who had taken part in the armed clashes during the Revolution. There is no way of estimating the total, which naturally must be a multiple of that figure. As political activists during the Revolution, Toury identified at least 750 Jews in Germany (without Austria) (*ibid.*, p. 47).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *inter alia*, Häusler, 'Toleranz, Emanzipation und Antisemitismus', *loc. cit.*, p. 98; Kober, *loc. cit.*, pp. 140f. A similar symbolical gesture was made in France, when Jews in 1848 participated in the planting of freedom trees; see Bensaïd, *loc. cit.*, p. 43.

<sup>63</sup> For the formation of the French Government and the political positions of Crémieux and Goudchaux, see George Bourgin, 'France and the Revolution of 1848', in Fejtö, *op. cit.*, pp. 83ff., 94. Interesting material on the political attitudes of French Jews during the Revolution is given by Szajkowski, 'Internal Conflicts in French Jewry at the Time of the Revolution of 1848', in Szajkowski, *Jews and the French Revolutions*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1058–1075. On political integration in 1848, see Girard, *op. cit.*, pp. 162f.; for the reactions of the Jewish population of France to the Revolution, see Bensaïd, *loc. cit.*, pp. 42ff.

important functions in the Civil Guard and the Security Committee. After the defeat of the Republic, some Jews were in the ranks of Garibaldi's troops who attempted to make their way to the North.<sup>64</sup>

In the German states, there were no Jewish Ministers, but a considerable number of Jewish parliamentary Deputies who had won the confidence of non-Jewish as well as Jewish voters. When the Frankfurt *Vorparlament* – a non-elective provisional body – met, its members, who had been invited on the strength of their national standing, included six Jews: Berthold Auerbach, Julius Fürst, Johann Jacoby, Ignaz Kuranda, Gabriel Riesser and Moritz Veit. Seven Jews were elected to the German National Assembly, some of them only in by-elections; they were, in addition to Jacoby, Kuranda, Riesser and Veit, Ludwig Bamberger, Moritz Hartmann and Friedrich Wilhelm Levysohn; Hartmann and Kuranda were among the Austrian Deputies in the Assembly.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, ten of the Christian Deputies were of Jewish descent, which is all the more significant as the electorate was hardly unaware of this fact, brought home in some cases by the unmistakably Jewish surnames of the candidates.<sup>66</sup> Gabriel Riesser, who sat on the Constitutional Committee and was elected Second Vice-President of the Assembly in October 1848, was also a member of the deputation which in April 1847 invited the King of Prussia on behalf of the National Assembly to become German Emperor. The leader of that deputation was Eduard Simson, one of the Deputies who had been baptised in childhood. He was elected President of the Assembly in December 1848. Two other Deputies who had been baptised as children came to hold important represen-

<sup>64</sup> For the political activities of Italian Jews in 1848/1849, see cursory treatment by Roth, *History of the Jews in Italy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 460–463, and Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 460–464.

<sup>65</sup> The data on Deputies of the German National Assembly are based on: Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–65; Ernest Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands. Regierungsmitglieder, Beamte und Parlamentarier in der monarchischen Zeit 1848–1918*, Tübingen 1968 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 19), pp. 171–209 (with biographical sketches of a number of prominent Deputies); Kober, *loc. cit.*, pp. 142ff.; Margarita Pazi, 'Die Juden in der ersten deutschen Nationalversammlung, 1848/49', in *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte*, V, Tel-Aviv 1976, pp. 177–209 (also with biographical sketches).

<sup>66</sup> A number of authors – e.g. Hamburger and occasionally Toury – fail to distinguish between Jews and persons of Jewish descent. This seems to me a problematical approach, bearing in mind that in contemporary usage, the term "Jew" referred to persons of the Judaic faith, and that on conversion all legal disabilities were automatically lifted. Especially during the age of emancipation – that is to say, when equality of legal status had not yet been established – it seems to me important to make a distinction between Jews and persons of Jewish descent. Accordingly, in the present study the term "Jew" always refers to members of the Jewish religious community, unless otherwise stated. This is not to deny that it may be useful or even necessary in certain contexts to extend the investigation to persons of Jewish descent, all the more so as their contemporary description as "baptised Jews" shows that at least some of them were after conversion still looked upon as Jews (quite apart from the fact that, even after embracing Christianity, many of those concerned continued to maintain links with Jewish life).

tative posts: Moritz Heckscher was variously Minister of Justice and Foreign Minister in the Provisional *Reich* Government; similarly, Johann Hermann Detmold was at various times Minister of Justice and Minister of the Interior in the same Government. In 1848, Jews were for the first time elected to the Parliaments or Constituent Assemblies of several states of the German Confederation: in Prussia, Bavaria, Brunswick, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Saxony-Anhalt, Hesse-Homburg, Frankfurt, Hamburg and Lübeck.<sup>67</sup> The Prussian Constituent Assembly included five Jewish Deputies, among them notably Johann Jacoby, one of the most prominent leaders of the democratic camp; Raphael Kosch, elected Vice-President in August 1848; and Julius Brill, a Silesian compositor, one of the few members of the working class in the Assembly. In addition, Jewish politicians were strongly represented in the Hamburg and Frankfurt Constituent City Assemblies. In the remaining Parliaments there were only one or two Jewish Deputies. In Prussia, on the other hand, even the First Chamber of the State Diet had two Jewish members in 1849.

A particularly active part, which had a significant bearing on the course of the Revolution, was played by Jews in Austria, above all, of course, in Vienna.<sup>68</sup> The newly elected *Reichstag*, which met in July 1848, included four Jewish Deputies: Adolf Fischhof, Joseph Goldmark and Rabbi Isaak Noah Mannheimer – all three of Vienna, but the last named elected in Galicia – and the Cracow Rabbi Berusch Meisels. Yet, their presence in the *Reichstag* was of secondary importance by comparison with the prominent, in some cases decisive contributions made by them and other Jews in critical situations and as members of numerous revolutionary bodies. Above all the physicians Fischhof and Goldmark became recognised spokesmen and leaders of the revolutionary movement on the basis of a Liberal programme. At the very beginning, on 13th March, Fischhof acted as the first spokesman of the surging masses when he spelled out the political demands of the Revolution in an improvised speech. On that day he and several other Jews were among the first leaders of the

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<sup>67</sup> Cf. information about Jewish Deputies in the confederate states given by Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–62 (and in the Appendix, pp. 345–350, a list of all known Jewish Deputies for the period up to 1866); Hamburger, *op. cit.*, pp. 173ff.; Kober, *loc. cit.*, pp. 144–148. All three authors include information about Deputies of Jewish descent.

<sup>68</sup> The following description is based on the occasionally diverging accounts by Weiss, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–20 ('Der Anteil der Wiener Juden an der Revolution' – 'The Part Played in the Revolution by the Vienna Jews'); Czaczkes-Tissenboim, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–216 (March Revolution – pp. 40ff., May Revolution – pp. 114f., Security Committee – pp. 135ff., October Revolution – pp. 188ff.); Rath, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Valentin, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 398ff., 552ff., vol. 2, pp. 75ff., 183ff.; Mayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 309ff.; also Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 362ff.; further details in Häusler, 'Die Revolution von 1848', *loc. cit.*, *passim*, and 'Toleranz, Emanzipation und Antisemitismus', *loc. cit.*, pp. 97ff.

popular movement.<sup>69</sup> In Vienna it was above all Jewish students and young graduates (physicians, jurists, journalists) who worked for the cause of the Revolution in common with the mass of their non-Jewish colleagues who – more resolutely than the students in other countries – looked upon themselves as a vanguard of the Democratic-Liberal people's movement. Four young Jewish graduates were members of the first deputation which negotiated on behalf of the insurgents. When the conflict became more acute, another Jew took a leading part in storming the arsenal. At the end of March a student committee was formed, which was to play an important part in the further course of events. Its Chairman was Goldmark, and the numerous Jewish members, most of them likewise young physicians, included Boch, Fischhof, Flesch, Frankl, Kapper, Mannheimer, Tausenau, Taussig and Unger. The armed *Akademische Legion* and the National Guard – set up to defend the goals of the Revolution not only against reactionary attacks but also against possible insurrectionary movements by the proletariat of the outlying districts of Vienna – also had Jewish members. Several companies elected Jewish commanders.

The outstanding part played by Jews in the revolutionary events in Vienna was clearly demonstrated towards the end of May 1848, when in response to extremist revolutionary tendencies the Security Committee was set up, which until the convocation of the *Reichstag* was the most important political institution in Vienna. Fischhof was elected Chairman by a large majority, and one of his two deputies was Karl Freund, another Jew.<sup>70</sup> This situation prompted a petition, addressed in mid-July 1848 by Vienna shopkeepers and tradesmen to the Minister of the Interior, calling for the exclusion of Jews from the Security Committee, since people did not want to be any longer under "Jewish tutelage".<sup>71</sup> To an increasing degree, the struggle against the Revolution took on an antisemitic complexion. One Imperial Minister, Schwarzer, was reported to have dismissed the Revolution altogether as "nothing but a Jew revolution".<sup>72</sup> However misleading such assertions were, the fact remains that Jews in not insignificant numbers enjoyed the confidence of large sections of the population who supported Liberal-Democratic views, and that a few, notably Dr. Hermann Jellinek and Adolf Chaizes, were trusted also by the revolutionary working class.<sup>73</sup> Jews again played a major part in the revolutionary

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<sup>69</sup> On Fischhof, see, *inter alia*, Cahnmann, 'Adolf Fischhof als Verfechter der Nationalität und seine Auswirkung auf das jüdisch-politische Denken in Österreich', in *Studia Judaica Austriaca*, *op. cit.*, Bd. 1, 1974, pp. 78–91.

<sup>70</sup> For the Security Committee, its origin and activities, see Kizling, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–148, and Rath, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>71</sup> For the text of the petition, see Czaczkes-Tissenboim, *op. cit.*, pp. 156f.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 168f.

<sup>73</sup> Jellinek was one of the nine revolutionaries (among them notably Robert Blum) who under martial law were executed by firing squads in November 1848. His death has frequently been taken as symbolic of the "equality of the religions" in the defeat of the



struggles of October 1848; some paid with their lives, others had no choice but emigration after the defeat.

In Germany, too, the part played by Jews in the revolutionary clashes was not confined to election rallies and parliamentary activities, but the scale and intensity of that participation cannot stand comparison with the contribution of Vienna's Jews.<sup>74</sup> Two facts may be adduced in explanation of this disparity: on the one hand the legal position of the Jews was generally better in Germany; on the other hand, the Revolution in Germany took generally a more moderate course. In Berlin, young Jewish intellectuals were able to exercise some influence at popular rallies and in political clubs, and in other towns as well Jews took over important political functions. Jews participated to a noteworthy degree in the Democratic Congresses held first in Frankfurt, then in Berlin, where the Jewish physician, Dr. Sigismund Asch of Breslau, was elected Vice-President. Another physician, Dr. Andreas Gottschalk of Cologne, who was baptised only in 1847, played an important part in the Democratic and Socialist movement of 1848. In Mannheim and Berlin a substantial number of Jews came into the open as resolute defenders of moderate Liberalism against all Democratic-Republican tendencies. Lastly, Jews took a prominent part in the political debates conducted in the daily press, in leaflets, journals and pamphlets. Their role was clearly important, but cannot yet be quantified with any certainty.<sup>75</sup> The contemporary propaganda slogan of the "Jew press" was intended in the first place to disparage Liberal, Democratic and Socialist publications. It indicates that Jewish journalists and publishers were predominantly on the side of the Revolution, but cannot help us in arriving at a tolerably reliable assessment of the quantitative and qualitative significance of publications considered to be "Jewish".

The development in Hungary was peculiar, running counter to the general trend. During the initial phase of the Revolution, the Jews were subjected to many rebuffs: they were excluded from the National Guard, and there were

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Revolution. Cf. Wolfgang Häusler, 'Hermann Jellinek (1823–1848). Ein Demokrat in der Wiener Revolution', in *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte*, V, Tel-Aviv 1976, pp. 125–175.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. in particular Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 47ff., and Kober, *loc. cit.*, pp. 140ff.

<sup>75</sup> For Germany, see Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 58f., and Kober, *loc. cit.*, pp. 153f. The most important organs of the Jewish press in the strict sense were *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, edited by Ludwig Philippson, and *Der Orient*, edited by Julius Fürst. Cf. Johanna Philippson, *loc. cit.*, and Willehad Paul Eckert, 'Ludwig Philippson und seine Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums in den Jahren 1848/49 – Die Revolution im Spiegel der Zeitung', in *Studia Judaica Austriaca*, *op. cit.*, Bd. 1, 1974, pp. 112ff. In this connection see also Horst Denkler, 'Flugblätter in "jüdischdeutschem" Dialekt aus dem revolutionären Berlin 1848/49', in *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte*, VI, Tel-Aviv 1977, pp. 215–257. For Vienna in general, cf. Weiss, *op. cit.*; Czaczkes-Tissenboim, *op. cit.*, pp. 98ff.; and Mayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 313ff. (in particular for the slogan of the "Jewish press").

moves to deprive them of the franchise, which had only just been granted to them. None the less, the majority of Hungarian Jews identified with the freedom movement, to which they gave unstinting and effective support, extending to armed service, as soon as they had been admitted to the National Army.<sup>76</sup> Yet, their influence upon revolutionary developments was very limited: no Jew sat in the National Assembly or held political office of any importance, and in the Army no Jew rose above the rank of captain. In brief, as one writer put it aptly: “Decisive influence of the kind exercised, for instance, by Fischhof and Goldmark in Vienna, by Jacoby in Berlin, by Crémieux in Paris, and by other Jews in smaller German states was at no time acquired by the Hungarian Jew.”<sup>77</sup> Yet, in the end the significance of their contribution to the Hungarian freedom struggle was certified to the Jews by the counter-revolution. They were treated with particular harshness by the victorious Imperial troops. Moreover, a special indemnification levy was imposed on the Jewish communities in the spring of 1850 to the tune of 2.3 million Gulden, reduced half a year later to 1.0 million. Thus the end of the Revolution visited upon the Hungarian Jews a novel kind of “Jew tax”.<sup>78</sup>

It is neither possible nor necessary in this context to explore the actions of the Jewish revolutionaries in detail. Nor is there much point in adding up the numbers of Jewish parliamentary deputies, in computing the percentage of Jewish members of the National Guard or the number of casualties as a proportion of the Jewish population. Such statistics may throw light on

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<sup>76</sup> For Hungary in general, see *Studia Judaica Austriaca, op. cit.*, Bd. 3, 1976 (‘Studien zum ungarischen Judentum’ – ‘Studies on Hungarian Jewry’), including in particular Häusler, ‘Assimilation and Emanzipation’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 57ff.; also Einhorn, *op. cit.*, pp. 67ff. Einhorn (pp. 115f.) said that, although accurate figures could not be given for the number of Jews who had joined the Hungarian National Army, one could accept “as the very lowest estimate possible” a figure of about 20,000. Häusler, on the other hand (*ibid.*, pp. 72f.) considers this estimate exaggerated, and refers to other contemporary accounts indicating a figure of about 10,000.

<sup>77</sup> Einhorn, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

<sup>78</sup> Einhorn, *op. cit.*, pp. 132ff.; Häusler, ‘Assimilation und Emanzipation’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 75f. The amount of 1 million Gulden was eventually earmarked by the Vienna Government for the establishment of a fund for the promotion of Jewish educational institutions. In moving the Emancipation Bill in the *Reichstag* on 28th July 1849, the Hungarian Premier Szemere said: “The fatherland has to redeem a great debt to its Jewish sons, a debt so tremendous that it could not be extinguished in scores of years nor by the award of the most exalted distinctions. Yet, the heroes, worthy descendants of the glorious Maccabees, will find their greatest reward in the elevating awareness of having proved worthy of their forebears in fighting against tyranny and brutal power, in having poured out their blood for justice and liberty. The least of earthly reward that we can add to that inestimable heavenly reward is surely to throw open to them a fatherland, which they have earned with the greatest of sacrifices; to accept as our brothers, equal in stature, those who have already sealed that union with their precious blood; to recognise as true Hungarians those who have more than any other ethnic tribe suffered and worked and sacrificed for Hungary.” (Quoted according to Einhorn, *ibid.*, p. 128; the same text also quoted by Häusler, *ibid.*, p. 74.)

different questions, but in the context of the present study they are irrelevant. What matters here is the relationship between Jews and non-Jews and the collective self-awareness of the Jews, and these aspects are sufficiently illustrated by the plain fact that Jews were involved at all, and in large numbers, and that they were recognised as representatives of the general revolutionary movement.

Undoubtedly, not all Jews were supporters of the Revolution, let alone active revolutionaries. In politics as in other respects the Jews did not constitute a monolithic group. Although their own interests should have inclined the Jews to see a Revolution striving to bring about a legal framework and living conditions in keeping with the standards of modern society in a positive light, considerable numbers of Jews, as of other sections of the population, were non-political. In the traditional Jewish milieu dominated by Orthodox principle, remoteness from politics was particularly pronounced as a rule, whereas elsewhere the advance along the path to assimilation was accompanied by a growing interest in the general socio-political conditions and in the victory of liberal norms and institutions. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the ranks of the highly assimilated sections of the Jewish population included both radical revolutionaries and conservatives.<sup>79</sup> In the stratum of the commercial and financial bourgeoisie there were not a few Jews who thought they stood to lose more than to gain through a Revolution. Rothschild's flight from Vienna in October 1848 can be taken as a striking illustration of this conflict of interest with the revolutionary movement.<sup>80</sup>

Jacob Toury has ventured, after long years of study, to express the political attitudes of the entire Jewish population in Germany in percentage figures. On this showing, the following picture emerges for the years 1848/1849: about 25 per cent of the Jews were conservative, 25 to 30 per cent loyalist, 30 to 35 per cent moderately Liberal, 14 per cent Radical-Democratic, and 1 per cent Socialist.<sup>81</sup> In Austria – according to Wolfgang Häusler – the corresponding graph would be shifted by a substantial margin to the Right, in view of the large number of Orthodox Jews in Bohemia, Moravia and Galicia, notwithstanding the opposite trend in Vienna.<sup>82</sup> A similar correction would probably result in

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<sup>79</sup> Cf. in particular Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–84 ('Messianische Schwärmer und Revolutionäre wider Willen' – 'Messianic Dreamers and Involuntary Revolutionaries'), and pp. 85–99 ('Opportunistische Passivität und konfessionelle Politik' – 'Opportunist Passivity and Denominational Policies').

<sup>80</sup> See also Einhorn, *op. cit.*, p. 11: "The rich Jewish merchant, like his Christian counterpart, as a rule holds conservative views. For no sooner does he set out to express his jubilation over a victory of freedom than news from the stock exchange reminds him of the substantial financial loss he has suffered as a result. And so, instead of intoning psalms at the synagogue to give thanks for the victory, he will sing dirges at the stock exchange to lament the slump in state bonds."

<sup>81</sup> Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 98; a similar estimate for the pre-revolutionary period *ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>82</sup> Häusler, 'Demokratie und Emanzipation', *loc. cit.*, p. 99.

Hungary, and even in France, the aloofness of Orthodox Jewry from the political struggles of 1848 has recently been shown to have been a factor of some importance.<sup>83</sup> On the other hand, when the assessment is confined to the section of the Jewish population that was politically active during the Revolution, the picture changes drastically with a marked leftward shift.<sup>84</sup> It is always possible, of course, to find examples in support of the widely held view that Jews after all were represented in all political camps; yet, it is worthy of note that most of the Jews who have been named as belonging to either the conservative or the Socialist camp were in fact so-called “baptised Jews”, that is to say Christians of Jewish descent, the most prominent examples of the opposing trends being Karl Marx and Friedrich Julius Stahl, the two names mentioned most frequently in support of this “equipoise theory”.

One point of the greatest significance for the further progress of emancipation was that after 1848 the Jews ceased to be mere passive objects of politics, and in the teeth of prejudice and in defiance of old and new restrictions took a hand in fashioning their own destiny as well as that of the wider body politic. Now a trend came to the fore of which beginnings had been noted for the first time during the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon: common action in a common cause ushered in a common history. Thus 1848 brought a fundamental change in the self-image and self-awareness of European Jewry. It was a change of far-reaching consequence. After centuries of oppression and contempt, the revolutionary experience taught the Jews of Europe to straighten their backs and walk with a new “upright gait”,<sup>85</sup> or in the telling words of Heinrich Graetz:

“In all civilised and semi-civilised lands the world over the Jews have sloughed off their servility; they hold their heads high and refuse to be intimidated any longer when the rabble yells ‘hep-hep’.”<sup>86</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Bensaid, *loc. cit.*, pp. 43 ff.

<sup>84</sup> Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 67, gives the following estimates for politically active Jews in 1848/1849: conservatives and loyalists 9 per cent, moderate Liberals 32 per cent, Radical Democrats 41 per cent, Socialists 18 per cent.

<sup>85</sup> As regards the “upright gait”, cf. Ernst Bloch, ‘Marx, aufrechter Gang, konkrete Utopie’ in Bloch, *Politische Messungen, Pestzeit, Vormärz*, Frankfurt a. Main 1970 (vol. 14 of Collected Works), pp. 445–458. The new spirit was reflected, for instance, in the petition of the Swiss Jews reported by Weldler-Steinberg (see note 45 above). The petition, dated 26th February 1849, said in part: “Israelite honour has been brilliantly vindicated by the fact that during the popular rising many Israelites were put with others at the head of the people’s movement, and were elected to representative positions, a number of them at the head of the highest authorities of the state ...”.

<sup>86</sup> Heinrich Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, vol. 11, Leipzig <sup>2</sup>1900, p. 549. As early as July 1848, a spokesman of the Hungarian Jews said: “The time of fawning and begging is over” (quoted by Einhorn, *op. cit.*, p. 102).

## V

Yet, viewed in the context of the history of European Jewry, the Revolutions of 1848 were two-faced. On the one hand wholehearted support for emancipation and the active participation of Jews in the revolutionary struggles; on the other hand anti-Jewish mass disturbances and excesses comparable in scale with the persecution of the Jews in the Middle Ages, with the so-called 'heph-hep' movements of 1819 in Germany and with the subsequent Russian pogroms beginning in the 1880s. David Friedrich Strauß commented that the "cries of anguish of persecuted Jews" were reminiscent of the time of the crusades, so that "at the very time when on one side an overwhelming vote of confidence has been carried in favour of the Jews, ... we see on the other side a clear vote of no confidence interposed".<sup>87</sup> Nor were such disturbances confined to a few states. At least 180 localities are on record in a number of states, where Jews were threatened or assaulted, their houses demolished or looted.<sup>88</sup> Such outrages occurred in French Alsace, Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel, the Prussian Provinces of Westphalia and Poznań, in

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<sup>87</sup> D. F. Strauß, *loc. cit.*, p. 117. Strauß had a ready sociological explanation for this at first sight surprising ambiguity: "These manifestations of opposing wills and views emanate from different sections of society. Persecutions of Jews occur mostly in the countryside: it is the peasant who rises up against vexatious creditors. The voices in favour of Jewish emancipation, on the other hand, are raised in parliamentary bodies and in newspapers. The signatories of petitions urging this cause are to be found among scholars and writers, generally among the urban educated classes, rarely among small traders and shopkeepers, hardly ever among the peasantry. Accordingly, anybody so inclined may argue then that those standing for culture, humanity and the spirit of the progressive age are for the Jews, and those representing boorish ignorance, selfishness and prejudice rise against them." Yet, Strauß continued, it was not simply a matter of educational standards, but of differences in material standards and conditions. The theoreticians of emancipation might in the circles in which they moved "have occasional meetings with educated Jews", whereas in the rural areas, the "real, genuine Jews" had to be dealt with whose social assimilation had not made much headway (*ibid.*). Baron, 'The Impact of the Revolution of 1848', *loc. cit.*, p. 211, has pointed out that this essay, predominantly critical of emancipation, is not included in Strauß's collected writings. On the other hand it is noteworthy that this article was also printed in a Jewish periodical: *Literaturblatt des Orients. Berichte, Studien und Kritiken für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur*, Leipzig, IX, No. 27f. (1848).

<sup>88</sup> Numerical data according to Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 290f. A comprehensive study of anti-Jewish disturbances and excesses in Toury, *Turmoil and Confusion in the Revolution of 1848. The Anti-Jewish Riots in the 'Year of Freedom' and their Influence on Modern Antisemitism* (in Hebrew), Merhaviva 1968. See also Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 319ff.; 'The Impact of the Revolution of 1848', *loc. cit.*, pp. 255ff.; a recent regional investigation by Michael Anthony Riff, 'The Anti-Jewish Aspect of the Revolutionary Unrest of 1848 in Baden and its Impact on Emancipation', in *Year Book XXI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1976, pp. 27–40. A detailed analysis of the rural and urban popular movement is presented by Manfred Gailus, *Die Märzbewegung in Deutschland: Träger, Formen und regionale Schwerpunkte* (typescript), Berlin 1978.

Bohemia, Moravia, and finally in Rome. The unrest was most serious in Alsace, where sixty localities were affected, and in Germany, in particular Southern Germany, with eighty localities.<sup>89</sup>

Widespread alarm was caused above all by the troubles in Alsace. In that region anti-Jewish excesses had occurred in 1789, but now sixty years had passed since the granting of legal equality to the Jews – or at any rate thirty years, reckoned from the abolition of the disabilities re-imposed by Napoleon – so that, according to the expectations of the emancipators, the old tensions should have been decisively reduced. Yet, this was clearly not the case: in Alsace, where the Jews lived in relatively compact areas, the process of cultural assimilation advanced very slowly, and the move away from the traditional Jewish occupations of hawking and trading and small-scale financial dealings made little headway. Thus, the relationship of the majority of Jews to the Christian population continued to be that of traders and money-lenders, and that meant frequently “usurers”.<sup>90</sup> They were not equal but different, and this being different was still felt in 1848 to be disturbing or even menacing. The situation is thrown into stark relief by the fact that hundreds of Alsatian Jews fled from the Sundgau across the border into Switzerland, a country, that is to say, for whose Jewish inhabitants equality before the law was still a long way off.<sup>91</sup> Thus, the disturbances and excesses in Alsace had to be seen both in France and outside as a surprising and incisive warning against the sanguine notion that legal equality must automatically and rapidly lead to the second step, the adjustment of the Jewish minority to the social *mores* of the majority of the population.<sup>92</sup>

Popular disturbances during the initial stages of a revolution tend to pinpoint the social crisis that gives rise to the revolutionary outburst. This certainly applies to the year 1848 when – irrespective of national and regional

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<sup>89</sup> Data for Alsace provided by Girard, *op. cit.*, p. 123; for Germany by Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 290. See also Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 72, with a regional breakdown for some sixty localities in Germany: 22 in Baden, 12 in Poznań, 10 “and more” in Bavaria (especially in Upper Franconia), 9 in Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Kassel, 5 in Upper Silesia, 2 in Württemberg. Further information in Eleonore Sterling, *Judenhaß. Die Anfänge des politischen Antisemitismus in Deutschland (1815–1848)*, Frankfurt a. Main 1969, pp. 173f.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. pp. 13ff. above, and in particular the works by Cohen, *loc. cit.*, and Girard, *op. cit.*

<sup>91</sup> Weldler-Steinberg, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 41; about 130 Jews did not return to Alsace, but remained in Basle (p. 62).

<sup>92</sup> On the disturbances and excess in Alsace, see the works by Dubnow (*op. cit.*), Baron (‘The Impact of the Revolution of 1848’, *loc. cit.*) and Girard (*op. cit.*), as well as M. Ginsburger, ‘Les troubles contre les Juifs d’Alsace en 1848’, *Revue des Etudes juives* 64, 1912, pp. 109–112. On the agrarian unrest in general: Albert Soboul, ‘La question paysanne en 1848’, *La Pensée*, 1948, No. 18, pp. 55–66; No. 19, pp. 25–37; No. 20, pp. 48–56.

differences – several crisis elements were present and superimposed upon one another.<sup>93</sup> All European countries were affected – although at very different levels of intensity – by the structural crisis which accompanied the transition from the old corporate-feudal to the modern bourgeois-capitalist society. The commercialisation and capitalisation of agriculture; the transition from the cottage industry and pre-industrial manufacture to centralised industrial production; the expansion of the network of communications; the opening up of new markets, and the constantly growing importance of capital brought about a “crisis of modernisation”, which was felt even in the relatively “backward” regions and economic sectors. During the years immediately preceding the Revolution of 1848 this structural crisis was further aggravated by economic crisis symptoms which affected both agriculture and the manufacturing sector. The total effect resulted from the superimposition of two distinct processes which took divergent courses. One crisis, of an older type, had its roots in agriculture; the other was a cyclical crisis of overproduction of the modern type, engendered by the development of a capitalist industrial economy.<sup>94</sup> The catastrophic harvest failures of 1845 and 1846 had led not only to an existential crisis of agriculture, but plunged the economy as a whole into a profound crisis marked by food shortages and soaring prices. In addition, there intervened in 1847 a downturn in trade in the manufacturing sector, with far-reaching repercussions on the labour and capital markets. Substantial national and regional differences were in evidence in agriculture as well as in trade and industry; none the less, on the eve of the Revolution the crisis took on such serious proportions that the unrest spread easily to areas that had been only indirectly or partially affected.

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<sup>93</sup> On the problems of economic crisis, see in particular Jürgen Bergmann, ‘Ökonomische Voraussetzungen der Revolution von 1848. Zur Krise von 1845 bis 1848 in Deutschland’, in J. Bergmann *et al.* (eds.) *Geschichte als politische Wissenschaft*, Stuttgart 1979, pp. 23–54; cf. also Karl Obermann, ‘Wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Aspekte der Krise von 1845–1847 in Deutschland, insbesondere in Preußen’, in *Jahrbuch der Geschichte*, 7, 1972, pp. 141–174; Julius Marx, *Die wirtschaftlichen Ursachen der Revolution von 1848 in Österreich*, Graz 1965, especially pp. 123ff. For France, see Peter Amann, ‘The Changing Outlines of 1848’, *American Historical Review*, 68 (1963), pp. 938–953; Roger Price, *The French Second Republic. A Social History*, London 1972, pp. 31ff. and 82ff.; R. Price (ed.), *Revolution and Reaction. 1848 and the Second French Republic*, London 1975.

<sup>94</sup> Concerning the two types of crisis, see in particular Wilhelm Abel, *Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im vorindustriellen Europa*, Hamburg 1974; *idem*, *Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im vorindustriellen Deutschland*, Göttingen 1972; *idem*, *Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur. Eine Geschichte der Land- und Ernährungswirtschaft Mitteleuropas seit dem hohen Mittelalter*, Hamburg <sup>2</sup>1966; Reinhard Spree, *Die Wachstumszyklen der deutschen Wirtschaft von 1840 bis 1880*, Berlin 1977; *idem*, *Wachstumstrends und Konjunkturzyklen in der deutschen Wirtschaft von 1820 bis 1913*, Göttingen 1978; R. Spree and Jürgen Bergmann, ‘Die konjunkturelle Entwicklung der deutschen Wirtschaft 1840–1864’, in *Sozialgeschichte Heute. Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg*, edited by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Göttingen 1974, pp. 289–325.

In this situation, the feudal burdens and restrictions were felt to be no less oppressive than the coercive force of a capitalist market economy. Thus the revolutionary mass movements, born of economic and social distress, united anti-feudal with anti-capitalist tendencies, and the two appeared not infrequently to be inseparably interwoven. This meant that the Jews, on the strength of their special position in commerce and the credit business – irrespective of their legal position – could easily be singled out as targets of the “people’s wrath”. And that is what happened.

Most of the excesses against Jews occurred in connection with the peasant movements, which in South West Germany were primarily directed against the manorial and mediatised princely estates.<sup>95</sup> Manor houses and rent offices were set on fire, and the rebellious peasantry sought to destroy documents and to force landlords to sign statements of renunciation. The anti-feudal thrust of these actions was also reflected in the fact that as a rule the lands of the sovereign ruler – identified with the “State” – were spared. These disturbances – which to contemporaries evoked memories of the Peasant War of 1524/1525 – were directed not only against the feudal lords, but at the same time also against the local representatives of the “money rule”, the new “féodalité financière”. In many of the manorial and princely domains these were above all Jews to whom the peasants were heavily indebted. Finding themselves in difficulties because of the crisis, the Jewish creditors brought pressure to bear on their debtors.<sup>96</sup> Observers of the situation in Baden were convinced that the peasant excesses were “due solely to the pressure of debts”.<sup>97</sup> In some localities clergymen or teachers who had acted as money-lenders were attacked in the

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<sup>95</sup> On the peasant unrest, see Günther Franz, ‘Die agrarische Bewegung im Jahre 1848’, *Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie*, 7 (1959), pp. 176–193; for one of the most severely affected states: Friedrich Lautenschlager, *Agrarunruhen in den badischen Standes- und Grundherrschaften im Jahre 1848*, Heidelberg 1915 (pp. 38ff. on persecution of Jews); on the indebtedness of the rural population, cf. H. Locher, *Die wirtschaftliche und soziale Lage in Baden am Vorabend der Revolution von 1848*, philosophical dissertation, Freiburg 1950 (typescript), pp. 22f. and 107ff., and A. Kopp, *Zehentwesen und Zehentablösung in Baden*, Freiburg 1899, pp. 117ff. For Alsace, see Soboul, *loc. cit.*, and Amann, *loc. cit.*, pp. 100ff.

<sup>96</sup> It was not by chance that anti-feudal and anti-Jewish disturbances coincided. The immediate cause was clearly discerned by contemporary observers. *Karlsruher Zeitung* of 20th March 1848 published a dispatch from Upper Franconia which aptly summed up the problem: “The explanation for the coincidence of persecutions of the Jews with attacks on the manorial estates of the nobility lies in the fact that in most of the villages belonging to these estates numerous Jewish families have settled, having been granted by the manorial landlords the right to settle – otherwise very difficult to obtain for Jews – in return for substantial payments of protection money.” The situation was aggravated by the fact that the population of manorial and mediatised princely estates lived under great economic strain owing to the feudal exactions. They had accumulated large debts, and it was chiefly the Jews who acted as money-lenders and creditors. Cf. also Valentin, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 344.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. Rürup, *Emancipation und Antisemitismus*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.



same way as were the Jews. “Everywhere around us”, said another observer in mid-March 1848, reporting from the town of Mosbach in the Odenwald, “numerous hordes of the populace threaten the Israelites, the noble landlords, and more and more anybody who is moderately affluent.” The report adds: “It seems almost as if the events of the Peasant War, which are not forgotten here, were to be re-enacted.”<sup>98</sup> In Württemberg, a witness argued that “behind the persecutions of the Jews ... there is not merely the motive of revenge for real or imagined past instances of having been overreached, but there is also a good deal of Communism, which is plying its trade with incredible insolence ...”.<sup>99</sup>

The extent to which attacks on Jews were motivated not only by their economic position and special “usurious” practices, but also by their status as an ethnic-religious minority is not always easy to assess. Cases have been reported in which only the houses of Jews with a particularly bad reputation as usurers fell victim to the “people’s judgement”, while the other Jewish families in the same locality were spared.<sup>100</sup> Yet, in other places, it was reported, “there was revealed a barbarous fury against all followers of the Mosaic faith”,<sup>101</sup> that could certainly not be explained in terms of economic conflict alone. Deep-rooted religious fears and prejudices against Jews and Judaism played an important part, as can be gauged by the fact that anti-Jewish threats often coincided with high Church holidays, such as Good Friday or Easter.<sup>102</sup>

Although most of the anti-Jewish disturbances occurred in the rural areas in the course of the peasant unrest, the towns, too, had their share of trouble. In Germany, incidents are known to have occurred at Karlsruhe, Heidelberg, Mainz, Gießen, Hamburg, Fulda, Landsberg, Hirschberg, Gleiwitz and other

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<sup>98</sup> Published in *Karlsruher Zeitung* of 13th March 1848. I owe the reference to this article and others in the regional press (cited in note 96 and the following notes) to the helpfulness of Manfred Gailus, Berlin, who is engaged in a study of the popular movements during the German Revolution of 1848, which involves a systematic investigation of the regional and supra-regional press. As regards anti-Jewish excesses, his results so far tend to confirm the findings of Toury.

<sup>99</sup> *Karlsruher Zeitung* of 13th March 1848, reporting events at Mergentheim on 9th March.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. *Mannheimer Abendzeitung* of 13th March 1848: at Ettlingen only two and at Richen five to six Jewish families (out of 31) fell victim to the “people’s judgement”. Those beaten up were said to have been notorious throughout the region for their extortionist practices, some of them having been sentenced previously by courts of law. “It is remarkable”, the report added, “that when one of the rioters at Richen went to attack the shop of an Israelite of good character, several people cried: ‘Stop, leave this one alone, he is not an extortionist’.”

<sup>101</sup> Wording used by *Mannheimer Abendzeitung* of 13th March 1848.

<sup>102</sup> See, for instance, the recollections of Levi Strauss, in Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 133ff. (among other things, about rumours of large-scale anti-Jewish riots planned for Good Friday); *ibid.*, p. 136, the following description of a neighbour: “the Christian master saddler who is heart and soul in favour of the radical movement of his time, and yet [!] is well disposed towards the Jews.”

places.<sup>103</sup> Both the underlying causes and the immediate circumstances which prompted such attacks on Jewish property – rarely on persons – were basically the same as in the country-side. The excesses were directed as a rule against individual Jews accused of “usury” or other practices harmful to the economic life of the Christian population. The effects of the economic and social crises were unmistakable. At Heidelberg, for instance, a clothing store was destroyed, whose Jewish proprietor was held responsible for the crisis in the tailoring trade.<sup>104</sup> In Prague and several other Bohemian towns isolated attacks had been made since the mid-forties on Jewish enterprises in the textile industry, and during the famine of 1847 on Jewish grain merchants as well. When, in the spring of 1848, unrest erupted among the Prague workers as a result of price rises and unemployment, there were at first acts of violence against a few Jewish bakers’ shops and Jewish dealers, which culminated on 1st and 2nd May in large-scale outrages against Jewish shops, influenced at least to some extent by an open anti-Jewish propaganda campaign during the preceding weeks.<sup>105</sup> In Preßburg (Bratislava) attacks had been made at the end of March on Jewish houses outside the Ghetto, which were followed at Easter (23rd and 24th April) by massive disturbances within and outside the Ghetto, when Jewish shops were destroyed and looted, and even a Jewish children’s home and a building at the Jewish cemetery were not spared.<sup>106</sup> Here, too, general economic tensions

<sup>103</sup> This list has been compiled in the main on the basis of the data collected by M. Gailus.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Riff, *loc. cit.*, p. 31. The “mob excesses” of 29th February 1848, in the course of which the clothing store was destroyed and a former Mayor, who tried to stop the riot, was seriously injured, are reported in *Triersche Zeitung* of 5th March 1848. The antisemitic charges against such stores and their contribution to the decline of the Christian artisan trades are graphically presented in an anonymous pamphlet first published in 1848: *Judenverfolgungen und Emancipation von den Juden*, Münster 1861, pp. 18f. The author explains that complaints were not concerned solely with economic matters, but equally with the detrimental effect on “integrity, civic loyalty, family bonds and the love of true freedom” (p. 19).

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 467f.; Stanley Z. Pech, *The Czech Revolution of 1848*, Chapel Hill 1969, pp. 19, 46, 139, 293f., and ‘Arbeiter in der böhmischen Revolution von 1848’, in Stuke/Forstmann, *op. cit.*, p. 175 (referring in particular to the violent disturbances of 1st and 2nd May). During subsequent disturbances and risings by the Bohemian workers, the “Jewish Question” appears to have played no part. On anti-Jewish demonstrations and disturbances in Prague and some other Bohemian towns in 1844 and the following years, see also J. Marx, *op. cit.*, in particular pp. 14f., 58ff., 161 ff. Apart from economic considerations, the nationality issue played a significant part in the anti-Jewish disturbances in Bohemia.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 370f.; Einhorn, *op. cit.*, pp. 92ff.; Häusler, ‘Assimilation und Emancipation’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 62f. At first, the disturbances were not quelled even by the use of military force. Several people were killed when rioters clashed with troops. Later, the troops were withdrawn, and order was eventually restored with the help of the citizens’ militia, but only after the Jews had undertaken to stop occupying residential and shop premises outside the Ghetto. According to Dubnow, *ibid.*, p. 371, the large synagogue at Preßburg (Bratislava) was “razed to the ground”. The most important

had been accompanied by a virulent anti-Jewish campaign, so that the general discontent became focused in the end on the Preßburg Jews.

The same type of propaganda succeeded also in Pest and in some other Hungarian localities in March and April “in turning justified discontent, occasioned by social evils, against the Jews, and thus paralysing it”.<sup>107</sup> and in diverting the anger of the urban masses towards anti-Jewish actions. Discussing the causes and the social basis of the disturbances, a contemporary commentator observed aptly: “It would be a great mistake to believe that the ringleaders of the Preßburg mob on 23rd and 24th April were proletarians or persons from the lowest class. In the ranks of those, oh so honourable men, we saw some so-called intellectuals as well as men of property.”<sup>108</sup> Another journal came to similar conclusions about the anti-Jewish excesses in Hungary during the spring of 1848: “The blame is put quite unjustly on the low-class rabble alone; in actual fact, high-class rabble incites low-class rabble ...”<sup>109</sup> This is true also for Vienna, where acts of violence were avoided, but a massive and growing antisemitic agitation had been rampant ever since the March events, so that by the end of July it was felt that the city was “on the verge of a persecution of the Jews”.<sup>110</sup> The social pressures behind the movement were obvious: reference was made to the antisemitism of tailors and cobblers.<sup>111</sup> At the same time, political motives in the narrow sense, actuated by the development of the Revolution, were also of some importance. To be against the Revolution, against the Radicals, against the Democrats and Republicans and their press in Vienna in the summer of 1848 implied invariably being “against the Jews” as well.<sup>112</sup>

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political result of the disturbances was a change in the attitude of the Hungarian *Reichstag*, which in view of the “popular mood” and the possible dangers to the Jews, abandoned all emancipatory measures. For the reaction in Vienna to the persecution of the Jews at Preßburg, cf. Weiss, *op. cit.*, pp. 81 ff.

<sup>107</sup> According to Häusler, ‘Assimilation und Emanzipation’, *loc. cit.*, p. 61. Other anti-Jewish disturbances in what was then Hungary occurred at Tyrnau (Trnava), Kaschau (Košice), Stuhlweißenburg (Székesfehérvár), Varasdin, Steinamanger (Szombathely) and Temesvár (Timișoara), as reported by Dubnow, *op. cit.*, pp. 371 f. The theory that the disturbances were, to some extent at least, manipulated and orchestrated by outside interests clearly applies to the events at Preßburg, Pest and Prague, but not to the peasant unrest in South West Germany and Alsace, where the spontaneous character of the outbreaks cannot be doubted, and where there was concern in all political camps lest the unrest escalate into another “peasant war”.

<sup>108</sup> Quoted by Häusler, ‘Assimilation und Emanzipation’, *loc. cit.*, p. 65.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> Vienna dispatch in *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22nd July 1848, quoted by Czaczkes-Tissenboim, *op. cit.*, pp. 135. See also pp. 41 ff. below on political antisemitism in Vienna.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. contemporary statements quoted by Rath, *op. cit.*, p. 104; see Czaczkes-Tissenboim, *op. cit.*, pp. 156 f. for the text of an anti-Jewish petition submitted by Vienna tradesmen and shopkeepers on 18th July 1848.

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Rath, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

It is worthy of note that the anti-Jewish excesses were confined almost exclusively to the first few weeks and months of the Revolution. The disturbances started at the end of February: in Alsace on the 27th, in South West Germany, sporadically at first, even a day earlier. They were most widespread, and at their most intense in March and April, while in May only isolated districts – mainly in Hungary, to a less extent in Silesia and Alsace – were affected. No further anti-Jewish tendencies are on record in connection with subsequent revolutionary crises, including the armed clashes in Italy, Austria and Hungary, the June rising in Paris and the insurrectionary movements linked with the German “*Reich* Constitution campaign” in 1849.<sup>113</sup> The reason may be that in Germany, to take one example, the peasants had withdrawn from the revolutionary struggles after the spring of 1848, and that generally the gravity of the economic and social crisis subsided gradually in nearly all countries in the course of the Revolution. Another possible interpretation may be that here a process of political education and clarification was at work, since not only the new government but also the popular Liberal and Democratic leaders vigorously opposed all anti-Jewish tendencies. Dubnow was the first to assess events in this light, when he wrote: “As soon as the Revolution had entered upon the phase of constructive work, the excesses that had accompanied the March upheavals came to an end.”<sup>114</sup> Whereas the spontaneous mass movements, inspired by short term impulses and interests, gave vent to passions, during the later phases of the Revolution action was guided predominantly by political programmes and strategies that were committed to Liberal and Democratic principles and left no room for subjecting the Jewish population to open discrimination or persecution. The opposite trend – on the ideological plane – prevailed only in Vienna, where antisemitic attitudes and utterances tended to increase rather than decline in the course of the Revolution.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Detailed studies have not yet been made for the period after May 1848; at any rate, there is no indication of such tendencies in the sources currently available. This seems particularly remarkable in the case of the Paris June Rising – since, in view of their social origin, the groups chiefly involved might have been only too ready to turn against “Jewish capital” – and in the case of the Baden riots of 1849.

<sup>114</sup> Dubnow, *op. cit.*, p. 321. As early as 8th March 1848, leading Liberals and Democrats in Baden, ranging from Bassermann to Hecker, published an appeal vigorously protesting against anti-Jewish excesses. It was the “sacred duty of every man of honour”, they said, to oppose such “shameful outrages” which had “besmirched the shining banner of freedom ... Only servants or dupes of reaction can aid or abet persecutions of Jews, which have occurred under despotic regimes, but never in a free country”. Quoted by L. Mathy (ed.), *Aus dem Nachlaß von Karl Mathy*, Leipzig 1898, pp. 124f. and by Sterling, *op. cit.*, pp. 166f. The appeal was unanimously approved by the Second Chamber of the Baden Diet; cf. Riff, *loc. cit.*, p. 38.

<sup>115</sup> It is worthy of some note that no anti-Jewish disturbances at all occurred in Galicia in 1848 (cf. Friedmann, *op. cit.*, p. 64). Similarly, in the Galician peasant rising of 1846 – in the course of which 1,200 people, including about 200 landowners and members of

The opponents of emancipation in various countries hailed the anti-Jewish unrest as the “people’s judgement” – even Friedrich Schiller was invoked against the Jews with a reference to the famous phrase that “world history is the world tribunal” (*die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*)<sup>116</sup> – while the revolutionary leaders took a clear stand against such tendencies. Yet, even the representatives of the liberal Jewish camp were inclined to make light of the excesses, or even to find some justification for them. As early as mid-March, Leopold Zunz dismissed them as “instances of mob frenzy” which, “like other mischief will pass without leaving a trace, but freedom will remain”.<sup>117</sup> The hope that the movements would quickly subside proved justified, but they certainly did not pass into oblivion “without a trace”. The shock caused by this flaring up of “popular wrath”, which no one had expected in the middle of the nineteenth century was too great to be soon forgotten. Indeed, the memory of the mass disturbances was to trouble the minds of the advocates of Jewish emancipation for decades to come.

The Revolution was still in progress when some governments first resorted to the argument of the “people’s wrath” as a pretext for delaying legislation on emancipation. Even in the revolutionary camp there were some politicians who did not hesitate to invoke the “popular mood” as an argument against immediate emancipation. “If we were to emancipate the Jews now”, Ludwig Kossuth told the Hungarian *Reichstag*, “we would be surrendering them to the butchers’ knives of their enemies and provoke a second massacre of St. Bartholomew.”<sup>118</sup> In Vienna, Jewish authors feared at the end of March

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their families, were killed and some 400 residences of the landowners were looted – the Jews were not attacked: cf. Stefan Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, Chicago 1969, p. 122; for a general account of the rising, see Arnon Gill, *The Polish Revolution 1846*, Munich 1974. – In Poznań, on the other hand, there were clashes between the Jewish and Polish populations, since the Jews rejected the Polish national aspirations and the insurrection led by Mieroslawsky: cf. Kieniewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 127 ff.; Dubnow, *op. cit.*, p. 368 f.; Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 52 f., 94 ff.; Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 296, 471 for recollections of looting and threats on the part of the insurgents.

<sup>116</sup> Quotations from A. Escherich, ‘Die Judenemancipationsfrage vom naturhistorischen Standpunkte’, *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, No. 4 (1848), p. 118.

<sup>117</sup> Letter by Leopold Zunz to Philipp and Julie Ehrenberg, dated 17th March 1848, published by Nahum N. Glatzer, ‘Leopold Zunz and the Revolution of 1848’, in *Year Book V of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1960, p. 132. In another letter, addressed to Samuel Meier Ehrenberg, dated 7th April 1848, Zunz wrote: “In spite of all the squabbling with and against the Jews, to which I attach no importance, our cause has triumphed in civilised Europe, and in this conviction let us at the next passover celebrate our deliverance” (*ibid.*, p. 139). S. M. Ehrenberg had written to Zunz on 5th March 1848 (*ibid.*, p. 132): “What I feared has partly come true. Jews have already been persecuted – and I believe, not without justification – especially in Alsace and Southern Germany.”

<sup>118</sup> Quoted by Dubnow, *op. cit.*, p. 371; cf. Häusler, ‘Assimilation und Emanzipation’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 59 f. František Palacký, one of the leaders of the Czech national movement, warned in a speech on 16th December 1848 against a sudden emancipation which, considering the intolerant attitude of the Prague population, could not serve the best

1848 that hasty emancipation measures might bring back “the spectacle of earlier Jew-baiting campaigns”.<sup>119</sup>

Whatever views one may take on various aspects of the anti-Jewish disturbances, there is no room for doubt that in an age imbued with optimistic faith in emancipation, the year 1848 provided terrifying evidence that even under “modern” conditions in Europe, the Jews were still vulnerable to more or less spontaneous outbursts of hate and brutality. It is perfectly understandable that a few years later, in a retrospective review of the Revolution, Ludwig Philippson should have extolled the benefits to be gained by the Jews in particular from a process of tranquil evolution under the guardianship of the State:

“All in all, we Jews recognise with gratitude that among all elements of the modern age it is the State, and above all and in particular the bureaucratic State, that has been and still is most open-minded towards us, since in every period of storm and stress the people rose up against us, and in every period of reaction it was the nobility and the upper bourgeoisie who did the same. Thus it is only the *State*, developing at a steady pace, that grants us tranquillity, justice and freedom, and in it alone lie our hopes for the future.”<sup>120</sup>

## VI

Apart from the anti-Jewish mass disturbances, the year 1848 witnessed the origin of important elements of a new antisemitic ideology.<sup>121</sup> Though often linked with acts of violence against Jews, especially in the towns, this ideological antisemitism was none the less an independent phenomenon. Neither was it

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interests of the Jews themselves. (Quoted by Baron, ‘The Impact of the Revolution of 1848’, *loc. cit.*, p. 242). A similar argument was used by an anti-Jewish Deputy of the Bavarian Diet, who at the sitting of 6th December 1849 referred to the anti-Jewish excesses in Alsace as a warning example: “Unconditional emancipation would have the effect of an Edict ordering new persecutions of the Jews.” (*Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Kammer der Abgeordneten*, Munich 1850, vol. 2, p. 500.)

<sup>119</sup> Heinrich Löwe in *Deutsch-Österreichische Zeitung* of 1st April 1848, quoted by Tietze, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

<sup>120</sup> *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, XVIII (1854), p. 40, cited from Ludwig Philippson, *Weltbewegende Fragen in Politik und Religion*, Leipzig 1868, p. 413; cf. Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

<sup>121</sup> On antisemitism during the first half of the nineteenth century, see in addition to Poliakov, *Le développement de l'antisémitisme*, *op. cit.*, also Poliakov, *Histoire de l'antisémitisme*, vol. 3: *De Voltaire à Wagner*, Paris 1968; Eleonore Sterling, *op. cit.*; Michael Behnen, ‘Probleme des Frühantisemitismus in Deutschland (1815–1848)’ *Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte* 112, 1976, pp. 244–279. On antisemitism during the Revolution, see Weiss, *op. cit.*; Paula Klein, *Der Antisemitismus in der Wiener Presse von 1848–1873*, unpublished phil. diss., Vienna 1936; Häusler, ‘Konfessionelle Probleme’, *loc. cit.*; I also owe suggestions and information to the diploma thesis of Annemarie Jung, *Entwicklung und Strukture des Antisemitismus in Deutschland zwischen Revolution und Reichsgründung* (typescript), Berlin 1978, which includes material on antisemitism in Vienna during the Revolution.

possible to blame all the excesses simply on antisemitic agitation, nor was the new antisemitic thinking confined to the social groups actually involved in the acts of violence. The influence of modern antisemitism extended to circles of the educated and propertied classes, although its chief support came from the petty bourgeois tradesmen and shopkeepers. During the revolutionary era, liberal and democratic convictions tended to act as a protective dam against the advance of antisemitic ideas, whereas the conservative or Catholic critique of revolution was liable, if not to foster antisemitism, at least to weaken the defences against the antisemitic mentality. In the radical camp, on the other hand, a critique of the victoriously advancing capitalist economic and social system could easily go hand in hand with criticisms of the Jews.

It is not by accident that in 1848 antisemitic publications began to operate with the slogan that the issue at stake was no longer emancipation of the Jews, but rather “emancipation *from* the Jews”.<sup>122</sup> It was clearly an attempt to fight off overwhelming social developments thought to be engineered and symbolically personified by the Jews.<sup>123</sup> Such notions centred on the much invoked “money power” of the Jews. This had been from the mid-1840s on the target of an extensive anti-capitalist literature in France. In 1845, Alphonse Toussenel caused a stir in Paris and elsewhere with his *Les juifs, rois de l'époque. Histoire de la féodalité financière*.<sup>124</sup> Like Pierre Leroux, who early in 1846 published an essay under the same title, Toussenel denounced capitalism as a “Jewish” development and went on to damn the “Jewish spirit”, which he defined as “the spirit of profit, greed and selfishness, the spirit of trading and speculation, in one word: the spirit of the banking business”.<sup>125</sup>

Such notions were wide-spread also in Germany and Austria. It will suffice in this context to point to the essay *Zur Judenfrage* of 1843, in which the young Karl Marx – showing far less originality than its critics as well as its advocates tend to give him credit for – largely followed the *Zeitgeist* by equating Jewry with capitalism.<sup>126</sup> The idea was summed up neatly in 1848 by the antisemitic

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<sup>122</sup> See in particular *Judenverfolgung und Emancipation von den Juden*, *op. cit.*; for the antisemitic demand for “emancipation *from* the Jews” in the 1870s, cf. Rürup, ‘Emanzipation und Krise’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 42ff.

<sup>123</sup> A revealing argument was put forward in the antisemitic Vienna journal *Schild und Schwert* of 19th November 1848: “... it was they [the Jews] who established railways and thus destroyed road transport, the haulage trade and commerce, turning the inhabitants of entire regions into beggars; ... it was they who with their factories ruined the established trades and lowered the wages for all types of work.” (Quoted by Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 37.)

<sup>124</sup> A second edition came out in Paris in 1847; extracts were published in a German translation in *Minerva*, 217 (1846), pp. 259–342; cf. note 22 above.

<sup>125</sup> Quoted by Silberner, *op. cit.*, p. 45; *ibid.*, pp. 29ff. a discussion of Toussenel’s book, and 44ff. comments on Leroux.

<sup>126</sup> About Marx’s controversial essay, see Shlomo Avineri, ‘Marx and Jewish Emancipation’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 25 (1964), pp. 445–450; a more general discussion in Julius Carlebach, *Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism*, London 1978; on the

author Eduard von Müller-Telling, who happened to be Vienna correspondent of *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*: "At the root of tyranny is money, and the money is in the hands of the Jews."<sup>127</sup> Even a Liberal like Karl Mathy in Baden, who was a staunch supporter of Jewish emancipation, suggested the establishment of public credit institutions in order to liberate the rural population from the "money powers", and he declared in the Baden Diet during the Revolution of 1848: "For this emancipation from the Jews I would vote no less gladly than for the emancipation of the Jews."<sup>128</sup>

The important point in that campaign against the "Jewish money power" was that the Jews figured no longer as oppressed people but as actual or future rulers and exploiters. In presenting such a picture, the manifest differences between the narrow group of Jewish bankers and the mass of the Jewish population, which lived at or below the level of middle-class standards, were deliberately ignored. The economic power of an individual Jew or a small group was tacitly transmogrified into the power of "the Jews" or of "Jewry". And on this point there was some common ground between conservative and social-revolutionary critics. Although the anti-capitalism manifest in the two camps reflected different spiritual values and diverging aims, the anti-Jewish thrust of their critique of capitalism was common to both.<sup>129</sup>

In a revolutionary situation which in most countries was characterised by national aspirations, the national question played a vital part in the relations between Jews and non-Jews,<sup>130</sup> particularly so in territories in which several nationalities lived side by side, so that the Jews were of necessity drawn into the struggles between the opposing sides.<sup>131</sup> The Jew could not become assimilated simultaneously to the Poles and to the Germans or Austrians, so that there was no way of avoiding conflicts. Whereas the Jewish population of Poznań opted mostly for the German side, the Galician Jews gave their support to the Polish cause. In Hungary, the Jews sided with the Magyars against the Austrians, as

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"Bruno Bauer controversy", which gave rise to Marx's essay, see Nathan Rotenstreich, 'For and against Emancipation. The Bruno Bauer Controversy', in *Yearbook IV of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1959, pp. 3-36. The charge of antisemitism is made emphatically by Silberner, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-142; the debate is summed up by Rosemarie Leuschen-Seppel, *Sozialdemokratie und Antisemitismus im Kaiserreich*, Bonn 1978, pp. 19-37. On this whole topic now Helmut Hirsch *Marx und Moses. Karl Marx zur 'Judenfrage' und zu Juden*, Frankfurt a. Main 1980.

<sup>127</sup> Eduard von Telling, *Freiheit und Juden. Zur Beherzigung an alle Volksfreunde*, Vienna 1848, p. 9. Cf. W.B. (Werner Blumenberg), 'Eduard von Müller-Telling, Verfasser des ersten antisemitischen Pamphlets gegen Marx', *Bulletin of the International Institute of Social History*, Amsterdam, vol. 6 (1951), pp. 178-197.

<sup>128</sup> Quoted by Riff, *loc. cit.*, p. 38.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. Sterling, *op. cit.*, pp. 134f.

<sup>130</sup> For the current state of research on nationalism and the question of nationality, see Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), *Nationalismus*, Königstein/Taunus 1978; H.A. Winkler and Thomas Schnabel, *Bibliographie zum Nationalismus*, Göttingen 1979.

<sup>131</sup> As regards the position of the Jews in the nationality conflicts, see in particular Baron, 'The Impact of the Revolution of 1848', *loc. cit.*, pp. 234ff.



well as against the Slav minorities. In Bohemia the Jews held aloof from Czech national aspirations, whereas in Italy they supported the struggle of the Italians against Austrian rule. In such situations it could easily happen that ancient anti-Jewish prejudices were harnessed to acute conflicts of interests, thus providing a fertile ground for the establishment of new antisemitic notions and attitudes.

Moreover, the continuing identity of the Jews as a social group set apart by ethnic as well as religious criteria could readily be felt as a threat to the nation-building process. This line was taken for instance in the liberal encyclopaedia *Die Gegenwart*, published in 1848, which wrote:

“It would be difficult to find a proposition that is more firmly anchored in the consciousness of the public than the statement that citizenship must spring from the root of nationality and rest on nationality. Therefore it will be rightly asked: are the Jews living in Germany to be regarded as German, or at any rate as Germanised, or should they be looked upon as a separate ethnic tribe?”<sup>132</sup>

This question challenged the enlightened-liberal theory of emancipation, which had insisted that the Jews were nothing more than a religious community, knit together more tightly than other denominations entirely as a result of external pressures. It was a question often asked in 1848. Yet, no commentator – Jewish or non-Jewish – drew the conclusion that if the Jews were indeed something more than a denominational group they ought to be treated like other nationalities.<sup>133</sup> In fact, the Hungarian Diet in 1849 passed two new laws

<sup>132</sup> ‘Die bürgerlichen Verhältnisse der Juden ...’, *loc. cit.*, p. 392. The article also draws attention to the Prussian Government’s Memorandum on the draft text of the “Jew Law” of 1847, which had argued that the Jews possessed some characteristics of a separate nationality, so that a complete fusion with the rest of the population would appear to be impossible. A contrasting view on the same problem was put forward in a remarkable speech by the Bavarian Minister von der Pfordten. Commenting on the “distinct tribal character” of the Jews and the ruling doctrine of “nationality” as the “most important lever in the life of the State”, he said: “Giving free rein to fantasy in recent years, we have talked ourselves into accepting the notion that the State and the nationality of the people within the State must be absolutely identical. But history gives the lie to this notion: there is hardly a single state in Europe which rests on a single nationality, and this fact is linked with the advanced state of the culture of the European peoples. Complete segregation of nationality belongs to the infancy of statehood ...” The Jews were no exception to this rule. “I cannot accept that there is no difference at all between German and Polish Jews, between Czech and French Jews. In fact, there is a substantial difference between Bavarian and Prussian Jews. Even these nuances have impressed themselves on the Jews living in our midst, and you will pick out a Berlin Jew from among other Jews, just as you will pick out a non-Jewish Berliner from among other Germans. Thus, the mixture of nationalities which prevails in general, applies to the Jews as well up to a point, and if that process has not advanced farther than is actually the case, the reason lies largely in the discrimination to which the Jews have so far been subjected by our legislation.” (*Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Kammer der Abgeordneten ...*, *op. cit.*, 6th December 1849, vol. 2, pp. 509f.)

<sup>133</sup> While Baron, ‘The Impact of the Revolution of 1848’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 246ff., developed the idea that the origins of national Jewish thinking can be traced back to the

simultaneously, one granting equal rights to the various nationalities in Hungary, the other granting emancipation of the Jews, thus establishing equality before the law to non-Magyars and non-Christians alike.<sup>134</sup>

Once the notion was accepted that the Jews ought to be Frenchmen, Germans, Hungarians – as the case may be – distinguished from their compatriots only by their religion, the “national peculiarity” of the Jewish population became objectionable and supplied an argument against emancipation. The Nation State, it was contended,

“can tolerate no closed castes, no separate confederacy, no people within the people. So long, then, as the Jews constitute such a separate entity it is not religious intolerance but political wisdom that bids us grant them civic rights only with certain qualifications”.<sup>135</sup>

The Prussian United Diet was told as early as 1847 that it would be “inconsistent ... to emancipate the Jews while allowing them to remain in the rigid isolation that had been forced upon them by the earlier legislation”.<sup>136</sup> In 1848, the condition for emancipation was spelled out in detail: “They must abandon all customs and traditions, and above all those legal concepts and legal norms that mark them out as a separate nationality among the Germans.”<sup>137</sup> In the year of the Revolution, the potential aggressiveness of the nationalist ideology against any deviations from the “national norm” was still neutralised as a rule by the dominant influence of libertarian and democratic standards. Only in Imperial Germany did it become unmistakably clear how important a part was played by an inward-looking nationalism in the emergence and spreading of modern antisemitism.<sup>138</sup>

In the light of some later theories, which developed the concept of a special “German-Jewish symbiosis”, it is of interest to note that in 1848 the opposite idea of a special antithetical relationship between Germans and Jews was put forward by some authors:

“The Jews are at the same time an alien people and a religious community. Their national and religious character is moulded in sharp contours as with no other nation. They have great virtues as well as great defects. Yet, both of these are equally dangerous

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Revolution, Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 94, has drawn what seems to me the correct conclusion “that generally the Jewish population was not prepared to entertain the notion of conducting an independent policy as a separate group”.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. Einhorn, *op. cit.*, p. 126; Häusler, ‘Assimilation und Emanzipation’, *loc. cit.*, p. 74.

<sup>135</sup> D.F. Strauß, *loc. cit.*, p. 118; *ibid.*, the term “national peculiarities”.

<sup>136</sup> Speech by Count Renard on 14th June 1847; see *Vollständige Verhandlungen ...*, *op. cit.*, 1847, p. 173.

<sup>137</sup> ‘Die bürgerlichen Verhältnisse der Juden ...’, *loc. cit.*, p. 394.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Rürup, ‘Emanzipation und Krise’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 52f. A systematic analysis of the relationship between nationalism and antisemitism is still outstanding.

to us Germans, because we have precisely the opposite defects and virtues. The German generally is upright, loyal, hard-working, good-natured and trusting, easy-going, seeking pleasure rather than material gain, and tending to intemperance. It is precisely these qualities that make him the ideal object of exploitation for the cunning, busy, enterprising, tenacious, temperate but passionately profit-minded Jew."<sup>139</sup>

By dint of such excursions into the psychology of nations the general problem of the integration of Jewry into modern society was given a new twist and turned into a specifically German problem.

Whereas generally in the context of the national idea and the striving to establish a Nation State the burden of complaints against the Jews related to their reluctance to become assimilated, some dissenting voices were raised during the Revolution, which – in anticipation of later developments – took exception to the very principle of assimilation. In the eyes of people gripped by the fear of “Jewish rule” – in fact by the fear of the new capitalist economic and social relations – assimilation of the Jews could easily come to appear no longer as a positive goal but as a danger. As an anonymous antisemitic pamphlet published at Münster in 1848 put it, the “outward assimilation of the so-called Reform Jews” was in most cases only a “sham” and thus “far more dangerous to the nations in the midst of which this process takes place than the earlier segregation” had ever been. “Indeed, it is this very outward assimilation that enables the Jews to exercise a corrosive influence upon other nations and religious communities, intent on gradually dissolving them, in a political, social, religious and moral sense, in a primeval mash which they expect to be able to exploit at leisure as a raw material.”<sup>140</sup> The anti-liberal tendency of the argument – the fear of the “primeval mash” of a defeudalised and “discorporate” society based on the autonomy of the individual – is unmistakable and not particularly original. Yet it marks a new departure in the emancipation debate, since this critique of the principle of assimilation cut the ground from under the liberal emancipation theory and defined the central positions of modern antisemitism.

Even the “racial question” played some, not altogether negligible part during the Revolution, although – it must be borne in mind – at that time the race concept had not yet been endowed with its biological-determinist character, and the dichotomy of nature and history had not yet been developed.<sup>141</sup> Nevertheless, in 1848 a well reputed journal published an essay purporting to consider the issue of Jewish emancipation “from the angle of natural history”. The author described the Jews as “an exceptional population”, that is to say,

<sup>139</sup> *Judenverfolgung und Emancipation von den Juden*, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21 f.

<sup>141</sup> On the “racial question”, see Poliakov, *Le mythe aryen*, Paris 1971; Patrick von zur Mühlen, *Rassenideologien. Geschichte und Hintergründe*, Berlin 1977; George L. Mosse, *Towards the Final Solution. A History of European Racism*, New York 1978. In German texts, the earlier concept happens to coincide with the earlier spelling: “Race” rather than “Rasse”.

“not a variety of any particular race, but possessed of exceptional, exclusive qualities among all races”.<sup>142</sup> This tag referred to the ability of the Jews to preserve their outward and inner identity in different historical periods and amid diverse cultures. The author held, however, that the positive aspects of this accomplishment, admirable as it was in itself, tended to be outweighed by its negative implications for the emancipation issue. Moreover, the first signs of a racial determinism appeared in the more virulent specimens of antisemitic literature, published in Vienna in particular. This trend found expression in a critique of baptism culminating in a warning to “beware above all of any *baptised Jew* unto the tenth generations”.<sup>143</sup>

It is remarkable that even respected authors advocated a concept of racial miscegenation as the only lasting solution to the “Jewish Question”.<sup>144</sup> In this context, the sanction by law of marriage between Jews and Christians was considered not merely a necessary consequence of emancipation, but a vital prerequisite of its success. Thus, an essay written in 1848 in support of the cause of emancipation declared that

“in due course the mixed marriage must lead to a veritable intermixture of the races, which will be bound to bring about the disappearance of peculiarities and ossified traits which have so far made of the Jews such a burden on our civil society. Such an intermixture will have to eradicate the specific Jewish traditions, customs and ideas in the circle of the families, and thus finally set at rest the misgivings lest emancipation might conceivably give wider scope to the rank growth of a hostile alien nationality within the bosom of the Germanic society.”<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Escherich, *loc. cit.*, p. 97. About the special characteristics of the Jews, he said: “And these characteristics setting the Jews apart are neither few in number, nor insignificant, nor variable, but have remained constant in all centuries and all climates. They are attached exclusively to this tribe and its individuals, and they are evident in the natural history of that people, in its physical appearance, the manifestations of its life, its fertility, its life style, the duration of life, its morbidity and mortality as well as in its intellectual and moral character.”

<sup>143</sup> *Schild und Schwert*, 18th November 1848, quoted by Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 93. Similarly *Wiener Zuschauer*, 2nd September 1848, quoted by Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 50: “That is how the Jews were, that is how they will be, and neither will baptismal water cleanse them.”

<sup>144</sup> Notably D.F. Strauß, *loc. cit.*, p. 119; also ‘Die bürgerlichen Verhältnisse der Juden ...’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 406f., a section subtitled “Racial miscegenation, a consequence of complete emancipation with far-reaching effects”; similarly, Riesser in a speech to the Frankfurt National Assembly stressed the beneficial effect of abolishing “tribal segregation” through the admission of mixed marriages (*Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen constituierenden Nationalversammlung*, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 1755).

<sup>145</sup> ‘Die bürgerlichen Verhältnisse der Juden ...’, *loc. cit.*, p. 406. Cf. D.F. Strauß, *loc. cit.*, p. 119: “Let the first concession to be made to the Jews, then, be the *connubium*, and only to the extent that the effect of this measure in amalgamating and drawing together the different elements becomes manifest among the mass of the lower strata of this people (where the greatest obstacles can be expected), let the remaining barriers be gradually removed.”

The sense of menace inspired by the thought that the Jews might continue to exist as a “Jewish people” even after the granting of equality before the law was widespread, and not confined to the circles of Jew haters. What was new was the fact that the remedy was no longer sought in the educational or supervisory functions of the State or in the inherent integrating force of society, but that the physical fusion of Jews and non-Jews, leading to the gradual disappearance of the Jews through their absorption into the society of the majority was held to be essential. In 1848, the “mixing of the races” was proposed for the sake of emancipation, but in changed circumstances the same considerations could lead to opposite conclusions when – as happened in the 1870s and 1880s – the “racial” distinctions were put forward as a seemingly clinching argument against the granting of equality to the Jews.

Another of the new elements of antisemitism that emerged during the revolutionary period was the notion of a Jewish “conspiracy”. In their attempts to find an explanation for the revolutionary events, conservative commentators pointed to the Jews as subverters and agitators, as the protagonists and progenitors of revolution.<sup>146</sup> Comments to this effect originated above all in Vienna, to a less extent in Berlin, during the Revolution, and continued to crop up in the political literature after its defeat.<sup>147</sup> It was in particular the exponents of the “Christian State” who – as Eleonore Sterling has pointed out – felt threatened by a twofold assault by finance capital and communism, both allegedly manipulated by Jews and at one in seeking to undermine and destroy their State.<sup>148</sup> As early as 1848 a reactionary and antisemitic Viennese newspaper, anticipating Treitschke’s notorious phrase, complained about “the Jews, and *chiefly the Jews*, as the misfortune of our fatherland, that is to say, the misfortune of *all of us*”.<sup>149</sup>

Bringing together the diverse strands of antisemitic ideologies, it emerges that during the Revolution polemics were no longer directed primarily at traditional unemancipated Jewry, but at a Jewry which was taken as having achieved emancipation. Thus, the post-emancipation propaganda theme, basic to modern antisemitism, was already present in the antisemitic utterances

<sup>146</sup> Cf. Johannes Rogalla von Bieberstein, *Die These von der Verschwörung 1776–1945. Philosophen, Freimaurer, Juden, Liberale und Sozialisten als Verschwörer gegen die Sozialordnung*, Berne 1976, in particular pp. 156ff.; also Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 66ff.; Sterling, *op. cit.*, pp. 139ff.

<sup>147</sup> Thus, the Catholic journal *Historisch-Politische Blätter*, Nos. 25 and 28 (1850), pp. 183 and 519, described the Jews as the “most bloodthirsty agitators”, the “loudest brawlers” and the “most venomous inciters” (quoted by Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 66). A Bavarian Minister, addressing the Chamber of Deputies on 6th December 1849, saw “some truth” in the assertion that the Jews were “the proper apostles of revolution” (*Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Kammer der Abgeordneten*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 510).

<sup>148</sup> Sterling, *op. cit.*, pp. 135ff.

<sup>149</sup> *Schild und Schwert*, 10th November 1848, in the column “Check on Jews”, quoted by Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 20; cf. Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 90. About Treitschke’s phrase, see Walter Boehlich (ed.), *Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit*, Frankfurt a. Main 1965, p. 11.

of the revolutionary period.<sup>150</sup> Even in 1848, then, that ominous compound of contradictory sentiments – contempt for traditional Jewry coupled with fear of the modern Jews – was strongly in evidence. The new antisemitism was in essence a manifestation of these incongruous reactions, an amalgam of arrogance and anxiety. The malignant potential of this explosive mixture became apparent for the first time during the period of the Revolution. Yet the new antisemitism could not flourish during the immediate post-revolutionary era when, in spite of the political defeat of the Liberal and Democratic forces, bourgeois-liberal ideas continued to be dominant. A quarter of a century was to elapse before modern antisemitism emerged in nearly all countries that had been affected by the Revolution as a political force to be reckoned with.<sup>151</sup>

## VII

“Starting point and destination” of the process of emancipation – in the striking phrase of a writer summing up the issue a few years after the Revolution – were “the coming out of the dead nationality of the Jewish people and their entry into the living nationalities of the civilised world”.<sup>152</sup> During the Revolution, the repudiation of a Jewish nationality was sometimes expressed in most emphatic terms, thus by *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*:

“We are Germans and want to be nothing else! We have no other fatherland than the German fatherland and wish for no other! Only by our *faith* are we Israelites, in every other respect we belong with devotion to the State in which we live.”<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Concerning attempts to interpret modern antisemitism as a movement directed largely against a Jewry that was already emancipated – and against the very principle of emancipation – see Rürup, *Emancipation und Antisemitismus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 90ff. and ‘Emancipation und Krise’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 42ff.

<sup>151</sup> Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 84, emphasises that “important intermediate stages in the transition from the traditional hostility against the Jews to modern antisemitism” can be discerned in 1848, in particular in Vienna. Little work has so far been done on the nature of antisemitism during the “period of transition” between the Revolution of 1848 and the crisis of the 1870s. Some light has been thrown on this subject by the investigations of Jung, *op. cit.*, see in particular pp. 185ff. (summing up and results).

<sup>152</sup> ‘Die religiöse und culturhistorische Bewegung im Judenthume’, in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. 10, Leipzig 1855, pp. 526f. For the internal problems of German Jewry during the period of the Revolution, see Toury, ‘Die Revolution von 1848 als innerjüdischer Wendepunkt’, in *Das Judentum in der deutschen Umwelt*, *op. cit.*, pp. 359–376. As the internal history of Jewry is the subject of several other contributions to this volume, I confine myself to a few observations and considerations associated with the notion of “self-emancipation”.

<sup>153</sup> Statement by Rabbi Leopold Stein (Frankfurt) in *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* XII (1848), p. 210, quoted by Toury, ‘Die Revolution von 1848 als innerjüdischer Wendepunkt’, *loc. cit.*, p. 363; cf. also Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

This was the programme of a consistent “confessionalisation”, a downgrading of Jewishness to a denominational category, and thus a final renunciation of the continuation of a separate Jewish history. In the same vein, a contributor to the Jewish journal *Der Orient* had declared at the beginning of the Revolution:

“... our history is concluded and has been absorbed into general history. An autonomous Judaism lives on solely in the *synagogue* and in the *world of learning*.”<sup>154</sup>

This programmatic pronouncement was far removed from the realities of life in 1848, nor was its point of view shared by the majority of the Jewish population in Germany or in other European states (France being no exception); yet, it expressed a readiness for Reform and integration that animated large sections of the Jewish intelligentsia. The danger of the final dissolution of Judaism – the avowed aim of the non-Jewish advocates of emancipation – was already discernible, but religious tradition and the science of history appeared to afford sufficient guarantees to assure the preservation of the Jewish heritage within modern society.

An erudite and discriminating essay on the “religious and cultural-historical movement within Jewry”, published in 1855, argued that by consciously supporting this trend, the Jews would gain “willing entry to the culture of our age and of the nation”, and would thus accomplish self-emancipation<sup>155</sup> – a remarkable concept of enduring interest even today, especially when compared to the subsequent notion of “auto-emancipation” formulated by the early Zionists. Germany, the essay said, had been the centre of that process of “self-emancipation” that had begun in the latter part of the eighteenth century and had borne fruit in the political field for the first time around 1830. Yet, the efforts for a regeneration of the Judaic community in the spirit of Moses Mendelssohn must not be confused with opportunism and mere adaptation. Though widespread among “influential wealthy Jews”, the phenomena of “sham knowledge, sham education and above all sham Enlightenment, that is to say, the ostentatious disregard of everything that up till now has been treasured by the Jews as specifically Jewish, as precious and sacred” could lead

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<sup>154</sup> *Literaturblatt des Orients*. ..., IX, No. 28 (28th July 1848), p. 437. However, the journal, in an editorial note, dissociated itself expressly from this point of view.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. ‘Die religiöse und kulturhistorische Bewegung ...’, *loc. cit.*, p. 550, where a distinction is made between “self-emancipation” and “establishment of political equality”. About the movement for political emancipation, the article says: “And it is in Germany, of all countries, that the movement has its origin, and it is in Germany, too, that a natural process of self-emancipation of the Jews – their willing entry to the culture of the age and the nation – is unfolding with historical inevitability and acting as the only legitimate and effective lever of that movement.”

at best to a “sham emancipation”.<sup>156</sup> In contrast, “self-emancipation” involved an earnest and conscious commitment to Judaism, which, however, must be understood as a Reformed Judaism critical of tradition, a Judaism whose place in modern society had yet to be determined, the essay concluded. Here we have a concept of integration and assimilation of the Jews that rested not on the surrender of the Jewish identity, but strove for a redefinition of that identity under the fundamentally altered living conditions established by the existence of Jews on terms of equality in a modern society.<sup>157</sup>

It cannot be said that the Revolution of 1848 marked a definite new stage in this process of “self-emancipation”; nevertheless, it did play a part in so far as it altered the self-awareness of large sections of the Jewish population in various countries. This new self-awareness and self-assurance, which made the emancipation issue appear in a different light, was eloquently expressed by Ludwig Philippson, editor of *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, when he wrote in 1850, after the renewed curtailment of Jewish rights in Prussia:

“What do you call emancipation? Do you perhaps mean those few words that say: from now on you will have the right to vote and stand for election, and to be admitted to the civil service? Surely that is only the ultimate consequence of real emancipation. But do you not know that inner emancipation came a long time before your measures? *You* do not emancipate the Jews, *they* emancipated themselves long ago. All *you* do is to complete the outward emancipation. From that moment when the Jews emerge from the Ghetto, when they participate in all the industrial and intellectual endeavours of mankind, when their children attend schools, including high schools, and universities, when their men are active in science and learning, the arts, industry and trades, when their women acquire culture and education – from *that* moment they are emancipated and have no need to wait for a few words written in a constitution.”<sup>158</sup>

Indeed, by the middle of the nineteenth century it had come to be understood in most European states that the process of “real emancipation”, of the social integration of the Jews, had long ceased to depend in the first place on progress in legislation, though, of course, it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of equality before the law for the “willing entry to the culture of the age and the nation”.

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<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 553.

<sup>157</sup> For a better understanding of Jewish history in the nineteenth century, it would seem to be important to provide a more precise and at the same time more differentiated definition of the concept of assimilation: there is no need to confine the concept to the notion of adaptation and submission to a more powerful environment; indeed, the meaning of assimilation may include a renewal and expansion of Jewish life.

<sup>158</sup> ‘Das Judentum und die Emanzipation’, in *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, XIV (14th January 1850), pp. 29f.



## VIII

Summing up some of the results of our investigation, we have to note in the first place that the relationship between Revolution and Jewish emancipation in the years 1848/1849 is beset by a series of apparent contradictions and ambiguities. Thus, the striking features of the Revolutions in most European countries include on the one hand active participation of Jews, partly in roles of leadership, on the other hand large-scale anti-Jewish popular movements and excesses; on the one hand emphatic support for emancipation in parliaments and among public opinion, on the other hand the emergence of new antisemitic concepts. Similarly we find within Jewry on the one hand definite tendencies towards disintegration, on the other a new Jewish self-awareness, an avowal of faith in an enduring place for Jewishness in a changed world.

Even as regards equality of legal status, no clear-cut result can be ascribed to the Revolutions: whereas some states showed no hesitation in proclaiming full equality before the law, others did hesitate and sought partial solutions, while yet others could not see their way to passing any legislation on the subject at all. After the failure of the Revolutions, the resulting picture was scarcely more coherent. In many states the defeat of the Revolution was followed by the repeal of emancipation measures, but there were some others where on the contrary it was the governments installed after the victory over the revolutionary forces which lifted all or at least some of the remaining legal disabilities imposed on their Jewish populations.

Thus, seen in the context of the history of emancipation in Europe, the revolutionary era brought few vital decisions. The "Age of Emancipation" neither began nor ended in 1848. At the outset great hopes had been pinned on the Revolution, hopes which – as it turned out in this as in other spheres – it could not, or only in part, redeem. Instead, forces working in the opposite direction emerged unexpectedly. Yet, the course of events showed that even after the failure of the revolutionary movement, the liberal ideas of the rule of law and the equality of all human beings before the law had not lost their force and were able in the long term to prevail in spite of delays and resistance from many quarters. The failure of the Revolution was a defeat of the bourgeois-liberal movement – and not only in respect of the issue of Jewish emancipation – but the defeat was not final.

On the level of social emancipation not much could reasonably have been expected from a revolution. It could only impede or boost a process of transformation that was already in progress. On balance, its effects in that respect can be said to have been positive. Similarly, no dramatic result was achieved in getting rid of surviving prejudices: a political theory as a rule cannot supersede an existing pattern of prejudice overnight, but the two will be superimposed on one another to begin with; the total displacement of the pattern is a slow process. In this respect, the reform of political and social institutions was able to create essential prerequisites of change, but not to bring

about an abrupt change of attitudes. Political value judgements are slow to change, and their effect on subconscious or barely conscious prejudices is hard to assess, but certainly does not act in a matter of weeks or months. Here, revolution can be of considerable importance as a source of tradition: the long-term effect of a revolution will often depend less on its concrete results than on its interpretation by posterity. Thus, it is equally possible for a revolution that failed to be a source of strength for future revolutionary movements or to engender a spirit of resignation among the forces striving for change. In this respect, the Revolution of 1848 can be seen to have established very different traditions in the various countries, depending above all on the influence of national revolutionary aspirations. It might be of interest to carry out a more detailed comparative study of the effects of such traditions on post-revolutionary history in general and on the process of Jewish emancipation in particular.

The general development of Jewish emancipation in Europe, then, was not determined by the Revolution; rather it depended crucially on the wider process of development affecting society as a whole, a process that moulded the character of the age. The emancipation of the Jews was from the outset a concomitant phenomenon in the process of the origin and rise of the bourgeois-capitalist society. Accordingly, the development of emancipation was of necessity governed by the dynamic of that process. Where the liberal-capitalist society prevailed, Jewish emancipation advanced, and where the old forces of the corporate-feudal order had blocked the emancipation of the new civil society, the emancipation of the Jews, too, could hardly make headway. There were some exceptions, running counter to the trend; nevertheless, the age of the emancipation of European Jewry could not be completed until at least the basic structures of the bourgeois-capitalist order had been securely set up.

Just as the establishment of a post-feudal society has been shown not to be necessarily the outcome of a successful bourgeois revolution, so it was possible for Jewish emancipation to be brought about by way of evolution. Revolutions, it is true, could speed that process, but they could also impede and delay it. These two trends, working in opposite directions, were both effective in 1848, so that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at a clear-cut conclusion about the significance of the Revolution for the process of emancipation. Yet, with the benefit of hindsight we can see today that if only equality of legal status for the Jews had been irreversibly established by the Revolutions of 1848/1849, the ensuing social conflicts would have been mitigated in great measure by the lasting prosperity of the following two-and-a-half decades, by the "golden years" of agriculture and the accelerating industrial revolution. Then the process of emancipation might have become more resistant to crises, and the partnership of Jews and non-Jews in Europe would have come to be accepted more readily as a matter of course.



REINHART KOSELLECK

on

## The European Revolutions of 1848 and Jewish Emancipation – A Comment

In his well balanced and lucid paper, Reinhard Rürup has shown how little the situation of the Jews was changed in the short run as a result of the revolutionary events of 1848. Yet, in the long run the momentum created by the Revolution played a not inconsiderable part in advancing the process of the integration of the Jews into society within the existing political framework. It was a process of many facets. For the first time we find Jews among the leaders of the revolutionary movement. Their presence indicates a new self-assurance, reflected in the increasingly used catchword of “self-emancipation”. At the same time an historical bond was forged between Jewish and non-Jewish revolutionaries, which decades later was to facilitate the passage of the emancipation laws. In striking contrast, there was a revival of anti-Jewish sentiment, especially in rural areas, including notably Alsace where the Jews had enjoyed equality of legal status for scores of years. Finally, it must be noted that there were counter-revolutionary governments which in their endeavour to grant equality of status to the Jews went further, at least in some respects, than did the elected parliaments created by the Revolution.

With these observations Reinhard Rürup has illustrated seemingly contradictory phenomena, which however are not confined to the situation of the Jews, but are characteristic of the Revolution of 1848 in general. Attempts to interpret the events of the Revolution in terms of a single linear progressive development are bound to result in a distorted picture. In fact, the Revolution of 1848 was an intricate web of diverse happenings, in the course of which opposing political and social forces largely neutralised one another.

### I

Though undoubtedly a European revolution, it was from the outset fragmented along national lines, in contrast to the great French Revolution which had uniformly affected the whole of Europe. Frontiers as well as constitutions were at stake in the struggles of 1848, quite apart from the unbridgeable gulf between proponents of a Greater German or a Little German solution, and quite apart from the clash between Austria and Prussia, which did not admit of a common constitutional settlement on a federal basis. The Jews, too, were drawn into these national issues, as they were faced with alternatives that had

no relevance to their immediate political demands for equality of status. They were now expected to identify not only with a state, as in the past, but with a nation. The options thus forced upon them went far beyond the scope of legal emancipation. Here, the question arises as to how many Jews were able to accept this challenge in 1848. There is good reason to suppose that the response was not uniform, but spanned a wide variety of attitudes, reflecting the social structure of the Jewish population.

This picture of deadlocked national forces was complemented by the fact that there was no uniform revolutionary class in the German states. Economically as well as socially, the middle class was too heterogeneous to act as a compact nucleus of the revolutionary movement. Strong enough to start a revolution, the bourgeoisie lacked the strength to win it.

In Germany, at any rate, there was no definite linkage between a group's social position, its economic interests and its political attitudes. Different social groups combined the three aspects in a wide variety of ways. The top layer of the economic bourgeoisie comprised manufacturers, entrepreneurs and bankers, many of whom moved into positions of political leadership, although they formed only a small minority in the elected assemblies. It was this group which, more than any other, reaped the benefits of the revolutionary events. Through the promulgation of written constitutions enshrining basic rights, and specifically in Prussia through the peculiar franchise with its three separate electoral rolls, the liberal leaders of the bourgeois business world were in a position to make sure that the constitutional arrangements in the various German states were in harmony with their needs and their dominant economic role. They were joined by the numerically important group of intellectuals: academic teachers, civil servants and jurists, forming a privileged upper middle class that had socially as much to lose as to gain. Accordingly, their political attitudes spanned a wide spectrum from left to right. Liberal élan was often found together with dynastic loyalties, though there was considerable variety in the ratio in which the two components were combined. Yet, the same milieu had also produced the poets, the journalists and the intellectual trail blazers of a new world that would relinquish bureaucracy and absolutism.

The Jews who played a prominent part in the revolutionary movement – again no more than a small minority among their co-religionists – can readily be fitted into this complex social pattern of leadership. Indeed, the question arises as to whether religious differences were of any importance at all, whether those individuals took their stand primarily as devout Christians and devout Jews. So much is certain that Christians and Jews alike were imbued with the spirit of German idealism – a philosophy in which Protestant elements prevailed – and its romantic variants.

The strata below these partly liberal, partly democratic leading groups present a far more complex picture. There were in the first place the vast masses of the petty bourgeoisie whose social, economic and political interests often pulled in different directions. The Radical Democrats whose energy had helped

to launch the Revolution and maintain its impetus were all too often backward-looking in their economic aspirations. Many of them were, or had been in the past, master craftsmen of recognised guilds, others still hoped to attain that status. The majority of these men were no longer, or had never been, independent, but were forced to hire themselves out to employers under freely concluded wage contracts. Nevertheless, they insisted on setting themselves apart from journeymen and ordinary workers, whose lot was in many cases no different from theirs. Similar tensions existed between journeymen and workers, and again between highly skilled and unskilled workers. No wonder revolutionary expectations – both social and political – varied substantially from group to group. At any rate, there was no clearly drawn boundary at the lower end of the traditional corporate structure, no dividing line separating the traditional bottom tier from the ever more rapidly growing mass of workers forming no part of the old estates, from the mass of proletarians seeking work in towns or villages, the unfortunates embodying in their persons the crisis of society. Their distress provided an impulse for unrest and revolutionary outbursts, but not the capacity to create a political organisation embracing the whole of the lower classes. As a result, these classes were a source of revolutionary ferment, without being able to impart to the Revolution a sense of direction. Interests rooted in the past acted as a brake. Active on the barricades, the revolutionaries were often enough merely reactive in their economic aspirations. Nor must it be forgotten that the socio-economic structure, though crumbling, was still predominantly pre-industrial.

Such was the social pattern characterising the vast majority of the population, and as before, the position of the Jews – this time the majority of the Jewish population – can be marked within that pattern. As regards the scope of their social and economic experience, lower-class Jews and Christians were equally removed from the liberal elements at the top. There is room for doubt, then, as to the extent to which the Jews of 1848 can be regarded as a homogeneous group. In the towns, most of them were still underprivileged, as inhabitants or “protected subjects” not endowed with the rights of burgesses of their towns. Yet their status was not much different from that of non-Jewish local inhabitants who, lacking in property or education, were likewise excluded from civic rights. Similarly, the inequality of rights prevailing in many parts between urban and rural inhabitants affected Jews as well as non-Jews. Seen against this tangled legal background, it is by no means clear whether the revolutionary demands were concerned solely with personal rights or extended to corporate rights as well. Notwithstanding the revolutionary phraseology common to all, the demands expressed a wide range of attitudes, from the traditional to the modern. On the whole, traditional patterns of behaviour were still dominant, so that even among the strata for which there was no room within the corporate structure – by now the majority of the population – ancient corporate distinctions carried no less weight than the demands for equality which ran ahead of the economic possibilities of that time. In these

circumstances the traditional elements of Jewry, those still practising their religion, could well fight for equality of civic rights, without automatically forming part of the Liberal or National Democratic camp.

The Revolution of 1848 achieved a large measure of success in doing away with ancient corporate privileges, but even in this field room for manoeuvre was narrowly circumscribed by the limited economic resources of the pre-industrial society. The underprivileged fought variously for shares in the common land, for the funds to be made available for poor relief, for employment, and in many states also for guild rights, yet those fragmented struggles never merged into revolutionary unity of action. That is why it is not surprising for the social historian that the Jewish minority, especially in the rural areas, should have remained locked into their traditional position as outsiders, in contrast to those Jews who were able, on the strength of wealth and education, to grow into the liberal upper stratum. The decisions carried by the Frankfurt Parliament not only aroused the resistance of the nobility, but in addition failed in many cases to win the approval of the heterogeneous lower classes which, between an oppressive past and a future without hope, had lost their bearings.

Numerous problems bequeathed by the relinquished corporate constitution remained unresolved owing to the shortage of financial resources. No general regulations were introduced concerning the problems of poor relief, right of settlement, civic rights, guild rights. No action was taken to bridge the gap either between the citizen of the state and the burgher of the town or between the active members of municipalities and communes and the mass of underprivileged inhabitants. With such antagonisms pervading everyday life, the cause of the Jews made little headway, and their unequal legal status remained unchanged in many German states.

It follows that, in order to present an adequate historical picture of the delayed process of Jewish emancipation, it will be necessary to view this process in the context of social history as a whole. This involves a number of questions of methodology, which I propose to formulate, if I may.

## II

What needs to be done is to investigate the situation of the Jews together with that of their non-Jewish environment by methods of socio-historical micro-analysis. In what respect, for example, did the rights and duties of the lower classes excluded from the corporate structure differ from the disabilities and "privileges" of the Jews who had not risen into the ranks of the liberal bourgeoisie? In what way were Jewish different from non-Jewish artisans, Jewish from non-Jewish cattle dealers or old-clothes dealers? Nothing short of comparative analyses can throw light on the reasons for the halting advance of Jewish emancipation. What needed to be changed? When, well before the Revolution, Friedrich Wilhelm IV invited the Prussian local government

authorities to submit suggestions relating to a corporate constitution for the Jews, he encountered a positive response in the Rhenish rural districts, but bitter opposition in the major towns of the same region, a contrast pointing to the social divergencies that were to mark the course of the Revolution of 1848.

Another inquiry should concern the numerical share of the Jews in the population of individual communes and the possibility of a correlation with the local occurrence of revolutionary events. How strong was Jewish participation in the large number of associations which increasingly dominated social life? Could the chances of integration depend on whether or not such numerical indices exceeded a critical threshold? Such questions would have to be investigated specifically for each vocation or walk of life. What were the personal contacts between Jews and Christians within each vocational group? Was the presence of such social contacts, or was their absence more conducive to the emergence of anti-Jewish attitudes? The answer to this question may vary from case to case; yet, it is a question that has to be asked when seeking to disentangle the reasons behind the widely staggered introduction of emancipation laws in the individual German states.

A second complex issue arises at this point. It concerns the role of the Jewish religion seen from the angle of the Christian denominations. I am inclined to believe that this question, which to Liberals and Democrats may have seemed marginal, was of overriding importance for the mass of ordinary people. It should be remembered in this context that the forcible union of Lutherans and Calvinists in Prussia had led to prolonged and passionate controversies, and that throughout the nineteenth century there were recurring clashes over religious issues. The findings of Bible criticism – a new branch of scholarship attuned to the ideas of Liberalism – had not penetrated the consciousness of the masses. The question of tolerance between Protestants and Catholics was hotly contested, and as far as mixed marriages were concerned, was interpreted in a decidedly one-sided manner, as the Catholic Church was not prepared to make any concessions on the points of baptism and education. Seen from the angle of such inter-denominational Christian problems, the question of Jewish emancipation appears in a different light. It is only intermarriage that can remove the last barriers between different social groups. Considering that the step across this barrier was beset by formidable difficulties even in the case of interdenominational Christian marriages, which were part of everyday life, it is understandable that the demand for Jewish equality could appear to be of secondary importance, or even as presenting an ideological alternative to the striving for Christian unity.

It is necessary in this inquiry to observe the distinction between modes of behaviour that the State can enforce, and those that develop through social intercourse. One of the tasks of social micro-analysis, for instance, would be to clarify the relations between Christian clergymen and the local rabbis. In the armed forces, that is to say, at state level, they were obliged to cooperate, but what was the relationship on the ground, in the communes? Thus, when



Bismarck launched his *Kulturkampf*, it would have been logical for the Jews to take the side of the Catholic Church in order to safeguard religious freedom for all faiths. That Jewry's liberal spokesmen were unable to do this only shows how difficult it was to draw clear-cut dividing lines. Theoretically it stands to reason that only a radical separation of Church and State could lead eventually to the granting of equality of status to the Synagogue. But in contrast to the United States, this was difficult to achieve in the European states, rooted as they were in a Christian-ecclesiastical tradition. And even when equal civic rights had been conceded to the Jews as individuals, the question of relations between the Synagogue and the Churches as officially privileged social organisations was still left open. Here again micro-analysis is needed to pinpoint those difficulties arising in the course of everyday relations that could not be removed by legislation, though the law might establish favourable conditions for surmounting them. This brings me to my concluding remarks.

### III

Reinhard Rürup has shown in his paper that during the Revolution of 1848 the question of Jewish emancipation was closely bound up with the problem of structural change in the pre-industrial society. This insight provided the basis for methodological suggestions designed to reformulate the problem in down-to-earth terms in the light of contemporary everyday life and experience. It emerged that the catchword of "emancipation" was a many-faceted concept applicable to very different processes of liberation, and – most importantly – that the gap between legislation and social reality was so wide that emancipation ordained by law was bound to leave strains and stresses in its wake. This contradiction was clearly reflected in the contemporary usage of the term "emancipation". It was clearly an ambivalent term.

"Emancipation" could be interpreted as a single act of legislation or as a long-term process. It was possible to look upon these two meanings as complementary, but it was equally possible to see them as antithetic.

When, around 1800, the term "emancipation" was transplanted from the sphere of Roman Law into the political vocabulary, it was with a juridical aim in mind. The word denoted a legal act that was to grant equality of status to the Jews as individuals irrespective of their religious affiliation. This was the thesis on which consistent Liberals, such as Humboldt or Krug, took their stand: social and religious objections to the emancipation of the Jews, they said, were self-perpetuating; hence the legal act – following the French example – must precede the process of social change.

This was undoubtedly an unambiguous legal programme; yet, it did not touch on the question as to the role that the Jewish religion, its Messianism and

its rites, could perform within the civic society of a national state embarking on a process of modernisation. It was in the light of this perspective that the legal concept changed imperceptibly into a dynamic concept of emancipation, a concept pointing towards the future. This dynamic concept, then, became the dominant one, but was itself open to diverging interpretations. Even the Liberals set out from the assumption that Judaism as a religious community would gradually wither away in the future. They envisaged a single legal act that would grant equality of status to the Jews as individuals, and at the same time usher in a long-term process of adjustment and education that would eventually lead to the disappearance of Judaism, and thus of Jewry. In the words of Immanuel Kant: "The euthanasia of Judaism is the pure moral religion." The Liberals clearly hoped that Christian interdenominational antagonisms could be resolved in the same manner. In any case, their usage of the term implied that emancipation would oblige the Jews in the future to cease being Jews. But was this not tantamount to stripping the term "emancipation" of much of its meaning? One can pursue this line of reasoning from Kant to Bruno Bauer and on to Marx. In their eyes, the purpose of emancipation was to abolish the need for it in the long run. To the Jews, of course, this proposition opened up a highly dubious historio-philosophical vista. Advocates of emancipation in the sense of eventual amalgamation or integration could not be seriously interested in the granting of equal rights to the Jews as Jews.

The ambivalence of emancipation is thrown yet more sharply into relief by the use of the term in the Christian camp. There were two contrasting approaches. Some of the committed Christians endorsed the demand for the amalgamation of the Jews, thus in essence sharing the hopes of the Liberals, looking forward to an emancipation that should end with the disappearance of Judaism and Jewry. The conservative, anti-liberal Christians, on the other hand, men like Radowitz, argued that the Jews, as the people of the Old Testament, ought to be preserved to the end of time, and this premise led them to the conclusion that the Jews must not be emancipated and granted equality of status with the Christians. To a conservative Christian, Jewish emancipation would have been thinkable only under conditions of a complete separation of Church and State – a price they were less and less prepared to pay in the course of the nineteenth century.

Thus, the analysis of the concept of emancipation reveals a profound ambivalence. The legal act and the historio-philosophical interpretation of emancipation as a process could be conceived as serving very different aims: the recognition of Jews as Jews or the abolition of Judaism. A study of the numerous parliamentary debates and pamphlets of the period shows that sometimes both divergent meanings were present in the same speech, and that speakers were able conveniently to switch from one interpretation to the other when it served the interests they represented. It appears, then, that the complexities and inconsistencies besetting emancipation as a socio-historical

development are equally manifest on the conceptual plane. Accordingly, the scholar using the concept of emancipation as an historical category ought to be aware that this approach involves him in the very same problems that need to be explored in the study of the plain facts of social history.

LAWRENCE SCHOFER

## Emancipation and Population Change

### I

Germany in the nineteenth century was not one country, not in economics, politics, nor in cultural traditions, and one has to search for the constituent elements in the fabric commonly called “Germany”.\* Religion and class may outdistance other descriptive and ascriptive categories, but Catholic/Protestant and bourgeois/proletarian hardly suffice to explain the distinctions between, say, Franconia and Upper Silesia. Religion and class cannot stand alone, and one can suggest other groupings that could profitably be generalised into the totality of German history.<sup>1</sup> At least they could be discussed as elements of the general, not as some freak outcropping – Jews, Poles, smaller nationality groups, Bavarians (and smaller groups within Bavaria), Rhinelanders, Upper Silesians, Hamburgers, Frankfurters. The list is long; some items outweigh others in importance. Here, however, the question is that of Jews.<sup>2</sup>

From the modern American social perspective, distinctive behaviour of Jews should mark them out merely as one segment of a whole society. However, for the German Jews of the nineteenth century, distinctive population behaviour tended to belie any complete psychological move into the vaunted monolith of German society. When did the Jews start becoming “Germans”? Most historians go back to the eighteenth-century *Haskalah*, perhaps mention the theological disputes of the nineteenth century, and then suddenly in the second half of the nineteenth century they observe increasing numbers of German Jews, or perhaps Jewish Germans – Jewish-German businessmen, Jewish-German nationalists, Jewish-German shopkeepers, a few Jewish-German non-Jewish Jews. This story goes on to point to a “modernised” community that spoke no Yiddish; the members lived in urban areas, engaged in trade and commerce, and by the 1870s were entering the liberal professions. Poznań and Eastern German Jews are said to have led the way to the cities; Bavarian,

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<sup>1</sup> Religion and class: Thomas Childers, ‘The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote’, in *Journal of Contemporary History*, XI (1976), pp. 17–42.

<sup>2</sup> Cultural regionalism: Fintan Michael Phayer, *Religion und das gewöhnliche Volk in Bayern in der Zeit von 1750–1850*, Munich 1970. Economic regionalism: Frank B. Tipton, Jr., *Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany During the Nineteenth Century*, Middleton, Conn. 1976.

Hessian, and other South German Jews showed more tenacity in upholding their village life styles, but with a short lag they also gravitated to the metropolises.

The picture is of course exaggerated. Rural Jews were the silent majority for a long time, and the Poznań version of the *shtetl* lasted till the end of the nineteenth century. Yiddish was by no means extinct in the Germany of 1850. Jews remained distinctive in many ways for decades, if not in speech and dress then in occupation and demographic behaviour. But by the time of the revolutionary turmoil of 1848 the new behaviour was apparent; given receptive circumstances like an industrialising and emancipatory society, the innovations were likely to succeed.<sup>3</sup>

One would be hard put to designate an exact date for the turning point of German Jewry, for the shifts did not occur all at once. Universal schooling instituted by Prussia in the eighteenth century and by other German states in the early nineteenth century certainly contributed as much to the decline of Yiddish as the Mendelssohn translation of the Bible did. The various measures of the Prussian reform era (1807–1813) also agitated the Jewish community, though Jews as well as peasants had to wait until the events of 1848 or even later to achieve full legal equality. Finally, the dramatic economic upsurge in Prussia and Saxony, starting in the 1830s and accelerating in the 1850s, gave a strong impetus to the disintegration of the older social category of “estate”.

The Revolutions of 1848 expressed the changing social position of large groups of people in German society. Prior to that year, “progress” toward equal citizenship for Jews was not inexorable, and the draft proposals for legislation about Prussian Jews in the 1840s suggested a real move back to an earlier corporate social order. Even after 1848 and after the constitutional freedom declared by the North German Confederation (1867) and German Empire (1871) Jews occupied a peculiar position in Germany. In fact, one might plausibly assert that the Jews continued to live in a quasi-estate system at least until the advent of the Weimar Republic – witness their specific urban living patterns, their occupations passed from father to son, their exclusion from a whole set of institutions and from large segments of proper society. Even their entry into the liberal professions of law, medicine, and journalism was reminiscent of upward social mobility via movement of the caste as a whole rather than by talented individuals.

It has long been remarked that Jews in Central and Eastern Europe exhibited demographic patterns different from the other peoples among whom they have lived. Fertility, mortality, migration, age at marriage, and related measures all suggested that Ashkenazi Jewry was somehow different. Their American

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<sup>3</sup> Steven M. Lowenstein, ‘The Pace of Modernisation of German Jewry in the Nineteenth Century’, in *Year Book XXI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1976, pp. 41–56, and many of the publications of Jacob Toury, such as *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1848–1871*, Düsseldorf 1977.

descendants apparently maintain some of this separateness as evidenced by fertility rates, urban clustering, rates of illegitimacy, and even Tay-Sachs disease.<sup>4</sup> Why did Jews show different mortality and fertility? How did these demographic characteristics affect their migration habits? To set out these differences systematically will help us to comprehend Jewish distinctiveness (and non-distinctiveness) in Europe, in this case in Germany.

## II

Although Jews constituted but a small portion of the population of Germany – primarily in Prussia, Hesse-Darmstadt, Bavaria and Baden – they played a major role in the emergence of a free society. Reinhard Rürup has gone to great lengths to show how intimately tied together were the “Jewish Question” and the development of German liberal institutions. Emancipatory legislation in many states stood incomplete until the 1860s because governments could not effect the final opening up of society to Jews: the special position of Jews in Poznań, the Bavarian restrictions on marriage, Badenese reluctance to include Jews in its legislation reforming other legal social strata. Prussian statistics of the nineteenth century belied any notion of the abolition of corporate status. Time and again Jews were singled out for separate and distinct enumeration, a procedure that became standard for other groups only at the end of the century when national consciousness was becoming widespread among Poles.<sup>5</sup>

In early counts, like those of Prussia in 1825 or 1843, the tally of Jews as a separate social group, aside from any religious census, was important. Even later, when the increasingly middle-class Jewish community prided itself on being a bastion of German civilisation, Jews could sometimes not avoid being classed with Poles, Czechs, Walloons and others as “non-Germans”.<sup>6</sup>

How far back one should go to study this making of a liberal society is not clear. Social and economic historians have by now persuasively shown that historical periodisation need not follow the lines of political regimes. Demogra-

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<sup>4</sup> Calvin Goldscheider, ‘Fertility of the Jews’, *Demography*, IV (1967), pp. 196–209. On pre-Second-World War Europe: Liebman Hersch, ‘Jewish Population Trends in Europe (prior to World War II)’, in *The Jewish People, Past and Present*, New York 1948, vol. 2, pp. 1–24. Technical considerations: Ailon Shiloh and Ida Selavan (eds.), *Ethnic Groups in America. Their Morbidity, Mortality, and Behavior Disorders*, vol. 1: *The Jews*, Springfield, Ill. 1973. A statistical analysis of population change in Prussia: Gerd Hohorst, *Wirtschaftswachstum und Bevölkerungsentwicklung in Preussen 1816 bis 1914*, New York 1977, chapter 4.

<sup>5</sup> Reinhard Rürup, ‘Judenemanzipation und bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland’, in Reinhard Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus. Studien zur “Judenfrage” der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Göttingen 1975, pp. 11–36. Rürup, ‘Die Emanzipation der Juden in Baden’, in *ibid.*, pp. 37–74.

<sup>6</sup> *Preußische Statistik*, XLVIII A, pp. 20–21 and *passim*.

phic change in particular presents a problem of dating. The constituent parts – fertility, mortality, and migration – can hardly be pinned to a specific point in time; one must speak in terms of decades or cohorts or generations.

Emancipation of German Jewry, embodied in the concept “1848”, forms a watershed in the development of German as well as Jewish society. The rights, privileges, and duties of equal citizenship and the legal washing away of corporate status fundamentally changed the circumstances and outlook of all inhabitants of Germany. So contemporary Jewish opinion-makers thought – witness the enthusiasm of Ludwig Philippson’s *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, even though the men of the time realised that Jews had to continue to chip away at their disabilities in an ostensibly open society.

Increasingly, however, social and economic historians have received recognition for their stressing longer-run developments. Does 1848 stand for any great extra-legal changes? Specifically, were the intrinsically long-term phenomena of fertility, mortality, and migration influenced by legislative changes? Did Jews demographically enter German society in the mid-nineteenth century? Or did they maintain their separateness? Did the demographic woes of twentieth-century German Jewry originate in their new equality, or were Jews simply participating in the moulding of an industrial society? What did the “demographic transition” mean to the Jews?

Many of the aggregate data relevant to these topics are known, and I plan to review them here from the vantage point of assimilation and Jewish separateness. I also propose to speculate on some specifically Jewish behaviour which might well have influenced the basic demographic variables; it may be possible to point out a way for historians to distinguish the specifically Jewish from more universally applicable social and economic indicators.<sup>7</sup>

### III

Jewish migration from Eastern Prussia – Poznań, West Prussia, Silesia – constituted perhaps the most striking of the demographic changes that accompanied the period of emancipation. Not that this was any novelty in nineteenth-century Germany; after all, Jews of the South-West in Württemberg, Baden, and Bavaria had participated in the large-scale move to America in 1817 and after.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Lawrence Schofer, ‘The History of European Jewry. Search for a Method’, in *Year Book XXIV of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1979, pp. 17–36.

<sup>8</sup> General on the emigration: Mack Walker, *Germany and the Emigration, 1816–1885*, Cambridge, Mass. 1964. On German Jews: Rudolf Glanz, ‘The “Bayer” and the “Pollack” in America’, in *Jewish Social Studies*, XVII (1955), pp. 27–42. Rudolf Glanz, ‘The German Jewish Mass Emigration: 1820–1880’, in *American Jewish Archives*, XXII (1970), pp. 49–66. Glanz, ‘The Immigration of German Jews up to 1880’, in *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science*, II–III (1947–1948), pp. 81–99. Adolf Kober, ‘Jewish Emigration

There it was not emancipation but the lack of it that encouraged Jews to leave; they simply could not make a living in that economy. Restrictions on their activity made their plight even worse than that of their Christian neighbours, who were abandoning their homeland in significant numbers. The exodus was a general, not a specifically Jewish, one.

The Grand Duchy of Poznań, newly annexed from Poland, contained the most sizable Jewish population in Prussia and in Germany, about 52,000 Jews in 1816, some 42% of the Prussian total.<sup>9</sup> Excluded from most of the emancipation provisions of the decree of 1812 and even of the revised Poznań ordinance of 1833, most of the Jews of this province laboured under severe legal handicaps, including the prohibition of free migration within Prussia.

TABLE I  
*Jews in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Germany*

Prussia	1848–1849	219,000
West Prussia		22,403
Poznań		81,299
Silesia		30,650
Bavaria	1844	62,830
Grand Duchy of Hesse	early 1850s	28,000+
Baden	1849	23,500
Württemberg	1849	11,974
Hanover	1849	11,500

*Source:* Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden, op. cit.*, pp. 10–18.

Prior to the end of the Napoleonic wars Jews had become quite numerous among the traders and artisans of Poznań. Prussian moves to integrate the new province into its own economy eventually ruined the artisan and trading sectors of the area because they had depended on markets across the Russian border. Large numbers of the newly dislocated were Jewish.<sup>10</sup> The stage was set for

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from Württemberg to the United States of America (1848–1855)', *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, XLI (1951–1952), pp. 225–273. Jacob Toury, 'Jewish Manual Labour and Emigration. Records from some Bavarian Districts (1830–1857)', in *Year Book XVI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1971, esp. pp. 51 ff.

<sup>9</sup> All figures from Bruno Blau, *Die Entwicklung der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Deutschland von 1800–1945*. Manuscript in the Leo Baeck Institute, New York. This manuscript is somewhat of an oddity, replete with very detailed population figures but no footnotes. Blau was a distinguished student of Jewish population, and his other published work suggests that this manuscript represents a faithful reproduction of the figures he found in the statistical publications of the various German states.

<sup>10</sup> Julian Bartyś, 'Grand Duchy of Poznań under Prussian Rule. Changes in the Economic Position of the Jewish Population 1814–1848', in *Year Book XVII of the Leo*



migratory action, and in fact some Poznań Jews in the 1830s and 1840s succeeded in using the primitive land transportation facilities of the time to make their way to ships leaving for America. Exact figures are hard to find, but it seems clear that the widespread practice of Jews working as travelling pedlars gave them the knowledge to make the longer journeys. However, only the rapid extension of German railways after 1850 and the development of trans-oceanic steamers starting in the 1860s enabled vast numbers of Central Eastern Europeans to move across the Atlantic. It has recently been asserted that tens of thousands of poor Jews emigrated in the first half of the century, but no verification exists as yet for this claim. (In this connection the reader is referred to Avraham Barkai's essay in this volume.)

Prussian policies in the 1840s hardly qualify as "liberal". Early drafts of new Jewish legislation recommended establishing even more rigid estate lines in society, but the political and social turmoil of the era militated against that move. Instead Jews in 1847 and 1848 received full citizenship. Certain restrictions on government employment remained, but full freedom of movement and private occupation prevailed from then on. Other states also proffered full emancipation in 1848, but a number reneged in the reaction of the 1850s. By 1871, however, Jews in every German state enjoyed the rights of full citizenship.<sup>11</sup>

In this sense the acts of emancipation opened the doors to the massive shifting of Prussian Jewish population that was to occur in the next sixty years, a movement away from the East and away from small towns into big cities. Jacob Toury has laid out in a clear manner the direction and volume of the internal German-Jewish migration, and it makes no sense to repeat in detail what he has recently published.<sup>12</sup> (The figures for the Jewish population in the revolutionary phase are shown in Table I.) Over the next fifty years the small towns of East and West Germany lost large portions of their Jewish populations to the larger cities. Although Southern Germany lagged behind the North-Eastern areas in this regard, by the end of the century the dominant tone of Jewish life was urban and increasingly metropolitan. The well-known big city character of German-Jewish life had become reality. Berlin, Frankfurt a. Main, Breslau, Cologne, Munich, Hamburg and a handful of others had

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*Baeck Institute*, London 1972, pp. 191–204. Bartyś tends to exaggerate the success of Jews in pre-Prussian times and to paint opportunities in Russian Poland in too rosy a light. On conditions across the border, see Jerzy Jedlicki, *Nieudana próba kapitalistycznej industrializacji* (An unsuccessful attempt at capitalist industrialisation), Warsaw, 1964.

<sup>11</sup> A convenient summary of emancipation legislation is found in Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op.cit.*, pp. 384–388 (note 3).

<sup>12</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op.cit.*, pp. 27–51. The sources here are varied, although Toury relies more heavily than one would expect on the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*. Cf. also Bernhard Breslauer, *Die Abwanderung der Juden aus der Provinz Posen*, Berlin 1909.

replaced older concentrations like Kempen, Lissa and Krotoschin, and many smaller towns and townlets. Why?

Prussia in the 1840s and 1850s was beginning to industrialise in a big way – joint-stock investment banks, railroads, textiles and clothing, soon coal, iron and steel, and large-scale agriculturally based industry like sugar production. Most dramatically, the shape of the labour market changed. Instead of the cyclical demands of sowing and harvesting, the new jobs required year-round labour set by the clock, not the sun. Tales of dark, dank mills and superhuman effort in heavy industry have overwhelmed us all in our reading of descriptions of nineteenth- and even twentieth-century industry. Jews did not fit in here; they formed no significant sector of the labour force engaged in factory production. Why they did not is another story. Experience in food and textiles and lack of tradition of physical labour helped to keep Jews in small workshops and in one- or two-person commercial enterprises. One is very surprised to find that the father of Socialist theoretician Eduard Bernstein was an engine driver. (Typically enough, this proletarian saved to send his son to a *Gymnasium*.)

Trade and commerce were the Jews' forte – bakers, tailors, cobblers, horse and grain dealers, then small shopkeepers, then Tietz and Wertheim and their department stores and their smaller-scale counterparts. One characteristic of an industrialising society lies in increased concentration of population, and in servicing these new populations Jews found their niche. With an enormous fund of experience, Jewish commercial entrepreneurs succeeded in carving out for themselves a sizable part of the service sector. Ethnic concentrations in specific trade should not surprise us; this was the German-Jewish version. In an economically stagnating Pale of Settlement in the nineteenth-century or inter-war Poland, these commercial services amounted to very little – street vendors, poorly stocked stores, and the like. But in prospering Germany, where the capitalist economy was generating large sums of consumer disposable income, Jews flourished.

They flourished in the transportation centres, in the trade centres. Where railways ran, they came. And when their children were ready to attend *Gymnasias*, these Jewish small-time but successful merchants moved again to those cities where good schools were to be found. Small towns like Ostrowo in Poznań and Briesen in West Prussia became repositories of the old, the poor, the widowed, the retired.<sup>13</sup> Not all the well-educated children became doctors or lawyers or journalists; many of them used their talents in business. The society was wide-open to purveyors of services; Jews filled the bill.

In the Eastern provinces industry did not prosper so much; agriculture remained strong. Cooperative societies and German- and Polish-backed farmers and shopkeepers helped persuade local Jews to start moving. The same kinds of opportunities did not exist here as they did elsewhere. Not only Jews

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. archives of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, collections on Ostrowo and Briesen.

emigrated, of course – the greatest losses of population in general occurred in Poznań and Pomerania. Most of these people were potential proletarians; German historians have generally ignored the special characteristics of the Jewish migrants who came from some of the same areas.<sup>14</sup>

Legal emancipation did not “cause” any of this. An enlightened bureaucracy pushed through emancipatory decrees over the protests of many Germans; that same spirit motivated many of the middle-class rebels in 1848. The opening-up of society and economy in a broad sense occupied their attention; Jews, liked or not, formed part of the vision of the new order of things.<sup>15</sup> The new freedoms helped the Jews to choose a new future in a social and economic order that was undergoing substantial change, but there is no simple move from emancipation to migration. In fact, Jews in South Germany had been on the move earlier. Once the breakthrough of emancipation came, the exodus from the East started. It did not stop with 1871; it lasted until the end of the First World War when reconstituted Poland reclaimed its eighteenth-century territory. In the Weimar Republic well over a majority of German Jews lived in a limited number of big cities.

Jews participated in general German movements. As with their trends in fertility and mortality, they somewhat preceded other Germans. “Flight from the land” did not become a general issue until the 1880s; influx to the Ruhr basin did not begin until the late 1850s, with the really intensive immigration starting in the 1870s. Jews moved a little earlier, but they were not unique.

#### IV

The rate of illegitimate births among Jews suggests strong social pressures not present to the same extent among most Christians. From 1821 to 1886 recorded figures show that while 1½ to 4% of Jewish births in Prussia were illegitimate, some 7½ to 10% of Evangelical Protestants and 5 to 7% of Roman Catholics were born illegitimate. (See Table III.) Only the small group labelled “other Christians” had a rate lower than the Jewish rate, but very few people were involved here.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Wolfgang Köllmann, *Bevölkerung in der industriellen Revolution*, Göttingen 1974, p. 56 on Poznań and Pomerania, p. 51 on the proletarian movement. Cf. also Antje Kraus's table of settlement rights in the various German states printed in Köllmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–98 – there is absolutely no mention of the specific Jewish position. This ignoring of the Jews is completely at odds with the attention that nineteenth-century officials paid to the question.

<sup>15</sup> The best general statement: Rürup, ‘Judenemanzipation und bürgerliche Gesellschaft’, *loc. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> *Preussische Statistik*, XLVIII A, p. 45.

A glance at a single year suffices to show how rare the event was. In 1852 in the province of Poznań only 82 Jews were born illegitimate, while 1,112 Protestants and 2,386 Roman Catholics were so born. (See Table II.) The absolute numbers reveal even better than percentages how minuscule the Jewish problem was. The early part of the nineteenth century may have been marked by some gaps in vital registration, but the consistency of the figures into the period of more reliable population information (starting in the 1840s) attest to the reliability of the relationships.

TABLE II  
*Illegitimate Births in Prussia, 1852*

<i>Province</i>	<i>Protestants</i>	<i>Catholics</i>	<i>Jews</i>
Prussia	7,556	2,335	14
Poznań	1,112	2,386	82
Berlin (not a province)	2,138	65	11
Brandenburg	7,779	93	15
Pomerania	4,101	25	10
Silesia	6,794	6,164	39
Saxony	5,982	212	3
Westphalia	1,002	829	15
Rhine province	866	3,157	20

*Source: Tabellen und amtliche Nachrichten über den preussischen Staat für das Jahr 1852, p. 179.*

TABLE III  
*Illegitimate Births in Prussia, 1830–1866 (% of all newborn infants)*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Protestants</i>	<i>Catholics</i>	<i>Jews</i>
1830	8.1	5.5	2.0
1840	8.0	5.6	2.1
1849	8.5	5.8	2.4
1856	8.6	5.4	2.7
1861	9.8	6.2	3.4
1866	10.3	6.3	2.9

*Source: Preussische Statistik, XLVIII A, p. 45.*

Interestingly enough, the rates of illegitimacy varied by region within Prussia. Evangelical Protestants consistently produced many more such children than Roman Catholics. Furthermore, the areas with high concentrations

of Poles – the regencies (*Regierungsbezirke*) of Marienwerder, Poznań, Bromberg, and Oppeln – manifested rates much lower than those of their German neighbours in Eastern Germany. Only the Western provinces (Westphalia and Rhine province), heavily Catholic ones, produced a lower rate of illegitimacy than that of the Polish areas.<sup>17</sup>

What suppositions can one make based on such numbers? In Prussia, Catholic Germans and Catholic Poles had a more coherent family life and could exert more social pressure on unwed mothers than could Evangelical Protestants. Catholic Bavaria, on the other hand, showed such a high rate of illegitimacy (perhaps 30% of all births) after sometime in the eighteenth century that one may assume that unwed motherhood no longer received the social disapprobation prevalent in other areas of Germany. That is, Westphalian Catholics differed drastically from Bavarian Catholics in this regard. All Bavarians laboured under restrictive marriage legislation intended to keep down the numbers of the poor. Bavarians reacted in several ways – emigration to America in the post-Napoleonic period was one; increased illegitimacy was another. Apparently the Bavarians prevented from tying the knot of marriage (and thus limiting their children) devised a solution worthy of the Gordian knot: they bore illegitimate children.<sup>18</sup>

Not so the Jews. They too showed signs of emigration fever in 1817 and after, but they did not spawn legions of children not bearing their fathers' surnames. Four Jewish settlements in middle Franconia – Ansbach, Berolzheim, Cronheim, and Pappenheim – displayed in the mid-nineteenth century illegitimacy rates of 3 to 4%, percentages much lower than those of their Catholic neighbours and quite similar to those of Jews in every other section of Germany. Even the 3 to 4% rate may have been high because a number of Jews lived together in religious union but without being recognised by the state authorities (*“wilde Ehe”*).<sup>19</sup>

Fragmentary evidence from Baden also suggests that pre-marital pregnancy among Jews usually resulted in marriage, whereas among local Christian peasants, births often took place without a legal father. In the townlet of Nonnenweier fewer than 15% of those Jews married in any cohort in the

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<sup>17</sup> Rates 1821–1866 on a national basis – *Preussische Statistik*, XLVIII A, p. 45. Regional basis – figures from 1852 – *Tabellen und amtliche Nachrichten über den Preussischen Staat für das Jahr 1852*, p. 177.

<sup>18</sup> General: Walker, *Germany, op. cit.* Bavarian morality: J. Michael Phayer, 'Lower-Class Morality. The Case of Bavaria', in *Journal of Social History*, Fall 1974, pp. 79–95. Illegitimacy in Bavaria: John Knodel, 'Law, Marriage, and Illegitimacy in Nineteenth-Century Germany. Two and One Half Centuries of Demographic History', in *Population Studies*, XXIV (1970), pp. 353–376.

<sup>19</sup> Towns in Bavaria: Steven M. Lowenstein, 'Voluntary and Involuntary Limitation of Fertility in Nineteenth-Century Bavarian Jewry', in press, manuscript p. 13. Thanks are due to Dr. Lowenstein for letting me see his paper.

nineteenth century had conceived premaritally, while for non-Jews that figure reached almost 50% in many decades of the century.<sup>20</sup>

Why were Jews so different? For one thing, customs like night-courting and bundling which encouraged sexual intimacy among young people characterised small town agricultural communities. Jews were undoubtedly excluded from such activities, which were often involved in a calendar marked by saints' days and other church celebrations.

Bastards had low social prestige among both Christians and Jews, but a religious curse upon such unfortunates lay only on Jewish heads. Reinforcement of this aversion came from the tightly-knit character of the small communities in which they lived. Apparently, Jews carried these mores with them when they started moving to the big cities in large numbers around the 1870s. Non-Jews also brought older mores with them, and these included a greater tendency to pre-marital sex.

More than one cultural tradition marked the "Germans". Data on illegitimacy suggest diverse patterns. In Prussia in 1849, areas of heavy Polish settlement had half the rate of illegitimate births of German Protestant areas in the East, while German Catholic areas showed less than the Polish areas. Bavaria, conversely, had much higher rates than anywhere else in the North or East. Time series could certainly be constructed to flesh out these cross-sectional observations.<sup>21</sup>

Later in the century, big-city life and looser social ties did not break down this traditional emphasis on family living. The spectacular rise of German Jewry into the respectable bourgeoisie prevented the disintegration of the family and the decline of rigid social standards. What was frowned on earlier by the local congregation now met with disapproval from the burgeoning middle class.

The contrast with life among Jews in Poland is striking. Literary evidence<sup>22</sup> from the 1920s suggests that in a poorer country with shrinking economic opportunities the much honoured Jewish traditional family sometimes fared poorly. Twentieth-century Poland emerges as a place where many Jewish families could not hold out against the poverty, degradation and temptations of urban life. Berlin and its *Scheunenviertel*, though not the seat of such an

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<sup>20</sup> Alice Goldstein, 'Some Demographic Characteristics of Village Jews in Germany: Nonnenweier, 1800–1931', unpublished paper, Brown University, pp. 38–39. I am obliged to Dr. Goldstein for letting me see this manuscript.

<sup>21</sup> Prussia – calculated from *Tabellen*, 1849, vol. 2. Bavaria – Knodel, 'Law, Marriage', *loc. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> YIVO Institute for Jewish Research (New York) archives, Vilna collection, autobiographies, folder 3581. For other examples of the brutality of life among the Polish Jews, cf. some of the accounts of Bund activist Bernard Goldstein, *Tsvantsig yor in varshever "Bund" 1919–1939*, New York 1960. For a more optimistic view of Polish-Jewish youth, see Moshe Kligsberg, 'Di yidishe yugnt-bavegung in Poiln tsvishn baide velt-milchomos (a sotsiologishe shtudie)', in Joshua A. Fishman (ed.), *Studies on Polish Jewry, 1919–1939*, New York 1974, pp. 137–228.

enormous Jewish settlement, showed that life in Germany in the twentieth century was not immune from such troubles either; that is why German-born Jews felt their status threatened by the “Eastern Jews” (*Ostjuden*), who lived in such quarters.

I have devoted a good deal of space here to illegitimacy not because the phenomenon was so important in the German-Jewish scene but because it is one area where social values affect fertility behaviour in a particularly noticeable way. The ethnic and regional character of Germany shows up sharply here.

## V

Mortality was the least likely of the demographic triad (mortality, fertility, migration) to be influenced by the new legal status or by any psychological euphoria of enthusiasts for the rights of the citizen. Germany – that is, the German states – had a death rate in the early nineteenth century characteristic for pre-industrial Europe. Jews resembled other groups in this regard, but some differences existed.

For purposes of differentiating between Jews and non-Jews, it is useful to distinguish between infant deaths (birth to age 1) and other deaths. The nationality make-up of Prussia also played a role. The spotlight will be on the mid-nineteenth century to emphasise the situation at the time of emancipation. (Jewish and general death rates in Prussia throughout a century are shown in Table IV.)

It is well known that illegitimate newborn infants die at a more rapid rate than do legitimate children. The outcasts generally have poorer and thus less

TABLE IV  
*Jewish and General Death Rates in Prussia, 1819–1910*  
(deaths per 1,000 population)

<i>Years</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>general</i>
1819–1822	20.5	26.5
1831–1834	21.8	31.6
1846–1849	23.5	31.9
1861–1864	16.4	26.7
1875–1880	18.8	27.6
1885–1890	16.9	25.4
1895–1900	14.8	22.2
1905–1910	14.9	18.3

*Source:* Heinrich Silbergleit, *Die Bevölkerungs- und Berufsverhältnisse der Juden im Deutschen Reich*, Berlin 1930, pp. 14–15.

healthy mothers; family networks cannot be consistently counted on to provide support. The connection, however, is not hard and fast. An inspection of illegitimacy death rates in Prussia in 1849 shows that while selected German areas had higher illegitimacy rates than areas with heavy Polish settlement, infants in the Polish areas died in greater numbers.

While Prussian Protestant areas showed higher rates of illegitimate children than did areas of heavy Polish population (see Table V), illegitimate children in regencies like Poznań died more frequently in the first year of life. Jews, on the other hand, hardly figured actively in this comparison because they had so few illegitimate children. Only Oppeln (Upper Silesia) had an evidently perceptible number, and even here only 4% of all Jewish births were involved. Elsewhere the general illegitimacy rate stood at two and even three times as high as the Jewish rate. Very few of the Jewish newborn infants died, legitimate or not. (For a comparison of Jewish and non-Jewish death rates in Prussia see Table VI.) The low numbers make a percentage calculation absurd; it is clear that even the outcast among the Jews was not neglected. The low number of illegitimacies meant that on the average Jewish babies were more likely to survive than non-Jewish ones.

Given time, one could construct a time series extending later into the nineteenth century, but we already know in general terms that (1) Jews had few illegitimate children and (2) the death rate for Jewish illegitimate infants was low. Consequently, it follows that some social values played a major role in Jewish reproductive practices. Further evidence of a low level of Jewish pre-marital sexual activity emerges from a study of the South-West German townlet of Nonnenweier. From 1880 to 1931 some 10 to 15% of Jewish married couples had children less than nine months after marriage, while their non-Jewish counterparts show rates of 32 to 50%.<sup>23</sup> Second, Jews in Germany on the average may well have been expected to live longer at least in part because so few births were illegitimate and because the legitimate children apparently received good care.

Moving from illegitimate births to all births, one sees that the overall Jewish infant mortality rate lay below that of the general population. In 1852, every area in Table VI showed a Jewish infant mortality rate at times as low as half the general rate, as in Stettin and Königsberg, and even down to one third the non-Jewish rate in Marienwerder. Why so? Once again, one must hazard guesses about personal cleanliness, care about food, respect for the needs of the infant. Breast-feeding was important; its absence in Eastern Bavaria contributed to a high infant mortality rate there. Jews did breast-feed, as did most Germans. Thus most Germans and Poles as well as Jews fended off infantile diarrhoea, a common killer of bottle-fed babies. The wealthy employed wet-nurses. (Rahel Straus in her memoirs relates how her mother astounded Jewish

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<sup>23</sup> Goldstein, 'Nonnenweier', p. 37.



TABLE V  
*Illegitimate Births in Selected Regencies of Prussia, 1849*

	<i>Nationality (%) (1867 figures)*</i>			<i>Births (1849 figures)</i>		
	<i>German</i>	<i>Polish</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>Total illegitimate births as % of total births</i>	<i>Total Jewish illegitimate births</i>	<i>Jewish illegitimate births as % of total Jewish births</i>
<i>Regencies of heavy Polish settlement</i>						
1. Poznań	36%	59%	4%	5%	3	2%
2. Bromberg	49	47	4	5	10	2
3. Marienwerder	61	37	3	5	0	2
4. Oppeln**	35	60	2	7	88	4
<i>German Protestant regencies (Eastern Prussia)</i>						
5. Königsberg	79	16***	1	9	0	
6. Stettin	99		1	7	0	
<i>German Catholic regencies</i>						
7. Koblenz	99+		1	3	2	2
8. Arnsberg	99+		1	4	1	2
<i>Berlin area</i>						
9. Potsdam with Berlin	99.5		0.5	10	0	
10. Berlin	96		4	15	n. a.	

\* Relevant nationality figures are not available for the years before 1867. \*\* – plus 3% Czech. \*\*\* – Masurians. n. a. – not available

Sources: 1867–*Preussische Statistik*, XLVIII A, p. 21. 1849–calculated from *Tabellen und amtliche Nachrichten über den Preussischen Staat für das Jahr 1849, passim*.

TABLE VI  
*Jewish and Non-Jewish Infant Death Rates in Selected  
 Regencies of Prussia, 1849*

	<i>All births: deaths, age 0-1, per birth</i>		<i>Jewish births: deaths, age 0-1, per birth</i>
	<i>illegitimate</i>	<i>legitimate</i>	<i>legitimate and illegitimate</i>
<i>Regencies of heavy Polish settlement</i>			
1. Poznań	.19	.18	.13
2. Bromberg	.20	.19	.12 (legitimate only = .11)
3. Marienwerder	.18	.17	.06
4. Oppeln	.17	.17	.11
<i>German Protestant regencies (Eastern Prussia)</i>			
5. Königsberg	.15	.14	.07
6. Stettin	.15	.15	.07
<i>German Catholic regencies</i>			
7. Koblenz	.18	.18	.12
8. Arnsberg	.20	.12	.07
<i>Berlin area</i>			
9. Potsdam with Berlin	.17	.16	.13
10. Berlin	.20	.18	n. a.

n. a. = not available.

*Source: Tabellen und amtliche Nachrichten über den Preussischen Staat für das Jahr 1849, passim.*

society in the city of Poznań in the 1870s by nursing her baby herself instead of using a Polish wet-nurse.)<sup>24</sup> There is more involved here, but it is hard to say what. In Warsaw in the 1930s Jews displayed far above average death rates from respiratory ailments (crowded living conditions?), but Jewish deaths from infantile diarrhoea amounted to less than one-third the non-Jewish rate.<sup>25</sup> Once again, one must call on sanitary standards somehow beneficial to infants, but the connections between Jewish practices and infant health are still unclear.

It is astonishing that this differential held true in other countries (with which I may draw a comparison here; the relevant figures are given in Table VII) well into the twentieth century. Latvia and Lithuania, Hungary (based on Buda-

<sup>24</sup> Bavaria: John Knodel and Étienne van de Walle, 'Breast Feeding, Fertility, and Infant Mortality. An Analysis of Some Early German Data', *Population Studies*, XXI (1967), pp. 119-120. Poznań: Rahel Straus, *Wir lebten in Deutschland. Erinnerungen einer deutschen Jüdin, 1880-1933*, Stuttgart 1962, Veröffentlichung des Leo Baeck Instituts, p. 25.

<sup>25</sup> Hersch, 'Jewish Population Trends', *loc. cit.*, p. 18.

pest), and the Netherlands (based on Amsterdam), countries at significantly diverse stages of socio-economic development and with strikingly different Jewish communities, showed higher infant mortality rates for non-Jews than for Jews. Such continuing disparities make one hesitate to assume blithely that Jews were overwhelmingly middle-class and therefore were merely displaying middle-class death (and birth) rates.

TABLE VII

*Jewish and Non-Jewish Infant Deaths (0–1 Years) as a Percentage of Live Births in Selected Areas of Europe in the Twentieth Century*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Entire population</i>
Russia	1900–1904	11.9%	25.4%
Poland	1927	7.3	15.1
Latvia	1926–1927	3.8	8.9
Lithuania	1935–1937	12.9	17.4
Amsterdam	1906–1910	7.2	9.2*
Budapest	1930	6.3	11.4*

\* Non-Jewish population only.

Source: Liebman Hersch, 'Jewish Population Trends', *loc. cit.*, p. 17.

The general picture of death rates for all Jews is well known. Jews lived longer than non-Jews in Prussia, reflected in a death rate of 20–25 per 1000, prior to 1848, as compared to a non-Jewish rate of 27–32 per 1000, (lasting until the 1870s). A healthier population? A non-agricultural population? Better care for the aged? Better infant care? Lower illegitimacy rate? Fewer children but healthier ones? Superior nutritional habits? Affluence? All, or some of these? – except the relative affluence, which did not mark the German Jews until the second half of the century. What is striking is that Jewish mortality began a singular decline in the late 1840s while the general death rate held firm until the 1870s or 1880s. The gap between the two remained perceptible as late as the First World War and even after.<sup>26</sup>

Why did Jews survive longer? It is not merely a question of age structure because the distinction between Jews and non-Jews lasted at least a century, long enough for any aberrations of the age pyramid to even out. Even if early nineteenth-century figures are unreliable, it is reasonable to assume that the gap between the two populations was authentic. Why did the Jewish death rate decline earlier? Is there any correlation with the emancipatory legislation of 1848?

<sup>26</sup> All figures from Heinrich Silbergleit, *Die Bevölkerungs- und Berufsverhältnisse der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 14\*–15\*.

Any direct connection is unlikely. Political earthquakes usually cause only a ripple in the death rate unless protracted wars are involved. The bad harvest, and the cholera and typhus epidemics of the 1840s struck all groups in Germany, but those catastrophes seem to have been the last of the old style food crises in Germany. From the perspective of the present, it is instructive to see how the disasters of the 1840s can make statistics fall prey to necrophilia. The *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* reported that hundreds of Polish Jews slipped across the border and assumed the identities of others who had perished from cholera – again, a quirk, one which would not disturb the general pattern, but it certainly made for some strange marriages!<sup>27</sup>

In general, trends in Jewish population movements, both death rates and birth rates (for details see Table VIII), preceded general trends by at least a generation. We can for the moment only marvel at the tenacity with which German Jews clung to life. Perhaps more village studies will reveal the secret, though I suspect the source lay in a combination of good child care, fewer children per family, and communal welfare concern. Later in the century increasing affluence played a role.

TABLE VIII  
*Jewish and General Birth Rates in Prussia, 1819–1910*  
(births per 1,000 population)

<i>Years</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>general</i>
1819–1822	39.1	43.9
1831–1834	34.8	39.6
1846–1849	34.9	38.0
1861–1864	33.0	40.5
1875–1880	32.2	41.1
1885–1890	24.6	38.8
1895–1900	20.1	37.8
1905–1910	16.6	33.4

Source: Heinrich Silbergleit, *Die Bevölkerungs- und Berufsverhältnisse der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 14\*–15\*.

## VI

The distinction between the Jewish and general birth rates in Prussia mirrored the death rate figures. All through the nineteenth century Jewish couples on the average had fewer children than the population at large. The 1819–1822 rate for Jews – if we can credit figures for so early a date – lay at

<sup>27</sup> *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, XIII (17th December 1849).

about 39 per 1,000 population, typical for a pre-industrial society, but still lower than the 43 per 1,000 for the population as a whole. By the 1840s the Jewish number had dropped to a new level, some 34 per 1,000, while the general level remained quite a bit higher. After the 1880s, both rates turned downward, with the urbanised and bourgeoisified Jews cutting their family size at a precipitous rate.<sup>28</sup>

Up to the last quarter of the century the numbers of Jews increased phenomenally because of the gap between the birth and death rates; late in the century that gap narrowed and by the Weimar period German Jewry was growing solely because of immigration from the East.

The period of 1848 played no exceptional role here, except perhaps as a contributor to the formation of values of those growing up at the time. Jews and other Germans did not start having more or fewer children because of revolutionary events in Berlin or Frankfurt a. Main or of outbursts by Polish nationalists in Poznań or by antisemitic rioters in Baden. Nor did Jews respond to emancipatory legislation in 1848 or the next two decades with a different number of children born. It is obvious that procreativity does not follow the rhetoric of democrats and radicals.

Ordinarily demographers speak of the fertility decline characteristic of industrial Europe – the last stage of the demographic transition – as part of a complex of public health measures, nutritional changes, and psychological attitudes. The attitudes are often categorised by the nebulous term “modernisation”, by which I suppose is meant that people in industrial society have fewer children because they want fewer children. Why they want fewer children is a more complex question answerable in many ways.<sup>29</sup>

Certain points are general. Better infant health means more survivors; fewer births are necessary to achieve a desired family size. The decline in the death rate created such a situation in Europe; one must now decide when people perceived that shift. Richard Easterlin has hypothesised that the teenage years mark the time when people form their views on the number of children they would like to have.<sup>30</sup> Thus the birth rate would decline about a generation after the death rate. So it was in Germany, more or less. However, that “more or less” leaves the question still unsettled.

Jews in mid-nineteenth century exhibited an enormous rate of natural

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<sup>28</sup> John Knodel, *The Decline of Fertility in Germany, 1871–1939*, Princeton, 1974, summary pp. 246–263; religion and ethnic affiliation, pp. 136–147.

<sup>29</sup> Ansley J. Coale, ‘The Decline of Fertility in Europe from the French Revolution to World War II’, in S.J. Behrman, Leslie Corsa, Jr., and Ronald Freedman (eds.), *Fertility and Family Planning. A World View*, Ann Arbor 1970, pp. 3–24. A general theoretical statement: Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake, ‘Social Structure and Fertility. An Analytic Framework’, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, IV (1956), pp. 211–235.

<sup>30</sup> Richard A. Easterlin, ‘Towards a Socioeconomic Theory of Fertility. Survey of Recent Research on Economic Factors in American Fertility’, in Behrman, Corsa, and Freedman, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–156.

increase (births minus deaths), one not supplemented by any large-scale immigration until 1890 or even after. It was not until the 1880s that the Jewish rate of natural increase started plummeting, while the all-German rate remained high until the First World War. Essentially, the death rate for the Jews levelled off, while the birth rate continued to drop.<sup>31</sup>

At this point I can only make suggestions for where to look for explanations. Distinctions between city and village Jews and between successful bourgeois and poor petty bourgeois spring immediately to mind. Shopkeepers and apprentices moved to big cities, struck it relatively rich, and responded in standard bourgeois style by choosing more leisure spending and less spending on children. Or, to use the strange language of some economists, they chose to have “higher quality” children by investing heavily in the upbringing of a few offspring. The Jews who thronged to the *Gymnasien* and *Oberrealschulen* in numbers out of proportion to their percentage of the population furnish ample illustration of this trend; they did not have to go to work at an early age to help support numerous siblings.

Jewish parents apparently regulated their fertility to take account of a specifically Jewish decline in the death rate. On both scales Jews preceded Germans by about a generation. Calvin Goldscheider has claimed on the basis of twentieth-century American data that the feelings of insecurity of a minority group have helped bring about the sharp decline in Jewish births in the United States.<sup>32</sup> Social and economic characteristics, he claims, are insufficient to explain the whole gap between Jewish and majority Protestant fertility. This perspective is controversial because it suggests that Jews (and others) in America feel the insecurity of minority group status very strongly, despite the egalitarian ideology of American life. The swifter the tempo of acculturation, goes this argument, the more likely is the group birth to diverge from the mean.

First appearances suggest that Jews in nineteenth-century Germany fit this pattern as well. It was the emancipation of 1847, 1848, and the next two decades that broke down the barriers to fuller Jewish participation in German economic life. The economic opportunities of the post-1848 boom also enticed large numbers of Jews to leave the small-town economy and to enter the urban, national one, albeit in the familiar clothing industries and especially in commerce. The birth cohorts of the 1850s were the ones that began to show a swift decline in the rate of population growth; it was also they who peopled the mansions and stores of the newly rich in the big urban centres. They and their children and grandchildren desperately strove for acceptance into German society, as chronicled most recently in the life of the banker Gerson Bleich-

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<sup>31</sup> Immigration: Salomon Neumann, *Zur Statistik der Juden in Preussen von 1816 bis 1880*, Berlin 1884. Birth rate: Silbergleit, *Die Bevölkerungs- und Berufsverhältnisse der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 14\*–15\*.

<sup>32</sup> Calvin Goldscheider, *Population, Modernisation, and Social Structure*, Boston 1971, pp. 270–298. Calvin Goldscheider and Peter R. Uhlenberg, ‘Minority Group Status and Fertility’, in *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXIV (1969), pp. 361–372.

röder.<sup>33</sup> He stood in the vanguard of the *nouveaux riches*; many others followed.

Most Jews must have regarded the antisemitic outburst during the Revolution of 1848 and the continuing restrictions on their activity as vestiges of a moribund structure, and Jewish self-consciousness surfaced on an impressive scale only decades later, finding expression in various organisations starting in the 1890s. One looks forward to a systematic investigation of income, class, and fertility behaviour among both Germans and Jews to help date this new outlook of the Jews. In the meantime, a look at fertility behaviour should begin to clarify suppositions about people's frame of mind.

Goldscheider's prejudice against *ad hoc* explanations demands that one stop studying Jews as though they were a unique species. One must look at other groups within Germany, not only Catholics and Protestants but also nationality groups like Poles and Czechs. Germany, particularly Prussia, was a multinational state prior to 1919, but historians have ordinarily given a fleeting glance to that fact except in *ad hoc* studies focusing on this or that group. Whether minority status led to high or low fertility depended on the cultural values of the specific groups involved; for the moment I wish only to indicate a whole world of historical reality waiting to be studied.

Another side of this consideration of birth rates lies in control of fertility, either by active methods of birth control or by indirect ones like late age at marriage, which was very effective in a community with so few illegitimate births. The debate among demographers about when knowledge of birth control filtered down to specific segments of the population seems very naive. If people have fewer children, it is most likely that they are practising some form of birth control. Very probably people had the number of children they wanted and then practised abstinence for long periods. Late marriages meant fewer childbearing years; celibacy without illegitimacy, no childbearing years.

Nobody talks about birth control in memoirs, but Jewish behaviour was clear. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the children of the 1850s started having children at a rate which lowered the rate of Jewish natural increase. Large families appeared disreputable, and established urbanites liked to attribute this phenomenon to the poor and ignorant immigrants from the East. Jews from Russian and Eastern Europe, the *Ostjuden*, in the 1890s and after came to take the place of the lower income group, the one expected to supply the children. There were not enough of them, however, to make up a growing deficit; they could not prevent an aging of the Jewish community in Germany in the twentieth century.

The Jewish bourgeois habit of late marriage conformed very well to the unique Western European pattern.<sup>34</sup> Marriage for the increasingly bourgeois

<sup>33</sup> Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron. Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire*, New York 1977.

<sup>34</sup> John Hajnal, 'European Marriage Patterns in Perspective', in David V. Glass and D. E. C. Eversley (eds.), *Population in History*, Chicago 1964, pp. 101–146 – the standard

Jewish society of Germany meant more than a pairing of two individuals; it signified an alliance of two families, a step to be taken only after careful consideration of all the characteristics of the prospective ally. Matchmakers, still active in the Germany of the late nineteenth century, may or may not have suggested a match, but extensive negotiations preceded any official meeting of the man and woman involved. We have the following description from Poznań society around 1870:<sup>35</sup>

“In Jewish homes it was then and even later still the custom that parents, relatives, friends of the family or professional matchmakers came to suggest this or that man for this or that young girl. If the external conditions like family, occupation, fortune, and health were satisfactory, then the parents of the girl consented for the young man to come for a ‘viewing’ (*Beschau*). Rarely did the young man leave without becoming engaged. That would have been a gross insult, for in truth one married not the individual girl but ‘into a family’.”

The popularity of the memoirs of Glückel of Hameln has bred a notion of a tradition of very young Jewish brides in Germany. Both aggregate and local data suggest that Jews married late and not as frequently as non-Jews in Prussia as a whole and in four Bavarian villages, in Nonnenweier in Baden, and in Berlin. Marriage figures for Prussia for the period from 1820 to 1867 are shown in Table IX; full details on the average age at marriage are given in Table X.

TABLE IX  
*Marriages per 1,000 Population in Prussia, 1820–1867*

<i>Years</i>	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
1820–1822	18.73	17.58	14.38
1832–1834	18.91	19.57	15.63
1841–1843	18.33	17.83	16.12
1850–1852	18.33	17.32	15.62
1865–1867	17.61	16.99	15.39

*Source: Preussische Statistik, XLVIII A, p. 174.*

Bavaria’s well known restrictions on marriages lasted for Jews until the 1860s. Like other Bavarians, many Jews had emigrated to the United States earlier in the century. However, other Bavarians, who were also limited in their

statement. Cf. also June L. Sklar, ‘The Role of Marriage Behavior in the Demographic Transition. The Case of Eastern Europe Around 1900’, in *Population Studies*, XXVIII (1974), pp. 231–247, and Katharine Gaskin, ‘Age at First Marriage in Europe Before 1850. A Summary of Family Reconstitution Data’, in *Journal of Family History*, III (1978), pp. 23–33.

<sup>35</sup> Straus, *Wir lebten in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, p. 14. My thanks to Monika Richarz for calling this passage to my attention.



TABLE X  
Average Age at Marriage in Nineteenth-Century Germany

<i>Marriage year</i>	<i>Men</i>		<i>Women</i>		<i>Number of cases</i>
	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Non-Jews</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Non-Jews</i>	
<i>Nonnenweier</i>					
1800–1849	32.1	27.9	26.6	24.3	
1850–1879	30.8	29.9	25.7	25.1	
1880–1931	31.8	28.7	26.1	24.4	
<i>Bavarian towns and villages, first marriages, Jews only</i>					
1834–1840					
Ansbach	30.4		28.9		
Pappenheim	37.0		36.7		
Schopfloch	31.5		28.6		
Demmelsdorf	30.4		24.8		
1871–1880					
Berolzheim	27.0		23.0		
Cronheim	28.2		22.5		
Ansbach	34.4		21.9		
<i>Berlin, Jews only</i>					
1759–1768					
exc. age 40+*	26.9		23.5		**M = 134, W = 175
all cases	28.5		23.6		M = 145, W = 176
1769–1778					
exc. age 40+	26.6		22.1		M = 84, W = 73
all cases	27.3		22.4		M = 87, W = 74
1779–1788					
exc. age 40+	25.3		22.3		M = 99, W = 69
all cases	27.2		23.3		M = 108, W = 71
1789–1798					
exc. age 40+	29.6		23.3		M = 117, W = 118
all cases	32.6		24.4		M = 138, W = 122
1799–1808					
exc. age 40+	31.2		25.1		M = 128, W = 157
all cases	34.1		25.5		M = 152, W = 159
1808–1813					
exc. age 40+	31.3		25.7		M = 58, W = 71
all cases	35.5		26.3		M = 81, W = 75

\* Age 40+ excluded to minimise effect of re-marriage. The likelihood of a first marriage beyond age 40 was a distinct possibility because of the difficulty in obtaining a right to settle in the city. Definite re-marriages are excluded here.

\*\* M = Men; W = Women.

TABLE X (continued)  
Average Age at Marriage in Nineteenth-Century Germany

Marriage year	Men		Women		Number of cases
	Jews	Non-Jews	Jews	Non-Jews	
<i>Berlin, Jews only*</i>					
1847	28.9		25.2		63
1848	30.0		27.2		105
1849	29.1		25.4		171
1850	30.3		25.3		237
1851	30.1		25.2		292
1847–1851	29.9		25.5		868
<i>Berlin, Jews only</i>					<i>Total Jewish marriages</i>
1850	30.2		25.8		***
1852	29.2		25.8		176
1855	29.8		24.4		130
1857	29.5		23.9		approx. 175
1859	30.4		24.4		150
1861	29.8		25.1		approx. 135
1863	29.3		24.3		?
1865	27.7		24.5		approx. 155
1869	30.0		25.0		approx. 200
1871	30.3		24.2		approx. 230
1873	29.2		25.5		approx. 200

\* All cases age 40+ excluded to minimise effect of re-marriage.

\*\* Sample size = 20–25% of the recorded marriages in each year.

*Sources:*

Nonnenweier – Goldstein, 'Nonnenweier', p. 18.

Bavaria – Lowenstein, 'Voluntary and Involuntary Limitation of Fertility in Nineteenth-Century Bavarian Jewry'.

Berlin, 1759–1813 – Jacob Jacobson (ed.), *Jüdische Trauungen in Berlin, 1759–1813*. Berlin 1968 (collection of genealogies of grooms and brides).

Berlin, 1847–1851 – Archives of the New York Leo Baeck Institute, Jacobson collection I 46, marriage certificates, Berlin.

Berlin, 1850–1873 – Staatsarchiv Potsdam, Rep. 5 D, Stadtgericht Berlin, Jewish marriages, volumes relating to these years. (I wish to record here my thanks to the archivists in Potsdam for allowing me to see this uncatalogued material.)

right to marry, continued to procreate (high rate of illegitimacy). Jews, as we have seen, restrained themselves. While Bavarians did not despise the offspring of illegitimate marriages, Jews branded such children as social outcasts. One group value system in this case thwarted the Bavarian officials' intent to limit

the numbers of the poor while the Jewish system supported the aims of the governors.<sup>36</sup>

Berlin before 1813 formed a special case, for Jewish elders and Christian officials held a tight rein on both entry to and the right to sojourn in the city. It is still of some interest to see the presumably high age at marriage in the eighteenth century. In a restricted population like that of Berlin, most marriages may be assumed to have been arranged between established families, most likely between an economically established man and quite often a young woman or perhaps even a teenager. The less well-to-do left barely a trace, such as the Isaac Wolf who on approximately 7th November 1761, married a domestic servant and left with her immediately for Mecklenburg. Berlin marriage certificates rarely list a groom under twenty-one. Moses Mendelssohn was thirty-three, while the more prosperous David Friedländer could afford to get married at twenty-two. Good dowries no doubt allowed some women earlier entry into matrimony, such as the fifteen-year old Henriette Herz and the nineteen-year old later famous as Dorothea Schlegel.<sup>37</sup>

Age at marriage among Berlin Jews started to rise toward the end of the eighteenth century, and by 1809–1813 approximated the average age for 1847–1851. The average age at first marriage in Berlin seems extraordinarily high in the nineteenth century, including the 1850s and 1860s – close to thirty for men, twenty-four to twenty-five for women. I have not been able to isolate comparative figures for Prussia as a whole or for the total population of Berlin, but I suspect that Jewish bridegrooms and brides were older than their Christian counterparts. This pattern strengthens the prevailing image of a society already bourgeois in behaviour patterns; men had to be economically established in life before marrying.

Cultural traditions do not die as easily as laws, as Bavarian illegitimacy shows. I would contend that the evolving socio-economic situation of the Jews and their earlier habits of late marriage reinforced each other and promoted this involuntary limit on fertility. Local case studies do not yet exist to modify what might be called a two-dimensional view of German society. However, Alice Goldstein's use of an *Ortssippenbuch* (a sort of village genealogy) as well as the existence of scattered archival materials, like those on Briesen (West Prussia) and Ostrowo (Poznań) in the YIVO archives, and like those from local town hall marriage offices hold out hope for a view of regional variations in Jewish, German, and Polish marriage behaviour.

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<sup>36</sup> Non-Jews: Knodel, 'Law, Marriage, and Illegitimacy'. Bavarian values: Phayer, 'Lower-Class Morality', *loc.cit.*, and the recent debate: W.R. Lee, 'Bastardy and the Socioeconomic Structure of South Germany', in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, VII (1977), pp. 403–425; Edward Shorter, 'Bastardy in South Germany. A Comment', in *ibid.*, VIII (1978), pp. 459–469; Lee, 'Bastardy in South Germany. A Reply', in *ibid.*, pp. 471–476. Jews in Bavaria: Lowenstein, 'Voluntary and Involuntary Limitation'.

<sup>37</sup> Jacob Jacobson (ed.), *Jüdische Trauungen in Berlin*, *op.cit.*: Wolf No. 83a; Mendelssohn No. 113; Friedländer No. 307; Herz No. 433; Schlegel No. 485.

In sum, in the first half of the nineteenth century Jews married later (less often?) than other Germans and certainly less than Poles in Prussia. Jews had fewer but healthier children, usually legitimate ones, and they lived longer. As a result Jewish population growth outstripped the general rate for at least the first six decades of the nineteenth century. As the first generation born into emancipated and industrialised society grew up, families became smaller. The gap between birth rates and death rates began to decline, while for the general population the rate of natural increase continued high. Native Jews were approaching the state of a stationary population (no growth) or even a declining one; only supplies from the prolific East filled out the population pyramid.<sup>38</sup> When the influx of newcomers declined during the First World War and after, the Jewish community as a whole grew older and became relatively smaller.

## VII

Demographic characteristics of population often are relegated to a subordinate role as “results” of socio-economic developments. Even the most sensitive of demographers, aware of the values lurking behind behavioural decisions, such as how many children to have and when and if to migrate, have usually been reluctant to delve into the set of values and customs which complement the more tangible social and economic environment. Demographic change in the past may be difficult to grasp, but we should go beyond a simplistic version of the Marx-Weber dispute that underpins much of the writing of historians and sociologists: do people’s values determine their changing behaviour, or does the shifting economic and social reality prepare the ground for new sets of values and tastes?<sup>39</sup>

In particular, fertility, mortality, migration, and their constituent parts make one look at group values set in particular socio-economic circumstances. Differences of this sort usually are measured in an urban-rural dichotomy, but recent work suggests that such a distinction may not be of overriding importance on the German scene.<sup>40</sup> Urban men and women may have been born and may have died at different rates from their rural compatriots, but the differences were not so extensive nor so long-lived as often assumed. In fact, cultural

<sup>38</sup> Rate of natural increase for Jews and non-Jews in Prussia and Bavaria: 1852–1866: *Preussische Statistik*, XLVIII A, pp. 65–66. Rate of natural increase by province: Silbergleit, *Die Bevölkerungs- und Berufsverhältnisse der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18\*–19\*. Decline in German fertility: Knodel, *Decline of Fertility*, *op. cit.*, esp. 136–141.

<sup>39</sup> Some notable exceptions – work by Richard Easterlin (note 30) and Calvin Goldscheider (note 4).

<sup>40</sup> John Knodel, ‘Town and Country in Nineteenth-Century Germany. A Review of Urban-Rural Differentials in Demographic Behavior’, *Social Science History*, I (1977), pp. 356–382, esp. 377–378.

variations within the German states may have contributed as much to fertility differentials as did socio-economic causes. Such regionally distinct customs as breast-feeding and night-courting account for significant variations in infant survival and in numbers of illegitimate births. These differences apparently transcended the urban-rural distinction. Ethnographic idiosyncrasies like these sometimes fade away in the accounts by responsible historians, who fear to fall victim to the charge of triviality and antiquarianism.

Moreover, cultural variations can also be expanded from individual customs like these to a whole complex of items making up a "Culture" writ large. Jews in Germany and elsewhere in Europe are one important example. Other national minorities, like the Poles in Germany, are another. Class distinctions are important at some times and places; even certain occupational groups like miners have exhibited very specific fertility patterns of their own. In any case, German Jews did exhibit specific residency patterns, specific occupational patterns, and specific demographic patterns.

The demography of nineteenth-century German Jews illustrates a certain separateness of the group and suggests a way of looking at the sub-sectors of the larger society. Population behaviour also betrays a set of psychological attitudes whose import is obvious but whose content remains murky. The German Jews lowered their death rates and birth rates before other Germans. Later they dropped actual family size to a point well below replacement level in the twentieth century. Jews also displayed specific migration patterns. Early in the nineteenth century they moved abroad with other South Germans, and from the 1830s on they started leaving the Eastern provinces for both America and German regions farther West. After the 1840s they became especially marked by their rush to the metropolis.

Some critics might suggest that the distinctions exemplified here are too crude to account for the diversity in German society. What in fact occurred was a split along class lines. As Jews entered the middle class, they behaved demographically like the middle class. A more apt comparison would be between the German of Polish middle class and the Jewish middle class; that comparison for the moment constitutes more an alternative hypothesis than a refutation of my proposal here. After all, did Jews become middle-class, and then alter their fertility patterns, or was it their low birth rate and smaller family size that assisted them in their climb up the social ladder? It is all too easy to assume the inexorable rule of class behaviour; historical reality suggests that values shared by ethnic groups play an important role in defining social behaviour. Jews everywhere in Germany – rural and urban, rich and poor, established bourgeois and marginal trader – all exhibited patterns of demographic behaviour which set them off from other peoples.

To say that Jewish birth and death rates shifted because the Jews were urban and bourgeois simply shifts the question; why were they urban and bourgeois? Demographic behaviours were in part functions of the new locale and life styles, but in part they were independent variables. Jews in Germany

seemed to have a different ideal family size from other Germans, and Jewish customs and standards helped them develop a characteristic demographic profile. From that profile we may go back to understand changing Jewish values of the times.

The connection between health standards, local customs, and the birth and death rates provides another opportunity to investigate sub-groupings in German society. Here is “hard” evidence for intellectual history. To mention but one item – we would like to know when the mass of Jews in Germany began to harbour doubts about their acculturation into German society. Do declining birth rates suggest insecurity as early as the 1880s, as the Goldscheider-Uhlenberg proposition would have us believe?<sup>41</sup> The jury is still out on this and on most other demographic-psychological relationships. But the material is available; and this essay which centres on the decades before and after the Revolution of 1848, but of necessity draws comparisons with earlier and later times, should be viewed as merely a first attempt to point in this direction.

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<sup>41</sup> Goldscheider and Uhlenberg, ‘Minority Group Status’, *loc. cit.*



PETER PULZER

on

## Emancipation and Population Change A Comment

Nothing is more difficult to establish in history than causality. It is difficult enough in political or diplomatic history. But in the end, once we have been through the sources, weighed up the evidence, sharpened one argument against another, we are reasonably confident that we know why there was a French Revolution, why the First World War broke out, why the Cold War developed. And even if there is no consensus among the specialist scholars the interpretations are generally reduced to two or three well-defined theses, each representing a coherent and plausible position. Faced with tangible events such as these, the historian confesses failure when he asserts that we cannot know their causes.

But does the same argument apply to social and cultural history? How do we account for changes in beliefs, tastes and habits? Sometimes there are economic explanations. Technological advances make possible the acquisition of household furniture or cotton clothes, the proliferation of seaside holidays or the popularity of certain sports and games. But such explanations cover a very narrow range. They tell us nothing about why one style of furniture or fashion in clothes prevails over another, why one leisure activity displaces another equally favoured by the economic framework. Unless we believe all social and cultural developments to be epiphenomenal, we have to admit that there is a large element of the arbitrary and unpredictable here.

There is a further difficulty. Political situations can change rapidly and decisively. One day Richard Nixon is President, the next he is not. One year China is the ally of Russia, the next it is not. No doubt there are subterranean, longer-term causes for these sudden events, but the suddenness of the event is often crucial in changing people's consciousness and affecting their later actions. So it is with 1848 and the political situation of the Jews in Germany. As Reinhard Rürup<sup>1</sup> pointed out, from 1848 onwards Jews ceased to be the mere objects of politics: their self-image had changed. A few days in March had done the trick. But social changes take longer. It is a generation, perhaps longer, before migration to towns, the abandonment of traditional for bourgeois clothes, the change from Yiddish to German or the beginnings of intermarriage make themselves felt in the internal transformation of a community.

So it is with demographic changes. Indeed, demographic changes may be an extreme case, for the statistics show no more than an aggregate of individual

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<sup>1</sup> Reinhard Rürup, the first essay in this volume.



choices. For that reason it may be useful to distinguish between mortality and fertility rates. Mortality rates probably change for largely external reasons: better medical provision, better diets, more reliable food supplies – though to what extent the individual takes advantage of them does, admittedly, remain a subjective matter. Fertility contains a much higher voluntaristic element. As Lawrence Schofer puts it, “... people on the average knew how to cut down on children ... Most likely people had the number of children they wanted ...”

But what determined the number of children they wanted? Here we are back at causality, and in search of the independent variable. At one point Lawrence Schofer suggests that there are demographic behaviour patterns common to Jews throughout Europe, from Lithuania to France, irrespective of their immediate environment. But he does not pursue this and perhaps this is just as well: the deviant behaviour of Jews within Germany is complicated enough. But is being a Jew in Germany an independent variable? Schofer compares Jewish fertility with Protestant and Catholic and suggests that one might compare it with that of the Polish and Czech minorities and one region with another. The advantage of this method is that the census data for these categories are readily available. The disadvantage is that these may not be the most suitable reference groups. Indeed Schofer gives himself a clue at one stage which he then does not follow up, when he suggests that “Jews continued to live in a quasi-estate system at least until the advent of the Weimar Republic”.

This could mean two things. On the one hand – as he implies – a cohesive internal structure and exclusiveness from “proper society”; on the other hand, existing as one estate among many in a society still characterised by a plurality of such sub-groups. If the latter assumption is valid we need to seek another estate as a reference group, one defined not only by denominational and ethnic, but also by socio-economic criteria. The nearest that suggests itself is the North German Protestant middle class. There are unfortunately no ready-made census figures for it – but with some ingenuity they could probably be derived from a sample of residential areas.

The reason for attempting this comparison would be to test the most tempting of the hypotheses that would explain why the drop in the Jewish birth-rate preceded that of the rest of the population by about a generation. That is simply that Jews became middle-class earlier. We know from the studies of Jacob Toury, Monika Richarz, Steven Lowenstein and Avraham Barkai<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1847–1871. Zwischen Revolution, Reaktion und Emanzipation*, Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte, Universität Tel-Aviv, Düsseldorf 1977; Monika Richarz, *Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe. Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678–1848*, Düsseldorf 1974 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 28); Steven M. Lowenstein, ‘The Pace of Modernisation of German Jewry in the Nineteenth Century’, in *Year Book XXI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1976; Avraham Barkai, ‘The German Jews at the Start of Industrialisation. Structural Change and Mobility 1835–1860’, in the present volume.

that the take-off point for Jewish upward social mobility was well before 1848. It would therefore not surprise us if bourgeois patterns of family life were more widespread among Jews in the second half of the nineteenth century than in German society as a whole: equally, we would expect to find them among other groups, such as the North German Protestant middle class, in advance of society as a whole.

This is no more than a tentative hypothesis. Its very obviousness, which makes it so attractive, should make us cautious. As Lawrence Schofer remarks in his conclusion, on most demographic-psychological relationships the jury is still out. One might go further and say that it is likely to stay out until we know what constitutes proof in social and cultural history.



MONIKA RICHARZ

## Emancipation and Continuity German Jews in the Rural Economy

The era of emancipation was the time of the greatest social changes in the history of the German Jews. Legal equality, cultural assimilation, religious reform, and the beginning of industrialisation affected every aspect of Jewish life. Social upward mobility and urbanisation were the most important features of these changes. During the last few years, historians have begun intensive research into this process.

This research, which was concerned primarily with urban Jews, has concentrated almost entirely on these dynamic developments, while the phenomenon of the continuity in Jewish life has found little consideration. Yet there were social spheres in which neither emancipation nor assimilation nor industrialisation brought about basic changes. There is no doubt that the traditional way of Jewish life was preserved for the longest time in the country, where the occupational structure as well as religiosity helped to resist changes. The rural Jews remained for the most part dealers in agrarian products and manufactured goods. Even the governments of Southern Germany which, in the first half of the nineteenth century, attempted to force an occupational shift away from trade to crafts and agriculture, did not really succeed.

From the eighteenth to the twentieth century, most rural Jews stayed in the same occupational groups, which had very specific functions in the agrarian economy. These functions were, first, the “export” of the agrarian products of the peasants to local or interregional markets; second, the “import” of finished goods needed by the peasants; third, providing credit for the peasants; and, fourth, dealing in real estate. The agrarian products to be “exported” were grain, cattle, horses, wine, tobacco, hops, flax, fur, hides, wool, feathers; wax, tallow, and wood. The rural Jews bought these products from the peasants for cash and sold them in regional markets, to wholesale merchants, and even outside the country. The Jewish traders “imported” mainly manufactured goods, but also cattle, horses, and even food, insofar as the peasants could not produce it themselves. Loans were usually extended by Jews who had built up a certain capital through their trading. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Jews were permitted to buy and own land, dealing in real estate was added to the typical occupations of rural Jews.<sup>1</sup> Jews did not have these

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<sup>1</sup> The statements made in this article about rural Jews are based to a large extent on the autobiographic sources I edited for the New York Leo Baeck Institute: Monika Richarz (Hrsg.), *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte*,

functions in the economy of all German states, for they had neither uniformly settled nor had they been employed as middlemen in the agrarian economy everywhere. In some agrarian regions, such as Schleswig-Holstein and East Prussia, the peasants or the estate owners undertook to sell their agrarian products themselves. In poorer regions, however, which had large Jewish populations – especially in Baden, Hesse, Württemberg, Franconia, and Poznań – many smallholders depended entirely on Jewish middlemen who extended credit to them.<sup>2</sup>

It is well known that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries some of the lesser princes and other noblemen liked to settle Jews in the countryside, because they were a welcome source of taxes and because they stimulated import and export. Many cities, on the other hand, successfully fought the settlement of Jews and obtained the *ius de non tolerandis iudeis*. As *Schutzjuden* (protected Jews), those who had settled in the country generally had no legal possibility of leaving their villages until, in the course of emancipation, they were finally given the right to choose their domicile. Outside Prussia, this only happened between 1848 and 1871, so that the large-scale migration from the country to the cities did not begin before 1871.

If we disregard Prussia and Saxony, the rural Jews constituted a silent majority in most German states well into the middle of the nineteenth century, and it is amazing how little we know about them. The state with the highest percentage of rural Jews was Württemberg. In 1832, 93% of all Jews in Württemberg lived in the country; in 1864, 60%, and in 1932 21%. We know that there are villages in Württemberg in which, from time to time, Jews made up half of the population. In the Grand Duchy of Hesse, half the Jews still lived in communities of under 2,000 people in 1871. In Baden, the Palatinate, Franconia, and Bavarian Swabia rural Jews also constituted the majority. In the Eastern provinces of Prussia most Jews lived in small towns, while in the Western provinces – Westphalia and the Rhineland – the rural population was in the majority. Because Southern Germany was less industrialised, as late as 1910, 45% of all Jews in Hesse, 32% in Württemberg, and 30% in Bavaria lived

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Bd. I, 1780–1871, Bd. II, 1871–1918, Stuttgart 1976, 1979 (Veröffentlichungen des Leo Baeck Instituts). Concerning rural Jews, see I, pp. 137–176; II, pp. 137–218, as well as the introduction to both volumes. The most important works in the rather sparse literature on rural Jews are: Utz Jeggle, *Judendörfer in Württemberg*, Tübingen 1969; and Werner J. Cahnman, 'Village and Small-Town Jews in Germany. A Typological Study', in *Year Book XIX of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1974.

<sup>2</sup> This is true especially for the 1880s, when the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* investigated the situation of the peasants in two large-scale inquiries, but may be taken as valid for the entire nineteenth century. *Bäuerliche Zustände in Deutschland*, Teil I–III, Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Bd. 22, Leipzig 1883. See especially the answer to question 16: 'Sind die Bauern regelmäßig in ihren Geschäften von Vermittlern abhängig und zwar in einer Weise, wobei sie notwendig verarmen müssen?' Examples: Teil II, pp. 65 and 295; III, pp. 26, 147, 157, 168. Some of the answers are written from an antisemitic point of view.

in villages with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants.<sup>3</sup> There were few Jews, and almost no rural Jews, in agrarian Northern Germany – Pomerania, Mecklenburg, and Schleswig-Holstein. This makes it possible to compare the trade of agrarian products in regions with rural Jews and in those without rural Jews.

Due to the nature of the agrarian trade, the Jewish dealers became the middlemen between town and country, continuously travelling back and forth. In memoirs we read again and again that the traders were travelling all week, coming home only for the Sabbath. On Sunday they set out again, beginning a new working week. Lena Kahn writes about her father's cattle-dealing in Sulzburg (Baden): "Usually, the oxen were yoked in on Saturday night, often twenty or fifty of them, and the trek to the market began, even if it took twenty hours to get there."<sup>4</sup> Such a big cattle dealer employed two helpers and, when necessary, he hired a cattle drover. Most dealers, however, were poor and had to handle all buying and selling as well as the transport themselves, or with the help of a family member. The physical exertion of walking many miles a day was made worse by a frugal diet. Being Orthodox, they ate only kosher food and so, when they were away from home, they could only have simple meals that they had to prepare themselves. How great the number of Jewish traders must have been becomes quite obvious when we realise that some fairs and cattle markets provided kosher eating houses. In Gießen, for instance, this was the case as early as 1715.<sup>5</sup>

Traders in agrarian products, just like pedlars, usually had fixed territories and regularly visited the same villages. In 1882, a Franconian priest describes it as follows: "The Jews have practically divided the country between them, so that every larger village has its own special Jew who, though not domiciled in the village, is almost always there to conduct his business."<sup>6</sup> The mobile presence of the Jewish traders was great, and in their territories they knew the peasants and their financial circumstances. Such a territory, called *medine* in Yiddish, was hereditary within a family. This certainly was an important factor in the continuity of the Jewish agrarian trade. If a trader tried to intrude into the *medine* of someone else, it could lead to considerable disputes. Some of the richer traders functioned as "*Hofjuden*", which in this case meant that they handled the entire buying and selling for big estates, and this provided them with a regular income. It is said that in the Province of Poznań the estate owners, even when they did business with their compeers, almost always used their Jews as go-betweens.<sup>7</sup> This means that the Jews held the positions of

<sup>3</sup> For a statistic on rural Jews, see: Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 29f; II, p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Lena Kahn, *Kindheitserinnerungen*. Memoirensammlung im Archiv des Leo Baeck Instituts, New York. These memories deal with the end of the nineteenth century.

<sup>5</sup> Rosy Bodenheimer, *Beitrag zur Geschichte der Juden in Oberhessen*, Gießen 1931, p. 31.

<sup>6</sup> Verein für Sozialpolitik, *Bäuerliche Zustände in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, III, p. 168.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

middlemen. This position too was often inherited from generation to generation.

In contrast to the farmers, the Jewish traders were not directly dependent on the soil but rather on the urban market outlets. This occupational mobility gave their lives an urban touch that became characteristic for them. They brought news from town and introduced urban amenities. The more prosperous traders not infrequently married urban Jewish women, furnished their houses like town houses, and gave their children a better education. This differentiated them substantially from the peasants in the village. As a consequence, there were two social groups that were totally different in religion, occupation, and way of life. It precluded any thought of assimilation in the urban sense. The Jews did not want to become assimilated to the peasants; they wanted to do business with them. This strict social separation, which also excluded mixed marriages, did not, however, prevent neighbourly and even friendly relationships between individual members of the two groups, who knew each other much better than Jews and non-Jews knew each other in the cities. This form of rural non-assimilation lasted through centuries and is another factor in the continuity of Jewish rural life.

A characteristic feature of the Jewish agrarian trade was the great flexibility of the traders in their choice of goods. As Glückel von Hameln has written: "A Jud nascht von a jeder Sach." Jews often chose the objects in which they traded according to marketability, to the season, and to availability. Also, there was no strict division between craft and trade – butchers often dealt with cattle and weavers with manufactured goods. Those few Jews who listed their occupation in the occupational census as farmers, often were traders or pedlars on the side.<sup>8</sup> In Upper Franconia, Eduard Silbermann combined the trade in hops – a definitely seasonal trade – with the peddling of manufactured goods.<sup>9</sup> The previously mentioned cattle dealer in Sulzburg originally imported cattle from Switzerland, but when this was no longer profitable, he switched to exporting wine from Baden to Switzerland.

Another continuous feature of the Jewish agrarian trade was selling on credit. For the poorer peasants, this was the most important point in their dealings with Jews. The Jews paid cash for everything they bought, but extended partial or total credit for everything they sold. This does not seem to have been the practice of non-Jewish traders, so that peasants who could pay only in instalments could buy only from Jews.<sup>10</sup> Until about the end of the

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<sup>8</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, p. 33; Cahnman, 'Village Jews', *loc. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>9</sup> Eduard Silbermann, 'Erinnerungen 1871–1917', in: Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 160–176.

<sup>10</sup> Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1847–1871*, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 378–381; Emil Schorsch, 'The Rural Jew. Observation on the Paper of Werner J. Cahnman', in *Year Book XIX of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1974, p. 131.

nineteenth century, small credit especially was given mostly by rural Jews. The newly established agrarian credit institutions were reluctant to risk giving small farmers personal credit. This can be seen from an inquiry the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* conducted in 1886.<sup>11</sup> Especially before the harvest, or in cases of rinderpest or crop failure, or during agrarian depressions, the farmers depended heavily on the credit extended by Jewish traders. The Jews also made cash loans, taking as pledge some arable land or a part of the expected harvest. In times of economic crises and increasing impoverishment of the small farmers, such deals were not without danger for the Jews. For if a farmer went bankrupt, he blamed his misfortune on the Jewish “usurer”, who sometimes had to go to court to get his loan repaid. The peasants, who even after the agrarian reform thought in terms of feudal and barter economy, saw in the Jewish money lenders the personification of capitalism whose rules they were unable to comprehend. The smallholders especially did not understand the consequences of the agrarian reform. The redemption payments they had to make to their former feudal lords meant a great financial drain. And it took them a long time to realise that as “independent entrepreneurs” they were now subjected to all the fluctuations of the agrarian market. In their distress they turned to the Jewish money lenders whom they knew as traditional sources of agrarian credit. Since in their pre-industrial mentality taking out a loan was a disgrace, they valued the discretion of the Jewish traders and did not want to make their financial plight public at the rural state loan banks, even if these were willing to give them credit.<sup>12</sup> This traditional attitude of the peasants was complemented by the traditional readiness of the Jewish money lenders not to shrink from small deals at high risks.

Yet the loan and credit dealings of the Jews contributed more than anything else to the constant ambivalence in the relationship between Jews and peasants. No work on the continuity of the economic life of the rural Jews would be complete without mentioning the continuity of agrarian antisemitism. During the 1880s antisemitic observers of rural life again and again deplored the supposedly naive trust the peasants put in Jewish traders:

“In the district of Paderborn one finds that Jew and peasant are almost always on familiar terms, calling each other by their first names. The peasant is pleased that in his Westphalian way he can address the rich trader with the familiar *du*. Whenever the peasant delivers his goods, he receives a good breakfast, but then, in turn, he has to take on a lot of goods from the wife; accounts are never settled. The peasant is quite proud to

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<sup>11</sup> The main topic of this second agrarian inquiry of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* was usury in connection with money, credit, goods, and cattle; its purpose was to determine its reasons and its extent. *Wucher auf dem Lande*, Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Bd. 35, Leipzig 1887. An important result of this inquiry was that it proved that agrarian credit institutes in very few territories of Germany gave sufficient personal credit to the peasants.

<sup>12</sup> *Wucher auf dem Lande*, *op. cit.*, pp. 45–48; see also Jeggle, *Judendörfer*, p. 56, where the author calls the Jews “bankers of the indebted peasants”.



have such business connections. The Jew fosters this pride, and soon the peasant owes the Jew a great deal of money, all duly entered in the Jew's ledger."<sup>13</sup>

In such reports, the peasants are described in an amazingly critical way: they do not keep accounts, do not plan rationally, do not modernise their farms, do not know their legal rights, and keep their credits secret from their neighbours. In short, the thinking and behaviour of the peasant are hopelessly pre-capitalist. The Jewish trader, on the other hand, is depicted as cunning and calculating, seducing the peasant into buying; his aim is to make the peasant financially dependent in order to exploit him. There is some truth in these clichés: Jewish agrarian traders on the whole were better situated and better educated than their customers—unless these were estate owners. This, combined with the traditional religious anti-Jewishness caused the ambivalence in their relationship. On the one hand, the small farmer trusted the Jew in his business dealings often over a very long period of time and even asked his advice in agricultural matters. On the other hand, this trust could turn into aggression in times of great poverty and indebtedness, especially when the profits of the agrarian traders remained stable or even increased through speculation.

The anti-Jewish attitude of the peasants was not always manifest, but it was always present below the surface, and always ready to come into the open in times of crisis. I am not talking only about theoretical antisemitism, as it was expressed in associations, speeches, and pamphlets, but about the actual anti-Jewish feeling in the country, as it was expressed in songs ridiculing the Jews, in stone-throwing, looting, and expulsions, as well as in religiously disguised forms, such as accusations of ritual murder. During the first half of the nineteenth century, in connection with the agrarian reform and the agrarian crisis, rural anti-Jewish riots broke out three times – in 1819, 1830, and 1848. In the second half of the century, hardly any such disturbances occurred, but after a long-lasting agrarian depression during the 1870s, Böckel and the *Bund der Landwirte* fostered ideological antisemitism.

In sketching the economic and social situation of the Jewish agrarian traders, I concentrated exclusively on the features of continuity, because these were more pronounced than the elements of change. Yet there can be no doubt that the rural Jews too underwent historical changes – which I will refer to later on.

To sum up, the main factors in the continuity are: rural settlement despite the beginnings of urbanisation, specific economic functions as middlemen between town and country, typical economic features such as the *medine*, great flexibility in the choice of goods traded and special sales methods, selling on credit despite the establishment of the first agrarian credit institutions, urban characteristics in cultural tastes and ways of life while remaining religiously Orthodox, strong social barriers between Jews and peasants, even at a time of urban assimilation, and, finally, latent agrarian antisemitism with open outbreaks in times of crisis. All these themes will have to be examined in much

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<sup>13</sup> *Bäuerliche Zustände in Deutschland, op. cit.*, II, p. 20.

greater detail. Within the framework of this contribution, they can only be listed as preliminary observations made on the basis of existing sources. A somewhat more concrete discussion of some of the problems follows in the next section, which considers the question: what influence did this surprising continuity have on the process of emancipation and on the Revolution of 1848?

In the first half of the nineteenth century governments considered the rural Jews simply as an obstacle in the process of emancipation. They did not want to emancipate these “Jewish Jews” in their traditionally Jewish occupations, they wanted to educate them. It cannot have been coincidence that the German states with the greatest number of rural Jews enacted so-called education laws, which granted political rights only to Jews in approved occupations – and that excluded a great many rural Jews. In Hesse-Kassel, for instance, the emancipation laws of 1816 and 1833 denied civic rights to all those Jews who were small cattle dealers, pawnbrokers, dealers in second-hand goods, and pedlars.<sup>14</sup> These laws were intended to increase the “productivity” of the Jews, that is to say they were intended to force a switch from trade to agriculture and crafts. A special thorn in the side of the governments were the so-called occasional dealers (*Nothändler*), in other words, the poorest pedlars who had no capital whatsoever. Since their children were usually denied settlement as pedlars, they were forced to learn a craft, at least pro forma; nevertheless they often turned to trade later on. The many official occupational censuses that were supposed to check on the shifts in occupations are therefore of doubtful value as far as they concern the number of Jewish craftsmen and farmers. During the general economic upswing of the 1850s and 1860s, after a good part of the poor Jewish agrarian traders had emigrated and the rest proved indispensable, the governments gave up their educational attempts and guaranteed full emancipation to all Jews.

Not only governmental policies, but the endless debates about emancipation in the *Landtage* showed as well the disdain with which rural Jews were treated. Reinhard Rürup has pointed out the importance the different attitudes towards urban and rural Jews had in the debates in the *Landtag* of Baden.<sup>15</sup> While the urban Jews were considered willing to be integrated socially and to change occupations, the image of the rural Jews was one of social isolation and persistence in old occupations. Even worse, they were considered as exploiters of the peasants. In 1831, a deputy in the Lower Chamber (*Zweite Kammer*) said:

“Just look ... how these Israelites, and I mean the few rich ones, influence the country through their cattle dealing and cattle lending; picture in your mind such an Israelite, money-proud, riding ahead of his subordinates who are ready to take the last cow out of

<sup>14</sup> Ludwig Horwitz, *Die Gesetze um die bürgerliche Gleichstellung der Israeliten im ehemaligen Kurhessen 1816 und 1833*, Kassel 1927, p. 41.

<sup>15</sup> Reinhard Rürup, *Emancipation und Antisemitismus. Studien zur ‘Judenfrage’ der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Göttingen 1975, pp. 55f.

the stable of a poor man; that denuded fellow may curse him, his mother may shed tears – nothing moves him. Some regions are totally impoverished through this trade ...”<sup>16</sup>

In 1848, another delegate expressed the same opinion when he concluded that “the rural Jews are the misfortune of the peasant”.<sup>17</sup> In the course of many debates it was stated again and again that the country people opposed the emancipation of the Jews, that they were afraid the Jews would usurp trade everywhere and make the rest of the population dependent on them. This antisemitic argumentation shows that the *Landtag* was not really concerned with the poorer dealers but rather, admittedly, with the “few rich ones”, whose financial power threatened them.

The difference in the attitudes towards rural and urban Jews was never more obvious than during the Revolution of 1848. Many urban Jews actively participated in the Revolution, and in their initial enthusiasm they hoped for a unified, national German State, whose constitution would grant them full emancipation. At the same time, however, the worst anti-Jewish riots took place in rural areas. We have definite proof of the number of incidents where the Jewish population was subjected to looting and physical violence in some places: 22 in Baden, 10 in Bavaria, 9 in Hesse, 2 in Württemberg, and many more in the province of Poznań, where Polish revolutionaries acted against the Jews.<sup>18</sup> Aside from Poznań, these disturbances were caused by peasants who had been reduced to intolerable poverty by the agrarian reform and the crop failures of the preceding years. These uprisings – the worst of which occurred in Odenwald – were aimed at all the creditors of the peasants: their former feudal lords, the tax offices and their officials, the Jews, and even some wealthy priests. In some villages, peasants extorted fraudulent receipts from Jews, or burned their account books. At the time of the abrogation of the feudal system, the peasants had borrowed money they needed for the redemption payments mostly from Jews. Consequently, the Jews were considered the financiers of the agrarian reform, and the wrath of the peasants turned against the Jews rather than against their former feudal lords. The entrepreneur Friedrich Harkort pointed out this obvious connection when he said that it is “not these mosaic Jews who are ruining the peasants but the Jews with spurs and boots”.<sup>19</sup>

In Baden, where such incidents of persecution of rural Jews were most numerous, the urban population had quite a positive attitude toward emancipation. In 1848, the citizens of Karlsruhe, Mannheim, and Heidelberg petitioned the *Landtag* to ratify the emancipation of the Jews.<sup>20</sup> But when, on the 2nd

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151, n. 126.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>18</sup> Jacob Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden in Deutschland. Von Jena bis Weimar*, Tübingen 1966 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 15), p. 72, n. 19.

<sup>19</sup> Quoted from Arno Herzig, *Judentum und Emanzipation in Westfalen*, Münster 1973, p. 29.

<sup>20</sup> Michael Anthony Riff, “The Anti-Jewish Aspect of the Revolutionary Unrest of

March 1848 the *Landtag* granted the Jews of Baden full political rights – which did not include communal rights – anti-Jewish disturbances broke out two days later in the district of Bretten near Karlsruhe. The *Bezirksamt* Bretten had sounded a warning the day before. Its spokesmen had pointed out that the continual suffering that country people had had to bear as a result of foreclosures by Jews might cause them to become most violent when the news from Karlsruhe reached them. The *Bezirksamt* held meetings in order to calm the peasants and to ask the Jews to refrain temporarily from collecting outstanding debts – but to no avail. In the course of these outbreaks, Jews in several villages were forced to renounce their communal rights; in other villages some Jews offered to renounce these rights out of fear; and in Flehingen 23 Jews even sent a petition to the Upper Chamber, asking not to be emancipated.<sup>21</sup> Another group of rural Jews acted in a more politic manner: they sent a delegation to the leader of the Revolution in Baden, Friedrich Hecker, which induced him to appeal publicly for protection of the Jews.<sup>22</sup> On the whole it may be assumed that the anti-Jewish riots in rural areas in 1848 expressed the convictions of the majority of the rural population and were therefore instrumental in delaying even further the full emancipation of the Jews.

The incidents I have described show clearly that the peasants saw in the Jews the executors of all the negative aspects of the agrarian reform. The small farmers had hoped to profit from their new freedom; now they found themselves faced with the problem of raising sufficient capital, and this new dependency on the capitalist market economy was symbolised by the Jews. This heightened emphasis on the traditional role of the Jews as bankers for the peasants, which had developed during the agrarian reform, leads us back to the question of continuity and change in the economic function of the rural Jews. When, at the beginning of this article, I spoke about the continuity in the economic and social life of the agrarian traders, I did not mention changes in the situation of the peasants, in the agrarian structure, and in the whole agrarian economy. Yet the importance and function of the Jewish agrarian traders can be satisfactorily analysed only in the context of German social and agrarian history in general. Since no preparatory work has been done for such an enterprise, I only want to pose a few questions and state a few hypotheses. It is too early to expect definitive results of any research.

Such an analysis will have to consider not only the agrarian reform and the two long-lasting agrarian crises of the nineteenth century, with all their consequences. What has to be taken into consideration as well are the effects that the rationalisation of agriculture and the great increase of population had

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1848 in Baden and its Impact on Emancipation', in *Year Book XXI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1976, p. 29.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>22</sup> Levi Strauss, 'Jugenderinnerungen', in Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 134f.

on the development of productivity, production, turnover, and consumption. Before a sensible quantitative and qualitative analysis of the Jewish share in agrarian trade can be undertaken, the economic fluctuations in the situation of the peasants on the one hand, and the economic cycles in the agrarian trade on the other hand, have to be determined. Such an investigation will have to depend heavily on local case-studies – provided that sufficient information is available.

I would now like to outline four sets of problems which seem to me especially important for a history of the Jewish agrarian trade in the nineteenth century.

### *1. Quantitative analysis according to regions and branches of trade*

It is important to determine as exactly as possible what share the rural Jews had in the various branches of the agrarian trade, with special emphasis on cattle and grain as well as dealings in money and real estate. One point in particular has to be clarified: Did the Jews, as is often claimed, hold a monopoly in certain branches? It is my hypothesis that in poor regions with a pre-capitalist subsistence economy Jews did frequently hold such monopolies. It remains to be investigated how the role of the agrarian traders changed with the modernisation of agriculture and the beginning of profit-orientated big concerns. Were Jews as important as traders and credit lenders in a modernised agriculture as they had been at a time when subsistence economy was predominant? To what extent did they continue to play their traditional roles in underdeveloped agrarian regions, and to what extent did they create new economic positions for themselves, for instance in the international wholesale grain trade?

### *2. Qualitative analysis*

First of all, the economical structure of these enterprises has to be analysed, and the changes it underwent in the nineteenth century examined. It is my hypothesis that the number of small agrarian traders without capital decreased through emigration and upward mobility, while the number of medium-sized and large businesses increased proportionately; that after 1850, however, financially strong traders moved to the cities, if the character of their business permitted it. Since the decrease in the number of traders coincided with an increase in general production and consumption, it seems obvious that the turn-over must have increased – unless the number of non-Jewish traders increased as well. Furthermore, the occupational mobility of the traders has to be investigated: to what extent were their businesses local, interregional (town – country), or export and import businesses? Which fairs and markets were most frequently visited by Jewish agrarian traders? And what about the customers? How many of them were smallholders, average farmers, estate owners? I assume that the trade with poor peasants was predominant. Last but not least: Did the trading methods of the Jews differ from those of non-Jewish traders, and if so, how?

### 3. Agrarian reform, agrarian crisis, and antisemitism

During the 1820s and 1830s, the combination of agrarian reform and agrarian crisis put an intolerable financial burden on the smallholders. It is my hypothesis that these economically endangered smallholders, who could only buy on credit, were the main customers of the Jewish traders. Such an economic relationship could not be anything but strained, especially since many peasants went bankrupt. The questions here are: How great was the indebtedness, how high was the interest on these loans, how great was the risk for the lenders? In this context the activities of the dealers in real estate, who bought bankrupt farms and broke them up to be sold also have to be investigated. What were the reasons for the profits, and what were the consequences of those dealings? What was the proportion of Jews and non-Jews in this business, which was called *Güterschlächtere*? And the most important question: did the straitened circumstances of the peasants during the agrarian depressions correspond to a recession in the agrarian trade in general, or did the prosperity of this trade continue to increase? This would mean that a discrepancy developed between the profitability of agriculture and the profitability of the agrarian trade, as Hans Rosenberg maintains for the period of the great depression.<sup>23</sup> In this connection another factor has to be investigated: how did the indebtedness of the peasants develop in the course of the century, and to what extent were their creditors at the end of the century still Jews? Only research such as this can determine the true nature of the economic tensions between peasants and Jews that were exploited by antisemitic propaganda. Only in connection with such an investigation will it make sense to analyse the spontaneous and the ideologised agrarian antisemitism and its proponents. Was there always a causal connection between agrarian depression and agrarian antisemitism? Equally important is the question of continuity or change in nineteenth-century antisemitism. It is obvious that the arguments of rural antisemitism remained almost unchanged throughout the whole century – which did not hold true for urban antisemitism.

### 4. The social history of the agrarian traders

What is needed is a group biography of the agrarian traders and a description of the non-economic interaction in a village – be that within the Jewish community, be it within the village as a whole. Such a study will have to pay special attention to the effects of emancipation, urbanisation, and industrialisation on Jewish rural communities and to the extent of changes that can be observed in religion, education, and language.

This investigation will also have to include those agrarian traders who migrated to the cities, as many horse and grain dealers did. I would like to

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<sup>23</sup> Hans Rosenberg, *Große Depression und Bismarckzeit*, Berlin 1967, p. 98. Unfortunately, Rosenberg does not provide any documentation for this interesting thesis.

propose the thesis that the divergence between urban and rural Jews became more pronounced in the nineteenth century because in rural areas assimilation and social integration were of little importance or non-existent, and the rural Jews remained for the most part religiously Orthodox. It was actually the possibility of migration to the cities that reinforced the traditional features of the rural communities after emancipation, because the more traditionalist Jews chose to remain in the villages. Peasants and Jews continued to co-exist as two strictly separate social groups. With their traditional economic function, the agrarian traders also kept their traditional way of life.

This list of questions is neither complete, nor can it be completely answered. The hypotheses I have put forth are based mostly on impressions received from reading Jewish autobiographies that describe the life of the rural Jew. In the two collected volumes of Jewish autobiographies I edited, I purposely gave a good deal of space to this type of memoir because there is hardly any secondary literature about rural Jews. The few studies we possess – with the exception of Utz Jeggle's *Judendörfer in Württemberg* – tend rather to romanticise and glorify the rural Jews and concentrate mostly on descriptions of their simple but pious life.<sup>24</sup> Jewish contemporaries did not idealise that life by any means – in fact, they largely ignored the existence of the rural Jew until many rural communities had begun to vanish. Bourgeois Jews in Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic considered rural Jews historical relics; Jews who had remained too Jewish.

In the final section of this paper, I would like to flesh out the theoretical skeleton with a more detailed description of one aspect of the rural economy. As we know, the most desirable Jewish family tree would probably consist entirely of rabbis; in reality, however, it is more likely to consist mainly of cattle dealers. In some villages, three quarters of all Jewish agrarian traders were cattle dealers. It is quite possible that around the middle of the nineteenth century cattle dealing was the most common Jewish occupation in the country. Yet while we know exactly what percentage of German physicians, lawyers, and professors were Jews, we know very little about the number of Jews among cattle dealers – although they surely accounted for more than half. A quantitative account for all of Germany could be found only for 1917. At that time the *Vorsitzende des Verbandes der Viehhändler Deutschlands* stated that there were approximately 40,000 independent cattle dealers in Germany, and that 25,000 of them – more than 60% – were Jews. Then he added that most Jewish cattle

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<sup>24</sup> Cahnman, 'Village Jews', *loc. cit.*, gives a colourful typology of rural Jews but does not go into the historical changes and the over-all economic aspects. For a somewhat glorified description of rural Jews, with emphasis on religion, see: Hermann Schwab, *Jewish Rural Communities*, London 1956.

dealers lived in Southern and Western Germany; in Northern and Eastern Germany they constituted only a minority.<sup>25</sup>

I would now like to concern myself briefly with the economic history of the Jewish cattle and horse dealers, as I learned it from memoirs, community histories, and regional economic histories.

If I refer to cattle and horse dealers together, because of their obvious connection, we must keep in mind that we are talking about two really very different economic branches. A horse was rather expensive and, as the forerunner of the car, it was held in much higher esteem than cattle which was primarily considered as food. Horse trading demanded a great amount of capital and expertise, and every prince who wanted to have a good stable of horses for both civilian and military use, took a lively interest in it. Cattle dealing, on the other hand, was practised by many traders who had only very limited capital at their disposal. As a matter of fact, some of them were so poor that they could not even afford to buy an old cow, but could only act as *shmoosers* or brokers who received a small fee for every deal they helped to bring about. In accordance with these differences, the social prestige of the horse dealer was much greater than that of the cattle dealer, and the horse dealer looked down on the cattle dealer, whom he considered common and uncouth. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was one of the functions of the Court Jew (*Hofjude*) to supply the princes with horses. In particular the armies' constant demand for young horses played an important economic role. Although the princes had their own stud farms, they were still dependent on the importation of fine horses, and that business was mostly in Jewish hands. In Prussia the Great Elector had already bought horses through his Court Jew Elias Gumperts, and in the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Court Jew Isaac (Itzig) Daniel Jafe of Breslau, who was later naturalised by the king, supplied the armies with Hungarian and Polish horses.<sup>26</sup> The Leo Baeck Institute in New York recently acquired a letter of safe-conduct which Frederick the Great had made out for the horse dealers Marcus Raphael and Jacob Wolf in 1777, when he sent them to the Khan of the Tatars in the Crimea, to buy no fewer than 300 thoroughbred horses. In 1789, Frederick William II granted the same Marcus Raphael a *General Schutz- und Handelsprivileg* for himself and his descendants, because Raphael had supplied the army with horses for 45 years, even in dangerous times of war.<sup>27</sup> According to various memoirs, Jews supplied the armies with horses for all the wars of the nineteenth century. One example was the wholesale horse dealer Philipp Elkan in Berlin

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<sup>25</sup> Address given in Aachen, before the *Komitee zur Förderung der Landwirtschaft unter den Juden*, in *Das jüdische Echo*, IV (8th June 1917), No. 23.

<sup>26</sup> Selma Stern, *Der preußische Staat und die Juden*, Bd. I, Teil 1, Tübingen 1962 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 7/1), p. 129; Bd. III, Teil 1, Tübingen 1971 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 24/1), p. 236.

<sup>27</sup> Family Collection Fraenkel-Berlin, Archives of the Leo Baeck Institute, New York.



who, after the war of 1870–1871, received the title *Kommerzienrat* because he had speedily supplied the army with a great number of horses. His fortune amounted to 150,000 Thalers.<sup>28</sup> A systematic search through army documents could give us important insights into the role Jews played as purveyors of army horses – be it as wholesale dealers, be it as subcontractors. That horses were considered more important than armament can be seen from the fact that whenever war threatened, the governments forbade the export of horses and controlled their sale. In peacetime the armies annually bought a fixed quota of horses at markets held expressly for this purpose (*Remontemärkte*), where anyone could offer horses of a stated quality to the army and cash was paid for each transaction.

Aside from their military uses, horses were needed in civilian life as riding and carriage horses, and as work horses. The general demand for horses, and the inventory of horses increased all through the nineteenth century. In 1853, Germany had 2.7 million horses; by 1900 the number had risen to 4.2 million.<sup>29</sup> It sounds paradoxical – but the increased demand for horses was directly connected not only with the general increase of population but with the construction of the railways, which extended the possibilities of long-distance transportation. As a result, production and traffic in goods within the cities and within the regions also expanded, and for this short-distance transport more and more horses were needed. This greater demand led to an expansion of the horse trade – especially in urban markets.

The occupational census of 1858 lists 989 Jewish horse traders for Prussia; and it is typical that the same census did not consider it worthwhile to take a separate count of cattle dealers.<sup>30</sup> More than 70 % of these horse dealers lived in cities – which, for Prussia, is not surprising. Only in the Rhine Province, which had as many as 227 Jewish horse dealers, did two thirds of them live in the country. We may assume that here – and perhaps in parts of Westphalia – the Jews had a monopoly of the horse trade. In the Eastern provinces of Prussia, on the other hand, the number of Jewish horse dealers was comparatively low. In these regions the great estates bred their own horses or the estate owners, who did not have to buy on credit, avoided middlemen and bought directly from breeders. The same phenomenon can be observed in the cattle trade: in those regions of Eastern Germany where big landowners predominated, and in the breeding territories of the wealthy farmers of Northern Germany, Jewish traders played a much smaller role than in the very differently structured agrarian regions of Southern and Western Germany, where a great many small

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<sup>28</sup> Akte über Elkans Ernennung zum Kommerzienrat im Bestand Polizeipräsidium Berlin, Staatsarchiv Potsdam Rep. 30, Bln C, Tit. 94, Nr. 1682. I am grateful to Dr. Ulrich Dunker, Berlin, for providing me with the contents of this document.

<sup>29</sup> H. Aubin and W. Zorn (eds.), *Handbuch der deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, Bd. II, Stuttgart 1975, p. 521.

<sup>30</sup> *Tabellen und amtliche Nachrichten für das Jahr 1858*, hrsg. vom Preußischen Statistischen Büro in Berlin 1860, Table 35.

farmers depended on middlemen for credit. It is characteristic that a market report of 1847 states in a survey on the twice yearly horse fair in Hamburg St. Pauli: "The Berlin-Hamburg railway brought several estate owners from Prussia, Mecklenburg, etc., who did their own buying."<sup>31</sup> Around the middle of the century, approximately 2,000 horses were traded at that fair every year – horses of the highest quality that were exported to countries as far as Belgium, France, and Italy. Thirty-five of the biggest traders were named in a petition of 1870, and obviously not more than two or three were Jews.<sup>32</sup> Although some of the buyers came from far away, one of the probable reasons for the seemingly small percentage of Jews was the fact that comparatively few had settled in the Northern German lowland.

Certainly more Jews were present at the market that was held yearly during the Leipzig Fair than at St. Pauli. Many Jewish horse dealers from Eastern Germany imported horses from Russia and Austro-Hungary, where the horse trade was largely in Jewish hands. During the 1880s more than 30,000 horses yearly were brought across the border to Germany from these two countries, which were the main sources for imported horses.<sup>33</sup> In Württemberg, the firm of Kahn and Rosenthal in Hohebach was also known as an importer of Hungarian horses.<sup>34</sup> In Western Germany, Jewish horse dealers imported horses from Belgium and England. In Zülpich, a small town west of Bonn, the horse-trading firm Schwarz imported studhorses from Ghent, Thourout, Romford (Essex), and London.<sup>35</sup> In the first half of the nineteenth century there were altogether three Jewish horse dealers in Zülpich; one of them, Hieronymus Hirsch, was the head of the Jewish community that had 75 members. Hirsch advertised his horses in the *Amtsblatt* (Official Gazette) of the Royal Prussian Government in Cologne. He also dealt in real estate, as did his son and son-in-law. From details like these we can see that horse dealers often were the wealthiest members of a rural community. Horse trading required much capital, and it was often conducted as an international business over long distances. It was of great advantage for Jewish horse dealers that many of the horse dealers in the foreign countries from which the imports came were also Jews.

Occupational statistics only rarely list the occupation of "cattle *and* horse dealer", for only rich cattle dealers were able to deal in horses as well. In his childhood memoirs, Julius Frank gives a charming description of the difficul-

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<sup>31</sup> Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Senatsprotokolle, Patronat St. Pauli, II A 6954.

<sup>32</sup> Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Cl. VII, Lit. Kb No. 15, Vol. 1-e.

<sup>33</sup> Statistik Vieheinfuhr und -ausfuhr für 1884 in: *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, N.F., vol. 15, Berlin 1885.

<sup>34</sup> Paul Sauer, *Die jüdischen Gemeinden in Württemberg und Hohenzollern. Denkmale, Geschichte, Schicksale*, Stuttgart 1972, p. 108.

<sup>35</sup> Klaus H. Schulte, *Dokumente zur Geschichte der Juden am linken Niederrhein seit dem 17. Jahrhundert*, Düsseldorf 1972, pp. 227f.

ties in handling two socially very differently evaluated occupations.<sup>36</sup> Frank's father lived in the Franconian village of Steinbach, where at the end of the nineteenth century twelve of the twenty Jews who worked were cattle dealers.

“My father was a very busy man, for he had two occupations that were difficult to combine. Five days a week he was mainly a cattle dealer ... He got up at six in the morning. At 8 o'clock he was already in his buggy, driving some ten kilometres to the Rhön villages, which were his domain ... Saturday, the Sabbath, was a day of rest. But most Sundays father drove to Kissingen, where nearly all his customers for horses lived. They were the numerous owners of hotels and hackney cabs, all of whom prided themselves on the beauty of their horses and carriages. On those Sundays father did not drive his buggy but his elegant carriage, which seated six people, drawn by two young, often mischievous horses with silver-studded harnesses ... Several times a year my father attended the horse markets in Hamburg and Hanover and bought 15 to 20 horses from the North German farmers who bred them. He needed a man to tend them on the freight train, since the journey home took about two days. They were expensive horses, costing on the average 800 Marks each – a great deal of money in those days. He had to borrow money from the bank, and it was therefore necessary to sell the horses quickly. Expenses for fodder and sometimes for a veterinarian were high. If even one of the horses died, there was practically no profit left.”<sup>37</sup>

This report gives interesting insights into the financial aspects of the horse trade. When Frank bought horses for 16,000 Marks at a horse market, he not only had to take out a loan at his bank to pay for them, but most probably had to let the purchasers pay him in instalments. The price of 800 Marks for a horse corresponded roughly to the annual salary a young Jewish teacher received – apart from free lodgings. If none of the 15–20 horses sickened or died before it was resold, this sum of 800 Marks also represented the minimum profit for Julius Frank, who had taken the corresponding risk.

Compared to the horse trade, the profits that could be made in the cattle trade were on an average much lower, and they varied greatly from dealer to dealer, depending on the size and type of cattle he dealt in. For the prices for different types of cattle also varied greatly. In Württemberg, in 1844, a calf cost between 12 and 15 Gulden, depending on its age; a cow cost 75 Gulden, a draught-ox 130, a fattened ox weighing approximately 10 hundredweight cost 220 Gulden.<sup>38</sup> It seems that many of the smaller cattle dealers dealt only in cows and calves, since that was all a poor peasant could afford. Julius Frank describes the daily life of an average cattle dealer – which probably was much the same as it had been a hundred years earlier:

“Their business took them to many villages around Steinbach, some of them many miles away. Each one of them did business in a certain district which was not contested by

<sup>36</sup> Julius Frank, ‘Erinnerungen’, in: Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 190–200.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 195f.

<sup>38</sup> *Beschreibung des Königreichs Württemberg*, 24. Heft, Oberamt Gerabronn, verfaßt von Bezirksamtman Mann Fromm, Stuttgart 1847, pp. 56f. I am indebted for this and other source material on rural Jewry to my late friend Bruno Stern, New York.

the others. Half of them did not even own a horse and carriage. Being used to this way of life from early youth, they did not mind walking for hours to reach the places where they transacted their business. Once a week they drove the four or five cows they had bought to one of the nearby cattle markets. Those who had a horse and carriage hired a day-labourer for that purpose and followed somewhat later in the carriage. I believe that my father was the only one who had a full-time hired helper. But that did not make his life much easier. The markets opened at daybreak, and the cattle had to be fed before being taken to market. And since it took two hours to get there, my father as well as his helper had to get up at 3 o'clock in the morning in summer.<sup>39</sup>

This description shows clearly that a cattle dealer not only needed much less working capital than a horse dealer, but also that he conducted his business over much shorter distances, which he negotiated on foot, going back and forth between his *medine* and the market town. The *medine* system prevented the competition between Jewish traders resulting in a price war, but it made the peasants dependent upon their local cattle dealers.

From a historical point of view, cattle dealing was one of the oldest Jewish occupations. Due to the laws of ritual slaughter, the Jews, wherever they lived, had to buy cattle and slaughter it themselves. They could not settle in places where they were not given that right. And since they were not permitted to eat certain parts of the animal, even if they had slaughtered it themselves, the right to slaughter usually included the privilege of selling these parts to non-Jewish customers – usually quite cheaply. This created a close connection between cattle dealing, butchering, and meat selling. Yet, across the centuries, this privilege provoked the wrath of the Christian butchers' guilds, which continuously complained about the illegal selling of meat by Jews.

In rural areas, where there were no butchers' guilds and where the peasants slaughtered only once a year, the Jewish butchers often held a kind of monopoly. There was, for instance, an amazingly large number of butchers among the rural Jews in the district of Cleves on the Lower Rhine: in 1756, 47 of the 131 Jews who worked were butchers.<sup>40</sup> Most of them, however, were also pedlars or pawnbrokers. In Cleves even the small towns and the aristocracy were supplied with fresh meat exclusively by Jews. The ratio was similar in the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, where in 1832 one third of all *Schutzjuden* were butchers.<sup>41</sup> In the nineteenth century, the butchers continued to deal in cattle, although they carefully avoided calling themselves cattle dealers, for as butchers they were counted among the craftsmen, which was one of the occupations the government wanted Jews to take up. The officials, however, were not unaware of these sidelines. The chief magistrate of the village of Laupheim in

<sup>39</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, op. cit., II, p. 191.

<sup>40</sup> Fritz Baer, *Protokollbuch der Landjudenschaft des Herzogtums Kleve*, Teil I: *Die Geschichte der Landjudenschaft des Herzogtums Kleve*, Berlin 1922, pp. 66–69.

<sup>41</sup> Harald Schieckel, 'Die oldenburgische Judenschaft in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts', in *Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte*, vol. 44, 1972, p. 282.

Württemberg, for instance, reported in 1845 that all Jewish butchers were cattle dealers on the side.<sup>42</sup> Even earlier, during the eighteenth century, the number of cattle dealers who were not also butchers, seems to have increased considerably. In Upper Hesse it was reported in 1719 that no cattle market could be held without Jews; in Cleves care was taken not to schedule a cattle market on the Sabbath; and in Ansbach, in order to promote the cattle trade, the *Leibzoll* was suspended three days a week.<sup>43</sup>

In the nineteenth century the economic conditions of the cattle trade improved considerably. Livestock censuses and consumption statistics show that the number and weight of cattle increased, as well as the absolute and relative meat consumption of the ever-growing German population. Between 1830 and 1870 the stock of cattle in Germany doubled. In the first half of the nineteenth century, improved breeding and feeding methods had already raised the average weight by 60%. As a result, the entire meat production increased three-and-a-half times between 1800 and 1883.<sup>44</sup> Some German regions specialised more and more in breeding cattle, others in fattening cattle. It was the function of the dealers to take young cattle to the fattening territories and then to sell the fattened cattle to the urban centres of consumption. In Northern Germany, some of the young, unfattened cattle came from Denmark, and some of the fattened cattle was exported to London. Like these North German territories, Württemberg also was largely dependent on cattle raising. Oxen fattened in Württemberg were exported to places as far away as Paris. They were the most important source of income for the export business of Württemberg.<sup>45</sup>

During the agrarian crisis of the 1820s, the price of meat and grain dropped almost 50%, but rose again in the 1830s.<sup>46</sup> During that time of crisis, the Jewish cattle dealers probably acquired many new customers, because more peasants were forced to buy on credit. And since the agrarian reform created many more smallholders, this too must have increased the number of customers of the Jewish cattle dealers. In other words, we may assume that agrarian reform and

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<sup>42</sup> Jacob Toury, 'Der Eintritt der Juden ins Deutsche Bürgertum', in *Das Judentum in der Deutschen Umwelt 1800–1850. Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Emanzipation*, herausgegeben von Hans Liebeschütz und Arnold Paucker, Tübingen 1977 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 35), p. 223.

<sup>43</sup> Bodenheimer, *Juden in Oberhessen*, *op. cit.*, p. 32; Baer, *Protokollbuch Kleve, Geschichte der Landjudenschaft*, p. 69; *Ansbach – 750 Jahre Stadt*, Ansbach 1971, p. 125.

<sup>44</sup> *Handbuch der Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, II, pp. 310f. According to Hans J. Teuteberg and Günter Wiegmann, *Der Wandel der Nahrungsgewohnheit unter dem Einfluß der Industrialisierung*, Göttingen 1972, pp. 94–132, per capita meat consumption did not begin to increase until 1860.

<sup>45</sup> *Württembergisches Jahrbuch 1820–1821*, p. 345; *Beschreibung des Königreichs Württemberg*, p. 55. Wolfram Fischer, *Das Fürstentum Hohenlohe im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, Tübingen 1958, p. 19.

<sup>46</sup> Wilhelm Abel, *Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur in Mitteleuropa vom 13. bis 19. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1935, p. 137.

agrarian crisis increased the importance of Jewish dealers in the cattle trade; this, in turn, benefitted them economically during the economic upswing of the following decades.

In parts of Western and Southern Germany, one half or even two-thirds of all working members of a Jewish community were cattle dealers. This percentage even increased, because cattle dealing was one of the occupations that were least affected by urbanisation. Through the *medine* system, cattle dealing remained in a family for generations. Despite their mobility, cattle dealers had close ties to their villages, where – like the peasants – they owned farms with stables and fields, which they cultivated to the extent of their own needs and the needs of their animals.

It is an important question in the context of Jewish history, to what extent and in which regions the Jews actually acquired a monopoly on the cattle trade in the nineteenth century. Until now, comparative statistics of Jewish and non-Jewish cattle dealers have been published for only four governmental districts in Hesse-Kassel, where more non-Jews were cattle dealers than was the average for the rest of Hesse. In these districts, 140 Jews were cattle dealers in 1852, as against 17 non-Jews, which means that 89% of all cattle dealers were Jews.<sup>47</sup> Besides, the Jewish businesses were much bigger than the non-Jewish ones: the Jewish dealers employed 49 people, the non-Jewish dealers only 2. Thus we may safely assume that 95% of the turn-over in cattle was in Jewish hands. According to an 1883 report of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, Jews also held a monopoly in Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Württemberg, Franconia, the Palatinate, the Rhine Province, Westphalia, Hanover, and in some parts of the Province of Poznań.<sup>48</sup> These were all regions in which small and medium-sized farms predominated, which meant that the farmers did not have enough capital or credit to buy cattle and did not raise cattle themselves. In more prosperous agrarian regions, such as Upper Bavaria, Mecklenburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and East Prussia, the farmers did not depend on Jewish middlemen. The cattle-raising farmers of the northern plains bought and sold their own cattle. Some of them could even afford to charter ships for the export of their fattened cattle to England.<sup>49</sup>

On the lowest rung of the peasant hierarchy were those smallholders who had to rent cows from Jewish dealers because they were too poor to buy them even in instalments. These destitute peasants received a cow from a Jewish dealer, used its milk and work power, and in exchange fed the animal and its calves. In the end cow and calves were sold, the dealer deducted the original

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<sup>47</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–77.

<sup>48</sup> *Wucher auf dem Lande*, *op. cit.*, pp. 38, 93, 117, 131, 166ff., 202f., 292, and *passim*.

<sup>49</sup> Concerning agrarian regions without Jewish cattle dealers, see *ibid.*, pp. 86, 252, 283, 350. In 1867, a peasant in Wesermarsch chartered a steamship for his export of cattle; cf. Eduard Krüger, 'Der Ochsen- und Schafhandel der Oldenburgischen Wesermarsch mit England 1845–1885', in *Oldenburgisches Jahrbuch*, vol. 46/47, 1942–1943, p. 114.

value of the cow from the amount received, and gave the peasant half of what remained. This type of cattle loaning can be traced back to Jews in seventeenth-century Germany, but it actually has a much longer tradition.<sup>50</sup> Even at that time this legal form of trade was branded as usury. In the 1880s such cattle loaning still existed in the poor regions of Baden, Franconia, Swabia, the Palatinate, Brandenburg, and the Rhineland.<sup>51</sup> By that time some of the agrarian credit institutions had started to loan out cattle, but they were not as successful as the Jewish traders because they demanded a down payment as security and because they conducted their business much less discreetly.<sup>52</sup>

In summing up, it can be said that the extent of the Jewish cattle trade depended on the local agrarian structure and the financial circumstances of the peasants. The Jewish cattle dealers seem to have held a monopoly primarily in agriculturally less developed regions, where the peasants depended on credit buying. It is obvious that such an economic structure almost unavoidably had to lead to accusations of usury against the Jews. Although it has been proved that this was true in some cases, on the whole – according to reports of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* – even the newly-established loan banks could not offer the smallholders credit for the purchase of cattle under more favourable terms than the Jewish cattle dealers; because of the poverty of the peasants and the often poor quality of the cattle, the business risk was very high. Therefore, the Jewish cattle dealers filled a necessary function. This still proved to be true in 1938, when their expulsion resulted in considerable economic losses for the peasants.<sup>53</sup>

The social situation of the Jewish cattle dealers improved continuously during the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the century most of them lived on the bare subsistence level. At that time, the governments of several South German states even tried to exclude poor cattle dealers and *shmoosers* from being emancipated, so that their children would have to turn to more “useful” occupations.<sup>54</sup> Later, during the 1860s, when more and more poor Jews had emigrated and the agrarian economic situation improved, reports of the wealth of some cattle dealers were frequently heard, and even the local magistrates acknowledged that the Jewish dealers stimulated trade and brought money into the villages.<sup>55</sup> An upper stratum of cattle dealers developed, which

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<sup>50</sup> B. Rosenthal, ‘Eine Wucherenquête in der Kurpfalz’, in *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, LXXIX (1935), p. 448. This inquiry deals with the year 1676.

<sup>51</sup> *Wucher auf dem Lande*, *op. cit.*, pp. 38, 93, 117, 131, 166 ff., 202f., 292, and *passim*.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 173f.

<sup>53</sup> Paul Sauer, *Dokumente über die Verfolgung jüdischer Bürger in Baden-Württemberg*, vol. I, Stuttgart 1966, p. 159.

<sup>54</sup> For instance, in Württemberg and Hesse-Kassel (cf. Note 14). Aron Tänzer, *Geschichte der Juden in Jebenhausen und Göppingen*, Berlin 1927, p. 134; *Wucher auf dem Lande*, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

<sup>55</sup> Tänzer, *Geschichte der Juden in Jebenhausen*, *op. cit.*, p. 149, reports this about the magistrate of Jebenhausen in 1863.

had considerable capital at its disposal, while the majority of cattle dealers just reached a comfortable living standard. Some wholesale dealers employed several buyers, had a yearly turn-over of thousands of heads of cattle, and owned extensive estates. A cattle dealer like David Kaufmann in Baden was able to take his six sons as buyers into the business, while he himself concentrated on sales in Mannheim.<sup>56</sup> Urbanisation increased the cities' demand for meat, and the railways made it possible to transport cattle quickly to the urban centres of consumption. Therefore, some of the wholesale dealers specialised entirely in supplying urban slaughterhouses and, if they had enough buyers in their employment, they even moved to the cities. For instance, in 1863, there were three Jewish wholesale dealers of this new type in Duisburg; between them, they handled 5,000 head of cattle per year.<sup>57</sup> This concentration of the cattle trade on the growing urban market outlets is a further proof of the historical changes the cattle trade underwent in the nineteenth century.

When a Jewish cattle dealer moved to the city, he gave up some of his traditional rural way of life. But something he surely retained – something that was essential in the practice of his occupation – the language of the cattle dealer. This business jargon, a mixture of German, Hebrew, and Yiddish, shows more clearly than anything else the continuity in the history of the cattle trade. When Werner Weinberg started his collection of the last remnants of *Jüdisch-deutsch* expressions, he interviewed mainly cattle dealers who had emigrated.<sup>58</sup> The language of the cattle dealer was the only “foreign language” the peasants ever thought worth learning, and in many villages they were well versed in it.<sup>59</sup> Perhaps nothing else illustrates so vividly the economic and social importance the Jewish cattle dealer had in Germany.

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<sup>56</sup> Alfred Kaufmann, ‘Anshej Rhenus’, in: Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 154f.

<sup>57</sup> Herbert Lehmann, *Duisburgs Großhandel und Spedition vom Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts bis 1905*, Duisburg 1958, pp. 185, 195.

<sup>58</sup> Werner Weinberg, *Die Reste des Jüdisch-Deutschen*, Stuttgart 1969, p. 7.

<sup>59</sup> Jeggle, *Judendörfer in Württemberg*, *op. cit.*, p. 238.





STEFI JERSCH-WENZEL

on

## German Jews in the Rural Economy – A Comment

To begin with, I should like to stress that we still know far too little about rural Jewry in Germany. Who, indeed, was a “rural Jew”? Did he have to be born in the countryside, in the region of his subsequent activities? How did he earn his living? Did he have to live among peasants or could he reside in the nearest small town? I find it most welcome, therefore, that Monika Richarz has dealt with this subject. Her reflections represent an important new beginning for further investigations of this kind.

I would like to confine my comments to three questions:

- (1) The significance of rural trade in the context of the process of industrialisation;
- (2) the character and function of Jewish rural trade in Prussia’s Eastern provinces;
- (3) the manifestations of xenophobia during the attempted Revolution of 1848.

(1): The study of the history of rural Jewry appears to me to be important above all because of the light it throws on the specific life style of those Jews. Such an inquiry is needed if the currently accepted view that the Jews were living almost exclusively in the towns, their vast majority bent on assimilation, is to be effectively revised.

In economic history, the rural trade here described is characteristic of regions to which industrialisation had come with a time-lag or not at all. German agriculture was of course lagging behind the new industries in applying technological progress, making use of the advances of scientific research in the sphere of crop and stock farming, and introducing modern marketing techniques. The paper by Monika Richarz gives the impression that the readiness for innovation that has widely been recognised as a typical trait of the Jews of that period was scarcely in evidence in the relatively static economy and society of South Western Germany. That may be correct for the affairs of the small peasants, who clearly were the principal customers of the Jewish traders. But what exactly did happen in the course of the capitalisation of landed estates, that is to say their conversion into capitalist enterprises employing wage labour together with labour-saving machines with the aim of maximising profits? How was rural trade affected by this development? Did it, too, acquire a new form of organisation? Were new markets opened up? Who took over the marketing of the agricultural commodities produced in this way? Was it again the Jews,

possibly the more affluent among them? In short: how did rural trade develop in response to the introduction of capitalist methods in agriculture, and what was the part played by the Jews in that development? And what were the repercussions on their life style and conditions of subsistence?

(2): Character and function of Jewish rural trade in Prussia's Eastern provinces.

I do not share Monika Richarz's view that it was of minor significance by comparison with Southern and Western Germany. It is true that well into the nineteenth century Jews wishing to settle in rural areas in Prussia had to contend with restrictions or even outright prohibition. This prevented the emergence of a cohesive rural Jewry conscious of its traditions. Even so, the part played by Jews in the rural economy, especially in the annexed parts of Silesia and Poznań, as well as in East Prussia and Pomerania, bears comparison with other German regions. I have in mind in the first place Jewish leaseholders on estates owned by the nobility, in villages and country towns. They rented breweries and spirit stills, sheep farms, dairy farms, dairies, fisheries, butchery businesses, bakeries. In Upper Silesia an attempt was made in 1780 to ban Jewish leaseholders. The ban had to be revoked in 1787 owing to the shortage of Christian leaseholders with adequate capital resources.<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to find quantitative data on the share of Jews in these trades concerned with the conversion of agricultural products. According to the authors of the *General-Juden-Reglement* of 1797 for Southern and New East Prussia, "most" – that is to say, well over half – of the leaseholders of breweries and spirit distilleries at that time were Jews.<sup>2</sup> They were forbidden to trade in other products, but there is evidence that they did in fact buy up the agrarian producers' skins and pelts, linen and wool, hops and tobacco, and sold them in the towns. In addition they were engaged in agriculture on a minor scale.

In the Mark Brandenburg, too, I have come across cases in which Jews came to play a crucial part in rural trade, buying wool and skins from the peasants and supplying them to weavers and tanners in the towns.<sup>3</sup> And they were not simply middlemen between peasants and artisans; they also extended credit to both, and were instrumental in bringing a large variety of goods into the

<sup>1</sup> See Ludwig von Rönne and Heinrich Simon, *Die früheren und gegenwärtigen Verhältnisse der Juden in den sämtlichen Landestheilen des Preußischen Staates*, Breslau 1843, p. 233.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 298; concerning the efforts to issue comprehensive regulations applicable to the Jews "resident in the countryside and engaged in commerce", see pp. 295f. Concerning the tradition of Jewish economic activity in the rural areas of East Prussia, cf. Selma Stern, *Der Preußische Staat und die Juden*, Teil 2, Abtlg. 1, Tübingen 1962 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 8/1), pp. 162ff.

<sup>3</sup> See Stefi Jersch-Wenzel, *Juden und "Franzosen" in der Wirtschaft des Raumes Berlin/Brandenburg zur Zeit des Merkantilismus* (Einzelveröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, Bd. 23), Berlin 1978, pp. 60, 194. During the nineteenth century commercial activities of this type were, if anything, on the increase.

villages. In West Prussia, the traditional relations between the Jews and the Polish rural population – which have been described as “fellowship cemented by working and living together”<sup>4</sup> – were restricted under Prussian rule to trade “in all conceivable goods”, but that trade, above all in livestock, timber and grain, was very substantial well into the nineteenth century.<sup>5</sup>

Trade in a multitude of goods does not seem to me to be a peculiarity of the rural Jews, but a characteristic of Jewish trade in general in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The 1749 Register of Berlin Jews listed some 300 heads of households, 78 per cent of them traders, engaged between them in some 450 different branches, often in combinations that strike the modern observer as exceedingly odd (such as clocks and watches, linen and tobacco).<sup>6</sup> The actual range of goods is likely to have been much wider still. In nineteenth-century Upper Silesia I have found similar combinations. In one small locality, for instance, Jews traded according to conditions of supply and demand in cloth, leather, spirits, spices, fancy goods, hardware and agricultural products.<sup>7</sup> This flexibility, I believe, was inspired above all by prudence, as a precaution against fluctuations in the general level of economic activity or in specific market conditions, or against sudden interruptions in the supply of goods. As far as the itinerant trade is concerned, it is well known that the product mix changes in line with the availability of supplies.

In Prussia's Eastern provinces, then, the Jews undoubtedly performed an important function in the marketing of agricultural products, including cattle and horses, and in supplying the rural population with non-agrarian commodities. Whether their share in rural trade was greater or less than in Southern and Western Germany I am not in a position to judge. I should like, however, to warn against any attempt at a hasty assessment, bearing in mind the vast differences in population density, which was very low, for instance, in Württemberg, but very high in Poznań.

How conspicuous the role of the Jews was in the rural economy of Prussia's Eastern provinces, especially in the former Polish territories, is clearly illustrated both by official records and numerous contemporary travellers' reports. Heinrich Heine, for example, in his *Reisebilder* of 1822 set down his impressions of the population of the future Province of Poznań.<sup>8</sup> He did not explicitly refer to Jews as rural inhabitants, but said “they are engaged in all trades and can rightly be called Poland's third estate”. Under the conditions of an almost

<sup>4</sup> Max Aschkewitz, *Zur Geschichte der Juden in Westpreußen* (Wissenschaftliche Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Ost-Mitteleuropas, Nr. 81), Marburg (Lahn) 1967, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 79.

<sup>6</sup> For details, see *ibid.*, pp. 96ff.

<sup>7</sup> See Stefi Wenzel, *Jüdische Bürger und kommunale Selbstverwaltung in preußischen Städten 1808–1848* (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, Bd. 21), Berlin 1967, p. 106.

<sup>8</sup> Heinrich Heine, *Reisebilder: Über Polen*, in *Sämtliche Werke* in 12 Bänden, 6.–8. Bd., Berlin-Leipzig n.d., pp. 181f.

exclusively agrarian economy, this meant being engaged in trade with a stock of rural suppliers and customers. And Heine added that “with a few exceptions, all inns are in the hands of Jews”, and that “every nobleman has a Jewish steward in the village or the town, whom he calls his factor, and who carries out all his commissions, sales and purchases, inquiries, etc.”. These broad generalisations would of course be modified by empirical historical research; nevertheless, they do point to the integral role played by the Jews in the predominantly agrarian life of Prussia’s Eastern Province.

Another traveller, Georg Forster – later to become Germany’s most prominent Jacobin – recorded in 1784 what he had been told in Warsaw “as the generally held opinion about Jews” in Poland:

“A Jew will pay 200 *Reichstaler* for the most ramshackle pot-house, because he engages in illicit trade. The Jews ruin the peasants, allowing them to tittle on credit, to drink themselves out of their next harvest while the corn is still green; they put salt into the spirits, they spoil the health of whole generations with their miserable half-baked bread, they lure the young peasant children into their dens and give them spirits to drink to get them early into the habit ... They are the factotums and chief tenants of the big landlords ...”.<sup>9</sup>

Disregarding the negative stereotypes, it can be said that this hearsay report points to an economic function of the Jews in substantial agreement with Heinrich Heine’s personal impressions.

In the German novel, too, East European Jews have been featured in this function – notably in Gustav Freytag’s *Soll und Haben* (1855) and Wilhelm Raabe’s *Hungerpastor* (1863) – though caricatured in an anti-Jewish spirit as usurious moneylenders to the impoverished gentry. Even in the late nineteenth century we find in Fontane’s *Stechlin* the figure of the mortgage broker Baruch Hirschfeld, whose incomplete command of German suggests that he is meant to be an East European Jew. As owner of “the big textile shop on the market place” (of Gransee, a country town of 3500 to 4000 inhabitants), he is strictly speaking not a rural Jew. Yet, in the eyes of the squire, who likes to reminisce about “the things we have been through together”, he is an “old friend” who as an estate agent and a source of credit has a secure place in the rural world.<sup>10</sup>

It seems to me, however, that in the nineteenth century these Jews engaged in rural trade in the Eastern provinces did not as a rule seek to identify with any traditional Jewish community. Rather, they tended to take the German side in

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<sup>9</sup> Quoted by Joseph S. Gordon, ‘Georg Forster und die Juden’, *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte*, VII, Tel-Aviv 1978, pp. 226f.

<sup>10</sup> See Fontane’s *Werke in fünf Bänden*, Bd. 5, *Der Stechlin*, Berlin-Weimar 1964, pp. 13, 343f. On the ambivalent relationship between landed gentry and Jews see Werner E. Mosse, ‘Die Juden in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft’, in *Juden im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890–1914*. Ein Sammelband herausgegeben von Werner E. Mosse unter Mitwirkung von Arnold Paucker, Tübingen 1976 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 33), pp. 90ff.

the German-Polish national controversies; most of them became dedicated Germans of the Jewish faith.

(3): The central theme is the year 1848. On this point I should like to qualify Monika Richarz's remarks.

It is well known that at times of economic stress and political unrest latent tensions between a majority and minority groups can lead to open aggression on the part of the majority. Such a situation was present in 1848.

I would say that there were latent tensions between peasants and rural traders in general, not only with the Jews among them. The rural traders, as profit-orientated non-producers, appeared to threaten the existence, already wretched, of the rural population. As Monika Richarz has pointed out, the peasant risings were directed against *all* creditors, but only the Jews were alien enough to be singled out as an outgroup chiefly responsible for one's own misery. With the Jews being made the main targets of attack in many parts of the country, it was possible to maintain the ruling structure of the ingroup. Another question arising in this context concerns the role played by the traditional religious anti-Jewish animosity in the countryside, where the hold of the Christian Churches on the population was yet stronger than in the towns.

Different motives were behind the anti-Jewish excesses in Poznań and Upper Silesia. Here, too, economic considerations may have played some part, but the main reason was the clear pro-German stand of the Jews. It is easily forgotten that only from 20 to at most 30 per cent of the population in these areas was German-speaking, the Jews among them. Over three quarters of these involuntary Prussian subjects never gave up the hope of restoring a Polish national state. The events during the first few days of the attempted revolution seemed to bring this goal within their grasp. Their reaction against all things German was all the more vehement when those hopes were dashed, as the Prussian Government refused to countenance any form, however limited, of Polish self-government. Jews took an active part in the fight against the Polish insurgents. In some localities they even held out after the German office-holders had fled. Thus, at Graetz, in the Province of Poznań, the physician Marcus Mosse temporarily assumed the office of mayor – thereby incidentally acting against the letter of the Prussian Statute of Urban Administration – after the German mayor had taken to flight.<sup>11</sup>

In conclusion I should like to say:

In order to correct the false cliché of exclusively urban Jews reading Schiller, Kant and Goethe and becoming assimilated, it seems important to intensify research into the history of rural Jewry in the German states. I would suggest, however, that Jewish rural trade should be included in such investigations, even where no rural Jewish communities in the narrow sense existed to conduct it. In other words, the investigations ought to extend to areas such as Prussia's Eastern provinces, because the economic function of rural trade there is

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<sup>11</sup> See Wenzel, *op. cit.*, pp.197, 209.

comparable to that in South Western Germany. In such studies it would be desirable to deal with the regions separately at first, with a view to a subsequent comparative assessment. Furthermore, the development of Jewish rural trade will have to be considered in the context of the overall economic development of each region. And here political and social processes which influenced the attitude of the majority of the population towards the Jews will have to be taken into account.

## The German Jews at the Start of Industrialisation Structural Change and Mobility 1835–1860

### I

Jewish economic history is mainly the story of reactions: of the adjustment of a permanently small minority group to developments and changes in their environment, on which they could themselves have – if at all – but little influence.\* This is probably the main cause of what has been decried as “the major pitfall” for the Jewish economic historian: “that of deviating into an apologetic line of reasoning, such as a simplistic ‘explanation’ of Jewish occupations, or a laudatory exposition of Jewish ‘contributions’ to an economy”.<sup>1</sup> Many of the pre-1933 German-Jewish publications whether they attempted to explain the “abnormal” occupational structure of the German Jews or to prove “normalisation”, or “productivisation”, or to praise their outstanding merits in the economic field – seem always to be on the defensive against the stereotypes and value-judgements of Gentile publicists, who defamed the Jews for their “abnormality”, economic parasitism or disproportionate wealth, even while “praising” them as the promoters of capitalism. The Jewish over-reaction to Sombart’s *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben*, rightly regarded by David Landes as a “pseudo-scholarly hoax”,<sup>2</sup> serves as one of many examples.

Only in more recent times, mainly in the publications of the Leo Baeck Institute, has a different approach come to the fore. Modern social and economic history has opened new vistas by posing new questions. It tries to base its conclusions on comprehensive – and as far as possible quantitative – information about the economic fate and behaviour of the multitude of common people, rather than on the few outstanding personalities or families. This is in our context by no means an easy endeavour: the many problems of existing or missing sources and of their appropriate evaluation are all too well known. Taking this and the present – rather unsatisfactory – state of research into account, this paper tries to examine the impact of the German “take-off”, or the “great spurt” towards sustained industrialisation, on German Jewry as a group: on its migratory movements, occupational and social mobility, on income and wealth and their distribution within the group.

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\* The author would like to thank Professor Jacob Toury and Dr. Nahum Gross for many helpful discussions and their learned remarks on the contents of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> Nahum Gross (ed.), *Economic History of the Jews*, New York 1975, pp. IXf.

<sup>2</sup> David S. Landes, ‘The Jewish Merchant. Typology and Stereotypology in Germany’, in *Year Book XIX of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1973, p. 22.



At the present stage of our knowledge we may be posing more questions than we are able to answer. Some of our conclusions must remain tentative, still to be substantiated, or, probably, to be modified, by specific and detailed studies. Moreover, even at this early period we are faced with the tricky question of “Who is a Jew?”. The German Jews were at that time an easily distinguishable minority group, still living within the community and closely affiliated to it by tradition, faith and heritage and by social bias and legal discrimination. Only a small minority chose to defect via apostasy and intermarriage – according to Jacob Toury’s estimates an annual average of no more than six or seven out of every ten thousand, for the whole period between 1800 and 1871.<sup>3</sup> But the rate of dissociation was evidently very different, according to place of residence, occupation and income. Their inclusion or subtraction may therefore influence any attempt to draw a comprehensive picture of group characteristics. Still I believe, that within those limits some major trends of developments have become sufficiently marked as established by the scholarly achievements of recent years, to justify some general conclusions.

## II

The period here under review coincides roughly with the first stage of German industrialisation. Economists may still argue about the exact timing of the German “take-off”, but, in a somewhat broader context of structural economic change and its impact on the Jewish minority, in the early 1840s the process was already well under way. In 1847 some 410,000 Jews – or 1.23% of a total population of 34 millions – lived within the boundaries of the *Deutsche Bund*, excluding the Habsburg *Länder*. Twenty years later their number had grown to 470,000, while their percentage had remained constant.<sup>4</sup> Only 56,000 Jews – 14% of the total – lived around 1840 in the twenty-four *Großgemeinden*, which came to contain, at some time between 1840 and 1885, over 2,000 souls.<sup>5</sup>

Even in 1852, as is shown in Table I, less than 40,000, or 9%, lived in towns of over 50,000 inhabitants:

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<sup>3</sup> Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1847–1871*, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 53, 60.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

TABLE I

*German Towns of over 50,000 Inhabitants and their Jewish Population (1852)*

	<i>Population</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>%</i>
Berlin	443,000	9,950	2.24
Hamburg	170,000	9,000	5.29
Breslau	121,000	7,450	6.16
München	118,000	860	0.73
Köln	101,000	1,500	1.45
Dresden	100,000	650	0.65
Leipzig	67,000	530	0.79
Frankfurt a. Main	62,500	5,000	8.00
Bremen	56,000	1,150	2.05
Nürnberg	54,000	100	0.19
Stettin	52,200	750	1.44

*Sources:* H. F. Brachelli, *Deutsche Staatenkunde. Handbuch der Statistik*, Bd. 1, Wien 1856, p. 59; Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

The massive concentration of Jews in the big cities was yet to come, generally not before the 1860s, but already at the start of our period the greater part of the German Jews were living in small and middle-size towns. In Prussia, according to official statistics, it was no less than 80% of all Jews, compared with less than 30% of the Gentiles.<sup>6</sup> In South and West Germany the picture was different, but as one half of all German Jews were living in Prussia we may already regard them by the middle of the century, as a preponderantly urban population group, but still far from being a metropolitan one.

This is to be considered as the first and fundamental unifying characteristic of the Jews as a group in economic and social terms. Nonetheless we cannot, of course, speak of a "Jewish economy" in any "autarchic" sense. With the exception of communal or household servants every Jew had to eke out his living and to provide for his family by individually making use of the opportunities offered by the general economic environment. But in doing so he was to a large extent constrained by the affiliating elements of cohesion and pressure mentioned above. The result was an evident similarity, not only in the spontaneous or compulsory choice from a restricted range of gainful occupations, but also in patterns of economic conduct and preferences, like self-employment, liquidity, saving, consumption and so on. It is in this sense that German Jewry constituted a distinctive group in the economic sphere also.

<sup>6</sup> Communications of Dieterici, Director of the Prussian Statistical Bureau, to the Prussian Ministers of the Interior von Arnim and von Westphalen of 24th September 1844 and 13th February 1851 respectively, in Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People (CAHJP), Jerusalem, P 12 (Ismar Freund), Geheimes Staatsarchiv, No. 27.

It is hard to detect any purely economic logic in the regional distribution of the Jewish population at the beginning of our period. Regions of settlement and concentration originated from the changes and differences in legal and emancipatory conditions in previous times. Any economic reasoning in the considerations of ruling princes who granted or refused rights of settlement was hardly ever consistent with the economic interests of the Jews themselves. The new element in Jewish migration of the late 1820s was that as the result of expanding, however protracted, emancipation and economic liberalisation, economic motivation became more and more decisive.

Jewish internal migration had generally been regarded as a part of, though preceding in timing and proportion, the general German population movement from East to West and into the regions of advanced industrialisation.<sup>7</sup> This view seems to be open to reconsideration and should be accepted only as a broad and rather inconclusive generalisation. German industrialisation took place with remarkable regional variations – not only between *Länder* and provinces, but even on the level of *Kreise* and *Bezirke*.<sup>8</sup> We therefore need a very detailed investigation of Jewish migration by place of out- and inflow, to disclose its exact correlation to industrial growth in different regions, sectors and branches. Such an investigation is still lacking, likewise a study of the demographic and social composition of the migrants, as compared with the general German population movements. A first glance at available data indicates significant divergences: the bulk of Gentile migrants were young, unmarried and unpropertied agricultural labourers, who found employment in mines and factories. The Jews, in contrast, moved generally *en famille* and definitely not for this purpose.<sup>9</sup> Future research on these lines will certainly provide more insight. Here I can point only to a few outstanding figures.

The Ruhr was the most rapidly industrialised area in Germany with the greatest net population gain from internal migration between 1849 and 1910.<sup>10</sup> Administratively the Ruhr was divided between the district of Arnsberg in the province of Westphalia and that of Düsseldorf in the Rhineland and included important industrial towns, such as Düsseldorf, Bochum, Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen and Essen. The interesting and significant fact is, that the Jewish population in this very heartland of German industrialisation grew only slightly in absolute terms and declined relatively. In the whole of Westphalia

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<sup>7</sup> Jakob Lestschinsky, *Das wirtschaftliche Schicksal des deutschen Judentums. Aufstieg. Wandlung. Krise. Ausblick*, Schriften der Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der deutschen Juden und der Hauptstelle für jüdische Wanderfürsorge, No. VII, Berlin 1932, pp. 53ff.

<sup>8</sup> F.B. Tipton, *Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany during the 19th Century*, Middleton, Conn. 1976, pp. 45ff.

<sup>9</sup> Monika Richarz (Hrsg.), *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1780–1871*, Stuttgart 1976, Veröffentlichung des Leo Baeck Instituts, pp. 139, 148f., 169f., 191 and *passim*, Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op.cit.*, p. 47.

<sup>10</sup> Tipton, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

the number of Jewish souls rose by only 1,300 between 1846 and 1866 and their percentage fell from 1.03 to 0.99%. In the same period the Jewish population in the district of Düsseldorf grew by 2,500 and their percentage from 0.8 to 0.9.<sup>11</sup> But at no time did the Jewish population of the Ruhr reach the overall percentage of all Germany and it declined with proceeding industrialisation: in 1895 it was no more than 0.7 in the Arnsberg district and 0.75 in that of Düsseldorf.<sup>12</sup>

In the middle of the century the Kingdom of Saxony was the most advanced region in terms of population growth and the industrial distribution and specialisation of the labour force.<sup>13</sup> One should therefore expect it to be a major attraction for Jewish migration. Indeed, Lestschinsky took the Saxon example to prove his argument of the Jewish rush into industrialising areas and the tendency of “productivisation”.<sup>14</sup> A closer look at the data reveals the obvious “fallacy of low numbers”: no more than eight or nine hundred Jews lived in the Saxon kingdom up to 1840, a mere 0.05% of the total population. In 1871 they were 3,500, or 0.13%.<sup>15</sup> This was indeed four times their number of 1840, but still only 0.7% of all German Jews. The rapid growth of later years was the result of immigrating *Ostjuden*, who already in 1905 made up some 60% of all the Jews in the kingdom. In this case the reason is to be found in the legal situation. Although the kingdom emancipated its native Jews in 1849 and did not reverse this legislation during the following years of reaction, its borders remained closed to Jewish migrants until 1867.<sup>16</sup>

The accelerated industrialisation of Upper Silesia belongs to a somewhat later period.<sup>17</sup> Therefore the quite remarkable growth of the Jewish population in the Oppeln district – from 16,400, or 1.77% in 1846 to 22,000, or 1.9% in 1866 – cannot be regarded as having been caused by industrialisation, but by the relative economic backwardness of the neighbouring regions – Poznań and Russian and Austrian Poland – and the traditional *Freizügigkeit* of Upper Silesia.<sup>18</sup> Industrialisation was, however, decisive for the fact that the new immigrants stayed on and that their number grew in absolute, but not relative, terms, in later years.

It is above all in this negative sense, that economic motivation of Jewish migration makes itself evident. Between 1816 and 1871 the economically backward regions of Germany, mainly Poznań, Western Prussia, Bavaria and

<sup>11</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>12</sup> *Die Gemeinden und Gutsbezirke des Preussischen Staates*, Berlin, years 1871 and 1895.

<sup>13</sup> Tipton, *op. cit.*, pp. 30ff.

<sup>14</sup> Lestschinsky, *Wirtschaftliches Schicksal*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>15</sup> ‘Die Juden im Königreich Sachsen 1834–1905’, in *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden (ZDSJ)*, 1908, pp. 108f.

<sup>16</sup> Adolf Diamant, *Chronik der Juden in Dresden*, Darmstadt 1973, pp. 31ff.; Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 305ff., 341.

<sup>17</sup> Tipton, *op. cit.*, pp. 132f.

<sup>18</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

Württemberg lost, in relative and at times even in absolute terms, significant parts of their Jewish population.<sup>19</sup> These were the main sources of Jewish emigration abroad, whose dimensions and effects still await comprehensive and detailed evaluation. It is my impression, that they have hitherto been underestimated and deserve profound investigation.<sup>20</sup>

They were also the regions that lost many of their Jewish inhabitants to other, economically more advanced areas within Germany. But to be more specific about the economic motives and effects of Jewish migration we still need a detailed breakdown of the regions and places which gained by it. Of course, the consistent trend of urbanisation, one of the main features of the movement, stands out already, but in the 1840s the process was just beginning. The metropolitan concentration of the German Jews took place in a chain of transitory stages. In 1840 even Berlin, the largest of the few really big cities in Germany, had no more than 5,600 Jews and it was only the third, after Poznań and Hamburg, of large Jewish communities.<sup>21</sup>

Everywhere in Germany the Jews were “on the move”, leaving villages and small towns in search of economic betterment. No less – probably even more important was the pursuit of better educational facilities for their children. This appears time and again as the most outstanding typical feature in Jewish migration, together with a trait of familial and communal affiliation.<sup>22</sup> The economic implications of this phenomenon are evident and it can only partly be explained as the simple secularised continuation of the traditional pre-eminence of “learning” amongst the Jews. Prolonged and costly education is at one and the same time the result of and the condition for economic improvement and a rising standard of living. Many Jewish families who sent their children to better and higher schools, even at the cost of severe sacrifice and hardship, would not have been able to do so a generation earlier. The mere possibility of being able to dispense for a longer period with the economic contribution of growing children was the result of previous, however modest, economic achievement. The aim was further social and economic mobility on an inter-generational level.

Beside these distinctive characteristics of Jewish migration the available data convey only the general impression, that centres of trade and services were

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<sup>19</sup> Lestschinsky, *Wirtschaftliches Schicksal*, *op. cit.*, p. 52; Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 11 ff., 37; Max Aschkewitz, *Zur Geschichte der Juden in Westpreußen*, Marburg (Lahn) 1967, pp. 87f.

<sup>20</sup> At the present time a detailed study of German-Jewish demographic developments in the nineteenth century is being done by Professor Uziel O. Schmelz and his staff at the Institute for Jewish Demography in Jerusalem. We may hope that it will before long provide us with much useful information, among other data also on migration movements inside Germany and emigration abroad. For my own statistical estimates of emigration during the period here under review see the Appendix, pp. 146–149.

<sup>21</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 34f.

<sup>22</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, p. 30 (introduction) and many of the memoirs, e. g. pp. 139, 170, 198 and *passim*.

more attractive than the emerging industrial towns. In an often quoted article of 1842 the director of the Prussian Statistical Bureau, J.G. Hoffmann, said wonderingly "... viele der angesehensten Städte enthalten nur eine wenig zahlreiche Judenschaft, und selbst die vorzüglich gewerbereichen großen Städte Elberfeld, Barmen und Aachen hatten nach der letzten Zählung noch bei weitem nicht 300 Juden unter ihren Einwohnern."<sup>23</sup> At the same time important Jewish communities developed in Mannheim and Nuremberg, which were soon to become important grain markets and centres of brewery provisioning.<sup>24</sup>

Generally we may conclude: Jewish migration started earlier, was proportionally more extensive and differed in composition and direction from the mainstream of the German *Binnenwanderung* induced by industrialisation. The reasons are of course to be found quite apart from the state of legislation, in the different social and occupational composition of the Jewish group at the start of industrialisation and in the specific, group-characteristic trends of their development during the process.

### III

To establish a picture of the occupational and social situation of the German Jews at the start of industrialisation we must briefly consider the preceding period. The unquestionable economic ascent of German Jewry began well before the era proper of industrialisation, most markedly at the time of the Napoleonic wars. Jewish tradesmen and pedlars clearly gained from the profit opportunities created by commodity shortages and army provisioning, which were at that time a source of remarkable capital formation in the trade and commerce sector.<sup>25</sup> We may assume that a fair number of the later flourishing Jewish middle-sized firms accumulated their first capital in these years, especially in the Rhineland. What followed was a general, although occasionally interrupted and not regionally uniform, process of economic advancement and consolidation. In the process of "loosening traditional structures and the redistribution of economic opportunities"<sup>26</sup> the Jews were evidently on the winning side.

<sup>23</sup> Johann G. Hoffmann, *Zur Judenfrage. Statistische Erörterung über Anzahl und Verteilung der Juden im Preussischen Staate, nach einer Vergleichung der Zählungen zu Ende der Jahre 1840 und 1822*, Berlin 1842, pp. 18f.

<sup>24</sup> Arthur Prinz, *Die Strukturwandlungen der deutschen Wirtschaft und die Wirtschaftstätigkeit der deutschen Juden 1815 –*, manuscript in preparation, partly in the Leo Baeck Institute Jerusalem. I thank Dr. Prinz for his courtesy in letting me use his manuscript.

<sup>25</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 92ff., 124f.; Hans Mottek, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands*, Berlin (East), 1976, pp. 81f., 120f.

<sup>26</sup> K. Borchardt, 'Germany 1700–1914', in *The Fontana Economic History of Europe*, London, p.94.

Probably the most outstanding feature of this development was the expansion and diversification of the Jewish occupational structure that had already started early in the first half of the nineteenth century. As this has been the central theme of most of previous research, I can here confine myself to a few summary remarks.

First, the clearly discernible trend is the continuous expansion of regular commerce, at the expense of money-, bill- and pawnbroking on the one hand, peddling and all kinds of *Not- und Schacherhandel* on the other. Much may be due to changing semantics, value-judgements or classification; the trend remains nevertheless clear: in the wake of a gradually expanding market economy, Jewish trade and commerce became increasingly "honourable".

Second, all available statistics show a remarkable percentage rise of craft-trades. In overall statistics this is partly explained by the inclusion of former Polish territories into Prussia, but the tendency appears clearly also in all other parts of Germany and in local records. We know today that this was a transitory and temporary development. Even when it lasted it was statistically overstated by manipulated registration.<sup>27</sup> Initiated by the *Erziehungspolitik* of German emancipators and governments, it was fostered by the efforts of over forty Jewish organisations. But since it was against the long-run trend of economic development, it could not last. These endeavours were, however, not entirely futile. For many poor youngsters they provided a way to gainful employment, or – presumably even more often – to emigration. Some of the apprentices, especially in the textile trades, could put the achieved technical knowledge to good use in later commercial or manufacturing operations. But, as can be seen clearly from the data in Table II, only a minority remained genuine artisans over a long period.<sup>28</sup>

Third, at the lowest level the eventual disappearance of *Betteljuden* and vagrants and the reduction of day-labourers and domestic servants, soon to become one of the main features of upward social mobility, had already begun. Our information about these lowest strata is scarce and those who belonged to them, or their descendants, were hardly likely to write their memoirs. The regrettable state of research here becomes obvious when we consider the fact that in some substantiated estimates they accounted, even in the late 1830s, for no less than 15 to 20% of the Jewish population. If this may be slightly exaggerated it is certainly true for the time of the Napoleonic wars and a short

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<sup>27</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, op. cit., p. 34; Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, op. cit., pp. 75f., 370f.

<sup>28</sup> Dagmar T. Bermann, *Produktivierungsmythen und Antisemitismus*, Diss. München 1971, pp. 54ff.; Monika Richarz, 'Jewish Social Mobility in Germany during the Time of Emancipation (1790–1871)', in *Year Book XX of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1975, pp. 217ff.; Jacob Toury, 'Jewish Manual Labour and Emigration. Records from some Bavarian Districts (1830–1857)', in *Year Book XVI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1971, pp. 48f.

TABLE II

*The Occupational Structure of the Jews in Prussia 1843–1861 (in %)*

<i>Occupation by sectors:</i>	<i>1843</i>	<i>1861</i>
<i>1. Self-employed:</i>	<i>61.8</i>	<i>66.3</i>
in: Agriculture	1.0	0.9
Craft trades	13.5	11.6
Trade and Commerce	39.7	44.6
Professions	2.7	2.9
Rentiers and Pensioners	2.7	4.2
Others	2.2	2.1
<i>2. Employees:</i>	<i>29.5</i>	<i>27.2</i>
in: Craft trades	5.8	4.4
Trade and Commerce	8.1	12.4
Lower community services	1.3	0.6
Day Labourers	4.2	3.0
Domestic servants	10.1	6.8
<i>3. Living on Public Charity, Beggars, and those without declared income</i>	<i>8.7</i>	<i>6.5</i>
	100.0	100.0

*Sources: Der erste vereinigte Landtag in Berlin 1847, E. Bleich (Hrsg.), Erster Theil, Berlin 1847, 'Ergebnis der Ermittlungen betreffend die socialen Verhältnisse der Juden in der Preußischen Monarchie und deren sittlichen Zustand'; Preußische Statistik, Bd. V, Berlin 1864, pp. 5ff. 'Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung und der Volksbeschreibung nach den Aufnahmen vom 3. Dezember 1861, resp. Anfang 1862'. Quoted in: Henry Wassermann, Jews, 'Bürgertum' and 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft' in a Liberal Era (1840–1880), Ph. D. Thesis, Jerusalem, 1979, pp. 22ff.*

period afterwards.<sup>29</sup> How and to where the numerous Jewish paupers subsisting on the fringes of law and society gradually disappeared is still largely a matter of conjecture. We may well assume that they made up a large part of Jewish mass emigration. Another sizeable number seems to have been absorbed into the ranks of their Gentile equivalents and so disappeared from the Jewish scene.<sup>30</sup> In nineteenth-century Germany tolerance was apparently at its best in the underworld.

Last, the professional sector: from the early nineteenth century Jewish students had sought access to universities and academic careers and their absolute and relative numbers rose markedly. It is therefore all the more

<sup>29</sup> Eleonore Sterling, *Judenhaß. Die Anfänge des politischen Antisemitismus in Deutschland 1815–1850*, Frankfurt a. Main 1969, pp. 31f.; Prinz, *op. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> Rudolf Glanz, *Geschichte des niederen jüdischen Volkes in Deutschland*, New York 1968, pp. 156ff.; Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto. The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation*, Cambridge, Mass. 1973, p. 121.



significant that the percentage of those in the liberal professions among Jewish occupations rose much less than could be expected. Only in 1882 did it reach the average 4.9% of the general occupational distribution.<sup>31</sup> This is partly explained by legal and covert discrimination, which excluded Jews from the state bureaucracy and academic careers and compelled many graduates to return to commerce. But it was evidently also the result of an exceptionally high rate of conversion in this group.<sup>32</sup> As most of the Jewish students at that time came from wealthy families, this specific way of escaping the “stigma” of the traditional occupations of their parents and seeking entry into the ranks of the *Bildungsbürgertum* was part of a general tendency within the social group of the economically most favoured Jewish bourgeoisie.

An episode from the year 1839 well illustrates this situation: the *Telegraph für Deutschland* had published an initiative to set up funds,

“... von denen sollen alle israelitischen Gelehrten, die sich mit Erfolg den philosophischen Studien gewidmet, mit Gymnasial- und Universitätszeugnissen und dem Doktordiplom versehen sind, als Juden aber keine Beförderung im Staate finden können, so lange sie in diesem Religionsbekenntniß verharren ... eine jährliche Unterstützung beziehen.”

When Gabriel Riesser was approached to support this initiative he refused, claiming that

“... das vorgeschlagene Unternehmen hat neben seinen unleugbaren guten Seiten manche schwierige und bedenkliche ... Es ist immer eine eigene Sache um eine Unterstützung, die ohne Gegenleistung, für eine mögliche Entbehrung, zur Vermeidung einer Treulosigkeit verliehen wird. Ich bezweifle, daß der Zartfühlende sie annehmen wird ... Welcher charaktervolle Mann wird nicht lieber Stunden geben, als sich eine Pension für sein Judentum zahlen lassen?”<sup>33</sup>

Let us now regard the general economic standing of German Jewry and its social stratification on the eve of industrialisation. As quantitative information about property and income is scarce and hard to come by, most prevailing estimates are derived from statistics of occupational distribution, which are rather unreliable and often biased sources. Manipulated or value-loaded classification is evident in many cases, on both the official and the Jewish side. They can therefore serve only to a very limited extent for an assessment of income or property. Not every one classified as “mit Gelde, umlaufende Papiere und Wechseln Geschäfte machend” was necessarily a banker; neither did all “Lieferanten, Agenten Kommissionäre und Makler, auch Pfandleiher” belong to the upper middle class. Those who lived from “Einkommen aus

<sup>31</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, op. cit., p. 93.

<sup>32</sup> Monika Richarz, *Der Eintritt der Juden in die Akademischen Berufe. Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678–1848*, Tübingen 1974 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 28), pp. 134ff., 160f.

<sup>33</sup> Meyer Isler, *Gabriel Riessers Leben nebst Mitteilungen aus seinen Briefen*, Frankfurt a. Main – Leipzig 1871, pp. 318f.

eignem Vermögen, Renten oder Pensionen" were not always rich, as can be seen in many tax-records, although some of them were among the richest.

Accordingly there are still considerable differences in the estimates of the proportion of the Jewish middle and upper classes around 1848 and their relative wealth. To quote some authors: Stefi Jersch-Wenzel assumes that

"Um die Mitte des Jahrhunderts kann man von einem nicht unbeträchtlichen jüdischen Großbürgertum, von einer gut situierten jüdischen Mittelschicht und einem relativ breiten jüdischen Kleinbürgertum sprechen. Ein jüdisches Proletariat hatte sich nicht herausgebildet."<sup>34</sup>

At the other extreme we find the opinion of Alfred Marcus, in an unpublished manuscript in the possession of the Jerusalem Leo Baeck Institute

"... daß die im nicht-österreichischen Gebiet in der Zeit von 1760–1848 lebenden Juden im allgemeinen arm waren und daß es ihnen nicht gelang, eine Mittelklasse zu entwickeln, die später, d.h. nach der 'zweiten Emanzipation', so charakteristisch wurde".<sup>35</sup>

A statement which covers close to one hundred years is, of course, vague but Marcus's opinion, according to which the Jewish middle class was established only after 1848 is clear. Steven M. Lowenstein seems to hold a similar view, when he states, that

"... at the emancipation period ... except for a small number of court factors and bankers, the vast majority of German Jews were either petty tradesmen (or, in Eastern Germany, petty artisans) of one sort or another, barely able to eke out a living, or, even worse, beggars or vagabonds living on the margins of society and often living outside the law".<sup>36</sup>

In my opinion the above estimates, like many more, are based on locally limited sets of data. Jersch-Wenzel's stratification may hold true for Berlin, which was at the time still very far from being representative for all German Jews. Around 1840, only some 5,600 Jews, or 1.4% of the whole, lived there under exceptional economic and social conditions, which were largely the result of the Prussian kings' policies to allot right of settlement only to an elite of wealthy Jews. On the other hand Lowenstein bases his argument on taxation data from two small towns in Württemberg and Poznań, which can also hardly be regarded as representative. Personally I tend to agree with Toury's more cautious and differentiated statement, that between the Napoleonic wars and

<sup>34</sup> Stefi Jersch-Wenzel, 'Die Lage von Minderheiten als Indiz für den Stand der Emanzipation einer Gesellschaft', in H.U. Wehler (ed.), *Sozialgeschichte Heute, Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg*, Göttingen 1974, p. 370.

<sup>35</sup> Alfred Marcus, *Eine Untersuchung über die wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit und Situation der Juden in Deutschland vom Beginn des modernen Kapitalismus bis zum Ende der Weimarer Republik*, unpublished manuscript in the possession of the Jerusalem Leo Baeck Institute, pp. 37f.

<sup>36</sup> Steven M. Lowenstein, 'The Pace of Modernisation of German Jewry in the Nineteenth Century', in *Year Book XXI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1976, p. 49.

the eve of the Revolution “a well-established Jewish middle class gradually evolved ... mainly in the towns”, but in 1848 the process was still far from concluded.<sup>37</sup> Also emphasising the exceptional character of the Berlin-Brandenburg data, Toury estimates that around 1848 some 15% of all German Jews belonged to the higher and middle bourgeoisie, 35% to the lower middle class, while the remaining half lived at bare subsistence level.<sup>38</sup>

Toury's estimates are further substantiated in his recent work<sup>39</sup> by some new and informative data from the few available tax records in Jewish and official archives. Similar assessments from Darmstadt and a few smaller communities in Bavaria and the Rhineland, which I was myself able to collect<sup>40</sup> also confirm that in the middle of the century the upward move into middle and higher tax-brackets had already been in progress for several decades. This is demonstrated also in the steady inflow of new taxpayers into the lower brackets. (See Tables III–V.) But as long as the number or percentage of tax-exempted community members remains unknown, this must be regarded as fragmentary information, worthy of further investigation.

To sum up the starting position: on the eve of industrialisation the German Jews had in many ways initiated what in their environment had only just begun. Behind them were several decades of slow but consistent economic and social advancement, and both geographically and socially they were “on the move”. The majority lived in small and middle-size towns, deriving their income from more diversified commercial activities than before. But most were still in the lower and middle income brackets and no less than half of them were poor and working hard for a mere subsistence. Compared with their environment, up to 1847 “the Jews had not yet caught up with high and middle bourgeoisie in the urban regions. The Jewish rural upper class was also still weaker than the Gentile one. But the rural poor were ... even more miserable than the village Jews, who did not depend solely on agricultural yields”.<sup>41</sup>

Seen in this context the Jewish story was one of unprecedented success. In the eyes of their neighbours, who felt left behind, it was also a conspicuous success, the more so, as they felt – not entirely unjustifiedly – that it was attained at their expense. The *März pogrome* can by no means be sufficiently explained on purely economic grounds. But the fact that Jewish property was already abundantly visible, so as to provoke the greed and envy of rioting gangs is in itself a manifestation of economic achievement.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Jacob Toury, *Turmoil and Confusion in the Revolution of 1848*, Merhavia 1968 (in Hebrew), p. 15.

<sup>38</sup> Jacob Toury, *Prolegomena zum Eintritt der Juden ins deutsche Bürgertum*, Tel-Aviv 1972 (in Hebrew), p. 122.

<sup>39</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 103ff.

<sup>40</sup> CAHJP, Gesamtarchiv der deutschen Juden (GA), Darmstadt-KGe 8/I; Altenkuntstadt – F II/34; Weisenau – Rh/Wei, 26–45.

<sup>41</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>42</sup> See for instance Abraham Gilam, ‘Die historische Bedeutung der Megillath Baisingen’, in *Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts*, XV (1976), No. 52, p. 80 and *passim*.

## IV

The era of early industrialisation found the Jews indeed “predestined and qualified”<sup>43</sup> to take advantage of the expanding market economy. But it cannot be considered as the decisive and abrupt turning point in their economic development. The preceding period of protracted emancipation had been one of slow upward mobility, and the achievements during industrialisation depended in most individual cases on those of the previous generation. Industrialisation expanded and accelerated trends of mobility which had started earlier. It definitely did not cause any gradual disappearance of specific Jewish group-characteristics in the economic sphere. Rather, it accentuated them even more. No actual “normalisation” or adjustment to the patterns of the majority can be discerned in labour, capital or income distribution within the Jewish group or in its general economic conduct and preferences, at least during the period here under review.

Table II shows the prevailing tendencies in the development of the occupational structure: the percentage increase of manual occupations which had taken place in the first half of the century, was reversed in the second half. Even in Poznań with its traditional large component of Jewish artisans, their numbers in relative and even absolute terms declined markedly between 1843 and 1861.<sup>44</sup> The sons of pedlars who had set out in the previous generation to become craftsmen, returned later as petty tradesmen and shopkeepers with fixed addresses, or – probably far more often – emigrated abroad.<sup>45</sup> As a result of progressing “piecemeal emancipation” and the freedom of movement and settlement, Jewish mobility took place mainly in the tertiary activities of trade and commerce, and to a lesser extent the professions, which were complementary to industrialisation.<sup>46</sup>

Emigration seems to have played an important role – not yet sufficiently recognised and researched – in changing the social structure of German Jewry. If there is as yet little agreement about the dimensions of Jewish emigration from Germany to overseas<sup>47</sup> and to Western European countries,<sup>48</sup> we know even less about its composition. There is, however, ample evidence that most of the Jewish emigrants were poor and came from villages and small towns. At

<sup>43</sup> Hans Mommsen, ‘Zur Frage des Einflusses der Juden auf die Wirtschaft etc.’, in *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 2, Stuttgart 1966, p. 353.

<sup>44</sup> Julian Bartyś, ‘Grand Duchy of Poznań under Prussian Rule. Changes in the Economic Position of the Jewish Population 1815–1848’, in *Year Book XVII of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1972, p. 202; Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 96ff.

<sup>45</sup> Landes, *loc. cit.*, pp. 14ff.; Richarz, ‘Social Mobility’, *loc. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>46</sup> Landes, *loc. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>47</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 43f., 50.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*; Liebman Hersch, ‘Jewish Migration during the last Hundred Years’, in *The Jewish People, Past and Present*, New York 1946, vol. I, pp. 407f.

that time Gentile emigrants were mostly peasants and craftsmen who, after selling their property or part of it could afford to emigrate with their families. The poor and unmarried field-hands went into towns and the emerging industrial centres.<sup>49</sup> This was in contrast to the Jews, where the better-off went to the towns, while the poorer emigrated to America and Western Europe. Most of them seem to have been single young men and even girls, who found it difficult to find husbands in the regions of the *Matrikelgesetze*. Many of them had their fare paid by Jewish charity: communities were apparently ready to go to any length to get rid of their local and transient applicants, under the motto "Pattern ist Geld wert!"<sup>50</sup> Cases of upper-class emigrants, of Jewish bankers and businessmen who went abroad to set up branches of their home firms, were a minority among the bulk of Jewish emigrants. Even at the present stage of research we may justly assume that the younger and poorer, but probably also the vocationally better-trained, and the personally more enterprising Jews, were those who sought improvement abroad. By doing so they reduced competition for scarce economic opportunities at home, and probably contributed the single most important factor to the remarkable decline of the Jewish lower classes.<sup>51</sup>

The second striking feature of a changing social stratification is the fact that almost everybody moved upward. According to Toury in 1871 more than 60% of all German Jews were in the middle and higher income brackets, compared with only 5 to 25% in the lowest, differing by regions. In 1848 the picture had been almost exactly the reverse!<sup>52</sup> My own samples of tax-registers (cf. Tables III–V) show a very similar trend of mobility, which seems to have been essentially slower in small village communities.

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<sup>49</sup> Mack Walker, *Germany and the Emigration 1816–1885*, Cambridge, Mass. 1964, pp. 156f.

<sup>50</sup> Rudolf Glanz, 'The German Jewish Mass Emigration 1820–1880', in *American Jewish Archives*, vol. XXII (1970), pp. 52f., 56; Toury, 'Manual Labour', *loc. cit.*, pp. 48f.; Jakob Lestschinsky, 'Jewish Migrations 1840–1956', in I. Finkelstein (ed.), *The Jews, Their History, Culture and Religion*, New York <sup>3</sup>1960, vol. II, pp. 1559f.

<sup>51</sup> Prinz, *op. cit.*, Toury, 'Manual Labour', *loc. cit.*, pp. 53ff.; B. Weinryb, 'Deutsch-Jüdische Wanderungen im 19. Jahrhundert', in *Der Morgen*, vol. 10 (1934), No. 1, pp. 4ff.

<sup>52</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

TABLE III

*Darmstadt: Official Tax Rolls of Jewish Community Members 1840–1861*

	1840	1850	1861
Taxpaying members:	112	128	172
Total Jewish tax sum (fl.):	18,760	22,009	41,477
Average tax sum:	167.5	171	241
<i>Distribution:</i>			
1. Over 1000 fl.	1	1	6
2. fl. 501–1000	6	10	18
3. fl. 171–500	30	23	47
4. fl. 61–170	40	60	56
5. fl. 21–60	26	18	27
6. fl. 1–20	9	16	18

*Note:* Of 71 names which appear in 1861 in the 3 upper brackets, only 15 were in 1840 in the same category. 30 seem to be new residents. 26 moved up from lower brackets. Of 18 names in the lowest bracket in 1861 only 5 appear in the tax roll of 1840. 13 are either new residents or moved up from the tax exempted community members.

*Source:* CAHJP, Jerusalem, Gesamtarchiv der deutschen Juden (GA), KGe 8/I, 71/72

TABLE IV

*Weisenau (Rheinhessen): Official Tax Rolls of Jewish Community Members 1843–1855*

	1843		1855	
Taxpaying members:	23		30	
Total Jewish tax sum (fl.):	733		1,187	
Average tax sum:	31.8		39.6	
<i>Distribution (number of taxpayers and percentage of total Jewish tax sum):</i>				
	No.	%	No.	%
Over fl. 50	5	49.9	10	69.6
fl. 25–50	4	18.0	5	14.1
fl. 1–24	14	32.1	15	16.1
	23	100.0	30	100.0

*Note:* Of 10 names, in 1855 in highest bracket, 4 were in 1843 in the same category. 3 seem to be heirs of families which were in the same group before. 1 rose from lower category. 2 unknown.

*Source:* CAHJP, Jerusalem, GA, FII, 34. Rh/Wei, 2632.

TABLE V  
*Altenkunststadt (Bavaria): 'Vermögensschätzung' 1835–1861*

	1835	1861
Assessed members:	64	67
Total assessed property (fl.):	160,700	328,325
Average assessed property (fl.):	2,511	4,900
<i>Distribution (fl.):</i>		
Over 20,000	–	2
15–20,000	1	3
10–15,000	–	3
5–10,000	7	17
2– 5,000	18	18
500– 2,000	25	14
Under 500	13	10

*Source:* CAHJP, Jerusalem, GA, F II, 34.

The data are still insufficient for a final and reliable assessment of distributional changes because we lack, in most cases, the numbers of the tax-exempt. But they provide a very strong suggestion of a continuous process of equalisation of income and property, which continued until the 1870s and 1880s, when the inflow of emigrants from the East replenished the ranks of the poorer Jewish population. This phenomenon also stands up to examination theoretically: industrialisation found the majority of German Jews in one of the favoured and rapidly expanding economic sectors. Being only a small minority, the number of whose poorer dependents had to a large part been reduced by emigration, competition within the group cannot have been strong. Almost everyone could gain from the opening of new opportunities.<sup>53</sup> On the other hand: although everyone moved up, only a few reached the very top.<sup>54</sup> Taken together this is a pattern of development which clearly points in the direction of equalising distribution.

The over-proportional growth of real per capita income of the commercially self-employed was the general trend of the time,<sup>55</sup> and the Jews made the best of it. There is no sign of a declining preference for self-employment among them, as has been claimed by Lestschinsky and others. Lestschinsky underlined the growing number and percentage of commercial employees at the expense, as he

<sup>53</sup> See Arcad. Cahan, in N. Gross, *op. cit.*, pp. 94f.; S. Kuznets, *Economic Structure and Life of the Jews* (Prelim. Draft at the Library of Kaplan School, Hebrew University, Jerusalem), pp. 56ff.

<sup>54</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 107ff.

<sup>55</sup> Jürgen Kuczynski, *Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1800 bis in die Gegenwart*, Berlin (East) 1949, vol. I, p. 107; Prinz., *op. cit.*

thought, of pedlars and small shop-keepers.<sup>56</sup> This contention is not, at least for the period investigated here, supported by the statistical evidence. Table II clearly shows that the bulk of new *Comisse* and other commercial employees was definitely not recruited from the ranks of former pedlars or shop-keepers, but rather from those of the day-labourers, community and domestic servants. In Prussia the combined percentage of all employees even declined between 1843 and 1861.

## V

Turning now to the top level, that is to the Jewish *Großbürgertum* – though to what extent such a group really existed or evolved in the wake of industrialisation is uncertain – I think we must distinguish between two groups: firstly, the descendants of the Court Jews who were prominent in finance and banking; secondly, the first or second generation of an emerging new group of larger-scale entrepreneurs. In the first group we find all the well-known and so often mentioned names, from the Rothschilds to the Goldschmidts, Oppenheimers, Mendelssohns, Seligmanns and many more. The second group were the newcomers, who, having gained some capital in the previous period, mostly from modest beginnings, rose to become heads of some really sizeable commercial enterprises. On the national and international market they dealt with textiles, metals and all kinds of commodities and quite a few became involved in manufacturing. This division is not, of course, absolute and no unsurmountable barrier existed. Nonetheless these were two distinctly different groups: they seldom mixed in social contact or in marriage, or even in business, held different economic positions and assumed different attitudes and played different roles within the Jewish communities.

On the bankers we already have quite a formidable literature. Jewish private banks already abounded in the eighteenth century and Kurt Grunwald counts no less than twelve important Jewish banks established between 1750 and 1800. He also points to the interesting fact that many of them emerged in a geographically limited area in South-West Germany, from where they spread out to become the founders of a veritable financial network across Western Europe and America.<sup>57</sup> The explanation for this interesting chapter of Jewish entrepreneurial history is implied in Grunwald's own definition of Jewish private banking as "the epilogue of the Court Jew". In the seventeenth and eighteenth century South Germany, with its many small principalities, was indeed the homeland of many *Hofagenten* or *Hoffaktoren*.<sup>58</sup> The Court Jews disappeared

<sup>56</sup> Lestschinsky, *Wirtschaftliches Schicksal*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>57</sup> Kurt Grunwald, *Studies in the History of the German Jews in Global Banking*, unpublished manuscript. I am indebted to Dr. Grunwald for his courtesy in allowing me access to his work.

<sup>58</sup> See Selma Stern, *The Court Jew*, Philadelphia 1950; Heinrich Schnee, *Die Hoffinanz und der moderne Staat*, Berlin 1953–1956 (6 vols).



at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but at least a part of their capital remained in the hands of their heirs. Actually many of the Jewish bankers were their descendants, in the Rhineland as well as in Berlin.

Opinions about the importance of private banking in German industrialisation still differ. In recent years economic historians have kept up a lively argument about the hypothesis of Alexander Gerschenkron, who regarded the German banking system as the prime source of capital and entrepreneurship, playing “the focal role in capital provision for the industrial take-off.”<sup>59</sup> Scholars specialising in both banking and industrial history have contested this, and tend nowadays to assign the banking system a merely marginal role, at least for the period here under review.<sup>60</sup> Even Gerschenkron based his argument primarily on the great corporate banks and less on the private banks. These were the actual domain of the Jewish bankers in our period, especially in the Rhineland, and they represent in the eyes of a specialist “a good example of the limitations of financial institutions as development mechanisms.”<sup>61</sup>

However this may have been, the Jewish part even in the restricted sector of private banking has often been exaggerated. It was certainly disproportionately high, but so was the Jewish part in the whole commercial sector. But German private banking was by no means “dominated” in any sense by Jews. Even in Frankfurt a. Main, which was the very core of Jewish private banking, the leading personalities of the *Effectensociätät* of 1835 were of pure Christian stock. Its historian took care to emphasise that the Frankfurt Jews were “... nicht minder ergiebig, indessen – entgegen mancher anderen Annahme – auch nicht ergiebiger” than the Gentiles.<sup>62</sup>

An illuminating episode of 1856 may serve as further evidence: a group of nine banks, six of them Jewish, had approached the senate for an authority to set up a corporate bank on the lines of the *Crédit Mobilier*, under the name *Frankfurter Kreditverein*. Kirchholtes, who recalls this story, regards the sponsors as “jene jüngeren Kräfte ... die noch kein großes Vermögen gebildet hatten”. The permission was denied following an intervention of “sieben der angesehensten Bankfirmen”, including Rothschild as the only Jewish firm. The historian concludes that

“... die jüngeren, in der Mehrzahl jüdischen Firmen, einfallsreicher, entschlossener und rascher gewesen waren, daß ihnen die etablierten Bankherren den Vorsprung neideten und verwehrten ... Daß die christlichen Bankhäuser über eine gesicherte Existenz verfügten, war verständlich, da sie im Gegensatz zu ihren jüdischen Konkurrenten

<sup>59</sup> A. Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass. 1962, p. 45.

<sup>60</sup> R. Cameron (ed.), *Banking and Economic Development*, New York 1972, pp. 11f.; Mottek, *op. cit.*, pp. 126f.; B. Gille, ‘Banking and Industrialisation in Europe’, in *Fontana Economic History*, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 287f.; Borchardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 104f.

<sup>61</sup> R. Tilly, *Financial Institutions and Industrialisation in the Rhineland 1815–1870*, Wisconsin 1966, pp. 114f.

<sup>62</sup> E. Achterberg, *Frankfurter Bankherren*, Frankfurt a. Main 1956, p. 12.

ten Besitz von Grund und Boden als selbstverständlich ansahen ... Das Haus M. A. von Rothschild & Söhne, das sich gleichfalls gegen das Projekt gestellt hatte, kann in diesem Zusammenhang nur bedingt angeführt werden, weil seine grundsätzliche Einstellung gegen Kreditvereine in der Art des *Crédit Mobilier* allgemein bekannt war."<sup>63</sup>

Whatever the real economic influence of the Jewish bankers and their effective part in the process of industrialisation may have been, there is no doubt about their "nuisance effect". They reappeared persistently and over many decades in every popular or "scientific" antisemitic outburst, and likewise in laudatory apologia. In this sense also they can be regarded as the "epilogue of the Court Jew". But the problem in our context here is: how far are we justified in regarding this group as a genuine Jewish *haute-bourgeoisie*? As a specific chapter of Jewish economic advancement it certainly belongs to our story. But did it also belong to the Jewish minority group whose economic fate we are trying to investigate? By the middle of the century many of them were now Jewish only by descent. In the years to come many more dissociated themselves from the Jewish scene by conversion and intermarriage.<sup>64</sup> They were an exclusive, closely-knit group of families, marrying among themselves, keeping to themselves and mostly caring only for themselves. Their social contacts and aspirations turned toward the ruling aristocracy and a good number succeeded in being absorbed in its ranks. True, in the eyes of racist antisemites of their own and later times this was of little avail: the von Eichthals remained forever Seligmanns and the Hitzigs, Itzigs. But did contemporary German Jewry really regard them as part of itself? With a few well-known exceptions they played almost no role in Jewish community life or even in Jewish philanthropy. To what extent then, must we include them in the historical description and analysis of the economic fate and development of German Jewry as a group?

In this, as in many other aspects the second group of the recently *arrivés* was entirely different. From among them came many of the leaders of Jewish communities and the important philanthropists who supported Jewish education, culture and charity. This is the group that constituted the real Jewish *Großbürgertum*. They came mostly from commodity trading and not from finance and early on took steps into manufacturing. For the period between 1800 and 1848 no less than 330 establishments are known, 102 of them in Berlin, and Toury estimates a total of close to 500. But these included only a few of the earlier factories set up by some of the Court Jews. Most of those had been textile mills or factories for luxury goods which were established in pre-industrial times on the orders of the Prussian king and destined to wither away when the monopolies were withdrawn. For the subsequent industrialisation,

<sup>63</sup> H.D. Kirchholtes, *Jüdische Privatbanken in Frankfurt a. Main*, Frankfurt a. Main 1969, pp. 25, 38f.

<sup>64</sup> Hugo Rachel and Paul Wallich, *Berliner Großkaufleute und Kapitalisten*, Berlin <sup>3</sup>1967, vol. 3, pp. 28ff.

induced by an expanding market demand, they had almost no relevance.<sup>65</sup> It is here that the story of the new class of Jewish entrepreneurs begins, taking first steps on the path that led, in the words of Kurt Zielenziger, “vom Ghettohändler zum Wirtschaftsführer”.

In earlier and recent publications we find much evidence for the rise and success of these former pedlars and petty tradesmen. They are found in every branch of industrial enterprise and their numbers grew with expanding industrialisation. There were even a few in heavy industry: Moritz Friedländer in Silesian mining;<sup>66</sup> Aron Hirsch from Halberstadt, who already in the 1820s had set up a copper mine in the Harz;<sup>67</sup> Ludwig Löwe, the son of a poor Jewish teacher, in the machine tool engineering industry,<sup>68</sup> and Alexander Coppel in Solingen cutlery manufacturing<sup>69</sup> – to name only a few. (We should probably include here also the well-known Jewish participation in railway development, but these were mainly financial transactions on the part of the bankers and not true manufacturing enterprises.)

But on the whole Jewish entrepreneurs in mining, smelting or machine-tool manufacture were exceptions. From the earliest beginnings concentration in textiles and clothing, and somewhat less in the food and tobacco industries was the outstanding characteristic of Jewish industrial activity. Of the 102 Jewish factories known in Berlin between 1800 and 1848, 52 produced textiles and clothing, 16 foods, beverages and tobacco. Not a single one was to be found in metal processing.<sup>70</sup> Elsewhere this concentration was at the time somewhat less pronounced, but everywhere textiles and garments were the largest components in Jewish industrial activities.

There were presumably two main reasons for this concentration: the vocational background of the Jewish entrepreneurs and the amount of capital at their disposal. Recent studies in entrepreneurial history suggest that merchants entering manufacturing show a preference for consumer-goods production which requires an intimate knowledge of market conditions. On the other hand, craftsmen with technological skills and experience went into the capital-goods industries, working initially in small but costly units for specific demand.<sup>71</sup> The Jewish concentration can probably serve as substantiating evidence.

<sup>65</sup> Toury, *Prolegomena*, *op. cit.*, pp. 83ff.

<sup>66</sup> Stefi Jersch-Wenzel, Introduction to: F.V. Grünfeld, *Das Leinenhaus Grünfeld*, Berlin 1967, p. 15.

<sup>67</sup> S.M. Auerbach, ‘Jews in the German Metal Trade’, in *Year Book X of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1965, p. 181.

<sup>68</sup> Kurt Zielenziger, *Juden in der deutschen Wirtschaft*, Berlin 1930, pp. 103f.

<sup>69</sup> Heinz Rosenthal, ‘Jews in the Solingen Steel Industry. Records of a Rhineland City’, in *Year Book XVII of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1972, pp. 210f.

<sup>70</sup> Jacob Jacobson, *Die Judenbürgerbücher der Stadt Berlin*, Berlin 1962, Nos. 1–3128, quoted by Toury, *Prolegomena*, *op. cit.*, p. 86; Hartmut Kaelble, *Berliner Unternehmer während der frühen Industrialisierung*, Berlin – New York 1972, p. 23.

<sup>71</sup> H. Mottek (ed.), *Studien zur Geschichte der industriellen Revolution in Deutschland*, quoted by Kaelble, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

ce for this hypothesis. On the other hand, no large amount of capital was needed by a small-town tradesman to start putting out work to home-working weavers, or even to set up a few looms in a near-by prison.<sup>72</sup> The necessary working capital consisted mainly of supplier credits or loans from relatives and friends. Once started, business could then slowly expand by hard work, commercial inventiveness and, at least in the first stages, modest personal consumption and a high saving rate. In the history of many Jewish firms, as in the volumes of memoirs recently edited by Monika Richarz, many revealing examples can be found of the rise of sometimes flourishing enterprises from very modest beginnings in this way.

If the relatively short supply of Jewish capital was responsible for its concentration in consumer-goods branches, it was also the reason for the limited formation of new capital. The leading branches at this stage of German industrialisation were transport, mining and capital-goods production. The most formidable capital formation took place in coal, iron and steel, where the Jewish part was negligible. Domestic household demand expanded slowly and the consumer-goods industries lagged behind in growth and technology. The really big fortunes were not made in the textile and garment trade, where the employment of outworkers remained important up to the 1880s.<sup>73</sup> Accordingly, although we have evidence of some rapidly expanding and successful Jewish firms, most of them remained small or medium-size enterprises and their owners well-to-do upper middle-class entrepreneurs.

This statement may appear to be an over-generalisation. Where, one may ask, do the rich Jews of Berlin, the Bleichröders, Strousbergs, Mendelssohns and all the other prominent *Wirtschaftsführer* who fill the pages of Zielenziger's book and many other monographs, fit into this picture? The answer is that if we want to remain faithful to our purpose, to describe as comprehensively as possible the overall development of the Jewish minority group, some neglect of exceptions is unavoidable. To quote an authority: "exceptional individual cases among a minority hardly matter ... and they have little significance in the economic life of the Jewish minority as a cohesive social group" (Simon Kuznets).<sup>74</sup> The famous names mentioned above (and the city of Berlin in general) obviously were such exceptions, and the focal treatment they all too often received – whether sympathetic or hostile – greatly distorted the picture of the real economic position of the German Jews. After all, even in the late 1860s less than 8% of all German Jews lived in Berlin under very exceptional conditions. According to Hartmut Kaelble, in 1849 half of all entrepreneurs in Berlin were Jews, a situation which he regards as responsible for the low social

<sup>72</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 248f., 300.

<sup>73</sup> Borchardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 132ff.; H. Böhme, *Prolegomena zu einer Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt a. Main <sup>6</sup>1972, pp. 48f.; T.S. Hamerow, *The Social Foundations of German Unification 1857–1871*, Princeton 1969, vol. I, pp. 16ff.

<sup>74</sup> Kuznets, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

status of the whole group of entrepreneurs.<sup>75</sup> This is in itself interesting enough and it would be worthwhile to confirm it by specific research. But it was hardly typical for all Germany, or even Prussia.

## VI

To sum up: the economic and social mobility of German Jewry, in terms of geographical, occupational and social changes, anticipated developments which were characteristic for the course of German industrialisation. With the coming of industrialisation, the Jews were already in a position which enabled them to gain thereby further and accelerated economic and social improvement. In 1860 they were, in absolute terms and in relation to their environment, a much better situated group than a generation earlier.

But this development took place in distinctive and group-specific patterns of economic conduct which clearly deviated from those of the Gentile majority. Jewish occupations were more diversified, covering a wider range of industries, than before, but their economic structure was still not more, and if anything even less, “normal”. Actually it could hardly have been otherwise. Kuznets, in his hypothetical model of the economics of small minorities, claims that “abnormality” is indeed normal: “If the economic structure of a country’s total population is ‘normal’, then, almost by definition, the economic structure of a small and permanent minority must be abnormal”.<sup>76</sup> Accordingly the smaller the minority the narrower the range of its distribution over occupations and industries tends to become.

A little over 1% of the total population, the German Jews were indeed a very small minority. Emigration at the bottom and dissociation at the top exerted an additional influence in the same direction, narrowing the occupational and social range, and thereby also equalising the distribution of income and property within the group. As a result we may conclude that in 1860 the German Jews were not only a wealthier, but also a socially more homogeneous group than twenty years before. A group of already distinctive middle-class character, the greater part consisted of petty tradesmen and shop-keepers. The few who ventured into industrial activity were highly concentrated in “typical Jewish” branches, like textiles, garments, foods and beverages.

Finally, some remarks on the Jewish contribution – damnable or meritorious, depending on the point of view – to the advancement of capitalism in Germany: there is, in my opinion, little hope that any objective assessment, substantiated by factual and quantitative evidence, will ever be possible. Indeed: who “contributed” more – Strousberg’s railways, or the tens of thousands of Jewish hucksters who toured the country with the products of

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<sup>75</sup> Kaelble, *op. cit.*, pp. 191 f.

<sup>76</sup> Kuznets, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

illegal artisans and undermined the traditional economic order, while opening new markets?

Maybe the futility of the whole question becomes evident by its sheer proportions. To what extent can a small, preponderantly middle-class group with relatively little capital be expected to become one of the “driving forces” of industrialisation? True, in some small and restricted areas, like Landeshut in Silesia, or Göppingen in Württemberg, Jewish entrepreneurial initiative was certainly beneficial to the whole population and played its part in developing their economy. Jewish merchants and manufacturers participated, beside their Gentile partners or competitors, in German industrialisation – as entrepreneurs, not as Jews. In some branches their part was proportionally higher than in others. But in the general framework of the whole country’s economic development this could, if only because of numbers, carry but little weight. Had there been no Jews, the course of German industrialisation would hardly have been different.

## Appendix

*A Statistical Estimate of Jewish Emigration  
from Germany between 1845 and 1871*

Few records or lists of Jewish emigrants from nineteenth-century Germany are preserved and estimates for the time prior to 1871 vary widely.\* According to Lestschinsky 150,000 of the 850,000 to 900,000 Jews who came to the USA in the whole nineteenth century, came from Germany and the German parts of Austria.<sup>77</sup> On the other hand Hersch calculated the figure of no more than 50,000 German-Jewish immigrants for America, adding another 10,000 for Western European countries.<sup>78</sup> Toury seems to accept the estimates of Felix Theilhaber,<sup>79</sup> speaking of up to 120,000 emigrants during the whole century and of around 70,000 between 1849 and 1880.<sup>80</sup> Rudolf Glanz's figures of 190,000 "German Jews" living in the USA in 1880 seem to include not only Jews from Bohemia and Hungary, but also the second generation of the immigrants born in America.<sup>81</sup> These are, of course, not to be counted as emigrants proper although they belong statistically to the "emigration loss" of the homelands.

As all these estimates are based on fragmentary information, it seemed appropriate to find the approximate number of emigrants during our period by way of statistical calculations used in empirical statistical research. The most usual and reliable of these methods in case of a lack of quantitative evidence is to multiply a plausible estimate of the overall population at the start of a given period with the average rates of natural growth during this period and to calculate the migratory balance at its end by comparing the result with the recorded intercensal difference.

Accordingly I chose the end of 1844 as the base of my calculations, accepting Toury's estimate of 400,000 Jews in the boundaries of the *Deutsche Bund* without the Habsburg *Länder*.<sup>82</sup> The comparable number for the end of our period is the first census of the German *Reich* for the end of 1871, after subtracting the Jews of the former French territories. (Some other slight territorial differences are mutually outbalanced and of little consequence.)<sup>83</sup>

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\* I am indebted to my friend Peter Salz of Lehavoth Habashan for his help with the statistical calculations and to Professor U.O. Schmelz of the Hebrew University who obligingly went over the draft of this appendix and contributed valuable advice.

<sup>77</sup> Lestschinsky, 'Jewish Migrations 1840–1956', *loc. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 1159f.

<sup>78</sup> L. Hersch, 'Jewish Migration during the last Hundred Years', *loc. cit.*, p. 408.

<sup>79</sup> Felix Theilhaber, 'Deutsche Juden im Auslande', in *ZDSJ*, I, No. 12 (1905); Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> Rudolf Glanz, 'The Immigration of the German Jews up to 1880', in *YIVO Annual*, II/III (1947/1948), p. 85, quoted by Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.      <sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

No data on birth-, death- or natural growth rates for all Germany are available. What we have is a continuous time series of annual rates for Prussia, compiled by Bruno Blau from official statistics, contained in his unpublished manuscript.<sup>84</sup> Blau's series have been compared and found to correspond with the calculated averages of Heinrich Silbergleit<sup>85</sup> which have evidently been derived from identical sources. Although some fragmentary data from other parts of Germany show a somewhat lower natural growth rate than in Prussia, this was not regarded as sufficient information to exclude the use of the Prussian rates as representative for all Germany. The possible margin of error should, however, be kept in mind. It is probably outbalanced at least to some extent by our total neglect of immigration from outside the German *Länder*. For the period here under review this was hard to estimate and may indeed have been negligible. S. Neumann calculated for Prussia no more than 3,600 souls in 25 years up to 1871<sup>86</sup> and Toury, accepting these figures, regards an annual average of 200 immigrants for the whole of Germany as probably too high.<sup>87</sup>

For greater accuracy the period of 27 years was divided into five year intervals and average rates were calculated from Blau's tables as the arithmetical means of annual rates. But Blau's data end in 1866 after which no Jewish census data were published until 1872. Therefore the rates for the last period of 7 years between 1865 and 1871 were calculated from Silbergleit's tables as the means of the data for 1861–1864 – i.e. the last years before the gap in published Jewish census data in Prussia – and those of 1875–1880, when publication was renewed. The calculated averages per 1,000 Jewish souls in Prussia are accordingly:

For:	Births	–	Deaths	=	Natural Growth:
1845–49	35.5		21.9		13.6
1850–54	35.7		19.1		16.6
1855–59	34.9		17.8		17.1
1860–64	33.9		16.8		17.1
1865–71	32.6		17.8		14.8

Starting with 400,000 at the end of 1844, the expected population at the end of each interval, had no emigration occurred, was calculated in the usual way:

$$K_n = K_0 \cdot \left(1 - \frac{p}{100}\right)^n$$

<sup>84</sup> Bruno Blau, *Die Entwicklung der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Deutschland* (copies of the manuscript are held by the Leo Baeck Institutes in Jerusalem, London and New York).

<sup>85</sup> Heinrich Silbergleit, *Die Bevölkerungs- und Berufsverhältnisse der Juden in Deutschland*, Bd. I, *Freistaat Preußen*, pp. 14–15.

<sup>86</sup> Salomon Neumann, *Die Fabel von der jüdischen Masseneinwanderung*, Berlin 1880, Table A.

<sup>87</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.



Where:  $K_n$  = population at the end of  $n$  years  
 $K_0$  = population at the start of the period  
 $p$  = the average natural growth rate (in %)  
 $n$  = the number of years

The results in our case are (in rounded numbers):

At the end of:

$$1849 - 400,000 \cdot (1.0136)^5 = 428,000$$

$$1854 - 428,000 \cdot (1.0166)^5 = 464,700$$

$$1859 - 464,700 \cdot (1.0171)^5 = 505,800$$

$$1864 - 505,800 \cdot (1.0171)^5 = 550,600$$

$$1871 - 550,600 \cdot (1.0148)^7 = 610,200$$

The first census of the German *Reich* taken in December 1871 counted 512,153 Jews, including 40,812 in Alsace-Lorraine. We have to subtract the Jewish inhabitants of these former French territories to arrive at the comparable number for the German-Jewish population at the end of 1871, rounded up to 471,400. Subtracting this figure from the expected population of 610,200 we get a negative migratory balance, or an "emigration loss", of 138,800 souls for the 27 years between 1845 and 1871. The figure exceeds, of course, the number of actual emigrants, as it includes the natural growth of the emigrants after leaving Germany. It is therefore comparable and roughly corroborated by the immigration estimates to the USA of Glanz which were mentioned above.

One way to approximate the number of proper emigrants is possible under the following (and quite unrealistic) assumptions:

1. That the number of emigrants was equal for every year of the whole period;
2. That the arithmetic mean of natural growth rates of all 27 years was the actual and equal rate for each year;
3. That all emigrants left at the end of each year together.

To calculate the number of emigrants every year ( $x$ ) under these assumptions, we can now proceed as follows:

If:  $K_0$  = the population at the start of the period,  
 $K_n$  = the population at the end of the  $n$ th year,  
 $n$  = the number of years,  
 $p$  = the average annual growth rate,  
 $q = \left(1 + \frac{p}{100}\right)$

Then:  $K_n = K_0 q^n - x \left(\frac{q^n - 1}{q - 1}\right)$

and  $x = [K_0 q^n - K_n] \cdot \left(\frac{q - 1}{q^n - 1}\right)$

In our case:  $K_0 = 400,000$   
 $K_n = 471,400$   
 $p = 1.58\%$   
 $q = 1.0158$   
 $n = 27$

Hence:  $x = 4179$ , which is the average number of emigrants for each year, totalling 112,833 emigrants for the whole period of 1845–1871.

Another method often used in demographical statistics is that of “collapsing”, where it is assumed that all emigrants left in bulk exactly in the middle of the period, in our case after 13.5 years or in the middle of 1858. Using the same formula marks as above the total number of emigrants in all 27 years ( $x$ ) is calculated by the formula:

$$x = K_0 \cdot q^{\frac{n}{2}} - K_n \cdot q^{-\frac{n}{2}}$$

The result arrived at by this method is a total of 112,791 emigrants, which is very close to our former result.

These are, of course, to be considered only as approximations of magnitude rather than exact statistical data. Even so the results exceed most existing estimates and their implications for the economic and social conditions of the Jews who remained in Germany deserve to be more closely scrutinised than is usually done.



ESRA BENNATHAN

on

## The German Jews at the Start of Industrialisation

### A Comment

Avraham Barkai's paper suggests a number of theses on the impact which German industrialisation in its earlier phases had on the Jews in Germany. The considerable interest of these theses lies, to my mind, in their being logically consistent and, above all, testable by methods and rules of evidence accepted by today's social sciences. Moreover, their relevance goes well beyond German and German-Jewish history.

The most general effects which one associates with industrialisation as it occurred in the Western world in the nineteenth century are higher rates of economic growth, increased specialisation in production, and relatively rapid changes in the distribution of incomes. The chief demographic facts of the process were higher population growth, increased geographic mobility, urbanisation and shifts of population to the industrially most active regions. The proposition about higher growth rates may have to be qualified somewhat to be generally true: while growth of national product and income may have accelerated before industrialisation became recognisable, industrialisation was accompanied by what were high rates of growth sustained over an unprecedentedly long period. Specialisation in production meant occupational change. The distribution of real income changed in the earlier stages of industrialisation in the direction of greater inequality, associated with the growth of new social classes. Thus qualified and spelled out, these propositions seem still today to be a valid description of the chief effects of industrialisation on the national economies and the populations as a whole.

Avraham Barkai puts together old evidence and new (including his own researches and the important work of Jacob Toury) to trace the peculiar experience of the Jews in Germany during this process. The distribution of income or wealth, so he suggests, narrowed among the Jews so as to yield greater equality. While the evidence on these points may not yet be very robust, the Jews seem to have avoided partial immiseration such as economic and social historians show convincingly to have affected substantial sections of the working classes during early industrialisation.<sup>1</sup> More than this, average income or prosperity appears to have grown greatly among the Jews. The evidence presented refers to a period when general per caput income is unlikely to have

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<sup>1</sup> See the work of Friedrich Engels, Jürgen Kuczynski or, in our day, Eric Hobsbawm.

risen at more than 5–6 per cent per annum.<sup>2</sup> The Jews, on this evidence, benefitted from the redistribution of income which accompanied industrialisation. The causes of this development Barkai finds partly in exits from the Jewish group in Germany which tended to truncate the income distribution from below. The first type of exit, much the more speculative, may have occurred from the socially and economically lowest classes by way of absorption in the corresponding classes of the German population. Much the better documented and probably much the more significant exit was by way of emigration abroad. This, Barkai suggests, removed the poor or, as I think more likely, those with the lesser economic prospects in Germany. Emigration was helped along by Jewish public charity and organisation. Barkai adds that it should have benefitted those staying behind by reducing competition. This may have been true in the very short run but even then it strikes me as decidedly unlikely: the poor do not much compete with the rich. *Pattern* (getting rid) of the poor was in the interest of the economically successful Jews since civic and political considerations reinforced their sense of responsibility for their poor. In their capacity as Jewish employers of Jews, however, it is likely to have been to their disadvantage.

The other part of the engine consists of the opportunities which the course of events presented to specific Jewish occupations. The important proposition on Jewish economic activity in industrialising Germany is that the occupational complexion of the group did not undergo major, let alone rapid changes, but merely some adaption. The opportunities came only partly in new industrial sectors; they arose to quite a significant extent in non-industrial sectors and activities (such as trade in agricultural products and inputs and agricultural processing) which benefitted from general economic growth and specialisation. Avraham Barkai draws supporting evidence from the directions of Jewish migration within Germany. Jewish geographic mobility in Germany was notoriously high and probably higher, class for class, than that of the Christian population. The implicit thesis is that relatively high geographic mobility was caused by (or, put more politely, associated with) relatively low occupational mobility and a persistent preference for self-employed status. Industrialisation modernised the Jews and their occupations but it did not produce a fundamental change in their occupational and socio-economic structure.

I do not know whether these propositions are really inconsistent with Sombart's views on these particular matters. They are, however, completely at variance with the thesis of Jakob Lestschinsky (to whom we should all acknowledge a true debt since he formulated sharp and falsifiable hypotheses and thus gave us something to bite on). What he presented (on factually inadequate grounds) as a process of social and economic "normalisation" of the Jews in Germany now looks much more like making the best of abnormality:

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<sup>2</sup> W.G. Hoffmann, J.H. Müller and others, *Das deutsche Volkseinkommen, 1851–1957*, Tübingen, 1959, Chapter 1.

of exploiting the resources inherent in the atypical economic and occupational constitution of the Jews in Germany at a time of high opportunity.<sup>3</sup>

Barkai's most general proposition on the first and the major encounter of Jews with industrialisation which took place in Germany in the middle of the last century is that it enriched the Jews as a group relative to the rest of the population and tended to reinforce their homogeneity. Increasing homogeneity is observed by him in a greater equality of the income distribution. This entails increased social and political homogeneity: for the average Jew the social consequence of German industrialisation was *embourgeoisement*. Homogeneity grew similarly in terms of occupation while it did not apparently decline in terms of self-employed status. It grew in terms of urbanisation. Taken all together we are offered a new view of Jewish history and society (and implicitly also of German history), not perhaps very far removed from various older notions but new at this point of time. It furthermore is a view which is compatible with some contemporary propositions on the behaviour and economic role of ethnic minorities.<sup>4</sup> It opens new questions. Some of these are indicated and treated in Avraham Barkai's paper, but others are omitted and on others there is room for differing from him on both premises and conclusions without departing far from his general base.

Take first the old question of what the Jews contributed to the advance of capitalism in Germany. This is obviously a fraught question and it remains so today: only specialist scholars will recognise the same tension in questions on the contribution of the Court Jews to German absolutism (few of my juniors, Jews or Germans, having watched the film *Jud Süss*). Barkai ends his paper by asking whether the Jews were dispensable in the generations of German industrialisation. There are minorities which have indeed been found indispensable. An example were the Hindu and Chinese traders and professional classes in Burma whose expulsion proved decidedly harmful to the country. But Germany in the nineteenth century was not like Burma in the 1950s and the question thus answers itself.<sup>5</sup> Being indispensable is not a standard by which

<sup>3</sup> Lestschinsky's proposition seems to me least true of those whom one thinks of as German Jews, excluding first and second generation immigrants. When account is taken of the immigrant groups, ever more important as the years go on, the total picture looks a good deal more as Lestschinsky describes it. The process by which it came about, however, is very different from what was in his mind. I have discussed some of these matters, by implication, in my contribution 'Die demographische und wirtschaftliche Struktur der Juden', in *Entscheidungsjahr 1932. Zur Judenfrage in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik*. Ein Sammelband herausgegeben von Werner E. Mosse unter Mitwirkung von Arnold Paucker, Tübingen 1965 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 13), pp. 87–131.

<sup>4</sup> In modern British research on ethnic minorities one finds similar propositions in the work of Dr. Sandra Wallman and her colleagues on ethnicity (part of the research sponsored by the Social Science Research Council's Research Unit on Ethnic Relations). In India, the yet unpublished work of Professors Louis Lefebvre (Brandeis University) and Mrinal Datta-Chaudhuri (Delhi School of Economics) leads in related directions.

<sup>5</sup> Professor H.C. Wallich's conclusion that the passing of the Jews from the German

the size of the Jewish contribution to the progress of the German economy and the industrial system can be assessed. Outside observers, applying more appropriate comparative standards, considered the contribution to be remarkable: this was the view of Alfred Marshall.<sup>6</sup> If such evidence appears too subjective, there is more objective evidence in Avraham Barkai's own work though he does not seem willing to follow this trail. It consists simply of the substantial increase in Jewish incomes which he and others have documented. No one maintains that incomes measure accurately the social economic value of the activity from which they are drawn. But there is a relation between contribution and reward. They should correspond the more closely with each other the more competitive is the activity in which the reward is earned. When Barkai feels that the Christians were not entirely unjustified when they resented Jewish success on the grounds that it had been attained at their expense he must be assuming the existence of Jewish monopoly positions. He does in fact suggest that emigration restrained competition among Jews; that competition within the group could not have been strong. I see no evidence at all for this conclusion. I suspect that like the charges of collusive monopoly commonly made against middlemen in developing economies the historical origins of this view are irrational group myths undisturbed by an understanding of how competitive behaviour manifests itself. It may furthermore owe something to a misunderstanding of the role which common ethnicity plays in the economic life of minorities. Barkai himself finds competition operating between Jews and Christians in several branches of the economy. He ends his paper by concluding that the Jews were dispensable to the economy: presumably because there existed reasonably good substitutes for Jews. The mere fact of competition operating between Jews and others in their economic activities suggests to me a high probability that competition was also active between the Jewish members of the main Jewish occupations, and creates the presumption that high and increasing incomes were a fair indication of the value of Jewish activity to the German economy as constituted. It is in any case quite inconceivable that Jewish economic and social advance should have continued for quite so long in Germany had there not been a corresponding and perceived value in it for the German economy and community at large. Germany was neither a backward country nor were the Jews negligibly few in numbers, let alone negligible in their chief occupational branches.

There are further questions, quite close to Avraham Barkai's theme but not treated by him explicitly. He quotes a proposition by Simon Kuznets, that the

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economy under the Nazis seems to have left no irreparable gaps appears to me to be rather more interesting. (*Mainsprings of the German Revival*. Yale University Press, 1955, p. 271.) But even this lack of major observable consequences seems unsurprising.

<sup>6</sup> "In every country, but especially in Germany, much of what is most brilliant and suggestive in economic practice and in economic thought is of Jewish origin". Alfred Marshall, *Principles of Economics*. 8th ed., London 1949, p. 623. The first edition was published in 1890.

economic structure of a small and permanent minority must, almost by definition, be abnormal by the norm of the total population. I place an emphasis on “permanent” which I read to mean persistent. The reasons for this very reasonable proposition are the economies of specialisation and concentration. How were these economies realised in practice; what held the Jews together as economic blocs? I believe that partial answers are to be found in an analysis of the economic value of common ethnicity. What was the special value of being a Jewish employer of Jews, and what the value of Jewish employees and agents to Jewish employers and principals? What was the value of the Jewish connection, and in which occupations was it greatest? Being a Jew subjected the person to a special form of social control in his relations with other Jews. In occupations in which information is a major requirement of success – including much of commodity trade and financial services – the problem arises how to acquire and appropriate information. Information, unlike commodities, is difficult to hold captive as one’s own exclusive property. Confidence and trust are thus particularly important assets of trade. As K.J. Arrow points out, trust is not a commodity which can be bought very easily: “If you have to buy it, you already have some doubts about what you’ve bought.”<sup>7</sup> If social control reinforces the contractual or market bond, loyalty will be more reliably supplied and the resulting efficiency should yield an economic advantage to both sides. There may be an explanation to be found here for the continuing viability of the independent or self-employed status which dominated in the Jewish group. To investigate the matter requires an intimate study of Jewish firms, of the extent to which Jews were employed by Jews, and of commercial dealings between Jews and between Jews and others. The mere study of the springs of Jewish concentration requires greater attention to the Jewish commercial elites and the large Jewish enterprises than Barkai finds interesting. A simple practical reason for this is that large or important enterprise leaves more records behind than the smaller enterprise or the independent trader. Without such study we shall not know to what extent there really existed a Jewish economy within certain sectors of the German economy, a concept which implies a measure of self-containedness. The answer to the question is not merely important for an understanding of Jewish history and Jewish society; it may contribute also to the understanding of the general role and position of minorities or ethnic groups which is today of great practical relevance to developed and developing countries.

It is the mark of fruitful hypotheses that they define a programme of research. Avraham Barkai’s paper leads to a wealth of research tasks: a search for direct evidence on incomes and wealth; new questions about internal and external migrations; research into the extent of competition in the Jewish occupations and of the history of firms and economically active individuals to discover the extent to which Jewishness was a valuable resource. Not least

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<sup>7</sup> Kenneth J. Arrow, *The Limits of Organization*, New York 1974, p. 23.



among the research projects which Avraham Barkai's paper suggests to me is a comparison between the economic experience of the relatively large Jewish community of Germany and that of the smaller Jewish populations of England and France in the same period or in the corresponding phases of industrialisation.

## Family Structure and the Position of Jewish Women

Although Jewish women, as such, did not participate in the events of 1848,<sup>1</sup> in its consequences the Revolution had important though indirect effects on the Jewish family and resulted in dramatic changes in the position of Jewish women.

My aim in this paper will be to delineate the nature and extent of some of these changes and to try to outline them in discernible and sequential patterns.\* Some preliminary observations would probably be helpful. We might note firstly that, in spite of the legendary reputation of the Jewish family, there are virtually no systematic studies on the subject available, if we exclude such delightful, but broad and entirely descriptive accounts as Israel Abraham's *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*<sup>2</sup> or Abraham Berliner's *Aus dem Leben der Juden Deutschlands im Mittelalter*.<sup>3</sup> The literature on Jewish women is even more unsatisfactory, because it consists either of catalogues of worthy and famous women from Bible times to the present,<sup>4</sup> or of detailed discussions of the position of women in relation to Jewish law, which tell us how things ought to be, but not how they are or how they were.<sup>5</sup> Secondly, the almost total absence of historical and analytic material of a type which is now widely represented in

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\* After completing this paper I came across an all-too brief report of a meeting of the *Gesellschaft für jüdische Familienforschung* which took place on 27th March 1935 (*Jüdische Familienforschung*, Jg. 11 [1935], pp. 669–670) at which Hannah Karminski, the able administrator of the *Jüdischer Frauenbund*, presented a lecture on 'The Influence of Emancipation on the Position of Women in the Jewish Family', in which she appears to have suggested a thesis which I am also putting forward about the differential adjustments made by Jewish men and women. Hannah Karminski died with millions of Jewish women in the brutal conclusion to German-Jewish history. I would like to dedicate this paper to her memory in the hope that I have done justice to those for whom she lived and died.

<sup>1</sup> No Jewish woman is mentioned for example by Anna Blos in *Frauen der deutschen Revolution 1848*, Dresden 1928.

<sup>2</sup> London 1896.

<sup>3</sup> Berlin 1937.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Meyer Kayserling, *Die Jüdischen Frauen in der Geschichte, Literatur und Kunst*, Leipzig 1879; Nahida Remy, *Das Jüdische Weib*, Leipzig 1892; Henry Zirndorf, *Some Jewish Women*, Philadelphia 1892; Egon Jacobsohn and Leo Hirsch, *Jüdische Mütter*, Berlin 1936; Bertha Badt-Strauss, *Jüdinnen*, Berlin 1937.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. E. Kitov, *The Jew and his Home*, New York 1963 (also in Hebrew, *Ish U'veito*, Jerusalem 1977); B. Knoblowitz, *Ma'amad Ha'Ishah Be'Am Yisrael (Position of the Woman in the Jewish People)*, Bnei Brak 1978 (in Hebrew); M. Meiselman, *Jewish Woman in Jewish Law*, New York 1978, which is also a spirited defence of Jewish traditionalism.

the literature on the family,<sup>6</sup> makes it inevitable that my presentation will have to be a tentative one in which I have explored a number of theses in an attempt to take account of and explain those changes we are able to identify. Thirdly, I have had to consider my approach in relation to the growing body of literature which the contemporary women's movement has given rise to. Ann Oakley notwithstanding and after careful thought, I do not regard myself as representing a "feminist perspective",<sup>7</sup> because I consider current attempts to match the long since discarded Graetzian historiography of "*Leiden und Gelehrten*" with a history, if I may so put it, of "*Leiden und Gebärten*", as inimical to a proper understanding of the dynamics of social change. A purely feminist perspective would also obscure a significant alteration in Central European social perceptions, brought about by the influence of the Enlightenment. Where, in feudal times, human relations tended to be defined essentially as obligations, that is to say, an assertion of the rights of the other (albeit linked with notions of privilege), the new era coined a conception of rights based on the assertion of the self. Since such a change would be gradual and perceived in descending order through the social system, we must guard against the "error", as Schumpeter called it,<sup>8</sup> of postulating that a concept which has meaning for us also had the same meaning for those we are observing. This would be particularly important for example when we come to consider the position of women in Jewish law. In our own time legal inequalities would be seen as indicating an inferior position. Earlier generations would be more likely to see such inequalities as having their roots in the need to affirm an accepted differentiation, in acknowledging a dichotomy which Fichte identified as the tension between "*gleichartig*" and "*gleichwertig*".

For all that, I do have a great deal of sympathy with the view argued by Sheila Rowbotham that women have been "hidden from history"<sup>9</sup> in a manner

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. M. Mitterauer and R. Sieder, *Vom Patriarchat zur Partnerschaft*, München 1977; Heidi Rosenbaum (Hrsg.), *Seminar: Familie und Gesellschaftsstruktur*, Suhrkamp 1978; E. Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family*, London 1976; L. Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800*, London 1977; W. Conze (Hrsg.), *Sozialgeschichte der Familie in der Neuzeit Europas*, Stuttgart 1976; F. Oeter (Hrsg.), *Familie und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen 1966; R. Trumbach, *The Rise of the Egalitarian Family*, New York – London 1978. The only study belonging to this genre which is marginally relevant here, that I am aware of, is J. Barta's doctoral dissertation *Die jüdische Familienerziehung in der zweiten Hälfte des XIX. Jahrhunderts in Mittel und Osteuropa*, University of Tübingen 1972. The lack of work in this area is strongly borne out in B. Schlesinger's bibliographical study *The Jewish Family*, Toronto 1971.

<sup>7</sup> Ann Oakley, *The Sociology of Housework*, London 1974, p. 3 who suggested that "A feminist perspective consists of keeping in the forefront of one's mind the life-styles, activities and interests of more than half of humanity – woman."

<sup>8</sup> J. A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*, New York 1954, p. 34.

<sup>9</sup> Sheila Rowbotham, *Hidden from History. 300 Years of Women's Oppression and the Fight against it*, London 1973. Note for example that Jacob Toury's important recent book *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1847–1871*, Düsseldorf 1977, has virtually nothing to say about women.

which is often unfair and constantly distorts historical realities. This is especially true in Jewish history, where women can be shown to have exercised a much greater influence than traditional histories would lead us to believe. The fourth problem arises from dominant assumptions in the literature on women and the family, which associate all change with economic factors, more particularly with the emergence of capitalism and its impact on class-based family structures.<sup>10</sup> While I would not want to underestimate the importance of this approach, I have been equally concerned with changing patterns of ideas and values, which often enough preceded and initiated economic change.

Fifthly, and following on from that, it should be emphasised that I am approaching my task from a sociological standpoint. To this end I have outlined three models or ideal-typical family constellations and explored their structural characteristics within an interpretative paradigm. Accordingly, my primary aim has not been to gather demographic and quantitative data for an attempt at family-reconstruction, though this is clearly an essential process in any future research, but to find the emerging concerns which moulded the processes of family adaptation. It would also be right to stress that I have treated Jewishness and Judaism as dynamic and central variables in my deliberations and have therefore tried as far as was possible, to use Jewish sources of the period in question as the critical material from which to develop my argument.<sup>11</sup> As a final preliminary observation I should perhaps make it clear that, although the period of 1848 and after saw the emergence of the

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<sup>10</sup> E.g. Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, New York and London 1974 or David Levine, *Family Formation in an Age of Nascent Capitalism*, New York – San Francisco – London 1977. This is, of course, too big a topic to be dealt with here, but one good illustration would be the spirited defence of Judaism, its attitude to women and the critical comments on the Jews of Germany, made from the vantage point of a more advanced capitalist society by Grace Aguilar in *The Women of Israel* (new edn.), London 1861, vol 2, pp. 369–377.

<sup>11</sup> In order to gain some insight into the inner dynamics of Jewish family life I have consulted sources, some of which may seem at first glance unusual, including: (a) *Zena Ur'ena* – a book full of comments on all aspects of family life, which was read by every or almost every Jewish woman between 1650 and 1850. Though not written by a woman, it proved to be so popular with them and was used so extensively that it is reasonable to assume that the views and values it propagated were accepted and internalised by women readers. Since I am at present working on a systematic analysis of this text, I have used some of the material from that project. For further details see note 29. References are to the Jerusalem 1965 (2 vols.) edition.

(b) The paintings of family life by Moritz Daniel Oppenheim in A. Werner (ed.), *Pictures of Traditional Jewish Family Life*, New York 1976.

(c) *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums (AZJ)* – in particular the volume of 1838, i.e. a decade before our period.

(d) The fascinating volumes edited by Monika Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1780–1871*, Stuttgart 1976 and ... *im Kaiserreich*, Stuttgart 1979, Veröffentlichungen des Leo Baeck Instituts.

(e) Autobiographies and biographies, e.g. *Solomon Maimon. An Autobiography*, London 1888; M.J. Cohen, *Jacob Emden. A Man of Controversy*, Philadelphia 1937.

movements for the emancipation of women, movements in which Jewish women were substantially involved, I have not dealt with them here, but have confined myself to an attempt to explicate the conditions which appear to have made these movements inevitable.

*Summary of Theses:*

1. Three types of family structure can be identified in the period under review.
2. In the course of the prolonged struggle for emancipation, the Jews of Germany strove to achieve parity as German nationals but failed to identify or secure positions in the German class structure.
3. In general terms the emancipated male was primarily a Jew, the emancipated female primarily a woman.
4. The strongest impetus for change was generated by:
  - a. Secular education
  - b. Attempts to restructure Jewish occupations
  - c. Residential dispersion of Jews amongst Gentile populations.
 These three factors varied in importance depending on time and place.
5. Women exercised a predominant influence in determining the social aspirations of the family.
6. Women utilised traditional Jewish values in a secular context to ensure upward social mobility.
7. The more general humanistic aspirations dictated the needs for change in Jewish law, the more defensive and inflexible it became.
8. The privatisation of the family in the second half of the nineteenth century resulted in:
  - a. loss of traditional communal links
  - b. a consequent loss of normative reinforcement
  - c. increased secularisation.
9. Once secularised the Jewish family changed independently of its Jewishness according to influences affecting the family *per se*, notably under the impact of urbanisation and industrialisation.
10. Whereas Mary Wollstonecraft advocated the *desirability* of economic independence for women at the end of the eighteenth century, by the end of the nineteenth century their numbers and the diminution of the domestic role made it *essential* for many to be able to be so.
11. Jewish leaders failed to recognise that the single and unattached woman posed the most important problem in that she had no formal place in communal structures and religious processes.
12. The small, nuclear family created new patterns of mother-child relationships. Whereas the traditional family utilised an "attachment-expectation" bond, the modern family developed a more intense "intimacy-dependency" bond.

## I

In order to understand what happened to and in the Jewish family we will have to look back for almost a century. Our attention will be focused on a timespan which extends roughly from 1775 to 1875. In this period the Jewish communities of Germany had to create structures which could accommodate themselves to three types of social system. The first was the final phase of absolutist feudal states which were continuously subjected to political, educational and economic pressures; the second was the period of the "*Kirchen und Erziehungsstaat*", which politicised the Jews of Germany, and the third was the emergence of a unified, secular, capitalist state, the ambivalent benefactor of the Jews of Germany, which tried to come to terms with, then rejected and ultimately destroyed them. I would like to argue that each historical period had what we might call a "core" family which, allowing for widespread local, personal and idiosyncratic variations, and with due emphasis on constant and even extensive overlap both into the past and into the future, nevertheless reflected an ideal-typical adjustment to the existing environment. The first of these, in a period of openly asserted *non-equality*, was the most Jewish type of family structure which we will call the "subsistence-family", because its primary concerns were "*Erwerb und Religion*",<sup>12</sup> the simple combination of making a living and being a Jew. The second type, which enjoyed the privilege of *equality before the law*, was the "*Bürger-family*", in a period when the Jews accepted the idea of a "*Kirchenstaat*" and regarded emancipation as a process in which Judaism was recognised as a "*Kirche*" on equal terms with the then dominant Christianity. In this they were at one with state officials, who welcomed a solution which gave most Jews what they wanted, without requiring the State to relinquish control over their Jewish populations. The third type is best described as the "urbanised-family", which is entitled to *equality through the law* and is politically emancipated in a secular state.<sup>13</sup> The structure and problems of this family type, though not necessarily living in an urban setting, were nevertheless governed by the impact the processes of urbanisation had on domestic life. Throughout the century we are considering, social and economic pressures tended to create a convergence of family lifestyles and family structures of Jewish and non-Jewish families, but by the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century two factors had emerged which were destined to dominate the final phase of German Jewry. One was the failure

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<sup>12</sup> *AZJ*, VIII (1844), p. 321.

<sup>13</sup> The change from Church to secular State had profound and in some cases immediate repercussions, because the secular State did not always ensure finance through taxation for communal expenditures. Cf. Salo W. Baron, 'The Impact of the Revolutions of 1848 on Jewish Emancipation', in *Jewish Social Studies*, 11 (1949). The differentiation between equality before and through the law was introduced by an opponent of emancipation. Cf. P.L. Wolfart, *Über die Emanzipation der Juden in Preussen*, Potsdam 1844.

of the Jews to secure acceptance *as Jews* in the German class-structure, and the other, and in our context more significant factor was that by and large Jewish men were to adapt to changing conditions in Germany as *Jews*, while Jewish women adapted, or had to adapt, as *women*.

Until the early years of the nineteenth century, for most of the Jews of Germany, the structure of the Jewish family corresponded most closely to Jewish religious norms and rabbinic prescription, because Jewish internal relations, especially laws of family life and personal status, enjoyed almost complete autonomy.<sup>14</sup> Irrespective of whether Jews lived in rural or urban areas, whether they were economically independent or poor, educated or near-illiterate, the roots of their being, the values by which they lived and their reactions to hostile or accommodating environments were drawn from Jewish values and transmitted through traditional authority. At the same time, physical movement, areas of settlement, occupations and taxation were decided and controlled by central and local civil and church authorities. In Germany, Jews lived partly in grossly overcrowded ghettos, as for example in Frankfurt a. Main where, throughout the eighteenth century, some 3,000 Jews lived in rather less than 200 houses,<sup>15</sup> in small towns as tolerated families, or in even more isolated groups in rural communities.<sup>16</sup> In spite of the widely divergent conditions under which Jews lived and irrespective of the size of the community, patterns of family composition and function appeared to be quite similar, as were occupations. Most Jews were pedlars and petty traders. Families were likely to differ mainly in the availability of physical space and corresponding levels of squalor and misery, which in many areas were not necessarily linked with poverty. A few men, who could afford to do so, devoted themselves entirely to study. This meant that most men were frequently absent from home for periods ranging from a day or days at a time to years.<sup>17</sup> Boys who had passed their thirteenth birthday would in many cases leave home, either in pursuit of further education or to apprentice themselves to a trader, while girls would remain at home to help their parents, or, especially among the poorer families, go into service to learn housewifely duties.<sup>18</sup> In spite of a nominally patriarchal family organisation<sup>19</sup> the active "head" of the house, in all but the wealthiest families, was the woman. It was her task to care for the home, to

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Guido Kisch, *The Jews in Medieval Germany. A Study of their Legal and Social Status*. (2nd edn.), New York 1970, p. 208.

<sup>15</sup> *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden (ZDSJ)* 6 (1910), p. 137. See also Börne's vivid description of life in such conditions in *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland (ZGJD)* 4 (1890), p. 254.

<sup>16</sup> Heinrich Silbergleit, *Die Bevölkerungs- und Berufsverhältnisse der Juden im Deutschen Reich. Preussen*, Berlin 1930, pp. 3–5.

<sup>17</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, p. 116, Herman Pollack, *Jewish Folkways in Germanic Lands (1648–1806)*, Cambridge, Mass. and London 1971, p. 155.

<sup>18</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 85 and 108.

<sup>19</sup> Jacob Katz, *Tradition and Crisis. Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages*, New York 1971, p. 136.

store goods for sale, to provide for the family, employ, board and supervise servants and tutors to educate her male children,<sup>20</sup> to supervise the training of her daughters and to initiate negotiations for their marriage. The “tutors” were mostly youngsters on the move, who having left their own families, had to interrupt their journeys to earn the fares for the next stage.<sup>21</sup> Households also frequently harboured widows, illegal residents, and boarders, in addition to male and female servants;<sup>22</sup> in short, its composition was variable and flexible, with blood relationships being perhaps rather less characteristic than membership of an externally defined and religiously delineated social network in which only the implementation of Jewish codes and customs were important, while civil regulations could be obeyed or circumvented with only the immediate welfare of the community as a criterion for moral consideration.<sup>23</sup>

The external world was seen as essentially hostile, not so much because all or most Jews experienced difficulties, but because it was arbitrary and unpredictable and appeared to be devoid of what to the Jews was an imperative element, a concept of justice. Since Jews were tolerated or harassed on the basis of their usefulness or otherwise, their dual in-group, out-group morality, which was regarded as such a pervasive characteristic by Max Weber, was functional rather than ideological. In-group morality was certainly an important factor in Jewish life. It was used as a barrier against the intrusion of alien (and threatening) attitudes and behaviour,<sup>24</sup> and differed from later responses to the Gentile world in that it was given expression in formal and ritualised rules. The position of women in this setting showed some interesting similarities with that of the surrounding culture. There were parallels in the structure and organisation of Jewish and peasant households, in the absence of formal education for girls, and the centrality of the economic role of the woman. Differences were marked in the greater entrepreneurial activities of Jewish women, who had to

<sup>20</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 85–86.

<sup>21</sup> Heinrich Graetz offers a lively description of what the life of such an itinerant student/tutor was like, though in his time he was also employed to teach girls. See his *Tagebuch und Briefe* edited by Reuven Michael, Tübingen 1977 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 34) and the experiences related in the first memoirs in Monika Richarz's first volume.

<sup>22</sup> Alexander Dietz, *Stammbuch der Frankfurter Juden*, Frankfurt a. Main 1907, p. 431 and *ZGJD*, 2 (1888), p. 182. A Responsum by Jacob Ettliger vividly described how on Friday night after the meal the children and house servants retired to sleep, thus leaving the mistress of the house alone with a boarder who then seduced her. Cf. *Binyan Zion* 1859, No. 154.

<sup>23</sup> This was the argument put forward strongly by Christian Wilhelm von Dohm in his classic *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*, Berlin 1881–1883, and repeated ad nauseam throughout the nineteenth century.

<sup>24</sup> There was some exchange of customs, especially in isolated rural areas, cf. the charming accounts in Herman Schwab's *Jewish Rural Communities in Germany*, London n.d. [1956]. The other side of the coin is illustrated by the group of servant- and lower-class girls described by Ludwig Geiger who saw baptism as the only solution to their breach of the behavioural code, cf. *ZGJD*, 3 (1889), p. 224.



respond to variations in market conditions more quickly than peasant women, whose predominantly agricultural environments offered less scope for innovation. More significant was the difference in ideological orientation, which we might express in this way. If for the peasant woman the patent injustices of this world were the *will* of God, as transmitted through a socially superior clergy, for the Jewish woman both legally imposed and randomly experienced suffering could be encompassed in a culturally transmitted conception of divine *purpose*. Peasants, Jews and women had no rights. What they had and enjoyed was either on sufferance or as privilege. It is unlikely therefore that Jewish women would have regarded any disabilities in Jewish law independently of the conceptual framework within which they accommodated their total life-situation. Thus the arbitrary award or withdrawal of permission to reside in a given locality could be explained in much the same way as the woman's inability to initiate divorce proceedings in an intolerable marriage, the knowledge that bastardy laws applied only to offspring of an adulterous wife and the exclusive obligation of men to devote themselves to the study of Torah. There was always the unswerving belief that the evil ruler would, in due course, face divine retribution, that the virtuous wife would receive her just reward and that in the "end of days", all injustices would cease, the woman who supported the scholar would find greater recompense than the scholar himself and eventually the burden of economic survival would be removed altogether so that men and women together could devote themselves exclusively to fulfilment in other-worldly pursuits. In addition and at a somewhat more mundane level, there was the assurance that difficulties arising from the inequitable position of women in Jewish law were vitiated by the application of social sanctions which communal authorities imposed on recalcitrant males who sought unfair advantage through the law, which in most instances, notably in social and economic conflicts, was wholly impartial even in a contemporary sense.<sup>25</sup>

An additional balance was provided by the strong social position of Jewish women. They were not confined to the home, but were directly involved in communal activities. They formed work and friendship groups,<sup>26</sup> partnered their husbands in commercial activities<sup>27</sup> and were much more active in

<sup>25</sup> *Zena Ur'ena*, the primary source of Jewish women's social and religious knowledge, has many references to problems of justice, suffering and reward and punishment. For specific items mentioned here, see particularly vol. 1, pp. 217 and 218, vol. 2 pp. 443 and 639. The power of social sanctions can be illustrated by the fact that rabbinic courts were able to force even baptised Jews to give their former Jewish wives a religiously valid divorce. See *ZGJD*, 4 (1890), p. 31 n; and *Jüdische Familienforschung (JFF)*, 3 (1929), p. 165. That all members of the community had equal access to legal process can be seen from an extensive Responsa literature which includes many instances of women and male and female servants seeking redress in disputes over conditions of employment or commercial contracts.

<sup>26</sup> See the discussion of old and modern versions of the *Zena Ur'ena* below.

<sup>27</sup> E.g. Jacob Emden's first and second wives "assisted him in appraising the value of the articles pledged as security for the loans he made." M.J. Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–38. See also Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, p. 98.

attending synagogue services than had earlier been, or now is, customary. Thus for example we have inscriptions on gravestones from 1764–1769 which list attendances at daily services, morning and evening as among the chief virtues of the deceased women. Similarly, a number of entries from “Memor” books describe several women who lived in the first half of the eighteenth century, who also attended synagogues daily and who are praised exclusively for their social and public achievements. Domestic virtues are not mentioned.<sup>28</sup> The *Zena Ur'ena* which made a point of encouraging women to attend synagogues by promising long life as a reward, relates a talmudic story of an old woman who, though weak and ill could not die. She was advised to stop attending daily services and died three days later.<sup>29</sup>

Marriages were arranged by parents and were intended as sexual and economic partnerships in which love was a hoped for and expected, but not

<sup>28</sup> Markus Horovitz, *Frankfurter Rabbinen*, Jerusalem 1969, Hebrew section, pp. 20–22, 24, 26–27 and 49, 52–53, 55.

<sup>29</sup> *Zena Ur'ena*, Jerusalem 1965, vol. 2, p. 580.

The *Zena Ur'ena* was probably published first in 1590 as a commentary and companion to the *Pentateuch*, written in Judeo-German or Yiddish especially for the unlearned and for women. It rapidly became the favourite reading of Jewish women who made it their own to a point where the special Hebrew script in which it was printed became known as the “*Weiber-schrift*” and the language “*Weiber-Taitsch*”. It was widely printed and read by Jewish women in Germany. One of its more striking and endearing features is an unabashed frankness on matters physical and sexual, in serious and religious issues as well as in somewhat frivolous and amusing tales. During the first half of the nineteenth century an important change took place. Editions of the *Zena Ur'ena* were published in Germany until 1836 based on the text of the oldest extant edition of 1622 (Basle). In 1848 an edition was published in Vilna which showed the first signs of “censorship” and from 1877 all further editions were published in East Europe, in square Hebrew letters with vowels and written in Yiddish rather than Judeo-German (i.e. more Hebrew and fewer German words) and with many passages relating to the sexuality of women in particular, but also other factual references to sex toned down or removed altogether. In spite of the 1836 printing in Sulzbach, attacks on the *Zena Ur'ena* in Germany began much earlier. In 1811 Sekel Aron, a printer in Sulzbach, published a volume *Sefer Etz Chaiim* with a subtitle “This is a German Chumash from the famous and already known translation”, which meant that it contained a simple reproduction of the Mendelssohn translation, without giving his name. In a “*Vorerinnerung*” the publisher explained that his objective in offering the volume was to help girls who had left school to acquire for themselves some knowledge of the history and religion of their people. He went on: “It might be objected that we [already] have a *Zenna Ur'enna*, true enough, and for some (like for example married women) useful, but generally and [?vadarmste] for half-grown girls it is no good: because the language is too coarse, the presentation contains too many casuistic explanations and several passages are too crude for the finer feelings of morality”. In 1861, David Schweitzer published a little volume under the title *Zeehnah Ureehnah – Kommet und Schauet!* which was a completely re-written “*Erbauungs- und Unterhaltungsbuch*” he had compiled because he found the original version of the *Zena Ur'ena* to be “unsuitable and even obscene”. (p. III). In the following year Emanuel Hecht published a similar revamped version which, like Schweitzer’s text, retained *Zena Ur'ena* as a Hebrew title followed by a German title *Der Pentateuch in lehrreichen und erbaulichen Betrachtungen, Erzählungen und Gedichten*.

essential ingredient.<sup>30</sup> Children were strongly desired in accordance with Jewish law, though boys were preferred to girls. Having sons who would become scholars is frequently described in the *Zena Ur'ena* as the greatest reward for a woman. The maternal role was as much an educational as a child-caring one, a combination which was facilitated by the loose family structure already referred to. Such a system again shows similarities with non-Jewish, especially peasant, households, in the less status-dominated integration of servants and the exercise of parental duties towards maids and apprentices,<sup>31</sup> but in the Jewish situation a concept of family would seem more appropriate, because of the strong consciousness of kinship which was reflected in interfamily marriages (disapproved of in the *Zena Ur'ena*) and because descent-based status and family linkage played such an important part in the evaluation of social position and economic co-operation. Child-rearing was in comparison to later practices less intimate and sentimental, due in part to the higher rate of infant mortality, enforced or elective parent-child separations<sup>32</sup> and the reliance on economic rather than emotional dependencies. Caring parents were providing parents and caring children were those who would support ailing and ageing parents.

Jewish families were linked through communal organisations which, designated as basic in Jewish law,<sup>33</sup> were an extension of the family and the formal assertion of a social network whose boundaries frequently blur the division

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<sup>30</sup> See the charming account in Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, p. 111, where a highly critical analysis by Isaac Tannhauser of his wife's character ends as follows: "My wife began to accept my wishes for a bit, and her words became more tolerable because I gradually got used to them. Added to that she found herself in blessed circumstances; so, by and by love began to take hold of my heart and I was happy to make room for it."

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Rolf Engelsing, 'Das Vermögen der Dienstboten in Deutschland zwischen dem 17. und 20. Jahrhundert', in Walter Grab (Hrsg.) *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte*, III, Tel-Aviv 1974, esp. p. 233 which echoes attitudes for seventeenth- and eighteenth-century employers very similar to Moritz Popper's comments in *ZGJD*, 5 (1892), esp. p. 363. This is not to suggest that problems of status did not arise between servants and their employers. A Responsum by Rabbi Yair Haim b. Moses Samson Bacharach reports a case in 1636 of a servant who had nursed a girl through a severe illness on condition that he could marry her when she recovered. Both father and girl agreed, but subsequently the father reneged on his agreement "because he was embarrassed that his daughter should marry a servant". *Havit Yair*, Frankfurt a. Main 1699.

<sup>32</sup> *ZDSJ*, 6 (1910), esp. p. 155. Until the nineteenth century the mortality rate of adults in ghettos was higher than that of the general population. Infant mortality, though lower than for the general population, was still relatively very high at an annual average of 44.4 per 1,000 in the period 1700–1750, and 30.4 per 1,000 in 1750–1800. (It is not clear if the fall in the second half of the century represents a decline in deaths or in better care made possible by a fall in the birth-rate.) Dohm, *op. cit.*, p. 7, has described the enforced dispersal of families.

<sup>33</sup> The *Mishnah* (Peah 1:1) prescribes these activities. It is incorporated in the daily morning service and its contents have become the basis of Jewish communal organisation.

between family and community.<sup>34</sup> Care of the poor, the sick and the unfortunate (e.g. widows, orphans), burial of the dead, provision for poor brides, for travellers, support for those imprisoned or held captive, provision of places of worship and, most important of all, the employment of teachers, tutors and other essential communal functionaries, were obligatory in even the smallest communities. Men and women were equally responsible for such services and involved in establishing them. In fact, the crowded living in ghettos, the active participation of women in economic spheres, the frequent absences of husbands and the predominant role of women in securing and organising early education and motivating their children to pursue it,<sup>35</sup> had two consequences which mark off this period from later stages. The first was that the rigid separation of the sexes, which became such an outstanding feature of Jewish religious life, was observed mainly in synagogue worship and in scholarly circles. Apart from that men and women often mixed quite freely in religious and social situations.<sup>36</sup> Secondly, that the high sex ethic of the Jews had to be uniformly imposed on men and women alike and had to be pervasively ritualised and constantly reaffirmed. This meant that sexual desires and the need for regulating them were expressed openly and included unambiguous assertions that women shared such desires and had legitimate claims on their satisfaction. Both men and women had equal and legal rights to seek sexual gratification, but only within the confines of a marriage relationship. As the *Zena Ur'ena* saw it, a man could not be moral unless led by a good (pious) woman, while women had to be constantly on guard because men, especially scholars, would attempt to lead them astray.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>34</sup> There is a widespread view that Jews have failed to develop political institutions. (Hannah Arendt is the strongest proponent, see also J.K. Feibleman, *The Institutions of Society*, London 1956, p. 337 or *Jewish Encyclopedia*, New York 1903, vol. 5, p. 336) but the close links between family and communal organisations in pre-emancipation Germany elevated both to higher levels of political functioning..

<sup>35</sup> See my chapter 'Deutsche Juden und der Säkularisierungsprozess in der Erziehung. Kritische Bemerkungen zu einem Problemkreis der jüdischen Emanzipation', in *Das Judentum in der Deutschen Umwelt 1800–1850*. Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Emanzipation herausgegeben von Hans Liebeschütz und Arnold Paucker, Tübingen 1977 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 35).

<sup>36</sup> Kayserling, *op. cit.*, p. 12 is quite adamant that women were never "eingeschränkt". Pollack relates instances of rowdy behaviour of women and girls at weddings and of mixed dancing. (*op. cit.*, pp. 39–40). Isaak Markus Jost, *Geschichte des Judenthums und seiner Sekten*, pt. 3, Leipzig 1859, p. 295, quotes Jacob Emden as complaining of a general decline in moral standards led by frivolous women, though Emden himself allowed an exceptionally free association of the sexes to bring him close to "disaster". (See M.J. Cohen *op. cit.*, pp. 49–50). Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 86, 88 and 115 suggest a free association, with even the "employment-officer" for tutors being a woman.

<sup>37</sup> *Zena Ur'ena*, *op. cit.*, p. 413. The *Zena Ur'ena* explained the greater threat from scholars as a result of the need of the "evil inclination" to tempt scholars away from their lofty activities. More probably scholars, as high status males, had more constant contact

Jewish family life in this period was supportive and cohesive. Its greatest problems, and paradoxically its strength, lay in the insecurity and uncertainty which threats of expulsion, punitive taxation and persecution constantly posed. There is no need to rehearse the complex events which altered the social position of the Jews, but two factors in particular accelerated change and are of special interest in our context. They have an added significance in that they represented measures which Jewish elites aspired to and state authorities implemented in their own interests. These were, firstly, the introduction of secular education and its association with the restructuring of Jewish occupations,<sup>38</sup> and secondly, and perhaps even more important, the gradual extension of the boundaries within which Jews were permitted to live on a permanent basis in non-Jewish residential areas. Although the reasons for this were due to the impact of the post-revolutionary French invasions, and the desire of some states, especially Prussia, to appear “civilised”, rather than to pave the way for Jewish emancipation, it had irreversible consequences in that it changed Jewish life and made the eventual emancipation of the Jews inevitable.<sup>39</sup>

## II

It would be much easier if it were possible to link changes in the structure of the family to readily apparent growth in industrial development<sup>40</sup> but in our case the situation is rather more complex. Changes in the home were linked to a number of general social factors as well as to specific influences which determined the nature of the changes we can identify. The more important general factors were that, while there was no marked shift from trade as the primary Jewish occupation, there was a substantial growth in secular education, which raised expectations for acceptance by the *Bildungsbürgertum* and also provided a model for the association of ethical religion and respectability. The home itself was influenced by the domestic model evolved in the upper levels of the middle class and transmitted to the equally well-off by example and the less well-off through the experience of sophisticated life-styles which Jewish servant girls acquired and eventually imitated when they married. Additional factors were the advent of mixed Gentile-Jewish residence, the expansion of

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with women in the community than the itinerant trader who was either on the road or a stranger where he visited.

<sup>38</sup> E.g. the Tolerance Edict of 1782 in Austria.

<sup>39</sup> There is a caustic though astute description of the effects of moving into Gentile neighbourhoods from Börne in *ZGJD*, 4 (1890), pp. 256–257. A more detailed and rather gentler account in Ulrich Frank's ‘Naemi Ehrenfest’, in *Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur*, vol. 8, Berlin 1905, pp. 176–248.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Ann Oakley, *Housewife*, London 1976. Although she writes about England in the industrial revolution it is interesting to note the similarities and differences.

trade and the impact of ferocious and continuous attacks on rabbinic or talmudic Judaism, which came from Jewish and non-Jewish sources.

Perhaps the most touching streak of naivety displayed by many German Jews during most of the nineteenth century, and particularly in the first half, was their faith in the heritage of the heady era of Enlightenment, its dogma of rationality and their firm belief that, if they were unpopular with Gentiles it was because they adhered to their ancestral religion, which they felt they had a right to do, and because they had developed undesirable social habits and occupations, which they longed to discard. Like Dohm, they regarded these unacceptable traits as imposed upon them. Given the right to live as free citizens they would abolish the objectionable parts of their traditional life-styles and their ancestral faith would re-emerge in its pristine glory, to be fully accepted even by those whose loyalties lay elsewhere. On the whole therefore, Jews agreed with and accepted the views of most state authorities that it was necessary to include in the process of "*Verbesserung*" a systematic rejection of trade and especially petty trade, as an unsuitable occupation for aspiring citizens. Instead there was a widely held view that whereas trade and commerce had been useful in the past because they made it possible to remain independent of the constraints imposed by other occupational obligations, thus leaving the trader free to immerse himself in the equally constraining observances of religious ritual, Jews ought now to concentrate on appropriate secular education for their children and combine this with consistent efforts to encourage and foster handicrafts, manual skills and agriculture.

When Prussia, for example, employed openly coercive methods to secure these aims, it received a good deal of approval and support from many Jews.<sup>41</sup> Even an all-powerful state however cannot predict or control the unintended consequences of its own actions.<sup>42</sup> Thus, a steady growth in the numbers of Jewish craftsmen would assume an industrial expansion which did not take place; it assumed a willingness of German guilds to accept Jewish craftsmen which was not forthcoming<sup>43</sup> and it assumed a readiness of town and village officials to grant Jews permission to establish themselves as craftsmen, which also assumed too much. Trained craftsmen, unable to settle in their special skills, either reverted to trade,<sup>44</sup> or emigrated, as the most determinedly craft-minded or politically conscious did.<sup>45</sup> The straightforward extension of secular education for Jews was just as likely to generate problems as to solve them, as was the case with the general population.<sup>46</sup> In Poznań for example, its most apparent overall effect was not, as was intended, to raise the Jews of that

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<sup>41</sup> *ZGJD*, 3 (1889), p. 29.

<sup>42</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, *Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, Stuttgart 1967, p. 331.

<sup>43</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), pp. 217 and 391.

<sup>44</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), p. 263.

<sup>45</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), p. 415.

<sup>46</sup> Koselleck, *op. cit.*, pp. 441–447.

province to the level of their brethren in the older parts of Prussia, but to motivate them to move from Poznań to the big cities, especially Berlin.<sup>47</sup> Nevertheless, it had to be accepted by the State that, to implement its social policies of an “*Erziehungsstaat*”, subjects who were expected to establish schools, initiate educational and welfare programmes and play a part in industrial and commercial development had a right to expect “security of tenure”,<sup>48</sup> they had to be encouraged to establish stable homes and, since states were also “*Kirchenstaate*”,<sup>49</sup> a proper regard for the exercise of religion had to be preserved.<sup>50</sup> Inevitably, such direct intervention by the State in questions of residence, education, occupation and religion was bound to undermine the stability of the Jewish home, which tended to change in the general direction of the social pressures being exerted upon it.

In the early nineteenth century the family appears to have undergone a marked change in Germany from the domestic partnership of husband and wife which, for all its variations in structural terms, was nevertheless a partnership, to a subservience model, the appearance of the “*Deutsche Hausfrau*”, celebrated by the romantics and legitimated by Fichte as a logical consequence of his *Wissenschaftslehre*.<sup>51</sup> The Jewish family followed this trend and over a period of some forty years, changes in family structures and the position of women were consolidated. As in the wider community, the most notable features to emerge were the reduction and ultimate rejection of the woman’s share in economic activity, the withdrawal of women into the home, the change from economic partnership to a domestic role for women, a more explicitly hierarchical structure of the family and the eventual denial of a manifest sexuality in women. We can trace the model for this family structure if we look at the memoirs of Fanny Lewald, who grew up in an assimilated, secularised Jewish family early in the nineteenth century.<sup>52</sup> Lewald was a fairly successful wine merchant in Königsberg. When Fanny was fourteen years old (1825) her mother had her eighth child and where, in previous years, the father would engage a housekeeper during the period of confinement, now, as the oldest child, she was considered mature enough (and had completed her schooling) to learn the duties of a “housemother” which her father indicated by bringing her the basket of keys (*Schlüsselkorb*)<sup>53</sup> with a brief word of

<sup>47</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), p. 317.

<sup>48</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), p. 196.

<sup>49</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), p. 309.

<sup>50</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), pp. 322–324 and 341–342.

<sup>51</sup> See my paper ‘The Forgotten Connection. Women and Jews in the Conflict between Enlightenment and Romanticism’, in *Year Book XXIV of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1979.

<sup>52</sup> Fanny Lewald, *Meine Lebensgeschichte* (3 vols.), vol. I, *Im Vaterhause* (new edn.), Berlin 1871. See esp. Chap. 13.

<sup>53</sup> Many of the details described by Fanny Lewald are supported by Margarete Freudenthal’s paper ‘Bürgerlicher Haushalt und bürgerliche Familie vom Ende des 18. bis zum Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts’, in Heidi Rosenbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–398. See esp.

encouragement. The household consisted of seventeen members. The parents, eight children, three commis (office clerks), an apprentice, a cook, a children's maid and a wet-nurse. Housekeeping in those days, remarked Fanny, "was sensible insofar as it adhered to the principle that it was cheaper to buy in bulk, where there was sufficient space for cheap storage. There was also a senseless desire to manufacture everything, as far as it was possible, within the home."<sup>54</sup> Fanny clearly had a firm grasp of what was involved in the awesome task she had undertaken. "An ordinary Königsberg family", she related, "would store in the autumn ten to twenty measures (*Scheffel*) of potatoes in the cellar. A few measures of fruit would be peeled in the summer and taken to the baker to be dried after being strung together, plums and cherries were cooked at home. A year's supply of vegetables were purchased in the autumn and stored in special beds of crude sand (*Einkellern*)." Similarly, whole barrels of sauerkraut, cucumbers and jars of beetroot and pickled herring were prepared, to say nothing of the special fruits, jellies and fruit juices in case someone was sick.<sup>55</sup> The dough for bread was prepared in the home and taken to the baker, while cakes were baked at home. Milk was bought straight off the cow, beer purchased by the barrel and bottled in the home. Sausages were made at home, meat bought in half-carcasses, cured and smoked. Poultry was kept and both meat and feathers used in the home. Needless to say, needlework and tailoring were done in the home and many families brought a shoe-maker into the house to teach his craft while supplying the family's needs. And all this on a fixed budget calculated and decided upon by the father.

If we use Jacob Toury's impressive account of the *embourgeoisement* of German Jewry<sup>56</sup> we can generalise by noting how, during the first half of the nineteenth century, Jews gradually moved from exclusively Jewish to mixed residential areas, from peddling and petty trade to more established forms of trading and small scale manufacturing. As far as the home was concerned, depending on the size of their commercial undertaking, it meant the inclusion of office staff in the household and possibly storage of goods and special rooms used only for business purposes. Servants would be taken on either as full-time employees or to carry out skilled tasks on short-term contracts, but both would form part of the household. A liberalisation of attitudes towards Jews increasingly allowed children to remain with their families and the growth of secular education now made it desirable for boys and girls to remain at home to pursue their schooling, with emphasis on religious education shifting from intensive *Yeshivah* type studies away from home, to a formal, Germanised "*Religions-*

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p. 388 on the symbolism of "*Schlüsselgewalt*". We might also note that where a woman is shown in her home in Oppenheim's family pictures, the "*Schlüsselkorb*" is very conspicuous. Cf. Werner, *op. cit.*, pictures 4, 7, 10, 12, 16 and 20.

<sup>54</sup> Lewald, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.

<sup>56</sup> Jacob Toury, 'Der Eintritt der Juden ins deutsche Bürgertum', in *Das Judentum in der Deutschen Umwelt*, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 227–241.



*unterricht*” at school or in association with it. A steadily rising number of men were earning enough money to maintain the entire household, they became the bread-winners and as such assumed a leadership role in the home from which they were no longer constantly absent. The woman, as we have suggested, responded by withdrawing from the bread-winning partnership (or was made to do so) and the objective she now pursued was to administer the household in accordance with her husband’s wishes. She would control the purchase of all essential supplies, organise the provision and maintenance of clothing, arrange for the cleaning of the home, supervise domestic servants and ensure that the children were properly looked after and educated. She is in fact a “domestic economist”, a “managing director” of an establishment in which her personal involvement in household tasks will vary according to the resources of the home and her skill in administering them. If the “housefather” was the man “who knows how to maintain his home with intelligence, love, steadfastness, order, industry, obedience, morality, simplicity and the fear of God”, then “only that which the housemother saves is the real profit of that which the housefather earns.... With dignity and calm she controls everything that falls into her sphere of work.”<sup>57</sup>

The family structure we have outlined here is clearly and characteristically middle-class and would have appealed to Jews particularly because it offered all the advantages of assimilating to the norms of the host society while retaining an element of partnership which was so important in the traditional family structure. Not all Jews however were middle-class and we must therefore attempt to explain how this family constellation affected Jews at other social levels and how, through variations in the partnership concept, women and their social roles came to be changed or devalued. Jews fell roughly into five social groups according to their occupations and incomes. Those at the highest and lowest levels were the most exposed in that social or economic pressures respectively forced them to accept a level of assimilation which made conversion to Christianity and inter-marriage unavoidable.<sup>58</sup> The middle level has already been described. We are left thus with the most problematic group, the petty trader of limited means, the craftsman and the employee, i.e. those who normally form a petty bourgeoisie but who might adopt either the life-style of an embryonic German proletariat or move deliberately towards a middle-class life-style. It seems likely that the critical variable in this situation is in fact the situation of the woman. Where both man and woman go out to work and pool their income to maintain the family, with the wife simply having the whole range of domestic duties added to her existing wage-work, then the family will become a worker family. The other alternative hinges on a deliberate retention

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<sup>57</sup> D. Gutmann [?], *Stunden der Andacht für Israeliten*, 1. Bd., Dinkelsbühl 1833, pp. 119 and 137.

<sup>58</sup> The exposed position of the highest *and* the lowest social strata was also noted by Ludwig Geiger, *ZGJD*, 3 (1889), pp. 211 and 227–228.

of the traditional Jewish partnership model. Irrespective of income and occupation, the woman will not go to work but remain at home. The couple set out to achieve three objectives. *First* to strive in every possible way to establish an independent work-status for the husband. *Secondly*, to “invest” as much of their resources as are available in moving towards a higher social status, a task which the woman would regard as her special contribution and which she endeavoured to achieve by increasing the value of earnings through careful housekeeping, intelligent management and possibly small-scale home manufacture. *Thirdly*, to promote the education of their children in any way open to them. This included an explicit socialisation of the children to aspire towards improved social standing. Striking support for this hypothetical model comes from information about German Jews who emigrated to America in the period we are discussing, taking with them the codes of conduct I have outlined and leading Rudolf Glanz to comment that “incomparably more consolidated middle-class families arose among Jewish immigrants than among any other ethnic immigrant group”.<sup>59</sup> Glanz also quotes an American observer who noted that “the Jew will not permit his wife to work ... and insists upon sending his children to school”.<sup>60</sup>

From a socio-cultural perspective, the position of Jewish women was affected most profoundly by two features which were a by-product of the Europeanisation of the Jewish family and which, though really quite alien to Judaism nevertheless came to be deeply embedded in their family structures. There was firstly the overbearing, domineering, authoritarian patriarchy in which the man ruled his home like a despot. A figure like, for example Fanny Lewald’s father could not derive his dictatorial arrogance from his Jewish roots. Nor, indeed, could Dr. Marcus Mosse, whose wife had left him and who wrote to her in an attempt to effect a reconciliation.<sup>61</sup> The letter, which has fortunately been preserved, demonstrates the extent to which European domestic norms had been incorporated into Jewish life-styles, and the unselfconscious arrogance of the patriarchal role. “Dear wife”, wrote Dr. Mosse, “You have sinned gravely – I may have done so too. This much however is certain: Adam could only sin after Eve had done so, and that is how it is with us; you alone must carry the blame of our misfortune, which I undoubtedly exacerbated through my own behaviour later on. Now listen: Since everything which I regard as essential for a peaceful existence, and have expected from you, is still what I consider to be absolutely necessary, if we are to be at peace not for a few days but for always,

<sup>59</sup> Rudolf Glanz, *The Jewish Woman in America. Two Female Immigrant Generations 1820–1929*, vol. II, *The German Jewish Women*, New York 1976, p. 18.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>61</sup> Although Fanny is at pains to project an image of a loving devoted father, she makes no attempt to hide the brutal despotism he exercised over the family. I am indebted to Dr. Fred Grubel of the Leo Baeck Institute, New York, for drawing my attention to and making available a copy of Dr. Mosse’s letter to his wife, dated 23rd June 1844. The original letter is in the Archives of the Institute in New York.

reflect and see if you are strong enough to overcome your false ambitions and your obstinacy; if you are willing and able to meet all the conditions, the fulfilment of which I cannot forgo; every sensible person will tell you that all that which I demand of you is nothing other than what is self-evident (*was sich von selbst versteht*). If you persist with your obstinacy, then do not ever return to my house, for you will never ever be happy with me; you can then expect only indifference, even contempt from me, from my children, from the whole town.” Dr. Mosse included with his letter a list of duties he had drawn up for his wife which he had earlier “read out” to her in the presence of a rabbi. The preamble to that document is of considerable interest:

“My wife promises – something that every wife owes her husband anyway – to accept my will in all things and to adhere strictly to my demands. Self-evident as that may be, our domestic relationship has frequently been disturbed by my wife’s refusal to render me obedience, by her assumption that she had a right to act independently and decisively, even when this involved going contrary to my specific instructions. In order not to have to constantly remind my wife what my wishes are, which I want to see carried out in regard to my household and her management of it, and since I have issued such instructions in vain for many years, I hereby record some notes which may serve as guidelines.” [For the full text of the guidelines see Appendix]

Secondly, the virtual obliteration of the sexuality of the “housemother” was again basically alien to Judaism but certainly found its way into Jewish family concepts. This can be demonstrated if we look at the way in which the *Zena Ur’ena* was adapted to conform to the moral conventions of nineteenth-century Christian culture. We might reasonably limit ourselves to two illustrations of how the modern, adapted or better-censored text deprived women of access to knowledge and of a proper recognition of their legitimate sexuality. Traditional Jewish literature has always been frank without being prurient, a distinction which was to some extent lost in the nineteenth century. Thus in *Genesis XLIX:3* Jacob describes Reuven, his firstborn as “my might and the first fruits of my strength”. This expression is explained by Rashi “Reishit Oni – This is the first emission for he had never had a nocturnal pollution in his life.” The old *Zena Ur’ena* (Basle 1622) has Jacob saying to Reuven: “You are my first drop of semen, for Jacob had not seen his semen until he came to Leah and she became pregnant in the first night from the drop of semen.” The Vilna 1848 and 1877 editions merely give and translate the biblical text “Reuven, you are my first born” – all the rest is left out. A second example deals more directly with the sexuality of women. *Leviticus XXI:13–14* specified that a High Priest had to marry a virgin. He was not permitted to marry a widow or a divorcee. For an audience for which widowhood especially was a commonplace expectation this would seem to call for some explanation. The old *Zena Ur’ena* has it as follows: “The reason why he should not take a widow or divorcee is because he should accustom the virgin to cohabit as is fitting for a High Priest. He and his wife must maintain a high level of sanctity. As he accustoms his virgin-wife so will she accept it and be satisfied. If he takes a widow or divorcee however, who may

have been used to frequent cohabitation with her first husband, she will incite the High Priest to cohabit with her all the time. Thus may the High Priest be led to sin.” The modern text has it: “He should take a virgin to train her to be content with little cohabitation as befits a High Priest. As he accustoms her so she will remain.”

The denial of sexuality is inevitably accompanied by a rejection of the woman’s role in the market place, by her withdrawal into the home, where her duties are intensified. We can illustrate this by three further changes in the text of the *Zena Ur’ena*. In a comment on *Proverbs XIV:1* (“Wise women build their houses”) the old versions of the *Zena Ur’ena* describe a “wise” woman thus: “She builds her home on strong foundations and looks after it with care. She herself brings what is needed to prepare good food and good beverages and also sets the table herself. And she arranges to work with other [women] and gathers good friends around her”. By 1877 this had been slightly but significantly reduced to: “who builds her house on good foundations and protects her home well, so that she brings everything into the home, cooks good food and makes good beverages. She prepares the table herself and calls on her good friends”. A further comment on the famous passage in *Proverbs XXXI:10* which describes a “virtuous” woman is elaborated in the old versions of the *Zena Ur’ena*: “a clever woman, skilled in working day and night or to trade day and night, to maintain her home. And she gives charity to the poor from what she has earned or from her profits”. In the modern version the clever woman “works day and night and maintains her home and gives charity to the poor”. Then again there is the problem why in *Exodus XIX:12* and *Deuteronomy V:16*, the law should state “Honour thy father and thy mother” whereas in *Leviticus XIX:3* it should say: “Every man shall fear his mother and his father”. The traditional explanation has it that the mother is more spontaneously honoured, therefore the father is put first, while it is more natural to fear the father, hence the mother is put first. In the old versions of the *Zena Ur’ena* the greater likelihood of honouring the mother is due to her role as provider “For the mother gives the child many kinds of good food and is always in the house with him”. In the modern version she has a more explicit caring role: “She is with him in the house and gives him good food and talks nicely with him ...”

We can summarise the change in attitude to women implicit in the textual alterations by the use of a single word in a commentary on *Leviticus XIX:1*, where the biblical wording has it that Moses addressed “all the congregation of the children of Israel”. Rabbi Bechay explained “in order to include the women in this”. The old *Zena Ur’ena* reported this “It teaches us that women *also* are required to keep themselves holy” (“*die Weiber auch sein schuldig zu halten sich heilig*”), while the modern version reads “To show that *even* women are required ...” (“*dos afilu Weiber senen chayov*”). (*Zena Ur’ena* 2, p.414)

It is not surprising that the education of girls followed a pattern of preparing the young to perform the domestic duties of the adult. While girls from wealthier families were introduced to German high culture and gracious living,

most girls received a mixed education in which mornings were devoted to German, Hebrew, History, Geography, Religion and Singing, mostly taught by men; the second half of the day was usually given over to “*weibliche Handarbeiten*” which included a wide range of skills, always taught by women and designed to prepare girls for a “*bürgerliches Leben*”. Great stress was placed in schools on modest and well-mannered behaviour, the utmost care and cleanliness in personal appearance and a general striving towards a “*Veredlung des weiblichen Gemüths*”.<sup>62</sup> However appropriate such training may have been, it failed to inculcate “*was zum religiösen Berufe des jüdischen Weibes gehört*”<sup>63</sup> and paved the way for the sense of alienation which was so pervasive after 1848. Before we turn our attention to the next phase of the family, we will have to look briefly at the position of women as a religious controversy and its effects on the structure of the family.

### III

As the broad masses of Germany’s Jews moved steadily towards an increasingly stable, prosperous and sedate existence, Judaism moved towards growing turmoil and upheaval. Jews battled with confidence and dignity for a secure place in the body politic, but cringed under the scathing attacks on their religion coming from within and from without. The *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* counselled fathers not to make fun of the ancestral faith at the family table, but itself posed the question – does Judaism carry the blame for the predicaments of the Jews?<sup>64</sup> In the period of the *Bürger*-family, Jews were divided, in their allegiance to religion, into three main groups. The “*Altgläubige*”, or, as they came to be known in the 1840s, the Orthodox, represented particularly among older, rural and less well-off Jews;<sup>65</sup> the Reformers, who ranged from almost Christianised extremists, notably in Frankfurt a. Main, Berlin and Breslau,<sup>66</sup> to conservatives whose minor synagogal innovations would scarcely cause a ripple in orthodox synagogues today. The third and probably largest group was described (and endlessly discussed) under the heading of “*Indifferentismus*”,<sup>67</sup> which appears to have consisted of two separate sections. One we might call the traditionalists. They were more or less observant but unthinking Jews, they adhered to rituals or adapted them without any real concern over principles (“*Grundprinzipien*”), like the delightful Mr. Dann who wrote about his home and parents: “The Sabbath was

<sup>62</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), pp. 212 and 301.

<sup>63</sup> Abraham Levi, *Rebecca oder das jüdische Weib in ihrem religiösen Berufe*, Frankfurt a. Main 1861, p. 44.

<sup>64</sup> *AZJ*, VIII (1844), pp. 242 and 322.

<sup>65</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), pp. 356–357 and 359–361.

<sup>66</sup> *AZJ*, VII (1843), pp. 405ff., *Der Orient* 1845, pp. 128ff.

<sup>67</sup> *AZJ*, VIII (1844), pp. 241ff.

strictly observed. My father would never have tolerated any discussion of business matters, or opened a business letter; but it gave him particular pleasure to write to his children and open their letters [on that day].”<sup>68</sup> Just like his unnamed counterpart thirty years earlier in Hamburg who would not read a business letter on the Sabbath, but would go to the theatre and purchase his ticket for cash.<sup>69</sup> In spite of the damning nomenclature employed at the time, it is very likely that this group was not deliberately breaking away from traditional norms; they did not disparage the norms, but tried, on the contrary, seemingly to reinforce them by abandoning them in some situations only to reaffirm them in what appeared to them more meaningful contexts.<sup>70</sup> The other section were the secularised Jews, who extracted ethical values which appealed to them from the Judaic tradition and rationalised them into a neutral *Weltanschauung*, like Fanny Lewald’s father who clearly echoes traditional Jewish teaching when he explains to her: “Every second devoted to the hereafter is one lost to the here and now. An ‘I have’ is worth a thousand times more than an ‘if I had’ and doing is always the most important thing, hence one must do what is right and appropriate to one’s situation and not worry about the next world. A man’s spiritual immortality resides in his actions, as his physical immortality is vested in his children. The Old Testament knew nothing of the belief in life after death. That is why the Jews attached such great importance to early marriage and children, through whom and in whom they lived on.”<sup>71</sup> It was as an altogether calculating rationalist that the same man announced to his family that he had decided that his two sons, aged thirteen and fifteen, were to become Christians. Fanny demanded to know why it should only be her brothers. “The baptism which will make your brothers free, would only bind you”, he replied. “I have worked it all out, so do not give it another thought. By letting the sons become Christians I set them free [and make them] masters of their own future. They will be able to choose any occupation they wish, enter public life as full equals and marry Christian or Jewish women, whichever they prefer. In the last resort the rational man does what he thinks will serve him best. Women however, who can choose neither occupation or husband, had best remain what they are from birth. If a Christian should express an inclination towards a Jewess, there will always be time to see what might be done.”<sup>72</sup> Herr Lewald soon changed his mind however, and allowed his daughter to convert. In much the same spirit a wealthy banker in a trite little melodrama serialised in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*

<sup>68</sup> Leo Baeck Institute New York. *Bibliothek und Archiv. Katalog*, Band I, Tübingen 1970 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 22), p. 398, No. 71.

<sup>69</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), p. 188.

<sup>70</sup> Shlomo Doshen and Moshe Shokeid, *The Predicament of Homecoming*, Ithaca, N.Y. – London 1974, Chap. 6.

<sup>71</sup> Lewald, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 293–295.

*des Judentums*, rejected a religious young suitor for his daughter's hand: "I have not trained my daughter to follow Jewish observances, have not educated her for a lifeless, stifling, old-fashioned Jewish home, but for a free position in society."<sup>73</sup>

At a more general, conceptual level, we have three main approaches amongst the Jews: the Orthodox, who wanted to *preserve* Judaism; the Reform, who wanted an emancipation *of* Judaism; and a broad stream who moved, more or less consciously, towards an emancipation *from* Judaism. Two issues particularly disturbed the religious equilibrium in the emancipation process. The first was the disconcerting and rarely acknowledged reality that, in a period in which the demand for political equality was a near-obsessive preoccupation, it was necessary to face the fact that in Judaism questions of equality are not nearly as consequential as its predominant concern with justice. And justice, the pursuit of justice, makes a priori assumptions about the inevitability and at times even the desirability of some inequalities. The Jews objected to the notion of a Christian State not, like Karl Marx, because such a State was a contradiction in terms, but because it denied them civil rights. With some notable exceptions, like Gabriel Riesser, they did not object to a "*Kirchenstaat*" in which religions rather than a religion would be part of the formal social structure,<sup>74</sup> yet, once the possibility of a "*Kirchenstaat*" is conceded, there can be no objection from a Jewish view of justice in a Christian population electing to form a Christian State, just so long as such a State would guarantee equality before the law, which it was prepared to do.<sup>75</sup> The disparate emphases on equality and justice are of even greater consequence on the question of women. In Judaism the position of the individual in society is not governed by principles of equality, but by tenets of justice. The laws of inheritance, for example, are inequitably weighted against women, albeit on a presumption that compensatory mechanisms are available which will ensure justice. Where legal practice can be shown to offend a principle of justice, the inequitable status of women is set aside as in the case of the daughters of Zelofhod (*Numbers* XXVII:1–11). The changes which took place in the Jewish social settings of our period, more particularly the dispersal of Jews among the general population, the corresponding decline in rabbinic supervision and control and the increasing displacement of autonomous Jewish civil law by secular state law, distorted the *halachic* position of Jewish women and led in some instances to serious disabilities. In 1837, when Abraham Geiger initiated a discussion of the changed position of Jewish women,<sup>76</sup> he correctly identified acute problems in

<sup>73</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), pp. 78ff. Quote on p. 397.

<sup>74</sup> S. Stern, 'Das Judentum als Element des Staatsorganismus', in W. Freund (Hrsg.), *Zur Judenfrage*, Berlin 1843–1844, pp. 125–165, esp. p. 147.

<sup>75</sup> This is, admittedly, a purely academic issue, if only because the German-Christian State was always imposed, never the result of free choice, but its validity as a conceptual obstacle in Judaism remains.

<sup>76</sup> Abraham Geiger, 'Die Stellung des weiblichen Geschlechtes in dem Judenthume unserer Zeit', in *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für jüdische Theologie*, 3 (1837), pp. 1–14.

the application of *Halachah*, but discredited his own arguments firstly by failing to differentiate between socially determined difficulties and principles of justice and equity, and secondly by basing them on a false premise, since his real objective was not to expose injustices to which women were subjected, but the validity of Jewish law which determined their status. It is true that Jewish law appears to favour men and certainly that men define the legal position of women. This does not necessarily conflict with traditional Jewish conceptions of justice, because Jewish law holds men and women to be different in essence, not in value. Change, in attitudes, if not in law, can only come about *through* the law, not by negating or abolishing it. Let me give one example. There are fourteen time-bound positive precepts which are obligatory for men, optional or not applicable to women. Since the imposition of religious obligations is seen as a manifestation of divine grace, men begin their daily prayer by thanking God that he has not made them women, whilst women praise God for creating them according to his will. This, most controversial of all prayers, can be and in fact was interpreted in different ways from “within the law” by three leading scholars in the period we are considering. Rabbi Jacob Lissa (died 1832) offered a “literal” interpretation (*Pshat*) in his commentary on the Prayerbook (*Siddur*). “Although [the woman] is also a daughter of Israel, because she is exempt from the study of Torah and positive, time-bound commandments” it behoves the man to give special thanks, by offering a “blessing of gratitude”. (*Birkath Ho’do*). Rabbi Jacob Emden (1697–1776) who appears to have been influenced by the ideology of the Enlightenment, wrote: “It seems right to me” that the woman offer a short indirect blessing and not a full, direct one. Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch’s commentary, first published in 1895, was written when the movement for the emancipation of women in Germany had gathered considerable force. He is at pains therefore to emphasise that even though women carried a lesser burden of obligations “they know that their obligations as free Jewish women will be no less acceptable to divine will and pleasure”. He thus converts the blessing into one of praise (*Birkath Sheva*).<sup>77</sup> This illustration indicates changes in perceptions but does not involve critical approaches to legislation. Abraham Geiger, on the other hand, based his intervention on a fundamental objection to the application of “oriental” laws in a “Germanic” context.<sup>78</sup> What he demanded for women was not an equalisation of status of men and women, but the equalisation of status of Jewish and German women. Since women did not have equality of status in German law, what Geiger was in

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Note that Samuel Holdheim tried to erase the Germanistic element in Geiger’s paper by elevating the debate to a Jewish law versus state law level. Cf. *Über die Autonomie der Rabbinen und das Prinzip der jüdischen Ehe*, Schwerin 1843.

<sup>77</sup> J. Lissa, *Siddur Derech Ha’chaim*, Wien n.d., p. 40.; J. Emden, *Siddur Beth Jakob*, Lemberg 1903, p. 32; S.R. Hirsch, *Israels Gebete*, Frankfurt a. Main 1895, p. 9.

<sup>78</sup> Inherent in the Reform Movement’s critique of Talmudic law was the assertion that it was “oriental” law designed for living in an oriental culture, of interest and value only in an historical-scientific sense but invalid as legislation.



fact advocating was the displacement of Jewish legal inequalities by German legal inequalities. In the event, this led to the abolition of some aspects of marriage law in Reform Judaism, it transferred women from the ladies' galleries of traditional synagogues to the main hall of worship, but it left the central issue of the equality of the sexes to less equivocal women of a later century.<sup>79</sup>

The second focal concern we must consider is another dichotomy, essentially alien to Judaism, but deeply embedded in the tradition of German idealist philosophy and transplanted from thence into materialist conceptions through Marx's critique of Hegel. It concerns the separation of social existence into public and private domains. We have seen in our brief review of the "subsistence" family that the basic Jewish family was not a private institution, but the nucleus of a social system which grew directly into communality. Notions of public and private had the immediate effect of dividing the social world, using in the first instance the most "obvious" criteria, like Geiger's "natural laws of both sexes".<sup>80</sup> The man, as Fichte spelt it out, was the natural representative of the public domain, the woman of the private domain. Since women had only the private domain, marriage and indeed the family, were privatised. The first consequence of this was that the more the family was privatised, the less Jewish it became. A second, and in our context critically important consequence, was this. If in the traditional Jewish family the roots of communal action reside in the family, then the privatisation of the family on the one hand deprived the religious involvement of the woman in the home of public status and thereby excluded her from the communal domain, and on the other, it imposed barriers between the family which was now private and communal organisation which becomes public. What is more, the privatised status of the woman was now equated with her position in society, because as a public domain, communality had lost the capacity to provide the affirmation of justice and the reinforcing vitality through which communal service had hitherto normalised and repaid the home, thus sponsoring a wholly spurious justification for the increasing isolation of Jewish women and their corresponding alienation from traditional roots.

We have seen how the whole tenor of life in Germany moved towards "*Verbürgerlichung*" which is symbolised by the increasing privatisation of the family. At the same time, communal facilities tended to undergo a fundamental change. They were rationalised, coordinated, bureaucratised. By 1838 the

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<sup>79</sup> W. Hamburger, 'Die Stellung des Reformjudentums zur Frau', *Emuna*, Jg. 10 (1975), Supplementheft 1, pp. 11–22 who notes that women were not ordained as rabbis in the Reform movement until the 1920s. There is an obvious conceptual confusion here which was not made explicit until the Bauer-Marx controversy over the emancipation of the Jews (see my *Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism*, London 1978) but even then it was not used in debates about women. Reform was never equated with "liberation".

<sup>80</sup> A. Geiger, *loc. cit.*, p. 13.

Jewish community of Berlin had a Commission for the Poor which wanted to *be* right more than it wanted to *do* right. Its Board of Management wanted to centralise all welfare organisations, wanted to see a thorough investigation of all applicants by using home visits and questionnaires and it wanted to help people find work rather than support them. It was concerned lest provision for the poor induce idleness and wanted to be sure that those without means were so not through an unwillingness to work, but because they were victims of state restrictions on Jews.<sup>81</sup> To be sure, the Commission did sterling work and helped many families. It did so as a typical Victorian public service agency which, however well-meaning, was a long way from, say, the community of Schmiegel in the Province of Poznań, which had 52 Jewish inhabitants, a day school for 63 children, a rabbi, a teacher and four societies: one to care for sick or dying men; one to care for sick or dying women; one to make sure that all poor children at school had proper clothing and school books; and a fourth to make sure that girls were properly trained and that poor girls received “the usual gifts” when they married.<sup>82</sup> The need for efficiency made Berlin charitable and the demands of justice made Schmiegel a community.

#### IV

Just as the economic and cultural emancipation of the Jews of Germany paved the way for the legal and political emancipation of 1848 and after,<sup>83</sup> so social and economic changes of the 1848–1875 period determined trends which were to shape subsequent events. If precise details and statistics are still under dispute,<sup>84</sup> there can be little controversy over the trends which became apparent. The first of these was the drift to the city. Whatever the precise dimension of this movement may have been, its significance should be measured not only in numbers, but in its effects.<sup>85</sup> If small Jewish settlements in rural areas remained more Jewish, they were nevertheless affected by developments in the towns which eventually overwhelmed the sheltered and traditional communities.<sup>86</sup> Within the towns themselves many changes took place which had little enough to do with the fact that people were Jewish. Thus it was not only Jews who migrated to the city; a much more important movement was that of the workforce for new industrial ventures. The absolute growth in the size of cities meant greater pressure on space, smaller dwellings, fewer and more expensive servants.<sup>87</sup> The domestic skills expected of a Fanny Lewald became

<sup>81</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), pp. 261–263.

<sup>82</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), pp. 230–231.

<sup>83</sup> Baron, *loc. cit.*

<sup>84</sup> Cf. *Year Book XIX of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1974, esp. p. 133.

<sup>85</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 169–174. See also Monika Richarz’s paper in this volume.

<sup>87</sup> Rolf Engelsing, ‘Einkommen der Dienboten ...’, in *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte*, II, Tel-Aviv 1973, esp. pp. 44–45.

largely superfluous, because the rapid spread of retail shops, in which Jews played a not insignificant part, made the wholesale purchase of perishable goods unnecessary and of durable goods uneconomic. Food shops provided a constant and relatively cheap supply of fresh food, textiles were quickly and readily available, central-heating and gas lighting made for more comfortable living, while running water and public sewerage systems simplified daily chores. Jews generally did well economically and the housewife was steadily relieved of the skills which in earlier years gave her such a central part to play in the household economy. Her husband's work place was now more likely to be separate from the home and he was less likely to require her assistance in it. In fact, husbands came to pride themselves on being the sole supporters of the family. The duties of a housewife became less managerial and the range of her tasks was reduced by the rapid spread of domestic technology. At the same time, improved public sanitation, a greater awareness of health needs, the steady availability of wholesome food, adequate clothing and housing, increased the expectation of life. Jews in particular lived longer. As standards of living rose, birth rates tended to decline, reducing yet further the woman's centrality in the family life cycle, while the children that were born had a much better chance of surviving to adulthood. The stresses of urban living also began to appear. Men tended to marry later and to die earlier than women, especially among Jews. Mixed marriages took place, with men marrying "out" more frequently than women.<sup>88</sup> Suicides among Jews increased, especially among men whose predominance in speculative commercial ventures were said to make them more vulnerable to abrupt changes in economic fortunes. The consequence of all these factors for Jewish, mainly middle-class women was firstly that numerically they increased more rapidly than men. Secondly, as housewives they increasingly faced a life in which social responsibilities and involvements were progressively reduced while their physical and intellectual potential was steadily enhanced.

Meanwhile the children of the changing Jewish home made for the higher schools, where they were often disproportionately strongly represented, with boys showing a marked preference for a *Gymnasium* type education.<sup>89</sup> It was a quest for education for its own sake (in the classic Jewish tradition), because most of the boys and girls faced insurmountable barriers, though of different sorts, according to their sex. The great expectations for boys which were raised by the Acts of 1848 and 1869 were never fulfilled and the impressive proportion of male Jews who entered higher education was never reflected, for example, in the recruitment to the army and the prestigious Higher Civil Service.<sup>90</sup> Trade, commerce and the liberal professions remained the chief outlets for Jewish

<sup>88</sup> *ZDSJ*, 1907, p. 79.

<sup>89</sup> *ZDSJ*, 1909, pp. 113–120 and 1911, p. 55, Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 169–174.

<sup>90</sup> J.C.G. Röhl, 'Higher Civil Servants in Germany 1890–1900', in *Jewish Contemporary History*, 2:3 (1967), pp. 101–121.

males. The situation was, if anything, even more unsatisfactory for girls, since they had to face the obstacles placed in the way of *women* seeking occupations, before the question of their Jewishness could even arise. It was a very frustrating position for young women who, although they held high qualifications from schools, if they wanted or had to earn a living, would in many instances have had to go to the lower end of the labour market, the only level at which employment for women was easily available. That many succeeded somehow, becomes readily apparent from the following: between 1882 and 1907 the increase of persons in employment in Prussia was 41.1% for men and 117% for women. For Jews in Prussia the increase was 23% for men and 113% for women.<sup>91</sup> There was good reason therefore why Jewish women should have become involved in the struggle for access to training for, and practice of the professions, so early and so conspicuously, but there is little evidence to suggest that Jewish men either understood or wanted to help.<sup>92</sup>

It is possible that, if it had not been for Abraham Geiger's attempt to "Germanise" Jewish women in order to attract them to the Reform movement and because it proved to be a useful stick with which to assault the "orientalism" of Jewish law, that the Orthodox community might have responded more positively to the unprecedented difficulties which the emancipation process was to create for, what was in effect, a new manifestation in Jewish history – the unattached Jewish woman who had or wanted to be economically independent and who had no place, as Bertha Pappenheim pointed out with bitterness, in either religious or communal organisations.<sup>93</sup> It is not that Orthodox leaders were not aware of the problem. In 1838 Samson Raphael Hirsch published his famous *Versuche*, which he addressed equally to "thinking youths and maidens".<sup>94</sup> The fiery champion of Orthodoxy Solomon Plessner included an uncompromising demand for the religious education of Jewish girls in the Introduction to his *Das Mosheh wi-Yehudit*,<sup>95</sup> which suggests that he was fully aware of the trends of his time, but once the debate had been reduced to marginal issues like synagogal seating arrangements, it was not likely that serious attention would be given to this subject. Nor did this situation change in the light of later events. Ruppin, Segall, Heinemann and Lestschinsky all drew attention to the problem of the unattached woman,<sup>96</sup> but as a challenge to the

<sup>91</sup> *ZDSJ*, 1911, p. 80.

<sup>92</sup> E.g. A. Kurrein, *Die Frau im jüdischen Volke*, Frankfurt a. Main 1883, directed against both Reform Judaism and the women's movement, it posits a collection of rabbinic stories to illustrate the *position* of women in Judaism but makes no attempt to deal with the core issues of either movement.

<sup>93</sup> 'The Jewish Woman in Religious Life', in *Jewish Review*, 3:17 (1913), pp. 405–414.

<sup>94</sup> *Versuche über Jissroëls Pflichten in der Zerstreung zunächst für Jissroëls denkende Jünglinge und Jungfrauen*, 1838.

<sup>95</sup> *Jüdisch-Mosaischer Religionsunterricht*, Berlin 1838, pp. XII–XIII.

<sup>96</sup> Arthur Ruppin, *Die Juden der Gegenwart*, (3rd edn.) Berlin 1918; Jacob Segall, 'Bevölkerungs- und Wirtschaftsfragen', in *Jeschurun*, 1 (1914), pp. 19–24; I. Heinemann,

Orthodox community it remained unanswered, as was the problem of the changing role of the woman in her home. The result of all the changes we have outlined also altered the structure of the Jewish family, which now was most typically a small, nuclear-type family, likely to live in a “*Wohnung*” rather than a house, with the man as breadwinner, working outside the home, the woman with two or three children as the main domestic work unit with a maid or perhaps a widowed mother of one of the parents. Contact between mother and children was now much more intensive and continuous than in earlier periods. For all that the authority of the mother declined, partly at least, because the power she exercised in the past over the household and all adults who shared in the child-rearing process, which did so much to impress the force of maternal authority on the child, had all but disappeared. The personality of the mother assumed much greater significance as a factor in the relationship with the child. Since children were more likely to survive and since they had to be dealt with directly by the mother, a new attitude developed, a more liberal approach to childhood and a greater interest in the developmental processes of the child. Thus we find a tremendous upsurge of interest in the work and ideas of Fröbel, who was adopted by many women as the man who would give women a more meaningful role in the home.<sup>97</sup> We also find some frankly critical approaches to the ways in which children were cared for. Johanna Goldschmidt called for an “*Umgestaltung*” of the family,<sup>98</sup> with the despotic, patriarchal father giving way to a corporate family unit in which small children were not reared by strangers, but by those to whom they were bound by nature.<sup>99</sup> She was deeply concerned about the position of adolescent girls and thought that systematic training in Fröbel methods would enable girls to carry out a meaningful task in the home, or to earn a living outside it. Although girls, like boys, attended school, there was really nothing they could do after completing school, until they married. Hence the hapless, middle-class adolescent, moody, dreamy “*Flitterpuppen*”.<sup>100</sup> For girls in rural areas the problem was exacerbated because young men migrated to the towns or emigrated, so that even marriage was uncertain.<sup>101</sup> Another dimension of the situation as seen at that time was the lack of training and involvement in Jewish matters, which left girls with an increasingly sophisticated secular education they could not make use of, and an ignorant indifference to Judaism, which they would eventually transmit to their children. In vain did Michael Sachs appeal to congregants

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*Zeitfragen im Lichte jüdischer Lebensanschauung*, Frankfurt a. Main 1921, esp. 102–106; Jakob Lestschinsky, *Das wirtschaftliche Schicksal des deutschen Judentums. Aufstieg. Wandlung. Krise. Ausblick*, Schriften der Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der deutschen Juden und der Hauptstelle für jüdische Wanderfürsorge, No. VII, Berlin 1932, p. 74ff. and 134–135.

<sup>97</sup> Maria Müller, *Frauen im Dienste Fröbels*, Leipzig 1928.

<sup>98</sup> Johanna Goldschmidt, *Blicke in die Familie*, Leipzig 1864, p. 7.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9–11.

<sup>100</sup> Heinemann, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

<sup>101</sup> *ZDSJ*, 1907, pp. 171–172.

from his pulpit to prevent the continuous decline in the standards of the Jewish home.<sup>102</sup>

In Jewish law a woman really only exists if she is married and comes into her own only if she has children. Although there have always been unmarried or widowed women in communities, as long as communal organisations began and ended in the home as integral parts in the life of every individual, this was not a problem, because the unattached Jewish woman would find her role and her identity through the community.<sup>103</sup> Since the advent of emancipation neither the family, nor the woman in it, has found a distinctive role to play, while the unattached woman appears to have no place at all. This is the more remarkable since motherhood is not obligatory for women in Jewish law. The changes we have reviewed have given women access to education, including Torah-education, and opportunities for economic independence, but the “new Jewish woman” is still to come.

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<sup>102</sup> Michael Sachs, *Predigten*, 2 vols, Breslau, 1885. See for example vol. I, pp. 232–233.

<sup>103</sup> If it was the norm for the woman to establish her status as a daughter or a wife, then the unattached woman was recognised (albeit negatively) through *not* having a father or a husband. Thus almost every list containing names of Jews is likely to have “Witwe XY” with the widow not only retaining the name of the husband but also his business which she carries on.

## Appendix

*Dr. Marcus Mosse's Guide to Good Housekeeping*

The full text of this guide is of interest not only for the support it lends to the model of the "*Bürgerfamilie*" which I have described, but also for the details it provides of household management and the roles of servants.

"A household is managed most conveniently if, as far as is possible, the work of every hour is planned in advance.

Servants should rise not later than 5 a.m. in summer, 6 a.m. in winter; children rise one hour later. The cook prepares breakfast – the nanny ((*Kinder-mädchen*) lays out clothes for every child – fetches water and sponges, cleans combs etc. The cook should only look after the kitchen, but if there is time she could also clean rooms; at least once a week every room is to be scrubbed, but sensibly, not all on the same day.

Every Wednesday laundry will be washed; every last Wednesday of the month a laundry-woman will be brought in to wash the big laundry. At least every Monday a tailoress will come into the house to carry out necessary repairs.

Every Friday or Thursday a week's supply of bread will be baked: I consider it best that corn is purchased, ground and kneaded at home.

Every Friday *Challah* (*Barches*) is to be purchased.

The weekly menu will be considered and planned by me every Thursday evening in consultation with my wife; but my decisions are final.

Following that, all purchases are to be made on Friday at the weekly market. My wife will, accordingly go to market every Friday, accompanied by a servant; but she can empower a "*Faktorfrau*" to do this for her, if she so wishes, but servants are not to be entrusted with it.

All expenditures are to be recorded daily and meticulously.

The children will be bathed every Thursday evening. The children's clothes must be kept neatly in a special cupboard; for every child a separate shelf with the name of the child at the top. The clothes of boys and girls should always be kept separate. For dirty laundry a laundry-basket must be available for the housewife. Equally important is a larder in which provender can be kept under lock and key, easily checked and protected from insects.

The kitchen should be properly and fully equipped – once a week all woodwork and copper is to be scrubbed, candlesticks and lamps are to be cleaned every day. Towards servants one must be strict but fair; they should never be scolded, which in any event is unseemly for a proper lady; they must receive ample and suitable food; disobedience and insolence of servants are to be reported to me.

My wife will never make visits in my absence, but should attend synagogue every Saturday or at least once a month; and take the children for a walk at least once a week.”





MARION KAPLAN

on

## Family Structure and the Position of Jewish Women A Comment

The history of the Jewish family and of the Jewish woman offers a unifying perspective to historians of German Jewry. Since the family was and is the basic unit of social organisation, an investigation of Jewish families may make it possible to visualise the often abstract, large-scale processes which affected the social history of German Jews. Also, since the position of women, much as the position of Jews, can serve as a bell-wether of Liberalism, their history can highlight major political and social evolution.

Historians of the German-Jewish family and of German-Jewish women face two formidable tasks: the first is to gather more information about the variety of experiences that Jews faced: the second is to compare these experiences with those of German families and German women. The paper presented by Julius Carlebach is bold and provocative, but we still have far to go. In the last several years, the history of women and the history of the family have attracted increased attention to the extent that they are today frequently treated as sub-disciplines. In contrast, there has been a remarkable lack of attention to the history of the Jewish family and Jewish women.

Recent studies of the family explore several general areas, including: demography or the study of fertility, nuptiality and mortality; household composition or the size and organisation of families; the psycho-social aspects of family relationships; and the relationship of the family to its environment. They employ various methods ranging from quantification to textual analyses. Many of the studies consist of detailed examinations focused on specific geographic regions. I would suggest that this is the best approach for scholars of German Jewry as well, for as Lawrence Schofer has pointed out, religion and class may outweigh other categories in importance, but they do not explain the distinctions between regional variations. Some of the groundwork has been laid by Alice Goldstein, Steven Lowenstein, and Lawrence Schofer.<sup>1</sup> Current work on

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<sup>1</sup> In a thought-provoking paper, Steven Lowenstein speculates that late marriage patterns and birth control among Bavarian Jews may have been influenced by legal conditions. 'Voluntary and Involuntary Limitation of Fertility in Nineteenth Century Bavarian Jewry' (paper presented at the Conference on Jewish Fertility, sponsored by the Department of Jewish Studies, City College New York, 22nd-23rd February 1976).

Alice Goldstein has found indications that as early as 1840 Jewish women over age 35 had begun to control their fertility. 'Some Demographic Characteristics of Village Jews

the family can also make a contribution to women's history. The structure of the family and its demographic characteristics shaped the quality of women's lives. It is impossible to understand the emotional reality of the female experience without examining the household. Even women's activities and interests outside the family are often connected with family structure and needs. Studying women in their roles as wives, mothers, daughters and sisters gives an essential dimension to the experience of women. Nevertheless, women have been "hidden from history" too long to turn up *only* within the context of the family. Women and their activities should not be subsumed or marginalised. Women led lives that were independent of immediate family concerns and which demand our separate investigation as well. And, since women were the majority, the events and processes central to their experiences must necessarily modify our understanding of German-Jewish history, just as a proper appreciation of women's history is essential to an understanding of the dynamics of social change in general. As social history opened paths to appraising the lives of ordinary people rather than elites, so will women's history provide us with the tools to research an *all-inclusive* history of German Jews, rather than a history of German-Jewish males.

When we begin to develop areas of inquiry, we should take into account the work already done by family and feminist historians, while keeping the unique political and socio-economic status of Jews in mind. I think there are several central questions that students of Jewish family and Jewish women's history must address as they enter this new territory. These relate – in our period – to questions about the impact of industrialisation and the growth of the State on family life and the role of women.

Before we make such inquiries, however, we have to decide if it is useful to employ a single model of the "Jewish family" or the "Jewish woman" or if a more differentiated analysis would better serve our purposes. First, let us turn to the family. Carlebach's paper outlines at least five groups of Jews by occupations and income. However, it then goes on to develop broad archetypes. Since family experience is largely dependent on wealth, class, geographical and occupational influences, it would have been more instructive to explore the impact of these categories than to generalise. Keeping these differences in mind, we can now turn to several sub-categories including 1) group specific fertility and mortality; 2) changes and continuities in household size and composition; 3) the relationship of the family to society; 4) the parent-child bond; and 5) the husband-wife relationship. We know the nineteenth century saw an increase in Jewish fertility until 1880 and then a rapid decrease. We need to know in more detail how the fertility and mortality rates reflected economic and political

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in Germany: Nonnenweier, 1800–1931' (unpublished paper, Population Studies and Training Center, Brown University).

The above reference is to the paper by Lawrence Schofer, 'Emancipation and Population Change', in the present volume.

conditions in various regions and among Jews of different economic status and religious devotion. What was the impact of legislation on family size, marriage age, migration, and I do not exclude intentional birth control? What was the effect of the property relations among members of a family on its demographic behaviour and geographic mobility? How did the more infrequent occurrence of pregnancy and childbirth in the late nineteenth century affect the vitality and role of women? In what ways do Jewish families reflect regional variations in births and deaths, and to what extent are Jews to be seen as a separate group across regional and class lines?

What can the study of Jewish household composition tell us about changes in the European family over time? Does the Jewish family fit what William Goode called “the classical family of Western nostalgia?”<sup>2</sup> An examination of the nineteenth-century Jewish household may, I suspect, not answer the debate over the alleged transition from the “extended” to the “nuclear” unit (a debate which is being laid to rest in political sociology but still infects history). Instead, it may emphasise life cycles<sup>3</sup> and class as a mode of understanding family history. For example, among pre-emancipation Jewry, young couples of some means lived with one set of parents while the husband pursued more education or set up a business. Then, for a longer period the couple would live in a small economic unit with its own children, perhaps co-habiting with a servant or relative. In later years, a father or mother might join them, since it was a custom (guaranteed by Jewish law) that parents be supported by their children if that became necessary.<sup>4</sup> In the second half of the nineteenth century, many middle-class Jews tended to postpone marriage and the formation of a separate household until they had acquired the skills and the capital necessary for economic independence. Such a decision extended the duration of the primary family unit and the dependence of children, and it probably contributed towards a reduction of offspring as a result of later marriage age. In this example, the new opportunities in the expanding German economy may have influenced not only household structure and fertility, but the collective mentality and expectations of people regarding their life cycles, as well as their notions of family, independence, and privacy. Yet, this same economic spurt did not affect all Jews in the same way. Some middle-class Jewish couples showed continuity with earlier traditions by marrying earlier and residing with a set of parents in the first years of marriage. It would be interesting to consider the

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<sup>2</sup> William Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, New York 1970, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Lutz Berkner has found that the families he studied went through extended and nuclear phases over several generations. The family form combined different stages in its own developmental cycle. His study of Austrian peasants is confirmed by several other investigations. Lutz K. Berkner, ‘The Stem Family and the Developmental Cycle of the Peasant Household. An 18th Century Austrian Example’, in Michael Gordon (ed.) *American Family in Perspective*, New York 1963, pp. 34–58.

<sup>4</sup> Jacob Katz, *Tradition and Crisis. Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages*, New York 1961, pp. 136, 140.

effect of family structure on entrepreneurial decision. How far was the success of Jewish business performance influenced by differences in internal family structure?

We need to ask how the structure of poor or rural Jewish household and kin groups was affected by the fluctuations of German capitalism. Goode has suggested that the benefits of the industrial system to the upper strata of society allowed them to maintain larger kin networks than poorer people.<sup>5</sup> With substantial resources, a set of relatives could and did help each other. Did such class differences affect Jewish kin relations or was the highly vaunted solidarity of the Jewish family impervious to economic exigencies? Also, what happened when households disintegrated? Jacob Toury mentions that the abundance of widows caused serious social problems in some *Gemeinden* in the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>6</sup>

State intervention, too, affected household size and composition, as well as migration patterns. We know that there were residential and employment restrictions on Jews in many areas of Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century which forced them to migrate and emigrate in large numbers. Studies in European family history indicate that decisions to migrate were family decisions; that whole families often migrated together; and that networks of kin sponsored one another as they moved from country to city or from town to town. How did Jewish family migration patterns compare to those of their German counterparts?<sup>7</sup> What effect did German politics have on traditional Jewish kin ties and how did this compare with German families? How did migration and emigration affect the lives of Jewish and German families?

When we finally identify the variety of Jewish households and family structures, we may then turn to the relationship between the family and society. The nineteenth century witnessed a withdrawal from corporate and communal identities into the family, and later another withdrawal from a family-centred existence to one in which the development of the individual personality was central. To what extent did these processes touch Jews, and in what ways? As Julius Carlebach points out in his paper, the Jewish family interacted intimately with its larger "family," the *Gemeinde*, a unique intermediary between the family and the larger and often hostile surrounding society. He suggests that the more privatised the family became, the less it maintained its Jewish heritage. While it is true that religious devotion waned (although I would

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<sup>5</sup> Goode, *op. cit.*, p. XVI.

<sup>6</sup> Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland, 1847–1871*, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 24.

<sup>7</sup> For example, did Jews more than Germans offer distant relatives a position in their homes (usually as *Dienstbote*) in order to facilitate their migration? In Cleves, for example, every Jewish family in the late eighteenth century had at least one "*Dienstbote*", often two. These were usually distant relatives who needed to reside with Jews who had obtained legal residence. Fritz Baer, *Das Protokollbuch der Landjudenschaft des Herzogtums Kleve*, Berlin 1922, p. 61.

disagree with the time period, 1800–1848, that is put forth in his paper<sup>8</sup>), most Jews retained meaningful *social* ties to their *Gemeinde* well into the twentieth century and long after German corporate and communal bonds had dissolved. What were the relative roles of secular law, antisemitism, and Jewish communal loyalty in maintaining the *Gemeinde*, even after purely religious ties were loosened? Did the *Gemeinde* compensate for lack of societal acceptance in Germany? How did the existence of the *Gemeinde* influence the status and perceptions of Jewish families and of individuals within them? How did the privatisation of the Jewish family compare to the isolation of its German counterpart?

What was the significance of the family to its members in an era of increasing individualism? Twentieth-century German-Jewish feminists suggested that the family was more important to an itinerant people, forced to move from country to country, with no history of permanence or belonging. Placed in a foreign culture, amidst different religions, the Jewish family provided roots and security to Jews.<sup>9</sup> These feminists considered the family to be the very cornerstone of Judaism and clung to the notion of the family, even as they sought the emancipation of the individual from traditional socio-cultural constraints. Did all Jewish families, in fact, provide the human ties and support that were withheld by an antisemitic society?: were they “havens in a heartless world?”<sup>10</sup> If so, did this lead to a more tenacious hold of Jewish families over the individuals in them? And did this have a positive emotional effect, or did it serve further to isolate individuals from society? Finally, and importantly, what role did religion play in fostering family bonds? It seems entirely

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<sup>8</sup> Religious devotion probably waned only after the middle of the century. For example, Toury has shown that attendance at Jewish schools in Prussia dropped from 50% to 47% between 1847 and 1864 – not a significant decline, and attendance actually increased in ten districts. *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden, op. cit.*, pp. 168–169. In general, the attention accorded to the loss of religious devotion and to “assimilationist” tendencies in German Jewry has not been matched by equal consideration of those Jews who maintained their group identity and religious tradition. A shift in research to small-town Jews, non-elites, and Jewish women may indeed modify our perception of the lack of Jewish consciousness. The smaller communities were the real upholders of piety, according to Leo Baeck. The few studies of small communities that do exist convey an atmosphere in which Jews did not forfeit their Jewishness. Toury has contributed some material on this subject for the years around 1848. He concluded that the majority of German Jews were strictly Orthodox (*altgläubig* or *streng Orthodoxe*). Their contact with the outside world was instrumental. In their internal lives they remained completely cut off from it. Memoirs of Jewish women from this period and later describe family life circling around the Jewish calendar. The sabbath and Jewish holidays punctuate the narratives throughout. Toury, ‘Neue Hebräische Veröffentlichungen zur Geschichte der Juden im Deutschen Lebenskreise’, in *Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts*, IV, No. 13 (1961), p. 13.

<sup>9</sup> Rahel Straus, ‘Ehe und Mutterschaft’, in *Vom jüdischen Geiste. Eine Aufsatzreihe*, edited by *Der Jüdische Frauenbund*, Berlin 1934, p. 21.

<sup>10</sup> Toury suggests that antisemitism plus the traditionalism of the Jewish family strengthened family ties.

reasonable to suggest that the family responds to both the forces of production and to value systems such as religion, as Carlebach observes, but this does not describe the *relationship* between these factors nor the mechanisms of change.

An inquiry into the family must study the parent-child relationship. Here, I would be interested in how the family in historically specific settings socialised children to conform to various sex roles; how it provided for the practical, intellectual,<sup>11</sup> and Jewish education of its young; and what kind of an emotional environment it offered its members. The answers to such questions can help us to understand the extent to which the Jewish family helped to integrate its members into the surrounding society and the extent to which it allowed them to adjust to change. Carlebach has pointed out two topics which merit further discussion: the role of mothers in transmitting Judaism and the evolution of the mother-child bond. It is true that mothers have been seen traditionally as transmitters of Judaism. In fact, this belief continued well into the twentieth century, allowing Jews to blame women for assimilationist trends they could not or would not reverse. It seems to me that mothers played a far more complex role. In the period under study, some read secular literature, but kept kosher homes;<sup>12</sup> others were in the forefront of acculturation and even encouraged their families to give up religious traditions; still others were more religious than their husbands. I would suggest that class, geographical location, the bonds and vitality of the *Gemeinde* and male attitudes played their parts in shaping women's reactions. Ultimately, the decline in Jewishness resulted as much from male as from female indifference.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Memoirs for this period indicate a negative attitude towards the intellectual education of girls. For example, one woman, born between 1850 and 1860 noted: "Lesen an sich als Beschäftigung galt nicht. Wir durften nur mittags nach Tisch eine Stunde uns mit Büchern beschäftigen ... Es war ein großer Schmerz wenn die Stunde um war. Meist hatte Mutter dann ausgeschlafen und kam in die Kinderstube: der Schreck, wenn ich dann noch las, war groß, denn Mutter zankte sehr über unnütze Zeitvergeudung. Ich war schon viele Jahre verheiratet und immer noch wenn ich zu einer unpassende Zeit las, erschrak ich wenn jemand kam." Similar stories are told by others. Still, Jewish girls were well represented in the higher schools for girls. In fact, in Poznań a *numerus clausus* was instituted in the *höhere Mädchenschule* in order to restrict the entrance of "too many" Jewish girls. Clearly, this is an area for further investigation since the statistical representation of girls in school and the memoirs of some of the same people seem to contradict each other. Finally, the representation of Jewish girls in higher schools must be compared to that of German girls of the same social and economic class before we attribute a thirst for knowledge to Jewish tradition. See for example: Esther Calvary, unpublished memoirs in the Archives of the New York Leo Baeck Institute, *Leo Baeck Institute New York. Bibliothek und Archiv. Katalog*, Band I, cited as *LBI Katalog*, Tübingen 1970 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 22), No. 55, p. 19 (pagination always refers to the individual memoirs); *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* (AZJ), XIII (1849), pp. 149, 491; Clara Geismar, unpublished memoirs, *LBI Katalog*, No. 126, p. 58.

<sup>12</sup> See for example: Wilhelm Kober, unpublished memoirs, *LBI Katalog*, No. 218, p. 3; Monika Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1780–1871*, Stuttgart 1976, Veröffentlichung des Leo Baeck Instituts, p. 53.

<sup>13</sup> This may be seen, in particular, with regard to the Jewish education of girls. Again,

The emotional response of parents to children is another complex area. It is premature to assume, as Carlebach does, that because more children died and some were compelled to leave home, child rearing was less intimate and sentimental (p. 166). Much earlier (1667) Glückel of Hameln chronicled the terror and grief she and her husband felt at the loss of one of their twelve children: "Both of us mourned so bitterly that for a long while we lay grievously ill; and so we had our great sorrow."<sup>14</sup> Also, it is difficult to relate a decline in infant mortality to an increase in parental affection in this period, since infant mortality for Jews and Germans rose between 1816 and 1875 and levels of infant mortality varied considerably by region.<sup>15</sup> We need more proof before we can begin to argue that parents became more emotionally involved with their offspring in the later nineteenth century. The memoirs of middle-class men and women in the early and later nineteenth century display no greater emotional content in the affective bond between parent and child. The father is usually described as somewhat removed, not central to the child's life, and the mother is the focus of it. Memoirs, of course, like novels or paintings, may reflect reality or compensate for it. They must be used critically. They do describe certain changes though, which may have influenced emotional ties. For example, it has been suggested by Carlebach that contact between mothers and children was "much more intensive and continuous" (p. 184) in the later nineteenth century. While it is true that middle-class mothers were able to afford some household help which potentially allowed them to spend more time with their children, this was the same period in which German society became

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memoir literature reports the shallow and boring lessons that girls received: Marie Maas wrote that the lessons were so boring that the girls and teacher fell asleep. (This was approximately during the 1860s). Marie Maas, unpublished memoirs, *LBI Katalog*, No. 251, p. 26. Born in 1844, Clara Geismar commented on the lack of understanding the women in her synagogue showed regarding the service. When she borrowed prayer books from women there were notations in the margins suggesting the emotion or reaction certain passages called forth ("allhier wird geheult"). "Die Mehrzahl der Frauen betete die vorgeschriebene Gebete ab ohne von ihrem Inhalt was zu verstehen." Clara Geismar, unpublished memoirs, *LBI Katalog*, No. 126, p. 73.

Still, as Mordechai Eliav has shown, at the beginning of the nineteenth century there were many Jewish girls who had no education at all. By the mid-century, there were hardly any Jewish girls without some education. Most studied in Jewish day or religious schools where they learned a mixture of morals and religion, reading and writing (German and *Judendeutsch*), arithmetic, drawing and *Handarbeiten*. See: Mordechai Eliav, *Jewish Education in Germany in the Period of Enlightenment and Emancipation* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem 1960, chapter 11, pp. 271–279.

<sup>14</sup> Glückel of Hameln, *The Memoirs of Glückel of Hameln*, trans. by Marvin Lowenthal, New York 1977, p. 87.

<sup>15</sup> Infant mortality improved very little before 1900 in Germany, France and England. Jews generally had better rates than the surrounding populations, but Knodel shows for Germany and Goldstein for Nonnenweier, that the worst rates existed between 1840 and the 1870s. See: John Knodel, *The Decline of Fertility in Germany, 1871–1939*, Princeton 1974, pp. 155–174; Goldstein, 'Nonnenweier'; Louise Tilly and Joan Scott, *Women, Work, and Family*, New York 1978, pp. 102, 172–173.



more open to Jews, and in which school and the accoutrements of middle-class status, such as piano lessons, sewing circles (for girls), and *Nachmittagsfräulein*<sup>16</sup> claimed more time from children. Also, social responsibilities occupied mothers. Thus, children may have seen less of mothers than was suggested. Further, the time children spent with parents depended on their sex. As has been mentioned by Carlebach, in traditional Judaism boys frequently left home after their thirteenth birthday. Later on, when sons began to enter higher education and business apprenticeships they left home before their sisters. The latter, who were expected to maintain closer ties with their parents, were kept at home to help out in the family business or play *höhere Tochter* until they married. While we should not confuse contact *per se* with emotional depth, it may well tell us something about family ties. Finally, children of poor or working-class Jews experienced different forms of family interaction depending on the geographical area in which they lived, the type of work the parents did, and the sex of the child.<sup>17</sup>

The relationship between husband and wife also reflected broader social currents. Carlebach has described a “domestic partnership” between man and wife in the earlier “subsistence” period which faded into a “subservience model” in the bourgeois era. Both models and their periodisation present problems. Since women were always subordinate to men and the unequivocally egalitarian family was rarely to be found, such a stark contrast is misleading. It may be more relevant to think of the relative distribution of work and power. Our models must again bend to historical specificity. The early nineteenth century did not see marked changes in family structure except, perhaps, among a tiny stratum of Jews like the Lewalds. In fact, by mid-century, the overwhelming majority of Jews still belonged to the petty bourgeoisie (25% to 27% in Prussia, 34% to 40% in Bavaria, 31% to 36% in Württemberg) or to those who eked out minimal to marginal existences (40% to 43% in Prussia, 45% to 50% in Bavaria, 45% to 50% in Württemberg). Whereas upper middle-class and middle-class women (about 30% to 33% of Jews in Prussia and only 15% to 16% in Bavaria and 19% in Württemberg) may have ceased working outside the home and may therefore fit the description of the “*Bürger family*” most Jewish women were still engaged in productive labour.<sup>18</sup> Some minded shops

<sup>16</sup> Toni Ehrlich, unpublished memoirs, *LBI Katalog*, No. 85, p. 30.

<sup>17</sup> Scott and Tilly have discovered that among the rural and urban poor it was daughters that were expendable. They, rather than their brother, were sent to work away from home when that was necessary to the family economy. We know that there were Jewish *Dienstmädchen*, but it would be illuminating to discover whether or not the Jewish family generally followed economic dictates by sending its daughters to work, or whether it attempted to keep them home. ‘Women’s Work and the Family in Nineteenth Century Europe’, in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1975), p. 52.

<sup>18</sup> The statistics are from Toury, ‘Der Eintritt der Juden ins deutsche Bürgertum’, in *Das Judentum in der Deutschen Umwelt, 1800–1850*. Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Emanzipation herausgegeben von Hans Liebeschütz und Arnold Paucker, Tübingen

while their husbands peddled wares; others took low-paying jobs to contribute to the economic sustenance of the family.<sup>19</sup> We know that there were Jewish female servants, lacemakers, and pedlars, but we need to know more about the families in this low-income bracket.<sup>20</sup> Despite women's economic responsibilities, it appears that rigid lines existed between male and female roles and women were never accorded the same authority as men in the family. There was a "partnership" among unequals: women acted within parameters set by men. It has long been recognised that "the *power* of earning is essential" to women's emancipation,<sup>21</sup> but it is not at all clear that economic productivity automatically implied partnership or increased respect for women, particularly in a pre-industrial context.<sup>22</sup> Further, anthropologists and feminist historians have shown that men and women frequently saw women's financial contribution to the family as less important than it really was. The woman still remained subservient to the man of the house even if he was unemployed. In Jewish history we have the classical example of the wife who provided for the family entirely while the husband devoted his life to the study of the Torah. The respect of the community went first to the man of learning; the children were dependent on the will of the father; and the woman remained subservient to her husband, both legally and socially. And, the "just reward" held out to the virtuous wife in the "end of days" did not resemble equality or justice: according to popular stories, such a woman could aspire to be her husband's footstool in the Garden of Eden.

Also, it would be interesting to pursue the consequences of the husband's periodic absence from home. As Julius Carlebach noted, in the "subsistence period" men were frequently away from home. Even later, there were rural areas where entire communities of Jews engaged in itinerant trade.<sup>23</sup> Still later, the bourgeois father spent long hours at work and went on business trips, often as much as one third of the year.<sup>24</sup> How did the authority of these wives compare to wives whose husbands were home more regularly? And how did it compare to the authority of German middle-class women?

Finally, it is doubtful that the "strong social position of Jewish women" balanced their inferior position *vis à vis* their husbands. Women did participate

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1977 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 35), pp. 232–233.

<sup>19</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 43, 55.

<sup>20</sup> Katz, *Tradition and Crisis*, *op. cit.*, p. 23; Hermann Schwab, *Jewish Rural Communities in Germany*, London [1957], p. 81.

<sup>21</sup> John Stuart Mill, *On the Subjection of Women*, Connecticut 1971, p. 67.

<sup>22</sup> In the pre-industrial Europe described by Laslett, the industrialising Europe analysed by Scott and Tilly, and in contemporary pre-modern societies studied by anthropologists, the household or family is the crucial economic unit. All family members are expected to work and it is simply assumed women will work, for their contribution is essential. Thus, women's work is taken for granted rather than winning them additional power.

<sup>23</sup> Toury, 'Der Eintritt', *loc. cit.*, p. 143.

<sup>24</sup> Toni Ehrlich, unpublished memoirs, *LBI Katalog*, No. 85, pp. 12, 29.

in the *Gemeinde* in the “subsistence period” referred to, but it was within clearly delineated, separate spheres. Women were rigidly excluded from participation in the official management of communal affairs and men always held the more responsible positions.<sup>25</sup> It is difficult to see how a male-delineated and male-controlled social position should balance our perception of women’s legal and cultural inferiority. Furthermore, one case of Biblical “justice” (the daughters of Zelofhod) does not substantiate Carlebach’s “presumption that compensatory mechanisms” or “social sanctions” provided the “affirmation of justice” which compensated women for their legal and social inferiority. Far more proof dating from modern times is required. And Responsa literature which includes cases of women seeking redress does not prove their “equal access to legal process”, but suggests that some women were bold enough or desperate enough to challenge injustice. “Equal access” is a fiction where laws are unequal.

Jewish women were active in communal charities organised by and for women. They did take initiatives and show independence. This is an area which was mentioned in Carlebach’s paper and one which deserves closer scrutiny and comparison with German women. Still, the extraordinarily circumscribed sphere of women’s activity cannot be forgotten, and the concept of a “partnership” tends to paint the picture too brightly.

The notion of a “subservience model” in the “*Bürger* family” is as problematic as the one of an earlier “partnership.” It would seem more appropriate to discuss women’s relative productive and reproductive (biological reproduction and domestic labour) value.

The “*Bürger* family” must be placed squarely *after* mid-century. In 1848 most Jews still lived in villages and towns (the mass urbanisation of Jews did not appear until the 1870s),<sup>26</sup> and the majority of Jews were not yet solid *Bürger*. In the period between 1848 and 1875 many women, even among the lower 40% of Jewish society, withdrew from productive labour either because they no longer had to work outside the home, or because they were compelled to become the symbol of their husbands’ wealth or pretensions. Even as their productive labour decreased, their reproductive work continued to be of importance to the family economy. Only the wealthier could afford a wife who was solely a “managing director”. For most women, housewifely skills could extend family income. They were far from “superfluous”<sup>27</sup> Housework was still

<sup>25</sup> Carlebach suggests that the sexes were not rigidly separated. Yet, writings on the subject, for example, Salo Baron’s *The Jewish Community* underline the strictly circumscribed character of women’s participation (vol. I, p. 349; vol. II, p. 36).

<sup>26</sup> As late as 1871, 68% of Bavarian Jews still lived in towns under 5,000. Lowenstein, ‘Fertility’, p. 2.

<sup>27</sup> Patricia Branca has questioned the pervasive image of middle-class Victorian women in England as essentially idle, pampered creatures leading self-indulgent, parasitic lives surrounded by servants. She asserts that “the middle class has been defined too exclusively in terms of values”, and seeks to investigate the economic realities of middle-class existence. By examining the material culture of the middle class through the use of

extraordinarily time consuming and the technology intended to lighten the housewife's task was widely used only at the end of the century. Thus, women's reproductive value was far from nullified. Nevertheless, since women's economic contribution hardly made up for her inferiority within the "subsistence" family, it is difficult to see how they could have become much more subservient.

Perhaps we should first ask what increased subservience means. Since women were brought up to be submissive and to accept male directives, it would be extremely difficult to measure such a phenomenon. For example, one woman (born in 1844) wrote: "I felt completely free, did everything completely as he wanted, but always thought I was living according to my own inspiration."<sup>28</sup> The same can be said for measuring the extent to which husbands became more autocratic. Whether or not it can be traced to Jewish roots, patriarchal arrogance was present in Jewish families both before and after their *embour-*

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income distributions, she suggests that the most typical women in this group led extremely demanding lives. She also uses the census data to confirm that the middle-class woman had to be content with a single servant, since there were not enough governesses, housekeepers, cooks, or nursemaids to fill the needs of the upper class, the upper middle class, and the middle class.

The same study might be done for Germany. In 1895, for example, it was estimated that there were about 2,678,000 servants (*Dienende*) at a time when about 3 million German families were considered "aristocratic and wealthy" (.25 million) or "upper middle-class" (2.75 million). Even if we were to assume that there was only one maid per family (and many of these families hired more than one), the result would still indicate that not every upper middle-class – let alone middle-class – family had a maid. Of course, much more careful statistical work needs to be done, but even at first glance, it would appear that upper middle and middle-class women were probably busier in the household – particularly in a country where the *Hausfrau* became legendary – than we may have thought.

Novels and memoirs can be used to verify this data. *Aus Guter Familie*, for example, a novel of the late nineteenth century, describes a family with all the values and pretences of the upper middle class, but whose wife and daughter must do heavy housework (despite having one maid). Jewish memoirs, too, portray this phenomenon. The wife and daughter of a Jewish "Beamte", for example, arose at 4 in the morning in order to scrub the doors and windows, clean floors and do the laundry. "No one could see this, it would have been a scandal." They called this the "Stunde der Erniedrigung". But, "diese Pein trug man mit Würde. Die Rauigkeit der Hände konnte wieder mit Hautcrème gutgemacht werden."

Finally, it should be added that when some families hired nursemaids and housekeepers, it was often because the mother still helped in the business while the maid cared for the children. Again, values and aspirations were such that they might have found such work in the family business degrading, but economic reality forced their participation.

See: Patricia Branca, 'Image and Reality. The Myth of the Idle Victorian Woman', in *Clio's Consciousness Raised*, ed. by Mary Hartman and Lois Banner, New York 1974, pp. 179–191; Uta Ottmüller, *Die Dienstbotenfrage*, Münster 1978; Werner Conze, 'Sozialgeschichte 1850–1918', in *Handbuch der deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, vol. II, Stuttgart 1976, p. 628, 632–633; Gabriele Reuter, *Aus Guter Familie*, Berlin 1908, 17th edition; Conrad Rosenstein, unpublished memoirs, *LBI Katalog*, No. 328, pp. 8, 19, 26.

<sup>28</sup> Clara Geismar, unpublished memoirs, *LBI Katalog*, No. 126, p. 96.

*geoisement*. If Jewish husbands became more dictatorial – and this needs further proof – it may have had less to do with women’s declining economic contribution than with women’s increased aspirations and their challenges to the sex role status quo. Dictatorial arrogance is usually manifested when power is challenged. This was the case with Dr. Mosse (1844), whose wife left him after displaying an “assumption that she had a right to act independently and decisively, even when this involved going contrary to my specific instructions”. Whereas this recalcitrant wife eventually submitted to a reconciliation on her husband’s terms, such male arrogance may not always have meant very much. It was Fanny Lewald’s father, after all, who begged her not to tell her sisters that she planned to earn her own living – a pathetic retreat from his stubborn insistence that his daughters would not work.<sup>29</sup>

While we entertain questions regarding male dominance and female subservience, it would be important to see if the wealth of the bride affected the power relationship between husband and wife. Dowries as well as marriages based on business partnerships played an extremely important role in the economic ascendancy of German Jewry.<sup>30</sup> In 1849 we find the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* asking why “so many marriage candidates of the Israelite middle class strive for financial gain rather than letting personal inclination decide” their marriage choice.<sup>31</sup> The question of dowries comes up often in the memoirs of middle-class Jews of the period and their importance is underscored by dowry insurance plans (*Aussteuerversicherung*) to which some fathers subscribed.<sup>32</sup> Did the relative wealth of the bride assure her greater status throughout the marriage? We know that dowries were still given in some families in the twentieth century, but that other couples began to marry without them in the late nineteenth century. When and to whom did they become less essential, and what effect did this have on the husband-wife relationship? Also, what was the status of the wife in marriages which brought family businesses together or where the bride’s parents established a business for the groom? Further, anthropologists have noted that the geographical closeness of the bride’s family often gives her relatively greater strength *vis à vis* her husband. How did geographical proximity in itself or, especially, that proximity related to shared economic enterprise affect the relative power of the wife in either period under consideration?

The concepts of “partnership” and “subservience” had their parallel, we are told, in marital sex; that is, in the denial of a manifest sexuality in women in the

<sup>29</sup> Fanny Lewald as quoted in Hugh Wiley Puckett, *Germany’s Women Go Forward*, New York 1970, p. 149.

<sup>30</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>31</sup> *AZJ*, XIII (1849), p. 204.

<sup>32</sup> Marie Maas, unpublished memoirs, *LBI Katalog*, No. 251. In the case of Marie Maas, the dowry insurance was used to send the brother to the university. Novels, too, describe girls’ dowries being used for the son’s education. However, Alice Goldstein suggests that the opposite was also true: that sons postponed marriage until their sisters’ dowries were secured. ‘Nonnenweier’, p. 20.

*Bürger* family. It is important and interesting to reflect on changes in sexuality for they tell us of changes in social structure and norms. Sexual repression was not part of woman's heritage from Judaism, but the acknowledgement of the importance of female sexuality in Judaism was a mixed blessing. While it permitted a humane attitude toward female sexual pleasure, it gave credence to those in Jewish tradition who viewed women as licentious, and in need of restraint.<sup>33</sup> The nineteenth century is equally dichotomous. The overriding cultural sexual stereotype was of the middle-class Victorian woman who was to "suffer and be still" during sexual intercourse, whereas working-class partners and prostitutes were seen to enjoy their physical encounters. What we need to know in all of these cases is what women themselves felt. The analysis of the *Zena Ur'ena*, for example, is suggestive and interesting, but it tells us only of the denial of women's sexuality *by men*. The *Zena Ur'ena* is a rich source of folklore and literature, but one which should be used with great care. A textual analysis of various editions of this source, without substantiating data written by women and without a clear indication of how many German-Jewish women actually read this book and when, is insufficient proof of women's actual experiences. Further, an 1811 edition is cited to show us that sexuality was toned down. The year 1811 is surely too early for the *embourgeoisement* of German Jews! And, editions from Vilna (1848, 1877), not from Germany, are used to suggest the denial of German-Jewish women's sexuality later in the century. It is a leap of faith to generalise about the sexuality of German-Jewish women from books which were written in Yiddish in Eastern Europe. By 1877, it is doubtful whether there were many German-Jewish women who could still read Yiddish. While literature written by men for women can inform us of how *men* felt about women's sexuality, and while there may be a reciprocal relationship between men's expectations and women's reactions, we must continue to search for sources which describe how women themselves felt. We cannot generalise until we discover them.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, and as in the earlier era, we can ask whether women's social roles counterbalanced their marital inferiority. It is the second half of the nineteenth century which witnessed the increasing<sup>35</sup> social responsibilities of middle-class

<sup>33</sup> For example, the Talmud taught that "a woman desires less material goods and more sex rather than more revenue and less sex". *Sotah* 21 B. See: Philip Sigal, 'Elements of Male Chauvinism in Classical Halakhah', *Judaism*, XXIV (Spring, 1975), pp. 226-244.

<sup>34</sup> Carl Degler cautions care in using prescriptive literature to determine sexual habits. Surveys he discovered of upper middle-class, educated women in the U.S. between 1890 and 1920 indicated that in most cases married sex was agreeable or enjoyable, yet the medical and advice literature of the time presumed that women did not enjoy sexual intercourse. 'What Ought to Be and What Was. Women's Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century', *American Historical Review*, 79 (December 1974). I would, furthermore, caution care in using a preponderance of male autobiographies and biographies, of letters and paintings done by men, and of prescriptive material written by men for women (see Carlebach, p. 159, note 11). A history of Jewish women and the Jewish family begs for female sources, and such sources must be used for an overall picture to emerge.

<sup>35</sup> I would dissent here from the statement in Carlebach's essay, p. 182.

Jewish women in both the Jewish and German communities. When emancipation offered Jews greater opportunities and communal ties began to loosen, it was women who played a significant role in re-establishing an elementary social service network to replace that of the ghetto. Their organisations proliferated rapidly. They cooperated with each other, with Jewish groups, and with non-Jewish welfare organisations. At the same time, Jewish middle-class women began to be active in German associations. They were among the founders of the *Allgemeiner deutscher Frauenverein* in 1865. A year later, Jewish women joined the new *Letteverein*, an organisation which promoted women's employment. They were also prominent in the many societies which supported the Fröbel kindergarten movement in the 1850s and 1860s. Thus, while it is true that the religious involvement of the woman in the home was deprived of public status, women achieved this status in new, secular ways. Whether such social status mitigated women's inferior legal and cultural status is debatable, but such social activity (in which men and women often worked more closely together than before) clearly enriched the lives of women and of the communities they served.

Jewish women have played a prominent role in the questions I have raised regarding the family. Still, they must be studied outside the family as well. The nineteenth century witnessed a series of major changes in female roles and attitudes, not least among Jewish women. These changes were intrinsically important to the lives of women and they can also contribute to our understanding of German-Jewish, and women's history. The year 1848 is a significant date for women, since it has been pointed to as the birthdate of the women's movement. Jewish middle-class women, as I mentioned, led the movement for women's emancipation. They were disproportionately represented in higher schools for girls, and they sought careers that were just beginning to open to women.<sup>36</sup> The experiences and achievements of these women, their paths through school and career and politics must still be traced. Also, the lives and contribution to society of working-class Jewish women, particularly of immigrant women in the later nineteenth century, must be studied far more systematically.

It has been suggested that "Jewish men were to adapt to changing conditions in Germany as *Jews*, while Jewish women adapted, or had to adapt as *women*". I would amend this by offering a different framework: Jewish women faced double jeopardy, as women *and* as Jews. They had to adapt in *both* areas. Subject to discrimination in German and Jewish laws and traditions, Jewish women had to strive for the right to achieve their full human potential. When Jews were emancipated, Jewish women still had to wait until their sex was enfranchised and they were granted rights that Jewish men enjoyed. Even after

<sup>36</sup> There was a general increase in the participation of Jewish women in the workforce, but the 113% increase mentioned (p. 183) could be misleading. The census of 1907 for the first time included a category of "helping family members", so many women who had always worked, but had not been counted, were now included in the statistics.

they had won limited rights as German women, they found themselves subject to antisemitic prejudices as well as traditional religious restrictions against their sex within Judaism. They struggled with anti-feminism and antisemitism.

In conclusion, what historians of the Jewish family and woman need most at this moment is more detailed information and tentative interpretations, rather than sweeping models. The paper by Julius Carlebach certainly provides a foundation for and an impetus to further research.





ISMAR SCHORSCH

## Emancipation and the Crisis of Religious Authority The Emergence of the Modern Rabbinate

In 1841 the *Culturverein*, a Berlin based society founded one year earlier to encourage talented Jews to direct their energies to the neglected fields of Jewish culture and scholarship, offered the substantial prize of 200 Thalers to the author of the best monograph on the subject 'What was, is, and should the rabbi be?\*' Two years later, with no bidders, the *Culturverein* trimmed its sails by abbreviating the topic to a study of the institution since 1782. A brief introduction devoted to the preceding centuries would suffice. But the second contest proved no more productive than the first. Not a single hungry historian ventured to try his hand and the prize went unawarded.<sup>1</sup>

Non-events, however, are not always insignificant. Occasionally they may serve to pinpoint the centre of a bewildering panorama. The still-born brain child of the *Culturverein* is an instructive case in point, for the topic selected aimed at the heart of the religious dilemmas tormenting Central European Jewry since the onset of the emancipation process. The steady improvement in legal status with its welcome expansion of opportunities for economic, educational and social integration had confronted both the individual Jew and the organised community with an unprecedented convergence of pressures for religious accommodation. The manifold need to diminish Jewish otherness chipped away at a sacred life style tested and toughened by recurring adversity. The mounting tension between ancient loyalties and new opportunities quickly provoked a crisis in religious authority, which compounded the confusion. The

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\* The following abbreviations have been used:

CAHJP	The Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem.
JNUL	The Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem.
DZAM	Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Merseburg.
AZJ	<i>Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums.</i>
JJGL	<i>Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur.</i>
JJLG	<i>Jahrbuch der jüdisch-literarischen Gesellschaft.</i>
MGWJ	<i>Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.</i>
TZW	<i>Der Treue Zions-Wächter.</i>
WZJT	<i>Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für jüdische Theologie.</i>
ZGJD	<i>Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland.</i>
ZRIJ	<i>Zeitschrift für die religiösen Interessen des Judentums.</i>

<sup>1</sup> Leopold Zunz, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 3 vols., Berlin 1875–1876, II, p.209; *Der Orient*, 1843, pp.305–306. For the statutes of the *Culturverein*, see *Der Orient*, 1841, pp.174–176.

rabbinate, which had reached the zenith of its institutional development in late medieval Ashkenazic Jewry, suddenly saw its authority challenged from diverse quarters. While government officials curtailed its powers and weighed its utility as an agent for social change within the Jewish community, Jews of culture and money moved to outflank it. The German rabbinate itself became in the early decades of the nineteenth century a bitterly contested prize, as competing parties fought to shape it in accord with their programme. By the 1840s the transformation was widespread and irreversible. The entrance of Jews into German society had created the modern rabbinate, a professional elite in consonance with the social context in which it operated.

The agenda put forth by the *Culturverein*, in short, was intended to illuminate a major consequence of emancipation. It was formulated on both occasions by none other than Leopold Zunz, the moving spirit of the *Verein* until 1844 when it began to divert its energies to Reform.<sup>2</sup> After an abortive career as a *Prediger* in Berlin in the early twenties, Zunz had retained an abiding interest in the rabbinate and his critical views were to contribute to its transformation.<sup>3</sup> The silence that greeted both topics suggests not only that few contemporaries could match Zunz's learning, but also that most fell far short of his acute understanding of their own turbulent era.

## I

The familiar is always difficult to define, for we lack the distance necessary for abstraction. Precisely because the modern rabbinate is so central to the conduct of Jewish life outside Israel it is advisable to begin our study of its genesis by establishing how German Jews redefined the institution in its transitional stage. Often what is self-evident conceals a tortuous history of ambiguity.

To fully appreciate the new, let us begin with a glance at the old. Hirschel Levin was the last Chief Rabbi (*Oberlandesrabbiner*) of Berlin. He assumed office in 1784, after having served in Glogau, Metz, Halberstadt and London, and died in 1800. Two years before his death, he addressed a petition directly to the King of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm III, requesting that his duties be lightened because of age and infirmities. Specifically he sought to be relieved of handling cases of wardship and of issuing responsa to the many *halakhic* questions directed to him. To drive home the validity of his request, Levin

<sup>2</sup> Zunz *op. cit.*, p. 209. On Zunz's central role, see CAHJP, P/47 (letter by Muhr to Veit, 18th December 1840) and *Der Orient*, 1840, p. 199. On his withdrawal from the *Verein*, see JNUL, 4° 792/F-2, p. 36.

<sup>3</sup> See the superb study by Alexander Altmann, 'Zur Frühgeschichte der jüdischen Predigt in Deutschland: Leopold Zunz als Prediger', in *Year Book VI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1961, pp. 3-59.

stipulated the taxing responsibilities of his office, which called for the vigour of a healthy man in the prime of life:

“It requires, in addition to the most exacting execution of all religious prescriptions, an ever watchful eye for maintaining the purity of the faith among the nation settled here, resolution of all related questions and doubts, responsibility for the continuation of talmudic learning, and finally the most extensive jurisdiction over a large number of juridical cases arising among the nation such as inheritance, divorce, etc.<sup>4</sup>

The entire document graphically depicts the well-known fact that the traditional Ashkenazic rabbi at the end of the eighteenth century still functioned primarily in a juridical capacity as an expositor of Jewish civil and religious law. Levin fulfilled that role with such learning, tolerance, and nobility that he even earned the lasting admiration of David Friedländer, who, as we shall see, abhorred the rabbinic type that Levin represented.<sup>5</sup>

A variety of official and personal documents from the early decades of the nineteenth century illustrates how quickly the extension of even partial emancipation opened the way to decisive modifications in the rabbinic office, although it must not be overlooked that the process of transformation had been set in motion long before, at the moment when the spirit of absolutism prompted rulers to begin curbing the judicial and coercive powers of the rabbinate.<sup>6</sup> I have intentionally stayed away from governmental edicts on the rabbinate, which will be analysed in a later context, in an effort to define the institution in terms of what was actually happening on the local level rather than in terms of what was expected at the level of government.

A letter of 1828 written by Nathan Marcus Adler to Gottschalk Ballin, the head of the Jewish community in Oldenburg where Adler was being considered

<sup>4</sup> Moritz Stern, ‘Meyer Simon Weyl, der letzte kurbrandenburgische Landrabbiner’, *Jeschurun*, XIII (1926), pp. 290–291. An instructive description of the power and status of the medieval rabbinate at its zenith is drawn by the worldly Italian rabbi Leon of Modena in his *History of the Rites, Customs, and Manners of Life of the Present Jews throughout the World*, translated by Edmund Chilmead, London 1650, pp. 68–71.

“These men, that is to say, the *Cacham*, *Rab*, or *Morenu*, decide all controversies concerning the Things that are either Lawful or Prohibited, and all other Differences; they execute the Office of Publick Notaries, and give Sentence also in Civil Controversies; they Marry, and give Bills of Divorce; they Preach also, if they can; and are the Chief men in the Academies before mentioned; they have the uppermost Seats in their Synagogues, and in all Assemblies; and they punish those, that are Disobedient, with *Excommunication*: and there is generally great Respect shewed unto them in all Things.” (pp. 69–70).

<sup>5</sup> David Friedländer, *Ueber die Verbesserung der Israeliten im Königreich Pohlen*, Berlin 1819, pp. XXXV–XXXVI. On the history of the medieval rabbinate, see Salo W. Baron, *The Jewish Community*, 3 vols., Philadelphia 1948, II, pp. 66–94.

<sup>6</sup> In Prussia the first decisive step was taken by the 1750 General Patent of Frederick the Great which denied rabbis nearly all jurisdiction in civil cases and sharply curtailed their coercive powers in religious matters. (See Selma Stern, *Der Preussische Staat und die Juden*, Dritter Teil/Die Zeit Friedrichs des Grossen. Zweite Abteilung: Akten, Tübingen 1971 [Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 24/2], pp. 118–133.).

for the position of Chief Rabbi of the duchy, offers a striking contrast to the picture painted by Levin but thirty years before.

“For beside the duties of preaching, running the school, [and] answering questions related to the synagogue and to ritual and ceremonial laws, the functions of the rabbi consist of weddings, divorces, translation of Hebrew documents [and] certification of ritual slaughterers ...”<sup>7</sup>

When Adler received his appointment from the government a few months later, he became the first German rabbi with a doctorate. Both his rabbinic and university training had been acquired in Würzburg, where the renowned Talmudist Abraham Bing taught many young aspirants for the rabbinate. Oldenburg was the first rabbinic position for both Adler (1828–1830) and his successor Samson Raphael Hirsch (1830–1841), and their combined early careers provide ample evidence that the emergence of the modern rabbinate was not a development restricted to the nascent Reform movement.<sup>8</sup>

The earliest instance of this shift in priorities attached to the office occurred in the largest Jewish community in the German states. In 1821 the Ashkenazic *Kehillah* of Hamburg numbering well over 6,000 Jews appointed Isaak Bernays to serve as its religious leader with the title *Hakham*. The community had been without a rabbi since 1812. In the interval it had suffered the formation within its ranks of a dissident Reform *Tempelverein*, which by 1820 had hired the services of two *Prediger*, Eduard Kley and Gotthold Salomon, both with doctorates, and precipitated a liturgical controversy of international scope.<sup>9</sup> In the person of Bernays the *Kehillah* found a man whose training foreshadowed the future. Beyond the customary *halakhic* expertise, testified to by ordination from Abraham Bing, he had acquired a rare mastery of the entire range of Jewish literature.<sup>10</sup> Even rarer for this early period, he had attended the universities of Würzburg and Munich, without completing the doctorate, attaining a level of secular knowledge which a Christian professor of theology at Munich, who recommended him to Hamburg, claimed he had on occasion seen in a Christian but never in a Jew.<sup>11</sup>

The contract between Bernays and the board clearly reflected the impact of

<sup>7</sup> Leo Trepp, *Die Oldenburger Judenschaft*, Oldenburg 1973, p. 90.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 88–207; Isaac Heinemann, ‘Samson Raphael Hirsch. The Formative Years of the Founder of Modern Orthodoxy’, *Historia Judaica*, XIII (1951), pp. 29–54.

<sup>9</sup> Helga Krohn, *Die Juden in Hamburg 1800–1850*, Frankfurt a. Main 1967, pp. 9, 28–35.

<sup>10</sup> In a letter dated 15th March 1833, Zunz asked his learned Hamburg friend Heimann Michael, the owner of the largest private Judaica collection left in Germany, whether he knew what Bernays thought of his recently published *Gottesdienstliche Vorträge der Juden?* Bernays had promised Zunz to read it and the latter obviously valued his judgment. (A[braham] Berliner, *Briefwechsel zwischen Heimann Michael und Leopold Zunz*, Sonderabdruck aus dem *JJLG*, IV, Frankfurt a. Main 1907, p. 11).

<sup>11</sup> Eduard Dukesz, ‘Zur Biographie des Chacham Isaak Bernays’, *JJLG*, V (1907), p. 300.

changing social conditions on the character of his office. He was specifically forbidden to rebuke, deprive of charity, or punish any native or foreign Jew for religious transgressions. He was expected to preach in German in the synagogue on all fast days and festivals and to assume responsibility for the educational institutions of the community. Finally, the contract emphasised that Bernays would exercise no jurisdiction over matters of civil law. Throughout, the contract designated the office in a new vocabulary befitting its transformation. Bernays was referred to as a “geistlicher Beamter”, a term appropriated from the established Churches, while the Sephardic title *Hakham* was unquestionably meant to convey the discontinuity between the new Hamburg rabbi and his predecessors.<sup>12</sup>

Less novel but still a departure was the job description of the rabbinic post in Breslau as formulated in the communal statutes revised in the mid-twenties. Though an impeccable character and undisputed mastery of the talmudic corpus were still the overriding qualifications, the community now also sought a man with knowledge of German adequate for the preparation of reports requested by the government. In addition to the traditional semi-annual *halakhic* lectures preceding the Day of Atonement and Passover, the rabbi was now instructed to deliver every month an edifying address of a religious and moral nature in the largest synagogue of the community. He was also expected to supervise the religious schools of the community and finally to regard visiting the sick and comforting the dying as one of his most sacred obligations.

Salomon Tiktin’s own conception of the rabbinic office was far more restricted. In 1823 he had submitted to the provincial government a traditional definition limiting the office to the interpretation and administration of Jewish law. Rabbinic functions included responsibility for all matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, licensing of ritual slaughterers, preparation and sale of kosher meat, and government inquiries on Jewish law. The rabbi occasionally delivered sermons in conjunction with holidays but had nothing to do with teaching the young. Tiktin’s adamant refusal to satisfy communal expectations for more than a decade and the determination to conduct his rabbinate in terms

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 302–304. Events in Poznań in 1815 seem dimly to anticipate the Hamburg scene of 1821. At that time the board moved quickly to bring the universally acclaimed talmudic scholar Akiba Eger to Poznań as Chief Rabbi. But it ran into some unexpected opposition from a determined minority which managed to extract several important concessions before it gave its consent. The opposition insisted that Eger should not be permitted to grant rabbinic ordination to unmarried adolescents. Talmudic studies comprised their entire formal education, and without some measure of secular education they were unfit to serve a German community. The opposition also succeeded in denying Eger the right to reprimand anyone publicly. His sermons were to be restricted to topics of general morality. Eger was the last great figure of the old Ashkenazic rabbinate in Germany. But even in “benighted” Poznań the winds of change had begun to blow. (See Philipp Bloch, ‘Die ersten Culturbestrebungen der jüdischen Gemeinde Posen’, in *Jubelschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstage des Professor Graetz*, Breslau 1887, pp. 202–208.)

of his own pre-emancipation conception of the office led to a search in 1838 for a second rabbi better suited to meet the needs of a new generation.<sup>13</sup>

Backed by more than 120 of the educated and wealthy members of the community, including the members of the board, Dr. Wilhelm Freund, an educator by profession, wrote in February 1838 to Rabbi Salomon Herxheimer, the liberal Chief Rabbi of Anhalt-Bernburg who had received his doctorate at Marburg, inquiring as to his interest in the position. It is clear from the contents of this long and instructive letter that Herxheimer was the board's first choice. Geiger could not even be considered, because he was anathema to the Orthodox (*die Strenggläubigen*). What the board was now looking for contrasted sharply with what it had expected from the office but fifteen years before.

"The requirements are 1) competent talmudic knowledge, where possible already officially exercised 2) university education, where possible evidenced by the doctorate 3) a competent oratorical ability (since our main synagogue has over 500 seats and holds 1,000 people) and finally 4) a strictly religious life style."<sup>14</sup>

The differences between the board and Tiktin were irreconcilable. In 1834 he had written to the board indignantly that no rabbi of an important community was ever required to deliver sermons (*Vorträge*) on a weekly basis. Moreover, his own experience had shown that an address laced with talmudic citations rarely edified or uplifted a congregation. When the board finally selected Geiger for the new position, Tiktin contended that a university education disqualified a man for the rabbinate, an argument which in Germany, as we shall see, was already well on its way to obsolescence.<sup>15</sup>

If Tiktin represented the rabbinic vintage of an earlier age, Geiger's first post in Wiesbaden (1832-1838) displayed all the earmarks of a new type of religious leadership. His contract called for him to preach in the synagogue and to dispense religious instruction daily to the older boys and girls of the community and made him responsible for supervising the conduct of worship and education.<sup>16</sup> His early letters from Wiesbaden confirm the scope of his work, the zest with which he pursued it, and the success he enjoyed. He preached every Saturday without difficulty, in part to teach German, in part to bring his congregation to appreciate "a rational service". He conducted weddings in the synagogue, accompanying each with a sermon. In the community school he taught the upper classes daily and supervised what went on in the lower ones. He also represented the community before the government, mediated conflicts between members of the community, and worked to improve the distribution

<sup>13</sup> CAHJP, P 17-437; *Bericht des Ober-Vorsteher-Collegii an die Mitglieder der hiesigen Israeliten-Gemeinde*, Breslau 1842, pp. 3-10.

<sup>14</sup> CAHJP, P 46/4.

<sup>15</sup> *Bericht des Ober-Vorsteher-Collegii*, p. 8; Ludwig Geiger (ed.), *Abraham Geiger. Leben und Lebenswerk*, Berlin 1910, p. 56.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

of charity. Geiger concluded his letter of 29th December 1832 to his younger friend and soon-to-be colleague Elias Grünebaum with the comment that in Wiesbaden the rabbi is truly a "Seelsorger".<sup>17</sup>

A few days later in a letter to his close friend Joseph Derenbourg, who was to shun the rabbinate for pure scholarship, much to Geiger's chagrin, Geiger reflected on the kind of education required of a modern rabbi (*ein gelehrter jüdischer Theologe*). He must acquire a broad and solid scholarly education, practical theological training especially in preaching, and an understanding of Judaism in its historical development. Of course, it was exactly the large dosage of academic exposure which tended to make the rabbinate for Geiger, and others, a discordant profession (*einen zwiegespaltenen Beruf*), impaled on the tension between the sacred habits of the multitude and the results of critical scholarship.<sup>18</sup>

The distance travelled in the reshaping of the rabbinate by the 1830s was incisively summed up in 1835 by the still unknown Zacharias Frankel, then serving the Bohemian town of Teplitz. Born in Prague into a wealthy and illustrious rabbinic family, Frankel went to Pest at the somewhat advanced age of twenty-four to gain his *Abitur* and doctorate.<sup>19</sup> In 1835 he composed a lengthy memorandum for a Teplitz government official describing the key religious institutions of the rabbinate, the synagogue, and the school. The statement in turn came to the attention of the Saxonian government prompting it to invite Frankel in 1836 to become the Chief Rabbi of the realm with his seat in Dresden. The memorandum contains a systematic presentation of his views on the rabbinate and adumbrates his later campaign to restore it to its central role in Jewish life. Despite Frankel's attempt to invoke as many ancient and medieval precedents as he could find, the treatment is informed throughout by the realisation that the modern rabbinate was the offspring of emancipation.<sup>20</sup>

The functions of the modern rabbi were conceived by Frankel so broadly as to make him the dominant figure in the community. He was to teach both the

<sup>17</sup> Ludwig Geiger (ed.), *Abraham Geigers Nachgelassene Schriften*, V, Berlin 1878, pp. 75–76; *AZJ*, LX (1896), p. 81 (letter to Derenbourg, 18th February 1833).

<sup>18</sup> *AZJ*, LX (1896), pp. 80, 188–189, 214.

<sup>19</sup> Shaul Pinchas Rabinowitz, *Rabbi Zehariah Frankel* (in Hebrew), Warsaw 1898, pp. 21–23.

<sup>20</sup> CAHJP, P 17/991. A copy of this significant manuscript of 57 pages is preserved in the large *Nachlass* of Moritz Stern, the former chief librarian of the Berlin *Gemeinde*. The extensive textual and explanatory notes, most likely prepared by Stern, indicate his intention to publish it. But the bibliography of his published works confirms that it never saw the light of day. (See Joseph Stern, *Moritz Stern. Bibliographie*, Jerusalem 1939.) My description of its genesis follows the reconstruction by Stern from which I have no reason to diverge. My attention was drawn to Frankel's *Gutachten* by my friend Professor Michael A. Meyer of Hebrew Union College.

On Frankel's life-long commitment to revive the title and office of rabbi, see the testimony of his former student Moritz Gudemann in his tribute in *Zacharias Frankel. Gedenklätter zu seinem hundertsten Geburtstage*, edited by M. Brann, Breslau 1901, pp. 55–56.



young and the old, the latter by means of sermons and lectures. He was to supervise the administration of charity, the conduct of the synagogue, and the competence of other religious functionaries. Authority to perform marriages and to issue divorce papers (the *Get*) was his alone. He was to comfort the suffering and to render opinions on questions of Jewish law. In sum, the rabbi constituted the lifeblood of the community. By representing a higher moral principle, the rabbi transformed the community into a spiritual whole. Those communities which chose to leave rabbinic positions vacant to facilitate their escape from talmudic constraints soon fell victim to fragmentation and chaos.

A new age likewise dictated modifications in rabbinic education. Frankel dismissed the exclusive concentration on talmudic studies along with its validating assumption that other bodies of knowledge were either false or irrelevant. Two considerations rendered a humanistic education indispensable for effective work in the rabbinate.

“The young grow up acquainted with modern literature, and not infrequently with ancient as well. Jews pursue the arts and sciences with love. If the rabbi is to be respected as a learned man, he must be academically trained. To be intimately familiar with the Talmud is not enough; the Muses must also not be strange to him. Furthermore, his perception will be so purified by a faith combined with a pure and elevated philosophy that he will be able to combat firmly much superstition and nonsense, without weakening his attachment to the Law. He should stand at the head of the community not as a blind fanatic, but as a believer imbued by a lofty deity. This certainly lies within his calling! He should be the teacher and guide of the people. Would our age in fact take instruction from a man trained otherwise?”<sup>21</sup>

At the same time, Frankel defended the continued centrality of talmudic studies. Mastery of German language and literature alone did not qualify a man to speak from the pulpit. Yet the era of the old *yeshivot* had passed; the young simply avoided them. Citing the example of the recently opened rabbinical school in Padua (1829), Frankel called for the opening of a broadly backed rabbinical seminary whose curriculum would comprise both humanistic and theological training and whose ordination could be relied upon to certify competence to provide religious leadership. Nearly two decades later Frankel would be invited to translate his vision into reality.

Frankel's discourse also touched on the third distinguishing feature of the modern rabbinate: the nature of its authority. The authority exercised by Hirschel Levin derived from a tangible, sacred, and comprehensive legal tradition. All his functions related to mediating the values and injunctions preserved in the corpus of rabbinic literature. That tradition was no less sacred for Frankel, but the age had reduced its stability and truncated its comprehensiveness. In its place Frankel invoked the universal category of religion. The rabbi had to be a man imbued with the spirit of God. “Religion can be taught

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<sup>21</sup> CAHJP, P 17/991, pp. 17–18.

only by a religious man.”<sup>22</sup> Prayer flowed from the heart and not the mind, and it was feeling which constituted the core of religion. To be sure, Frankel meant religion as refracted through the Jewish experience, but Judaism proved to be more than its rabbinic crystallisation. It was susceptible to modification from two directions: the collective will of the people and the wisdom of an advanced age. Talmudic literature now embodied but one of several sources of inspiration and instruction for rabbinic leadership. In an age rampant with secularisation Frankel believed that religion in its Jewish guise should serve as the ultimate source of authority for the modern rabbinate.

The memorandum by Frankel has provided us with a commentary to the contractual descriptions of the rabbinate in transition, and like any good commentary, it has explicated and amplified our texts. Across Central Europe from Wiesbaden to Breslau, from Oldenburg to Teplitz, a type of rabbinic leadership had begun to emerge which distinctly differed from its late medieval counterpart in terms of function, education, and authority. The synagogue became the rabbi’s principal arena and teaching Judaism, in whose name he spoke, his primary function. The courts and talmudic academies, in which he formerly exercised his expertise and power as transmitter of Jewish law, did not survive emancipation. As the last major public forum of Jewish religious life, the synagogue gained a centrality it had never enjoyed in medieval times. Nor did the medieval rabbi ever deign to conduct its operations. Emancipation transmuted Judaism into a religion and its place of worship inevitably became its dominant institutional expression. But in its formative stage, the synagogue was also an institution in flux that begged for leadership. The transformation of the rabbinate represented a momentous response to that power vacuum, because the ensuing dialectic invigorated both the synagogue and the rabbinate.

## II

The remarkable historical fact about the modern rabbinate is the speed with which it came to prevail in all sectors of German Jewry. Measured by the acquisition of secular education, the most conspicuous mark of its practitioners, the modern rabbinate had become a permanent and prominent feature by mid-century. Without a doubt the decision to search for a university educated rabbi who would adapt synagogue services and educational programmes along German lines often polarised the members of a community, and yet the rapid erosion of the medieval rabbinate was a process that could neither be stemmed nor reversed. Writing in 1838 in firm support of Ludwig Philippson’s recent proposal to raise funds for a Jewish theological faculty to be attached to a German university, Meyer Isler of Hamburg observed that the change in the

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<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

character of rabbinic education had been so thoroughly welcomed by most of the communities in Germany

“that I have no fear of being in error when I claim that throughout Germany, perhaps with the single exception of the most eastern region, no new rabbi in the last fifteen or twenty years has been appointed who has not more or less associated himself with this advance by adding Gymnasium and university studies to his talmudic training.”<sup>23</sup>

The historical evidence seems to accord with Isler’s assertion: by the 1840s the modern rabbinate was advancing steadily across Germany.

The evidence is of two kinds: statistical and attitudinal. The statistical data derive from the unmistakable stamp of the modern German rabbi: the achievement of the doctorate. A new type of rabbinic leadership had given rise to a corresponding revolution in professional training. Fortunately, it is easy to determine if a rabbi had earned a doctorate. In a society as rank conscious as Germany’s, if he had, he flaunted it. His name rarely if ever appeared in print unadorned by his title. The Eastern European opponents of the modern rabbinate ingeniously turned the honorific into a sign of disgrace. By disdainfully referring to German rabbis only as doctors, they meant to belittle the extent of their talmudic knowledge.

A variety of fragmentary statistics gives some idea of the steady increase in the number of young men entering the rabbinate who equipped themselves with a university degree. The rabbinical conferences which spanned the decade from 1837 to 1847 provide one source of information. The following table makes clear how many in attendance were the product of a university education.<sup>24</sup>

*Doctorates at Rabbinical Conferences*

<i>Conference</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Total No. of Rabbis</i>	<i>Doctorates</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Wiesbaden	1837	13	6	46
Braunschweig	1844	22	15	65
Frankfurt a. Main	1845	28	19	68
Breslau	1846	24	13	54
Dresden (abortive)	1847	19	10	53

To be sure, there is considerable overlap in attendance among the first four conferences with their dominant Reform tone. Geiger and Herxheimer managed to participate in all four. Nevertheless, what is significant about those

<sup>23</sup> *AZJ*, II (1838), p. 154.

<sup>24</sup> *AZJ*, LX (1896), p. 213; *Protocolle der ersten Rabbiner-Versammlung*, Braunschweig 1844, p. 1; *Protokolle und Aktenstücke der zweiten Rabbiner-Versammlung*, Frankfurt a. Main 1845, p. 3; *Protokolle der dritten Versammlung deutscher Rabbiner*, Breslau 1847, p. 1; *Der Orient*, 1846, p. 237.

present with doctorates is that with the exception of Gotthold Salomon, whose doctorate still derived from the second decade, all had earned their degrees toward the end of the 1820s and after. A new generation versed in German culture and exposed to critical scholarship was entering the rabbinate.<sup>25</sup>

Frankel's abortive theologian's conference, enlarged to include laymen who were excluded from the Reform assemblies, would have brought together a more conservative cluster of rabbis from the same generational group as their Reform counterparts who had also graduated from a German university. A rabbi like Hirsch S. Hirschfeld, who occupied the pulpit in Wollstein (Poznań), had received his doctorate from the University of Berlin in 1836 and embarked on an ambitious literary project to expound the systems of rabbinic law and lore in German. A confirmed Hegelian as well as the son-in-law of Salomon Eger, to whom he dedicated his study of *midrashic* exegesis, he lived gracefully and creatively in two incongruous worlds.<sup>26</sup> In brief, the intention of Hirschfeld, Abraham Wolf, Michael Sachs, Levi Bodenheimer (who broke with the Reformers), Samuel Meyer, Jacob Levy (the later Aramaic lexicographer), Wolf Meisel, and I. A. Fränkel to cooperate with Frankel serves to counter the impression that the modern rabbinate was a Reform preserve, a thesis to which we shall return.

Sporadic reports on the rabbinate in contemporary Jewish newspapers by informed local correspondents constitute another source of statistical information. Bavaria, for example, with its Jewish population of 63,000 in 1843, second only in size to Prussia, was divided into 44 rabbinical districts. Since its draconic Jewry law of 1813, Bavaria had required of its rabbis extensive academic studies, without however stipulating the amount, and passage of a state-administered examination, which varied in difficulty from district to district. By 1847 exactly one-quarter of the Bavarian rabbinate, comprising eleven rabbis, had a university degree.<sup>27</sup> In Württemberg, with its tradition of well-educated Lutheran clergy, the government since 1828 had specifically demanded university study for its rabbis and in 1834 dismissed some 45 pre-emancipation rabbis unable to pass the new state examination. In 1847 the

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<sup>25</sup> See Appendix.

<sup>26</sup> Monika Richarz, *Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe. Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678–1848*, Tübingen 1974 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 28), p. 99n. and *Der Orient*, 1841, pp. 1–2. In the 1840s he wrote *Der Geist der talmudischen Auslegung der Bibel. Halachische Exegese*, Berlin 1840, and *Der Geist der ersten Schriftauslegungen. Die haggadische Exegese*, Berlin 1847. Regarding his plan for a Latin edition of the Talmud, see *Der Orient*, 1840, p. 185. A Catholic physician and close friend of Hirschfeld has left an intimate portrait of the man and his family. (Ulla Wolff-Frank. 'Das Haus. Aus den Aufzeichnungen des Kreisphysikus Dr. E.', *JJGL*, XXII [1919] pp. 132–158.).

<sup>27</sup> See the illuminating analysis of state policy toward the rabbinate in Bavaria in *AZJ*, II (1838), pp. 473–474, 481–482, 485–488, 502, 509–510. Information on the educational level of individual rabbis is to be found in *Der Orient*, 1847, pp. 75–76, 81–82.

Jewish population of nearly 12,000 was served by twelve rabbis of whom six had completed a doctoral programme.<sup>28</sup>

The most difficult rabbinate on which to obtain any information, alas, is that which served the largest segment of German Jewry. In 1843 Prussia included a Jewish population of 206,500 divided into 863 organised communities.<sup>29</sup> But since the government, as we shall see, treated the rabbis as non-persons, I have been unable to come up with official statistics on the size and composition of the rabbinate. A few stray facts must suffice. Writing in 1845, Frankel claimed that in all the seven eastern provinces of Prussia there were not eight academically trained rabbis. The *Prediger* he contemptuously divided into those who could and those who could not read Hebrew.<sup>30</sup> By 1847, however, Poznań alone with its 67 odd rabbis already had four university graduates including Hirschfeld in Wollstein, Schwabacher in Schwerin, Gebhardt in Gnesen and Stein in Filehne.<sup>31</sup> Altogether I have tracked down twenty Prussian rabbis and preachers with doctorates in the 1840s in a community which may have totalled some 430 rabbis. Thus rabbis with doctorates in Prussia would have comprised as yet less than five per cent of the total rabbinate.<sup>32</sup>

In all of Germany by 1847, I have been able to identify sixty-seven rabbis and preachers who had acquired the coveted university degree.<sup>33</sup> But the significance of this figure far transcends its size. First, nearly all of these men had finished their studies after 1830. The better part of their careers still lay ahead of them, while many of their older colleagues with much less secular education came from an earlier vintage. As they retired they would definitely not be replaced by men who resembled them in training. The days of the cultural autodidact in Germany were over. Equally important is the obvious fact that the body of university trained rabbis was substantially larger than the number holding doctorates. Many young men of this first generation of modern rabbis had obtained the *Abitur* and spent time in a university without completing the degree. Men like Isaak Bernays, Samson Raphael Hirsch, Leopold Stein and Bernhard Wechsler can hardly be classified as illiterate for having failed to achieve the doctorate! In states like Bavaria and Württemberg where state

<sup>28</sup> Paul Tänzer, *Die Rechtsgeschichte der Juden in Württemberg*, Berlin 1922, pp. 76–77; Aron Tänzer, *Die Geschichte der Juden in Württemberg*, Frankfurt a. Main 1937, pp. 70–78; *AZJ*, XI (1847), pp. 724–726. The population statistics for Bavaria and Baden come from the *Vollständige Verhandlungen des Ersten Vereinigten Preussischen Landtages über die Emancipationsfrage der Juden*, Berlin 1847, p. XVI.

<sup>29</sup> *AZJ*, X (1846), p. 118.

<sup>30</sup> *ZRIJ*, II (1845), pp. 209–210.

<sup>31</sup> *Der Orient*, 1847, pp. 290–291.

<sup>32</sup> The mathematics behind this “guestimate” is simple enough. If Poznań’s 135 organised Jewish communities had a total of 67 rabbis (*ibid.*) and the district of Oppeln in Upper Silesia had 42 communities with 20 rabbis (*Zur Judenfrage*, II [1844], p. 54), it means that the Prussian ratio of community to rabbi is approximately 2:1. Therefore, 863 organised communities in all of Prussia (*AZJ*, X [1846], p. 118) should have somewhere in the vicinity of 430 rabbis. For Prussian rabbis with doctorates, see the Appendix.

<sup>33</sup> See Appendix.

examinations certified rabbinic competence a doctorate was a luxury. In chaotic Prussia, on the other hand, the doctorate served as a surrogate for state certification. Finally, and no less obvious, was the pattern of rabbinic appointments. By the 1840s the large and middle size communities – Hamburg, Stuttgart, Hanover, Cassel, Munich, Berlin, Breslau, Königsberg, Filehne, Wollstein, Gnesen, Dresden, Magdeburg, and Frankfurt a. Main – had filled their pulpits with modern rabbis. A respectable percentage of German Jews was already being served by a new type of spiritual leader. His presence in smaller communities only underscored the direction of the trend and the degree of consensus. By mid-century leadership had passed to rabbis whose eloquence and culture testified to extensive formal education.

The attitudinal evidence in favour of our proposition that the modern rabbinate was fully operational in Germany by the 1840s is even more cogent than the statistical. The need for a secularly trained rabbinate was no longer a bone of contention between Reform and Orthodox. It is hard to imagine that the word consensus has any applicability in a decade so rife with religious controversy as the 1840s, but the evidence is incontrovertible that on the issue of formal secular education, Reform and Orthodox were joined in unexpected agreement. This consensus deserves emphasis and reflection because it contrasts so vividly with the attitude of East European Orthodoxy to secular education.

Typical is the Hebrew responsum written by Eliyahu Rogolar, the rabbi of Kalisch (in Congress Poland but on the Poznań border), to Zevi Lehren, the Amsterdam communal leader, following the rabbinical conference in Braunschweig. Besides condemning the *halakhic* innovations of the German rabbis, Rogolar delivered a brief against secular learning. He invoked the example of the revered scholar and saint, Eliyahu of Vilna, who had dabbled in secular studies only in his leisure hours and steadfastly warned against them. Talmudic studies, Rogolar insisted, were self-sufficient and irreconcilable with philosophy.<sup>34</sup> This principled resistance to secular studies was to frustrate every effort by the Russian government and the Jewish intelligentsia to modernise rabbinic education throughout the century. The conflict soon led to the extraordinary phenomenon of a dual rabbinate: a minority of official but unpopular rabbis literate in Russian but incompetent in Talmud intent on dislodging the dominant and still respected leadership trained in the insulated world of the *yeshivot*.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Eliyahu Rogolar, *Yad Eliyahu* (in Hebrew) (Warsaw 1900), part one, pp. 32–35. I am indebted to my friend Professor Emanuel Etkes of The Hebrew University for bringing this responsum to my attention.

<sup>35</sup> Azriel Shochat, *The "Crown Rabbinate" in Russia* (in Hebrew) (The University of Haifa 1975). Both the *Maskilim* and the government at various times called for importing modern rabbis from Germany until a native rabbinate along German lines could be produced (pp. 17, 20, 40). In fact, in the early 1860s the assimilated communities of Odessa and St. Petersburg brought Simeon L. Schwabacher and Abraham Neumann respectively to occupy their pulpits (pp. 64–66, 130).

At first glance it would appear as if the lines of battle in Germany in the 1840s were similarly drawn. In the aftermath of Braunschweig, whose tremors were felt across the continent, Orthodox leaders prompted by Lehren, among others, launched an international effort to repudiate the decisions of the conference. When the protest was published, it bore the weighty endorsement of 77 rabbinic signatures. Within a few months a second edition appeared with 116. But the number of signatories with doctorates remained constant at four, representing barely 3% of the later and larger figure, a percentage strikingly lower than that to be found at Braunschweig.

However, the actual import of this document runs counter to first impressions. The text itself lacks so much as a critical allusion to the validity of secular studies. Its criticism is directed solely at the *halakhic* record of the conference. The fact that the authors of the protest stayed clear of any principled attack against secular learning suggests its western provenance, a conclusion confirmed by the geographic distribution of the signatories. Whereas the second edition does not carry the name of a single Russian rabbi, it does contain the names of 46 German, 18 Viennese, Prague, and Moravian, 12 French, 2 Swiss, and 38 Hungarian rabbis, although the Hungarians agreed to sign only after they had persuaded the initiators of the protest to add a Hebrew translation to the German text, for “who would delight in teaching his son the holy tongue if he sees rabbis afraid to use their own language?” Equally significant is the fact that the only university graduates to sign the protest came from the German rabbinate. The correct point of reference is not the larger number of doctorates in the Reform camp, but the absence of any doctorates among Orthodox rabbis outside Germany. Like the rest of German Jewry, German Orthodoxy was rapidly diverging from its East European counterpart.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> The dual language protest was published in pamphlet form in 1845 under the title *Shelomei Emunei Yisrael*. The German text with the original 77 signatories was reprinted in *Der Orient*, 1845, pp. 100–103. The second edition with 116 signatories which I used is bound without title page together with the Seminary library’s copy of Zevi Lehren and Aaron Prinz, *Torat Ha-Kanaut*, Amsterdam 1845. The four German rabbis with doctorates were Nathan M. Adler, Aron Auerbach and his brother Benjamin Hirsch Auerbach (their father was Abraham Auerbach who also signed), and Meyer Fränkel. For the letter by Abraham Samuel Benjamin Sofer to Jakob Ettlinger, from which the quotation is taken, see Solomon Sofer (ed.), *Iggrot Sofrim*, Tel-Aviv 1970, III, pp. 6–8.

Although contemporaries credited the Amsterdam magnate Zevi Lehren with initiating the Orthodox protest (the opening paragraph of the aforementioned letter by Rogolar to Lehren; *AZJ*, IX (1845), pp. 125–126; Heinrich Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden*, XI, 2nd edn., Leipzig 1900, p. 517), there is some evidence to suggest the deep involvement of the Ettlinger circle in Altona. For example, on 7th March 1845 Samuel Enoch, the editor of the *Treue Zions-Wächter*, sent a draft of the forthcoming circular to Rabbi Loeb Schwab of Pest requesting his signature “im Namen eines zu diesem Behufe zusammengetretenen Comitee”. (Leo Baeck Institute Archives, AR-7002, Appendix II; see also the aforementioned letter by Sofer to Ettlinger in response to a similar request.) In her unpublished doctoral dissertation, Judith Bleich has attempted to credit Ettlinger with the entire initiative. (*Jacob Ettlinger. His Life and Works*, New York University 1974, pp. 186–191). In light of Lehren’s *Torat Ha-Kanaut*, which consists of 37 responsa

Once again, one is struck by how early the divergence becomes evident. From the outset of the emancipation era in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the emerging leadership of West European Orthodoxy displayed surprising receptivity to the intrusion of secular learning. Whereas Bernays (b. 1791) and Jakob Ettlinger (b. 1798) both attended German universities, Seligmann Bär Bamberger (b. 1807) was self-taught, to the point where he could read Latin and Greek authors in the original. All three men preached and wrote in German. The mentor of Bernays and Ettlinger was Abraham Bing (b. 1752) who presided over the talmudic academy in Würzburg until 1839 and taught a good many of the first modern rabbis in Germany, despite their simultaneous attendance at the University of Würzburg. In 1833 Bing did appeal in vain to the Bavarian government to release prospective rabbis from the requirement of a university education, which seriously infringed on their talmudic studies. Yet even for Bing the objection was partial rather than total.<sup>37</sup>

In Berlin another survivor from the pre-emancipation rabbinate went well beyond Bing in an effort to integrate the two areas of study. Meyer Simon Weyl (b. 1744) succeeded Hirschel Levin as the chief occupant of the Berlin rabbinate in 1800. Nine years later he unhappily settled for the unwieldy title of Associate Chief Rabbi from a wary communal board reluctant to grant him too much rabbinic authority.<sup>38</sup> In November 1824 the aging Weyl unilaterally approached the Prussian Minister of Education and Religion with a proposal to answer one of the great problems of the age: the proper training of rabbis and teachers. Weyl submitted a plan to found a theological seminary that would serve and be financed by all of Prussian Jewry. Piqued by Weyl's failure to seek its counsel and approval, the board allowed the idea to languish with his death in February 1826.<sup>39</sup>

But what is noteworthy about this unapplauded venture was Weyl's profound grasp of the nature of his age. No enlightened nineteenth-century Jew expressed the relationship between social context and rabbinic education with more insight and cogency than this rabbinic "leftover" from an earlier era.

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to him condemning the Braunschweig conference, this revision is excessive. Rather, the protest appears to have been the product of a joint venture.

<sup>37</sup> On Ettlinger, see *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, VI, Berlin 1930, col. 826; S. Eppenstein, 'Leben und Wirken Dr. I. Hildesheimers', *Jeschurun*, VII (1920), pp. 276–278; and now the admirable biography by Bleich, *op. cit.*, pp. 242–261. On Bamberger, see *Rabbiner Seligman Bär Bamberger*, Würzburg 1897, pp. 6–7, 10–11, 16; Herz Bamberger, *Geschichte der Rabbiner der Stadt und des Bezirkes Würzburg*, Hamburg 1906), pp. 67–72; and Mordechai Eliav, 'Ha-Rav Yitzhak Dov Ha-Levi Bamberger. Ha-Ish U-Tekufato', *Sinai*, LXXXIV (1979), Nos. 1–2, pp. 61–71. On Bing, see Herz Bamberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–90.

<sup>38</sup> Moritz Stern, *loc. cit.*, pp. 298–307 and Louis Lewin, *Geschichte der Juden in Lissa*, Pinne 1904, pp. 338–346.

<sup>39</sup> Copies of some documents pertaining to the altercation between Weyl and the board are preserved in CAHJP, P17/448. For the reconstruction of this instructive episode, see Michael Holzman, *Geschichte der jüdischen Lehrer-Bildungsanstalt in Berlin*, Berlin 1909, pp. 1–31.



“The Israelite in the Kingdom of Prussia has been given a new relationship (*Beziehung*). He is no longer merely a member of a religion; he has also become a member of the State, and he must be equipped with all the skills which his expanded role (*Beruf*) requires. It is therefore necessary that one depart from the narrow course (*Tendenz*) which has prevailed in Israelite seminaries up to now and also here to move forward with the demand of the age: namely, that in such an institution attention must henceforth be paid to all those educational subjects which are indispensable to the teacher of the people [the rabbi] and the teacher of the young, if they are to do their jobs worthily.”<sup>40</sup>

Accordingly, Weyl recommended that in the seminary’s preparatory class, which would extend over four years, students should devote twenty hours a week to religious subjects and eighteen hours to a programme of secular studies to include German, French, Latin, geography, history, science, and mathematics. In the upper class, which would last another three years, prospective teachers and rabbis would be separated. While he did not spell out the rabbinic programme, the future teachers would continue to study language, literature, philosophy, and pedagogy alongside their religious studies. Weyl’s departing vision fully anticipated the institution of the modern rabbinate.<sup>41</sup>

No less prescient was Israel Deutsch (b. 1800), the rabbi of Beuthen, a Jewish community in Upper Silesia with more than 700 Jews in the early 1840s, which he served from 1829 until his death in 1853.<sup>42</sup> Without benefit of formal education, he gained a good command of German, though he never felt comfortable preaching in it, and a respectable degree of general culture. His fascinating correspondence with Abraham Muhr, an educated, well-known, and Jewishly learned businessman in Pless, not only represents a rare instance of dialogue between two men of increasingly divergent religious views, but also reveals a vivid picture of a deeply committed traditional rabbi pained by the pace and excesses of an age in flux.<sup>43</sup> With a fine sense of self-awareness, he admitted to Muhr in 1838:

“I recognise in myself a hybrid. Part of the modern generation, though clothed in stiff, medieval garb, I differ from my own kind only in that I realise better what I need, what I lack.”<sup>44</sup>

Deutsch was not averse to external improvements in Judaism like the sermon, confirmation, the organ, and decorum.<sup>45</sup> What he found contemptible among the Reformers was their motive, their irreverence, and their unbridled critical scholarship.<sup>46</sup> He preferred the gentle and respectful approach of an

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18–23.

<sup>42</sup> The population figure is given by Salomon Neumann, *Zur Statistik der Juden in Preussen von 1816 bis 1880*, Berlin 1884, p. 46.

<sup>43</sup> *Proben aus dem literarischen Nachlasse des Herrn Israel Deutsch*, ed. by Abraham and David Deutsch, Gleiwitz 1855. The introduction contains a brief biography.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 54.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 72, 77, 94, 102, 119, 120.

Azariah de Rossi.<sup>47</sup> Deutsch was even prepared to attend Frankel's conference in 1847, to the dismay of his Orthodox colleagues.<sup>48</sup> Above all, he believed that viable modifications could only be introduced by a new type of Orthodox leadership, religious to the core yet immersed in German culture.

"Reform must therefore, if it is to be beneficial, come from the Orthodox, whose lives are not in contradiction to Scripture and Tradition. However at present, this is still impossible, because Orthodoxy still lacks a sufficient number of men who possess enough academic education (*wissenschaftliche Bildung*) in order to carry out reform properly. That we lack academically trained men stems from the fact that many believe that an academic education affects religion adversely and is irreconcilable with Orthodoxy. But many have now retreated from this view. Scholarship is no longer scorned. If Orthodoxy will not disappear in the interval, it will find in the next generation thoroughly educated adherents. And it will be reserved for them to set into motion that which we can only regard as a pious wish."<sup>49</sup>

By the 1840s German Orthodoxy had gained enough academically trained rabbis to found and sustain its first newspaper. The enormous religious ferment which marked and invigorated Jewish life during the decade preceding the Revolutions of 1848 spawned a number of short-lived journalistic ventures which covered the gamut of religious positions. There was no mistaking the identity of the *Treue Zions-Wächter*; it was militantly Orthodox, as its name implied. But it also bore the unmistakable imprint of its German context, despite the fact that it was actually published in Danish Altona. Its editor, Samuel Enoch, was a native of Hamburg who had studied rabbinics with Bernays, Bing, and Bodenheimer and received a doctorate from the University of Erlangen. In Altona he opened and directed a Jewish secondary school and worked closely with Jakob Ettlinger, whose German sermons he frequently published in his paper.<sup>50</sup> Although the circle of contributors to the *Treue Zions-Wächter* was rather limited, it did include a number of other rabbis with doctorates like the learned Benjamin Auerbach in Darmstadt who had obtained his degree from Marburg. German Orthodoxy had come of age; it was ready to employ the fruits of assimilation to defend the sanctity of Jewish law.

Given that setting, one is hardly surprised not to find in its pages any polemic against secular studies. Rabbi I. Löwenstein of Geilingen (Baden), who signed the Orthodox declaration against the Braunschweig conference and wrote

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>48</sup> *AZJ*, X (1846), p. 731; *Der Orient*, 1847, p. 3. Also his article in *Der Orient*, 1847, pp. 5–8 where he raised the issues which troubled him.

<sup>49</sup> *Proben*, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–63.

<sup>50</sup> On Enoch, see *Israelitische Wochenschrift*, 1877, p. 40. He published the *Treue Zions-Wächter* from 1845 to 1854. Beginning with 1846 he and Ettlinger put out a Hebrew *Literaturblatt* entitled *Shomer Zion ha-Neeman* which was primarily restricted to the traditional mode of *halakhic* discourse but thereby drew contributors from Eastern Europe. A charming example of Ettlinger's sermonic style is 'Israels Zeitrechnung nach Mondesumlauf', *TZW*, 1846, Nos. 16–19.

vehemently against Reform, conceded that the Jew was not meant to vegetate in a ghetto. His religion was not hostile to science. On the contrary, he contended, only through confronting the world could his faith be tested and strengthened. True science and religion had always enriched each other.<sup>51</sup> Accordingly, when Enoch issued a call for building an Orthodox rabbinical seminary in July 1846 he proposed that it combine both religious and profane studies. Out of a nine hour day, three hours were to be allotted to German style, philosophy, homiletics, mathematics, history, and geography. The goal was to equip the prospective rabbi with all the secular education necessary for his job.<sup>52</sup> It is worth noting that Enoch's carefully drawn proposal evoked not a single response.

But to focus exclusively on the issue of secular studies is to obscure growing differences between Reform and Orthodox over related issues. Accepting the validity of a general education did not mean according it the same valence as given by Reform advocates. The writers of the *Zions-Wächter* were consistently unwilling to grant it parity with the talmudic studies necessary for the rabbinate. Enoch significantly designated secular studies in his proposal as ancillary (*Hilfswissenschaften*), and they were to be taught in the controlled environment of a seminary. At the same time, the Orthodox mounted a campaign to reassert the centrality of traditional Jewish learning. The study of philology and philosophy no more qualified a man to be a doctor than it did to be a rabbi.<sup>53</sup> The heart of the rabbinate still consisted of administering Jewish law in such areas as ritual slaughtering, the writing of sacred texts, ritual bathing, marriage and divorce, and all others in which it was still operable. Piety and talmudic learning were the qualities a community should look for when searching for a rabbi, and these were precisely the attributes conspicuously absent among Reform rabbis.<sup>54</sup>

The Orthodox shift in emphasis impinged on another fundamental problem: the process of certification. How could a community be protected from hiring a rabbinic candidate whose oratorical skills and university degree belied a meagre mastery of sacred texts? The granting of rabbinic ordination had traditionally crowned a fruitful personal relationship between student and teacher, and its efficacy rested on communal trust in the reputation of the mentor. Though emancipation had hobbled the system by closing the academies in Germany and rupturing the ties to the East, it remained functional. When poverty drove Zunz in the 1830s to look for a pulpit, he was forced to acquire ordination, despite his scholarly credentials, from Aron Chorin, the venerable Hungarian Reformer.<sup>55</sup> The institution of *Prediger* whose responsi-

<sup>51</sup> *TZW*, 1846, p. 125.

<sup>52</sup> *TZW*, 1846, pp. 241–245.

<sup>53</sup> *TZW*, 1846, p. 34; 1847, p. 100.

<sup>54</sup> *TZW*, 1847, pp. 97–101, 105–108.

<sup>55</sup> S. Maybaum, 'Aus dem Leben von Leopold Zunz', *Zwölfter Bericht über die Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums in Berlin*, Berlin 1894, pp. 19–29.

bilities were restricted to synagogue and school was an innovation intended, among other things, to circumvent the need for talmudic certification. But the plethora of *halakhic* modifications adopted and proclaimed by the rabbinical conferences of the 1840s mobilised the Orthodox to call for revamping the slovenly procedure of certifying the talmudic qualification of candidates for the rabbinate. What drew a number of Orthodox rabbis to announce their willingness to attend Frankel's abortive Dresden conference was the possibility of forming a national rabbinical board to certify prospective rabbis.<sup>56</sup> Clearly the insistence on proper rabbinic credentials was meant to challenge the legitimacy of Reform leadership.

The Reform, of course, were not oblivious to the problem of certification. It was simply subsumed under the larger issue of the proper locus for future rabbinic education. With the dream of a Jewish theological faculty at a German university, Geiger and Philippson hoped to duplicate the institutional model of German Protestantism which since the Reformation had used the university as the training ground for its ministers.<sup>57</sup> The inclusion of Jewish studies in the university structure would accord the field a level of respect it could not hope to attain in the framework of a separate seminary along Catholic lines. Even more, such academic integration would transform the traditional mode of Jewish study into a critical and historical discipline. The canons of nineteenth-century scholarship would govern both the humanistic and Judaic components of a rabbi's training. The proponents of the seminary option from Weyl and Frankel to the *Zions-Wächter* were less taken by the glamour of university accreditation and more eager for a religious ambiance in which the traditional study of classical texts would still prevail.<sup>58</sup> But even the latter option was distinctly German. Esriel Hildesheimer, who had obtained his doctorate from the University of Halle in 1845 with a dissertation on the proper method of

<sup>56</sup> *Der Orient*, 1846, p. 274 and the Hebrew *Beilage* to No. 40. Originally scheduled for 21st–22nd October 1846, it was postponed upon request to the following spring (*Der Orient*, 1846, p. 293), but never materialised. The contemporary press provides only the most fragmentary evidence of the jockeying which took place behind the scenes. (For a good specimen, see *AZJ*, X (1846), pp. 492, 523.) The *TZW* repudiated the idea because Frankel had failed to sign the denunciation of the Braunschweig conference (1846, pp. 249–250; 1847, pp. 81–83). But reports did circulate at the time that Rabbi Salomon Eger of Poznań supported Frankel's scheme (*Der Orient*, 1847, p. 73), though this seems unlikely from Eger's own harsh words to his brother Abraham in a letter after the fact. According to him, Frankel's intended assembly frightened the Orthodox more than the three previous Reform conferences (Solomon Sofer, *op. cit.*, I, p. 84), perhaps because, as we have seen, it threatened to split them.

<sup>57</sup> Abraham Geiger, 'Die Gründung einer jüdisch-theologischen Facultät', *WZJT*, II (1836), pp. 1–21; *AZJ*, I (1837), pp. 349–351; Friedrich Paulsen, *The German Universities and University Study*, trans. by Frank Thilly and William Elwang, New York 1906, p. 38. See also Salo W. Baron, 'Jewish Studies at Universities. An Early Project', *Hebrew Union College Annual*, XLVI (1975), pp. 357–376.

<sup>58</sup> See Michael A. Meyer, 'Conflicting Views on the Training of Modern Rabbis in 19th-Century Germany' (in Hebrew), *Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress for Jewish Studies*, II, Jerusalem 1976, pp. 195–200.

interpreting Scripture, invested a superhuman effort in his attempt to create a modern rabbinical seminary with a large quotient of secular studies in Eisenstadt in the 1850s and 1860s, yet the German transplant did not take.<sup>59</sup> Ironically, the German university, so inhospitable to Jewish studies, imprinted its indelible stamp on all three German seminaries. What came to separate them was not their brand of scholarship but the degree of *halakhic* observance.

But in the 1840s this outcome was far from self-evident. In fact in 1842 German Jewry was treated to a controversy which rendered explicit the most disruptive implication of university education for rabbis. In that year Geiger had published the first of a series of scholarly essays designed to undermine the exegetical base of Judaism's *halakhic* superstructure. Succeeding generations of rabbinic sages, he contended, displayed ever less evidence of understanding the plain sense of Scripture and were guilty of deriving countless religious injunctions and practices from Scripture through the most forced and arbitrary kind of exegetical reasoning.<sup>60</sup> Geiger's provocation prompted his Orthodox opposition – Salomon Tiktin, Salomon Eger, David and Israel Deutsch, among others – to challenge the right of a rabbi to unrestricted free inquiry. In the words of Tiktin:

“How can a man who denies the tradition and publicly ridicules the principles of the Talmud exercise functions whose correct execution rests entirely on traditional stipulations?”<sup>61</sup>

That question had been wracking German Protestantism at least since 1830 when the powerful conservative *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* of Hengstenberg had launched its counter-offensive against the rational theologians who dominated the Protestant theological faculties of Prussian universities. While the king would not then agree to purge those professors who undermined the sacred texts and dogmas of the Church, he made it clear to his minister of religion that all new academic appointments were to be theologically Orthodox.<sup>62</sup> During the next two decades government-backed theological Orthodoxy recaptured the theological faculties, compelled pastors to accept the official creed, and drove thousands of liberal Protestants into the ranks of dissenters. Until 1848 religious controversy frequently served as the medium for the expression of political discontent.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Eppenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 290–299; Mordechai Eliav, ‘Torah im Derekh Eretz be-Hungaria’, *Sinai*, LI (1962), pp. 127–142.

<sup>60</sup> A. Geiger, ‘Das Verhältniss des natürlichen Schriftsinnes zur thalmudischen Schriftdeutung’, *WZJT*, V (1844), pp. 53–81. It is evident from contemporary references that this essay appeared in early 1842 (*Proben, op. cit.*, pp. 3–4; Salomon A. Tiktin, *Darstellung des Sachverhältnisses*, Breslau 1842, p. 28).

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>62</sup> Johannes B. Kissling, *Der deutsche Protestantismus*, 2 vols., Münster 1917, I, pp. 42–67; Robert M. Bigler, *The Politics of German Protestantism*, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1972, pp. 76–124.

<sup>63</sup> Bigler, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–155; Hans Rosenberg, *Politische Denkströmungen im deutschen Vormärz*, Göttingen 1972, pp. 18–50.

In Breslau, the board decided to submit the Orthodox challenge to the German rabbinate. The formulation of the question caught the potential conflict between the rational ethos of the university and the dogmatic claims of the tradition inherent in the training of a modern rabbi. The board asked:

“Whether Jewish theology could tolerate scholarly treatment, unrestricted research, or if the traditional statutes as preserved in the Talmud may not be touched or even investigated?”<sup>64</sup>

This discomfiting question elicited a range of deeply felt responses of which the board saw fit to publish seventeen that were unequivocally affirmative. The statistics are significant. Ten were written by rabbis with doctorates; only three were written by men born before 1800, and Joseph Maier of Stuttgart clearly belonged to the new generation; except for Chorin in Arad and Holdheim in Schwerin, all the respondents came from Western and Southern Germany. In short, the confrontation exhibited regional, educational, and generational differences as well as religious ones.

The respondents tended to affirm both horns of the dilemma: the historic right in Judaism to express independent opinions and the continued validity of Jewish law. Their efforts to reconcile the tension took a variety of forms. Holdheim and Abraham Kohn of Austria argued that research is personal and permissible, but that altering the law can only be done in concert. Geiger never presumed to refashion Judaism single-handedly according to the results of his research.<sup>65</sup> That is why, Moses Gutmann of Bavaria observed, the Orthodox were utterly unable to impugn the piety of Geiger’s personal life.<sup>66</sup> Kohn also drew attention to the precedent of the medieval Jewish exegetes who constantly interpreted the plain sense of Scripture contrary to *halakhic* derivations.<sup>67</sup> On the other hand, Herxheimer added, when the rabbi was asked what the law in a particular matter is, it was not his subjective view that was being sought but rather the law as codified.<sup>68</sup> David Einhorn made the same distinction using the example of the civil servant who administers many a law whose wisdom he may dispute.<sup>69</sup> In contrast Mendel Hess, the editor of the radical *Israelit*, restricted the rabbi’s freedom of action by warning that he can only teach what the people are capable of understanding. He must never impose his views on an ill-equipped community.<sup>70</sup> In sum, the liberal members of the modern rabbinate passionately defended the freedom of inquiry they had learned to value and exercise at the university. To have done less, Bernhard Wechsler of Oldenburg

<sup>64</sup> *Rabbinische Gutachten über die Verträglichkeit der freien Forschung mit dem Rabbineramte*, 2 vols., Breslau 1842–1843, I, p. 16.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 76.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 164–165.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 111.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 120.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 136.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 157–159. See also his essay ‘Sind die neuen Rabbiner Heuchler?’, in *Der Israelit*, 20th February 1842, pp. 29–31.

feared, would have meant to drive the best minds out of the rabbinate.<sup>71</sup> At the same time, however, they avowed the need to subordinate individual views to the collective will of Jewish law. By implication, the soon-to-be-convened rabbinical conferences would provide a welcome instrument to transcend the limitations of the individual to effect change.

Zacharias Frankel did not submit a statement to the Breslau board, but it is possible to gain an approximate idea of his position through an essay by Wolf Landau which took up the question in the pages of Frankel's *Zeitschrift* in 1845. A native of Dresden, Landau had received his doctorate in 1839 from the University of Leipzig and his rabbinic ordination in 1845 from Frankel. He was employed by the Dresden Jewish community as a teacher and upon Frankel's departure would become its rabbi. Thus Landau was both physically and religiously close to Frankel.<sup>72</sup> Deeply troubled by the allegedly high-handed treatment of *halakhic* material by Chorin, Holdheim, and Geiger, he struggled to formulate several principles which should govern rabbinic behaviour. First, a rabbi must believe in the divine origin and eternal validity of the Bible. Second, he must accept tradition, defined as that body of law extrapolated by the rabbis from Scripture in which there is consensus as to the substance of the law, if not to its exegetical derivation. In both categories of Jewish law, Landau was prepared to grant full freedom of inquiry, provided that the observance of the law continued, for in neither was he ready to countenance *halakhic* change. Only in the area of rabbinic ordinances was change permissible. A man unwilling to avow these principles was unfit for the rabbinate. Instead Landau called for university trained men steeped in all the sources of Jewish history who would speak of Judaism with authenticity and reverence from the pulpit and in the classroom.<sup>73</sup>

The Orthodox view on the right of free inquiry was stated with clarity and pathos by Israel Deutsch, one of the instigators of the original attack against Geiger. Muhr had criticised him for denouncing Geiger rather than refuting him with scholarship. He answered with disarming candour:

“You say we should have rebutted in a scholarly manner. Now before you, friend, who know that I never attended school, it is of no consequence if I freely admit that I do not know how one begins to wage a fight in a scholarly manner. In my simplicity I believed that every discipline (*Wissenschaft*) has its own sources, authorities and axioms, concerning which it need not give any further reckoning and at which point one must cease questioning. Tradition, however, has no other guarantee for it than the tradition itself. Its sources and authorities are its transmitters, with the Jewish tradition therefore

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 93–94.

<sup>72</sup> Meyer Kayserling, *Bibliothek jüdischer Kanzelredner*, 2 vol., Berlin 1870–1872, II, p. 114.

<sup>73</sup> Wolf Landau, ‘Anforderungen des Glaubens und der theologischen Wissenschaft an den Rabbiner’, *ZRIJ*, II (1845), pp. 139–142, 182–190, 214–218. See also the lengthy refutation of Geiger's thesis by another member of Frankel's Dresden circle, M. Schwarzauer, in the *Literaturblatt des Orients*, 1842, Nos. 17, 18, 19 and 25.

the Talmud alone. Scholarship here means to prove from the Talmud what the tradition says about itself. This we did, if not fully, at least sufficiently. Or should we have demonstrated the tradition philosophically?"<sup>74</sup>

This response closely approximated the stance previously taken by Samson Raphael Hirsch and subsequently by the *Zions-Wächter*. Having made its peace with the demand for university trained rabbis, German Orthodoxy likewise faced the consequences. Initially it sought to seal off hermetically the study of sacred texts from all outside sources and new methods. But that would not be its last response to the challenge of modern scholarship.<sup>75</sup>

### III

If the modern rabbinate was operating widely in Germany by the 1840s, then it is self-evident that the Breslau Rabbinical Seminary, opened in 1854, must be seen as the consequence and not the cause of this development. By the time funds became available for the creation of a seminary in Germany, the function, education, and authority of the modern rabbi had been worked out. What Breslau did indeed provide was a stable institutional setting in which to develop the Jewish component of rabbinic education: a curriculum corresponding somewhat more fully to the totality of Jewish religious creativity and cautiously infused by the critical spirit of *Wissenschaft*.<sup>76</sup> Even less significant in the emergence of the modern rabbinate were the earlier rabbinical seminaries in Padua and Metz, opened in 1829, which simply did not live up to their promise. The *Ecole Rabbinique* for decades was hardly distinguishable from the old Metz *yeshiva* whose site it occupied, while the *Collegio Rabbinico* merely exhibited the trappings of a comprehensive curriculum and a critical approach.<sup>77</sup> In brief, the modern rabbinate is not the creation of a school but the product of a milieu, and this insight brings us to the ultimate and most

<sup>74</sup> *Proben, op. cit.*, pp. 98–99. On his role in the *Gutachten* submitted by nine Upper Silesian rabbis in behalf of Tiktin (*Darstellung, op. cit.*, pp. 28–31), see *Proben, op. cit.*, pp. 3–4.

<sup>75</sup> *TZW*, 1845, p. 19; Samson Raphael Hirsch, *The Nineteen Letters of Ben Uziel*, trans. by Bernard Drachman, New York 1942, pp. 169–209. On the divergence of Hildesheimer from the Hirsch position on *Wissenschaft*, see Mordechai Eliav (ed.), *Rabbiner Esriel Hildesheimer Briefe*, Jerusalem 1965, Veröffentlichung des Leo Baeck Instituts, pp. 207–216.

<sup>76</sup> Markus Brann, *Geschichte des jüdisch-theologischen Seminars in Breslau*, Breslau 1904, Beilage I (Z. Frankels Organisationsplan ...).

<sup>77</sup> For the *Ecole Rabbinique*, see Jules Bauer, *L'École rabbinique de France*, Paris n. d., and now the rich new material in Phyllis Cohen Albert, *The Modernization of French Jewry. Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth Century*, Hanover, New Hampshire 1977. For the *Collegio Rabbinico*, see the careful study by Nikolaus Vielmetti, 'Die Gründungsgeschichte des Collegio Rabbinico in Padua', Sonderdruck aus *Kairos*, Heft 1 (1970). I am indebted to my friend Professor Daniel Carpi of Tel-Aviv University for providing me with a copy of this essay.



elusive historical question: namely, why did the modern rabbinate arise in Germany?

Certainly both the French and Austrian governments appreciated the centrality of rabbinic leadership in Jewish society and moved quickly to transform and co-opt it to accelerate the process of assimilation. The quasi-governmental system of consistories imposed by Napoleon in 1808 radically redefined the functions and educational prerequisites of the rabbi and even set up machinery to ensure at least partial compliance.<sup>78</sup> In Austria, Emperor Francis I announced in 1820 his intention of soon requiring that every new rabbinic candidate should demonstrate by examination a thorough philosophic as well as Jewish education.<sup>79</sup> But lack of determined government enforcement in both post-emancipation France and pre-emancipation Austria allowed the training of rabbis to proceed unreformed. Neither edicts nor assimilation alone were enough to set the stage for the emergence of the modern rabbinate.

It is a convergence of factors that seems to make the institution indigenous to the German states. Operating in a legal context of partial emancipation, the German rabbinate was simultaneously exposed to a powerful and persistent anti-clericalism within the Jewish community, to government pressure in a variety of forms, and to the pervasive influence of the German university. The convergence of these diverse factors on the rabbinate produced a revolution in the nature of religious leadership.

The violent anti-clericalism which erupted in German Jewry at the end of the eighteenth century with the glimmer of emancipation went far beyond the well-known literary outbursts by educated malcontents.<sup>80</sup> It quickly assumed the character of a co-ordinated assault for control of the two communal institutions over which traditional rabbinic supervision had usually been minimal – the elementary school and the synagogue. Far sooner than the rabbis, their critics sensed that with the shrinkage of communal parameters and the loosening of communal bonds these institutions would become the dominant forums of Jewish religious expression. Across Germany from Breslau to Seesen, Jews from the ranks of the young and the wealthy cooperated to build tuition-free schools (*Freischulen*) and conduct German services free of rabbinic control. Often education and worship took place in the same building, on different days, with the *Lehrer* serving as *Prediger*. The very effort to create an office of *Prediger* in cities like Berlin, Leipzig, Königsberg, and Hamburg and to fill it with men learned in Judaism but university-educated bespoke a manoeuvre, to outflank the traditional rabbinate. But the laymen who organised

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<sup>78</sup> Simeon J. Maslin, *Selected Documents of Napoleonic Jewry*, Cincinnati 1957, pp. 30–31, 98–101, 108–109, 113–121; Albert, *op. cit.*, pp. 143–150, 182–187.

<sup>79</sup> A. F. Pribram, *Urkunden und Akten zur Geschichte der Juden in Wien*, 2 vols., Vienna 1918, II, pp. 305–306. More generally, G. Wolf, 'Die Versuche zur Errichtung einer Rabbinerschule in Oesterreich', *ZGJD*, V (1892), pp. 27–53.

<sup>80</sup> Israel Zinberg, *A History of Jewish Literature*, trans. by Bernard Martin, VIII, Cincinnati–New York 1976, pp. 96–126.

these dissident temple associations were not about to grant their *Prediger* exclusive authority in matters of religion either. As the 1817 statutes of the Hamburg *Tempelverein* stipulated, the *Prediger* enjoyed merely a consultative role in deliberations pertaining to the service of his office. Only in cases where the board of four members was deadlocked would the *Prediger* be allowed to cast the deciding vote.<sup>81</sup>

In the larger communities the forces of anti-clericalism were often powerful enough to attack the institution of the rabbinate directly. Thus when the post of Chief Rabbi fell vacant in Breslau in 1793, in Berlin in 1801, in Hamburg in 1812, in Königsberg in 1813, in Glogau in 1816 and in Poznań in 1846, they succeeded each time in preventing the office from being filled again and in forcing the next rabbinic appointment to settle for a lesser title.<sup>82</sup>

In an authoritarian State intra-group conflict is inevitably played out on the level of government. Anti-rabbinic forces thus soon moved to enlist official support to break the power of the traditional rabbinate. Specifically they tried to minimise its significance by depicting an archaic institution with restricted and peripheral functions. In 1819 David Friedländer, the central figure of the anti-clerical movement from the start, published a devastating critique of the traditional rabbinate. He stressed that the rabbi did not bear the slightest resemblance to pastor or priest. With no sacramental powers, the rabbi was merely *primus inter pares*, a knowledgeable consultant in matters of Jewish law, invested with no greater authority than that of any learned layman. He played no role whatsoever in performing circumcisions, conducting services, offering moral guidance, teaching the young, visiting the sick and dying, and administering charity. Hence to revere the rabbi as the sole religious authority in Jewish life was not only an error in fact, but, because of his conservative bent, precluded any prospect for Reform.<sup>83</sup>

Exactly one year later the Saxon government turned to Ruben Gumpertz, another member of the Berlin Jewish patriciate, for information on the duties and position of the rabbi in Prussia, and received a précis of the Friedländer portrait. A disciple of Mendelssohn, a close friend of Friedländer and Jacobson, and a relative of Zunz, Gumpertz summarised the critique in a derogation that would reverberate in Prussian circles for the next century:

“Quite properly and fittingly, therefore, one could call the rabbis ... kosher supervisors (*Kauscherwächter*), since, as indicated above, their functions relate primarily to decisions regarding permitted and forbidden foods, the kashrut of foods and drinks and what pertains to them.”

<sup>81</sup> JNUL, 4° 792/D 25.

<sup>82</sup> Markus Brann, ‘Geschichte des Landrabbinats in Schlesien’, *Jubelschrift zum siebenzigsten Geburtstag des Prof. Dr. H. Graetz*, Breslau 1887, pp. 262–267; *idem*, ‘Aus der Zeit von hundert Jahren’, *MGWJ*, LIX (1915), pp. 135–136.

<sup>83</sup> Friedländer, *op. cit.*, pp. XXXI–XXXIX, 25–38.

Ironically, as we shall see, the Gumpertz memorandum became the basis of Prussian policy toward the rabbinate, while the Saxon regime chose to ignore it.<sup>84</sup>

To forestall that eventuality, Simon Weyl, Berlin's last leading rabbi to be drawn from the ranks of the medieval rabbinate, submitted to the Prussian Minister of Religion in 1826 his own lengthy statement. Weyl, who had requested and received from the Ministry a copy of the notorious Gumpertz memorandum, accused it of being infested with Friedländer's bile. His own brief on behalf of the centrality of traditional rabbinic leadership, despite its total dissimilarity to the Christian ministry which he admitted, had no other purpose than

“to counter the false views, put forth recently by men whose intentions are to belittle the rabbis in the eyes of adult Jews who are uninformed and without religious knowledge. Thereby they hope to create an opening for unworthy religious ideas and to spread a spirit of sectarianism, which, because it does not recognise positive religion, seeks to create new forms for new false teachings.”<sup>85</sup>

Weyl understood what was at stake. Who exercised the authority to effect the religious accommodations dictated by emancipation? The energy invested to dismiss the importance of the rabbinate spoke volumes about its dominant and obstructive position.

It is important, however, not to miss the genuine religious impulse which at least partially fuelled this struggle for power in a period of bewildering transition. The pointed ridicule of the culinary duties of a truncated medieval rabbinate along with the general conviction that rabbinic leadership bore no resemblance to the Christian clergy bespoke a set of new expectations. Emancipation had begun to alter the conception of religion as well as the legal status of Jews. Increasingly confined to the synagogue, the religious experience should uplift, edify, and ennoble. The preoccupation with the aesthetics of worship and the spoken word denoted a radical shift in emphasis from outwardness to inwardness, from executing a prescribed action to experiencing a mood. A rabbinate, excluded from the synagogue and presiding over ritual matters no longer perceived to have the slightest connection with religion, offended Jews who had been conditioned to look for spiritual edification from their religious leaders rather than legal expertise. The irreverent words of Gotthold Salomon, who can scarcely be dismissed as an irreligious personality, to his colleague

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<sup>84</sup> *Zur Judenfrage*, II (1844), p. 215. In the 1840s Jewish spokesmen appreciated the influence of Gumpertz's memorandum on Prussian policy. That is why Wilhelm Freund, the editor, published it for the first time (*ibid.*, pp. 213–216) and added a rejoinder as well (*ibid.*, pp. 199–210). On Gumpertz, see David Kaufmann and Max Freudenthal, *Die Familie Gomperz*, Frankfurt a. Main 1907, pp. 204–215. In Saxony, though not a civil servant, the rabbi did enjoy official recognition. His election was confirmed by the Minister of Religion and he could not be dismissed without the Minister's approval. (*Zur Judenfrage*, II [1844], pp. 302–303).

<sup>85</sup> CAHJP, P 17/447.

and counterpart Isaak Noah Mannheimer in Vienna in 1830 indicate both the wide extent and religious roots of this revulsion:

“You really have nothing to do with strictly rabbinical functions? Right? You really need not concern yourself with stomachs, or cows and oxen, wild fowl or poultry, or with women and their [ritual] baths? We should express it openly, that these tasks must be fully separated from the office of teacher and preacher, and a special man should be assigned to them just as to the [biblical] scapegoat. As long as this does not happen, the hands and feet of the better and enlightened rabbis will be bound. Every stomach and slaughter expert must remain subordinate to the rabbi ... but the rabbi himself must not get involved with these things.”<sup>86</sup>

This sustained and varied assault from within certainly accelerated the demise of the medieval rabbinate and helped to pave the way for the development of new forms of religious leadership. But in the long run the rebellion proved to be a mixed blessing for the modern rabbinate in Germany, for it left behind a legacy of deep suspicion toward every assertion of rabbinic prerogative. Such heady ideas as the egalitarian nature of Judaism and the dispensability of rabbinic authority continued to plague the modern heirs of the medieval rabbinate as they sought to solidify their own control over religious life.

Two disparate efforts by them to consolidate rabbinic authority in the 1840s ran into serious lay opposition. The first arose in conjunction with the protracted courtship of Zacharias Frankel by Berlin. As we have seen from the forceful articulation of his views in 1835, Frankel was determined to regain for the modern rabbi the dignity and preeminence once enjoyed by his medieval ancestor. By 1838 the Berlin board was ready to invite him to fill its top rabbinic post which had been held vacant since the death of Weyl in 1826. But Frankel was not prepared to consider leaving Dresden till the autumn of 1841. In the negotiations which followed Frankel drove a hard bargain. He insisted on being recognised as the highest religious authority in the community, on receiving a life contract and a salary of 2,500 Thalers plus a parsonage to obviate any need for outside income, and on gaining official government endorsement. As supreme religious authority, Frankel claimed the exclusive right to submit synagogal reforms to the board for approval, control over all the community's educational institutions including the teachers' seminary run by Zunz, and exclusive authority to sanction marriages. Despite the cost in terms of money and power, the board approved Frankel's election in September 1842 as Berlin's first *Oberrabbiner* in more than four decades. At this

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<sup>86</sup> M. Rosenmann, 'Briefe Gotthold Salomons an Isaak Noah Mannheimer', *JJGL*, XXII (1919), p. 78. It is equally important to note that Kant's philosophical repudiation of heteronomy as ethically worthless served to alienate many an educated Jew from traditional Judaism. For a typical example, see F. Eisenberg, *Staat und Religion, mit bes. Rücksicht auf die Stellung der Israeliten*, Leipzig 1844, pp. 148–156. This valuable book was brought to my attention by Dr. Max Gruenewald.

juncture Frankel held out for the unattainable – official appointment by the Prussian government. Finally, on 6th February 1843, Frankel sent off a proud and forthright letter to the Minister of Religion expressing his dismay at the deteriorating status of Prussian Jewry. He appealed to Eichhorn to begin to correct this appalling situation by officially investing him with the authority to serve as Chief Rabbi of Berlin. Since Eichhorn would offer no more than a mere confirmation of his election, Frankel made the momentous decision to stay in Dresden.<sup>87</sup>

The entire performance by Frankel can only be understood against the backdrop of more than sixty years of rampant anti-clericalism. Frankel's excessive demands were designed to counter the abhorrence of rabbinic supremacy which still ran deep among the members of the board. His close friend Joseph Muhr, the banker and older brother of Abraham Muhr in Pless who had been so instrumental in engineering his election in the first place, had informed him of the dominant influence of the publisher Moritz Veit, and Frankel regarded Veit as an uninformed political Jew completely insensitive to traditional Jewish forms of religious expression.<sup>88</sup> His fears were not misplaced, for Veit was indeed an inveterate foe of what he termed rabbinic despotism. As he caustically wrote to Johann Jacoby in May 1841, "the priestly yen for power finds room under the hats of doctors just as easily as under Polish fur caps."<sup>89</sup> Veit was convinced that his vision of unhindered religious progress could only be guaranteed through a presbyterial form of government in which bishop and presbyters shared power. Though a member of the board, the rabbi should have but one vote. Frankel's proposal smacked of an episcopal hierarchy.<sup>90</sup> Not assured of victory in advance, Frankel backed off to await more favourable conditions to advance his cause.

The second noteworthy assertion of rabbinic preeminence of the decade came with the well-known rabbinical conferences. On the one hand, they were a symptom of growing professional consciousness. Ludwig Philippson urged his young, cultured colleagues to view themselves as religious professionals. Like other emerging professionals – doctors, apothecaries, scientists, lawyers, philologists, Protestant pastors, farmers, and industrialists – the rabbis should convene annually to enhance their work. Toward that end, attendance was restricted to rabbis, associate rabbis, and preachers.<sup>91</sup> On the other hand, the

<sup>87</sup> This fascinating episode was reconstructed by S. Bernfeld on the basis of the extensive correspondence between Joseph Muhr and Frankel which he published in a series of fourteen articles in the *AZJ*, LXII (1898) Nos. 29–31, 33–34, 37, 39, 41, 45, 48–51.

<sup>88</sup> *AZJ*, LXII(1898), p. 607. On Joseph Muhr, see Markus Brann, *Abraham Muhr. Ein Lebensbild*, 2nd edn. (n.p., n.d.), pp. 11–12.

<sup>89</sup> Ludwig Geiger, 'Zum Andenken an Moritz Veit', *MGWJ*, LII (1908), p. 528.

<sup>90</sup> Ludwig Geiger (ed.), *Michael Sachs und Moritz Veit. Briefwechsel*, Frankfurt a. Main 1897, p. 62.

<sup>91</sup> *AZJ*, VIII(1844), pp. 26–27; *Protocolle der ersten Rabbiner-Versammlung*, p. 5.

conferences came in the wake of a spate of radical declarations on the nature of Judaism by lay groups which maximised the degree of historical discontinuity, and consequently the conferences amounted to a rabbinic counter-attack to reclaim exclusive authority to speak on religious matters.<sup>92</sup> But the conferences also coincided with a period of mounting pressure in Prussian society for a liberalisation of church rule. Through the congregations and national councils of the Protestant Friends and the German Catholics and the officially but briefly backed synodal reorganisation of the Evangelical Church, laymen were fighting for a greater voice in shaping church policy and doctrine.<sup>93</sup> The intent of the rabbinical conferences ran headlong into the egalitarian spirit sweeping the German religious scene.

Veit made it bluntly clear to his close friend Michael Sachs, whom he had brought to Berlin as associate rabbi after the Frankel fiasco, that he was not to attend the Braunschweig conference. It was precisely his lack of involvement in rabbinic politics that made Sachs appealing to Berlin. Religious leadership had to be a cooperative venture on all levels. Locally the rabbi served as theological consultant of the board in its spiritual work; nationally a synodal structure better accorded with the temper of Prussian Jewry. Sachs heeded his advice.<sup>94</sup>

The most vociferous lay backers of the synod model organised themselves into the Berlin Reform association and issued a national call for a synod composed of deputies elected by the educated Jews of Prussia. Its mandate would be to revive Judaism by bringing it once again into accord with the beliefs and practices of its adherents. The association recognised neither a binding theology nor a dominant clergy. Moreover, professional obligations precluded the rabbis from revamping Judaism themselves:

“The synod should not teach but give us Judaism. The rabbis as such cannot do that; they are condemned to teach us; to teach us with a shrug of the shoulder that which they might well be quite disinclined to give us. They stand between us and the Law as unfree judicial representatives whom the harsh law may pain but which they must still enunciate.”<sup>95</sup>

Despite a variety of tacks, the synod proposal failed to find much resonance outside Berlin. Within its own bailiwick, the association made Holdheim, whom it employed in April 1847, subservient to the will of the board. It

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<sup>92</sup> Heinrich Graetz, *The Structure of Jewish History and Other Essays*, trans., ed. and introduced by Ismar Schorsch, New York 1975, pp. 21–23.

<sup>93</sup> Catherine Magill Holden, *A Decade of Dissent in Germany. An Historical Study of the Society of Protestant Friends and the German-Catholic Church, 1840–1848* (unpub. diss. Yale University, 1954); Gwendolyn Evans Jensen, ‘Official Reform in Vormärz Prussia. The Ecclesiastical Dimension’, *Central European History*, VII (1974), pp. 137–158.

<sup>94</sup> L. Geiger, *Sachs und Veit*, pp. 83–84.

<sup>95</sup> *AZJ*, IX (1845), p. 376. See also *AZJ*, X (1846), pp. 505–508, 530–533 for lay reaction in Frankfurt a. Main.

conceded only that he be invited to participate with a right to vote in all sessions dealing with religious affairs.<sup>96</sup>

The criticism of the rabbinical conferences from the right also questioned the exclusion of learned laymen. Raphael Kirchheim of Frankfurt, who had translated and published Rapoport's passionate Hebrew rebuke, taunted the rabbis for the fixation on their title while trampling the teachings of rabbinism. The Prophets and early talmudic sages themselves would have been disqualified from attending, for neither held official clerical posts. Abraham Adler, the *Prediger* in Worms, responded disingenuously that considerations of space dictated admitting only professionals.<sup>97</sup> The criticism prompted Frankel to open his abortive counter-conference to theologians, men of Jewish learning regardless of their employment, and he beseeched Zunz personally to honour the assembly with his presence, to no avail. In consonance with his democratic convictions, Zunz would participate only if deputised by a constituency.<sup>98</sup>

The relentless pressure from within the Jewish community by the detractors of the rabbinate was complemented by substantial pressure from without in the form of government policy. The crossfire decisively impaired the institution's ability to hold out against modernisation. Autocratic regimes throughout Europe from Napoleon to the Czar recognised the centrality of the rabbinate in the pre-emancipation community and moved to harness its authority to prepare Jews for integration. The policy was lucidly formulated by Secretary of State Schroetter in the lengthy deliberations which preceded the Prussian edict of emancipation of 1812:

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<sup>96</sup> See the copy of his contract in CAHJP, P 43. Under the impact of the revolutionary climate, efforts to convene a nationwide synod were revived in 1848 in South-Western Germany. (See Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1847–1971*, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 248–252.) Eisenberg, *op. cit.*, (pp. 168–169) was also wary of rabbinic presumption to govern Jewish life unilaterally. The *Gemeinde*, he believed, should be run by a lay board in which the rabbi enjoyed but a single vote. In 1853 the radical Galician Reform leader Joshua Heschel Schorr criticised Geiger in the pages of *Hehalutz* for having harmed the cause of Reform by inviting only rabbis to the conferences. The exclusion of competent laymen aroused suspicion that the rabbis were out to increase their power, while at the same time preventing some rabbis from speaking candidly for fear of losing their jobs. (Joshua Heschel Schorr, *Selected Essays* [in Hebrew] ed. by Ezra Spicehandler, Jerusalem 1972, p. 84.).

<sup>97</sup> Abraham Adler, *Die sieben und siebenzig sogenannten Rabbiner und die Rabbiner-Versammlung*, Mannheim 1845, pp. 10–11, 29. The Hebrew original and German translation by Kirchheim were published together under the title *Sendschreiben eines Rabbiners an die Rabbiner-Versammlung zu Frankfurt am Main*, Frankfurt a. Main 1845.

<sup>98</sup> The original *Aufruf* appeared in *Der Orient*, 1846, pp. 149–151. The letter to Zunz dated 21st June 1846 is in JNUL, G 12. Frankel answered Zunz's criticism indirectly in *ZRIJ*, III (1846), p. 340. Zunz had been peeved by Frankel's attempt to place the teachers' seminary under rabbinic supervision when he considered coming to Berlin as *Oberrabbiner*. (Nahum N. Glatzer (ed.), *Leopold Zunz. Jude – Deutscher – Europäer. Ein jüdisches Gelehrtschicksal des 19. Jahrhunderts in Briefen an Freunde*, Tübingen 1964 [Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 11], pp. 217 n. 1, 223).

“Because of the great influence which the rabbis have over the community, it is necessary to ensure that educated and, what follows naturally from this, tolerant people be elected as rabbis.”<sup>99</sup>

Accordingly, Schroetter urged that every applicant for a rabbinic post must give evidence of having spent three years at a university studying philosophy and Semitic languages.<sup>100</sup>

Although the Prussian government ignored his counsel, its intent was subsequently implemented by other German states. The most instructive example is that of Bavaria. In 1813 it became one of the first German regimes to insist that future rabbis acquire extensive academic training. In 1826 it effectively closed the large and famous *yeshiva* in Fürth when it forced the faculty to incorporate secular studies into the curriculum. Still more significant than the stipulation of educational requirements was their enforcement through state examinations, which were regionally administered. Thus in Upper Franconia every rabbinic applicant was subjected to a battery of tests which covered Greek, Latin, logic, metaphysics, moral and religious philosophy, pedagogy, history, exegesis of the Old Testament, homiletics, and Jewish history, philosophy and liturgy and which usually took eight to ten days to complete.<sup>101</sup>

The imposition of state examinations constituted the key element in the rapid transformation of the Bavarian rabbinate, despite the basically rural and traditional character of the population that it served. By comparison, the French rabbinate lagged decades behind. Indeed, the French government since 1820 had required that every candidate for a rabbinic post must be fluent in French and familiar with Latin and Greek. Nevertheless, though such a level of education fell far short of the *baccalauréat*, the graduates of the *Ecole Rabbiniq* rarely reached it during the school’s thirty-year sojourn in Metz. The decisive difference between France and Bavaria was the absence of enforcement. Neither the French government nor the Central Consistory ever sought to devise a system of examinations to disqualify candidates with insufficient education.<sup>102</sup> Academic standards without enforcement sank to the level of sage counsel.

The Bavarian combination of enforced requirements provided the model for much of Germany. The Electorate of Hesse, Württemberg, Baden, the Duchy of Saxony, and Frankfurt a. Main set up machinery to examine candidates for

<sup>99</sup> Ismar Freund, *Die Emanzipation der Juden in Preussen*, 2 vols., Berlin 1912, II, pp. 246–247.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>101</sup> Stefan Schwarz, *Die Juden in Bayern*, München – Wien 1963, p. 347. On the fate of the *yeshiva* in Fürth, see Isaak M. Jost, *Neuere Geschichte der Israeliten*, 3 vols., Breslau n. d., I, p. 132. Regarding Upper Franconia, see *AZJ*, II (1838), pp. 473–474. Actually the first German regime to require secular education of its rabbis was Baden in 1809. But this provision of its Jewry law was simply ignored until 1823 and even thereafter only fitfully implemented. In consequence, the Baden rabbinate of the 1840s remained undistinguished and poorly educated. (*Israelitische Annalen*, 1839, pp. 392–393, 398–399, 413–414.).

<sup>102</sup> Bauer, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–23, 46–47, 50–52, 65–69; Albert, *op. cit.*, pp. 252–253.



the rabbinate while states like Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Nassau, Oldenburg, and the Duchy of Hesse were satisfied with evidence of academic training.<sup>103</sup> In sum, firm government intervention applied effective leverage to modify the nature of rabbinic education.

Prussia of course stands out as the obvious exception to this pattern. Its policy toward the rabbinate from the emancipation edict of 1812 through the Jewry law of 1847 was marked by studied neglect. Though it shared the intent of other German states, to orchestrate the assimilation of its Jewish population, it chose not to coopt the rabbinate as an instrument of state policy. On the contrary, by the sudden and total removal of every external prop it hoped to weaken the religious cohesiveness of the Jewish community and to intensify the centrifugal pressure. In 39 paragraphs the edict of emancipation mentioned the office exactly twice and alluded to it once. Rabbis were deprived of whatever judicial authority they had left; foreign Jews were denied the right to become rabbis in Prussia; and by implication weddings were lifted from rabbinic jurisdiction. The rabbinate, much like the organised Jewish community, had been set adrift to fend for itself.<sup>104</sup>

The Gumpertz memorandum not only signified an unexpected endorsement for the Prussian government of its hands-off policy toward the rabbinate from the Jewish side but also provided the basis for a disabling extension. Since the nature of religious leadership in Judaism differed fundamentally from that which prevailed in Christianity, the government embarked on a policy to deny the rabbinate any opportunity to recast its image by appropriating terminology from the Christian ministry. A tacit alliance between the government and the anti-clerical camp led by Friedländer had locked the Prussian rabbinate into a petrified mould.

Over the next quarter century a series of government rescripts prevented the institution from asserting its spiritual character. As expounders of law whose opinions Jews were not even obliged to accept, the rabbis lacked the attributes which would qualify them to be classified as clerics.<sup>105</sup> Not being teachers of religion in the Christian sense, they did not merit the honour, when elected to office, of government confirmation.<sup>106</sup> Despite Weyl's learned protest, the Minister of Religion decided that marriages could be solemnised without them, since they were not endowed with any *potestas ecclesiastica*.<sup>107</sup> In the 1840s Eichhorn issued orders forbidding rabbis to use the Protestant titles *Geistlicher*

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<sup>103</sup> Jost, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 98, 132–134, 146–158, 175, 214, 216–217, 223–224, 227–228, 260, 264.

<sup>104</sup> Freund, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 455–459.

<sup>105</sup> Jeremias Heinemann (Hrsg.), *Sammlung der die religiöse und bürgerliche Verfassung der Juden in den Königl. Preuss. Staaten betreffenden Gesetze, Verordnungen, Gutachten, Berichte und Erkenntnisse*, 2nd edn., Glogau 1813 – reprinted Hildesheim 1976, p. 394.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 396–397.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 275.

or *Prediger* or to wear the clerical garb of pastors.<sup>108</sup> In 1846 Eichhorn, already hard at work on the pending Jewry law, articulated the motivation behind government policy with a candour that only bureaucratic secrecy permits. The statement cleanly disconnected the conflicting strategies of both sides in the emancipation struggle:

Modern Judaism visibly strives to appropriate the terms peculiar to the Christian Church and its institutions and to imitate the forms of the Christian service. If we could assume that thereby a convergence and a gradual conversion to Christianity would be prepared, then it would be in the interest of the Christian Church to advance that striving in every way. It is however more than doubtful if in fact it does not achieve exactly the opposite, insofar as one is satisfied with the form while the content is thereafter tossed aside just as before.<sup>109</sup>

A specific objective is often rendered more desirable through denial than persuasion. How often does deprivation stimulate a drive to over-compensate! The intent of Prussian policy was not to transform the medieval rabbinate but to discredit it. The effect, however, was precisely the opposite: to galvanise Jewish efforts to renovate the institution along the lines of the Protestant clergy. The doctorate came to certify what the State withheld. Even astute Christian observers perceived that in Prussia the degree functioned as a surrogate for state certification. In 1846 the Dean of Breslau's Faculty of Philosophy informed Eichhorn that

"... the larger communities in the cities demand now of every applicant for a rabbinic post that he acquire a doctorate, because they regard this step as a form of state examination and thereby persuade themselves as to a candidate's competence .."<sup>110</sup>

The government's stance on the rabbinate derived from the same source as its policy on religious Reform: a contempt for the spiritual claims of Judaism. By preserving religious forms which no longer accorded with the tastes and needs of Jews integrating into German society, the government hoped to accelerate and finalise the process of alienation. In the early 1840s the government did finally give up its oppressive defence of Orthodoxy, but it continued to abide by its policy toward the rabbinate.<sup>111</sup> The Jewry law of 1847

<sup>108</sup> DZAM, Ministerium des Innern, Rep. 77 Tit. 415 Nr. 54; Rep. 77 Tit. 2 Gener. Nr. 28; Rep. 77 Tit. 30 Nr. 132.

<sup>109</sup> DZAM, Ministerium des Innern, Rep. 77 Tit. 2 Gener. Nr. 28 p. 111 b.

<sup>110</sup> Moritz Kalisch, *Die Judenfrage in ihrer wahren Bedeutung für Preussen*, Leipzig 1860, pp. 18–19.

<sup>111</sup> The famous Cabinet Order of 9th December, 1823 had quashed efforts at liturgical reform in Berlin and forestalled all similar efforts throughout Prussia for the next two decades. (Ludwig Geiger, *Geschichte der Juden in Berlin*, 2 vols., Berlin 1871, I, pp. 164–168, II, pp. 210–234.) The policy of intervention in Jewish religious affairs was finally abandoned by Eichhorn in late 1842 in the face of the irreconcilable differences wracking the Jewish community in Breslau since Geiger's arrival. (DZAM, Ministerium des Innern, Rep. 77 Tit. 1021 Breslau Nr. 32 vo. II; *AZJ*, VIII (1844), pp. 718–720).

codified that policy and determined the status of the rabbi in Prussia till the formal dissolution of the Jewish community by the Nazis in 1938.

It is doubtful if ever there was a Jewry law more painstakingly prepared than the comprehensive Prussian legislation of 1847. Nearly six years in the making and involving every level of government, the law generated an archive of data on the condition of Prussian Jewry, a deluge of inter-office memoranda exposing the line-up of bureaucratic attitudes, and a bevy of Jewish petitions betraying the wide diversity of religious attachments and social aspirations.<sup>112</sup> Among other things, the law set out to order the chaotic internal affairs of the local Jewish community by meticulously stipulating its rules of governance. The First United Diet, "Prussia's first *Reichstag*", did manage to temper somewhat the reactionary tone and substance of the draft which eventually emerged from the years of ministerial deliberation.<sup>113</sup> For example, it replaced the offensive political term *Judenschaft* for the local Jewish community with the religious term *Synagogengemeinde*.<sup>114</sup> Nevertheless, the final legislation still treated its subject as a body politic rather than a religious association.

The law created a strong, well-organised community on the local level without ever acknowledging its religious purpose or according recognition to the presence of religious leadership. An elected lay board exercised full control over all communal affairs and institutions, and it alone represented the community before the outside world.<sup>115</sup> The office of rabbi was mentioned only once when foreign Jews were forbidden to serve without prior acquisition of citizenship,<sup>116</sup> otherwise it was consistently submerged in the lifeless term *Kultusbeamten* (religious functionaries). Nor did the law require a community to hire a *Kultusbeamte* to conduct its religious life, whereas it did make it mandatory to employ the services of a *Religionslehrer* to instruct the young.<sup>117</sup> Even in connection with the performance of weddings, the law circumvented the rabbi with the unwieldy phrase "*der die Trauung vollziehende Jude*" (the Jew who performs the wedding).<sup>118</sup>

In its accompanying explanation of the draft submitted to the Diet, the government justified its concept of the rabbi as a sometime employee of the

<sup>112</sup> Horst Fischer, *Judentum, Staat und Heer in Preussen im frühen 19. Jahrhundert. Zur Geschichte der staatlichen Judenpolitik*, Tübingen 1968 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 20), pp. 151–190; Herbert Strauss, 'Pre-emption Prussian Policies towards the Jews 1815–1847', in *Year Book XI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1966, pp. 107–137; *idem*, 'Liberalism and Conservatism in Prussian Legislation for Jewish Affairs, 1815–1847', *Jubilee Volume dedicated to Curt C. Silberman*, ed. by Herbert A. Strauss and Hanns G. Reissner, New York 1969, pp. 114–132.

<sup>113</sup> The title was bestowed by Reinhart Koselleck, *Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, Stuttgart 1967, pp. 367, 368.

<sup>114</sup> *AZJ*, XI (1847), p. 420.

<sup>115</sup> *AZJ*, XI (1847), pp. 421–422.

<sup>116</sup> *AZJ*, XI (1847), p. 454.

<sup>117</sup> *AZJ*, XI (1847), pp. 423–424, 441.

<sup>118</sup> *AZJ*, XI (1847), p. 445.

board. It contended that Judaism drew no distinction between laymen and clergy and recognised no man as a supreme religious authority. Neither the powers nor functions of rabbis corresponded to those exercised by Christian clergy. Specifically their presence at religious ceremonies was not required, and in general their authority was commensurate with the public confidence that their learning could generate.<sup>119</sup>

Philippson, who denounced the entire piece of legislation as retrograde, was particularly piqued by the implicit denigration of the modern rabbinate:

In regard to the rabbis, the well-known Gumpertz memorandum of 1818 [sic], which reduces the rabbis to mere adjudicators of kosher and *trefa*, still constitutes the foundation. The changing times that demand of rabbis preaching, theological learning, teaching religion, and pastoral work, are passed over without notice and disregarded. Today when the smallest community demands of its *shochet* (ritual slaughterer) to be a rabbi, the State still regards the rabbi as a *shochet*. This is the legacy of the lifeless twenties for Judaism.<sup>120</sup>

But the link between Gumpertz and 1847 was not quite as direct as Philippson implied. Gumpertz's message was mediated and reinforced by no less a formidable figure than Leopold Zunz, his second cousin and close friend, whose influence on the law in regard to the nature of religious leadership appears to have been decisive. It is ironic that a man who so detested Prussia's emancipation policy should have become such a vigorous ally in its campaign to thwart the development of effective rabbinic leadership. But the convergence of extremes effected a temporary alliance. Zunz's anti-clericalism matched his abhorrence of Prussian illiberalism.<sup>121</sup>

The highest echelons of the Prussian government had been weighing seriously the advisability of a general Jewry law for the entire realm as far back as 1839,<sup>122</sup> and Zunz's career intersected its long pre-history several times. Although evidence is wanting, it is hard to escape the impression that the topic proposed by Zunz for the *Culturverein* prize essay of 1841, our point of departure, was not prompted by the political apprehension that future Prussian legislation might accord the rabbinate a centrality historically and theologically unwarranted. Two years later Zunz was invited by the board of the Poznań Jewish community to offer in writing his answers to nine involved questions relating to the conduct of Jewish religious life sent out by the Ministry of

<sup>119</sup> *Vollständige Verhandlungen*, p. XXVII.

<sup>120</sup> *AZJ*, XI (1847), p. 372.

<sup>121</sup> For an early and vehement expression of Zunz's hostility toward the contemporary occupants of the rabbinate, see his 1819 article 'Geist der Rabbiner', republished by Ludwig Geiger in *AZJ*, LXXX (1916), pp. 413–414. This outburst was provoked by the uncompromising rabbinic rejection of the liturgical reforms initiated by the Hamburg *Tempelverein*. Zunz speaks of "contemporary rabbinism" as "a degenerate institution of ignorance, arrogance and fanaticism." (p. 413). See also my essay 'From Wolfenbüttel to Wissenschaft. The Divergent Paths of Isaak Markus Jost and Leopold Zunz', in *Year Book XXII of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1977, pp. 109–128.

<sup>122</sup> DZAM, Ministerium des Innern, Rep. 77 Tit. 30 Nr. 85 vol. II.

Religion to assist it in drafting the relevant sections of the pending Jewry law. On the subject of the rabbinate, Zunz sketched an institution of limited authority and function. The community elected a rabbi to interpret Jewish law, to supervise its ritual institutions, to handle all cases of marriage and divorce, and to teach Talmud. Whereas once his education was restricted to talmudic studies, today the rabbi must be trained as a theologian. Yet Zunz gave no hint that the modern rabbi preached or taught the young. In short, he was neither priest nor minister. His authority rested on trust in his expertise and piety, and in the event that trust vanished he was subject to dismissal.<sup>123</sup> Zunz personally sent copies of his response to the Ministries of Religion and Interior and was honoured with acknowledgments from both.<sup>124</sup>

By 1845 these two ministries had swung into high gear in their preparatory work on a comprehensive Jewry law. This time the government turned to Zunz directly. On 27th February he was part of a delegation that also included Joseph Muhr, the president of the Berlin *Gemeinde*, and Julius Rubo, its long-time syndic, which had been invited by the Ministry of Interior to meet with two of its officials for the purpose of providing further reliable information on Jewish affairs. Zunz was probably accorded the honour on the basis of his scholarly stature, his official position as director of Berlin's teachers' seminary, and the instructive quality of his 1843 memorandum. According to the officials' written summary of that meeting, it is evident that the Gumpertz spirit pervaded the delegation's presentation. It had insisted that the only indispensable official for a Jewish community was a teacher (*Religionslehrer*). Judaism did not regard the rabbi as an official invested with church authority (*potestas ecclesiastica*). The conduct of worship services did not require his presence, and his authority was no greater than public confidence in him.<sup>125</sup> The summary of this meeting was eventually printed by the government in 1847 as part of an appendix to its official commentary justifying the draft submitted for consideration to the United Diet.<sup>126</sup> The government had found a far more learned Jewish advisor than Gumpertz to validate its calculated neglect of the rabbinate.

Muhr, Rubo, and Zunz met once again with the same two officials from the Ministry of Interior on 8th April. Finally in June they completed their own long awaited memorandum on subjects covered during those two influential meetings. Again they emphasised the importance of the *Religionslehrer*, a man

<sup>123</sup> Zunz, *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, pp. 207–210. Zunz was not the only man to submit his views. Compare, for example, the response of Heymann Jolowicz, the *Prediger* in Marienwerder (*Der Israelit*, 1843, Nos. 28–30.)

<sup>124</sup> JNUL, 4° 792/C–1.

<sup>125</sup> CAHJP, P 2/55 B. Rubo's own views are more fully presented in his *Die Rechtsverhältnisse der jüdischen Gemeinden*, Berlin 1844, pp. 56–81. This learned tract was likewise prompted by the government's request for information on the religious affairs of the Jewish community.

<sup>126</sup> DZAM, *Geheimes Zivilkabinett*, 2.2.1. Nr. 23681.

of broad Jewish learning, whose task was to instruct children of both sexes in Judaism. They called on the government to appoint examining commissions for each province to certify qualified teachers. In turning to the rabbi, the authors revealed the ultimate source of their antagonism to the office in any form and thereby clarified the basic issue:

“Freedom of conscience must not be curtailed. Related to this is the fact that the synagogue (*der jüdische Kultus*) can no longer survive in the rigid forms of the Tradition. One or another board, one or another religious functionary seeks to introduce in its or his domain a change that accords with the [present] spiritual movement. This movement must not be restrained; indeed it cannot be restrained.”<sup>127</sup>

For this reason the authors stressed the egalitarian nature of Judaism and the non-obligatory force of rabbinic pronouncements. Put differently, rapid religious accommodation necessitated a reduction in rabbinic power.

To handle the spread of religious strife which would ineluctably follow such a diffusion of authority, the authors proposed to establish a national commission to illuminate the issues of Jewish law and the local conditions involved in a communal fracas. The commission should consist of three *Kultusbeamten* (*Rabbiner, Religionslehrer, Prediger*) and six respected laymen, both groups to be appointed by the government, though synagogue boards should have the right to nominate a list of lay candidates. In an early draft the government adopted a modified form of this proposal, changing, among other things, the composition to five rabbis and four laymen.

Muhr, Rubo, and Zunz took umbrage at the redistribution of power and in a second memorandum dated 6th July 1846, delivered a blistering attack against the rabbinate. In particular they advised that the term *Rabbiner* be omitted from the legislation, a counsel, as we have seen, accepted by the government. Their argumentation was twofold. First, it is a nondescript title without objective reality, arbitrarily bestowed on or appropriated by the most dissimilar people: any ancient or medieval Jewish author, any Jew who was author of a Hebrew book on Judaism, any Jew in Polish or Turkish garb who knows some Hebrew, any student of the Talmud, any man bearing the title *Morenu* (the traditional title of rabbinic ordination) whatever his livelihood, anyone employed by a community to perform the most diverse functions, and, finally and properly, men who have demonstrated the talmudic knowledge or professional competence to merit the title. Proof of the confusion, historical as well as substantive, surrounding the title is provided by the silence which greeted the prize essay contest of the *Culturverein* in 1841 and 1843. Second, the authors argued that the contemporary rabbinate can boast of few men conscious of their times and grounded in modern scholarship, who have tried to confront the dilemmas of the age in a scholarly way and by virtue of their learning and character have won the public's trust. Such men are more often to be found in

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<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93. Copy in JNUL, 4° 792/D-24a.

the ranks of the non-professionals. The religious advances made to date owe little to the professional rabbinate.

On the make-up of the commission, the authors reaffirmed their previous stand. Independent laymen were more likely to deliver impartial opinions than members of a clerical guild dependent on, yet often in conflict with, their own community. Personal ties to colleagues in polarised communities would still further colour their judgment.<sup>128</sup>

While the authors spoke as one throughout these three significant documents, the leading voice was unmistakably that of Zunz. The extensive knowledge, charged opinions, and laconic, apodictic style were transparently vintage Zunz. His impact on the final version of the law of 1847 was enormous. For its own very different reasons, the government chose to incorporate his guidelines: to play down the institution of the rabbinate, to delete the title *Rabbiner*, to employ the term *Kultusbeamte*, to give priority to the office of *Religionslehrer*, and to create a national commission for resolving communal dissension, although its composition was left more flexible than Zunz would have liked.<sup>129</sup> Indeed, Zunz spoke for many and that fact gave his voice still greater resonance. The boards of major communities like Breslau and Königsberg, though not Berlin, were so committed to the defence of “an unrestricted freedom of conscience, the independence of the individual community, and a complete integration of Jews with their Christian fellow citizens in all non-religious areas” that they were determined even to deny the rabbi a seat on the board.<sup>130</sup> The rabbinate stood athwart the path of unhampered religious Reform. The uncharacteristic responsiveness of the Prussian government on this score to popular opinion, which stood in such marked contrast to its stubborn resistance to the groundswell of the 1840s in favour of full emancipation among key sectors of Prussian society, granted the anti-clerical forces an irreversible victory. The modern rabbinate in Prussia was hamstrung at the very moment of its emergence.

The dramatic interplay between internal and external pressures on the medieval rabbinate throughout Germany in the first half of the nineteenth

<sup>128</sup> JNUL, 4° 792/D-24a.

<sup>129</sup> The final version read: “The commission should ... consist of nine religious functionaries or other men of the Jewish faith who enjoy the confidence of the Jewish community (*Judenschaft*) to which they belong. (*AZJ*, XI (1847), p. 424). As far as I know, this commission was never activated. Contemporaries were not unaware of the influential role played by Muhr, Rubo, and Zunz. (*Der Orient*, 1847, pp. 370–371).

<sup>130</sup> See the illuminating correspondence between the boards of Berlin, Breslau and Königsberg published by Hermann Vogelstein, ‘Zur Vorgeschichte des Gesetzes ... vom 23. Juli 1847’, *Zweiundvierzigster Bericht über den Religions-Unterricht der Synagogengemeinde zu Königsberg in Pr. für das Schuljahr 1908/1909*, Königsberg n.d., pp. 3–28. The quotation comes from a letter dated 14th June 1842 by the Königsberg board to its Berlin counterpart, p. 16. In contrast, Berlin and Veit firmly believed that the rabbi should be a member of the board. (See Veit’s extensive *Gutachten* on the government’s draft in CAHJP, P 2/V 55 B.)

century was accompanied by yet a third decisive factor: the flowering of the German university. If anti-clericalism and government policy were the jaws of the vice which ensnared the rabbinate, the university was the tool which effected the change. Testimony to its centrality in the transformation process was the fact that the doctorate became the emblem of the modern rabbi.

When Renan declared after the Franco-Prussian War that the German universities had won the war, he paid tribute to the classical age of the institution.<sup>131</sup> Revitalised in the dark days following the Prussian collapse of 1806, the German university uniquely combined the tasks of teaching and research predicated on a belief in the unity of knowledge. The new preeminence of the philosophy faculty, which now trained the nation's Gymnasium teachers and also attracted the candidates for the rabbinate, bespoke a lofty commitment to broad, critical, disinterested humanistic studies intended primarily to cultivate the mind rather than to prepare for a profession.<sup>132</sup> Regardless of whether this German version of *Paedia* was ever tenable, it exercised a hypnotic influence on aspiring young Jews who by 1848 already constituted a percentage in the student population twice as large as that of Jews in the general population.<sup>133</sup>

Equally influential was the Protestant model of training clergy at a university rather than a seminary. Although the inclusion of practical theology into the curriculum of the theological faculty generated much debate, the State usually required of a theological student a three-year course of university study before he qualified for the first of two state examinations to gain admission to the ministry, a branch of the civil service.<sup>134</sup> In consequence, most candidates for the Protestant ministry did not stay to complete the doctorate.<sup>135</sup>

The significance of these societal forces on the formation of the modern rabbinate can best be appreciated by comparison to the French scene, where higher education in the German sense was unknown and the intellectual training of the parish priest remained rudimentary. The Revolution and Napoleon had chosen to dismantle rather than revitalise the decadent universities of the eighteenth century, replacing them with unintegrated faculties and special schools. The faculties of sciences and letters primarily licensed teachers for the *lycée* and administered the examination for the *baccalauréat*. The level of instruction was inferior, large areas of knowledge ignored, and research relegated to non-teaching institutes.<sup>136</sup> The theological faculties, of course, had been put out of business long before by the Council of Trent which had transferred the training of priests to episcopal seminaries. In the nineteenth

<sup>131</sup> Theodore Zeldin, *France 1848–1945*, 2 vols., Oxford 1973–1977, II, p. 320.

<sup>132</sup> Friedrich Paulsen, 'Die deutsche Universität als Unterrichtsanstalt und als Werkstätte der wissenschaftlichen Forschung', *Gesammelte Pädagogische Abhandlungen*, Stuttgart – Berlin 1912, pp. 151–188.

<sup>133</sup> Richarz, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

<sup>134</sup> Bigler, *op. cit.*, p. 53; Paulsen, *The German Universities*, p. 336.

<sup>135</sup> Richarz, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

<sup>136</sup> Zeldin, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 316–345.



century both the *petits* and *grands séminaires* in France were marked by a severe religious regimen, exclusion of secular studies, and uncritical study of sacred texts.<sup>137</sup> Thus the intellectual mediocrity of the French rabbinate for most of the century mirrored the secular and religious academic levels obtaining in French society.

By contrast, the German rabbinate emerged in a context marked by intellectual ferment, discipline, and excellence. The university in its great formative period after 1815 transformed traditional Jewish learning into German *Wissenschaft*, but equally important it enabled the rabbinate to remain a scholarly profession. At its best the German experience of *Bildung* fused with the Jewish value of Torah study to create a life-long commitment to advance the frontiers of Jewish knowledge and self-understanding. The persistent exclusion of young Jewish scholars from university careers in Judaica further enhanced the scholarly character of the German rabbinate. *Wissenschaft des Judentums* soon became the preserve of practising rabbis because the rabbinate provided one of the few professional careers in which it could be pursued. While that consequence may have had its drawbacks for the dispassionate study of the Jewish past, it certainly heightened the intellectual vigour of the rabbinate. Soon enough, these diverse developments granted the modern rabbinate a scholarly stature that went far to offset the weakness of its legal position. As in the Middle Ages learning remained the ultimate source of religious authority.

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<sup>137</sup> Paulsen, *The German Universities*, p. 48; Zeldin, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 994–1004.

## Appendix

*Rabbis with Doctorates in 1840s*<sup>138</sup>

<i>Name</i>	<i>University at which Degree Taken</i>	<i>Chief Rabbinic Mentor</i>	<i>Communities Served till 1848</i>
1. Adler, Abraham	Bonn (1835)	in Karlsruhe	Worms
2. Adler, Lazar		Abraham Bing	Kissingen
3. Adler, Nathan M.	Erlangen (1828)	Abraham Bing	Oldenburg Hannover
4. Adler, Samuel	Giessen (1836)	Jakob Bamberger	Worms Alzey
5. Aub, Joseph			Bayreuth
6. Auerbach, Aron			Dept. of Rhein-Mosel
7. Auerbach, Benjamin H.	Marburg	L. Kalburg K. Bamberger	Darmstadt
8. Auerbach, I.			Frankfurt a. Main
9. Bodenheimer, Levi	Würzburg (1828)	Abraham Bing Ascher Löb	Hildesheim Krefeld
10. Cohn, Salomon	Breslau (?)		Oppeln
11. Einhorn, David	München	in Fürth	Birkenfeld Schwerin
12. Enoch, Samuel	Erlangen (1832)	Isaak Bernays Abraham Bing Levi Bodenheimer	Kassel Altona
13. Formstecher, Salomon	Giessen (1831)	in Offenbach	Offenbach
14. Fränkel, I. A.			Märkisch- Friedland
15. Fränkel, Meyer			Witzenhausen
16. Frankel, Zacharias	Pest (1831)	in Prag	Teplitz Dresden
17. Frankfurter, Naftali			Lehrenstein- feld Braunsbach
18. Gebhardt			Hamburg Wreschen Gnesen

<sup>138</sup> This list was compiled from the primary sources and secondary literature on which this essay is based. I regret the lacunae that remain. My sources were not quite as obliging as I would have liked.

<i>Name</i>	<i>University at which Degree Taken</i>	<i>Chief Rabbinic Mentor</i>	<i>Communities Served till 1848</i>
19. Geiger, Abraham	Marburg (1834)	Salomon Geiger	Wiesbaden Breslau Buchau
20. Güldenstein, Michael			
21. Gutmann, Moses	Erlangen		Redwitz
22. Haas, Moses			Hofgeismar
23. Herxheimer, Salomon	Marburg	Scheyer	Eschwege Bernburg
24. Herzfeld, Levi	Berlin (1836)	Samuel Eger	Braunschweig
25. Hess, Mendel			Stadt- Lengsfeld Halle
26. Hildesheimer, Esriel	Halle (1846)	Jakob Ettlinger	
27. Hirsch, Maier			Freudenthal Braunsbach
28. Hirsch, Samuel			Dessau Luxemburg
29. Hirschfeld, Hirsch S.	Berlin (1836)		Wollstein Gleiwitz
30. Hochstädter, Benjamin	Jena (1843)		Langen- schwalbach
31. Holdheim, Samuel	Leipzig		Frankfurt a.d. Oder Mecklenburg Berlin
32. Jellinek, Adolf	Leipzig		Leipzig
33. Jolowicz, Heymann			Marienwerder
34. Kämpf, Saul Isaac	Halle (1844)	Akiba Eger	Mecklenburg- Strelitz Prag Stolp
35. Klein			Hamburg
36. Kley, Eduard			Dresden
37. Landau, W.	Leipzig (1839)	Zacharias Frankel	
38. Landsberg, Meyer			Hildesheim
39. Levi, Benedict	Giessen (1828)	Koppel Bamberger	Giessen
40. Levi, Jacob	Halle (1845)	Akiba Eger	Rosenberg
41. Lewysohn, Ludwig	Halle (1843)		Frankfurt a.d. Oder
42. Lilienthal, Max	München (1837)	Hirsch Aub	Riga

<i>Name</i>	<i>University at which Degree Taken</i>	<i>Chief Rabbinic Mentor</i>	<i>Communities Served till 1848</i>
43. Löwenmayer, M.	Erlangen		Salzburg
44. Löwi, Isaak	München		Fürth
45. Maier, Joseph	Tübingen	in Fürth	Stuttgart
46. Mainzer, Maier Aron			Weikersheim
47. Mayer, Samuel	Tübingen	Klaus in Mannheim Abraham Bing	Hechingen
48. Meisel, Wolf A.	Kiel (1841)	Jacob Oettinger	Stettin
49. Meyer, Samuel E.			Hannover
50. Neumann, Abraham	Giessen (1833)	in Fürth	Riga
51. Philippson, Ludwig	Jena (1833)	in Dresden	Magdeburg
52. Rohmann, Philipp	Würzburg	Abraham Bing	Kassel
53. Rothschild, David			Hamm
54. Saalschutz, Joseph	Königsberg (1824)		Wien Königsberg
55. Sachs, Michael	Berlin (1834)		Prag Berlin
56. Salomon, Gotthold			Hamburg
57. Schiller, Salomon M.			Eperjes Leipzig
58. Schlenker, Seligman			Regensburg
59. Schwabacher, Simeon L.	Tübingen (1841)		Prag Hamburg Landsberg Schwerin
60. Sobernheim, Isaak	Bonn (1834)		Bingen
61. Sommerfeld, Hermann			Elbing
62. Stein			Filehne
63. Ullmann, Lion	Giessen (1835)	Mengenber N. Ellinger	Krefeld
64. Wälde, Abraham			Jebenhausen Berlichingen
65. Wassermann, Moses	Tübingen (1832)	Abraham Bing	Mühringen
66. Weiman, Elkan	Würzburg	Abraham Bing	Welbhausen
67. Wolf, Abraham A.	Giessen (1821)	Abraham Bing	Kopenhagen



HERBERT A. STRAUSS

on

## The Emergence of the Modern Rabbinate – A Comment

The paper by Ismar Schorsch offers a wide-ranging debate on the emergence of the modern rabbinate in Germany. It is based on a series of texts both printed and archival, and on the reading of secondary literature. It will be impossible to do justice to the wealth of information and ideas advanced in these pages, the more so as the author has chosen to reflect not only on the political, social and organisational question related to his topic, but also on some theological and religious matters which reflect the author's values and views on the *then* current debates between a more conservative direction, as represented by Zacharias Frankel, the founder of the Breslau *Jüdisch-Theologisches Seminar* (and thus the grandfather of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York) and such scions of Reform as David Friedländer, Leopold Zunz, the Berlin-Jewish communal leadership of the 1840s (Veit, Rubo, Muhr) and others.

If I understand Ismar Schorsch's argument correctly, the main positions taken appear to be as follows. The first half of the nineteenth century saw the transformation of the "traditional" rabbi into a "modern" rabbi. This modern rabbi is defined in several ways and dimensions: he acquires new functions in the religious context of the emerging *Relionsgemeinschaft* (as against the older separate Jewish *Volksgemeinschaft*); he derives his authority from the new function and (the third element) from the addition of secular (university) education as indicated by the Dr. phil. in philosophy, history, or classics (Semitic philology, classical languages) to his rabbinic training; this process of "modernisation" affected all branches of the rabbinate eventually, including the Orthodox German rabbinate; the process, as demonstrated by statistics for selected German states, including Bavaria and Prussia, was well under way by 1847 ("the educated rabbi was in place by the 1840s"), in fact, the *Rabbiner Doktor* was the predominant social type by that period. In Prussia, due to the influence of a few Berlin Reformers like Gumpertz and Friedländer, the government failed to promote the new rabbi and failed to give him – and the movement towards communal modernisation – the government backing found in states like Württemberg or Bavaria, with the result that the rabbi failed to become a government official, obtain a position as an army chaplain in parallel to his Christian colleagues, or receive adequate government pensions for his labour.

If this is, in fact, the burden of the argument, it is supported by interpretations of events seen as causal factors, partly in political and "church" history. Ismar Schorsch offers parallels to Prussian Protestant developments without,

however, demonstrating concrete links or cause-effect relationships in this department. The paper also includes interpretations of Prussian policies towards the Jews, and ends with an attempt to contrast what is described as the non-development of a truly university-level rabbinate in France (under the *Consistoire*) with the Prussian/German rabbinate.

If one grants that the “modern” rabbi is indeed properly defined in the terms stated above (neither the modern American rabbinate nor the Israeli theocratic establishment-rabbi would quite fill the bill of this normative definition), the main point – the end of the influence of the traditional, primarily Eastern-Jewish-based rabbi of the pre-emancipation period in nineteenth-century Western Europe – is, of course, beyond dispute to the point of consensus, even if one should question the quality of this secularism: numerous dissertations by German rabbis deal with Jewish textual criticisms, editions of post-biblical texts, Jewish medieval philosophy and fine points of Semitic philology. The modernity lay in the method rather than the subject, the Dr. phil. shared in the increasing positivism and loss of significance of the German university philology *Betrieb*, criticism was applied to “safe” non-canonical writings, with the result that the major contributions to *religious* thought, and to Jewish intellectual history, did not, for the most part, come from the *Rabbiner Doktor*. One may also recall that rabbinical students were long recruited from Eastern Europe in the seminaries.

There are, however, some specific issues raised by Ismar Schorsch that deserve a second look.

The first question concerns the focus of his paper. He places the development into an intellectual history context. What, however, were the social factors in the story? The two rabbinical roles (“traditional” versus “modern”) are seen as distinct social types, yet we hear little of the precise social position of the pre-modern model. The sources at my disposal (Prussian files for the pre-1871 period) suggest that the “old” rabbi was typically underpaid, dependent primarily on the wealthy members of the community which employed him, that he typically needed to be in business to make a living, that the *hatarat horaa* (“certification”) was frequently not from the established *yeshivot* or the great *talmide chachamin* but from less learned sources – in short, he belonged to the under-class and shared their social and economic values. Long prior to 1815, increasing regulation of Jewish economic and legal relations with the Christian environment by absolutist governmentalism and mercantilism had the effect of eroding his role. (Was the rabbi ever central in view of the basic plutocratic component of Jewish communal organisation, as abundantly demonstrated e.g. by Salo Baron’s works?) He had no role in the *Gottesdienstordnungen* (rules for the proper re-organisation of the religious services and the administration and taxation of the community) typically issued by small-state governments of pre-1815 Germany: he gave few if any sermons (*drashot*), did not teach the young, and was not *ex officio* in control of the charitable system: thus the field of his activity was narrowed by the social change of the early emancipation

period and by the beginnings of legal interference by the secular government in the Jewish community. The new functions needed in the much-narrowed communal frame of the *Religionsgemeinde* now separating the “Holy” from the “profane” (i.e. being relegated to a church-like role leaving behind the intense social network of pre-emancipation communality) were not discharged by the “traditional” rabbi. Thus the *Maskilim*, Moses Mendelssohn, and a wide array of opinion, including Prussian government opinion, were forced to conclude that the old rabbi was beyond reconstruction in the new scheme. Schorsch’s acceptance of the thesis that one single memorandum by a single Berlin Reformer echoed by a second one determined Prussian policy is acceptable only if one disregards the large body of evidence on the image of the “traditional” rabbi: Schorsch’s thesis, first formulated by Ludwig Philippson in 1847 and repeated by Auerbach in 1890 replaces social analysis with a conspiracy theory that disregards the fact that the Prussian government received a vast array of “expert opinions” from rabbis, in preparation for its 1847 law, that included Rabbi Eger’s of Poznań and that of other Orthodox luminaries.

This was in line with long-standing Prussian views of what was to be done with the Jewish population, as I pointed out in an article referred to by Schorsch.<sup>1</sup> Dohm’s improvement strategy aimed at the *embourgeoisement* of the Jew, and the traditional rabbi was perceived throughout as an aider and abetter of those ills the Prussian bureaucrats believed were to be found in the culture of the Jewish lower classes. That there was a good deal of prejudice in their view of the “old” rabbi is beyond question – but Friedländer and the weighty Berlin “experts” (Zunz, Rubo, Muhr, Veit) should not be blamed for what was really a class prejudice widespread at the time.

This leads to the second point one would like to question: if Ismar Schorsch’s statistics would, in fact, demonstrate that the modern rabbi was the predominant social type of rabbi by the mid-1840s it is hard to conceive why the Prussian government would not have relied on the strength of this majority to help it to dominate the situation, or would not have accepted that body of “expert opinion” (e.g. Rabbi Eger’s) that cast the traditionalists in the roles of social “improvers” in line with government policy. Closer scrutiny of the available data – including those adduced by Ismar Schorsch – would suggest, however, that the vast majority of rabbis in the mid-1840s was of the traditional type. The highly selective group of rabbis attending the Braunschweig etc. Assemblies would, of course, by the fact of their self-selection show a majority of “secular” i.e. university trained rabbis. In Württemberg, forty-five rabbis had been dismissed for lack of secular education in 1834, and by 1847, six out of twelve had university training: the rest of the congregations, one presumes, was served by teachers whose training, by all accounts, left

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<sup>1</sup> Herbert Strauss, ‘Pre-Emancipation Prussian Policies towards the Jews 1815–1847’, in *Year Book XI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1966.



much to be desired, and six modernists in a state do not yet a majority trend make. In Prussia, the weight of the traditional rabbi was overwhelming, although one must certainly grant to Ismar Schorsch that there were new types in office in major pulpits in major cities – still, the trouble occurring in Breslau in the 1840s, and the feud between *Vorsteher* Hellwitz and Rabbi Sutro in Westphalia, both of which reflect the power of the traditionalists to impede change, are tips of an iceberg. The government was consistently petitioned by all sides to intervene on their side, and in this war of petitions the neologists had by no means always the upper hand during the rule of Frederick William III and, to some extent of Frederick William IV. Schorsch deplors that the Prussian government – as was in fact the case – favoured traditionalism over Reform before the mid-1840s, and that it “left the Jewish community to fend for itself”.

Even if one is left to wonder whether Ismar Schorsch would really have preferred a Prussian *Staatssynagoge* – a thought about which non-Prussians may be allowed some slight shudders, even if it had meant better pensions and more communal power for rabbis – the 1840s with their overwhelming preponderance of traditional rabbis, especially in rural areas and in the as yet strongly traditionalist Eastern provinces and *Regierungsbezirke* acquired between 1772 and 1815, were not the time for reliance on the “modern” rabbi, precisely because there were so few of them, and experience had shown how tough their opponents could be.

This brings me to my third and last point, the background of Prussian policies on the religious affairs of the Jewish community. These policies were by no means uniform, partly because the changes in Prussian Liberalism between the *Reform era* Hardenberg (which ended by about 1822), the later (rigid) years of Frederick William III and the Utopian medievalism of the early years of Frederick William IV were real and contradictory. This happened partly because the government bureaucracy failed to arrive at a consensus on Jewish policies, and partly because each department, in its legislative policies, pursued goals that contradicted the already unclear policies of the governing assemblies and agencies. If there was uniformity, it was based on the absolutist Lutheran tradition of separating *ius in sacra* from *ius circa sacra*. Non-interference in the religious affairs of the minority religion, as implied by this neat slogan, had, however, been disregarded consistently because the government saw the links between religious modernism and political Liberalism, and, for this reason, favoured traditional practice over innovation. Still, it needed rabbis to be trained in Prussian civil procedure or law precisely because (here I feel Ismar Schorsch underestimates the impact of the Edict of 1812), since 1812, the Edict, in contradistinction to the older *Allgemeine Preussische Landrecht* of 1794, had re-introduced rabbinical participation in marriage and divorce proceedings. (Reading of bans, examination of obstacles to marriage, divorce – in divorce, Prussian law called for an attempt at reconciliation between the partners, in Jewish law divorce was mandatory in cases of adultery.) The Jewish oath, still

taken in the synagogue in the presence of a rabbi, called for a similar interpenetration of Jewish religious and Prussian secular law. In the last analysis, these and similar issues had created a distinct government interest in promoting the “modern” over the “traditional” rabbi. This contradicted other policies and created additional confusion.

Why then did the law of 1847 not draw the proper consequences and prescribe university training for the rabbi who functioned in many areas in extension of Prussian civil law? Why did it not follow the French example? Here the history of Prussian attempts to find a uniform law (dating back longer than the year 1839 referred to by Schorsch) was, in my opinion quite honestly summarised by Minister Eichhorn in the report with which he introduced the government draft of the law of 1847 to the *Herrencurie* (Upper House) of the *Vereinigte Landtag* on 14th June 1847: asserting the classical principle of non-interference in the internal *Kultusverhältnisse* of the Jews (“to whom the State wished to give maximum freedom”), and rejecting the French model, Eichhorn finds the government incompetent to legislate for internal Jewish affairs at a moment when “an intensive religious change” – “*eine große religiöse Bewegung*” – manifests itself among Jews. The State should limit itself to the organisation of the external forms of Jewish religious life, the new corporate status of congregations. Congregations should retain free choice; the new representations and expert commissions – which included rabbis, as properly pointed out by Ismar Schorsch – were not to rule but to advise (*begutachten*) and remain subject to the *freiwillige* deliberations of the congregation. The debates following the introduction of the law did bring out some (conservative) opinion that the law was to lead Jews ultimately to the recognition of the values of the Christian State, but it would be incorrect to ascribe to this motive alone the entire legislative effort. The actual religious and social situation of Jews in Prussia was in considerable flux, and the change being affected by this flux on the congregational level in the social and educational characteristics of the rabbi could simply not be reflected in uniform prescriptions which contradicted the sound idea of separating the Jewish “Church” from the State in religious matters. The 1840s were clearly not yet dominated by the modern rabbi. It may have been a blessing in disguise – although religious thought does not really show this – that the *Rabbiner Doktor* did not also acquire the law-and-order ethos of Prussian officialdom. Government offices are hardly conducive to the hard intellectual labour and the freedom of thought on which the continued renewal of the link between religion and life depends.



STEVEN M. LOWENSTEIN

## The 1840s and the Creation of the German-Jewish Religious Reform Movement

The 1840s were the crucial decade for the creation of a Jewish religious Reform movement in Germany.\* Although attempts to institute various religious Reforms in German-Jewish communities can be traced back to the Napoleonic period or even earlier, those Reforms were either of limited scope or they failed to survive the 1820s. It is true that such events as the opening of the Hamburg Temple in 1818, with its organ, reformed prayerbook and other innovations, aroused tremendous controversy, but German Jewry as a whole remained overwhelmingly Orthodox. The Prussian decree of 1823 forbidding all religious innovations in the synagogue, as well as a general loss of momentum, led to the restriction of innovation to a few localities. When compared to later Reforms, many of the changes of the pre-1820 period were mild and limited. This situation began to change again only in the late 1830s as a new generation of secularly trained rabbis began to take over from the Old Guard. Activities began to speed up; innovations were re-introduced (or more often introduced for the first time). The *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* for the late 1830s abounds in references to the first confirmations held in various communities as well as the first introduction of other innovations, most of them still rather mild. In 1840 the first Reform prayerbook since the 1819 prayerbook of the Hamburg Temple was issued.<sup>1</sup> In 1843 the first radical Reform society – rejecting circumcision and calling for the moving of the Jewish Sabbath to Sunday – came into existence in Frankfurt a. Main. Though its programme was rejected by the vast majority of German Jews, its impetus helped push the more moderate Reform rabbinical leadership to call the First Rabbinical Conference in Braunschweig in 1844. At this and the two conferences which followed, the rabbis laid the groundwork for the later German liberal Jewish movement. Many of the rabbis went back to their communities to introduce the Reforms decided upon at the conferences. By 1850, although they had still not captured such major communities as Hamburg and Berlin, the Reformers had made great strides both in the cities and the small towns towards gaining nationwide influence. In the next two or three decades, the

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<sup>1</sup> Jakob Petuchowski, *Prayerbook Reform in Europe*, New York 1968, pp. 2–3. Significantly the 1840 Reform prayerbook (written by Leopold Stein) bore the subtitle *Bausteine zur Auferbauung eines veredelten Synagogengottesdienstes*, a clear sign that liturgical Reform was still in a very early stage.

religious Reform movement would re-structure the religious service in most large communities and develop into the Liberal religious movement which dominated twentieth-century German Jewry.

In studying the process of religious change among European Jews, a distinction must be made between the abandonment of traditional religious practice and the creation of a religious Reform movement. Though there is an inter-relationship between these two phenomena, they are nevertheless separate and distinct. It was perfectly possible for an individual to work on the Sabbath, eat non-kosher food, and neglect other traditional regulations without feeling the need for a "modernised" religious service or for changes in the Jewish ritual. In fact this pattern was a common one in such countries as England, Holland, Italy and France. In those countries few Jews attended Liberal or Reform synagogues (at least until the twentieth century), but a large percentage of the Jewish population no longer observed the traditional restrictions and practices. In Germany and the United States, on the other hand, the abandonment of traditional practice by the individual (basically a negative phenomenon) was paralleled by the positive creation of a new religious ideology and new religious forms. The causes for the abandonment of Orthodox religious practice were manifold, but they were often as much economic and social as ideological. The pressures for social integration into general society led many to abandon practices which they felt set up a barrier against social intercourse (e.g. the dietary laws), while the need to be economically competitive forced many to do business on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath. In addition many acculturated Jews found themselves repelled by the traditional Jewish service for aesthetic reasons.

In a society in which the pressures from within and without for increased Jewish integration were becoming stronger, there were four possible reactions that could be developed. First, one could simply reject the pressures and attempt to live to the letter of the *Halachah* (Jewish religious law). Second, one could violate the norms of the traditional law out of necessity while continuing to believe in their validity and attending traditional religious services whenever possible. Third, one could, while not converting to Christianity, reject the whole traditional system and withdraw from all activities in the Jewish community. Finally one could attempt to reconcile one's life-style with one's beliefs (*Leben und Lehre*) by adhering to, or creating a new Jewish religious system which retained at least some of the basic tenets of traditional Jewish belief while modifying or abrogating the old religious law. This final method of dealing with the changes in Jewish society and intellectual climate was that adopted by the leaders of the religious Reform movement. To a great extent their activities were directed towards bringing back to the synagogue the growing number of Jews who had abandoned both traditional practice and interest in the Jewish community. They hoped to make Judaism attractive to the "indifferent" by bringing the religious services into line with nineteenth-century ideas of aesthetics and decorum or, in a later stage, both by modifying

the place of law in Jewish life and by changing certain traditional beliefs or ideals (e.g. the hope for a return of the Jews to Zion). Thus, in intention, early Reform was mainly a reaction to an earlier abandonment of traditional practice. In many, perhaps most, communities, however, Reform served not only as a means to regain the loyalty of those who had already given up tradition, but also as a force designed to modify the practice of Jews still living according to the old tradition. The Reform leadership often felt it necessary to stop the traditionalists in their communities from certain folk practices which might be offensive to the point of view they were trying to develop. Thus, attempts were made to enforce decorum among a Jewish population for which this idea was still foreign. In some communities even stronger changes were achieved despite the basic conservatism of the local Jewish population. A good example of this phenomenon occurred in Alzey in 1846 where, after the Breslau Rabbinical Conference declared it permissible, Jewish shopkeepers opened their shops on the second day of Jewish holidays for the first time.<sup>2</sup>

The distinction between changes in individual observance of Jewish law and the development of a religious Reform movement can perhaps explain what might otherwise be a very puzzling fact. Unlike the first, partially abortive, movement for religious Reform (between 1810 and 1823), which was mainly urban in character, the more successful and widespread Reform thrust of the 1840s gained as much initial success in small- and medium-sized towns as in the large urban centres. This fact, which can be verified both by looking at the rabbis who favoured Reform during the 1840s (see Table I) and by looking at which communities adopted religious innovations, need not conflict with the usual assumption that urban Jews were quicker to acculturate than rural Jews.<sup>3</sup> The newspaper accounts and memoirs of the period attest to the fact that “*Indifferentismus*” was more widespread in the cities than elsewhere. Many of the urban Jews who no longer lived according to the tradition simply stopped coming to the synagogue. While this was relatively easy in the anonymity of the large city, it was far more difficult in the small towns with their group cohesiveness and social pressure. So, in the city, the “progressives” were indifferent while the synagogue-goers were traditional, while in smaller communities both “progressives” and “traditionalists” continued to interact in communal affairs and in synagogue worship. Orthodox leaders in the cities

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<sup>2</sup> *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* (hereafter referred to as *AZJ*), X, No. 45 (1846), p. 656.

<sup>3</sup> Even this latter idea must be modified somewhat. There is considerable evidence that small-town Jews adopted acculturated forms of dress, education, reading habits, speech and social manners. See, e.g. Monika Richarz (Hrsg.), *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1780–1871*, Stuttgart 1976, Veröffentlichung des Leo Baeck Instituts, pp. 170, 271–272, 290–291. This was caused partly by restrictive residency laws which kept progressive individuals in the countryside. After these laws were rescinded and Jewish urbanisation increased enormously in the last third of the nineteenth century, most of the “progressives” left for the cities.

were sometimes more ideologically committed and unbending than their small-town counterparts. In states (like Prussia between 1823 and 1840) in which government regulations inhibited religious Reform, the laws were more likely to be enforced in administrative centres than in outlying areas. So, while the progressives are likely to have been at least as common in Berlin or Königsberg as they were in Alzey and Bernburg, their “indifference” to Jewish religious matters gave them less communal influence than their small town counterparts.

A factor which had great influence on the development and spread of Jewish religious innovation was the attitude of the various independent German states. Governments, which were accustomed to close connection with and supervision of the Christian Churches, naturally felt it their right and duty to intervene in internal Jewish affairs (at least as long as “liberty of conscience” was not infringed). Depending on their political and religious outlooks, the various kingdoms, principalities and duchies could either favour or oppose Reform. Generally, the more liberal states encouraged (sometimes even enforced) Reforms, while the conservative governments opposed (or even forbade) them. This fitted in with their general view of the “Jewish Question”. Liberal governments usually favoured granting a large measure of political rights and socio-economic opportunity for Jews, usually with the tacit implication that, in return, the Jews would integrate themselves as much as possible with the non-Jewish population among whom they lived. Conservatives, who believed in a Christian State, often wanted Jews to remain a separate and recognisable group.

The small and medium sized-states were especially active in supervising Jewish communal life. In some areas (Baden, Württemberg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin) the government created a central Jewish consistory (*Oberrat*) on the Protestant (and Napoleonic French-Jewish) model to supervise Jewish life closely. Some governments created chief rabbinate for their principalities, or divided their states into district rabbinate. Often they required the rabbis to have an advanced secular education.<sup>4</sup> The one state which never set up any authority above the individual communities was conservative Prussia. While some small states tried to force Reform on a reluctant Jewish population (most famous of these actions was the law of 1823 in Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach ordering Jews to conduct their public prayers in German), most went no further than promulgating *Synagogenordnungen* enforcing decorum.

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<sup>4</sup> For some of the laws concerning central Jewish consistories and government requirements for appointment of rabbis see: Alfred Gunzenhauser, *Sammlung der Gesetze, Verordnungen, Verfügungen und Erlasse betreffend die Kirchenverfassung und die religiösen Einrichtungen der Israeliten in Württemberg*, Stuttgart 1909, pp. 11–16, 161–162; L. Donath, *Geschichte der Juden in Mecklenburg von den ältesten Zeiten (1266) bis auf die Gegenwart (1874)*, Leipzig 1874, pp. 224–226; Stefan Schwarz, *Die Juden in Bayern im Wandel der Zeiten*, München – Wien 1963, pp. 243, 347; Berthold Rosenthal, *Heimatgeschichte der badischen Juden seit ihrem geschichtlichen Auftreten bis zur Gegenwart*, Bühl 1927, p. 317.

Some states changed their policies on Reform. Thus Prussia, which in 1823 had declared all Jewish religious change illegal, rescinded this law after the Tiktin-Geiger dispute in 1844, while Bavaria, which at first encouraged some Reforms, became decidedly hostile towards them by the 1840s. These changes in government policy often had a long-term effect on the geographical distribution of religious Reform.

Relatively little information is available about the geographic and social spread of the first great wave of religious Reform between 1810 and 1823. Most of the communities which we know were affected during that period were urban (Hamburg, Berlin, Kassel, Karlsruhe, Frankfurt a. Main)<sup>5</sup> and there is some evidence that many of the followers were from the wealthier and better educated classes. Except in the Kingdom of Westphalia where a central consistory enforced the generally moderate Reforms (between 1810 and 1814), the Reformers usually formed separate societies for reformed worship (*Tempelvereine*) although they did temporarily gain control of the communal boards (*Vorstand*) in Hamburg and Berlin.<sup>6</sup> The Reforms promulgated by these early Reformers included increased decorum, some prayers and songs in German, confirmations for boys and girls, sermons in High German, and organ accompaniment for the service. In at least two communities (Berlin and Hamburg), the Reform societies printed their own prayerbooks with a somewhat modified order of prayer. Prayers calling for a return to Zion and restoration of sacrifices – both ideas considered inimical to modern culture and to social and political integration into German society – were modified or eliminated.

The Reformers of this early period were clearly a small minority of the German-Jewish population and met with the opposition of virtually the entire German rabbinate.<sup>7</sup> Government opposition in Prussia put an end to the Reform temples there after 1823 and the movement petered out in most other areas. In only three communities did full-fledged Reform temples survive – Hamburg, Leipzig and Seesen. In most other areas, aside from some changes in decorum, the only Reform initiatives which survived were in the field of education. A number of the early Reform leaders (Creizenach, Kley, Franckolm) were active as school directors and educators. In several cities (e.g. Frankfurt a. Main) Jewish schools provided special religious services for their

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<sup>5</sup> Some smaller towns were also involved, notably Seesen, site of the *Jacobsonschule*, but there are relatively few reports of such small-town Reform activities extant from the period.

<sup>6</sup> Professor Michael Meyer, Cincinnati, in a written communication to the author, 2nd January 1979.

<sup>7</sup> Whereas the anti-Reform *Eleh Dibre Habrith*, Altona 1819, contains opinions of over twenty-five rabbis from eighteen different cities (of which the following in Germany: Hamburg, Altona, Fürth, Mainz, Breslau, Poznań, Rawitsch, Hanau and Lissa and a number more from such Central European communities as Bratislava, Nikolsburg, Trietsch in Moravia, Amsterdam and Wintzenheim in Alsace) the pro-organ collection *Noga Zedek* contained only four opinions, two from Italy and two from Hungary.



students in which German prayers, weekly sermons and other Reforms were introduced despite the fact that the communal synagogue was totally Orthodox and unchanged. Sometimes adults also attended these services, so they achieved an influence which went beyond the school alone. The youth services were tolerated precisely because they did not claim to be true communal functions; the Orthodox could continue to feel that the synagogue was still strictly traditional and that the other service did not affect them.

Another aspect of Reform closely tied to education was the new ceremony of confirmation. This ceremony, based on Christian models<sup>8</sup> was intended to supplement (or more rarely, replace) the traditional *bar mitzvah*. Both girls and boys, on graduating from religious school, were given a public oral examination on the bases of the Jewish religion and were then blessed by the rabbi and formally inducted into Judaism. This ceremony, which was felt to be more successful as an educative device than the *bar mitzvah* was intended to be held in the synagogue, usually on a Sabbath or holiday. The confirmation ceremony survived or was introduced in the 1820s and 1830s even in some communities which had introduced few if any other innovations in the liturgy. Even when the Orthodox objected, they usually insisted only that the ceremony (which then became a mere graduation with public examination) should not be held in the synagogue.<sup>9</sup> Presumably the traditionalists were more willing to tolerate confirmations than other innovations because they were related to education and occurred but once a year.

Because Reform after 1823 retreated into the realm of education, the 1820s and 1830s witnessed the publication of a number of catechisms and manuals of Jewish religious instruction (some of them specifically intended for study for the confirmation) written from a non-traditional point of view,<sup>10</sup> but not a single publication of a reformed prayerbook. The result of the, “retreat into education” was that Reform remained dormant for some fifteen years, but the ideas which underlay it spread to a new generation of laymen and “*Rabbinate*-

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<sup>8</sup> The use of the term “*Konfirmation*” in the literature of the day presents several difficulties. On the one hand, many writers used the word simply as a more “refined” synonym for *bar mitzvah*, on the other, many who favoured confirmations shied away from the overly Christian term and preferred such neutral terms as “*feierliche Einsegnung*”.

<sup>9</sup> *AZJ*, III, No. 98 (1839), p. 593. Even the later editor of the anti-Reform newspaper *Der Treue Zions-Wächter*, Samuel Enoch, performed confirmations in the Jewish school in Altona on Sunday, 25th October 1840 (*AZJ*, IV, No. 46 [1840], p. 656).

<sup>10</sup> Among these were Isaak Ascher Francolm, *Die Grundzüge der Religionslehre aus den zehn Geboten entwickelt*, Neustadt a.O. 1826; Salomon Herxheimer, *Israelitische Glaubens- und Pflichtenlehre*, 1830; Joseph Lewin Saalschütz, *Grundlage zu Katechisationen über die israelitische Gotteslehre*, Wien 1833; *Lehrbuch der israelitischen Religion zum Gebrauch der Synagogen und israelitischen Schulen*, Württemberg, Oberkirchenbehörde, 1838. See also Jakob J. Petuchowski, ‘Manuals and Catechisms of the Jewish Religion in the Early Period of Emancipation’, in: Alexander Altmann (ed.), *Studies in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Intellectual History*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1964, pp. 47–64.

*kandidaten*” through the schools. Therefore Reform could re-emerge in the 1840s with strong support within the young adult population.

The earliest wave of Reform was heavily concerned with improving the aesthetics and decorum of Jewish worship, though the Hamburg Temple and others went beyond this to make ideological changes as well. Changes in decorum and aesthetics were incorporated into regulations (*Synagogenordnungen*) which were backed by communal authority and, in many cases (especially in the smaller states) by government power as well. The tradition of reforming *Synagogenordnungen* began in the Kingdom of Westphalia in 1810 where it was enforced by the State. As in so much else connected with religious Reform, the first wave of regulations ends in 1824 and those few extant *Synagogenordnungen* from the late 1820s and early 1830s are much more moderate and do not have government sanctions to enforce them. Between 1836 and 1838 the regulation movement begins again with new enthusiasm, a stronger ideological base and the all-important government approval. The authors of the regulations studied the rules promulgated in other communities. Certain provisions recur again and again and in at least one case<sup>11</sup> a large part of one *Synagogenordnung* was copied verbatim from the *Synagogenordnung* of another state.

The numerous *Synagogenordnungen* issued between 1838 and 1844 share many features. Although they are still based on the traditional prayerbook,<sup>12</sup> they do introduce some liturgical changes. After 1850 some *Synagogenordnungen* go further and prescribe full-fledged liberal services. It is the period 1838–1844, however, in which the *Synagogenordnungen* play the most important role in the spreading of religious Reform. Several of the leaders of the Reform movement in that period were initiators of *Synagogenordnungen*.<sup>13</sup>

All the *Synagogenordnungen* before 1850 begin with the tacit assumption that the community to be regulated is made up of traditional Jews following age-old customs and liturgy which needed some change. The vast majority of the extant *Synagogenordnungen* were issued in various parts of Southern and Western Germany. The rules fall into several broad categories and it is both instructive and amusing to look at these more closely.<sup>14</sup> One category of regulations

<sup>11</sup> The *Mecklenburg-Schwerin Synagogenordnung* of 1843 contains many verbatim passages from the *Württemberg Synagogenordnung* of 1838.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, chapter 2 paragraph 6 of the *Württemberg Synagogenordnung*: “An den Werktagen sollen die Gebete nach der im allgemeinen Gebetbuch (Seder Tefila) beobachteten Ordnung vorgetragen werden”, and paragraph 16: “Die Ordnung der Gebete an den Sabbathtagen ist die im allgemeinen Gebetbuch Seder Tefila gehaltene”. This passage is repeated verbatim in the Mecklenburg-Schwerin regulations.

<sup>13</sup> E.g. David Einhorn, Joseph von Maier, Samuel Holdheim. A number of communities which did not have *Synagogenordnungen* which are extant, set up liturgical standards which were similar to the 1838–1844 *Synagogenordnungen*. Among these were the so-called *Braunschweig Agende* of 1842 which served as a model for many reforming communities, and the rules of Geiger’s synagogue in Breslau (1844). *AZJ*, VI, No. 28 (1842); VIII, No. 49 (1844), p. 705.

<sup>14</sup> See Table IV.

typical of all *Synagogenordnungen* issued by governments were policing measures. These include a ban on private religious services and on bringing pre-school children to the synagogue. Another group of rules to increase the general dignity of the service through the introduction of robes for cantors and rabbis, requirement of top hats instead of caps on the Sabbath, and regulations for the order of the Torah procession played an especially important role in the less radical *Synagogenordnungen*. A large proportion of the *Synagogenordnungen* especially before 1824 and after 1836 were devoted to the suppression of various “undignified” or “indecent” folk customs and acts of folk piety. Among the practices forbidden were swaying during prayer (*schaukeln*), noisemaking during the reading of the Book of Esther, penitential flagellation (*Malkoth*) on the eve of Yom Kippur, breaking a glass at weddings and sitting on the ground on the Fast of Tisha Be'av. An even clearer indication of a Reform tendency was liturgical change. No change in the wording of the traditional prayers occurs in the regulations before 1836. Thereafter prayers calling for vengeance for the blood of Jewish martyrs (*Av Harachamim*, *Avinu Malkenu Nekom* etc.), the recitations of talmudic legal passages (e.g. *Bame Madlikin*) and of the *Piutim* (medieval religious poetry) were eliminated or abridged. In no case, however, is any attempt made to change prayers dealing with such crucial beliefs as the restoration of Temple sacrifices or the return to Zion. Interestingly, the *Synagogenordnung* promulgated by the later radical Reformer Samuel Holdheim (Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 1843) departs from the earlier practice of merely abolishing “offensive” passages and instead re-writes them in a new spirit. Here we can already see the beginnings of a new wave of ideological liturgical Reform.

Most of the innovations of the *Synagogenordnungen* were still very limited even between 1836 and 1844. None went nearly as far as the Hamburg prayerbook of 1819. Many of the *Synagogenordnung* regulations (e.g. regular German sermons, no swaying back and forth during prayer, no auctioning of the call to the Torah in the synagogue) were later adopted even by Orthodox German Jews. Yet despite the moderate nature of the *Synagogenordnungen*, they aroused considerable opposition from the traditionalists. The *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* reported that some Jews from Mecklenburg-Schwerin spent the High Holidays of 1843 in Hamburg to avoid the new regulations and in 1848 when government regulation broke down, a number of traditionalist communities in Württemberg re-introduced prayers abolished in the *Synagogenordnung* of 1838. In Mittelfranken local opposition prevented the introduction of the *Synagogenordnung* in many places.<sup>15</sup> Holdheim was so worried about the opposition to the *Synagogenordnung* in Mecklenburg-Schwerin that he asked the Braunschweig Rabbinical Conference to give its explicit approval.<sup>16</sup> Al-

<sup>15</sup> *AZJ*, VII, No. 52 (1843), p. 768; XII, No. 28 (1848), p. 400; III, No. 26 (1839); III, No. 32 (1839); III, No. 85 (1839), p. 420.

<sup>16</sup> *AZJ*, VIII, No. 27 (1844), p. 372.

though the pace of innovation was increasing by 1844, it had not yet reached the degree of radicalism of Hamburg twenty-five years earlier.

The late 1830s and the early 1840s were marked by a return to nationwide religious controversies based on particular local issues. Three of the controversies – the Geiger-Tiktin dispute, the second Hamburg *Gebetbuchstreit* of 1842, and the Frankfurt *Reformverein* controversy of 1842–1843 – deserve special attention. In some ways the first of these disputes still belongs to an earlier era. Although the advent of Abraham Geiger as a rabbi in a major Jewish community in 1838 was an indication of the progress of the Reform movement, the nature of the conflict was no different from what it had been before 1823. The main issue was whether non-Orthodox forms of Judaism had a right to exist, and specifically whether higher education disqualified a man for the rabbinate. The Hamburg *Gebetbuchstreit*, though often couched in similarly global terms, really dealt with a different question. The Hamburg Temple had already existed for twenty-five years and had published a prayerbook many years earlier. Jakob Ettlinger and Isaak Bernays, the local rabbis who led the attack on the prayerbook, had tacitly tolerated the Temple for years, in fact, if not in theory. As long as the Hamburg Temple was a merely local institution with a limited following, the Orthodox said nothing. Only when the Temple showed by revising and reprinting its prayerbook that it wished to serve as a model for other communities, did the attack take place. The issue was no longer whether Reform Judaism should exist, but rather whether it could be allowed to spread and gain control of the German-Jewish communities. Though the Orthodox opinions took the form of declaring the Temple prayerbook religiously invalid, the real fear was the expansion of religious forms they thought they had contained since 1823.<sup>17</sup>

The creation of the Frankfurt *Verein der Reformfreunde* by Moritz Abraham Stern, Theodor Creizenach and Gabriel Riesser marked the revival of a radical phenomenon. For the first time in over twenty years laymen forming a private society were agitating for a radical programme which, while retaining ethical monotheism, called for the abolition of virtually the entire structure of Jewish law, the abandonment of a hope of national Jewish restoration, the moving of the Sabbath to Sunday and the elimination of circumcision as a mandatory rite. The Frankfurt society, although supported by a number of distinguished individuals, never gained a widespread following; almost all German rabbis, including Reformers, denounced it.<sup>18</sup> Despite the fact that the *Reformverein*

<sup>17</sup> Some examples of the polemic literature on the Hamburg prayerbook are: N. Frankfurter, *Stillstand und Fortschritt*, Hamburg 1841; A. Geiger, *Der Hamburger Tempelstreit, eine Zeitfrage*, Breslau 1842; S. Holdheim, *Verketzerung und Gewissensfreiheit*, Schwerin 1842; and *Jude und Nichtjude, eine Erwiderung auf die Schriften ... der Herren Holdheim, Salomon und Frankfurter*, Amsterdam 1842; G. Salomon, *Sendschreiben an den Herrn Dr. Z. Frankel ... in Betreff seines ... Gutachtens über das neue Gebetbuch der Tempelgemeinde*, Hamburg 1842.

<sup>18</sup> See, e.g. Salomon Abraham Trier, *Rabbinische Gutachten über die Beschneidung*, Frankfurt a. Main 1844; *AZJ*, VII, No. 28 (1843), as well as *AZJ*, VII, No. 30 (1843),

gained such a small following, this “attack from the left” had an important effect on the growing movement for religious innovation. In Frankfurt itself the pro-Reform community board finally chose a Reform rabbi, Leopold Stein, as the spiritual leader of the community. (Stein was, however, not at all in accord with the *Reformfreunde*). More importantly, the young rabbis who had slowly been introducing innovations in various communities now felt impelled to meet to plan a programme of Reform which could be introduced throughout Germany. The three annual rabbinical conferences which followed (Braunschweig – 1844, Frankfurt a. Main – 1845, Breslau – 1846) changed the nature of the German Reform movement and paved the way for the conquest of most German-Jewish communities by the forces of religious change.

It is remarkable that these meetings of a relatively small number of German rabbis had such a tremendous impact. Although only a total of twenty-five rabbis attended the Braunschweig Conference and only forty-two individuals attended any of the three conferences, the meetings made possible far more radical actions than had previously been attempted in the communities. It is highly significant that the main practical Reforms discussed at each conference (abolition of *kol nidre* in 1844, severe limitation of the use of Hebrew in 1845, abolition of the second days of most holidays and the introduction of a three-year Torah reading cycle in 1846) were not yet in practice in the vast majority of the communities represented at the conferences. The *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* reports in quite some detail on the introduction of these innovations after the conferences.<sup>19</sup> The *Rabbinerversammlungen* were thus concerned mainly not with co-ordinating and justifying Reforms already in effect, but rather with introducing them for the first time.

After the First Rabbinical Conference, the Orthodox counter-attacked with a public protest petition signed by seventy-seven rabbis (about one half of whom were from Germany). Later some more signatories joined them. A comparison of the mainly reformist members of the rabbinical conferences with the mainly Orthodox protesters,<sup>20</sup> gives us a clear picture of the nature of the Reform rabbinical leadership at a crucial point in time.

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p. 438 and VIII, No. 7 (1844), p. 88 contain strong attacks on the *Reformverein* by Philippson. Even the radical David Einhorn rejected the *Reformverein*.

<sup>19</sup> *AZJ*, VIII, No. 41 (1844), p. 577; IX, No. 44 (1845), p. 661; IX, No. 51 (1845), p. 661; X, No. 5 (1846), p. 68; X, No. 43 (1846), p. 629; X, No. 31 (1846), p. 451 and X, No. 45 (1846), p. 656.

<sup>20</sup> Not all who attended the conferences were clear supporters of the Reform position. At the first conference the conservative views of Philipp Goldmann of Eschwege are quite clear. His fellow conservative Levi Bodenheimer of Hildesheim refused to attend later conferences for ideological reasons (*AZJ*, X, No. 25 [1846], p. 366). The walkout of the conservatives Zacharias Frankel and Leopold Schott from the Frankfurt Conference is well known.

On the other side among the seventy-seven anti-Reform signatories were Salomon Fuerst of Heidelberg who approved the installation of an organ in his communal synagogue in 1854 and Marx Heyum Seligsberg of Fellheim who attended the reformist Augsburg

The delegates at the rabbinical conference were a more uniform group than their Orthodox opponents. Most striking was their youth. The median age of the rabbis at each conference varied between thirty-six and thirty-seven. Although there were rabbis as young as twenty-five and as old as sixty-six, almost 70% were between thirty and forty years of age and only about 19% were over forty. This contrasts with the Orthodox protesters whose wide age-range (thirty-one to ninety) showed much less uniformity. The majority of the protesters were well over forty years of age. Thus it is clear that the rabbinical conferences were the work of a new generation of religious leadership. Few had been old enough to play any role in the controversies of 1810–1823; few had held any teaching or rabbinic post before 1831 (the majority began their careers no earlier than 1836), and most had fewer than eight years service in the community they served at the time of the conferences. The Reformers were new men looking for new solutions and just beginning to embark on their careers.

A surprisingly large proportion of the rabbinical conference members represented tiny principalities, duchies or city states. Close to one-third of the rabbis came from independent states whose total population was less than 300,000. This phenomenon was caused partly by the fact that the Bavarian government forbade the seven Bavarian rabbis who wished to attend from doing so, and partly because the paternalistic small states often intervened to aid the Reform cause. Except for the city-states of Hamburg and Frankfurt a. Main none of the small states represented had a substantial Jewish population. Among the German Orthodox protesters the small states were represented much more sparsely.

Perhaps even more surprising is the fact that there was little difference between the size of the towns represented by the Orthodox and by the Reformers.<sup>21</sup> In each case about one quarter of the sample lived in large cities (over 20,000 inhabitants). The Reformers tended to be more strongly represented in small cities of 5,000 to 20,000 inhabitants, while the Orthodox predominated in villages and towns of under 5,000. What is absolutely clear is that Reform in the 1840s was not merely a phenomenon of the large cities. Despite the sarcasm of Philippson about the Orthodox protesters from “Wassertrüdingen, Beiersdorf etc.”, the Reformers too had solid small-town roots; some of the villages with Orthodox rabbis had larger Jewish populations than the large towns with Reform rabbis.<sup>22</sup> Not only did many of the Reform rabbis lead small-town communities, but they themselves were usually from rural or small-town families.<sup>23</sup> Most had had no contact with cities except in their university

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synod of 1870. (Rosenthal, *Heimatgeschichte der Badischen Juden*, p. 369; *Verhandlungen der zweiten israelitischen Synode zu Augsburg*, Berlin 1873.)

<sup>21</sup> See Tables I, II and III.

<sup>22</sup> For example Ichenhausen with its 737 Jews, Gailingen with its 672, Hürben with its 576 and Beiersdorf with 440, each had more Jews than either Koblenz, Braunschweig, Schwerin, Trier or Stuttgart at the time of the rabbinical conferences.

<sup>23</sup> See Table I.

years.<sup>24</sup> They were not urbanites “bringing the message to the countryside”, but themselves derived from the *Landjuden* who still predominated in German Jewry.

In 1844–1846 Reform was still mainly a Western and Southern German movement. The communities represented at the conferences tended to cluster in two main areas – the area near the Rhine, Main and Mosel rivers in the West and the area just west of the Saale and Elbe in Central Germany (the latter area had a very sparse Jewish population). Most of the rabbis were also born and grew up in the Western areas. Only five of the forty-two rabbinical delegates came from east of the Oder-Neisse line and few came from east of the Elbe. The Eastern provinces of Silesia, Poznań and West Prussia where a large portion of German Jewry lived were still little affected by Reform. This phenomenon is in contrast not only with later patterns but also with earlier ones, since it was precisely those parts of Prussia east of the Elbe which were most affected by the Mendelssohnian Enlightenment. The German protesters against the rabbinical conferences were also mainly from South Germany, which perhaps indicates that, despite the Geiger-Tiktin controversy, Orthodox rabbis in the Eastern provinces of Prussia paid little attention to the conferences because they felt little threat.

After the Braunschweig Conference of 1844 there was a revival not only of the Orthodox opposition to the Reform rabbis, but also of the movement of radical laymen. The Berlin *Reformverein* which was founded in 1845 received quite different treatment from the German-Jewish public and leaders than its predecessor in Frankfurt a. Main two years earlier. This was due at least in part to the fact that the Berlin Reformers couched their radical programme in more “positive-historical” and respectful terms.<sup>25</sup> The controversy stirred up by the annual rabbinic conferences was probably also important in making the Berlin Reform programme acceptable to larger numbers of people. The Berlin programme shows us the frame of reference of radical university-educated<sup>26</sup> laymen as opposed to rabbis. To some extent there is a repetition of the Enlightenment anti-clericalism of such earlier figures as David Friedländer with the important difference that they represented a far larger group in the

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<sup>24</sup> Even the universities themselves were often in small towns or medium-sized cities. Most of the rabbis attended universities near their birthplaces. Ismar Schorsch is undoubtedly correct in stressing the importance of university education for the creation of the modern rabbinate. Doctorates were certainly more common among Reform than among Orthodox rabbis in the 1840s. A good example of the effect of university education on an individual can be seen from Heinrich Graetz’s diaries. The difference between the entries before and after his years at the university is striking, Reuven Michael (Hrsg.), *Heinrich Graetz. Tagebuch und Briefe*, Tübingen 1977 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 34).

<sup>25</sup> See e.g. Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–230; *AZJ*, IX, No. 16 (1845), p. 234.

<sup>26</sup> Of the twenty-eight signatories to the original petition of the *Reformgenossenschaft*, ten had doctorates (*AZJ*, IX, No. 16 [1845], p. 234).

1840s. The *Reformverein* proposed that Reforms should be decided upon by a national synod made up mainly of laymen. Among their practical proposals were the almost exclusive use of German in the religious service and the provision of a Sabbath service on Sundays. They were impatient with the casuistic attempts by the reforming rabbis to find a way of reconciling innovations with historical precedents and prevailing forms. What they wanted was a Judaism to fit their mentalities and style of living.

The movement for a synod which began in 1845 continued for several years though it never succeeded in its main goal. A number of rabbis who had violently opposed the Frankfurt society looked upon the Berlin society and the synod movement with favour. *Reformvereine* developed in a number of communities,<sup>27</sup> sometimes because of local issues, sometimes because of the Berlin agitation. Interestingly supporters of the more radical ideas of the *Reformvereine* were not restricted to Western Germany nearly as much as the supporters of rabbinical Reform. The existence of the *Reformverein* movement created pressure on the left as well as on the right for the rabbis of the conferences. Even so thoroughgoing a Reformer as Abraham Geiger found himself faced with a group in his own Breslau community who opposed him as too moderate.<sup>28</sup> In the meantime the Berlin *Verein*, while not giving up its hope for a synod, organised its own services and in 1847 hired Samuel Holdheim, a leader of the rabbinical conferences, as its rabbi. The Berlin *Reformgemeinde* service which was almost exclusively in German was far more radical than almost all other German synagogue services and remained so throughout its almost one hundred years of existence.

A study of the concrete innovations<sup>29</sup> introduced into German-Jewish communities during the 1840s and earlier shows that, despite the increase in

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<sup>27</sup> For example the Poznań *Bruderverein*, the Exin *Reformfreunde* (1851), the Elbing Reform community (1849), the Münster Reform community (1847), the Schneidemühl *Neue Gemeinde* (1849), Worms *Reformfreunde* (1848), Giessen *Reformfreunde* (1845), Kulm *Reformgenossenschaft* and Baden *Landesverein zur Verbesserung der inneren und äusseren Zustände der Juden*. *AZJ*, IX, No. 19 (1845), p. 281; IX, No. 27 (1845), p. 411; IX, No. 50 (1845), p. 735; XII, No. 7 (1848), p. 93; XII, No. 42 (1848), p. 603; XII, No. 30 (1848); XIII, No. 21 (1849), p. 274; XIII, No. 47 (1849), p. 665; XIII, No. 21 (1849); XIII, No. 31 (1849), p. 440; XIV, No. 2 (1850), p. 22; XV, No. 30 (1851), p. 354. Philippson, who violently attacked the Frankfurt *Verein*, actually participated in services at the Berlin society.

<sup>28</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 16 (1845), p. 236; IX, No. 18 (1845), p. 265; X, No. 14 (1846), p. 202; X, No. 17 (1846), p. 249.

<sup>29</sup> The data for this section of the present paper was supplied mainly by a thorough reading of the first fifteen years of the *AZJ* (1837–1851) which gives very detailed information on local religious changes. Additional study of other Jewish newspapers of the day as well as local histories would undoubtedly supply further details, though probably without changing the general outlines presented here. I have collected material only about those communities which were within the boundaries of Germany between 1871 and 1918, with the exception that Alsace and Lorraine were excluded and Luxembourg included.



Reform activity and the increased radicalisation of both word and practice, the Reformers were still far from imposing their programme on most communities. The most widespread innovations before 1850 were regular German sermons, confirmations and choirs. The issue involved in regular German sermons was different from many other issues. It is true that eighteenth-century German rabbis gave only a few learned lectures a year in Yiddish, but the replacement of Yiddish by German was not so much a question of ideology as of ability. Not all rabbis (especially older ones) were able to give a sermon in grammatical High German. This was true not only in the Eastern provinces but also in the West.<sup>30</sup> The community could require monthly or weekly sermons instead of the traditional biennial ones, but the provision of German sermons was still mainly a question of personnel. A community which desired it would have to engage an educated (usually young) rabbi, teacher or *Prediger* who had the ability to give German sermons. Furthermore the new style of preaching designed to edify and appeal to the sentiments<sup>31</sup> rather than merely discuss a sacred text, required a training few older rabbis had. Because of the various talents required for the new type of preaching, many communities were able to achieve only part of the ideal. Some ended up with regular sermons in Yiddish-accented German, while others had sermons in perfect German but only rarely. Some communities hired a *Prediger* to serve alongside the older, more traditional rabbi. In Berlin the community hired Michael Sachs, a man of rather conservative views, as its preacher in 1844 while retaining the older rabbis Jacob Joseph Oettinger and Elchanan Rosenstein. Even thereafter Oettinger gave semi-annual Yiddish *drosches* often with ludicrous results.<sup>32</sup>

The creation of a synagogue choir also depended on the existence of the available personnel. As long as only males participated, the Orthodox usually acquiesced in the use of choral music, though they sometimes tried to keep their children out of the choir.<sup>33</sup> Often even traditional communities used a choir with instrumental accompaniment for the dedication of new synagogue buildings,<sup>34</sup> but did not use either choirs or accompaniment for regular daily,

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<sup>30</sup> *AZJ*, II, No. 106 (1838) records that Rabbi Leon Ellinger of Mainz (who most probably was a native of Bavaria) gave a sermon in German "as well as he was able to". Other rabbis speaking German poorly were noted in Düsseldorf where Rabbi Rosenberg's "jüdisch-deutsch" expressions were criticised and in Zülz where the rabbi is described as having a "Polnische Zunge mit deutscher Sprache". The *AZJ* also printed a scathing attack on the German grammar of Rabbi Bamberger of Würzburg.

<sup>31</sup> See Alexander Altmann, 'The New Style of Preaching in Nineteenth-Century German Jewry', in *Studies in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Intellectual History*, *op. cit.* pp. 65–116.

<sup>32</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 224–225.

<sup>33</sup> The Strzelno choir, for example, was sabotaged through lack of co-operation by parents in 1849 (*AZJ*, XIII, No. 17 [1849] p. 223).

<sup>34</sup> For example Bromberg (1838), Danzig-Mattenbuden (1838), Merzig (1842), Nordhausen (1844), Rödelheim (1838). In Altona even the strictly Orthodox S. Enoch led a memorial service for the King of Denmark at which a mixed choir sang. *AZJ*, II, No. 96

Sabbath, or holiday services. Before 1840 choirs were rarely found in the Eastern provinces of Poznań and Silesia, but were relatively common in the South, especially the Palatinate and other parts of Bavaria. In the early 1840s choirs were introduced in many more communities and after 1845 their introduction in East German communities became common. Mixed choirs were not very common; only about ten communities can be said with certainty to have had them by 1850. In many communities the choir was made up mainly of schoolboys.

Confirmations were somewhat less common than choirs. Before 1840 they (like the choirs) were most common in the South (Bavaria, especially the Palatinate, and Württemberg) and the central areas. After 1840 and especially after 1845, they began to be introduced in the provinces of Poznań and Silesia. At the same time that innovations were beginning to be introduced in the Eastern provinces, certain areas in South Germany were eliminating innovations they had previously introduced. Thus most communities in Bavarian Swabia, which had formerly had confirmations, omitted them by 1845, and, despite the Württemberg *Synagogenordnung* of 1838 which ordered the introduction of mixed choirs of schoolchildren, girls were not found in Württemberg choirs in the same year.<sup>35</sup> A general Orthodox counter-attack was noticeable by the late 1840s in parts of the South, centred in North Baden, North Württemberg and Western Bavaria (excluding the Palatinate.).

Some other moderate Reforms like the abolition of the auction of the call to the Torah were also reported from a number of communities. When we come to the more decided Reforms approved at the rabbinical conferences, we find they were less widespread. The abolition of the *kol nidre* prayer on Yom Kippur, which annulled religious vows for the coming year, did not directly challenge any basic tenet of Orthodox Judaism, though its replacement by an unrelated German prayer shocked the emotions of many. The *kol nidre* issue had special immediacy since the prayer was used as an excuse by anti-emancipation Christians for continuing the degrading special Jewish oath. Ironically one of the first to abolish *kol nidre* (although he restored it after a year or two) was the later leader of German separatist Orthodoxy Samson Raphael Hirsch in his capacity as Chief Rabbi of Oldenburg in 1839.<sup>36</sup> Other early communities to abolish *kol nidre* were Uehlfeld and Fürth, both in Bavaria. A number of communities represented at the rabbinical conferences abolished the prayer a few years later (between 1844 and 1846). In all, the Jewish press reported only about a dozen communities which had eliminated *kol nidre* by 1850.<sup>37</sup> The

(1838); II, No. 103 (1838); II, No. 133 (1838); IV, No. 6 (1840); VI, No. 37 (1842), p. 551; VIII, No. 22 (1844), p. 298.

<sup>35</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 7 (1845), p. 104; IX, No. 14 (1845), p. 216.

<sup>36</sup> *AZJ*, VI, No. 12 (1842), p. 170; II, No. 50 (1838); Michael (Hrsg.), *Heinrich Graetz. Tagebuch und Briefe, op. cit.*, p. 82 (Graetz claims credit in his diary for giving Hirsch the idea of abolishing *kol nidre*).

<sup>37</sup> They include Bernburg (1844), Braunschweig (1844), Dresden (1845), Frankfurt a. Main (1844), Fürth (1838), Langenschwalbach district (1846), Oldenburg (1839),

abolition of the second day of holidays was first introduced, at least in theory, by the Westphalian rabbi Joseph Friedländer in the 1830s; although a few communities went through with the abolition which was approved at the rabbinical conference of 1846, their number was still small in 1850. The three-year Torah reading cycle (to substitute for the traditional annual cycle) was only slightly more successful. A number of communities carried out this innovation between 1845 and 1850 mainly in Northern Germany; almost nowhere had it been attempted earlier.<sup>38</sup>

The most obvious sign of a Reform synagogue, however, was the introduction of organ accompaniment for Sabbath and holiday services. No other innovation was as likely to cause the Orthodox to withdraw and form separate synagogues; no other change was as sure a sign of Reform predominance. Introducing an organ required not only control of the community administration by the Reform party, but also the availability of the funds for purchasing an expensive instrument and installing it. Some communities waited until they built new synagogues to instal an organ; others purchased a less expensive harmonium. Only three German synagogues – the Hamburg Temple, the Temple of the “Berlin community” in Leipzig, and the Temple in Seesen – are known to have had organs in 1840. Germany had not moved any further in this matter than Jewish communities in such neighbouring countries as France, Belgium, Austria and Hungary. Between 1840 and 1850 the introduction of an organ was discussed in about fifteen additional communities;<sup>39</sup> only a few

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Randegg (1844), Mecklenburg-Schwerin (by 1850), Uehlfeld (by 1838), Weimar duchy (by 1837). *AZJ*, I, No. 28 (1837); II, No. 50 (1838); VI, No. 12 (1842), p. 170; VIII, No. 41 (1844), p. 577; IX, No. 6 (1845), p. 82; IX, No. 44 (1845), p. 661; XI, No. 22 (1847), p. 333; XIV, No. 6 (1850), p. 74. Adolf Eckstein's *Festschrift zur Einweihung der neuen Synagoge in Bamberg*, Bamberg 1910, pp. 74–75, seems to indicate that some rabbis of the Oberfranken province of Bavaria tried to abolish *kol nidre* in 1831 but it is not clear that this was actually carried out.

<sup>38</sup> The second day of holidays was abolished in Alzey (1846), Breslau (1846), Brilon (by 1842), Oberstein (1847). Its abolition was supported by Zacharias Frankel in Dresden and by the Baden *Landesverein zur Verbesserung der inneren und äusseren Zustände der Juden*. *AZJ*, X, No. 43 (1846), p. 629; X, No. 45 (1846), p. 656; X, No. 38 (1846), p. 576; XI, No. 3 (1847), p. 39; X, No. 45 (1846), p. 648. The three-year Torah cycle was introduced in the Hamburg Temple, Aachen (1851), Bernburg (1845), Breslau (1846), Buchau (1845–1846), Dannenberg (1849), Frankfurt a. Main (by 1848), Neukirchen bei Rietberg (1847) and various towns in Mecklenburg-Schwerin including Schwaan, Bützow, Wittenberg and Stavenhagen (1848). *AZJ*, VIII, No. 38 (1844), p. 532; IX, No. 51 (1845); X, No. 5 (1846), p. 68; XI, No. 11 (1847), p. 161; XI, No. 45 (1847); XI, No. 1 (1847) p. 1; XII, No. 10 (1848); XII, No. 28 (1848), p. 403; XII, No. 2 (1848), p. 25; XII, No. 12 (1848), p. 175.

<sup>39</sup> Discussions on introducing an organ took place in Bingen (1841), Buchau (1845), Burgkunstadt (1845), Darmstadt (1848), Frankfurt a. Main (1844), Fürth (1848), Hildburghausen (1844), Kassel, Münster (1848), Speyer (1850), Strelitz (1847) and in the Baden *Landesverein zur Verbesserung der inneren und äusseren Zustände der Juden*. *AZJ*, V, No. 45 (1841), p. 644; V, No. 25 (1841), p. 368; VIII, No. 45 (1844); VIII, No. 38 (1844), p. 532; IX, No. 47 (1845), p. 699; X, No. 31 (1846); X, No. 5 (1846), p. 68; XI,

introduced one during the decade, among them the Münster *Reformgemeinde* in 1848 and Speyer in 1850. Plans for organs were underway in Frankfurt a. Main and Fürth by the late 1840s. Many important communities in the Rhine valley (e.g. Aachen, Koblenz, Mainz, Heidelberg, Mannheim) introduced organs in the early 1850s. The pace continued to pick up so that by the turn of the century over 130 communities had organs or harmoniums.<sup>40</sup> Before 1850 the introduction of the organ was just beginning.

Within each community the introduction of innovations was a complex process which often led to conflict. Few large communities were without any widespread disagreement about the Reform question, but the strength of each side and the form of the conflict varied greatly from area to area. In some communities the lay communal leadership strongly supported Reform, but the city rabbi was staunchly Orthodox, and opposed any change. Such was the case in Frankfurt a. Main between 1839 when the Reform party gained control of the *Vorstand* and 1843 when the Reformer Leopold Stein was chosen as assistant rabbi (he soon succeeded to the chief rabbinate when Salomon Trier resigned in 1844). Similarly in such cities as Darmstadt, Münster, Königsberg, and Bonn, strong-willed Orthodox chief rabbis in the 1840s prevented changes desired by at least part of the Jewish community. In Münster this situation led to a split in the community in 1847 when the Reformers broke away and formed their own religious service under the leadership of *Prediger* Salomon Friedländer.<sup>41</sup> In other communities a "progressive" rabbi or preacher found himself in violent disagreement with most or part of his conservative community. This was the case in Mecklenburg-Schwerin and in Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach where the conflicts were especially acute.

In many communities, especially in the 1830s and early 1840s, innovations were introduced (or attempted) not by the rabbi, but by the new preacher hired alongside him. Many of the leaders of the rabbinical conferences began their careers in this position. Sometimes the relationship between the senior rabbi and his reformist assistant was good as, for instance, in Magdeburg where the rabbi accepted the Reforms of his assistant, or Braunschweig, where the Orthodox Egers and the Reformist Herzfeld were able to find compromises which enabled them to work in mutual respect. In some cases like Königsberg, the Orthodox rabbi (Mecklenburg) had to allow the *Prediger* (Saalschütz) some leeway in putting through innovations. In some towns, however, the conflict was bitter. Besides the well-known Geiger-Tiktin controversy, one can cite the case of Worms where the *Prediger* Adler attended all three Reform rabbinical

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No. 5 (1847), p. 74; XI, No. 20 (1847), p. 300; XII, No. 13 (1848), p. 193; XII, No. 42 (1848), p. 603; XIV, No. 8 (1850), p. 114.

<sup>40</sup> *Deutsch-israelitischer Gemeindebund, Statistisches Jahrbuch* 1898, p. 157, contains a list of communities with synagogue organs. The list is probably not complete. Such radical innovations as Sunday Sabbath services were introduced in a few widely scattered communities.

<sup>41</sup> *AZJ*, X, No. 52 (1846), p. 757; XII, No. 42 (1848), p. 603.

conferences, while the *Kreisrabbiner* Bamberger was one of those who worked and protested against them.<sup>42</sup>

The internal conflict in many large communities often led to outright schisms. Although we are accustomed to thinking that it was the Orthodox party which seceded from the general Jewish community, this was not always the case during the 1840s. Not only was the very oldest Reform Temple in Hamburg a private society, not a part of the official community, but so were many other Reform services. In towns where the Orthodox controlled the communal decision-making apparatus (e.g. Münster, Poznań, Berlin) Reformist associations formed their own separate prayer meetings. In areas where the Reformers gained control during the 1830s and 1840s (e.g. Mecklenburg, Frankfurt a. Main, Gleiwitz), the traditionalists often created similar Orthodox prayer meetings.<sup>43</sup> The most famous of these Orthodox societies, the Frankfurt *Israelitische Religionsgesellschaft* which later called Samson Raphael Hirsch to be its spiritual leader, has been the subject of some semi-legendary accounts about its founding by a handful of individuals. In 1850 when it was founded, the Orthodox forces in Frankfurt a. Main were not nearly as weak as the historians of the Hirschian community imply. They represented perhaps one-third of the local Jewish population and had the all-important support of the Rothschild family. Philippson's Frankfurt correspondent even calls the *Religionsgesellschaft* "die Rothschild Gemeinde".<sup>44</sup> Samson Raphael Hirsch's success in Frankfurt a. Main was not so much in winning back an almost lost community, but in preserving the loyalty to Orthodoxy of a part of one of Germany's best educated and bourgeois communities. In 1851 when Samson Hirsch came to Frankfurt, Reform was by no means all powerful in Germany; Hirsch slowed its advance but he did not reverse it.

The private religious societies generally began within the framework of the Jewish communal structure as special "party organisations". Even in this form their legality was precarious, since many communities forbade private religious services. The upheaval of the Revolution of 1848, while it did not usually favour either the Reform or the Orthodox party, did help break down the authority and monopoly of the Jewish communal administration. *Reformgesellschaften* or *Vereine* now became full-fledged *Reformgemeinden* whose members no longer paid taxes to the main community.<sup>45</sup> Some Jews used the opportunity to sever all tangible links with the Jewish community. Orthodox

<sup>42</sup> *AZJ*, III, No. 11 (1839); II, No. 82 (1838); VI, No. 31 (1842), p. 460; XI, No. 25 (1847), p. 378; IX, No. 22 (1845), p. 327.

<sup>43</sup> *AZJ*, X, No. 42 (1846), p. 603; XI, No. 42 (1847), p. 630; XII, No. 10 (1848), p. 148; XII, No. 13 (1848), pp. 191–197; XIII, No. 26 (1849), p. 347; XIV, No. 52 (1850), p. 712; XIV, No. 14 (1850), p. 184; XIV, No. 6 (1850), p. 69.

<sup>44</sup> *AZJ*, XIV, No. 14 (1850), p. 184; XIV, No. 47 (1850), p. 643; XV, No. 13 (1851), p. 147; XV, No. 27 (1851), p. 315.

<sup>45</sup> For example the Poznań *Bruderverein* and the Berlin *Reformgenossenschaft*. *AZJ*, XIV, No. 16 (1850), p. 209; XIV, No. 52 (1850), p. 712.

Jews used the breakdown in central authority to abandon Reforms forced on them by law and to work for the dissolution of central consistories.<sup>46</sup> The Revolution of 1848 dealt a death-blow to the plan to make the (Reform) rabbinical conferences an annual event. The Fourth Rabbinical Conference which was originally scheduled for the Summer of 1847 in Mannheim and which had been postponed to the Spring of 1848 had to be given up altogether. Though the idea of a synod of laymen and rabbis did receive some impetus from the Revolution, whose democratic ideal it seemed to fulfil, this idea, too, had to be abandoned after a few preliminary meetings.<sup>47</sup> The only real effect, then, which the Revolution had on Reform was to undermine most of the efforts for co-ordination, and to return the initiative to the individual community. No further attempt to hold a rabbinical conference or synod was made until the late 1860s.

Although Reform grew rapidly between 1850 and 1870, this does not mean that all communities changed in the same direction. In fact a two-fold process took place in the second half of the nineteenth century; this process was partly connected with the rapid migration to the city which set in during the last third of the century. As Reform became more and more predominant in the rapidly growing urban communities, it lost ground in rural communities in certain regions. This was caused by the fact that the "progressive-minded" were more likely to move to the cities, while the more conservative usually remained in villages and small towns. Thus the dichotomy between Reform urbanites and traditional villagers became the common pattern by 1900. A number of communities which sent rabbis to the Reform rabbinical conferences of the 1840s (e.g. Eschwege, Trier, Marburg) had Orthodox rabbis in the twentieth century.

Similarly certain regions were reconquered by the Orthodox forces. A clear case of this phenomenon is the Bavarian province of Unterfranken. In 1838 the province was divided into six rabbinical districts. Of the six rabbis appointed with government approval, three were Orthodox and the others more "progressive". Among the Orthodox rabbis chosen was Seligmann Baer Bamberger, rabbi of Würzburg, who was appointed despite his lack of university training. The Orthodox managed to unseat Rabbi Neuburger of Aschaffenburg in 1845; by 1880 all the rabbis of the province were Orthodox and Reform as a religious movement had disappeared from a province with over one hundred Jewish

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<sup>46</sup> For example, the Baden *Komité zur Auflösung des Oberraths* issued a circular in December 1848 calling for the election of rabbis and teachers (with the proviso that they be acceptable to leading Orthodox rabbis). There was also agitation in Württemberg against the *Synagogenordnung* and the *Oberkirchenbehörde*. *AZJ*, XIII, No. 3 (1849), p. 37; XII, No. 28 (1848), p. 400; XIV, No. 31 (1850), p. 427.

<sup>47</sup> *AZJ*, XII, No. 33 (1848), p. 470. On the synod see *AZJ*, XII, No. 30 (1848), p. 431; XII, No. 31 (1848), p. 439; XII, No. 33 (1848); XII, No. 38 (1848), p. 545; XII, No. 46 (1848), p. 658; XII, No. 47 (1848), p. 675; XII, No. 52 (1848), p. 759; XIII, No. 14 (1849), p. 184.

communities.<sup>48</sup> The fact that Bamberger's "reconquest" was so successful may help explain why he opposed S. R. Hirsch's plan for the Orthodox to leave the general *Gemeinde* and form separate communities in the 1870s. In his region Reform had lost all control over the communal apparatus; *Austritt* would have benefited only the non-Orthodox.

The phenomenon of the Orthodox "reconquest" was restricted mainly to Southern and Western Germany and to smaller and medium-sized towns. By the twentieth century, Prussia was the centre of the liberal movement, while parts of Bavaria, Württemberg and Hesse were bastions of Orthodoxy. The pattern of the early 1840s had partially reversed. The danger of inferring developments in the nineteenth century from their twentieth-century results should be obvious.

A picture of the place of the 1840s in the history of German Reform can perhaps best be given by the analogy of an upward curve. The period before 1823 would show an upswing which was mainly reversed between 1823 and 1836. When the "graph" begins to rise again it is at first almost imperceptible. The 1840s were the "turning point" during which the speed of change accelerated rapidly. Although change by 1850 was very small compared to what it would be in later years, the crucial point had been reached. Reform could no longer be suppressed; it was already on the way towards taking over the majority of German Jewry. This majority was not achieved until almost a generation later, but the direction of change had been made unmistakably clear.

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<sup>48</sup> Berthold Strauss. *The Rosenbaums of Zell*, London 1962, pp. 20–21; *AZJ*, IX, No. 17 (1845), p. 255.

## Appendix



TABLE I

*Participants in the Rabbinical Conferences 1844–1846*

<i>Name</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Community</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Birth date</i>
ADLER, Abraham Isaac	Hess.- Darmstadt	Worms	Prediger	1813
ADLER, Samuel	Hess.- Darmstadt	Alzey	Kreisrabb.	1804
AUERBACH, Jacob	Frankfurt	Frankfurt	Prediger, Lehrer	24 Nov. 1810
BEN ISRAEL	Prussia	Koblenz	Prediger	1819
BODENHEIMER, Levi	Hanover	Hildesheim	Landrabb.	13 Dec. 1807
EDLER	Prussia	Minden	Prediger	
EINHORN, David	Oldenburg	Hoppstätten (Birkenfeld)	Landrabb.	10 Nov. 1809
FORMSTECHE, Salomon	Hess.- Darmstadt	Offenbach	Oberrabb.	28 July 1808
FRANKEL, Zacharias	Saxony	Dresden	Oberrabb.	30 Sept. 1801
FRANKFURTER, Naftali	Hamburg	Hamburg Temple	Prediger	13 Febr. 1810
GEIGER, Abraham	Prussia	Breslau	Rabbiner	24 May 1810
GOLDMANN, Philipp	Hess.- Kassel	Eschwege	Kreisrabb.	1808
GOLDSTEIN	Mecklenburg- Schwerin	Waren	Prediger	
GOSEN, Moses Salomon	Hess.- Kassel	Marburg	Provinzial- rabbiner	1780
GÜLDENSTEIN, Michael	Württemberg	Buchau		16 Sept. 1814
HEIDENHEIM, Philipp	Schwarzburg- Sondershausen	Sondershausen	Prediger	14 June 1814
HERXHEIMER, Salomon	Anhalt- Bernburg	Bernburg	Landrabb.	6 Febr. 1801
HERZFELD, Levi	Braunschweig	Braunschweig	Landrabb.	27 Dec. 1810
HESS, Mendel	Sachsen- Weimar	Stadt- lengsfeld	Landrabb.	17 Mar. 1807
HIRSCH, Samuel A.	Luxembourg	Luxembourg	Landrabb.	8 June 1809

<i>Birth place</i>	<i>Date of first position</i>	<i>Date of current appt.</i>	<i>Conferences attended</i>	<i>Docto- rate</i>	<i>Population of community</i>	
					<i>Total</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
Worms		1842	1, 2, 3	yes	9,100 <sup>1</sup>	889 <sup>2</sup>
Worms	1836	1842	1, 2, 3	yes	4,800 <sup>1</sup>	364 <sup>3</sup>
Emmendingen			2, 3	yes	58,440 <sup>5</sup>	3,262 <sup>4</sup>
Karlsruhe	1831	1843 1831	1, 2, 3 1		23,431 <sup>5</sup> 14,734 <sup>1</sup>	415 <sup>6</sup> 513 <sup>7</sup>
Dispeck	1840	1842	1 2, 3	yes	12,782 <sup>5</sup> 1,395 <sup>9</sup>	193 <sup>8</sup>
Offenbach	1832	1842	1, 2, 3	yes	13,000 <sup>1</sup>	1,081 <sup>10</sup>
Prague	1831	1836	2	yes	94,000 <sup>1</sup>	644 <sup>11</sup>
Oberdorf	1836	1840	1	yes	155,000 <sup>11</sup>	10,000 <sup>1</sup>
Frankfurt a. Main	1832	1838	1, 2, 3	yes	112,194 <sup>5</sup>	7,384 <sup>1</sup>
Wanfried an der Werra	1831	1831	1 3		9,001 <sup>7</sup> 6,389 <sup>7</sup>	236 <sup>12</sup>
Kirchhain		1802	2, 3		8,428 <sup>1</sup>	98 <sup>12</sup>
Sontheim		1841	2, 3	yes	2,292 <sup>13</sup>	643 <sup>14</sup>
Bleicherode		1837	1		5,117 <sup>1</sup>	186 <sup>15</sup>
Dotzheim	1827	1831	1, 2, 3	yes	10,000 <sup>1</sup>	
Ellrich/Harz		1842	1, 2, 3	yes	37,000 <sup>1</sup>	286 <sup>3</sup>
Lengsfeld		1827	1, 2, 3	yes	2,091 <sup>13</sup>	
Thalfang bei Trier	1838	1841	1, 2	yes	12,170 <sup>1</sup>	

<i>Name</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Community</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Birth date</i>
HOCHSTÄDTER, Benjamin	Nassau	Langenschwalbach	Prediger	1810
HOFFMANN, Joseph	Sachsen-Meiningen-Hildburghausen	Walldorf	Landrabb.	1806
HOLDHEIM, Samuel	Mecklenburg-Schwerin	Schwerin	Landrabb.	1806
JOLOWICZ, Heymann	Prussia	Marienwerder Kulm Köslin	Prediger	23 Aug. 1816
JOST, Isaak Markus	Frankfurt	Frankfurt	Prediger	22 Feb. 1793
KAHN, Joseph	Prussia	Trier	Oberrabb.	2 Sept. 1809
KLEIN, Joseph	Prussia	Stolp		
LEVY, Moritz Abraham	Prussia	Breslau	Lehrer	11 Mar. 1817
LEVY, Loebel	Prussia	Münsterberg		
LOEWENGARD, Maier Hirsch	Württemberg	Lehrensteinfeld	Rabbiner	5 Mar. 1813
MAIER, Joseph von	Württemberg	Stuttgart	Kirchenrat & Landrabb.	Apr. 1797
PHILIPPSON, Ludwig	Prussia	Magdeburg	Rabbiner	28 Dec. 1811
PICK, David	Austria	Teplitz	Kreisrabb.	1805
REISS, M.	Baden	Breisach		
SALOMON, Gotthold	Hamburg	Hamburg Temple	Prediger	1 Nov. 1784
SCHOTT, Leopold	Baden	Randegg	Rabbiner	1807
SOBERNHEIM, Isaak	Hess.-Darmstadt	Bingen	Rabbiner	1807
STEIN, Leopold	Frankfurt	Frankfurt	Rabbiner	5 Nov. 1810
SÜSSKIND, Samuel	Nassau	Wiesbaden	Rabbiner	1811
TREUENFELS, Abraham	Nassau	Weilburg	Rabbiner	16 Dec. 1818
WAGNER, Hayum	Baden	Mannheim	Klausrabb.	
WECHSLER, Bernhard	Oldenburg	Oldenburg		1807

<i>Birth place</i>	<i>Date of first position</i>	<i>Date of current appt.</i>	<i>Conferences attended</i>	<i>Doct-rate</i>	<i>Population of community</i>	
					<i>Total</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
Hürben	1833	1845	2	yes	3,242 <sup>13</sup>	138 <sup>14</sup>
			1, 2		2,700 <sup>13</sup>	537 <sup>16</sup>
Kempen	1836	1840	1, 2, 3	yes	18,000 <sup>1</sup>	303 <sup>17</sup>
Santomischel			1, 2, 3	yes	6,700 <sup>1</sup> 9,937 <sup>7</sup> 11,000 <sup>1</sup>	492 <sup>7</sup>
Bernburg		1835	2	yes	58,440 <sup>5</sup>	3,262 <sup>4</sup>
Wawern bei Trier		1841	1, 2, 3		19,639 <sup>5</sup>	232 <sup>14</sup>
Memelsdorf		1841	1	yes	10,079 <sup>5</sup>	
Altona			3		112,194 <sup>5</sup>	7,384 <sup>1</sup>
		1830	3		5,000 <sup>1</sup>	213 <sup>14</sup>
Rexingen		1844	2, 3		807 <sup>13</sup>	124 <sup>14</sup>
Fruchtlingen bei Tübingen	1834	1838	1, 2	yes	45,000 <sup>1</sup>	230 <sup>14</sup>
Dessau		1833	1, 2, 3	yes	55,816 <sup>5</sup>	559 <sup>8</sup>
Tschkin			3		4,000 <sup>1</sup>	
			2		3,400 <sup>1</sup>	572 <sup>12</sup>
Sandersleben	1802	1818	1, 2, 3		155,000 <sup>11</sup>	10,000 <sup>1</sup>
Randegg			1, 2		800 <sup>13</sup>	289 <sup>18</sup>
		1839	1, 2, 3	yes	6,320 <sup>1</sup>	420 <sup>19</sup>
Burgpreppach	1834	1843	2, 3		58,440 <sup>5</sup>	3,262 <sup>4</sup>
Kirchheimbolanden	1843	1844	2	yes	13,695 <sup>5</sup>	247 <sup>20</sup>
Detmold		1844	2		3,602 <sup>7</sup>	67 <sup>20</sup>
		c. 1838	2, 3		27,000 <sup>21</sup>	1,483 <sup>20</sup>
Schwabach		1841	1, 2, 3		9,400 <sup>1</sup>	

TABLE II  
*Orthodox Protesters against First Rabbinical Conference 1844*  
*(German Rabbis only)*

<i>Name</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Community</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Birth date</i>
ADLER, Abraham	Bavaria	Burgpreppach	Distr.-Rabb.	
ADLER, Nathan Marcus	Hanover	Hanover	Landrabb.	15 Jan. 1803
AUERBACH, Abraham	Prussia	Bonn	Rabbiner emeritus	1763
AUERBACH, Aron	Prussia	Bonn	Rabbiner	
AUERBACH, Benjamin Hirsch	Hesse- Darmstadt	Darmstadt	Landrabb.	22 June 1808
BAMBERGER, Jacob	Hesse- Darmstadt	Worms	Kreisrabb.	1785
BAMBERGER, Seligmann Baer	Bavaria	Würzburg	Distr.-Rabb.	6 Nov. 1807
BOEHEIM, Abraham	Bavaria	Gunzenshausen	Distr.-Rabb.	1767
BUTTENWIESER, J.L.	Bavaria	Wasser- trüdingen	Distr.-Rabb.	
DISPECKER, Simon	Bavaria	Beiersdorf	Distr.-Rabb.	
EGERS, Joseph	Prussia	Halberstadt	Rabbiner	
ELIASON, Valentin Scheyer	Mecklenburg- Strelitz	Strelitz	Landrabb.	
ELLINGER, Leon (called Löb Schnadig)	Hesse- Darmstadt	Mainz	Rabb.- verweser	1770
EMDEN, Haim Joseph	Bavaria	Pappenheim	Distr.-Rabb.	1754
ETTLINGER, Jakob Aaron	Denmark	Altona	Oberrabb.	1798
FRENKEL, Meier	Hesse-Kassel	Witzenhausen	Kreisrabb.	1813
FRIEDBERG(ER), Isaak	Baden	Mosbach	Bezirkrabb.	
FUERST, Salomon	Baden	Heidelberg	Bezirkrabb.	1792
GUNZENHAUSEN, Isaac Hirsch	Bavaria	Binswangen	Rabbiner	
HIRSCH, Joseph	Prussia	Kreutznach	Rabbiner	
HIRSCH, Samson Raphael	Hanover	Emden	Landrabb.	1808
HOCHHEIM, Isaac Moses	Bavaria	Ichenhausen	Rabbiner	1790
JOSAPHAT, Gerson	Prussia	Halberstadt	Rabbiner	
LANDAUER, Joseph	Bavaria	Fischach	Rabbiner	

<i>Birth place</i>	<i>Date of first position</i>	<i>Date of current position</i>	<i>Docto- rate</i>	<i>Population of community</i>	
				<i>Total</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
		1838		548 <sup>1</sup>	166 <sup>1</sup>
Hanover	1827	1830	yes	26,896 <sup>2</sup>	710 <sup>3</sup>
Buxweiler, Alsace		1809		17,223 <sup>4</sup>	536 <sup>5</sup>
		1839?	yes	17,223 <sup>4</sup>	536 <sup>5</sup>
Neuwied	1834	1834		29,000 <sup>6</sup>	532 <sup>7</sup>
Neckar- bischofsheim		1824		9,100 <sup>6</sup>	889 <sup>8</sup>
Wiesenbronn	1840	1840		26,814 <sup>9</sup>	425 <sup>9</sup>
		1821		2,600 <sup>10</sup>	270 <sup>10</sup>
				1,775 <sup>24</sup>	132 <sup>11</sup>
				1,550 <sup>10</sup>	440 <sup>10</sup>
		1824		19,159 <sup>4</sup>	324 <sup>9</sup>
		1825		3,236 <sup>28</sup>	158 <sup>28</sup>
		1830		46,000 <sup>6</sup>	2,134 <sup>4</sup>
				2,080 <sup>12</sup>	259 <sup>12</sup>
Karlsruhe		1836		32,200	2,350 <sup>1</sup>
				3,171 <sup>28</sup>	175 <sup>13</sup>
				3,258 <sup>28</sup>	190 <sup>14</sup>
				c. 17,500 <sup>26</sup>	c. 350 <sup>15</sup>
				980 <sup>10</sup>	300 <sup>10</sup>
				10,928 <sup>27</sup>	506 <sup>17</sup>
Hamburg	1830	1841		12,000 <sup>6</sup>	c. 500 <sup>16</sup>
Ansbach		1828		2,409 <sup>1</sup>	737 <sup>1</sup>
Kassel?		1836	yes	19,159 <sup>4</sup>	324 <sup>9</sup>
				720 <sup>1</sup>	284 <sup>1</sup>

<i>Name</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Community</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Birth date</i>
LEVIAN, Matthias	Prussia	Halberstadt	Rabbiner	
LOEWENSTEIN, J.	Baden	Gailingen	Bezirkrabb.	
LIPSCHUETZ, Israel	Prussia	Danzig	Oberrabb.	1782
MAYER, Mayer	Bavaria	Altenstadt & Osterberg	Rabbiner	
MECKLENBURG, Jacob Hirsch	Prussia	Königsberg	Oberrabb.	1785
MUNK, Michael Levin	Prussia	Danzig	Oberrabb.	
SAENGER, Jonas	Bavaria	Buttenwiesen	Rabbiner	
SCHWARZ, Haim	Bavaria	Hürben	Rabbiner	24 Aug. 1800
SELIGSBERG, Marx Heyum	Bavaria	Fellheim	Rabbiner	c. 1799
STAADACKER, Zacharias	Baden	Merchingen	Rabbiner	21 July 1799
STRASSER, Laser	Prussia	Neustadt a. d. Warthe	Oberrabb.	
SUTRO, Abraham	Prussia	Münster	Oberrabb.	5 July 1784
THALHEIMER, Faust Loeb	Bavaria	Markt Steft	Rabbiner	
TRAUB, Hirsch	Baden	Mannheim	Stadtrabb.	
TRIER, Salomon Abraham	Frankfurt a. Main	Frankfurt	Rabbiner	1756
WECHSLER, Abraham	Bavaria	Schwabach	Distr.-Rabb.	1797
WETZLAR, Marcus Gerson (Mordechai)	Hesse-Kassel	Gudensberg		

Notes to Table I: <sup>1</sup>1850    <sup>2</sup>1837    <sup>3</sup>1855    <sup>4</sup>1848    <sup>5</sup>1846    <sup>6</sup>1858    <sup>7</sup>1880  
<sup>8</sup>1840    <sup>9</sup>1930    <sup>10</sup>1828    <sup>11</sup>1840    <sup>12</sup>1835    <sup>13</sup>1930    <sup>14</sup>1843    <sup>15</sup>1871  
(entire principality)    <sup>16</sup>1833    <sup>17</sup>1845    <sup>18</sup>1825    <sup>19</sup>1828    <sup>20</sup>1842    <sup>21</sup>1861

<i>Birth place</i>	<i>Date of first position</i>	<i>Date of current position</i>	<i>Docto- rate</i>	<i>Population of community</i>	
				<i>Total</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
Poland		1824		19,159 <sup>4</sup>	324 <sup>9</sup>
		1829		1,324 <sup>17</sup>	672 <sup>17</sup>
Emden?	bef. 1821	1837		66,827 <sup>4</sup>	2,467 <sup>9</sup>
		1835		955 <sup>1</sup>	250 <sup>18</sup>
				647 <sup>1</sup>	94 <sup>1</sup>
Inowraclaw				75,234 <sup>4</sup>	1,688 <sup>17</sup>
		1824		66,827 <sup>4</sup>	2,467 <sup>9</sup>
		1831		806 <sup>1</sup>	344 <sup>1</sup>
		1828		1,227 <sup>19</sup>	576 <sup>20</sup>
Beiersdorf		1830		595 <sup>1</sup>	211 <sup>1</sup>
				901 <sup>24</sup>	325 <sup>6</sup>
				1,187 <sup>28</sup>	548 <sup>2</sup>
Bruck, Bavaria	1814	1815		24,193 <sup>4</sup>	
		1840		1,310 <sup>10</sup>	75 <sup>10</sup>
		1824		27,000 <sup>25</sup>	1,483 <sup>23</sup>
				58,440 <sup>4</sup>	3,262 <sup>22</sup>
		1815?		7,160 <sup>10</sup>	250 <sup>10</sup>
		1830?		2,500 <sup>24</sup>	122 <sup>21</sup>

Notes to Table II: <sup>1</sup>1867 <sup>2</sup>1845 <sup>3</sup>1855 <sup>4</sup>1846 <sup>5</sup>1871 <sup>6</sup>1850 <sup>7</sup>1828-30 <sup>8</sup>1837  
<sup>9</sup>1840 <sup>10</sup>1837 <sup>11</sup>1852 <sup>12</sup>1832 <sup>13</sup>1835 <sup>14</sup>1865 <sup>15</sup>1827 <sup>16</sup>1808 <sup>17</sup>1843  
<sup>18</sup>1854 <sup>19</sup>1871 <sup>20</sup>1839 <sup>21</sup>1835 <sup>22</sup>1848 <sup>23</sup>1842 <sup>24</sup>1930 <sup>25</sup>1861 <sup>26</sup>1827  
<sup>27</sup>1858 <sup>28</sup>1880



TABLE III  
*Comparisons between Participants in (Reform) Rabbinical  
 Conferences and Orthodox Protesters*

<i>a. States represented</i>	<i>Reform individuals at conference</i>	<i>Reform communities represented</i>	<i>Orthodox individual protesters</i>	<i>Orthodox communities represented</i>
States with total population above 1,000,000:				
Prussia	9	10	11	7
Bavaria	– (7 who wished to at- tend forbidden by government)	–	15	15
Hanover	1	1	2	2
Baden	3	3	5	5
Württemberg	3	3	–	–
Saxony	1	1	–	–
(Austro-Hungary)	1	1	26	(24)
(Denmark)	–	–	1	(1)
<hr/>				
Total (without Austria)	17	18	34	30
(with Austria)	18	19	60	54
<hr/>				
States with population between 400,000 and 1,000,000:				
Hesse-Darmstadt	4	4	3	3
Hesse-Kassel	2	2	2	2
Mecklenburg-Schwerin	2	2	–	–
Nassau	3	3	–	–
<hr/>				
Total	11	11	5	5
<hr/>				
States with fewer than 400,000 inhabitants:				
Mecklenburg-Strelitz	–	–	1	1
Frankfurt a. Main	3	1	1	1
Hamburg	2	1	–	–
Schwarzburg- Sondershausen	1	1	–	–
Anhalt-Bernburg	1	1	–	–
Braunschweig	1	1	–	–
Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach	1	1	–	–
Luxembourg	1	1	–	–
Sachsen-Meiningen- Hildburghausen	1	1	–	–
Oldenburg	2	2	–	–
<hr/>				
Total – small states	13	10	2	2
<hr/>				
Overall total (without Austria)	41	39	41	37
(with Austria)	42	40	67	61

*b. Birthdates*

	<i>Reformers at conference</i>	<i>Orthodox protesters</i>
before 1780	1	5
1781–1790	1	4
1791–1800	2	7
1801–1805	4	1
1806–1810	18	3
1811–1815	6	1
after 1816	4	–
Total whose birthdate is known	36	21

*c. Year of current appointment*

before 1820	2	3
1821–1830	1	14
1831–1835	7	3
1836–1840	7	7
after 1841	16	1
Total whose date of current appointment is known	33	28

*d. Size of community – General population*

	<i>Reform individuals at conference</i>	<i>Reform communities represented</i>	<i>Orthodox individual protesters</i>	<i>Orthodox communities represented</i>
above 50,000	9	5	4	3
20,001–50,000	4	4	7	7
10,001–20,000	7	8	7	4
5,001–10,000	10	11	3	3
2,001–5,000	9	9	7	7
under 2,000	3	3	13	13
Total	42	40	41	37

*e. Jewish population*

above 1000	9	5	7	6
501–1000	7	7	10	9
301–500	4	4	9	7
201–300	7	7	7	7
101–200	4	4	6	6
51–100	2	2	1	1
under 50	–	–	–	–
Total	33	29	40	36

TABLE IV  
*Summary of Synagogenordnungen*

	Westphalia 1810	Baden 1824	Munich 1826	Bendorf 1828	Koblenz 1832	Rodalben 1832	Mittelfranken 1838
<i>Category 1: "Policing regulations"</i>							
Private services forbidden	X	X					X
No children under the age of:	4	5	4	4	4	pre-school	4
Surveillance of private religious lectures (shiurim)							
Early service (Hashkome) forbidden							
<i>Category 2: Folk practices forbidden</i>							
No swaying during prayer		X					X
No loud praying along with cantor	X	X	X		X	X	X
No Hamansklopfen (noisemaking during reading of Book of Esther)	X	X	X			implied	X
No leaving seat to kiss Torah		X				X	
No disturbances (Unfug) on Tisha B'Av (Fast of 9th of Av)						X	
No disturbances (Unfug) on Simchath Torah		X				X	
No disturbances (Unfug) on Hoshana Rabba (7th day of Sukkot) & no noisy beating of willow branches						X	X only cantor may beat willow
No penitential flagellation (Malkoth) on eve of Yom Kippur						X	X
No Mahnführen (throwing wheat before a wedding)						X not in synagogue	X
No appearing in stockinged feet on Tisha B'av							X
Priests (Kohanim) not to be in stockinged feet for blessing the people			X only slippers				X
No loud kissing of Tsitsit (fringes)							X
No putting on Tefilin in synagogue itself (only vestibule)							X
No special singing of prayers (Smeichim Betzetam) for woman who emerged from confinement after giving birth							X

	Württemberg 1838	Edenkoben 1841	Birkenfeld 1843	Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1843	Sachsen-Meiningen-Hildburghausen 1844	Meisenheim 1848
<i>Category 1: "Policing regulations"</i>						
Private services forbidden	X		X	X		
No children under the age of:	boys 6 girls 9	pre-school	pre-school	boys 6 girls 9	9	pre-school
Surveillance of private religious lectures (shiurim)	X		X	X	forbidden in private houses	
Early service (Hashkome) forbidden				X		
<i>Category 2: Folk practices forbidden</i>						
No swaying during prayer			X			
No loud praying along with cantor	X	X	X	X	X	
No Hamansklopfen (noisemaking during reading of Book of Esther)	X				X	
No leaving seat to kiss Torah	X	X		X	X	
No disturbances (Unfug) on Tisha B'Av (Fast of 9th of Av)					X	
No disturbances (Unfug) on Simchath Torah				X	X	
No disturbances (Unfug) on Hoshana Rabba (7th day of Sukkot) & no noisy beating of willow branches	X		X	X	X	
No penitential flagellation (Malkoth) on eve of Yom Kippur	X		X	X	X	
No Mahnführen (throwing wheat before a wedding)	X		X		X only at home	
No appearing in stockinged feet on Tisha B'av	X		X or Yom Kippur	X but slippers allowed	X no removing shoes	
Priests (Kohanim) not to be in stockinged feet for blessing the people						
No loud kissing of Tsitsit (fringes)		X	X		X	
No putting on Tefilin in synagogue itself (only vestibule)						
No special singing of prayers (Smeichim Betzetam) for woman who emerged from confinement after giving birth	X only "recitando"			X sung by choir		

	Westphalia 1810	Baden 1824	Munich 1826	Bendorf 1828	Koblenz 1832	Rodalben 1832	Mittelfranken 1838
No kissing ark curtain on arriving in synagogue							
No covering the couple with a prayer shawl at weddings							
No breaking a glass at weddings							
No wearing torn clothes (in mourning) on the Sabbath							
No uncovered arm when wearing Tefilin							
No bringing palm branch (Lulav) to the women's gallery during the service							
No putting on white shrouds (Sargenes) in synagogue itself (only vestibule)							
Low seats on the fast of the 9th of Av						no sacks	not on floor
Only cantor may shake palm branch							
No dancing with bride by women during morning service							
No jesters at wedding		X					
No mourners at door of synagogue on Friday night							
No leaving synagogue during memorial service by persons whose parents were alive							
<i>Category 2 A: Limitation of participation to rabbi or cantor</i>							
Only rabbi can correct mistakes in Torah reading			X				
Only rabbi may say blessings at weddings						X	X
Only cantor may lead service							X
Only cantor may say Haftara							
<i>Category 3: Prohibitions of public display of Jewish ceremonies and folk customs</i>							
Tearing clothes in mourning allowed only at home							
No wearing Kirchenkleider (prayer shawls?) in street		X					

	Württemberg 1838	Edenkoben 1841	Birkenfeld 1843	Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1843	Sachsen-Meiningen-Hildburghausen 1844	Meisenheim 1848
No kissing ark curtain on arriving in synagogue	X			X	X	
No covering the couple with a prayer shawl at weddings	X				X	
No breaking a glass at weddings	X			X	X	
No wearing torn clothes (in mourning) on the Sabbath			X			
No uncovered arm when wearing Tefilin			X			X
No bringing palm branch (Lulav) to the women's gallery during the service			X			
No putting on white shrouds (Sargenes) in synagogue itself (only vestibule)			X			
Low seats on the fast of the 9th of Av			no sacks	only stools	no low seats	
Only cantor may shake palm branch				X	X	
No dancing with bride by women during morning service					X	
No jesters at wedding						
No mourners at door of synagogue on Friday night					X	
No leaving synagogue during memorial service by persons whose parents were alive				X		
<i>Category 2 A: Limitation of participation to rabbi or cantor</i>						
Only rabbi can correct mistakes in Torah reading	X	X	X	X	X	
Only rabbi may say blessings at weddings	X		X	X		
			only person per forming ceremony			
Only cantor may lead service	X	X	X	X		X
Only cantor may say Haftara			X	X		
<i>Category 3: Prohibitions of public display of Jewish ceremonies and folk customs</i>						
Tearing clothes in mourning allowed only at home	X			X	X	
No wearing Kirchenkleider (prayer shawls?) in street		X				

	Westphalia 1810	Baden 1824	Munich 1826	Bendorf 1828	Koblenz 1832	Rodalben 1832	Mittelfranken 1838
No special Jewish costume for attending synagogue (e.g. barette)					X		X (or special coat)
No knocking on doors or calling in streets to announce beginning of prayers (Schulklopfen)					X	X	X
Rules for decorum in public funerals						X	
No women at burials							
No blessing the new moon in the street							
<i>Category 4: Liturgical changes</i>							
Tochacha (Biblical portion containing curses for disobedience) to be read aloud							X
Shir Hayihud not said on weekdays							X
Bame Madlikin (Talmudic passage about candlelighting) not said							X
Piutim (religious poetry) abridged							X
Av Haraḥamim (prayer for revenge for martyrs) eliminated							X
No memern (reciting prayers for martyrs from Memorbuch)							
No mystical "Yehi Ratson" on Hoshana Rabba							X
No "Yehi Ratson" on Rosh Hoshana or Sukkot							X
Passage asking revenge "Avinu Malkenu Nekom" eliminated from Avinu Malkenu							X
Sermon explaining book of Lamentations on Fast of 9th of Av							X
Limitation on elegies (Kinot) recited on 9th of Av							X
Rules concerning penitential prayers (Selichoth)							X

	Württemberg 1838	Edenkoben 1841	Birkenfeld 1843	Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1843	Sachsen-Meiningen-Hildburghausen 1844	Meisenheim 1848
No special Jewish costume for attending synagogue (e.g. barette)	X			X		
No knocking on doors or calling in streets to announce beginning of prayers (Schulklopfen)	X		X	X	X	
Rules for decorum in public funerals	X		X	X	X	X
No women at burials	X		women permitted	X		
No blessing the new moon in the street					X	
<i>Category 4: Liturgical changes</i>						
Tochacha (Biblical portion containing curses for disobedience) to be read aloud	X		X	X		
Shir Hayihud not said on weekdays	X only on Yom Kippur		X	X only on Yom Kippur		
Bame Madlikin (Talmudic passage about candlelighting) not said				only before service		
Piutim (religious poetry) abridged	X		X	X	X	
Av Haraamim (prayer for revenge for martyrs) eliminated	X		X	abridged		
No memern (reciting prayers for martyrs from Memorbuch)	X		German prayer instead			
No mystical "Yehi Ratson" on Hoshana Rabba			X			
No "Yehi Ratson" on Rosh Hoshana or Sukkot			X	X		
Passage asking revenge "Avinu Malkenu Nekom" eliminated from Avinu Malkenu	X		X	X		
Sermon explaining book of Lamentations on Fast of 9th of Av	X		X to reconcile it with patriotism	X		
Limitation on elegies (Kinot) recited on 9th of Av	X		X	X		
Rules concerning penitential prayers (Selichoth)	X		X	X		



	Westphalia 1810	Baden 1824	Munich 1826	Bendorf 1828	Koblenz 1832	Rodalben 1832	Mittelfranken 1838
Song of Songs on Passover; and other books read on holidays							
Ezehu Mekoman (Talmudic passage about sacrifices) eliminated							
Prayer against slanderers changed to against slander (Velamalshinut in Amidah)							
Tachanun abridged							X
Words Siman Tov Umazal Tov (with good luck) eliminated from marriage ceremony							
Akdmut (poetic insertion in Ten Commandments text) eliminated							X
<i>Category 5: Regulations for greater dignity and formality</i>							
Robes for rabbis or cantors		X	X				X
Regulations for precedence in calling to the Torah (Hiuvim)			X				
Pews installed to replace moveable stands							X
Youths not permitted to take Torah from Ark on Simchath Torah		X					
Rules concerning the Torah procession			X				X
No children in procession with palm branch			X				
Women must have covered heads			X				
Hats required on Sabbath (not caps)			X		X	X	X
No jackets (Jacke)				X	X		
Kaddish to be said in unison by all mourners							
<i>Category 6: Regulations concerning music</i>							
No secular melodies allowed		X					X
No bass and soprano Beisänger	X	X					
Choir instituted		X boys					X boys

	Württemberg 1838	Edenkoben 1841	Birkenfeld 1843	Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1843	Sachsen-Meiningen-Hildburghausen 1844	Meisenheim 1848
Song of Songs on Passover; and other books read on holidays	only after service			only after service		
Ezehu Mekoman (Talmudic passage about sacrifices) eliminated				X		
Prayer against slanderers changed to against slander (Velamalshinut in Amidah)				X		
Tachanun abridged			X	X		
Words Siman Tov Umazal Tov (with good luck) eliminated from marriage ceremony				X		
Akdamut (poetic insertion in Ten Commandments text) eliminated			X			
<i>Category 5: Regulations for greater dignity and formality</i>						
Robes for rabbis or cantors	X		X	X		
Regulations for precedence in calling to the Torah (Hiuvim)	X		X	X	X	X
Pews installed to replace moveable stands			X		X	
Youths not permitted to take Torah from Ark on Simchath Torah						
Rules concerning the Torah procession	X		X	X		X
No children in procession with palm branch						
Women must have covered heads						
Hats required on Sabbath (not caps)						X
No jackets (Jacke)						
Kaddish to be said in unison by all mourners	X				X	
<i>Category 6: Regulations concerning music</i>						
No secular melodies allowed	X		X	X	X	
No bass and soprano Beisänger				X		
Choir instituted	X child- ren	X boys	X boys & girls	X child- ren	X	X child- ren

	Westphalia 1810	Baden 1824	Munich 1826	Bendorf 1828	Koblenz 1832	Rodalben 1832	Mittelfranken 1838
No chanting between words by the cantor							X
<i>Category 7: Introduction of German</i>							
German sermons		X weekly			X monthly		X specific occasions
Prayer for government in German		X	X		no, Hebrew	X	?
German songs and prayers added to regular service							
<i>Category 8: Miscellaneous</i>							
Auction of honours and call to Torah forbidden		X	permitted				X in synagogue building
No saying yasher koach (thank you) after an honour in the synagogue			said only by syn. administrators				X
Call to Torah without mentioning names							
Use of family names in call to the Torah	X		X				
Cut in number of blessings (mi sheberachs) on call to the Torah		X	X only 3 names				X only 2 names
No additions to the usual 7 called to the Torah on the Sabbath		X 3 are permitted					
No calling of boys to Torah on Simchath Torah (kol hanorim)							X
No waiting for rabbi to complete the Shema before continuing prayers	X						
No waiting for a quorum (minyan) before beginning prayers							
No Psalms beyond the usual to be recited							
Unmarried girls permitted in synagogue		X					X
Confirmations introduced		X public exam.					

	Württemberg 1838	Edenkoben 1841	Birkenfeld 1843	Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1843	Sachsen-Meiningen-Hildburghausen 1844	Meisenheim 1848
No chanting between words by the cantor			X			
<i>Category 7: Introduction of German</i>						
German sermons	X weekly		X	X monthly	X bi-weekly	
Prayer for government in German	X new prayer		X	X bi-lingual		
German songs and prayers added to regular service	X		X	X		
<i>Category 8: Miscellaneous</i>						
Auction of honours and call to Torah forbidden	X in synagogue	X	X	X in synagogue building	X	X
No saying yasher koach (thank you) after an honour in the synagogue				X	X	X
Call to Torah without mentioning names				X		
Use of family names in call to the Torah						
Cut in number of blessings (mi sheberachs) on call to the Torah	X		X only 2 names	X only 1 name	X only 1 name	X only 1 name
No additions to the usual 7 called to the Torah on the Sabbath			X	X		
No calling of boys to Torah on Simchath Torah (kol hanorim)	X		X	X		
No waiting for rabbi to complete the Shema before continuing prayers	X			X		
No waiting for a quorum (minyan) before beginning prayers	X		X	X		
No Psalms beyond the usual to be recited	X			X		
Unmarried girls permitted in synagogue			X		X	
Confirmations introduced	X		X	X	X	

	Westphalia 1810	Baden 1824	Munich 1826	Bendorf 1828	Koblenz 1832	Rodalben 1832	Mittelfranken 1838
Limits on Torah reading by Bar Mitzvah		X must prove ability			X 1 Torah portion only		
Catechism lessons ordered		X school book					X
Boys to be called to Torah on day of confirmation							
No changing of seats during year of mourning					X		
No changing seats to stand in front of priests for blessing (Duchan)							
No silver Ethrog cases			X				
No special candles for reading Book of Esther			X				
No funerals until 3 days after death							

	Württemberg 1838	Edenkoben 1841	Birkenfeld 1843	Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1843	Sachsen-Meiningen-Hildburghausen 1844	Meisenheim 1848
Limits on Torah reading by Bar Mitzvah	X		X	X		
Catechism lessons ordered	X		X		X	
Boys to be called to Torah on day of confirmation	X?				X	
No changing of seats during year of mourning						
No changing seats to stand in front of priests for blessing (Duchan)				X		
No silver Ethrog cases						
No special candles for reading Book of Esther						
No funerals until 3 days after death					X	



URIEL TAL

## German-Jewish Social Thought in the Mid-Nineteenth Century

### I

During the Revolution of 1848\* Ludwig Philippson published his *Vorlesungen über die Religion der Gesellschaft*.<sup>1</sup> In the history of modern Jewish religious thought this has been the first attempt at, as Philippson called it, a *Gesellschaftslehre*, i.e. at crystallising social teachings in the light of reinterpreted

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<sup>1</sup> Ludwig Philippson, *Vorlesungen über die Entwicklung der religiösen Idee im Judenthume, Christenthume und Islam und Vorlesungen über die Religion der Gesellschaft*, 2nd edn., Oskar Leiner, Leipzig 1874; 371 pp. The volume was published by the *Institut zur Förderung der israelitischen Literatur*, 18th year, 1872–1873 [henceforth cited: *Religion*].

The first edition appeared in 1848; the English translation appeared in 1855 and the French one in 1857. The book as a whole sums up a series of public lectures Philippson gave on the eve of the Revolution, in the years 1846/1847, and a series of articles that were published in the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* at about the same time. Several of these lectures and articles reflect Philippson's aspirations "... to play an active part in the German revolutionary movement in 1848", cf. Johanna Philippson, 'The Philippsons, a German-Jewish Family 1775–1933', in *Year Book VII of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1962, pp. 107–108. Johanna Philippson in her instructive biographical writings on Ludwig Philippson does not refer to his *Religion der Gesellschaft*.

As to my discussion of the social thought of a number of other writers in this paper, it should be emphasised that when topics such as "emancipation" or "Church-State separation" are referred to, I have limited my analysis to one focal point only – not to topics like emancipation or Church-State separation as such, for here much research has been done already, but rather to the social thought reflected in those topics.

Finally a preliminary remark on the method used in this study seems to be in order. This paper deals with the teaching about what constitutes a just society as conceived by a number of Jewish thinkers and publicists, teachers, scholars or rabbis. One of the indications of a just society, these authors felt, was the relative freedom for self-determination, the equal right to be different. A just society is one in which the Jew can achieve both integration and identity, universalism and particularism. The term Jew meant, in all cases, a German citizen who was differentiated from other Germans by his religious affiliation. Hence, in this context, religion was conceived not primarily in theological terms but rather in functional terms, i.e. religion as an identifying factor amidst both society and State.

For this framework, it would seem to me, what Peter L. Berger called the "sociological



Biblical Judaism. The book appeared in German, English and French; written by a leading Jewish thinker, writer, teacher, editor and rabbi its point of departure was less inductive and more deductive with the purpose of interpreting Jewish particularism as part of a modernised social universalism.

One of the main themes in that period of Philippson's ramified publicistic activity was that in those days, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the concept of "society" was of growing importance in European thought, and that Jewish thought should make a major contribution to that development. Philippson's use of "society" and "social" was not always consistent, but one point was constant: "society" meant the plane on which there is simultaneously a separation and also a reciprocal relationship between the individual and the State, between the human being and the citizen, and between Jew and Christian. In some instances the term "social" denoted the problems of modern, urban, industrial society. At times the term "society" appeared in the context of Philippson's definition of Judaism as the source of social morality, so that Judaism was a "religious society" based on moral values such as "... personal freedom, equal rights", more equality in the distribution of property,<sup>2</sup> and in that spirit Jewish teachings in their biblical origin are described as the

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and historical theory of religion" offers useful scientific tools (*The Sacred Canopy*, Anchor, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, New York 1969, pp. 29–51, 175–177, 179–185). Thomas Luckmann, Alfred Schutz in *Das Problem der Relevanz* (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a. Main 1971, pp. 67–78, 208ff.), as well as Helmuth Plessner in his significant anthropological philosophy, have suggested that the function of religion as a factor in the social self-definition of man, shows that what constitutes social reality is not simply the empirical facts, but rather the empirical facts together with the meaning they had for those studied by the historian; cf. Mary Douglas (ed.), *Rules and Meanings*, Penguin, London 1977, Parts I, V. Also see Helmut Peukert, *Wissenschaftstheorie, Handlungstheorie, Fundamentale Theologie*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. Main 1969.

It is the meaning of man's existential experience, and not only the object of man's experience as such, which constitutes historical reality, as indicated by the key term of Alfred Schutz: "Strukturen der Lebenswelt". Following Husserl reality is conceived in structures of "Sinnzusammenhänge" i.e. of the interaction of meanings. Accordingly the actual historical development of society and civilisation necessarily takes place through symbols, not simply through the naked "facts as such". These symbols, then, are constantly re-interpreted according to the changing social conditions prevailing in history. Social thought, therefore, if related to religious affiliation, as was the case in mid-nineteenth century for German-Jewish thought, reflects a dialectical inter-relationship of form and content, idea and concrete reality, function and its meaning in the eyes of those studied by the historian, everyday praxis and structures of articulation, experience and its expression, reason and emotion. The socio-political universe is an illuminating case in point, for it is through symbols, metaphors and mythical modes of articulation, that organised political order is maintained. It is in this sense, then, that social thought and religious affiliation have interacted in German-Jewish mid-nineteenth-century self-understanding, and it is the purpose of this study to analyse this interaction.

<sup>2</sup> *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judent[h]ums – ein unparteiisches Organ für alles jüdische Interesse*, herausgegeben von Rabbiner Dr. Ludwig Philippson in Magdeburg, Leipzig, (henceforth cited: *AZJ*), XI, No. 17 (19th April 1847), p. 250.

*Soziallehre des Mosaismus*, whose main purpose is to order social relations.<sup>3</sup> Sometimes Philippson used the term “society” in a different context to mean the surrounding community into which the Jews sought to be absorbed.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> *AZJ*, XI, No. 20 (10th May 1847), p. 293; also cf. *AZJ*, XII, No. 36 (28th August 1848), p. 505 – Philippson already in 1845 declared that “the calling” of Judaism is, among others, to shape “... das soziale Leben in der Gesellschaft” according to Biblical principles of justice and equality, cf. *AZJ*, IX, No. 9 (24th February 1845), p. 113. About the same time Philippson referred to a number of meanings of the term “Gesellschaft”; a) the surrounding society in which the Jew was about to integrate; b) the realm of man and citizen amidst the State, as differentiated from the by then outdated corporative structure; c) mankind in general in terms of modern society which will no longer tolerate inequality and moral constraint; d) the term “soziale Bildung” of the Jews, indicating their skills or vocations which they were supposed to acquire in addition to their “spiritual education” as means for a better integration in the surrounding society; cf. *AZJ*, IX, No. 20 (May 1845), p. 294.

Attempts to reformulate the meaning of the term “Gesellschaft” by combining the legacy of the Enlightenment and more recent sociological, and pragmatical, interpretations were made somewhat later cf. *AZJ*, XVI, No. 25 (14th June 1852), p. 289; XXI, No. 17 (20th April 1857), p. 221. From the 1850s on the impact of national and liberal social thought, such as the teachings of Robert von Mohl, (in contra-distinction to Heinrich von Treitschke’s *Die Gesellschaftswissenschaft* of 1851), Friedrich List and the more conservatively and nostalgically styled social thought of Heinrich W. Riehl, on Philippson grew quite considerably.

<sup>4</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 19 (5th May 1845), p. 279. When referring to the German surrounding society into which the Jews intended to integrate the term “Civic Society” (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) is sometimes used. Similarly so by Rabbi S. Herxheimer in *Sulamith*, 1842, VIII, No. 9–10, p. 220. While the term civic society indicates the sociological structure of the surrounding community in the post-feudal era, the term “politische Volkstümlichkeit” refers to the historical “organic” framework of peoplehood, cf. *AZJ*, IX, No. 20 (20th May 1845), pp. 294–295. As to the genesis of the terms related to the process of Jewish civic integration, including the term *verbürgerlichte Juden*, i.e. Jews who have formally started that process and have become, to some extent, a middle-class society, cf. Jacob Toury, *Der Eintritt der Juden ins deutsche Bürgertum. Eine Dokumentation*, Diaspora Research Institute of Tel-Aviv University Series, edited by Shlomo Simonsohn, Tel-Aviv 1972, pp. VIIIff., and the document GLAK 206/2199; *idem*, *Prolegomena to the Entry of Jews into German Citizenry* (in Hebrew), Diaspora Research Institute of Tel-Aviv University Series, Tel-Aviv 1972, pp. 11–24; 112–134. The terminology of the founders of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* served as a significant link between the meaning of the terms “civic society”, “civic improvement” of the early Enlightenment era and that of mid-nineteenth-century Jewish social thought; see J.A. List in his writings of 7th November 1819, quoted at length by Sinai (Siegfried) Ucko, ‘Geistesgeschichtliche Grundlagen der Wissenschaft des Judentums’, in Kurt Wilhelm (Hrsg.), *Wissenschaft des Judentums im deutschen Sprachbereich. Ein Querschnitt*, Band I, Tübingen 1967 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 16/I), p. 325. On the historical background of the great diversity of meanings of the terms “Bürger”, “Bürgertum” etc. in mid-nineteenth-century social thought, including the terminology used in the *Staatslexikon* edited by Karl Rotteck and Theodor Welcker, see James J. Sheehan ‘Liberalism and Society in Germany 1815–1848’, in *Journal of Modern History*, 1973, (45) 4, pp. 595, 601ff. Also see Werner Conze ‘Vom “Pöbel” zum “Proletariat”’, in *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Wiesbaden 1954 (41), pp. 333–364.

Philippson was not the only one of the Jewish thinkers, scholars and publicists who in the 1840s made increasing use of the terms “society” and “social.” Thus, for example, in the well-known debate regarding the Sabbath that took place at the Third Rabbinical Conference and in its wake, the Sabbath was defined as a “social and political” phenomenon, for in the spirit of Formstecher several Reform rabbis declared that the Bible in fact attached crucial importance to the “social meaning” of the Sabbath, which should continue to be observed as a “social institution”,<sup>5</sup> and David Honigmann of the Reform trend close to Samuel Holdheim, defined the Sabbath as a “social regulation” (*soziale Einrichtung*), for “in the Mosaic political code, the Sabbath and the work arrangements are interdependent within the social order ...”<sup>6</sup> Honigmann also added, under the influence of Bible criticism, that historically the Sabbath was created as a socio-economic institution, and only later acquired a “dogmatic, rabbinical” meaning.<sup>7</sup>

Zacharias Frankel used the phrase “social circumstances” (*soziale Zustände*) to indicate relations among human beings in general and between Jews and non-Jews in particular, and also in the sense of “relations in daily contacts” and even in the context of the social and political movements of the 1840s.<sup>8</sup> The concept was applied in the same vein by Fabius Mieses, one of the Jewish intellectuals, who in his publicistic activity endeavoured to build a bridge between the heritage of Galician and German Jewry, and who described himself as a historical positivist already two years before the appearance of Frankel’s *Zeitschrift*; in his understanding “society” is the plane upon which man’s creative powers are expressed, in contrast to the State (*Staatsverband*) which serves as a legal framework ensuring the orderly operation of society.<sup>9</sup> And Adolf Jellinek, disappointed by the outcome of the 1848 Revolution in Vienna, but convinced that Jews had no choice but to continue the struggle within society (*Gesellschaft*) for progressive social ideals, declared that the mission of the Jews was “... to cleanse the states of political and social

<sup>5</sup> *Der Israelit des 19. Jahrhunderts. Eine Wochenschrift für die Bekenntnis und Reform des Judentums*, redigiert und herausgegeben von Dr. M. Hess, (henceforth cited: *Israelit-19. Jahrh.*), VII, No. 51 (20th December 1846), pp. 401 ff. Also cf. No. 52 (27th December 1846), pp. 409 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Israelit-19. Jahrh.*, IX, No. 20 (14th May 1848), p. 153.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Zeitschrift für die religiösen Interessen des Judentums* unter Mitwirkung mehrerer Gelehrten, Berlin, ed. by Dr. Zacharias Frankel, (henceforth cited: *ZRIJ*), I, 1844, p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> *Literaturblatt des Orients. Berichte, Studien und Kritiken für Jüdische Geschichte und Literatur*, Leipzig (henceforth cited: *Literaturblatt*), No. 23 (4th June 1847), column 365; cf. *idem*, *Literaturblatt*, No. 27 (2nd July 1847), column 426. One of the significant characteristics of Biblical law and Jewish ethical tradition, wrote Mieses, is the emphasis on social and political justice. Contrary to the Kantian categorical imperative, Mieses argued, Jewish ethics are closely related to the social reality. Hence even the God of Israel is not conceived in abstract but, allegorically speaking, in concrete and eudaemonistic terms such as in Tractate *Kiddushin* p. 31a; *Shabbath* p. 85b; cf. *Literaturblatt*, No. 23 (4th June 1897), pp. 365–368. See also below, note 11.

prejudices ...". That was the form in which Jellinek envisaged the continuity of the mission the Jews had performed in earlier historical periods; just as in the past Judaism operated to liberate the human spirit from religious prejudice or idolatry, so now in the middle of the nineteenth century it must work for social progress.<sup>10</sup>

## II

Just a few months before the Revolution, Fabius Mieses wrote that Gabriel Riesser in the early 1830s had already insisted that the struggle for Jewish emancipation had to be not uni-directional as many believed but bi-directional and even dialectical: entry into the surrounding society on the one hand, and on the other a reinforcement of the particular unique character of the Jew as a member of modern civic society.<sup>11</sup> Indeed it was Gabriel Riesser, planted solidly in mid-nineteenth-century German Liberalism, who expressed grave fears of what he felt was the corrosive power of Liberalism. Riesser warned of the danger that the humanistic, universal value upon which German Jewry based its struggle for emancipation would impel Jews to relinquish their particularity as Jews and become "... the contrary of cohesiveness, namely decay and disintegration ..."<sup>12</sup>

The Jewish community was losing its attraction more and more and already "most of us do not want to know anything about that narrow connection" and many of "... the more educated among our co-religionists" are moving away from Jewish community life.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore the political campaign for emancipation led some German Jews to such a degree of universality that for them Judaism lost the traditional vitality it had. Because of the great yearning for universality, there was danger that the fight for emancipation should be

<sup>10</sup> *Der Orient. Berichte, Studien und Kritiken für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur*, herausgegeben von Dr. Julius Fürst, Leipzig (henceforth cited: *Orient*), IX, No. 23 (3rd June 1848), p. 177.

<sup>11</sup> *N. Gelber Papers*, File 4a, p. 1; "... daß die soziale Frage, die Einsicht in die Realitäten der gesellschaftlichen Zustände, der Klassen und Religionsgesellschaften, das Bedürfniss für ein freies Gesellschaftsleben im Staatsverbände, und ganz besonders die Zustände menschlicher Entwürdigung, welche die Juden immer noch schmerzlich empfinden, von Gabriel Riesser schon vor Jahren in den Vordergrund des politischen Bewußtsein gerückt wurden ..."

The N. Gelber Papers here referred to are not in the Nathan M. Gelber Collection on Polish Jewry in the Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People (CAHJP P/38). These source materials pertaining to the history of Galician Jewry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, copied by the historian, the late Nathan Michael Gelber, are at present in the Adler-Rudel Nachlaß, file marked "Galicia 4a/4b" in Box "Ostjuden", in the possession of the Jerusalem Leo Baeck Institute.

<sup>12</sup> *Der Jude. Periodische Blätter für Religion und Gewissensfreiheit*, in zwanglosen Abtheilungen herausgegeben von Dr. G. Riesser, Zweiter Band, Altona (henceforth cited: *Der Jude*), No. 1 (2nd April 1833), p. 8.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8; No. 2 (19th April 1833), pp. 9, 10.

conducted on the basis of “abstract principle alone”.<sup>14</sup> The Jews dared not lose the living ties with each other, or between them and their historical heritage, and instead be content with “... the liberal principle, the basic principle of freedom, the free development of all human powers and faculties ...”<sup>15</sup>

Riesser feared that “... involvement in the general concern of freedom, with all the great political problems of the century” was likely to lead the strugglers for emancipation to diminish or even abandon their particularity as Jews. While the intentions were good, Riesser noted, humanism achieved at the cost of the loss of the particularity of the Jews as a social group differentiated from the rest of society by its religion is actually “a misconceived humanism ...”<sup>16</sup>

The problem was aggravated in the 1830s and 1840s and became crucial in 1848, when it was stressed even more than before that Judaism no longer had a separate nationality that might interfere with the Jews’ total integration into the European countries.

Beginning with the well-known reply to Paulus in 1831, in his polemics in the wake of the discussions in the Second House of the Grand Duchy of Baden in 1832; in literary criticism such as his consideration of Börne and in his objections to Gustav Pfizer and Wolfgang Menzel in the early 1840s; and in his important speech against Moritz Mohl in the German National Assembly in Frankfurt on 29th August 1848; in all these, Riesser stressed that Judaism was not a nationality but a group differing from other citizens in religion only. Consequently Riesser supported the efforts at Reform of liberal Jewry, but emphasised that the Reform should be instituted for religious reasons and not because of political interests, in order to obtain civic or social emancipation. Reform as a means of reaching political goals would mean political intervention in religion and an offence against the principle of Liberalism including human and civil liberty. On the other hand, however, in Riesser’s social and political thought too, religion is viewed functionally, serving as the primary or perhaps sole instrument distinguishing the Jews from other German citizens.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4. 5.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 2 (19th April 1833), p. 10. Riesser warns against any kind of single-minded integration into the surrounding environment, especially by the enlightened Jews, for this might lead to a “slow death” of all that constitutes “the essence and the value” of a *Religions-Gesellschaft*.

<sup>17</sup> Gabriel Riesser, *Eine Auswahl aus seinen Schriften und Briefen, Denkmäler jüdischen Geistes*, hrsg. von Dr. B. May und J. B. Levy, vol. II. Verlag von J. Kauffmann, Frankfurt a. Main 1913, pp. 9ff., pp. 27ff.; pp. 42ff.; pp. 83ff.; pp. 103ff. For a detailed bibliography of the polemics by H. E. G. Paulus see Volkmar Eichstädt, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Judenfrage* vol. I. Hamburg 1938, §§ 655, 853, 886, 887, 923. Riesser, while actively supporting the Reform of Jewish religion and tradition, was rather critical of “... customs, symbolic functions ... torn away from their living meaning ...” It would seem that both his personal background and his pragmatic approach to the social function of religion motivated him to emphasise the significance of religious experience in terms of a “... living wholeness”; cf. *Riesser, op. cit.*, pp. 49ff.

This approach was later highly appreciated by Rabbi Heymann Jolowicz, in his study:

At this point Riesser raised the question that was to be a central one in Jewish social thought: what was the nature of that Jewish particularity whose loss he warned against? What in the language of the founders of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, was its “substance”.<sup>18</sup> And in fact Jewish periodicals of the time abounded in answers worded in the most general terms like: “the commonality”, “the shared belonging”, “our uniqueness”, “religiosity and the unique Jewishness ...”

Fabius Mieses saw very well that German Jews, in seeking to enter civil society while retaining their particularity, encountered a society that itself was not yet a unified national society, so that the Jews of Germany were experiencing a dual dilemma, internal and external, and therefore found it difficult to answer the question of “... what then is the meaning of these generalised concepts of the social entity, that meaning which actually grew historico-organically and definitely continues to prevail ...”<sup>19</sup>

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*Die fortschreitende Entwicklung der Cultur der Juden in Deutschland und die wissenschaftliche Ausbildung des Judenthums von Mendelssohn bis auf unsere Zeit*, Verlag der Stuhrschen Buchhandlung, Berlin 1841 pp.20ff. Also see the correspondence between Gabriel Riesser and Moritz Abraham Stern, one of the leaders of the Jewish Reform Association in Frankfurt a. Main of 1843, reproduced in part in: *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland*; 1888, pp. 47ff. In the *Konstitutionelle Jahrbücher* of 1843 as well as in his “Jewish Letters”, Riesser expressed his fear that freedom of faith (*Glaubensfreiheit*) might turn into the loss of faith altogether. Moreover, just as old, Orthodox religion became oppressive, the revolt against this oppression might create a new form of extremism i.e. an “anti-religious principle” which then also becomes a threat to genuine spiritual and social freedom as well as to the socio-political cohesion of Jewish society. See also Moshe Rinott, ‘Gabriel Riesser. Fighter for Jewish Emancipation’, in *Year Book VII of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1962, pp. 11ff.

<sup>18</sup> Ucko, *loc. cit.*, p. 326; cf. Jacob Toury ‘The Jewish Question. A Semantic Approach’, in *Year Book XI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1966, p. 103.

<sup>19</sup> *N. Gelber Papers*, file 4b. This quotation was copied by Gelber from notes attached to the manuscript of Mieses’s article cited above, note 9. Ever since he started working on the history of the Jews of Brody, Galicia, Gelber showed deep interest in Fabius Mieses, his personality and his literary work. Gelber felt that a serious, critical biography of Mieses would shed new light on the history of the encounter of Galician Jewry and its rich Hebrew culture with German and European civilisation. But then Gelber did not leave more source materials pertaining to Fabius Mieses, although he was convinced that quite a number of unpublished manuscripts must have remained in some personal or family archives. Among others, Gelber said, a manuscript of as yet unpublished chapters connected with Mieses’s book *The History of Modern Philosophy. From the Days of Kant till Hegel*, publ. by Moritz Scheffer, Leipzig 1877 (in Hebrew) seems to exist. The biography of Fabius Mieses by Azriel Ginzig, in *Otzar Hassifruth*, ed. by Shaltiel Eisig Gräber, Jaroslaw, publ. by Josef Fischer: 1889–1890, vol. III, pp. 3–39 (in Hebrew), is not a completely reliable essay yet it reflects aspects of the Jewish-European culture contact as well as of the creative tension between traditional Judaism and modern civilisation. The historical thought of Fabius Mieses was influenced by Nachman Krochmal from whom Mieses learned a great deal in his youth; additional sources of inspiration were some of the Jewish intellectuals in Breslau, among them Zacharias Frankel, Abraham Geiger and then Heinrich Graetz. Mieses expressed high regard for Graetz yet criticised his *Die Konstruktion der jüdischen Geschichte*; cf. ‘Ein Wort über

The dilemma between universality and particularity in the self-definition of the Jews was phrased with great clarity by Abraham Geiger in the first issue of the Jewish scholarly journal he edited.<sup>20</sup> Reform Judaism was caught between two inherent aspects of progress, the disruptive forces of rational understanding (*Verstand*), of historical and critical thought on the one hand, and on the other the unifying, liberating, constructive forces of reason (*Vernunft*). The process of modernisation Judaism was undergoing likewise had two sides, civil equality on the one hand, and on the other the danger, with the attainment of that equality, that particularity and religious independence would be lost.<sup>21</sup>

In Jewish thought the dilemma was formulated to state that while Judaism was a group identified by its religion only and its values were universal, at the same time those universal values were to identify the Jews as a particular group. One of the examples of this bi-directional definition was the description of Judaism as a religion whose essence was ethical. In the early 1830s Jeremias Heinemann, one of the forerunners of the traditionalist way of modern Jewish life, noted that "... the major concern of a religion must be directed at morality ..."<sup>22</sup> That was the meaning also of the traditional theological principle

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Judenthum oder die Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Eine Parallele', in *Literaturblatt*, No. 24 (11th June 1847), column 377. Isaak Mieses, to whom Graetz referred in his *Konstruktion* was the uncle of Fabius's father, see Heinrich Graetz, *The Structure of Jewish History and Other Essays*, translated, edited and introduced by Ismar Schorsch. The Jewish Theological Seminary of America (vol. III in Moreschet Series, Studies in Jewish History, Literature and Thought), New York 1975, pp. 63, 70, 304n, 305. The illuminating interpretation by Schorsch of Jewish historical thought in the 1840s is most helpful for a better understanding of Fabius Mieses's Jewish enlightened conservatism, cf. Schorsch, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

The terminology used by Mieses, as well as by other Jewish intellectuals who were close to the trend of "historical Judaism", such as Meyer Isler of Hamburg, was at this particular point quite similar to that of Herder and Schleiermacher. Mieses hoped for a complete Jewish integration into European society and civilisation yet with Schleiermacher he believed that even in a unified Germany "... historical states or groups should retain their individual characteristics ..." Cf. *Aus Schleiermachers Leben in Briefen*, ed. by Wilhelm Dilthey, Berlin 1863, vol. III, pp. 428–429.

<sup>20</sup> *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für jüdische Theologie*, hrsg., von Abraham Geiger, Berlin (henceforth cited: *WZjT*), I (1835), pp. 8–9, cf. Michael A. Meyer, 'Jewish Religious Reform and Wissenschaft des Judentums. The Positions of Zunz, Geiger and Frankel', in *Year Book XVI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1971, pp. 26–32.

<sup>21</sup> *WZjT*, p. 1. Geiger's approach was defined in terms of a "positive teaching" as distinguished from "... so-called Deism", cf. *Israelitische Annalen. Ein Centralblatt für Geschichte, Literatur und Cultur der Israeliten aller Zeiten und Länder*, hrsg. von Dr. Isaak Markus Jost, Frankfurt a. Main (henceforth cited: *Annalen*), No. 22 (31st May 1839), p. 172.

<sup>22</sup> *Jedidja. Allgemeines Archiv des Judenthums* (Neue Folge) Berlin (henceforth cited: *Jedidja*), I, No. 1 (1833), p. 25. Also see Samuel Holdheim's fundamental sermon: 'Die Heiligung des göttlichen Namens', *Jedidja*, I, No. 22 (1833), pp. 97–123.

The emphasis on morality as the essence of Judaism reflects a strong impact of the early Enlightenment, both Jewish and Christian, cf. the significant study by Nathan Rotenstreich, *Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times. From Mendelssohn to Rosenzweig*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York – Chicago – San Francisco 1968, pp. 6–42; also

regarding *Imitatio Dei*, it was argued, for “in the image of God” meant a resemblance of virtues and acts, and thus a way of life ordered according to ethical qualities, not on the theological plane only, but in daily life in society. But now that European thought recognised the natural right of all men to happiness, “... this too is expected of a true religion, that it should bring together morality and happiness ... true morality cannot but further the true happiness of man ...”<sup>23</sup>

In such a view of ethics, religion helps man to attain “inner health” (*innere Gesundheit*) as well as social health, which is a pre-requisite for human happiness. The blend of ethics and happiness in a religious context had to apply also in civic life, in the acceptance of the burden of law in a free will decision, that is, in freedom. In the spirit of the idealism of the Enlightenment and in language drawn from Lessing, Jeremias Heinemann asserts that by nature man is capable of achieving perfect virtue (*Menschenvollkommenheit*) if only he conducts himself according to ethical rules that stand the test of rational criticism. These universal principles fit in with Judaism, and to a great extent even derive from it, adds Heinemann. It was according to Judaism that the ethical code could be realised only if it also governed social and political life. It should be recalled, says the editor of *Jedidja*, that for Judaism in its biblical origin, the political plane too is intertwined with religion (*alles Politische mit Religiösität verwebt*). Furthermore, the outstanding figures in the Bible, and thus in the history of Judaism as well, show that in Judaism political life was raised to the level of religiosity, and religion was not lowered to the level of politics.<sup>24</sup>

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see Wolfgang Phillip, *Das Werden der Aufklärung in theologiegeschichtlicher Sicht*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1957, pp. 172ff., cf. Lucien Goldmann, *Der christliche Bürger und die Aufklärung*, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, Neuwied – Berlin 1968, pp. 55ff.

<sup>23</sup> *Jedidja*, pp. 27–28.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31. Interpretations like these, according to which Judaism is essentially a doctrine of universal ethics rooted in a particular, religious tradition, were obviously apologetically motivated, cf. ‘Blicke in die Geschichte des Geistes des jüdischen Volkes’, *AZJ*, VII, No. 45 (6th November 1843), pp. 665–657; No. 46 (13th November 1843), pp. 681–682. Similar motivations affected the beginnings of modern Jewish historiography, as was pointed out by Ismar Schorsch regarding Markus Jost who “... read back into history the concerns of the day” (cf. below note 72). Some of the leading authors, though, were quite aware of the possible effects of an apologetical bias, cf. *AZJ*, IX, No. 20 (12th May 1845), p. 293; also see *Israelit-19. Jahrh.*, V, No. 14 (7th April 1844), p. 105 “... daß man sich von jeder Übertreibung der Verdienste unserer Glaubensgenossen hüte ...”. Moreover, in addition to apologetics Jewish thought was both motivated and formed by hermeneutical considerations as well. Attempts were made to re-interpret Biblical and historical traditions according to changing forms of meaning. With new existential experience the same texts acquired different meanings; the same symbols signified different contents; the same terms alluded to different associations. On the methodology of this most helpful approach to a critical analysis of the history of social and religious thought, cf. Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1969, chapters



Elias Grünbaum, one of the Reform rabbis who contributed a great deal to the repeal of the obnoxious oath *More Judaico* in Bavaria, had much the same view. Contrary to the claims of opponents of Jewish emancipation, in the main supporters of the “Christian State” idea, it was in Judaism that were laid the foundations of the love principle, as an ethical principle that should govern social life in practice. Furthermore the notion of Israel as the chosen people meant only that Israel was chosen to have moral obligations, among them the obligation to love. Grünbaum expressed Samuel Holdheim’s systematic conception in popular terms, affirming that the Mosaic faith (*Mosaismus*) developed national particularity only as a transitional stage, as a short, inessential historical stage, limited to the period when the tribes of Israel united into a religious nation. In essence, however, Judaism is a religion of universal morality, and consequently the principle of love is one of its outstanding tenets.<sup>25</sup> Because of the universal nature of morality, the precept to love one’s neighbour applies not only to the Jews among themselves, it is a commandment that applies to all men regardless of religious affiliation, nationality or class. In the spirit of the Jewish Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century, and in the catechismic style current also in the first half of the nineteenth century,<sup>26</sup> Grünbaum pointed out that translated into the language of social and political reality, the love principle meant justice. And justice was not restricted to people of a specific religion or nation, but was universal in character, as it was a corollary of man’s rational nature. Consequently not only the laws of the Pentateuch testify to the universal value of Judaism but also its later development, which despite the liberals’ harsh criticism of the rabbinate, also includes universal moral values. Thus for example the Talmud explained that the verse “Do what is right and good in the sight of the Lord” (Deut. VI: 18) shows that a moral standard and integrity must be maintained even in financial affairs and matters of agrarian land ownership (Tractate *Baba-Metzia* p. 16a, p. 35a; and Tractate *Avodah Zarah* p. 25b). Thus the test of true morality comes in practical day-to-day matters, and – in the spirit of the Naḥmanides’s interpretation of that same Deuteronomy verse – in relations between human beings, in which the commandments are: do not slander, do not take vengeance or bear a grudge, do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbour, do not curse the deaf,

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2–5, 8, 11, 12. See also Hugh Dalziel Duncan, *Symbols in Society*, Oxford University Press, London – Oxford – New York 1972, Part. IV: ‘Methodological Propositions’. The hermeneutical analysis applied to modern social and existential thought may be useful in helping to fill the gap in the study of interrelationship of ideas and social reality, created by the conventional “Ideologienverdacht”, cf. Kurt Lenk, *Volk und Staat. Strukturwandel politischer Ideologien im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart – Berlin – Köln – Mainz 1971, pp. 9–42.

<sup>25</sup> Elias Grünbaum, ‘Der Grundsatz der Liebe und dessen Entwicklung im Judenthume’, *WZjT*, 1836, vol. II, pp. 285ff.; 1837, vol. III, pp. 59ff.

<sup>26</sup> Jakob J. Petuchowski, ‘Manuals and Catechisms of the Jewish Religion in the Early Period of Emancipation’, in: Alexander Altmann (ed.), *Studies in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Intellectual History*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1964, p. 62.

respect old age, and speak quietly to people.<sup>27</sup> On this point Grünbaum formulates the developmental historical approach as essential to an understanding of the human, social nature of all religion, and especially of Judaism. The historical approach to religion, in particular the positivistic and not only the critical approach, is according to Grünbaum preferable to a static approach, whether it is pagan religion steeped in materialism, or religion of reason (*Vernunftsreligion*) that abstracts its faith from social reality; neither of these offers society a guide to an ethical way of life leading to progress through the dialectical meeting of matter and spirit. In contrast, Judaism as a historical religion is a guide to a social life based on love and justice in particular, and on morality leading to human progress in general. And here too arose the same dilemma between universality and particularity; on the one hand the ethical values of Judaism are universal, and on the other the function of that universality is to ensure the particularity of the Jews within the society around them.<sup>28</sup>

### III

Another aspect of the dilemma between universality and particularity was the question of the separation of religion and the State. At first glance it would seem that the Jews of Germany would be in favour of the separation of Church and State, especially when the State was considered a Christian one. But on the other hand, they could hardly support complete separation of religion and State, and in particular of religion and society, for it was precisely the close reciprocal relationship between the two which underlay the self-definition of the Jews. An essential part of Gabriel Riesser's political stand was his objection to the principle of a Christian State, and insistence on the separation of Church and State. And it was precisely that separation that impelled him to work toward a reinforcement of Jewish cohesiveness among those who were relatively modern in outlook and well educated. His call for that separation, as stated in the early 1830s and later in letters and speeches in the 1840s was based on a primary principle of natural law and nationalism, i.e. the natural right of man to enjoy a civil status in which there is no "mixture of State and Church authority". The separation was to ensure the competence of each of the two realms of social life, religious faith and civic loyalty.<sup>29</sup> The primary universal principle Riesser believed, imposed a national-social principle. As it was man's natural right to benefit from that separation, there was no justification for making membership in the German nation conditional on affiliation with Christianity, for in such a case a matter of religion turns into a matter of politics and the separation between religion and State fades away. From these

<sup>27</sup> Grünbaum, *loc. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 60–73.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 296.

<sup>29</sup> Riesser, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

two basic assumptions Riesser concluded that there was no justification for the Prussian government policy making conversion a condition for employment in government service, as army officers, for instance, or in university faculties. The Prussian government was operating in contradiction to natural law, added Riesser, in its attempt to spread Christianity by means of political and economic pressure, and through this pressure wished to affect "... all intelligence, all capability, all education".<sup>30</sup> But the call for the separation of Church and State was what led figures like Riesser and publicists like Fabius Mieses to realise that it was not enough to call for the separation and it was to be hoped that the "... socio-political legal equality" of Jewish citizens would strengthen the ties among "Progressive Jews" in the German states.<sup>31</sup>

In the liberal Jewish camp itself there was no consensus on the separation of religion and State, because of the fear that grew after 1848<sup>32</sup> that without state involvement it would be difficult to maintain community services, schools or social services. Rabbi Heymann Jolowicz, for instance, explicitly demanded that the State see to "... Organisation der Synagoge"<sup>33</sup> precisely because, as it had pretensions to being a Christian State, it was obliged to see to the strengthening of religion as an educational and moral force among its citizens. Moreover, Jolowicz added, it was Fichte who at the inception of the national awakening in Germany asserted that the purpose of a human society in general (*aller Gesellschaft*) was to ensure the realisation of civil rights, with completely equal rights to all its members, and "strong, active" intervention on the part of the State to foster its citizens' religious life would assist each individual to realise his natural rights. The State should then see to it that every Jewish community had a religious school, that every Jewish child had a progressive

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 68, 71.

<sup>31</sup> *N. Gelber Papers*, File 4b, p. 2.

<sup>32</sup> Salo W. Baron, 'Church and State Debates in the Jewish Community of 1848', in *Mordecai M. Kaplan Jubilee Volume*, English Section, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York 1953, pp. 54, 57–68. See also Jacob Toury, *Turmoil and Confusion in the Revolution of 1848* (in Hebrew), Moreshet and Tel-Aviv University, 1968, pp. 63–98. James J. Sheehan has clearly pointed out that a "... recurrent theme in liberal writing on social problems during the *Vormärz* was an emphasis on the State as a necessary bulwark against social disorder ..." cf. Sheehan, *loc. cit.*, p. 598. This trend in German social thought may help in understanding why, as C.E. Williams correctly stated "... the debacle of the Revolution of 1848, when even the Liberals showed themselves attached to class interests and national ambitions, ensured the survival of the authoritarian state in Germany", cf. 'Writers and Politics. Some Reflections on a German Tradition', in *Journal of European Studies*, VI (1976), p. 88. The need for a constitutional policy that separates State and Church yet that at the same time does not deprive religious institutions of governmental support and protection has been pointed out by Isaak Markus Jost in his study: 'Das geschichtliche Verhältnis der Rabbinen zu ihren Gemeinden nach den Quellen', in *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie*, herausgegeben von Christian Wilhelm Niedner, ord. Prof. der Theologie an der Universität Leipzig (Neue Folge), Hamburg–Gotha, 1850, vol. 20, pp. 351, 377.

<sup>33</sup> Jolowicz, *op. cit.*, p. IV.

Jewish education without which he would not later be able to obtain a marriage licence. The State should also make sure that the services were progressive. Religion and its institutions should therefore be considered not a private matter but a civic one, consequently deserving State support and even State intervention.<sup>34</sup>

Another point of view, also from the liberal Jewish camp, was expressed by David Honigmann and Elias Grünbaum. Their point of departure was a criticism of the heritage of eighteenth-century political thought, according to which "... an emancipation of the Jews or more precisely an improvement of their civic position" was conceived of as an extension of the principle of "natural status" in contrast to the notion of "positive Law". According to the principle of natural status as outlined by Rousseau, the State is the product of the "social contract" made in historical periods preceding that of the nation-state.<sup>35</sup> That concept, Honigmann said, prevents the adoption of a pluralistic approach to the State, for according to it the State is a natural organism allowing no room for a foreign body, that is, for social or religious groups that are not integral parts of that type of organism. This concept, Honigmann added, prepares the ground for "... the totality ... of the State's domain ..." and thus for the Machiavellism already discernible in Europe at the beginning of that century. Besides, organistic notions of that sort raise material power to the level of a supreme value, and all other social values are subordinate to it, so that the "ethical significance of social behaviour" loses its value. In regimes of Machiavellian character the Church and State tend to be intertwined, and this merger makes it even harder for the Jews to sustain themselves as a separate group yet totally involved in the society, State and nationality surrounding them. The separation of religion from the State is necessary to the maintenance of identity together with integration. Religion is the framework for inner life and man's ethical capacity, and as long as these satisfy the needs of society the State has no authority to regulate them or force itself on them. The State is in charge of social acts, and so cannot be the source of morality, but is charged with ensuring the realisation of morality. It is "an enduring institution embracing the entire ordering and furthering of social life, [and] originally rooted in man's natural and moral province like the family ..."<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. IV–VII.

<sup>35</sup> *Israelit-19. Jahrh.*, V, No. 50 (15th December 1844), p. 400.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, Honigmann, in this review of: *Staat und Religion mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Stellung der Israeliten in den sogenannten christlich-germanischen Staaten*, Otto Wigand Verlag, Leipzig 1844, by F. Eisenberg agrees with the main Hegelian thesis of Eisenberg, according to which the State constitutes the embodiment and the fullest realisation of man's freedom. At the same time Honigmann points out that there is no need to subordinate man's "religious conscience" to the "general spirit". Honigmann concludes that a total separation of religion and statehood is unnecessary, for both are but expressions of man's morality, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 399–401; 408–410.

Honigmann's and Grünbaum's criticism of the "social contract", though it hardly accorded with Rousseau's original intentions, again shows the profundity of the dilemma between universality and particularity in Jewish social thought. The desire of liberal Jews to safeguard Jewish particularism within social universalism gave rise to a difficulty similar to that facing German Liberalism in general. This was aptly described by Karl von Rotteck during the years he fought for freedom of the press, parliamentary responsibility on the part of government ministers, improved conditions for teachers, and the like. According to Rotteck and Karl Theodor Welcker, whose Liberalism Mieses felt to be closest to the heart of progressive (*fortschrittlich*) Judaism, one of the goals of political Liberalism was to apply the principle of *Gesellschaftsvertrag*. The social contract now derives its authority from the common will (*Gesamtwille*), in contrast to earlier historical periods when divine grace (*Gottesgnadentum*) was still the source of political and social authority. Consequently, Rotteck noted, a constitutional State (*Rechtsstaat*) founded on natural rational law (*Vernunftsrecht*) is a more advanced stage of development than that conceived of by historical positivism. At the same time when there was fear that the Prussians would dominate the alliance of German states, Liberals like Rotteck stressed that it was better to foster the self-determination of the historical states rather than "a national whole" in case such a generality might lead to the obscuring of the particularity of the historical states. Thus, added Mieses, German Liberals too are of two minds regarding universality and particularity as applied to Germany.<sup>37</sup>

#### IV

The particular-universal dilemma was evident also in Jewish historical thought. Heymann Jolowicz in 1841 noted that with the beginning of modern Jewish studies in the second decade of this century, historical research and with it the positivist scientific approach began to replace the abstract elements of idealism and romanticism. Theoretical methods involving the "deification of nature" such as that of Schelling, or involving the elevation of "feeling" to the level of the highest value such as that of Jacobi, no longer satisfied a rational person seeking to understand human reality. From then on education in general and historical research in particular became relevant to social thought, throwing new light on "social, moral and religious life ..."<sup>38</sup> At this point, Jolowicz attempted to utilise Hegelian terms to explain the shift that was taking

<sup>37</sup> *N. Gelber Papers*, File 4b, p. 2. Also see Reinhard Rürup 'German Liberalism and the Emancipation of the Jews', in *Year Book XX of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1975, pp. 62, 63. On the historical background see Eleonore Sterling, *Er ist wie Du. Aus der Frühgeschichte des Antisemitismus in Deutschland (1815-1850)*, Chr. Kaiser-Verlag, München 1956, pp. 91-101.

<sup>38</sup> Jolowicz', *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

place in the way Jews understood themselves. Under the influence of what he called *deutsche Wissenschaft*, Jewish thought too began to view “reason and faith, history and law” as “... Manifestations of the spirit ...”, now rising to consciousness. As a result of this process there is a gradual realisation of Hegel’s notion about the identity between “the real” (*das Wirkliche*) and “the cognitive” (*das Vernünftige*) and it is that development which now opens the way for the realisation of human freedom including the freedom and equality of the Jews: “... thereby State and Church, scholarship and life acquired a freer direction, in which the individual in his conscious activity now seeks to follow in the divine tracks of history in order to attain cognition of the truth of all phenomena and the conditions of life ...”<sup>39</sup> Here, just as Jolowicz sought to relate theoretical thought to historical and social thought, he attempted to draw similar conclusions from the evolution of the human spirit in general, and the developmental path taken by the spirit of Judaism (*Entwicklungsgang des jüdischen Geistes*).<sup>40</sup> Accordingly, the Jews too were entering upon a historical process through which they would achieve their freedom, thanks to “the spirit that has attained self-knowledge”.

An additional definition of Judaism in terms of a historical-positive continuum, was suggested by Rabbi Gotthold Salomon. Accordingly the “Oral Torah” should be understood as a historical creation, a framework of customs, norms and ways of life which constantly develop and change in the light of changing needs. Only the Biblical *Fundamentallehren* enjoy a meta-historical status. The Talmud, therefore, added Salomon, never intended to enslave Judaism to the “petrified letter” (*Sclaverei des Buchstabens*); on the contrary, the Talmud shows how great and creative Jewish adaptiveness has always been.<sup>41</sup> A similar definition of “historical Judaism” yet this time including Biblical tradition was offered by Ludwig Philippson; accordingly Judaism should be understood as a revealed, rather than as a rationalistic, religion. Revelation, however, is a continuing process, hence Judaism should be interpreted as a constantly developing religion, modifying, adapting and even abandoning traditions all according to “... what the necessity of history requires”.<sup>42</sup>

Similar attitudes, defined in a somewhat more radical way though, were expressed by David Honigmann, and in fact by a growing number of writers.

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20. The quest for social relevance, the disenchantment with abstract, speculative philosophy and the shift to historical thought that might enable intellectuals to achieve some kind of involvement in social concrete reality, became a major area of concern for progressive yet non-socialist intellectuals, cf. the influential *Politische Vorlesungen* by Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs, Halle 1843, vol. I, pp. Vff.

<sup>40</sup> Jolowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>41</sup> *Israelit-19. Jahrh.*, V, No. 13 (31st March 1844), p. 99.

<sup>42</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 20 (12th May 1845), p. 294; see also the polemics on “tradition and modernisation” in *Annalen*, No. 22 (31st May 1839), pp. 169–172; No. 26 (28th June 1839), pp. 201–203.

The changing conditions brought about by historical development rendered Jewish nationalism, Jewish law and rabbinic authority, in fact all of Jewish tradition, into an ever-changing framework of values. Historism tended now to lead to historicism, to a relativisation of tradition, even though that was contrary to the intention of mid-nineteenth century Jewish social thinkers.<sup>43</sup>

About that time Zacharias Frankel made his first systematic attempt to formulate historical thought that was not merely “abstract thinking”<sup>44</sup> but rather thought related to social reality and precepts, for “Judaism is a religion of action”.<sup>45</sup> Like other thinkers, scholars and publicists of his day, Frankel chose as a point of departure the feeling that the middle of the nineteenth century was a time of social and political change on the one hand, and intellectual and religious challenge on the other. It was a time, Frankel stated, of rapid change in “social circumstances”, in day-to-day social relations, and Frankel shared the general feeling of those days that “... time out-stripped itself with stormy speed and is driving incessantly forward”.<sup>46</sup> In such a period, the Jew can no longer stand aside and keep aloof from storms and vicissitudes. For from the intellectual and religious point of view as well, it was a period of testing and challenge. On the one hand the Jews had to participate in the general development of culture and science, and on the other there was a danger that reason (*Verstand*) would become the only lord (*Alleinherrschaft*) and have a destructive effect on Judaism. Just as there was no possibility or justification for the Jews to remain bound by rigid dogmatism or even “superstition that dims the light of the spirit ...”,<sup>47</sup> they should not go to the

<sup>43</sup> *Israelit-19. Jahrh.*, V, No. 51 (22nd December 1844), p. 409.

<sup>44</sup> *ZRIJ*, I (1844), p. 11.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9–10, 20; Also see the term “das historische Judenthum” in ‘Aufruf zu einer Versammlung jüdischer Theologen’, *Orient*, VII, No. 20 (14th May 1846), pp. 149–151. On the use of history and of the “historical method” as an answer to “... the radical views of reformative rationalism” rooted in eighteenth-century Enlightenment, by Friedrich Karl von Savigny and following him by Wilhelm Roscher see Roscher’s *Grundriß zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswissenschaft nach geschichtlicher Methode*, Göttingen: 1843, pp. IV–V. The organicist approach to history by Savigny contributed to his fear of alien elements such as the Jews; the Jews “... according to their inner nature are and remain for us foreigners and the failure to recognise this could lead us to the most disastrous confusion of political concepts ...” Friedrich Karl von Savigny, *Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft*, Heidelberg 1840, p. 175.

<sup>46</sup> *ZRIJ*, I (1844), p. 15. Afterwards, in his introduction to the first issue of *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, October 1851–December 1852, Rudolf Kunze, Dresden 1852, pp. 1 ff., Frankel defines the days of 1848 as a “... deep ... dream” which was “... interwoven with wild phantasies ...”, while now, after that dream has passed, a spiritual and emotional “depression” is prevailing. It is up to scholarship, primarily theology and history, to lift the spirit and to help society to regain its strength and integrity. Protestant theologians and historians of religion, among them the opponents of David Friedrich Strauss, such as Ullmann, reacted in quite similar terms, cf. note 63 below.

<sup>47</sup> *ZRIJ*, I (1844), p. 4. Rabbi Levi Bodenheimer of Crefeld, described Frankel, whom he supported as “... promoter of the moderate progress”, cf. *Orient*, No. 23 (4th June 1846), p. 180.

other extreme and permit progress (*Fortschritt*) to affect the historical continuity of tradition. The times called for a blend of faith and life, restraint and progress, faith and thought; and this blend must be accomplished through a “moderate reform” (*gemäßigte Reform*)<sup>48</sup> determining the proper proportion in this synthesis of tradition and progress. In this task, some help is available from the practice “in den sozialen und politischen Reformen”, for there too, said Frankel, current needs (*die gegenwärtigen Verhältnisse des Lebens*) are the point of departure for the creation of new forms. The social movements of mid-nineteenth century show that “history and science indicate which goals are to be reached and in what ways one can get there ...”<sup>49</sup> In religious life, however, and particularly in Judaism, there was a further dimension, that of tradition, not as an abstract concept, but empathetically, as part of real life. Judaism was a religion that “interwove itself completely with life”. Today as well, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Judaism must continue not only to develop and innovate beliefs and opinions, but to aim for the alteration of religious practices.<sup>50</sup> This blend of deed and thought, thought and belief, can prevent Judaism from deteriorating into hypocrisy on the one hand, or into crude materialism on the other.<sup>51</sup>

On this point, it is evident in Frankel as well, Jewish thought of that period was concerned with the question of the substance of the historical continuity. What was the instrument of the historical continuity in which Frankel wished to make changes while maintaining tradition in the light of “the ideas and conditions of the time ...”?<sup>52</sup> At first glance the answer should have been clear, for only in the early 1840s did Frankel define the historical continuity in Judaism as a nation whose language is Hebrew and whose historical homeland is *Eretz Israel*.<sup>53</sup> But apparently in the overall historical thinking of Frankel

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 18. Fabius Mieses also uses the term “moderate Reform” when describing “historical Judaism” as “... the third, conservative” trend; cf. *Literaturblatt*, No. 27 (2nd July 1847), column 424. Mieses sees in the conservative trend in mid-nineteenth-century Judaism an attempt at renewing some of the Pharisaic traditions including their “moderate progress” (*gemäßiger Fortschritt*), see *Literaturblatt*, No. 24 (11th June 1847), column 380.

<sup>49</sup> *ZRIJ*, I (1844), p. 6.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>53</sup> Frankel, in the course of his polemics of 1842 with Rabbi Gotthold Salomon, on the prayerbook issued by the Hamburg Reform Temple, and later during the Second Rabbinical Conference at Frankfurt a. Main, 15th–28th July, 1845, pointed out that “Jewish nationalism” has in these days two different, yet complementary, meanings. Those who will achieve full emancipation cannot but see in the countries that grant them civic and social equality, their “fatherland”. These Jews indeed have to relinquish (“*aufgeben*”) their “*partikulare jüdische Nationalität*”. Hence for them (such as soon the Jews in Prussia and as is to be hoped the Jews in the southern Lands of Germany), Hebrew and the Land of their Fathers will have mainly educational, inspirational and edifying significance. The Jews who live in countries that do not grant emancipation, however, such as the Jews in Russia, surely are entitled to hope for a rebuilding of a



and those close to him in the positivist historical school, the concept of nation was not interpreted in a political sense, but as a people (*Volk*) with a unique religious history, whose essence lay in language, law and culture, in all, a way of life. Frankel therefore wished to find answers to his questions: what then was “the aim of the endeavours ... according to what criteria should the moderation, the restraint of progress be measured ...,”<sup>54</sup> through historical, and not national political, consciousness. That same year, 1844, in a discussion of Jewish education for Jewish youth, Frankel’s journal asserted that the insistence of the historical positivistic trend in Judaism on the retention of the Hebrew language derived from a view of Judaism not as nationalism, but as religion. Furthermore, “... we have given up nationality, live for our new fatherland, love and cherish its language, and in the virtue of patriotism do not wish to lag behind even those who are more privileged than we in the fatherland; but the Hebrew language, the companion of our youth, in which our religion that supersedes all changes of time and nationality, was given to us and has been preserved despite all upheavals of life, that language we cannot abandon with impunity ...”<sup>55</sup>

History teaches us, Frankel noted, that changes were continually made in Judaism, and life itself served as the guide. Thus the constant, prevailing throughout the continuity of historical changes, is “the totality” (*die Gesamtheit*), and the people (*Volk*) in the sense of the embodiment of the general will (*Volkswille*, or *Gesamtwille*).<sup>56</sup> It was the general will that produced customs and ways of life, sanctified them, and changed them in the light of changing

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Jewish homeland, or even “*ein jüdischer Staat*” in the land of their ancient fathers. In both cases, the Hebrew tongue and the Land of Israel should be cherished as a living, meaningful legacy and there is no reason to fear that, as some assimilationists or Gentile opponents to Jewish emancipation would have it, faithfulness to one’s tradition would diminish the love of the Jews for Germany their homeland (“*Vaterlandsliebe*”). One of the key terms of Frankel at this point was “spiritual independence”; this independence is a necessary condition, Frankel concluded, for an authentic religious life and it does not interfere with the full integration of the Jew in Germany. Cf. *Orient*, III, No. 7 (12th February 1842), pp. 53–54; *ibid.*, No. 8 (19th February 1842), pp. 61–64; *ibid.*, No. 9, (29th February 1842), pp. 71–72; *Literaturblatt*, No. 23 (4th June 1842), column 353–368; *ibid.*, No. 24 (6th June 1842), column 377–384; *Orient*, VI, No. 31 (30th July 1845), pp. 243–244; cf. also the *Protokolle* of the Second Rabbinical Conference, p. 35.

Subsequently Frankel modified his views and emphasised more the spiritual aspects of Jewish peoplehood. In his letter to the Curatorium of the Breslau Theological Seminary, published in the ‘Report’ that summed up the first twenty-five years of the Seminary’s activity several years after Frankel died (Breslau 1879, p. 70), Frankel emphasised that the Jewish faith is not dependent on Jewish nationhood (“*Volkstum*”) in the socio-political sense. Moreover, Judaism “... unfolded its noblest buds in times of wanderings and homelessness ... scholarship is the heart of Judaism ... the conservation of Judaism rests in the idea ...”, reprinted, in part, in *Die Welt*, 1901, No. 40, p. 8, by Felix Perles. Also see Perles, *Jüdische Skizzen*, Verlag Gustav Engel, Leipzig 1912, p. 30.

<sup>54</sup> *ZRIJ*, I (1844), p. 5.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 20, 21, 24.

concepts and needs. But on this point Frankel did not content himself with the optimism that characterised the rationalists of the Enlightenment era; the era of positivistic historical research required the guiding hand of scholarship, including historians and theologians, so that the will of the people should find expression faithful to historical heritage on the one hand and the new needs developing on the other.<sup>57</sup>

A significant parallelism, sometimes even a close semantic and conceptual similarity, developed between the Jewish historical consciousness and social thought discussed in this chapter, and the trend of historical positivity in German Protestantism. The parallelity was mainly in forms of thought, analysis, research and articulation, less in content. As to the content, the historical positivity of the Protestants continued to maintain two ancient traditions: a) Christianity is the fulfilment of the Biblical, especially the prophetic, religion of Israel, since the *Heilsgeschichte* has been foretold in the Old Testament "... a shadow of things to come" (Col. II: 17; also Hebr. X: 1); b) the State, even the modern State, should be a Christian one, since the source of its authority is not in itself but rather in the realm of transcendence "... for there is no power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God" (Rom. XIII: 1 ff.).

However the forms of social thought and the methodology of study and research developed similarly. Karl Ullmann, the Protestant theologian of Heidelberg University stated that the historical-positive trend attempts a constructive interrelationship of scholarship and living reality, of theology and that which really is of great concern for the people, from personal, social or political points of view.<sup>58</sup> This trend in Protestantism wished to achieve a compromise between what F.S. Oldenberg called the stubborn and fanatic opposition to all things new in the Church on the one hand, and the extremist opposition to all tradition on the other. Only a synthesis of old and new might enable the Church to fulfil her calling, i.e. serving as a spiritual and social guide in those days of political upheaval.

Among the ideas and methodological issues with which the trend of Protestant historical-positivity wrestled and which found its parallelity in Jewish thought, the following were included: a) The belief that historical research is capable of proving the socio-ethical relevance of religious tradition, and thereby leading to normative values; b) the assumption that the normativity of scholarship does not necessarily impair the objectivity of scholarship. Theologians, such as the members of the *Historisch-Theologische Gesellschaft* of Leipzig, or Ullmann and his colleagues at the *Studien*, but even more conserva-

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20. At that time Moritz Veitel of Papa, Hungary, wrote: "... The banner of the scholarly theologians in Judaism (in Israel) is history ..." cf. *Orient*, VI, No. 21 (21st May 1845), pp. 166–168.

<sup>58</sup> 'Theologie, Theologen und Geistliche zu dieser Zeit', in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, Friedrich Perthes Verlag, Hamburg (henceforth cited: *Studien*), 1849, vol. XXII, p. 18.

tive Lutherans such as *Consistorialrath* and Superintendent Andreas Gottlob Rudelbach from Glauchau, contributed to the development of a methodology which reconciles critical historical research with positive historical Christianity. If indeed the New Testament does proclaim the ultimate truth, and the historical study of religion, as all serious scholarship, does reveal the truth, it must be possible to avoid a clash between these two different sources of truth.

c) From this point of departure, Protestant scholarship turned with new emphasis to a number of auxiliary disciplines such as philology, archeology, geography, statistics, genealogy, heraldry, numismatics, palaeology etc. These disciplines, it was said, are most likely to further objective research” “... ohne sich von Lieblingsmeinungen, Autoritäten und Parteien in ihrem Forschen und Darstellen bestimmen zu lassen” thereby “... den religiösen Zeitverirrungen auf das Kräftigste zu begegnen”.<sup>59</sup> Therefore it was declared in the ‘Introduction’ to the *Zeitschrift für historische Theologie* that what was needed was “... an accurate historical knowledge of the different religions of the world ... the clarification of the history of all religions”; for it is precisely this broader understanding that will prove that of all religions Christianity is “... die vollkommenste und beseligendste”.<sup>60</sup> d) The belief that religion, if modernised, will be strong enough to resist the “Leviathanic” tendencies of statehood. The State, by its very nature, tends to accumulate power and to maintain monopoly of its use. Therefore an institutionalised value-system is needed in order to protect both individual and society against the might of the State. This attitude was by no means limited to Liberals; on the contrary it was the conservative Lutherans and the staunch supporters of the “Christian State” ideology who warned against the loss of Church self-government, as well as of civic self-determination. The State and modern nationalism, said Rudelbach, should not be allowed to overpower Christianity, and Protestants should learn a lesson from the history of Judaism. Whenever nationalism as a political, particularistic, factor got the upper hand Judaism tended to turn away from its Biblical origins, especially from the teachings of the Prophets; and whenever Judaism maintained its original universal and meta-national nature, it remained faithful to its calling until subsequently it had been completed and fulfilled by Christianity.<sup>61</sup> While criticism from the Christian side was of course quite disturbing for the Jews, Jewish socio-religious thought (not to speak of the ideology of the Jewish rebels in mid-nineteenth century) constantly warned against Jewish

<sup>59</sup> *Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*, herausgegeben von D. Christian Friedrich Ilgen, Verlag von Joh. A. Barth, Leipzig, (henceforth cited: *Zeitschrift*), I (1852), No. 1, p. 16.

<sup>60</sup> *Zeitschrift*, pp. V–VI.

<sup>61</sup> Andreas Gottlob Rudelbach, ‘Christenthum und Nationalität’, in *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Lutherische Theologie und Kirche*, herausgegeben von Andreas G. Rudelbach, Glauchau und H. E. F. Guericke, Halle; IX (1848), pp. 477–555. Also see J. H. Kurtz, ‘Präliminarien zu einer neuen Konstruktion der heiligen Geschichte’, in the same journal, IV (1843), pp. 46–63.

parochialism and narrow nationalism or “Jewish national separatism”.<sup>62</sup> Also, together with Protestant conservatives most if not all Jewish socio-religious thinkers spoke out against the threat to the individuality of man and citizen and of groups defined according to their religious affiliation. e) Finally a parallelity developed with regard to what contemporaries called “sobriety” (*Nüchternheit*) of both Christians and Jews concerning the Revolution of 1848. Ullmann explained that the State, by its very nature and mission is “... die Obrigkeit mit der vollen Macht und Autorität” yet that at the same time this authority is not derived from a human but rather from a religio-ethical source. Hence it should be obvious that the realm of politics is of great concern for the theologian; it is the theologian who is called on to make sure that the ethical criteria and their revelatory origin are honoured by the State. The Revolution of 1848 can teach us, Ullmann added, that violence is not able to bring about happiness, justice or salvation. All violent revolts are a *Nationalunheil*. Statehood is not a value in itself; it is a legal framework the purpose of which is to make social life (*Gemeinleben*) possible and safe. Humanism too, when alienated from reli-

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<sup>62</sup> The first Jewish conservative or “historical”-positive thinkers expressed their opposition to any socio-political form of Jewish nationality in terms not too different from those used by the liberals. One of the major differences was their attitude to Hebrew as the sacred language of prayer and as an effective means in education; “... wir haben die Nationalität aufgegeben, leben unserem neuen Vaterlande, lieben und pflegen dessen Sprache und ... Patriotismus ..., aber die hebräische Sprache ... in welcher unsere ewige, über allen Wechsel der Zeit und der Nationalität erhabene Religion uns gegeben ... können wir nicht ... verlassen ...”, *ZRIJ*, I (1844), pp. 74–75. Philippson, still in the 1850s and 1860s used the term “*Nation*” rather than “*Volk*” to indicate that it is the common descent (*Abstammung*) that keeps the Jews together, cf. *AZJ*, XIX, No. 2, (8th January 1855), p. 16. The criticism of Jewish national separatism made by Christian authors such as Johann B. Graser, Christian Friedrich Koch, Johann G. Hoffmann was shared by a growing number of Jews, including Rabbi Sigismund Stern, F. Eisenberg, David Honigmann, Rabbi Salomon Herxheimer, Rabbi Heymann Jolowicz, cf. *AZJ*, IX, No. 4 (24th February 1845), pp. 113ff.; X, No. 2 (5th January 1846), p. 31; *Israelit- 19. Jahrh.*, V (1844), No. 50, pp. 399–410; *Orient*, III (1842), No. 35, pp. 278ff.; No. 38, pp. 307ff. Several of the personal archives and *Nachlässe* by rabbis of the mid-nineteenth century preserved in The Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem, include quite instructive source materials on the issue of Jewish nationalism and the necessity to curb or to overcome it; a systematic study of the sermons, correspondence and additional kinds of manuscripts by authors such as Heymann Jolowicz, P. 42; Michael Sachs, P. 41; Salomon Herxheimer, P. 46, Salomon Plessner, P. 51, would be a rewarding project. See, for example the sermon by Jolowicz of 21st May 1847, *Geist und Wesen der israelitischen Religion*: “... nicht Absonderung ... denn in der Zerstreung gerade, in dem Sichhineinleben und Hineinbilden Israels in die Verhältnisse der Völker entwickelte es seines Daseins schönste Kraft und Eigenthümlichkeit; also ward die Zerstreung sein Bindemittel, die Vernichtung sein Leben ...” *Nachlaß Jolowicz*, P. 42/2, vol. 2. The attitude of Jewish neo-Orthodoxy is not dealt with in this article. A careful survey of the rich archival collection of Samson Raphael Hirsch, also at the Central Archives, Jerusalem (HM P/1; HM 4762–70), has shown that this trend in German-Jewish socio-religious thought requires a new thorough study; also see the warning against violence and the abuse of power in *Jeschurun*, IV (1858), No. 11, pp. 580ff.

gious values and authorities is likely to become destructive, for it elevates man and his self-centred and egotistic concerns to an absolute value. Similarly philosophical anthropology or atheism too, when given priority over religion, cannot but bring about a relativisation of moral criteria and thereby chaos in all social life and institutions. The brutal violence of 1848, the political failure of the Revolution and the general anarchy afterwards, Ullmann concluded, have increased public interest in religion, especially in religion reinterpreted in the light of scholarship.<sup>63</sup>

## V

One of the few attempts to formulate systematic Jewish social thought, termed the *Gesellschaftliche Lehre* of Judaism<sup>64</sup> was made by Ludwig Philippson before 1848, in that year itself, and subsequently in the 1850s and 1860s. According to Philippson this social thought is based on *Soziallehre des Mosaismus* despite the fact that there is no longer “any political and national life of the Jewish stock ...”<sup>65</sup> As a point of departure for the development of the Jewish *Soziallehre* Philippson characterises the atmosphere of the 1840s, noting it was a period in which “... the elements of society itself were drawn into conflict with each other ... the indigenous organisation of society with all its general rules is on the verge of dissolution ...”<sup>66</sup>

On the one hand the historical foundations of the medieval State were already undermined, including the feudal structure and the serf system as well as the special status of the Church. On the other hand the newer society which emerged with the French Revolution and Napoleon did not manage to get rid of aristocratic trends and is not at present capable of solving the difficult social problems which have arisen with the advancement of the masses; thus the present is a time of “... most convulsive revolution ... most spasmodic movements ...”<sup>67</sup> The result is a growing awareness of social inequality, and of the social polarity and injustice prevailing in society: “... Excessive luxury ... excessive misery; dozens [of people] have abundance, hundreds of thousands are starving; dozens enjoy themselves, hundreds of thousands labour ...”<sup>68</sup> And to the awareness of this situation is added the feeling “... that mankind is standing on the edge of a steep abyss ...”<sup>69</sup> And the upshot of all this, says

<sup>63</sup> *Studien*, vol. XXV (1852), p. 31; cf. pp. 5–39. Also see *Studien*, vol. XXII (1849), pp. 3–47; and Adolf Hilgenfeld, ‘Die wissenschaftliche Theologie und ihre gegenwärtige Aufgabe’, in *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, Druck & Verlag von Friedrich Mauke, Jena 1858, pp. 1–21.

<sup>64</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 9 (24th February 1845), p. 114.

<sup>65</sup> *AZJ*, XI, No. 17 (19th April 1847), p. 250; *ibid.*, No. 20 (10th May 1847), p. 293.

<sup>66</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 6 (3rd February 1845), p. 70.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 7 (10th February 1845), p. 86.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 9 (24th February 1845), p. 114.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 6 (3rd February 1845), p. 70.

Philippson, is that the question of the status of the Jews cannot be discussed only as an isolated problem, but it must be understood that in the fight for "... the civil equality of the Israelites ... we are dealing here with something much greater, the emancipation of mankind itself ..."<sup>70</sup>

And because the problems of the time are so serious, temporary solutions will not do, nor will political solutions only, for we see "politics ... is suffering from shipwreck ...",<sup>71</sup> and the vacuum left by the failure of the political solution must be filled with old-new content, with content drawn from religion. That solution seemed to Philippson virtually inevitable, for at the time "... the religious questions assailed mankind with new vigour to the extent that the foundations of society shook ..."<sup>72</sup>

From this point of departure of the spirit of the times or consciousness of the times, and as Fabius Mieses says "... the religious current consciousness of the crisis in society ...",<sup>73</sup> Philippson posits the guiding principle for the formulation of Jewish social thought, which is that there is no basis for the separation of religion from State, and even less of religion from society, though the separation of Church and State is likely to be necessary as long as the principle of a "Christian State" is current in large German states like Prussia. It is religion which must and can provide man with ethical ideals, it must and can serve as a moral guide in day-to-day social reality, it is religion that will provide "human society", the *menschliche Gesellschaft*, with the stability that is at present shaky. Furthermore, religion can enrich life and prevent its being limited to materialism and hedonism, on condition that society understands that religion is not mere abstract metaphysics but a set of social moral values, for religion is "the highest law of morality ..."<sup>74</sup> Basic values such as love of

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 7 (10th February 1845), p. 87. Philippson's interpretation of Jewish emancipation as a universal phenomenon, i.e. as part of the emancipation of mankind, was closely related to the famous Bruno Bauer controversy of 1843–1844; cf. the analysis of the polemic work by Rabbi Gotthold Salomon: *Bruno Bauer und seine gehaltlose Kritik über die Judenfrage*, Perthes-Besser & Mauke, Hamburg 1843, in *Israelit-19. Jahrb.*, V, No. 12 (24th March 1844), pp. 89–92; No. 13 (31st March 1844), pp. 97–101; No. 14 (7th April 1844), pp. 105–108; No. 15 (14th April 1844), pp. 113–115. See the fundamental studies by Nathan Rotenstreich, 'For and against Emancipation. The Bruno Bauer Controversy', in *Year Book IV of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1959, pp. 3–36; *idem*, *Judaism and Jewish Rights* (in Hebrew), Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Tel-Aviv 1959, 124 pp. Also see Schorsch, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>71</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 6 (3rd February 1845), p. 70. The term "politics" had different connotations in the social thought of Philippson and other Jewish thinkers and publicists. When describing the lesson to be learned from the 1848 Revolution, Philippson emphasised that "... the great convulsion of the year" had serious moral religious and social implications; only a superficial view would limit it to the "political" area. Cf. *Vorlesungen* p. 162. But then in a different context "Politics in its highest sense" means the fusion of society and religion in actual concrete public life, cf. *Vorlesungen*, p. 226.

<sup>72</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 6 (3rd February 1845), p. 70.

<sup>73</sup> *N. Gelber Papers*, File 4b, p. 8.

<sup>74</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 6 (3rd February 1845), p. 70.

one's fellow man, and the prohibition of murder and stealing originate in religion, and if society really accepts them and abides by them the way will be open to the disappearance of hatred of one people for another, of one social class for another, of one religion for another, and war, that is so typical of social and political life, will cease altogether.<sup>75</sup>

This approach regarding the intermingling of religion and society originates in biblical Judaism, affirms Philippon, for the *mosaische Institutionen* produced "a completely organic fusion of religion and society ..."<sup>76</sup> From this, Philippon passes on to a more detailed treatment of the "basic problems of society" in the light of Judaism, and especially in the light of what he called "Mosaic code". A prime rule in the political legislation of the Mosaic law was "One Law and one Statute shall be for you and for the stranger that sojourns with you" (Numbers XV: 16) so that Mosaic law does not recognise aristocracy or noble status, or a privileged social class based on birth or property, which is why the prophet Isaiah (V: 8) cries "Ah, those who add house to house and join field to field/Till there is room for none but you/To dwell in the land." Nor does the Mosaic law recognise legal or administrative privilege for any population group in connection with the payment of taxes; in principle therefore Judaism does not recognise the division of society into classes.<sup>77</sup> To the extent that the Mosaic law does embody civic relations implying social categories such as the distinction between the "citizen" (*der Eingeborene, der Israelit*) and the "stranger" (*der Fremdling*) and third the "resident" (*der Beisasse*), that should be understood as a temporary provisional historical necessity, the result of conditions obtaining in biblical times, and not evidence of a true socio-political ideology favouring class divisions or social or ethnic discrimination. This argument was a kind of attempt to refute the criticism levelled by opponents of Jewish emancipation, including conservative Christian groups,<sup>78</sup> asserting that

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 9 (24th February 1845), pp. 113ff.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, cf. *AZJ*, XI, No. 21 (17th May 1847), pp. 309ff.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 7 (10th February 1845), p. 86.

<sup>78</sup> Karl Streckfuss (K. Preuss. Geh. Ober-Regierungsrath), *Über die Verhältnisse der Juden zu den christlichen Staaten*, Anhang: 'Die Erklärungen der Stände sämtlicher Provinzen der Preussischen Monarchie über die bürgerlichen Verhältnisse der Juden'; A. Schwetschke & Sohn Verlag, Halle 1833; Anton Theodor Hartmann, 'Darf eine völlige Gleichstellung in staatsbürgerlichen Rechten sämtlicher Juden schon jetzt bewilligt werden? beantwortet durch einleitende Erörterungen über Mosaismus und Talmudismus', in *Archiv für die neueste Gesetzgebung aller deutschen Staaten*, vol. V, 1834, No. 1, pp. 206–240; No. 2, pp. 1–41; cf. replies by Gotthold Salomon: a) *Briefe an Herrn Anton Theodor Hartmann etc.*; b) *A. T. Hartmanns neueste Schrift ... in ihrem wahren Lichte dargestellt: Zweites und letztes Sendeschreiben*; Altona 1835; Friedrich Clemens, *Diversions eines Christen im Freiheitskampfe der Juden*, gedruckt bei Hammerich und Lesler, Altona 1835, 16 pp.; Heinrich Stephani, *Ist es rathsam den Juden das volle Staatsbürgerrecht unbedingter Weise zu erteilen? von einem Staatsgelehrten*, in Baumgärtner's Buchhandlung, Leipzig 1838, 57 pp.; Theodor Brand, *Die Judenfrage in Preussen, Gegenwart auf die Schrift: "Die gegenwärtig beabsichtigte Umgestaltung der bürgerlichen Verhältnisse der Juden in Preussen von einem unbekanntem Author"*, Druck C. F. A. Günther, Berlin 1842, 22 pp.; Wolfart (K. Preuss, Geh. Ober-Finanz Rath), *Über die*

Jews had no right to demand equal rights in Germany, as even their own Law discriminated between Jews and non-Jews. But at the same time Philippson and most of the Jewish thinkers, scholars and publicists who dealt with the matter sought to hearten the Jews themselves, “who simply accept the slanders as historical and theological facts ...”<sup>79</sup> The egalitarian principles of the Mosaic law, Philippson continued, obtained in the principles and history of the Jewish people in both biblical and post-biblical times and in medieval Jewish society. The fact that principles are maintained at different times and under varying conditions endow those principles with the authority of values essential to historical Judaism, which must therefore be deemed obligatory values in the present and future. A typical example, says Philippson, is the basic law on fully equal rights, which was given at the start of Moses’s construction of the political society (Ex. XVIII: 21). The covenant made with God included all the strata of the people “You stand this day, all of you, before the Lord your God; your tribal heads, your elders and your officials, all the men of Israel, your children, your wives, even the stranger within your camp, from the hewer of thy wood unto the drawer of thy water” (Deut. XXIX: 10).<sup>80</sup> And thereafter, Philippson added, on the basis of Markus Jost’s research, the principle of social equality was sustained at various times and places, in post-biblical Judaism, at the time of the Sanhedrin, the Talmud, and even subsequently in the social regimes of Jewish self-government in the diaspora. In Jost’s terms Philippson noted also that the equality principle in the history of Israel could be viewed as one that was “republican” in nature.<sup>81</sup>

The principle of the equality of man is very significant for current problems

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*Emanzipation der Juden in Preussen*, bei Riegel, Potsdam 1844; S[igismund] Stern, *Das Judentum und der Jude im christlichen Staat*, Vorlesung, gehalten in Berlin, am 26. Februar und auf Verlangen wiederholt am 15. März 1845, gedruckt bei G. Feister, Berlin 1845, 41 pp.; C. F. Edler, *Stimmen der preussischen Provinzial-Stände des Jahres 1845 über die Emanzipation der Juden*, Berlin 1845, pp. 5, 9, 31, 42–54; E. W. Klee, Regierungsrath, *Über die Emanzipation der Juden. Zugleich eine Kritik der Behandlung dieser Frage auf dem Vereinigten Landtage in Preussen*, Verlag von W. Heinrichshofen, Magdeburg 1847, 54 pp. Both Bismarck in his famous speech at the *Preussischen Ersten Vereinigten Landtag* of 15th June 1847, and Friedrich Julius Stahl in his: *Der christliche Staat und sein Verhältniss zum Deismus und Judentum*, Berlin 1847, 2nd edn. 1858, clearly expressed an essential implication of the “Christian State” idea for the future integration of the Jews in Germany. Accordingly Liberalism, critical rationalism, and “... merely tolerance and love of mankind” do not offer a solid foundation for strong cohesive statehood. Only traditional religion might be capable of unifying the nation and arresting the process of moral and civil disintegration so typical of revolutionary society and of the modern industrial State.

<sup>79</sup> *N. Gelber Papers*, File 4b, p. 8.

<sup>80</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 9 (24th February 1845), p. 115; also see *AZJ*, XI, No. 6 (1st February 1847), pp. 81 ff.

<sup>81</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 9 (24th February 1845), pp. 115–116; *ibid.*, No. 11 (10th March 1845), pp. 145 ff.; XI, No. 6 (1st February 1847), p. 83. Cf. Ismar Schorsch, ‘From Wolfenbüttel to Wissenschaft. The Divergent Paths of Isaak Markus Jost and Leopold Zunz’, in *Year Book XXII of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1977, pp. 109–128.



such as the question of property, Philippson affirmed. That question of property is perhaps the most crucial one in the area of social relations, and, Philippson adds, history teaches that the unequal distribution of property (*Ungleichheit des Besitzes*) was one of the destructive elements in the history of nations and states: "... One can confidently claim that the inequality of property is the cause of most evil, yes, of most crimes, of most human degeneracy ..."<sup>82</sup> Thus, Philippson continues, it is no wonder that now, in the late 1840s, people are coming to wild and extreme conclusions in seeking solutions to the question of how inequality in wealth can be abolished, (meaning the Socialist and Communist movements).<sup>83</sup> But still, the other side of the coin must be kept in mind, Philippson added, for along with the moral value of equality in property there is the value of "... the variety of human relations, the sanctity of property and the inevitable demand of personal freedom ... human society would be an unbearable tyrant if it wished to oppose property and the right to profit; but if these are given free rein, then the next moment inequality of ownership again appears ..."<sup>84</sup>

In the *mosaische Institution* an effort was made to solve social questions through legislation and a set of moral values aimed chiefly at preventing extreme wealth on the one hand and severe poverty on the other, as shown, for example, in the episode of Naboth the Jezreelite (1 Kings XXI: 3ff.).<sup>85</sup> As examples of means of achieving the goal Philippson cited biblical agrarian policy, and the Sabbatical and jubilee regulations, the cancellation of debts or the restriction of usury on the one hand, and provisions for charity, and the support of the needy, such as the precepts on leaving part of the crop for them to glean, on the other (Lev. XIX: 9–10: Deut. XXIV: 19–21). While the chief aim of the social morality in Judaism is the prevention of extreme inequality, if there is still need to aid the poor the well-to-do are under obligation to share what they were privileged to have (*Schuldigkeit der Besitzenden*) and the obligation of charity is not to be viewed as an act of mercy or pity. On that basis, Jewish communities of the Middle Ages evolved a network of social institutions, schools, refuges for the poor, services to the sick and their families, care for orphans, the ransoming of captives, the outfitting and dowering of brides, burial societies, arrangements for consoling families in mourning etc.<sup>86</sup>

With all Philippson's obviously apologetic and propaganda aims, he was well aware that only a portion and at times only a very small proportion of these

<sup>82</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 11 (10th March 1845), p. 146. See also: *Vorlesungen*, pp. 234ff.; 258ff.

<sup>83</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 11 (10th March 1845), p. 146. See also: *Vorlesungen*, pp. 247, 254.

<sup>84</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 11 (10th March 1845), p. 146. Philippson emphasised that a State that would impose total equality in the distribution of property would "... *aus der menschlichen Gesellschaft nur eine Zwangsanstalt machen ...*"

<sup>85</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 12 (17th March 1845), p. 162.

<sup>86</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 11 (10th March 1845), pp. 146, 147, 148; No. 12 (17th March 1845), pp. 162, 163, 164; XI, No. 5 (25th January 1847), p. 72; No. 6 (1st February 1847), pp. 82ff.

principles of social morality were realised in practice in historical reality. Philippson knew very well that it was impossible to abide by laws such as that on the cancellation of debts. He therefore stressed that in the discussion of what he termed Jewish social teachings he wished to apprise his contemporaries of the principles, the spirit (*Geist*) of the Mosaic laws and the Jewish tradition, and in the social ideals that he viewed as essential to Judaism.<sup>87</sup> In describing this essence, Philippson noted, it must be kept in mind that the social laws and ideals developed in the temporary historical conditions that obtained during the wanderings in the desert, the settlement of the Land of Israel and the period of the prophets. In the course of history the temporary conditions changed, and with the change in historical circumstances it was no longer necessary to adhere to the external forms of the Laws of Moses or of medieval tradition. At present with the help of both critical and positivist historical research it was possible to select from historical evolution the essential values, and abandon those that emerged from temporary circumstances. This approach of Philippson's had great similarity to the positivistic and critical historical teachings of Protestants in the middle of the nineteenth century, but he added that traditional Jewish interpretive rules should be applied to modern thought; these rules included the discovery of universal value in the particular historical traditions.<sup>88</sup> That is the way, for example, in which the ethical significance of the Sabbath can be understood today.

While in antiquity and the Middle Ages the Sabbath was given a metaphysical, cosmological or even mystical interpretation, today its sociological meaning can again be understood as the "first labour regulation" in human civilisation. This contribution to mankind should be seen at present in the light of the utopias of Saint-Simon, Fourier or Owen except that the Sabbath did not remain in the realm of utopia. Thanks to the Sabbath, workers can rise above the status of object and achieve recognition of the fact that "... they are creatures higher than hammers and shuttles, than servants of steam and other engines ...". Moreover, the inclusion of the Sabbath in the number of days the employer pays his workers for is also an achievement whose source is the biblical tradition.<sup>89</sup>

In the same structure whose essence is the social application of principles originating in religion and divine revelation, Philippson explains a series of moral values like the purity of the family and modesty, the negation of hatred and vengeance and the approval of justice and honesty in social relations, economics and political power struggle; the objection to evil, social oppression, violence, corruption, prejudice, false witness and the perversion of justice and the approval of consideration for others and even the protection of animals. A cogent illustration of the transition from theology to what Philippson termed

<sup>87</sup> See above, note 24.

<sup>88</sup> *AZJ*, XI, No. 5 (25th January 1847), pp. 69–70.

<sup>89</sup> *AZJ*, IX, No. 12 (17th March 1845), pp. 161, 162.

“social teachings” is the theological concept of the sanctity of God, now applied to society; sanctity now meant not only resembling the ways of God, as the rabbinical tradition held, but the development of a progressive society through man’s own conscious decision, until “moral consciousness” (*sittliches Bewußtsein*) prevails in day-to-day social reality.<sup>90</sup>

After the Revolution of 1848, Philippson expressed widespread disappointment at the attempt to solve social problems with brutal violence.<sup>91</sup> The lesson of 1848 was by no means restricted to the political field, Philippson claims.<sup>92</sup> The main point was that “... mankind must eventually arrive at the conviction, and from the conviction to the implementation, that a really blessed harvest can never come from a bloody seed ...”<sup>93</sup> Violence (*brutaler Kampf*) has only destructive consequences for both workers and employers and society as a whole. One-sided demands for higher wages do not benefit the working class (*Arbeiterstand*) either, as they will lead to higher prices forcing society into vicious circles of pressure and enmity.<sup>94</sup> It was a grave error to expect any constructive outcome from revolutions and social struggles, whether Socialist or Communist, that are based on a one-sided view of protecting the narrow interests of any one group. Furthermore violent revolutions have a habit of getting out of the control of those who conduct them: “... they swallow up the individuals who proclaimed themselves their proponents ...”<sup>95</sup> The way to reform society is thus not through revolution, but through evolution. Only development in the realm of education, technology and economics, if accompanied by moral consciousness on the one hand, and restraining action by a constitutional State on the other, can lead to just solutions of urgent social problems such as: safeguarding the civil and spiritual freedom of man; greater equality in wage opportunities and social conditions; the improvement of labour relations, especially between employers and workers; ensuring proprietary rights while taking care that those rights do not lead to extreme social polarity between the rich and the poor.<sup>96</sup>

The factor that can provide guidance for such development, says Philippson, is religion, though here Philippson himself cautions against delusions. It must be kept in mind that in past eras of human history, religion was not able to prevent bloodshed, corruption, evil and exploitation. Furthermore, it was religion that aroused the most brutality; that everywhere invoked and reinforced inequality, privilege, the urge to dominate ...<sup>97</sup> and at the same time

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<sup>90</sup> *AZJ*, XI, No. 5 (25th January 1847), p. 71; No. 6 (1st February 1847), pp. 84ff.; No. 17 (19th April 1847), pp. 250, 251.

<sup>91</sup> *Vorlesungen*, pp. 184, 196, see above, notes 43, 54.

<sup>92</sup> *Vorlesungen*, p. 162.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 183, 184.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>96</sup> *Vorlesungen*, p. 184.

<sup>97</sup> *Vorlesungen*, p. 206.

society made use of religion to protect class interests. Religion did not succeed in combatting the division of mankind into masters and slaves, into lords and serfs, into tyrannical rulers and subject masses. "... When ... nations groaned under the whip of absolute despotism ... was it religion which sounded the call for freedom, which damned violence and tyranny and with all its power stood on the side of the oppressed? Certainly not ..."<sup>98</sup>

Religion was a disappointment also, said Philippson, because it supported and justified the unequal distribution of wealth, the exploitation of ordinary people by men of means, and did not succeed in eradicating hatred.<sup>99</sup> Just as this historical awareness can show that the use of religion for evil is destructive to society, it can also show that the essence and content of religion are the only guarantees of social progress. For this lesson to be absorbed by modern society, religion must be illuminated with the light of its own true historical source, Philippson concludes, the Law of Moses, and in particular the *Soziallehre des Mosaismus*.<sup>100</sup>

## VI

The fervour of the Revolution of 1848 that caught hold of Jewish thinkers, scholars, rabbis and publicists lasted only a short while.<sup>101</sup> On the other hand, Jewish social thought, which as we have seen began to develop before 1848, pointed out some of the dilemmas which became crucial in Jewish life and institutional development after the Revolution, throughout the whole second half of the century and even beyond that:<sup>102</sup>

The separation of Church and State on the one hand, and on the other hand the fear that such separation would weaken religion, thus weakening the chief element in Jewish self-definition as a social group differentiated from other citizens only by religion;

<sup>98</sup> *Vorlesungen*, p. 210.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> *Vorlesungen*, pp. 212ff.

<sup>101</sup> *Israelit-19. Jahrh.*, IX (1848), No. 11 (12th March 1848), pp. 81–83, 87, 88; No. 15 (9th April 1848), pp. 117, 118; No. 16 (16th April 1848), pp. 121–123; No. 17 (23rd April 1848), pp. 129, 130; *Orient*, IX, No. 22 (27th May 1848), pp. 169–172; No. 23 (3rd June 1848), p. 177; No. 24 (10th June 1848), pp. 185, 186; *Oesterreichisches Central Organ*, I, No. 1 (4th April 1848), pp. 1–6; No. 16 (9th July 1848), pp. 205–206; No. 22 (22nd July 1848), pp. 241–242; *AZJ*, XII, No. 29 (10th July 1848), pp. 409, 410; No. 36 (28th August 1848), pp. 505, 506, 507.

<sup>102</sup> See Salo W. Baron, 'The Impact of the Revolution of 1848 on Jewish Emancipation', in *Jewish Social Studies*, XI, No. 3 (July 1949), pp. 195–203, 213–218, 220–233; *idem*, 'The Revolution of 1848 and Jewish Scholarship', in *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, vol. XX, 1951, pp. 67–99; *idem*, 'Aspects of Jewish Communal Crisis in 1848', in *Jewish Social Studies*, XI, No. 2 (1952), pp. 99ff. See also Nahum N. Glatzer, 'Leopold Zunz and the Revolution of 1848', in *Year Book V of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1960, pp. 122–139.

Liberalism on the one hand as a liberating force, and on the other as a danger to the continued existence of tradition;

Society on the one hand as a plane on which man realises his natural rights and on the other as a source of the danger that it would become dominated by the mass, oppressing the individual;

The State on the one hand as a force likely to restrain society and prevent it from disregarding individual rights, and on the other as a force likely, by intervening in society, to prevent it from carrying out its function of coming between the individual and the State;

Historism on the one hand as a means of selecting the essential from the historical continuum, thus strengthening the continuity of tradition under changing conditions, and on the other hand a critical factor revealing the historical needs which tradition aims to fill, thus relativising that tradition;

Modern, industrial society on the one hand as a framework for human freedom and free intellectual development, and on the other as a way of life leading to rootlessness, personal isolation and alienation from tradition;

And the dilemma which seems to summarise all those noted above: universality versus particularity, the integration of the Jews in the society and culture around them, and their differentiation from that society, at one and the same time.

MICHAEL A. MEYER

on

## German-Jewish Social Thought in the Mid-Nineteenth Century – A Comment

Uriel Tal has provided us with an excellent overview of the dilemmas facing reflective German Jews about the time of the Revolution of 1848. He has shown us the diverse ways in which they wrestled with conflicting values and given us, in the case of Ludwig Philippson, an interesting solution. It is not the intention of this response to take issue with Uriel Tal's presentation. He has accurately drawn the problems and the arguments from the sources. I wish only to provide a slightly different perspective on the same subject by attempting to place some of the thinking analysed by Uriel Tal more directly into the social and religious context of Jewish community life at the time. Put differently, I would like to relate the general theoretical dilemmas to specific practical concerns. To this end, I believe a comparison of the views of two leading figures may prove enlightening. I have chosen Ludwig Philippson and Samuel Holdheim.

Let us begin, then, with the concerns of Ludwig Philippson, community rabbi in Magdeburg, editor of the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, and an active but moderate proponent of religious Reform.<sup>1</sup> Although he does not, to my knowledge, use the word, Philippson was in all of his capacities troubled by the increasingly apparent effects of *secularisation*. Its products were a general religious indifference and, in practical terms, a withdrawal from Jewish community life. As politics came increasingly to crowd religion from the forefront of consciousness, religious concerns in general, and Judaism in particular, came to appear as irrelevant.<sup>2</sup> Since for Philippson Jewish identity was based on Judaism as a religion, not a nationality, the decline of religion had to have a centrifugal influence on Jewish cohesiveness. Jacob Toury has argued against Salo Baron that the political enthusiasm of 1848, during which Jews and Christians met as equals in the assemblies and on the barricades, left Jewish community life decisively weakened.<sup>3</sup> Whether or not this was so, it is clear that

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<sup>1</sup> On Philippson most recently see Johanna Philippson, 'Ludwig Philippson und die Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums', in *Das Judentum in der Deutschen Umwelt 1800–1850. Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Emanzipation* herausgegeben von Hans Liebeschütz und Arnold Pauker, Tübingen 1977 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 35), pp. 243–291.

<sup>2</sup> Jacob Toury, 'Die Revolution von 1848 als innerjüdischer Wendepunkt', in *Das Judentum in der Deutschen Umwelt, op. cit.*, p. 372.

<sup>3</sup> *Idem*, *Turmoil and Confusion in the Revolution of 1848* (in Hebrew), Israel 1968, specifically pp. 163, 187; Salo W. Baron, 'Aspects of the Jewish Communal Crisis in 1848', *Jewish Social Studies*, XIV (1952), pp. 99–144.

Philippson feared such a prospect. He was therefore ambivalent about the potentially devastating force of political Liberalism and distinctly opposed to those radical doctrines which meant to displace religion entirely.

Philippson rejected the absolute separation of Church and State. He saw value in a limited governmental regulation of Jewish community affairs intended to prevent arbitrariness and anarchy, provided only that it was not destructive of religious freedom.<sup>4</sup> His colleague Abraham Geiger went further.<sup>5</sup> Geiger was convinced that to exclude religion from the purview of the State, at a time when politics was dominant and the State widely regarded as the focus of values as well as interests, would mean to consign it to relative insignificance and to harm Judaism irreparably. What was needed was equal recognition and support for all religious denominations in place of extending special favours to Christianity while Judaism – at least in Prussia – suffered malign neglect.<sup>6</sup> But, as Uriel Tal has pointed out, the union of Church and State was no less problematic for German Jewry than their separation. For the State could too easily mean the *Christian* State, especially for one so influenced by the political philosophy of Friedrich Julius Stahl as was Frederick William IV. Hence the need to speak of the *Rechtsstaat* rather than the State in general.<sup>7</sup> The term “Church” was no less a problem since *Kirche* specifically designates a Christian institution, and the union of State and Church is therefore easily translatable into the union of the State with Christianity. Philippson preferred to shift the focus of the problem, substituting a different terminology: in place of State, society; in place of Church, religion.

In the series of essays in the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* of 1845, which bears the seeds of the later lectures entitled *Religion der Gesellschaft*, Philippson begins with the striking sentence: “The proposition: religion and State must be separate – is false.”<sup>8</sup> Thus from the very start he has substituted religion for Church. It is religion, a general term embracing Judaism and not designating a specific institution, which is to be brought into contact with the State. But is it really the State which is to be “organically assimilated” with religion? Philippson must have been uneasy with that combination. The State possesses coercive power, and for religion to be its controlling influence would mean theocracy. By the end of the first paragraph Philippson has made a second shift. Thereafter he speaks of religion and *society*. He now writes: “Religion and

<sup>4</sup> *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judent[h]ums (AZJ)*, XI (1847), p. 517.

<sup>5</sup> *Der Israelit des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, IX (1848), pp. 149–150, 172–173; *Abraham Geigers Leben in Briefen*, ed. Ludwig Geiger, Berlin 1878, pp. 196, 200–201; Salo W. Baron, ‘Church and State Debates in the Jewish Community of 1848’, in *Mordecai M. Kaplan Jubilee Volume*, New York 1953, pp. 59–63.

<sup>6</sup> See also the sentiments expressed by a correspondent from Stettin in *AZJ*, IX (1845), pp. 217–219.

<sup>7</sup> E. g., Salomon Cohn in *AZJ*, XII (1848), pp. 441–442.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, IX (1845), p. 69. The essay was reprinted in his *Weltbewegende Fragen in Politik und Religion*, Leipzig 1868, pp. 84–112. Section 7 (pp. 104–107) was inserted.

society cannot achieve any goal if they do not intertwine into a single entity.” Thus society, but not the State, is lifted out of the secular realm. According to Philippson, it is not the human being alone, but society as well, which is God’s creation.

The greatest advantage of this new formulation is that it permits Philippson to cast the entire issue into a specifically Jewish perspective. Judaism should not and cannot dictate to the State, but it does possess just the right cure for the ills of society. Unlike Christianity, the dominant faith which continues to exercise an attraction for many assimilating Jews, Judaism can be accused neither of seeking a relationship to the State in order to exploit its power nor of relegating religion to the realm of the individual. If religion was being increasingly disregarded and even scorned, that was because in its Christian form it addressed itself only to the individual. Such a stance was no longer appropriate for a politically and socially conscious age. In Philippson’s words: “Mankind no longer desires merely to be comforted, it seeks to be healed.”<sup>9</sup> In following the example of Christianity, Judaism too had concerned itself overly with the individual. But the present historical juncture called for Judaism to recapture its own peculiar, but universally applicable social doctrine.

It is Judaism alone, Philippson tells us, which can address contemporary social issues because it has always focused on improvement of society rather than salvation of the individual and because its Mosaic institutions, as Tal has illustrated, provide a model equally removed from acceptance of the *status quo* on the one hand and from what he regarded as the one-sided doctrines of Socialism and Communism on the other. Judaism bears a comforting message of social meliorism: reduction of gross inequality without violent revolution, the abolition of class privilege together with the retention of private property.<sup>10</sup> Far from being irrelevant, it now appears to have the sole comprehensive solution to society’s ills. Of course ancient Israel is not a perfect model. As a religious Reformer, Philippson could scarcely give his sanction to the totality of biblical legislation. But Mosaism settled long ago what Philippson calls the principal issues (*die Grundfragen*) of social morality. A third shift in terminology has thus occurred almost without our being aware of it. Religion has become Judaism. Speaking to a mixed audience of Jews and Christians in Magdeburg, Philippson was claiming that it is Judaism to which society must turn for counsel, at a time when – as Tal has mentioned – politics has suffered shipwreck.

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<sup>9</sup> Ludwig Philippson, *Die Religion der Gesellschaft und die Entwicklung der Menschheit zu ihr*, Leipzig 1848, p. VIII.

<sup>10</sup> Worthy of note is a specific proposal that Philippson makes on the basis of biblical social morality. He suggests that society feed, clothe, and educate the children of the proletarian class. In justifying the expenditure involved, he points out how much Prussia pays to maintain a standing army. Its 1848 budget included 25½ million marks for military expenses and only ¼ million for elementary education. (See Philippson, *Die Religion der Gesellschaft*, pp. 174–175.).



Philippson's social philosophy is, of course, suffused with liberal optimism. He is convinced that the wealthy and powerful will forego their selfish interests once they accept the religious (i.e. Jewish) idea of the organic society in which individual and collectivity are no longer at odds. His idealism was certainly shared by the men who later sat in the *Paulskirche*. What is unique to Philippson is only his ability so persuasively to provide roots for it in Judaism. His particular solution is certainly understandable in a rabbi concerned primarily with the preservation of his faith and in the editor of a Jewish newspaper which sought to address the broadest possible segment of liberal Jewry. Not surprisingly, however, the Jewish delegates to the Frankfurt Parliament did not for a moment consider ancient Israel their model for German society. Quite the contrary, even for Gabriel Riesser, the only Jewish delegate to speak up as a Jew, the Jews' right to equality in Germany was based not on what they could bring to Germany, but on his contention that German institutions had so completely suffused their souls.<sup>11</sup>

Although he was a liberal rabbi like Philippson, Samuel Holdheim's views on Judaism and Germanism, like those of Riesser, leaned more toward emphasis on the latter than on the Mosaic prescriptions of his Magdeburg colleague.<sup>12</sup> Among the most radical of the rabbinic Reformers, Holdheim, first in Mecklenburg-Schwerin and then as rabbi of the independent *Reformgenossenschaft* in Berlin, consistently favoured an absolute separation of Church and State. His position on this issue became especially apparent after Holdheim moved to the Prussian capital in 1847 and took over his new assignment.

The Prussian Jewry law of 23rd July 1847 had called for state enforcement of Jewish community membership. Abraham Geiger, among others, had welcomed this provision which marked a departure from earlier government policy and seemed to indicate that the State was moving toward unprejudiced concern for all religious groups. But Holdheim disagrees: for him any state interference in the life of religious communities represents an infringement of religious freedom. Holdheim's model is the United States where religious life is wholly unregulated. As a negative example he points to France, where all religious groups stand under the aegis of the State, and the result for the Jews has been religious stagnation. State supervision must necessarily hamper free intellectual development. Because the State supports the established community it hinders the formation of counter-institutions representing an advanced minority. As

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<sup>11</sup> Ludwig Philippson, 'Rückblick auf die Jahre 1848 und 1849', *Volks-Kalender für Israeliten auf das Jahr 5610*, IX (1850), pp. 90–91; Margarita Pazi, 'Die Juden in der ersten deutschen Nationalversammlung', *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte*, V, Tel-Aviv 1976, pp. 177–209. Cf. *Gabriel Riesser's Gesammelte Schriften*, Frankfurt – Leipzig 1867, vol. II, pp. 183–184.

<sup>12</sup> On Holdheim most recently see Jakob J. Petuchowski, 'Abraham Geiger and Samuel Holdheim. Their Differences in Germany and Repercussions in America', in *Year Book XXII of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1977, pp. 142–149.

long as any Church enjoys the special solicitude of the State, the Jewish community should receive it also. But the ideal is a State which takes no cognisance of any religious group.<sup>13</sup>

The difference between Holdheim on the one hand, Geiger and Philippson on the other, is partly explicable by Holdheim's religious radicalism which gives relatively greater value to individual freedom and untrammelled religious innovation than does the more conservative liberalism of most of his colleagues. Holdheim sensed that State recognition would redound to the benefit of the moderates, frustrating Reformers who would challenge majority opinion.<sup>14</sup> Dissent and voluntaristic religious activity would become more difficult. The State, Holdheim assumes, would have to allow the communities to establish limits of belief and practice should they so desire. It would be better for the State to regard religious groups like all other private associations, remove itself from any recognition of them, and maintain a posture of total indifference to their inner life.<sup>15</sup>

Yet in addition to the religious considerations, there was also for Holdheim the very practical concern that state-enforced community taxes would stifle the growth of the *Reformgenossenschaft*. As a voluntary organisation, his society received no community support, yet its members were expected to pay their community taxes in full. In the midst of the turmoil of 1848, Holdheim's congregants in fact passed a resolution to withhold their dues, which they managed to do until the government forced them to pay.<sup>16</sup> Community rabbis, by contrast, were concerned rather about the financial plight of the central institutions, which likewise became more severe during the year of Revolution.<sup>17</sup> For them, state enforcement of community taxes was absolutely essential to assuring Jewish institutional continuity in a period of grave uncertainty.

It is interesting that for Holdheim, no less than for Philippson, his position on the Church-State issue is connected with a particular understanding of Judaism. This is apparent already in Holdheim's writings before he came to Berlin, beginning with his *Ueber die Autonomie der Rabbinen* in 1843.<sup>18</sup> Like

<sup>13</sup> *Der Israelit des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, IX (1848), pp. 149–150.

<sup>14</sup> Toury has shown that the Orthodox took a similar position as they, too, feared the rule of the centre ('Die Revolution von 1848', *loc. cit.*, p. 373).

<sup>15</sup> *Der Israelit des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, IX (1848), pp. 195–196.

<sup>16</sup> Samuel Holdheim, *Geschichte der Entstehung und Entwicklung der jüdischen Reformgemeinde in Berlin*, Berlin 1857, pp. 239–241. Beginning in 1854 they were no longer required to contribute to that portion of the general budget which went for worship and religious education.

<sup>17</sup> In October 1848 the Breslau community leaders informed Abraham Geiger that they were no longer able to pay his salary. Non-payment of dues caused problems in other communities as well. See Salo W. Baron, 'The Impact of the Revolution of 1848 on Jewish Emancipation', *Jewish Social Studies*, XI (1949), pp. 201–202.

<sup>18</sup> A second edition was published in 1847 with a new preface which is of particular interest for our subject. The preface was reprinted in the October 1847 issue of the *Reform-Zeitung*.

Philipppson, Holdheim removes the focus from the Church-State dichotomy, preferring to use a related set of concepts which make the general issue more applicable to Judaism. For Holdheim the primary division is that between religion and nationality. Religion is to be understood as essentially universal, nationality as necessarily particular. Insofar as Judaism and Christianity are religious, they meet on the ground of a common humanity. Problems arise between them when one or the other sets up barriers of national particularity. The incompleteness of Jewish emancipation, in Holdheim's view, is currently less the result of Jewish failures in this regard than it is of what he calls "Christian nationality". It is the conception of the German Christian State which in this fashion has perverted Christianity.<sup>19</sup> "The contradiction," he says, "is therefore no longer: Jew and human being, but rather Jew and Christian, or more correctly, non-Christian and Christian, most correctly human being and Christian."<sup>20</sup> The removal of the national element from religion thus becomes a task no less of liberal Christians than of liberal Jews.

Holdheim's treatment of historical Judaism is an attempt to weed out the national from the religious. Unlike Philipppson, he cannot find a model in Mosaic institutions since he sees them as integral elements of a theocracy in which Church and State were united to govern a chosen nation. Neither the theocratic form nor the political-religious laws deriving from it can claim validity in the present age. While Philipppson idealises the biblical epoch, Holdheim is more critical. There was no freedom of conscience in ancient Israel, he declares. If someone was born an Israelite and became an idolater, his sin was considered high treason and punished by death. Foreigners were tolerated only if they would give up their idolatry. Tolerance, Holdheim tells us, is a product of the modern age. But if one compares the ancient Jewish theocracy with the new theocracy of the Christian State, the advantage accrues to the former. For the ancient Hebrews did not punish belief in foreign gods, but only their worship. Monotheism was considered identical with morality, polytheism with immorality. Idolatry was suppressed only because it was presumed to produce socially unacceptable behaviour. Thus the ancient Hebrew theocracy, for all of its shortcomings, must be deemed preferable to the currently advocated Christian one. Proponents of the Christian State who seek to exclude the Jews would at least possess some social justification if, analogously with the biblical Israelites, they claimed one must be Christian to be moral. But Christian orthodoxy, for a theological reason, will not make that claim. It would mean affirming the unacceptable proposition that morality rather than faith is primary. Thus the rejection of the Jews rests not on their position in society but rather on their self-exclusion from the peculiar religious

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<sup>19</sup> Some years later Holdheim devoted a lengthy essay to the subject of the Christian State entitled *Stahl's christliche Toleranz*, Berlin 1856.

<sup>20</sup> *Ueber die Autonomie der Rabbinen und das Princip der jüdischen Ehe*, 2nd edn., Schwerin 1847, Vorwort, p. X.

sphere of Christianity. It is their failure to embrace the dogmas of the Christian faith which renders them politically unacceptable.

For Holdheim, as for Philippson, Christianity has created a dichotomy between faith and life which is not characteristic of Judaism. It has banned religion from the sphere of politics and society, even as its institutional expression, the Church, has sought exclusive prerogatives from the State. In ancient Israel there was no such separation. Although Holdheim is far too ambivalent and selective about the specific institutions that emerged from this union for him to offer them as a model, he too stresses positively the organic connection of the religious and the moral (which for him replaces Philippson's "social") spheres that pervades the Hebrew Bible and later Judaism as well. For Holdheim as for Philippson the this-worldly stance of Judaism suggests its greater relevance in a secular age. But for Holdheim that cannot mean going back to particular laws and institutions which were the expression of a more primitive time. The appropriate answer lies neither in the specific regulations of the ancient theocracy nor in the otherworldliness of Christian orthodoxy. It is rather in what he calls "Judaism's original idea of morality and humanity", which was characteristic of the prophetic age.<sup>21</sup> Thus for Holdheim too Judaism offers a guide to contemporary society, but is not very specific;<sup>22</sup> it is more prophetic and less Mosaic than Philippson's ideal.

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, p. V.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62: "In Ansehung des Rechtes und des Gerichtsstandes, wie auch in Bezug auf die bürgerliche Pflichterfüllung des Juden in seinem Vaterlande, enthält sich die Religion aller besonderen Vorschriften und gebietet dem Juden bloss Gerechtigkeit, Treue und Pflichterfüllung im Allgemeinen."



## Religious Dissent and Tolerance in the 1840s

### I

The unity of Church and State, of religion and politics, which was so conspicuous at the height of the baroque period – visibly manifest in the unity of style of contemporary churches, monasteries and princely palaces – was severely shaken during the subsequent period. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the pre-revolutionary era of enlightened absolutism and rococo art, the relations between Church and State underwent a crisis the course and outcome of which helped to determine future developments. While basing its claim to rule on divine sanction, latter-day absolutism was bent on establishing not the dominance of religion, but the domination of religion by the State. This implied in the long term the dissolution of religion, which in turn was bound to undermine the citizen's faith in the divinely ordained authority of the monarchical ruler, whose position as the chosen one, set above the mass of his immature subjects, ceased to be taken for granted as part of the natural order of things.

This trend of dissolution was reflected in the art and the literature of the period. Rococo art – devoid as it was of major innovative ideas in architecture – abounds in symptoms of dissolution. (I have in mind, for instance, the grottos characteristic of the period, in particular the grotto-like confessionals of the church of Zwiefalten in Württemberg, with walls appearing to melt and drip away as if made of hot wax.) Examples of this kind – and there are many of them – present so telling a picture of dissolution that the parallel can hardly be accidental. In terms of intellectual history, the destruction of the classical faith in the Church and the end of the uncritical acceptance of divinely ordained powers that be was reflected and at the same time powerfully promoted by the literature of the Enlightenment, which owed much of its vitality to the increase in goods transport and the geographically uneven growth of trade and production. Dominated by a mercantile-bourgeois conception of utility, by the rationality of the market place, where no distinction can be allowed between Jew and Christian, between freeman and bondsman, the cast of mind of the Enlightenment was, if not necessarily a-religious and materialistic, at least uncommitted to organised religion. Applied to the affairs of State, for instance under the aegis of mercantilism, this mode of thinking was bound to clash with the Church.

It is not surprising, then, that enlightened absolutism – product of the union between an intellectual and a political trend – came into open conflict with the

Churches, above all with the Catholic Church. Here it is important to note that the relationship between State and Church depended on whether the majority of the population was Catholic or Protestant. This difference in the external relations of the two Churches is due to a basic difference in their internal structure. Whereas the Protestant Churches were on principle organised on a territorial basis and tended, more or less explicitly, to acknowledge the (secular) Prince as the fountainhead of religious authority, the Catholic Church, in spite of its manifold links with secular power, had contrived to develop an autonomous hierarchical structure with the Pope rather than the local ruler (even if he were a Prince-Bishop) at the apex. The significance of this effective organisational independence was clearly recognised early on, and under the heading of ultramontanism has come to be widely understood as an important factor in the history of the nineteenth century and beyond.

The structural difference between the two Churches led to divergent developments. In the Protestant states, where the links between the Church and the secular power were stronger, the leading clergy and Church administrators were far more effectively influenced by the political and economic interests of the State; they yielded far more readily to the governmental pressure exercised by enlightened absolutism than did the dignitaries of the Catholic Church in the same circumstances. Thus, liberalisation made much more headway among Protestants than among Catholics, at any rate as far as the upper strata of society were concerned. This trend had its theological implications. In the words of the Catholic scholar, Konrad Algermissen, "the rationalist-naturalistic Enlightenment was by no means a minority current of opinion challenging a Protestant Christianity firmly rooted in its faith; on the contrary, it represented the theological mainstream of contemporary Protestantism and remained dominant for scores of years" as well as influential in the field of Church organisation.<sup>1</sup> No similar statement could be made about the Catholic Church, in spite of the views expressed on Church organisation by Ignaz von Wessenberg and on theological subjects by Georg Hermes and Anton Günther.

The Jewish response to the Enlightenment was no less differentiated than the Christian one. In the West, where the paramountcy of the synagogue had become precarious, support for the Enlightenment, and later for Liberalism, was stronger. In the East, where the local congregation had far more effectively retained its function as an instrument of social supervision and control, these influences were weaker. The *Toleranzpatent* of Joseph II encountered vehement resistance in Galicia, and aroused misgivings elsewhere, whereas it was hailed in Berlin by Naphtali Herz Wessely.

What enlightened absolutism sought to achieve was to strengthen the centralised power of the State, which was to exercise unfettered control over all domestic forces and resources. This implied of necessity a curtailment of the competencies of non-state authorities representing the Estates, guilds or reli-

<sup>1</sup> Konrad Algermissen, *Konfessionskunde*, Celle 1957, p. 667.

religious bodies. The holders of group power were enjoined to be tolerant, in other words, to allow the State a free hand. In its endeavour to extend its power to the religious sphere, the State was bent on whittling away and eventually abolishing the traditional autonomy of the Jewish communities. The Prussian Law of 1812 made a step in that direction by conferring on the communities the status of private associations and ending the royal endorsement of rabbinical authority.<sup>2</sup> The individual experienced this development as a progressive liberation from religious tutelage, and it was – rightly – hailed on these grounds by leading spokesmen of the Enlightenment who, however, failed to appreciate the threat to freedom posed by state intervention. To begin with, the State appeared to act as the ally of the individual, as the agent destined to create and preserve a sphere of individual freedom. This explains the loyal (and in some cases fulsome) support of government policies on the part especially of Jewish exponents of the Enlightenment.

The changed religious situation called for a changed concept of religion. This was put forward in a radical spirit by Moses Mendelssohn, who rejected on principle the traditional link between religion and secular power and, carrying the principle to its logical conclusion, even denied the right of religious groupings to expel any member. “The true, divine religion”, he said succinctly, “needs neither arms nor fingers in order to function, for it is in essence all spirit and heart.”<sup>3</sup> The driving force behind the religious change – the force that impelled also the Enlightenment, political and industrial revolution and the rise of the bourgeoisie – rendered the instruments of religious supervision and intervention largely ineffective, a development illustrated most strikingly by the process of secularisation in the narrow sense, the abolition of ecclesiastical principalities, abbeys of princely status and similar institutions. One conspicuous result of this gradual transformation was an attitude of indifference or even hostility to the established religious bodies adopted by large sections of the population in the nineteenth century. Yet, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that this attitude extended to religion as such, that it was a-religious or even anti-religious. On the contrary, it can be said that the release and self-liberation of the individual from institutional bonds entailed a growing emotional, internalised, attachment to religion in its new shape. The complete breach with religion is equally untypical on the intellectual and emotional plane. The very critique of religion was instrumental in saving religion. The most extreme, and at the same time most illuminating example is Feuerbach’s thesis according to which the truth of Christianity remains undiminished, provided it is correctly understood as the truth not of a heavenly, supramundane sphere, but of this terrestrial world.

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<sup>2</sup> L. Auerbach, *Das Judentum und seine Bekenner in Preußen und in andern deutschen Bundesstaaten*, Berlin 1890, p. 290.

<sup>3</sup> *Moses Mendelssohn’s gesammelte Schriften*, ed. by G.B. Mendelssohn, vol. III, Leipzig 1843, p. 195.



Religion endured not only in this non-institutional and undogmatic form, but also (especially in the case of Catholicism) in the shape of an ecclesiastical hierarchy, that is to say of power apparatus, although its scope was limited at first, both externally and internally. The hierarchy found itself impelled to seek an arrangement with the new State on a new basis. This proved before long to be possible, as it became clear that the monarchical state itself was under threat of being swept away by the forces of change and liberation. In Prussia Frederick William IV, and in Bavaria Ludwig I – the latter especially in the years 1838 to 1846, while Karl von Abel held the Religious Affairs Ministry – had no hesitation in leaning on the support of Prussia's Protestant and Bavaria's Catholic orthodoxy. (It may be added that the group of Protestant conservatives which had emerged in the mid-1820s under the banner of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* was not as insignificant numerically as a comparison with the volume of religious-liberal publications might suggest.) This re-institutionalisation of religious life under the aegis of the established Churches, aided and protected by the State, was bound to arouse opposition at a time of steadily advancing modernisation with its social consequences, including notably the proletarianisation of large numbers of people, spotlighted dramatically by the weavers' rising of 1844. Thus, re-institutionalisation gave a fresh impulse not only to the radical critique of religion (as opium of the people) but also to non-conformist undogmatic religiosity.

## II

These strivings – a ground-swell affecting sizable sections of the population, in particular during the years leading up to the Revolution of 1848 – found their most effective organisational expression in the movement that can be summed up under the heading of “religious dissent”, an historical entity of considerable political as well as religious complexity.<sup>4</sup> The two wings of the movement were the Protestant *Freunde*, subsequently known as *Lichtfreunde*, “Friends of Light”, and the *Deutschkatholiken*. As religious groupings they were largely neglected by liberal historians, while their treatment at the hands of “official ecclesiastical historiography” was, in the words of Walter Nigg, “prejudiced and inadequate, a falsification of history”.<sup>5</sup> Thus they came to be seen in retrospect, quite wrongly, as fringe movements, irrelevant even in their own time, marred by sectarianism, whereas they represented in truth an elementary outburst of enlightened religiosity arousing an exceptionally wide response in the ranks of the petty and middle, and even of the upper bourgeoisie.

The most important leaders of the movement were on the Protestant side Leberecht Uhlich (1799–1872) in Magdeburg, Gustav Adolf Wislicenus (1803–

<sup>4</sup> Theological-scientific rationalism is not dealt with in this paper.

<sup>5</sup> Walter Nigg, *Geschichte des religiösen Liberalismus*, Zürich – Leipzig 1949, p. 176.

1875) in Halle and Julius Rupp (1809–1884) in Königsberg: on the Catholic side Johannes Ronge (1813–1887) in Breslau, who was joined by the Breslau Canon and Professor of Ecclesiastical Law Michael Eduard Regenbrecht, as well as the less important figure of Johannes Czernski (1813–1893) at Schneidemühl.

Uhlich's writings show how little the "freedom of the spirit" demanded by the movement depended on sober rationalist concepts, and how much it had in common with eighteenth-century pietism (making due allowance for the change in external conditions). Hermann Jellinek – brother of the Jewish historian Adolf Jellinek – writing from the point of view of radical criticism, recognised this link at the time in his book on the contemporary religious, social and literary scene. In the first part, subtitled 'Critique of the Religion of Love', he characterised the *Lichtfreunde* as the "attenuated phase of critical pietism".<sup>6</sup>

A more consistent stand than Uhlich's was taken by Wislicenus, who had studied Protestant theology in Halle with Gesenius and Wegscheider. He went farthest in the endeavour to free religion of the ballast of traditional Christianity and interpreted religion basically in terms of morality. A similar view was taken by the devout Kantian Rupp (grandfather of Käthe Kollwitz), who was a *Dozent* in philosophy at Königsberg University and perhaps intellectually the most eminent representative of the movement.

Ronge, on the other hand, was typical of the movement's dynamic force. In the course of a triumphant tour of Germany, described in the annals of the movement as a "missionary journey", he encountered an exceptional welcome and very large attendances at many different places. An historian of the non-conformist *freireligiöse* movement reported "untold thousands" at Frankfurt a. Main, 13,000 tickets sold for admission to a service at Offenbach, an audience of 15,000 at Ulm, and no less than 30,000 at the Paradeplatz in Königsberg.<sup>7</sup>

Contemporary comments, especially on the *Deutschkatholiken*, differ so widely from later judgements, coloured by the mood of the reactionary period of the 1850s, that it is difficult at times to realise that they relate to the same events. As eminent a contemporary historian as Georg Gottfried Gervinus described the emergence of the *Deutschkatholiken* as an historical turning point.<sup>8</sup> "He dares", said a contemporary review article, "to see in the *deutsch-katholische* ferment something other than the birth of a new sect. He sees in its leaders and friends the missionaries of an incipient new Church ... of a great spiritual-national unity in which denominational antagonisms shall be re-

<sup>6</sup> Hermann Jellinek, *Die religiösen, sozialen und literarischen Zustände der Gegenwart*, Zerbst 1847, p. 259. – Evidence adduced by Jellinek to corroborate his thesis included the pamphlet by Johann Konrad Dippel, *Ein Hirt und eine Herde*.

<sup>7</sup> Gustav Tschirn, *Zur 60jährigen Geschichte der freireligiösen Bewegung*, Gottesberg 1904, pp. 21, 23ff.

<sup>8</sup> Georg Gottfried Gervinus, *Die Mission der Deutschkatholiken*, Heidelberg 1845.

solved”.<sup>9</sup> The educated middle class tended to overrate a highly literary, intellectualised freedom of the spirit in the Goethean mould, and this one-sided attitude – which could so easily degenerate into a self-indulgent, more often Protestant than Catholic pseudo-religious, humanitarian and nature-loving rhapsody – went hand in hand with a failure to do justice to that more elemental, but less literary and sophisticated movement for the liberation of the spirit, a movement that helped to prepare the ground for the Revolution of 1848 and motivated directly some of the revolutionaries.

The *Freireligiösen* looked upon themselves more or less emphatically and insistently as Christians, and the freedom to which they aspired was at the outset one of undogmatic, unfettered or – to use a contemporary phrase – “fluid” Christianity. But the fact that they conceived that Christianity in terms of true humanity clearly indicates that their path led inevitably to a demand for complete freedom of religion. In putting forward that demand, they were not motivated solely by theoretical reasoning or by a spontaneous identification with the postulates of tolerance and freedom of opinion bequeathed by the Enlightenment, for there were at the same time eminently practical, down-to-earth reasons: the need to hold their own as a group. That need became all the more pressing as, contrary to their initial hopes, the revival of the conservative forces of the old Orthodoxy relegated them to a position of permanent outsiders who, for the sake of collective survival, were dependent on the civic freedoms, and as religious outsiders in particular on the freedom of religion. And the freedom of religion for which they stood applied equally and unambiguously to non-Christian religious minorities.

The first and decisive impulse was addressed to the task of ending the denominational fragmentation of religion, interpreted in the widest sense, inclusive of the non-Christian religions, Judaism in particular. The logic of economic and political developments pointed in the same direction. With the progressive intensification of economic activity and the growth of an increasingly centralised state structure, group boundaries inhibiting social intercourse and the direct link between the State and the individual citizen were felt to be vexatious. This trend towards the breaking down of denominational barriers, brought the various religious groups closer to one another, a process that was seriously impeded only where – as in the Catholic Church – a powerful and independent supra-regional hierarchy was able to throw its weight into the balance.

It is interesting to note that the most far-reaching instance of this inter-denominational rapprochement occurred not in the years leading up to the Revolution of 1848, but as early as 1830, when at the time of the July Revolution a number of North German Protestants and Jews formed a group which they called the *Philalethen* (Friends of Truth). In contrast to present-day

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<sup>9</sup> Friedrich Theodor Vischer, ‘Gervinus und die Deutschkatholiken’, *Jahrbuch der Gegenwart*, III (1845), p. 1086.

œcumenical aspirations, their common point of departure was the humanist religion of reason. The decisive step in bringing their case before the public was taken by Theodor Olshausen, a barrister who in 1829/1830 was active in Kiel.<sup>10</sup> In July 1830 he published anonymously a 'Draft Petition addressed to German Princes' in which he demanded that "in recognition of the universal rights of man" every citizen should be granted the right to "freely practise his religion" and the opportunity of resigning from any of the existing religious communities.<sup>11</sup> Later that summer the Jewish writer and headmaster in Hamburg, Immanuel Wohlwill, published in Kiel, also anonymously, the 'Principles of the Religious Friends of Truth', in which he proposed arrangements that could be described as model statutes for non-denominational communities.<sup>12</sup> This was the revised version of an earlier manuscript, which he had submitted to Olshausen, who found that it was in complete agreement with his own views. So close was the rapprochement between enlightened Jewish and Christian opinion at that time. At least two more Jews belonged to the circle of the *Philalethen*: they were William Leo-Wolf (Hamburg) and Abraham Hertz (Kiel).<sup>13</sup>

In the Catholic Church, too, tendencies towards overcoming denominational barriers were in evidence well before the 1840s. As early as 1817, addressing the Wartburg Rally of German students, Friedrich Carové declared that "opposite poles have been striving of late to unite and interpenetrate: it is for us to close the circle, and it is incumbent on every educated individual, on everyone who wants to have part in the honour of his nation to be a learned knight and a knightly priest".<sup>14</sup> This appeal was clearly supra-denominational, designed to promote "union and interpenetration" on a national basis, in the service of national unity. In 1838, Carové published a pamphlet in Leipzig, *Papismus und Humanität*, in which he endorsed the demand for the "emancipation of the

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<sup>10</sup> In 1851 he emigrated to the USA, where he published the journal *Der Demokrat* and the well-reputed newspaper *Die westliche Post*. He returned to Europe in 1865.

<sup>11</sup> (Theodor Olshausen), *Entwurf einer Bittschrift an deutsche Fürsten*, Kiel 1830, pp. 5f., 13f.

<sup>12</sup> Immanuel Wohlwill, *Grundsätze der religiösen Wahrheitsfreunde oder Philalethen*, Leipzig – Kiel 1830. Earlier, under his original name of Immanuel Wolf, he had published a programmatic article, 'Über den Begriff einer Wissenschaft des Judenthums', *Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums*, Berlin 1822, pp. 1–24.

<sup>13</sup> See H[anns] G. Reissner, 'Begegnung zwischen Deutschen und Juden im Zeichen der Romantik', in *Das Judentum in der Deutschen Umwelt 1800–1850*. Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Emanzipation herausgegeben von Hans Liebeschütz und Arnold Paucker, Tübingen 1977 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 35), pp. 340ff.

<sup>14</sup> Friedrich Carové, *Rede gehalten am 19ten October 1817 zu denen, auf der Wartburg versammelten, deutschen Burschen*, Eisenach n.d., p.9. – At the time, Carové, aged twenty-eight and already a qualified lawyer, studied philosophy at Heidelberg. Later, as a private scholar, he made a name for himself with his writings on the philosophy of history and religion. Though a sympathiser, he was not a member of any *deutschkatholische* congregation.

Catholic Church from Rome” that had been formulated by the Bonn Professor Augusti.<sup>15</sup> Carové wanted the Jews to be included in the unity of all Germans. This he spelt out in a pamphlet on Jewish emancipation, philosophy and reform projects, published in 1845.<sup>16</sup> But as early as 1819 a group of the Heidelberg *Burschenschaft* ‘Teutonia’, inspired by Carové, openly opposed the anti-Jewish utterances of the philosopher Professor Jakob Fries, and did not hesitate to draw their swords to protect Jews against a riotous mob which the local police had failed to control.<sup>17</sup>

Among the Jews, as among Catholics, there were endeavours to bring religion into harmony with the aspiration for national identity, the unity of all Germans, including the German Jews. It is hardly by accident that in the very year in which Ronge had published his letter against the pilgrimage to the Sacred Robe at Trier and in which the *deutschkatholische* movement got off the ground, a Jewish layman, Dr. Sigismund Stern, Head of the Jewish boys’ school in Berlin, a well-known educationalist and leader of Reform Judaism, should have started a series of lectures calling for the establishment of a “German-Jewish Church”, which caused quite a stir at the time. This episode, however, is mentioned here only in passing, since for all its resolve to assimilate and meet the demands of the modern age, the Jewish group inevitably failed to attract outside support and remained isolated. Thus, the Jewish Reformers were much closer than were the Christian *Freireligiösen* to the tradition of the Enlightenment, summarised by Mendelssohn in the eloquent phrase: “For the sake of your and our own happiness, bear in mind that religious unification is not tolerance, indeed is contrary to true tolerance”.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, many of the *Freireligiösen* were bent precisely on such unification including the Jews. The essence of the *deutschkatholische* movement was aptly described at the time by the *deutschkatholische* historian Friedrich Kampe as a “marriage” between Catholicism and Protestantism.<sup>19</sup>

None the less, the proclaimed principle of tolerance and freedom of religion proved on many occasions to be effective, both in general and in the test case of relations with the Jews. The principle was applied internally as well as externally. Thus, a Free Congregation was not committed to any dogma and was to have room for a wide range of religious convictions among its members.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland*, I (1838), p. 489.

<sup>16</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm Carové, *Über Emanzipation der Juden, Philosophie des Judenthums und Jüdische Reformprojekte zu Berlin und Frankfurt*, Siegen – Wiesbaden 1845.

<sup>17</sup> See Eleonore Sterling, *Judenhaß. Die Anfänge des politischen Antisemitismus in Deutschland (1815–1850)*, Frankfurt a. Main <sup>2</sup>1969, p. 149.

<sup>18</sup> Mendelssohn, *op. cit.*, p. 361. On Sigismund Stern and his demands for state recognition of the Jewish religion and his call for equal rights for a “deutsch-jüdische Kirche” with the Christian religious institutions see now also Dolf Michaelis, ‘The Ephraim Family and their Descendants’, in *Year Book XXIV of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London 1979, pp. 244–246.

<sup>19</sup> Friedrich Ferdinand Kampe, *Geschichte der religiösen Bewegung der neueren Zeit*, Leipzig 1852–60, vol. I, p. 29. (Hereafter quoted as *Geschichte*.)

Jews were in principle eligible for membership, without having to be baptised. A small number of Jews did actually avail themselves of this opportunity, a point duly stressed by the historian of the *freireligiöse* movement. "From its very inception", he wrote, "the *freireligiöse* movement proved that it was planted on a new and broader base ... For the first time Catholics and Protestants treading the road to freedom – with many Jews as well taking an active part – clasped hands in a new spiritual community that rose high above the denominational past."<sup>20</sup> The most prominent case was that of Rudolph Benfey, who reported on his experiences as a member of the Free Congregation in Halle, led by Gustav Adolph Wislicenus.<sup>21</sup> The membership of the Hamburg Free Congregation appears to have included a good many Jews – temporarily at least – in 1849, among them in particular fairly young Jewish women. This can be gleaned from a comment in *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, noting that

"what we have here is a free Christian congregation, whose preacher, Weigelt, may not be destined to be a second John Chrysostom, yet he generally preaches on texts of the Old Testament in the way a Jewish preacher really ought to preach, and that on Sunday. It is striking, however, that a large number of youngish Jewish ladies, both from Orthodox and liberal families, have fallen into the habit of regular attendance at those sermons. Many reasons conspire to attract large audiences: there is the charm of novelty, a Sunday with nothing to do, the prospect of meeting Christians, a measure of ostentation, and it is all made so easy, as acquisition of membership and resignation from the Free Congregation are not tied to any ceremonial, but a simple declaration is sufficient."<sup>22</sup>

Friedrich Ferdinand Kampe, in his contemporary book on the history of the religious movement also refers in passing to a Jewish member of a Free Congregation.<sup>23</sup> There were, on the other hand, some more traditionally inclined elements among the *Freireligiösen* who felt misgivings about the participation of unbaptised Jews. Nevertheless, on balance – bearing in mind especially the prevailing attitude of the two official Churches<sup>24</sup> – the fact that the Free Congregations had any Jewish members at all is striking enough. Seen in this light, the highly emotional reaction of Rudolph Benfey becomes understandable. In his book he extolled "a union marking the reconciliation of

<sup>20</sup> Tschirn, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>21</sup> Rudolph Benfey, *Die protestantischen Freunde und die Juden*, Leipzig 1847, pp. 3ff. – In 1849, Benfey was expelled from Prussia as an "undesirable alien" on account of his political activities; see J. Brederlow, "Lichtfreunde" und "Freie Gemeinden". *Religiöser Protest und Freiheitsbewegung im Vormärz und in der Revolution 1848/49*, Munich – Vienna 1976, p. 112.

<sup>22</sup> *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, XIII (29th October 1849), p. 619. See also Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1847–1871. Zwischen Revolution, Reaktion und Emanzipation*, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 132.

<sup>23</sup> Kampe, *Geschichte, op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 106.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. for instance Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden, op. cit.*, pp. 133 (note 70), 153 (notes 76ff.); see also M. Dierks, *Die preußischen Altkonservativen und die Judenfrage 1810/1847* (Diss.), Rostock 1939, and F. Clausen, *Judengegnerische Strömungen im deutschen Katholizismus des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Diss.), Jena 1942.

Judaism with Christianity”<sup>25</sup>, yet his own narrative suggests that this high-flown description rather overstates the case.

Useful as the admission of Jews to the Free Congregations may be as a yardstick of their internal tolerance, the numbers involved remained small, for one thing because it appears that generally not many Jews were eager to join.<sup>26</sup> Accordingly, the touchstone of the dissenters’ tolerance was their attitude in practice as well as in theory to the Jews – the traditional outsiders of Christian society – as an alien group.

As for the practice, all that can be said in the absence of comprehensive information is that at least in some parts it was very promising. Naturally, the Christian non-conformists found it easiest to establish contacts with the reformed elements of Jewry whose spiritual and political-practical attitudes were akin to their own. There were cases, however, in which the Jews held back out of fear of the authorities. In 1847, the Königsberg Free Congregation of Julius Rupp was able to hold its service at the premises of the Jewish community, when it was found that no other venue of sufficient capacity was available. But this was placed on record as an act of exceptional generosity; such aid was certainly not a common occurrence.<sup>27</sup> Elsewhere relations were yet closer. In Hamburg – as mentioned before – Jewish women in particular flocked to the sermons of the *freireligiöse* preacher Weigelt. In Mannheim, the *deutschkatholische* preacher Heribert Rau turned up at the dedication of the local synagogue with a poem celebrating ‘The Consecration of the Temple’. It seems likely that other members of his congregation were also present at the ceremony. Cooperation was carried further still at Offenbach, where in 1857 the *deutschkatholische* preacher stood in for the rabbi at a Jewish funeral and was reported as having delivered a most moving oration. Such *communicatio in sacris* between a Christian preacher and a rabbi ceased to be thinkable when the *freireligiöse* movement had passed its prime. Only in our own time has it become a possibility once again. In the circumstances it was not surprising that in 1867 members of Jewish Reform congregations attended the annual conference of the East German Free Congregations at Königsberg.<sup>28</sup> A Jewish journal commented as follows:

“Of all religious groupings, the Free Congregations are closest to ourselves, both in regard to the goal, the ideal of the prophets ... and in respect of the ways and means by which this exalted goal can be attained: liberation of the individual through avowal of faith and education, hence unlimited freedom of thought and of teaching!”<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Benfey, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> Even moderate Reform circles turned against the Free Congregations in order not to be identified with their “radicalism”. Cf. Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden in Deutschland. Von Jena bis Weimar*, Tübingen 1966 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 15), p. 26.

<sup>27</sup> See Tschirn, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>28</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

<sup>29</sup> *Die Gegenwart*, I (1867), pp. 321f.; quoted by Toury, in *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

One would expect that such comparatively harmonious relations should have led to a substantial number of mixed marriages. Kampe mentions this point, without however going into detail about the numbers involved and their regional distribution.<sup>30</sup>

During the heady days of 1848, a short-lived attempt was made to prepare the foundation of a German National Church embracing the Christian denominations as well as the Jews. Kampe's report is characteristic of the climate of that year:

"In June and August of that year meetings took place at an association at Frankfurt a. Main in the presence of numerous guests, in order to discuss a plan submitted by a Protestant parson from Nassau, which envisaged the foundation of a German National Church on the basis of a rationalist creed, and suggested as a first step to this end the convening of a constituent assembly. The debates proceeded in a spirit of German-national unity and religious tolerance. The speakers included the local *deutschkatholische* preacher, a Protestant parson from Austria, a Roman Catholic priest from Constance and Jewish rabbis. In the course of further deliberations, held in a more intimate circle, it was agreed to respond to the proposal by launching a national association which, while avoiding at first an open breach with the established denominations, should cultivate the idea of unity based on the freedom of the spirit. But preparations for the issuing of a general appeal were cut short by the September events in Frankfurt and the general change in the political situation."<sup>31</sup>

It appears that in these endeavours a decisive part was played by the *Deutschkatholik* Franz Wigard, who is specially mentioned in this context by Kampe.

In this as in the previous cases mentioned here it was, of course, a question of an understanding achieved by like-minded representatives of different religious communities. (The Roman Catholic priest from Constance, who attended the Frankfurt discussions, was undoubtedly a supporter of Wessenberg.)

This limitation of inter-denominational practice indicates a fatal ambivalence that was starkly revealed in the theoretical pronouncements of that period, which are important both in completing the contemporary picture and in pointing to the future.

The ambivalence is conspicuously manifest in the powerful emotional rather than rational argument used by Uhlich in an address, quoted in full by Hermann Jellinek, possibly from his own notes. According to Uhlich, the Religion of Humanity, defined by many as the religion of love (of truth and freedom) demands the condemnation of hate:

"Looking back at the course of history, we find that love among people is inhibited by religious faith. How fiercely the flame of consuming hate burned for thousands of years between the different religions and denominations, how violently the Jews hated the first Christians and those that came after, down to the present day, and how the Christians in

<sup>30</sup> Kampe, *Geschichte*, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 343.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.



turn requited hate with hate! ... This fire, which lately, during the past decade, was only smouldering under the ashes and seemed close to extinction, is being fanned once more in our time, and what hate could be more bitter than the hate swaying and filling the hearts of the faithful, defending and hardening their faith against those attacking it, those to tread the road of reason?"<sup>32</sup>

This passage indicates the common ground, the basis on which agreement is to be sought: not on the basis of faith, which sows hate, but of reason, which makes for unity.

"When we meet a Jew, we should not say: 'You are a Jew and I am a Christian', but what we want to say is: 'that is what both of us have been, but now we are human beings. You, and you, whatever religious community you may be coming from does not concern us, we are at one with you, so long as we find you standing on the ground of pure humanity.'" <sup>33</sup>

Thus, the limit of tolerance is defined by the limit between reason and faith.

Yet, at the same time representatives of the *freireligiöse* movement came out without any ambiguity in favour of comprehensive freedom of religion, including the dogmatic creeds. In an appeal to the United Prussian Diet, which met in 1847, Gustav Adolph Wislicenus wrote in the concluding passage:

"Thus, not only justice, but to no lesser extent the well-being of the State and the moral law call for action to let religion be free ... The most diverse parties must recognise the freedom of religion unless they prefer to fish in troubled waters. For that reason we have spoken in the name of all, not only on our own behalf, even for the Church from which we have seceded."<sup>34</sup>

Here Wislicenus clearly spoke for the entire *freireligiöse* movement, however heterogeneous it was in other respects. The *Deutschkatholik* Ferdinand Kampe expressed himself in a similar vein, when he demanded the "absolutely unconditional recognition of every religious society" and simultaneously the "thorough separation of Church and State"<sup>35</sup> as an essential condition for genuine freedom of religion. The principle involved was formulated yet more clearly by Ronge, who proclaimed "every individual's right to free self-determination", which was unthinkable without freedom of religion:

"Therefore I want to, indeed I must, will a full recognition of free human dignity, complete equality of rights, and for the nations unfettered sovereignty of the people as the fountain-head of the institutions of the State."<sup>36</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 29f.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>34</sup> Gustav Adolph Wislicenus, *Religionsfreiheit!*, Leipzig 1847, pp. 23f. (This pamphlet may be regarded as a counterpart to one arguing the opposite case: Friedrich Julius Stahl, *Der christliche Staat und sein Verhältnis zu Deismus und Judentum*, Berlin 1847.)

<sup>35</sup> Kampe, *Geschichte*, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 195.

<sup>36</sup> Johannes Ronge, *Religion und Politik*, Frankfurt a. Main 1850; quoted by F. W. Graf, *Die Politisierung des religiösen Bewußtseins. Die bürgerlichen Religionsparteien im deutschen Vormärz: Das Beispiel des Deutschkatholizismus*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1978, pp. 339f.

Seen in this light, persecutions of heretics and Jews are bound to seem highly reprehensible. Kampe pilloried them as the manifestation of an old and outdated ideal:

“Such, then, was the old ideal. It is written: ‘ye shall be holy because I am holy!’ ... Persecutions of heretics and Jews then appear as moral deeds: the massacre of St. Bartholomew was followed by a Te Deum in Rome; the most evil atrocities perpetrated against heretics are not sinful, but commended.”<sup>37</sup>

Did the new ideal of the Religion of Humanity, then, rule out all discrimination? It does not seem so. As it happened, the new view was often enough propounded in such a manner that the old prejudices reappeared in the form of new, more or less modified, variants. Thus, Kampe said in his report on the fourth session of the Leipzig Lay Council of 1845:

“The session closed with the adoption of a provision ... which, in the words of the President, was designed to subordinate (Judaic) Catholicism, with its unprincipled sanctification of approved conduct,<sup>38</sup> as well as (Pauline) Protestantism to the *deutsch-katholische Church* ...”<sup>39</sup>

(The charge of unprincipled sanctification of approved conduct levelled at Catholicism and Judaism – the latter often being indicted in this context on the additional count of being strictly and purely legalistic – continues to linger to this day.)

Wislicenus, too, betrayed his limitations. Commenting on the Bible passage – evidently repugnant to him – in which God commands the Israelites preparing for the exodus to rob the Egyptians of jewellery and clothing,<sup>40</sup> he arrived at the conclusion that such behaviour was a “manifestation of the Jewish mentality”.<sup>41</sup> Jellinek aptly exposed the psychological mechanism behind this attempt on the part of Wislicenus to exonerate the Jewish God at the expense of the Jews in order to save that God for himself and his personal religiosity. Jellinek commented: “Is it not an apologia for Jehovah, when it is claimed that robbing and cheating ‘cannot have been the divine will’ ...? Instead of characterising Jehovah in terms of this injunction – which would mean to annihilate him altogether – Wislicenus, the ‘Pantheist’ exculpates him and blames the divine command to cheat the Egyptians on the ‘Jewish mentality’.”<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Kampe, *Das Wesen des Deutschkatholizismus*, Tübingen 1850, p. 182. (Hereafter quoted as *Wesen*.)

<sup>38</sup> “Sanctification of approved conduct” here stands for *Werkheiligkeit*, Luther’s dismissive term for *Werkgerechtigkeit*, the doctrine of justification (or even salvation) through good works. Protestant writers commonly bracketed *Werkheiligkeit* with hypocrisy. (Translator’s note.)

<sup>39</sup> Kampe, *Geschichte*, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 173.

<sup>40</sup> *Exod.* III: 21 f. and XII: 35 f.

<sup>41</sup> Wislicenus, as quoted by Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 16 f.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

The devaluation of alien religiosity, in particular of Judaism (the “Jewish mentality”), which occurs here more or less casually, was treated elsewhere in a more methodical vein. In the “new Reformation” of the nineteenth century, wrote Ronge – who looked upon himself as the leading champion of Reform, as a second Luther – the German people was freeing itself “from the thralldom of the Asiatic dogmas and traditions”.<sup>43</sup> Here, the temporal dimension of the new and the old, of the present-day and topical in contrast to all that belonged to yesterday, was supplemented by a spatial dimension, which decisively sharpened the distinction. It was a device calculated to re-emphasise the old antagonism between Christianity and Judaism. Moreover, Asiatic was set in opposition not to European but to German ways of thinking. This is how Kampe envisaged the fulfilment of the absolute Religion of Humanity:

“No people on this earth is better suited for this religion, better suited to trace its outlines, render it effective and bring it to life than is the one people that in the end gave birth to it, than is the thinking, thorough, emotionally rich German people. The old form of religion, not a product of thought, could only have arisen in the passive, visionary, emotionally self-indulgent Orient, the Greek form only in Greece.”<sup>44</sup>

Thus, the old “order” resting on the superiority of Christianity over Judaism is restored with the help of a geographical and at the same time ethnic scheme contrasting Asia with Europe, or – more accurately – the Orient with Germany. This is hardly surprising, bearing in mind that the rational Religion of Humanity was consistently interpreted as purified, and hence true, Christianity. In Uhlich’s words:

“It is surely a great mistake to look upon reason as inimical to Christianity. Our reason has long since absorbed the true teachings of the Gospel, and thus has become *Christian reason*.”<sup>45</sup>

It is significant that Kampe himself, who denied this connection and considered Christian dogma incompatible with rational thought,<sup>46</sup> should have put so much stress on the German-oriental contrast, thus preserving the antithesis to Judaism.

This antithetic view of Judaism – still dominant in spite of the new faith in reason – was summed up succinctly by Carové, without following Ronge and Kampe in construing an antithesis between Asiatic-oriental and German ways. Carové formulated the contrast between Christianity and Judaism in an attenuated form:

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<sup>43</sup> See Lothar W. Silberhorn, ‘Der Epilog eines religiösen Reformers. Ungedruckte Aufzeichnungen Johannes Ronges aus dem Londoner Exil’, *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, VI (1954), p. 117.

<sup>44</sup> Kampe, *Wesen*, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

<sup>45</sup> Uhlich, *Bekenntnisse*, Leipzig 1845; quoted by Kampe, *Geschichte*, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 186.

<sup>46</sup> Kampe, *Wesen*, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

“... when even Catholicism does not succeed in bringing the postulates of modern culture into harmony with its own fundamental tenets, how much less can the talmudic synagogue be capable of doing so, which with its inflexible rules is lagging as far behind Catholicism as the latter is lagging behind the religious consciousness of our age!”<sup>47</sup>

Comments like these ignored the elementary fact that Judaism – in this respect no different from Christianity – has a history, that is to say, has undergone a development ranging from antiquity to the present day; and thus it was possible to combine the new belief in the supremacy of reason with the reaffirmation of the old Christian interpretation of Judaism as a religion rendered obsolete by Christianity.

Even so, the libertarian impetus of the Protestant *Freunde* and the *Deutsch-katholiken* was strong enough to mitigate the antagonisms and point the way to an improved state of affairs. A stand like that taken by Bruno Bauer, who combined a radical critique of religion with extreme anti-Jewish views, was certainly untypical of the Free Congregations and their supporters. When Johannes Ronge was asked in 1881 – admittedly in very different circumstances – to sign the antisemitic petition, he addressed an open letter to the clerical members of the *Antisemiten-Comité* (among them notably Adolf Stoecker), in which he exposed their bias and roundly condemned antisemitism, “deeply ashamed that German and Protestant clergymen should debase themselves to the extent of blatantly denying the fundamental law of Christianity and the principle of Protestantism”. He saw their action as symptom of “a deep-rooted sickness of Germany’s Protestant Church”.<sup>48</sup>

### III

The tolerance of the dissidents was, both in practice and in theory, a tolerance of ambiguities. Irrespective of many pronouncements about a new fluidity of formerly rigid dogmatic positions, the conscious or subconscious aim was unification, or even absorption, rather than the recognition of the legitimacy of diversity, let alone contrariety, that is the meaning of genuine plurality. This tendency is implicit in statements such as Kampe’s pronouncement that “every progress in the social formation of the peoples was ushered in by changes in their religious views”,<sup>49</sup> or Ronge’s demand that “love of the fatherland must become religious, and life altogether must become religion”,<sup>50</sup> utterances which could scarcely be repeated today.

For all that, the *freireligiöse* movement made a decisive step forward. Its breach with the big established Churches was at the same time a breach with the

<sup>47</sup> Carové, *Emanzipation*, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

<sup>48</sup> Ronge, *Offenes Sendschreiben*, Darmstadt 1881.

<sup>49</sup> Kampe, *Wesen*, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

<sup>50</sup> Ronge, *Religion und Politik*, quoted by Graf, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

virtually unbroken tradition of intolerance of the Orthodoxies. This was a new departure that had far better chance than the liberalism of the theologians ever had of influencing significant numbers of Christians, and it was for that and no other reason that the struggle against this tendency was waged far more vehemently and uncompromisingly. That it failed in the end to stave off the defeat of tolerance was not due to any ambiguity or weakness of its stand, but to the weakness of the movement as a whole in the face of the preponderance of the reactionary forces. And the victory of reaction was not merely an outward one, achieved by brute force; buoyed up by external power, it also worked inwards, affecting men's minds. Triumph, honourable or not, tends to carry conviction. A path that before 1848 had appeared to many to be practicable, looked to the majority in retrospect to be leading nowhere, an aberration. Even liberal circles re-orientated their mode of thinking and feeling in the light of traditions that were mighty, because they were the traditions of the mighty. Heine rediscovered his Jewish God, and when Wagner, a generation later, composed his *Parsifal*, it was precisely the liberal, educated bourgeoisie that recognised in it its own image. At the same time, the petty and middle bourgeoisie – the very sections of the population from which the *freireligiöse* movement had drawn its support – proved particularly susceptible to antisemitic manipulation.

The collapse of the Revolution was not confined to the political and social field: it was also a religious collapse, and it is as such that it has been of far-reaching consequence for the history of tolerance and intolerance, above all for the history of antisemitism.

S. S. PRAYER

## Heine's Portraits of German and French Jews on the Eve of the 1848 Revolution

Some thirty-seven years ago F.R. Leavis set out to define, in his *New Bearings in English Poetry*, the kind of evidence that poets might offer those who go to them for insight into what it means to be alive, to be conscious, to be a human being, in a given time and place. "Poetry matters", Leavis said, in words which have lost little of their relevance, despite fashionable denigrations of his "elitism", "because of the kind of poet who is more alive than other people, more alive in his own age ... The potentialities of human experience in any age are realized only by a tiny minority, and the important poet is important because he belongs to this (and has also, of course, the power of communication). Indeed, his capacity for experiencing and his power of communicating are indistinguishable ... He is unusually sensitive, unusually aware, more sincere and more himself than the ordinary man can be ... He is a poet because his interest in his experience is not separable from his interest in words; because, that is, of his habit of seeking by the evocative use of words to sharpen his awareness of his ways of feeling, so making these communicable."<sup>1</sup>

It would be misleading to suggest that Heine fits the whole of this description. He is a great "manager" of information. His utterances have to be seen in their particular context (at whom are they directed? what purpose is the poet pursuing? what kind of censorship does he have to circumvent?); they have to be held and weighed against other utterances, by Heine himself and his contemporaries. It would be a very naive historian who sought factual information in Heine's accounts of actions and events he purports to have witnessed, without checking them carefully against other documents. Nevertheless I do believe that Heine conveys certain aspects of nineteenth-century experience more powerfully than any other writer, and that among these aspects the experience of being a Jew who had paid the price of baptism for his entrance-ticket to European civilisation looms large. From that existential vantage-point Heine looked out at other men and women of Jewish origin and created out of what he saw an unparalleled portrait-gallery on whose cataloguing, description and evaluation I am at present engaged. Three or four of such portraits, from just one small segment of Heine's creative life, is all I shall have time to consider in this short paper; I think, however, that they are representative enough to suggest the kind of experience such portraits mediate and the kind of evidence they may be found to provide.

When one speaks of literary "portraits" one is, of course, applying a metaphor from the visual to the verbal arts. Heine himself constantly sought

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<sup>1</sup> Leavis, *op. cit.*, London 1932, p. 13.

such metaphoric illumination, and he spoke of his own writings in terms of at least three distinct visual forms. The first of these is the early photograph, the daguerreotype, whose development Heine viewed with fascination though also with some misgivings: in one of his last writings he speaks of the scenes from Parisian life which he first published in the 1840s and then radically revised in the 1850s as “honest daguerreotypes”.<sup>2</sup> The second of the three visual forms for which Heine saw analogies in his own writings is that of painting in general and realistic painting in particular<sup>3</sup> – an art which, however faithfully it seeks to match the superficies of life, is of necessity more selective, and more expressive of the artist as well as the ostensible subject, than a photograph. And lastly, perhaps most important of all: Heine not infrequently speaks of those of his contemporaries who have been transmogrified in his writings as “Fratzen” or “Karikaturen”.<sup>4</sup> The second of these terms reminds us that his later works were composed in a Paris that saw an unprecedented flowering of the art of caricature in the cartoons and lampoons of Philipon and his team and above all in the superb drawings and lithographs of Honoré Daumier. When Heine introduces a thumb-nail sketch of an obscure contemporary into one of his letters from Paris, telling his brother Maximilian on 21st April 1834

“daß ich Benno Goldschmidt hier gesehen, welcher einen ungeheuer großen Schnurrbart trägt, so daß wer ihn nicht kennt ihn für einen kalabresischen Banditen, kurz für einen wütenden Bramarbas halten würde. Er ist aber noch der Alte, und wenn er an der Wand den Schatten seines eigenen Schnurrbarts sieht, erschrickt er;”<sup>5</sup>

or when he merges Meyerbeer’s activities as an orchestral conductor with his alleged activities as an orchestrator and conductor of his own fame:

“Er nickt mit dem Haupte, und alle Posaunen der großen Journale ertönen unisono; er zwinkert mit den Augen, und alle Violinen des Lobes fiedeln um die Wette; er bewegt nur leise den linken Nasenflügel, und alle Feuilleton-Flageolette flöten ihre süßesten Schmeichellaute. – Da gibt es auch unerhörte, antediluvianische Blasinstrumente, Jerichotrompeten und noch unentdeckte Windharfen, Saiteninstrumente der Zukunft, deren Anwendung die außerordentlichste Begabnis für Instrumentation bekundet. – Ja, in so hohem Grade wie unser Meyerbeer verstand sich noch kein Komponist auf Instrumentation, nämlich auf die Kunst, alle möglichen Menschen als Instrumente zu gebrauchen, und durch ihr Zusammenwirken eine Übereinstimmung in der öffentlichen Anerkennung, die ans Fabelhafte grenzt, hervorzuzaubern.”<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Heinrich Heine, *Werke und Briefe*, ed. H. Kaufmann, Berlin 1962, VI, pp. 254–255. This edition is henceforth cited as *W*.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. *W* V, p. 480.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. *W* VI, p. 254; VII, p. 296. For the relation between caricature and truth, see *W* VI, p. 588.

<sup>5</sup> Heinrich Heine, *Briefe. Erste Gesamtausgabe nach den Handschriften*, ed. F. Hirth, Mainz-Berlin 1949ff., II, p. 61. This edition is henceforth cited as *B*. Here as elsewhere I have modernised Heine’s orthography.

<sup>6</sup> *W* VI, p. 387.

– when we read passages such as these we cannot but recall the cartoons and caricatures that were so prominent a feature of French life, entertainment and social comment in the mid-nineteenth century; in an age in which no Parisian could look at Louis Philippe's head without being at once reminded of Philipon's pear.

One must not, however, think of the literary portrait, as practised by Heine, too exclusively in terms of the visual arts. The historical portraits he found in the French historians he so avidly read – from Basnage to Mignet, Michelet and Thierry – and the pen-portraits of contemporaries he found in the journals he read no less avidly until his paralysis made it impossible to frequent *cabinets de lecture* – these as often as not subordinated visual to intellectual and moral elements, characterised by description and evocation of activities, thoughts and verbal expressions rather than those of peculiar features of face and body. Heine, in fact, constantly sought to convey all these things together; and some of the passages which gave most offence to his contemporaries, and still make us uncomfortable today, are precisely those in which he attempted to depict moral and intellectual qualities through foregrounding or exaggerating some physical peculiarity of his original. "Ich suchte", he tells us of one of the verbal portraits he penned for the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, "in seiner äußern Erscheinung die Signatur seiner innern Gemütsart zu erspähen."<sup>7</sup> How he did this will be examined towards the end of this paper in a specific instance.

It would be wrong, however, to think of Heine solely in terms of either French or German historiography and literary portraiture. There is an illuminating remark in Theodor Creizenach's recollections of a conversation he had with Heine when he visited him in 1846. Creizenach found Heine reading Isaak Markus Jost's history of the Jews; and he tells us that Heine said to him: "Hätte ich die Gewißheit, noch zehn Jahre zu leben, so würde auch ich jüdische Geschichten [sic] schreiben. Zur Vorbereitung aber müßte man ein ganzes Jahr kein Buch als den Herodot lesen."<sup>8</sup> Herodotus's cosmopolitan interest in states and individuals beyond his own Dorian front-door; his occasional patent unfairness; his Ionian scepticism which yet accommodated the idea of powerful, fateful forces working within history; his love of digressions to embellish his central themes and his deliberate intermingling of the great and the small; his handling of the Ionian language, so easy and fluent, yet at the same time so consummately polished – all these features may be found again in Heine's verbal portraits, sketches and cartoons of historical and contemporary figures.

Last, but by no means least, we must never underestimate the force of the literary tradition to which Heine himself so often refers and into which much of his work deliberately places itself: the tradition of Aristophanic satire, in which

<sup>7</sup> Heinrich Heine, *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. K. Briegleb, vol. V (ed. K. H. Stahl), Munich 1974, p. 1024.

<sup>8</sup> M. Werner and H. H. Houben (eds.), *Begegnungen mit Heine. Berichte der Zeitgenossen*, Hamburg 1973, I, p. 589.



persons become symbols for, or indices of, social, political, philosophical and aesthetic forces, positions, ideologies and activities.

Among the personalities Heine introduces into his work, men and women of Jewish origin loom large. If we confine ourselves, as this symposium invites us to do, to the work of the 1840s alone, we at once recall the Frankfurt pageant of the later portions of *Der Rabbi von Bacherach*; Börne and his entourage; the baptised theologian Neander; the scholar Ludwig Marcus amid other figures prominent in the *Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden*; bankers like the Rothschild and Fould families; the lawyer Crémieux; the composers Meyerbeer, Mendelssohn and Halévy; writers like Berthold Auerbach and Alexandre Weill; entrepreneurs like Georg Harrys and Maurice Schlesinger; the actress Rachel Félix; the Hamburg Jews sketched in the last cantos of *Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen*; Ferdinand Lassalle; the rabbis, pedlars, servants that people the Frankfurt portions of *Ludwig Börne. Eine Denkschrift ...* – a largely unexplored and unchronicled gallery into which we shall now take a few steps.

Though he was discontented with things as they were in nineteenth-century Germany and, increasingly, in the France of Louis Philippe; though he allied himself with the political Left in the 1840s through his friendship with Marx, his contributions to *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* and other scathing politico-satiric poems – Heine remained ever suspicious of revolutionaries. The incipient Communist movement he watched with an interest in which hopes for social justice and *Schadenfreude* coexisted uneasily with shivers of repulsion and fear of cultural iconoclasm. *Ludwig Börne. Eine Denkschrift*, published in 1840, is the most memorable public acknowledgment of his distaste when brought into contact with some of those who sought a radical re-ordering of German society; but this is only the logical consequence of a view of himself which he had first presented in a letter to Moritz Embden on 2nd February 1823:

“Obschon ich aber in England ein Radikaler und in Italien ein Carbonari bin, so gehöre ich doch nicht zu den Demagogen in Deutschland; aus dem ganz zufälligen und geringfügigen Grunde, daß bei einem Siege dieser letztern einige tausend jüdische Häuse, und just die besten, abgeschnitten werden;”

views which issued in the no less characteristic outburst to Ludolf Wienburg in July or August 1830: “Bricht nun gar in Deutschland eine Revolution aus, so bin ich nicht der letzte Kopf, der fällt.”<sup>9</sup> When he met Ferdinand Lassalle towards the end of 1845, he saw in him a friend who personified a new generation without fears and scruples of this kind; a generation he had already hailed in *Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen*:

<sup>9</sup> B I, pp. 61, 457. In ‘Kopflös – ein Leitmotiv in Heines Werk’, *Internationaler Heine-Kongress 1972*, Hamburg 1973, pp. 227–244, Leslie Bodi has discussed some of the metaphoric uses to which Heine put the image of beheading.

“Es wächst heran ein neues Geschlecht,  
Ganz ohne Schminke und Sünden,  
Mit freien Gedanken, mit freier Lust –  
Dem werde ich alles verkünden.”<sup>10</sup>

There is a doubtful tradition, going back to Lothar Bucher, which tells us that in a letter no longer extant Heine called the young Lassalle “den Messias des Jahrhunderts”<sup>11</sup>; what is undoubtable, however, is that he characterised him with extraordinary enthusiasm in a letter to Varnhagen dated 3rd January 1846.

“Ein junger Mann von den ausgezeichnetesten Geistesgaben: mit der gründlichsten Gelehrsamkeit, mit dem weitesten Wissen, mit dem größten Scharfsinn, der mir je vorgekommen; mit der reichsten Begabung der Darstellung verbindet er eine Habilité im Handeln, die mich in Erstaunen setzen, und wenn seine Sympathie für mich nicht erlöscht, so erwarte ich von ihm den tätigsten Vorschub ...”<sup>12</sup>

What Heine here expects of Lassalle is not, it should be noticed, a furthering of radical political and social ideals, but help in his squabbles with his family over his uncle's will. But, however that may be, he concludes, “Jedenfalls war diese Vereinigung von Wissen und Können, von Talent und Charakter, für mich eine freudige Erscheinung.” Here the seasoned reader of Heine pricks up his ears. “Vereinigung von ... Talent und Charakter” is precisely the ideal that Heine himself was always said to miss – an ideal proclaimed by Börne with an edge against Heine and underlying much of the satire of *Atta Troll*. And having reminded Varnhagen of *Atta Troll*, he now recalls *Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen* as he continues his epistolary eulogy of Lassalle, praising the very qualities that set Marx's teeth so much on edge when *he* came to have dealings with Lassalle.

“Herr Lassalle ist nun einmal ein so ausgeprägter Sohn der neuen Zeit, der nichts von jener Entsagung und Bescheidenheit wissen will, womit wir uns mehr oder minder heuchlerisch in *unserer* Zeit hindurchgehungert und hindurchgefaset.”

And now comes the transition so characteristic of Heine's portraits, where the individual is again and again made symbolic of his time, where the “signature” of the time can be read in an individual's physical make-up and mental set.

“Dieses neue Geschlecht will genießen und sich geltend machen im Sichtbaren; wir, die Alten, beugten uns demütig vor dem Unsichtbaren, haschten nach Schattenküssen und blauen Blumengerüchen, entsagten und flennten und waren doch vielleicht glücklicher, als jene harten Gladiatoren, die so stolz dem Kampftode entgegengehen. Das tausendjährige Reich der Romantik hat ein Ende, und ich selbst war nur sein letzter und

<sup>10</sup> *W* I, p. 504.

<sup>11</sup> *B* III, p. 35.

<sup>12</sup> *B* III, pp. 36–37.

abgedankter Fabelkönig. Hätte ich nicht die Krone vom Haupte fortgeschmissen, und den Kittel angezogen, sie hätten mich richtig geköpft.”

And having thus placed himself *between* the old and the new, having portrayed himself as an adherent of the old world who had joined the new in fear of his very life, Heine turns to Varnhagen, “mein wahlverwandtester Waffenbruder”:

Sie haben gleich mir die alte Zeit begraben helfen und bei der neuen Hebammendienste geleistet – ja, wir haben sie zu Tage gefördert und erschrecken. – Es geht uns wie dem armen Huhn das Enteneier ausgebrütet hat und mit Entsetzen sieht, wie die junge Brut sich ins Wasser stürzt und wohlgefällig schwimmt!”

Here we have a clear example of one of the most characteristic features of Heine’s portraits: that they seek to make us conscious of portrayer and portrayed, of Heine himself as well as the contemporaries or historical figures whom he seeks to describe. In *Ludwig Börne. Eine Denkschrift* Heine spoke openly about “dieses beständige Konstatieren meiner Persönlichkeit” and “Hervorstellen meiner eigenen Person” and explained its importance for his portrayal of Börne:

“Ich zeichne nur sein Bild mit der genauen Angabe des Ortes und der Zeit, wo er mir saß. Zugleich verhehle ich nicht, welche günstige oder ungünstige Stimmung mich während der Sitzung beherrschte. Ich liefere dadurch den besten Maßstab für den Glauben, den meine Angaben verdienen.”<sup>13</sup>

“Genaue Angabe des Ortes und der Zeit” is, of course, particularly characteristic for portraits that occur in the course of a letter, where convention demands precise information of just this kind.

Heine’s enthusiasm for Lassalle lasted just a little while longer – on 10th January 1846 we find Lassalle described as “einer meiner liebsten Freunde ... der ... mein volles Zutrauen besitzt”, and on 15th February of the same year as a “Prachtkerl”.<sup>14</sup> But enthusiasm waned when Lassalle tried to draw Heine into battles he could not regard as his own – to join the Heine family quarrel, in which a poet asserted himself against a millionaire, with the Hatzfeld family quarrel, in which a wronged woman tried to assert her rights against the German nobleman she had married.<sup>15</sup> By the time Lassalle’s political and social bent had fully appeared, after the 1848 Revolution had come and gone (sichtbar gewordener Gotteswahnsinn)<sup>16</sup> Heine called that Revolution), the sick poet, now for ever confined to his mattress tomb, found himself compelled

<sup>13</sup> *W* VI, p. 213.

<sup>14</sup> *B* III, p. 39; and Heinrich Heine, *Säkularausgabe*, vol. 22, *Briefe 1842–1849*, ed. F. H. Eisner and C. Stöcker, Berlin – Paris 1972, p. 198.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Shlomo Na’aman, ‘Heine und Lassalle. Ihre Beziehungen im Zeichen der Dämonie des Geldes’, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, IV (1964), p. 72.

<sup>16</sup> *B* III, p. 151. Other epithets Heine here applies to the Revolution are “Universal-anarchie” and “Weltkuddelmuddel”.

to change the positive accentuation of his portrayal into a negative one. In a letter to his brother Gustav dated 21st January 1851, he sketched his revised impression of “der junge Lassalle, der als Hauptperson in der Hatzfeldschen skandalösen Kassetengeschichte figuriert” as follows:

“Als er hierher kam ... war er kaum 19 Jahre alt, und nie hat ein junger Mensch, sowohl durch sein Wissen als durch seine Persönlichkeit, besonders durch seine Geistes-schärfe und eine meinem träumerischen Charakter fehlende Energie mir mehr zugesagt wie eben dieser junge Lassalle ... Keiner begriff wie Lassalle, wo mich der Schuh drückte ... Dieser Mensch aber, in seiner raschen Entwicklung zum Schlechten, ist einer der furchtbarsten Bösewichter geworden, der alles fähig ist, Mord, Fälschung und Diebstahl, und eine an Irrsinn grenzende Willenszähigkeit besitzt. Mit diesem will ich nichts anfangen ...”<sup>17</sup>

Lassalle now seemed to Heine to resemble a character from an Eugène Sue novel; if he was indeed, as the letter to Varnhagen had averred, a true representative of the new generation, then the poet's disillusionment with that generation after 1848 could not be more complete. When the Revolution such men had desired came, the paralysed poet could offer it no welcome. “Sie wissen”, he wrote to Alfred Meissner on 12th April 1848, “daß ich kein Republikaner war und werden nicht erstaunt sein, daß ich noch keiner geworden. Was die Welt jetzt treibt und hofft, ist meinem Herzen fremd.”<sup>18</sup> But when the Revolution failed and some of those who had made it became martyrs, Heine found eloquent words, in his great poem ‘Im Oktober 1849’, to extol their heroism and pour scorn on the victors. Lassalle was not among those he extolled – but unlike Marx he never let disapproval of his erstwhile friend and confidant tempt him to antisemitic abuse. He continued to see in him the representative of a new generation of activists which embraced Jews and Gentiles, Germans and Frenchman alike; he remained ready to believe that if he had gone all the way with Lassalle his battle against his family might have been brought to a less humiliating conclusion;<sup>19</sup> and he seems to have made his personal peace with him in the last year of his life.<sup>20</sup>

Lassalle does not appear by name in any of the writings Heine himself published: it is therefore time to turn to one who does, to the composer Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, whom Heine first met and wrote about in the 1820s. In the forties he presented his image of Felix Mendelssohn in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* – in the course of an article dated mid-April 1842, in which he took Rossini's *Stabat Mater* as an occasion for formulating anew his perception of the relationship between Christianity and art. Here is his key-sentence:

<sup>17</sup> B III, pp. 260–261.

<sup>18</sup> B III, p. 133.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Na'aman, *loc. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Lassalle's letter to Karl Marx, written in early July 1855, in Werner and Houben, *op. cit.*, II, p. 396.

“Nicht die äußere Dürre und Blässe ist ein Kennzeichen des wahrhaft Christlichen in der Kunst, sondern eine gewisse innere Überschwänglichkeit, die weder angetauft noch anstudiert werden kann in der Musik wie in der Malerei.”<sup>21</sup>

“Weder angetauft noch anstudiert” – the familiar charge of German nationalists against Heine, that despite his German schooling and his Christian baptism he had always remained a Jew, is here taken up by the poet himself and applied to an analysis of Mendelssohn’s art which culminates in the finding that Rossini’s *Stabat Mater* is “wahrhaft christlicher” than *Paulus*, “das Oratorium von Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, das von den Gegnern Rossinis als ein Muster der Christentümlichkeit gerühmt wird”.

“Muster der Christentümlichkeit” – can we not hear, in that very formulation, the voice of Heine the parodist superseding that of the sober analyst and chronicler? If we miss it here we can hardly miss it in what follows, as we listen to Heine adopting a pious phraseology which deliberately conflicts with his attitude and tone elsewhere. “Der Himmel bewahre mich”, he writes, “gegen einen so verdienstvollen Meister wie den Verfasser des *Paulus* hierdurch einen Tadel aussprechen zu wollen ...” Having made this pious disclaimer, he brings out what must have made antisemites rejoice at the contrast he has drawn between Mendelssohn’s expression of the Christian spirit, and Rossini’s: “... am allerwenigsten wird es dem Schreiber dieser Blätter in den Sinn kommen an der Christlichkeit des erwähnten Oratoriums zu mäkeln, weil Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy von Geburt ein Jude ist.” This statement contains a deliberate and characteristic ambiguity. When the article was originally published, anonymously like all such contributions to the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, readers would take it to mean that to reject *Paulus* because its composer was of Jewish origin would be the last thing the author would think of doing. Better informed readers, however, and those who recognised Heine’s style, would catch an allusion to Heine’s own history: the writer of these lines, they would understand him to say, would be the last person to condemn *Paulus* on such grounds because he too had submitted to baptism, he too arrogated to himself the right to speak for a community other than the Jewish one to which so many of his enemies sought to confine him. As so often, Heine is speaking *pro domo* – he is investigating a problem that concerned him deeply, probing a wound of his own, putting his own portrait alongside that of his sitter. “Aber ich kann doch nicht unterlassen”, he therefore continues, with self-torturing insistence, “darauf hinzudeuten, daß in dem Alter, wo Herr Mendelssohn in Berlin das Christentum anfang (er wurde nämlich erst in seinem dreizehnten Jahr getauft), Rossini es bereits verlassen und sich ganz in die Weltlichkeit der Opernmusik gestürzt hatte”. The implication is clear: the Jewish-born artist accepts Christianity at the very moment in which the Christian-born one leaves it *for the good of his art*. What, then, becomes of the vaunted Christian spirit of

<sup>21</sup> Heinrich Heine, *Zeitungsberichte über Musik und Malerei*, ed. M. Mann, Frankfurt a. Main 1964, pp. 138 ff.

Rossini's *Stabat Mater*? Heine has his answer ready, an answer once again of the greatest interest in view of his own development, in view of his own relationship to Judaism in the tragic last years of his life. "Jetzt", he says of Rossini, "wo er diese [Weltlichkeit der Opernmusik] wieder verließ und sich zurückträumte in seine katholischen Jugenderinnerungen, in die Zeiten, wo er im Dom zu Pesaro als Chorschüler mitsang oder als Akoluth bei der Messe fungierte – jetzt, wo die alten Orgeltöne wieder in seinem Gedächtnis aufrauschten und er die Feder ergriff, um ein Stabat zu schreiben: da brauchte er wahrlich den Geist des Christentums nicht erst wissenschaftlich zu konstruieren, noch viel weniger Händel oder Sebastian Bach sklavisch zu kopieren; er brauchte nur die frühesten Kindheitsklänge wieder aus seinem Gemüt hervorzurufen ..." That's what Christianity can be to the modern artist, and what Heine was to find in Judaism too: a return to childhood, to a ceremonial from which the grown man has become estranged but which he can see, in his later years, to have had a profound relation to his experiences as a man.

It will not have escaped the attentive reader that even while ostensibly concentrating on one pole of his comparison, on Rossini, Heine keeps the other pole, Mendelssohn, unobtrusively in view. When he tells us that Rossini had no need to construct the spirit of Christianity artificially, that he needed even less to copy Handel or Bach in order to write music breathing a Christian spirit, he is clearly alluding to Mendelssohn's activities as a re-discoverer of Baroque music, and more particularly as rehabilitator, re-editor and re-performer of the sacred music of Johann Sebastian Bach. That contrast must be in our mind as we turn to Heine's account of the reception of Mendelssohn's music by the Parisian public. Rossini's *Stabat Mater*, he tells us, was received with rapture, both in the concert-hall of the Italian Opera and in the concerts arranged by the editors of *La France musicale*; and when Mendelssohn's *Paulus* turned up in the same season and the same *France musicale* series, the public was bound to feel invited to measure the one against the other.

"Bei dem großen Publikum gereichte diese Vergleichung keineswegs zum Vorteil unseres jungen Landsmannes: es ist auch, als vergliche man die Appeninen Italiens mit dem Tempower Berg bei Berlin. Aber der Tempower Berg hat darum nicht weniger Verdienste, und den Respekt der großen Menge erwirbt er sich schon dadurch, daß er ein Kreuz auf seinem Gipfel trägt. 'Unter diesem Zeichen wirst du siegen'. Freilich nicht in Frankreich, dem Lande der Ungläubigkeit, wo Herr Mendelssohn immer Fiasko gemacht hat. Er war das geopferte Lamm der Saison, während Rossini der musikalische Löwe war, dessen süßes Gebrüll noch immer forttönt."<sup>22</sup>

With their multiple ironies these lines widen our perspective. The Jewish component, they tell us, cannot be eliminated from an artist who was born a Jew – our childhood impressions inevitably form an essential part of our mature personality; but that does not make "our young compatriot" Mendelssohn any less a German. He has been affected by everything the Tempower

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

Berg represents in this passage; so that the French public, when it rejects Mendelssohn, is rejecting much that Prussia stood for in the age of Frederick William IV. The Emperor Constantine may have been rightly told, in the fourth century, that he would conquer under the sign of the Cross, *in hoc signo vinces*; all King Frederick William and the artist under his Most Christian protection could do was to parody that feat rather than re-enact it. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy might carry with him the “große Menge” that furnished his auditors in Berlin; the “großes Publikum” of Paris, capital of the land of unbelief, was bound to reject an art that smacked of Prusso-Christian revivalism. And so the Christian imagery returns, with new ironic resonances, as Mendelssohn is termed “das geopferte Lamm der Saison” and Rossini opposed to him (with Biblical as well as hagiographic echoes) as the lion who, in this season, bears off the victory.

Even this, however, is not the end; for Heine adds no less than two codas. The first begins with the news that Mendelssohn-Bartholdy plans to visit Paris in the near future. There is no certainty about this (“Es heißt hier, Herr Felix Mendelssohn werde dieser Tage persönlich nach Paris kommen”); but there is another piece of news to which, Heine tells his readers, greater credence can be given.

“So viel ist gewiß, durch hohe Verwendung und diplomatische Bemühungen ist Herr Léon Pillet dahin gebracht worden, ein Libretto von Herrn Scribe anfertigen zu lassen, das Herr Mendelssohn für die große Oper komponieren soll. Wird unser junger Landsmann sich diesem Geschäft mit Glück unterziehen?”<sup>23</sup>

Here once again the seasoned reader of Heine pricks up his ears. “Durch hohe Verwendung” (that is to say, anything from hints to orders coming from the highest seats of power), “diplomatische Bemühungen”, “ist ... dahin gebracht worden, ein Libretto von Herrn Scribe anfertigen zu lassen”, “für die große Oper” – the signals are coming in thick and fast to tell us that Mendelssohn is being manoeuvred in the same direction as his celebrated contemporary Meyerbeer, the man who had managed to conquer the Parisian public as well as the Prussian court by means that Heine thought only tenuously connected with the quality of his music. The word “Geschäft” in which the passage just quoted culminates becomes charged with meaning: art, Heine is telling us, is becoming a business in the modern world; it is increasingly a matter of diplomacy, of enlisting the help of the powers that be, and it needs the kind of management-talents which Meyerbeer, in Heine’s view, had been able to deploy with the aid of a great deal of money, a venal press, and the advertising genius of Maurice Schlesinger. Will this younger German composer, “unser junger Landsmann” as Heine now calls Mendelssohn-Bartholdy for the second time, be able to emulate Meyerbeer in this respect? “Ich weiß nicht”,

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 140–141.

he says, and launches into his second coda, in which a significant theme of the essay is restated for the last time and given a significant extension.

“Seine künstlerische Begabnis ist groß; doch hat sie sehr bedenkliche Grenzen und Lücken. Ich finde in talentlicher Beziehung eine große Ähnlichkeit zwischen Herrn Felix Mendelssohn und der Mademoiselle Rachel Félix, der tragischen Künstlerin. Eigentümlich ist beiden ein großer, strenger, sehr ernsthafter Ernst, ein entschiedenes, beinahe zudringliches Anlehnen an klassische Muster, die feinste geistreiche Berechnung, Verstandesschärfe und endlich der gänzliche Mangel an Naivetät. Gibt es aber in der Kunst eine geniale Ursprünglichkeit ohne Naivetät? Bis jetzt ist dieser Fall noch nicht vorgekommen.”<sup>24</sup>

In the first coda the parallel between Mendelssohn and the most famous Jewish composer of his day, Meyerbeer, had been implied rather than made explicit; in the second the parallel between him and a Franco-Jewish artist in a different sphere, the great tragédienne Rachel, is overtly drawn and elaborated. And the charges Heine brings against Mendelssohn and Rachel are the very charges that were so often brought against Heine himself and have been heard again and again since, when artists of Jewish extraction are discussed: that with all their intellectual penetration, their diligence in studying the best models, their industry, their skill, their seriousness, they lacked some essential ingredient, an ingredient common to “real” genius however defined. One only has to listen to Heine’s key-words to recognise the common portrait drawn of European Jews from the era of emancipation to our own day: “ein ... beinahe zudringliches Anlehnen”, “geistreichste Berechnung”, “Verstandesschärfe”, “Mangel an Naivetät”. This is something Heine constantly does: he brings stereotypes out into the open, in order to see how they work in his own context; he never thought, as so many others did, that if one ignored them they would disappear.

Heine is not Wagner, however, whose later portrait of Mendelssohn in *Das Judentum in der Musik*<sup>25</sup> has such a disturbing, and surely not fortuitous, affinity with Heine’s own. Again it pays to listen carefully to what he actually says. His answer to the question whether great art is possible without “Naivetät” is that this never yet happened until now. “Bis jetzt ... noch nicht”. Mendelssohn, Rachel Félix and (dare we add?) Heine himself are different from the great geniuses of the past; they do lack an element which has hitherto been deemed an essential part of genius – but may they not, by virtue of this very fact, be the harbingers of a new art, an art of the future, an art more consonant with the modern world than that which formed the horizon of expectation of their nineteenth-century public? In the creation of *that* art, we may surmise, artists of Jewish origin may play an important part.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141.

<sup>25</sup> Richard Wagner, *Gesammelte Schriften und Dichtungen*, 2nd edn., vol. V, Leipzig 1888, pp. 66–85.



In the modern world artists need agents, and Heine has a good deal of fun at the expense of Jewish promoters of German art in Paris, notably that same Maurice Schlesinger who played such a fateful part in the life of Gustave Flaubert. But there are amateur promoters too; when no professional concert-agent, Heine tells us, showed himself eager to bring Mendelssohn's music to Paris, a private concert was arranged:

“Wie man mir erzählt, hat der Bankier Leo, vieljähriger Agent des Mendelssohnschen Hauses und ein sehr feiner, nach Bildung strebender Mann, in seinem Hause jene Musikstücke exekutieren lassen.”<sup>26</sup>

Again we have to listen carefully to catch Heine's drift. Felix Mendelssohn's music, he tells us, is being promoted by a banker who has been acting as commercial agent for the Mendelssohn family and is now branching out into another kind of agency, promoting music in the way he continues promoting the Mendelssohn business-interests. His qualification for this is not that he is cultured but that he “aspires to culture” – a phrase which brings reminiscences of Heine's most elaborate portrait of a culture-hungry Jewish bourgeois in *Die Bäder von Lucca*. What it implies in Leo's case he will later spell out, devastatingly, in the caricatures of Leo and his circle which he inserted into *Lutezia*. But, he continues in the piece on Mendelssohn written for the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, Leo's attempts at artistic promotion failed to achieve the effect they were designed to have:

“... der Umstand, daß die geladene Zuhörerschaft zumeist aus Angehörigen von mosaischem Bekenntnisse bestand, wirkte jedoch nicht vorteilhaft, da einige derselben entdeckt haben wollten, als habe der Komponist an den althebräischen Melodien der sogenannten Kinnes, den Klagliedern ob der Zerstörung Jerusalems, hie und da ein Plagiat begangen. Wie weit dieser Vorwurf begründet sein mag, können wir nicht ermessen; er ist übrigens nicht neu in der Geschichte der Musik, schon Marcello hat ihn erdulden müssen, und namentlich seine Psalmen sollen mit den alten Synagogengesängen eine auffallende Ähnlichkeit bieten.

Es ist immerhin möglich, daß Mendelssohn, der gelehrte Nachahmer Marcellos, nur diesem Vorbilde etwas zu entlehnen glaubte und also ganz unschuldigerweise einen Hausdiebstahl beging.”

Here, once again, we see Heine making the point about the derivativeness and ultimate lack of effectiveness of Mendelssohn's music which Wagner was also to make – but from a wholly different perspective. Wagner saw in Felix Mendelssohn the tragic result of the endeavour of a people without true music of its own (the Jews) to write in the idiom of another, artistically more gifted people. “Der Jude”, Wagner tells readers of *Das Judentum in der Musik*, “hat nie eine eigene Kunst gehabt”; his synagogue music is a caricature, a “Fratze des gottesdienstlichen Gesanges”, a “Sinn und Geist verwirrendes Gegurgel, Gejodel und Geplapper, das keine absichtliche Karikatur widerlicher zu ent-

<sup>26</sup> *W VI*, p. 643.

stellen vermag, als es sich hier mit vollem naiven Ernst darbietet".<sup>27</sup> Not so Heine: the music of Jewish worship, he believes, was good enough to inspire Christian composers too, composers from whom Mendelssohn-Bartholdy derived at second hand what should have been his own birthright.

This gives Heine his cue for speaking about the deepest considerations which Mendelssohn's art and its fate in the new world of advertising and promotion suggested to him.

"Wo hört bei ihm die Lüge auf und fängt die Kunst an? Wo schwindet bei ihm wieder die Kunst und beginnt die Lüge? Es ist unendlich schwer, hier die Grenze zu bestimmen. Jedenfalls aber bewundern wir das große Formtalent Mendelssohns, seine Begabung, sich das Außerordentlichste anzueignen, sein feines Ohr für Stil und seine ernsthafte, beinahe passionierte Indifferenz."

Once more the parallels with Wagner's notorious estimate of Mendelssohn are striking; Heine even goes beyond Wagner in violence of phrasing, when he speaks of Mendelssohn's alleged "intimer Lebensmangel, seine raffinierte Leerheit, seine geschminkte Lüge". But here again the difference between Heine and Wagner outweighs the likenesses.

"Suchen wir nach einer analogen Erscheinung, [Heine writes] so finden wir sie ganz besonders in der Dichtkunst, und zwar in der Person unseres ehrwürdigen und vortrefflichen Ludwig Tieck, der, ein Meister jeden Stils, das Höchste zu reproduzieren wußte, sei es schreibend oder vorlesend, der selbst das Naive zu machen verstand und der doch nie etwas hervorbrachte, was die Menge bezwang und was lebendig blieb in ihrem Herzen."<sup>28</sup>

What ails Mendelssohn, Heine here tells us, is not what ails the Jews; it is rather what ails so many modern artists, including those very Romantics whom German antisemitic nationalists venerated as true begetters of their own ideology and as indigenous geniuses that had nothing in common with Jewish outsiders and other such marginal men. But in Mendelssohn's case, of course, the problem was exacerbated because it linked itself with the problem of Jewish assimilation, the denial of Jewishness in favour of "Germanness" or Christianity.

As so often, Heine is here pointing to dangers that beset his own art – dangers all the greater because of his social position, because of his need to make a living by gaining as many readers as possible. This leads to a special animus which appears most clearly in a letter to Ferdinand Lassalle, dated 11th February 1846. Here he felt he could spell out clearly what he would not, for obvious reasons, say in public.

"Ich habe Malice auf ihn wegen seines Christelns, ich kann diesem durch Vermögensumstände unabhängigen Menschen nicht verzeihen, den Pietisten mit seinem großen, ungeheuren Talent zu dienen. – Je mehr ich von der Bedeutung des letzteren durchdrun-

<sup>27</sup> Richard Wagner, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 76.

<sup>28</sup> *W* VI, pp. 643–644.

gen, desto erboster werd ich ob des schnöden Mißbrauchs. Wenn ich das Glück hätte, ein Enkel von Moses Mendelssohn zu sein, so würde ich wahrlich mein Talent nicht dazu hergeben, die Pisse des Lämmleins in Musik zu setzen. Unter uns gesagt, der nächste Grund, warum ich manchmal Mendelssohn prickelte, betraf einige hiesige Stockenthusiasten desselben, die ich ärgern wollte ... und die unedel genug waren, jenen Angriffen das Motiv unterzulegen, ich wollte dadurch Meyerbeer den Hof machen. Ich schreibe Ihnen alles dieses mit Vorsatz und ausführlich, damit sie später die Gründe meines Zerwürfnisses mit Mendelssohn besser kennen mögen als der Pöbel, dem man sie entstellt insinuiert wird. Bis dahin bleibt alles unter uns."<sup>29</sup>

What leaps to the eye in this passage is once again the difference from Wagner rather than the likeness: the veneration of Moses Mendelssohn, the "reformer of the Jews", the unbaptised Jew who conquered the respect of the German intellectual world; the scabrously expressed belief that in trying to please an ostensibly Christian society Felix Mendelssohn was making unworthy use of his talents. In a way Heine had said it all in the few lines of *Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen* in which the Emperor Barbarossa is made to show an incongruous and anachronistic interest in the great Moses of Berlin and in which he elicits from the "Ich" that narrates the poem an answer that reads as follows:

"'O Kaiser', rief ich, 'wie bist du zurück!'  
Der Moses ist längst gestorben,  
Nebst seiner Rebekka, auch Abraham,  
der Sohn ist gestorben, verdorben.

Der Abraham hatte mit Lea erzeugt  
ein Bübchen, Felix heißt er,  
Der brachte es weit im Christentum,  
Ist schon Kapellenmeister."<sup>30</sup>

The contrast to be drawn here is not so much with Wagner as with Karl Marx, who never spoke of Moses Mendelssohn without a profound and ill-informed contempt.<sup>31</sup>

Our detailed look at Heine's characterisation of Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy necessarily took in other Jewish figures and their associations in Heine's mind: Moses Mendelssohn, the Jew who worked for the amelioration of his co-religionists and became a *praeceptor Germaniae* without ceasing, in any sense, to be a Jew; Meyerbeer, the commercial manager of his ever-increasing musical fame; Rachel Félix, the interpreter of a literary classicism that constituted one of the principal glories of French culture; Ferdinand Lassalle, the firebrand of a new generation with whom Heine formed for a time, an uneasy alliance; August Leo, the Hamburg banker settled in Paris who

<sup>29</sup> B III, pp. 50–51.

<sup>30</sup> W I, p. 474.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. S.S. Praver, *Karl Marx and World Literature*, Oxford 1976, pp. 369f., 383.

attempted to mediate, with what Heine considered inadequate cultural resources, between German celebrities and the French public. Most of these had their portraits painted at fuller length elsewhere in Heine's writings: Moses Mendelssohn in *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland*, Meyerbeer in some hilarious poems as well as in increasingly vituperative prose essays, Lassalle in the series of letters already quoted, August Leo and his circle in a scathingly satiric passage of *Lutezia* – while Rachel Félix, though never portrayed at full length, turns up in Heine's writings and conversations in several rapid sketches that suggest different aspects of the significance she had for the poet. One of these aspects was that of the "respect revolution" which Heine saw taking place all around him, an upsetting of established hierarchies in which the acceptance of Jews into European society played, in Heine's eyes, an important part. How this works can best be shown in his own words. The passage to be quoted appeared in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* under the date 22nd May 1841:

"... eine erfrischende Diversion gewährte uns die Entführung der spanischen Infantin durch Ignaz Gurowski, einen Bruder jenes famosen Adam Gurowski, dessen Sie sich vielleicht noch erinnern. Vorigen Sommer war Freund Ignaz in Mademoiselle Rachel verliebt; da ihm aber der Vater derselben, der von sehr guter jüdischer Familie ist, seine Tochter verweigerte, so machte er sich an die Prinzessin Isabella Fernanda von Spanien. Alle Hofdamen beider Kastilien, ja des ganzen Universums, werden die Hände vor Entsetzen über den Kopf zusammenschlagen: jetzt begreifen sie endlich, daß die alte Welt des traditionellen Respektes ein Ende hat!"<sup>32</sup>

Louis Philippe, Heine adds, understood this perfectly, and therefore sought to secure his power by appeals, not to traditional feelings of respect for royalty, but to people's real needs, to naked necessity – "reelle Bedürfnisse und nackte Notwendigkeit".<sup>33</sup> Jewish emancipation is seen as an index of the same revolutionising potential which made Heine, in a celebrated passage of *Ludwig Börne. Eine Denkschrift*, number the Rothschilds, those props of the establishment execrated by the left wing, among the "greatest revolutionaries" of modern Europe.

Our close look at Heine's dealings with Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy showed clearly that his individual portraits should never be considered in isolation. They demand to be seen in temporal perspective (who draws the portrait, when, and why?), in a whole constellation of other figures, and within a complex of social and aesthetic problems (Jewish integration into the life of various European states, social mobility, Christian art and Jewish-born practitioners ...). I would therefore like to pass now from the individual to the group portrait – to the constellation of Jewish figures Heine placed in his readers' view when the blood-libel was hideously revived in Damascus with the aid of a

<sup>32</sup> *W.* VI, p. 397.

<sup>33</sup> Heinrich Heine, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. E. Elster, Leipzig – Wien n. d., VI, p. 602. This edition is henceforth cited as *S.*

French consul and the subsequent connivance of French statesmen eager to fish profitably in the troubled waters of the Middle East. More than most of his assimilated contemporaries, more than Moses Hess, for instance, Heine felt that this was his business, that what was happening in Damascus concerned him immediately. He saw to it that influential journals were supplied with documents detailing the inhuman ways in which “confessions” had been extracted from the unfortunate Jewish suspects, offering to subsidise the publication of such documents out of his own meagre store; and what is more important, he deployed every weapon in his writer’s armoury to discredit the blood-libel. His talents as a portraitist were also enlisted in this worthy cause.

Heine begins<sup>34</sup> with an attempt to counter the views deliberately fostered in Germany by a correspondent suspicious of Jewish influence: that vast sums of “Jewish” money were being expended to exaggerate the Damascus affair in European eyes, and that, in particular, the French press was in the hands of rich Jews eager to advance the cause of their co-religionists at the expense, if need be, of the political interests of France. In a skilful counter-manoeuvre Heine insinuates that the boot is on the other foot: that it is the correspondent bringing these charges who is involved in a conspiracy designed to lead German opinion astray in the interest of French Middle Eastern politics. Then he goes on to delimit his field. “Wir lassen die Persönlichkeit und die Motive jenes Berichtstatters unbeleuchtet” (the image of murky darkness here suggested can hardly fail of its effect) “enthalten uns auch aller Untersuchung jener Damaszener Vorgänge” (for that, we must remember, Heine had done his best to ensure that authentic documents reached German journals), “nur über das, was in Beziehung derselben von den hiesigen Juden und der Presse gesagt wurde” (Heine is writing, we must remember, from Paris), “erlauben wir uns einige berichtigende Bemerkungen.” He is only interested in the truth, Heine protests; “und was ... die hiesigen Juden betrifft, so ist es möglich, daß unser Zeugnis eher gegen als für sie spräche.” For alas – the German correspondent who speaks of vast sums being expended by French Jews on behalf of their unfortunate Syrian co-religionists is wretchedly ill-informed. Heine would praise French Jews rather than blame them if they showed such financial zeal “zur Ehrenrettung ihrer verläumdeten Religion”.

“Die Juden in Frankreich sind schon zu lange emanzipiert, als daß die Stammesbande nicht sehr gelockert wären, sie sind fast ganz untergegangen oder, besser, aufgegangen in der französischen Nationalität, sie sind gerade ebensolche Franzosen wie die andern, und haben also auch Anwandlungen von Enthusiasmus, die vierundzwanzig Stunden und, wenn die Sonne heiß ist, sogar drei Tage dauern – und das gilt von den bessern.”

Once again, an antisemitic argument is being quietly inverted: it is not the Jews who are corrupting the French in order to bring about *une France juive* – it

<sup>34</sup> *WVI*, pp. 292ff. Variant readings will be found in *S VI*, pp. 582ff. The article dated 27th May 1840 was headed ‘Die Juden und die Presse in Paris’ when it first appeared in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*.

is the French who are assimilating the Jews to such an extent that they came to share such alleged national failings as Gallic fickleness. What, then becomes of the Jewishness of these Frenchmen professing a Mosaic faith? Heine offers the following answer:

“viele von ihnen üben noch den jüdischen Zeremonialdienst, den äußerlichen Kultus, mechanisch, ohne zu wissen warum, aus alter Gewohnheit; von innerem Glauben keine Spur, denn in der Synagoge ebenso wie in der christlichen Kirche hat die witzige Säure der Voltaireschen Kritik zerstörend gewirkt.”

Again we witness the inversion of a stereotype: instead of seeing Jewish assimilation harming Christianity, we are invited to watch Gentile scepticism eroding the religion of the Jews. Only then, after these important caveats, do we come to the statement which is so often quoted out of context: “Bei den französischen Juden, wie bei den übrigen Franzosen, ist das Gold der Gott des Tages, und die Industrie ist die herrschende Religion.” The real force and drift of Heine’s argument can best be seen, as so often, by contrasting it with that of Marx.<sup>35</sup> The religion of money, Heine tells us, is not to be equated with Judaism, as Marx was to assert soon afterwards. On the contrary: Jews have been swept along by a current of materialism and commercialism in the non-Jewish society that has accepted them; and their history has ensured that they proved strong swimmers in these muddy waters. The ability to turn propositions “standing on their head” into counter-propositions “standing on their feet”, for which Marx is so often given credit, belongs much more surely to Heine.

But Heine is a poet, master of metaphor and metonymy, and with a witty conceit he now elaborates the (to him clearly abominable) identification of God with gold and industry with religion that has affected the Jews along with the rest of Europe.

“In dieser Beziehung dürfte man die hiesigen Juden in zwei Sekten einteilen: in die Sekte der rive droite und die Sekte der rive gauche; diese Namen haben nämlich Bezug auf die beiden Eisenbahnen, welche, die eine längs dem rechten Seineufer, die andere dem linken Ufer entlang, nach Versailles führen und”

(wait for it!)

“von zwei berühmten Finanzrabbinen geleitet werden, die miteinander ebenso divergierend hadern wie einst Rabbi Samai und Rabbi Hillel in der ältern Stadt Babylon.”

The last adjective in this witty passage reminds us that Paris is the *new* Babylon, whoring after gods abhorrent to a pristine, pre-exilic Israel. It may well be that Heine’s transference of the Hillel-Shammai debates from Jerusalem, where they took place in actual fact, is not an error, but artistic licence deliberately employed for precisely this effect. The elder Hillel was, after all, born in Babylon.

<sup>35</sup> ‘Zur Judenfrage’, in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Berlin 1972, vol. I, pp. 347–377.

Within this unconventional variation of the stereoscopic view which brings together religion and high finance Heine has now focused his readers' gaze on two prominent individuals. General traits are now personalised, given the names of actual people – names prepared for by his previous portrayal of assimilated French Jewry and given a wider context by the contrasting evocation of the two great Jewish teachers of an earlier age. The two famous “Finanzrabbinen” into whose presence Heine conjures us are, of course, Baron James, head of the House of Rothschild in Paris, and the banker-politician Benoît Fould. But just as Shammai and Hillel were two wholly different personalities, so, Heine tells us, are their modern financial successors – and here he leads us firmly back to the question of the Syrian Jews and their French co-religionists.

“Wir müssen dem Großrabbi der rive droite, dem Baron Rothschild, die Gerechtigkeit widerfahren lassen, daß er für das Haus Israel eine edlere Sympathie an den Tag legte als sein schriftgelehrter Antagonist, der Großrabbi der rive gauche, Herr Benoît Fould, der, während in Syrien, auf Anzeigung eines französischen Konsuls, seine Glaubensbrüder gefoltert und gewürgt wurden, mit der unerschütterlichen Seelenruhe eines Hillel in der französischen Deputiertenkammer einige schöne Reden hielt über die Konversion der Renten und den Diskonto der Bank.”

Heine's unsympathetic sketch of Fould is made even more unsympathetic by seeing him as the “Hillel” of the team. Hillel's “unerschütterliche Seelenruhe”, he bids us recall, was due to a steadfast morality and trust in God which contrast strikingly with his modern counterpart as Heine portrayed him. In a later gloss, the poet was to find himself forced to make an *amende honorable* to Benoît Fould who did speak out, in the French Chamber of Deputies, against the Damascene atrocities.<sup>36</sup> In his eagerness to present typical attitudes in personalised form Heine was often unfair to individuals – but that is in the nature of caricature, and Heine was surely one of the greatest caricaturists in words that the world has ever seen.

Rothschild fares better than Fould, as always in Heine's pages. Though he saw in him the high-priest of the modern golden calf, Heine also looked on him as a revolutionary *à l'insu* who was helping to abolish the privileges of an outdated hereditary nobility, and as a man who preserved, in his personal life, the virtues of pity and charity along with the Jewish religion which enjoined them. James Rothschild fares better, too, than the Jewish Consistory of France of which he was a prominent member; its deliberations, Heine tells us, resulted in no more than a resolution to publish the documents which set out the facts of the persecution its Syrian brethren were suffering. Rothschild is outshone, however, by the admiring portrait Heine now begins to draw of Adolphe Crémieux<sup>37</sup> – a portrait whose outlines he was later to fill in with glowing colours.

<sup>36</sup> *WVI*, p. 306.

<sup>37</sup> *WVI*, pp. 293–294.

“Herr Crémieux, der berühmte Advokat, welcher nicht bloß den Juden, sondern den Unterdrückten aller Konfessionen und aller Doktrinen zu jeder Zeit seine großmütige Beredsamkeit gewidmet, unterzog sich der obenerwähnten Publikation, und mit Ausnahme einer schönen Frau”

(here Heine is paying another, more oblique compliment to the French branch of the Rothschild family, for the lady referred to is beyond a doubt Baroness Betty Rothschild)

“und einiger jungen Gelehrten ist wohl Herr Crémieux der einzige in Paris, der sich der Sache Israels tätig annahm. Mit der größten Aufopferung seiner persönlichen Interessen, mit Verachtung jeder lauernden Hinterlist trat er den gehässigen Insinuationen unentwegt entgegen und erbot sich sogar, nach Ägypten zu reisen, wenn dort der Prozeß der Damaszener Juden vor das Tribunal des Pascha Mehemed Ali gezogen werden sollte.”

Again we cannot but note the deliberate subversions of antisemitic stereotypes: the common charge that Jews, if they help at all, help only their own kind, that they are cowardly and underhand; and in the passage that follows, Heine makes short work too of contemporary insinuations that Crémieux was backed by vast Jewish finances. As he does so, he reveals the deep personal hurt of the poor poet in a rich Jewish family and the even deeper hurt of a man who had accepted baptism for the sake of a career that never took off the ground. His article is full of caricatures of men who abandoned their Jewish names or the religion of their fathers without economic necessity, for reasons of social snobbery:

“Ein ehemaliger preußischer Lieferant welcher, anspielend auf seinen hebräischen Namen Moses (Moses heißt nämlich auf deutsch ‘aus dem Wasser gezogen’, auf italienisch ‘del mare’), den dem letztern entsprechenden klangvollen Namen Baron Delmar angenommen hatte ... ein anderer aus dem Wasser gezogener Baron, der im edlen Faubourg den gentilhomme catholique und großen Schriftsteller spielt ...”<sup>38</sup>

Here the Rothschilds, as Heine said more than once, again provided a great counter-example: they remained Jews, they never changed their family name, however high they rose in Gentile society. Heine’s deepest scorn, however, is reserved for a type of baptised Jew that he encountered in his historical studies, as well as among his contemporaries:

“Unter den getauften Juden sind viele, die aus feiger Hypokrisie über Israel noch ärgere Mißbreden führen, als dessen geborene Feinde. In derselben Weise pflegen gewisse Schriftsteller, um nicht an ihren Ursprung zu erinnern, sich über die Juden sehr schlecht oder gar nicht auszusprechen. Das ist eine bekannte, betrübsam lächerliche Erscheinung.”

It is therefore ridiculous, Heine tells his German readers, to suspect French Jews of using their financial power to present a distorted, one-sided case for

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<sup>38</sup> *W* VI, pp. 294–295.



their Damascene fellow-Jews in plain contradiction of French political interests. It is more than ridiculous, in fact, it is sinister – for the tactics here employed are the same as those recently employed against the *Jung Deutschland* movement. What German reactionaries had then not just insinuated but loudly proclaimed, in plain contradiction of the facts, was that *Jung Deutschland* was really *Jung Palästina*, that its critique of German society and German culture boiled down to a Jewish plot, masterminded by Börne and Heine, to subvert German national traditions and national pride along with the Christian religion. The same people who saw only Jewish money behind the agitation on behalf of the Syrian martyrs saw only Jewish machinations behind the attempt to liberalise German society and German culture – and in fighting the one lie, Heine thought, he was also helping to expose the other.

Heine's articles for the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* usually ended with some sign that what he had described was only what appeared to a particular observer at a particular time, and that the future might bring surprising illuminations as well as changes. He therefore did not find it difficult to introduce into a later article, one which enshrined a vigorous defence of the Jewish religion against blood-libels apparently condoned even by Adolphe Thiers, the *amende honorable* to Benoît Fould which has already been mentioned. The Fould family did not, however, escape Heine's satiric lash for long. In 1846 it was the turn of Benoît's more famous brother Achille.

“Daß Herr Achilles Fould zu Tarbes gewählt worden und in der nächsten Deputiertenkammer wieder die hohen Pyrenäen repräsentieren wird, haben die Zeitungen zu Genüge berichtet. Der Himmel bewahre mich davor, daß ich Partikularitäten der Wahl oder der Person hier mitteile.”<sup>39</sup>

Mock-pious phrases (“Der Himmel bewahre mich ...”) are always a signal in Heine to look for impious insinuations. He clearly suggests that the “particularities” he is withholding would not redound to the credit of electors or elected. But don't think, Heine goes on, that the new deputy is an outstanding villain or even an outstanding fool.

“Der Mann ist nicht besser und nicht schlechter als hundert andere, die mit ihm auf den grünen Bänken des Palais-Bourbon übereinstimmend die Majorität bilden werden ...”

Glancing at Fould's political colouring (he is a conservative supporting Molé rather than a “ministerial” supporting Guizot), Heine now springs his surprise. He has never, we know, been noted for excessive sympathies with mediocrities of conservative – or indeed any other – political complexion; but in the case of Achille Fould, he tells us:

“Seine Erhebung zur Deputation macht mir ein wahrhaftes Vergnügen ...”

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<sup>39</sup> SVI, pp. 626–627.

and after startling the reader to attention the sentence continues blandly on its way by stating what Heine calls, tongue firmly in cheek, an “utterly simple reason”:

“... aus dem ganz einfachen Grunde, weil dadurch das Prinzip der bürgerlichen Gleichstellung der Israeliten in seiner letzten Konsequenz sanktioniert wird. Es ist freilich, sowohl durch das Gesetz wie durch die öffentliche Meinung, hier in Frankreich längst der Grundsatz anerkannt worden, daß Juden, die sich durch Talent und Hochsinn auszeichnen, alle Staatsämter ohne Ausnahme zugänglich sein müssen. ...”

That, no doubt, is one in the eye for German readers whose governments have not seen fit, in the year of grace 1846, to apply that principle of natural justice to their Jewish subjects, and who for their own part, as constituent elements of public opinion, have not accepted it wholeheartedly even as an ideal. Heine is once again speaking *pro domo* here, for it was precisely this failure of Prussian law and Prussian opinion which had driven him first to baptism and then to emigration. But after his sober statement of the very different, much more humane assumptions of the French he goes on, in his wittiest manner, to complain of their insufficiency.

“Wie tolerant dieses auch klingt, so finde ich hier doch den säuerlichen Beigeschmack des verjährten Vorurteils. Ja, solange die Juden nicht auch ohne Talent und ohne Hochsinn zu jenen Ämtern zugelassen werden, so gut wie Tausende von Christen die weder denken noch fühlen sondern nur rechnen können, so lange ist noch immer das Vorurteil nicht radikal entwurzelt, und es herrscht noch immer der alte Druck! Die mittelalterliche Intoleranz schwindet aber bis auf die letzte Schattenspur, sobald die Juden auch ohne sonstiges Verdienst bloß durch ihr Geld zur Deputation, dem höchsten Ehrenamte Frankreichs, gelangen können ebenso gut wie ihre christlichen Brüder, und in dieser Beziehung ist die Ernennung des Herrn Achilles Fould ein definitiver Sieg des Prinzips höchster bürgerlicher Gleichheit.”

Wit, Heine had said in an early letter, is worth nothing in isolation; it becomes tolerable only when it rests on a foundation of seriousness. His passage on Achille Fould's election at Tarbes shows that principle in practice. It shows Heine pillorying a society whose motto is “enrichissez-vous”; ridiculing the notion that Jews scrambling for money and honours were doing anything their Gentile brethren were not doing with equal determination and in greater numbers; and directing attention to the *Leistungsdruck* under which Jews stood in European society, the necessity to prove over and over again that they were not just equal to, but better and worthier than, their non-Jewish competitors – a pressure bound to produce reaction-phenomena that would retard rather than advance the cause of their civic integration.

Heine has not yet finished with this subject, however. He now goes on to draw his readers' attention to a paradox they might have missed: that his witty demonstration of the workings of civic *equality* was triggered off by the election of a Jewish *millionaire* to the lower house of the French parliament. Achille Fould was not the only rich Jew to be so elected – and this leads Heine to

propose, humorously, a treatise on the national wealth of the Jews from the times of the patriarch Abraham onwards.<sup>40</sup>

“Noch zwei andere Bekenner des mosaischen Glaubens, deren Namen einen ebenso guten Geldklang hat”

(a typical Heinesque elaboration of the German idiom “sein Name hat einen guten Klang”!),

“sind diesen Sommer zu Deputierten geworden. Inwieweit fördern auch diese das demokratische Gleichheitsprinzip? Es sind ebenfalls zwei millionenbesitzende Bankiers, und in meinen historischen Untersuchungen über den Nationalreichtum der Juden von Abraham bis auf heute werde ich auch Gelegenheit finden von Herrn Benoît Fould und Herrn von Eichthal zu reden. Honni soit qui mal y pense.”

An *amende honorable*, as this new mention of Benoît Fould may serve to show, never protected one of Heine’s victims from further attack. And having once thought of the idea of a work “über den Nationalreichtum der Juden von Abraham bis auf heute”, Heine cannot forbear to elaborate it further in his own satiric way. Will its implications not be antisemitic? Not at all, Heine replies.

“Ich bemerke im voraus um Mißdeutungen zu entgehen, daß das Ergebnis meiner Forschungen über den Nationalreichtum der Juden für diese sehr rühmlich ist und ihnen zur größten Ehre gereicht. Israel verdankt nämlich seinen Reichtum einzig und allein jenem erhabenen Gottesglauben, dem es seit Jahrhunderten ergeben blieb. Die Juden verehrten ein höchstes Wesen, das unsichtbar im Himmel waltet, während die Heiden, unfähig einer Erhebung zum Reingeistigen, sich allerlei goldene und silberne Götter machten, die sie auf Erden anbeteten.”

The paradox has been announced: a paradox, be it noted, based once again on a principle exactly the opposite of that advanced by Karl Marx who adopted the vulgar equation of Judaism and the worship of money. Not at all, says Heine; the spirituality of the ancient Jewish religion, the purity of its ethical monotheism, contrasted with that of the peoples all around who worshipped silver and gold, *kesev vesahav*. How then, we are to ask ourselves, could an “erhabener Gottesglaube” of this kind become the cause of national wealth? Here is Heine’s answer:

“Hätten diese blinden Heiden all das Gold und Silber, das sie zu solchem schnöden Götzendienst vergeudet, in bares Geld umgewandelt und auf Interessen angelegt, so wären sie ebenfalls so reich geworden wie die Juden, die ihr Gold und Silber vorteilhafter zu plazieren wußten, vielleicht in assyrisch-babylonischen Staatsanleihen, in Nebukadnezar’schen Obligationen, in ägyptischen Kanalaktien, in fünfprozentigen Sidoniern, und anderen klassischen Papieren die der Herr gesegnet hat, wie er die modernen zu segnen pflegt.”

This is surely an excellent *jeu d’esprit*, in which modern financial concepts,

<sup>40</sup> SVI, p. 627.

practices and institutions are superimposed on the Biblical world in such a way that the modern either has an incongruous *relation* with the ancient – as in “ägyptische Kanalaktien” – or stands in equally incongruent *contrast* to it – as in “fünfprozentige Sidonier”. But this sustained joke, heightened by the use of Biblical phraseology, has once again a serious undertone which we miss at our peril. Is there not, Heine suggests to his readers, some real relation between a spiritual, ethically strict religion, and capitalism – the sort of relation, in fact, to which Max Weber and R. H. Tawney were to point many decades later? But beyond that Heine’s deliberately absurd demonstration enshrines a parodistic reversal of Jewish interpretations of recent history in terms of the Biblical past together with ridicule of those who regard Jews as an a-historical entity, as a group whose characteristics have remained fundamentally unchanged from Abraham’s day to the present.

Achille Fould, in fact, aroused Heine’s admiration in later years – in the very years in which he became one of the chief targets of Marx’s attack because of his collaboration with Napoleon III. His satiric portrait therefore disappeared from the German and French versions of the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* articles which Heine published in the 1850s under the titles *Lutezia* and *Lutèce*. Since Heine did not have access to his original manuscripts he failed, in these later versions, to restore the touches the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* had removed from his portrait of Adolphe Crémieux when it shortened the article dated 31st January 1841 – but the labours of Heine’s editors enable us to fill in some missing portions.

Heine begins his elaboration by adverting again to Crémieux’s intervention in the Damascus affair.

“Als Herr Crémieux mit Mehemet Ali von den Justizgreueln sprach, die in Damaskus verübt worden, fand er ihn zu den heilsamsten Reformen geneigt, und wären nicht die politischen Ereignisse allzu stürmisch dazwischengetreten, so hätte es der berühmte Advokat gewiß erreicht, den Pascha zur Einführung des europäischen Kriminalverfahrens in seinen Staaten zu bewegen.”<sup>41</sup>

The Franco-Jewish advocate, Heine thus tells us, in intervening on behalf of persecuted Jews, is advancing the cause, not just of Jews, but of Mehemet Ali’s other subjects too – is helping to bring to the Middle East principles of justice which will save non-Jews from the fate of his tortured co-religionists. Crémieux, he has heard, is preparing for publication the diary he kept during his journeys to the Middle East, and that leads him to speculate on the interesting parallel such a diary would surely offer to the famous *De Legatione ad Gaium* of Philo Judaeus. “Es herrscht”, Heine adds, “in der Tat eine große Ähnlichkeit zwischen den beiden Missionen, und wie der gelehrte Alexandriner hat auch Adolphe Crémieux seinen Namen verewigt in den Annalen des unglücklichen Volks, das nicht sterben kann.”<sup>42</sup> Here we have a characteristic sidelight on

<sup>41</sup> *W* VI, p. 365.

<sup>42</sup> *W* VI, p. 638.

Heine's view of modern Jewry in the early 1840s – here as elsewhere he uses the Christian image of the Wandering Jew (or rather, the German image of “der ewige Jude” – to characterise the Jewish people and suggests, by this analogy, that its extinction (in the sense, no doubt, of complete assimilation) would be a blessing. That is an attitude which comes out very clearly in Heine's poem in praise of his Uncle Salomon's foundation of a Jewish hospital, also written in the early 1840s: a poem redolent of that ethnic death-wish which afflicted many men and women of Jewish origin in the era of emancipation.

“Ein Hospital für arme, kranke Juden,  
 Für Menschenkinder, welche dreifach elend,  
 Behaftet mit den bösen drei Gebrechen,  
 Mit Armut, Körperschmerz und Judentume!  
 Das schlimmste von den dreien ist das letzte,  
 Das tausendjährige Familienübel,  
 Die aus dem Niltal mitgeschleppte Plage,  
 Der altägyptisch ungesunde Glauben.  
 Unheilbar tiefes Leid! Dagegen helfen  
 Nicht Dampfbad, Dusche, nicht die Apparate  
 Der Chirurgie, noch all die Arzeneien,  
 Die dieses Haus den siechen Gästen bietet.  
 Wird einst die Zeit, die ew'ge Göttin, tilgen  
 Das dunkle Weh, das sich vererbt vom Vater  
 Herunter auf den Sohn – wird einst der Enkel  
 Genesen und vernünftig sein und glücklich?  
 Ich weiß es nicht! Doch mittlerweile wollen  
 Wir preisen jenes Herz, das klug und liebeich  
 Zu lindern suchte, was der Lindrung fähig,  
 Zeitlichen Balsam träufelnd in die Wunden ...”<sup>43</sup>

In a pioneer work that has not lost its value in over thirty intervening years, Israel Tabak has pointed to the dual feeling inherent in this poem: the combination of Heine's short-lived longing for a day in which Jews would lose their identity and disappear as a people with praise of the Jew who casts in his lot with his people, who identifies himself with his co-religionists in the hour of their distress and helps them to the best of his ability.<sup>44</sup>

Heine's portrait of Crémieux is rounded out by a passage in which the Jewish advocate whose work benefited, not only his co-religionists, but all mankind, is presented as a champion of universal justice as well as a true heir of the ideals of liberty, fraternity and equality proclaimed by the French Revolution; and by another, designed to remove all impressions of Robespierrean dourness and austerity, which once again affords us a glimpse of Rachel Félix.

<sup>43</sup> *WI*, p. 328.

<sup>44</sup> I. Tabak, *Judaic Lore in Heine. The Heritage of a Poet*, Baltimore 1948, p. 194.

“Vielleicht mögen ihm einige Pharisäer gram sein, denn er liebt Musik, besonders italienische, er liebt schöne Pferde, auch die Tragödien des Racine, und er war der Pflegevater einer Komödiantin, welche Mademoiselle Rachel heißt. Aber diese grämlichen Zeloten sollten ihm doch seine Lebenslust und seinen heidnischen Geschmack einigermaßen verzeihen, und sei es auch nur um des Eifers willen, womit er ihre eigenen Bärte und Gliedmaßen in Schutz nahm gegen die Partei der Folterknechte von Damaskus.”<sup>45</sup>

The theme Heine here brushes lightly is one that agitated him all through his life, one that he had recently elaborated in *Ludwig Börne. Eine Denkschrift*. He saw, or tried to see, the distinction into “Jews” and “Christians”, or “Jews” and “Gentiles”, or “Jews” and “Germans”, “Frenchmen” etc. cut across by other, more significant distinctions: notably that between the ascetic human type and the type that enjoyed the pleasure of this world without pangs of conscience. In that dichotomy Crémieux would be found on the side of Jan Steen, or Mirabeau, or Goethe, while the other side would bring together the racially proud German Wolfgang Menzel and the Christian theologian Hengstenberg with many a bearded Jew. It might be said in passing that Heine never came to appreciate fully the joyous, life-affirming side of the Jewish religion in matters other than the celebration of the Sabbath and the eating of *Schalet*.

I would like to end this survey with a look at a characteristic passage in which Heine himself employs the word *Karikatur* to describe the subject of one of his most elaborate portraits. It comes from an essay, first published in May 1844, in which Heine uses the occasion of the death of Ludwig Marcus to recall the days in which they had been fellow-members of the *Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden*, to draw thumb-nail sketches of the chief adherents of that *Verein* (including Eduard Gans, who frequently gave Heine occasion for self-lacerating remarks on apostasy), and to situate the *Culturverein's* endeavours in the history of German-Jewish struggles for self-knowledge, self-improvement, and emancipation.<sup>46</sup>

Heine begins by speculating on the reason why so many of the most honourable, clean-living and industrious German intellectuals who emigrated to Paris succumbed to insanity. Is it perhaps, he asks, because France is a hothouse that develops with especial rapidity mental seeds imported from German-speaking lands; or is the very fact that such Germans leave their native country to “climb the hard stairs of exile” already a *sign* of incipient madness? And the complaints of these exiles about political oppression and religious intolerance in the German states, are they not – Heine adds in a satiric passage prudently deleted before publication – are they not the symptom of a sickness bound, sooner or later, to culminate in revolutionary rage or Communist madness, in face of a German fatherland that feeds its dissenters in prison and graciously allows Jews the same right as Catholics and Protestants to contribu-

<sup>45</sup> *W* VI, p. 638–639.

<sup>46</sup> *W* VII, pp. 283–298.

te their mite to the completion of Cologne cathedral? It would be quite wrong, Heine concludes, to think of these voluntary exiles as eccentric Storm and Stress figures – and he calls as his chief witness and example Ludwig Marcus, “dieser deutsche Gelehrte, der sich durch Fülle seines Wissens ebenso rühmlich auszeichnete wie durch hohe Sittlichkeit”.

Having drawn, as it were, a German setting for Marcus and given due weight to its importance for his characterisation, Heine now proceeds to relate his life-story in such a way that its Jewish component comes out no less clearly. He mentions “unbemittelte Eltern, die dem gottesfürchtigen Kultus des Judentums anhängen” and takes Marcus’s birthplace, the town of Dessau, as an occasion for speaking once again of Moses Mendelssohn, “der berühmte Weltweise” who was also born there and to whom Marcus is said to bear so striking a facial resemblance that but for chronology and Moses Mendelssohn’s well-known virtue some very frivolous thoughts might have been given rein. There was no illicit paternity, then;

“Aber dem Geiste nach war Marcus wirklich ein ganz naher Verwandter jenes großen Reformators der deutschen Juden, und in seiner Seele wohnte ebenfalls die größte Uneigennützigkeit, der dulddende Stillmut, der bescheidene Rechtsinn, lächelnde Verachtung des Schlechten und eine unbeugsame, eiserne Liebe für die unterdrückten Glaubensgenossen.”

Heine would seem to be drawing the portrait of a Jewish saint, set off by the parallel figure of Moses Mendelssohn on the one hand and the contrasting figure of Eduard Gans, the renegade leader who “saved himself first”, on the other. But this modern saint, Heine shows us, deserves honour for his striving rather than his achievement. Marcus is exhibited as a polyhistor whose whole life centred on the thought of his Jewish brethren, who never ceased to return from his intellectual and spiritual labours “zu der Leidensgeschichte Israels, zu der Schädelstätte Jerusalems, um derentwillen er vielleicht die semitischen Sprachen mit größerer Vorliebe als die andern betrieb”. But what came of it all?

“Alles, was Marcus wußte, wußte er nicht lebendig organisch, sondern als tote Geschichtlichkeit, die ganze Natur versteinerte sich ihm, und er erkannte im Grunde nur Fossilien und Mumien. Dazu gesellte sich eine Ohnmacht der künstlerischen Gestaltung ... Un genießbar, unverdaulich, abstrus waren daher die Artikel und gar die Bücher, die er geschrieben.”

The essay in which this passage occurs, *Ludwig Marcus. Denkworte*, throws Marcus’s failure into relief by its own sense of history, its own connection with contemporary life, and its own easy and mellifluous style.

In his honourable steadfastness and devotion to a chosen cause Marcus did not stand alone; Heine finds eloquent words to praise the scholarly and philanthropic virtues of Zunz, Bendavid and Moser whose lives, he tells us, recall instances of anonymous martyrdom common in Jewish history. In this respect they, like Marcus, are contrasted with the most gifted member of the

*Culturverein* who is also, however, presented as the most questionable character: the “lost leader” Eduard Gans. But the cause Marcus served with such admirable fortitude seems to Heine, in 1844, as “lost” as its leader. The ideals of the *Culturverein* he now sees as “eine hochfliegende, große, aber unausführbare Idee”:

“Geistesbegabte und tiefherzige Männer versuchten hier die Rettung einer längst verlorenen Sache, und es gelang ihnen höchstens, auf den Walstätten der Vergangenheit die Gebeine der älteren Kämpfer aufzufinden.”

And Heine adds, in words most modern historians would surely underwrite:

“Die ganze Ausbeute jenes Vereins bestand in einigen historischen Arbeiten, in Geschichtsforschungen worunter namentlich die Abhandlungen des Dr. Zunz über die spanischen Juden im Mittelalter zu den Merkwürdigkeiten der höheren Kritik gezählt werden können.”

It is curiously but significantly, the “renegade” Eduard Gans who is credited with finding a better way than the other members of the *Culturverein* to advance the Jewish cause and facilitate the desired integration of Jews into German society. “Vulgarising” (the word is Heine’s) Hegel’s writings, Gans attacked reactionaries and servile German scholars in his writings and his fiery lectures:

“[Er förderte] die Entwicklung des deutschen Freiheitssinnes, er entfesselte die gebundensten Gedanken und riß der Lüge die Larve ab. Er war ein beweglicher Feuergeist, dessen Witzfunken vortrefflich zündeten oder wenigstens herrlich leuchteten.”

Can we not recognise, here, elements of a self-portrait? Is not this way of attempting to further the emancipation of Jews by furthering that of Germans – is it not precisely Heine’s own way in these years leading up to the Revolutions of 1848? And when we then read how much less worthy of respect Gans was as a human being than the ineffective Marcus, how rarely, in fact, genius and virtue go together, and how the defects of Gans’s character showed themselves most clearly when he abandoned the religion of his ancestors for the sake of an academic advancement which Marcus scorned to buy at such a price – can we not see once again the lineaments of a candid *self*-portrait peep through Heine’s ostensible portrait of an early associate? Do we not feel ourselves invited to range the talented and effective Heinrich Heine alongside the talented and effective Eduard Gans against the virtuous but ineffectual Marcus whose obituary praises are here being sung?

This is not the place to follow Heine into his never less than interesting glosses on the *Culturverein*’s endeavours to mediate between historical Judaism on the one hand and modern scholarship and science on the other; nor can we now consider his timely analyses of a situation in which *religious* antipathy was giving way to *economic* and *social* resentments in the long history of antisemitism, or his elaborate portrayal of European Jewry as the “Swiss guard” of belief in God, or his controversial views on the “natural affinity” of Jews and



Germans. We cannot wholly overlook, however, in the context of a symposium on the Revolutions of 1848, Heine's gleeful warnings, in this essay of 1844, of the advance of a militant international proletariat that would seek to sweep away all "Nationalitätenwesen" and would put soi-disant German patriots "die nur Rasse und Vollblut und dergleichen Roßkammgedanken im Kopfe tragen" into such a tizzy "daß es ihnen nicht mehr in den Sinn kommen wird, an der Deutschheit der Juden zu mäkeln". How the proletarians would react to the Jews in their midst if and when their programme was realised Heine does not say – we know that he always had doubts and fears about the fate of Jews after *any* revolution.

It is now time, however, to take a look at Heine's account, in his obituary essay, of his renewed acquaintance with Ludwig Marcus in Paris, and to focus, in this concluding passage, on two particularly characteristic areas of this literary portrait. Unable to make his living in Germany, we learn, Marcus had emigrated to France, found a post as a teacher in Dijon, and had then abandoned that post in order to finish a large-scale History of Abyssinia – a work that had grown out of an interest in female circumcision which had caused Heine and Gans a great deal of amusement in their Berlin years. But in moral dignity, Heine tells us, Marcus far surpassed the Gans who laughed at his obsessions and his clumsy way of expressing himself; and the first of the two passages I shall now quote is designed to illustrate that fact. Heine is talking about Marcus's decision to give up his teaching-post in order to complete his scholarly life's work.

“Wie ich von andern hörte, war ein bißchen Eigensinn im Spiel, und das Ministerium hätte ihm sogar vorgeschlagen, wie in Frankreich gebräuchlich, seine Stelle durch einen wohlfeiler besoldeten Suppleanten zu besetzen, und ihm selber den größten Teil seines Gehalts zu lassen. Dagegen sträubte sich die große Seele des Kleinen, er wollte nicht fremde Arbeit ausbeuten, und er ließ seinem Nachfolger die ganze Besoldung. Seine Uneigennützigkeit ist hier um so merkwürdiger, da er damals blutarm in rührender Dürftigkeit sein Leben fristete. Es ging ihm sogar sehr schlecht, und ohne die Engelshilfe einer schönen Frau wäre er gewiß in darbendem Elend verkommen. Ja, es war eine sehr schöne und große Dame von Paris, eine der glänzendsten Erscheinungen des hiesigen Weltlebens, die, als sie von dem wunderlichen Kauz hörte, in die Dunkelheit seines kümmerlichen Lebens hinabstieg und mit anmutiger Zartsinnigkeit ihn dahin zu bringen wußte, einen bedeutenden Jahrgehalt von ihr anzunehmen. Ich glaube, seinen Stolz zähmte hier ganz besonders die Ansicht, daß seine Gönnerin, die Gattin des reichsten Bankiers dieses Erdballs, späterhin sein großes Werk auf ihre Kosten drucken lassen werde. Einer Dame, dachte er, die wegen ihres Geistes und ihrer Bildung soviel gerühmt wird, müsse doch sehr viel daran gelegen sein, daß endlich eine gründliche Geschichte von Abyssinien geschrieben werde, und er fand es ganz natürlich, daß sie dem Autor durch einen Jahrgehalt seine große Mühe und Arbeit zu vergüten suchte.”

That portrayal of a “wunderlicher Kauz” and his unwordly thought-processes has clearly a strong element of caricature – but it is a caricature wholly without malice. And what is perhaps most interesting of all, in the context of

Heine's Jewish portraits, is to find that here, in 1844, when he was closer to Marx than at any other time of his life, he decisively subverts Marx's mischievous equation of Judaism with a money-grubbing capitalism. He does this by showing how a poor Jewish scholar refuses to accept the ethic of exploiting other people's labour, even when it would benefit his scholarly life's work, even when the practice he objects to is suggested to him by the French government; and how he is nevertheless enabled to carry on his selfless and commercially "unproductive" work with the help of a member of a Jewish family which for Marx as for the whole of Europe personified capitalism. There can be no doubt that the lady Heine describes in such glowing terms is once again the Baroness James de Rothschild; and I use the adjective "glowing" in Heine's own sense, for it cannot have escaped my readers that Heine here operates with terms of metaphoric opposition later made famous by Brecht:

"... eine der glänzendsten Erscheinungen des hiesigen Weltlebens, die ... in die Dunkelheit seines kümmerlichen Weltlebens hinabstieg ...

Denn die einen sind im Dunkeln  
Und die andern sind im Licht ..."<sup>47</sup>

In Heine's case the two worlds come together in an act of meaningful patronage, an act which can be clearly situated in one of the best and most constant Jewish traditions: willing support of selfless and materially "unprofitable" scholarship by wealthy business-people with a genuine respect for learning.

One essential element is still missing in our account of Heine's Jewish portraits in the 1840s; and the last passage to be quoted from *Ludwig Marcus. Denkworte* will serve to introduce it. In the earlier part of his essay Heine refers to "die äußere Erscheinung des kleinen Mannes, die nicht selten zum Lachen reizte" – and now, towards the end, he returns at greater length to Marcus's physical appearance.

"Die Zeit, während welcher ich den guten Marcus nicht gesehen, etwa fünfzehn Jahre, hatte auf sein Äußeres eben nicht verschönernd gewirkt. Seine Erscheinung, die früher ans Possierliche streifte, war jetzt eine entschiedene Karikatur geworden, aber eine angenehme, liebliche, ich möchte fast sagen erquickende Karikatur. Ein spaßhaft wehmütiges Ansehen gab ihm sein von Leiden durchfurchtes Greisengesicht, worin die kleinen Äuglein vergnügt lebhaft glänzten, und gar sein abenteuerlicher, fabelhafter Haarwuchs! Die Haare nämlich, welche früher pechschwarz und anliegend gewesen, waren jetzt ergraut und umgaben in krauser aufgesträubter Fülle das schon außerdem verhältnismäßig große Haupt. Er glich so ziemlich jenen breitköpfigen Figuren mit dünnem Leibchen und kurzen Beinchen, die wir auf den Glasscheiben eines chinesischen Schattenspiels sehen. Besonders wenn mir die zwerghafte Gestalt in Gesellschaft seines

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<sup>47</sup> Bertolt Brechts *Dreigroschenbuch. Texte, Materialien, Dokumente*, ed. S. Unseld, Frankfurt a. Main 1960, p. 80.

Kollaborators, des ungeheuer großen und stattlichen Professors Duisberg, auf den Boulevards begegnete, jauchzte mir der Humor in der Brust ...”<sup>48</sup>

This is an excellent example of the physical side of Heine’s portraits: his ability to evoke the impression made by a man’s outward appearance through foregrounding certain features in the manner of a caricaturist (the disproportion between Marcus’s head and body, his shining eyes, his fantastic halo of hair); through bringing out other features by means of an analogy (here with Chinese shadow-figures) and heightening yet others by means of contrasting juxtaposition (little Marcus and huge Duisberg). It is all summed up by a series of oxymora of which “spaßhaft wehmütig” is the central one – oxymora leading up to the explicit contrast, after the passage I have quoted, between the beautiful soul Heine detected in his little Jewish friend, and the grotesque envelope in which the Lord, in the haste of creation, had seen fit to wrap it. Grotesque elements become more prominent towards the end of the Marcus essay, when Heine describes the insanity in which the little man ended his life; and in a charming closing gesture Heine imagines himself opening Marcus’s coffin as it awaits burial and asking pardon for any hurt he may have done him. Noticing a smile on the dead face he fancies that Marcus is smiling because Heine was too blind to appreciate the importance of his learned labours. The last sentence, as so often in these essays of the 1840s, opens perspectives onto the future: perhaps Salomon Munk, the famous Orientalist of the *Bibliothèque Nationale*, will lead the world to a juster appreciation of what Marcus was and what he achieved than Heine himself had been able to muster.

And that, I think, is a not inconsiderable service which Heine’s writings on Jewish personalities and affairs render to the historian. They do not pretend to recount from some high vantage-point “wie es eigentlich gewesen”; they tell us what it looked like to a particular observer at a particular time, and they leave it to later readers to test that observer’s sensitivity, intelligence and perspicuity against other evidence – including, of course, all subsequent developments. My own feeling is that Heine’s portraits of his contemporaries have little to fear from such tests; that even his undoubted injustices to individuals he encountered on his life’s journey encapsulate a sensitive perception of historical realities, and can be used – at the very least – to pinpoint problems Heine himself had to face as a Jewish-born author striving for recognition in the nineteenth-century

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<sup>48</sup> *WVII*, p. 296. The complicated textual filiations of *Ludwig Marcus. Denkworte*, and the authority of various readings and reconstructions, have been admirably described and analysed by Michael Werner in his *Cahier Heine*, Paris 1975, pp. 62–65. Wider questions concerning the relation between the texts of Heine’s manuscripts, versions printed in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* during the 1840s, and versions printed in *Lutezia* (1854) are discussed by Erhard Weidl in *Heinrich Heines Arbeitsweise. Kreativität der Veränderung*, Hamburg 1974, pp. 92–98, 106–109, 113–117.

Diaspora. Usually, however, they are more than that: complex little masterpieces of sardonic observation and depiction which have a life that transcends the life of their historical originals, which confront us with a heightened image, not only of the long-dead men and women we have come to talk about in this symposium, but also – *mutatis mutandis* – of ourselves.



ALBERT H. FRIEDLANDER

on

## Heine's Portraits of German and French Jews A Comment

I must be forgiven if I approach the task assigned to me with a small touch of irreverence: but the subject matter almost commands it. Let us remember Thomas Mann's 'Notiz über Heine', where he refers to Heine's answer to his friends who criticised the malicious aspects of his *Börne* book: "Ach, nur wer das selig zerstreute Lächeln versteht, mit dem er den Freunden ... zur Antwort gab: 'Aber ist's nicht schön ausgedrückt?' nur der begreift welche eine denkmalswürdige Erscheinung dieser Künstlerjude unter den Deutschen gewesen!"<sup>1</sup>

We have been able to listen here to a model of *Geistesgeschichte* – an important area of historical exploration which tends to be ignored within our discipline. Indeed, it can be argued that Heinrich Heine himself prepared the way for this type of presentation. Siegbert Praver has reminded us of Heine's service to the historian, of "writings which tell us what it looked like to a particular observer at a particular time", of giving us "Jewish paradigms of the predicaments, problems and opportunities ... which our Conference has ... to investigate".

More than that, he has reminded us of Heine, Heine the historian, Heine the poet, Heine the journalist. He could have confined himself to sober historical observations by Heine which would have fitted more neatly into the categories of our discipline – but he did not do so. Other writers can be historians – Schiller, for example. But, as a recent study of Heine has pointed out:

"Wenn Schiller philosophische Schriften schrieb oder Goethe naturwissenschaftliche, so hielten sie sich an die der spezifischen Aufgabe zugewiesenen besonderen Darstellungsformen. Heine spielt dagegen auch in diesem Bereich souverän mit den traditionellen Gattungen und stellt Geschichte, Philosophie, Literatur, Mythologie und Politik poetisch-publizistisch dar. Bei ihm stehen die literarischen Gattungen nicht nebeneinander, sondern in intensivster Mischung und befruchten sich gegenseitig."<sup>2</sup>

Heine's method cannot be ignored; we have Siegbert Praver to remind us that the historian cannot distance himself or herself from the impressionist, creative chroniclers of our time. All observation distorts. We characterise ourselves in our writings, we reappear in our portraits. I would gently argue with Siegbert Praver that there is even more of Heine in his Eduard Gans portrait than Praver surmised: Gans used his conversion ticket into European culture

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Mann, *Gesammelte Werke*, Frankfurt a. Main 1960, vol. X, p. 839.

<sup>2</sup> Manfred Windfuhr, *Heinrich Heine. Revolution und Reflexion*, Stuttgart 1969, p. 109.

in the way Heine desired so passionately: was there a higher goal in life than to be a professor at a German university? Gans, scion of a banking family, accepted by the very group which rejected Heine ... there is much here to be explored. Yet Praver is right in stressing the Börne portrait as a key text. Beyond the unconscious self portrait, there is also the very clear picture drawn by Heine in which he consciously places himself in the centre of the picture. The outside world did it: *Jung Deutschland* as *Jung Palästina*. And Heine is quite clear in stating that it was necessary to portray himself in the book:

“Ist aber einerseits dieses beständige Konstatieren meiner Persönlichkeit das geeignetste Mittel, ein Selbsturteil des Lesers zu fördern, so glaube ich andererseits zu einem Hervorstellen meiner eigenen Person in diesem Buch besonders verpflichtet zu sein, da durch einen Zusammenfluß der heterogensten Umstände sowohl die Feinde wie die Freunde nie aufhörten, bei jeder Besprechung desselben über mein eigenes Tichten und Trachten mehr oder minder wohlwollend oder böswillig zu rasonieren.”<sup>3</sup>

Of course we must understand one through the other: Heine and Börne – the stepchildren of Germany, as Liptzin called them – are paradigms of Jewish fate for that century and for our own as well. That is why we shall have to take Siegbert Praver’s sensitive evocation of them into our meetings and deliberations: through the individuals we move into the events and into the ideas. It was around that time (actually, in 1821) that Wilhelm von Humboldt spoke about the tasks of the historian at the *Akademie der Wissenschaften* in Berlin. One point made by him was that:

“jede menschliche Individualität ist eine in der Erscheinung wurzelnde Idee, und aus einigen leuchtet diese so strahlend hervor, daß sie die Form des Individuums nur angenommen zu haben scheint, um in ihr sich selbst zu offenbaren.”<sup>4</sup>

But what idea is central to Heine? Is it the critical appraisal of events and persons in which the flaw is always exposed, a treatment so radical that it always exposes the author as well? Is it the awareness of paradox and polarities, the use of the oxymoron conjoining contradictions in a meaningful pattern? The “honest daguerreotype” and the “Karikatur” which shock us into deeper knowledge have, rightly, been shown as essential to Heine in this presentation; but, again, they are only gateways leading us into new areas of understanding.

The Börne-Heine portrait leads into the world of the Jewish emigré, that super-charged and over-heated microcosm of Jewish life where friendships are betrayed for ideals, and ideals for friendship. It is that world of letters where correspondents report upon one another, where German writers are plagued by their papers regarding the latest news about Heine. It all sounds so familiar to us now; but it was new then – and it was partly Heine’s creation, as Karl Kraus maintains so bitterly. And, of course, the other emigrés were jealous of Heine,

<sup>3</sup> Heinrich Heine, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Ernst Elster, Leipzig 1887, VII, p. 132.

<sup>4</sup> Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Über die Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers*, Taschenausgabe, Verlag Felix Meiner, Leipzig n. d., p. 20.

of the man who knew Hugo, Balzac, Musset, Dumas, Berlioz, Chopin, and Liszt. Jealous! Heine was starving in the midst of plenty (although that, too, is a relative concept). He was a sick man among the healthy – and that *is* an aspect often forgotten. The “mattress grave” dates from 1848 – but that was a culmination, not a new fact.

Heine is too fascinating a topic, and it is hard to let go. Let me only point out that Heine's reports on the Damascus Affair become part of that event; that Heine's criticisms of Germany help to shape one aspect of Germany, and that he saw it more clearly than most. Karl Kraus could only say “Über Hitler fällt mir nichts ein” – but Heine thought about him a century before he came to life. I would only differ somewhat from Siegbert Praver when he states that most modern historians would surely underwrite Heine's comment on the *Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden* that “its total product consisted in a few historical works”. After all, even the term *Wissenschaft des Judentums* was a creation of Eduard Gans, and the term “renegade” applied to him has to be evaluated in the context of his fellows who formed a significant pattern within Jewish history in which the history of the *Culturverein* has primarily been appreciated within the Leo Baeck Institute and its publications but not beyond that area. But these are all tasks for tomorrow. One can only express appreciation to Siegbert Praver for bringing Dr. Heinrich Heine into our circle of historians. Let the final words be his, applied by him to Jehuda Halevi but clearly, again, part of a self-portrait:

“Aber ihn hab ich erkannt –  
 Ich erkannt ihn an der bleichen  
 Und gedankenstolzen Stirne,  
 An den Augen süßer Starrheit –  
 Sahn mich an so schmerzlich forschend –  
 Doch zumeist erkannt' ich ihn  
 An dem rätselhaften Lächeln  
 Jener schön gereimten Lippen,  
 Die man nur bei Dichtern findet.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Heinrich Heine, ‘Hebräische Melodien’, here cited from *Jüdisches Schicksal in deutschen Gedichten*, Berlin 1929, p. 417.





## The Revolution of 1848 Jewish Emancipation in Germany and its Limits

### I

The period between the incorporation into the Napoleonic Empire of parts of Germany and the founding of the German Empire in 1871, saw the gradual removal, in Germany, of traditional Jewish disabilities, culminating in the formal recognition of full legal equality. This process of emancipation, reflecting German economic, political and social conditions, was prolonged, chequered and untidy.

Among the factors determining location, timing and effectiveness of the process, the political decisions of governments held pride of place. Legal emancipation, first and foremost, was an act of state, not infrequently also of *raison d'état*. The history of Jewish emancipation, at least in a formal sense, is in Germany – as indeed elsewhere – one of legislative enactments.

What then induced the governments of German states during this period, to emancipate their Jewish subjects? As Reinhard Rürup has shown, abstract considerations of political morality, the Rights of Man, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, had little or no part in the process.<sup>1</sup> (Indeed, a recent study by Phyllis Cohen Albert of the modernisation of French Jewry suggests that even in the case of French policy towards the Jews, the role of the principles of 1789 may have been seriously overrated).<sup>2</sup>

What was in fact decisive in causing governments first to reduce selectively and finally to remove Jewish disabilities were primarily considerations of economic utility.<sup>3</sup> The process by which some Jews in the age of absolutism

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<sup>1</sup> Reinhard Rürup, 'Emanzipation und Krise. Zur Geschichte der "Judenfrage" in Deutschland vor 1890', in *Juden im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890–1914*. Ein Sammelband herausgegeben von Werner E. Mosse unter Mitwirkung von Arnold Paucker, Tübingen 1976 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 33), especially pp. 4, 6f., 20ff.

<sup>2</sup> Phyllis Cohen Albert, *The Modernization of French Jewry. Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth Century*, Hanover, New Hampshire 1977, pp. 50ff.

<sup>3</sup> "In dem Prozess der jüdischen Verbürgerung", writes Jacob Toury, "kommt zunächst der Fürstengunst und der jüdischen Finanzkraft eine schwerwiegende Bedeutung zu. Denn diese beiden Faktoren begannen noch vor einer generellen Verbreitung der Aufklärung unter Juden und Nichtjuden wirksam zu werden. Selbst weniger 'aufgeklärte' Herrscher wie z. B. die Wittelsbacher oder gewisse geistliche Herren gewährten 'ihren' Hofjuden und Finanzagenten weitgehende Vergünstigungen." Jacob Toury, 'Der Eintritt der Juden ins deutsche Bürgertum', in *Das Judentum in der Deutschen Umwelt 1800–1850*.

received privileges approximating closely to full civil rights has been studied by Heinrich Schnee. Schnee in fact believes – though his claim has been challenged – the efforts of Court Jews and their descendants to have been the single most important factor in securing the emancipation of German Jewry.

He writes:

“Erhärtert wird erneut die vom Verfasser aufgestellte These, daß den Hofjuden ein entscheidender Anteil an der sogenannten Judenemanzipation, der staatsbürgerlichen Gleichberechtigung der Israeliten, gebührt; die Rothschilds, die Familien Reutlinger, Haber und Jacobson in Karlsruhe, die Kaullas in Stuttgart, die Familie Hirsch in Würzburg und München waren Vorkämpfer der staatsbürgerlichen Gleichberechtigung, und so manche christlich gewordenen Nachkommen von Hofjuden haben sich tatkräftig für die Interessen des Judentums eingesetzt ... Den entscheidenden Durchbruch verdankt das Judentum den Hoffaktoren; das ist ihr historisches Verdienst.”<sup>4</sup>

It is, however, worth noting that Schnee’s illustrations are drawn from the South German states and the lesser principalities of Central Germany. In Prussia, the situation was different. Gerson von Bleichröder, the belated Prussian “Court Jew”, played no conspicuous part in the eventual full legal emancipation of his co-religionists.

In fact, the process begun by princes in the age of absolutism in the interest of their personal- and state-finances, more rarely, of economic “development” – was continued by “development-minded” bureaucrats, anxious to enhance the economic potential of their states. It is these groups which, in furtherance of their economic aims, removed discriminatory restrictions on the movement and settlement of Jews and the range of their economic activities. Except where – as in the Free Cities of Hamburg and Frankfurt – entrenched patriciates in a last-ditch defence of their economic privileges had succeeded in delaying the granting of Jewish equality,<sup>5</sup> at least equal opportunity for Jews – within the framework of increasingly *laissez-faire* economies – had become an accomplished fact through most of Germany well before the middle of the nineteenth century. For Prussia, the most important of the German states, key stages in the process were the citizenship-law of 1812, the relatively moderate tariff of 1819 and the foundation of the *Zollverein*, a sizable “free trade area”, in 1834. It is worth noting that the later of these developments did not refer specifically to Jews. What changed, in fact, was essentially the general economic environment.

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Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Emanzipation herausgegeben von Hans Liebeschütz und Arnold Paucker, Tübingen 1977 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 35), p. 153.

<sup>4</sup> Heinrich Schnee, *Die Hochfinanz und der moderne Staat. Geschichte und System der Hoffaktoren an deutschen Fürstenhöfen im Zeitalter des Absolutismus*, vol. IV, Berlin 1963, p. 346.

<sup>5</sup> Toury, ‘Der Eintritt der Juden ins deutsche Bürgertum’, *loc. cit.*, p. 165. For the far-reaching concessions made to Court Jews and, following them, to what Toury describes as “Adelsbürger”, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 153ff.

Moreover Jews, given their favourable starting point in terms of economic expertise and possession of mobile capital, had been able to take the fullest advantage of the new opportunities offered by early industrialisation. Thanks to opportunities provided by the public transactions of the Napoleonic period (war-contracts, public loans, the collection and transfer of contributions and indemnities) as well as the private financial transactions of rulers like the Grand-Duke of Hesse-Kassel, followed by railway construction and early industrialisation, Jewish economic emancipation was successfully accomplished. In the thirties and forties, the entry of Jews into the German *Besitzbürgertum* recently described by Toury,<sup>6</sup> was progressing at an accelerating rate. In Berlin in particular – a city without an entrenched patriciate – a substantial wealthy bourgeoisie developed of which Jews formed a major part. Indeed Hartmut Kaelble, in his study of early Berlin entrepreneurs (c. 1830–1870) estimates that about half were either Jews or of Jewish extraction.<sup>7</sup> The political reaction which followed the Revolution of 1848 had no measurable effect on Jewish upward mobility in the economic sphere.<sup>8</sup>

## II

The process of economic emancipation was accompanied by another, that of acculturation, the acquisition by increasing numbers of Jews of elements of German culture and German value systems. This, as is well known, owed much to the ideology of the European Enlightenment. It is commonly associated with the name of Moses Mendelssohn, his circle and his descendants. An important aspect, as Jacob Toury has shown,<sup>9</sup> was the entry of young Jews into German gymnasia. From there, in increasing numbers they made their way into German universities and subsequently into the academic professions.<sup>10</sup> The result of these developments was the well-known emergence of a significant Jewish *Bildungsbürgertum*.

Acculturation, as has been repeatedly shown, left its mark on Jewish religious attitudes. It altered Jewish ritual, changed the spirit of the rabbinate, led to the abandonment of many traditional observances. This too can be seen as an aspect of Jewish emancipation: the emancipation from the traditional forms and attitudes of medieval Judaism.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 160ff.

<sup>7</sup> Hartmut Kaelble, *Berliner Unternehmer während der frühen Industrialisierung*, Berlin 1972, p. 79.

<sup>8</sup> Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1847–1871*, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 115.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 171ff.

<sup>10</sup> Monika Richarz, *Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe. Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678–1848*, Tübingen 1974 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 28), pp. 83ff.

<sup>11</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 138ff.

This, like economic emancipation was a relatively slow development proceeding on an ever broadening front and one essentially independent of political events. Neither the Restoration with its reactionary governments and theories of the Christian State, nor the short-lived reaction after 1848, nor yet the new antisemitism of the last quarter of the century could seriously retard, let alone arrest it. Even the Jewish national reaction which developed expressed itself in a German cultural and ideological idiom.

Again it is obvious that in this cultural emancipation the Revolution of 1848 – operating as it did on an entirely different plane – played little or no part.<sup>12</sup> Cultural developments would hardly have been different if the Revolution had never occurred. Whether its success would have accelerated the process is a matter for speculation. Acculturation had begun long before 1848 and would continue thereafter. In the two basic processes underlying Jewish emancipation in Germany: economic advancement and acculturation: the Revolution of 1848 played no significant part.

### III

Economic and cultural change created the pre-conditions for political emancipation. This, unlike cultural emancipation and to a greater degree than economic progress, was dependent on the attitudes of non-Jews, of governments and officialdom, public opinion, elected representatives and voters. Political emancipation depended on governments, on parliamentary majorities, on parties and on the willingness of mainly non-Jewish electorates to choose Jews as their representatives. In essence, the political emancipation of Jews, therefore, depended on the progress of European Liberalism.

That progress, before 1848, had been fitful and uneven, due in part to the political divisions of Germany. Varying with the degrees of illiberalism, the civic and political rights of Jews had differed from state to state. They could differ even within a single state. This situation, as Jacob Toury has shown,<sup>13</sup> persisted also after 1848. According to his calculations 20% of German Jews resident in fifteen states enjoyed after 1848 either full political rights or, at least, a significant improvement in their legal situation. The great majority however, living in eleven states – and these included the most populous, Prussia and Bavaria – soon reverted to their pre-revolutionary status. In seeking to explain why a number of otherwise heterogeneous states preserved full Jewish equality in both theory and practice, Toury concludes that a decisive part was played by

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<sup>12</sup> Toury has argued that one effect of the events of 1848 on Jewish cultural life was a rapid diminution of Jewish group- and communal identification. Jacob Toury, 'Die Revolution von 1848 als innerjüdischer Wendepunkt' in *Das Judentum in der Deutschen Umwelt*, *op. cit.*, p. 367; Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, pp. 296ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 307.

“the attitude of princes, their governments and legislative assemblies” who, during a period of general reaction, remained faithful to liberal ideas. Also, as these were mainly the smaller states, the economic importance of Jews may have been relatively greater, which would favour the maintenance of liberal legislation.<sup>14</sup>

What in fact was needed to bring about political emancipation was the support of rulers, their ministers, majorities in the Diets, against the background of a public opinion that was at least not actively hostile. Such conditions, during the *Vormärz* period, had existed in few German states. Neither, in general, did they exist in 1848 when princes and their ministers, under the impact of revolutionary events, soon abandoned the vestiges of an earlier Liberalism. Indeed it could be argued that the Revolution of 1848 retarded political emancipation, that the outcome, if any, was negative.

Within a few years of the Revolution situations favourable to Jewish aspirations arose in a number of states with the accession of new and relatively “liberal” or at least “modern-minded” rulers. Thus Rürup, in his study of emancipation in Baden<sup>15</sup> stresses the significance of the accession in 1852 of the liberal Grand Duke Friedrich. Numerous elements of anti-Jewish discrimination were then abandoned in administrative practice. Presently, the first Jews were admitted to the state-service. Six years later, the assumption by the Prince of Prussia of the office of Prince Regent tended, according to Toury,<sup>16</sup> to further the cause of Jewish emancipation. (One is reminded also of the accession in 1855 of the mildly liberal Alexander II of Russia and its favourable results for Russian Jewry.)

It may be doubted, however, whether the accession of some mildly liberal rulers would of itself have sufficed to bring about the political emancipation of German Jews. The “Liberalism” of such rulers became effective only against the background of the general progress of liberal and emancipatory ideas accompanied by conditions of relative economic prosperity. Rürup in his study of emancipation in Baden draws attention to the characteristic memorandum of the Baden government explaining its draft law of 1862 for the full legal emancipation of Jews in the grand-duchy:

“Die politische Gärung hat einer ruhigeren, geläuterteren Anschauung über die gegenseitigen Rechte der im Staat vorhandenen Stände und Einzelnen Platz gemacht, die Überzeugung, daß nur die möglichst freie Entfaltung der Individualkräfte zur größeren Vollkommenheit des Ganzen führe, ist mehr und mehr durchgedrungen; auf der anderen Seite ist, dank einer Reihe von Umständen, der durchschnittliche Wohlstand der Bevölkerung des Landes auf einem Punkt angelangt, wo auch etwaigen ökonomischen Bedenken kein entscheidendes Gewicht beigelegt zu werden braucht.”<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 306.

<sup>15</sup> Reinhard Rürup, ‘Die Judenemanzipation in Baden’, in *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, Band 114 (1966), p. 291.

<sup>16</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

<sup>17</sup> Rürup, ‘Emanzipation und Krise’, *loc. cit.*, p. 26.

“In klarer und umsichtiger Weise”, comments Rürup,<sup>18</sup> “wurde so in wenigen Sätzen das Emanzipationsproblem in den Zusammenhang der liberalen Regierungspolitik und der allgemeinen Zeitströmungen gestellt.”

In effect, developments like the emancipation in Baden in 1862 are merely incidents in the broad progress of Liberalism manifested in events like the Crimean War, the *Risorgimento*, the liberation of the Russian serfs in 1861, the Prussian constitutional conflict and the beginnings of the American Civil War. Liberalism, in a large part of the world, was in the ascendant and Jewish emancipation was a necessary part of the application of its general emancipatory philosophy. As Lamey, the Liberal minister who presided over Jewish emancipation in Baden, wrote to the Grand Duke Friedrich:

“Die ganze Anlage unserer staatlichen Zustände verträgt es nicht mehr, daß eine Klasse von Untertanen um eines so wenig zutreffenden Merkmals willen, wie der äußerlich bekannte Glaube es ist, von einer Reihe rechtlicher Befugnisse ausgeschlossen bleibt.”<sup>19</sup>

The political emancipation of German Jews, then, was favoured by the rising tide of Liberalism resting on the economic progress of the fifties and sixties.

Yet it may be doubted if these developments alone would have sufficed to break the resistance to Jewish emancipation in the last citadels of reaction like the estates of the two Mecklenburgs. Nor yet would piecemeal emancipation produce uniformity in the legal position of Jews in Germany.

The ultimate stages therefore in the political emancipation of Jews in Germany developed *pari passu* with the political unification of the country. With the creation first of the North German Confederation and, later, of the German Empire, legislation about the position of Jews in these new states became unavoidable. Given the general temper of the age and the position of the National Liberals as the government-party in Prussia and the North German Confederation, it was unthinkable that such emancipation should take place on terms less favourable than the most liberal in operation in any constituent unit. Accordingly, the law passed on 3rd July 1869 gave equal rights with non-Jews to Jews throughout the North German Confederation. When the German Empire came into existence, the arrangements of the Confederation were extended.

To the long and chequered progress of political emancipation in Germany, the events of 1848 made little direct contribution. True, the Liberal parliamentarians of the *Paulskirche* had adopted almost unanimously the proposed clauses in the charter of Basic Rights which gave the Jews full legal equality, but the necessary conversion of the executives, of princes, ministers and officials, had not been accomplished in the greater part of Germany. The failure of the Revolution, moreover, had proved a serious setback. The end effect of the Revolution on Jewish emancipation had been almost certainly negative.

<sup>18</sup> Rürup, ‘Die Judenemanzipation in Baden’, *loc. cit.*, p. 295.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 294.

Nor is it possible to trace much connection between the Liberal “revolution of the intellectuals” of 1848 and the cautiously liberal policies of princes, governments and chamber majorities of the sixties. It is not without significance that emancipation in 1869–1871 was achieved not under the banner of the *Paulskirche* and the “principles of 1848” but under the guidance of Bismarck as part of an administrative “tidying-up” operation.

#### IV

Formal political emancipation, however meant little without equality of opportunity in public life. This, on the one hand, would involve equal chances in the public service, what might be called “administrative emancipation”. Further, it meant that Jews would not only be legally eligible but would in fact be adopted as candidates and elected on equal terms with others. The two aspects, though entirely distinct, passed nonetheless through parallel vicissitudes.

Administrative emancipation, involving as it did the exercise of authority by Jew over non-Jew with the Jew as the representative of public authority had not, with minimal exceptions, existed before 1848. Nor had followers of the Jewish religion been elected to the chambers though, as Stefi Jersch-Wenzel has shown, not a few, in certain areas, had attained municipal office.<sup>20</sup> The Revolution did little to alter this situation. Its failure, if anything, meant a temporary re-affirmation in many places of the doctrine of the Christian State.<sup>21</sup>

The Liberal surge of the fifties and sixties brought some abatement of the discrimination against Jews in the public service. From 1858, as Ernest Hamburger has shown,<sup>22</sup> it is possible to note a slow but continuous process by which Jews began not only to appear – as yet modestly but in increasing numbers – in German legislatures but also to be appointed to judicial and executive offices from which they had previously been excluded. A few unbaptised Jews attained senior positions in judicial and academic institutions. A professing Jew became Minister of Finance in Baden. Jews were elected increasingly to legislative assemblies. Lasker and Bamberger even achieved a degree of prominence. The situation would, of course, change radically with the rising tide of antisemitism that accompanied the “Great Depression”.

<sup>20</sup> Stefi Wenzel, *Jüdische Bürger und kommunale Selbstverwaltung in Preussischen Städten*, Berlin 1967, pp. 54ff., 90.

<sup>21</sup> Ernest Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands. Regierungsmitglieder, Beamte und Parlamentarier in der monarchischen Zeit 1848–1918*, Tübingen 1968 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 19), pp. 24f., and Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

<sup>22</sup> Hamburger, *op. cit.*, pp. 217ff.



In these developments, once again, the Revolution of 1848 played little part. The ups and downs of administrative emancipation as of Jewish participation in elective assemblies were the product of broader causes. In general, liberal attitudes seem to have been, in the main, a function of relative economic prosperity.

## V

Just as legal emancipation did not necessarily produce equality in the chances of exercising public authority, so cultural emancipation (from the ties of traditional Judaism) failed to lead to consistent social emancipation (or integration in German society).

To a limited extent, as is well known, such integration had in fact occurred in a certain social milieu and in certain localities among which Berlin and Vienna were prominent. This involved, essentially, a small section of the German-Jewish cultural and economic elite – an elite that combined the pursuit of cultural interests with independent means and, in some cases, an element of political or intellectual commitment. A degree of integration was achieved with a non-Jewish cultural elite drawn from a segment of the ruling bureaucracy, part of the cultural and artistic establishment and some members of the nascent professions.

However, the price of this type of social integration for the Jew was logically – and normally – conversion to Christianity, the “entry ticket to European civilisation”, followed as often as not by *connubium*. In a society lacking completely in pluralistic approach, this was the only consistent – indeed perhaps the only possible – outcome.<sup>23</sup> Though willingly adopted by a section of the new Jewish elite – there occurred throughout the century a steady trickle of conversions, notably in the forties and again in the eighties – this was yet a “solution” open to relatively few. Whilst some rejected it on grounds of conscience or filial piety, others lacked the high educational and financial qualifications required (and, indeed, demanded). Eventually, moreover, with growing “rejection” from the non-Jewish side, conversion, instead of total social integration, tended to produce something like a “Marrano society” of baptised Jews, lacking integration with either Jews or non-Jews.

Obstacles to social integration were, of course, twofold. On the one hand, the bulk of Jews consistently rejected conversion to Christianity as well as (except on conditions unacceptable to many non-Jews) *connubium*. Furthermore, with

<sup>23</sup> “Soweit Juden es aber ablehnten”, writes Toury, quoting a Jewish publication of the early seventies, “‘durch konsequentes Verleugnen des Judentums die politische und soziale Stellung’ zu verbessern, blieben im allgemeinen die Versuche der Annäherung und der Begegnung zwischen Christen und Juden in den Vorstufen der intimen Verbindungen stecken.” Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

the rise of racial antisemitism in the seventies even baptism – where it was still considered or practised – would no longer buy automatic social advancement.

Moreover, whilst most Jews rejected the pre-conditions of social emancipation, a majority of non-Jews to a greater or lesser degree clung to traditional anti-Jewish attitudes ranging from religious prejudice or personal antipathy to xenophobia and virulent and aggressive racialism. Some such prejudices indeed, might have embraced members of any minority group, but others applied specifically to Jews. Whilst much of this reflected traditional Christian attitudes, other factors like resentment at Jewish economic success, competition and the new racialist doctrines increasingly played a part.

In short, almost insuperable obstacles to Jewish social integration persisted among both Jews and Gentiles alike. Ludwig Philippson in 1867, in the high noon of German Liberalism, wrote in the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* that imponderabilia in fact inhibited intimate personal contacts between Jews and non-Jews to such an extent that, in the last decades, they had hardly grown at all.

“Man darf hier nicht verkennen, daß das religiöse Bekenntnis, namentlich wenn es wie in der Gegenwart sich z. T. wieder sehr schroff herausstellt, eine trennende Macht ausübt. Ein weiteres Moment liegt in den noch lange nachwirkenden andauernden Antipathien [of non-Jews], die leider von der Kanzel, der Schule, der Literatur immer wieder aufgefrischt werden. Indes trägt hierzu [from the Jewish side] der Wegfall der Verschwägerung, also auch der Familienbeziehungen wesentlich bei, sowie die Festhaltung der Speisegesetze<sup>24</sup> den geselligen Verkehr erschwert ...”<sup>25</sup>

As a result of all these factors, even had a larger proportion of Jews than was in fact the case been willing to pay the price of social emancipation, it became increasingly doubtful whether the sacrifices of their traditions would achieve the desired result. Social emancipation and integration, the widespread lack of which many Jews – unreasonably – lamented and resented, was in any case a chimera.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> “Hin und wieder gestand man zu”, writes Toury, quoting a report from Mecklenburg in 1853, “daß es schwer sei, mit Christen Tischgemeinschaft zu halten, wenn man mit ihnen ‘bei Tische sitzt, ohne Warmes zu essen’, oder bei ‘einem etwanigen(!) Happen Brot erst den Hut aufsetzt’, wenn man eine gesellschaftliche Einladung wegen irgendwelcher Trauertage ablehnt oder sich weigert, neben Frauen zu sitzen. Das könne vielleicht übersehen werden, ‘wenn der Mann besonders reich oder gelehrt oder bejahrt ist, im allgemeinen aber wird das nie angehen.’” *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 122–123. “Mit anderen Worten”, writes Toury, “solange der Jude im Judentum und der Christ im Christentum beharrte, konnten außergewöhnliche Freundschaften die Demarkationslinie überspringen und überbrücken, konnten gemeinsame geistige Interessen in der kulturellen wie auch in der politischen Sphäre Gemeinsamkeiten und Verbrüderungsgefühle schaffen, aber eine volle gesellschaftliche Integrierung, symbolisiert durch die Möglichkeit der Gemeinschaft von Tisch und Bett, blieb eben ausgeklammert – oder wurde doch erst durch die endgültige Absage ans Judentum unwiderruflich vollzogen.” *Ibid.* p. 123.

<sup>26</sup> Reinhart Koselleck has made the suggestive point that the problem of Jewish integration may have been in part also one of critical numbers. Had the Jewish

The problems of social emancipation, however, had in any case little direct connection with the events of 1848. If the Revolution had any effect here, some evidence suggests that, if anything, a process of gradual social integration during *Vormärz* was abruptly halted and, possibly, reversed.

“Solange die reaktionären Strömungen herrschend blieben” [writes Toury], “also etwa bis 1858, konnten Juden mit Recht darüber klagen, daß ‘die gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen ... welche in den vierziger Jahren so schnelle Fortschritte gemacht, vielfach gelitten’ hätten.”<sup>27</sup>

Toury, in fact, speaks of “das Bild eines schmerzhaften Einschnittes in den gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen den Konfessionen, der sich sehr bald nach der revolutionären Verbrüderung von 1848 bemerkbar machte”.<sup>28</sup> What might conceivably have developed into a degree of real social integration on the basis of a pluralist spirit of the mutual respect of different “estates”, confessions or ethnic groups would henceforth be possible only within the political and intellectual framework of a nationalist Liberal movement that was both unitary and centralist – as indeed it had already shown itself to be in the *Paulskirche*.

## VI

In conclusion, so far as the longer-term situation of the Jews in Germany was concerned, the “Revolution of the Intellectuals” may be considered largely a “non-event”. With regard to emancipation, their major concern, it may be doubted whether their aspirations were directly furthered by the events of 1848. Whilst the Revolution was an eminently political event, emancipation was a political phenomenon only to a limited extent. Even in its own political sphere, the Revolution of course changed little either in Germany in general or in regard to the situation of the Jews. The two principal – and related – factors promoting Jewish emancipation in the late fifties and sixties – relative economic prosperity and the world-wide progress of Liberalism – were subsequent and not directly related to the Revolutions of 1848.

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community in Germany been smaller, social integration (conceivably absorption in the majority) would have been easier. Had it been significantly larger, social integration into a unitary or would-be culturally homogeneous society would have been out of the question and any integration possible would have had to be based on pluralist concepts (the Swiss or possibly U.S.A. model). The actual numbers and distribution of Jews in Germany made either type of “solution” inherently unlikely.

<sup>27</sup> Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden*, *op. cit.*, p. 119. “Das war um so schmerzlicher, nachdem sich gerade in den vierziger Jahren, also im sogenannten ‘Vormärz’, selbst an kleineren Orten gewisse engere gesellschaftliche Beziehungen herauszubilden begonnen hatten”.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120.

Only in an indirect, negative and somewhat speculative sense may the events of 1848 be said to have furthered the process of Jewish emancipation (together with the parallel processes of acculturation, assimilation and integration). Toury sees as the main long-term result of the “Year of Revolutions” so far as the Jews of Germany were concerned, the rapid relaxation of the ties joining them together as an ethnic, social and cultural community:

“Mit einem Wort, die gesamtjüdische Reaktion [to the events of 1848] war die Auflösung der gesamtjüdischen Bande. Das jüdische Gruppengefühl wurde bewußt zu einem spirituellen Band der mosaischen Konfessionalität verwässert. Damit wurde einer Entwicklung, die bereits fünfzig Jahre lang am Werk gewesen war, die revolutionäre Krone aufgesetzt.”<sup>29</sup>

If this view is accepted – and the evidence that such in fact was the major impact of 1848 on German Jews remains to be furnished – then indeed the Revolution, even if it did not initiate this important process (essentially of emancipation from the cultural and social ties of traditional Judaism), at any rate both accelerated it and provided its climax. In that case – arguably – by frustrating and, in fact, destroying for ever the integration model of *Vormärz* (based on a form of mutually acceptable and potentially friendly *apartheid*), it may, at the same time, have created some necessary pre-conditions for the implementation of integration on some liberal-national unitary model reflecting the aspirations of Liberals (Jewish and non-Jewish alike). A change of this kind, in turn, could be seen as a necessary pre-condition of such emancipation and integration as in fact were achievable under the (national) Liberal model. In this indirect sense alone – if Toury’s claim is accepted – can the Revolution of 1848 be said to have had a part in creating the conditions which made possible the eventual emancipation of 1869/1871.

As for the attitude to the Revolution of the Jews themselves, whilst revolutionary events may have produced a degree of mobilisation of interest as well as some polarisation, it would probably be a mistake to overrate these effects. The solidarity of younger members of the German-Jewish intelligentsia with the forces of change antedated the Revolution and would continue to the days of the Weimar Republic. In this respect, 1848 was at the most a catalyst, perhaps a mere episode.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Jacob Toury, ‘Die Religion der Politik. Zum 120. Jahrestag der Revolution von 1848’, in *MB. Mitteilungs-Blatt/Wochenzeitung des Irgun Olej Merkas Europa*, No. 11 (15th March 1968), p. 4.

<sup>30</sup> It has, however, been argued that the events of 1848 finally (and fatefully) sealed the alliance in Germany between the Jews (and the cause of Jewish emancipation) and Liberalism. In *Vormärz* only a small minority of Jews were actively identified with Liberalism – during and after the Revolution, they espoused its cause in growing numbers. In fact, it was under National Liberal auspices (through the alliance of Liberal elements with Prusso-German bureaucracy) that Jews finally received legal emancipation in 1869 and 1871. The alliance survived the Liberal heyday and divided and declining Liberalism continued to enjoy massive Jewish support. The alliance may have weakened the Jewish position by reinforcing anti-Jewish attitudes among the opponents of Liberal-

As regards the masses of the Jewish lower middle class it may be doubted if they were greatly affected – except in some cases negatively – by events. It is generally held that traditional Jewish attitudes tended to political quietism and to social – and to some extent political – conservatism. The victory of reaction, in all probability, affected their lives but little and caused them little grief. To the extent that they were involved in the twin processes of economic and cultural emancipation, they would be little deterred by the Revolution. These, indeed, were evolutionary processes.

Yet a case might still be made out that, on a larger view, Jews also had some stake in the outcome of the Revolution of 1848. The granting to Jews of full political and civil rights in the whole of Germany which might then have occurred, would undoubtedly have been conceived in a spirit different from that of Bismarck's later emancipation. Emancipation in 1848/1849 might in fact, for what it is worth have followed the "French" rather than the "German" model. It might in fact, have been more ideological and inspired by ideas of "natural rights".

However the question must be asked whether a revolutionary and ideological emancipation of this kind would have made much difference in practice. In a formal sense at least, the Bismarckian emancipation was complete: nothing more comprehensive could have emerged in 1848. So far as the spirit of the enactment was concerned, there is little evidence to suggest that the implementation after 1848 would have been much more liberal than that which occurred some twenty years later. Whatever Parliament in the *Paulskirche* might decree, equality for Jews in the public service would depend, as before, mainly on monarchs, princes and bureaucrats. Would these, after a revolutionary emanci-

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ism whether of the Right or, more rarely, the Left. But would in particular conservative elements have been less hostile to Jews if the alliance with Liberalism had not existed? It may be doubted, as conservative antisemitism was fed from other sources. In Christian Social propaganda, the links between "Jewish capitalism" and economic Liberalism under the name of "Manchestertum", were indeed stressed. It was here that the identification in particular of some prominent Jewish economic journalists with doctrines of *laissez-faire* and anti-protectionism may have exposed Jews in general to hostility. But many Jewish bankers and merchants would in any case have embraced such economic doctrines as a result of their economic interests. Branches of economic activity in which Jews were prominent on the whole stood to lose from Protectionism. The Jewish identification with German Liberalism was only in part the outcome of the events of 1848. – It is, of course, possible to take the view that a "conservative alternative", existing in *Vormärz*, was destroyed by the Revolution. A good deal of evidence to show the possibility of such an "alternative" would however be required to make this a plausible argument. – The "spirit of 1848" may indeed have captured a part of the Jewish population and remained with it to the end but it may be doubted whether this greatly affected either the course or degree of Jewish emancipation and integration in Germany. In essence, moreover, there was no alternative. (Interventionist Social Democracy ran counter both to the instincts and interests of many Jews and whilst, to a limited extent, an integrating force for Jewish Socialists, would be no more capable than Liberalism of defending Jewish emancipation in Germany against its enemies.).

pation, have shown greater willingness to promote Jews to high office than they did in the relatively liberal fifties and sixties?

In the elective sphere on the other hand, the implementation of equality for Jews lay in the hands of parties and electorates. Here also, some “liberalisation” in fact occurred during the liberal era. But were any decrees of the *Paulskirche* likely to reduce, let alone remove centuries-old deep-seated popular prejudices? Even the most extreme forms of democracy – and Bismarck would later introduce universal suffrage – would not necessarily help to promote the cause of Jewish political equality.

Moreover, the parliamentarians of the *Paulskirche*, not least those of the Left, proved themselves extreme nationalists, centralists and “unitarians”. Nor were they uniformly friendly to the Jews – and, indeed, why should they be? Certainly nothing was further from their minds than the recognition of rights of minority groups or communities whether ethnic or religious. Their attitudes, in this respect, may have differed little from those of the Abbé Sieyès or, indeed, Napoleon. Under the system of the *Paulskirche* as under that of Bismarck, there would be little room for Jews as a religious group equal in status with the dominant Churches or as an ethnic group equal in esteem with the majority. There is little to suggest that the men of the *Paulskirche* suffered from a greater addiction to pluralism than did the constitution-makers of 1869/1871.

Social integration, lastly, was, for a variety of reasons, no more likely to be achieved under an ideological system than under a bureaucratic one. Given the realities of German religious, social, political and cultural development, the mode of emancipation might make at best a marginal difference. Emancipation under the Black, Red and Golden banner might differ but little from that under Black, White and Red. No more than the Weimar Republic, again under the colours of Black, Red and Gold, was the *Paulskirche* likely to produce a society in which Jews would enjoy equality and security.



FRANK EYCK

on

## The Revolution of 1848 – A Comment

The whole subject of Jewish emancipation on closer examination bristles with difficulties and problems. Werner Mosse's paper poses many questions on the 1848 period and suggests a number of answers, some of which require further examination in view of the intricacies of the whole topic. Werner Mosse is surely right in his judgment that the process of emancipation in Germany was "prolonged, chequered and untidy", reflecting as it did the diverse political conditions in the German Confederation.

The main thrust of Werner Mosse's argument is to de-emphasise the importance of the events of the revolutionary period of 1848 in the process of Jewish emancipation in Germany. Here he relies on his definition of different levels of emancipation. Full emancipation, if at all feasible, required acculturation and assimilation. Acculturation, like economic emancipation, was relatively slow and essentially independent of political events. "In the two basic processes underlying Jewish emancipation in Germany: economic advancement and acculturation: the Revolution of 1848 played no significant part." Indeed, the failure of the Revolution proved a serious setback. The end-effect of the Revolution on Jewish emancipation was almost certainly negative. Mosse is sceptical about the whole process of emancipation in nineteenth-century Germany: "Social emancipation and integration, the widespread lack of which many Jews – unreasonably – lamented and resented, was in any case a chimera."

It is very difficult to view the fate of the German Jews, even in the nineteenth century, without being aware of the tragic happenings of our own time. But in order to achieve the maximum objectivity of which we are capable the attempt must be made to judge the events of 1848 against the background of the age and without reference to later antisemitism. The temptation must also be resisted to judge the history of 1848 too exclusively from the point of view of the Jews, even at a conference dealing with German-Jewish history. The Jews were not the only victims of discrimination in the territories of the German Confederation before 1848. They may well have suffered more than other religious minorities in many ways, but there were also drawbacks in being a Catholic in a Protestant or a Protestant in a Catholic state. Indeed, it was not the Jews, but the Christian opponents of the church policies of governments, who were the victims of *religious* persecution. The legal restrictions on the Jews were particularly galling because they were imposed on account of their religious



faith. But the Jews were not the only group to be limited in their rights in the status-centred period before 1848. The maze of regulations affecting many groups was symptomatic of a concept of society quite remote from us today. The Jews were, no doubt, wronged in Germany in the generation after the Congress of Vienna, but they were not the only group to suffer.

To get some order into the subject, Werner Mosse attempts to distinguish between various aspects of emancipation and assimilation, such as the cultural, political and economic. Possibly these are more inter-connected than he suggests. In any case, all the terms used, such as emancipation, acculturation and assimilation are – as he shows – deceptively simple descriptions of a complex problem in the case of the Jews in Germany, particularly during the nineteenth century. What does the historian mean by the emancipation of the Jews? Is it the same as was conveyed by the term to Jews and non-Jews in Germany during the 1848 period? According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary,<sup>1</sup> to emancipate means to “free from legal, social, political, intellectual or moral restraint”. What does that imply in relation to the position of the German Jews in 1848? There is no problem over the aspect of the definition relating to the legal position. As was proclaimed in paragraph 13 of the Basic Rights of the Frankfurt Parliament, in future the enjoyment of civic rights was not to be conditional on belonging to a particular religious faith, nor were these rights to be limited for individuals belonging to particular faiths. This superseded the Act of 1815 setting up the German Confederation, which permitted special legislation applying to the Jews. The rest of the dictionary definition of the term emancipation cannot be interpreted quite so easily. Under what social, political, intellectual and moral restraints, if any, were the Jews in Germany at that time? There were social restrictions, for instance related to intermarriage (apart from any legal barriers), but these were not by any means one-sided. It was certainly no easier for a Jewish family to admit a Christian, than for a Christian family to accept a Jew in its midst. While the Christian Churches proselytised Jews, basically the rabbinate discouraged conversion. The obstacles to intermarriage are not likely to have been entirely theological. It cannot have been easy for a Christian convert to Judaism to blend into a Jewish family, though it was occasionally done very successfully. Family and religion are inseparable to Judaism, giving it great strength in our own day, when the crisis of the family is symptomatic for the uncertainties of our age. In Judaism, family worship has always played an even more crucial part than it does or did in Christianity, with its greater emphasis on devotion practised in church, outside the home. Furthermore, centuries of persecution had taught the Jews that their only hope for the future lay in remaining united and supporting each other. In trying to cope with petty restrictions and regulations in the pre-1848 period, German Jews constantly needed help from each other, which in general they

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<sup>1</sup> Third edition, 1934.

gave readily. An age-old tradition of charity fitted well into this pattern.<sup>2</sup> There was naturally a strong group feeling against any member not conforming to the group pattern, either by undergoing baptism, or by intermarrying, which might prove the first step towards it. If emancipation was regarded as freeing Jews from unjustified moral and social restraints preventing their intermarriage with Christians, or their baptism, that would be quite unacceptable from a Jewish point of view. Indeed, if Jewish emancipation involved emancipation from Judaism itself, implying moving on to a higher stage, that assumption would be abhorrent not only to Jews, but also to Christians today.

Did the Jews in Germany in 1848 face up to the particular problems involved in emancipation? Gabriel Riesser sat in the Frankfurt Parliament and was the Jewish spokesman in the debate on 28th August 1848 on the section of the Basic Rights affecting particularly the rights of his co-religionists. Riesser criticised the prejudices on both sides that had in earlier ages been responsible for a law preventing mixed marriages. Even the legislation of a more modern age, which permitted them, but added the intolerant stipulation that children from these marriages should become Christians, could not change anything in the unity of the Jewish people (*Einheit des jüdischen Volksstammes*). Riesser welcomed the proposed clauses in the Basic Rights which gave the Jews legal equality. He made interesting observations on its results:

“a consequence of our new law will be that marriages will be mixed, and that religion will no longer be a permanent and insuperable dividing wall preventing a union of the peoples (*Stammeseinigung*), particularly if you add the express stipulation that the difference in religion may not constitute a bar to marriage; and then the separation of the peoples will cease.”

Riesser based his case for legal equality not only on the liberal principle of justice for all, but on his confidence that the Jews would under just laws become increasingly more enthusiastic and patriotic supporters of Germany.<sup>3</sup> In Riesser's speech, the liberal and national aspects of the cause of 1848, the combination of which proved so fateful to the German Jews, came together. This is only to be expected in a man who was one of the chief advocates of German unification and who was appealing to a body whose chief task it was to draw up a constitution for a united Germany. What is perhaps surprising is that his main hope for the future lay in intermarriage, which was bound to make greater inroads into Jewish than into Christian numbers. There is little emphasis in Riesser's speech on the Jewish religious heritage. In an age of increasing industrialisation and scientific progress, all traditional religions were

<sup>2</sup> Monika Richarz (Hrsg.), *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1780–1871*, Stuttgart 1976, Veröffentlichung des Leo Baeck Instituts, gives many examples of Jews assisting each other in difficulties.

<sup>3</sup> Translated from *Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen constituirenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main*, III, Leipzig 1848, 1755ff. See also Frank Eyck, *The Frankfurt Parliament 1848–1849*, London 1968, pp. 241 ff.

going through a crisis. The Christian Churches were not exempt from that. But Judaism was particularly vulnerable at this time. One of Riesser's friends and collaborators was the mathematician Moritz Abraham Stern, the father of the historian Alfred Stern and the first Jew to become *Ordentlicher Professor* in Germany. M. A. Stern was not even a monotheist like Riesser. Only piety and family feeling tied him to Judaism. He was all in favour of emancipation and even in 1842 took its achievement in the future for granted. His worry about Judaism concerned what he regarded as the decay of its religious state of affairs. He feared that in the long run, after securing equal rights, many of the better-educated Jews would tire of the traditional forms of their religion and would not be able to resist the temptations of Christianity, which allowed more freedom to conscience. That would leave to Judaism mainly that part of the people which lacked the intelligence and energy to make independent progress. This remnant would then be cut off from the religious progress which was developing unceasingly in Christian Europe.<sup>4</sup> While overstating his case, Stern showed considerable awareness of the problems Judaism would be facing after securing equal rights. Although not particularly religious himself, he wondered how Judaism could survive in anything like its current strength when religious observances no longer commanded obedience. While the Christian Churches also faced their problems, and while many dissentient clergy and laymen would have been surprised about Stern's reference to church tolerance and progressiveness, the major Christian denominations could weather the storm better than Judaism. Perhaps some of these factors explain why in Mosse's words there was, under the *Paulskirche* as under Bismarck "little room for Jews as a religious group equal in status with the dominant churches or as an ethnic group equal in esteem with the majority". In any case, there is the question whether the Jews were, indeed, a religious group like any other. Surely the Jews have always regarded themselves as more of a separate people or group than even, say, the Mennonites who are also a very closely-knit community. The coherence of Judaism in Germany was further reinforced by discriminatory legislation. In turn, the removal of the special status of the Jews was bound to weaken their coherence in the long run.

Werner Mosse examines the mainsprings of the movement to secure equal rights for the Jews in Germany. He believes that the Jews were emancipated primarily because of economic utility, and that the Rights of Man, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity had little to do with it. He does, however, see the effect of ideology in the acculturation or assimilation which accompanied the process of economic emancipation. He believes that these owe much to the ideology of the European Enlightenment. It may perhaps be argued generally in the context of European history that economic progress only became possible through the political changes arising from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The Jews were only one of many groups bound to benefit in the long run from

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<sup>4</sup> Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland*, *op. cit.*, pp. 413f.

the greater application of rational principles by governments. Mosse fully recognises the contribution nineteenth-century Liberalism made to the improvement of the position of the Jews in Germany: "In essence the political emancipation of Jews ... depended on the progress of European Liberalism." At least two aspects of European Liberalism affected the German Jews. They certainly benefited from the human rights that were an inherent part of liberal doctrine. But European Liberalism had another side to it. There was also a somewhat critical attitude to the place of religion in society, or – if this is too sweeping – at least a wary eye was kept on religious societies, particularly the more powerful ones, and on "clerical influences". There was the question whether religion (particularly as manifested by a faith which went back to a period before the culture of Greece and Rome so much admired by the educated bourgeoisie in Germany) and "progress" could be reconciled. It was paradoxical that at least many educated German Jews, just as they were on the brink of securing equal rights for their religion, became sceptical of the faith of their fathers. Possibly the paradox is not so great as it appears. Perhaps the moment for greater tolerance between religious groups could only come when religious fervour had cooled. Pluralism was in some respects easier in an atmosphere of comparative indifference. However, in the long run indifference did not provide a sound basis for mutual tolerance.

Nobody would wish to deny the debt Jews owe to Liberalism. In the context of Werner Mosse's paper the question is one of definition and extent. The term Liberalism is bound to remain in some ways a historian's short-hand for the 1848 period and previously, because there was no organised Liberal party under that name. Moderate Liberalism was distinguished both from the more conservative forces on its right and from the radicalism on its left. The moderate Liberals in general favoured parliamentarianism, constitutionalism and the *Rechtsstaat*, but not necessarily manhood suffrage. Not all the acts of the German confederation regimes between 1815 and 1847 had been "reactionary". There were many liberal influences at work in governments during that period. Even comparatively conservative governments had granted constitutions, not necessarily because they were particularly "liberal", but because they believed that some of the new ideas might benefit them. Thus the South German states introduced constitutions in the years after 1815 to give greater coherence to their states which had been considerably expanded in the French revolutionary and Napoleonic period. Similarly, the liberal aspects of the ideals and achievements of 1848 did not cease to have an effect with the "failure" of the Revolutions. Even Bismarck was influenced by some of the liberal aspects of the revolutionary period of 1848. Thus the granting of equal legal rights to Jews in the North German Confederation and the *Reich* owes something to the influence of liberal ideas on Bismarck himself. Rulers in the post-1848 period favourable to Jewish emancipation mentioned by Mosse include the Grand Duke Frederick I of Baden and King William I of Prussia. The latter was profoundly impressed by his experience in 1848 and by the relationship he

developed with the constitutionally-minded husband of Queen Victoria, Prince Albert. The Grand Duke Frederick was William's son-in-law.

Werner Mosse stresses long-term developments and he is right in his scepticism of what a "revolution" can achieve. The concept of revolution, of something that "revolves", is in itself hardly satisfactory. How violent does a change have to be to qualify for the award of the term "revolution"? Political events, even if thoroughly dramatic, do not necessarily change people's attitudes. Mosse is fully entitled to generalise about the impact of the Revolution or to speak in general terms of the attitude of the Frankfurt Parliament. However, many different aspects were at work in the 1848–1850 period. Werner Mosse shares some of the scepticism Sir Lewis Namier had voiced about "the revolution of the intellectuals" and particularly the parliamentarians of the *Paulskirche*.<sup>5</sup> In Mosse's view, the parliamentarians of the *Paulskirche* were not uniformly friendly to the Jews. He raised the question: "Indeed, why should they be?" One cannot imagine that the bitter prejudices of centuries vanished within a few weeks or months, but it is still remarkable that, with one exception, all the speeches in the debate involving the position of Jews were favourable to them. In fact, the most important witness for the philosemitism of the assembly and of the constituency it represented was the one speaker unfavourable to the Jews. Moritz Mohl, the radical brother of the moderate Liberal Minister of Justice Robert Mohl, put forward an amendment retaining some discrimination against the Jews. His speech arguing for the amendment was constantly interrupted by other members of the assembly. After one interruption Mohl said: "Gentlemen! I fulfil my duty to the German people, knowing full well that this will make me unpopular." Mohl was a Protestant. Interestingly the speeches from the floor in favour of granting equal rights to the Jews came from Roman Catholics. The Protestant *rapporteur* of the Constitutional Committee, Georg Beseler, a moderate Liberal, firmly rejected any special legislation affecting the Jews. He said that question had been decided in the public opinion of Germany. Whatever the practical consequences might be, the principle of freedom of religious faith and of equality before the law had to be applied without exception to all concerned. When Mohl's amendment was called, the necessary support, so that it could be considered, was not found and the amendment lapsed. The version of paragraph 13 proposed by the Constitutional Committee was adopted. The assembly was almost united in rejecting legal discrimination against the Jews.<sup>6</sup>

Though Moritz Mohl could be written off as an unrepresentative crank at the time, he must not, in retrospect, be dismissed too lightly, for he proved to be a portent of a troubled future. It may not be coincidence that it was a radical, nationalist speaker representing lower middle-class interests who broke the

<sup>5</sup> '1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals', in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. XXX (1944), London 1947.

<sup>6</sup> See Eyck, *The Frankfurt Parliament*, pp. 241 ff.

humanitarian ranks of the moderate Liberals based on a broader middle class. The moderate Liberals, with their emphasis on constitutional safeguards, the supremacy of the law and the sanctity of elections were the best friends of the Jews. The Left, with its susceptibility to an only vaguely defined popular or general will and to nationalist oversimplification was a far less reliable ally. Mohl denied that the Jews could ever, because of their descent, fully belong to the German people. He claimed that thousands of poor peasants had been ruined by Jewish usurers. The economic activity of the lower-class Jews was ruinous to the people (*volksverderblich*), thus anticipating one of the main slogans of National Socialist propaganda. Nationalism and populism – also aspects of 1848 – had grave dangers for the future of the Jews, even greater than their subjection to the Christian State from which they were just emerging. In 1848 these future perils could not yet be fully realised. And in historical fairness it must be admitted that on the basis of the evidence of the middle of the nineteenth century the pessimists were not necessarily bound to be right. Namier is surely wrong in regarding the Liberals of 1848 as forerunners of the Nazis. No straight line ran from 1848 to 1933. The establishment of the Nazi regime cannot be explained entirely in terms of actions by non-Jewish Germans, but must take into account such international complications as the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles and the world economic crisis of 1929 to 1932.

It was logical from the point of view of the whole country that unification and liberalisation were attempted at the same time. That was the only way to prevent pockets of illiberalism and the denial of equal rights anywhere in Germany. Men like Riesser hoped that the Jews would be fully accepted as Germans. He himself had been so successful in his acculturation that he was elected as second vice-president of the Frankfurt Parliament five weeks after his intervention in the debate on the Jews. He did not realise sufficiently that assimilation was easier for the middle than the lower classes. Also he does not seem to have faced up sufficiently to the whole problem of the survival of Judaism and of the spiritual values it represented. Could the Jews be fully recognised as Germans without acculturation, and could they survive as Jews with acculturation? Their problems in Germany were certainly compounded by the chronological coincidence of their emancipation with the movement towards unification. In this sense the position of Jews in Great Britain was much easier.

Lord Acton rightly stated that the degree of freedom in a country could be judged by the treatment it accorded to minorities.<sup>7</sup> Pluralism is a difficult object to attain. Particularly in matters of religion, strong feelings will be aroused and tolerance will not be easy. It is hardest to achieve mutual toleration between different convictions – and particularly so far as they relate to religious faith –

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<sup>7</sup> Quoted in 'Lord Acton: Apostle of Liberty', in G. P. Gooch, *Maria Theresa and Other Studies*, London 1951, pp. 333–334.

while these views are held strongly. One of the most hopeful features of the year 1848 was the increasing understanding the various religions showed for each other, a development from which the German Jews as a minority group benefited. However, in matters of religion the promise of a better atmosphere between the Christian religions was not fulfilled, as the *Kulturkampf* of the 1870s shows. Fortunately the Jews were not involved in these controversies. The Jews in Germany were not in the long run secure in their enjoyment of the liberal benefits of 1848, because they were threatened by the populist and nationalist heritage of the revolutionary era. It was one of the tragic ironies of the Nazi period that the same regime which persecuted the Christian Churches found the ground for its antisemitic propaganda well prepared by the crudities of age-old accusations hurled from pulpits against the people that had murdered the Son of God. Only after the sufferings at the hands of an anti-religious state, a more ecumenical spirit began to emerge more strongly not only between Catholic and Protestant, but also between Christian and Jew, based on mutual respect for each other's faith.

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