Jewish Emancipation Reconsidered

Edited by
MICHAEL BRENNER
VICKI CARON and
URI R. KAUFMANN

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The French and German Models

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Michael Brenner

Introduction

Rabbi Shlomo ben Isaac, better known as Rashi, was a wanderer between different worlds. Born in Troyes in 1040, he studied in Worms and Mainz, the centres of medieval German Jewish learning, before moving back to the valley of the Seine. Rashi's Bible and Talmud commentaries have served as the basis for rabbinical interpretations up to our own day. His writings were known not only to the Jewish world, however. Through Nicholas of Lyra they reached Martin Luther and thus influenced Protestant thought during the German Reformation. On a different level, contemporary scholars of the French language rely on Rashi's writings, which used numerous vernacular expressions in Hebrew transcription, as an important source for learning about the pronunciation of medieval French.

In the Middle Ages, neither France nor Germany were well-defined national entities, and medieval Ashkenaz encompassed a Jewish community stretching from the western parts of the Holy Roman Empire to the northern regions of France, thus defying any "national" definition. After the successive expulsions of the Jews from France in the fourteenth century, which were motivated by economic greed, religious fanaticism and the desire of the French monarchs to create a greater sense of national unity, only isolated pockets of Jewish settlement survived. Jews continued to live in the papal enclaves around Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, and beginning in the sixteenth century New Christians from the Iberian peninsula, who subsequently returned to Judaism, began to settle in the southern port cities of Bordeaux and Bayonne. In the Holy Roman Empire, by contrast, with its hundreds of principalities and independent cities, there was never a complete expulsion of Jews, despite numerous local expulsions. As a result of the severely diminished size of the Jewish communities in France after 1394, as well as their relative isolation, relations between French and German Jewish communities remained insignificant for almost three centuries.

The renewal of relations between French and German Jews in the seventeenth century was the direct outcome of the redrawing of the European map in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War. After the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the territories of Alsace and Lorraine increasingly came under French sovereignty, which meant that France again became home to a large Ashkenazi Jewish community. Culturally these Jews were indistinguishable from other southwestern German Jewries, and for most of the eighteenth century they shared a common language – Yiddish – and common religious customs and traditions. It was only in the after-

math of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars that the fates of these Jewish communities began to diverge. By the early nineteenth century the idea of a single Ashkenazi Jewish community residing in the heart of Europe, united by common religious practices and customs, began to give way to a new concept – the notion of Jews as either French or German citizens of the Jewish faith.

This volume, which grew out of a conference held in Tutzing, Germany, in May 2001 titled, "Two Paths of Emancipation? The German and French Jewish Models Reconsidered", focuses on the history of French and German Jews from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, a period commonly referred to as the emancipation era. These two Jewish communities are often seen as paradigms of the two different paths of emancipation, one that arose out of revolution as opposed to one that arose out of evolution.[1] While French Jews were emancipated within the span of a year (1790/91) during the French Revolution, German Jews had to fight for their legal equality until 1871, when emancipation was formally incorporated into the constitution of the new German Reich. French Jews, it is often claimed, received their equality early and subsequently had to prove that they were worthy of it, while German Jews were promised equality as the ultimate reward for their successful integration and acculturation into German society.

The contributions to this volume aim to investigate critically this widely accepted paradigm of the two main paths of Jewish emancipation in Europe. They do so by comparing different aspects of Jewish life from the end of the eighteenth century, when debates over Jewish emancipation first began to acquire currency, until the era of extermination under the Nazis. We therefore hope that this volume will make a contribution both to the nascent field of comparative Jewish history as well as to the rapidly growing literature comparing the French and German historical experiences in general.[2]

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[1] See especially Reinhard Rürup, 'Jewish Emancipation and Bourgeois Society', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 14 (1969), pp. 67–91.

[2] In recent years several collected works have attempted to provide a comparative view of Jewish history. See, for example, Jacob Katz (ed.), *Toward Modernity: The European Jewish Model*, New Brunswick 1987; Frances Malino and David Sorkin (eds.), *From East and West: Jews in a Changing Europe, 1750–1870*, Oxford 1990; Todd M. Endelman (ed.), *Comparing Jewish Societies*, Ann Arbor 1997; Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Kaznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship*, Princeton 1995; Jonathan Frankel and Steven J. Zipperstein (eds.), *Assimilation and Community: The Jews in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Cambridge, England 1992; Rainer Liedtke and Stephan Wendehorst (eds.), *The Emancipation of Catholics, Jews and Protestants: Minorities and the Nation State in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Manchester 1999.

Similarly, a number of works offering a comparative perspective on French and German history have recently appeared. See especially Michael Jeismann, *Das Vaterland der Feinde: Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1792–1918*, Stuttgart 1992; Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge, MA 1992; Etienne François, Hannes Siegrist and Jakob Vogel (eds.), *Nation und Emotion: Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich: 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 1995; Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum: Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 1995; Jakob Vogel, *Nationen im Gleichschritt: Der Kult der "Nation in Waffen" in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1871–1914*,

Topics range from the early modern encounter between Alsatian and south German Jewries, the Jewish Enlightenment movements in the French and Prussian contexts, and the impact of emancipation on Jewish scholarship and the Jewish press, to discussions of new forms of synagogue architecture, and a comparative analysis of the antisemitic movements in both countries, as well as Jewish responses to those movements. These essays concentrate mainly on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the emancipation discourse was still very much alive. We intentionally decided to exclude essays dealing with the persecution of Jews and the reversal of emancipation under Nazi Germany and Vichy France. Research on this period has reached such immense dimensions that it could have been covered only very superficially here. Instead, we opted to include an epilogue by Diana Pinto comparing the French and German Jewish communities as they embark on the twenty-first century. Since the Second World War and the immigration of millions of Jews from North Africa in the 1950s and 60s, France has supplanted Germany as the principal centre of Jewish life in Western Europe. Nevertheless, despite the Holocaust, Germany, too, serves as a destination for Jewish immigrants, primarily from the former Soviet Union.

Some of the contributions may surprise the reader, such as the emphasis on the role played by Jews themselves in the struggle for emancipation, or the rise of Paris as the capital of Jewish political activity in the nineteenth century, far surpassing Berlin. Other contributions will reinforce traditional interpretations, such as the greater social and cultural freedom afforded Jews by the more liberal French policy, which granted Jews relatively unimpeded access to political and scholarly realms, in contrast to the far more restricted access afforded by the German states prior to unification and even by Imperial Germany after 1871. In this sense, some contributions of this volume tend to reinforce more traditional views regarding Germany's *Sonderweg*, or special path, in the modern period.

All the contributors are keenly aware of the manifold problems involved in comparing two national entities, which are complex in and of themselves: on the one side, for example, there was a unified French state; on the other side, at least for much of the nineteenth century, there were numerous German states and hence a variety of Jewish policies. But also in terms of Jewish life, it is important to remember that we cannot speak of monolithic French and German Jewish communities: the Sephardi Jews of Bordeaux scarcely resembled their Ashkenazi coreligionists in Alsace and Lorraine; traditional rural Jews in Franconia shared little with the assimilated Jewish burghers of Berlin. One result of this collective enterprise, therefore, is to challenge many of the accepted truisms that have informed our understanding of French and German Jewish history. In order to provide readers with a sense of the

Göttingen 1997; Moritz Föllmer, *Die Verteidigung der bürgerlichen Nation: Industrielle und hohe Beamte in Deutschland und Frankreich 1900–1930*, Göttingen 2002. See also the collaborative work of Etienne François and Hagen Schulze (eds.), *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, 3 vols., Munich 2001, which in many ways stands as the German counterpart to Pierre Nora (ed.), *Les Lieux de mémoire*, 3 vols., Paris 1984–1992.

ongoing scholarly debates over these issues, we have decided to include the comments originally delivered at the Tutzing conference. By including these remarks, we hope to provide a forum for discussion in which readers are invited to participate further.

In this respect this volume follows the lines of two earlier enterprises, which compared the historical experiences of Jews in Germany with those in Italy and in Britain respectively.[3] As is always the case with collaborative efforts like this one, obviously not all topics could be covered. Much scholarly work still needs to be done, especially in areas of religious life, women's history, communal structures and the role played by East European Jews in both countries.

The conference which inspired this volume was organised by the Wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft of the Leo Baeck Institute. This conference marked the first time that the Leo Baeck Institute, which is dedicated to preserving the memory of the German-Jewish past and hosts offices in the United States, Great Britain, Israel and Germany, has undertaken a systematic attempt to integrate French-Jewish historical scholarship into its compass. The editors would like to express their gratitude to the Robert-Bosch-Stiftung and the Bayerisch-Französisches Wissenschaftszentrum for having sponsored this conference and to the Evangelische Akademie in Tutzing for having served as our host. We are also grateful to Dr. Michael Heinzmann for having assisted in the organisation of the conference, and to David Rees for his enormous editorial work of rendering texts by French, German, Italian and Hebrew native speakers into British English. Without his efforts this volume would not have been possible.

[3] Mario Toscano (ed.), *Integrazione e identità: L'esperienza ebraica in Germania e Italia dall'Illuminismo al fascismo*, Milan 1998; and Michael Brenner, Rainer Liedtke and David Rechter (eds.), *Two Nations: British and German Jews in Comparative Perspective*, Tübingen 1999.

Simon Schwarzfuchs

Alsace and Southern Germany: The Creation of a Border

A traveller visiting southwestern Germany and the adjacent French region of Alsace before World War II would have been struck by the resemblance between the two regions. The architectural features, such as the half-timbered village houses, the red sandstone of the public buildings, and the similarities among the churches, would have suggested to the traveller that these two regions, although physically separated by the Rhine, actually constituted two components of a single region, the Rhineland.

If the traveller had been Jewish, he would have immediately noticed other affinities between the small, rural communities scattered across these two regions: a common language (now known as Western Yiddish), common customs, the likeness of family names, and a great resemblance in the appearance of the synagogues and cemeteries. During his visits to the synagogue, or when taking part in family events, he would have observed the same folklore, customs, minhag, and liturgy along both banks of the Rhine. Even had our traveller not been Jewish, he would have noticed in both regions the great economic presence of Jews in retail business and in cattle trading. The traveller would also have noted large Jewish populations in those cities that prior to Emancipation had tolerated few, if any Jewish families.

Were these Jewish communities of the Rhineland direct descendants of the medieval Jewish communities of these regions, which had managed to survive and recover from the massacres and waves of expulsion that had followed the Great Plague? Although there can be no doubt that a small Jewish population managed to survive these events, modern historical research does not support the notion of a direct link between the medieval and later Jewish communities.

It is now evident that the Jewish population on both sides of the Rhine greatly increased during the 150 years preceding the French Revolution and the Emancipation of the Jews in France. What caused this population growth? Were the striking similarities that united these two regions real and enduring? Did Rhineland Jewry resist the change of regime resulting from the uninterrupted annexationist policy of the French monarchy and the ensuing parting of ways between the German Rhineland and Alsace?

The horrors of the Thirty Years' War, which ended in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia, and the subsequent persecutions and destruction of the great Polish and Russian Jewish communities, which accompanied the Chmielnicki revolt of 1648–1649, were undoubtedly a turning point in the history of the Jewish communities

of Europe, both Eastern and Western. No Jewish community remained unaffected. The great flight before the Cossack hordes from the East pushed masses of Jews westward to those depopulated regions of Germany that had suffered so terribly and had nearly been destroyed during the last years of the Franco-German hostilities. Now these regions were crying out for new settlers, who would help to reconstitute the population of recently depopulated cities and villages and would revitalise the sagging economies of the region. This wave of immigration from the East was part of a world-wide trend of renewed Jewish settlement in the West, which had repercussions even in the New World: a Jewish community was set up in 1652 in New Amsterdam, and in 1656 a new Jewish community emerged in London.

Did these waves of immigrants join and strengthen the already existing local settlements along the Rhine? Or did they ignore the older settlements altogether and create entirely new ones? The names of many settlers may offer clues to their geographical origins, but one has to remember that during this period most Jews did not use permanent family names. Even in cases where Jews did possess family names, the names do not readily indicate the history of their bearers, since we do not know how long a particular name had belonged to a particular family. Whatever the case, the year 1648 must be looked at as a watershed in the history of central European, particularly German, Jewry. This year marks in many ways the second beginning of the Jewish communities of *Ashkenaz*. It should be emphasised that *Ashkenaz* was at this time still a purely geographic term that referred to the German speaking countries generally.[1] Needless to say, the changes did not always occur right away: the year 1648 represents not a revolutionary moment but rather the initiation of a process of westward Jewish migration that may be continuing even today.

In order to understand the new situation of German Jewry during this period, we shall have to rely on a number of local statistics, since there is no general survey available.[2] We see from these figures, for example, that in 1648 there were no Jews in the Margravate of Baden-Baden. Fifty years later, in 1697, there were already Jewish settlements in Ettlingen, Kuppenheim and Bühl. The following figures show the extent of this evolution:

Ettlingen:	0 families in 1648, 5 in 1700, 19 in 1801
Bühl:	0 families in 1648, 14 in 1700, 22 in 1739, 26 in 1797 (119 persons)
Gailingen:	18 families in 1734, 40 in 1779

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[1] It may be mentioned here that the fourth part of the *Germania Judaica* (in preparation) has also chosen the year 1648 as its *terminus ad quem*. The recently published English version of *German-Jewish History in Modern Times*, ed. by Michael A. Meyer, vol. 1, New York 1996, begins in 1600 "although arguments can be made for beginning our account with the ... settlement of fifty Jewish families, expelled from Vienna, in the Margravate Brandenburg in 1671 ...", p. xi.

[2] The figures are taken from Joseph Walk (ed.), *Pinkas Hakehillot, Germany*, (Heb.), vol. 2, *Württemberg, Hohenzollern, Baden*, Jerusalem 1986, pp. 175–176, under the heading of the different communities. For the margravate of Baden-Baden, see also J. A. Zehnter, 'Geschichte der Juden in der Markgrafschaft Baden-Baden', *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, vol. 11, no. 3, 1896, p. 375.

Kuppenheim: 0 families in 1548, 15 in 1697 (66 persons)
Schmieheim: 3 families in 1709, 28 in 1758
Sintzheim: 2 families in 1705, 9 in 1722, 27 in 1782 (121 persons)

The figures for Mannheim and Karlsruhe are even more illuminating:

Mannheim: 5 families in 1650, 15 in 1663, 84 in 1691, 50 in 1761 (225 persons)
Karlsruhe: 9 families in 1720, 62 in 1733 (282 persons), 75 in 1750

The decline in the number of Jewish families in Mannheim between 1691 and 1761 can be explained by the continuation of westward Jewish migration even from Germany, as evidenced by the growing number of Mannheimers in Alsace during the second half of the eighteenth century.

In Hessen we can observe the case of Bingen, where we find 21 families in 1700, and 76 families (343 persons) in 1765.[3] In what is today Württemberg, the community of Crailsheim grew from 16 families in 1714 to 78 in 1752, and a number of its Jewish inhabitants could shortly thereafter be found in Alsace. The general picture is no different in Franconia.[4] Bamberg (Upper Franconia) grew from ten families in 1633 to 107 in 1763 (483 persons), and a sprinkling of Bambergers ultimately also settled in Alsace. In Munich, too, the number of Jews rose from four families in 1728 (17 persons) to 49 families in 1798 (220 persons). In Swabia we find in Oettingen (the homeland of the Alsatian Ettingers?) 18 families in 1665 and 85 families in 1785 (385 persons). In Harburg, there were 11 families in 1671 and 71 in 1794 (322 persons).

Although further examples could easily be given, these suffice to show that the continuous population growth experienced in these regions of Germany cannot be explained by natural increase alone: a general trend was obviously at work. It is to be hoped that figures for many more communities will soon be gathered and synthesised in order to further our understanding of German-Jewish demography. This work has already been done for Alsace, which makes it much easier to keep track of and analyse these population changes as they occurred in the Jewish communities there.[5] With the Treaty of Westphalia, the French monarchy, which had received from the Habsburg Empire their possessions in the Sundgau and Upper Alsace, felt free to pursue its policy of "reunification", thereby aiming to bring the remainder of the province of Alsace under its authority. Alsace thus became progressively French. The religious status quo was maintained as a matter of policy in order to placate the Alsatian Protestant communities, which thus received official recognition from the same monarchy that would soon decree the expulsion of Protestant believers from the rest of France. The basic principle of French policy in Alsace was

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[3] Henry Wassermann (ed.), *Pinkas Hakehillot, Germany*, (Heb.), vol. 3, *Hesse, Hesse-Nassau, Frankfurt*, Jerusalem 1992, p. 101.

[4] The following figures will be found in Baruch Zwi Ophir (ed.), *Pinkas Hakehillot, Germany*, (Heb.), vol. 1, *Bavaria*, Jerusalem 1972, under the heading of the different communities.

[5] Georges Weill, 'Recherches sur la démographie des Juifs d'Alsace du xvie au xviiie siècle', *Revue des études juives*, vol. 130, no. 1, 1971, pp. 51–90 and the map at the end of the volume.

not to infringe upon the already established practices in the province.[6] It is more than likely that the French governor did not have the Jews in mind when he formulated this policy, since there was no need to please them to guarantee the peace of the province. Nevertheless, the Jews unintentionally benefited from it. The acquired rights of the local nobility were also confirmed, which meant that the seigneurs maintained the privilege of granting the *droit de réception*, or right of settlement, which allowed them to invite foreign Jews to settle in their domains. This arrangement was, of course, to the advantage of the nobility, since immigrating Jews had to pay the usual taxes. A problem eventually arose, however, when the monarchy also tried to force the Jews to pay a special tribute into the King's treasury. Notwithstanding this conflict between the monarchy and the aristocracy over the taxation of the Jews, Jews continued to enjoy the right to settle in Alsace.

It should be emphasised that during this period all governing powers in Alsace were interested in stimulating immigration to the province in order to rehabilitate its shattered economy. In addition to Jewish immigrants, many Catholic and, more surprisingly, many Protestant immigrants found their way to Alsace as well.[7]

There can be no doubt that until 1648 the Jews of Alsace felt that they were an integral part of the *Ashkenazi*, that is, the larger German-speaking Jewish community, and they were not inclined to identify themselves with France. In contrast to the Jewish community of Metz, they were not yet engaged in the business of providing the French army with military supplies, nor had they developed a Paris-oriented mentality. These changes would inevitably come afterwards, when the Jews of Alsace eventually recognised that the King of France had replaced the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire as their master. Alsatian Jewry would then develop a new perspective as a result of the confrontation between its *Ashkenazi* background and its impending integration into the French world.

The demographic situation in Alsace underwent considerable change between 1648 and the French Revolution. It has been estimated that there were no more than 100 to 115 Jewish families in the whole province in the mid-sixteenth century.[8] This number, after a decline towards the end of the sixteenth century, may have increased somewhat during the first part of the seventeenth century. In 1689, there were between 525 and 587 families, which would bring the total Jewish population to about 2,700 persons, if we assume the average family size was 4.5 persons. In 1697 according to the Intendant of Alsace, Jacques de la Grange, there were 3,655 Jews in the province.[9]

Nineteen years later, the Intendant of Angervilliers organised an official census of the Jews of Alsace in order to ascertain whether the Jewish population had perhaps

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[6] See especially Georges Livet, *L'Intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV, 1548–1715*, Strasbourg 1956, and the chapters by the same author in *Histoire de l'Alsace*, ed. by Philippe Dollinger, Toulouse 1970.

[7] Livet, *L'Intendance d'Alsace*, pp. 467–472; Livet, 'La Guerre de Trente ans et les traités de Westphalie: La Formation de la Province d'Alsace', in *Histoire de l'Alsace*, p. 287.

[8] Weill, 'Recherches sur la démographie', p. 53.

[9] Rodolphe Reuss, *L'Alsace au xviie siècle*, Paris 1898, vol. 2, p. 576.

grown too much so as to justify a possible expulsion of those Jews who had settled in the province during the previous twenty-five years. According to his published statistics, there were between 1,269 and 1,348 Jewish families living in Alsace in 1716, which corresponded to a total Jewish population of about 6,000 people. There is every reason to believe that this census was fairly accurate, even though it revealed a Jewish population increase – in less than half a generation – of 35 percent. Whatever has been said about the early age of marriage of Jewish women and the allegedly large size of Jewish families, it is impossible to explain this demographic leap solely as the result of natural increase. It must be largely explained as the result of continual immigration.

This trend continued over the course of the eighteenth century. Subsequent censuses show the following results:[10]

1732:	1,675 families (approx. 8,300 persons)
1744:	2,104–2,125 families (approx. 10,500 persons)
1754:	2,565 families (approx. 13,000 persons)
1780–1:	3,600 families (18,330 persons)
1784:	3,913 families (19,707 persons)

It is necessary to add, however, that as a consequence of the continual increase of the Jewish population the censuses became less and less reliable, since the unsettled Jewish population – peddlers, beggars, vagabonds, etc. – grew as well. It may be assumed that the real Jewish population of Alsace in 1784 was at least 20 percent higher than that listed in the official census. All these statistics confirm the decisive role of immigration in this Jewish population explosion, which was part of a general, although less intense phenomenon. According to the Intendant La Grange, Alsace had a total population of 257,000 in 1697. By 1784 the population had increased by 243 percent to 624,000.[11]

No less interesting than this population explosion was the geographic redistribution of Jewish settlements throughout the province. In 1689, 76 percent of the recorded Alsatian Jewish families lived in about a hundred localities in Lower Alsace. In 90 of these localities there were fewer than ten families. Westhoffen had 37 families and Marmoutier had 20, and these were the largest communities in the province. In seven other towns there were between 10 and 19 families. In Upper Alsace, where 24 percent of all Alsatian Jews lived, only three of the recorded 34 settlements – Ribeauvillé, Hégenheim, and Bergheim – counted ten or more Jewish families, and none of the remaining 31 settlements had more than six Jewish families.

A century later, in 1784, the picture had again changed: 74 percent of the Jews now lived in 129 different localities in Lower Alsace. Bischheim, with 473 Jews of 79 families, had become the largest Alsatian Jewish community. The Jewish population of Upper Alsace had decreased from 54 communities with 1,142 families in 1766, to 50 communities with 1,107 families in 1784.

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[10] Weill, 'Recherches sur la démographie' pp. 62–65.

[11] Livet, *L'Intendance d'Alsace*, p. 623.

These figures make it clear that by the end of the eighteenth century Lower Alsace counted far more Jewish settlements than Upper Alsace, and that the Jewish settlers were much more scattered here than in the south. The settlers were to be found in all districts that had granted them the right of residence, and many among them would try to set up communities near the highways leading to the great cities, where they were forbidden to stay at night but were allowed to enter during the day to conduct business. The right of residence was not granted with the same generosity in the southern part of Alsace, and the Jews there tried to set up their settlements in the vicinity of the cities, which were forbidden to them, and along the Swiss border, which was now open to local and international trade.

The Jewish population had increased – not taking into account the "invisible Jews" – from about 2,800 persons in 1689 to 19,107 in 1784, that is, nearly sevenfold. During the same period, the number of Jewish settlements had grown from 134 to 179: a mere third. It seems that while the *seigneurs* who had shown a lenient attitude towards the Jews did not change their policies and continued to grant the *droit de résidence* to newcomers, those who had always opposed Jewish immigration continued to do so as well. That is why the great surge in the Jewish population manifested itself in the strengthening of already existing communities and not in the creation of new ones. In all of Alsace at the end of the eighteenth century there were about 1,150 towns or villages, of which about 900 belonged to noblemen who could potentially have granted the right of residence to new Jewish settlers. It is a fact that only 20 percent decided to do so. The remainder continued to exhibit hostility towards the Jews. The major cities – Strasbourg, Colmar and Mulhouse – as well as some cities of lesser importance, continued to keep their gates closed to Jews, even when they endured their presence from morning to dusk to enable them to conduct business. The refusal of the Alsatian nobility to allow Jews to settle in the major cities, in contrast to the situation in the German Rhineland, resulted in the presence of Jews in villages and small towns that continued to exhibit the characteristics of rural life. Under these conditions, the Jewish communities that emerged were necessarily small: as we have seen, the largest community, that of Bischheim, numbered only 473 persons in 1784. Only two other communities in Upper Alsace counted more than 400 Jewish settlers in the same year: Wintzenheim with 430 persons, and Hegenheim with 409 persons. It should be emphasised in this regard that despite its smaller Jewish population Upper Alsace counted no fewer than 15 communities with over 200 Jewish inhabitants. In Lower Alsace there were only ten communities of this size. Therefore, the major part of rural Alsace and nearly all of its urban centres remained off-limits for the Jews. Although the Jews of Alsace became much more urbanised after Emancipation, many rural Jews continued to live in rural villages and small towns. The number of new Jewish settlements remained minimal during the first half of the nineteenth century.[12]

[12] Weill, 'Recherches sur la démographie', p. 66–67. On the urbanisation of Alsatian Jews during the first half of the nineteenth century, see Paula E. Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace: Acculturation and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century*, New Haven 1991, ch. 6, pp. 86–97.

Since it is obvious that the explosion of the Alsatian Jewish population cannot be explained by natural increase, we must therefore look for another explanation. The specific Alsatian phenomenon cannot be isôlated from the general historical scene: the Jews' flight from Eastern Europe was becoming more and more evident at this time, resulting in the continual growth of the Jewish populations of Central and Western Europe. But even this observation does not explain the origins of the newcomers to Alsace. We must ask whether the list of the names of the Jews of Alsace as published in a recent collection of eighteenth-century marriage contracts[13] as well as in the 1784 census[14] can shed any light on this question.

On January 21, 1701, the Conseil Souverain d'Alsace – the provincial Parliament – ordered that all Jewish marriage contracts drawn up by rabbis of the province be deposited in the notarial offices within 15 days.[15] These contracts were, of course, written in Hebrew, and the authorities, being unable to read or check their contents, were usually satisfied with the rabbis' written confirmation that the deposited contract was identical to the original. Information other than the names of the parties involved was seldom included in this confirmation. These contracts were scattered among many notarial offices, and it is only recently that they have been located and summarised. More than 5,000 such contracts, dating from 1702 to 1791, have been collected.[16] Although practically all existing contracts have now been located, it is not possible to ascertain how many have been lost, and whether the less well-to-do Jews also drew up such documents, since their preparation by the rabbi and their communication to the notarial authorities would imply some kind of payment. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is obvious that this mass of documentation is an important source for our purpose. We shall examine first the onomastic material for any geographic information it contains, and then the specific localities from which the married couples and their witnesses came.

Sixty names altogether were of German, non-Alsatian origin.[17] It is then obvious that the great majority of the new settlers were of German – more precisely, south-

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[13] A.A. Fraenckel, *Mémoire juive en Alsace: Contrats de mariage au xviiie siècle*, Strasbourg 1997.

[14] *Dénombrement général des juifs qui sont tolérés en la province d'Alsace, en exécution des lettres-patentes de sa Majesté, en forme de règlement, du 10 juillet 1784*, Colmar 1785, réédition Willy Fischer, n.p., 1975.

[15] Zosa Szajkowski, *Franco-Judaica: An Analytical Bibliography of Books, Pamphlets, Decrees, Briefs and Other Printed Documents Pertaining to the Jews in France, 1500–1788*, New York 1962, p. 87, § 1002.

[16] A number of marriage contracts that I published many years ago have been overlooked. See S. Schwarzfuchs, 'Contrats de mariage alsaciens des Archives Générales d'Histoire Juive de Jerusalem', *Archives juives*, 3, 1966–67, pp. 23–24.

[17] Altschuhl, Auerbach, Bacharach, Bamberg(er), Berlin(er), Bernheim, Bingen, Bobenheim, Braunschweig-Brunswick, Breisgauer, Kuppenheim-Koppenheim, Dalimbourg, Dalsheimer, Dannheisser-Danhausser, Darmstadt, Dessau, Dispeck, Ditisheim, Emerich, Ettingen, Frankfurt (am Main), Freiburg, Gallhausen, Ginsburg(er), Guggenheim, Greilsammer, Grombach, Gundersheim, Hadamar, Halberstadt, Hamburger, Heilbronn, Heimendinger, Heitzfeld, Hesse, Hildenfinger, Horchheim, Koblenz, Kremnitz, Landau, Mannheim(er), Maas-Masse, Nersum, Neuburger, Norden-Nordon, Oppenheim, Ullman-Ullmo, Rothenbourg, Saxe, Schlesinger,

ern-German – origin. The list of the locations from which the married couples and their witnesses came further confirms this statement.[18] Polish Jews also participated in this wave of immigration, but their number was limited. It may safely be said therefore that the growth of Alsatian Jewry occurred primarily through the immigration of its neighbours, and these demographic movements were part of the great population shift that changed the face of European Jewry. Eastern Jewry participated indirectly in this revolution, inasmuch as its continuous pressure compelled the Jews in the southern part of Germany to move towards the West.

The census of the Alsatian Jews taken in 1784–1785 and published soon afterwards was intended to give police authorities the ability to control Jewish immigration into France. The census contained a list of all Alsatian Jews tolerated in the province: those whose names did not appear on this list would be expelled. This policy aimed at limiting Jewish immigration into Alsace was never applied, however: the Revolution was nearing, and the Jewish problem was not at the centre of attention.

The names that appeared in this census only confirm the special relationship between the Alsatian and South-German communities that had existed for over a century.[19] One may well ask whether this relationship was reciprocal. The Jewish popu-

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Schwab-Schwob, Schweich, Sintzheim, Spire-Spira, Steinhardt, Thalheimer, Worms(er), Wertheim(er), Wilstatt, Windmühl. In addition to these names of German origin, there were also some names of Polish, Czech, Swiss and Austrian origin. For all of these names, see Rosanne and Daniel N. Leeson, 'Index de Mémoire juive en Alsace: Contrats de mariage au XVIIIe siècle', par A.A. Fraenckel, 'I, Bas Rhin, II, Haut Rhin', *Cercle de Généalogie Juive*, Paris 1999.

[18] The following 107 German, non-Alsatian towns and villages (or Länder) are thus mentioned: Albersweiler, Altbreisach, Altdorf, Anspach, Auerbach, Bamberg, Belle Kam, Berlin, Bergzabern, Bingen am Rhein, Bleichwiller, Blieskastel, Breslau, Burkunstadt, Boeschingen, Buehl, Cannstadt, Cleve, Darmstadt, Dessau, Dietz an der Lahn, Dresden, Edenkoben, Eichstetten, Eisenstadt, Emmendingen, Ettinghoffen, Flossenheim, Frankfurt (am Main), Franken (it does not seem impossible that the common name Franck could show a Franconian origin), Freistett, Freiburg, Fürth, Gailingen, Gallhausen, Geilheim, Gersbach, Glogau, Gottesviller, Grossglogau, Grumbach, Gross Kiesenheim, Grossenbissen, Grünstadt, Gunzenhausen, Halberstadt, Halle, Hamburg, Hanau, Hannover, Hechingen, Hirschberg, Hohenems, Homburg, Horb in Schwaben, Ichenhausen, Ihringen, Illereichen, Ingenheim, Karlsruhe, Kuppenheim im Breisgau, Kirchen, Kirchheimbolanden, Koblenz, Kreuznach, Landau, Landen, Lichtenau, Lichtenfels, Mainstockheim, Mannheim, Mainz, Mendingen, München, Mühringen, Neckarsulm, Neufreistett, Neustadt, Niderkirchen, Nonnenweier, Oedingen, Offenbach, Pforzheim, Pirmasens, Randegg, Regensburg-Ratisbonne, Reutlingen, Saarwellingen, Schalbach, Schmieheim, Schnaittach, Schwabach, Sintzheim, Steinhardt, Stockstadt, Sulzburg, Thüngen, Treibisch, Treutlingen, Trier, Wachenheim, Weinheim, Weisenheim am Sand, Wittelshausen, Weinweiler, Worms, Zeltingen.

There are also a number of individuals who came from Amsterdam, Broda, Endingen (in Switzerland), Eybeschütz, Jungbunzlau, Kopenhagen, Krakow, London, Mesritsch, Nickolsburg, The Hague, Prague and Vienna. Their number remained small, and they did not change the general picture.

[19] In addition to 46 German, non-Alsatian names that appeared in the preceding list, this list contains the following names: Bachert, Beyer, Bintzchinger, Bobenheimer (Bodenheimer?), Brinau, Bropst, Buhma (Boehm?), Durlach, Edinger, Ellenbogen, Frantzdoerfer, Harburger, Ulff,

lation of southern Germany had greatly increased since 1648, but nothing shows that there was any Alsatian immigration of significance to Baden or Württemberg. There were, of course, marriages that brought some Alsatian Jews to Germany, but this flow is not at all comparable to the out-migration of German Jews to Alsace.

One more remark about those German Jews who had family names. We know what names were used by the Jews of the Margravate of Baden-Durlach during the eighteenth century. We find the names Zifi (Ziwi), Bloch, Schwab, Meyer, Geismar, Weyl, Bickert, Dukas, Gideon, Heilbronner, Levi, Wertheimer, Dreyfuss and Rieser.[20] With one or two exceptions, these were exactly the same names that became common among Alsatian Jews at that time.

But let us return to Alsace. The newcomers melted easily into the already existing Alsatian Jewish communities. One may well ask how this came about, since the newcomers were more numerous than the established Jewish residents. It seems that there were scarcely any social, cultural or linguistic differences between the Jews living to the east and the west of the Rhine. The traditions and usages of the Jews who were called in Hebrew *B'nei Rainus*, or the Jews of the Rhineland, had already been mentioned during the Middle Ages. These Rhineland Jews are not to be confused with the so-called Jews of Austria. Modern research differentiates between the West-German Jewish liturgy and its East-German counterpart. Rhineland Jewry – all the communities living in the valley or vicinity of this mighty stream, from Switzerland to Holland – shared common practices, and during the period prior to the French Revolution, they felt themselves to be members of a single community. This situation spared the newcomers from having to set up new organisations of their own. Rabbi Joseph Steinhardt, during his stay in Nidernai in Lower Alsace, ruled that, when in doubt, the Jewish inhabitants of Alsace had to consider themselves as belonging to the *B'nei Reinus* as opposed to the Austrian tradition.[21] Could it be that some newcomer from Vienna or another Austrian community had rebelled against the Rhineland tradition? If so, Steinhardt's ruling put an end to that.

The Rhenish Jews had common traditions, dating back to their ancient communities. A few examples will illustrate this trend. The concept of the *Memorbuch*, or memorial book of Jewish martyrs, for instance, originated in the Rhine valley communities, perhaps as a way to commemorate the victims of the Crusades, and each local community over the course of generations added to the list of martyrs the names of its own prominent men or women, as well as of local martyrs.[22] Some communities further East later adopted this usage as well, but it never spread to East European Jewish communities. The same may be said about the so-called *wimpel*, or

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Lemburg, Lorch, Schubacher, Tagendorf, Tschopig, Tschoemburg, Ulmer, and Witterschlag (Wertenschlag?). From Daniel N. Leeson, 'Index du dénombrement des Juits d'Alsace de 1784', *Cerde de genealogie juive*, Paris 2000.

[20] See J. A. Zehnter, 'Geschichte der Juden in der Markgrafschaft Baden-Durlach', *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1897, pp. 667–669.

[21] In his responsa, *Zikhron Joseph*, Fürth 1773, *Even Haezer*, 1.

[22] See Magnus Weinberg, 'Untersuchungen über das Wesen des Memorbuches', *Jahrbuch der jüdisch-literarischen Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt am Main, vol. 16, 1924, pp. 253–320.

swaddling cloth from an infant boy's circumcision that was later donated to the synagogue to be used as a Torah binder. This term was never used in Alsace or, to the best of my knowledge, in Baden: there, a young boy would be satisfied to bring his *mappa* to the synagogue. East European Jewish communities also ignored the *Holle Krash*, or baby naming ceremony. Apart from a few Hebrew verses, this ceremony was held in the vernacular and culminated with the question: "Hollegrasche, Hollegrasche! What should be the name of the little baby?" The same phrase was said everywhere in the Rhineland, with the changes occurring only in local pronunciation.[23]

A close scrutiny of the Alsatian rabbinate also shows the affinity of Alsatian Jewry with its neighbours on the other side of the Rhine. It may be said that Alsatian Jewry did not possess the schools or teachers to produce a rabbinate of note; there were, of course, yeshivot in Alsace, but these were not of the highest level. Alsace could not compete with the famed Metz yeshivah, and even less with its rabbis, who were, one might be tempted to say, the best that money could buy.

A few examples from the careers of some Alsatian rabbis will suffice to illustrate the free movement of rabbis across the Rhine. Issachar Baer Wiener, whose family came from Vienna, served as Landesrabbiner in Bouxwiller from 1712 to 1730, before leaving for Mainz. One of his later successors, Rabbi Aviezri Selig Auerbach, had served as rabbi of Edenkoben in the duchy of Zweibruecken in the Saar region, before coming to Bouxwiller in 1762 and serving there until 1769.

The two best-known Alsatian rabbis, Joseph Steinhardt and David Sintzheim, also travelled back and forth across the Rhine. Steinhardt informs us in the introduction to his collected *Responsa* that after his studies in Germany, he was called to the rabbinate in Alsace, first in Rixheim and later in Nidernai, "where there are sage, rich, God-fearing and upright men who volunteer to serve their people, with their wealth. ... The great majority of the people are ready to listen to their teacher and to his law. They are disciplined and respect his orders ...". He then adds: "I had been in this province for about fifteen years, when the Lord raised my flag and elevated my chair to the top of the community here, in the sainted and famous community of Fürth ...".[24] The celebrated David Sintzheim, who was to marry Cerf Berr's sister, was born in Trier and studied in German yeshivot, where he met the no less celebrated Moses Sofer, the Chatam Sofer, who greatly lauded him. Sintzheim became the first rabbi of Strasbourg, after teaching in the Bischheim yeshivah, which had been set up by his brother-in-law. He had moved to Alsace with his father, Rabbi Isaac Itsik Sintzheim, when the latter was appointed rabbi in Nidernai. Isaac's father, too, came from Vienna.[25] These examples show conclusively the dependence of Alsatian Jewry on the German-trained rabbinate, although we also find there a few Metz-trained yeshivah graduates, as well as some rabbis whose tal-

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[23] See Benjamin Salomon Hamburger, *The Roots of the German Minhag*, (Heb.), 2 vols., Bne Brak 1995–2000, vol. 1, pp. 415–455, vol. 2, pp. 502–532.

[24] *Zikhron Joseph*, p. 3 of the introduction.

[25] Eljakim Carmoly, 'Notices bibliographiques', *Revue Orientale*, vol. 2, 1842, p. 341.

mudic education was acquired in private studies under the supervision of a rabbi, who was generally a relative.

It appears that in the first generation of their rule the French authorities were not interested in reorganising the existing Alsatian Jewish institutions. Their attitude changed over the course of the eighteenth century, when they attempted to set up a superstructure that did not abolish the old institutions, but instead sought to integrate them into the French governmental system. French administrators recognised the existence in Alsace of a number of *Landjudenschaften*, semi-autonomous Jewish communities, as shown by the fact that local rabbis needed to secure an official government appointment. But the French authorities also tried to impose another type of organisation on the *Landjudenschaften*. This trend became possible because Louis XIV, the King of France, had become powerful enough to improve the "custom" or the "usage" of Alsace and to "perfect" it at the same time. With the first steps having been made at the initiative of the French authorities, the Alsatian Jews slowly detached themselves from German practices, to which they had hitherto been faithful.

The *Landjudenschaft* has been defined as a closed and united community established by the free will of its members and recognised by the state authorities.[26] It functioned under the fiction of the existence of a contract with the state, which granted the community members the right of settlement, which the Jewish communities in turn could use to favour the immigration of new Jewish settlers. The *Landjudenschaft* enjoyed autonomy in its direction and in the dispensation of justice. The extensive fragmentation of Alsatian Jewry, and the relatively small number of Jews in the individual communities, had caused its division into five – sometimes six – territorial organisations. These were characterised by the existence and functioning of a *Landesrabbiner*, who had to secure the king's agreement after his election by the leaders of the *Landjudenschaft*. Although each of these organisations remained independent, it was soon felt that the Intendants, who were the king's representatives, were intent upon imposing a new and unifying organisation upon them: the *nation juive d'Alsace*. The prerogatives of the rabbis were not endangered, but three syndics of the *nation* would eventually be appointed on the king's orders, in order to represent the *nation*'s interests. Traditional Jewish leaders remained in charge of local interests, but the *Landjudenschaften* were now made subordinate to the general syndics. The union of all Alsatian communities had now been realised within the *nation juive d'Alsace*.[27]

The Alsatian Jews soon realised that they constituted only one of the three nations of the so-called German Jews of France. The two other *nations* enjoyed an independent existence alongside them: the *nation* of the Jews of the city and region of Metz, and the *nation* of the Jews of the former duchy of Lorraine. Steps had to be taken in order to ensure the common representation of the three German *nations* in northeastern France, since they now knew that their future would be settled in Ver-

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[26] Daniel J. Cohen, *Die Landjudenschaften in Deutschland als Organe jüdischer Selbstverwaltung von der frühen Neuzeit bis ins neunzehnte Jahrhundert*, vol. 1, Jerusalem 1996, pp. v–xx.

[27] Simon Schwarzfuchs, *Du Juif à l'israélite: Histoire d'une mutation (1770–1870)*, Paris 1989.

sailles or Paris and not in the German-speaking world. The solution was found with the *unio personalis* of the leadership of the three *nations*: Cerf Berr, who was already the syndic of Alsatian Jewry, was also elected in 1787–1788 as syndic of the other two *nations*.

Thus the new *syndic général* of the three *nations* had become the anointed chief of the Ashkenazi *nations* of France. These three communities would subsequently appear as a single *nation* in the eyes of the administration of the kingdom. The preeminence of the Alsatian leadership was now recognised. This does not mean, however, that Cerf Berr had become some kind of *Hofjude*, or Court Jew, since this institution, outside the duchy of Lorraine, remained unknown in France. Needless to say, no such regrouping of different Jewish territorial communities occurred at this time in Germany.

Even before Alsatian Jewish leaders began to look towards France, Moses Blin, the most important figure of Alsatian Jewry in the mid-eighteenth century, had left Alsace and settled in the community of Metz, where he founded a yeshivah.[28] Cerf Berr, like Blin, was one of the major suppliers of the French army, and it is certainly not by accident that he commissioned a painting of himself holding a letter signed by Vergennes, the then foreign minister of the King of France. The same Cerf Berr would later acquire property in Tomblaine in the duchy of Lorraine and spend a great deal of time there.

Alsatian Jewry was practically untouched by the *Haskalah*. It was too rural to be influenced by a movement that developed in an essentially urban surrounding. Cerf Berr may have turned in 1780 to Moses Mendelssohn for help in the preparation of a memorandum on improving the conditions of the Jews of France or, more precisely, of the German *nations* which had settled in the northeastern provinces of France. This is how Christian Wilhelm Dohm's help was secured. Cerf Berr had Dohm's essay, *On the Civic Improvement of the Jews*, translated into French and published in Dessau in 1782 (the German original was published in Berlin in 1781). In his haste, he forgot to get a licence for the importation of this publication, and the entire run of this edition was pulped, with only a few copies surviving. Cerf Berr would subscribe in 1785 for 15 copies of the Hebrew-German, Berlin *Haskalah* publication *ha-Meassef*, but his interest in the German *Haskalah* would stop there, and there is no evidence of any intellectual curiosity in this new intellectual movement among other Alsatian Jewish circles.[29]

As we have therefore seen, the two communities of the Rhineland had been united and had shared a common way of life until the beginning of the eighteenth century. With the deepening of French influence in Alsace, these communities gradually began to part ways and to develop in different directions: a new mentality

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[28] See Weill, 'L'Alsace', in *Histoire des Juifs en France*, ed. by Bernhard Blumenkranz, Toulouse 1972, pp. 152–154, 190. I hope to publish soon the regulations of Blin's (or Blien's) yeshivah.

[29] Schwarzfuchs, 'La Haskalah et le cercle de Metz à la veille de la Révolution', in *Politique et religion dans le judaïsme moderne: Des communautés à l'émancipation*, ed. by Daniel Tollet, Paris 1987, pp. 51–59.

began to emerge. In Alsace, French first names began to appear among the Jews even before the Revolution, as shown in the 1784 census, and nobody would find it remarkable that Cerf Berr's daughter Fradel called herself Fanchon.[30] The fact that Alsatian Jewry eventually stopped employing German rabbis did not mean that religious practice or usage would change any time soon. As far as religion was concerned, both communities remained very conservative. Alsatian Jewry nevertheless, no longer considered itself an Ashkenazi community, and *Ashkenaz* would henceforth come to refer specifically to the country that came to be known as Germany. Later in the nineteenth century, in view of the difficulties of Franco-German coexistence, Alsatian Jewry would increasingly identify itself as French.[31]

Most of the German-Jewish historians whose writings I have drawn upon to prepare this essay would reject the possibility of any significant French influence on German Emancipation: they would minimise the previously intimate relationship between these two components of Rhineland Jewry. They would also minimise the influence of the French Revolution, as far as Jewish emancipation was concerned, and instead they would emphasise the importance of the reforms initiated by Joseph II, which were at least written in German.[32] It would seem that everything depended on the side of the Rhine where one lived. The Rhineland Jews, whether French or German, did not choose their sides: instead, the border was imposed on them. They were ready to accept this fate and to agree to these externally imposed geographic and political boundaries. In the nineteenth century divergent patriotisms would eventually bring an end to their former unity.

Comment by Sylvie Anne Goldberg

Simon Schwarzfuchs' essay, 'Alsace and Southern Germany: The Creation of a Border', intends to show that the creation of a new border between France and the Holy Roman Empire after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 led to the eventual separation and distinct evolution of the Jews of southern Germany from those of Alsace and Lorraine. Schwarzfuchs even attempts to conceptualise a new way of analysing how distinctiveness develops within groups who traditionally had shared a common culture, but who were suddenly separated by political events. Unfortunately, after providing so much demographic and onomastic information, it seems as if he did not have enough time to expound on the possible pre-existing differences between

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[30] Leeson, 'Index du dénombrement'. Other French names listed include Adélaïde, Barbe, Benoit, Jacquette, Léon, Lion, Madelaine, Marc, Marie Anne, Mathieu, Paul, Philippe, Rosine and Véronique. On naming patterns among nineteenth-century Alsatian Jewry see Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace*, pp. 67–68, 123.

[31] On this process, see Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany: The Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, 1871–1918*, Stanford 1988.

[32] Adolf Lewin, *Geschichte der badischen Juden seit der Regierung Karl Friedrichs (1738–1909)*, Karlsruhe 1909, p. 22, and Erwin Manuel Dreifuss, *Die Familiennamen der Juden unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Verhältnisse in Baden zu Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Frankfurt am Main 1927, p. 27.

the Jews of southern Germany and those of Alsace and Lorraine. Nor did he have an opportunity to provide an account of how Germanic and French Jews greeted the Edict of Toleration issued in 1782 by the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II.

I would therefore like to situate Schwarzfuchs' essay into a broader context. As we know, geographical boundaries were of little significance in the eighteenth century when compared to the cultural differences prevailing within the existing political states. To illustrate this point, I need to refer back to several facts about the French kingdom in the eighteenth century and conclude with a discussion of the influence the Berlin circle of *maskilim* exercised on the Jews of Alsace and Lorraine. Although I will emphasise the local diversity that prevailed among the Jews of France, the case of French Jewry should not be seen as exceptional. Rather, it was in many ways typical. In the Austrian Empire, for example, with its huge Jewish communities annexed from Poland, Galician Jews were perceived during the early nineteenth century much as the Alsatian Jews were perceived in France at the time of the French Revolution. In addition, both these groups of Jews experienced similar difficulties in balancing their Jewish and their new national identities.

In the decades immediately preceding the French Revolution, inner frontiers divided the Jews living in France into three distinct groups, and these frontiers were so strong that they prevented the Jews from engaging in collective political activities. As a result of these internal divisions, there were scarcely any Jews in pre-revolutionary France who could have been considered on par with Moses Mendelssohn in Prussia, either in terms of intellectual stature or in terms of willingness to serve as a political spokesman for the French Jewish community as a whole. This difference may also have been due to the fact that the Sephardi Jewish population of southern France enjoyed many of the benefits of emancipation well before the French Revolution and therefore did not feel the compunction to lobby for emancipation.[1]

French Jewry on the eve of the Revolution numbered approximately 40,000 individuals. According to statistics at our disposal, the Jews of Alsace and Lorraine in northeastern France, who numbered over 30,000, constituted the largest contingent.[2] The remaining 10,000 Jews were divided into two main groups. The Sephardi Jews had first fled from Spain in the fifteenth century and then from Portugal in the sixteenth as a result of the persecution of the Inquisition. These Jews originally settled in France as New Christians, since Jews were not yet officially tolerated, and for the most part they congregated in the southern port cities of Bordeaux and Bayonne. By the end of the eighteenth century this group, which was

[1] Arthur Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews: The Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism*, New York 1970. See also Frances Malino, *The Sephardic Jews of Bordeaux*, Tuscaloosa, AL 1978.

[2] The census of 1784 counted 19,624 Jews in Alsace. However, all scholars agree that this figure is an undercount, since many Jews without fixed or legal residence evaded the census takers. The actual Jewish population in 1784 is estimated at 22,500–25,000. *Le Dénombrement général des juifs d'Alsace*, Colmar 1785; Elie Scheid, *Histoire des Juifs d'Alsace*, Paris 1882, pp. 248–251; Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, pp. 321–22; Paula E. Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, Berkeley 1998, p. 8.

frequently referred to as the "Portuguese nation," numbered about 5,000. Another 2,500 Jews lived in the papal states in the Comtat Venaissin in the region of Avignon. These territories became part of France only at the time of the French Revolution. Finally, another 500 to 800 Jews from all these regions lived in Paris illegally.[3]

The huge imbalance between the Jews of Alsace and Lorraine, who constituted 85–90 percent of all French Jews, and the Sephardi and Provençal Jews of southern France was accompanied by sharp disparities in their social and cultural profiles, which fuelled intense rivalries and animosity among them.[4] As a rule, the Jews spoke three different languages: Yiddish, Spanish, and Judeo-Provençal. Each of these groups also had its own religious identity, characterised by specific rites and expectations regarding the degree of communal autonomy owed them by the state. While the Sephardi Jews were well integrated into French society, as were some of the Avignonnais, the Jews of northeastern France were not at all well integrated.[5] Schwarzfuchs rightly claims that the crucial problem of the time was the right of residence in the French kingdom. The Portuguese had received their "lettres patentes" as early as 1550, although they were officially recognized as Jews rather than as New Christians only in 1723.[6] These Jews had complete freedom of movement and considerable economic freedom. The Jews of the Comtat were also able to receive special dispensations to leave their towns.[7] By contrast, the Jews of Alsace and Lorraine, although tolerated, remained subject to a host of medieval disabilities, including onerous taxes and severe restrictions on their residential mobility and occupational freedom until the 1791 edict of emancipation.[8]

Culturally, too, the Sephardi Jews were more highly assimilated. Several of them, including David Gradis, Jacob Rodrigues Péreire and Louis Francia de Beaufleury, spoke and wrote French, and through their cosmopolitan family networks they became prominent in international trade.[9] They developed extensive social and econ-

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[3] Robert Anchel, *Les Juifs de France*, Paris 1946; Anchel, *Les Juifs à Paris au xviiie siècle*, Paris 1946. For an excellent brief overview of the Jewish population of France in all these regions, see Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, ch. 1, pp. 1–15.

[4] A similar situation prevailed outside of France as well. See for example, Joseph Kaplan, 'The Portuguese Community in 17th Century Amsterdam and the Ashkenazi World', in Jozeph Michman (ed.), *Dutch Jewish History*, vol. 2, Jerusalem 1989, pp. 23–45.

[5] On the high degree of acculturation among the Sephardim, see Gérard Nahon, *Métropoles et périphéries séfarades d'Occident, Kairouan, Amsterdam, Bayonne, Bordeaux, Jérusalem*, Paris 1993; Nahon (ed.), *Les 'Nations' juives portugaises du sud-ouest de la France (1684–1791)*, Paris 1981; Malino, *The Sephardic Jews of Bordeaux*; Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*. For an in-depth overview of all Jewish communities in eighteenth-century France, see especially Hertzberg.

[6] *Lettres-patentes du Roi, confirmatives de privilèges, dont les juifs portugais jouissent en France depuis 1550; données à Versailles, au mois de juin 1776*, Bordeaux 1781. See also Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, pp. 15–16, 50–51; Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, pp. 2–3.

[7] Zosa Szajkowski, *Franco-Judaica: An Analytical Bibliography of Books, Pamphlets, Decrees, Briefs and Other Printed Documents Pertaining to the Jews in France, 1500–1788*, New York 1962.

[8] The texts of the documents relating to the emancipation of the Jews are available in *La Révolution française et l'émancipation des Juifs*, Paris 1968.

[9] David Gradis was a candidate for the Estates General in 1789. He wrote on philosophy and re-

omic contacts with non-Jewish population in the region, and they were generally aware of the new enlightened ideas and intellectual trends of the time.[10] As for the Provençal Jews, this group was sharply split along social lines. Those who escaped from the papal towns to settle near the Sephardi Jews in Bordeaux or Bayonne enjoyed a social status similar to that of their Sephardi coreligionists. Some of them even became well-to-do traders, despite repeated attempts by the Sephardi Jews to have them expelled since they perceived them as economic competitors.[11] By contrast, those who remained in the papal states of Avignon, Cavaillon, Carpentras and l'Isle sur Sorgue until the French Revolution continued to live in wretched ghetto conditions.[12] As for those Avignonnais Jews who made their way to Paris, French officials considered them so poor that they did not even demand that they pay for the *permis de séjour*, or official right of residence.[13]

A handful of the Ashkenazi Jews also attained high social rank.[14] Cerf Berr and Liefman Calmer,[15] the latter of whom even bought a barony, were the leading Ashkenazi personalities of the time. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Ashkenazi Jews remained mired in poverty.

As for Jewish life in eighteenth-century France, we have many extant sources. One of the most fascinating rabbis of the period, Rabbi Hayyim Joseph David Azulai of Jerusalem, the HiDa, visited France twice as an emissary in 1755 and in 1777–78.[16] During these visits, he kept a diary that bears witness to the way French Jews

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ligion. See his biographical notice in Elyakim Carmoly, *La France israélite, mémoires pour servir l'histoire de notre littérature*, Frankfurt 1858, pp. 145–157. Jacob Rodrigues Péreire came to Paris in 1749 to present a new educational technique for the deaf-mute children. He remained in Paris, where he became the *syndic*, or lay leader, of the Sephardi Jewish community of Paris. Louis Francia de Beaufleury served as a lawyer at the parliament of Bordeaux, and wrote an important work about poverty and mendicancy: *Projets de bienfaisance et de patriotisme, pour la ville de Bordeaux et pour toutes les villes et gros bourgs du Royaume*, Paris 1783. More generally on this topic, see Léon Lallemand, *Histoire de la charité*, Paris 1910, vol. 4, ch. 3.

[10] For in-depth socioeconomic and cultural profiles of the Sephardi Jewish community of southern France, see Nahon, *Métropoles et périphéries séfarades*; Nahon, (ed.), *Les 'Nations' juives portugaises*; Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*; Malino, *The Sephardic Jews of Bordeaux.*

[11] Moise Schwab, 'Documents pour servir à l'histoire des Juifs de France', *Revue des Etudes Juives*, vol. 11, 1885, pp. 141–149.

[12] Armand Mossé, *Histoire des Juifs d'Avignon et du Comtat Venaissin*, Paris 1934; Reprint Marseille 1976; René L. Moulinas, *Les Juifs du pape: Avignon et le Comtat Venaissin*, Paris 1992.

[13] See the introduction of Paul Hildenfinger, *Documents sur les juifs à Paris au xviiie siècle, actes d'inhumation et scellés*, Paris 1913. On the several "Etat des juifs", i.e., police reports about the legal situation of the Jews in Paris, written during the period 1715–1789, see Léon Kahn, *Les Juifs de Paris au dix-huitième siècle*, Paris 1894, chs. 1–2, pp. 5–36.

[14] This is true, despite Arthur Hertzberg's assertion that "the position of the Jew in Metz was the same as in Vilna; so were the attitudes towards him". Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, p. 137.

[15] Isidore Loeb, 'Un Baron juif français', *Archives israélites*, vol. 46 (1885), pp. 188–190, 196–198. See also Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, pp. 162, 250.

[16] Meir Benayahu, *Rabbi Hayyim Yosef David Azulai*, Jerusalem 1959. See also Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, pp. 160–63.

lived in the period prior to the French Revolution. If Azulai's testimony is to be believed, some of the Jews of Bordeaux committed public infractions of Jewish laws, such as violating the Sabbath and Jewish holidays, eating forbidden food, or being lax in the observance of *niddah,* or ritual purification laws governing the timing of sexual relations between men and women with relation to menstruation. Moreover, even at this early date Azulai viewed Paris as the centre of moral delinquency. According to his account, Mordechai Tama, the rabbi of the Avignon Jewish community in Paris, drank in taverns with gentiles, and another Jewish leader in Paris admitted to having a gentile mistress.[17] The Paris police archives confirm these assertions, and they further testify that Sephardi youths in Paris carried swords and openly entertained relationships with Christian girls[18]. The same was true, too, for some Ashkenazi Jews living in Paris: Elie Worms of Sarrelouis, for example, financially supported mademoiselle De Launay, an actress of the Royal Theatre.[19] Insofar as Jewish scholarship was concerned, no one from the major centres of French Jewish life had sufficient learning to function as a rabbi of significant authority. The Sephardi rabbis who served the community of southern France tended to come from abroad; for example, Rabbi Raphael (Samuel Jacob) Meldola in Bayonne came from Italy,[20] the rabbi of Avignon came from Holland, and Rabbi Elie Vitte Espire or Ispir in Carpentras came from Prague and was later appointed in Nîmes. Even in Metz, where the local rabbis were more distinguished, several rabbis came from abroad, such as Rabbi Jacob Joshua Falk (1734 and 1741),[21] Rabbi Jonathan Eybeschütz (1741 and 1750),[22] and Rabbi Asher Lyon (1766–1785).[23] Nevertheless, there

[17] Hayyim Yosef David Azulai, *Ma'agal tov ha-shalem*, ed. by Aaron Freimann, Jerusalem 1934, pp. 115–116; Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, p. 161. On the beginnings of non-traditional behaviour among the Jews of Alsace and Lorraine in the eighteenth century, see Jay R. Berkovitz, 'Social and Religious Controls in pre-Revolutionary France: Rethinking the Beginnings of Modernity,' *Jewish History*, vol. 15, 2001, pp. 1–40.

[18] Kahn, *Les Juifs de Paris*, Paris 1894, pp. 49–50.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 53–58; Kahn, *Les Juifs de Paris sous Louis XV (1721–1760)*, Paris 1892, p. 16, 47; and Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, p. 161.

[20] Belonging to the prestigious dynasty of Sephardi rabbis known since the thirteenth century in Toledo, he succeeded Isaac da Costa as chief rabbi of Bayonne and Saint Esprit and served from 1722 to 1744.

[21] Born in Cracow (1680–1756), he became one of the leading rabbis of the period, known especially for his involvement in the struggle against the Sabbatean movement gaining ground in Poland and elsewhere in the Ashkenazi world. He was at the origin of their excommunication in 1722, and as the target of many critics was compelled to go abroad.

[22] Considered a giant in both Kabbalah and Talmud, he was also considered one of the greatest preachers of his day. Despite being among the rabbis who excommunicated the Sabbateans in Prague, he was nonetheless himself suspected of Sabbateanism throughout his life, after his own son declared himself a Sabbatean prophet and an anonymous Sabbatean work, published in 1724, was ascribed to him. In 1751 he was also suspected of having produced amulets bearing Sabbatean formulas.

[23] Abraham Cahen, 'Le Rabbinat de Metz pendant la période française (1567–1871)', Paris 1886. This work also appeared under the same title in the *Revue des études juives*, vol. 7 (1883), pp. 103–15, 204–26; vol. 8 (1884), pp, 255–74; vol. 12 (1886), pp. 283–97; vol. 13 (1886), pp. 105–26.

was true Jewish learning: the yeshivot at Metz, Ettendorf and Mutzig were renowned. There was also a vibrant Jewish cultural life. Hebrew printers appeared almost simultaneously in Metz in 1764 and Avignon in 1765. While the press in Avignon focused solely on the publication of the local prayer book, which was based on the provençal rite, the press in Metz published some 47 titles, several of which became important in classical Jewish scholarship. It also published a prayer book and a Passover haggadah translated into the indigenous Yiddish; a Hebrew grammar, bearing witness to the rise of the Hebrew *Haskalah*; and even a Yiddish translation of Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe.*[24]

Despite the fact the public debates over the Jewish question in France and the German states in the eighteenth century were both influenced by Enlightenment ideas, these debates exhibited significant differences.[25] In part, these differences were due to the religious and political affiliations of the philosophers and publicists involved. In France, in contrast to the situation in the German states and the Austrian Empire, the chief concern of these publicists, and especially Voltaire, was not the Jews themselves, but rather the power of the Catholic Church; arguments against the Jews frequently served as a weapon to diminish clerical power.[26]

In both France and the German states the debate over the Jewish question was conducted primarily through pamphlet literature. Just how acerbic Voltaire's position on the Jewish question was can be gauged by the fact that it prompted Isaac de Pinto, a Sephardi philosopher and economist who spent most of his life in Holland, and Zalkind Hourwitz, a Polish Jewish immigrant writer living in Paris, to write apologies in favour of the Jews. Although de Pinto's pamphlet, *Apologie pour la nation juive*, published in 1762, is most famous for its assertion of Portuguese superiority over all other Jews, its main aim was to champion the new economic ideology of mercantilism rather than to fight for Jewish emancipation *per se.*[27] Nor was Hourwitz's pamphlet, *Apologie des Juifs*, written for the 1785 essay contest sponsored by the Metz Royal Society of Arts and Sciences on the subject: "Are there means of making the Jews happier and more useful in France?" and published in 1789, a wholehearted defence of Jews. Already known for his biting editorials in the Parisian press, Hourwitz exhibited the same animosity towards rabbinical Judaism as did many contemporary non-Jewish detractors of Judaism.[28]

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[24] Benjamin Friedberg, *Toldot ha-Defus ha-Ivri*, Antwerp 1937.

[25] Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation 1770–1870*, New York 1978, pp. 96–99.

[26] See Voltaire's famous and venomous essay on "Jews" in his *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, Kehl 1764. For an English translation, see Voltaire, *Philosophical Dictionary*, ed. and trans. by Theodore Besterman, Baltimore 1971.

[27] Isaac de Pinto, *Apologie pour la nation juive, ou réflexions critiques sur le premier chapitre du viie tome des œuvres de M. de Voltaire, au sujet des Juifs, par l'auteur de "l'Essai sur le luxe"*, Amsterdam 1762.

[28] After Rabbi Lyon's death in 1785, no one was appointed rabbi in Metz until the Napoleonic era. Perceiving this situation as a model to be followed elsewhere, Hourwitz suggested suppressing the function of rabbis altogether: "It would even be desirable to prohibit them from having rabbis. ... Thus the Metz community has done without for the past two years ..." ("Il serait même à désirer

As regards the beginning of the Jewish Enlightenment in France, the first to express a desire to become frenchified were the wealthiest Portuguese and Avignonnais Jews, who already spoke French fluently. Besides de Pinto, two Jews from the papal states, Mordecai Venture and Israel Bernard de Valabrègue, the interpreter for Hebrew and Oriental languages at the Royal Library, also translated some liturgical pieces into French. Venture was the first to translate the entire prayer book into French in 1772.[29] In northeastern France, and especially in Alsace, where the vernacular was generally German, this process of frenchification was delayed until after the Revolution.

Finally, I would like to comment on Schwarzfuchs' allegation that Alsatian Jews exhibited little or no interest in these new intellectual trends. In my view, the gaze of the enlightened Jews of France was indeed turned towards the Berlin *Haskalah* circle. When Cerf Berr, the *syndic*, or lay leader, of the Ashkenazi Jews, decided to enter the battle for the Jewish rights, he asked Mendelssohn for help, as Schwarzfuchs notes. Mendelssohn in turn requested assistance from Christian Wilhelm Dohm. Dohm's text was written in 1781, just before Joseph II promulgated the Edict of Toleration.[30] Naftali Herz Wessely, a member of Mendelssohn's circle, reacted promptly to Joseph II's edict by writing his tract *Divrei shalom ve-emet*. This text was immediately translated into French by Berr Isaac Berr from Nancy, and it first appeared in Berlin in 1782.[31] Moreover, although it is true that Cerf Berr subscribed only to 15 issues of *ha-Meassef*, he was nonetheless praised in a 1786 issue of the journal by his friend, Wessely. In addition, Cerf Berr was complimented in an issue of 1788.[32] Do these details express "no evidence of any intellectual curiosity in this new intellectual movement among other Alsatian Jewish circles"? Or shall we look at these events from the opposite side of the coin and consider that they may instead reflect the close interaction between French and German Jewish Enlightenment circles?

Still, in the German states as well as in France, the battle for Jewish rights was of interest only to the small world of Jewish intellectuals and the wealthiest elite, who

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qu'on leur défendit d'avoir des rabbins [...]. Aussi la communauté de Metz se passe-t-elle des rabbins depuis deux ans ..."). In Zalkind Hourwitz, *Apologie des Juifs en réponse à la question: est-il des moyens de rendre les Juifs plus heureux et plus utiles en France?*, Paris 1789, reprint, Paris 1968, p. 38, n. 1. On Hourwitz, see Malino, 'The Right to be Equal: Zalkind Hourwitz and the Revolution of 1789,' in F. Malino and David Sorkin (eds.), *From East and West: Jews in a Changing Europe, 1750–1870*, Oxford 1990, pp. 85–106; and esp. Malino, *A Jew in the French Revolution: The Life of Zalkind Hourwitz*, Oxford 1996.

29 This prayer book was published in Paris according to the Spanish-Portuguese rite, in four volumes, which appeared in 1772, 1773, 1774, and 1783. See also Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, pp. 176–178.

30 Christian Wilhelm Dohm, *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*, Berlin 1781.

31 Berr Isaac Berr's 'Instruction salutaire adressée aux communautés juives qui habitent paisiblement les villes de la domination du grand Empereur Joseph II', (Berlin 1782), was first published in France in 1790.

32 *Ha-Meassef*, 1786, pp. 32–34; 48–49; his compliment is in the preface of the volume published in 1788. See also Frances Malino's essay in this volume.

had few ties to the larger Jewish society. Jews who lived in small towns or villages were unconcerned about such questions. French and German Jewish peddlers and cattle dealers had to worry about earning their daily bread and surely did not read *Haskalah* literature. As we know, the process of urbanisation among Jews on both sides of the Rhine did not take place until the nineteenth century, when all restrictions on the right of residence were finally abolished. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the majority of Jews in the Rhineland and in Alsace and Lorraine continued to live in villages and small towns, as Schwarzfuchs correctly points out.[33] Under these conditions, neither French nor German Jews participated in the debate over Jewish emancipation to any significant degree. In reality, the French Revolution marked an irrevocable landmark in the way Jews perceived of their position vis-à-vis the state. While some Jews from the Habsburg Empire considered Joseph II's Edict of Toleration a new form of tribulation, the Jews of Alsace and Lorraine likewise regarded the repression of their semi-autonomous communities by the French Revolution a new form of oppression, even though many of them had fought against the authority of the *parnassim*, or lay leaders of these communities, in the past.[34] This desire to retain some sort of communal bond placed these Jews in a position of conflict with the new laws of the state.

Although Schwarzfuchs did not discuss the history of emancipation, I would like to conclude by making a general observation about its development. In reconsidering the French and German models of Jewish emancipation, we should remember that in reality the first models of integrated and acculturated Jewish communities were almost certainly the Sephardi communities of Holland or England.[35] These models, reinforced by French Enlightenment ideas and reinterpreted through the

[33] On urbanisation among the Jews of Alsace and Lorraine, see Paula E. Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace: Acculturation and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century*, New Haven 1991; Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany: The Jews of Alsace-Lorraine*, 1871–1918, Stanford 1988, esp. ch. 8, pp. 157–177. On urbanisation among German Jewry, see Steven M. Lowenstein, *The Mechanics of Change: Essays in the Social History of German Jewry*, Brown Judaic Studies, 246, Providence 1992, esp. chs. 1 and 5, pp. 9–28, 133–152; Alice Goldstein, 'Urbanisation in Baden, Germany: Focus on the Jews,' *Social Science History*, 8.1 (Winter 1984), pp. 43–66; Werner J. Cahnman, 'Village and Small Town Jews in Germany: A Typological Study', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 19 (1974), pp. 107–35.

[34] See, for example, the pamphlet written by Berr Isaac Berr, 'Lettre d'un citoyen, membre de la ci-devant communauté des Juifs de Lorraine, à ses confrères, à l'occasion du droit de citoyen actif, rendu aux juifs par le décret du 28 septembre 1791', Nancy 1791. Reprinted in *La Révolution française et l'émancipation des juifs*, vol. 8, Paris 1968. On the resistance of the Jewish communities of Sarreguemines and Lunéville in Lorraine against the *syndics* of Nancy, see Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, p. 45.

[35] On the Sephardi community of Amsterdam, see Miriam Bodian, *Hebrews of the Portuguese Nation: Conversos and Community in Early Modern Amsterdam*, Bloomington 1997; J. Kaplan, 'The Portuguese Community' (n. 4); Nahon, *Métropoles et péripheries séfarades* (n. 5). On the Sephardi community in England, see Todd M. Endelman, *The Jews of Georgian England, 1714–1830: Tradition and Change in a Liberal-Society*, Philadelphia 1979, reprint, Ann Arbor 1999; Endelman, *Radical Assimilation in English Jewish History, 1656–1945*, Bloomington 1990; and David B. Ruderman, *Jewish Enlightenment in an English Key*, Princeton 2000.

prism of German *Haskalah*, inspired the emergence of a new international outlook. Yet, it was only as a result of the French revolutionary process, which gave priority to abstract political ideas over traditional popular sentiments, that these ideas began to be translated into social reality. Still, the vast majority of the French population, like the Jews of Alsace and Lorraine, were not yet ready to abandon their religious and ethnic affiliations. Consequently, it was only over the course of the nineteenth century that these abstract enlightenment ideas began to be realised, creating a new sense of cultural cohesion and national unity that transcended traditional religious and ethnic bonds and ultimately reshaped the cultural landscape of the nationstate.

Frances Malino

Jewish Enlightenment in Berlin and Paris

Jewish Enlightenment in France and the German states should not be discussed in terms of a tale of two cities. Berlin, the centre of German-speaking Enlightenment, was also the centre of Jewish Enlightenment.[1] Paris, although the centre of French-speaking Enlightenment, was neither the centre of Jewish life nor of French Jewish Enlightenment. On the contrary, there were numerous centres, some interconnected, others jealously guarding their separation and distinctiveness. Not even this dramatic contrast, however, has stood in the way of a rather stark delineation of the primacy of the Berlin *Haskalah* and the derivative nature of its Parisian or French counterpart.

The Jews "are enlightened in Germany, the land of philosophy; indifferent and conservative in France, the land of Catholicism by indifference", reported a German correspondent of the French journal *Archives israélites* in 1845.[2] That enlightenment shone more brightly on the Jews of Germany was also the Abbé Henri Grégoire's view as well as that of the French *maskil* Moses Ensheim, who confided to Grégoire in the fall of 1792 that his coreligionists in Germany were less irritating, more enlightened and more tolerant than those in France.[3]

Certainly these views, which reflect the emergence of the Reform movement in Germany and the resistance to it in France, support the traditional interpretation historians offer of the German and French *Haskalah* movements. Indeed, they may have even contributed to this interpretation, best exemplified in Jacob Katz's suggestion that while the teaching of German-Jewish reformers like Moses Mendelssohn had an effect on French Jews, it was the political advances gained by French Jews through the French Revolution which had an impact on German Jewry.[4] Although David Sorkin has both challenged and enriched Katz's analysis of the *Haska-*

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[1] Another centre, of course, was Königsberg.

[2] Cited in Jonathan Helfand, 'The Symbiotic Relationship between French and German Jewry in the Age of Emancipation', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* (LBIYB) 29 (1984), p. 346.

[3] Cited in Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, 'Icon of Emancipation: Jewish Intellectuals and the Abbé Grégoire', presented to the *Haskalah* Seminar of the Center for Advanced Judaic Studies, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, November 4, 1998. A revised version will appear as, 'Strategic Friendships: Jewish Intellectuals, the Abbé Grégoire and the French Revolution', in Ross Brann and Adam Sutcliffe (eds.), *Pasts Perfect: Reconfiguring Jewish Culture, c. 1100 – c. 1850*, forthcoming, Philadelphia 2003.

[4] Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto*, Cambridge 1973, p. 4.

lah by relocating it to its larger Central European setting, he has not questioned the presumed centrality of Berlin.[5] In general, moreover, with the exception of Jonathan Helfand, Simon Schwarzfuchs and most recently David Ruderman, historians have shied away from a comparative geography of the *Haskalah*, particularly in Germany and France.[6]

There is, of course, good reason for viewing eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century *Haskalah* from the primary vantage point of Berlin, especially when comparing it to that of its French neighbour. Yet I would argue that this traditional view is less than half the picture, for it obscures not only the particularity of the French situation but also the extent to which the "radical *Haskalah*" of Berlin was itself influenced and transformed by developments in France. Finally, it obscures as well the legacy of the *Haskalah* in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western Europe when, with the creation of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, Paris became its centre and Berlin merely a minor player.

Let us first remind ourselves, however, of the intimacy of relations between the *maskilim* of Berlin and their counterparts in France. Berr Isaac Berr, among the most respected and important leaders of French Jewry, fully identified with the Berlin *Haskalah*. He subscribed to its Hebrew journal *ha-Meassef*, translated Naphtali Herz Wessely's *Divrei Shalom ve-Emet* (Words of Peace and Truth) and secured its publication in France.[7] On the eve of the emancipation of the Jews of France, moreover, when he wrote his *Lettre d'un citoyen ... à ses confrères* (Letter of a Citizen to his Fellow Jews), the reforms of the German *maskilim* and the vision of Wessely provided Berr Isaac Berr both his inspiration and solace.[8] Moses Ensheim, the brilliant mathematician from Metz, left his wife and child to travel to Berlin, where he became tutor to Mendelssohn's family (1782–1785) and contributor to *ha-Meassef*. Returning to France, Ensheim found a friend in Abraham Furtado, who secured a place for him in Bayonne as tutor in the home of his more observant brother Joseph.

Isaiah Berr Bing of Metz also spent time in Berlin, became a disciple of Mendelssohn, and successfully translated his *Phaedon* into French. Cerf Berr of Medelsheim, the venerable and official leader of the Jews of Alsace, had turned to Mendelssohn as early as 1780 to help ameliorate the situation of the Jews of Alsace. His plea subsequently elicited Christian Wilhelm von Dohm's pivotal treatise *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden* (Concerning the Amelioration of the Civil Status of the Jews).[9] Finally, one should include the Polish-born Zalkind Hourwitz, who jour-

[5] David Sorkin, *The Berlin Haskala and German Religious Thought*, London 2000.

[6] Helfand, 'The Symbiotic Relationship'; Simon Schwarzfuchs, 'Les Lumières chez les Juifs de France', in *Transactions of the Seventh International Congress on the Enlightenment*, Paris 1989; and David Ruderman, *Jewish Enlightenment in an English Key*, Princeton 2000.

[7] Hartwic Weisly [*sic*], *Instruction Salutaire adressée aux communautés juives*, Paris 1790.

[8] Berr Isaac Berr, *Lettre d'un citoyen, membre de la ci-devant communauté des Juifs de Lorraine, à ses confrères, à l'occasion du droit de Citoyen actif, rendu aux Juifs par le décret du 28 Septembre 1791*, Nancy 1791.

[9] Christian Wilhelm Dohm, *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*, Berlin 1781. Dohm's pamphlet was subsequently translated into French by Bernoulli, whose edition, completed in the

neyed to Germany and quite probably Metz before settling permanently in Paris. Through numerous publications and provocations, Hourwitz brought to his adopted country the debates as well as the passion of the Berlin *Haskalah*.[10]

When we look beyond these personal connections, however, a striking dissonance resonates between the arguments of the *maskilim* of Berlin and those in France. Tensions and disputes among the French *maskilim* themselves, moreover, rarely mirrored those in Berlin. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the religious and political climate in France played a distinctive role in reframing both the content and context of *Haskalah* ideology.

Although there is no doubt that the most influential figures among the *maskilim* of France were Moses Mendelssohn and Naphtali Herz Wessely, their positions and the principles they used to justify them were rarely, if ever, appropriated in full by their followers in France. On the contrary, logically consistent arguments expressed by these German *maskilim* quickly bifurcated and were rendered contradictory when translated into the French context.

Berr Isaac Berr of Nancy and Isaiah Berr Bing of Metz, for example, both of them from wealthy French Jewish families, consistently defended the lay leadership and its use of coercion, as well as the corporate existence of the Jewish communities. "Two nations in one climate", Bing had written as late as 1787.[11] In this, they stood opposed to Mendelssohn's positions, clearly articulated in his Preface to Menasseh ben Israel's *Vindiciae Judaeorum* (1782), as well as in his own *Jerusalem* (1783). On the other hand, both Berr Isaac Berr and Isaiah Berr Bing were ardent supporters of vocational and educational reform, so much so that Berr Isaac Berr could think of no better way to respond to the debates in the National Assembly in December of 1789 concerning active citizenship for the Jews of France than to publish a new edition of Wessely's *Words of Peace and Truth*, originally translated into French in 1782.

In this edition, Berr Isaac Berr introduced the text with a plea to the Abbé Jean Sieflein Maury, among the most prominent antagonists of Jewish citizenship: "Believe Monsieur, that we will find in France men, who, like Rabbi Hertz Weisly [*sic*] will teach us to observe our religious laws and your civil laws ...".[12] Unpersuaded, Maury merely reiterated his public position, that the Jews should receive the protection, hospitality and humanity that the French nation owed all foreigners. As for Berr Isaac Berr, his belief that Wessely's *Words of Peace and Truth* would convince the deputies of 1789 that the Jews could become useful French citizens suggests that he failed to grasp fully the position of the Abbé Maury or, more significantly, that of the French revolutionaries.

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spring of 1782, has been republished with an annotation by Dominique Bourel: Dohm, *De la réforme politique des Juifs*, Paris 1984.

[10] For a discussion of Hourwitz and the *Haskalah*, see Frances Malino, *A Jew in the French Revolution: The Life of Zalkind Hourwitz*, Oxford 1996.

[11] Isaiah Berr Bing, *Lettre du Sr. I.B.B. Juif de Metz*, Metz 1787.

[12] Weisly, *Instruction Salutaire*, p. 7.

This was not the case for Zalkind Hourwitz or Moses Ensheim, both of whom Berr Isaac Berr studiously ignored when calling the Abbé Maury's attention to the enlightened Jews of France. Eschewing the *shtadlanut* of the wealthy leaders of Nancy and Metz, these two *maskilim* also borrowed copiously from Mendelssohn, but from his arguments against religious coercion, against juridical autonomy for the Jewish community and against any explicit contract between the "regeneration" of the Jews and emancipation. They praised as well Wessely's commitment to natural law and to the study of science and European languages. But rather than convince the French deputies that Wessely's reforms would ultimately lead to the Jews becoming useful citizens, Hourwitz in particular appropriated Wessely's cutting remark – that the Jews' only crime was that of being born to Jewish parents and having followed their ancient faith – as a critique of those who withheld citizenship from the Jews. For Hourwitz and Ensheim, in contrast to Berr Isaac Berr and Isaiah Berr Bing, Mendelssohn's and Wessely's arguments led naturally to the radical political position of the French revolutionaries.

Hourwitz and Ensheim also shared, and indeed even borrowed from, Mendelssohn's vision of a future when Jews and Christians would live together harmoniously, mutually respecting each other's religious differences. If Christianity would divest itself of its irrational dogmas, Mendelssohn had written to the Crown Prince of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, and agree that its founder had never freed the Jews from the Mosaic law, then Judaism would recognise Jesus as a "prophet and messenger of God", sent "to preach the holy doctrine of virtue ... to a depraved human race".[13] Just a few years later, a more sarcastic Hourwitz confided to the King's minister Chrétien-Guillaumes de Lamoignon de Malesherbes his desire to see an end to the dispute between Jews and Christians. Worshipping God according to their conscience, Hourwitz explained, they should say to one another: "Pass me the messiah to come, I shall pass you the messiah who came".[14]

Among all the *maskilim*, whether in Berlin and Königsberg, or Paris, Metz and Nancy, there emerged a veritable Sephardi mystique, one from which, as Ismar Schorsch has successfully demonstrated, the *Haskalah* could draw much of its validation.[15] But if the golden age of Maimonides inspired the *maskilim* of Berlin, those in France could turn as well to the prosperous and privileged Sephardi communities of Bordeaux and Bayonne. Ironically, only the impoverished Hourwitz and Ensheim had esteem, even affection, for these Sephardim; indeed, they both believed that the future for French Jewry lay in their example. Although descendants of Berr Isaac Berr and Abraham Furtado would subsequently unite in marriage, neither Berr Isaac Berr nor Isaiah Berr Bing sought support or guidance from the Sephardi leadership. On the contrary, until the Revolution defined them as one, there was little if any friendly contact between the Jewish leadership of northeastern France and that of the southwest.

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[13] Cited in Michael A. Meyer, *The Origins of the Modern Jew*, Detroit 1967, p. 36.

[14] Hourwitz to Malesherbes, June, 1789, Archives Nationales, 154 APII 136.

[15] Ismar Schorsch, 'The Myth of Sephardic Supremacy', LBIYB 34 (1989), pp. 44–66.

Can we, indeed should we, call the Sephardi aristocrats, for example Abraham Furtado, David Gradis and Jacob Rodrigues Péreire, *maskilim*? They were certainly aware of the intellectual achievements of Mendelssohn and Wessely, and in some instances corresponded with the Berlin *maskilim*. On the other hand, there is little to suggest a serious confrontation with Judaism among the Sephardim of Bordeaux or Bayonne.[16] Indeed, in striking contrast to the Ashkenazim, including Hourwitz and Ensheim, they neither applauded nor turned for counsel to the philosophers of their own golden age. Nevertheless, their advocacy of secular education, their establishment of a curriculum designed to teach Hebrew grammar, an appreciation of the Psalms and Prophets and knowledge of the prayer book, and finally their explicit goal of fostering "a fear of God and development of honest men", indicates that their image of the future, even if it evolved without conflict or confrontation, dovetailed with that envisioned by the Berlin *maskilim*.

Where the Sephardim differed profoundly from the *maskilim*, however, was in their contemporary point of reference. Rather than the religious reforms of the German Enlightenment, they appropriated the universalism and rationalism of the French *philosophes*. That Hourwitz and Ensheim looked to Furtado and the Sephardim for intellectual guidance as well as financial support, moreover, suggests quite rightly that they, too, in contrast to Berr Isaac Berr and Isaiah Berr Bing, found inspiration, if not always satisfaction, in the arguments of the *philosophes*, including those of Voltaire.[17]

One could enumerate many more examples of how the *maskilim* of France differed from each other and from their German counterparts, but this would merely confirm what we have already established, namely a Berlin-inspired *French* version of the *Haskalah*. There is, however, an additional point to be made, one that I believe suggests that there is also a French inspired chapter in the evolution of the *Haskalah*.

In contrast to the German states, there really were no court Jews in France. Yet, in certain respects the role played by court Jews in the German states corresponded to that played by royal academies in France, most notably the Metz Academy of Arts and Sciences. Like the court Jews, the Academy in Metz publicised the views of the *maskilim* and brought them before official bodies of state. By addressing in 1785 the question of "how to make the Jews more useful and happy in France", moreover, the Metz Academy also brought to public attention the desirability of an emancipa-

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[16] Frances Malino, *The Sephardic Jews of Bordeaux*, Tuscaloosa 1978.

[17] Although Hourwitz criticised both Voltaire and Rousseau for their willingness to let the Jews "perish in misery", he also called attention to the beneficial effects of Voltaire's views: "It may well be that Voltaire had intended less the modern Jews than the ancient ones, that is the trunk of Christianity against which he constantly takes aim. Whatever it may be, the Jews pardon him all the evil he has said of them in favour of the good he has done for them albeit without wishing it, perhaps even without knowing it. For if they enjoyed a little rest during these last years, it is due to the progress of enlightenment to which Voltaire in his numerous works against fanaticism has surely contributed more than any other writer". Hourwitz, *Apologie des Juifs*, Paris, 1789, p. 56, n. 1.

tion contract, one whose justification lay not only in the "usefulness" of the Jews but also in their cultural and moral "regeneration".[18]

Ironically, this conception of an emancipation contract represented the position neither of the *maskilim* of France nor, for that matter, those of Berlin, but rather of a self-designated spokesman for the Jews, the Abbé Grégoire. By appropriating the Jewish cause as his own, and the *Verbesserung* of Dohm as his point of departure, and with the uneasy but essential collaboration of his Jewish friends, most notably Berr Isaac Berr, Isaiah Berr Bing and Moses Ensheim, Grégoire, a Jansenist committed to religious reform within his own religious community, publicly linked *Haskalah* ideology to regeneration, and regeneration to the granting of *full* political rights to the Jews.[19]

Grégoire's views, published on the eve of the Revolution in his prize-winning *Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des Juifs* (Essay on the Physical, Moral and Political Regeneration of the Jews) actually had little if any direct influence on the revolutionary debates surrounding Jewish emancipation.[20] Indeed, Grégoire himself did not even participate in the most important of these debates. When the emancipation decree of 1791 was voted by the Assembly in September, moreover, there was not even a hint of Grégoire's regeneration or the enlightenment's contingency of tolerance. Yet, no one can deny that Grégoire's name became synonymous with Jewish emancipation. Even more importantly, his call for regeneration of the Jews, along with its presumption of their degradation, came not only to characterise the emancipation process as a whole, but also was wedded to the construction of nineteenth-century Franco-Judaism.

Needless to say, how and why Grégoire came to play this pivotal role is beyond the purview of this paper. Nevertheless, one can point to his self-promotion, his numerous publications concerning the Jewish question, especially during the Napoleonic re-examination of the emancipation process, and, of course, to the collusion of generations of French Jews, for whom celebration of the anniversary of

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[18] For a discussion of the role of court Jews in Germany, see David Sorkin, *The Berlin Haskala and German Religious Thought*, London 2000; Selma Stern, *The Court Jew: A Contribution to the History of the Period of Absolutism in Central Europe*, trans. by Ralph Weiman, Philadelphia 1950; New Brunswick, NJ 1985; Jonathan I. Israel, *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550–1750*, 3rd rev. ed., London 1998; *From Court Jews to the Rothschilds: Art, Patronage, and Power, 1600–1800*, ed. by Vivian B. Mann and Richard I. Cohen, Munich 1996.

[19] Alyssa Sepinall has persuasively argued that the term *régénération* used in connection to Jews is primarily Grégoire's innovation. Sepinwall, 'Regenerating France, Regenerating the World: The Abbé Grégoire and the French Revolution, 1750–1831', Ph.D. diss., Stanford University 1998, p. 95. On the use of the term *régénération* during the French Revolution in general, see Mona Ozouf, 'Regeneration', in *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, ed. by François Furet and Mona Ozouf, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, MA 1989, pp. 781–90. On the impact of the theme of regeneration on nineteenth-century French Jewry, see Jay R. Berkovitz, *The Shaping of Jewish Identity in Nineteenth-Century France*, Detroit 1989; Paula E. Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace: Acculturation and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century*, New Haven 1991; Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany: The Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, 1871–1919*, Stanford 1988, pp. 1–26.

[20] Abbé Henri Grégoire, *Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des juifs*, Metz 1789.

emancipation was unimaginable without public praise for Grégoire. "Do you know who defended the Israélite cause with the most vigour?" Rabbi Félix Meyer asked his coreligionists on the centenary of the Revolution. "The Abbé Grégoire, whose name merits being inscribed in gold letters in the book of our benefactors".[21]

Central to our understanding of the original contribution of French *maskilim* to the *Haskalah*, however, is less Grégoire himself than the legitimisation given to his views, especially his call for regeneration of the Jews. In a poignant and passionate letter to his coreligionists, written immediately after emancipation had been granted, Berr Isaac Berr publicly linked implementation of the educational and social reforms of the *Haskalah* to the Jews being deemed worthy of the full rights of citizenship.

> If we ourselves are not able to enjoy all the sweet things that the new constitution offers us, for it is difficult to change customs and habits acquired over thirty and forty years, we shall at least see our children gather the first flowers of this delicious plant; we must also hope for indulgence on the part of our generous fellow citizens, if our regeneration does not come about as promptly as we ourselves would desire it. Our education has been defective in many points of view. Already the famous Rabbi Hartwig Wessely, of Berlin, has rendered an eminent service, by publishing several works in Hebrew on this subject ... I entreat you, dear brethren, to follow this author in his meditations; and you will easily remark that our fate, and the fate of our posterity, depends solely on the change we shall effect in our mode of education... .[22]

Revolutionary events notwithstanding, Berr Isaac Berr had retrieved Grégoire's *ancien régime* expectation of regeneration and made it, along with the reforms of the *Haskalah*, the *sine qua non* of Jewish emancipation. To be sure, in contrast to the situation in the German states, Berr Isaac Berr could not make the reforms of the *Haskalah* a precondition of Jewish emancipation. He could, however, and did make these reforms a precondition for "enjoying" emancipation.

The *maskilim* in Berlin, of course, were well aware of events in France, following them closely on a day-to-day basis. Nevertheless, rather than the debates in the National Assembly or even the emancipation decree itself, it was Berr Isaac Berr's *Lettre* which provided them a rhetoric for understanding the emancipation process. Hinted at in Friedländer's memoranda, this rhetoric became full blown only in the first decade of the nineteenth century when *maskilim* like Joseph Wolf, following Berr Isaac Berr's lead, transformed the radical *Haskalah*'s "prescription for renewal" into an "ideology of emancipation".[23]

Except for the Sephardim and a minority of Ashkenazim, the Jews of France also constructed an ideology of emancipation, one which took comfort not in the revol-

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[21] *Discours prononcé à l'occasion du centenaire de la Révolution française au Temple israélite de Valenciennes, le 12 mai 1889 par M. Félix Meyer Rabbin*, published by the Administrative Committee of the Jewish Community.

[22] Berr Isaac Berr, *Lettre d'un citoyen*, pp. 11–12.

[23] David Sorkin, 'Preacher, Teacher, Publicist: Joseph Wolf and the Ideology of Emancipation', in Frances Malino and David Sorkin (eds.), *Profiles in Diversity: Jews in a Changing Europe*, Detroit 1998, p. 118.

utionary decrees but rather in Berr Isaac Berr's assurance that God had chosen the French to effect the "regeneration" of the Jews, just as he had chosen Antiochus, Pompey and others to humiliate and enslave them. By 1806, when Napoleon Bonaparte sent the "question of the Jews" back to the negotiating table, Berr Isaac Berr's *explication du texte* could be seen as prescient. For this time, in contrast to the decrees of 1790–91, the unresolved ambiguities of the *ancien régime* and the "anarchy" plaguing the Jewish leadership inextricably and permanently linked emancipation to a regeneration demanded only of the Jews.

The *maskilim* from the German states and France were both influenced by and reflected their own countries' political, intellectual and spiritual climates. In spite of significant differences between them, however, which, as we have seen, included a conflation in France of the two stages of the *Haskalah* delineated by David Sorkin (an early *Haskalah* vision of the cultural renewal of Judaism and a later vision of *Haskalah* as a remedy for the affliction of the Jews), these *maskilim*, in dialogue with each other, successfully constructed a revolutionary rhetoric of regeneration and emancipation.[24] It was this rhetoric, moreover, which subsequently defined and gave direction to nineteenth-century European Jewry as a whole.[25]

Berlin and Paris, symbols of change in eighteenth-century Europe, can and indeed should also be understood and approached as symbols of change in modern Jewish history. But to establish this view we need to jettison the myth separating a Berlin-inspired *Haskalah* from a French-inspired political emancipation. In its place we can then begin to consider and explore a paradigm that is relational.[26]

Comment by Dominique Bourel

Since my field is what one might call "Berlinology",[1] I want to add some comments to complete Frances Malino's picture. I agree in principle with her description of the relationship between Berlin and Paris, but it is evident that we have to

[24] David Sorkin, *The Berlin Haskala*.

[25] One need only turn for example to the mandate of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, an international Jewish organization founded in Paris in 1860. Although its membership was half German until 1901, the Alliance sought, in its own words, "to work throughout the world for the emancipation and the moral progress of the Jews". Echoes of the *Haskalah*, of Naphtali Herz Wessely and of Berr Isaac Berr, permeated the Alliance's activities. Present as well, and endowed almost with patron status, is the towering figure of Grégoire, along with his ambivalent, contradictory and complex call for regeneration.

[26] Needless to say, many questions remain to be addressed both by German and French Jewish historians. Are there, for example, the same French influences on German-Jewish discussions in Königsberg as in Berlin? Are the socio-economic tensions among the *maskilim* in France found as well among those in Berlin? Finally, although I have only alluded to the differences in chronology, there should be a more detailed discussion of how David Sorkin's stages of the *Haskalah* apply to developments in France.

[1] See Michael Brenner, 'Mekoma shel berlin be-toldot yahadut germania', *Braun Lectures in the History of the Jews in Prussia*, no. 5, Ramat Gan 2000.

take into consideration additional factors. Thus, we have to look at Prussian diplomatic archives around the end of Frederick the Great's reign (1740–86), as well as at the sources on the Abbé Emmanual-Joseph Sieyès and the world of the French émigrés. While I agree with Malino's portrait of the Abbé Grégoire in general,[2] I believe we still have much to learn about his relationship with the German *Haskalah*. In my own opinion, the influence of the *Hofjuden*, even in Prussia, was more important than the prize competition of the Metz Academy, which concerned solely the upper levels of society. We need to ask, "who actually read the works which received the three prizes?" There is no doubt that the social and the political consequences of the activities of the *Hofjuden* were more far-reaching than the intellectual endeavour of the French essay writers.

I

The social background for the modernisation of the Jews in Paris and in Berlin was quite diverse. France has always been a Catholic country, while Prussia – especially Berlin – constituted an interesting religious melting pot. The *Hohenzollern* dynasty had been Calvinist since the *Confessio Sigismundi* in 1613 and in Berlin there was a significant community of Lutherans, with a form of Pietism originating in Halle. There were also the *Huguenots* – the French Protestant refugees – without whom it is impossible to grasp the intellectual and social culture of the city. And finally, there was also a Catholic minority, which included the melancholic, but genial president of the Academy, Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, whose secretary was the young *maskil* Aaron S. Gumperz,[3] and the sympathetic and jovial Marquis Jean Baptiste de Boyer d'Argens,[4] who served as a link between the French *Lumières* and German *Aufklärung* philosophers. These three confessions all entertained a particular relationship with Jews and Judaism. The names of Christian Fürchtegott Gellert and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, with their sympathetic presentations of Jews, had no equivalent in French culture. It is evident that in this respect there was a gap between the *curés* and the pastors. In Prussia, pastors were obliged to take an academic degree in Halle that included the study of Hebrew. They could read Johann Jakob Schudt, Johann Christian Wagenseil and many other authors on Jews

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[2] For the most recent monograph on Grégoire see Rita Hermon-Belot, *L'Abbé Grégoire: La Politique et la vérité*, Paris 2000.

[3] Hartmut Hecht (ed.), *Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis*, Berlin 1999; Hans Lausch, 'A.S. Gumperz und der Auftakt zur Euler-Dollondschen Achromasie-Kontroverse', in *History of Mathematics* (Paper no. 47), Clayton, Va 1991; and recently, David Sorkin, 'The Early Haskala', in David Sorkin and Shmuel Feiner (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Haskala*, London 2001, pp. 10–26.

[4] Jean Louis Vissière (ed.), *Le Marquis d'Argens*, Aix-en-Provence 1990. On the Academy and its relations to Jews see the old, still ongoing Faustian editions of Leibniz or Euler. See also Martin Fontius and Helmut Holzhey (eds.), *Schweizer im Berlin des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin 1996; and Jens Häseler and Antony McKenna (eds.), *La Vie intellectuelle aux réfugies protestants*, Paris 1999.

and Judaism. Numerous translations of the Talmud, Maimonides and other Jewish classics were also available to them.

Do we have a comparable situation in Paris? Clearly not. Arnold Ages has shown how insignificant *hebraica* and Judaica culture was to this Catholic world, as well as to the world of the *philosophes*: Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu and Diderot.[5] For the last, who was the least ignorant in this respect, "there were among them [the Jews] only bearded ones and shaved ones".[6] In Germany Jews were already able to enter institutes of higher education.[7] To be sure, Berlin had no university yet, but Jews were in the *Collegium medico-chirurgicum*, and others, such as Markus Herz, either returned to or came for the first time to Berlin after graduating from Halle.[8] There is an entire generation of *maskilim* – Levi Hanover, Herz Ullmann, Abraham Wolf and Isaak Alexander – to whom scholars still have to turn their attention.[9] In Paris, evidently, there was no parallel whatsoever to this generation of German *maskilim*.

In the middle of the eighteenth century, Paris had just a tiny Jewish community of around 500 persons, while Berlin, when Mendelssohn came to the city in 1743, numbered 333 Jewish families, or about 2,000 persons. After the Seven Years War (1756–1763), there was a group of very wealthy families in Berlin who earned a great deal of money and promoted the *Haskalah*.[10] In this respect, too, there was nothing comparable in Paris. It is important to note in this connection that Christian Wilhelm Dohm and Naphtali Herz Wessely were translated into French, while Mendelssohn, except for his *Phädon* and his painful exchange with Lavater, was not.

We doubtless find subtle echoes of Dohm's writings in Metz and Paris. But here, too, the difference is striking: before the French Revolution, there was a huge debate in Germany about the Jews (particularly following the publication of Lessing's play, *Die Juden*, in 1754),[11] but there is no analogous debate in France at this time.

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[5] Arnold Ages, *French Enlightenment and Rabbinic Tradition*, Frankfurt am Main 1970; Ages, *The Image of Jews and Judaism in the Prelude to the French Enlightement*, Sherbrooke (Canada) 1986.

[6] Dominique Bourel, 'Les Rasés et les barbus: Diderot et le judaïsme', *Revue Philosophique* (1984), pp. 275–285. See also Steven M. Lowenstein, *The Berlin Jewish Community: Enlightenment, Family and Crisis, 1770–1830*, New York 1994, pp. 45–46.

[7] Monika Richarz, *Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe: Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678–1848*, Tübingen 1974.

[8] On Herz, see Martin L. Davies, *Identity or History: Marcus Herz and the End of the Enlightenment*, Detroit 1995; and Marcus Herz, *Betrachtungen aus der spekulativen Weltweisheit*, ed. by Elfriede Conrad *et al.*, Hamburg 1990.

[9] Steven and Henry Schwarzschild, 'Two Lives in the Jewish Frühaufklärung: Raphael Levi Hanover and Moses Abraham Wolf', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 29 (1974), pp. 229–276. Alexander Even Chen, 'Haskala, pragmatism ve emouna: Mishnato ha-filosofit shel Naftali Herz Ulman', Ph.D diss., Hebrew University 1992; Lausch, 'Abraham Wolff "Rechenmeister"', *History of Mathematics* (Paper no. 50); and Isaak Alexander, *Schriften: ein Beitrag zur Frühaufklärung im deutschen Judentum*, ed. by Anja Speicher, Frankfurt am Main 1998.

[10] Lowenstein, *The Berlin Jewish Community*.

[11] Paolo Bernardini, *La Questione ebraica nel tardo Illuminismo tedesco: Studi intorno allo 'Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden' di C. W. Dohm*, Florence 1992.

The debate between Voltaire and Pinto was very limited and thus cannot be compared to the debate in Germany. The Jewish question was still a regional one in France, since the different communities – the highly assimilated "marchands portuguais", the "juifs du Pape" and the poor *schnorrer* of Alsace and Lorraine – had scarcely anything in common. With the publication of Dohm's *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden* in 1781, however, the Jewish question in France was transformed from a regional one into a broader European issue.

One of the major agendas of the *maskilim* in the German states was the reform of Jewish education. With the *Jüdische Freischule* founded in Berlin in the 1770s we have something entirely new in Europe. The education debate was one of the foremost debates in the German *Aufklärung* with no equivalent in France. This was due not only to the influence of Prussian Pietism but also to internal Jewish discussions. This emphasis on education was followed by close attachment to *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, which also became a German-Jewish speciality.

II.

The French path to Emancipation in 1791 did not necessarily imply positive consequences for the Jews of Germany. Especially in Prussia, the French Revolution was viewed as having a provocative, potentially dangerous influence. When Markus Herz wanted to be accepted in the Academy of Berlin in 1792, one of his adversaries claimed that such a step would be perceived as official affirmation "in favour of the new ideas".[12] The Emancipation of the Jews in France was part and parcel of the French Revolution, which, not surprisingly, cast a bad light on the idea of emancipation in the eyes of German princes and kings. For the first time in European history, the full emancipation of the Jews was implemented. No longer a dream, emancipation now provided a totally new possibility for reshaping Jewish identity.

I believe that the *Haskalah* integrated the best aspects of the phenomena of the *Siècle des Lumières* and the *Aufklärung*: from the first, the *Haskalah* took its political agenda; from the second, it took its moderation and, above all, its character of philosophical speculation, incarnated by Mendelssohn. The aim of providing a philosophical foundation for a new mode of Judaism, which offered a response to the new question of "how to be a Jew in a modern world?" appeared only on the German-Jewish agenda; it was not at all a problem for French Jews. Mendelssohn's *Jerusalem* (1783) and his decision to publish a translation of and a commentary on the Torah were revolutionary events that reflected only the intellectual and social ambience of Berlin.

The second wave of the Prussian *Haskalah* occurred within the context of the French model, which showed that emancipation was not only possible but also im-

[12] Bourel, 'Moses Mendelssohn, Markus Herz und die Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin', *Mendelssohn Studien*, vol. 4 (1979), pp. 223–234.

minently attainable. The practical reforms of David Friedländer prove that this generation was ready to think about the modernisation of Judaism. We find nothing similar in France.

We still have a great deal of work to do in order to improve our knowledge of this era. One of the urgent desiderata is a comparison between the French and the German rabbinate. What are the differences and the similarities? Moreover, is it possible to study the correspondence between two figures such as Jonathan Eybeschütz and Moses Ensheim, for example? Where are the Emdens, the Fränkels and the Hirschels in France?

Finally, a rather sad observation has to be made. Neither the sensational act of the French emancipation in 1791 nor the long and diversified path of the nineteenth-century German development succeeded in the long term. The full emancipation of the Jews in France did not occur in 1791, but in 1831 with the French government's decision to pay the salaries of rabbis, just as it was already paying the salaries of Catholic and Protestant clergy. Moreover, the outbreak of the Dreyfus affair in 1894 shows that problems persisted. In Germany, complete emancipation came about only after 1871, but after one or two generations, as shown, for example, by the *Judenzählung*, or Jewish census, ordered by the Prussian army in 1916, Jewish emancipation was once again put in doubt. Perhaps neither of the two models was ever likely to be successful. To be sure, they ushered in some positive results, but they also gave rise to many illusions.

In conclusion, we might be able to illuminate this unfortunate double history by returning to eighteenth-century Berlin and Paris. When the German-Jewish spy Benjamin Veitel Ephraim travelled from Berlin to Paris, he went with a secret mission: to try to understand the French Revolution in order to explain it to the Prussian king upon his return.[13] He was arrested in Paris and spent a few days in jail as an "agent du Roi de Prusse". When he returned to Berlin, he was again arrested, and this time he was accused of being a "Jacobin". He came from the upper crust of *Haskalah* society, and as someone fluent in French, he had translated Montesquieu, and he was familiar with international economic thought. He was ultimately too enlightened, or too French, for German society, yet he remained too German in the eyes of the French.

[13] Bourel, 'Ephraïm: un espion juif allemand sous la Révolution', *Yod*, nos. 27–28 (1989), pp. 81–91.

Perrine Simon-Nahum

Wissenschaft des Judentums in Germany and the Science of Judaism in France in the Nineteenth Century: Tradition and Modernity in Jewish Scholarship

In examining the problem of the relationship between tradition and modernity among the members of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* movement we are immediately struck by a paradox. Throughout the nineteenth century Jews never ceased to invoke modernity, either to celebrate it for having bestowed emancipation in France, or to demand the equivalent political rights in Germany. This debate about Judaism and modernity was accompanied by a reaffirmation of the centrality of religion, which focused on matters connected to religious reform or the intellectual redefinition of Judaism. The scholarly relationship to biblical texts, and for that matter traditional texts in general, constituted one of the principal angles by which Jews would seek to negotiate their entry into the modern world. This issue was all the more essential in that the modernity that emerged out of German university circles in the early nineteenth century emphasised philosophy and especially the critical study of texts. Philology became the principal means of rearticulating the Jewish past. The Jewish practitioners of *Wissenschaft*, who themselves were trained in German universities, applied the philological and critical criteria they had learned at German universities to the study of their own tradition, including its central text – the Hebrew Bible.

The study of texts thus became a principal avenue by which Jews sought to enter modernity in the early nineteenth century, and this trend was reflected in the biographies of the members of the *Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden* (Society for Culture and Science among Jews), founded in 1819. After having spent their youths studying in traditional talmudic schools, these young Jewish intellectuals now took up courses in the departments of philosophy or classical studies at the best German universities, such as Berlin or Göttingen.[1] To be sure, this encounter be-

[1] Monika Richarz, *Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe: Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678–1848,* Tübingen 1974; Ismar Schorsch, *From Text to Context: The Turn to History in Modern Judaism,* Hanover, NH 1994, pp. 51–70. See also Uriel Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany: Religion, Politics and Ideology in the Second Reich, 1870–1914,* Ithaca 1975; Shulamit Volkov, *Jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Zehn Essays,* München 1990; Nahum N. Glatzer, 'The Beginnings of Modern Jewish Studies', in Alexander Altmann (ed.), *Studies in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Intellectual History,* Cambridge, MA 1964, pp. 27–45; Abraham Geiger, *Abraham Geiger and Liberal Judaism: The Challenge of the Nineteenth Century*, ed. and intro. by

tween general philosophical thought and Judaism was not a new phenomenon in Judaism. Philo of Alexandria had already borrowed from the Neoplatonists, and Maimonides had belonged to a school of Aristotelianism that had blossomed in the Arab Muslim world between the tenth and the twelfth centuries. Moreover, medieval Jewish exegesis had never been closed to the hermeneutic methods used by Christian scholars.[2]

Two features characterised the new relationship of *Wissenschaft* scholars to the text, both of which came to define modernity in the context of the nineteenth century. First, *Wissenschaft* scholars borrowed the methods of textual exegesis from non-Jewish religious philology and even from classical philology, and they henceforth established a rupture between theology and science that had not previously existed, even during the Enlightenment. Second, by focusing so much attention on this rupture, the *Wissenschaft* movement succeeded in modifying the status of the biblical text without undermining its centrality.

Haskalah and the Bible

The novelty of *Wissenschaft's* relationship to the biblical text becomes even clearer when we consider that the *maskilim*, in demanding the entry of Jews into the modern world, had already reflected a great deal on the role traditional texts would play in rearticulating Judaism so as to make it suitable for the modern age. For the *maskilim*, the goal was to harmonise Jewish hermeneutic principles with the philosophical demands of the Enlightenment, as set forth by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing in 1780 in his *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (The Education of Humanity). That the *Haskalah*'s principal representative, Moses Mendelssohn, was also the translator of the Pentateuch highlights this trend. The aim of Mendelssohn's translation was simultaneously scientific and apologetic.[3] Convinced that German Enlightenment philosophy was fully compatible with Judaism, Mendelssohn embraced the philosophy of Friedrich August Wolf, which emphasised natural religion. For Jews, Men-

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Max Wiener, trans. by Ernst J. Schlochauer, Philadelphia 1962; Susannah Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*, Chicago 1998; Céline Trautmann-Waller, *Philologie allemande et tradition juive: Le parcours intellectuel de Leopold Zunz,* Paris 1998; Perrine Simon-Nahum, *La Cité investie: La 'Science du judaïsme' français et la République*, Paris 1991; Roland Goetschel, 'Aux origines de la modernité juive: Zacharias Frankel (1801–1875) et l'école historico-critique', *Pardès*, nos. 19–20, 1994, pp. 107–132.

[2] Julius Guttman, *Philosophies of Judaism: A History of Jewish Philosophy from Biblical Times to Franz Rosenzweig*, New York 1964; Amos Funkenstein, *Theology and Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century*, Princeton 1986; Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, Berkeley 1993; Stephen D. Benin, *The Footprints of God: Divine Accommodation in Jewish and Christian Thought*, Albany 1993.

[3] Alexander Altmann, *Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study*, Philadelphia 1973; Moshe Pelli, *The Age of Haskalah: Studies in Hebrew Literature of the Enlightenment in Germany,* Leiden 1979; David Sorkin, *Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment*, Berkeley 1996; and Sorkin, *The Berlin Haskalah and German Religious Thought: Orphans of Knowledge*, London 2000.

delssohn's translation of the Pentateuch had pedagogical utility, since they considered Luther's translation of the Bible pernicious because of its christological overtones. Thus, for Mendelssohn, his Bible translation and commentary served two purposes: on the one hand, these works encouraged the regeneration of the Jews, and on the other hand, they demonstrated to Christians that Judaism, even more than Christianity, was the principal bearer of rational philosophy.

Mendelssohn's philosophic work, however, continued to rely on Jewish tradition, and its exegetical method drew extensively on medieval Jewish homiletic works. For Mendelssohn, the Hebrew Bible remained a revealed text that embodied not only the essence of Judaism but also the moral principles of practical philosophy. Mendelssohn gave particular emphasis to *halakhah*, or Jewish law; he regarded the granting of the law to the Israelites at Mount Sinai as a sign that they had been chosen by God to serve as a priestly nation. Mendelssohn's philosophical views determined his definition of the purpose of exegesis. Since the Bible consisted above all of practical knowledge, translators and exegetes were obliged to reproduce it as faithfully as possible. On this issue, Mendelssohn relied on Judah Halevi's idea that the Bible was intended to be oral, and that even after it was written down, the Hebrew language, in contrast to all other languages, retained its original oral quality. It was this belief that led Mendelssohn to rely exclusively on the Masoretic text for his translation. In the final analysis, Mendelssohn remained an Enlightenment thinker in that he used history to support the authenticity of the biblical text without attempting to place the text within its broader historical context.

Philology, Hermeneutics and Wissenschaft

The view of the biblical text forged by the practitioners of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* marked a significant break from the view propounded by Mendelssohn and the other *maskilim*. Whereas the *Haskalah* had relied on medieval Jewish exegetical practices, *Wissenschaft* reconstructed the biblical text according to modern hermeneutic principles derived from Protestant biblical criticism, and especially the critical philology of F.A. Wolf. What distinguished this form of Jewish exegesis from earlier ones that had also borrowed from non-Jewish traditions is that in this case, for the first time, these external principles were held in higher esteem than the principles inherited from Jewish tradition.

The consequences of this development were not solely intellectual. With the introduction of the philological method, the biblical text was no longer perceived primarily as the guarantor of ethical behaviour. Rather, what now became most important was the role of the biblical interpreter, who became a sort of symbol of the Jewish attitude towards modernity. In this way, a scientific ethic replaced a religious one.[4] From now on, the major task would consist of showing that the message of the

[4] Josef Simon, 'Philosophie critique et Ecriture sainte', *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, no. 4, Oct.-Dec. 2000, pp. 441–460.

Hebrew Bible could survive the assault of philological criticism without ceding any of its value, just as classical Greek texts, whether Homer or the Greek tragedies, continued to serve as aesthetic models for the literary elite in modern times. The effort to live up to the moral demands of the Bible, which had always been regarded as the core of Judaism, was now supplanted by the intellectual effort to understand the biblical text through philological criticism.

The application of modern philological interpretative techniques and methods to biblical exegesis thus had a profound impact on Jewish society as a whole. The principal break with the past consisted of conceding the human authorship of the Bible. An emphasis on the subjectivity of both the interpreter and the author of the text allowed a modern philological system of hermeneutics to develop among Jewish scholars. If the idea of a divine author filtered through a human interpreter had already been present in Jewish exegesis, the divinity of the author precluded any in-depth questioning of the text's meaning. If the text remained unclear or contradictory, these problems were ascribed to the limitations of the human intellect. In addition to the belief in the human authorship of the Bible, the hermeneutic principles developed by Friedrich Schleiermacher, which had a profound influence on all subsequent biblical interpretation, further upset traditional Jewish modes of reading and interpreting the biblical text.[5]

The approach of the *Wissenschaft* movement to biblical texts was therefore influenced by critical philology and Protestant hermeneutics. Both of these borrowings, however, required major redefinitions of Judaism. From the perspective of critical philology, the first task of *Wissenschaft* consisted of reintegrating ancient Judaism into the existing landscape of civilisations worthy of scientific study. Classical antiquity, as Wolf defined its scope in his 1807 work *Darstellung des Altertums* (The Story of Antiquity) was limited to Greek and Roman antiquity, both of which were simultaneously represented as aspects of universal history as well as self-contained entities in and of themselves.[6] Only the Greeks and Romans, according to Wolf, incarnated the true "culture of the mind", of which the Hebrews and the Christians carried only the seeds.

In the more philosophical conception developed by August Boeckh in his *Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften* (1816), Christianity and Judaism were, by contrast, reintegrated into the course of universal history, which, ac-

[5] Friedrich Schleiermacher, 'L'Herméneutique repose sur le fait (*Factum*) de la non-compréhension du discours', in F.D.E. Schleiermacher, *Herméneutique*, Paris 1987, p. 73. (For the English edition, see Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings*, trans. and ed. by Andrew Bowie, Cambridge, UK 1998.)

[6] Friedrich August Wolf, *Darstellung des Alterthumswissenschaft nach Begriff, Umfang, Zweck und Wert*, Berlin 1985. See also F.A. Wolf, *Prolegomena to Homer*, trans., intro. and annotated by Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most and James E.G. Zetzel, Princeton 1985. On the history of classical scholarship, see John Edwin Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, 3 vols, Cambridge, UK 1903–1908; Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *History of Classical Scholarship*, trans. by Alan Harris, ed. by Hugh Lloyd-Jones, London 1982; Rudolf Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship from 1300 to 1850*, Oxford 1976.

cording to Boeckh, included "ancient and modern, oriental and occidental, Greek, Roman, Indian, Hebrew and other philologies".[7]

Another of Boeckh's central ideas adopted by the *Wissenschaft* movement was that philology represented the history of the Idea as incarnated in historical phenomena. This concept permitted the *Wissenschaft* movement to respond to the greatest challenge posed by German philosophy: how to reconcile the universal and the particular. Boeckh in essence presented a link between contingent historical phenomena and the philosophical ideas they incarnated, without, however, presenting them in a dialectical relationship that could be resolved only through the transcendence of this relationship itself. Although the reconciliation between philosophical ideas and earthly events could never be completely realised, the task of philology was to effect this reconciliation in an effort to approximate the truth to the greatest extent possible. In contrast to the Hegelian dialectic, the meaning of earthly or historical phenomena, according to Boeckh, could never be understood in and of themselves.

The construction of the Science of Judaism revived the architectonics put into practice by Boeckh in his *Enzyklopädie*. It is in light of this work that we should reconsider two of the fundamental texts of the *Wissenschaft* movement: Immanuel Wolf's *Über den Begriff einer Wissenschaft des Judentums* (On the Concept of a Science of Judaism) (1822),[8] and Leopold Zunz's 1818 pamphlet *Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur* (On Rabbinic Literature).[9] Although the construction of these two texts has always been somewhat obscure, they become considerably clearer when seen in relation to Boeckh's *Enzyklopädie*.

From a contemporary perspective, Wolf's emphasis on the interdisciplinary nature of knowledge is striking in its modernity and its conception of history. Even though it could not claim philosophical distinction, Wolf's essay nevertheless revealed a considerable depth of knowledge. First of all, Wolf highlighted the relationship between the Science of Judaism and the diverse academic disciplines in general, which taken together represented an encyclopaedic organisation of knowledge. Furthermore, the Science of Judaism was also based on the notion that the relationship between the whole and its individual parts was a sort of hermeneutic circle. Hence, the Science of Judaism felt compelled to study the external manifestations of Jewish life from both synchronic and diachronic perspectives before carrying out an examination of Jewish intellectual life. As Wolf explained, "events are only manifes-

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[7] August Boeckh, *Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften*, Leipzig 1877. For the quote see the English translation: Boeckh, *On Interpretation and Criticism*, trans. and ed. by John Paul Pritchard, Norman 1968, p. 19.

[8] Immanuel Wolf, 'Über den Begriff einer Wissenschaft des Judentums', in *Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, vol. 1, no. 1, Berlin 1823, pp. 5–24. For the English translation, see I. Wolf, 'On the Concept of a Science of Judaism', trans. by Lionel E. Kochan, *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 2 (1957), pp. 194–204.

[9] Leopold Zunz, 'Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur nebst Nachrichten über ein altes bis jetzt ungedrucktes hebräisches Werk', in Zunz, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 3 vols, Berlin 1875–1876, vol. 1, pp. 1–31. On Zunz, see Michael A. Meyer, *The Origins of the Modern Jew*, Detroit 1979, pp. 144–182; Schorsch, *From Text to Context*, passim.

tations of the moving and developing spirit".[10] This cyclical construction, which Boeckh described in terms of "centre" and "periphery",[11] was utilised by Wolf in order to demonstrate Judaism's central role in the history of the human spirit. If this link between historical events and the Idea did not exist, Wolf claimed, "universal history would appear to be only an aggregate of isolated facts, a multitude of varied individual events in which bloody conflicts, intrepid conquests and miraculous accidents take on the greatest importance".[12] Moreover, Wolf identified the Idea with the Jewish concept of monotheism, which he believed was alive and constantly evolving. Thus for Wolf, Judaism continued to play a critical role in universal history even after the advent of Christianity, whereas for Hegel Judaism represented only an early stage in the historical development of the Idea that was superseded with the advent of Christianity. Moreover, *Wissenschaft* embraced Boeckh's methodology as well as his conception of the relationship between historical events and the universal. Indeed, Wolf took Boeckh's ideas to another level in putting forth the notion that the central Idea of Judaism was the absolute unity of Everything.

In addition to the theory of the human authorship of the Bible, *Wissenschaft* also borrowed the Protestant emphasis on myth, which had been introduced into the reading of the Old Testament by Christian Gottlob Heyne and the Göttingen School and was subsequently elaborated upon by Johann Gottfried Eichhorn in his *Einleitung ins Alte Testament* (Introduction to the Old Testament) (1780–1783).[13] It was this theory that allowed Zunz to treat the historical "monuments" of biblical history prior to the Babylonian Exile as myths, comparable to the Homeric poems or the epic tales of other civilisations. This theory of myth broke with traditional Jewish interpretations of the Bible as a historical narrative of real events that reflected the moral progress of the Hebrew people. Historical evolution was now to be explained not as the continuous striving of the Hebrew people to achieve moral perfection in order to live according to God's commandments, but rather as the evolution of the Idea in and of itself.

The Legacy of Wissenschaft

How should we interpret the radical innovation introduced by *Wissenschaft* in the reading of traditional Jewish texts? With respect to its scholarly impact, *Wissenschaft*

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[10] Immanuel Wolf, 'On the Concept of a Science of Judaism', p. 200.

[11] According to Boeckh, "The only correct method is cyclical, in which everything leads back to the center and proceeds in all directions from this center toward periphery". Boeckh, *On Interpretation and Criticism*, p. 33.

[12] Wolf, 'On the Concept of a Science of Judaism', p. 200.

[13] Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, *Einleitung ins Alte Testament*, 5 vols., Göttingen 1820–1823 (2nd ed.). For the English translation see Eichhorn, *Introduction to the Study of the Old Testament*, trans. by G.T. Gollop, London 1888. See also Otto Eisfeldt, *The Old Testament: An Introduction*, Oxford 1965; Brevard Shilds, *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture*, London 1979; John Rogerson, *Old Testament Criticism in the Nineteenth Century: England and Germany*, London 1984.

enjoyed enormous success. By introducing the idea that Judaism continued to play a vital and creative role into the modern era, *Wissenschaft* stimulated an enormous body of scholarship throughout the nineteenth century. In terms of its broader popular influence, however, *Wissenschaft* in many respects remained marginal. Historians have often viewed the marginality of the movement as stemming from the apologetic and supposedly ahistorical nature of its scholarship, thus suggesting that the movement failed to realise its ideals. If, however, we see the movement as an extension and a Jewish adaptation of Boeckh's philology, *Wissenschaft* can be exonerated of these accusations.

Wissenschaft des Judentums can be defined as a system of literary hermeneutics that constructs a scientific object, namely Judaism, as a "text". In this sense, the movement's work on the Hebrew language and Hebraic literature indisputably led to scholarly advances, most notably the works of Zunz and Moritz Steinschneider. In *Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur*, Zunz had already expressed the concept that would animate his entire life's work, namely the fact that the history of the cultural development of the Idea was essentially identical to the history of language and literature. Thus, according to Zunz, the notion of "rabbinic literature" ought to be understood more as a concept than as a chronological description of a particular historical era, namely the Middle Ages. For Zunz, who regarded history as the development of language rather than the history of events, rabbinic literature designated the period between the biblical period, based on the study of Hebrew biblical texts, which he regarded as myths, and modern European literature, which began with the Humanism of the Renaissance. The task he assigned to Hebraic philology was the same one Boeckh had assigned to philology in general. For Zunz language constituted the chief unifying principle of research. The study of language was first of all the history of literary forms, next a history of grammatical interpretations, and finally a history of the formation of language itself. As such, the study of Hebrew could no longer be restricted to homiletic and poetical genres. Zunz's outline of the history of language borrowed from the theory of myth, according to which literary genres characterized the successive stages in the development of civilization. Similarly, Zunz regarded Aramaic not only as an auxiliary to the interpretation of biblical texts, but rather as the missing link in the study of the history of language. Thus, the study of the Hebrew and Aramaic languages for Zunz did not constitute a discrete branch of knowledge; rather, he perceived it as the equivalent of what philology in general meant to Boeckh, that is, it represented the highest level of knowledge.

The accusation that *Wissenschaft* scholarship was ahistorical collapses if one approaches *Wissenschaft* scholarship from a hermeneutic rather than a historical perspective. Once we understand that for these scholars the term "history" signified not the history of worldly events, but rather the history of the cultural manifestations of the Idea, *Wissenschaft* scholarship appears to have fulfilled its mission. Can one blame Jewish scholars for not having fulfilled the program F.A. Wolf had laid out for critical philology, when German philologists themselves fell short of this goal? Nineteenth-century German philologists never furnished a "critical philology" in F.A. Wolf's sense of providing a history of philological interpretations.

Rather, they created only a technical philology, on the one hand, and a philosophy of hermeneutics, on the other. If we read the works of the *Wissenschaft* movement against this broader background, we begin to understand why there is such a vast chasm between the scholarly erudition of the movement, reflected by the huge amount of primary source material it assembled, and the movement's philosophical desire to comprehend the "essence of Judaism" by focusing on the philology of the Hebrew language. Ultimately, however, the members of this movement never succeeded in linking their scholarly erudition to their more abstract philosophical aspirations.

The Science of Judaism in France

The Science of Judaism in France arose from the desire of Jewish intellectuals to reconcile the academic study of Judaism with the fact of political emancipation. With the exceptions of Samuel Cahen and Adolphe Franck, all *Wissenschaft* scholars in France were native Germans or descendants of Jews who had come to France from Germany to pursue careers denied them in their native land because of their Jewish birth.[14] If one acknowledges that *Wissenschaft's* relation to modernity was defined by its interpretation of ancient Jewish texts, a project that was inspired by Protestant hermeneutics, as well as its use of a historical model heavily informed by German Idealism, the differences between the French Science of Judaism and its German counterpart become readily understandable.

The Intellectual Context

The context of French Jewish life was completely different from that in Germany. In a famous letter to Friedrich Schiller on June 23, 1798, Wilhelm von Humboldt disparaged the capacity of French intellectuals to conceptualise and think critically. Despite the efforts of Charles de Villers, one of the great figures of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, who sought to introduce the philosophical writings of Immanuel Kant to the French public, Kant's work in France was quickly reduced to academic philosophy or spiritualism.[15] Victor Cousin's reading of Kant understood criticism as an analysis of the faculties of the mind, without perceiving the theoretical importance Kant assigned to *a priori* forms of intuition. For Cousin, the challenge posed by Kant's philosophy was to define Reason without denying its psychological dimension or abandoning the experimental method.

In the philosophical realm, Cousin's counterpart in the study of ancient religions was Joseph-Daniel Guigniaut, the translator of Friedrich Creuzer's six-volume

[14] Jay R. Berkovitz, *The Shaping of Jewish Identity in Nineteenth-Century France*, Detroit 1989.

[15] See François Azouvi and Dominique Bourel, *De Königsberg à Paris: La réception de Kant en France (1788–1804)*, Paris 1991; Bourel, 'Les Premiers pas de Kant en France', in *La Réception de la philosophie allemande en France au xixe et xxe siècles*, Lille 1994, pp. 11–25.

Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen (1819–1823), which was published in France between 1825 and 1851 and exercised a profound influence there on the development of classical studies during the second half of the nineteenth century.[16] Guigniaut inserted Creuzer's translation into a larger framework in which a multitude of civilisations participated in a philosophical syncretism that forged the history of the human spirit.[17] According to Cousin's philosophy, history was conceived as the process by which thought was detached from feeling, by which humankind moved from a state of spontaneity to one of reflection. Myth, according to Cousin, thus corresponded to the period of the spontaneity of the human spirit as opposed to subsequent ages governed by reason and reflection. It was therefore Cousin's conception of antiquity into which Science of Judaism scholars in France sought to integrate their own reflections on Judaism.

The Universalism of the French Science of Judaism

Since the prestige of philology in France was not linked to its status among the other scholarly disciplines but rather to the status of the subject of study, the French members of the Science of Judaism were unable to legitimate the scientific study of Judaism in the same manner as their German counterparts. They could not claim to be conducting legitimate scholarly work simply by submitting Jewish texts to philological analysis. Instead, they first had to acquire an institutional legitimacy by validating a general historical view of the development of civilisations into which they could then integrate the study of Judaism. They had to surmount the paradox of appearing to carry out Cousinian science while actually applying opposing principles. The difficulty resided in the need to demonstrate the highly developed rather than archaic nature of ancient Judaism, while simultaneously claiming that the principles upon which ancient Judaism had been based remained valid in the nineteenth century.

Hence there arose the necessity of identifying ancient Judaism with values that corresponded to modern liberal French political ideas, a view directly opposed to Cousin's scheme regarding the historical development of civilizations. The way in which French Jewish scholars accomplished this end was by stressing the idea of monotheism, which they defined as a historical versus a philosophical concept. The French Jewish scholars involved in the Science of Judaism set out to prove that the texts of ancient Jewish civilization, just as much as the texts of classical Greece or Rome, reflected "an aesthetic, moral, or political ideal",[18] and therefore constituted

[16] Friedrich Creuzer, *Religions de l'Antiquité*, trans. by J.D. Guigniaut, 2 vols., Paris 1825, vol. 2.

[17] See Pierre Judet de la Combe, 'The Philological Argument over Myth: The Terms of a Debate in Germany and France at the Beginning of the Last Century', *Revue Germanique*, vol. 4, 1995, pp. 59–67.

[18] Judet de la Combe, 'Champ universitaire et études homériques', in Mayotte Bollack and Heinz Wismann, (eds.), *Philologie et herméneutique*, Göttingen 1984, pp. 25–60, esp. p. 39. See also Victor Cousin's essay, 'Du premier et du dernier fait de conscience, ou de la spontanéité et de la réflexion', (1818), reprinted in Victor Cousin, *Fragments philosophiques*, Paris 1826.

an integral element of the classical tradition that continued to be relevant into the modern period.

This rift in France between literature and philology, inherited from the seventeenth-century quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns, who denied institutional recognition to the study of sacred texts, corresponded to an ideological battle between two political camps. On the one hand, those who emphasised philology were republicans, believers in progress and German scientific methods, and they were identified with Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris. On the other hand, those who rejected philology were, for the most part, advocates of French classicism. This explains why the Science of Judaism movement in France treated language completely differently than its counterpart in Germany. The French scholars of the Science of Judaism refused to adopt a hermeneutic stance that considered language to be the reflection of a particular stage of social or political development. French Jews thoroughly acknowledged Guigniaut's demand to take into account the historical distance that separated the interpreter of a text from the text being studied. What then became intelligible in the text was no longer its literary form, but rather the historical conditions surrounding its creation. What an ancient text would therefore reveal would either be a positivist historical reading or a completely allegorical reading, but never a hermeneutic reading. Ancient literary and sacred texts were therefore merely the subjective translation of the historical context out of which they had arisen.

As Pierre Judet de la Combe has illustrated, Guigniaut's undertaking was expanded in the 1860s to include the study of literature as a whole, and not simply mythology.[19] With this broad definition of Science, Jewish scholars began to embrace a single goal: to apply the universal principles of scientific study to all fields of Jewish creativity without distinction: literature, religion and the political evolution of ancient Israel.[20] Seen from this perspective, this effort resembles the goal of the German practitioners of *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. In reality, however, the French Jewish scholars' perception of the relationship between the universal and the particular reflected a very different way of thinking. Entrusted with the task of assuring the continued vitality of Judaism in nineteenth-century France, the concept of the Universal embraced by French Jewish scholars depicted Judaism as the direct ancestor of the western spirit; one could even say – paradoxically – the Christian spirit. Here we can begin to see the origin of James Darmesteter's late nineteenth-century theory of prophetism, which he defined as the modern social and political expression of the ethical values originally expressed by ancient Judaism.[21] Hence, as a result of the completely different intellectual and political conditions that shaped

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[19] Judet de la Combe, 'Champ universitaire'.

[20] See, for instance, Adolphe Franck, *Etudes orientales,* Paris 1861; Franck, *Nouvelles études orientales,* Paris 1896; Joseph Derenbourg, *Essai sur l'histoire et la géographie de la Palestine d'après les Thalmuds et les autres sources rabbiniques,* Paris 1867, part 1; Joseph Halévy, *Mélanges de critique et d'histoire relatifs aux peuples sémitiques*, Paris 1883.

[21] James Darmesteter, *Essais orientaux*, Paris 1883; Darmesteter, *Les Prophètes d'Israël*, Paris 1892.

the emergence of the Science of Judaism in France and Germany, Jewish scholars in both countries developed different notions of the proper relationship between the modern Jewish scholar and ancient Jewish texts and even different notions regarding modernity itself.

Comment by Nils Roemer

A comparison of French and German-Jewish historiographies runs the risk of essentialising their postulated homogenous natures. Which points in their respective developments should we compare? Can we examine the origins of these historiographical schools and assume that we grasp the "kernel" out of which they ultimately developed? Simon-Nahum takes this path and looks in particular at the *Verein für die Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden* (Society for the Culture and Science of the Jews), created in 1819, and at Leopold Zunz (1794–1886). Without debating the importance of the Verein, we have to remember that German-Jewish *Wissenschaft* remained a highly dynamic and evolving entity that had numerous starting points. The Verein at its inception comprised multiple and divergent voices, such as the second-generation *maskil* Lazarus Bendavid, the Hegelian Eduard Gans and the *Altertumswissenschaftler* Zunz. Isaak Jost, for example, who remained influential in German-Jewish scholarship until the 1850s, participated in the Verein for only a short period, while most of the other members abandoned Jewish scholarship after the Verein's demise in 1824. In retrospect, the Verein appears to be a point of origin, but it was barely a beginning. When Heinrich Graetz composed his *Construction der jüdischen Geschichte* (*The Structure of Jewish History*) in 1846, he named numerous thinkers and scholars, including Joseph Salvador, but he did not refer to the Verein.[1]

Simon-Nahum places the Hebrew Bible at the centre of *Wissenschaft*'s engagement with the past. However, during the first decades of the nineteenth century, German-Jewish historians like Zunz and Jost reconstructed the Jewish post-biblical past in order to promote contemporary social, cultural and religious transformations of German Jewry. These scholars' lachrymose historical accounts documented a continuous process of decline caused by persecutions and expulsions, but they were not at first particularly interested in a scholarly study of the Bible. Nevertheless, Simon-Nahum's contention seems particularly pertinent to French-Jewish historians. Whereas German-Jewish scholarship focused mostly on the Second Temple period onwards and remained apprehensive about engaging in biblical criticism, Joseph Salvador and Léon Halévy wrote about the biblical period already during the 1820s.[2] Focusing on biblical Jewish history helped these authors illustrate Ju-

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[1] Nils Roemer (ed.), *Heinrich Graetz: Die Construction der jüdischen Geschichte*, Düsseldorf 2000. For an English translation, see Heinrich Graetz, *The Structure of Jewish History and Other Essays*, trans., ed. and intro. by Ismar Schorsch, New York 1975.

[2] Joseph Salvador, *Le Loi de Moises ou systeme religieux et politique des Hébreux*, Paris 1822; Léon Halévy, *Résumé de l'histoire des Juifs anciens*, Paris 1825.

daism's universal significance. Their idealised biblical Judaism functioned as a blueprint for a still unachieved future. Infused with Saint-Simonism, Salvador and Halévy highlighted Judaism's universalism and contended that the medieval and modern Christian churches had deviated from their original path.[3] The difference between German and French Jewish historiography is further illustrated by the fact that German-Jewish discussions of the biblical period as well as the formulation of the mission theory depended at times on Salvador, whose work was translated into German during the 1830s and 1840s.[4]

Simon-Nahum presents philology as the second characteristic feature of *Wissenschaft*. Whatever the importance of philology in modern Jewish Studies, it did not establish a lasting split between theology and science, as Simon-Nahum postulates. Zunz and Moritz Steinschneider indeed championed a radical secular approach, but by and large to no avail. Abraham Geiger and Heinrich Graetz, as well as the next generation of Jewish historians like Gustav Karpeles and Marcus Brann, inserted theology into their historical accounts most clearly in the way they subscribed to the mission theory. By the end of the nineteenth century, Jewish historians, educators and religious leaders promoted Jewish scholarship as a means of strengthening a religious Jewish identity in France and Germany. As Moritz Lazarus, the Jewish philosopher and professor at the *Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums* (College for the Science of Judaism), stated in his keynote lecture in 1894, 'What is and to What End Does One Study Jewish History?', "we Jews devote ourselves to the history of Judaism for no other reason than to be good Jews".[5] Likewise, Rabbi Zadoc Kahn, who served as Chief Rabbi of Paris and later of France, asserted in an afterword to the French translation of Graetz's *Geschichte der Juden* (History of the Jews) that "nothing attaches the Jews more to their religion than a profound knowledge of their past ...".[6]

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[3] Aron Rodrigue, 'Halévy and French Jewish Historiography', in Elisheva Carlebach, John M. Efron and David N. Myers (eds.), *Jewish History and Jewish Memory: Essays in Honor of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi*, Hannover, NH 1998, pp. 413–425; Michael Graetz, *The Jews in Nineteenth-Century France: From the French Revolution to the Alliance Israélite Universelle*, trans. by Jane Marie Todd, Stanford 1996, pp. 135–142 and 161–193; Perrine Simon-Nahum, *La Cité investie: La "Science du judaisme" français et la République*, Paris 1991; Jay R. Berkovitz, 'Jewish Scholarship and Identity in Nineteenth-Century France', *Modern Judaism*, vol. 18 (1998), pp. 1–33.

[4] Joseph Salvador, *Geschichte der mosaischen Institutionen und des jüdischen Volks*, Hamburg 1836; Joseph Salvador, *Geschichte der Römerherrschaft in Judäa und der Zerstörung Jerusalems*, trans. by Ludwig Eichler, Bremen 1847; 'Salvadors Geschichte der mosaischen Institutionen', *Der Israelit des 19. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 1 (1840), pp. 45–48, 115–120; 'Auszüge: Mitteilungen über Salvador', *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* (AZJ), vol. 3 (1839), pp. 264–284; 'Einige Literaturbriefe', AZJ, vol. 11 (1847), pp. 605–608 and 673–675. For the mutual influence, see Michel Espagne, *Les Juifs allemands de Paris à l'époque de Heine: La Translation ashkenaze*, Paris 1996; and Dominique Bourel, *Minderheiten als Kulturvermittler zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich*, Stuttgart 1999.

[5] Moritz Lazarus, *Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man jüdische Geschichte und Litteratur? Ein Vortrag*, Leipzig 1900, p. 38.

[6] H. Graetz, *Histoire des Juifs*, 5 vols., Paris 1882–1897, vol. 5, pp. i-vi, esp. p. v.

In respect to Victor Cousin's influence, Simon-Nahum stresses that Jewish historiography in France appealed more clearly to a universal framework and attributed to Judaism a pivotal role in the emergence of the Western World. Yet the attempt to show Judaism's universal significance by emphasising the Jewish idea of monotheism, the role of Jews as translators during the Middle Ages, the *Hebraica Veritas* in the Reformation and last but not least the significance of Baruch Spinoza for modern philosophy, was also common to German-Jewish historiography. For Heinrich Heine, for example, it was still incumbent upon Europe to follow the model of Judaism: "The rest of Europe too raises itself to the level of the Jews. I say raises itself – for even in the beginning the Jews bore within them the modern principles which only now are visibly unfolding among the nations of Europe". Heine was no exception, but Graetz happily quoted this passage at length.[7]

Nevertheless, Simon-Nahum's assertion regarding the importance of universalism in French-Jewish historiography may help to explain its dominance in the study of Jewish philosophy.[8] Moreover, it seems that whereas Zunz and Steinschneider struggled in vain to place the study of the Jewish past within a comparative framework, Salomon Munk in France had more success. He studied Palestine as a space of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, whereas Zunz and Graetz elaborated on its Jewish topography and Jewish travellers.[9] German-Jewish historians by and large devoted themselves to comparative studies mostly to contrast, but rarely to discuss, aspects of Jewish history as cross-religious or cross-cultural phenomena.

Beyond these similarities and dissimilarities, German-Jewish historiography differed from French-Jewish scholarship as it developed, especially from the 1850s to the 1870s in Germany, along the path of modern religious reform. Compared to France, therefore, *Wissenschaft* in Germany became more contested and fragmented. Although the *Jüdisch-Theologische Seminar*, the *Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums* and the *Rabbiner Seminar für das Orthodoxe Judentum* were all rabbinical seminaries, they nevertheless became institutions of Jewish scholarship early on. In contrast, the *Ecole rabbinique*, first established in Metz and transferred to Paris in 1859, where its name was changed to *Seminaire Israélite*, began to produce mod-

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[7] H. Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart: Aus den Quellen neu bearbeitet*, 11 vols., Leipzig 1853–1874, vol. 11, p. 401. For the English translation quoted here, see Frederic Ewen (ed.), *The Poetry and Prose of Heinrich Heine*, New York 1948, p. 678.

[8] Salomon Munk introduced the term "Jewish philosophy" in his *La Philosophie chez les Juifs*, Paris 1849, which was translated into German by Bernhard Beer and appeared as *Philosophie und philosophische Schriftsteller der Juden*, Leipzig 1852.

[9] Salmon Munk, *Palestine: Description géographique, historique, et achéologique*, Paris 1845, pp. 1–2. This work appeared in German as Munk, *Palästina, geographische, historische und archäologische Beschreibung dieses Landes und kurze Geschichte seiner hebräischen und jüdischen Bewohner*, ed. by Moritz Abraham Levy, Leipzig 1871. In comparison, see Leopold Zunz, 'Geographische Literatur der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis zum Jahre 1841', and 'Zur Palästinischen Geographie, aus jüdischen Quellen', *Gesammelte Schriften*, 3 vols., Berlin 1875–1876, vol. 1, pp. 146–216, and vol. 2, pp. 265–304; and H. Graetz, 'Zur Topographie Palästinas', *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums* (MGWJ), vol. 31 (1882), pp. 4–23.

ern scholarship on a large scale only at the end of the nineteenth century, since the true centre of French-Jewish scholarship was the university.[10]

Moreover, German-Jewish scholarship was publicly more visible and became a central component of the German-Jewish subculture. A Jewish scientific and literary society in Paris during the 1860s folded after it had published a few volumes of Heinrich Graetz's *Geschichte.*[11] When the work was fully translated into French only in the 1880s and 1890s, the publication still depended on private donations.[12] By comparison, in Germany, Graetz's *Geschichte* had become, like other works of Jewish scholarship, a commodity that sold quite well.

Finally, the relationship between French and German-Jewish scholarship became increasingly shaped by nationalism, as evidenced by the clash between Abraham Geiger and Joseph Derenbourg during the 1870s, in the wake of the German-French War.[13] French and German patriotism not only widened the gap between the two scholarly camps but also resulted in the respective scholars devoting themselves in an unprecedented fashion to the study of German and French-Jewish history.[14] In particular, French-Jewish scholars saw themselves in opposition to their German counterparts.[15] When in 1879 Rabbi Zadoc Kahn founded the *Société des Etudes Juives,* French scholars embraced the notion of *Wissenschaft:* "We are not in the business of making religious propaganda, nor are we aiming at edification". In the same fashion, Kahn announced that the Société would apply itself to all aspects of the Jewish past. Despite this unreserved enchantment with the lore of *Wissenschaft,* Kahn stressed that the Société would pursue patriotic interests in its attempt to create a "French library of Jewish science and literature".[16] Accordingly, the *Revue*

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[10] Phyllis Cohen Albert, *The Modernization of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth Century*, Hannover, NH 1977, pp. 249–252.

[11] H. Graetz, *Sinaï et Golgotha, ou les origines du Judaisme et du Christianisme: suivi d'un examen critique des evangiles anciens et modernes*, trans. and ed. by Maurice Hess, Paris 1867; and H. Graetz, *Les Juifs d'Espagne, 945–1205*, Paris 1872. These works were published by the *Société Scientifique Littéraire Israélite.*

[12] See the concluding remarks by Zadoc Kahn in H. Graetz, *Histoire des Juifs*, 5 vols., Paris 1882–1897, vol. 5, pp. i-vi, esp. p. v.

[13] Ludwig Geiger, *Abraham Geiger: Leben und Lebenswerk*, Berlin 1910, pp. 212–214; Max Wiener, *Abraham Geiger and Liberal Judaism*, trans. by Ernst J. Schochauer, Philadelphia 1962, pp. 88–90.

[14] See, for example, Léon Kahn, *Les Juifs de Paris pendant la Révolution*, Paris 1898; and Israel Lévy, *Histoire des juifs de France*, Paris 1903.

[15] Phyllis Cohen Albert, 'Ethnicity and Jewish Solidarity in Nineteenth-Century France', in Jehuda Reinharz and Daniel Swetschinski (eds.), *Mystics, Philosophers and Politicians: Essays in Honor of Alexander Altmann*, Durham 1982; and Michel Gardaz, 'The Age of Discoveries and Patriotism. James Darmesteter's Assessment of French Orientalism', *Religion*, vol. 30 (2000), pp. 353–365. For the general change in French perceptions of Germany after 1870, see Claude Digeon, *Crise allemande de la pensée française (1870–1914)*, Paris 1959, pp. 535- 537; and on the responses of French Jews, see Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany: The Jews of Alsace and Lorraine*, 1871–1918, Stanford 1988.

[16] 'A Nos lecteurs', *Revue des études juives* (REJ), vol. 1 (1880), pp. v-viii, esp. p. v. The Monatsschrift welcomed this new addition to the world of Jewish scholarship. See 'Revue des études juives', MGWJ, vol. 30 (1881), pp. 459–470.

des études juives aimed to "relieve France of its inferior position" in comparison to German-Jewish scholarship.[17] Concurrently, the *Historische Commission für Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland* (Historical Commission for the History of the Jews in Germany), established in 1885, and later the *Gesamtarchiv der deutschen Juden* (Central Archives of the German Jews), founded in 1905, carried out a similar patriotic task in Germany.[18] Ultimately, this embrace of German and French patriotism by Jewish scholarship in both countries signified both what these two historiographical schools shared and what most divided them.

[17] 'A Nos lecteurs', REJ, p. v.

[18] Joseph Meisl, 'Ha-va'adah ha-historit le-toldot ha-yehudim be-germaniah', *Zion*, vol. 19 (1954), pp. 171–172; Ismar Schorsch, *Jewish Reactions to German Anti-Semitism, 1870–1914*, New York 1972, p. 45; and 'Bericht über die Tätigkeit des Gesamtarchivs der deutschen Juden', *Mitteilungen des Gesamtarchivs der deutschen Juden*, vol. 3 (1911), pp. 55–84.

Richard I. Cohen

Celebrating Integration in the Public Sphere in Germany and France

The increasing openness of the modern age ushered in a temptation for Jews to be at the centre of the cultural, economic and social arena, where politics were played out and where freedom of movement and association were common. Major European cities in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries underwent dramatic changes economically, demographically, structurally and culturally. Physical and economic expansion encouraged the migration of new elements to the city – merchants, intelligentsia, petty traders, public officials and others. Social mobility changed the stratified or quasi-feudal structures as agrarian society waned in most areas. National groups – Slovaks, Romanians, Germans, French, Serbs, Italians, Armenians and Greeks – were on the move looking for more convenient living space. Jews joined this migratory movement, passionately seeking the haven of major cities in Catholic and Protestant Europe. A new milieu with untold possibilities and attractions, a clear departure from restricted and confined living spaces, challenged the previous boundaries between Jews and the surrounding world. In this changing environment, Jews were presented with opportunities for constructing their individual and collective space, a clear hallmark of their growing freedom.

The municipal authorities of those metropolitan centres to which Jews gravitated between the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries gradually removed all regulations on the residential rights of Jews. Toleration became the rule of thumb. As these restrictions were lifted and Jews voluntarily decided where to live in the city, they faced cultural and social problems, such as having to decide where to reside and with whom, how to retain a separate system of values and traditions, and how to shape their public and private space. Should they mask their identity out of a fear of being seen as clannish, or should they embrace their new freedom and associate openly with whomever they desired, whether or not they were Jews? How did Jews use their newfound freedom to build their public and private space? What happened to the former centre of Jewish life – the synagogue – as medieval restrictions on their construction were almost entirely removed?

Urban acculturation reveals that Jews in emancipated Europe were generally not inhibited by fears of appearing clannish. Although they were aware of their visibility, sensed their "otherness" and remained conscious of discrimination, they found inner resources to forge new forms of Jewishness. Residence within the urban space was characterised by hope and energy. Nowhere could this be better

appreciated than in the ways in which Jews affirmed their trust in the public space by constructing imposing houses of worship. By looking at several examples, this essay will concentrate on the ways Jews in Germany and France turned the consecration of new synagogues into significant moments in their respective processes of acculturation. I will argue that these synagogues were not only transmitters of religious and moral messages, but that they figured as significant markers for particular Jewish communities seeking to redefine their identities in their respective countries. The synagogue constituted the principal transmitter of this new Jewish identity to Jews and non-Jews alike.

Let me begin by recalling the inauguration of the first public synagogue in Munich in 1826. Prior to that year, Jews prayed privately in the confines of their homes. In 1815 the Jewish community of Munich, which numbered fewer than five hundred individuals, was officially established, and the Jewish community was granted the right to establish a public synagogue not connected to a private home. Due to controversy among the leading figures in the Jewish community over the desired location of the synagogue – whether in the centre of town or on the periphery – the project was postponed, and the cornerstone was laid only in 1824 after local authorities intervened in favour of the more distant site. Two years later, on 21 April 1826, the synagogue was inaugurated with much pomp and ceremony, in the presence of King Ludwig I of Bavaria, who had shown his support for the new structure by donating four white marble palm capitals for its interior.[1] (Fig. 1)

The Jewish community made a great effort to lend the ceremony a festive character, and in turn it was praised by *Sulamith*, a leading Jewish journal of the time. For the Jews of Munich, the dedication of the synagogue was clearly an event to be cherished.

On this occasion, the Munich Jewish medallist, I.W. Loewenbach, struck a medal that resonated with pride and thanksgiving.[2] (Fig. 2) Showing on one side the facade of the new synagogue, designed a few years earlier by the architect Jean Baptiste Metivier along the lines of a private house, the medal carried a German inscription on the obverse. It read as follows:

ERBAUT/UNTER DER GLORREICH:/REGIERUNG DES HÖCHST-SEL:/KÖNIGS MAX: IOSEPH I./EINGEWEIHT AM VORABENDE/DES PESACHFESTES 5586 D.I. AM/21. APRIL 1826 IN GEGENW: I.I.-M.M./DES KÖNIGS LUDWIG I./VON BAYERN UND DER/KÖNIGIN THERESE./GOTT ERHALTE/SIE LANGE![3]

Possibly the first such medal to commemorate the consecration of a synagogue, it introduced a custom quickly adopted by other Jewish communities. Jews in the

[1] The section of this essay dealing with Munich is based on my book, Richard I. Cohen, *Jewish Icons: Art and Society in Modern Europe*, Berkeley 1998, pp. 78–84.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[3] The English translation of the text is: "Built during the glorious reign of His Highness, Max Joseph I, now deceased. Dedicated on the eve of Passover, 5586 – April 21, 1826 – in the presence of King Ludwig I of Bavaria and Queen Therese. May God guard over them for a long time".



Fig. 1 Interior of Munich synagogue, dedicated in 1826. Architect: Jean Baptiste Metivier.

nineteenth century would commemorate the building of synagogues and other public Jewish buildings with the striking of commemorative medals or the production of souvenir objects, such as glasses, cups and engravings. These memorabilia emphasised the social significance attached to these public moments and the cere-

Fig. 2 I. W. Loewenbach, Medal for the dedication of the Munich synagogue in 1826. Silver. Diameter: 39 mm. Collection Israel Museum, Jerusalem, no. 754/86.

monies that accompanied them. Invariably these ceremonies were graced by the presence of non-Jewish dignitaries, and as such they became important communal events, symbolising the growing acceptance of Jews into society. Moreover, these moments of dedication, just as in Catholic and Protestant communities, became points of departure for recounting the community's historical evolution, and the commemorative objects became standard fare. Common also was the formal procession in which prominent lay members of the community and local government officials carried the Torah scrolls under a canopy through the adjacent streets to the synagogue, marking these streets as a public space shared by Jews and non-Jews alike. Although this custom had a precedent in sixteenth-century Italy, the nineteenth-century sequel was characterised by far more elaborate preparation and greater symbolic meaning. Public celebrations of the Torah, Judaism's most central symbol, not only honoured the Torah in public, just as Catholic processions honoured the cross, but they also emphasised that particular Jewish community's sense of belonging to their civic surroundings. The theme of belonging was also duly enunciated in the dedicatory sermons, almost always in German, that accompanied synagogue dedications. In some cases, these ceremonies inspired local artists to document these events, while in others it encouraged individuals of means to commission memorabilia or ceremonial objects.

This was the case in Munich. A Torah shield created in Augsburg that possessed exceptional and unique elements was among the various objects donated to the synagogue. (Fig. 3) Not only are the two reclining lions in an unusual position, unprecedented in Torah shields, but also the two branches, one of oak and one of palm, that extend from a bouquet between the lions, are unique iconographic motifs for this synagogue object. Their asymmetric design intimates their symbolic implication. The art historian Franz Landsberger interpreted these branches as symbols of Germanism (oak) and Judaism (palm) and the reclining lions as inferences to the Lion of Judah and Henry the Lion, recognised as the founder of Munich. Both sets



Fig. 3 Torah shield, Germany, early nineteenth century. Silver, gilt. Repoussé, cast, and engraved. Dedicated to the Munich synagogue, 1826. Hebrew Union College Skirball Cultural Center and Museum, Los Angeles.



Fig. 4 Torah shield. Munich, 1826. Silver, gilt. Repoussé, cast, and engraved. Precious (jade and opal) and non-precious stones; weight: 1.060 kg., height: 41 cm., width: 26.2 cm. Collection Israel Museum, Jerusalem, no. 148/63. The names of the donors, the three Marx brothers, who were leading members of the Munich Jewish community, appear on the dedicatory plaque at the bottom of the shield. Dedicated to the Munich synagogue, 1826.

of symbols conveyed a clear message – Judaism and Germanism could dwell together in harmony. Draped on either side of the Decalogue, the branches allude to a shared tradition of humanistic values that could enlighten humankind. Moreover, the anonymous patron adorned the crowns on the shield with precious jewels – diamonds, rubies, and pearls – to tangibly express the sense of joy that a public synagogue had been built. Together with the medal, the ceremony and the other objects dedicated to the synagogue on this occasion, the shield proclaimed the profound gratitude of Jews to the Bavarian rulers, evoked their yearning for a symbiosis between Judaism and Germanism and exhibited their attachment to Munich and its cherished symbols.[4] (See also the Torah shield in Fig. 4.)

Berlin, whose growth as the centre of Prussian society intensified in the nineteenth century, offers another example. The city gradually emerged from the heavy economic burden of the Napoleonic wars and soon became the cultural and architectural centre of Germany. The inspiration for this major transformation came from the renowned architect Karl Friedrich Schinkel (1781–1841), who in the 1820s designed the museum that would house the masterpieces belonging to the Prussian state. Opened in 1830, the museum (now called the Altes Museum) was built in the square that already included the royal palace, the Zeughaus (the armoury) and the cathedral, according art a space commensurate with the paramount symbols of the monarchy, the army and the church. A monumental structure, the museum put Berlin on the map as a city that could rival Vienna or Dresden for its cultural prominence. Together with its political and economic vitality, as well as its liberal civic society, this cultural dimension made Berlin increasingly attractive to Jews. Berlin thus became a hub of Jewish life.[5] According to the demographer Bruno Blau, the size of Berlin's Jewish population, which numbered 36,000 in 1871 and constituted four percent of the city's population, had grown sixfold since 1840. By 1925 the Jewish population numbered 172,000, constituting about 4 percent of the city's total population.[6] German Jews gravitated to the north central part of the city and figured there prominently. In the developing city, distinct Jewish neighbourhoods arose with a myriad of different institutions and synagogues. Yet, since Jews had no communal monuments of their own and were not represented in German public monuments,[7] synagogues assumed that function.

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[4] Cohen, *Jewish Icons*, p. 82; Franz Landsberger, 'A German Torah Ornamentation', in Joseph Gutmann (ed.), *Beauty in Holiness: Studies in Jewish Customs and Ceremonial Art*, New York 1970, pp. 106–121.

[5] Steven M. Lowenstein, *The Mechanics of Change: Essays in the Social History of German Jewry*, Atlanta 1992; Lowenstein, *The Berlin Jewish Community: Enlightenment, Family, and Crisis, 1770–1830*, New York 1994; Emily D. Bilski (ed.), *Berlin Metropolis: Jews and the New Culture, 1890–1918*, Berkeley 1999.

[6] Lowenstein, *The Mechanics of Change*, p. 145.

[7] A proposal by admirers – non-Jews and Jews – to add a medallion with Mendelssohn's portrait to a planned monument in memory of great figures in Berlin was eventually abandoned. See Alexander Altmann, *Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study*, Philadelphia 1973, pp. 754–755.



Fig. 5 Facade of the Oranienburger Straße synagogue, inaugurated in Berlin in 1866. Photograph from Märkisches Museum, Berlin.

The Oranienburger Straße synagogue, a creation of the mid-century, was the largest in the world at that time.[8] (Fig. 5) Designed by Schinkel's student Eduard Knoblauch (1801–65), it was built in the Moorish style, which captured the imagination of German Jews in this period. In close proximity to the museum quarter, this liberal synagogue granted the Jewish immigrants to Berlin a resounding sense of presence in the city. Room was made for 1,400 men and 800 women, who were to sit in an open gallery. This relatively high percentage of seats for women represented an innovation since women had begun to come more frequently to synagogue services, especially to hear the sermons. A choir loft accommodated sixty people. Using the most modern building techniques, iron construction and gas lighting, the synagogue's sanctuary soared 23 meters high and measured some 57 meters in length and 40 in width. Due to various hurdles it took ten years to complete the building, and the budget soared even higher than the originally estimated cost of about 125,000 thalers. Not wedged into a narrow space on a side street or lane, the synagogue, with its two matching cupolas and large dome, was clearly visible from the outside, accentuating the economic and civic accomplishment of its congregants. Contemporaries often compared the building to the famous Spanish Alhambra in Granada, noting its overall appearance, the nave where the *aron kodesh* (holy ark) was ensconced, the lush gold ornamentation, and the myriad of shapes and designs on the walls and ceiling. (Fig. 6) Indeed, the Oranienburger Straße synagogue and the Alhambra show clear similarities.[9] Other contemporaries compared the synagogue, some positively and some negatively, to the Temple of Solomon, intimating that this synagogue symbolically represented the reconstructed temple in a new fatherland.

Here, too, an elaborate ceremony was planned to officially inaugurate the synagogue. (Fig. 7) Many public dignitaries were present at the celebration, including Count Otto von Bismarck. Jews came dressed in formal attire, heard a mixture of musical themes as well as speeches lauding the Jewish situation in Berlin and received good wishes from local officials. Precisely orchestrated, the ceremony emphasised the participation of non-Jewish dignitaries, a sense of decorum and the abolition of boundaries between the public and Jewish space: young and elder congregants walked through the surrounding area to the synagogue in a dignified manner holding Torah scrolls. Local and national dignitaries also took part in the procession. Onlookers, non-Jews and Jews, lined the streets to catch a view of the dignitaries and the activity. With all its pomp, the inauguration was truly a communal rite, and the organisers believed that the ceremony enhanced the stature of Berlin Jews in the eyes of Berlin society.[10] A display of assertiveness was present in both the

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[8] Sections of the following discussion are based on Richard I. Cohen, 'Urban Visibility and Biblical Visions: Jewish Culture in Western and Central Europe in the Modern Age', in David Biale (ed.), *Cultures of the Jews: A New History*, New York 2002, pp. 731–796.

[9] Harold Hammer-Schenk, *Synagogen in Deutschland: Geschichte einer Baugattung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (1780–1933)*, 2 vols., Hamburg 1981, vol. 1, p. 290.

[10] See Michael A. Meyer, '"How Awesome is this Place!" The Reconceptualisation of the Synagogue in Nineteenth-Century Germany,' *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 41 (1996), pp. 51–63, re-



Fig. 6 Ark and nave of the Oranienburger Straße synagogue, Berlin, 1866.



Fig. 7 Interior of the Oranienburger Straße synagogue, Berlin, 1866. Photograph appeared in the *Illustrated London News*, 1866.

synagogue and the public procession. To commemorate the day as a landmark, an oil painting showing the facade of the building was executed by Emile de Cauwer in 1865, and reproductions were made available.[11] A medal was also struck in Berlin to commemorate the inauguration, and other memorabilia to preserve the memory and showcase the success of the event followed soon after. As was common in the nineteenth century, reports on the inauguration of the synagogue appeared in a variety of Jewish newspapers in Europe and America. Yet the reports of this affair were special; they communicated a sense that a truly pathbreaking event had occurred.

The Oranienburger Straße synagogue influenced the design of other synagogues in other countries. It was indicative of a cultural message that bourgeois Jews in many cities wanted to foreground: it communicated optimism, belief in the processes of integration and emancipation and above all a sense of belonging. The Moorish style of the synagogue, emphasising the congregants' relationship to medieval Spain, did not detract from this sense of optimism. Since they were thought to represent the apotheosis of rationalist thought, tolerance of divergent opinions, and high aesthetic standards, Spain and Spanish Jewry captured the imagination of nineteenth-century German Jews. German Jews found in this culture a precursor to their own experience, and they showed a penchant for Spanish style in several distinct areas of creativity – scholarship, liturgy, literature and architecture. As Ismar Schorsch has astutely observed, the Spanish influence on nineteenth-century synagogues "dovetailed ... completely with the overriding Spanish bias of German Jewry".[12] The Oranienburger Straße synagogue marked a complete reversal of what has come to be known as the "diasporic mentality". There was no masking here of Jewish identification or of Jewish success. These Berlin Jews were promoting a forthright pronouncement that they, like their brethren in other cities of the Reich, wanted to be a presence in their city and that they had the wherewithal to do so.[13] A contemporary Jewish commentator took note of the implications of such a building. The synagogue, he wrote, demonstrates "that the Jews can show what power they possess".[14] Before looking at developments in France, we should remind ourselves that this synagogue was inaugurated in 1866, before the Jewish population in

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printed in Meyer, *Judaism within Modernity: Essays on Jewish History and Religion*, Detroit 2001, pp. 223–238.

[11] Andreas Nachama and Gereon Sievernich, *Jüdische Lebenswelten Katalog*, 2 vols., Berlin 1991, vol. 1, p. 194. For a wonderful example of such a procession, see a photograph of one that took place in Prague at the turn of the twentieth century, reproduced in David Altshuler (ed.), *The Precious Legacy: Judaic Treasures from the Czechoslovak State Collections*, New York 1983, p. 105.

[12] Ismar Schorsch, *From Text to Context: The Turn to History in Modern Judaism*, Hanover, NH 1994, p. 81; Hammer-Schenk, *Synagogen in Deutschland*, vol. 1, p. 293.

[13] See, for example, Shulamit S. Magnus, *Jewish Emancipation in a German City: Cologne, 1798–1871*, Stanford 1997, pp. 216–217, 190ff. The illustrations following p. 190 show the sense of excitement involved in building the Glockengasse synagogue, where "no expense was spared".

[14] Quoted in Carol H. Krinsky, *Synagogues of Europe: Architecture, History, Meaning*, New York 1985, p. 268.

Berlin experienced its greatest surge in growth. More impressive buildings were to follow over the next three generations.

While the Oranienburger Straße synagogue was being built, the official leadership of the Jews in France, the Central Consistory, which had been established by Napoleon in 1808, negotiated with French officials the construction of two new synagogues in the French capital. Paris, "the capital of the nineteenth century", to use Walter Benjamin's phrase, then in the midst of its tremendous urban redevelopment under the famed prefect and architect Baron Georges Eugène Haussmann, witnessed a rapid increase in the size of its Jewish population, which exceeded even the growth rate of the city's non-Jewish population. Although no more than 1,000 Jews were living in Paris at the time of the French Revolution, by 1861 they numbered 25,000, or 26 percent of the total French Jewish population.[15] Jewish migration to Paris was spearheaded by the economic and professional elite, who sought to take advantage of new professional opportunities, including public office, a trend exemplified by Adolphe Crémieux.[16] Even before the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in the wake of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, which brought another large migration of Jews from the east of France to Paris, the Consistory sought in 1859 to build two new edifices with the financial backing of the Ministry of Interior. In their negotiations with the French authorities a controversy arose over the space that would be allotted. The ministry suggested the rue de la Victoire in the ninth arrondissement, but the Consistory, often seen as the driving force behind "assimilationist" tendencies, was interested in obtaining a more attractive street with greater visibility, rue Olivier, also in the ninth arrondissement, with its main exit on rue de Châteaudun. Haussmann, however, dismissed their request. But the Consistory, headed by a determined lay leadership, had already raised a significant sum of money from the Paris Jewish community, and they remained firm in pressing for a respectable space. Haussmann adamantly continued to oppose the rue Olivier plan, as did Empress Eugénie, who objected to an exit on the same street as the Notre-Dame-de-Lorette church. The community was left with no choice but to build the synagogue on the rue de la Victoire, a narrow and far less impressive street.[17] (Fig. 8)

But what they could not achieve in securing their desired locale, the Jews of Paris tried to make up in the construction of the interior. Designed by the Jewish architect, Alfred Aldrophe (1834–95), a Romanesque style was planned for the internal

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[15] Phyllis Cohen Albert, *The Modernization of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth Century*, Hanover, NH 1977, pp. 22–25; Paula E. Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, p. 58.

[16] Michael Graetz, *The Jews in Nineteenth-Century France: From the French Revolution to the Alliance Israélite Universelle*, trans. by Jane Marie Todd, Stanford 1996, pp. 41–78.

[17] David Cohen, *La Promotion des juifs en France à l'époque du second empire (1852–1870)*, 2 vols., Aix-en-Provence 1980, vol. 2, pp. 783–795; Dominique Jarrassé, *Une histoire des synagogues françaises: Entre Occident et Orient*, Arles 1997, pp. 218–225; Krinsky, *Synagogues of Europe*, pp. 247–250; Simon Schwarzfuchs, *Du juif à l'israélite: Histoire d'un mutation, 1770–1870*, Paris 1989, p. 301. On Haussmann's influence on nineteenth-century Paris, see Vanessa R. Schwartz, *Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Paris*, Berkeley 1998, pp. 16–26.



Fig. 8 Facade of the Victoire synagogue, Paris, inaugurated in 1875. Photograph by Oscar Israelowitz.

Fig. 9 Interior of the Victoire synagogue, Paris. Photograph from 1980. Photograph taken by Carol H. Krinsky. It appears in her book *Synagogues of Europe. Architecture, History, Meaning*, New York 1985.

space, more in the tradition of French architecture than the Moorish style. Seeking to accommodate the growing Parisian Jewish population and seat a large audience – as many as 5,000 – the dimensions of the inner sanctuary exceeded those of most Parisian churches and edifices. Forty-four meters long and 17 meters wide, the sanctuary soared over 28 meters, culminating in a barrel-vaulted ceiling. The sanctuary arrangement centred on the area where the ark and *bimah* (the platform on which the ark stood) were situated. (Fig. 9) This setting shows the influence of the Reform temples of early nineteenth-century Germany, in which the well ordered service was orchestrated by professionals. Accentuating the importance of the ark area, the entrance to it was made from marble columns. In framing the atmosphere of the sanctuary, synagogue and Consistory officials were given designated seats near the ark. Behind the ark were twelve windows upon which the tribes of Israel were inscribed and above them five windows with the star of David in the centre and the names of the books of the Pentateuch. Following a decision taken at a French rabbinical council in 1856 that allowed organs in consistorial synagogues, an organ was built with the hope of enticing greater community participation in the services. Notwithstanding these changes, Hebrew remained the language of prayer.[18]

The main area of the synagogue was created through a combination of expansive arches and two levels of supports. Women were seated on aisle galleries not covered by grids. All in all, the synagogue created an uncommon setting for Jews who had moved to Paris from Alsace and Lorraine, where they were accustomed to smaller settings and less rigid seating arrangements. The new space conveyed a clear message: acculturation in a major urban centre necessitated a house of worship that distanced the rabbi from his congregants and provided orderly and formal services that were aesthetically pleasing.[19] Likened to a cathedral without its gloomy interior, the synagogue opened in 1875.[20] Since the inauguration of the synagogue was held only five years after France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, the Chief Rabbi of Paris, Zadoc Kahn, felt compelled to proclaim that the dedication of the synagogue offered "proof that France ... has the right to take off its mourning clothes and celebrate anew the feasts of the spirit, of art, and of religion".[21] Reporting in detail on the dedication ceremony, the *Archives israélites*, the principal journal of French Jewry, basked in pride at the order, elegance and nobility that marked the event. Unabashedly, it mentioned that the "most celebrated, most wealthy Israelites" were granted the honour to hold the richly decorated torah scrolls, and it spoke glowingly of the "magnificent synagogue in one of the wealthiest and most elegant quarters of Paris". But, according to the *Archives israélites*, the wealthy, to their credit, ap-

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[18] Schwarzfuchs, *Du Juif à l'israélite*, pp. 297–301.

[19] Albert, *The Modernization of French Jewry*, p. 192. Albert points out that after 1840 the Central Consistory became stricter in imposing order in the synagogue during services, and after 1870 it instituted a uniform prayer for the French government.

[20] Israel Cohen, *Travels in Jewry*, New York 1953, p. 309.

[21] Quoted in Krinsky, *Synagogues of Europe*, p. 249.

propriately remembered the poor at this occasion and sponsored a special charitable collection in which the "most charming of the young girls of the Jewish community" collected money, as was customary in France at such ceremonies. Speeches lauded the French nation for having granted the Jews emancipation prior to all other European countries, and Zadoc Kahn proclaimed that the building of the synagogue signified more than any previous act France's profound commitment to the rights of minority religions. The only lacuna in the ceremony noted by the reporter was the absence of any representatives of the French government. The presence of many non-Jewish municipal representatives did not compensate for their absence. To further highlight this glaring omission, the reporter even cited the presence of heads of foreign states at celebrations of other Jewish synagogues in other countries.

The principal themes of the Victoire dedication reappeared in analogous ceremonies in other French cities. These themes included: a historical summary of the path French Jews had taken since the Revolution; an expression and glorification of the equality of the three major religions; and the praise of French officials for the contributions of Jews to French society. These dedication ceremonies thus provided opportunities for Jews throughout France to demonstrate their adherence to the consistorial banner of *religion et patrie* (religion and fatherland), and to assert their rightful sense of belonging to the French public space.

The elegant interior provided by the Victoire synagogue enabled French Jews to feel that they had a true centre located in a dignified surrounding. The Victoire synagogue, which was the congregation of the Chief Rabbi, fulfilled the aspiration of the community. It offered a setting for aristocratic Jews to hold weddings,[22] a site for the community to commemorate special events, such as the inauguration of Kahn as Chief Rabbi of France in 1889, or memorial services for Jews killed in battle, and it served as a place where the model of integration and collective identity – *patrie et religion* – could be celebrated. Synagogue ushers wore hats with a tri-colour badge, the emblem of the Revolution, while the rabbis were garbed in dress similar to that of French Catholic priests (clerical robes, long white bands from the neck down and three-cornered hats).

Yet cultural values were not the only ones involved in creating such a public space: the Consistory throughout the nineteenth century had waged a long-standing battle against private *minyanim* (quorums of ten men for services). Although the struggle to curtail these private services was presented to French authorities as a necessity to preserve "the dignity of religion and the security of the state",[23] economic and political ambitions also informed this campaign. From its inception, the Consistory believed it could carry out its mandate and guarantee its financial status only by ensuring payment for synagogue seats and for functions performed by accredited consistorial officials. Its unrelenting battle against private services was in-

[22] Michael R. Marrus, *The Politics of Assimilation: A Study of the French Jewish Community at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair*, Oxford 1971, plate 1 shows an image of a Rothschild wedding held in the Victoire in 1876.

[23] Albert, *The Modernization of French Jewry*, p. 212.

tended to secure the Consistory's pre-eminence, and it often necessitated the intervention of the French authorities against any potential competitors.[24] The building of the Victoire synagogue could thus be seen as an outgrowth of the consistorial drive to regulate and shape Jewish religious life, but it also helped promote the stature of French Jewry in the eyes of Jewish and non-Jewish Parisians alike.

The Victoire synagogue highlighted the ways in which the aspirations of a community came into play in the construction of a public space, and how that space in turn helped fashion those who interacted with it. Indeed, two generations later, in 1913, Russian-born Jews supported the erection of a synagogue in art nouveau style in the Marais district, the home of a growing east European Jewish population, in an apparent effort to assert their independence from consistorial leadership.[25]

The three synagogues showcased here – Munich, Berlin and Paris – among dozens in urban settings across Central and Western Europe, were built at a time when migration of Jews had been set in motion but had not yet reached levels attained during the last quarter of the century. The dedication ceremonies that accompanied these new synagogues highlighted the optimism and sense of pride that dominated the ambience within which community leaders thrived. This juncture needs to be stressed in order to underscore the dramatic change already taking place in the self-consciousness of these Jews as expressed by their unmistakable and uncompromising demand to be visible. The contrast to the pre-emancipation period is illuminating. Prior to 1789 legislation in various European countries often confined Jewish services to private homes or sharply restricted the physical dimensions of synagogue buildings. By constructing monumental synagogues in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Central and Western European Jews collectively affirmed their presence in the public space. What stands out in these structures is the preoccupation with a dignified and impressive undertaking. The male Jewish lay leaders who stood behind these endeavours, although successful in their business ventures, craved integration into the societies to which they belonged, yet they still felt threatened by lingering forms of discrimination and antisemitism. These leaders were also growing more distant from Jewish ceremonial observance. The meanings conveyed by these impressive buildings were different for them than for women. These men were attempting to refute notions of the "artless Jew",[26] to assure the wider society of the allegiances of the Jewish bourgeoisie to the principles of religion and civility and to establish a Jewish public space that could enhance their stature in the eyes of their fellow citizens. The act of worship was secondary to them. By contrast, for women, who also took part in these dedicatory ceremonies, worship was becoming more important. Thus, the selection and negotiation of a public space for these synagogues as well as the orchestration of synagogue dedica-

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[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 196ff.

[25] Carol H. Krinsky, 'Hector Guimard's Art Nouveau Synagogue in Rue Pavée, Paris', *Journal of Jewish Art*, vol. 6 (1979), pp. 105–111.

[26] See Kalman P. Bland, *The Artless Jew: Medieval and Modern Affirmations and Denials of the Visual*, Princeton 2000.

tion ceremonies came to constitute critical moments in the evolution of the self-confidence of French and German Jews in the nineteenth century. The construction and dedication of synagogues affirmed their conviction that they rightfully belonged to the German and French public space.[27]

Comment by Jakob Vogel

The field of symbolic politics sheds considerable light on the differences and similarities in the emancipation processes in Germany and France in the nineteenth century. Analysing symbolic expressions of Jewish identity as embodied in public monuments and rituals tells us a great deal about the ways in which German and French Jews perceived their new status. Looking at the reactions to the new Jewish self-representation by the surrounding society, which in both cases was predominantly Christian, highlights how the forms selected by Jews to represent their new position were shaped by the distinctive social and political contexts of these two societies. In this respect, symbols and rituals should not be perceived as elements of "culture" masking a certain "social reality" that represents individual or group interests, but rather they should be understood as the actual vehicles through which these social interests are articulated and shaped.[1]

But is it then possible to speak of two distinct paths of symbolic integration of Jews into the public spheres in Germany and France? In what ways, for instance, did the preponderance of Protestants in German society influence the forms German Jews used to represent themselves? And in France how did the shift from a Catholic dominated Second Empire to the laic Third Republic affect Jewish symbolic politics?

Richard Cohen's essay puts forth a number of interesting answers to these important questions. By focusing on three case studies – the Munich synagogue, inaugurated in 1826; the Oranienburger Straße synagogue in Berlin, inaugurated in

[27] This was true not only for Western and Central Europe. See, for example, the discussion over the St. Petersburg synagogue in late nineteenth-century Russia in Benjamin Nathans, 'Conflict, Community, and the Jews of Late Nineteenth-Century St. Petersburg', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 44 (1996), pp. 208–214. For an expanded version of this essay see Nathans, 'People of the City: Jews and the Urban Challenge', in Ezra Mendelsohn (ed.), *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 15, New York 1999, pp. 104–148.

[1] For this change of perspective see especially Roger Chartier, 'Le Monde comme représentation', *Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, vol. 44, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1989), pp. 1505–1520. An important area in which this change of perspective has produced many new studies is the analysis of national and monarchical representation. For the German literature see, for example, Etienne François, Hannes Siegrist and Jakob Vogel (eds.), *Nation und Emotion: Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich, 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 1995; Johannes Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg*, Paderborn 2000; Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum: Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 1995; Jakob Vogel, *Nationen im Gleichschritt: Der Kult der "Nation in Waffen" in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1871–1914*, Göttingen 1997.

1866; and the synagogue on the rue de la Victoire in Paris, inaugurated in 1875 – and by analysing their respective architectural styles and inauguration ceremonies, Cohen not only highlights the general trend towards greater visibility and integration of the Jewish community, but he also points to the different social and political contexts in which these three synagogues were conceived and presented to the general public.

I would like to focus on what I believe are the three main arguments developed by Cohen concerning the broader questions of comparing the German and French paths of emancipation. In focusing on this issue, I will leave aside other interesting points Cohen develops, such as the way in which Jewish identity in each of these three cities was represented through the construction of new synagogues and their inauguration ceremonies. Although these points merit further discussion, here I would like to limit myself to an analysis of the more comparative aspects of Cohen's paper.

First, it has to be noted that Cohen underlines the similarities between Jewish emancipation in both countries far more than the differences. He sketches a general trend of growing Jewish self-esteem and civic pride, which was manifested in both Germany and France through the construction of new and grander synagogues that assured greater visibility for Jews in the public sphere. Through the bright decoration of the buildings and the sumptuous staging of the inauguration ceremonies, these synagogues reflected the eminent social position recently attained by these burgeoning urban Jewish communities.

But the choice of these three examples also poses the question of whether this optimistic picture of integration and success actually corresponded to the reality of Jewish life in both countries. Although Cohen's portrayal is undoubtedly correct for the wealthier communities in both countries – and these three cases represent such communities – it is not necessarily true for the poorer Jewish communities, and it is certainly not true for the more orthodox ones, which were opposed to liberal Judaism's new forms of self-representation. Harold Hammer-Schenk, an authority on German synagogue architecture, has, for instance, insisted that most synagogues in Berlin in the second half of the nineteenth century were relatively small, and often built in places hidden from the public view.[2] The same is true for Paris and elsewhere in France, where a large number of smaller and less-wealthy Jewish communities existed, even if these congregations lacked consistorial sanction.

Second, as Cohen's paper shows, the construction of a new "Jewish style" in synagogue architecture and ritual also meant the extensive borrowing of symbolic forms from the surrounding Christian society. Medals, processions, rabbinic raiment and most other "newly" invented Jewish traditions were heavily influenced by Protestant and Catholic symbols, which dominated the sphere of religious representation in each society. This ostensible Christian influence was certainly a major reason why more orthodox Jews were opposed to these new forms of religious rep-

[2] Harold Hammer-Schenk, *Synagogen in Deutschland: Geschichte einer Baugattung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (1780–1933)*, 2 vols., Hamburg 1981, vol. 1, pp. 421–432.

resentation. The problem of choosing a particular architectural and ritual style for new synagogues thus became an important question for Jews in both countries. Cohen seems to suggest that the choice of structures for the Oranienburger Straße synagogue in Berlin and the rue de la Victoire synagogue in Paris reflected two different national paths of symbolic integration: while Berlin Jews insisted on their symbolic "otherness" by adopting the Moorish style, which represented a self-confident image of emancipation and success, the Paris Consistory favoured a more reserved approach by opting for a Romanesque style that was, according to Cohen, "more in the tradition of French architecture than the Moorish style".

There is no doubt that the construction and celebrations of these two synagogues had a strong impact on the public image of Jews in both Germany and France and elsewhere as well.[3] These synagogues represented the most visible and successful Jewish communities in each country. Naturally, the capital city was at the heart of national symbolic politics (even though Berlin in 1866 was not yet the capital of the German Empire, but "only" of the state of Prussia). Having a sumptuous building occupying this symbolic place considerably enhanced Jewish self-esteem in both Germany and France. Nevertheless, this sense of pride did not mean that both buildings reflected a "sacred" or "national style" of Jewish representation, as Cohen seems to suggest. For the German case, Hammer-Schenk has shown that, although the Moorish style dominated the 1870s, most German synagogues from the 1880s on were actually built in the same Romanesque style that Jewish architects in France identified with "French" tradition.[4] In late nineteenth-century Germany, however, this Romanesque style was perceived by Christian and Jewish architects alike as a "German" style of church and synagogue building.[5] Jewish communities in both countries were thus confronted with the problem of how to demonstrate their "national" affiliation through specific architectural styles, even though there was widespread disagreement in both countries over what the respective "national style" actually was. Declaring that a building conformed to the "national tradition" did not therefore mean that that building actually represented the dominant national style; rather, it merely meant that the Jewish community was conforming to what it believed to be the national style.

Third, an important difference that Cohen points to concerns the presence of state dignitaries at the inauguration ceremonies for the new synagogues. In Munich and Berlin important non-Jewish representatives like the Bavarian king and the Prussian chancellor attended these celebrations, whereas in Paris the Jewish community was not honoured by the participation of any representative of the national

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[3] *Ibid.* Both synagogues also had a strong impact on the international discussion about the style of synagogue building.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 337–352. The reverse seems to be true for the case of Brussels, where the adoption of the Romanesque style was prevented by local Jewish authorities who argued that it was essentially a "Christian style". See Richard I. Cohen, *Jewish Icons: Art and Society in Modern Europe*, Berkeley 1998, p. 5.

[5] Hammer-Schenk, *Synagogen in Deutschland*, p. 343.

government. Does this mean that German Jews were more accepted in the public sphere than French Jews, at least by the state and its representatives?

Cohen rightly points out the presence of municipal representatives at the inauguration at the rue de la Victoire synagogue, thus avoiding such facile explanations. The specific political context in which each inauguration ceremony was staged also has to be taken into account. Otto von Bismarck, for instance, needed the support of liberal Jews in order to conduct his politics of rearmament in the mid-1860s, so it is not surprising that he was eager to show his sympathy for the Jewish community at an important moment of its life. In France, on the other hand, the government was still dominated in the mid-1870s by the conservative regime of *ordre morale*, which was known for its strong affiliation with the Catholic clergy. The political attitude towards the Jewish community changed only in 1879, when republicans for the first time won control of the government and introduced a more laic approach to the emancipation of the Jews.[6] Comparing the specific moments of the inauguration ceremonies in Berlin, Munich and Paris can therefore prove misleading in the search for the long-term trends characterising Jewish-Christian relations in both countries. Nevertheless, such shifts in political attitudes towards Jewish representation need to be taken into account in drawing up a general comparative picture.

In order to answer the question about the symbolic integration of Jews into the public sphere in both Germany and France it seems necessary to go beyond the scope of Cohen's paper and to change the perspective slightly by looking at official state and municipal ceremonies in each country. We also need to ask whether Jewish dignitaries were present at these ceremonies, and if so, whether they were represented to the same extent as representatives of the Christian churches. Having worked extensively on national festivals in both Germany and France between 1871 and 1914,[7] I can say that the picture that emerges here is considerably less optimistic than the one Cohen depicts. In the German case I never found a single trace of rabbis or other Jewish dignitaries being invited to official ceremonies organised by the Imperial government, despite Jewish emancipation in 1871. Jews, of course, were welcomed to participate with their own celebrations in national festivals or dynastic rituals, such as the annual celebration of the Kaiser's birthday,[8] but Jewish

6 Although the establishment of the Third Republic is usually dated to September 4, 1870, the French republicans did not gain full power of the state before the fall of General Mac Mahon's regime of *ordre moral* in 1879. See Philip Nord, *The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France*, Cambridge, MA 1995.

7 See also Jakob Vogel, 'Paris et Berlin sous les armes. Fêtes militaires et festivités dans les capitales allemande et française, 1871–1914', in Christophe Charle and Daniel Roche (eds.), *Capitales culturelles – Capitales symboliques: Paris et les expériences européennes (xviiie–xxe siècles)*, Paris 2002, pp. 61–69; Vogel, 'Demonstrative Innerlichkeit und bekennender Glaubenseifer: Protestantische Elemente im Kaiserkult des deutschen Reiches 1871–1914', in Friedrich W. Graf (ed.), *Protestantische Lebenswelten*, Munich 2003.

8 See also Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918*, Chapel Hill 1997; Fritz Schellack, *Nationalfeiertage in Deutschland von 1871 bis 1945*, Frankfurt am Main 1990; Ute Schneider, *Politische Festkultur im 19. Jahrhundert: Die Rheinprovinz von der französischen Zeit bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (1806–1918)*, Essen 1993.

dignitaries never acquired a status comparable to that of their Protestant and Catholic counterparts, who were regularly invited to such celebrations. Despite the growing secularisation of state ritual after 1871 (the Christian ritual of the coronation of the Kaiser, for instance, was never adopted by the imperial state), Protestant pastors continued to play a prominent role in most national rituals, such as the inauguration of national monuments by the Kaiser, the consecration of military flags or the opening of parliamentary sessions.[9] In the more Catholic regions of the Reich, priests also took part in such events, but Jewish communal representatives were never invited. This picture, however, might change if one were to examine such ceremonies at the communal rather than the state or national level. Generally speaking, the German state represented itself exclusively as a Christian society.

This trend certainly did not pertain to the French Third Republic. In fact, the republican state, at least during the first decades of its existence, banned the Catholic church almost entirely from official festivities – a unique phenomenon at the end of the nineteenth century, when monarchs all over Europe continued to represent themselves as "Christian rulers". But this change in religious politics did not mean that the French Jewish community had acquired the same status as the Catholic church. As the *Ralliement* of the early 1890s showed, Catholics remained symbolically the most important religious community in the French public sphere. Even if representatives of all three religions were invited to official ceremonies, churches, not synagogues, were the places in France where these ceremonies, such as state burials, most frequently took place – think, for instance, of the Pantheon, which, despite all attempts at symbolic "laicisation", remained the place of a republican cult of the "Great Men", a cult that greatly resembled the traditional cult of Catholic saints.[10] Jews who wanted to be integrated into republican society had to embrace an *histoire de France*, which remained heavily influenced by Catholic images and stereotypes – think, for instance, of the history of Jeanne d'Arc,[11] or the metaphors of "martyrdom" that regularly appeared in the commemorations of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870.[12] Although these images and stereotypes were usually reinterpreted in a laic sense by governing republicans, conservative Catholics still had a strong influence on public discourse about French national history.

Thus, even if the Jewish community gained a more prominent place in the public sphere in both Germany and France during the nineteenth century (and Cohen rightly points out how much the status of Jews had changed since the eighteenth

[9] Vogel, 'Demonstrative Innerlichkeit'.

[10] Mona Ozouf, 'Le Panthéon', in Pierre Nora (ed.), *Les Lieux de mémoire*, 3 vols., Paris 1984, vol. 1, pp. 139–166; Avner Ben-Amos, *Funerals, Politics, and Memory in Modern France, 1789–1996*, Oxford 2000.

[11] Gerd Krumeich, *Jeanne d'Arc in der Geschichte: Historiographie-Kultur-Politik*, Sigmaringen 1989.

[12] Marie-Luise Christadler, 'Zur nationalpädagogischen Funktion kollektiver Mythen: Die französische "Bewältigungsliteratur" nach 1871', in Jürgen Link and Wulf Wülfing (eds.), *Nationale Mythen und Symbole in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts: Strukturen und Funktionen von Konzepten nationaler Identität*, Stuttgart 1991, pp. 199–211.

century), this "emancipation" never meant an "equal" symbolic status, since the Christian churches in both societies staunchly defended their dominance in state ritual and representation. It was therefore only at the communal level that Jewish self-representation played an increasingly important role in the public sphere. But even here the symbolic position of Jews was never completely secured, and it often became the target of more or less open hostilities. Christian symbols and rituals thus influenced not only the manner and form by which emancipated Jews in both Germany and France sought to express their new social status, but the public sphere in both countries continued to be shaped by this persistent Christian orientation.

Uri R. Kaufmann

The Jewish Fight for Emancipation in France and Germany

Historiography

Modern Jewish historiography has focused more on the role of Jews than on Jews themselves in the fight for emancipation. I will argue here that there was indeed a substantial Jewish fight for equal rights in France and Germany. I will also analyse the extent to which the developments in the two countries were comparable. Moreover, I will attempt to show that a social historical rather than merely an ideological approach to the problem of emancipation will demonstrate that in reality there were many similarities between these two processes.

Traditional Zionist and diaspora nationalist historiography, tended to view emancipation and acculturation in negative terms. Jacob Toury, for example, himself of German Jewish origin, maintained a negative view of the whole period because he negated the Jewish Diaspora's right to exist.[1] In this respect we observe a marked difference between the older school of Zionist historiography and the present-day generation in Israel today. Shulamit Volkov, who belongs to this second group, argued that there was no politicisation among German Jews before 1848, but she uses terms such as "Jewish subculture" and "dissimilation", thus highlighting trends that contrast to the assimilationist trends emphasised by her predecessors.[2] The first generation of this school had to overcome the trauma of the rise to power of the Nazis and the Holocaust, and they rejected assimilation as dangerous and misguided.

Historians frequently use the term "emancipation" too broadly. While it sometimes stands for the desire of Jews to integrate, including the rise of reform and conservative Judaism, it also tends to be used as a designation for the whole period of European-Jewish history from 1780 to 1871.[3] Moreover, it often functions as a sy-

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[1] Jacob Toury, *Soziale und politische Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1847–1871*, Düsseldorf 1974, pp. 139, 161–210.

[2] Shulamit Volkov, 'Jews in the Life of the Peoples: National Narrative or a Chapter of Integrative History', (Heb.), *Zion* 61 (1996), pp. 91–111; Volkov, *Das jüdische Projekt der Moderne*, München 2001, pp. 134, 313ff. See also David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry 1780–1840*, New York 1987. On the negative judgment of the East European school, see, for example, Simon Dubnow's negative view of Gabriel Riesser, Dubnow, *Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, vol. 9, Berlin 1929, p. 46.

[3] Paula E. Hyman, *The Emancipation of Jews in Alsace*, New Haven 1991; Hyman, 'The Social Context of Assimilation: Village Jews and City Jews in Alsace', in Jonathan Frankel (ed.), *Assimilation and Continuity*, Cambridge 1992, pp. 110–129.

nonym for assimilation, defined here as the negation or denial of one's Jewish identity.

The questions of integration, acculturation and religious modernisation among German-speaking Jewry in the nineteenth century should not automatically be equated with emancipation or the fight for equal rights. Thus, emancipation should not be used as an all-encompassing term to describe all the social, political and economic changes that occurred among Jews in the nineteenth century. Rather, I would suggest that this term refer to the struggle for the legal equality of Jews in society. To examine this battle for legal equality, I would also suggest that we focus not only on developments in the major urban centres, but that we look as well at Jewish life in small towns and villages where many German and French Jews resided during the first half of the nineteenth century.[4]

The Fight of French Jews for Emancipation, 1789–1791

France was a pioneer in the battle for Jewish emancipation. Historical scholarship shows clearly that Jews were preoccupied with this struggle from the beginning. Naftali Dov Cerf Berr, the leading representative of Alsatian Jewry, which was the largest Jewish community in France at the time, travelled to Paris in 1790 and hired the Christian lawyer Jacques Godard, who collected petitions in favour of emancipation from the non-Jewish residents of Paris.[5] The example already set by the Sephardi community of southwestern France also proved helpful. The Jews of Bordeaux already possessed municipal voting rights, and they were officially recognised as the "nation portugaise" among the local, urban bourgeoisie. Moreover, the 500 Jews of Paris formed a sort of avant-garde during the French Revolution, voluntarily joining the *Garde Nationale* in a symbolic gesture of patriotism.[6]

The battle for emancipation did not get through parliament easily. There were four major debates before September 1791, when equal rights for all French Jews were finally declared.[7] After 1791, however, new inequalities arose. The well-known Infamous Decree of March 1808, implemented during Napoleon's reign,

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[4] Usiel O. Schmelz, 'Die demographische Entwicklung der Juden in Deutschland von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis 1933', *Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1982), p. 40.

[5] Georges Weill, 'Cerf Berr de Medelsheim, militant de l'émancipation', *Nouveaux Cahiers*, 45 (1976), pp. 30–42, esp. pp. 39–42; Renée Neher-Bernheim, 'Cerf Berr de Medelsheim et sa famille', *Saison d'Alsace*, 55/56 (1976), pp. 47–61, esp. 54–60.

[6] Arthur Hertzberg, *The French Enlightement and the Jews*, New York 1968, reprint 1990, p. 347; Jacques Godechot, 'La Révolution française et les juifs (1789–1799)', in Bernhard Blumenkranz (ed.), *Les Juifs et la Révolution française*, Paris 1989, pp. 50–60.

[7] Robert Badinter, *Libres et Egaux*, Paris 1989, pp. 143–210; Dubnow, *Weltgeschichte*, vol. 8, Berlin 1930, pp. 86–104, Henry Lucien-Brun, *Etude Historique su la condition des Israélites en France depuis 1789*, Lyon 1900, pp. 47–84, David Feuerwerker, *L'Emancipation des Juifs en France*, Paris 1976, pp. 294–378.

placed Jewish moneylenders under special supervision.[8] Similarly, in 1805 the Jews of Paris demanded the equality of Jewish religious practice, but this request was refused. The consistorial system applied to Jews did not conform exactly to the Protestant and Catholic models.[9] Although Catholic and Protestant clerical personnel began to receive state salaries under Napoleon, rabbis were paid state salaries only in 1831. Moreover, the oath *more judaico*[10] was not abolished until 1846, and it was the Jews, led by Adolphe Crémieux, who fought a bitter battle against it.[11]

The Fight for Emancipation in Germany, 1797–1815

German Jews were well aware of the French debates of 1790–1791 regarding Jewish emancipation. As early as 1804 there existed a German translation of the French parliamentary debates of the revolutionary era. Moreover, German Jews began their own drive to achieve emancipation. In 1802 Jacob Baruch, the father of Ludwig Börne, petitioned the Reichstag of the Holy Roman Empire to eliminate the body tax.[12] And in 1815 Jews also sent representatives to the Congress of Vienna in an attempt to secure emancipation for the Jews of the various German states.[13] David Friedländer (1750–1834) was active on behalf of the Prussian Jews following the discussions in Paris in 1789.[14]

At the same time, a Christian-Jewish public sphere came into being. Synagogue inauguration speeches began to be printed, and Christians were invited and even attended these events, especially in the larger urban Prussian-Jewish communities. The prominent Jewish lay leader Israel Jacobson invited Christian notables to the opening of the new synagogue in Seesen in the kingdom of Westphalia in 1810.[15] Such social interaction between Jews and Christians did not exist before 1800. These Jewish lay leaders saw themselves as part of the larger German society, believing that the time had now arrived when "Israel should not dwell alone". This turn to the non-Jewish public was already evident in the writings of Moses Mendelssohn, and especially in *Jerusalem* (1783). Here Mendelssohn presented Judaism as a more rational religion than Christianity, thus reacting to the Prussian theologian Johann David Michaelis, who had argued against Jewish emancipation.[16]

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[8] Simon Schwarzfuchs, *Napoléon, the Jews and the Sanhedrin*, Philadelphia 1979, pp. 124–130; Paula E. Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, Berkley 1998, 46–47.

[9] Robert Anchel, *Napoléon et les Juifs*, Paris 1928, pp. 62ff; Schwarzfuchs, *Napoléon*, pp. 41, 141.

[10] Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, pp. 55–56.

[11] Feuerwerker, *L'Emancipation des Juifs*, pp. 615–617.

[12] At gates and bridges Jews had to pay a "body toll". See Isidor Kracauer, *Geschichte der Juden in Frankfurt*, 2 vols., Frankfurt 1927, vol. 2, pp. 343ff, esp. 446–449.

[13] Salo Baron, *Die Judenfrage auf dem Wiener Kongress*, Vienna 1920, pp. 23–147, esp. 129.

[14] Dubnow, *Weltgeschichte*, vol. 8, pp. 194–200; Josef Heller, 'Friedländer, David', in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Berlin 1930, vol. 6, pp. 1180ff.

[15] *Sulamith*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1810), pp. 298–317.

[16] Christian Wilhelm Dohm, *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*, Berlin 1783, part 2,

Reaction and Progress

In France, in contrast to the situation in the German states, there existed a central Jewish body: the Central Consistory. The numerous petitions sent to the French government by chief rabbis of France who served between 1808 and 1818 – Josef David Sinzheim, Simon Deutz and Abraham Cologna – prove that they participated in the fight against discrimination.[17]

The Jewish consistories emerged as organisations that lobbied against anti-Jewish discrimination; they were not purely religious bodies, as were the Protestant consistories. Thus, in 1823 the consistory of Upper-Alsace criticised a government-sponsored inquiry on the status of Jews.[18] The chief rabbis of Upper and Lower Alsace, Naftali Hirsch Katzenellenbogen, Jacob Meyer and others also protested repeatedly between 1809 and the 1840s against the oath *more judaico*.[19] One of these protesters, Lazare Isidor, was later appointed chief rabbi of France, not least because of his courageous attitude.

In France as a result of emancipation there were also more Jewish politicians than in Germany. The principal figure was Adolphe Crémieux, who sat in parliament in the 1840s. Crémieux's deep involvement in Jewish affairs did not repel non-Jewish voters. It was no coincidence that he belonged to the old francophone stock of the Comtat Venaissin. By contrast, even in the mid-nineteenth century Alsatian Jews were culturally more German than French. Thus, the future *homme de lettres* Alexandre Weill, who was born in the Alsatian village of Schirhoffen in 1811, had to go to Nancy in the 1830s in order to learn French properly.[20]

In France, there was not a single Jewish leader opposed to emancipation, not even among the traditionalists. Nevertheless, there was already a sort of *Kulturkampf* regarding the extent to which secular topics were to be taught in the schools. Here, Weill's memoirs prove that this fight took place even in small Alsatian villages in the 1820s, and the introduction of more secular learning, a reform sponsored by the Central Consistory, was not restricted to the still relatively small urban Jewish communities.[21]

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pp. 72–77. Moses Mendelssohn, *Jerusalem, or, On Religious Power and Judaism*, trans. by Allan Arkush, Hanover, NH 1983.

[17] Archives Nationales de France (AN), Paris F19 11 007; F19 11 030, August 21, 1809, August 28, 1809.

[18] Lettre addressée à M. le Préfet du département du Haut-Rhin, Colmar 1823.

[19] Leo Baeck Institute (LBI) Archives, New York, Alsace-Lorraine Collection 7/8, fol. 627, letter (Dec. 12, 1823). See also AN, Paris, F19 11030. Letter from Consistoire of Upper Alsace to Central Consistoire, August 8, 1809; Feuerwerker, *L'Emancipation des Juifs*, pp. 565–650.

[20] Alexandre Weill, *Ma Jeunesse*, vol. 1: *Mon enfance*, Paris 1870, pp. 57, 116, 120. On Weill see Joë-Yehoshua Friedmann, *Alexandre Weill, écrivain contestataire et historien engagé (1811–1899)*, Strasbourg 1989, pp. 21–29; Friedmann, 'Un Témoin de la vie juive en Alsace aux xixe siècle: Alexandre Weill', *Saisons d'Alsace*, n.s., nos. 55–56 (1975), pp. 103–118. On Weill's career after 1870 see Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany: the Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, 1871–1918*, Stanford 1988, pp. 29, 34–35, 208.

[21] Alexandre Weill, *Ma Jeunesse*, vol. 1, p. 34.

"From France Shall Proceed the Teaching ..."

A perspective looking beyond national boundaries has to bear in mind that French Jews vigorously demanded legal equality for their coreligionist abroad, as illustrated by the French-Jewish struggle for the emancipation of the Jews of Switzerland. The Wahl brothers of Mulhouse fought for the right to purchase real estate in the Basle region, which had always been forbidden to Jews. This incident led to a diplomatic crisis between France and Switzerland in 1835, and the French even closed the border with parts of Switzerland.[22] From 1839 to 1853, Rabbi Moise Nordmann (1809–1888) of Hegenheim in Upper Alsace fought against the discrimination of French Jews conducting business in Switzerland, and the Ditisheim family of southern Alsace with the backing of Crémieux petitioned the French Foreign Ministry in the early 1850's for the right to reside in the canton of Basle-Land.[23] The French Jewish press harshly criticized the Swiss government's anti-Jewish stance,[24] and the president of the Central Consistory even met with emperor Napoleon III to discuss the matter in 1857.[25]

Germany between Restoration and Revolution, 1815–1848

In Germany after 1815 there was no central Jewish institution to lead the struggle for equal rights; the fight therefore had to be carried on regionally. Moreover, there were no Jewish representatives in any of the German parliaments before 1848. The following pattern of Jewish political activity can be discerned: first, Jewish leaders submitted hand-written petitions; then the petition was printed and circulated; and afterwards a Jewish lawyer such as Gabriel Riesser was hired to argue the case.

In Baden the Oberrat der Israeliten, the representative body of Jews, circulated a printed petition for Jewish emancipation in 1820,[26] and the smaller Jewish community of Württemberg similarly protested the discriminatory educational policies of the government.[27] Other Jewish communities, such as those of Bavaria and Hessen-Kassel, followed suit. In Baden, the battle for Jewish rights reached a new level of intensity in the 1830s. Here, Jewish leaders, such as Leopold Ladenburg,

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[22] Achilles Nordmann, 'Die Juden im Kanton Baselland', *Basler Jahrbuch*, 1914, pp. 180–249.

[23] Document Nov. 11, 1851, in LBI Archives, Alsace-Lorraine Collection 7/8, fol. 2501 ff.; Papers of the Ditisheim family in the Swiss Jewish Museum of Basle, JMS 758.

[24] *Univers israélite* 1862/63, pp. 110–111, 285.

[25] Archives du consistoire central israélite, Paris, dossiers diplomatiques, Suisse, M., February 18, 1857, letters to French Foreign Ministry.

[26] *Unterthänigste Vorstellung des Grossherzoglich badischen Oberrats im Namen sämtlicher israelitischer Staatsbürger des Grossherzogtums*, Karlsruhe 1820.

[27] Samuel Mayer, *Die öffentlichen Verhältnisse der Juden*, Stuttgart 1827; Mayer, *Bitten und Wünsche der Israeliten des Königreichs*, Stuttgart 1827; Carl Weil, *Über die Zulässigkeit der Juden zum Bürgerrecht*, Stuttgart, 1827; Weil, *Denkschrift über den Königlichen Gesetzesvorschlag über die künftigen Verhältnisse der Israeliten*, Stuttgart 1827.

David Zimmern and Naftali Epstein, fought vigorously for Jewish rights, despite fierce resistance by the ruling Liberal Party.[28] Dozens of signatures can be found on the petitions in favour of Jewish emancipation circulated between 1831 and 1833. To counter the assertion of a member of parliament that the Jews did not want emancipation, Jewish leaders obtained the signatures of 1,400 heads of families in late 1845 and early 1846. This was a considerable proportion of the roughly 4,600 heads of families, most of whom were wandering peddlers and cattle dealers, who lived in the rural villages in the region that spanned from Lörrach to Külsheim.

By the 1840s the number of non-Jewish politicians supporting Jewish legal equality had increased. In Baden there was Friedrich Daniel Bassermann, and in the Rhine valley quite a few urban, non-Jewish notables signed petitions in favour of emancipation to be sent to the provincial parliament. The provincial parliament accepted these petitions in 1843.[29] The state parliament, or Landtag of Baden, followed three years later, but the government authorities showed no interest in the cause. Gabriel Riesser was the main speaker on behalf of the Jewish communities of Baden between 1830 and 1837. He belonged to the first generation of academically-educated Jewish lawyers. The enthusiastic welcome he received in Fürth and the surrounding area in 1837 shows that he was known and admired even by simple rural Jews. Thus the assertion that Jewish notables were out of touch with lower-class Jews is not always true. Other printed sources, such as privately printed sermons and speeches, many of which were later destroyed by the Nazis, show the rapid dissemination of Jewish propaganda in the fight for equality. Although these trends occurred somewhat later in southwest Germany than in Prussia, already by the 1820s a considerable amount of this literature was being printed and circulated. In one of these speeches, the liberation from Egyptian slavery celebrated at Passover was transformed into a commemoration of the contemporary struggle for Jewish emancipation.[30] The debate over religious reform and the fight for emancipation were the main themes of the Jewish press of this period, such as Isaak Markus Jost's *Israelit des 19. Jahrhunderts* and Ludwig Philippson's *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*. These newspapers offered reports from local correspondents throughout the German states about progress towards emancipation in specific locales. Although these reports do not provide a complete picture of conditions in every German state, they nevertheless provide at least a partial view of changing socio-economic and political conditions. Even the neo-Orthodox press, despite its fight against the Reform movement, exhibited for the most part a pro-emancipation attitude.[31]

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[28] Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe 231/1423, collection of petitions to parliament; Leopold Ladenburg, *Die rechtlichen Verhältnisse der Israeliten in Baden*, Mannheim 1832; Ladenburg, *Die Gleichstellung der Israeliten mit ihren christlichen Mitbürgern*, Mannheim 1833; (Naftali Epstein), *Gehorsamste Vorstellung an die Hohe 2. Kammer der Ständeversammlung des Grossherzogtums Baden*, Karlsruhe 1832.

[29] Dieter Kastner, *Der rheinische Provinziallandtag und die Emanzipation der Juden im Rheinland 1825–1845*, 2 vols., Köln 1989.

[30] Meyer Kayserling, *Bibliothek jüdischer Kanzelredner*, Berlin 1870, p. 370.

[31] 'Das orthodoxe Judentum oder die zu neuer Glorie auferstandene Freiheit', *Der Treue Zionswächter*, April 4, 1848.

After the Revolutions of 1848

After 1849–1850 the political situation in the German states was again characterised by a period of severe political repression, although a few achievements of the Revolution of 1848 were preserved. In Baden, for example, Jews were for the first time allowed to run for state election. No Jewish candidate was elected, however, until 1862. In Prussia the myriad of different legal regulations concerning the Jews were unified by a comprehensive law in 1847, but the Prussian government continued to refuse to officially recognise the Jewish religion and religious education. Moreover, Jews had to pay double taxes: not only did they have to finance a Jewish infrastructure of prayer and schooling, but they were also taxed for church buildings and schools that were barred to their own children. Jews had no chance to be hired as teachers in public schools, and even Jewish religious lessons were not guaranteed by the Prussian authorities until after 1907.[32]

Only in the 1850s could a significant liberalisation begin to be discerned. Prussia finally emancipated its Jews in 1869, and the full emancipation of all German Jews was achieved at the time of unification in 1871.

France: The Eastern Departments

Many of the issues German Jews had to fight for in the nineteenth century had been resolved in France much earlier. By 1831 the French state paid the salaries of the rabbis and some cantors. With the abolition of the oath *more judaico* in 1846 there no longer existed any official anti-Jewish discrimination. Nevertheless, at the local level Jewish communities still had to fight for their share of communal funding for Jewish schools. These problems relating to the implementation of emancipation have not been thoroughly researched. Provincial authorities were generally not in favour of the Jews, and there was considerable resistance on the part of local elites especially in Alsace and Lorraine to Jewish emancipation, which they felt had been imposed on them by the central government in Paris. These local elites had fought to prolong the anti-Jewish Infamous Decree after 1818. The anti-Jewish pogroms that broke out in Alsace in March and April 1848 showed that the rural strata of the population had not accepted emancipation. In these attacks synagogues were damaged, Torah scrolls were desecrated, roofs were stripped of their tiles and furniture was thrown through the windows. Many Alsatian Jews, in the wake of these attacks, fled to Switzerland and Baden. In an effort to stem this anti-Jewish violence, the central government in Paris named a commission to investigate these pogroms, and one of the commission's members was Michel Heimerdinger, a member of the Central Consistory who was himself of Alsatian origin.[33] But ultimately the courts,

[32] Marjorie Lamberti, *Jewish Activism in Imperial Germany: The Struggle for Civic Equality*, New Haven 1978, pp. 124–151.

[33] Paula Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace*, New Haven 1991, p. 23.

influenced by the anti-Jewish popular mood, treated the perpetrators leniently and pronounced extremely mild sentences.[34]

Although the role of Jewish moneylending in the countryside was the major impetus behind the 1848 pogroms in Alsace, resentment over Jewish emancipation also played a role. In Hagenthal in Upper Alsace anti-Jewish violence broke out because the Jews dared to present a candidate for the elections to the National Assembly.[35] After the pogroms Jews were informally forbidden from settling in certain regions of Alsace, despite formal freedom of residence, and the services of Jewish doctors were sometimes refused by Christian patients.[36]

In Baden some Jews had bought local citizenship rights prior to 1848. This change of status was the motive for similar attacks on Jews as in Alsace. The Jews in Baden were forced to relinquish their rights. These massive upheavals motivated the politicians to postpone emancipation until 1859, at which time the Jews of Baden began again to circulate petitions in favour of equal rights.[37]

Conclusions: The Right to be Different

Jews in both France and Germany fought actively for emancipation. But in Germany, in contrast to France, this struggle was a long, drawn-out process, which came to an end only in 1871. In France, although emancipation was not challenged after 1815, the implementation of emancipation was much more gradual, due largely to local resistance in Alsace and Lorraine, and in some respects emancipation became a reality there only after 1850. It is no coincidence that synagogue buildings in France were more modest than in Germany; since the opposition to the Jewish newcomers in French cities could sometimes be violent, French Jews had to be cautious in establishing their urban presence. In Paris an impressive synagogue was inaugurated in 1875, but it was hidden in an inner courtyard and was therefore nearly invisible from the outside street.[38] In 1843 the local authorities in Colmar allowed the synagogue to be built only at the periphery of the old city.[39] Its style was so modest as to be inconspicuous. Even in Strasbourg no imposing synagogue was built until 1898 during the German occupation.[40]

Moreover, as David Cohen, Paula Hyman and others have shown, French Jews began to move into the high-level civil and military services only in the 1860s. The

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[34] *Archives israélites*, 1848, pp. 353, 413, 434.

[35] Archives Départementales du Haut-Rhin, Colmar, V 615, June 10, 1848; Hyman, *Emancipation*, pp. 25ff.

[36] Hyman, *Emancipation*, pp. 26–29. See also Archives Départementales du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg, III M 147, December 28, 1857, judge of Molsheim to préfet; III M 149, October 24, 1867.

[37] Reinhard Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*, Göttingen 1975, pp. 65–69.

[38] Dominique Jarrassé, *L'Age d'or des synagogues*, Tours 1991, pp. 2, 101. On the Paris synagogue see Richard I. Cohen's essay in this volume.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 30. Jean Daltroff, *1898–1940: La Synagogue consistoriale de Strasbourg*, Strasbourg 1996.

nomination of Leopold Sée of Upper Alsace as a general was a turning point in this respect. Among French Jews there developed a strong patriotism independent of the difficulties of everyday life. This patriotism ultimately inspired the *mission civilisatrice* of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle.* That this patriotism had deep roots can be seen in an Alsatian Hebrew calendar from the 1860s: a chronology was printed in Hebrew letters, and the date of emancipation was mentioned in the same line with the date of the creation of the world.[41]

The Jews of the German states prior to unification were also extremely patriotic, but perhaps not with the same sense of mission. The *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden,* the German counterpart of the Alliance, was not formed until 1901.

Although some scholars have recently argued that the Jews of France, despite or perhaps because of emancipation, did not feel free to express their cultural distinctiveness, this claim seems somewhat exaggerated. Alexandre Weill, who had moved to Paris after the annexation of Alsace by Germany in 1871, published poems in Judeo-German in 1889.[42] No German-Jewish poet of the time would have dared to do that. The German-Jewish writer Berthold Auerbach of Nordstetten, a figure comparable to Weill, did not publish his memoirs of his Jewish village during his lifetime for fear of fanning popular hatred of Jews. As in France, there was not a single German Jewish leader who spoke out against emancipation: some orthodox leaders expressed reservations, but these doubts should not be overstated. Modern Orthodoxy made its peace with urban bourgeois German culture. Its leader, Samson Raphael Hirsch, combined his staunch German patriotism with his vigorous attacks against religious reform.[43]

French Jews were more politicised before 1848. In a society of notables, such as France during the July Monarchy and the Second Empire, it is not surprising that Jews entering politics did not experience great success, but these early Jewish politicians, such as Adolphe Crémieux or Michel Goudchaux, nevertheless foreshadowed trends that would become more widespread during the Third Republic. Local police reports from the period of the 1848 Revolution show that Baden Jews, too, even in rural areas, were heavily engaged in republican politics.[44] French Jews were also involved in international politics even before the creation of the Alliance in 1860, as evidenced by their fight on behalf of their coreligionists in Damascus, who had been accused of ritual murder in 1840, as well as their campaign for the right of Alsatian Jews to travel and reside in Switzerland (1845, 1851–53).

Jewish leaders in France had to fight for the realisation of the emancipation decreed in 1791. While Crémieux and Max Cerfberr were elected to office, German Jews were scarcely present in parliaments before 1848. It was the Jewish community

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[41] Original was in the possession of the late Robert Braunschweig, Berne.

[42] Alexandre Weill, *Dorfweiber Schmüess am Schabbes-Nachmittag*, Strasbourg 1889.

[43] Mordechai Breuer, *Jüdische Orthodoxie im Deutschen Reich 1871–1918*, Frankfurt am Main 1986, pp. 228ff., 291ff.

[44] Heinrich Raab, *Revolutionäre in Baden 1848/49*, Stuttgart 1998 (see accompanying CD-ROM).

leaders who signed petitions and brought the emancipation question repeatedly into the public debates. Their real political influence was limited. The Jewish consistorial elite in French Alsace was quite passive despite the fact that this region experienced difficulties accepting the Jews. Discrimination in Alsace and Lorraine was informal and was counter-balanced by metropolitan Paris and the mostly pro-emancipation state. The lack of social integration in the Alsatian province seems to have been comparable with the situation in Germany.

The above analysis shows that if we look at emancipation not only from an ideological and legal perspective, but from a social historical one as well, especially one that focuses on the interaction of Jews and non-Jews at the local level, the Jewish struggles for emancipation in France and Germany exhibit many common traits, despite significant differences in the chronology of achieving legal emancipation.

Comment by Ulrich Wyrwa

Uri Kaufmann convincingly points out the parallels between the German-Jewish and the French-Jewish experiences in the process of emancipation. Furthermore, he is sceptical about the thesis that emancipation mainly means assimilation, which is why he concentrates on Jewish political activity in favour of emancipation. He is also critical of using the term emancipation imprecisely and therefore defines emancipation strictly as legal equality. Finally, concentrating on the local and regional peculiarities, Kaufmann emphasises the great variety of Jewish experiences in both France and Germany, thus calling into question the validity of the so-called German and French models of emancipation.

In his essay Kaufmann gives a concise view of the paths of emancipation in Germany and France. For the period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Kaufmann emphasises the influence of the French Revolution in both France and the German states. He rightly mentions the obstacles to full legal equality even during the French Revolution, and he points to Napoleon's scepticism concerning Jewish emancipation. Kaufmann also stresses the impact of the French Revolutionary debates over Jewish emancipation in the Germans states. In addition to the translations of the National Assembly debates into German, we could also cite the large number of reports and comments that appeared in Berlin newspapers such as the *Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung* (known as the *Vossische Zeitung*) and the *Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen* (known as the *Haude- und Spenersche Zeitung*), where the Jewish writer Lazarus Bendavid served as political editor after 1802.[1]

A second phase in this struggle for emancipation, which Kaufmann labels "Reaction and Progress", extended from 1815 to the Revolution of 1848. Even though France was a centralised nationstate, and the German states were bound together

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[1] Otto Tschirch, *Geschichte der öffentlichen Meinung in Preussen, (1795–1806)*, 2 vols., Weimar 1933–1934, vol. 2, p. 148.

only in a loose confederation, the Jewish fight against discrimination and for greater political rights continued in both political entities.

Finally, Kaufmann denotes a third period in this century-long battle for emancipation, which spanned the years from the Revolution of 1848 to unification in 1871. Immediately after the Revolution of 1848, a period of political reaction set in in the German states, but at the end of the 1850s the liberal movement began to gain cultural and political hegemony both in the German states and in France as well.

In his short overview, Kaufmann shows us how Jews in both countries were engaged in the fight for legal and political equality. The differences between Germany and France, as Kaufmann points out, are evident first by the fact that in France the political rights granted by the constitution of 1791 were never questioned, and second by the fact that French Jews enjoyed more toleration than German Jews. Despite these differences, Kaufmann emphasises the many parallels between the French and the German Jewish emancipation processes. At the same time he notes the similarity between German and French Jews in that both displayed a great variety of experiences within their respective countries.

Far from questioning Kaufmann's thesis, I will merely add some salient critical remarks. First, the parallels between the German and French Jewish experiences were already evident during the Enlightenment and the years immediately prior to the French Revolution. For example, there are marked similarities between Zalkind Hourwitz's prizewinning essay written for the Metz Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences in the late 1780s and Moses Mendelssohn's essay submitted to the Berlin Academy in 1764.[2] There are also similarities in their respective battles for the "civic betterment" of the Jews.[3] This term had been made famous by the Christian writer Christian Wilhelm Dohm; but Dohm had developed this concept as a result of his political engagement with French Jews, and he was encouraged in his endeavours by Mendelssohn.

Second, Kaufmann may have underestimated the impact of the Prussian Emancipation Edict of 1812, proclaimed by Reinhard Rürup to be one of the chief landmarks in the history of emancipation, second only to the French emancipatory legislation of 1791.[4] Despite its shortcomings, this edict likewise established a sense of mission among Prussian Jews, as demonstrated by the commemorative publications of Ismar Freund, Paul Rieger and Hermann Cohen on the occasion of the centennial anniversary of the edict.[5]

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[2] Moses Mendelssohn, *Abhandlung über die Evidenz in Metaphysischen Wissenschaften, welche den von der Königlichen Academie der Wissenschaften in Berlin auf das Jahr 1763 ausgesetzten Preis erhalten hat*, Berlin 1764; reprint in Moses Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 24 vols., Berlin 1929–1997, vol. 2, Berlin 1931, pp. 267–330.

[3] See also in this volume the article by Frances Malino and Dominique Bourel's comment.

[4] Reinhard Rürup, 'The Tortuous and Thorny Path to Legal Equality: "Jew Laws" and Emancipatory Legislation in Germany from the Late Eighteenth Century', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 31 (1986), pp. 3–33, esp. p. 15.

[5] Reinhart Koselleck has noted that this edict was the only juridical text in Prussia of this period to use the term "citizenship". See Koselleck, *Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution: Allgemeines*

Third, one might take issue with Kaufmann's remark that Prussian conservatives by the mid-nineteenth century had come to terms with the emancipation of Jews as individuals. Although the emancipation of Jews as individuals was the concept upheld by Count Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre in the National Assembly during the French Revolution, mid-nineteenth-century Prussian conservatives were far more oriented towards the concept of the Christian state, in which Jews were tolerated only as a distinct corporation separate from Christian society and lacking political rights.[6] This distinction constituted one of the principal differences between France and the German states, although it was less a difference between the two countries than between the conservative elites of Paris and Berlin.

These remarks by no means refute Kaufmann's exposition. Quite the contrary, I would like to press his argument further in three aspects. First, by concentrating on the Jewish engagement for emancipation, we can see that emancipation was not simply a gentile project, and that Jews were not merely the passive "victims" of a wider socio-technological project aimed at suppressing their distinctiveness, as Zygmunt Baumann has argued.[7] Rather I would assert that emancipation was also a Jewish project, and that it emerged from the Jewish experience in a changing world. Jews became involved in that process as a result of their own social experiences, and they pursued their own political aims.

Second, regarding the diversity of Jewish experiences within Germany and France, grounded in local and regional peculiarities, it is worth noting that these internal differences were far more striking than the national differences between France and Germany. It is even questionable whether it is possible to construct "national paths" of emancipation at all, particularly when we are dealing with a period during which Germany had not yet become a nationstate. Therefore, it is difficult to maintain the claim that Germany and France exhibited two distinct models of emancipation; they both exhibited distinct features but in different regional and local contexts.

Third, I would like to point out the European dimensions of the process of emancipation. Taking a synoptic view of the European-Jewish experience of emancipation and looking beyond the perspective of individual nationstates, it is surprising to see parallels in the emancipation processes in nearly every European country.[8] From

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Landrecht, Verwaltung und soziale Bewegung von 1791 bis 1848, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1975, p. 59. See also Ismar Freund, *Emanzipation der Juden in Preussen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Gesetzes vom 11. März 1812*, 2 vols., Berlin 1912; Paul Rieger, *Zur Jahrhundertfeier des Judenedikts vom 11. März 1812: Ein Rückblick auf den Kampf der preussischen Juden um die Gleichberechtigung*, Berlin 1912; Hermann Cohen, 'Emanzipation: Zur Hundertjahrfeier des Staatsbürgertums der preußischen Juden', in Hermann Cohen, *Jüdische Schriften*, 2 vols., Berlin 1924, vol. 2, pp. 220–228.

[6] Herbert A. Strauss, 'Bilder von Juden und vom Judentum in der Entwicklung der Gesetzgebung Preussens im Vormärz', in Manfred Jehle (ed.), *Die Juden und die jüdischen Gemeinden Preussens in amtlichen Enquêten des Vormärz*, 4 vols., Munich 1998, vol. 1, p. xlviii.

[7] Zygmunt Baumann, *Moderne und Ambivalenz: Das Ende der Eindeutigkeit*, Hamburg 1992, pp. 133–198.

[8] Ulrich Wyrwa, 'Die Emanzipation der Juden in Europa', in Elke-Vera Kotowski, Julius H.

the beginning of the period of emancipation during the *Ancien Régime* up through the end of the period in the 1870s, similar political debates for or against Jewish emancipation can be seen almost everywhere in Europe. In the 1840s, for example, in nearly all European countries, the issue of Jewish emancipation had become one of the main topics of public debate, and in the liberal years of the mid-1850s even in Russia and Romania, a liberal policy in favour of Jews seemed to emerge for a brief moment.[9] Furthermore, the French Revolution was not an event limited to France. It had historic repercussions throughout Europe. Likewise, the Revolution of 1848 was an event of European dimensions, and Jews had similar experiences not only in France and Germany but also in Italy and Hungary.

Even minor events in the history of emancipation had a European dimension. The case of the Jewish Wahl brothers, for example, attracted attention beyond the borders of Switzerland and France. It was this case that inspired Giuseppe Mazzini to write an essay in favour of political rights for Jews.[10] Even the principal Italian pamphlet in favour of Jewish emancipation by Carlo Cattaneo was prompted by this event.[11] And the Wahl case also provoked response from Prussian conservatives, who in a Prussian journal defended the legitimacy of the expulsion of the French Jews from Basel.[12] Finally, the period of Jewish emancipation came to an end with a European political event – the Congress of Berlin in 1878 – where the idea of Jewish legal equality became a principle of European diplomacy.[13]

Thus Jewish emancipation was a European process in the same way the Enlightenment, the emergence of a civil society and the process of nationstate building were also European-wide phenomena. Regarding the Jewish fight for emancipation, the Polish author Jan Czynski described the struggle of Polish Jews as a European question in a French-language pamphlet published in 1833 in Paris.[14] And in 1871, as the era of emancipation was winding to a close, the Italian rabbi and editor of the Jewish journal, *Il Vessillo Israelitico*, Flaminio Servi, described the Jews of Eu-

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Schoeps and Hiltrud Wallenborn (eds.), *Handbuch zur Geschichte der Juden in Europa*, 2 vols., Darmstadt 2001, vol. 2, pp. 336–352. See also Eli Bar-Chen's observation in this volume concerning the intensity of communication among various European Jewish communities regarding the progress of emancipation.

[9] John D. Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question*, 1855–1881, Cambridge 1995, pp. 13–31; Beate Welter, *Die Judenpolitik der rumänischen Regierung, 1866–1888*, Frankfurt am Main 1989, pp. 19, 25–26.

[10] Giuseppe Mazzini, *Scritti editi ed inediti*, 79 vols., Imola 1909–1940, vol. 6, 1909, pp. 401–418, first published in *La Jeune Suisse*, no. 37, November 4, 1835 and no. 39, Novembre, 11 1835.

[11] Carlo Cattaneo, 'Ricerche economiche sulle interdizioni imposte dalla legge civile agli israeliti', *Annali di Giurisprudenza*, vol. 28 (1836); reprinted in Cattaneo, *Interdizioni israelitiche*, Rome 1995.

[12] [Anonymous], 'Noch Einiges über die Emancipation der Juden', *Preussische Provinzial-Blätter*, vol. 26 (1841), pp. 301 ff.

[13] Nathan Michael Gelber, 'Jüdische Probleme beim Berliner Kongress 1878', in Robert Weltsch, *Deutsches Judentum: Aufstieg und Krise; Gestalten, Ideen, Werke*, Stuttgart 1963, pp. 216–252.

[14] Jan Czynski, *La Question des Juifs polonais envisagée comme question européenne*, Paris 1833.

rope as an integral component of European culture and society in his book, *Gli Israeliti d'Europa nella civiltà.* He wrote this book from a decidedly European perspective, and he enthusiastically described the history of the Jews in Europe from the French Revolution to his own day as a triumphal history that marked a decisive break with the past persecutions and sufferings of the Jewish people.[15]

[15] Flaminio Servi, *Gli Israeliti d'Europa nella civiltà: Memorie storiche, biografiche e statistiche dal 1789 al 1870*, Torino 1871.

Silvia Cresti

Kultur and Civilisation after the Franco-Prussian War: A Debate between German and French Jews

In recent historiography the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 is considered a turning point in German and French cultural history. The republic declared on September 4, 1870 changed not only the war but also the self-perception of the Germans and the French, as well as their perceptions of the enemy. After the French defeat of August 1870 and the declaration of the Third Republic, what had begun as a Franco-Prussian war became a Franco-German war. The classical territorial war between states evolved into an ideological and national war, in which the French and German people fought one another. In order to analyse the intellectual and political shift that took place in continental Europe by the end of the nineteenth century, when Imperial Germany and the Third Republic considered themselves "arch enemies" and constructed their respective national identities on reciprocal opposition, the Archimedean point was in September 1870, when, as Michael Jeismann has claimed, hostility became nationalised.[1]

The transition from a war between states to a war between peoples and nations transformed national sentiments on both sides of the Rhine. Until the summer of 1870 the nation to which one belonged and the enemy against whom one fought were conceived of as objective and political entities; afterwards they became abstract categories, albeit in different ways in each country. For the French, their nation was increasingly seen as an entity embodying universal values: France now represented *la civilisation*, the expression of the highest human values. Germans, by contrast, who defeated and humiliated France, were perceived by the French as representing *la barbarie*: they stood beyond the pale of civilisation.

On the German side of the Rhine, civilisation was also redefined, although in an inverse way. In Germany, where unification occurred during the battle against

[1] See Michael Jeismann, *Das Vaterland der Feinde: Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1792–1918*, Stuttgart 1992. See also Philippe Levillain and Rainer Riemenschneider (eds.), *La guerre de 1870/71 et ses conséquences*, Bonn 1990; Jean El Gammal, 'La guerre de 1870/71 dans la mémoire de droites', in Jean-François Sirinelli (ed.), *Histoire des droites en France*, 3 vols., Paris 1992, vol. 2, pp. 471–504. For a comparative analysis of German and French concepts of nation and nationalism after 1871, see Etienne François, Hannes Siegrist and Jakob Vogel (eds.), *Nation und Emotion: Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich, 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 1995; and Jakob Vogel, *Nationen im Gleichschritt: Der Kult der "Nation in Waffen" in Deutschland und Frankreich 1871–1914*, Göttingen 1997.

France, the experience of the battlefields and the victory over France were transposed into theoretical and national terms: *civilisation* ceased to be a common characteristic of all Western countries, while *Kultur* acquired a universal function. In Germany the term *Kultur* now represented universal values in a privileged and exclusive way, while the term *civilisation* was progressively identified with France and other Western countries and took on negative overtones.

By September 1870, therefore, two different national sentiments had been born, represented by the French Third Republic, which identified itself with the exemplar *civilisation*, and the German Kaiserreich, which professed an exclusive *Kultur*.[2] This ideological war between Germany and France was reinforced after 1870, when scholars on both sides of the Rhine, expressing their opposing concepts of national identity, debated Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. In Imperial Germany intellectuals legitimated the annexation by referring to the German idea of national belonging, whereas the French claim on its lost provinces was founded on the French concept of nationality. As the disputes that arose between Theodor Mommsen and Fustel de Coulanges, on the one hand, and Ernest Renan and David Friedrich Strauss, on the other, show, Germans believed Alsace-Lorraine had to be considered German because its inhabitants were of German descent and spoke German. Culture was therefore considered a principal attribute of Germanness. From the French perspective, however, Alsace-Lorraine was French since the population there wished to remain French citizens: they were French on account of their values and institutions, and above all on account of their civilisation.

This essay aims to investigate in detail these contrasting national identities, which took shape in the years immediately following the Franco-Prussian War. This investigation will focus on the shift from when France and Germany perceived of each other as political opponents to when they began to perceive of each other as ideological entities embodying values antithetical to their own.

By investigating the evolution of these two distinct national identities during these years, I intend to focus specifically on the Jewish perspective. I will investigate the patriotic commitments expressed by French and German Jewries as compared to the patriotic narratives expressed in these two countries more generally. A comparative inquiry into the national identities of Jews on both sides of the Rhine is of particular interest since their respective nationalisations had followed different chronological patterns than that of their non-Jewish compatriots. In addition to the complex correlation between national and religious identity that both French and German Jews had already developed, the war and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine challenged their national and religious identities in unprecedented ways.

By the 1870s the confessionalisation of Judaism – the attempt to define Judaism solely as a creed, shorn of all ethnic components that suggested that Jews were a supra-national community bound by a sense of solidarity – had been accomplished among French and German Jews. Thus, for middle-class liberal Jews in both coun-

[2] See Jörg Fisch, 'Zivilisation, Kultur', in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 9 vols., Stuttgart 1992, vol. 7, pp. 679–774.

tries, Judaism was officially relegated to the private sphere. Consequently, during the Franco-Prussian War French and German citizens of the Jewish faith had to fight one another. Nevertheless, religious, cultural and economic ties still persisted between these two Jewish communities. Thus, the Franco-Prussian War affected German and French Jews differently than it did non-Jewish citizens of Germany and France, and Jews were particularly implicated in the debate over the fate of Alsace-Lorraine. Nearly two-thirds of all French Jews prior to 1870 lived in these provinces, which were annexed to the Reich after the war. The large Jewish community here, which numbered 40,938 in 1871, was almost completely of Ashkenazi background, and these Jews historically had close religious, cultural and economic ties to the larger Ashkenazi community on the other side of the Rhine.[3]

Thus, during the 1870s in both Imperial Germany and the Third Republic, the apposite terms qualifying national identity were legitimated through the debate over the issue of Alsace-Lorraine, and it is of interest to analyse how German and French Jews expressed their respective national identities with respect to this question. In sum, an analysis of the national identity and patriotic commitments of these two Jewish communities can reveal a great deal about the more general ways in which German and French national identities were conceived in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War.

In this essay I will first delineate a *longue durée* narrative of how the nation and national belonging have been represented in both Germany and France over the course of the nineteenth century. I will trace these different intellectual traditions prior to the Franco-Prussian War and analyse how they were reformulated in antagonistic ways after 1871. Second, I will analyse the national allegiances and patriotic feelings expressed by German and French Jews in the 1870s and the impact that these allegiances had on their respective religious commitments. The main questions I will consider are the following: Did German and French Jews adopt the more general national stances of hostility and hatred towards one another? Did the symbols, concepts and images expressed by German and French Jews in their respective articulations of patriotism conform to mainstream expressions of German and French national identities? And finally, if they did indeed conform to these more general expressions of national identity, to what extent did this conformity affect their Jewish identity? In sum, what were the similarities and differences in the ways German and French Jews defined their identities as German or French citizens and as Jews?

To conduct this inquiry I will focus on two sources: the *Archives israélites* and the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*.[4] These journals were the most important non-

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[3] For the population figures, see Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany: The Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, 1871–1918*, Stanford 1988, p. 76. On the Jewish community of Alsace and Lorraine prior to 1871 see Paula E. Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace: Acculturation and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century*, New Haven, CT 1991; and Caron, *Between France and Germany*, ch. 1, pp. 1–26.

[4] There is little systematic research on the *Archives israélites* and the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* specifically, as there is little research on the Jewish press in nineteenth century in general.

scholarly Jewish journals in both countries; both had nation-wide circulations and represented the Jewish urban middle and upper-middle classes. Thus, these two journals reflected similar social and intellectual strata. In addition, they represented the social class most influenced by patriotic sentiments in each country. To analyse the patriotic sentiments of German and French Jews in the immediate aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, I will focus especially on articles dealing with the question of Alsace-Lorraine. In addition, I will look at debates concerning the Crémieux decree of 1870, which granted French citizenship to Algerian Jews and debates concerning the laicisation of French public education and the French public sphere in general. As for German Jews, I will analyse in addition to debates concerning Alsace-Lorraine the discussion regarding whether the Jewish religion should be officially recognised as equal to the two Christian religions in the educational system, especially in the state of Prussia. Further, I will investigate a series of articles debating the historical influence of religion on German culture and on the concept of citizenship.

The analysis of these two journals will illustrate how German and French Jews in the late nineteenth century defined their national identities in terms derived from their respective national traditions: French Jews defined their being French in political terms based on the political concept of citizenship, while German Jews defined their Germanness in cultural terms based on their German culture. These divergent concepts of national identity also influenced the ways German and French Jews defined their Jewishness. For French Jews, whose commitment to France was expressed through political involvement with institutions, Judaism was an exclusively private matter clearly separated from the public space.[5] Therefore, their identity was split between their political loyalty to France and their religious loyalty to Judaism, a dualism best demonstrated by the motto of the Central Consistory: *patrie* and *religion*.

In Imperial Germany, however, this bifurcation of spheres was impossible, since it presumed a definition of nationality that was political and abstract and divorced from any specific religious affiliation. But in the immediate aftermath of unification, to be German meant to participate in *Deutschtum*, which expressed the *Kultur* of the entire *Volk*. This ethnic and cultural definition of Germanness was a complex and intricate matter because ethnicity and culture were interwoven. Moreover, German culture in Imperial Germany retained a strong Protestant character.[6]

Regarding these two journals, see Béatrice Philippe, *Les Archives Israélites de France de leur création en 1840 à février 1848 ou un journal juif sous Louis-Philippe: Etudes des mentalités*, Paris 1975; and Hans Otto Horch, *Auf der Suche nach der jüdischen Erzählliteratur: die Literaturkritik der 'Allgemeinen Zeitung des Judentums' (1837–1922)*, Frankfurt am Main 1985. For a general overview of the Jewish press in the nineteenth century, see Bernhard Poll (ed.), *Jüdische Presse im 19. Jahrhundert*, Aachen 1967.

[5] Pierre Birnbaum has qualified the integration of French Jews as "state integration", underlining the role of politics and of the State in France. See Pierre Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic: A Political History of State Jews from Gambetta to Vichy*, trans. by Jane Maire Todd, Stanford 1996.

[6] On Deutschtum and Protestantism in Imperial Germany, see Helmut Walser Smith, *German*

The identity of German Jews was therefore extremely complicated. They were not Germans and Jews, but doubly German Jews. On the one hand, since German culture deprived of *ethnos* allowed only a surrogate access to Germanness, they were perceived as Jews even in their national allegiance. On the other hand, as Jews they had to confront the cultural dimension dominating the public sphere: Protestantism. Judaism was, therefore, not separate from national allegiance but was involved in the formulation of the national identity of German Jews: for them nationality and religion were inextricably intertwined.

In both Imperial Germany and the Third Republic, therefore, definitions of citizenship complemented definitions of Judaism. For German Jews, the two spheres of nationality and religion were therefore interconnected, while for French Jews these spheres remained clearly divided, due to the secular nature of the public sphere during the Third Republic. These differences ultimately determined the divergent approaches taken by German and French Jews to the debates about nationality and citizenship that arose after 1871.

There is little comparative research on the patriotic feelings of both Jewish communities after the Franco-Prussian War, just as there is little comparative research on the different paths taken by Judaism on both sides of the Rhine over the course of the nineteenth century.[7] To the extent that scholars have compared the respective evolutions of German and French Jewry in the nineteenth century, they have tended to emphasise the impact of the early emancipation of French Jews as opposed to the late emancipation of German Jews. The emergence of the major religious and cultural movements of modern German Jewry, including the Reform, Conservative and even neo-Orthodox movements, as well as the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* movement, have all been interpreted as efforts by German Jews to prove their worthiness for citizenship. Although French Jews in the early nineteenth century also called for "regeneration", the changes they proposed were less radical and tended to focus less on ritual or ideological redefinitions of Judaism than on pedagogical and socio-economic reforms. According to Esther Benbassa and others, this difference can be explained by the fact that French Jews were under considerably

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Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870–1914, Princeton 1995. On the hegemony of Protestantism in Germany, see Wolfgang Altgeld, *Katholizismus, Protestantismus, Judentum: Über religiös begründete Gegensätze und nationalreligiöse Ideen in der Geschichte des deutschen Nationalismus*, Mainz 1992.

[7] In her book on the identities of Jews of Alsace-Lorraine after the annexation, Vicki Caron delineates two different patriotic commitments: a political commitment to France, as opposed to an ethnic and cultural understanding of Germanness. See Caron, *Between France and Germany*, esp. chs. 2 and 6, pp. 27–44 and pp. 118–135. On the relationship of French and German Jews during the nineteenth century, see Michael Graetz, 'The History of an Estrangement between Two Jewish Communities: German and French Jewry during the Nineteenth Century', in Jacob Katz (ed.), *Towards Modernity: The European Jewish Model*, New Brunswick, NJ 1987, pp. 159–169; Jonathan Helfand, 'The Symbiotic Relationship between French and German Jewry in the Age of Emancipation', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* (LBIYB) 29 (1984), pp. 331–350.

less pressure to prove themselves worthy of citizenship than their German coreligionists.[8]

The nexus between emancipation and integration is therefore crucial. German Jews had to integrate as Jews, whereas French Jews integrated as citizens. But can the divergent paths taken by these two Jewish communities be reduced merely to the fact that French Jews possessed political rights while German Jews did not? Is it true that only the difference in the timing of emancipation produced such major cultural and intellectual differences?

In my view, the difference in the timing of emancipation offers only a partial explanation. It does not, however, explain why German and French Jews continued to perceive of their national and Jewish identities differently even after 1871, when German Jews were finally granted political rights. It is therefore necessary to consider other factors in analysing these different evolutions.

In analysing the distinct processes of integration experienced by German and French Jewry it is also necessary to take into account the different societies into which they were integrating. The typology of integration depended on the nature of the general society, as it determined the rules, values and symbols on which integration based. Thus, the integration of Jews proceeded in different directions even in the various West European nations. The diversity of modes of Jewish integration in Western Europe is highlighted by the fact that this integration assumed different national forms. This nexus between Jewish integration and nationalisation explains why German and French Jews defined their religious faith and their national allegiances differently.

The search for specifically German and French models of Jewish integration raises the following questions: how did German and French Jews define the relationship between their Jewish faith and their national identity in the late nineteenth century? And how did they define the proper relationship between citizenship and national identity?

Even before the Franco-Prussian War two distinct intellectual traditions existed on both sides of the Rhine expressing a sense of national belonging. In Germany, the idea of an ethno-cultural nation, which dated back to Johann Gottlieb von Herder, prevailed, while in France, as Rogers Brubaker has noted, the prevailing sense of the nation was based on the political notions of consent and choice, as exemplified by Ernest Renan's concept of "elective nation".[9] Hence in France, the idea of the nation was expressed primarily through the abstract political notion of *citoyenneté*, which had been born at the time of the French Revolution. In Germany, by contrast, the idea of the nation was expressed primarily in apolitical cultural and ethnic terms so as to create a sense of unity among individuals who prior to 1871

[8] Esther Benbassa, *Histoire des Juifs de France*, Paris 1997 pp. 136–137. For the English translation, see Benbassa, *The Jews of France: A History from Antiquity to the Present*, trans. by M.B. De Beroise, Princeton 1999.

[9] Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge, MA 1992; Guy Hermet, *Histoire des nations et du nationalisme en Europe*, Paris 1996.

did not live in a unified nationstate. Finally, in the German states, *Kultur* was inextricably linked to religion and specifically Protestantism, while in France, *civilisation* was linked to *laicité*, the secular tradition of separation of church and state, which again dated back to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.

The Franco-Prussian War radically modified the meaning of these two different conceptions of nationality. The German concept of *Kultur* had traditionally been antagonistic to politics, but before 1870 this construct had not been used to oppose values and institutions of the West and France in particular. Nor had German *Kultur* been perceived as superior to France's national values. But with the war, the German concept of the ethno-cultural nation was politicised. *Kultur* increasingly signified an exclusive German political model antagonistic to the Western and French models identified with civilisation. In sum, after 1870 German *Kultur* no longer referred solely to Goethe and Schiller; rather, it was now extended to specific political beliefs which were perceived as antagonistic to Western and French political values precisely because they were interpreted as un-political.[10]

The "anti-Western turn" upon which the German nation was built had a linguistic fallout as well. After 1871 in Germany the term *Kultur* took on a broader and more politicised meaning, and it increasingly signified profundity, sincerity, loyalty and integrity. By contrast, the term *Zivilisation*, which had carried a positive connotation before 1871, became a derogatory term, connoting superficiality, artificiality and falsehood, traits which were now identified with France and the West more generally.

A similar linguistic transformation occurred on the French side of the Rhine. There, the term *civilisation* was increasingly identified with specifically French values, while the Germans were portrayed as barbarians. After the Franco-Prussian War, for example, a series of postcards representing French girls humiliated by brutal Prussian officers was widely diffused,[11] while some novels by Guy de Maupassant similarly portrayed Germans soldiers as barbarians.[12] Thus, from the French perspective, Europe after the Franco-Prussian War was divided into two camps: the civilised and the barbarians.

By 1871, however, these categories had not yet solidified: in Germany, political leaders were preoccupied with consolidating the new Reich, while French statesmen were still reeling from the trauma of the defeat, the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the Commune. Due to this fluidity, the year 1871 offers a propitious moment to undertake an analysis of how both the French and the Germans reconfigured their respective conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. In particular, we will focus on the role played by Jews on both sides of the Rhine in the hardening of these attitudes.

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[10] On the unpolitical nature of German national identity, see Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology*, Garden City, NY 1965; Stern (ed.), *The Failure of Illiberalism: Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany*, New York 1972.

[11] On the iconography of Prussian soldiers as barbarians, see Jeismann, *Das Vaterland der Feinde.*

[12] For example Maupassant's *Boule de suif* (1880).

In the immediate aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, both German and French Jews referred to the war as a catastrophe and continued to speake of their opponents in respectful terms. According to the *Archives israélites*, for example, the war was a catastrophe for France not only because of the physical and moral losses incurred, but also because the war constituted a blow to world civilisation. Indeed, the *Archives* even conceded that the Prussians, at least at the beginning of the war, had behaved like "civilised enemies".[13]

But the same article depicts German Jews in clearly derogatory terms:

> There is one point about which much has been said and about which we cannot remain silent, that is, the role of German Jews during this war; this role was the most sad, the most reprehensible. In order to curry all the more favour from triumphant Teutonism and to persuade themselves that they are pure Germans, they have exceeded even the excesses of language and violence that have characterised nearly all the German papers, to the extent that even some of the more sensible among those have nicknamed them Patriot Jews (*Patriejuden*). They are not to be blamed for having shown themselves to be good Germans, but rather for having forgotten, in their affected francophobia, that without France they would still be in the Ghetto. ... Let's limit ourselves to asking them how many among the dead bodies that they left on our battlefields they [can] count as army officers and as judges in the courts![14]

French Jews were therefore particularly irritated by what they considered the excessive chauvinism of their German coreligionists, whom they believed owed a debt of gratitude to France for having disseminated the ideas and values of Jewish emancipation not only to Germany, but to the entire world. Furthermore, by referring to the incompatibility of Teutonism and Jewishness, the *Archives israélites* suggested that these two categories were incompatible, in contrast to the situation in France where neither religion nor nationality were defined in ethnic terms. French Jews therefore referred to their non-Jewish compatriots as "our fellow citizens", thus underlining that all French citizens were related through a political bond, whereas they referred to Jews in other countries, including Germany, as "our coreligionists", a term shorn of any ethnic connotations.

Two other topics discussed by the *Archives israélites* further reflect the fact that they perceived nationality and citizenship to be universal categories theoretically open to everyone: the debate over the Crémieux Decree of 1870, which accorded the rights of citizenship to Algerian Jews, and the debate over the right of the Jews of Alsace and Lorraine to opt for French citizenship following the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871. To counter those in France who criticised the granting of citizenship to Algerian Jews, the *Archives israélites* stressed the morally uplifting aspects of French citizenship. According to the editor the Jews of Algeria, precisely because they had become French citizens, reacted to antisemitic attacks with greater dignity than unemancipated Jews elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Referring to a recent wave of pogroms in Galicia in 1873, the editor noted that the Jews there "allowed them-

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[13] *Archives israélites* (hereafter referred to as AI), 1871 (32), pp. 4–5, 90.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 92. On these debates more generally, see Caron, *Between France and Germany*, ch. 2, pp. 27–44.

selves to be vilified without resistance". By contrast, the Jews of Constantine had offered staunch resistance to such attacks since they had been bestowed with "human dignity" as a result of the Crémieux Decree.[15]

These concepts of citizenship and nationality as universal and elective appeared again in the spate of articles in the *Archives israélites* on the fate of the population of Alsace-Lorraine following the Franco-Prussian War. The editors of the *Archives israélites* repeatedly declared that the population of these provinces as a whole "wished to remain French", and they noted that Alsatian Jews in particular possessed "a heart that was simultaneously Jewish and French".[16] To counter German claims that the population of the annexed provinces was in reality culturally and ethnically German, the *Archives israélites* stressed that nationality and citizenship were matters of choice rather than ethnicity: "A territory, a province is not at all denationalised today solely due to a fortuitous military campaign: strategic calculations and perfected armaments can decide the advantage in 100 battles, but the free consent of the interested parties should alone determine their country (*patrie*): to dispose of their fates without consulting them is to treat them as pariahs, it is to make of their native country a prison ...".[17]

This definition of nationality and citizenship, as we have already noted, relied on a sharp distinction between public and private spheres, and the *Archives israélites* clearly believed that religion belonged to the latter. French Jews, it maintained, in an article on the role of religion in education, held that "these two spheres had to remain completely independent of one another, and that the duties of the believer could not exercise any influence over the resolutions of the citizen, nor over the politics of the country. Just as we do not allow religion to enter into politics, we do not allow patriotism any authority over spiritual matters. ... In the temple, there are only Jews; in the public realm (*la Cité*) there are only French".[18] It was therefore imperative that education be "secular in the public school and religious within in the bosom of the family".[19]

In Imperial Germany, however, such a rigid separation of private and public spheres was not possible, since it presumed a secularisation of the state. But there the public realm remained heavily influenced by religion, especially Protestantism. Indeed, the Second Empire was seen by many as a Christian State. Not surprisingly, therefore, German Jews, unlike their French coreligionists, referred to their non-Jewish compatriots as "our fellow Christian citizens". The significant adjective "Christian" meant that the public sphere was still permeated by religion and that non-Christian citizens were unable to participate in it on an equal basis. Moreover, the only way Judaism could achieve official recognition was if it acquired access to

[15] AI, 1873 (34), p. 743.

[16] AI, 1872 (33), pp. 333, 336.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 337–338.

[18] AI, 1873 (34), p. 612.

[19] AI, 1872 (33), p. 564.

the public sphere. One area where this could happen was in regards to the role of religion in public education, a matter alien to French Jews.

In an 1871 series of articles in the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* titled "What Jews Have to Demand from the German State", education was the central issue. In Prussia, Judaism, in contrast to Protestantism and Catholicism, was taught exclusively by teachers paid for by the Jewish community, and the classrooms were provided after the regular school day only at the good will of the municipalities. The *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* therefore urged that Prussian Jewish communities establish their own religious schools, and it argued that it was now the duty of the state to support these institutions financially so as to make Judaism equal to the two major Christian denominations.[20] Thus, for German Jews, in contrast to their French coreligionists, civil rights remained closely bound up with religion. As the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* declared: "For many centuries the German Reich, the German territories and their laws had retained a confessional character. It was only after a very difficult and protracted process that there emerged in Germany a conception of law that mandated that political and civil rights needed to be separated from religion".[21]

Moreover, German Jews, like their Christian compatriots, tended to define Germanness in ethnic terms, and they followed the German terminology of the time in speaking of Germanness as a matter of *Stamm*, or tribal descent.[22] In an article of January 17, 1871 titled 'The German Reich and the Jews', the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* celebrated the creation of the new German Empire which it perceived as "the German tribes' sense of belonging to a national state, [a sense] which had existed in the old German Reich and likewise today constitutes the core of the new German Reich".[23] Since the new Empire united a variety of different German tribes, Jews, too, could join this new nation as equals if they were also a tribe, just like the Saxons, the Bavarians or the Franconians.[24]

German Jews also used this argument to justify the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in general and to claim that the Jews of the annexed provinces were German by descent. In an article titled, "To Our Coreligionists in Alsace-Lorraine", Dr. Ludwig Philippson, editor of the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, sought to convince the Jews of Alsace-Lorraine that they were "preeminently of German origin".[25] Although Philippson acknowledged that these provinces had belonged to

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20 *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* (hereafter referred to as AZJ), 1871 (35), pp. 653–654.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 801.

22 See Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Cambridge 2001, pp. 270ff.

23 AZJ, 1871 (35), pp. 41–43, esp. p. 41. See also *ibid.*, p. 610.

24 See on this issue Michael Brenner, 'Religion, Nation oder Stamm: Zum Wandel der Selbstdefinition unter deutschen Juden', in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Dieter Langewiesche (eds.), *Nation und Religion in der deutschen Geschichte*, Frankfurt am Main 2001, pp. 587–601.

25 Ludwig Philippson, 'An unsere Glaubensgenossen in Elsass und Deutsch-Lothringen', AZJ (35), March 14, 1871, pp. 209–211. See also Caron, *Between France and Germany*, pp. 39–41. All quotations in this paragraph are from the AZJ article.

France for the past few centuries, he maintained that they nevertheless remained German according to linguistic, cultural and historical ties. Moreover, according to Philippson, the German states throughout the Middle Ages had tolerated Jews, in contrast to France, which had expelled them. Thus, he claimed, the Jews of Alsace-Lorraine had Germany alone to thank for their right of residence. Moreover, according to Philippson, the Jews of the annexed provinces had preserved much of their German cultural heritage: they followed Ashkenazi religious rites in their synagogues, they recruited their rabbis principally from Germany, and they had maintained close ties to their German coreligionists. Thus, he maintained, "the connection between them and German Jewry never died out". Although Philippson recognised that the annexation constituted a traumatic event for the Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, he nevertheless expressed the hope that in the future they would work hand in hand with their German coreligionists to achieve their shared goals: "support of our holy religion" and "equality in state and society".

Imperial Germany never underwent a complete secularisation and German culture, interpreted as the expression of the German *Volk*, remained heavily suffused with Protestant values.[26] Not surprisingly, German Jews were deeply influenced by this ethnic definition of belonging and citizenship, which they expressed so forcefully at the time of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.

Comment by Sandrine Kott

In her essay Silvia Cresti investigates the patriotic sentiments expressed by French and German Jews during the years after 1870, and she compares these to the general national narratives of these two countries. Cresti's investigation reveals interesting insights since the emergence of national identity among Jews on both sides of the Rhine followed different patterns and chronologies than that of their non-Jewish compatriots. This investigation allows us to understand how French and German Jews constructed their identities both as Jews and citizens in relation to their national surroundings.

Cresti first presents the classical opposition between culture and civilization as the two dominant national narratives in both countries. She then studies the impact of these contrasting national narratives on French and German Jews as regards their identities as Jews and as citizens. Her inquiry is based primarily on a comparison of articles in two journals: the *Archives israélites* and the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, which both represented the urban and middle to upper-middle class Jews.

We are therefore provided with two comparative perspectives: from the point of view of Jewish history, comparing the French and German situations allows us to

[26] See Rudolf von Thadden, 'Aufbau nationaler Identität: Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich', in Bernhard Giessen (ed.), *Nationale und kulturelle Identität: Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewusstseins in der Neuzeit*, Frankfurt am Main 1996, p. 502.

consider the notion of Jewish identity as it relates to the non-Jewish milieu. For a general French or German historian, the Jewish perspective offers an interesting angle to rethink traditional oppositions between French and German conceptions of national identity.

I. Jewish Identity and Nationalism

The importance of religion for the definition of Jewish identity in France and Germany has to be linked to the different roles played by the Catholic Church in the construction of national identity in both countries. The Third Republic constructed its identity on *laicité* and was a secular state.[1] Imperial Germany, by contrast, was, as Cresti notes, Protestant, and more specifically Lutheran. Luther was seen as a founding figure of the nation, and the Emperor, as king of Prussia, was also head of the Protestant Church.[2]

One could widen this approach by trying to define more precisely how the complicated links between the Jewish people and the surrounding society and culture played out. Such an approach will allow us to understand more precisely how Jewish identity was progressively "nationalised" in both countries so that we can go beyond a simple conception of "nationalisation".

Jewish emancipation was completed in France in 1791, whereas it constituted a prolonged process in the German states, lasting until 1871. This legal evolution was accompanied by a process of integration that has been studied for the most part in cultural terms for German Jews,[3] whereas for French Jews scholars have focused primarily on their political and social integration.[4] Because Jewish emancipation in both countries coincided with a period of national affirmation and, in Germany, even the construction of the nationstate,[5] these processes of emancipation and integration were accompanied by the emergence of strong patriotic loyalties. In the context of the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), French Jews shared, although in less aggressive terms, the revanchist sentiments of their fellow citizens.[6] One testament

[1] See Pierre Nora (ed.), *Les Lieux de mémoire: La République,* 3 vols., Paris 1997, vol. 1.

[2] See esp. Gérald Chaix, 'Die Reformation', vol. 2, pp. 9–28, Etienne François, 'Die Wartburg', vol. 2, pp. 154–170, and Oliver Janz, 'Das evangelische Pfarrhaus', vol. 3, pp. 220–225, all in Etienne François and Hagen Schulze (eds.), *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, 3 vols., München 2001.

[3] See the literature cited in Trude Maurer, *Die Entwicklung der jüdischen Minderheit in Deutschland*, Tübingen 1992, pp. 28–59.

[4] See esp. Pierre Birnbaum, *Les Fous de la République: Histoire politique des juifs d'Etat de Gambetta à Vichy,* Paris 1992. This book has been translated into English as *The Jews of the Republic: A Political History of State Jews from Gambetta to Vichy*, trans. by Jane Marie Todd, Stanford 1996.

[5] See Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany,* Cambridge, MA 1992.

[6] For France see Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany: The Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, 1871–1918*, Stanford 1988, ch. 2, esp. pp. 27–44; and Michael R. Marrus, *Les Juifs de France à l'époque de l'affaire Dreyfus*, Paris 1972, pp. 118–122. Marrus' book has been published in English as *The Politics of Assimilation: The French Jewish Community at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair,* Oxford 1971.

to this hostility is the fact that French Jews frequently believed antisemitism was primarily German.[7] Thus, for French Jews, the Germans were double enemies. But these affirmations of anti-German feelings can also be seen as a means of demonstrating loyalty towards the French Republic and at the same time fighting against growing French antisemitism.[8] Still, they do not necessarily tell us a great deal about the real feelings of French Jews towards Germany. Both Jewish communities had to adjust to the dominant nationalist discourses in their respective countries as part of the process of integration. In order to deconstruct this conflation of Jewish and nationalist identities we have to pay more attention to the social and cultural grounding of both Jewish communities within their national surroundings.

II. French and German Jews in their National, Social and Political Surroundings

Jewish integration in Germany, as we have seen, has been understood primarily in cultural terms, and the scholarly debates about it have focused on the question of the German-Jewish symbiosis.[9] This cultural point of view has recently been widened, and the concept of subculture, which was first used in German historiography to refer to the Social Democratic milieu, has now been adopted to describe other political and religious milieus, such as the liberal, Catholic and Jewish subcultures.[10] By using this notion of subculture we have to look more carefully at the everyday social and cultural practices through which the identity of a group is constructed. Such a perspective will allow us to understand how Jewish culture, insofar as particular social boundaries and customs were concerned, constituted itself in relation to the dominant society.

This approach fits the German case particularly well since it was characterised by strong political and religious segmentation. Thus, the emergence of a German-Jewish subculture can be interpreted as an expression of this general political and religious fragmentation and not necessarily as a result of the "ethnicification" of Jewishness. In France, conversely, relatively early emancipation was coupled with a repub-

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[7] See Caron, *Between France and Germany*, p. 32; Vicki Caron and Paula E. Hyman, 'The Failed Alliance: Jewish-Catholic Relations in Alsace-Lorraine, 1871–1914', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 26 (1981), pp. 3–21; and Paul Raphaël, *La France, l'Allemagne et les juifs (1789–1915), antisémitisme et pangermanisme*, Paris 1916.

[8] Michel Winock, *Edouard Drumont et Cie: Antisémitisme et fascisme en France*, Paris 1982.

[9] See Maurer, *Entwicklung der Jüdischen Minderheit*, pp. 167–179.

[10] On the Social Democratic subculture, see Dieter Langewiesche, 'Kultur der Arbeiterbewegung im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik: Bemerkungen zum Forschungsstand', *Arbeiterkultur in Deutschland, Ergebnisse*, vol. 26 (October 1984), pp. 9–23. On the liberal subculture, see Lothar Gall (ed.), *Liberalismus*, Köln 1976, and James H. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the 19th Century*, Chicago 1978. On the German Catholic subculture, see esp. David Blackbourn, *Class, Religion and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany: The Center Party in Württemberg before 1914*, Wiesbaden 1980, and Blackbourn, *Marpingen: Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford 1993. Finally, on the Jewish subculture see esp. David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840*, New York 1987.

lican, liberal and anti-communitarian model of integration.[11] As Count Stanislas de Clermont Tonnerre declared in the National Assembly in 1789, "To the Jews as a nation, nothing; to the Jews as individuals, everything. ... They must form neither a political body nor an order in the state; they must be citizens individually".[12] For its founders, the French Republic was to be constructed by dissolving all preexisting factions and communities into a single body of citizens.

But such overgeneralisations neglect the reality of social boundaries in both countries as well as the internal diversity within both groups of Jews, neither of which can be reduced to a monolithic community. As Michel Espagne has pointed out, "Isn't the Berlin Jewish intellectual closer to the Berlin Protestant than to his humble coreligionist coming from the Palatinate"?[13] Thus, in both the German and French cases[14] it is necessary to speak of a variety of Jewish subcultures.[15]

Cresti has chosen to study two well-established Jewish journals, and she has restricted her investigation to educated, urban, middle-class Jews, who in both countries belonged largely to the same subculture. This delimitation leads us to ask two questions. First, it is necessary to know whether this group, when it expressed itself on political matters, argued from a specifically Jewish point of view. Second, it is necessary to look beyond the "Jewishness" of these journals to try to identify the particular non-Jewish subcultures to which they were linked. In both cases it seems obvious that the nationalist commitments expressed by these journals also reflected their liberal conceptions of national identity. In the German case it has become customary to describe the relationship between left liberals and the Jewish urban elites as a *Weggemeinschaft* (or "companionship on a common course"), a term that first appeared during the Revolution of 1848.[16] In France, as in the German states, liberals advocated the full emancipation of the Jews. But beyond that it is clear that German left liberals and Jews often came from the same social strata and shared

[11] French political historians today speak of "political culture". See Serge Bernstein (ed.), *Les Cultures politiques en France*, Paris 1999.

[12] Cited in Paula E. Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, New Haven 1998, p. 27. The translation here has been modified slightly.

[13] Michel Espagne, *Les Juifs allemands de Paris à l'époque de Heine: La Translation ashkénaze*, Paris 1996, p. 15.

[14] Paula Hyman and Vicki Caron have shown that the Jews of Alsace and Lorraine constituted a distinct French Jewish subculture. See Caron, *Between France and Germany*, and Paula Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace: Acculturation and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century*, New Haven 1991.

[15] Arno Herzig uses this expression for the *Ostjuden*, but the concept applies to Jews still living in the countryside in Alsace, Bavaria or Baden. Herzig, 'Juden und Judentum in der sozialgeschichtlichen Forschung', in Wolfgang Schieder and Volker Sellin, *Sozialgeschichte in Deutschland: Entwicklung und Perspektiven im internationalen Zusammenhang*, 4 vols., Göttingen 1987, vol. 4, pp. 108–133.

[16] Jacob Toury, *Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden in Deutschland: Von Jena bis Weimar*, Tübingen 1966; and Dieter Langewiesche, 'Liberalismus und Judenemanzipation in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert', in Peter Freimark, Alice Jankowski and Ina S. Lorenz (eds.), *Juden in Deutschland: Emanzipation, Integration, Verfolgung und Vernichtung*, Hamburg 1991, pp. 148–163.

common values, such as the centrality of *Bildung*.[17] This convergence allows us to speak of a common liberal subculture. In the German case one has to remember that national claims were first formulated by liberals who, at the beginning of the Second Reich were still the only unequivocal supporters of unification. But the liberal conception of the nation was far removed from the organic romantic vision, which became dominant in the 1880s and 90s. While the nation was perceived by liberals as a means of achieving emancipation from feudalism, for Jews the nation was a precondition for their emancipation.[18] By founding the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* in 1837, Dr. Ludwig Philippson (1811–1889) wanted above all to promote German-Jewish literature,[19] but he was also heavily involved in the German liberal culture of his time. This involvement needs to be taken into account to understand the nature of this journal's patriotic commitment.

At the same time, in France the ideology of Franco-Judaism, which was developed by James Darmesteter and other members of the Jewish intellectual elite of Paris, rested on a comparable convergence of Jewish and liberal interests. Franco-Judaism assumed that the prophetic Jewish ideals of justice and progress were identical to the ideals of the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution.[20] But at the same time, the "elective definition of the nation," to use Ernest Renan's famous term,[21] which competed with other more ethnic definitions of nationhood, found particular favour among French Jews, the majority of whom came from Alsace and Lorraine and were French "by election". Thus, instead of supposing that Jews merely adopted the prevailing definitions of national belonging expressed at this time, I would rather suggest that we try to understand Jewish national identity as a reflection of the liberal subculture of the early 1870s, which included Jews and non-Jews alike not as members of any particular ethnic group but solely as political and social subjects. As such, Jewish individuals in both countries contributed actively to the elaboration of a national identity, which was not merely imposed on them.

III. The Jewish Perspective on National Identity

In the last ten years the opposition between two concepts of national identity has increasingly been questioned.[22] A number of scholars have shown convincingly that

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[17] George L. Mosse, 'Deutsche Juden und der Liberalismus', in *Das deutsche Judentum und der Liberalismus, German Jewry and Liberalism*, Sankt Augustin 1986, pp. 173–191; Mosse, *German Jews beyond Judaism*, Bloomington, IN 1985.

[18] See Otto Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland, 1790–1990*, München 1993, pp. 112–199; Dieter Langewiesche, *Nation, Nationalismus und Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa*, München 2000, pp. 191–214.

[19] Michael Brenner, *The Renaissance of Jewish Culture in Weimar Germany*, New Haven, 1996, p. 16.

[20] On Franco-Judaism, see Marrus, *The Politics of Assimilation*, pp. 85–121.

[21] See Ernest Renan's famous speech delivered in 1882 at the Sorbonne: 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?', in Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? et autres écrits politiques*, Paris 1996.

[22] On the construction of these "imagined communities", see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined*

the binary oppositions between the so-called French and German conceptions of national identity – civilisation versus culture, state-nation versus culture-nation, elective versus organic conceptions of the nation[23] – have been constructed in both countries by intellectuals and politicians in an overly simplistic and confrontational manner.[24] In order to free themselves from this dualistic construction, scholars have recently begun to look beyond existing narratives and have tried to capture the social practices and emotions upon which these narrative were based.[25] In doing so, they have illuminated more similarities than differences in the ways in which both nations have constructed their national identities. An examination of the role Jews played both in constructing these national narratives as well as in challenging them can enrich this scholarly trend. From this perspective it would be particularly interesting to look at sources emanating from specific Jewish subcultures in order to reconstruct how Jewish identity and Jewish nationalism were articulated in both national contexts.

One fruitful way of breaking down stereotypes regarding the nation is to examine the actual social and cultural exchanges between the two countries. In that process, which has been studied by Vicki Caron for Alsace and Michel Espagne for Paris, Jews played a prominent role. Espagne shows convincingly that "Judaism became a privileged vector of exchange", and that "Parisian Judaism in the context of the [nineteenth] century constituted a largely Franco-German society, a society which, through its structure and the biography of its members, formed an inter-cultural network, a stable space of exchange between the nations".[26] In light of Espagne's view it is difficult to set French and German Jews against one another. The Parisian Jewish community, which became the largest Jewish community in France in the second half of the century,[27] was largely a Germanic or Ashkenazi community in that most of its members came from Alsace and Lorraine. In the second half of the nineteenth century, most highly educated French Jews studied in Germany. Samuel Cahen (1796–1862), who founded the *Archives israélites* in 1840, was born in Metz and studied in Mainz to become a rabbi. He was of Ashkenazi cultural background, and he saw the *Archives israélites* as a means of establishing an international journal intended for both a Jewish and non-Jewish audience and not merely a French-Jew-

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Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London 1991; and Anne-Marie Thiesse, *La Création des idéntités nationals: Europe xviiie–xxe siècles*, Paris 1999.

[23] These binaries reside to some extent on the classical opposition between Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottlieb von Herder on the one hand, and Renan, on the other.

[24] See, for example, Michael Jeismann, *Das Vaterland der Feinde: Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1792–1918*, Stuttgart 1992.

[25] See esp. Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum: Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 1995; and Jakob Vogel, *Nationen im Gleichschritt: Der Kult der "Nation in Waffen" in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1871–1914*, Göttingen 1997.

[26] Espagne, *Les Juifs allemands*, pp. 18 and 238.

[27] Michael Graetz, *Les Juifs en France au xixe siècle: De la révolution française à l'Alliance Israélite Universelle*, Paris 1989, pp. 63–110. For the English translation see Michael Graetz, *The Jews in Nineteenth-Century France*, trans. by Jane Marie Todd, Stanford 1996. See also Paula E. Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, ch. 4, pp. 53–76.

ish journal. This does not mean that this journal did not express strong pro-French sentiments, but it nevertheless had a marked cosmopolitan bent, which would have strongly appealed to left liberals and socialists in both countries at that time.

Thus, to conclude, I would argue that a major goal of studying Jewish national identity in the mirror of broader national histories is to open up a set of reflections on the constitution of Jewish identity within its particular social and cultural context in addition to providing a particular angle by which to approach the larger question of national narratives in general. As the analysis above suggests, both the issue of Jewish identity and the issue of national identity are more complex than prevailing stereotypes and narratives often suggest. Approaching the question of how national narratives are constructed from the particular perspective of Jewish history can therefore help illuminate this complexity and break down the simplistic binary oppositions that have hitherto informed our understanding of Franco-German relations.

Eli Bar-Chen

Two Communities with a Sense of Mission: The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden

Emancipation is one of the most written about subjects in modern Jewish history. Historians from different countries and different fields have investigated the legal, cultural, sociological, economic and demographic aspects of emancipation.[1] They have also sought to analyse the influences of emancipation on Jewish identity, and many of their works have concentrated on the communities which were the first to experience emancipation: the Jewish communities of Western Europe.[2] This essay attempts to add another aspect to our understanding of Jewish emancipation in France and Germany that has not yet received sufficient attention. Here we will investigate the efforts of these two communities to emancipate the Jewish communities of the "Orient" – North Africa and the Middle East – as well as those of Eastern Europe, which lived under circumstances completely different from those in Western Europe.

The purpose of shifting attention away from France and Germany themselves is threefold. First, it will demonstrate the importance of information collection and management as integral parts of emancipation. Second, it will show the extent to which the identity of emancipated French and German Jewries was shaped by the information that flowed from the Near East to Western Europe. And third, it will demonstrate that this reshaped identity marked a new phase in the self-perception of both French and German Jews and increasingly distinguished them from the rest of the Jewish world. In some respects one can even refer to this development as a Western European Jewish *Sonderweg*.[3]

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[1] See, for example, Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation*, 1770–1870, Cambridge, MA 1973; Jacob Katz, *Zur Assimilation und Emanzipation der Juden*, Darmstadt 1982; Michael S.N. Salbstein, *The Emancipation of the Jews in Britain: The Question of the Admission of the Jews to Parliament, 1828–1860*, Rutherford, NJ 1982; Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship*, Princeton 1995.

[2] See, for example, David J. Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840,* Detroit 1999; Jay R. Berkovitz, *The Shaping of Jewish Identity in Nineteenth-Century France*, Detroit 1989; Jerry V. Diller, *Freud's Jewish Identity: A Case Study in the Impact of Ethnicity*, Rutherford 1991; Marion A. Kaplan, *The Making of the Jewish Middle Class: Women, Family, and Identity in Imperial Germany*, New York 1991.

[3] The term *Sonderweg* is taken from the German historiographical debate over the particularity

In making these arguments I will focus on the activity of the two international Jewish organisations that were established in France and Germany: the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* and the *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden*. First, these organisations helped to unite under one roof the French and German Jewish communities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Second, they both served as the main instruments for spreading emancipation to the Middle East and Eastern Europe. And third, when one tries to understand the transformation of Jewish identity by examining only literary, philosophical or religious works, one confronts the problem of how representative these works really are. An examination of Jewish organisational life, on the other hand, is far more representative. Therefore, conclusions drawn from an analysis of these organisations can be taken to be representative of major trends and developments in the larger Jewish world. Furthermore, an analysis of Jewish organisational life offers the historian an interesting avenue of approaching the abstract subject of emancipation. By their bureaucratic nature, organisations such as the Alliance and the Hilfsverein offer a concrete way of approaching the abstract subject of the transformation of Jewish identity during the era of emancipation.

In May 1860 a group French Jews established an international Jewish organisation: the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*.[4] Forty-one years later, German Jewry followed this example, founding the *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden*.[5] Both organisations had similar goals: the emancipation of the Jews all over the world, the fight against antisemitism and the advancement of less developed Jewish communities.[6] Historians investigating the Alliance and the Hilfsverein have emphasised their political activities with regard to the emancipation of East European and Near Eastern Jewry, which consisted principally of lobbying for the Jewish cause in Western Europe. They have also shown how the educational systems that were established by the Alliance and the Hilfsverein were intended to regenerate East European and Near Eastern Jewry according to western standards. At the same time, these historians have implied that education was an integral part of these organisations' concept of emancipation. These organisations believed that the education of Near Eastern and

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of modern German historical development. See David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford 1984; Helga Grebing, *Der "deutsche Sonderweg" in Europa 1806–1945: eine Kritik*, Stuttgart 1986.

[4] On the establishment of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, see André Kaspi, 'La Fondation de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle', diplôme d'études supérieures dactylographié, Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris, 1959; André Chouraqui, *L'Alliance Israélite Universelle et la renaissance juive contemporaine, cent ans d'histoire*, Paris 1965, pp. 19–41; Narcisse Leven, *Cinquante ans d'histoire*, 2 vols., Paris 1911/1920, vol. 1, pp. 63–68.

[5] On the establishment of the *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden*, see Moshe Rinot, *Der Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden in Creation and Struggle*, (Heb.), Jerusalem 1971, pp. 2–77.

[6] On the goals of the Alliance and the Hilfsverein, see, Chouraqui, *L'Alliance*, part 1, annex 4, p. 412; *Geschäftsbericht des Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden* (G.d.H.d.D.J.), 1901–1902, vol. 11, p. 153. In the manifest of the Hilfsverein, the emancipation of the Jews and the fight against antisemitism are not as prominent as they are for the Alliance. However, the speeches of the directors of the Hilfsverein and its activities from its inception leave no doubt that these goals were paramount for the German organisation as well.

East European Jewish communities according to western standards should have justified the treatment of Jews in the regions as equal citizens.[7]

The realisation of these goals, however, was not an easy task, and these two organisations had to find solutions for pragmatic problems that were difficult to anticipate. The Alliance and the Hilfsverein struggled to attain the emancipation of Jews wherever they lived, but without concrete knowledge about the actual situations in which these Jewish communities lived, it was difficult to demand the abolition of legal discrimination. Attaining detailed information about these communities was also a prerequisite for the educational activity of the Alliance and the Hilfsverein. It was necessary to know the number of Jewish pupils in each community in order to determine how many schools and teachers were needed. They also had to know the professions and incomes of the parents to decide how much money could be raised in these communities and how much needed to be contributed from the budgets of their organisations. In other words, without concrete knowledge about the conditions of the different Jewish communities that they intended to assist, neither the Alliance nor the Hilfsverein could have realised their objectives.

From the outset, therefore, these two organisations used different channels to acquire and update information. The first channels of information were the actual branches that the Alliance and the Hilfsverein established in various cities in Eastern and Southern Europe, North Africa and the Near East. While each branch reported about the conditions in their respective communities, at the same time they also transmitted information, sometimes unwittingly, about general developments in their regions.[8] The following excerpt from an 1863 letter from the local branch of the Alliance in Greece to the organisation's headquarters in Paris demonstrates the important role of the local branches in providing information about the Greek Jewish community:

> With its establishment the Alliance set out to follow the noble goal of the emancipation of the Jews wherever they live and the defence of their interests wherever they are threatened. For two years a very important and convenient change has been taking place in the mind of the [Greek Jewish] population. With the planned annexation of the Ionian islands to Greece, the emancipation of the Jews would seem to be a natural result.[9]

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[7] Michael Laskier, *The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco, 1862–1962*, Albany 1983; Aron Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews: The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860–1925*, Bloomington 1990; Yaron Tsur, 'France and the Jews of Tunisia: The Policy of the French Authorities towards the Jews and the Activities of the Jewish Elite during the Period of Transition from Moslem Independence to Colonial Rule, 1873–1888', (Heb.), Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University 1988; Aron Rodrigue and Esther Benbassa, *The Jews of the Balkans: The Judeo-Spanish Community, Fifteenth to Twentieth Centuries*, Oxford 1995, pp. 65–115.

[8] See, for example, three collections from three different countries: Archives Alliance Israélite Universelle; Paris [henceforth Arch. AIU], Bulgarie, IC 1–49, Situation générale intérieure des juifs; Egypte, IC 1–27, Situation générale intérieure des juifs; Irak, IC 1–9, Situation générale des juifs; G.d.H.d.D.J., 1903, p. 18; G.d.H.d.D.J, 1909, pp. 44–46.

[9] Arch. AIU Grèce, IC 4 196.

The second main channel of information about local Jewish communities consisted of the schools of the Alliance and the Hilfsverein. The teachers and directors were obliged to send reports to the central committees of the two organisations. They depicted the situations of the schools, the progress of the pupils, the lesson plans and particular problems with teachers and parents, etc. But they also referred to the general condition of the local Jewish communities in which the schools had been established. These reports shed light on the demographic and professional profiles of the communities, their habits, beliefs, ways of life, relationships with local authorities and even the climactic and agricultural conditions of the regions. The accuracy of the reports was generally high, since they were composed by teachers and directors, most of whom – especially in the case of the Alliance – were natives of the local Jewish communities and were familiar with the local languages, habits and political conditions.[10] A 1909 report sent from a Hilfsverein kindergarten in Jerusalem concerning professional, linguistic and ethnic divisions there provides a sense of how detailed and accurate this information was:

Merchants of vegetables and milk: 71 parents, which are 24.5 percent of the [Jewish] population. Artisans: 58 parents, which are 20 percent of the population. Employees in shops and offices: 37 parents, which are 12.8 percent of the population. Teachers and clerks: 17 parents, which are 5.9 percent of the population. Ashkenazi: 119 pupils, which are 37.1 percent of all pupils. They speak a German dialect. Sephardi: 115, which are 35.8 percent of all pupils. They speak a Spanish dialect. Yemenites: 16, which are five percent of all pupils. They speak Arabic. Bukharian: 13, which are 4.1 percent of all pupils. They speak Uzbek. Georgians: ten, which are 3.3 percent of all pupils. They speak Georgian… .[11]

Besides the local branches and the schools, the Alliance and the Hilfsverein used other channels to collect information. Activists of the two organisations left Paris and Berlin and visited the different communities and schools. During these visits, they wrote reports about the communities and their environment.[12] The Alliance and the Hilfsverein also exchanged information with each other and with other Jewish organisations, such as the Anglo-Jewish Association, on a regular basis.[13] These sources were all collected in the central archives of the Alliance and the Hilfsverein in Paris and Berlin. Thus, for the first time in Jewish history since the destruction of the Second Temple centres of information were established with the purpose of documenting Jewish life throughout the entire world.[14]

[10] G.d.H.d.D.J., 1909, pp. 64, 73; 'Spezialbericht für die Alliance Israélite Universelle von Schuldirektor Albala', Arch. AIU, Allemagne, ID 1–2.

[11] G.d.H.d.D.J., 1909, p. 73.

[12] 'Rapports d'inspection en Turquie, 1888, Arch. AIU, Loeb, Isidore, France VII A 45; Solomon Reinach, 'Rapport sur les juifs Tunisiens 1883', Arch. AIU, France VII A 56; Arch. AIU, Allemagne, H 1–6, 5825; 'Mission en Abyssinie chez les Fallaches' (Josephe Halévy 1867, 1875), Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem, France HM2/6403.

[13] Arch. AIU, Allemagne, H 1–6, 9649, 9610, 6802, 6709/2; Arch. AIU, Angleterre, III H 31, 25 Nov. 1872, 4032.

[14] On the archive of the Alliance, see Georges Weill, 'Les Archives de l'AIU antérieures à 1940', *Archives juives*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1965–1966).

The creation of these Jewish archives has received little attention until now, and the importance of this development cannot be overestimated. Archives represent in many respects the "memory" of an organisation, whether of a state, a ministry, an economic enterprise or organisations like the Alliance or the Hilfsverein.[15] The continuity and integrity of an organisation are preserved through its archives. But at the same time, archives in a way also became an alternative to traditional Jewish memory, especially for French and German Jews.[16]

Traditional Jewish memory was based on the Bible and Talmud and on the Jewish customs and rituals. The knowledge of these sacred texts and the practice of these rituals created a sense of continuity between the Jews in modern times and their ancestors in the past. The Jew who read the weekly torah portion in the synagogue could feel that he was a direct descendant of Abraham, Moses and David, and that he was sharing a common text and ritual with Jews all over the world. The Jew who chanted the morning prayer could feel that he was following an ancient ritual that Jews everywhere had practiced for thousands of years.[17] In this way, both the continuity and integrity of the Jewish people were preserved.

For many French and German Jews after emancipation, traditional Jewish memory began to fade. Secularisation led them to abandon Jewish laws and rituals. As Jews began to acculturate into French and German societies and to learn French and German, they began to forget Hebrew, the language of the Jewish holy texts. Thus, a sort of Jewish amnesia set in. One could claim that the creation of modern Jewish archives helped to preserve and update a unique Jewish memory among French and German Jewries, since the Alliance and the Hilfsverein documented Jewish life throughout the world. But this modern Jewish memory was different from the Jewish memory that prevailed in the majority of Jewish communities outside Western Europe, which remained wed to traditional Jewish values. In a sense, the emergence of a new sense of Jewish memory among French and German Jews after emancipation created a further rift between Eastern and Western Jewries and set these two Western communities in particular on a sort of *Sonderweg*.

But this rift was not only due to the influence of the information gathered by these two organisations. One can point to two other influences that also helped to shift the Jewish identity of French and German Jews onto a distinct track. The first influence was related to universalism. As mentioned above, the collection of information was a prerequisite for the political and educational activities of the organisations. But from the moment the archives were established, this information attained a quasi-independent status. The manipulation of information became one of the

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[15] On the influence of archives on memory and consciousness, see Pierre Nora, *Zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis*, Berlin 1990, pp. 47–56.

[16] On the importance of information to the functioning of organisations, see, for example, Renate Mayntz and Norbert Szyperski, *Dokumentation und Organisation: Studie zu Primär- und Sekundärdokumentationen in Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und öffentlicher Verwaltung*, Bergisch Gladbach 1984; Edward E. Lawler and John Grant Rhode, *Information and Control in Organizations*, Pacific Palisades, CA 1976.

[17] Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Zakhor, Jewish History and Jewish Memory*, Seattle 1982.

principal tools by which these organisations fought for the emancipation of Jews in North Africa, the Near East and Eastern Europe.[18] The Alliance and the Hilfsverein transmitted information about the oppression of these Jewish communities to the mainstream European press, which played an increasingly important role in nineteenth-century Western European politics.[19] The press published detailed articles that exposed their readers to the persecution of and discrimination against Jews in Russia, Romania, Morocco and Persia. In the name of enlightenment and human rights the Alliance and the Hilfsverein tried to win the support of European public opinion. They hoped that this public opinion in turn would pressure western governments to intervene to stop these anti-Jewish atrocities and to promote Jewish civil rights.[20] The Alliance and the Hilfsverein also took care to ensure that this information was distributed to members of parliament in France and Germany. In the name of universal human rights, they initiated parliamentary debates on the situation of Jews in different countries. These European parliamentary debates were in turn covered by the press, which again focused public opinion on the condition of these oppressed Jews. This process was further encouraged by the fact that the editors of the Jewish press in France and Germany frequently held key positions of leadership in the Alliance and the Hilfsverein. Thus, through the pages of the Jewish press, French and German Jews were urged to join the Alliance and the Hilfsverein so they could assist in the struggle for the emancipation of Jews throughout the world.

The cultivation of Jewish and non-Jewish public support for the emancipation of these oppressed Jewish communities through the dissemination of information about their conditions became a crucial factor in securing Jewish emancipation in the Near East and Eastern Europe. France and Germany had strong economic, political and military interests in countries like Russia or Romania, which persecuted their own Jewish populations.[21] Although Germany and especially France had em-

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[18] On this strategy, see 'Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden an die AIU', July 20, 1902, in Arch. AIU, Allemagne, H 1–6, 9208/2; 'Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden an die AIU', December 28, 1902, Arch. AIU, Allemagne, H 1–6, 9867/2; 'AIU an den Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden', in Arch. AIU, Allemagne H 1–6, 9966.

[19] On the evolution of the European press in the nineteenth century, see George Boyce, James Curran and Pauline Wingate (eds.), *Newspaper History from the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day*, London 1978; Joachim Kirchner, *Das deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen, seine Geschichte und seine Probleme*, 2 vols., Wiesbaden 1958–1962, vol. 2; Claude Bellanger *et al.*, *Histoire générale de la presse française*, 4 vols., Paris 1969–1976, vols. 2–3; René de Livois, *Histoire de la presse française*, Lausanne 1965.

[20] On the development of public opinion as a political factor, see Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Neuwied 1962; Franz Schneider, *Pressefreiheit und politische Öffentlichkeit: Studien zur politischen Geschichte Deutschlands bis 1848*, Neuwieg am Rhein 1966.

[21] On the German-Russian and French relationship, see, for example, Walter Kirchner, *Die deutsche Industrie und die Industrialisierung Russlands, 1815–1914*, St. Katharinen 1986; Helga Deininger, *Frankreich, Russland, Deutschland, 1871–1891: Die Interdependenz von Außenpolitik, Wirtschaftsinteressen und Kulturbeziehungen im Vorfeld des russisch-französischen Bündnisses*, Munich 1983.

ancipated their own Jewish populations and were obligated to uphold the humanist and universal values of the Enlightenment, they were not willing to risk their own political and strategic interests for the sake of the Jews. In this context, public opinion became the only method to convince western governments to use their influence on behalf of the emancipation of the Jews. Moreover, the Alliance and the Hilfsverein were voluntary associations, and the only way to win support for their cause was through the dissemination of information about Jewish suffering around the world. By reading about pogroms in Russia, professional restrictions in Romania or blood libels in Greece, the French and German Jewish communities were persuaded to support the struggle for emancipation undertaken by these organisations.

This strategy may have strengthened the already strong commitment of French and German Jews to the universal values of enlightenment; this is the second way in which Jewish identity in France and Germany was influenced by the informational projects of these two organisations. Indeed, universalism was not a new attitude in Judaism. One could consider, for example, monotheism and the Noachide laws as applying to the whole of mankind. But at the same time Judaism has always had a strong particularist aspect. Most Jewish laws – the *mitzvot* – are reserved only for Jews. Jews traditionally avoided the conversion of non-Jews and regarded it as unwelcome, especially when they lived under Christian or Islamic regimes. It is true that the Jewish enlightenment or *Haskalah* of the eighteenth century promoted the adoption of the universal values that were part of the European Enlightenment.[22] But it is also likely that the activities of the Alliance and Hilfsverein further contributed to the spread of universalism among Jews at the expense of Jewish particularism. The Alliance and the Hilfsverein spread the universal values of the Enlightenment among thousands of Jewish readers. They united Jews throughout the world behind the struggle for Jewish emancipation. In so doing, these organisations bolstered the Jewish commitment to universalism, and they converted this commitment into a strategy of Jewish self-defence.

The third way in which this dissemination of information influenced French and German Jewish identity is connected both to the relationship of French and German Jewry to the Christian environment in which they lived and to the way in which French and German Jews perceived their role in the Jewish world. Before emancipation in France and Germany, Jews were clearly distinguished from the rest of society by their unique way of life as well as by the general climate of antisemitism. These two factors inhibited the unification of these Jewish communities from

[22] On the *Haskalah* movement, see, for example, Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry*; Sorkin, *Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment*, Berkeley 1996; Sorkin, *The Berlin Haskalah and German Religious Thought: Orphans of Knowledge*, London 2000; Michael A. Meyer, *The Origins of the Modern Jew: Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germany, 1749–1824*, Detroit 1967; Karlfried Gründer and Nathan Rotenstreich (eds.), *Aufklärung und Haskala in jüdischer und nichtjüdischer Sicht*, Heidelberg 1990; Michael Graetz, 'Jüdische Aufklärung', in Michael A. Meyer and Michael Brenner (eds.), *German-Jewish History in Modern Times*, 4 vols., New York 1998, vol. 1, pp. 261–380.

within and without. But emancipation, secularisation and acculturation blurred these distinct boundaries between Jews and non-Jews. Legal equality made the integration of Jews into European society more likely. Secularisation reduced the differences between Jews and non-Jews in everyday life, while acculturation minimised the cultural differences between Jews and the rest of society.

Exposure to information about remote communities that maintained a traditional Jewish way of life emphasised the fact that emancipated Jews remained Jews, despite their acculturation and secularisation.[23] At the same time, knowledge about those traditional Jewish communities – their suffering, habits, dietary customs and ways of life – emphasised the differences between French and German Jews, on the one hand, and the "backward" Jewish communities of the Near East and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, thereby underlining the degree to which French and German Jews had become westernised. This European-Jewish identity helped maintain cohesion within both the French and German communities. Indeed, this sense of a shared Western or European identity helped preserve a sense of Jewish unity, particularly since Western Jews had now split along denominational lines into orthodox, conservatives, reform or secular Jews. However, this shared identity now created a rift between them and their less fortunate Jewish brethren outside Western Europe.[24]

How did this process take place? How did the dissemination of information shift French and German Jewish identity in such a complex way? The following report written by an Alliance envoy describing the Jewish communities of Iraq, sent on July 12, 1906 from Baghdad to Paris, was also translated into German, and it was thus relevant to both communities. Reading this report inspires us to imagine the impact of such reports on the identities of nineteenth-century French- and German-Jewish readers. The report opens with a general description of the landscape in which the communities lived:

> If the Euphrates is crossed at Biredischik one reaches Mesopotamia, and a few kilometres later a bald chalk plateau of abundant beauty and fertility. This is the plateau of Sorudsch, the ancient Batus. A short distance away is located Orfa, or Urfa. It is worth a stay in this city.[25]

But this report does not end with this eyewitness testimony. This geographical site is then connected to historical Jewish memories:

> This is Ur Kasdim ... which is located in the middle of a rich and fertile plateau that is irrigated by the abundant springs and streams of the Euphrates. Charon, the birthplace of our patriarch Abraham, is located 39 kilometres from Orfa... .[26]

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[23] For a general historiographical discussion of the way national identity is constructed through connections to historical sites, see Pierre Nora, *Les Lieux de mémoire: La Nation, le territoire, l'état, le patrimoine*, 3 vols., Paris 1984.

[24] For a discussion of the way identity is constructed in relation to the "other", and especially oriental populations, see Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, London 1978.

[25] *Bericht der Alliance Israélite Universelle für das Jahr 1906*, pp. 75–77.

[26] *Ibid.*

The link between places that were deeply anchored in traditional Jewish memory, such as Charon, and concrete geographical sites, in this case the Arab city Orfa, gave new meaning to the words of the Alliance envoy. Orfa became less foreign to the reader as he began to treat it as a site from Jewish memory, a part of his religious and historical past. Such linkages provided the European, emancipated Jews of France and Germany with images that distinguished them from their Christian compatriots.

While this report connected events from Jewish history with geographical sites, one can at the same time discern another tendency. These sites are depicted as non-European sites, as places under Muslim rule:

> At the foot of the hill, Top-Dag, on which the houses of Orfa are built, are two beautiful springs, rich with fish… . At the site of one spring, a mosque rises up … a little ways away, but still at the foot of Top-Dag, stands another mosque, in which Abraham was born [according to Muslim tradition]… . From the ceiling hangs the supposed cradle of the patriarch Abraham, covered with a green cover, as the graves of saints are covered in mosques… .[27]

Immediately after describing a Muslim tradition whose otherness highlights the Europeanness of the reader, the writer turns to a description of the Jewish community in Orfa, whose "different" way of life reinforced the readers' sense of their European-Jewish identity:

> Nearly all Jews of Orfa are poor, nearly all of them are engaged in trade with fabrics and spices … The community possesses one synagogue, which is well equipped and has three rooms. Only a few children learn to write Hebrew. This is all. No local language, no foreign language, no Turkish, no Arabic, no history, no arithmetic and no general study… . The hundred girls [of the community] are growing up without any education and cannot read and write… . Our coreligionists here are engaged only in small-scale commerce. Crafts are unfamiliar to them. Their habits are backward, and the position of the women is inferior. When one sees Aleppo for the first time, one can believe that no other city could be more backward. But if one goes into the countryside, Aleppo appears a paradise in comparison. The main food of Orfa: cereal mixed with chopped raw meat with red pepper, parsley and onion. One mashes this mixture with the hands into balls, and one enjoys it without cooking.[28]

Thus, a completely different sort of Jewish community was being portrayed for European Jewish readers. Western European Jewish readers were being presented with Jews, most of whom were illiterate, and whose entire cultural world was centred around the holy Jewish scriptures. The everyday life of these "oriental" Jews could even evoke a feeling of disgust among the "civilised" European Jews of the West. This gap between the European reader and the communities being portrayed created a sharp hierarchical distinction between Near Eastern and Western Jews. The portrayal of such a hierarchy was clearly evident in all Alliance and Hilfsverein reports.

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27 *Ibid.*

28 *Ibid.*

Information about such backward communities, together with reports about pogroms and anti-Jewish persecution inspired Western Jews to identify with those more backward Jewish communities that existed in a "semi-barbarous" world outside Europe where all principles of humanity and civilisation were unknown. In contrast to this dark world stood Western and Central Europe, where Jews enjoyed equal rights and frequently attained high-ranking social positions in their respective countries. Although antisemitism still existed in Western Europe, European Jewry was not generally exposed to physical or official persecution.

This hierarchy between the enlightened European world, on the one hand, and the unenlightened non-European world, on the other, was fostered by other factors as well. The Jews of Germany and France belonged to communities capable of offering help to benighted Jewish communities, and they therefore considered themselves superior. The Jews of Russia, Romania, Morocco and Iraq were the recipients of this help, and they were therefore regarded by the Western Jews as inferior. Furthermore, North Africa and the Near East and Mesopotamia were subjected to colonial control by the European powers. This situation underscored European technological, economic, military and cultural superiority over the rest of the world.

These combined processes placed West European Jewry at the centre of the Jewish world and pointed to the future direction for Jewish progress. Jewish communities outside Europe had only to attain the legal and cultural status of West European Jews. French and German Jews stood at the pinnacle of progress; they belonged to a world that was governed by the universal principles of enlightenment and whose technological, economic, military and cultural position was superior.

This new internal-Jewish hierarchy may possibly even have created a new sense of Jewish time. Gershom Sholem has emphasised the concept of messianic time in his research on the Sabbatean movement of the seventeenth century.[29] According to this concept, while certain Jewish communities, such as the Babylonian and the Spanish communities, became more powerful and more prosperous over time as compared to other communities, they remained equal to these other communities, since all of them believed that the only legitimate centre of Judaism had been destroyed. These more powerful Jewish communities influenced the rest of the Jewish world, but the idea that they could ever replace Jerusalem was unthinkable. Jewish time was moving towards the rebuilding of the destroyed centre: the completion of the rebuilding would be the end of Jewish time, that is, the end of history; it would mark the beginning of the messianic era. Perhaps in this respect as well we can discern a *Sonderweg* in the development of French and German Jewish self-consciousness. It may be that the Alliance and the Hilfsverein contributed to the creation of a new concept of messianic time, in which the direction of Jewish historical progress gravitated towards Paris and Berlin and no longer towards Jerusalem. In this new conception, the adoption of Western values and educational standards was regarded

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[29] Gershom G. Scholem, *Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah, 1626–1676*, trans. by R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, Princeton 1973.

as the final goal of Jewish historical development. The Jews of the Near East and Eastern Europe still had to reach these Western standards, while French and German Jewry, having already completed this process, perceived themselves as standing at the end of time.

Comment by Aron Rodrigue

An important aspect of nineteenth-century Jewish history is the growing organised involvement of European Jews, especially French Jews, with the affairs of Jewish communities in distant lands, most notably in the Middle East and North Africa. By the second half of the century, a full-fledged Europeanising "civilising mission", aimed at transforming Sephardi and Eastern Jewries and led by some of the leading figures of West European Jewry was well under way.

This important development did not start with the foundation of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* in 1860. This organisation, like others that followed it, such as the *Anglo-Jewish Association* and the *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden*, represented the crystallisation of long-term trends that had begun among European Jewry at the time of the *Haskalah* and the French Revolution. It was in France, the site of the first and most thorough emancipation of the Jews, that the idea of "civilising" other Jewish communities first appeared. German Jewry followed this example soon after.

By the 1830s and 1840s, a coalition between a financial elite represented by the Rothschilds, with their Orleanist sympathies, and a primarily professional and intellectual elite, personified by Adolphe Crémieux, with openly republican affiliations, had come to dominate the Parisian Jewish leadership. The personnel of the consistories, the charity organizations, the educational institutions, the nascent Jewish press, and increasingly the Parisian rabbinate together created a distinctive Franco-Jewish public sphere, with its particular political and ideological discourse in matters of Jewish interest.

The emancipation of French Jewry during the French Revolution provided the matrix for this discourse, and it constituted the single-most important component of Franco-Jewish identity in the nineteenth century. Jewish leadership was determined to defend these newly gained rights; to extend them even further, as exemplified by the drive to abolish the oath of *more judaico*;[1] and to be vigilant in the face of any recrudescence of antisemitism. The primacy given to emancipation went hand in hand with the desire to extend the process of "regeneration", that is, the effort to transform the profile of French Jewry so as to diminish as much as possible its public particularism. The increased use of terms such as "assimilation" and "fusion" pointed to the desired goal of remaking Jews into Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, with religion retreating to the private sphere.

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[1] A special form of oath required of Jewish witnesses testifying in non-Jewish courts of law. This oath, a vestige of the Middle Ages, was generally accompanied by humiliating rituals and self-deprecatory formulations.

Assimilation, however, did not imply the complete abandonment of a distinct Jewish specificity. Jews continued to share a sense of a common past, a common religion and a shared fate that bound them together over the world. This sentiment was expressed openly in the public realm by the vocabulary used by the Jewish elite, with words such as *famille*, *nos frères*, and *peuple* constituting the primary referents in this discourse. A deep sense of solidarity with "coreligionists" everywhere remained of paramount importance.

This keenly felt solidarity fuelled the desire to extend and duplicate the French-Jewish experience of emancipation/regeneration wherever the opportunity presented itself. The very fact that French Jewry was the first community to be emancipated catapulted it to a leadership position in the western Jewish world, while it took more than another half a century for British and German Jewries to reach this position. In 1854 Dr. Ludwig Phillippson of Magdeburg, editor of the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, pointed to Paris as the centre (*Mittelpunkt*) of nineteenth-century Jewry.[2] The Franco-Jewish elite was fully conscious of its responsibilities as the vanguard in the struggle for international Jewish rights. As the *Archives israélites* declared in 1858, it was in Paris that were "formulated the ideas of the Occident" and where "Jewish civilisation held its assizes".[3] Consequently, French Jews firmly believed that their path of emancipation had to become the norm for the rest of world Jewry. Jules Carvallo, a member of the Saint-Simonian movement and later a founding member of the Alliance, put it in these terms in 1851:

> Everyone can appreciate the benefits resulting from the emancipation of the Jews of France. Once they formed a foreign population ... now they are devoted citizens, loving and serving their country... [T]his state of the Jews, exceptional and peculiar to France alone, will [eventually] become the normal state among all the peoples.[4]

The Alliance, founded in 1860, incarnated these impulses, and it attempted not only to intervene whenever Jews were persecuted, but it embarked on a massive program of "regeneration" by means of its school network, which sought to ready the "backward" Jews of the Mediterranean basin for emancipation through exposure to French culture as filtered through the experience of French Jewry.[5] The work of the Alliance, however, whether in the realm of schooling, or in the circulation of news about distant Jewish communities, grew directly out of the activities of European Jewish leaders in the decades that preceded its foundation.

The conquest of Algeria by France in 1830 brought French Jewry into direct contact with a Jewish community in a Muslim country. As the Central Consistory

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2 *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* (henceforth AZJ), vol. 18 (1854), p. 295.

3 *Archives israélites* (henceforth AI), vol. 19 (1858), p. 625.

4 *Univers israélite* (henceforth UI), vol. 6 (1850–1851), p. 255.

5 For a case study of the work of the Alliance in one region see Aron Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews: The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860–1925*, Bloomington 1990. For an overview of its activities as a whole, see Rodrigue, *Images of Sephardi and Eastern Jewries in Transition: The Teachers of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, 1860–1939*, Seattle 1993.

became inundated with reports about the situation of Algerian Jews, it became clear that something had to be done as soon as possible. The most extensive of these reports, written in 1842 by two delegates of the Marseilles consistory, Isaac Altaras and Joseph Cohen, viewed Algerian Jews as a segment of the Jewish people liberated by France from centuries-old oppression at the hands of a fanatical and barbaric tyranny. This tyranny had led to the degeneration of the best faculties of the Jewish people, and Algerian Jewry now had to be saved from itself. The forces of civilisation, however, had to be activated externally. The task at hand, according to the Altaras-Cohen report, consisted of a "mission to improve through moralisation a population which has groaned under a degrading servitude during eighteen centuries ...".[6]

Altaras and Cohen urged the government to extend the consistorial system to Algeria to oversee this mission – a request that was granted. An Algerian central consistory was created in Algiers in 1845, and two provincial consistories were established in Oran and Constantine. These were to supervise the running of the synagogues, the education of children, the finances of the community and the spread of manual and agricultural occupations among the Jews. In short, their function was to be the same as that of the French consistories as dictated by Napoleon: to administer, to police and to "regenerate". The Algerian consistorial system was directed by rabbis imported from metropolitan France.

It would be easy to see in this development a Jewish variant of French colonialism with its theories of "assimilation". Although some colonial notions undoubtedly influenced French-Jewish perceptions and actions vis-à-vis non-European Jewries, they do not, however, explain the central dynamic at play. The Franco-Jewish leadership saw itself as in step with the goals of the entire Jewish people. The act of emancipation and the accompanying process of "regeneration" had allowed French Jewry to enter "civilisation". Other Jewries were not perceived as distinctively different or "other", but essentially as extensions of "self". Therefore, French Jews regarded it only as a matter of time before these less developed Jewish communities underwent the same process in the face of advancing "civilisation". Solidarity dictated that they be helped along this path. Hence the drama of emancipation/regeneration had to be constantly re-enacted.

Moreover, in a region such as Algeria where France had direct rule, Algerian Jews, just like the Jews of France, had to become French citizens. The Crémieux decree of 1870 naturalising the Jews of Algeria *en masse* was a direct outgrowth of this mid-nineteenth century self-legitimation and self-definition among Franco-Jewish elites. We now know that the push for the mass naturalisation of Algerian Jewry was an almost exclusively French-Jewish affair, with petitions and lobbying orchestrated from Paris. Most Algerian Jews were loath to give up Jewish religious law in matters affecting personal status, which naturalisation would have entailed.

[6] Isaac Altaras and Joseph Cohen, 'Rapport sur l'état moral et politique des israélites de l'Algérie et des moyens de l'améliorer', 1842, cited in Simon Schwarzfuchs, *Les Juifs d'Algérie et la France (1830–1855)*, Jerusalem 1981, p. 68.

When the French government granted Algerian Jews the right to individual naturalisation in 1865, few took advantage of it precisely because of this reluctance. Therefore, French Jewish leadership concluded that the only solution was compulsory collective naturalisation, a goal achieved by Crémieux in 1870.[7] Any other option would have been intolerable. French Jewry could not abide an unemancipated Jewish community in a region that had technically become part of France. French protectorates such as Tunisia and Morocco, which both had significant Jewish populations, would later pose the same problem, and the Alliance repeatedly attempted, this time without success, to replicate the Algerian model of emancipation.

French Jewry saw in Algerian Jewry not only a poor, traditional, "backward" Jewish community, but it saw itself as it had existed a generation or two before. If it had not been for the French Revolution, French Jewry might itself have been in the same condition. Crémieux stated this succinctly in 1872: "It is France who has made us who we are. What the Jews of Algeria are ... we have been in 1789 and in 1790; we have been the pariahs, the disinherited in the midst of France".[8] These same sentiments were decisive in shaping the policies of the Alliance. Non-European Jewish communities represented the past that emancipated Jews had left behind. But solidarity, the sense of collective responsibility as expressed by the Talmudic motto adopted by the Alliance, "all Jews are responsible for one another", made it incumbent upon French Jewry, the first emancipated Jewish community in the world, to show its less fortunate brothers and sisters the way. This stance was also, of course, defensive. In the age of growing European domination of the Middle East and Africa, which resulted in increased contacts between Europeans and the Jews of these areas, the fear of being tarred with the same brush as their "backward", "Oriental" coreligionists was never far from the considerations of the French Jewish elite.

This solidarity occasionally encouraged French Jewish leaders to adopt a stance critical of the French government. In 1840 some Jews in Damascus were imprisoned as a result of a blood libel when the Christian population accused them of having killed a Capucin monk in order to use his blood for ritual purposes. The French consul, Ratti Menton, took the charge seriously, and he incited the crowd even further. When this news reached France, the Jewish community acted decisively. Both Baron James de Rothschild and Crémieux visited the French Prime Minister Adolphe Thiers to urge him to remedy the situation. Their appeal fell on deaf ears. Thiers went so far as to defend the French consul, when interpellated in the Chamber by Achille Fould, a Jewish deputy. Thiers's behaviour outraged Rothschild, Crémieux and the consistorial administration. French Jewry launched a major press campaign to clarify the situation and to defend the accused Jews. They

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[7] For a discussion of Algerian Jewry and France, see Michel Abitbol, 'La citoyenneté imposée: Du décret Crémieux à la guerre d'Algérie', in Pierre Birnbaum (ed.), *Histoire politique des Juifs de France*, Paris 1990, pp. 196–217.

[8] Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 197–198.

organised public protests and collaborated closely with the Board of Deputies of British Jews to convince the British government to intervene. Lord Palmerston, Britain's Foreign Minister, was indeed sympathetic and pressured Mehmet Ali, the ruler of Damascus, to act leniently. Crémieux accompanied Moses Montefiore, the noted Anglo-Jewish leader and philanthropist, and Salomon Munk, a well-known orientalist, to the Middle East, and their mission succeeded in having the Jewish prisoners freed.[9]

Significantly, Crémieux took the opportunity of his visit to Cairo to open two modern Jewish schools that offered a European-style education – the first such institutions in the Middle East. For the leadership of French Jewry, the defence of Jewish rights always went hand in hand with "regeneration" through education and moralisation.

The Damascus Affair was extraordinary in that the consistory, with Crémieux as its vice-president, acted independently of the French government and openly criticised it. Such a stance was unprecedented for what was, after all, an institution that was formally part of the French state apparatus. But the emotional nature of this case, in addition to the fact that it impugned not only the honour of Middle Eastern Jews but that of all Jews, ultimately inspired West European Jewish leaders to abandon their traditional low profile political lobbying. Their role in this affair was therefore linked both to a sense of solidarity with coreligionists in distress and to the firm conviction that emancipation would be in danger everywhere if such accusations were not put to rest.

The concern with Middle Eastern Jews exemplified by the Damascus Affair soon became a fixture of the nascent European Jewish press, which acted as the single most important conduit for the dissemination of information about the Jewish world as a whole. This press played an instrumental role in the emergence of a transnational, Europe-wide Jewish public sphere in the modern period. Before 1840 only Germany had a major Jewish newspaper, the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*. The *Archives israélites* was founded in France in the very year of the Damascus Affair, and four years later its more traditionalist counterpart the *Univers israélite* was founded. The *Jewish Chronicle* of London saw the light of day in 1841, together with a rival, *The Voice of Jacob*, with which it merged in 1844.[10] Austria, Italy and the United States all saw the emergence of a Jewish press in the 1840s, which also witnessed the publication of the first Ladino newspaper in the Ottoman Empire. The efflorescence of newspaper publishing in Hebrew and in Yiddish in Eastern Europe followed in subsequent decades.

The first article on the Jews of the Middle East appeared in early 1840, even before the outbreak of the Damascus Affair, and it was subsequently picked up by the

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[9] For the most recent and thorough discussion of the Damascus Affair, see Jonathan Frankel, *The Damascus Affair: "Ritual Murder," Politics, and the Jews in 1840*, Cambridge 1997.

[10] For a discussion of this development, see Barukh Mevorakh, 'Ikvotehah shel alilat Damesek be-hitpathutah shel ha-itonut ha-yehudit ba-shanim 1840–1860', *Zion*, vols. 18–19 (1958–1959), pp. 46–65.

Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums and soon after a French translation appeared in the *Archives israélites*.[11] Translations of the same article by Jewish newspapers throughout the world was standard practice throughout the nineteenth century.

The decades following the Damascus Affair saw an avalanche of articles on Eastern Jews in all Jewish newspapers. The picture of Middle Eastern Jewry, and especially the Jews of Constantinople, evoked in these articles was broadly similar and followed a static script that bore the hallmarks of the orientalism of that period. These were "backward", "obscurantist" Jews, unchanging, mired in the superstition that they had acquired from their Muslim neighbours. They were in desperate need of reform and education if they were to be made one day worthy of emancipation. The dual theme of regeneration and emancipation accompanied all these texts with monotonous regularity. In the process, of course, much demographic and cultural information about these communities was presented, contributing to a significant increase in awareness and knowledge about Jews of distant lands. Thus, long before international Jewish organisations, such as the Alliance, began to play an instrumental role in forging a sense of solidarity among far-flung Jewish communities, this role had already been assumed by the European Jewish press. As the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* had declared as early as 1841, the purpose of writing about the Jews of the Middle East was "to make the vistas of the European [Jewish] masses transcend their narrow frontiers, to have them consider Jewry not as a nation, but still as a great community of belief (*Glaubenscomplex*) ...".[12]

Not only did a paternalist "noblesse oblige" project of reforming and civilising Jewish communities in need of help emerge, but this sense of unity also necessitated the promotion of Jewish emancipation throughout the world. The *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, which fought for German-Jewish emancipation at home, was a leading proponent of this view. The concern with international Jewish rights reappeared on the agenda in 1854, when Western powers began to pressure their Ottoman ally in the Crimean War to grant legal equality to the Christians of the Empire. Ludwig Phillipson described an acute "Jewish Eastern Question", to be resolved through the emancipation and the education of the Jews of the Ottoman Empire,[13] and the European Jewish press as a whole took up the case for the inclusion of the Jews in the forthcoming legislation. This conviction that there existed a single united, transnational Jewish politics was echoed in European-Jewish publications aimed at promoting the status of Ottoman Jews. As the *Jewish Chronicle* noted in 1854:

> Besides the most intense sympathy awakened in us by the condition of our Oriental fellows in descent and religion ... it cannot escape us that this event [the Crimean War] cannot remain without its influence on us European Jews. If the Turkish Jews are passed over and excluded from so great a world historical opportunity, then our doom is also sealed, and we almost hear the proclamation resounding through the whole earth 'the descendents of Judah remain a rejected and oppressed

[11] AI, vol. 1 (1840), pp. 198–201, 249–251; AZJ, vol. 4 (1840), pp. 39–40, 55–56.
[12] AZJ, vol. 5 (1841), p. 81.
[13] AZJ, vol. 18 (1854), p. 152.

race'! Should the Sultan, on the contrary, pronounce the equalization of the Jews with the Christian population, it must sooner or later affect also those Christian states which hitherto yet deny us that equality. We ourselves are therefore concerned thereby.[14]

Yet it was French Jews who again stood in the vanguard of the drive to include Ottoman Jews in this legislation, supported in large part by the European Jewish press. Both the Rothschilds and the consistory appealed to Napoleon III to act. Albert Cohn, president of the consistorial *Comité de Bienfaisance*, was sent on an official mission to the Middle East, and he intervened successfully with the Sultan and the Ottoman Foreign Minister in Constantinople.[15] This effort yielded results; the Jews of the Ottoman Empire were emancipated together with the Christians in the Reform Decree of 1856.[16]

Again, as during the Damascus Affair, Albert Cohn, who dispensed Rothschild money during his trip, established European-style Jewish schools in Constantinople, Izmir, Alexandria and Jerusalem. Just as French Jewry had been forced to transform itself after 1791 to demonstrate that it merited emancipation, it was now inconceivable that Ottoman Jewry would not follow the same path.

Similar sentiments and policies would guide the activities of the Alliance, founded a few years later, with the close collaboration of Western and Central European Jewish elites. New tensions and political trends would bring rival organisations, such as the Hilfsverein, onto the scene by the early twentieth century. But as much as these organisations contributed to the dissemination of knowledge about Jews throughout the world and took part in campaigns to promote Jewish rights, it was the distinctive Jewish newspaper culture, which had existed from the 1840s on, that played a decisive role in creating a Jewish public sphere concerned with the fate of Jews everywhere. The discourse of the these organisations, which simultaneously reflected a sense of Western superiority and a deeply internalised perception of Jewish unity, can be found in the pages of the mid-nineteenth century Western and Central European Jewish press.

In the end the major concern that animated both the press and the international Jewish organisations was not so much the transformation of the exotic Jewish "other", but the ongoing transformation of the "self", a process that had begun at the end of the eighteenth century. For Western and Central European Jews, this project of regeneration was therefore as much about themselves as about Eastern Jews. The editorial note in the *Archives israélites* following the translation of the article on Turkish Jewry that had previously appeared in the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* spoke volumes in this respect:

[14] *Jewish Chronicle*, 21 April 1854.

[15] See Isidore Loeb, *Biographie d'Albert Cohn*, Paris 1878, pp. 64–85; and Yuda Nehama, *Biografia del muy afamado Savido y Filantropo Avraham Hakohen, ke lo yaman Albert Kohn de Paris*, Salonica 1877, pp. 104–106.

[16] On the Turkish Reform Edict, see Enver Ziya Karal, *Nizam-i Cedit ve Tanzimat Devirleri, 1789–1856*, Ankara 1956, pp. 243–257.

> This [negative] judgment of our coreligionists in Turkey applies also … to those [Jews] of other countries where many of the superstitions reported here have, or have had, equally numerous partisans… . The last fifty years have caused a large number of [these superstitions] to disappear, especially in France and Germany.[17]

Non-European Jewish communities of the time represented the past that emancipated Jews had either transcended or were still fighting to transcend.

Many of the *maskilic* and emancipationist impulses, forged in France and the German states in the second half of the eighteenth century, dealt with the fight for Jewish political rights and for the cultural transformation of the Jews both at home and abroad. The struggles for "regeneration" and emancipation went hand in hand. The Jewish newspaper culture, which came into being in the 1840s and subsequent decades and underpinned the new Jewish public sphere that emerged in these countries, played a major role in this struggle. By disseminating information about the condition of Jews throughout the world, the press served simultaneously as an expression of these impulses and as a potent contributor to them. The Alliance and later the Hilfsverein emerged as the institutionalised and rationalised crystallisation of these deep currents. Like the press, they both contributed to and were shaped by Jewish modernity in the making.

[17] AI, vol. 1 (1840), p. 198.

Christian Wiese

Modern Antisemitism and Jewish Responses in Germany and France, 1880–1914[1]

I

At a conference of the *Société des Etudes Juives* held in Paris in April, 1907, Isaïe Levaillant, the editor of the *Univers israélite* and the former director of the Sûreté Nationale, delivered a lecture on 'The Genesis of Antisemitism under the Third Republic'. Reflecting on the Dreyfus Affair, he emphasised that "contemporaneous antisemitism cannot be seen as a French product; we inherited it from Germany with its traditional confessional struggles, where the spirit of castes was always dominating, and where, as a consequence of its national victories, pride of race was intensified to a kind of paroxysm".[2] This depiction of antisemitism as a phenomenon alien to the French political tradition, adopted only by reactionary and clerical circles, echoes the opinion of the liberal Catholic Dreyfusard Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu. In his book *The Jews and Antisemitism: Israel Among the Nations*, published in 1893, Leroy-Beaulieu had asserted that antisemitism was not compatible with the French national genius but had originated from the racial pride of nationalistic Germany.[3] Such formulations, inspired by the intense French-German political rivalry,

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[1] I would like to thank Vicki Caron, who so generously shared her views with me and, as a critical reader of my paper helped me to develop a clearer insight into the problems involved in this topic.

[2] Isaïe Levaillant, 'La Genèse de l'antisémitisme sous la troisième république", in *Revue des études juives*, vol. 53 (1907), pp. lxxxvi–c, esp. p. lxxxiv.

[3] Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *Die Juden und der Antisemitismus, Israel unter den Nationen*, Wien 1893, p. x: "Antisemitism does not match our principles nor our national genius. We inherited it from outside, from countries that do not possess our spirit and our traditions. It stems from across-the-Rhine, from Old-Germany that is always prepared for confessional struggles and filled with the spirit of castes, from New-Germany that, puffing itself up with racial pride, condemns everything which is not totally German, and it stems from orthodox, half-Asiatic Russia". Radical German antisemites, like Eugen Dühring, likewise perceived French antisemitism as an import from Germany, although a poor copy. As Dühring stated: "Nach dem Vorgange Deutschlands hat sich nämlich auch in Frankreich ein berufsmässiger sogenannter Antisemitismus geregt, ist aber wesentlich auch nur reactionärer gerathen, ja in seiner geräuschvollsten Auftischung noch beschränkter ausgefallen. ... Christische [*sic*] Allüren und eine, ich will nicht sagen fanatische, aber doch fanatistelnde [*sic*], wenn auch nach Bedürfnis jesuitisch versteckte Bethätigung des Religionsgegensatzes haben sich in Frankreich unter einiger katholischer Rückendeckung ziemlich breit auslegen

reflected the views of many in France, including the Jews, and they thus inspire a systematic comparison of the antisemitic movements that emerged in both countries.

The prevailing image of France's liberal and democratic contribution to Western political culture frequently leaves the impression that antisemitism there was a marginal phenomenon compared to the situation in Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, Paula Hyman has recently argued that "the antisemitism of the Dreyfus Affair coexisted with a higher degree of integration of Jews within the institutions of French society than was possible in Germany and Austria at the time", and she furthermore points out this antisemitism did not have a lasting impact on the status of French Jewry.[4]

But a closer look reveals another reality. "No other Western industrialised society", Herbert A. Strauss has emphasised, "had created a spook resembling the Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s, no other country had mixed its socialist traditions with antisemitic diatribes against Jews and then came near to making racism – having strong roots in French intellectual and publicist tradition – the basis of government policy".[5] George L. Mosse has similarly noted that "ironically, before the First World War, it was France, rather than Germany or Austria, that seemed likely to become the home of a successful racist and National Socialist Movement. Germany had no Dreyfus Affair".[6] To be sure, Léon Blum, reflecting back on the Dreyfus Affair era in his memoirs written in the 1930s, noted that the antisemitic movement that emerged at this time "was not an antisemitism of pogroms, of violent or bloody demonstrations".[7] Nevertheless, as Stephen Wilson has observed, this antisemitic outburst, which erupted in a wave of riots throughout France at the time of the Zola trial in January and February of 1898, terrorised the Jewish population and made it obvious that "large numbers of people were prepared to make the step from holding antisemitic opinions to taking antisemitic action".[8] In light of such divergent interpretations, a comparative analysis, which examines the ideological and

... können. Obenein sind Hauptbläser hierbei Pfaffenliteraten von Judenmischlingsphysionomie [*sic*] gewesen". Eugen Dühring, *Die Judenfrage als Frage des Racencharakters und seiner Schädlichkeiten für Völkerexistenz, Sitte und Cultur*, 1901, p. 116.

[4] Paula Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, Berkeley 1998, p. 99. Jacob Katz similarly argues that although French antisemitism was more radical as far as its goals were concerned, it had fewer social consequences. See Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism, 1700–1933*, Cambridge, MA 1980, p. 300.

[5] See Herbert A. Strauss, 'France: Intertwined Traditions', in Strauss (ed.), *Hostages of Modernisation: Studies in Modern Antisemitism 1870–1933/39*, 3 vols., Berlin-New York 1993, vol. 1, pp. 455–463, esp. p. 455.

[6] George L. Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution*, New York 1978, p. 168.

[7] Léon Blum, *Souvenirs sur l'affaire*, Paris 1935, pp. 62–63. Historiography today, however, is much more aware of the intensity of violence that erupted in 1898. See, for example, Pierre Birnbaum, *Le Moment antisémite: un tour de la France en 1898*, Paris 1998, and Stephen Wilson, *Ideology and Experience: Antisemitism at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair*, Rutherford, NJ 1982.

[8] Stephen Wilson, 'Antisemitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair', in Strauss, *Hostages of Modernisation*, vol. 1, pp. 541–592, esp. p. 599.

political manifestations of antisemitism in France and Germany, and which situates these movements within their broader social and political contexts, is all the more essential.[9] It is also instructive to compare the Jewish responses to antisemitism in both countries since these were quite divergent as well.

The enormous research that has been devoted to the emergence of "modern antisemitism" in Germany and France during the last quarter of the nineteenth century reveals that we are dealing with a highly complex phenomenon that has to be interpreted within a specific political, social and cultural context. German antisemitism needs to be understood against the background of the crisis of national identity after the unification of the German Reich in 1871 as well as the intense socio-economic crisis that gripped the nation as a result of the long depression that lasted from 1873 to 1896. As George Mosse, Peter Pulzer and others have noted, the "crisis of modernity" that ensued led to a widespread antagonism to liberalism, democracy and the "ideas of 1789", which ultimately became identified with Jews and Judaism.[10] To be sure, many questions remain controversial, such as the way in which Christian religious ideas continued to influence Jew-hatred even in an increasingly secular society.[11] Similarly in France, the persistence of religious themes, as well as the anticlerical battles of the 1880s and 1890s exercised a decisive influence on French antisemitism. Where a comparison of German and French antisemitism has been undertaken, the question of whether antisemitism was more severe in Germany than in France remains unresolved. Saul Friedländer, for example, in his attempt to grasp the specific character of German antisemitism, discerns a clear difference, first in the widespread influence in Germany of antisemitic attitudes in nearly every aspect of social, political and cultural life, and second, in a very specific German mystical,

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[9] For an important methodological foundation for such a comparative approach, see Strauss, 'Introduction: Possibilities and Limits of Comparison', in Strauss (ed.), *Hostages of Modernisation*, vol. 1, pp. 1–7.

[10] Among the major works on German antisemitism during the *Kaiserreich*, see Peter Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany & Austria*, rev. ed., London 1988; George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*, New York 1965; Richard S. Levy, *The Downfall of the Anti-Semitic Political Parties in Imperial Germany*, New Haven 1975; Reinhard Rürup, 'Die 'Judenfrage' der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und die Entstehung des modernen Antisemitismus', in Rürup (ed.), *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*, Göttingen 1975, pp. 74–94; Hans-Günther Zmarzlik, 'Antisemitismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871–1918', in Bernd Martin and Ernst Schulin (eds.), *Die Juden als Minderheit in der Geschichte*, München 1982, pp. 249–270; Werner Jochmann, 'Struktur und Funktion des deutschen Antisemitismus 1878–1914', in Herbert A. Strauss and Norbert Kampe (eds.), *Antisemitismus: Von der Judenfeindschaft zum Holocaust*, Bonn 1985, pp. 99–142; Helmut Berding, *Moderner Antisemitismus in Deutschland*, Frankfurt am Main 1988, pp. 86–164; Olaf Blaschke, *Katholizismus und Antisemitismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, Göttingen 1997.

[11] See, for example, the description of the different methodological approaches and problems by Christhard Hoffmann, 'Neue Studien zur Ideen- und Mentalitätengeschichte des Antisemitismus', *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung*, vol. 1 (1992), pp. 274–285; Hoffmann, 'Christlicher Antijudaismus und moderner Antisemitismus: Zusammenhänge und Differenzen als Problem der historischen Antisemitismusforschung', in Leonore Siegele-Wenschkewitz (ed.), *Christlicher Antijudaismus und Antisemitismus: Theologische und kirchliche Programme Deutscher Christen*, Frankfurt am Main 1994, pp. 293–317.

anti-Jewish racial ideology that began to develop in the nineteenth century and culminated in the Holocaust. French antisemitism, from this perspective, although leading to the destructive anti-Jewish policies of Vichy, appears less virulent and less ideologically consistent.[12] While Friedländer focuses mainly on German antisemitism just before the Holocaust, Robert Wistrich is greatly interested in the contradictory phenomenon that occurred in France, which was both the birthplace of Jewish emancipation in Europe during the French Revolution and the site of the most dramatic and influential outburst of antisemitism in any Western country in the nineteenth century – the Dreyfus Affair. He therefore concentrates on what he calls "radical antisemitism", a secular ideology with deep roots in anti-religious concepts of the Enlightenment that developed between 1840 and 1880. This type of antisemitism, which paradoxically developed under the influence of left-wing intellectuals like Charles Fourier, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Alphonse Toussenel, provided the bridge to the new racial doctrines of the post-1870 era. From this perspective, Wistrich emphasises the commonalities between German and French antisemitism, despite the different socio-political contexts in the two countries. According to Wistrich, the success of the French emancipationist model in the nineteenth century should not prevent one from recognising that French thinkers contributed as much as the Germans to the emergence of modern secular antisemitism.[13] Others, like Pierre Birnbaum, accentuate the correlation between a new political antisemitism and the success of Jewish politicians in entering the political system during the Third Republic. The myth that the Third Republic was dominated by Jews is comparable only to the myth that the Weimar Republic was in reality the "Judenrepublik".[14] Finally, historians like Jacob Katz see the major difference between the French and German "antisemitic cultures" in the Catholic and more traditional character of French antisemitism, in contrast to the more secular antisemitism that emerged in Germany, which was overwhelmingly Protestant.[15]

In my own view, I would agree with Wistrich that Germany and France were the two major centres of virulent anti-Jewish thinking in Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century. As Wistrich has accurately noted, both countries provided "a kind of laboratory of antisemitic concepts, ideas and slogans", which demonstrated remarkable continuity until the Holocaust.[16] Much historical evidence suggests important parallels between French and German antisemitism, both in

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[12] Saul Friedländer, *Das Dritte Reich und die Juden* (vol. 1: *Die Jahre der Verfolgung 1933–1939*), Munich 1998, pp. 99–101.

[13] Robert S. Wistrich, 'Radical Antisemitism in France and Germany (1840–1880)', in *Modern Judaism* 15 (1995), pp. 109–135, esp. p. 112.

[14] Pierre Birnbaum, *Un Mythe politique: La "République juive" de Léon Blum à Pierre Mendès France*, Paris 1988, pp. 34–36. In Germany, according to this interpretation, antisemitism arose in a different context and exhibited different features; there it was an expression of the reactionary politics of a mainly Christian and aristocratic country that denied Jews access to important sectors of society. Birnbaum, *Un Mythe*, pp. 24–27.

[15] Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, pp. 292–300.

[16] Robert S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred*, New York 1991, p. 126.

terms of ideological sources and the socio-political situations that led to the emergence of antisemitic movements. Above all, antisemitism can be described as a "crisis of modernity" that affected both countries, albeit in different ways and for different reasons. This crisis, which emerged as a consequence of the rapid advance of capitalism and industrialisation and the concomitant social changes that ensued, was accompanied by a growing disenchantment with political liberalism and a crisis of nationalism that transformed the Jews into symbols of the social, economic and political ills that plagued both societies.

Notwithstanding these similarities, it is nevertheless clear that the distinct political, social, intellectual and religious circumstances in France and Germany had a determining impact on the ideological forms of the respective "antisemitic cultures". First, it is necessary to take into account the different attitudes of the German and the French states towards their Jewish minorities. Second, as Katz has pointed out, in Catholic France antisemitism, even when it assumed anthropological and racial forms, ultimately remained more influenced by traditional religious stereotypes, while in Germany antisemitism was more radical and consistent. In Germany too, of course, anti-Jewish prejudices were determined by religious considerations, but the emergence of an anti-religious antisemitism struck deeper roots there.[17] Moreover, whereas German antisemitism was more multifaceted and diverse as a consequence of the lateness of German unification, French antisemitism, I will argue, was far more homogeneous.

I will outline the major parallels and differences between French and German antisemitism during the formative decades from the 1870s until the First World War. Although the development of antisemitism between 1918 and the Holocaust deserves special attention, I will limit myself here to only a few observations about this period. I will conclude with some general comparative remarks on the Jewish reactions to antisemitism in both countries. Such a comparison is important because it will shed additional light on both the character of the respective antisemitic threats as well as the self-consciousness of these two important Jewish communities.

II

A comparison of the situation of Jews in both countries reveals some crucial differences that influenced the character of French and German antisemitic movements. Above all, France had long been unified and was a model modern nation-state, *la Grande Nation*. France had also been the first country to award civil equality to Jews, and the legal position of Jews in France was envied by Jews elsewhere.[18]

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[17] Uriel Tal, *Religious and Anti-Religious Roots of Modern Anti-Semitism*, New York 1971; Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany: Religion, Politics and Ideology in the Second Reich, 1870–1914*, Ithaca 1975.

[18] Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, pp. 107–108; Esther Benbassa, *The Jews of France: A History from Antiquity to the Present*, Princeton 1999, pp. 117–119; Pierre Birnbaum *The Jews of the Republic:*

This situation radically differentiates the German from the French case: in France, as Wilson notes, although anti-Jewish prejudice seems to have been widespread, "its translation into policy was always inhibited by an attachment to the egalitarian ideology of the French Revolution, though this itself was related to the emergence of racial ideology".[19] By contrast, the persistence of anti-Jewish sentiments in modern Germany can be ascribed to the specific German process of emancipation, which, by making acculturation a precondition for the granting of equal civil and political rights, led to ongoing debates over the advisability of Jewish integration.[20] In Germany the antisemitic praxis of excluding Jews from important public functions in the state bureaucracy, the military, the judicial system and the universities remained effective even after full legal emancipation had been granted. French Jews, by contrast, had more reason to feel that their integration was more advanced and that anti-Jewish sentiments would, in the long run, disappear.[21]

The impression of both Jewish and non-Jewish contemporary observers, therefore, was that the most virulent antisemitic movements in Europe had originated in Germany, Hungary and Russia, and reached France only later.[22] The German antisemitic movement, as a result of the serious economic depression in the years after the unification as well as a deep national and cultural crisis of identity, had emerged already in the 1870s.[23] In 1879, the Prussian Protestant minister and politician Adolf Stoecker launched his anti-socialist and antisemitic campaign against Jewish emancipation, which he believed was threatening the Christian character of the German state. This conservative, anti-democratic and anti-emancipatory discourse deeply influenced an entire generation of German intellectuals who were later to hold positions as state officials, university professors and Protestant ministers.[24] The histo-

A Political History of State Jews in France from Gambetta to Vichy, Stanford 1996; and Birnbaum, 'Between Social and Political Assimilation: Remarks on the History of Jews in France', in Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship*, Princeton 1995, pp. 94–127.

[19] Wilson, 'Antisemitism in France', in Strauss (ed.), *Hostages of Modernisation*, vol. 1, p. 576.

[20] See, for example, Peter Pulzer, 'Why Was There a Jewish Question in Imperial Germany?', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* (LBIYB) 25 (1980), pp. 133–146; Pulzer, *Jews and the German State: The Political History of a Minority, 1848–1933*, Oxford 1992; Werner E. Mosse, 'From "Schutzjuden" to "Deutsche Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens": The Long and Bumpy Road of Jewish Emancipation in Germany", in Birnbaum and Katznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation*, pp. 59–93.

[21] In 1882, *Le Figaro* concluded a report on the first international Congress of Antisemites in Dresden with the following observation: "An antisemitic movement like the one that is emerging in some parts of the world would generally appear ridiculous in France. In any case, if it were to become an evident force, the government would certainly not remain passive and the courts would act". Cited in Wistrich, 'Radical Antisemitism', p. 110.

[22] An analysis of the *Archives israélites* shows that between 1879 and 1882 articles on antisemitism mostly referred to the events in Germany.

[23] Hans Rosenberg, *Große Depression und Bismarckzeit: Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa*, Berlin 1967.

[24] Hans Engelmann, *Kirche am Abgrund: Adolf Stoecker und seine antijüdische Bewegung*, Berlin 1984; Günter Brakelmann, Werner Jochmann, and Martin Greschat (eds.), *Protestantismus und Politik: Werk und Wirkung Adolf Stoeckers*, Hamburg 1982.

rian Heinrich von Treitschke, with his slogan "The Jews are our misfortune" ("Die Juden sind unser Unglück"), which engendered the "Berliner Antisemitismusstreit" of 1880–81, exercised a similar influence. Treitschke provided academic legitimacy and respectability to what had hitherto seemed a disreputable popular movement. Although Treitschke's demand that German Jews abandon any distinctive Jewish identity did not rely on racial arguments, he did suggest that Jews remained an "alien" element in the German population, and he blamed Jewish emancipation as well as Jewish involvement in liberalism and socialism for having inspired the antisemitic backlash.[25]

While the debates of the years 1880–81 and the decline of political liberalism in Germany signalled the growing influence of "integral nationalism" aimed at ensuring the hegemony of a Prussian-dominated, conservative and Christian culture, the 1890s witnessed the successful rise of radical antisemitic parties, which demanded the reversal of emancipation and introduced racial themes into antisemitic ideology.[26] Influenced by a pessimistic critique of modernity that perceived Jews and Judaism as symbols of capitalism and mass democracy, individualistic, radical *volkish* antisemites postulated an eternal racial antagonism between "Aryans" and "Semites".[27] Together with aggressive nationalist tendencies and antidemocratic impulses, this brand of antisemitism became an integral part of political culture in Germany at the turn of the century, and especially in the immediate aftermath of the First World War.

The sensational antisemitic movement like the one that took place in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and which forced prominent Jewish intellectuals like the historian Heinrich Graetz or Harry Bresslau, professor of history at the University of Berlin, among others, to refute the antisemitic attacks of their academic colleagues, did not take place in Paris. The French-Jewish community, however, was not spared this antisemitic outburst. Beginning in the late 1880s, a growing volume of attacks against Jews and Judaism began to appear, culminating in the publication in 1886 of the most influential antisemitic book, Edouard Drumont's *La France juive.* Drumont effectively combined traditional Christian anti-Jewish themes with anticapitalism and racial antisemitism to create a new and more powerful antisemitic movement.[28]

The new wave of antisemitism in France can also be explained as a result of a deeply rooted anxiety caused by the processes of modernisation – urbanisation, se-

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[25] Walter Boehlich (ed.), *Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,* Frankfurt am Main 1965; Michael A. Meyer, 'Great Debate on Antisemitism: Jewish Reaction to New Hostility in Germany 1879–1881', LBIYB 11 (1966), pp. 137–170.

[26] Levy, *The Downfall of the Anti-Semitic Political Parties.*

[27] Steven E. Aschheim, '"The Jew Within": The Myth of "Judaization" in Germany', in Jehuda Reinharz and Walter Schatzberg (eds.), *Jewish Response to German Culture: From the Enlightenment to the Second World War,* Hanover, NH 1985, pp. 212–241.

[28] On the impact of Catholic antisemitism in France prior to 1870, see Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction,* pp. 107–144; Natalie Isser, *Antisemitism during the French Second Empire,* New York 1991.

cularisation and industrialisation – combined with anti-republicanism, nationalism and xenophobia. As a political ideology, antisemitism attracted disparate groups, from Catholics and monarchists on the right, who awaited the restoration of a conservative, clerical France, to socialists on the left, who rejected the economic structures of capitalism and the economic and cultural hegemony of the bourgeoisie. To all these groups, the Jews symbolised the distressing symptoms of modernity ushered in by capitalism and political liberalism.[29] A closer examination of these ideological currents will illuminate some crucial similarities and differences between the French and the German situations.

In France, a dominant element in the new antisemitism of the late nineteenth century was a deeply-rooted, Catholic, anti-Jewish tradition that refused to accept Jewish emancipation and the increased economic, cultural and political role of the Jews. These conservative and clerical forces wanted France to be a unified Catholic country, grounded in the identification of Catholicism and French culture, as opposed to the German variation, which equated *Deutschtum* and Protestant culture. French Catholics began to feel especially besieged under the Third Republic, which they perceived as dominated by atheists, secularists, Protestants and Jews, all of whom intended to de-Christianise France.[30] Henri Gougenot des Mousseaux's 1869 pamphlet, *Les Juifs, le Judaisme et la Judaisation des peuples chrétiens*, which endlessly repeated the alleged connection between Jews, Freemasons, revolution, capitalism and the persecution of the Church, was reissued in 1886.[31] The idea of a Jewish-masonic conspiracy had little impact in Germany, because Jews there were not accepted as members of the lodges, in contrast to the situation in France, where Adolphe Crémieux, the president of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* and the minister of justice in 1870 played an important role in the masonic movement.[32] The type of antisemitism expressed in the Catholic newspaper *La Croix* was comparable to the

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[29] Wistrich, *Antisemitism*, pp. 54–65; Benbassa, *The Jews of France*, pp. 137–141. For a comparative perspective concerning the whole of Europe, see Jehuda Reinharz (ed.), *Living with Antisemitism: Modern Jewish Responses*, Hanover, NH 1987. Zeev Sternhell, 'The Roots of Popular Anti-Semitism in the Third Republic', in Frances Malino and Bernard Wasserstein (eds.), *The Jews in Modern France*, Hanover 1985, pp. 103–134.

[30] Philip Nord has shown that the Third Republic was created and supported in large measure by groups outside the political establishment, e.g., Protestants, Masons and Jews. Nord, *The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France*, Cambridge, MA 1995. On Catholic antisemitism in late nineteenth-century France, see Pierre Sorlin, *"La Croix" et les Juifs (1880–1899)*, Paris 1967; Sorlin, 'Die französischen Katholiken und die Erfindung der "jüdischen Gefahr"', in Olaf Blaschke and Aram Mattioli (eds.), *Katholischer Antisemitismus im 19. Jahrhundert: Ursachen und Traditionen im internationalen Vergleich*, Zürich 2000, pp. 163–194; Pierre Pierrard, *Juifs et catholiques français: De Drumont à Jules Isaac (1886–1945)*, Paris 1970; David I. Ketzer, *The Popes against the Jews*, New York 2001, pp. 166–185.

[31] Henri Roger Gougenot des Mousseaux, *Le Juif, le Judaïsme et la judaïsation des peuples chrétiens*, Paris 1886.

[32] For the important connection between anti-masonic and antisemitic sentiments, see Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, pp. 139–144; Katz, *Jews and Freemasons in Europe 1723–1939*, Cambridge, MA 1970.

attacks made by August Rohling, professor of Hebrew literature at Charles University in Prague, in his book *Talmudjude*, which first appeared in Münster in 1871. Here Rohling attacked the Talmud and demonised Jews as criminal and murderous elements.[33] In France, these stereotypes served to foster Catholic resentment against the Third Republic and expressed a longing for a re-Catholisation of the nation's culture and politics.

Hostility to Jews in France was not, however, restricted to "reactionaries", but it was inherent in French "progressive" and socialist thought. Radical secular antisemitism, according to Arthur Hertzberg, Jacob Katz, Robert Wistrich and others, had its origins in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the same movement that had undermined the religious tradition that had shaped Christian attitudes to Jews and served as the foundation of political emancipation.[34] Ironically, these same rationalist doctrines provided the ideological basis for modern secular Jew-hatred in the post-1870 era. While this was true of Germany as well, left-wing antisemitism, with its strong anti-capitalist animus, was indisputable stronger in France. At least until the Dreyfus Affair, the left was not free from antisemitic inclinations based on the identification of Jews with capitalism, and especially the financial activities of the Rothschild family. The utopian socialists – Charles Fourier, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Alphonse Toussenel – turned the Jews into the negative symbols of a society dominated by money, profit and injustice. Toussenel, in his 1847 pamphlet, *Les Juifs, rois de l'époque: histoire de la féodalité financière*, stigmatised the modern reign of money as an era of Jewish usury, and he depicted the Rothschilds as the "new kings of the epoch". Toussenel's work pioneered a new literary genre that foreshadowed every theme of fin-de-siècle French antisemitism and expressed the hope that the "social struggle" between the people and their capitalist exploiters would lead to liberation from the "Jewish yoke". Toussenel's work influenced antisemites like Drumont as well as the more conservative antisemitism of Charles Maurras, who after the Dreyfus Affair became the leader of the royalist league, the *Action Française*.[35]

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[33] See Stefan Lehr, *Antisemitismus – religiöse Motive im sozialen Vorurteil: Aus der Frühgeschichte des Antisemitismus in Deutschland 1870–1914*, Munich 1974, pp. 34ff.

[34] See Arthur Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews: The Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism*, New York 1968; Wistrich, 'Radical Antisemitism', esp. pp. 112–121; Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, pp. 107–138.

[35] On left-wing antisemitism in France, see Pierre Birnbaum, 'Anti-Semitism and Anticapitalism in Modern France', in Malino and Wasserstein (eds.), *The Jews in Modern France*, pp. 214–223; George Lichtheim, 'Socialism and the Jews', *Dissent* (July-Aug. 1968), pp. 314–342; Wistrich, 'Radical Antisemitism', pp. 114–16. Socialists in Germany also harboured ambivalent feelings towards Jews and Judaism. The more extreme antisemitism of French socialists marks perhaps the most decisive difference between German and French antisemitism. On socialist antisemitism in Germany, see Rosemarie Leuschen-Seppel, *Sozialdemokratie und Antisemitismus im Kaiserreich: die Auseinandersetzungen der Partei mit den konservativen und völkischen Strömungen des Antisemitismus 1871–1914*, Bonn 1978; Mario Keßler (ed.), *Arbeiterbewegung und Antisemitismus: Entwicklungslinien im 20. Jahrhundert*, Bonn 1993.

A third important ideological current in French antisemitism was anti-religious racial antisemitism, which idealized the Aryan and demonised the Jew. This theory found ardent defenders not only in Germany but in France as well. It is in regard to this question that a comparative perspective can be most instructive, especially because the character of radical antisemitism in both countries is so controversial. As noted above, Robert Wistrich has forcefully argued that this current of antisemitism in both France and Germany developed out of a militant atheism that negated the tradition of Judeo-Christian monotheism and blamed Judaism for having created Christianity. In Germany, according to Wistrich, this accusation was made by Bruno Bauer, Wilhelm Marr and Eugen Dühring. In France Wistrich argues that it was made primarily by Gustave Tridon, who in his *Du Molochisme Juif*, published at the end of the 1860s,[36] developed the racial doctrines of Ernest Renan and Joseph Arthur de Gobineau into a "hatred of Semitism", which attacked the Hebrew Bible as a text that reflected "a God who is an assassin, hypocritical and perverse, complicit and an instigator of all crimes".[37] Ideas like these are reminiscent of radical German *volkish* antisemitism, promoted by agitators like Theodor Fritsch, which laid the foundations for Nazi ideology.

While it is true that French Jews faced racial antisemitism in the 1880s and 1890s, "scientific" racism in France attracted only isolated individuals and did not play as important a role in French political life as compared to Germany and Austria. Moreover, recent research has shown that in France many works that claimed to be engaged in racial discourse remained riddled with traditional anti-talmudic arguments. As Michel Winock has argued, racism was often used "as a further ingredient" to enrich an already existing synthesis of religious and social hatred.[38] Traditional religious themes were even incorporated into the new racial arguments. Proudhon, for example, despite his hostility to the Church, claimed that Jews had excluded themselves from humanity by having rejected Christ.[39] Similarly, Toussenel, despite the fact that he had been strongly influenced by Voltaire's anti-clericalism, nevertheless argued that: "If the Jewish people really was the people of God, it wouldn't have murdered the son of God; [and] it wouldn't continue to exploit through usury all the workers whom Christ wished to redeem."[40] Toussenel's treatise, one of the classics of French antisemitism, uses the word "race" in an unsystematic way, and it reflects the way French antisemites combined Christian prejudices with a protest against the social and economic role played by Jews in post-emancipation society. Indeed, according to Katz, it was precisely because of its anti-religious attacks on the Old Testament that the journal *L'Antisémitique*, founded in

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[36] Gustave Tridon, *Du Molochisme juif: Etudes critiques et philosophiques*, Bruxelles 1884. Wistrich, 'Radical Antisemitism', pp. 114–116.

[37] Cited in Wistrich, 'Radical Antisemitism', pp. 121–129. On Renan and his entourage, see Dieter M. Hoffmann, *Renan und das Judentum: Die Bedeutung des Volkes Israel im Werk des "Historien philosophe"*, Würzburg 1988.

[38] Michel Winock, *Edouard Drumont et Cie. Antisémitisme et fascisme en France*, Paris 1982, p. 9.

[39] Pierre Joseph Proudhon, *Jésus et les origines du christianisme*, Paris 1896, p. 122.

[40] Alphonse Toussenel, *Les Juifs rois des l'époque*, Paris 1845.

1883, proved unsuccessful. By contrast, Drumont's *La France juive* was hugely successful in the 1890s because it synthesised traditional religious critiques of Jews, decrying them as Christ killers and perpetrators of ritual murder, with a more "modern" racial critique of Jews. The central assertion of *La France juive* was that Jews, although members of an inferior race and followers of a primitive, despicable religion, had joined together with their natural allies, the Freemasons, to conquer France from within. The extraordinary popularity of this book suggests that the public must have been extremely receptive to this kind of antisemitism, which constructed a vision of French national identity based on socio-economic and racial antagonism to Jews, who were perceived as a threat to the integrity of the Catholic nation. Despite the ideological differences among the various antisemitic factions in France, Drumont provided sufficient common ground to unite all those who felt themselves to be the losers in the process of modernisation, whether they came from the Boulangist left or the conservative Catholic right.[41]

That Drumont's antisemitism did not use the concept of race systematically, but instead continued to rely heavily on traditional Christian antisemitic stereotypes can be ascribed to the fact that there was, in reality, considerable overlap between these two types of antisemitism, notwithstanding the fact that they have generally been treated as contradictory.[42] For Drumont, the term "race" tended to be used loosely as a symbolic "cultural code," to use Shulamit Volkov's term, rather than connoting a rigid ideological system.[43] In this respect, mainstream antisemitism in France was not unlike the antisemitism expressed by the Prussian Protestant minister Adolf Stoecker, in that both movements called for the establishment of a "Christian state" and blamed Jews for all the social, economic and political evils of modern times. Other German antisemites, however, such as Eugen Dühring, who wrote in 1881 a pamphlet titled 'The Jewish Question: A Question of Race, Mores, and Culture' ('Die Judenfrage als Racen-, Sitten- und Culturfrage'), relied on new and far more radical racial arguments. Indeed, Dühring denounced French antisemites, including Drumont, as "reactionary" and dominated by "Christian affectations", which he felt obscured a true understanding of the Jewish question.

In recent years, Moshe Zimmerman and others have argued convincingly that German antisemites like Marr and Dühring accentuated the "racial characteristics"

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[41] On the way in which antisemitism had forged this coalition between progressive and authoritarian sectors of the population in the Boulangist movement, see Michael Burns, 'Boulangism and the Dreyfus-Affair 1886–1900. Old Legends and New Myths', in Strauss, *Hostages of Modernisation*, vol. 1, pp. 514–540.

[42] As Stephen Wilson has commented, "Racial concepts, in effect, reinforced the view that Jews were inherently different, and lent antisemitic ideology a modern and scientific air, but they were not themselves a determining factor in it. Behind them stood profound religious and socio-psychological urges, which had in the past, for example, found expression in the identification of the Jews with the Devil". Wilson, 'Antisemitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair', in Strauss, *Hostages of Modernisation*, vol. 1, p. 588.

[43] Shulamit Volkov, 'Antisemitism as Cultural Code – Reflections on the History and Historiography of Antisemitism in Imperial Germany', LBIYB 23 (1978), pp. 25–46.

of Jews while rejecting traditional religious antisemitism, in contrast to the trend among their French counterparts.[44] According to this view, the emergence of a vehement racial antisemitism can be understood only against the background of the confessional controversies in Germany during the *Kulturkampf*. A broad-based anti-Jewish coalition, spanning from left to right, such as the movement forged by Drumont in France, was impossible in Germany because here religion served as a dividing rather than a uniting force. A racial ideology that transcended confessional boundaries, however, proved far more promising. This fact, together with the particular nature of German nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century, may explain why racial antisemitism ultimately enjoyed more success in Germany than in France.[45]

III

The difference between premodern and modern Jewish responses to antisemitism in Jewish history, according to historian Ben Halpern, is that premodern Jews felt "detached from the values of the Gentile society about them so that outer humiliations could not easily penetrate the defences of their culture and touch them inwardly".[46] Modern Jews, by contrast, experienced antisemitism as a challenge not only to their sense of belonging to society, but to their entire identity. The range of possible responses to this challenge included individual reactions of shame or pride, such as intensified attempts either to acculturate or to strengthen one's Jewish identity, or collective reactions, such as Jewish nationalism or the creation of Jewish self-defence organisations, such as the *Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens*, founded in 1893. In Western and Central Europe, Jews had to combat the post-emancipation notion that political activity on the part of Jews as a separate collective body was considered illegitimate since Jews had been emancipated as individuals. While these general reflections apply to both Germany and France, a closer examination is necessary to see how these two Jewish communities experienced the antisemitic movement in their respective societies.

As regards German Jewish reactions to antisemitism prior to the First World War, a great deal of work has been done on the Centralverein, which, as Ismar Schorsch, Arnold Paucker and others have shown, represented a turning point in the self-perception of the German Jewish minority.[47] This forceful self-defence organisation,

[44] On Marr, see Moshe Zimmermann, *Wilhelm Marr: The Patriarch of Anti-Semitism*, New York 1986. Marr's pamphlet, *Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum vom nicht confessionellen Standpunkt aus betrachtet* (1879) is a programmatic expression of radical, anti-religious, racial antisemitism.

[45] Johannes Heil, 'Antisemitismus, Kulturkampf und Konfession – Die antisemitischen "Kulturen" Frankreichs und Deutschlands im Vergleich', in Blaschke and Mattioli (eds.), *Katholischer Antisemitismus*, Zürich 2000, pp. 195–228.

[46] Ben Halpern, 'Reactions to Antisemitism in Modern Jewish History', in Reinharz (ed.), *Living with Antisemitism*, pp. 3–15, esp. pp. 5 and 10.

[47] Ismar Schorsch, *Jewish Reactions to German Anti-Semitism, 1870–1914*, New York 1972; Ar-

established by predominantly liberal, assimilated Jewish academics, emerged in the wake of a wave of antisemitic incidents, including a campaign against kosher slaughtering in Saxony, a ritual murder accusation in Xanten, and the incorporation of an antisemitic plank into the Conservative Party Platform in December 1892. The ideology of the Centralverein stressed "Germanness" and "Jewishness" as the two pillars of German-Jewish identity,[48] and the organisation endorsed a strategy of active and public self-defence based on the anticipation of a more successful integration of Jews into German society. The Centralverein, as well as other organisations such as the *Kartell-Convent Jüdischer Corporationen*, a student association founded in 1896, and the *Verband der deutschen Juden*, founded in 1905, waged a vigorous campaign to defend Judaism and the Jewish community against antisemitic attacks. Although some scholars have criticised the apologetic propaganda of the Centralverein as ineffective, the Centralverein and these other associations played an important role in reinforcing Jewish identity, especially by fostering the scholarship of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* movement, with its traditional twofold aim of refuting anti-Jewish images and opposing indifference and conversion.[49] The emphasis on *Wissenschaft des Judentums* provided a means by which liberal Jews could acknowledge Judaism as a legitimate part of German society and culture.

French Jewry developed no organisational counterpart to the Centralverein, nor did it encourage a particular brand of scholarship linked to self-defence efforts. Although *Wissenschaft des Judentums* had a tradition in Germany since the early nineteenth century, it developed rather belatedly in France. It was not until 1880 that Rabbi Zadoc Kahn founded the *Société des Etudes Juives*, which asserted for the first time the autonomy of French Jews from their more influential German coreligionists.[50] That this process of establishing a specific French-Jewish historiography,

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nold Paucker, 'Zur Problematik einer jüdischen Abwehrstrategie in der deutschen Gesellschaft', in Werner E. Mosse (ed.), *Judentum im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890–1914*, Tübingen 1976, pp. 479–547; A. Paucker, 'The Jewish Defense against Antisemitism in Germany, 1893–1933', in Reinharz (ed.), *Living with Antisemitism*, pp. 104–132.

[48] Jehuda Reinharz, 'Deutschtum und Judentum in the Ideology of the Centralverein Deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens 1893–1914', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 36 (1974), pp. 19–39; Reinharz, *Fatherland or Promised Land: The Dilemma of the German Jew 1893–1914*, Ann Arbor 1975.

[49] Max Wiener describes the science of Judaism in Germany as an intellectual means "to exalt the heritage of the Jewish past, cleansed of its dross, in order to give non-Jews a new respect for their race and to imbue the Jewish community with confidence and self-respect." Max Wiener, *Jüdische Religion im Zeitalter der Emanzipation*, Berlin 1933, p. 16. See also Christian Wiese, *Wissenschaft des Judentums und Protestantische Theologie im wilhelminischen Deutschland: Ein "Schrei ins Leere"?*, Tübingen 1999.

[50] In 1880 the editors of the first volume of the *Revue des études juives* proclaimed their goals as follows: "One has often stated, and with a feeling of regret, that our country is far from occupying one of the first ranks in the vast scientific and literary movement, which during the last forty or fifty years has successfully revived the study of Jewish antiquity. To raise France from the state of inferiority, which suits neither her past nor her present traditions, to enter freely into this remarkable movement where she was so wrong to have let herself be outstripped, to regain, if possible, *le temps perdu*, such has been the goal of some men of goodwill" ('A nos lecteurs', in *Revue des études juives*,

which could have served as the foundation of an apologetic response to antisemitism, was less successful than in Germany, can paradoxically be ascribed to the relative success of emancipation in France. Among German Jews, by contrast, the long struggle to justify emancipation "provoked a painful self-consciousness that was often translated into historical consciousness".[51] As Paula Hyman has noted, the fact that French Jews had achieved emancipation early weakened bonds of Jewish group identity and reduced the apologetic orientation of Jewish Studies in France. Jewish scholars, of course, wrote articles against antisemitism, such as the lengthy essay by Isidore Loeb, the secretary of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* in Paris, 'Réflexion sur les Juifs', published in the *Revue des études juives* in 1893/94. Loeb's attempt to emphasise the morality of Judaism and to refute racialised images of the dangerous and criminal Jew, which he continued to see as a German import, resembles the self-defence efforts of German Jewish scholars. Loeb, however, was one of the few representatives of the French *science du judaïsme* who openly addressed these questions. Most other French Jewish scholars, such as Théodore Reinach, believed antisemitism was on the verge of disappearing from French society altogether, and in this same issue of the *Revue des études juives* recommended that the most effective strategy of fighting antisemitism was to display the "silence of disdain".[52] Moreover, as Perrine Simon-Nahum has so clearly emphasised, the fact that the representatives of the *science du judaïsme* were intensely connected to republicanism resulted in a program of Jewish studies that provided a basis for a new definition of Jewish identity which reaffirmed the values of emancipation within a republican framework.[53]

As to French-Jewish responses to antisemitism in general during this period, a systematic analysis of the work of Jewish institutions, the Jewish press and Jewish scholarship still needs to be done.[54] As in Germany, French Jews countered antisemitism from the 1880s on primarily through the written word; in this respect a systematic analysis of newspapers like the *Univers israélite* and the *Archives israélites* would certainly be revealing. These responses sought to make non-Jews more aware

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vol. 1 (1880), p. v. For the intellectual and political development of Jewish Studies in nineteenth-century France, see Perrine Simon-Nahum, *La Cité investie: La "Science du Judaïsme" français et la République*, Paris 1991.

[51] Paula Hyman, 'French Jewish Historiography since 1870', in Malino and Wasserstein (eds.), *The Jews in Modern France*, pp. 328–346, esp. p. 329.

[52] Théodore Reinach, 'Actes', *Revue des études Juives*, vol. 15 (1885), p. 132. On the Reinach-family, who incarnated the assimilationist values of Franco-Judaism, see Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic*, pp. 7–19.

[53] According to Perrine Simon-Nahum, "C'est le républicanisme qui réalise la synthése entre la réalité d'un judaïsme émancipé et la science du judaïsme ... Dès l'épisode boulangiste, défense du judaïsme et de la République forment dans leur esprit une seule et même chose". Simon-Nahum, *La Cité investie*, pp. 253–266, esp. p. 254.

[54] On Jewish reactions to the Dreyfus Affair, see Michael Marrus, *Politics of Assimilation: French Jewry at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair*, London 1971; Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, esp. pp. 692–730; Richard I. Cohen, 'The Dreyfus Affair and the Jews', in Shmuel Almog (ed.), *Antisemitism through the Ages*, New York 1988, pp. 291–310; Birnbaum, *Le Moment antisémite.*

of the realities of Jewish life, religion and history, in the hope that such knowledge would dissipate anti-Jewish prejudice. Furthermore, the deep conviction expressed in 1889 by Rabbi Zadoc Kahn on the occasion of the centennial of the French Revolution that France would never "repudiate her past, her traditions [or] her principles, which constitute the best of her moral patrimony",[55] shows that "Frenchmen of the Mosaic persuasion" were not prepared for the virulence of the antisemitism that emerged in the 1880s and 1890s. This confidence in the legacy of the Revolution determined the politics of the consistorial leadership, which represented itself merely as a religious body and felt empowered to intervene only in cases where the rights of Jews as Jews were recognisably curtailed. The Dreyfus Affair, which shocked French Jewry from 1894 until the turn of the century, was, of course, of crucial importance in inspiring French Jews to embark on a political struggle to preserve their rights.[56]

Recent research has undermined the traditional view that French Jews were passive during the Dreyfus Affair, an impression influenced by Hannah Arendt's thesis on the political naivité of the French Jewish establishment.[57] This view was reinforced by French Jewish observers like Léon Blum, who criticised the Jewish bourgeoisie in the 1930s for the naïve belief that antisemitic passions would vanish if only Jews remained silent.[58] There is, of course, sufficient reason for such criticism, especially if one considers the reluctance of Jewish institutions like the Central Consistory and the Alliance to fight antisemitism at the time of the Dreyfus Affair. These organisations held the deeply rooted conviction that problems between the Jews and the wider French community could best be solved within the framework of the liberal Third Republic, and that any public display of "Jewish solidarity" would only intensify the impression of Jewish particularism and fan the flames of

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[55] Zadoc Kahn, cited in Benjamin Mossé (ed.), *La Révolution française et le rabbinat français*, Avignon 1890, p. 12.

[56] On the impact of the Dreyfus Affair in general, see esp. Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*; Birnbaum, *Le Moment antisémite*; Norman Kleeblatt (ed.), *The Dreyfus Affair: Art, Truth and Justice*, Berkeley 1987; Michael Burns, *Dreyfus: A Family Affair*, 1789–1945, New York 1991; Jean-Denis Bredin, *The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus*, trans. by Jeffrey Mehlman, New York 1986.

[57] Hannah Arendt, 'From the Dreyfus Affair to France Today', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 4 (1942), pp. 195–240. Michael Marrus' *The Politics of Assimilation*, the classic study of this subject, is indebted to Arendt's judgment.

[58] According to Léon Blum, "The rich Jews, the Jews of the middle class, the Jewish functionaries feared the struggle undertaken for Dreyfus exactly as they fear today the struggle undertaken against fascism.... They imagined that the antisemitic passion would be turned aside by their cowardly neutrality". Léon Blum, *Souvenirs sur l'Affaire*, Paris 1935, p. 97. On Blum's attitude, see Johannes Glasneck, 'Léon Blum zur jüdischen Frage und zum Antisemitismus', in M. Keßler (ed.), *Arbeiterbewegung und Antisemitismus*, pp. 35–45. Contemporary observers from other countries, such as the author of an article in the Hebrew newspaper *Ha-Meliz*, published in Russia, also blamed French Jewry for its self-delusion: "Our brethren in France, asleep with storm around them, will still not stop being in their Eden of pleasant dreams. If they would only wake from their deep sleep now, they would see the heavy cloud coming up on the sky of their lives, but they lie there [...] dreaming". Cited in Richard I. Cohen, 'The Dreyfus Affair and the Jews', p. 308.

antisemitism.[59] In France, where acculturation and integration had proceeded much further than in Germany, it was even more difficult to express particularistic political and cultural interests.[60] Moreover, the majority of French Jewry tended to underestimate the virulence of French antisemitism during the Third Republic, and they interpreted it primarily as an attack on republican values. In contrast to German Jews, they assumed that antisemitism was not endorsed by the state but originated from political currents opposed to it. They were therefore convinced that they could best defend Jewish interests by acting as French citizens and by defending the republic. Furthermore, this perception was shared even by the majority of non-Jewish opponents of antisemitism, who rarely perceived antisemitism as directed exclusively against Jews but rather envisioned it as a threat to the republic itself.[61]

Nevertheless, recent historical scholarship suggests that the French Jewish response was more complicated. Scholars like Paula Hyman, Richard Cohen and Pierre Birnbaum have emphasised the deep impact the Dreyfus Affair made upon French Jews, in that the Affair highlighted the vulnerability of Jews even in France despite the country's liberal traditions. The antisemitic riots of early 1898, which took on an especially violent form in Algeria,[62] instilled fear among Jews and led them to reassess their situation. The Jewish press is most revealing in this respect: French-Jewish journalists widely reported incidents of antisemitic violence, and they condemned the silence of the Consistory and the Alliance.[63] The aforementioned Levaillant, who served as editor of the *Univers israélite* at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, proclaimed that "in the presence of the formidable coalition that threatens them, it is time for Jews to prepare for combat",[64] even though he became a member of the Consistory soon afterwards. Indeed, in 1897 he went so far as to write:

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[59] The consistorial minutes indicate that the Consistory never formally discussed the events of the Dreyfus Affair. See Marrus, *The Politics of Assimilation*, pp. 250–253. On the hesitation and political quietism of the Jewish establishment, see Birnbaum, *Le Moment antisémite*, pp. 343–368. On the cautiousness of the Consistory in face of the persecution of the Jews during the Vichy-regime, see Yerachmiel (Richard) Cohen, 'The Jewish Community of France in the Face of Vichy-France Persecution: 1940–1944', in Malino and Wasserstein (eds.), *The Jews in Modern France*, pp. 181–204.

[60] On French-Jewish acculturation, see Simon Schwarzfuchs, *Du juif à l'israélite: Histoire d'une mutation (1770–1870)*, Paris 1989; Jay R. Berkovitz, *The Shaping of Jewish Identity in Nineteenth Century France*, Detroit 1990; Phyllis Cohen Albert, 'Israelite and Jew: How Did Nineteenth-Century French Jews Understand Assimilation?', in Jonathan Frankel and Steven J. Zipperstein (eds.), *Assimilation and Community: The Jews in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Cambridge 1992, pp. 88–109.

[61] Wilson, 'Antisemitism in France', in Strauss (ed.), *Hostages of Modernisation*, vol. 1, p. 575; Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, p. 110; Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, pp. 692–742.

[62] See Stephen Wilson, 'The Anti-Semitic Riots of 1989 in France', *Historical Journal*, vol. 16 (1973), pp. 789–806.

[63] Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, p. 110.

[64] *Univers israélite*, April 30, 1897.

It seems impossible to believe that, on the eve of undergoing a decisive assault, the Jews of France have not thought to arm themselves for the struggle and to organise their defence ... . The French Jews are incapable of protecting themselves: no coming together has even been attempted; no committee or association has been founded; in short, there exists not even the shadow of an organisation. ... Never have a herd of sheep consented to be slaughtered with a more docile and stupid resignation.[65]

Not surprisingly, Levaillant served as secretary of the secret *Comité de Défense contre l'Antisémitisme* founded by Zadoc Kahn in 1894. The Jewish notables who made up this committee tried to intervene diplomatically behind the scenes, a strategy that contrasts strikingly to the more self-confident German self-defence organisations. Indeed, this committee's activities and funding were so secret that its existence was not revealed to the public until 1902.[66]

Although the Jewish Dreyfusards tended to stress that they were not motivated by their Jewishness but merely their republican sympathies, there is evidence that this wave of antisemitism led to an increased sense of Jewish group solidarity just as in Germany. Even Théodore Reinach wrote in 1894 that "the principal effect of antisemitism is to oblige the Jews to group together and to close ranks, and thus to revive a Jewish particularism that had gradually been breaking down".[67] As Stephen Wilson has shown, Jews played a notable role in the main Dreyfusard organisation, the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, which was founded in 1898 in response to the riots and was designed to defend liberal and republican principles rather than Jews qua Jews.[68] Still, for many intellectuals the Affair prompted a reevaluation of their commitment to assimilation and resulted in a reaffirmation of their Jewish cultural heritage and identity; according to Pierre Birnbaum, "the most alienated of them discovered their Judaism and even proclaimed their identity when confronted by an outburst of antisemitism at one time or another".[69] It is difficult to assess the extent of this identification and to compare it to the German-Jewish phenomenon of "dissimilation", but the available sources indicate that some change in Jewish consciousness occurred. Nevertheless, Dreyfus's pardon in 1899 and his rehabilitation in 1906, which Levaillant hailed as proof of "the collapse of a transformed and perverted antisemitism that calls itself nationalism", reinforced the republican sym-

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[65] *Univers israélite*, August 6, 1897.

[66] Michael Marrus, 'Le Comité de Défense contre l'Antisémitisme', in *Michael*, vol. 4 (1976), pp. 163–175. The text of the communiqué of the committee was published in *Univers israélite*, December 5, 1902.

[67] Théodore Reinach, *La Grande encyclopédie*, 1894, cited in François Bournand, *Les Juifs et nos contemporains (L'Antisémitisme et la question juive)*, Paris 1898, p. 291.

[68] Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, p. 704. This attitude is, of course, comparable to the self-understanding of the German *Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus*, which devoted itself mainly to the defence of liberalism in general. See Barbara Suchy, 'The Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus (I): From its Beginning to the First World War', LBIYB 28 (1983), pp. 205–239; Suchy, 'The Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus (II): From the First World War to its Dissolution in 1933', LBIYB 30 (1985), pp. 67–103.

[69] Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic*, pp. 92–93.

pathies of French Jews.[70] As the *Archives israélites* declared in 1906, "The Dreyfus Affair has concluded for the Jews, and its conclusion makes us love our dear country even more, if that were possible".[71]

Zionist responses to antisemitism in France before World War I were even more marginal than in Germany, which witnessed the emergence of a "post-assimilationist" Zionist movement led by intellectuals like Kurt Blumenfeld.[72] In France, by contrast, few Jews followed the example of Bernard Lazare, who became one of Dreyfus's most ardent defenders and embraced a Zionist identification with the oppressed Jewish people, despite the fact that he had previously advocated unconditional assimilation and had even shared some of the antisemitic views of Maurice Barrès.[73] Assimilated Jews in France, even more than in Germany, saw Zionism as dangerous because it threatened the republican synthesis.[74] Levaillant, for example, interpreted Zionism as an understandable reaction to antisemitism, but he was convinced that it would disappear as soon as antisemitism vanished. As he stated in his 1907 essay "La Genèse de l'Antisémitisme sous la Troisième République":

> For a long time this country, even the country's republicans, did not grasp that antisemitism was only a mask worn by rejected clericalism, and that disguised as a war against the Jews the battle was in reality waged against the republic. But owing to the lessons of the Dreyfus Affair ... the country's eyes were opened, and it saw clearly that antisemitism constituted a danger not only to a religious minority, but also to all the achievements of modern France.[75]

Unfortunately, Levaillant may have overestimated the sympathies that democratic forces felt for the Jews, and he definitely underestimated the persistence of antisemitism especially on the nationalist right. The loud agitation of *La Libre parole* was replaced by the ideology of the *Action Française*, founded in 1898 by Charles Maurras, Léon Daudet and others who longed for a renaissance of France on the basis of Catholic spirituality and a chauvinistic French nationalism that excluded Jews.[76]

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[70] *Univers israélite*, May 25, 1906.

[71] *Archives israélites*, July 26, 1906, cited in Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, p. 113. See also Benbassa, *The Jews of France*, pp. 156–157.

[72] Jehuda Reinharz, *The German Zionist Challenge to the Faith in Emancipation 1897–1914*, Tel Aviv 1982; Reinharz, 'The Zionist Response to Antisemitism in Germany', LBIYB 30 (1985), pp. 105–140; Yehuda Eloni, *Zionismus in Deutschland: Von den Anfängen bis 1914*, Gerlingen 1984.

[73] On Lazare, see Nelly Wilson, *Bernard Lazare: Antisemitism and the Problem of Jewish Identity in Late Nineteenth-Century-France*, Cambridge, G.B. 1978; Siegfried Loewe, 'Von der Assimilation zum Zionismus', in Christoph Mieting (ed.), *Jüdischer Republikanismus in Frankreich*, Tübingen 1998.

[74] Catherine Nicault, *La France et le sionisme 1897–1948: Une rencontre manquée?*, Paris 1992. Paula Hyman has explored the institutional, cultural and political impact of Eastern Jewish immigrants upon French Jewry and their influence on the development of Zionism in France. Hyman, *From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Remaking of French Jewry, 1906–1939*, New York 1979.

[75] Levaillant, 'La Genèse de l'Antisémitisme', p. c.

[76] Wilson, 'Antisemitism in France', in Strauss, *Hostages of Modernisation*, vol. 1, pp. 579–81. Zeev Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire 1885–1914: Les Origines françaises du fascisme*, Paris 1978; Sternhell, *Ni droite ni gauche: L'Idéologie fasciste en France*, Paris 1983; Udo Starck, *Die nationalrevolu-*

Such beliefs resurfaced in the 1930s and 1940s, when antisemitism once again assumed a politically destructive character, leading Vichy authorities ultimately to collaborate with the Nazi politics of annihilation.[77]

Comment by Vicki Caron

In comparing the rise of radical antisemitic movements in France and Germany during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Christian Wiese takes into account several striking differences between these two national contexts. First, France was an overwhelmingly Catholic country, while Germany was largely Protestant. Second, there was a strong secular tradition in France, linked to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789, in contrast to Germany, where religion retained a much stronger hold over the public sphere. And third, France had long been a unified nation state, while Germany experienced unification only in 1871.

These differences notwithstanding, Wiese believes that the antisemitic movements in France and Germany were ultimately more similar than different, and he sees both antisemitic movements as linked to a more general crisis of modernity. This crisis was linked in part to the rapid advances of capitalism and industrialisation, which shattered traditional class boundaries and uprooted millions from their traditional livelihoods and rural milieus, propelling the "Social Question" to the forefront of attention. He also links antisemitism to the crisis of democracy and a growing disenchantment with political liberalism. Despite the expansion of the franchise at the end of the nineteenth century, huge sectors of the population felt excluded from the political process, and they began to search for political leaders in order to make their voices heard. And finally, in both France and Germany there was a profound crisis of nationalism. In Germany, as George Mosse has shown, this crisis of nationalism was triggered by the deep disillusionment that many felt about political unification.[1] Contrary to the lofty expectations long held by romantic intellectuals that unification would resolve all the nation's social, economic, political and religious ills, these problems persisted and even worsened after 1871. In France as well, despite the long history of unification, the defeat in the Franco-Prussian

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tionäre Herausforderung der Dritten Republik 1880–1900: Auflösung und Erneuerung des rechts-links-Schemas in Frankreich, Berlin 1991; Eugene Weber, *Action Française: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France*, Stanford 1964; Victor Ngyen, *Aux origines de l'Action Française: Intelligence et politique à l'aube du xxe siècle*, Paris 1991.

[77] Ralph Schor, *L'Antisémitisme en France pendant les années trente: Prélude à Vichy*, Paris 1992; Michael Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, New York 1981; Stephen A. Schuker, 'Origins of the "Jewish Question" in the Later Third Republic', in Malino and Wasserstein (eds.), *The Jews in Modern France*, pp. 135–180; Vicki Caron, *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis*, 1933–1942, Stanford 1999; Caron, 'The "Jewish Question" from Dreyfus to Vichy', in Martin S. Alexander (ed.), *French History Since Napoleon*, London 1999, pp. 172–202.

[1] George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*, New York 1964.

War evoked a profound soul-searching among intellectuals and political leaders as to the underlying causes of French decadence. Is it surprising that Jews were blamed for these socioeconomic and political crises? Not really. As a recently emancipated group in both countries, Jews, who were largely urban and middle class, appeared to be the beneficiaries of those trends that so many others felt to be threatening.

Despite these important similarities, Wiese, who has focused here primarily on antisemitic ideology, perceives several important differences. First, he argues that in France, despite the growing pervasiveness of racial rhetoric in the 1880s and 1890s, racism was never articulated systematically, and he furthermore suggests that French antisemitic ideology retained a more traditional Christian hue. By contrast, he argues that in Germany, despite the persistence of more traditional Christian forms of antisemitism, such as Adolf Stoecker's Christian Social Movement or the Christian antisemitism of Heinrich von Treitschke, racial antisemitism assumed a more "scientific" form and was therefore more virulent.

While it is true that racial antisemitism everywhere was more virulent than its non-racial counterpart (here Uriel Tal's distinction between Christian and anti-Christian forms of antisemitism is useful),[2] this distinction should not blind us to several facts. First, racial antisemitism everywhere in Europe at end of the nineteenth century was fairly amorphous, despite its pretension to scientific legitimacy. Moreover, Christian social movements, while perhaps more moderate than their racial counterparts, were nevertheless quite radical, and they, too, must be counted as critical components of what Carl Schorske refers to as "politics in a new key".[3] There is nothing traditional about the oft-repeated refrain that "the Social Question is the Jewish Question", even when the rhetoric retained a Christian tinge; this is true whether we are speaking of Adolf Stoecker in Berlin, Karl Lueger in Vienna, or the Abbé Théodore Garnier in France. Indeed, these Christian social movements were vastly more popular and more politically successful than racial antisemitic movements, and as such they played a more important role in diffusing antisemitic sentiments.

I would also suggest that, despite its less "scientific" nature, antisemitic rhetoric in France was no less virulent than its German counterpart. Indeed, such ideological vagueness was sometimes a huge political asset. Edouard Drumont, for example, was able to appeal to socialists as well as ultramontane Catholics precisely because he could be all things to all people. What is most striking about the French case is the sheer scope of antisemitism: it penetrated everywhere, as Pierre Birnbaum has shown in his recent book, *Le Moment antisémite*.[4] Moreover, in assessing the respective strength of these antisemitic movements, there is no doubt that the antisemitic movement that broke out in France at the time of the Dreyfus Affair was far more

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[2] Uriel Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, trans. by Noah Jonathan Jacobs, Ithaca 1975; esp. intro., chs. 1 & 4, pp. 15–23, 1–80, 160–222.

[3] Carl E. Schorske, 'Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Trio', in Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture*, New York 1981, pp. 116–180.

[4] Pierre Birnbaum, *Le Moment antisémite: Un tour de la France en 1898*, Paris 1998.

violent than its German counterpart.[5] In sum, in order to compare the virulence of these two national antisemitic movements, it is necessary to look not only at ideology and rhetoric but also at the mass support garnered by these movements, as well as their willingness to resort to street violence.

Nor am I certain that the more Christian hue of French antisemitism makes it any more traditional than German antisemitism. Just because Edouard Drumont or Charles Maurras used Christian themes, there is nothing traditional about their antisemitism. Both Drumont and Maurras exploited Christian rhetoric for opportunistic reasons. As Drumont repeatedly declared, he had nothing against Judaism as a religion; the only synagogue he wanted to close down was "the Bourse".[6] Indeed, the fact that Maurras was a self-avowed agnostic and clearly used Catholicism as a political tool ultimately led to the papal ban on the *Action Française* in 1926.

Finally, even the antisemitism of Catholic groups in France was not traditional. The Abbé Garnier, for example, whether in his numerous speeches throughout the 1890s, which frequently attracted audiences of 1,000 to 2,000, or in his newspaper, *Le Peuple Français*, rarely relied on traditional Christian antisemitic themes, such as attacks on the Talmud or the charge that Jews murdered Christ. Far more frequently, Garnier put forth the standard socioeconomic-political critique, stressing the role of Jews as capitalist exploiters and as perpetrators of the Third Republic's anti-clerical campaign.[7] The same can be said of the major Catholic newspaper, *La Croix*, directed by the Assumptionist order. In 1893, one of *La Croix*'s writers railed against the Third Republic's "frightful *Kulturkampf*" in these terms:

> For the past 20 years, Free Masonry has subjected France to an onerous stranglehold ... Intrigues, venality, corruption, hypocrisy, frightful sordidness, the subservience of French policy to that of Germany and England. An unprecedented public debt – deficits, shameless private fortunes made in the Discount Bank Affair and the Panama Affair, etc. The domination of Jews and the exploitation of the country by means of fleecing the workers blinded and duped by journalists and political leaders sold to the Jews or to Germany – one-half of the country excluded from the rule of law by a handful of bandits wearing the [Masonic] triangle.[8]

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[5] Stephen Wilson, *Ideology and Experience: Antisemitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair*, Rutherford, NJ 1982.

[6] 'La France', April 16, 1890, clipped in Archives Nationales, Paris, (AN) F7 15951/2.

[7] On Garnier, see Robert F. Byrnes, *Antisemitism in Modern France*, New Brunswick, NJ 1950, pp. 211–12, 216–17, 224; Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, passim; Wilson, 'Catholic Populism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Oct. 1975, pp. 607–705; Philip G. Nord, *Paris Shopkeepers and the Politics of Resentment*, Princeton 1986, pp. 392–96, 399, 405, 467.

[8] L'Ancre, 'L'effroyable Kulturkampf que nous subissons depuis vingt ans', *La Croix de Paris*, August 20, 1893, p. 1. On *La Croix*'s antisemitism, see Pierre Sorlin, *"La Croix" et les juifs*, Paris 1967; Pierre Pierrard, *Juifs et catholiques français*, Paris 1970; Michael Burns, *Rural Society and French Politics: Boulangism and the Dreyfus Affair, 1886–1900*, Princeton 1984, esp. ch. 5, pp. 121–137; Danielle Delmaire, 'L'Antisémitisme du journal *La Croix* du Nord pendant l'affaire Dreyfus, 1898–1899,' in V. Nikipowetzky (ed.), *De l'antijudaisme antique à l'antisémitisme contemporain*, Lille 1979, pp. 209–24; Delmaire, *Antisémitisme et catholiques dans le Nord pendant l'Affaire Dreyfus*, Lille 1991.

Even among Catholics at the turn of the century, this brand of secular antisemitism took precedence over traditional religious themes.

Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, these groups cooperated politically with radical racial antisemites, such as Edouard Drumont and Jules Guérin. Guérin, who was far and away the most radical of all late nineteenth-century French rabble rousers, regularly attended meetings of the *Union Nationale*, the Abbé Garnier's Social Catholic movement, and Drumont, too, worked closely with Catholic socialist leaders. Indeed, the first Christian Democratic convention in Lyon, in 1896, was referred to by police as the antisemitic convention, and its guest of honour was none other than Drumont.[9] In sum, at least at the end of the nineteenth century, there is scant difference between the rhetoric of racial antisemites, such as Drumont and Guérin, and that of the leaders of the Christian Democratic and Catholic Socialist movements. Wiese is therefore correct to argue that there are no significant ideological differences between the French and German antisemitic movements at this time.

The sole point on which there was a significant ideological difference hinges on the allusion Wiese made to Free Masons, and this point requires further elaboration. I would argue, together with Pierre Birnbaum, that antisemitism in France had a strong political as well as economic component; it served not only as a means of attacking capitalism, but, in conjunction with anti-Masonic rhetoric, it served as a vehicle for attacking the state, and specifically the Third Republic. The French identification of Jews with Masons makes a certain amount of sense, and not only because Jews tended to be active in Masonic lodges. As Philip Nord has shown in his recent book, *The Republican Moment*, the Third Republic was created in large measure by groups who had previously stood outside the political establishment – Masons, Protestants and Jews.[10] The anti-Masonic theme was strong in France not only because people were inclined to support conspiracy theories, which they were, but also because Free Masonry served as an important form of political mobilisation for republicans at a time when political parties were just beginning to form. In Germany, on the other hand, while antisemitism also served to some degree as a means of attacking the parliamentary system, it did not identify Jews with the state (although this identification did emerge in the Habsburg Empire, where Jews were closely allied with the central government).

In carrying out a comparison of antisemitism in the two national contexts, it would be useful to look at two other factors that have not been touched on here. First, we need to examine the question of political mobilisation. Who was attracted to antisemitic movements, and how powerful were they politically? One striking

[9] On antisemitism and Christian Democracy, see Nord, *Paris Shopkeepers*, pp. 383–408; Jean-Marie Mayeur, 'Les Congrès Nationaux de la 'Démocratie Chrétienne à Lyon (1896–1897–1898)', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, vol. 9 (1962), pp. 171–210; Byrnes, pp. 213–224; Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, passim; *Congrès National de la Démocratie Chrétienne, tenu à Lyon, les 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 Nov. 1896, et organisé par la 'France Libre'*, Compte rendu, Lyon, n.d.

[10] Philip G. Nord, *The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France*, Cambridge, MA 1995.

difference that immediately comes to mind is the strength of antisemitism on the left in France. Although antisemitism continued to be strong in Germany well into the 1890s among certain sectors of the socialist party, especially those running in rural constituencies,[11] the fact that August Bebel, the principal spokesman for the German socialist movement, had condemned antisemitism as "the socialism of fools" meant that, at least on the official level, antisemitism played no role in socialist party politics.[12] By contrast, antisemitism was widely accepted among all sectors of the French left until the turn of the century. Even the most prominent socialist leaders, including Jules Guesde, Jean Jaurès and Gustave Rouanet, did not hesitate to identify Jewish capitalism – especially the Rothschilds – with capitalism in general right up until the Dreyfus Affair.[13]

The other factor that needs to be taken into account – and to my mind this is the most critical one – is the attitude of the state. Here we see a clear difference between France and Germany. The fact that the *Kaiserreich* continued to discriminate systematically against Jews in civil and military service well after emancipation, not so much on the basis of racial antisemitism, since conversion usually made a difference, but according to criteria mandated by the ideology of the Christian state, radically differentiates the German and French cases. The Third Republic, as Birnbaum has shown, was remarkably open to Jews, and Jews penetrated all levels of the civil and military services. For them, the Third Republic was the realisation of the promise of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen – careers open to talent without regard to religious or ethnic background.[14] It is true that those Jews who achieved these high positions in the state administration were frequently hounded mercilessly by antisemites, and some, like Isaiah Levaillant, who had served as the director of the Sûreté générale in the 1880s, were even forced to leave office. Nevertheless, the fact that they were appointed to these posts in the first place is of immense importance. Hence, what most differentiates antisemitism in the French and German contexts is not the nature or level of popular antisemitism, but the respective attitudes of the

[11] Marjorie Lamberti, *Jewish Activism in Imperial Germany: The Struggle for Civil Equality*, New Haven 1978.

[12] Robert S. Wistrich, *Socialism and the Jews: The Dilemmas of Assimilation in Germany and Austria-Hungary*, Rutherford, NJ 1982; Paul Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction: A Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany*, New York 1949, pp. 151–206.

[13] Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, pp. 319–78; Byrnes, pp. 156–178; Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism, 1700–1933*, Cambridge, MA 1980, pp. 119–128; Victor Glasberg, 'Intent and Consequences: The "Jewish Question" in the French Socialist Movement of the Late Nineteenth Century', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1, Jan. 1974, pp. 61–71; Edmund Silberner, 'French Socialism and the Jews, 1865–1914', in *Historia Judaica*, XVI, 1954, pp. 3–38; Georges Lichtheim, 'Socialism and the Jews', in Georges Lichtheim, *Collected Essays*, New York 1973, pp. 413–458. On Jaurès in particular, see Harvey Goldberg, 'Jean Jaurès and the Jewish Question: The Evolution of a Position', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 20–21, 1958–59, pp. 67–94; Goldberg, *The Life of Jean Jaurès*, Madison 1968; *Jaurès, Les socialistes et l'Affaire Dreyfus*, special issue of *Jean Jaurès Cahiers Trimestriels*, Oct.-Dec. 1995, No. 138.

[14] Pierre Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic: A Political History of State Jews in France from Gambetta to Vichy*, trans. by Jane Marie Todd, Stanford 1992.

two states. It is precisely because French Jews felt they could rely on the state, regardless of changes in administration or even regime, that they felt so profoundly shocked and betrayed by the implementation of Vichy's antisemitic program. As the Jewish leader Raymond-Raoul Lambert commented in his diary just after the passage of the first *Statut des Juifs* on October 18, 1940,

> Racism has become the law of the new state. What shame! I still cannot come to terms with this negation of justice and scientific truth … . All my illusions are shattered.[15]

As for Jewish responses to antisemitism, I would agree fully with Wiese that Jews in France responded to antisemitism more often as French citizens than as Jews. It is furthermore true that Jewish communal institutions assumed a lower profile in the battle against antisemitism than did their German counterparts. This trend was due in part to the fact that the French Jews were even more committed than their German counterparts to the politics of political neutrality, the notion that in the post-emancipation era, Judaism was to be defined in exclusively religious terms, shorn of all ethnic or national components. This trend was also due to the fact that in France there was a far more sizeable group of secular liberal republicans with whom they could ally.[16]

This being said, however, three points need to be made. First, in order to explain the apparent quiescence of the French-Jewish community, we need to take into account a factor that is often ignored: the fierce anti-clerical climate in general. During the 1880s and especially the 1890s, the state closely monitored the involvement of Catholics in political activities. Had Jews involved themselves in activities considered out of bounds for Catholics, there would have been a sharp outcry that Jews were receiving privileged treatment, and indeed, the Dreyfusard activities of the Chief Rabbi of France, Zadoc Kahn, provoked precisely this charge.[17]

The second point that needs to be made here is that despite the relative quiescence of French Jews, it is clear that the French-Jewish response to antisemitism was more vigorous than generally believed. At the end of the nineteenth century, Jews filed numerous defamation suits against antisemitic leaders, and they frequently challenged antisemites to duels, which in the context of these times needs to be considered a political act. Moreover, in 1892, when Drumont's newspaper *La Libre parole* resorted to ritual murder accusations, Chief Rabbi Zadoc Kahn waged a full-scale campaign against Drumont in the press.[18]

A third and final reason we tend to underestimate French-Jewish responses to antisemitism is that these responses often seem to confirm antisemitic stereotypes, and especially the allegation that a Jewish-Masonic syndicate was controlling the

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[15] Raymond-Raoul Lambert, *Carnet d'un témoin, 1940–1943*, introduction and annotation by Richard I. Cohen, Paris 1985, p. 85.

[16] See Stephen Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, pp. 692–730; Nord, *The Republican Moment*.

[17] See the press clippings in the police file on Kahn, in Archives of the Paris Police, BA 1301.

[18] 'Lettre de M. Zadoc-Kahn, Grand-Rabbin de France à M. Edouard Drumont', *Libre parole*, July 8, 1892, in AN F7 15951/2.

government from behind the scenes by means of its deep financial coffers. There is considerable evidence, however, that during the Dreyfus Affair, prominent Jews, and especially the Rothschilds, did in fact funnel large sums of money to various organs of the mainstream press to "persuade" them to adopt a pro-Dreyfus and anti-antisemitic stance. Similarly, during the 1930s, the Consistory subsidised several "philosemitic" journals, most notably Oscar de Férenzy's *La Juste Parole*.[19] It is also probable that the Consistory was funnelling money to several of the mass circulation dailies to secure a more pro-refugee stance, just as Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet charged in late 1938. In fact, if we do not take seriously the possibility of Consistorial subsidies, it is difficult to explain why the fiercely xenophobic mass-circulation daily, *Le Matin*, suddenly changed its stance towards Jewish refugees at the time of the Saint-Louis affair in the summer of 1939.[20] By resorting to such practices, Jewish leaders were simply following the established custom of the day, and the venality of the French press in the 1930s is renown. Nevertheless, the unsavoury nature of this behaviour, as well as the fact that it lends credence to antisemitic stereotypes, encourages historians today to underestimate these practices.

In sum, there is far more work to be done on this question of French-Jewish responses to antisemitism, and if we attempt to look beyond public organisational responses, we might well find that the political behaviour of French Jews was not terribly different from that of their German coreligionists.

[19] On Férenzy's successful request for a subsidy from Consistory of Paris in 1935, see correspondence between the Secretary General, Consistory of Paris, and Férenzy, October 11, 1935, October 15, 1935, and January 11, 1936, in Archives, Consistoire Israélite de Paris, ACIP B 131.

[20] Vicki Caron, *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942*, Stanford 1999, pp. 298, 534, n. 120.

Jacques Ehrenfreund

Citizenship and Acculturation: Some Reflections on German Jews during the Second Empire and French Jews during the Third Republic

Following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Jews lived in France and Germany in extremely different national contexts. The French Third Republic restructured itself around the seminal political ideas of the Revolution of 1789, and more precisely, around the Jacobin tradition in its centralising and universalistic aspects. In this context, the nation found its legitimacy in politics, and every form of particularism was considered an attack on the "one and indivisible" character of the French republic. In Germany, the Wilhelmine era was a time rich in potential for the Jewish minority because it concluded the process of Jewish emancipation begun with Napoleon's conquests in 1806. What characterised the new German nationstate, however, was its anti-liberalism and its tendency to define its national character in cultural rather than political terms.

French and German Jews were thus integrated after 1870 into two nationstates whose national identities diverged fundamentally. A comparison of the processes of acculturation of the Jewish minorities in France and Germany in the decades prior to the First World War necessarily poses the question of the impact of the national context on the formation of minority identities. Are not the fundamental differences between the two communities, as well as their few similarities, the consequence of the dominant character of the state during the period in which a sense of national identity was emerging? A comparison of the processes of acculturation in the French and German contexts therefore allows us to contrast the consequences of acculturation through politics as opposed to culture.

The First World War proved the success of the degree to which French and German Jews were integrated into their respective national cultures, since both communities greeted the war with the same nationalistic enthusiasm. Should they still have been considered members of the same group a hundred years after their respective emancipations? Is it not possible instead to provide evidence through the comparison of the determinative character of these two national traditions and to show that the distinguishable, fundamental differences between French and German Jewry have their origin precisely in the differences between these two national characters and traditions? We must conclude these introductory remarks with a caveat that necessarily accompanies all works of comparative history: all comparison presumes simplification while attempting to avoid schematisation.

I. Jews in French and German Society

A comparison of French and German Jewries highlights certain common traits. A similar evolution, characteristic of the entry of Jews to citizenship, and more broadly, to modernity, is evident. Although these two groups differed significantly in terms of absolute numbers, with French Jews numbering no more than 75,000 in the mid-1890s, and German Jews numbering about 570,000 at the same time, in terms of relative size these two communities were comparable since both constituted only about one percent of the total populations of their respective countries.[1] Moreover, the socioeconomic evolution and profile of these two minorities in the last decades of the nineteenth century are comparable. On both sides of the Rhine, entry into the bourgeoisie was the most important characteristic of these decades. As in Germany, Jews in France by 1900 were largely members of the bourgeoisie, in comparison with a century earlier, when they were by and large poor and excluded from the dominant social classes. Embourgeoisement went hand in hand with progressive urbanisation. Recall that in 1900 about a quarter of German Jews lived in Berlin, whereas after 1890 two-thirds of all French Jews lived in Paris. In France as in Germany another sign of upward social mobility was education. In Berlin as in Paris Jews increasingly moved into the new liberal professions as well as commerce and banking.[2]

Yet another and even more important consequence of their entry into the bourgeoisie was that French and German Jews alike completely internalised the category of the national. The nation became the primary group with which they identified. Thus, in these two countries the national languages gradually took the place of Yiddish, which was still widely used at the beginning of the nineteenth century.[3]

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[1] On the French Jewish population, see Doris Bensimon and Sergio della Pergola, *La Population juive de France: Socio-démographie et identité*, Paris 1986, p. 26; Paula E. Hyman, 'The French Jewish Community from Emancipation to the Dreyfus Affair', in Norman L. Kleeblatt (ed.), *The Dreyfus Affair: Art, Truth and Justice*, Berkeley 1987, p. 28. The slightly lower figure of about 68,000 in Bensimon and Pergola is due to the fact that immigrants and Jews in rural areas were not included. On the German Jewish population, see Michael A. Meyer (ed.), *German-Jewish History in Modern Times*, 4 vols., New York 1997, vol. 3, p. 8.

[2] On Jewish socioeconomic mobility and urbanisation in France, see Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, Berkeley 1998, passim; Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace: Acculturation and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century*, New Haven 1991, ch. 3, pp. 30–49; Phyllis Cohen Albert, *The Modernisation of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth Century*, Hanover, NH 1977, pp. 3–41; Esther Benbassa, *The Jews of France: A History from Antiquity to the Present*, trans. by M.B. DeBevoise, Princeton 1999, chs. 8–9, pp. 96–134 (original published as *Histoire des juifs de France*, Paris 1997); Doris Bensimon Donath, *Socio-démographie des juifs de France et d'Algérie, 1867–1907*, Paris 1976. On Germany see Steven M. Lowenstein, *The Mechanics of Change: Essays in the Social History of German Jewry*, Atlanta 1992, esp. chs. 1, 5, pp. 9–28, 133–51; Meyer, (ed.), *German-Jewish History in Modern Times*, vol. 3, chs. 1–2, pp. 7–67.

[3] On changing linguistic practices among French and German Jews, see esp. Lowenstein, *The Mechanics of Change*, chs. 1, 7, pp. 9–28, 183–200; Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace*, ch. 4, pp. 53–76. Both these authors argue, however, that the shift from Yiddish to the national languages in both the French and German contexts occurred gradually.

Through these new national languages, new cultural practices as well as a new national "ethos" became accessible to Jews. One sees in these two societies the same desire of Jewish minorities to prove their fidelity to the nation. In both states, the years of the 1870s and 1880s furnished repeated occasions for Jews to display and affirm their patriotism, their complete identification with the national group.[4]

In France as in Germany the primacy of the national entailed relegating religious identity to a secondary status. That is, Judaism became confessionalised; it divested itself of all ethnic components. The end of the nineteenth century thus constituted the golden age of the *israélite français* and the German of the Mosaic persuasion, so derided by the new Jewish identity movements, such as Zionism or Jewish socialism, which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. The entry of Jews into French and German culture marks the beginning of the progressive secularisation of Judaism.

In France as in Germany we are dealing with the dynamics of the differentiation of national cultures, which contributed to the production of complex social identities among these two groups of Jews, based on a sincere will to harmonise their Jewish and their national traditions. In both countries, it was a question of being fully involved in their respective national communities while keeping the door open to Judaism. The determining character of the national context becomes evident when one observes how, despite their commonalities, these two minority Jewish cultures structured themselves in completely different ways.

II. The Universalism of Bildung in Opposition to Integration into the Nation

Over the course of the nineteenth century the German people interrogated themselves a great deal about their national identity. Rejecting the French model of the political nation, Germans erected a cultural definition. The concept of *Bildung* played a role in the history of Germany analogous to the idea of the republic in the history of France. Aleida Assmann, in a short book titled *Arbeit am kollektiven Gedächtnis. Eine kurze Geschichte der deutschen Bildungsidee* (Work on National Memory. A Short History of the German Cultural Idea), demonstrates the seminal role played by *Bildung* for a nation with an insecure sense of identity:

> In Germany, the history of *Bildung* accompanies the passage from a corporate society to a modern bourgeois society. In the process of the formation of the state, the citizen, now considered as having rights, liberates himself from his status as subject of the prince. ... Having done that, he passes from a system of traditional loyalty to a state of law.[5]

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[4] For an expression of these national loyalties among Jews in the contested territories of Alsace and Lorraine, see Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany: The Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, 1871–1918*, Stanford 1988.

[5] Aleida Assmann, *Arbeit am Nationalen Gedächtnis: Eine kurze Geschichte der deutschen Bildungsidee*, Frankfurt am Main 1993, p. 32.

Bildung subverted traditional identities; it furnished the glue for a definition of a new social identity within a structure that had become national. What Assmann demonstrates so well is the slow nationalisation of this idea throughout the nineteenth century. In the late eighteenth century, Goethe and the Humboldt brothers defined *Bildung* as being based on principles: liberty, progress and universalism. The turn of the century marked a fundamental change. As Assmann notes:

With the era of nationalisation, beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, *Bildung* changed its profile. It distanced itself from universal humanism and allied itself with the linguistic, historic, and geographic particularisms of a people. The idea of *Bildung*, this concept whose German career had begun in the last third of the eighteenth century, gave way in the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries to a series of partially aggressive educational models.[6]

Although it began as an integrative and universal principle, *Bildung* was put at the service of a national project that became increasingly exclusive during the Second Empire. It distanced itself from its Enlightenment origins, and it became historicised. History, which initially had played a secondary role, now became central. Assman shows how during the Second Empire, the sacralisation of history became a substitute for the idea of universality. A nationalised *Bildung* served as a profane religion in an increasingly secularised society. And it ultimately became an instrument of exclusion of groups considered undesirable. Again, as Assmann notes: "The idea of *Bildung*, which had begun its course as a promoter of integration, had become an instrument of exclusion".[7]

It was through their history that Germans thought about national identity. From the time of Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, the nation was conceived primarily as a historical and cultural entity rather than a political one. German nationalism, because it was born of opposition to the French Revolution, affirmed itself in the historic continuity between the Middle Ages and the present. Because German nationalism rejected the principles of the French Revolution as well as modernity, the past acquired a determining importance in the discourse of national identity. It was through the past that the nation conceived of itself and justified its existence. During the Wilhelmine era the Jewish minority too appropriated this historical mode of thinking, and as a result they created a distinct German-Jewish subculture. To take up the insight of George Mosse and David Sorkin, through the concept of *Bildung*, the Jews refashioned their collective identity.[8] The other imperative for German Jews was to affirm their right to be full participants in the German nation.

When historical rationality began to take the place of theology in both Jewish and German cultures at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the contacts and

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[8] David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840*, New York 1987; George L. Mosse, *German Jews beyond Judaism*, Bloomington 1985; Mosse, 'Jewish Emancipation: Between Bildung and Respectability', in Jehuda Reinharz and Walter Schatzberg (eds.), *The Jewish Response to German Culture: From the Enlightenment to the Second World War*, Hanover, NH 1985, pp. 1–16.

frictions between these two hermeneutics were already palpable. For the majority German culture in the wake of national unification in 1871, history served to construct a national identity that affirmed itself principally around an exclusivist reading of *Bildung*; the historicisation of German culture accompanied its progressive nationalisation. For the Jewish minority, however, the historicisation of Jewish tradition was simultaneously characterised by the desire for integration and the obstacles faced in bringing this project to fruition. The historicisation of Jewish tradition also displayed the particular conditions under which Jewish tradition was secularised and the limits this attempt at secularisation confronted.[9]

The historicisation of Jewish culture expressed a desire to reread the Jewish tradition so as to allow that tradition to assume a place in German society. Considerable effort was made to depict a minority past compatible with that of the nation as a whole. Towards that end the duration of the Jewish presence on German soil was underlined, as was the importance of Jewish cultural contributions to the grandeur of German civilisation. Jewish historians and public figures furnished the "proof" necessary for integration into the national society. It was therefore in the name of the past and not solely on the basis of egalitarian political principles that the Jewish minority demanded its right to citizenship. In the context of a romantic definition of the nation, history served the Jewish minority as a political strategy of the first order in the battle for emancipation.

German-Jewish historical discourse also served, however, to construct a modern Jewish collective identity. This new historical identity sought to elaborate a Jewish culture emancipated from religion. The Jewish historian, invested with a mission that surpassed his scientific competency, was to furnish the group with renewed resources on which it could depend for its existence. In the Jewish minority culture, as in the German national culture, historical discourse provided the foundation for a new mythology that focused on past suffering. The recollection of tragic events of the past provided both the national and minority cultures with a solid base for the formulation of contemporary political demands.

Jewish history was therefore invested with a contradictory function. It was, on the one hand, to furnish a justification for integration into the German nation; on the other hand, it was to serve as the cement of a new, collective Jewish identity. This new historical discourse was reflected in a variety of practices that popularised it and transformed it into a shared "cultural property".[10]

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[9] On *Wissenschaft des Judentums* see esp. Ismar Schorsch, *From Text to Context: The Turn to History in Modern Judaism*, Hanover, NH 1994; Schorsch, intro. to Heinrich Graetz, *The Structure of Jewish History and Other Essays*, trans., ed. and intro. by Ismar Schorsch, New York 1975, pp. 1–62; Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory*, Seattle 1982, pp. 81–103; Meyer, *The Origins of the Modern Jew: Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germany, 1749–1824*, Detroit 1979, pp. 144–182; Meyer, *Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform Movement in Judaism*, New York 1988, pp. 75–99.

[10] On those aspects of social practices, see J. Ehrenfreund, *Mémoire juive et nationalité allemande: Les Juifs berlinois à la Belle Epoque*, Paris 2000.

During every stage of the historicisation of Jewish culture, some aspects of traditional religious thought and practice persisted and prevented the culture's complete secularisation. The notions of divine intervention and the universal mission of Judaism served as referents to traditional religious themes in this newly historicised Jewish thought. The internal contradiction at the heart of Jewish historical discourse – the fact that it served both to promote integration and to affirm a Jewish particularist identity – did not permit the Jewish past to be nationalised along the same lines as the pasts of other ethnic groups.

Both the idea and the cultural practices of the nation were born of the secularisation of European culture. Nationalist thought could be put in place only once man rather than a divinely transcendent God became the centre of attention. Politics progressively took the place of theology, thus transforming ethnic groups into political actors. Secularisation permitted history to take the place of religion as a way of explaining the events of the world. It was this evolution that prepared the way for the gradual nationalisation of European culture. For the Jewish minority, however, the tension between the desire for integration and the affirmation of particularism prevented the total secularisation of the tradition, the nationalisation of the Jewish past and the constitution of the group around a political ideology. German Jews anchored their existence in an unequivocal attachment to universalism, which they interpreted as the common possession of both Jewish and German culture. It was, paradoxically, this commitment to universalism that placed Jews in a precarious situation in Wilhelmine society.

Universalised Jewish history allowed Jews to integrate into German culture and society, but it also affirmed fidelity to an earlier theological tradition. Indeed, the existence of a German-Jewish culture and sensibility relied on this development of history that did not annul Jewish tradition but modernised it. This deeply rooted connection between Judaism and universalism placed the Jews in an extremely difficult situation because it situated them in a position of exteriority with regard to the German nation, which was in the process of trying to create a monolithic national identity. The universalism of German Jews thus placed them in an increasingly marginal position, as every aspect of German culture, including even the most universalistic, such as *Bildung*, was gradually nationalised. As a consequence of this extreme nationalisation, entire segments of public life were in actuality closed to Jews, despite the fact that they remained open to them in a legal sense.

Wilhelmine society was distinguished by its segmentation: numerous group identities continued to survive within the nation. The nationalisation of social space did not imply – as was the case in republican France – the total negation of cultural particularisms. Regional identities, which continued to be strong during this period, and the federal character of the state confirmed this fact. These factors, however, did not contradict the ever-growing nationalisation of German society. On the contrary, it was precisely through the local *Heimat* that identification with the global nation was constructed. In the case of the Jewish minority, it was their subculture that permitted their integration into the nation. Jews, following the lead of the neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen, saw in the universalist affirma-

tion of German *Bildung* the basis of an "elective affinity" between Jewishness and Germanness. They failed to take into account the degree to which the German culture emerging at this time, including *Bildung* itself, was becoming nationalised.

German-Jewish identity was different from Catholic, social-democratic or regional identities insofar as it maintained an unbreakable link to the idea of universalism, which had fallen out of favour in the larger German society. German Jews, through their affirmation of universalism, put forth an alternative to a more insular and monolithic definition of German national identity. Paradoxically, because the Jewish use of history did not annul the universalist dimension of the Jewish tradition, the Jews were condemned to isolation.

III. The Universalism of the Third Republic versus Franco-Judaism

Were German Jews exceptional in their attachment to universalism? What was the attitude of French Jews during the same period? That other great Jewish community of Western Europe lived in a completely different political context, but it confronted similar difficulties with regard to having to define its particular identity while integrating into the larger national collectivity. The radically different solutions found in France correspond to the different possibilities offered by French political structures.

The fundamental difference between French Jews during the Third Republic and German Jews during the Wilhelmine era was linked to their respective definitions of nationality. The Third Republic demanded of its Jews political and intellectual adherence to republican ideology. That was all the easier because French Jews perceived an affinity between the universalism of their own religious tradition and republican ideology. In a situation where integration into the nation rested upon a political base that affirmed the universal, the Jewish minority could feel more secure. It was, in fact, through an over-identification with the republic, magisterially described by Pierre Birnbaum, that French Jewry most directly expressed its particularism.[11]

The republic, however, tolerated only one interpretation of itself. As Georges Clemenceau declared in January 1891:

> Here is M. Joseph Reinach, standing before us to undertake the enormous task of sifting through the French Revolution in his own way: I accept this, I reject that! I admire such ingenuity. Gentlemen, whether we like it or not, whether it pleases or shocks us, the French Revolution is all of a piece.[12]

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[11] Pierre Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic: A Political History of State Jews from Gambetta to Vichy*, trans. by Jane Marie Todd, Stanford 1996. Originally published in French as *Les Fous de la République: Histoire politique des juifs d'Etat de Gambetta à Vichy*, Paris 1992.

[12] Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic*, p. 8.

The refusal to accept plural interpretations of French identity during the Third Republic permitted the Jewish minority to continue to adhere to the universalism inherent in its own tradition, but it forbade the constitution of a cultural minority such as existed in Germany. Republican France was clearly less open to the affirmation of cultural differences than its neighbour; it offered Jews total political equality, but only on condition that they renounce any particularist Jewish identity.

The story of the Science of Judaism in France aptly illustrates this difference between French and German Jewries. The important cultural contacts between France and Germany, and especially the immigration to France of German-Jewish scholars, gave rise to a French "Science of Judaism". While the Science of Judaism spread in Germany, it did not experience the same success in France, as Perrine Simon-Nahum has demonstrated so well.[13] How can we explain this difference? It was doubtless the advent of the Third Republic in 1870 that enabled the French-Jewish bourgeoisie to acquire posts of political and administrative responsibility. Finally, even the great crisis constituted by the Dreyfus Affair (1894–1899) confirmed French Jews in their political mode of self-definition. To quote Perrine Simon-Nahum:

> In regrouping the ensemble of the intellectual world around the Dreyfusard/anti-Dreyfusard cleavage, the Dreyfus Affair transposed to the domain of values the social integration realised in the 1870s. The definitions of Jew and republican became superimposed, henceforth rendering useless a mode of learned reflection and condemning the French science of Judaism to rapid disappearance.[14]

Through political activism, the universalism of French Jews integrated itself perfectly into the larger republican project. Still, the appearance of new anti-republican definitions of Frenchness, which were nearly always antisemitic, would continue to seriously threaten the edifice of Franco-Judaism.

The national context was therefore determinative in the construction of Jewish identities in France and Germany. The republic, one and indivisible, did not permit the emergence of a Franco-Judaism characterised by the persistence of a Jewish "minority culture", in contrast to the situation in Wilhelmine Germany. For one thing, the Jacobin tradition allowed Jews to penetrate into the spheres of the state. For another, French Jews saw in the republic a universal cadre with which they identified, and in which they perceived the echo of their own traditional universalism. France represented the new promised land precisely because of this coincidence of Jewish and republican universalism: there was no place in this configuration for the emergence of a Franco-Jewish subculture.

As for German Jews, they lived in a non-liberal state in which certain spheres, such as the civil service, the university and the army, remained hermetically closed to them. Yet they also perceived their integration into the German nation as the

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[13] Perrine Simon-Nahum, *La Cité investie: La "science du judaisme" français et la République*, Paris 1991.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

only viable collective project available to them. To put it in Hermann Cohen's terms, there existed in their eyes an elective affinity between *Deutschtum* and *Judentum* that was fundamental and indispensable. The progressive nationalisation of the German social sphere after 1871, however, led to the growing isolation of the minority, which remained alone in its universalist affirmation of *Bildung*.

France thus became the country which witnessed the birth of a new Jewish solidarity, political in nature, of which the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* was the best illustration. German Jewry gave birth to a rereading of Jewish history with the tools provided by German culture. These two paths to modernity were the result of two divergent manners of conceiving universalism, and they opened the door to two modern conceptions of Judaism.

The republican and Wilhelmine models of acculturation were both severely tested by the First World War and the crisis of liberalism that followed. The universalism of both the republic and *Bildung* was called into question by the emergence of Maurrasianism and Volkism, nationalist movements of a new type, for which the negation of universalism constituted the principal *raison d'être*.

Translated from the French by Paula Hyman

Comment by Paula E. Hyman

In his splendid book on Berlin Jewry at the turn of the twentieth century, *Mémoire juive et nationalité allemande*,[1] Jacques Ehrenfreund declares that he is writing a cultural history of the social phenomena that accompanied the encounter of Jews with the modern German state and society. In his essay he has offered us a cultural reading of the ways in which the Jews of Wilhelmine Germany and Third Republican France defined themselves vis-à-vis their respective countries. He succeeds in identifying the many similarities in their paths of acculturation. In particular, he demonstrates how both Jewries constructed universalist identities – though different ones – that stemmed from their encounters with their respective national cultures: the German-Jewish identity based on *Bildung* and the French-Jewish identity rooted in identification with the political ideology of republicanism. Both Jewish communities denied any conflict between their Jewishness and their citizenship. They saw their identities as Jewish citizens as fully in step with their respective country's values. Both asserted the "elective affinity" of Judaism and their national cultures. Ironically, both were marginalised by their identification with universalism.

What is most intriguing in Ehrenfreund's essay, however, is his presentation of the difference that emerges in the ability of each Jewish group to assert its particularity in its specific social and political setting. Ehrenfreund sees the universalism of

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[1] Jacques Ehrenfreund, *Mémoire juive et nationalité allemande: Les Juifs berlinois à la Belle Epoque*, Paris 2000.

French republicanism at the turn of the twentieth century as a totalising hegemonic force that did not allow space for minority cultures. He describes Wilhelmine Germany, on the other hand, as a pluralist society. Prussian elites had struggled to establish a monolithic national identity but had failed. In the wake of that failure, minorities – whether Bavarians or Catholic Prussians or socialists – could establish a "local" identity as the basis of their belonging to the nation. (I'm not speaking here, of course, in strictly geographical terms.)

Jews, too, were able to take advantage of that social segmentation, that local space, to build an argument for their inclusion in the German nation on the basis of their historic specificity. Because of the nature of French republicanism, however, French Jews, according to Ehrenfreund, could not define themselves as a cultural minority. The definition of French universalism allowed no space for minorities.

I would like to raise a number of issues regarding both Germany and France that complicate this analysis. Wilhelmine Germany, I would suggest, was certainly *socially* pluralist.[2] A rich associational life, replete with professional societies, labour unions, social clubs, gymnastic and hiking groups and philanthropic organisations, flourished, as Ehrenfreund demonstrates in his book. Jews participated in some of those general associations, which offered them opportunities for integration. From others they were excluded. They also established their own associations, which were legitimate counterparts to hundreds of other social groupings. But Wilhelmine Germany was perhaps less culturally pluralist than Ehrenfreund suggests. True, the assault on political Catholicism conducted by Bismarck in his *Kulturkampf* and the banning of the Social Democratic Party both failed, but their very occurrence pointed to the strength of a nationalist cultural narrative that defined German identity in opposition to "others", among whom Jews figured prominently. The attempts of German Jews to define themselves as equal participants in the shaping of German culture were met with hostility on the part of elite arbiters of what was truly German. One need only think of Heinrich von Treitschke's vitriolic attack in 1879–80 on Heinrich Graetz's *Geschichte der Juden*, whose Jewish pride he viewed as an insult to the German nation.[3] When Jews were recognised as important contributors to general causes, even liberal ones – feminism, for example, comes to mind – their Jewish particularism was often erased. Not atypical was a gentile colleague's eulogy of a renowned Jewish feminist, with the words, "There has never been a better Christian!"[4]

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[2] David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford 1984; Geoff Eley (ed.), *Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870–1930*, Ann Arbor 1996. For a social history of pluralism on the ground, see Till van Rahden, *Juden und andere Breslauer: Die Beziehungen zwischen Juden, Protestanten und Katholiken in einer deutschen Großstadt von 1860 bis 1925*, Göttingen 2000.

[3] Heinrich von Treitschke, *A Word About Our Jewry*, ed. by Ellis Rivkin and trans. by Helen Lederer, Cincinnati n.d. See also Michael A. Meyer, 'Great Debate on Antisemitism – Jewish Reactions to New Hostility in Germany 1879–1881', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 11 (1966), pp. 137–70.

[4] See Marion Kaplan, 'Friendship on the Margins: Jewish Social Relations in Imperial Germa-

Far be it from me to challenge the characterisation of the French Third Republic as a strong, centralising state with no awareness of cultural pluralism. However, French society was never as monolithic as that characterisation would suggest. There were those – royalist sympathisers, traditional Catholics and regional loyalists – who resisted the republican narrative of French history. Of course, the vast majority of French Jews could not align themselves with those critics of republicanism. They recognised that their own emancipation, their very claim to equality within French society, rested on republican universalism and the tolerance it extended to religious groups that did not challenge the state. Yet there were other, more ambiguous voices among French intellectuals, which inspired some Jewish intellectuals to explore more particularist definitions of Jewish culture. Despite his early expression of antisemitism, Maurice Barrès, for example, with his integral nationalism, inspired the particularist Jewish cultural explorations of the young Edmond Fleg and André Spire, whose work became influential after the First World War. (Barrès even included the Jews among the "diverses familles spirituelles" of France, about which he wrote in 1917.)[5]

Space for the development of a minority culture depends not only on prevailing attitudes towards pluralism but also on the differential distribution of political power and socioeconomic opportunities among the various groups comprising society. Ehrenfreund downplays the different impact of political emancipation on French and German Jews. As Pierre Birnbaum has so powerfully demonstrated, French Jews were able to achieve illustrious careers not only in business and the arts, as in Germany, but also in the civil service, the army and electoral politics, even while maintaining their Jewish identity and affiliation with Jewish communal institutions.[6] In the comparative study that this book exemplifies, it is certainly worth asking how the early emancipation of French Jewry and the delayed emancipation of German Jewry influenced their respective senses of social, political and cultural self-confidence. In their newspapers of the 1830s and 1840s, for example, French Jews juxtaposed their good fortune, living in a land where the equality of all citizens before the law was established, with the unhappy circumstances of their German coreligionists, who still had to prove that they merited emancipation. Nor did they feel that they had to renounce their *personnalité*, or distinctiveness, to be French to the fullest extent of the word.[7] The Dreyfus Affair, which saw the most sustained

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ny,' *Central European History*, vol. 34, no. 4, 2001, pp. 471–501, esp. p 491. Kaplan expresses a more pessimistic view, however, in her book, *The Making of the Jewish Middle Class: Women, Family and Identity in Imperial Germany*, New York 1991.

[5] See Paula E. Hyman, *From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Remaking of French Jewry, 1906–1939*, New York 1979, pp. 42–49; Aron Rodrigue, 'Rearticulations of French Jewish Identities after the Dreyfus Affair', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3 (Spring/Summer 1996), pp. 1–24; and Maurice Barrès, *Les Diverses familles spirituelles de la France*, Paris 1917.

[6] Pierre Birnbaum, *Les Fous de la République: Histoire politique des juifs d'Etat de Gambetta à Vichy*, Paris 1992. For the English translation, see Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic: A Political History of State Jews in France from Gambetta to Vichy*, Stanford 1996.

[7] Hyman, 'L'Impact de la Révolution sur l'identité et la culture contemporaines des juifs d'Al-

political expression of antisemitism since the Revolution, found many Jewish spokesmen calling for the political mobilisation of Jews to fight not only for Dreyfus' vindication but for the Revolution of 1789's own ideals of freedom and equality.[8]

This point brings me to the issue of antisemitism and its differential impact on the lives of French Jews in the Third Republic and German Jews in the Wilhelmine Empire. Antisemitism set some limits to Jews in both societies, but its practical effect on Jews in Germany was far greater than in France, a point Ehrenfreund acknowledges, but only in passing. He mentions briefly in parentheses the barriers that blocked the access of German Jews to positions in the civil service, the army officer corps and the university, but he does not dwell at all on the fact that these were the very institutions that defined the German Empire.[9] To be sure, German Jews found many other sectors of German society open to their talents, and they found ways to avoid encounters with antisemitism in their professional and social lives. However, discrimination in these areas had a significant impact on their rate of conversion to Christianity, their professional distribution and perhaps their self-confidence. Moreover, organised antisemitism was at its height from the late 1870s to the late 1890s, and its propaganda was widespread. When the Conservative Party won seventy-two seats in the 1892 elections, the result was that the second largest bloc in the Reichstag was openly antisemitic. It is worth noting as well that two ritual murder cases, in 1891 in Xanten (the Rhineland) and in 1900 in Konitz (West Prussia) stimulated antisemitic violence in the countryside.[10]

I am not arguing here that German Jews experienced antisemitism on a daily basis or saw it as a profound threat, or that French Jews were able to shrug off the antisemitism that exploded during the Dreyfus Affair. What I am suggesting is that any consideration of the experience of French and German Jews as a minority in

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sace', in Pierre Birnbaum (ed.), *Histoire politique des juifs de France*, Paris 1990, pp. 21–38, esp. pp. 31–33. For an analysis of these sentiments at the time of the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany in 1871, see Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany: The Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, 1871–1918*, Stanford 1988.

[8] For Jewish responses to the Dreyfus Affair, see Michael R. Marrus, *The Politics of Assimilation: The French Jewish Community at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair*, Rutherford, NJ 1982, pp. 692–730; Paula E. Hyman, 'The French Jewish Community from Emancipation to the Dreyfus Affair', in Norman L. Kleeblatt (ed.), *The Dreyfus Affair: Art, Truth and Justice*, Berkeley 1998, pp. 91–114.

[9] Kaplan, 'Friendship on the Margins'.

[10] The literature on German political antisemitism at the end of the nineteenth century is vast. For several of the most important works, see Richard S. Levy, *The Downfall of the Anti-Semitic Political Parties in Imperial Germany*, New Haven 1975; Paul W. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction: A Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany*, New York 1949; Peter Pulzer, *Jews and the German State: The Political History of a Minority, 1848–1933*, Oxford 1992; Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, Cambridge, MA 1988; Uriel Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany: Religion, Politics, and Ideology in the Second Reich, 1870–1914*, trans. by Noah Jonathan Jacobs, Ithaca 1975.

their respective countries must not lose sight of their social reality as well as the meanings they attached to it. We learn a great deal from a cultural interpretation of social phenomena, but the social phenomena themselves must remain at the centre of historical inquiry.

Pierre Birnbaum

In the Academic Sphere: The Cases of Emile Durkheim and Georg Simmel

Jews and the State

During the latter years of World War I, French and German Jews find themselves clashing mercilessly in the name of their respective fatherlands, indistinguishable and anonymous among the hordes of nameless soldiers. Suddenly, a bayonet in the hands of a French Jewish soldier pierces the body of a German Jewish soldier. As the German falls to the ground, mortally wounded, he begins saying the *kaddish*, or mourner's prayer recited by Jews, to the shocked amazement of his French counterpart.[1]

Such deadly face-offs on the battlefield echoed similar encounters during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Photos and engravings from that time show groups of Jewish soldiers wearing *tallitot* over their French or German uniforms and celebrating Jewish holidays separately from one another. Emancipated citizens of their respective countries, integrated into public life, they all were eager to honour the glory of their respective fatherlands, to defend them bravely and to fall on the battlefield in numbers that were proportionally higher than those of non-Jewish soldiers.[2] The similarities end here, however. Whereas the French Jew Abraham Sée was promoted to the rank of general during the 1870 war, whereas several other Jewish generals and countless colonels fought in the 1914–1918 conflict, there was nothing comparable on the German side. While Jewish generals such as Jules Heyman, Georges Alexandre, Jules Valabrègue, Pierre Brisac, Justin Dennery, Paul Grumbach, and commanders such as Gédéon Geismar and Camille Levi bravely led their

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[1] See Philippe Landau, *Les Juifs de France et la grande guerre: Un Patriotisme républicain*, Paris 1999, ch. 5, pp. 79–93.

[2] On the nationalism of Jews in France and Germany in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, see Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany: The Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, 1871–1918*, Stanford 1988, ch. 2, pp. 27–44. On the number of German Jewish soldiers killed or wounded during World War I, see Peter Pulzer, *Jews and the German State: The Political History of a Minority, 1848–1933*, Oxford 1992, p. 206. On these numbers for France, see Pierre Birnbaum, *Un Mythe politique: "La République juive"*, Paris 1995, p. 157 (For the English translation see Birnbaum, *Anti-Semitism in France from Léon Blum to the Present*, trans. by M. Kochan, Oxford 1992); Paula E. Hyman, *From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Remaking of French Jewry, 1906–1989*, New York 1979, pp. 49–59; Landau, *Les Juifs de France*.

men into battle for the French side, no Jew – neither in 1870 nor even in the Weimar Republic – ever became a general or even a colonel in the German army. Emancipation in Germany quickly reached its limits. Even after 1871 the Christian state continued to resist meritocratic equality in the public service, while such advancement in France was encouraged by the rapid secularisation of the state. Clearly the Dreyfus Affair could have happened only in France: indeed, never had a "Captain Dreyfus" been called upon to serve on imperial Germany's general staff, whereas in France that well-known officer was not even the first Jew to have been promoted to this rank. In spite of enduring prejudice, French Jewish officers enjoyed the full confidence of the army general staff.[3] Reinstated into the army in 1906 and promoted, Dreyfus took part in the early fighting of World War I. On the battlefield with him was his son Pierre, yet another of the many Jewish career officers serving his country with valour.

Jewish graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique were not the only ones to display great bravery on the battlefield: many Jewish students and graduates of the Ecole Normale Supérieure were also willing to die for France. André Durkheim, a gifted "Normalien" and son of Emile Durkheim, was killed in the First World War, to the great despair of his father, who did not survive his grief. Had the young Durkheim during one of the war's titanic battles perhaps crossed the path of the physician Hans Simmel, the son of Georg Simmel, who was fighting on the German side? The chances of such a direct confrontation between the sons of these two famous Jewish sociologists, both passionately engaged in this conflict, are so slight as to be practically nonexistent. Nevertheless, such an improbable encounter merits attention as a symbol of two fundamentally unequal emancipation processes. For although German Jews were free to study and practise medicine, their status in elite state educational institutions – the ones securing access to a state system which continued to be Christian – remained fragile unless they converted. Indeed, that was exactly what Hans Simmel's grandparents had done in the hope of facilitating the assimilation of their son Georg and their grandson Hans. Such efforts were in vain, however. Throughout his life Georg confronted antisemitism, which ultimately made his career next to impossible, and Hans was even briefly deported by the Nazis. By contrast, the French Jew Emile Durkheim, who never renounced his Jewish background, easily entered the Ecole Normale Supérieure and climbed the career ladder all the way to the Sorbonne, where he became one of France's foremost thinkers; his son André was also admitted to the Ecole Normale, like so many other Jews since the early nineteenth century. There, he began a potentially brilliant career that was brutally cut short by history.

Equal in the face of death, French and German Jews had completely different fates within their respective societies. While the emancipation of German Jews followed "a tortuous and thorny path",[4] that of French Jews was more straightforward.

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[3] Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic: A Political History of State Jews in France from Gambetta to Vichy*, Stanford 1996, esp. ch. 4, pp. 45–53.

[4] Reinhard Rürup, 'The Tortuous and Thorny Path to Legal Equality: Jew Laws and Emanci-

Granted French citizenship in 1791 after a difficult struggle, they were given immediate access to a public space that had become separate from the religious sphere. Inspired by the Enlightenment, the French Revolution began the process of secularising society, purging Catholicism from the French state, which from the late Middle Ages had evolved into the model of a strong state which sought to shape the nation into a community of subjects and later citizens free of all particularist features. This purely political context offered Jews a career strategy hitherto unavailable to them: through the oath of allegiance to the Revolution they gained unrestricted access to prestigious state schools and careers that remained closed to them elsewhere. Thus, from the turn of the nineteenth century on, there were Jews in every incoming class at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Polytechnique, the magnificent springboards established by the Republic to train its future leaders and replace the former Catholic elite, who often preferred to withdraw from the civil service of the secular state. Forced to disappear as a separate nation, Jews, like Catholics or Protestants, were expected to set aside their collective beliefs upon entering the public space while remaining free to honour them individually within the private sphere. The republican contract was designed as a zero-sum game: the gain in the public sphere was countered by the loss of collective ethnic identity and by the disavowal of an allegiance that could no longer be exhibited publicly.

As many rabbis had feared, however, the triumph of the "Jews of the Republic" was accompanied by a sharp loss to Judaism, since many young Jews were tempted to abandon their religious tradition in the face of the wide-open doors of state power. Entering secular schools and institutions of learning in droves, they forsook the rabbinical seminaries and even the study of Judaism. The academic study of Judaism in nineteenth-century France would depend largely on contributions made by German Jews like Salomon Munk and Joseph Derenbourg, who had migrated to France when they found that the doors of German universities remained closed to them. Ironically, it was in France that these German Jewish scholars gained entry to the Collège de France or the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes and took their first steps towards brilliant careers.[5]

To be sure, prejudice had not vanished from French society – nor, indeed, from the country's highly institutionalised civil service, where certain high-ranking officials had no qualms about articulating antisemitic views in administrative reports on their Jewish subordinates. Jewish secondary school teachers, university professors and military graduates of the Polytechnique had undoubtedly become disenchanted at times, especially during the Restoration, which had introduced many

patory Legislation in Germany from the Late Eighteenth Century', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* (LBIYB) 31 (1986), pp. 3–33.

[5] Perrine Simon-Nahum, *La Cité investie: La "Science du judaïsme" français et la République*, Paris 1991; Aron Rodrigue, 'Rearticulations of French Jewish Identities after the Dreyfus Affair', in *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3, Summer 1996; Patrick Cabanel, 'La République juive: Question religieuse et prophétisme biblique en France au 19e siècle', in Chantal Bordes-Benayoun (ed,), *Les Juifs et la ville*, Toulouse 2000, pp. 134–138; Jay Berkowitz, *Rites and Passages: The Making of Jewish Culture in Modern France*, forthcoming.

retrograde policies. But the July Monarchy, the Second Empire,[6] and especially the Third Republic – which completed the secularisation process and even introduced separation of church and state – saw more and more Jews gain access to top government posts as prefects or sub-prefects, generals, colonels, judges and even members of the Council of State, France's highest administrative court. Few of these Jews felt compelled to reject their identity by converting; most married Jewish women and socialised in Jewish networks; many sat on the Consistory or central council of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* without jeopardising their government careers; and nearly all requested the presence of a rabbi at their funerals, which were held with elaborate ceremonies in the presence of high-ranking government officials. Their loyalty to Judaism, at least throughout the nineteenth century, is striking. Jews also played a prominent role in the implementation of the Republic's policies of secularisation, social welfare and colonial conquest. The ideal formulated as early as 1788 by the abbé Henri Grégoire in his *Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des juifs* appeared to have been fulfilled: "Let us bring them nearer to us, to our customs, let us open to them all the avenues where talent and virtue can blossom, let us bind them to the state through the hope of public consideration and the right to hold any position in all classes of society".[7] Less than a century later these aims had been achieved: French Jews were definitely "bound to the state" and enjoyed broad "public consideration", a status that even the Dreyfus Affair did not shake. Whether they were generals, prefects, or judges, Jews were able to pursue their careers with little difficulty even during those years of turmoil and resurgent antisemitism. Moreover, those Jews who, like Dreyfus himself, suffered discrimination in the pursuit of their careers were frequently compensated with promotions.[8]

The late nineteenth century gave birth to the myth of a "Jewish Republic" – the fiction that Jews manipulated all of French history from the French Revolution to the Third Republic. Constructed systematically by Edouard Drumont in his 1886 treatise *La France juive* and similar pamphlets, this myth stirred an intense antisemitic mobilisation, which culminated in 1898 at the height of the Dreyfus Affair with the eruption of coordinated protest rallies and riots. Small disciplined groups incited crowds of tens of thousands to rise up in nearly all major French cities, and even in the country's remotest backwaters, to demand "death to the Jews" and to threaten

[6] David Cohen, *La Promotion des Juifs en France à l'époque du Second Empire, (1852–1870)*, 2 vols., Aix-en-Provence 1980.

[7] Abbé Henri Grégoire, *Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des juifs*, Paris 1989, p. 151.

[8] Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic*; Birnbaum (ed.), *La France de l'Affaire Dreyfus*, Paris 1994, pp. 526–528. On the topic of the Alliance and the modernisation of French Jewry, see Michael Graetz, *Les Juifs de France au 19e siècle: De la Révolution à l'Alliance israélite universelle*, Paris 1989. On the relatively low numbers of conversions among French Jews, see Richard Cohen, 'Conversion in Nineteenth-Century France: Unusual or Common Practice?', in *Jewish History*, Autumn 1991. On the acculturation of French Jews at this time, see Paula E. Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, Berkeley 1998, ch. 4, pp. 53–76, as well as Antoine Compagnon, *Connaissez-vous Brunetière?*, Paris 1997.

Jewish shopkeepers and attack synagogues.[9] The state's extraordinary success at politically integrating the Jews had provoked an understandable backlash, which in reality was aimed not only against the Jews, but also against the state itself and the Third Republic's cultural identity. If it is true, as Peter Pulzer has claimed, that "at the time of the Dreyfus Affair French antisemitism reached a degree of intensity for which there was no parallel in Germany before 1933",[10] and if, as George Mosse has noted, "Germany had no Dreyfus Affair",[11] this distinction is due to the very success of emancipation in France. Of course Germany never experienced a Dreyfus Affair; there had never been a "Captain Dreyfus" on imperial Germany's general staff.

This antisemitic reaction – to some extent understandable in view of the generally perceived unacceptability of Jews embracing state careers, but ultimately explicable only as a myth – should nevertheless not mask the reality of the uniqueness of the French situation, which is best appreciated when compared to the situation in Germany at the same time. Napoleonic influence had given Jews in the German regions annexed by France or influenced by French law varying degrees of civil rights. In March, 1812 Prussian Jews were granted the status of "natives and citizens of the Prussian state" and entitled to the "same civil rights and liberties as those enjoyed by Christians" – except for access to state office. Although Jews could become teachers or hold posts in municipal government offices, they remained excluded from the state itself. Moreover, most of these measures were repealed after the defeat of Napoleon, and it was not until the Revolution of 1848 that the Frankfurt Assembly proclaimed without explicitly mentioning Jews that the exercise of political and civil rights must remain independent of religion. After the failure of the revolution, the Prussian constitution of 1850 reaffirmed this principle – but it nevertheless declared that the Christian religion remained the foundation of state institutions, thus reaffirming the ideology of the Christian state. Not until the Prussian law of July 3, 1869 could it finally be said, in theory at least, that "all remaining restrictions of civic and citizenhood rights imposed on the grounds of differences of religious confession are herewith abolished. In particular, eligibility for taking part in representative bodies at commune and state level and for the holding of public offices shall be independent of religious confession".[12]

In reality, more than a century after the principles of the Enlightenment, universalism and rationalism had brought French Jews – in practice as well as in theory –

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[9] Stephen Wilson, *Ideology and Experience: Antisemitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair*, Rutherford, NJ 1982, pp. 107, 734, and ch. 3, pp. 107–124; Birnbaum, *Le Moment antisémite: Un tour de la France en 1898*, Paris 1998.

[10] Pulzer, *Jews and the German State*, p. 14.

[11] George Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism*, New York 1978, p. 168.

[12] Cited in Rürup, 'The Tortuous and Thorny Path to Legal Equality', p. 32; see also pp. 14–15. See also Werner Mosse, 'From "Schutzjuden" to "Deutsche Staatsbürger Judischen Glaubens": The Long and Bumpy Road of Jewish Emancipation in Germany', in Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States and Citizenship*, Princeton 1995, pp. 59–93.

full political emancipation, German Jews still found themselves virtually excluded from state decision-making processes. The romantic reaction, the cult of Germanism and the "Volk", the durability of provincial divisions that hindered the implementation of a uniform reform policy, and finally the rivalry with France tended to make Germany a cultural rather than a political community.[13] Barred from state functions and full citizenship, German Jews retained a livelier subculture than in France and developed community organisations that were more willing to display their collective identity.[14] German Jews were more often members of the economic and social elite than the political elite, and some were even close to Kaiser Wilhelm II himself and placed their fortunes at his service. These *Kaiserjuden*, descendants of the eighteenth-century court Jews, included the banker Gerson von Bleichröder, for instance, who exercised a critical influence on Otto von Bismarck, as well as Albert Ballin, Carl Fürstenberg, Max Warburg and Walther Rathenau.[15] Thus, these Jews entered the public space de facto, without, however, occupying official positions in the state, which remained essentially Christian; their relationship with the state therefore remained informal.

Moreover, the outsider role of these German Jews revealed the fragility of their status, and to some degree even their lives: Ballin committed suicide and Rathenau, the only Jew ever to be appointed to a position comparable to those commonly exercised by Jewish civil servants in France, was assassinated in 1922 – evidence of how intolerable it remained to many Germans that a Jew should become Foreign Minister.[16] Rathenau's late and unprecedented promotion was hardly comparable, for instance, to the career of Adolphe Crémieux, who was Minister of Justice during the Revolution of 1848, head of the interim government for a short period in 1870, while at the same time, he served as a leader in the Jewish community and became an ardent defender of Jews throughout the world.[17] We should also remember that in 1936 Léon Blum became President of the Council and head of the Popular Front government.[18] Just how fragile the position of German Jews remained, even

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[13] Louis Dumont, *L'Idéologie allemande: France-Allemagne et retour*, Paris 1991; Birnbaum, 'Nationalism: A Comparison between France and Germany', in *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 133, August 1992, p. 429.

[14] David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry: 1780–1840*, New York 1987; Jacques Ehrenfreund, *Mémoire juive et nationalité allemande: Les juifs berlinois à la Belle Epoque*, Paris 2000.

[15] On Bleichröder see Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire*, New York 1977. On Court Jews in general see Vivian Mann and Richard Cohen (eds.), *From Court Jews to the Rothschilds: Art, Patronage and Power, 1600–1800*, New York 1996.

[16] On the Kaiserjuden see Werner Mosse, *Jews in the German Economy: The German-Jewish Economic Elite, 1820–1935*, Oxford 1987; W. Mosse, *The German Jewish Elite: A Socio-Cultural Profile, 1820–1935*, Oxford 1989; W. Mosse, 'Wilhelm II and the Kaiserjuden: A Problematic Encounter', in Jehuda Reinharz and Walter Schatzberg (eds.), *The Jewish Response to German Culture*, Hanover, NH 1985, pp. 164–194; Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron*, passim.

[17] Daniel Amson, *Adolphe Crémieux, l'oublié de la gloire*, Paris 1988; Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic*.

[18] It should be noted, however, that Blum's ascension to the premiership ignited a fierce antisemitic backlash. See Birnbaum, *Un Mythe politique*, pp. 135, 142; Vicki Caron, *Uneasy Asylum:*

in the Weimar Republic, is highlighted by the reminiscences of Kurt Blumenfeld. Describing a 1922 discussion between Albert Einstein, Walther Rathenau and himself, Blumenfeld claimed that "Rathenau admitted that all he did was to exercise a *function*, that of course a thousand links and the best reasons in the world tied him to this German world, of which he was at the time the political representative, but that his belonging, far from being absolute, was only relative".[19] By contrast, there can be no doubt that French Jewish civil servants felt that they were exercising more than a mere function.

In addition to Rathenau, several dozen German Jews succeeded in becoming Reichstag deputies particularly in the 1870s and 1880s. Jews were members of various political parties, especially on the left, such as the Progressive Party or the Social Democratic Party, where, from 1880 on, at least ten percent of deputies were of Jewish descent.[20] Across Germany, many of these deputies, like their French counterparts, remained active in their Jewish community organisations, even though they did not always share these organisations' points of view.[21] In France, however, there were scarcely any Jews in the socialist or communist parties until the 1930s – so strong was their loyalty to the universalist republican state that had emancipated them so early.

As demonstrated by Peter Pulzer, "at no stage in German history between 1871 and 1933 was there a consensus that the Jew was a citizen like any other".[22] The emancipation of 1871 remained for the most part a "dead letter", and Jews continued to be excluded from diplomatic or military posts.[23] No German Jew ever rose in the army beyond the rank of captain, and the brilliant Jewish captain Maximilian Hollerbaum was refused promotion on the grounds that he was "by virtue of his religious denomination not suitable for the rank of battalion commander, that is, with responsibility for training an officer corps".[24] The situation was strikingly different in France, where dozens of Jewish generals, some of them practising Jews, were placed in command of divisions even though they retained an ostensible Jewish identity and overtly Jewish names such as Abraham, Moïse and Mardoche. Similar conditions existed in the judiciary, as illustrated by Justice Councillor Breslauer's

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France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942, Stanford 1999, ch. 12, pp. 268–301; Caron, 'The "Jewish Question" from Dreyfus to Vichy', in Martin Alexander (ed.), *French History since Napoleon*, London 1999, pp. 172–199, esp. pp. 184–189.

[19] Cited in Hans Mayer, *Allemands et juifs: La révocation*, Paris 1999, p. 227. Emphasis added.

[20] Pulzer, *Jews and the German State*, p. 152.

[21] See esp. Marjorie Lamberti, *Jewish Activism in Imperial Germany*, New Haven 1978, chs. 3 and 4; Pulzer, *Jews and the German State*, pp. 121 ff. Comparative data can be found by consulting Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic*, chs. 15–18.

[22] Pulzer, *Jews and the German State*, p. 23.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 116. On Jews in the army during the Kaiserreich see Werner T. Angress, 'Prussia's Army and the Jewish Reserve Officer Controversy before World War I', LBIYB 17 (1972), pp. 19–42. The most important reference work on the access of Jews to the German political and administrative elites remains Ernest Hamburger, *Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands: Regierungsmitglieder, Beamte und Parlamentarier in der monarchischen Zeit, 1848–1918*, Tübingen 1968.

1907 pamphlet: "Everywhere in Germany the picture is the same, everywhere Jews are either entirely excluded from the judiciary, or discriminated against and excluded from the rank of the higher judiciary".[25] Few unbaptised Jews became high court judges, and none became public prosecutors, in stark contrast to the situation in France, where as early as the Second Empire Jews who held high offices in Jewish community organisations were frequently appointed to such functions. And even though the Second Empire was an era of rapprochement between the state and the Catholic Church, many unbaptised Jews were nevertheless allowed to hold seats on the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Appeal. In Germany, the exclusion of unbaptised Jews from the civil and military services extended even to the administrative bureaucracy and more surprisingly to the teaching profession, from primary schools to universities. Since Jews were still considered alien to German culture, unbaptised Jews were nearly always excluded from institutions responsible for the socialisation of the young, and as late as 1917 there were no more than 13 Jewish full professors teaching at German universities.[26] Meanwhile, French Jews from the early nineteenth century on were appointed to posts in lycées, the prestigious grandes écoles and even universities. It was only with the advent of the Weimar Republic that German Jews would find the doors of the civil service open to them. And not surprisingly, a form of political antisemitism comparable to that which had long existed in the Third Republic began to develop. Like the Third Republic, Weimar too was targeted as a "Jewish Republic", and it was likewise accused of having accorded Jews too easy access to high political and administrative posts, a trend many attributed to the fact that the state had now been cut off from its Christian roots.[27]

Emile Durkheim

These differences between France and Germany make it easier to understand what might separate the destiny of a man like Durkheim, sociologist of republican integration, from that of his contemporary, Simmel, sociologist of "the Stranger". For many critics, Durkheim's entire work is a reflection on the implementation of a type of assimilation that implies the disappearance of earlier identities. These critics see Durkheim, master thinker of the teachers of the Republic, sociologist of education, as striving to establish a type of education to hasten republican assimilation by

[25] Cited in Pulzer, *Jews and the German State*, pp. 44–45, see also pp. 52–53.

[26] The most important reference work on Jews in the teaching profession is Monika Richarz, *Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe: Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland, 1678–1848*, Tübingen 1974. See also Pulzer, *Jews and the German State*, pp. 109ff; and Marion Kaplan, *The Making of the Jewish Middle Class: Women, Family, and Identity in Imperial Germany*, New York 1991, pp. 168–191. A systematic comparison can be made with Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic*, part 1, pp. 7–53.

[27] Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Antisemitism in Germany and Austria*, Cambridge, MA 1988; Steven Aschheim, 'The Jew Within: The Myth of "Judaization" in Germany', in Reinharz and Schatzberg (eds.), *The Jewish Response to German Culture*, pp. 212–241.

creating a new form of collective identity distinct from earlier traditions and customs. By singing the praises of a national system of education, they say, Durkheim also settled the question of his own Jewish heritage, making it a thing of the past. Ever since, Durkheimian sociology has been accused of ignoring the persistence of particular ethnic or religious allegiances and of not taking into account forms of commitment and solidarity that exist apart from citizenship. And yet Durkheim was a man of many faces, an enemy of preconceived notions, who was nevertheless careful to remind his listeners: "Do not forget that I am the son of a rabbi".[28] A rabbi's son who turned away from the path of his father, Moïse Durkheim, who was a rabbi in the Lorraine town of Epinal, to fulfil his father's implicit expectations and better realise his father's frustrated scientific ambitions. Thus did David Emile Durkheim, the youngest in the family, become a Moses of sociology, a champion of social assimilation as a path towards modernity, a man who did not reject "the values and personality of his father, but rather his [father's] career";[29] a secularised rabbi who wanted to restore order and harmony to a society racked by internal divisions, a new Moses who yearned to reach the promised land, the continent of sociology, which he perceived as a place where social harmony would be reinvented.[30] Durkheim was a prophet in search of justice, embarking upon the exodus from an Egypt of authoritarianism and injustice by denouncing the anomic sources of a dehumanised contemporary world.[31] He was the scholar par excellence, who "transcends the Jewish view of modernity".[32] To claim that implicitly or explicitly "Durkheim's entire work is essentially Jewish", despite the author's own positivist project, may be going too far. Nevertheless, the "enigma" of Durkheim's Jewish identity remains,[33] and it is probably not solved by the contrary assumption, voiced by Ivan Strenski, that "readers will search in vain for essentialist claims of Durkheim's devotion to otherwise long-regarded essential Jewish ideas and practices. ... Durkheim was not in effect a modern marrano, a kind of secret Jew hiding under the cloak of conversion to the values of the Third Republic liberalism. He was not secretly trying to express his Jewish identity under the guise of his seemingly secular sociology of religion". While Strenski's admonition that we should reject all essentialist concepts is well taken, to claim that "throughout nearly all his life, Durkheim seemed to have

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28 Cited in Jean-Claude Filloux, *Durkheim et le socialisme*, Paris 1977, p. 34.

29 Louis Greenberg, 'Bergson and Durkheim as Sons and Assimilators: The Early Years', *French Historical Studies*, no. 4, Autumn 1976, esp. p. 630.

30 W.S.F. Pickering, *Durkheim's Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories*, London 1984, p. 521.

31 Eugen Schoenfeld and Stjepan Mzstrovic, 'Durkheim's Concept of Justice and its Relationship to Social Solidarity', *Sociological Analysis*, vol. 4, no. 67, 1989, pp. 50–52, 125.

32 Deborah Dash Moore, 'David Emile Durkheim and the Jewish Response to Modernity', *Modern Judaism*, vol. 6, 1980, esp. p. 289. See also Jacob Jay Lindenthal, 'Some Thoughts Regarding the Influence of Traditional Judaism on the Work of Emile Durkheim', *Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Thought*, vol. 11, 1970.

33 Pickering, 'The Enigma of Durkheim's Jewishness', in Pickering and Herminio Martins, *Debating Durkheim*, London 1994, pp. 29, 35.

resisted identification of himself as Jewish" is an assertion that poses more problems than it solves.[34]

The great Jewish journals of the time were also undecided in their interpretation of the life of the founder of French sociology. At Durkheim's death, he was buried in the Jewish section of the Montparnasse cemetery, where his gravestone is adorned with a Hebrew inscription that unfortunately is illegible. As the 1917 obituary in the *Archives israélites* noted:

Though no longer practising Judaism, he had remained a Jew at heart, and our oppressed brothers could count on his devoted assistance. His son was killed in action. He sat on the commission in charge of reviewing foreigner registration certificates and had recently accepted the presidency of the historical research commission investigating the role of French Jews during the war. He bestowed his high patronage on all activities likely to valorise Jewish merit.[35]

The paper was visibly proud to render homage to a man who, like the *Archives israélites* itself, had consistently defended "Jewish merit", but what does that mean? And though the *Archives israélites* may have seen Durkheim as a Jew whose life had honoured both the Republic and French Jewry, this opinion was not shared by the *Univers israélite*, where a two-page article was devoted to Durkheim's passing. Here, Durkheim was no longer referred to as "a Jew at heart", as a man who enhanced "Jewish merit", but rather as a respectable scientist who served "science and his country". In contrast to the *Archives israélites*, the *Univers israélite* did not gloss over his aloofness from religious practice; indeed, it used it to draw rather negative conclusions on the ultimate significance of his work. The article began with a precise review of Durkheim's career, recalling his close relationship to Louis Liard – the director of higher education and a key link between the republican state and the university – listing the titles of his main works, highlighting the importance of his journal *L'Année sociologique* and stressing that Durkheim "can be considered the leader of the French school of sociology". The journal continued:

On this occasion [First World War], Mr. Durkheim, who had always kept himself aloof from Judaism, became aware that there was such a thing as a Jewish Question. His awareness grew from his interest in the fate of immigrant Jews, who were subject to malicious defamation, even though so many of them had enrolled as volunteers in the early days of the war. He hoped to improve relations between these immigrants and Jews holding French citizenship and assumed the presidency of a committee that had taken on this task. At the information and action committee for neutral Jews, of which he was also a member, he occasionally denounced his own past indifference to his brothers who were suffering for the sole reason of being Jewish. In his eyes, the only possible solution to the Jewish Question was the emancipation and assimilation of the Jews, and in a letter to a newspaper, he once declared that the Russian Revolution had eliminated the Jewish Question. Mr. Durkheim had also taken an active interest in the establishment of the historical research commission into the history of French Jews during the war.

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[34] Ivan Strenski, *Durkheim and the Jews of France*, Chicago 1997, pp. 4–6.

[35] *Archives israélites*, November 22, 1917. The commission proved the high degree of patriotism of French Jews by stressing their proportionally high death rate during the war.

> Those who knew Mr. Durkheim confirm that the man was equal to the scientist and to the citizen: a firm, forthright personality, scrupulously unyielding and inflexibly honest. We are saddened by the thought that this rabbi's son had not come to know the religion of his forefathers, that this sociologist failed to appreciate the social character of Judaism, that this scientist and teacher of Jewish origin has undoubtedly contributed to the alienation of many a Jewish intellectual from Judaism.
>
> These regrets are added to the sorrow felt at the passing of a man who has served and honoured both science and his country.[36]

This text has never been commented by Durkheim experts, not even among those who claim to have investigated his relationship to Judaism. It reveals a sudden public awareness of the author of *Règles de la méthode sociologique* (Rules of Sociological Method) (1895), a man who, in the presence of the members of the information and action committee for neutral Jews, the Research Committee for Documents Concerning the Jews of France During the War, had reproached himself for his past "indifference" towards "his brothers who were suffering for the sole reason of being Jewish". Does this remark, which has gone unnoticed by critics of Durkheim, contradict the opinion of the *Archives israélites* that he had remained "a Jew at heart"? Or was he an indifferent Jew? To be honest, he was probably neither, but he was a Jew nonetheless.

Let us take a look at his work: to what extent can it be claimed that "this rabbi's son had not come to know the religion of his forefathers, that this sociologist failed to appreciate the social character of Judaism"? As we shall see, a careful examination of Durkheim's writings reveals clearly that this is not the case. Far from being ignorant about Judaism, Durkheim was conscious of its specific role within social organisation. But the regret expressed by the *Univers israélite* was essentially a condemnation of the Durkheimian project itself judged by its consequences: "this scientist and teacher of Jewish origin", the journal assumed, had "undoubtedly contributed to the alienation of many a Jewish intellectual from Judaism".[37] The conclusion drawn from the *Univers israélite's* assessment is evident: with his sociology devoid of any Jewish dimension, his intellectual project eminently opposed to Judaism, Durkheim diminished the value of religious belief and delivered a mortal blow to Jewish scholarship.

This strongly critical view is taken by Perrine Simon-Nahum, who sees

> Durkheimian sociology as the failure of scholarly Judaism .... The central thesis of Durkheimian sociology, which makes religion into a deified form of society, reflects the passage of a significant number of Jewish intellectuals in contact with neo-Kantian rationalism from a conception of the world still imprinted with religiosity to a secularised vision of society. ... This deification of society along the terms of Durkheimian theories about religion reflects the practice of the French Jewish community at the end of the nineteenth century. In the secondary place reserved, however, for in-

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[36] *Univers israélite*, November 30, 1917; Birnbaum, 'French Sociologists between Reason and Faith: The Impact of the Dreyfus Affair', *Jewish Social Studies*, Winter 1995, p. 28.

[37] *Univers israélite*, November 30, 1917.

dividual belief, which itself is a derivative of collective belief, one in effect finds the expression of the privatisation of Judaism and its fusion with republican ethics.[38]

According to this interpretation, Durkheimian sociology is again seen as the death of Judaism, the moment when the triumph of republican ideals leads to the deification of society, the triumph of a secularisation that is fatal to religiosity and transcendence. That Durkheimianism should constitute a threat to the scholarly projects of men like Salomon Munk, James Darmesteter and Joseph Derenbourg is an incontestable fact: from Durkheim to Marcel Mauss, Henry Lévy-Bruhl, Claude Lévi-Strauss or Raymond Aron, we find great intellectuals of "Jewish origin" turning away from scholarly Judaism in order to investigate the social logic of societies, whether primitive or modern. Judaism has disappeared entirely from their scholarly or pedagogical pursuits at the Collège de France or the Sorbonne.

Nahum's interpretation is tempting, but it makes sense only if we see the relationship between Durkheim and Judaism as a "divorce".[39] But even though sociology may well diminish the religious field as a whole in favour of the social sphere, we can nonetheless demonstrate that, as a man and a sociologist, Durkheim did not confine his Jewish identity to the private sphere alone. Rather he remained interested in its significance, albeit on a secondary level. Although he may not have shared the religious erudition of the great nineteenth-century Jewish scholars, he was not at war with them, and he remained preoccupied with the issues they raised. Since scholars who emphasise the importance of Durkheim's Jewish identity highlight the high degree of endogamy in the families of Durkheim and his wife, the many rabbis in both families, the Jewish names given in memory of the grandparents, Emile's bar-mitzvah, his synagogue marriage, his compliance with Jewish holiday rituals, in short his inclusion in a truly Jewish social network, this essay will take a closer look at his scholarly work.

What strikes the reader immediately in *De la division du travail social* (On the Division of Labour in Society) (1893) is its frequent references to the Old Testament: quite unexpectedly, we find that Durkheim gave considerable prominence to biblical examples, particularly to describe mechanical social solidarity, which results from a relatively undifferentiated division of labour. He demonstrated that the Pentateuch, which included the Ten Commandments, contained few penal sanctions. In his opinion this was because the Pentateuch was not a code. Rather, Durkheim claims:

It is above all a résumé of all sorts of traditions by which the Jews explained to their satisfaction and in their fashion the genesis of the world, of their society, and of their principal social practices. ... Since the book is only a tissue of national legends, we can rest assured that everything that it contains was engraved on every conscience. ... From this point of view, the determination of punishment becomes something accessory.[40]

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[38] Simon-Nahum, *La Cité investie,* pp. 280–284, esp. pp. 283, 284.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 278.

[40] Emile Durkheim, *On the Division of Labor in Society*, trans. by George Simpson, New York 1933, p. 76.

In his eyes, the ancient Hebrews were "a primitive people" with an extensive concept of punishment;[41] they were an "inferior society" in which respect for religion took precedence over every other obligation.[42] Durkheim had been a careful reader of the writings of Salomon Munk, former professor at the Collège de France and one of scholarly Judaism's preeminent representatives, and he often quoted Munk's work on Palestine. In this sense, one cannot simply claim that Durkheimian sociology marked the end of scholarly Judaism: Durkheim's project may have been a radically different one, but some of his conclusions are rooted in scholarly Judaism. Durkheim had a remarkable knowledge of the Pentateuch: he often quoted it to illustrate his views, to find exceptions, or to reflect on unexpected situations, such as offences for which no punishment had been foreseen – for instance the case of a man, who when found collecting wood on the Sabbath, was taken to Moses and Aaron, who then "put him in ward, because it was not declared what should be done to him".[43] For Durkheim, the Old Testament represented the opposite of modern society, in which organic solidarity and restitutive law blossom while repressive law declines. In ancient Israel, respect for society was at its maximum: society was the object of a sacred cult, individualism was unknown and the risks of anomy were nonexistent. Durkheim engaged in a scholarly calculation: he pointed out that "in these four or five thousand verses, there is a relatively small number wherein laws which can rigorously be called other than repressive are set down". This statement was followed by a half-page list. According to Durkheim, there were only 135 of these non-repressive verses, but most of them, being of a religious nature, were just as weighty as the repressive ones. His conclusion illustrates the mechanical solidarity of "inferior societies":

> [I]n varying degrees, all Hebrew law, such as we find it in the Pentateuch, bears an essentially repressive stamp. ... Because all the prescriptions that it lays down are commandments from God, placed, so to speak, under his direct suzerainty, they all owe to this origin an extraordinary prestige that renders them sacrosanct. Thus, when they are violated, public conscience does not content itself with a simple reparation, but demands expiation that avenges it. ... [T]here is nothing common between Hebraic law and our law".[44]

A bit later, Durkheim listed the details of moral offenses that were punished under Hebrew law but were no longer considered illegal in organically solidary societies, which result from a strong division of labour: defilement of the fiancée (Deuteronomy XXII, 23–27), prostitution (Leviticus XIX, 29), deception on the part of a deflowered girl who presents herself as a virgin at marriage (Deuteronomy XXII, 13–21), etc.[45] He added that "we could not enumerate all the religious

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[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 85–86. See also pp. 91–92.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 140, 178 and passim.
[43] Durkheim is quoting Numbers XV and Leviticus XXIV. See *ibid.*, pp. 94–95.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 138–142.
[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 157–158.

crimes which the Pentateuch marks out and represses. The Jew had to obey all the commandments of the Law on pain of suppression".[46]

At the moment of formulating his fundamental theory of the inevitable decline of religion in developed societies, he once again, by way of contrast, referred to Judaism as a religion with a sphere of action extending "beyond the commerce of man with the divine". Indeed, "if there is one truth that history teaches us beyond doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller portion of social life. ... [L]ittle by little, political, economic, scientific functions free themselves from the religious function, constitute themselves apart and take on a more and more recognised temporal character".[47]

There could be no greater opposition between Judaism and the modern world: Durkheim decided to devote his efforts to a differentiation of the religious and the political by wholeheartedly supporting the secular educational policies of the Third Republic. Durkheim, the sociologist of a republic of citizens concerned only with Reason, seems to have turned his back completely on the Judaism of his ancestors, which he perceived as an "inferior" and antiquated religion. A bit later – in 1899–1900 – he tempered this opinion in his article 'Deux lois de l'évolution pénale' ('Two Laws of Penal Evolution'), published in *L'Année sociologique*. After describing the harshness of repressive law in Syrian and Egyptian society, he noted the relatively moderate nature of ancient Israelite Law, as evidenced by several passages of Deuteronomy and Numbers, which he quoted verbatim. In conclusion Durkheim noted:

> [T]he Hebrews were certainly not superior to those before them. ... However, Mosaic law is much less severe than the laws of Manu or the sacred Egyptian writings. ... Mutilation, practised so widely in other Oriental societies, is mentioned only once in the Pentateuch. ... What is the reason for this relative mildness? It is that among the Hebrews, absolute government could never establish itself on a durable basis. ... The spirit of the nation remained profoundly democratic.[48]

In *Le Suicide* (1897), Durkheim argued that Jews were less prone to suicide than Protestants or Catholics, even though they tended to be more urban, a factor that normally increased the probability of suicide: "If, therefore, the rate for Judaism is so low, in spite of this aggravating circumstance, it may be assumed that other things being equal, their religion has the fewest suicides of all".[49] In his well-known reflec-

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[46] *Ibid.*, p. 160. Later on, in 1906, Durkheim reflected that "as a whole, Jewish criminality is essentially less than that of other confessions". Compte-rendu de Bruno Blau, 'Die Kriminalität der deutschen Juden', in Durkheim, *Journal sociologique*, Paris 1969, p. 621.

[47] Durkheim, *De la Division du travail social*, pp. 168–169.

[48] Durkheim, 'Deux lois de l'évolution pénale', in Durkheim, *Journal sociologique*, pp. 251–252. He also noted here that "in the Pentateuch, there is no mention whatsoever of prison" (p. 257). In a review published in 1897–98 in *L'Année sociologique*, he noted that the rabbis modernised Jewish law by allowing women to divorce. Durkheim, Compte-rendu de David Werner Amram, 'The Jewish Law of Divorce according to Bible and Talmud', in Durkheim's *Journal sociologique*, p. 478.

[49] Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, trans. by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, London 1952, pp. 155–156.

tions on the varying propensities of Protestants and Catholics to commit suicide, Durkheim convincingly demonstrated that "the greater concessions a confessional group makes to individual judgment, the less it dominates lives, the less its cohesion and vitality ... ; the superiority of Protestantism with respect to suicide results from its being a less strongly integrated church than the Catholic church".[50] Durkheim then turned to Judaism; he repeated his hypothesis – which he had heavily qualified – that it was an inferior religion – and he now used two very different arguments to account for the low suicide rate among Jews. The first, mentioned above, was related to the strong degree of social cohesion, the "family communism" that resulted from common beliefs controlled by the "Jewish church", a rather strange expression coming as it does from the son of a rabbi. Social integration, therefore, protected against suicide. Marriage also helped, since it had a "magical-religious character" and acted as a sort of "consecration" or sacrament.[51] Durkheim then investigated the correlation between educational levels and suicide tendencies, noting that "of all religions, Judaism counts the fewest suicides, yet in none other is education so widespread".[52] In Durkheim's eyes, the People of the Book do not seek education for its own sake, but simply as an instrument of defence:

> [I]f the Jew manages to be both well instructed and very disinclined to suicide, it is because of the special origin of his desire for knowledge. It is a general law that religious minorities, in order to protect themselves better against the hatred to which they are exposed, or merely through a sort of emulation, try to surpass in knowledge the populations surrounding them. ... The Jew, therefore, seeks to learn, not in order to replace his collective prejudices by reflective thought, but merely to be better armed for the struggle. ... This is the reason for the complexity he presents. Primitive in certain respects, in others he is an intellectual and a man of culture. He thus combines the advantages of the severe discipline characteristic of small, ancient groups with the benefits of the intense culture enjoyed by our great societies. He has all the intelligence of modern man without sharing his despair. ... The religion with least inclination to suicide, Judaism, is the very one not formally proscribing it and also the one in which the idea of immortality plays the least role. Indeed, the Bible contains no law forbidding man to kill himself. ... The beneficent influence of religion is therefore not due to the special nature of religious conceptions. If religion protects man against the desire for self-destruction, it is not that it preaches the respect for his own person to him with arguments *sui generis*, but because it is a society.[53]

Here Durkheim presented an interesting analysis: the Jew, a "cerebral and refined" being, remains nevertheless a "primitive" being exhibiting "collective prejudices" consolidated by external hatred. The Jew's yearning for education is rooted not in his values but in his instinct for survival. Since the Bible was indifferent on the question of suicide, the Jew's distaste for suicide cannot be explained by

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

[51] Durkheim, Review of M. Mielziner, *The Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce in Ancient and Modern Times,* 1905, *L'Année sociologique*, vol. 8. Durkheim, *Textes*, 3 vols., Paris 1975, vol. 3, pp. 115–116. See also Durkheim, 'Le Problème de la solidarité familiale et du totémisme chez les Hébreux', in Durkheim, *Textes*, vol. 2, pp. 285–288.

[52] Durkheim, *Suicide*, p. 167.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 167–170.

belief, but rather by external pressure reinforced by a hostile environment. The underlying conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is clear: if hostility declines, so will the need for education; Jews will gradually become less cerebral and refined, and suicide will increase. Durkheim was absolutely convinced of the truth of this assumption. Towards the end of his renowned work, he noted that Judaism, "the most archaic of religions", should be of interest to anyone wanting to reduce suicide: "Judaism, in spite of its great historic role, still clings to the most primitive religious forms in many respects. How true it is that moral and intellectual superiority of dogma counts for naught in its possible influence on suicide!"[54] Still, Durkheim concluded by again qualifying his own thought, admitting "the great historic role" of Judaism – much as he eventually admitted that the word "primitive" was an inadequate description, particularly since the Jews had retained their "democratic" character. Durkheim therefore wavered between logical arguments supporting the determinacy of social causality and an appreciation of what he perceived to be the true nature of Judaism. Ultimately, Durkheim seemed incapable of wholly rejecting the moral system of this so very precious "family communism".

So much ambivalence silenced the writer, who eventually ceased to consider the Jewish dimension. From the moment of Durkheim's admission that religion was essential, from the moment when he overturned the focal point of his interests by placing religion at the heart of his own reflections, Judaism, strangely enough, vanished from his writings. In his last great work, *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life), published in 1912, he hardly referred to Judaism at all. And in his celebrated "Conclusion" he emphasised that religion represented "the image" of society, that mythologies and theologies merely idealised reality in the most primitive religions as well as in "the most recent and the most refined", that they transposed society, "the only source of life at which we can morally reanimate ourselves".[55] He furthermore added:

> Thus there is something eternal in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successively enveloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence come ceremonies which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the results which they produce, or the processes employed to attain these results. What essential difference is there between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principal dates of the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt or the promulgation of the Decalogue, and a reunion of citizens commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life?[56]

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[54] *Ibid.*, p. 376.

[55] Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. by Joseph Ward Swain, London 1915, pp. 421, 425.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 427.

Here again, as in both *De la division du travail social* and *Le Suicide*, Jewish society represents a source of "warmth", of community, the "family communism" so propitious to mutual solidarity and collective consciousness. Inversely, when Durkheim's nephew Marcel Mauss isolated himself from his family by engaging in an extra-marital relationship and neglecting his responsibilities to his mother, Durkheim wrote: "you live ... in a family which you have disorganized and to which you surely radiate coldness".[57] At the moment of concluding his last major work – only a few years before his own death and that of his son – when he described the sacrifices to be made for the fatherland and the civilian ceremonies that consolidate feelings of collective belonging and of national identity, Durkheim confirmed the role Jewish history played for him by evoking the Jews "remembering the exodus from Egypt or the promulgation of the Decalogue".

In his earlier article 'De la définition des phénomènes religieux' ('Of the Definition of Religious Phenomena'), published in the 1897–1898 issue of *L'Année sociologique*, Durkheim had furthermore claimed that "a Jew must believe that Yahweh has saved his ancestors from Egyptian bondage" before being able to link this collective belief, the foundation stone of his religion, to the fact that nowadays, "fatherland, the French Revolution, Joan of Arc, etc. are for us sacred objects that we will not allow to be touched".[58] How close these arguments were to those in *Les Formes eléméntaires*, in spite of the fourteen-year time difference! Like the devoted citizens of the secular Republic celebrating its feasts, for which Durkheim became the chief theoretician, Jews commemorated their liberation from Egypt and their subsequent entry into the democratic society that Durkheim extolled. They also remembered the promulgation of the Decalogue, the moral code par excellence, which gave most modern societies their underlying legal structure. Alongside Christians and other citizens of the Third Republic, Jews suddenly embodied the archetype of a society based on solidarity and social "warmth" transformed into common religion. They were no longer rejected as belonging to a primary, archaic religion. In noting this example, was Durkheim remembering Moses leading the Jews out of Egypt? Was he remembering Moïse Durkheim, his father, whose role he had assumed, in a different manner, by leading the nation towards the secular Republic and the nation's scholars towards sociology?

Georg Simmel

Durkheim did not conceal his hostility towards the sociological theory developed in Germany by Georg Simmel, finding it remote from his own concepts. He was not particularly interested in publicising for the benefit of a French readership the interactionist analyses from across the Rhine, which held that society was

[57] Letter of June 1905 to Marcel Mauss, in Durkheim, *Lettres à Marcel Mauss*, Paris 1998, p. 357.

[58] Durkheim, 'De la définition des phénomènes religieux', in Durkheim, *Journal sociologique*, pp. 155–157.

the result of a network of discrete interactions and not a collective body. Nevertheless, after much hesitation and major editorial cuts, he decided to publish his rival's 'Comment les formes sociales se maintiennent' ('How Social Forms Maintain Themselves') in the 1896–1897 issue of *L'Année sociologique*.[59] Sometime later, in a letter to Celestin Bouglé, Durkheim's closest collaborator and later the director of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, Durkheim wrote: "If I remember correctly, you had told me that Simmel was a Jew. But I'm surprised that he didn't tell me that himself when I asked him to drop the passage on Zionism in his article by telling him that I was of Jewish origin and that I would be regarded as a Zionist [were I to publish it]. What a nightmare [that would be], on top of the nightmare professional editing already is".[60] Although Simmel was clearly not a Zionist, as we will see, Simmel's tendency to describe Jews as a people obviously made Durkheim extremely uncomfortable.

A short time earlier, on the occasion of the First Zionist Congress held in Basel, Switzerland in 1897, Simmel had been asked to comment on the nature of the Zionist movement. His two relatively unknown written responses are well worth quoting to show how unfounded Durkheim's suspicions regarding Simmel's purported Zionism were. In reality the views of Simmel and Durkheim vis-à-vis Zionism were quite similar, despite their differences on many other issues. As Simmel stated:

> The idea that European Jews might want to establish themselves in some non-European country and break the ties that link them to European culture is utopian. This is most certainly so in the case of Western Jews: neither the German, nor the French nor the English Jews will ever wish ... to leave the countries where they have established such profound roots. As to the so-called Eastern Jews, they will be afraid of letting the European aspects of their nature, so painstakingly acquired, die out. They might easily believe that emigrating to Asian countries would turn them into Asians again, in the same manner that young girls sometimes believe that taking a new name after marriage will make a new person of them.... This is why I do not have a positive view of the Zionist project: it is also for this reason that I do not believe in its success.

Responding to objections raised by his correspondent, Simmel continued in a second letter:

> The Jews can dissolve without a trace no more than any other nation, regardless of whether its culture is low or high. It is not a matter of *Aufgehen* (dissolving) but rather of *Verschmelzen* (fusion) with the other, and in the course of such a fusion of two nations, a third nation will emerge in which neither of the two nations will have disappeared without leaving a trace, a new nation that will contain elements of both of the others. For have not the Germans already assumed many Jewish elements, if only because the Jews participate in German cultural life? The Jews have also certainly assumed several elements of the German spirit.... I wonder at the fear of death that has taken hold of the Jews at the present moment, now that their influence has been steadily growing among

[59] The French version of this text can be found in Georg Simmel, *Sociologie et épistémologie*, Paris 1981, pp. 171–206.

[60] Durkheim, 'Lettre à Célestin Bouglé', April 3, 1898, *Revue française de sociologie*, vol. 17, 1976, p. 169.

all European nations. The Jews are certainly not in danger of dissolving; on the contrary, they are at the stage of the Judaisation of Europe. From a psychological point of view, "Jewish" elements can be found in the blood of all civilised nations, and this Judaisation of non-Jews will occur in a parallel development to the Europeanisation of the Jews. The more the Jews assimilate, the more they themselves will also assimilate, and the moment of the greatest assimilation of the Jews will correspond to the moment of their greatest influence as a psychological element. This is why I believe it is incorrect to call me a pessimist: a man who sees the steady growth of the nation cannot be a pessimist. I suppose that those who are much more affected by pessimism are the ones who believe that Judaism can be saved by isolating it, by locking it in a cage far away across the ocean that no one could ever attack and that one could bring to Europe from time to time as an extraordinary and unique thing to remind Europe of its antisemitism. But all dreams are in vain. Europeans and Jews are locked in a solid cultural embrace.[61]

Simmel could hardly have been any clearer. Despite the fact that he had defined Jews as a nation, he nevertheless revealed himself to be a convinced anti-Zionist, speaking up against the utopian dream with its dangerous consequences. For him it was clear that Jews could not be locked up artificially in a "far away cage" across the ocean, with the sole aim of protecting them from antisemitic threats. Europe remained their destiny, the place where they could flourish, the place they were unable to renounce. Neither in Western nor in Eastern Europe could Jews imagine being "Asians" and letting "the European element in them die". At this time, Simmel had not the slightest doubt; nothing – not even the persistent and distressing antisemitic intrigues that he confronted on an almost daily basis – nothing could make him question his concept of assimilation by fusion, a concept that, as he saw it, ensured "the steady growth of the nation". In his mind, assimilation did not imply mere dissolution: it was truly a "fusion" of the two "nations", a fusion that would give the Jews "the greatest possible psychological influence" over European nations. Simmel extolled this "cultural embrace" praised by so many writers and philosophers, all of whom stressed with great emotion the exceptional and fertile character of this fusion that had produced so many "double, contradictory" souls like Simmel himself.[62]

Simmel, through his parents, had his roots in the legendary city of Breslau, which in 1854 saw the foundation of the rabbinical seminary whose teaching staff included Zacharias Frankel and so many of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* scholars.[63] A stranger to Jewish culture and tradition, Simmel perceived himself simply as a European. And like Durkheim, he opposed Zionism despite the fact that he too was

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[61] S. Lozinskij, 'Simmels Briefe zur jüdischen Frage', in Hannes Böhringer and Karlfried Gründer (eds.), *Ästhetik und Soziologie um die Jahrhundertwende: Georg Simmel*, Frankfurt 1976, pp. 240–243.

[62] For a closer look at this relationship, see Jehuda Reinharz and Walter Schatzberg (eds.), *The Jewish Response to German Culture*, Hanover, NH 1985. See also Paul Mendes Flohr, *German Jews: A Dual Identity*, New Haven 1999, p. 18.

[63] Michael A. Meyer, *Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform Movement in Judaism*, New York 1988; Ismar Schorsch, *From Text to Context: The Turn to History in Modern Judaism*, Hanover, NH 1994, esp. p. 255.

confronted with a virulent antisemitism. But he approved of the "Judaisation" of Europe, which was so incompatible with the positivist views expressed by Durkheim in *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*. It is true that late nineteenth-century Germany was not comparable to republican France, where despite the antisemitism often incited by adherents of an intransigent Catholicism and occasionally echoed in republican ranks, Jewish government officials could generally pursue their administrative careers with little difficulty and without having to convert. Durkheim's loyalty to Judaism, therefore, came more from the heart, from the private sphere: it did not run counter to his positivist vision of the world, which was born of the Enlightenment and was now guided by the Republic. Opposed to positivism in an imperial, reactionary and Christian Germany, which forced Jews to convert and continued to resist Enlightenment, Simmel, by contrast, envisioned the "Judaisation" of society as an "embrace" that would bring about the triumph of new values, new patterns of behaviour. Simmel, whose career remained hindered by antisemitism, saw this creative "fusion" of shared values as the only solution. In his context, these shared values alone – not positivism – could guarantee the stability of the "embrace". The social solidarity that Durkheim expected from the functional division of social labour was founded, in Simmel's view, on social relationships based on shared values.

Simmel – the non-Jew nonetheless perceived as a Jew – could only hope for the rapid triumph of "fusion". In contrast to Durkheim, who remained Jewish, and in contrast to Karl Marx, Simmel was born of parents who had already converted.[64] His great-grandfather's name was Isaak Israel. His grandfather, Simon Isaak Simmel, was still a very religious man; born around 1780, he started a small business and settled in Breslau, where in 1810 Georg's father Eduard was born. A businessman himself, Eduard decided to become a Catholic and was baptised during a trip to Paris, changing his name to Eduard Maria Simmel. Business flourished: he started a chocolate factory that brought him substantial financial success. In 1838 he married Flora Bodstein, who was the daughter of another Breslau Jewish business family and had converted to Protestantism as a young girl. Georg was their only son. Born in Berlin, he remained Protestant to the end of his life, like his mother. A brilliant student of philosophy, he gradually climbed the rungs of an academic career – finding it difficult, however, to obtain a permanent, well-paid job. He married Gertrud Kinel, a Catholic girl raised as a Protestant by her mother and herself a philosopher, author of a number of well-known works. When the girl's father, Albert Kinel, met Georg Simmel for the first time, he asked him candidly "Are you Jewish?" – to which Simmel laconically replied: "My nose unmistakably betrays me".[65]

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[64] See Michael Landmann, 'Bausteine zur Biographie', in Kurt Gassen and Michael Landmann (eds.), *Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel*, Berlin 1958, pp. 11ff.

[65] Klaus Christian Köhnke, *Der junge Simmel: In Theoriebeziehungen und sozialen Bewegungen*, Frankfurt am Main 1996, p. 140. See also Alfred Laurence, 'Georg Simmel: Triumph and Tragedy', in Larry Ray (ed.), *Formal Sociology: The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, Brookfield, VT 1991.

Although non-Jewish, Simmel found himself constantly referred to as a Jew by both his enemies and his friends. Countless contemporary anecdotes described him as "typically" Jewish. Even his closest friends saw him through the prism of stereotypes. One non-Jewish friend, the poet Paul Ernst, wrote of him: "The philosopher was, by his birth, Jewish, and curiously enough he had incorporated the traits particular to Jewish feeling and Jewish thought". In 1935, Sabine Lepsius, who had known Simmel for fifty years, described her childhood friend and former lover as follows:

His movements were ... twisted. ... People thought him ugly, but if one took the time to look at him, he was not, for his head had a lovely shape, his forehead was nearly beautiful as well, his eyes small but incredibly expressive. His nose looked Jewish, his mouth very finely drawn and his body well proportioned. ... Only his skinny hands, with their protruding veins, were ugly, and he gesticulated far too much with them.[66]

As late as 1948 Sophie Rickert, wife of Gertrud Kinel's close friend Heinrich Rickert, similarly described Simmel as

a tall, thin man of totally Jewish appearance. His facial features could not claim to be beautiful. Perhaps one could even say that they were grotesque. This was particularly striking when his wife stood next to him. She was at least as tall as he was, light blond and so very "Aryan" that the Third Reich itself could not have taken exception. And nevertheless, he was absolutely distinguished.[67]

And in 1948 Marianne Weber (Max Weber's wife) commented:

Gertrud Simmel was a beautiful woman, tall and slim, full of grace and dignity, a pleasant Nordic appearance, blonde and blue-eyed, with soft features ... and commanding a certain reserve. What an odd couple, she and her husband Georg. He was barely of medium height, shorter than she was, typically Jewish, not handsome; but what do exterior appearances matter in a man of such rich spirit![68]

Perceived as a Jewish caricature even by his friends, Simmel made a similar impression on those who hindered his teaching career and did not hesitate to use explicitly antisemitic pretexts to do so. Simmel applied for a number of professorships but did not succeed until the age of 56, in Strasbourg, after a debate in the parliament of Alsace-Lorraine concluded that he should not be considered Jewish. The day following his appointment, Simmel, in one of his rare public reactions to antisemitism, wrote to a deputy of the *Landesausschuss*, the Alsace-Lorraine provincial assembly:

I am pleased to hear of your intention to use your mandate to improve conditions at our universities ... . But it would be very difficult to present these matters to you in such a manner as to impress parliament. Much of what is involved here is a pernicious tendency on the part of the administration, which is well known by all those who belong to the academic world but regarding

[66] Both quotes are cited in Köhnke, *Der junge Simmel*, pp. 128–132.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 131.

which one can clearly gather no legal evidence, and the government would simply deny, for instance, antisemitism.[69]

Simmel ultimately accepted the professorial position with little enthusiasm, since it was far from his beloved Berlin and the enthusiastic audiences who adored his public lectures. Simmel's career, as a result of this antisemitic obstruction, which discriminated against even converted Jews, was indeed a string of failures.

One of these was Simmel's first, unsuccessful attempt in February 1884 to secure the *habilitation*, a prerequisite for becoming a university professor. On this occasion, Count Yorck von Wartenburg wrote a letter of congratulations to the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, who was occasionally accused of sharing popular antisemitic sentiments: "My congratulations on every single case in which you manage to keep away from the chair that superficial Jewish routine which lacks the sense of responsibility for thought, just as the entire tribe lacks a feeling for mental and physical soil".[70] In 1908 Simmel's application for a chair in philosophy at Heidelberg was also rejected in spite of support from Max Weber, Heinrich Rickert and Georg Jellinek. Simmel nearly received the post, but a letter from Dietrich Schäfer, a disciple of the nationalist historian Heinrich von Treitschke, cancelled the procedure at the last moment:

Whether professor Simmel is baptised or not, I do not know, and I did not want to ask. But he is totally Jewish in his exterior bearing, in his manner and in his ideas. Possibly this is what has prevented him from being offered a chair elsewhere as it has hindered his advancement here ... but these explanations are not needed, for his academic and literary merits and successes are limited and mediocre. His audiences are large. ... He speaks very slowly, drop by drop, and offers little material. ... Moreover, he spices his talks with witty remarks. His audiences correspond to his style. Even for Berlin, ladies make up a particularly strong contingent. Also strongly represented are people from the East, those who have established themselves here and also those who stream in from the East every new semester. His entire manner corresponds to their orientation, their taste. ... I truly do not believe that Heidelberg will be enhanced if we give the ideologies held by Simmel, which are different enough from our German Christian classical education, a space even greater than that which they already enjoy among the teaching staff.[71]

Weber had been right when, before the appointment had been made, he had written these frank lines to the university administration: "Enclosed are two lists; the

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[69] *Ibid.*, p. 146. On Simmel's appointment to the University of Strasbourg, see Caron, *Between France and Germany*, p. 143.

[70] Köhnke, *Der junge Simmel*, p. 116. Köhnke assumes that Dilthey opposed Simmel's *habilitation* for antisemitic reasons. This interpretation comes close to the more mitigated judgment of the sociologist Albert Salomon, who was a student of Simmel's. Salomon noted that "although Dilthey was an implacable antisemite, he supported Simmel". Albert Salomon, 'Georg Simmel Reconsidered by Albert Salomon', in Gary Jaworski, *Georg Simmel and the American Prospect*, New York 1997, esp. p. 94.

[71] Cited in Michael Landmann, 'Bausteine zur Biographie', in Gassen and Landmann, *Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel*, pp. 26–27. On this failure at Heidelberg and Schäfer's intervention, see Hans Liebeschütz, *Von Georg Simmel zu Franz Rosenzweig: Studien zum Jüdischen Denken im deutschen Kulturbereich*, Tübingen 1970, pp. 106–112.

first one has the names of three Jews, the second, three other names. The Jew in the third position is better than the first on the non-Jewish list; but I know that you will nevertheless choose a name from the second list".[72] A strong supporter of Simmel, Weber was well aware that Simmel's appointment was being blocked by antisemitism.

Basically, Simmel adapted to his German environment by positioning himself "at the periphery of Jewish history".[73] He therefore seldom made any public mention of his Jewish background. The future sociologist Herman Schmalenbach, a Protestant and at the time a student of Simmel's, remembers how during a 1906 gathering at Simmel's home as he was finishing a lecture on the metaphysics of Jews, Simmel made the surprising comment that "With Judaism, you will end up as badly off as all of us".[74] This extremely rare use of "we" reminds us of another famous, even more astonishing comment made by Simmel to Martin Buber, the Jewish philosopher who was another of Simmel's Berlin students and whose work was to be strongly influenced by Simmel's social theories – so much so that, when Buber was appointed to the University of Jerusalem, he submitted a course project which drew heavily on Simmel's theories of social forms.[75] Long before his departure for Palestine, when Buber gave Simmel a copy of his 1906 book on Hassidism, *Die Geschichten des Rabbi Nachman* (The Tales of Rabbi Nachman), the latter replied: "We are indeed a remarkable (*merkwürdiges*) people" – a surprising acknowledgment, once again, that he belonged to a Jewish nation. According to Buber this was the only time he had ever heard Simmel use the pronoun "we" when referring to Jews.[76]

A non-Jew who was seen by others as a Jew, as a man who was conscious of belonging to Jewish history in a manner that gave him a special status that shaped his destiny, but who was ignorant of his culture, Simmel remained, according to the philosopher Ernst Bloch, shaped by "Eastern European Jewish habits".[77] He was

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[72] Cited in François Léger, *La Pensée de Georg Simmel*, Paris 1989, p. 14.

[73] Hans Liebeschütz, *Von Georg Simmel zu Franz Rosenzweig*, p. 104.

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[75] See the letter by Martin Buber to Gershom Scholem, November 24, 1935, in Dominique Bourel, *Identité et cultures: Lettre d'information du Centre de recherche français de Jérusalem*, no. 13, October 1996, p. 33. Buber wanted the chair to be called "torat ha hevra", general sociology, and he intended to investigate "social forms, mutual relationships between persons, forms and social orders". It is easy to see why the *Encyclopedia Judaica* presented Buber as a disciple of Simmel: "Buber, in turn, stimulated by Simmel, described Jewish existence as manifesting itself not so much in substance but in relationships, that is, as essentially social in character. In this fashion, Simmel's approach to sociology has become a cornerstone of the sociology of the Jews". *Encyclopedia Judaica*, vol. 14, p. 1576. In his monumental biography of Buber, Maurice Friedman refers often to the relationship between Simmel and Buber. Maurice Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, 3 vols., New York 1983, vol. 1, pp. 23, 134–135, and passim.

[76] Cited in Gassen and Landmann, *Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel*, p. 222; Liebesschütz, *Von Georg Simmel zu Franz Rosenzweig*, p. 122; and Laurence, 'Georg Simmel: Triumph and Tragedy', (see n. 65), pp. 40–41. On the fleeting relationship between Simmel and Buber, see Grete Schaeder, *Martin Buber: Hebräischer Humanismus*, Göttingen 1966.

[77] Gassen and Landmann, *Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel*, p. 250. Landmann, 'Ernst Bloch

just as harshly condemned by the Jewish philosopher Franz Rosenzweig as "a Mephisto of the Jewish world". For the author of *The Star of Redemption* (1921), whose work represented the most erudite form of Jewish messianic philosophy, "wherever there is a strange thought, a truly strange thought, for instance Simmelian thought, it is no longer our affair". In Rosenzweig's eyes, Simmel's philosophy was "smoke, not food"; Simmel's gestures betrayed a "man without a soul" whose thoughts arose from his brain alone because his heart was "atrophied".[78] A diabolical "oriental" Jew whose physical appearance and gestures were foreign to German culture, long rejected by the university as a result of intransigent antisemitism, Simmel, to his friends' great surprise, became a German nationalist in the early years of World War I. Ernst Bloch was even inspired to comment: "Simmel is behaving like a Teutonic Zionist".[79] To no avail: in many respects he remained a "stranger" to German society.

This posture of the "Stranger in the Academy",[80] this position as a solitary, marginal scholar with no immediate disciples – in contrast to Durkheim, who had become the uncontested leader of an academic school of sociology[81] without having faced institutionalised antisemitism in the course of his career – this outsider position, this lack of roots in the soil ultimately inspired Simmel to write, in his *Soziologie* (1907), his celebrated essay "The Stranger". Here, Simmel pointed to the Jews of Europe as the classic example of this alienation. By his very nature, the stranger is not "an 'owner of soil' – soil not only in the physical, but also in the figurative sense of a life-substance which is fixed, if not in a point in space, at least in an ideal point of the social environment".[82] Even in his more intimate relations, the stranger can use all his charms, yet he will never be "an owner of soil" as long as others see a stranger in him. Was not Simmel evoking his own failure here? In spite of the extraordinary "charm" he exerted on his audiences, in spite of being neither a Jew nor a stranger, did not Simmel remain, in the eyes of others, a Jewish stranger lacking roots in the soil? Worse still, this quality of being a stranger pursued him even in his "more intimate relations", into the heart of the social interactions that he believed constituted the core of social existence. This theme of the Jew as symbol of the stranger was already evident in his earlier work *Philosophie des Geldes* (The Philosophy of Money), published in 1900. Here Simmel declared:

über Simmel', in Böhringer and Gründer, *Ästhetik und Soziologie um die Jahrhundertwende*, (see n. 61), p. 270.

[78] Cited in Liebesschütz, *Von Georg Simmel zu Franz Rosenzweig*, pp. 141–144.

[79] Landmann, 'Ernst Bloch über Simmel', p. 271.

[80] The expression is from Lewis A. Coser, 'The Stranger in the Academy', in Coser (ed.), *Georg Simmel*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1965.

[81] Donald Levine devotes a few lines to this comparison in the introduction to Levine, *Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms*, Chicago 1971, p. 10. He also notes the profound influence of Simmel on both Max Weber and Leopold von Wiese as well as on several other German sociologists or philosophers of the time, pp. 45ff.

[82] Kurt H. Wolff (trans. and ed.), *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, Glencoe, IL 1950, pp. 402–408.

there is no need to emphasise that the Jews are the best example of the correlation between the central role of money interests and social deprivation. ... Because the wealth of the Jews consisted of money, they became a particularly sought-after and profitable object of exploitation, for no other possessions can be expropriated as easily, simply and without loss. ... If one deprives somebody of his land, it is impossible – except by turning it into cash – to realize the benefit right away, since time, effort and expenses are required. ... The relationship of Jews to money in general is more evident in a sociological constellation that gives expression to that character of money. The role that the stranger plays within a social group directs him, from the outset, towards relations with the group that are mediated by money, above all because of the transportability and the extensive usefulness of money outside the boundaries of the group. ... Dispersed peoples, crowded into more or less closed cultural circles, can hardly put down roots or find a free position in production. They are therefore dependent on intermediate trade, which is much more elastic than primary production, since the sphere of trade can be expanded almost limitlessly by merely formal combinations and can absorb people from outside whose roots do not lie in the group. The basic trait of Jewish mentality – to be much more interested in logical-formal combinations than in substantive creative production – must be understood in the light of their economic condition. The fact that the Jew was a stranger who was not organically connected with his economic group directed him to trade and its sublimation in pure monetary transactions. ... It was of particular importance that the Jew was a stranger not only with regard to the local people, but also with regard to religion. ... The high interest rate charged by Jews was the result of their being excluded from land ownership.[83]

Simmel, better than Marx, knew how to situate the role of Jews in business in its proper historical context: their exile and dispersion since the Babylonian captivity conferred upon them the formidable privilege of remaining "the Other", "the Stranger" par excellence, free of any roots, alone capable of exercising a monetary function that was so dangerous and unstable that it often provoked financial retaliation in the form of confiscation or exorbitant taxes. In *Philosophie des Geldes*, Simmel had already established a close link between the status of the stranger and the Jews "who came from the outside, [and] who do not belong to the group". In these few pages devoted to the Jews of the Diaspora, who for him "represent the finest example" of a more general sociology of social groups involved with money, Simmel described them consistently as "strangers", and mainly through them he constructed a theory of the social function of the stranger.[84] He concluded his study by writing that "strangers" in the original sense no longer exist today; trade relations, the customs and laws of even very remote countries, have come to form a more and more uniform organism. ... The contrast that existed between the native and the stranger has been eliminated, because the money form of transactions has now been taken up by the whole economic community".[85] Some commentators have concluded from this remark that "it is not the exclusion of the Jew as a stranger that

[83] Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, New York 1990, pp. 223–225.

[84] *The Philosophy of Money* often refers to the Jews. See *Philosophie de l'argent*, Paris 1987, pp. 448, 454, 460, 472. Surprisingly, Gianfranco Poggi's systematic study of this book does not mention this point. Gianfranco Poggi, *Money and the Modern Mind: Georg Simmel's Philosophy of Money*, Berkeley, CA 1993.

[85] Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, p. 227.

constitutes modernity. The stranger, even if the Jew is considered a stranger, should always be understood as the product of a form of interaction".[86] This view thus calls into question the essentialist character of the Jew as the "stranger" in order to place greater emphasis on the role of social context in transforming various social groups into "strangers".

This interpretation, however, does not stand up to a careful reading of *Soziologie*, Simmel's other fundamental work, published in 1907. This short work, which has now become a classic, begins and ends with references to the Jew as the stranger par excellence. Indeed, for Simmel:

> The stranger is thus being discussed here, not in the sense often touched upon in the past, as the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the person who comes today and stays tomorrow. ... He is fixed within a particular spatial group, or within a group whose boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries. But his position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it which do not and cannot stem from the group itself. ... For, to be a stranger is naturally a very positive relation; it is a specific form of interaction. ... Throughout the history of economics the stranger everywhere appears as the trader, or the trader as stranger. ... The classical example is the history of European Jews.[87]

As we see, the sole empirical example of the stranger ever provided by Simmel was that of European Jews who, as in *Philosophie des Geldes*, represent the classic case of strangers who assume the monetary and commercial function assigned to them as a consequence of their outsider status and their lack of ties to the soil.[88] This formulation is repeated almost verbatim in two of Simmel's earlier fundamental works. The stranger is also different from the expatriate, from the exile or even from the emigrant or nomad, since he is the one who, more than the others, "comes today and stays tomorrow". He is an integral part of the group, but at the same time he remains outside of it. To be sure, in a more general manner the figure of the stranger

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86 Otthein Rammstedt, 'L'Etranger de Georg Simmel', *Revue des Sciences Sociales de la France de l'Est*, 1994, esp. p. 151. Freddy Raphael, on the contrary, closely links the stranger to the Jew in Simmel's work. Freddy Raphael, 'L'Etranger' de Georg Simmel', in Patrick Watier (ed.), *Georg Simmel: La sociologie et l'expérience du monde moderne*, Paris 1986, pp. 265–278. Raphael writes, "As a stranger, the Jew participates in different symbolic spheres, and as such he questions the claim any of them could ever make to absolute quality. Etymologically, the word Hebrew, "Ivri", means "the one who passes from one side to another". The Jew is faithful to his vocation when he forces a culture to give up its claim to being a universal model and, moving beyond its confinement and self-satisfaction, to become richer from the difference. ... He betrays his vocation when he confines himself to the unyielding frame of the nation state and makes of it his finality: the cult of the soil has its roots in idolatry" (p. 273).

87 Wolff, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, pp. 402–408.

88 René König stresses this definition of the stranger as the Jew in Simmelian thought. René König, 'Die Soziologie', in Leonhard Reinisch (ed.), *Die Juden und die Kultur*, Stuttgart 1961, esp. pp. 74–75. One notes that Simmel's statement "The classical example is furnished by the history of European Jews" does not appear in the translation of these pages on the stranger in Yves Grafmeyer and Isaac Joseph, *L'Ecole de Chicago: Naissance de l'écologie urbaine*, Paris 1984, p. 55.

represents "a relationship between people", a social form based on an interactionist sociology, which can therefore be applied to a variety of empirical contents.[89] Nevertheless, in these few pages Simmel relied exclusively on the historical example of European Jews. In concluding these pages, Simmel did note that what distinguishes the situation of the stranger does not depend on any single individual but on the entire group, and he again invoked the case of the Jews. Alluding to the taxation of German Jews in the Middle Ages, Simmel maintained:

> Whereas the Beede [tax] paid by the Christian citizen changed with the changes of his fortune, it was fixed once for all for every single Jew. This fixity rested on the fact that the Jew had his social position as a Jew, not as the individual bearer of certain objective contents. Every other citizen was the owner of a particular amount of property, and his tax followed its fluctuations. But the Jew as a taxpayer was, in the first place, a Jew, and thus his tax situation had an invariable element.[90]

The reification of the stranger was, in Simmel's eyes, exemplified by the Jew who was "taxable primarily as a Jew". Although the Jew was "an organic member of the group", he nevertheless inspired violent reactions among those who encountered him. And as long as he was considered a stranger in the eyes of others, he could never be an "owner of soil". Simmel thus gave us an original interpretation of antisemitism as a form of rejection of the Jew-Stranger who was profoundly assimilated into society. As was the case too in Germany at that time, the Jews had become an organic element provoking violent reaction, despite his familiarity and even his charms. Simmel seems to be referring here to the strong symbiosis between German society and its Jews, a symbiosis that did not prevent Simmel's own rejection. This rejection continued in spite of all the "charm" Simmel exerted on his Berlin audiences. He was a "stranger in the academy" but also, ultimately, a stranger to German identity, a "man without any qualities" other than his Jewish origin.

In those first years of the twentieth century, therefore, French-style emancipation and German-style emancipation each retained their own logic, which led to different Jewish destinies.

Translated from the French by Nicole Gentz

Comment by Peter Pulzer

The main thesis of Pierre Birnbaum's essay, as I understand it, is that the careers of Emile Durkheim and Georg Simmel, though no doubt determined by individual factors, were characteristic of the situation of the Jews, or at any rate intellectual Jews in their respective countries. It is easy to test this proposition with a counterfactual. Would Durkheim's career have been possible in Germany? And would Simmel's behaviour patterns have been necessary or probable in France? But on the as-

[89] On the stranger as a social form, see P.A. Lawrence, *Georg Simmel: Sociologist and European*, New York 1976, pp. 19, 28.

[90] Wolff, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, pp. 402–408.

sumption, for the moment, that Birnbaum is right, and that we can accept Durkheim and Simmel as representative or even typical figures, I want to ask how we can explain the differences between them in terms of the modern history and political structures of the two countries. Let me begin with the process of Jewish emancipation, a process that was common to the Western and Central European world from the late eighteenth century onwards. The stimulus to this process lay in the spread of Enlightenment ideas, though the Enlightenment itself took different forms in each of the relevant countries. What was common to all of them was a redefinition of the terms of citizenship. Of these redefinitions, I should like to identify three types, insofar as they affected the civic status of Jews.

The first is the implicit emancipation characteristic of Anglo-America. This was most straightforward in the newly founded United States, where the First Amendment to the Constitution simply forbade the establishment of any state religion. That is not the same as saying there is no antisemitism in the United States, nor that there has never been social discrimination or informal segregation. No Jew has ever been president; but then there has been only one Catholic in the White House, even though there are many more Catholics than Jews in America, and very few presidents had ancestors who did not come from the British Isles. In the course of time, however, every other public office has been open to Jews, and where Jews have benefited from anti-discrimination legislation, this has been incidental; all such legislation was passed with other minorities, who had suffered greater disadvantages, in mind. In Britain, following the re-admission of Jews in 1655, Jews lived under some disadvantages, but the laws that affected them were directed at non-Anglicans, non-Protestants or foreign-born persons generally. In neither the United States nor post-1655 Britain were there any "Jew laws". There is therefore no reason why Durkheim's career should not have been paralleled in either country, though more probably in the twentieth rather than the late nineteenth century. Conversion to Christianity would, however, have been irrelevant to his career prospects.

The second type is the French, which I shall call "big bang" emancipation. There is a short debate, there is a vote on a law and the matter is settled. Even the Restoration of 1815, reactionary in other respects, did not rescind the civil rights of Jews secured under the Revolution, and Napoleon's *décrets infâmes* lapsed quietly. Here, too, we must distinguish between the legal status of Jews and undercurrents of antisemitism or certain forms of social discrimination. The Dreyfus case happened in France, not Germany, but its outcome, too, was French. As Birnbaum points out, high-ranking Jewish officers in the French army were nothing unusual even before the First World War.

The third type I shall have to call the German, for want of a better term. It was characterised by a continuous dialectic between Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, and by disputes about the nature and limits of national identity. The Enlightenment was certainly present in the German states, as the reforms of Joseph II and those of Baron Karl vom Stein and Prince Karl August von Hardenberg showed, but it was an Enlightenment from above and not dedicated to the ideal of

natural rights, the *citoyen libre* or the freeborn Englishman. That was the first obstacle to a relatively painless integration of Jews into social and public life. The second obstacle was the mismatch between nation and state. The question who was a Frenchman or who was a Briton was easily answered, even two hundred years ago, because in each case territory helped to define the nation. In Germany, the Romantic notion of the *Kulturnation*, though not initially intended to be exclusive or discriminatory, quickly became so. The main reason for that lay in the experience of the Napoleonic wars, which became a crusade not only against a military enemy but against the agent of an un-German ideology. Some time in the first half of the nineteenth century, German nationality became defined against others; not necessarily mainly or primarily against Jews, but also against them. This explains why, in the course of the nineteenth century, Jews tended to be suspect as being Francophile or Anglophile, which, indeed, they had good reason to be; and why the *Reich* law on citizenship, when it was eventually established in 1913, was based on *ius sanguinis*, and continued to be so based until amended in 1999. German uncertainties about identity and nationality had one further effect. The debate on Jewish citizenship lasted nearly a century, beginning with Christian Wilhelm Dohm's plea of 1781 and ending with the law of July 3, 1869. As early as 1809, Wilhelm von Humboldt had warned that emancipation in instalments would aggravate the problem instead of solving it, and so it turned out. The long drawn-out discussions accustomed the German public to assuming that there was a 'Jewish Question'. In doing so, it undermined the sense of security of the Jewish population.

I should like to mention one other aspect of the practicalities of emancipation and civic equality in a comparative European perspective. Emancipation, where it occurred, appears to have been more effective in Catholic than in Protestant continental states. This might seem surprising, even counter-intuitive, given the historic role of the Catholic Church in demonising Jews and claiming moral and confessional monopoly. There is, however, a simple explanation for this phenomenon. Much of Catholic Europe was characterised, at least in the second half of the nineteenth century, by an anti-clerical hegemony – not only in France, but also in Belgium, Italy and to some extent in Cisleithan Austria. Even within Germany, this applied to Bavaria, where Jews had better access to academic, judicial and even military positions before 1914 than in the Lutheran North. In Prussia and, after 1871, the German Empire, this type of secularisation did not apply. The dominance of *Kulturprotestantismus* meant that Prussia and the Empire were *de facto* denominational states. The notion of the *citoyen libre* was as foreign to the Empire as it had been to the constituent states, hence the pressure on academics to keep quiet about their Jewish affiliations or to convert. Though Germany was by 1900 a more urbanised and industrialised state than France, Jews in Germany remained more of an estate than in France, and renunciation of Judaism was a more usual price for professional advancement. Indeed, because of the anti-clerical hegemony, conversion was almost pointless as a career move in France. Would an observant Catholic have stood a better chance of an appointment at the Ecole Normale Supérieure than a secular Jew?

While agreeing with Birnbaum's general proposition, I should like to end with some further considerations. There is no doubt that the careers of Durkheim and Simmel reflected the contrasting paths of emancipation in their respective countries. However, it is possible that the choice of a different pair of scholars might have led to a less clear-cut conclusion. Suppose we had decided instead to compare Henri Bergson, who was closer to Catholicism than to his metropolitan, bourgeois Jewish background, and the neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen, who held a chair at Marburg and publicly engaged himself in Jewish concerns. Would we arrive at identical conclusions? A second consideration relates to the position of Jews in the two countries during the First World War. Why was there a commission in France to record Jewish service, with which Durkheim felt an obligation to associate himself? Its equivalent existed in Germany, but for obvious reasons: to counter the propaganda of the antisemitic Right and because German Jews had a pathological need to demonstrate their patriotism. But does its existence in France not point to a structural weakness in the *contrat républicain*? Lastly, there is the question of relative loyalty to the Jewish faith. Birnbaum observes that conversion was rarer among French than among German Jews, which he regards as evidence for a successful *privatisation du judaïsme*. But one indicator of successful integration in the case of German Jews was the rising rate of intermarriage. It may be that comparative data do not exist for France, but any indication of the intermarriage rate would give us a further criterion for measuring this *privatisation*.

Steven E. Aschheim

Towards the Phenomenology of the Jewish Intellectual: The German and French Cases Compared

In 1956 Hannah Arendt proclaimed, "The German-speaking Jews and their history are an altogether unique phenomenon; nothing comparable to it is to be found even in the other areas of Jewish assimilation. To investigate this phenomenon, which among other things found expression in a literally astonishing wealth of talent and of scientific and intellectual productivity, constitutes a historical task of the first rank, and one which, of course, can be attacked only now, after the history of the German Jews has come to an end".[1] Arendt energetically answered her own call and, on occasion quite brilliantly, addressed herself to the task.[2] Her conviction concerning German Jewry's unique intellectual productivity and remarkable cultural achievements was no idiosyncratic quirk. For over a half-century, now, fascinated scholars have been chronicling, mapping and variously explaining – often in a highly sophisticated manner – these accomplishments.

To be sure, some of this scholarship is to be explained as an act of commemorative valorisation. Still, it would be no exaggeration to state that the study of German Jewish culture has turned into something of an academic industry.[3] Indeed, at times it comes perilously close to functioning as an ideology. George Steiner, for instance, has insistently advertised the prodigal creative genius of post-Enlightenment German-speaking intellectuals and artists steeped in the emancipated, secular, critical, rationalist liberal humanism of Central Europe – and equated this with his own prescriptive, highly idealised conception of Judaism itself.[4] George Mosse has per-

[1] See the (1956) 'Preface' to Hannah Arendt, *Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess*, ed. by Liliane Weissberg, trans. by Richard and Clara Winston, Baltimore 1997, p. 82.

[2] There are too many examples of Arendt's work to be listed here. But in addition to the above work, see especially the essays in Part 1 ('The Pariah as Rebel') of her anthology, *The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age*, ed. by Ron H. Feldman, New York 1978, and most crucially, her marvellous piece 'Walter Benjamin: 1892–1940', in her *Men in Dark Times*, New York 1968.

[3] For a fine example that documents and seeks to explain "the startling cultural productivity of the German-Jewish symbiosis", see David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1740–1840*, New York 1987, especially the 'Conclusion', pp. 173–178. The quote appears on p. 177.

[4] This view is evident in almost everything Steiner writes. See especially 'A Kind of Survivor', in George Steiner, *Language and Silence: Essays on Language, Literature and the Inhuman*, New York 1977, as well as his autobiographical comments in Steiner, *Errata: An Examined Life*, London 1997.

suasively argued that the unequalled cultural-intellectual productivity of German Jews is explicable primarily through their peculiar appropriation of the distinctive German Enlightenment notion of *Bildung* into the creative core of their newly acquired identities. Like Arendt, Steiner and many others, Mosse offers this interpretation not only as an analysis but partly as autobiographical self-description and partly as his creed, urging this form of Jewishness as the one that ought still to function as "inspiration for many men and women searching to humanise their society and their lives".[5] German Jewish intellectuality here serves as a metaphor for the critical, unmasking, yet always humanising and autonomous mind.[6]

My own work, too, I must admit, has been informed by similar assumptions and preferences. I confess that for me it was these Central European intellectuals, rather than British or French thinkers, who, in matters both Jewish and general, seemed most relevant and acted as magnetic models.[7] These may have been somewhat chauvinistic biases. Nevertheless, they appeared to be solidly grounded, based upon a clearly demonstrable historical reality, a *Sonderweg* related to the peculiar, jagged circumstances of Jewish emancipation within the German *Kulturbereich*. This was a model that, while not always making the connections explicit, posited a link between social and individual tensions, political discontents and intellectual creativity. Thus in Germany, even for the most assimilated of Jews – such as Karl Marx – the "Jewish Problem" or issues of Jewishness possessed a proximity, an existential edge, likely to be less pressing in the French context.[8] French Jews, it seemed clear, lacked a comparable productivity, or so the implicit theory went, because they were far more comfortably assimilated and acculturated, their identities less torn by the fractures of a long, drawn-out emancipation process and its accompanying, constantly uncertain social signals.

To the extent that one gave thought to this question (and not much thought has been expended in this direction – I have not come across a single systematic French-German Jewish cultural comparison![9]), this model would attribute less creativity to French Jews on the paradoxical basis of the success of the French *Sonderweg*. Because there existed in France a powerful republican, revolutionary tradition, integration and identification were rendered easier – or at least more tension-free – than in Ger-

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[5] See George L. Mosse, *German Jews Beyond Judaism*, Bloomington 1985, p. ix. In his autobiography, *Confronting History: A Memoir*, Madison 2000, Mosse writes of *German Jews Beyond Judaism* that it "is certainly my most personal book, almost a confession of faith" (p. 184).

[6] See the analysis of Mosse, 'George Mosse at 80: A Critical Laudatio', in Steven Aschheim, *In Times of Crisis: Essays on European Culture, Germans and Jews*, Madison 2001, pp 155–170. This essay originally appeared in *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 34, no. 2 (April 1999), pp. 295–312.

[7] I explore the personal and autobiographical dimensions of these predilections in an essay, 'Growing up German-Jewish in South Africa', in Aschheim, *In Times of Crisis*, pp. 59–63. This appeared originally in *American Jewish Archives*, vol. 40, no. 2 (November 1988), pp. 359–364.

[8] This "proximity" thesis was suggested to me by Jeffrey Barash in a conversation in Jerusalem, August 23, 2000.

[9] Sorkin's *Transformation of German Jewry* seeks to explain the peculiar creativity of German-speaking Jewry via the comparative method, but instructively he does this by examining the English and Russian cases and does not even mention French Jewry. See pp. 173–178.

many. Certainly in political terms, as Jonathan Frankel has pointed out, at the core of French society were institutional forces and individuals that were friends and allies of the Jews, while one would be hard put indeed to find such equivalents in Germany. The Dreyfus Affair rendered this positive point as clearly as it highlighted the negative and previously hidden dimensions of French life.[10]

James Joll once concretised these differences in a comparison between the two most famous Jewish intellectuals who reached the pinnacle of political life in their respective countries: Walther Rathenau and Léon Blum. While both were original figures, Joll insists, they also personified the stereotypical characteristics of their respective nations: Blum was logical and rational, Rathenau obscure and metaphysical. Both were deeply influenced by the fact that they were Jews (Blum not only explicitly acknowledged his Jewish identity, he also voiced a certain sympathy for Zionism, a position rather uncharacteristic of many mainstream French Jews), yet, Joll writes:

> [T]he difference in their attitudes to their Jewish heritage throws light both on their characters and on the position of the Jews in France and Germany. Both identified themselves with their native country; but while for Blum assimilation was easy and natural, and hardly caused him any personal anxiety, even if it was at times a political disadvantage, for Rathenau his Jewish origins and his sedulous cultivation of Prussian traditions were in constant conflict, and added yet another rift to an already divided nature. Rathenau's death was directly due to the fact that he was a Jew; but it was not until the Germans had conquered and corrupted France that Blum's life was in danger for the same reason.[11]

Prevailing scholarship has indeed portrayed German Jewry as more psychologically fractured and embattled than French Jews, and the undoubted richness and qualitative edge of its intellectual achievements have, to a large extent, been explained by these conflicts. The iconic status of the most famous exemplars, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Albert Einstein (one is tempted to add Franz Kafka to this trinity), may by now be cliché-ridden, yet no one can doubt that they were indeed among the crucial makers and embodiments of modern secular thought, universal men who – in ways notoriously difficult to define precisely (a point to which I shall return) – were nevertheless quintessentially Jewish. There is a virtually inexhaustible list of German-speaking Jewish cultural and intellectual luminaries, and their influence is felt down to our own time. Is it not rather astonishing – and a phenomenon worth further investigation – that many current cult figures of Anglo-American culture, thinkers who are regarded as foundational of diverse contemporary political and ideational currents, were Weimar Republic Jewish intellectuals? These would include members of the so-called "Frankfurt School" – Theodor

[10] I owe these insights to a conversation with Jonathan Frankel in Jerusalem, October 3, 2000.

[11] James Joll, *Intellectuals in Politics: Three Biographical Essays*, London 1960, pp. xii-xiii. In overall terms this portrait is accurate, yet it downplays the antisemitic attacks that Blum had to endure. On these attacks see Pierre Birnbaum, *Anti-Semitism in France: A Political History from Léon Blum to the Present*, trans. by M. Kohan, Oxford 1992; Vicki Caron, 'The "Jewish Question" from Dreyfus to Vichy', in Martin S. Alexander (ed.), *French History since Napoleon*, London 1999, pp. 172–202.

Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse – who propounded the sophisticated, culturally attuned Western neo-Marxism now known as "Critical Theory"; Leo Strauss and the revival and re-formation of an erudite, if somewhat arcane, neo-conservatism; Hannah Arendt, with a radical and post-totalitarian non-ideological reaffirmation of the political realm; and Walter Benjamin, who has become almost synonymous with the integrity of the critical enterprise itself.[12]

This vaunted creativity applies equally to "inner" Jewish matters and to general, secular, cultural projects. Already in his 1967 work, Michael Meyer demonstrated that the very "Origins of the Modern Jew", and the construction of the lineaments of contemporary Western Jewish identities and ideologies were to be found in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century encounter with European culture in Germany.[13] Scholars have painstakingly investigated and claimed as pioneering German Jewry's confrontation with modernity and the creation of its Jewish equivalents.[14] A cursory list of the relevant familiar names associated with the German *Kulturbereich* – Moses Mendelssohn, Leopold Zunz, Abraham Geiger, Zacharias Frankel, Samuel Holdheim, Hermann Cohen, Theodor Herzl, Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Gershom Scholem – far from exhausts what could easily become an "interminable and otiose"[15] catalogue. Who has not been privy to conferences lauding the German-Jewish intellectual legacy? I have never heard a comparable testament to, say, the English-Jewish or even the French-Jewish heritage.[16]

But I am beginning to feel a little uncomfortable with this conventional wisdom. The present – very speculative and tentative – essay is, then, designed as an act of critical self-examination (inspired by a conversation I had with Richard I. Cohen some years ago in which he challenged many of these pieties). To what extent does the model hold? Were German-Jewish intellectuality and its cultural productions (whether specifically Jewish or expressed more generally) really quantitatively and qualitatively *sui generis*? I believe that not enough thought has gone into how we can properly arrive at such judgements. Could a comparison with the French-Jewish

[12] The fact that these were all critics of the liberal project may tell us as much about our own intellectual state of mind as it does about Weimar culture. But this is a separate matter that I have considered elsewhere. See especially my essays: 'German Jews beyond *Bildung* and Liberalism: The Radical Jewish Revival in the Weimar Republic', in Aschheim, *Culture and Catastrophe: German and Jewish Confrontations with National Socialism and Other Crises*, New York 1996, pp. 31–44; and 'Against Social Science: Jewish Intellectuals, the Critique of Liberal-Bourgeois Modernity, and the (Ambiguous) Legacy of Radical Weimar Theory', in Aschheim, *In Times of Crisis*, pp. 24–43.

[13] Michael A. Meyer, *The Origins of the Modern Jew: Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germany, 1749–1824*, Detroit 1967.

[14] This is the view, for instance, of Gerson D. Cohen, 'German Jewry as Mirror of Modernity', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 20 (1975), pp. ix-xxxi. Tellingly, almost all of Jacob Katz's work on the processes of Jewish modernisation concentrates on the German case.

[15] George Steiner's phrase in *Errata*, p. 53.

[16] This point was made in George L. Mosse's (unpublished) concluding remarks at a conference held in Madison, Wisconsin on October 7–9, 1993 to honour his work. For the other contributions to this conference see Klaus L. Berghahn (ed.), *The German-Jewish Dialogue Reconsidered: A Symposium in Honor of George L. Mosse*, New York 1996.

experience (one complicated, admittedly, by my own amateurishness in that field) provide a different perspective on this particular claim, and could it shed light on some of the more general assumptions and questions involved in this kind of discourse? And, if so, what methodology would enable us – fairly and impartially – to carry out such a comparison?

One guideline, perhaps, could be the way in which the protagonists themselves viewed this question. Certainly, at least with regard to internal Jewish scholarship and culture, a sense of comparative inferiority constituted a subjective datum of nineteenth-century French-Jewish consciousness itself.[17] In the first place, a French *Haskalah* did emerge, but it was very closely derived from, indeed was modelled upon, its Berlin counterpart. And while a French *Wissenschaft des Judentums* did develop, its first publication (the *Revue des études juives*) did not appear until 1880 (is it not symptomatic that we use the German expression – *Wissenschaft des Judentums* – unself-consciously and cross-culturally?). When the "Science of Judaism" did eventually emerge in France, it was as a direct result of German-Jewish influence: its earlier and most important exponent was the German-born and trained Solomon Munk.[18] As the editors of the *Revue* put it:

> One has often stated and with a feeling of regret, that our country is far from occupying one of the first ranks in the vast scientific and literary movement, which during the last forty or fifty years has successfully revived the study of Jewish antiquity. To raise France from the state of inferiority, which suits neither her past nor her present traditions, to enter freely into this remarkable movement where she was so wrong to have let herself be outstripped, to regain if it is possible, *le temps perdu*, such has been the goal of men of goodwill.[19]

To be sure, as Jay Berkowitz and other scholars – such as Frances Malino – have pointed out, although French-Jewish scholarship was built upon the German model, it did develop different foci of interest, which were more in tune with the French context and its specific interests.[20]

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[17] It should be pointed out – and the present volume represents one indication of this – that contemporary historians are now beginning to question this negative French-Jewish self-evaluation and are arguing for a degree of autonomy and creativity absent in the consciousness of the historical actors themselves as well as in previous historiography.

[18] Munk was born in Glogau, Germany and studied at the Universities of Berlin and Bonn. He later moved to France, where in 1863 he succeeded Ernest Renan in the Chair of Hebrew at the Collège de France. The other major exponent, Joseph Derenbourg, was born in France, but was also a German resident. The French-born and trained Auguste Franck was an exception to the pattern.

[19] 'A nos lecteurs', *Revue des études juives*, 1 (1880), p. v, cited in Frances Malino, 'Introduction', in Frances Malino and Bernard Wasserstein (eds.), *The Jews in Modern France*, Hanover, NH 1985, p. 6.

[20] See the superb work by Jay R. Berkowitz, *The Shaping of Jewish Identity in Nineteenth-Century France*, Detroit 1989, pp. 142–144. He argues that, unlike in Germany, where there was a concentration upon rabbinic literature and a disinclination towards biblical criticism (prompted by the anti-Jewish bias of this Protestant-dominated field, with which German Jewish scholars did not want to be associated), in France, Jews were prominent in biblical and philosophical studies. Thus the

If we limit ourselves initially to these internal Jewish matters, then, there is no dispute as to the greater originality, the qualitative edge and influence of the Germans over the French. But is this not stating the obvious? Are not these defining differences easily explicable in terms of the glaringly different demographic, political and intellectual conditions pertaining to the two countries? Even if German Jewry never possessed the masses that lived in Eastern Europe, it had far more substantial numbers than the community in France, which in the nineteenth century never constituted more than one percent of the total population. At the time of the French Revolution, the entire French Jewish population was not more than 40,000, concentrated mainly in Alsace and Lorraine. There were no major urban centres comparable to Berlin, Hamburg or Königsberg, and the cities had only a few Jews, and certainly no known intellectuals (unless one includes traditional rabbis in this category). The important city of Strasbourg entirely excluded Jews, and some estimates have put the total Jewish population of Paris between 500 and 800, consisting not of scholars, but mainly poor shopkeepers, peddlers and labourers. Michael Graetz has shown that it would take another generation or two before Paris became the centre of French Jewry. (It was only at the end of the nineteenth century, when nearly 60 percent of French Jewry resided there, that any kind of comparison becomes salient.)[21] The fact is that by the turn of the century, the French Jewish population, which had suffered a sharp decline of over 40,000 souls in 1871 with the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, was among the smallest of all major European countries, with the exception of Italy. Numbering only 72,000, less than half a percent of the total population, French Jewry was half the size of the British Jewish population at this time, and it was smaller even than that of the Netherlands.[22]

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by-now frenchified Munk dispassionately treated issues pertaining to the documentary hypothesis, disputing most of the claims, but accepting in principle the idea of human authorship of the Pentateuch. Unlike German-Jewish scholars, and in the spirit of the Durkheimians, he adopted a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. French scholars, Berkowitz notes, hardly touched rabbinic literature. Because reformers and rabbis cooperated in France, critical study of the Talmud was unnecessary, as was not the case for their German counterparts. Munk, it should be noted, also translated Maimonides' *Guide for the Perplexed* into French. Of course, French Jewish scholars were clear about the fact that they modelled their translation work on the Mendelssohn *Biur*. See also Ivan Strenski, *Durkheim and the Jews of France*, Chicago 1997, esp. p. 95. On Malino's views, see her essay in this volume.

[21] On the emergence of Paris as the centre of French Jewry, see Michael Graetz, *The Jews in Nineteenth Century France: From the French Revolution to the Alliance Israélite Universelle*, trans. by Jane Marie Todd, Stanford 1996, ch. 2, pp. 41–78, esp. pp. 41–42; Paula E. Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France*, Berkeley 1998, pp. 58, 92. In Metz, where there was less isolation, more wealth, and mobility, a *maskilic* movement did emerge, but the names of its practitioners – Lipmann Moses Bueschental, Moses Ensheim, Elijah Halfan Ha-Levi, Elie Halévy, 1760–1826, who became editor of the first French Jewish journal, the weekly *Israélite français* – remain far less well known than those across the Rhein.

[22] I have used the figures supplied by Eugen Weber in his 'Reflections on the Jews in France' in Malino and Wasserstein, *The Jews in Modern France*, pp. 8–9.

Apart from this crucial demographic difference, there were also important relevant politico-cultural divergences. In Germany, the link between theology and philosophy was almost constitutive of the culture. Their separation – like the process of emancipation itself – came much later and was more problematic than in France, where the force of the Enlightenment and the revolutionary inheritance meant a quick and radical split between the two realms. There was thus no built-in structural need for intellectual innovation via the reform of religion: because theology and philosophy were severed, and the political act of emancipation swiftly enacted, citizenship and religious affiliation could separate from one another, with a kind of traditional orthodoxy remaining intact, unthreatened. In Germany, emancipation was conditional upon fundamental behavioural and ideational reform. This was to be facilitated through the peculiar notion of *Bildung*, that ideational or ideological complement to the slow progress towards German political emancipation. *Bildung*, I might suggest, with its emphasis on the process of self-cultivation, had reform built into it. In Germany, then, it was this built-in need, this creative tension, that produced the Mendelssohns, the Zunzs, Geigers, Frankels, and so on.[23] This "theologico-political predicament" applied to the later period as well, when it was clear that the tensions had, if anything, sharpened, providing the backdrop for such diverse and creative responses as those proffered by Hermann Cohen, Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin and Leo Strauss, who constantly invoked this term to formulate his intellectual dilemma.[24]

This theologico-political predicament was largely absent in France. While, of course, no overall account should omit the Jewish Saint-Simonians, who introduced radical intellectual trends into the general French as well as the French Jewish community, as Michael Graetz has shown,[25] the lack of this predicament may account for the greater religious conservatism among French Jewry as a whole. To be sure, there were, as Jay Berkowitz has documented, various waves within French Jewry that initiated attempts at so-called "regeneration". These ideologies were often explicitly based on the Berlin *Haskalah*. But typically (as in the 1830s), they were far more conservative with regard to religious values and liturgical and educational reform than their German counterparts.[26] As one of these *régénérateurs*, Sa-

[23] I owe some of these insights to a conversation with Jeffrey Barash, Jerusalem, August 23, 2000.

[24] See the difficult but insightful 'Preface' to Leo Strauss, *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*, New York 1965.

[25] See Graetz, *The Jews in Nineteenth Century France.*

[26] Berkowitz comments that among these intellectuals there "appears to have been greater affinity and loyalty to the basic ideals of Mendelssohn and Wessely in France than among the reformers in Germany". Berkowitz, *The Shaping of Jewish Identity*, n. 11, p. 270. See, too, the comparisons with regard to French-Jewish and German-Jewish education in *ibid.*, ch. 8, pp. 173–191. It should also be noted that there were other more minor Jewish intellectuals who, in the Third Republic, sought to redefine Jewish identity and to "re-embody" it – such as Hippolite Prague, editor of the *Archives israélites*; the Jewish theologian Maurice Liber of the *Société des Etudes Juives*; James Darmsteter; Israel Lévi; and so on. See Strenski, *Durkheim and the Jews of France*, p. 38. (See n. 20 above.)

muel Cahen pithily observed, "liberty is not favourable to religious discussions". Cahen shrewdly noted what we still take to be the crucial reason for these differences: the timing of emancipation had a decisive relationship to the nature and degree of the cultural development of the population. In Germany, while intellectual achievement was of the highest order, the Jews' legal status lagged behind. Cahen observed that German-Jewish progress in modernisation (at least in the realm of religious reform) was paradoxically linked to government intolerance. In France, the opposite situation pertained. There the Jews had obtained citizenship well before they had achieved a level of cultural sophistication that would have enabled them to identify and resolve problematic religious issues.[27]

But one has to wonder about the fairness, even the possibility, of such a comparison. On what basis can it be properly conducted? There is here a certain incommensurability; it is inappropriate to compare apples and oranges. The problem may be misguided. The more pertinent questions perhaps should be directed towards an examination of the distinct nature of the two societies and the particular structures that determined where the energies (Jewish and other) could and had to be directed, what outlets were available, and so on.[28] Given this logic, one could well reverse the question and ask not why German Jews excelled intellectually but why French Jews featured so prominently and successfully in variegated French affairs of state, in ways unthinkable within the German context. In a series of illuminating and by now familiar studies, Pierre Birnbaum has demonstrated how, given its universalistic and meritocratic criteria, the French Revolution (and its culmination under the Third Republic) made state-centred emancipation possible, thereby enabling unprecedented Jewish access to national, political, administrative, judicial and military institutions and structures of power. In unprecedented ways, Jews were incorporated into the strong republican French State without – in contrast to the German and Austro-Hungarian cases – being obliged to convert (one need mention here only such familiar names as the Reinach family, Adolphe Crémieux, Léon Blum and Pierre Mendès-France to make the point graphically clear).[29]

In other words, in the age of emancipation – when vast energies were directed towards advancement – Jews took their opportunities according to what was contextually available. While French Jewish creative energies went into political matters, for German Jews, it was precisely this lack of integration, their peculiar outsider status and its accompanying tensions that, according to some historians, not only directed them into the cultural and intellectual arenas, but above all encour-

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[27] Berkowitz, *The Shaping of Jewish Identity*, pp. 209–210. Berkowitz (n. 18, p. 283) reminds us, however, that Michael Meyer challenged the notion that religious reform was a strategy designed to strengthen the case for emancipation. See Meyer, *German Political Pressure and Jewish Religious Response in the Nineteenth Century*, New York 1981, pp. 11–14.

[28] Conversation with Jonathan Frankel, Jerusalem, October 3, 2000.

[29] Most centrally, see Birnbaum's *The Jews of the Republic: A Political History of State Jews in France from Gambetta to Vichy*, trans. by Jane Marie Todd, Stanford 1996; and his superb essay on the French model of emancipation in Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States and Citizenship*, Princeton 1995, pp. 94–127.

aged a highly productive critical and humanising intellectuality, a body of significant scholarship sceptical of virtually all orthodoxies. While French Jewish scholars, especially during the Third Republic, were able to find homes within state institutions of learning, George Mosse has suggested that the peculiar *Bildungs* productivity of the German-speaking intellectuals, the critical rejection of orthodoxies, the originality and independence, may actually have been a result of their having been excluded from universities and official bodies of higher education.[30]

Yet it could also be plausibly argued, I believe, that these putatively unique German-Jewish *Bildungs* characteristics were, after all, not that unique, and that in general outline they were remarkably similar to the liberal, humanist, universalist and rationalist values of French republican, or "state Jews". (This, of course, is not to suggest that there were no right-wing or conservative Jews in either France or Germany, even if they were not preponderant.)[31] Was not this patriotic universalism, which combined old and new loyalties, equally true for Franco-Judaism and German Jewry's ideology of symbiosis?[32] Gambetta's vision of the nation, conceived far more on the basis of morality and universal values than on notions of land and soil, fit the worldviews of German Jews steeped in *Bildung* as much as it did these state-centred French Jews.[33] This interpretation does not conjure up radically separate worlds of distinctive traits and characteristics, but rather points to the common needs, interests and ideologies of vulnerable minorities in a post-emancipation world. Léon Blum's cultural-moral notion of socialism differs in no significant way from George Mosse's *Bildung* socialists, German-Jewish Marxists "of the heart", with their emphasis on culture, personality, ethical and intellectual improvement, as well as economic reform.[34] "The Jews", proclaimed Blum in 1899,

> have made a religion of Justice as the Positivists have made a religion of Facts and Renan a religion of Science. ... The idea of inevitable justice is the only thing which has sustained and united the Jews in their long tribulations. ... And, unlike the Christians, it is not from another existence that they expect reparation and equity. ... It is this world ... which must one day be ordered in accord-

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[30] These remarks were made at the above-mentioned talk that George Mosse gave in Madison, Wisconsin, October 7–9, 1993. (See n. 16 above.)

[31] The phenomenon of right-wing and conservative Jews is well known in the German case. In France too, while republican liberalism was the dominant strain among late nineteenth-century Jewry, there were those who were influenced by Maurice Barrès (paradoxically to return to their Jewish roots), and the Action Française appealed, for instance, to people such as Daniel Halévy. See Venita Datta, *Birth of a National Icon: The Literary Avant-Garde and the Origins of the Intellectual in France*, Albany 1999, n. 4, p. 251. In the 1930s the foremost right-wing Jewish spokesman was Edmond Bloch, leader of the Union Patriotique des Français Israélites. See Paula E. Hyman, *From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Remaking of French Jewry, 1906–1939*, New York 1979, pp. 214, 227–228.

[32] This patriotic universalism was evident in Hermann Cohen's rendering of the terms *Deutschtum* and *Judentum*, as well as in Crémieux's statement of May 1872: "To the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob, to the God of David and Solomon, our adoration as believers; to our France of 1789, our worship as sons; to the Republic of 1870, our absolute devotion. That is our great Trinity". Cited in Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic*, p. 230.

[33] Birnbaum, *The Jews of the Republic*, pp. 11–12.

[34] Mosse, *German Jews Beyond Judaism*, ch. 4, pp. 55–71.

ance with Reason, and make one rule prevail over all men and give to each his due. Is this not just the spirit of Socialism?[35]

Viewed thus, it is not the differences but rather the commonalities that are striking.

Even if a certain asymmetry did apply to the world of inner Jewish scholarship, in the domain of general culture we find that, like German Jewry, French Jews did indeed distinguish themselves (and in ways that, similarly, appear disproportionate to their overall numbers). To be sure, the particular Jewish odyssey, the commitments and identifications of these individual thinkers, writers and artists varied tremendously. Many of these Jews were assimilated, or only tangentially Jewish, or even wholly "non-Jewish Jews", but so, too, were many German-Jewish intellectuals. Whatever the status of their Jewishness, luminaries like Marcel Proust, Henri Bergson and Emile Durkheim also stand, surely, in the front-rank. We should be aware that such Jewish name-dropping catalogues smack of a certain parochialism, a kind of chauvinism, and, more often than not, lack analytic purpose and bite. Still, if comparison is the order of the day, the point needs to be made that not only in the sphere of politics and administration, but also in the world of French arts and letters, people of Jewish provenance were (and indeed still are) conspicuously present. A chronologically blind, and far from comprehensive list would have to include historians such as Daniel Halévy and Marc Bloch, social scientists and political commentators such as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Raymond Aron, composers such as Jacques Fromental Halévy and Darius Milhaud (both of whom, incidentally, identified with Jewish themes and causes),[36] and the oldest French impressionist (even though he was born on St. Thomas, in the Danish West Indies) Camille Jacob Pisarro (1830–1903). One could also add the philosopher Léon Brunschvicg.[37] To be sure, not all of these men were French-born; but one should not be overfastidious, for how many German Jews originally came from Posen or places even further East? Is it necessary to state, furthermore, that not just in Germany but also in France, Jews

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[35] Cited in Joll, *Intellectuals in Politics*, p. 6.

[36] Halévy, who was one of the most successful French opera composers of the nineteenth century, wrote that most bitter and explicit opera, *La Juive*, in 1835, and also the lesser-known *Le Juif Errant*, in 1852. The eclectic, avant-garde composer Darius Milhaud (1892–1974) was closely identified with Jewish causes (there is a commemorative Israeli postage stamp in his honour), and he often composed explicitly Jewish music. Among his works are the biblical opera *David* (for the Jewish Festival of 1954), *Poèmes juifs*, *Service Sacre* (*Kedusha*), and musical settings of the Psalms. Strenski notes that together with Israel Lévi, Milhaud was very much part of the pre-World War I French-Jewish renaissance and was joint founder of *Les Amis du Judaisme* in 1913. Strenski, *Durkheim and the Jews of France*, p. 73.

[37] In this paper I have almost entirely omitted the remarkable post World War II presence of Jewish thinkers who often overtly identify with and write about Jewish matters (such a list would have to include luminaries such as Emanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Claude Lanzmann, Alain Finkielkraut, etc., and could, of course, be significantly extended). I have not dealt with this chapter in the present paper partly because of the significantly transformed nature of the post-Holocaust context, but also because the comparative German-French moment has been rendered irrelevant, indeed impossible. On many of these intellectuals, however, see Judith Friedlander, *Vilna on the Seine: Jewish Intellectuals in France since 1968*, New Haven 1990.

numbered disproportionately as consumers of culture, patrons and mediators of the arts, especially in its avant-garde guises?[38]

Perhaps we should look most pointedly at the roles played by two remarkable French actresses of Jewish origins: Rachel Felix (1821–1858) and Sarah Bernhardt (1844–1923). While both were stereotyped as quintessential Jewish women by contemporary antisemitic discourses,[39] both nevertheless succeeded in becoming the most celebrated of theatrical figures, representative symbols, the very incarnations of the French nation.[40] Some have argued that this phenomenon represents mere exotica, of little sociological or historical significance. For all that, I would suggest that even as a piece of exotica this would hardly have been possible within the German context, where the stage, more often than not, was the forum for mocking or castigating Jews rather than celebrating them.[41] Both actresses consciously maintained a sense of Jewish identification. Both emphasised their archetypal Jewish names, Rachel and Sarah. Rachel Felix, or the "Queen", as she became known, achieved a fame quite unprecedented in her time, becoming in effect, as her biographer Rachel Brownstein has remarked, the first international dramatic star in the history of the European theatre.[42] Contemporaries agreed that her performances were breathtaking, and she single-handedly revived what had become the old-fashioned genre of high tragedy (especially through Corneille and Racine) and, indeed, saved the Comédie Française. Most relevantly, this beautiful woman who, according to her biographer, lived the life of a pleasure-loving Parisian courtesan,[43] proudly and conspicuously proclaimed her Jewish origins (her parents were peddlers from Alsace, of whom it was said that they barely spoke French). Indeed, she was given a state funeral, officiated by Grand Rabbi Lazare Isidor of Paris, which over a hundred thousand mourners attended. Her sister, Sarah, who supervised the

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[38] On the problematic of defining the "Jewishness" of such activities, see Ezra Mendelsohn, 'Should we take Notice of Berthe Weill? Reflections on the Domain of Jewish History', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Fall 1994), pp. 22–39.

[39] On these antisemitic representations, see the essays by Sander Gilman, 'Salome, Syphilis, Sarah Bernhardt, and the Modern Jewess', and by Carol Ockman, 'When is a Jewish Star just a Star? Interpreting Images of Sarah Bernhardt', in Linda Nochlin and Tamar Garb (eds.), *The Jew in the Text: Modernity and the Construction of Identity*, London 1995. I thank Richard I. Cohen for this reference.

[40] In 1848 Rachel literally came to symbolise the Republic. The Comédie Française was renamed the Théâtre de la République, and a rapturous Rachel was heroically portrayed chanting the *La Marseillaise*. *Ibid.*, pp. 185–187.

[41] See Elisabeth Frenzel, *Judengestalten auf der deutschen Bühne: Ein notwendiger Querschnitt durch 700 Jahre Rollengeschichte*, München 1940; Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto*, New York 1978, esp. p. 86.

[42] See esp. the excellent work by Rachel M. Brownstein, *Tragic Muse: Rachel of the Comédie-Française*, New York 1993. I thank Zvi Jagendorf for suggesting both the topic and the book to me. Brownstein informs us that the name "Felix" – Latin for "happy" – was a fairly common name among Jews and constituted a translation of the Hebrew "Baruch" ("blessed") (p. 50).

[43] One Jewish newspaper put it thus: "All we can say of Mlle. Rachel is, that to her other immoralities she had not added that of apostasy". Cited in *ibid.*, p. 25.

funeral arrangements, first assembled a *minyan* of local Jews, who chanted Hebrew prayers beside the deathbed.[44]

The similarities between Rachel Felix and Sarah Bernhardt are striking. Although Bernhardt, in comparison to Felix, was far less expansive about her Jewishness, this most famous woman in fin-de-siècle France, as Janis Bergman-Carton notes, constantly called attention to her dual origins: she was the illegitimate daughter of a beautiful Dutch Jewess and a dashing but much absent Catholic father, who nevertheless was around long enough to insist that she receive a convent education. Part of Bernhardt's persona was a continuous play with hybrid possibilities of identity, the rejection of simple categorical binaries. She intuited the relevance of her origins early on and elected to use the name Sarah instead of her given name Rosine, even after her 1857 baptism. She regularly delivered fluid narratives of her Jewish origins and experimented with the possibilities of gender and self-transformation. It was precisely this un-fixedness of her self-narration that defined her essential modern Jewishness in the eyes of her contemporaries. William Dean Howells described Bernhardt's Hamlet thus: "You never ceased to feel for a moment that it was a woman who was doing that melancholy Dane, and that the woman was a Jewess, and the Jewess a French Jewess".[45]

While Felix and Bernhardt, despite the antisemitic attacks, were able to become the celebrated embodiments of France itself (and this notwithstanding the fact that both Jews and actors have generally been regarded as outside the pale of respectable society), "non-Jewish" Jewish intellectuals in the twentieth century, such as Julien Benda and later Raymond Aron, took upon themselves, albeit in very different ways, the roles of liberal consciences of the nation.[46] Moreover, it could be argued that during and after the Third Republic, French social science was very much a "Jewish" affair. A mention of the most prominent among these figures proves this point: for the earlier period, Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl stand out, as do Claude Lévi-Strauss and the ubiquitous Raymond Aron for the post-Second World War period.

In ways not wholly different from the German situation, then, French Jews were remarkably prominent in the French cultural and intellectual scene. But this is the

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[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 17–20.

[45] I have relied fully on the interesting article by Janis Bergman-Carton, 'Negotiating the Categories: Sarah Bernhardt and the Possibilities of Jewishness', *Art Journal*, vol. 55, no. 2 (Summer 1996).

[46] See esp. Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, trans. by Richard Aldington, New York 1959 (the work originally appeared in 1928 as *La Trahison des clercs*), and Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, trans. by Terence Kilmartin, New York 1957 (the work originally appeared in 1955). By placing these two together, I do not mean to imply that there were not significant differences between them. See Aron's critical comments on the lofty, but rather abstract and distant moralism of Benda: "It is seldom possible to choose between parties, regimes or nations on the basis of values defined in abstract terms. ... The intellectual who sets some store by the just and reasonable organisation of society will not be content to stand on the side-lines, to put his signature at the bottom of every manifesto against every injustice". Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, pp. 301ff.

point at which we have to face the difficult questions. These questions apply to both Jewries and, beyond that, reach to the more fundamental problem of the phenomenology of the modern Jewish intellectual as such. Are ethnic origins relevant to general intellectual creations, and if so, in what ways? How can both the activities of these intellectuals and the content of their thought be related to Judaism or Jewishness, especially when Jewish self-identification covered the entire spectrum, ranging from estrangement or near-conversion (à la Henri Bergson), and indifference or wariness (à la Marc Bloch), to varying degrees of commitment (sometimes with these attitudes combined in one person)? And just as vexingly, in what ways can it be said that particular endeavours in the fields of general intellectual and artistic culture were somehow a reflection of "Jewishness"?[47]

There is, for instance, a large literature on the complex issue of the purported Jewishness of French social science (especially Durkheim's),[48] similar to the literature on the Jewishness of psychoanalysis and Freud. Some commentators, like John Cuddihy, have indeed, very problematically, linked the two, viewing the projects of both Freud and Durkheim as symptomatically Jewish, part of post-emancipation Jewry's wider, creative, yet essentially subversive undertaking: the unmasking and undermining of the codes of Western civility and a (hidden) defence of less refined but more authentic forms of Jewish community. Durkheim's observations concerning the lower rates of Jewish suicide – a function of the maintenance of tight group ties – is taken as evidence and reflects one instance of this bias. (In this view, Lévy-Strauss's recovery of the sophistication of the "savage mind", his relativisation of the superiority of Western society, his sublimations of the antimonies of the raw and cooked, becomes a kind of later exemplification of this subversive Jewish project.)[49] Even Pierre Birnbaum, that most careful and refined of observers,

[47] For a nuanced view proclaiming the relevance of this factor in terms of the Jewish sense of cognitive belonging and social outsiderness, see Paul Mendes-Flohr's suggestive essay, 'The Study of the Jewish Intellectual: A Methodological Prolegomenon' in his *Divided Passions: Jewish Intellectuals and the Experience of Modernity*, Detroit 1991, pp. 23–53. For a critical analysis of this perspective see, of course, Peter Gay, *Freud, Jews and Other Germans: Masters and Victims in Modern Culture*, Oxford 1978.

[48] Strenski, *Durkheim and the Jews of France*, (see n. 20 above), not only provides an example of this, but also exhaustively lists other such attempts.

[49] John Murray Cuddihy, *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity*, New York 1974. Cuddihy's work contains many interesting insights. Yet it also reveals the dangers of such an undertaking since its ultimate impulse veers close to older stereotypical conceptions of Jewish subversiveness and unruliness. See the superb review by Robert Alter, 'Manners and the Jewish Intellectual', *Commentary*, vol. 60, no. 2 (August 1975), pp. 58–64. Alter concludes: "In dropping so many Jewish names, Cuddihy seems to have forgotten about Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, Baudelaire, Mann, Lawrence .... Cuddihy's sleight-of-hand trick is to focus on a few seminal thinkers of Jewish origins within this much larger movement and so to give the impression that the subversiveness of modernism was foisted on intellectuals everywhere by the Jews, who repeatedly argued out of the resentment of their own special social predicament as though they were describing man in general. I do not presume to know Cuddihy's motives, which may well be associated with a kind of uneasy admiration of Jewish intellectuality. But whatever his conscious intentions, the clear tendency of his historical exposition is to represent Jewish social

has, in far more subtle and restrained form, recently discerned a similar tendency for Durkheim and French-Jewish social scientists in general. The shift in Durkheim's thinking that occurred between 1895 to 1900, he argues, was implicitly linked to pondering the Jewish question that was raging in France at that time. "Is it too much to suggest", he writes,

> that what we see taking shape here – between the lines, as it were – was a theory of the collective consciousness as shared by unified values yet quietly tolerant of beliefs and allegiances that could not be accommodated within the limits of a purely 'scientific' and 'universalistic' ideology? Did Durkheim move beyond the realm of pure theory to suggest that republican assimilation made room for the recognition of differences? ... The tie to Judaism, even when vociferously renounced, had a way of reappearing in a disguised form. This was especially true when anti-Semitism re-emerged in French society, as it did during the Dreyfus Affair, the Occupation and the Six-Day War in 1967. The sociologists and anthropologists ... maintained a sort of hidden fidelity to their Jewish roots.[50]

What emerges from this literature is that the peculiarly "Jewish" may have less to do with substance than with sensibility; "Jewishness" is to be found in the nature of the emphases and sensitivities, in the weighting of omissions and inclusions. There is much that is alluring in this thesis, which intuits connections to Judaism, yet because this view is so often vague and shrouded in the allusive language of transmutation or hidden – even invisible – codes, it covers too much ground and explains too many thinkers on exceedingly speculative (and often self-serving) bases. Insofar as such "ethnic" accounts are needed (and many would ask why such are needed at all), there may be other, far simpler, explanations. Thus perhaps Jews excelled in the French social science of the Third Republic not because of some hidden Jewish essence, but because this discipline was relatively new and thus open at universities, where ambitious but previously excluded Jews could now gain access and pour their energies into such activities.[51] Indeed, French Jews were quite aware of this factor and proffered it as an explicit explanation of their success. Gustave Kahn, the resident poet of the late-nineteenth-century avant-garde journal *La Revue blanche* (with its heavy concentration of acculturated Jewish intellectuals), noted: "Because the modern state was opening all its doors to us, admitting us to all its competitive exams, we had to take advantage of this opportunity which was finally offered us to prove that we were not the inferior race ... but of the first order by reason of its great capacity for work and by its intellectual gifts".[52]

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thought as inherently meretricious, disruptive, vindictive, twisting, and breaking the civil body of Christian society on the Procustrean bed of Jewish social distress" (pp. 63–64).

[50] Birnbaum, *Jewish Destinies: Citizenship, State, and Community in Modern France*, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer, New York 2000, pp. 64–98, esp. pp. 94, 98. See also Birnbaum's essay in this volume.

[51] Once again I owe this thought to Jonathan Frankel (from a conversation held on October 1, 2000).

[52] Cited in Datta, *Birth of a National Icon*, p. 107 (see note 31 above).

This possibility of access and openness in the public realm is, I think, quite crucial. The glitter of Paris was partly a function of its legendary hospitality to exiles, including such famous German Jewish intellectuals as Heinrich Heine, Ludwig Börne and Karl Marx. Just as the success and visibility of Rachel Felix and Sarah Bernhardt was most unlikely in the German setting, the open, absorptive power of Paris – not the nature of the Jewishness of those who excitedly flocked to the capital – obviously helps to explain why, for instance, so many Jewish musicians and artists resided and flourished there. Giacomo Meyerbeer and Jacques Offenbach came to France from Germany in order to succeed and achieve fame, and they did so brilliantly. The same applies to so many Eastern European Jewish artists who constituted a central presence within, and bestowed much of the fame upon the ironically named *Ecole de Paris* (School of Paris). Marc Chagall, Haim Soutine, Jacques Lipchitz, and the wild and prolific Bulgarian Jules Pascin (Pincas) achieved worldwide fame. They were joined, of course, by the Italian Amedeo Modigliani, to mention only the masters among them.[53]

What does Jewishness have to do with all of this? Our rather obsessive need to link "membership in a particular group to the way people think"[54] may derive from a certain (perhaps chauvinistic) pride, but it often betrays an essentialism that reveals the flip side of antisemitism. While modern intellectual Jews tend towards a certain radicalism and non-conformism and a rejection of orthodoxies, antisemitic accounts often highlight these same characteristics, but perceive them in the reverse way. Thus André Gide in 1914 rejected Proust's, *Swann's Way*, in his *Journal* as follows:

> [T]here is today in France a Jewish literature that is not French literature, that has its own virtues, its own meanings, and its own tendencies ... Jewish literature – a history that would not have to go far back in time. ... I can see no disadvantage to fusing the history of Jewish literature of other countries, for it is always one and the same thing. ... [Jews] speak with greater ease than we because they have fewer scruples. They speak louder than we because they have not our reasons for speaking often in an undertone, for respecting certain things.[55]

In this respect, the discourses about both Freud and Durkheim, for instance, are remarkably similar. Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi's posthumous conversation with Freud, imploring the (very recalcitrant) master to acknowledge psychoanalysis as a "Jewish science", is the positive mirror to the antisemitic discourse that regards psychoanalysis as a sullying, dirty, and essentially resentful Jewish activity.[56] Similarly, in

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[53] See Waldemar George, 'The School of Paris', in Cecil Roth (ed.), *Jewish Art: An Illustrated History*, London 1971, pp. 229–260. This aspect of the school is now becoming increasingly recognised in the popular press. See for instance, Michael Gibson, 'The Gifted Foreigners of the School of Paris', *International Herald Tribune* (December 23–24, 2000), p. 7.

[54] Strenski, *Durkheim and the Jews of France*, (see n. 20 above), p. 1.

[55] Cited in Elaine Marks, *Marrano as Metaphor: The Jewish Presence in French Writing*, New York 1996, pp. 59–60.

[56] See Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable*, New Haven 1991, esp. ch. 5. Antisemites depicted psychoanalysis as an essentially "dirty" and subversive level-

what way is the massive sympathetic literature that determinedly seeks to somehow "Judaise" Durkheim and Durkheimian thought different from the hostile remarks of the Bergsonian Gilbert Maire, who in 1912 declared that sociology in the hands of Durkheim, its "'grand priest', was a Jewish science, a theory of the subordination of the individual to society ... a way in which 'to speak Hebrew into the social being'"?[57]

This emphasis on the Jewishness of prominent intellectuals is not a recent phenomenon. Already in 1928, the highly acculturated Julien Benda bemoaned the arrogance of what he saw as a nationalist conceit, a generalised casuistry that he believed affected Jews and non-Jews alike:

We all know how during the last fifty years so many men of learning have asserted their views in the name of *French* science, of *German* science. We know how acridly so many of our writers in the same period have vibrated with *French* sensibility, *French* intelligence, *French* philosophy. Some declare that they are the incarnation of Aryan thought, Aryan painting, Aryan music, to which others reply by discovering that a certain master had a Jewish grandmother, and so venerate Semitic genius in him. Here it is not a question of inquiring whether the form of mind of a scholar or an artist is the signature of his nationality or his race and to what extent, but of noting the desire of the modern 'clerks' that it should be so, and noting how new a thing this is.[58]

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ling Jewish act, reducing spiritual matters to their most gross, primitive and sexual dimensions. Peter Gay, too, has noted this confluence of antisemitic and philosemitic discourses in the tendency to attribute modernism to Jewish contributions. According to Gay, this interpretation of modernism "gives Jews more publicity than they deserve whether favourable or unfavourable. There were many modernists who were not Jews, many Jews who were not modernists. And many of the Jews who were modernists were so not because they were Jews. It is sheer anti-Semitic tendentiousness, or philosemitic parochialism, to canvass the great phenomenon of modernism from the vantage point of the Jewish Question". Gay, *Freud, Jews and Other Germans*, p. 21.

57 Cited in Yerushalmi, *Freud's Moses*, ch. 2, and n. 12, p. 162. Strenski notes in this connection: "The Jewish philosophers of Durkheim's generation – those who opposed him in the name of the autonomy of reason, such as Léon Brunschvicg – seemed immune enough from some native Jewish tendency toward the social". Strenski, *Durkheim and the Jews of France*, p. 18. But beyond this, Maire misunderstood what Durkheim was doing, for, like so many other (bourgeois *Bildung*) Jews, Durkheim never abandoned his deep embrace of individualist values. What he patriotically sought to do was reform individualist Cartesianism along societal lines, both within the domain of national morale and in the realm of science. This attempt to integrate individualism within nationalism, as distinguished from integralist efforts to suppress such individualism under the weight of nationalism, was, as Strenski puts it (p. 42), just as characteristic of French as it was of German Jews (if we are to make the claim that Jews tended to emphasise certain things and downplay others). Be that as it may, Maire's essentialist, hostile reading is really not far from the sympathetic and suggestive, but ultimately problematic approach of Louis Greenberg, who posits that Durkheim's anti-aesthetic sensibilities were derived from his rabbinical father Moise and his adherence to a strict Talmudic rationalism, whereas Henri Bergson's Polish Hasidic background may have pushed intuition to the centre of his thought. See Louis Greenberg, 'Bergson and Durkheim as Sons and Assimilators: The Early Years', *French Historical Studies*, vol. 9, no. 4 (Autumn, 1976), pp. 619–634. The difficulty here is that Durkheim's positivistic hostility to poetry, arts and mysticism, and Bergson's irrationalism are far more easily and persuasively accounted for in terms of the wider, prevalent intellectual currents of their times.

58 Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, pp. 61–62. (See n. 46 above.) Benda earlier referred to

Where are we left then with the double issue that has emerged in this essay, that is, the question of the comparison between the French-Jewish and German-Jewish intelligentsia and, perhaps even anterior to this, the proper mode of conceptualising what we mean by "Jewish intellectuality", especially when it reaches beyond the domain of explicit Jewish themes? This essay – at both the particular "Jewish" and the more general level – has sought to address the comparison in terms of what we take to be some of the significant commonalities as well as the more important differences. On both these levels, the methodological and substantive difficulties are manifold and the results problematic and meagre. It may very well be that a more productive approach would be an examination not so much of the comparative as the relational dimension, analysing the complexities of mutuality, the reciprocal influences, interactions, tensions and analogies, the pertinent mirror-images. Such a history would necessarily entail questioning whether or not the nature of such reciprocal influences, jealousies, admiration, conflict and cooperation, mirrored or differed from the history of the broader and always fraught German-French nexus.

We would, however, still be confronted with the perennial question as to how to define and grasp the "Jewish" dimensions of such intellectuality. This is not a question that will simply go away; indeed, it may be one which, *à la* Benda, is itself in need of historicisation and contextualisation. For now, some balance between a liberal blindness to Jewish particularity and the impulse to isolate the specifically Jewish element within general culture needs to be found.

Of course, the two ingredients need not necessarily be viewed as mutually exclusive. Thus, even as determined and committed a Jewish observer as Gershom Scholem, who always insisted that Freud never regarded himself as anything but a Jew, conceded that it was necessary for Freud to go beyond his Judaism in order to pursue his scientific work.[59] Certainly, at least in intellectual and cultural terms, a sometimes intentional or unconscious hybridity has been the order of the post-emancipation European day.[60] The realms of endeavour, identities and creations are too mixed, too subtle, to indulge in essentialist categorising.[61]

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the new Jewish propensity of "labouring to assert this peculiarity, to define its characteristics ... I am not trying to discover whether the impulse of these Jews is or is not nobler than the efforts of so many others to have their origin pardoned in them; I am simply pointing out to those interested in the progress of peace in the world that our age has added one more arrogance to those which set men against each other, at least to the extent that it is conscious and proud of itself". Benda added that he was "speaking of Western Jews of the bourgeöis class. The Jewish proletariat did not await our time to plunge into the feeling of its racial peculiarity. However, it does so without giving provocation" (pp. 11–12 and n. 1, p. 12).

[59] See the exchange of letters between George Lichtheim and Gershom Scholem, letters 108a (November 28, 1966) and 108 (December 4, 1966), respectively, in Gershom Scholem, *Briefe*, vol. 2 (1948–1970), ed. by Thomas Sparr, München 1995, pp. 157–163, esp. 159 and 162, where Scholem very briefly concedes this.

[60] This should not be confused with the fashionable, latter-day emphasis of post-colonialist discourse that has valorised hybridity, marginality and exile in ways quite different from the context

Let me conclude with two examples, drawn respectively from the German and French Jewish contexts, which seem not only to depict authentically how contemporaries viewed this issue but also to capture, perhaps rather idealistically, the cultural mix of such creative adventures. The first example comes from Ernst Bloch's description of the exciting Weimar years:

That Reinhardt or S. Fischer or even Bruno Walter and Otto Klemperer or Joseph Kains were Jews, that Piscator or Rowohlt or Furtwängler or Bassermann were not – that was of interest to absolutely no one except for shady plotters or sinister tabloids. Most people didn't even know about it. Who in the world identified Weill's music for the *Three-Penny Opera* as Jewish or Brecht's text as outright German? ...The pleasant, uncomplicated everyday living and working together – that, above all, remains worthy of remembrance.[62]

The second example is Matthew Arnold's poetic summation of Rachel Felix, in whose image the contradictory as well as unifying forces of modern life and ancient times were both played out – and resolved:

Sprung from the blood of Israel's scattered race,
At a mean inn in German Aarau born,
To forms from antique Greece and Rome uptorn,
Tricked out with a Parisian speech and face,
Imparting life renewed, old classic grace;
Then, soothing with thy Christian strain forlorn,
A-Kempis! her departing soul outworn,
While by her bedside Hebrew rites have placed –
Ah, not the radiant spirit of Greece alone
She had – one power, which made her breast its home!
In her, like us, there clashed contending powers,
Germany, France, Christ, Moses, Athens, Rome,
The strife, the mixture in her soul, are ours,
Her genius and her glory are her own.[63]

Comment by Nancy L. Green

I was perhaps invited here as a social historian,[1] but I come to you as a comparative historian interested in comparative methods. I would thus like to explain

under discussion here. See Ian Buruma's excellent, 'The Romance of Exile', *The New Republic*, February 12, 2001.

[61] See 'German History and German Jewry: Junctions, Boundaries, and Interdependencies' in Aschheim, *In Times of Crisis*, pp. 86–92.

[62] Ernst Bloch, 'Die sogenannte Judenfrage' (1963), in Bloch's *Literarische Aufsätze*, Frankfurt am Main 1965, p. 553, cited in Paul Mendes-Flohr, 'Jews Within German Culture' in *German-Jewish History*, ed. by Michael A. Meyer, 4 vols., New York 1998, vol. 4, p. 192.

[63] Cited in Brownstein, *Tragic Muse*, p. 233. (See n. 42 above.) As Brownstein notes (pp. 230–234), Arnold wrote a number of poems on Rachel, which he published in his *New Poems* of 1867.

[1] To compare Jewish immigrants and workers in the French and German contexts. Although I

how my page-by-page reading of Steven Aschheim's essay shifted from perplexity to exasperation to approval and admiration. This has to do with the comparative project itself, its format and its construction. His paper is thus also an entrée into asking more fundamental questions about the purpose of this conference and the ways in which the French and German cases can be compared.

As a historian of Jews in France, I was at first perplexed. Aschheim's essay starts out with such a German-centred historical perspective (as he himself admits), that I was at first taken aback. Even when he explains that this was the result of his own training and interests, Aschheim's argument on behalf of the superiority of German-Jewish intellectuals seems to leave no room whatsoever for the French thinkers. He admits that "[t]hese may have been somewhat chauvinistic biases. *Nevertheless* [my emphasis of his logic] they appeared to be solidly grounded ...". In this view, German-Jewish intellectuals clearly outshine French-Jewish intellectuals, an interpretation reflecting not simply Jewish pride, but German-Jewish pride.

From the other side of the Rhine, to one contemplating French Jewish intellectuals on their own terms, this assumption is surprising. For those who have read the Halévys, Fleg, or Durkheim within the French tradition, the comparative dismissal may never have occurred. Is this a problem of one chauvinistic bias against another, brought out by the comparative question? Is it an occupational hazard of intellectuals each defending their own turf? (This could result from either an *a posteriori* identification with one's subject or an *a priori* reason for being drawn to a subject in the first place.)

My perplexity turned to frustration as Aschheim continues to pursue this premise of difference, only rhetorically questioning a German-Jewish exceptionalism before proceeding to validate that difference by exploring the various explanations for it. Thus, perhaps the German-Jewish environment produced more interesting intellectuals than the French-Jewish environment because of the continued close relationship between theology and philosophy in Germany, in contrast to the more radical church-state antagonism in France ever since the revolutionary period; or because of the struggle for emancipation in Germany, as opposed to the notion that it was "given" to Jews in France; or because of the resultant creative tension that led to the Reform movement in Germany, unnecessary for the obverse reason in France. While these explanations are each interesting and merit further study (and can also help ask the essentially French-Jewish historiographic question, 'Why is

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have recently edited a collection of documents along these lines, the topic merits a more full-fledged research project, along the lines begun in Andrew S. Reutlinger, 'Reflections on the Anglo-American Jewish Experience: Immigrants, Workers, and Entrepreneurs in New York and London, 1870–1914', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, vol. 66, no. 4 (June 1977), pp. 473–84; or more recently in Karin Hofmeester, *Van Talmoed to Statuut: Joodse Arbeiders en Arbeidersbewegingen in Amsterdam, Londen en Parijs, 1880–1914*, Amsterdam 1990; in the article by Lloyd Gartner and response by Trude Mauer in Michael Brenner, Rainer Liedtke, and David Rechter (eds.), *Two Nations: British and German Jews in Comparative Perspective*, Tübingen 1999; and Reiner Liedtke, *Jewish Welfare in Hamburg and Manchester, c. 1850–1914*, New York 1998. See Nancy L. Green (ed.), *Jewish Workers in the Modern Diaspora*, Berkeley 1998.

there no Reform Judaism in France?'), I was by this time exasperated by the pursuit of explanation based on the construction of a comparison that not only assumed difference but assumed it with the odds heavily biased in favour of one side.

Just as I was wondering and despairing about the dissymmetries of research and researchers, however, Aschheim asks the crucial question: "But one has to wonder about the fairness, even the possibility, of such a comparison. On what basis can it be properly conducted?" (I might interject here that differential access to sources may be part of the answer, but it is as much a part of the problem as of the answer.) And then, reversing the structure of his initial premise, he begins to do two important things: explore similarities, on the one hand, and, on the other, shift the very comparative question itself to another terrain.

After all, as Aschheim points out, *both* France and Germany produced important Jewish thinkers coming out of the Enlightenment tradition and reflecting what Aschheim calls a "patriotic universalism". Here I would point out that the *level* of comparison is as important as choosing the sites of comparison. At this more general level of comparison, similarity rather than difference is apparent; apples and oranges may be different at one level, but as fruit they are similar.

Aschheim also reverses the question by actually asking a different comparative question, redefining the definition of intellectual: Why is it that France produced so many Jewish civil servants and so many men of letters in the university, while Germany did not? By defining the status of the intellectual differently – outside of the philosophical-theological realm – the question is a different one. The hierarchy inherent in the question is also different, and the French intellectuals are seen in a more positive light.

However, as pleased as I was by Aschheim's shift from a mode of difference to a mode of similarity, and particularly by his recognition of the importance of shifting the comparative question, I then became troubled by the implication of the similarity argument: How is it that German Jews, like French Jews, "did indeed distinguish themselves (and in ways that, similarly, appear disproportionate to their overall numbers)"? Here, too, Aschheim seems to have heard my concern, when he adds the following: "We should be aware that such Jewish name-dropping catalogues smack of a certain parochialism ...". Lauding Jewish intellectuals, whether German or French, obviates the more fundamental question of the relationship of creativity to origins. There may indeed have been a good number of French and German Jewish intellectuals, but there are also numerous French and German intellectuals altogether. What makes Jewish intellectuals stand out (besides their demographic over-achieving)? More importantly, what makes them particularly Jewish?

There, too, Aschheim seems to have anticipated my questions, aptly critiquing the "Jewishness" studies that attribute a certain Jewish ethics, language, or "feeling" to a writer or even a discipline. He explicitly recognises that Jewish pride often betrays an essentialism of which the obverse, when used by others, can be antisemitism. Aschheim readily acknowledges that this general question of a definition of "Jewish intellectuality" is perhaps more fundamental than the comparative question itself.

Aschheim concludes by suggesting a relatively safe form of comparative studies, proposing that we look to the interactions and actual relations of historical actors themselves and their reciprocal visions, rather than our comparing them, as present-day historians, with the pitfalls of hubris, chauvinism or specialisation that our research may imply. Fair enough. But I would add that the researchers' comparative projects, which bring this volume together, are still useful – with several caveats.

A comparative study can focus on either similarity or difference; furthermore, difference itself can be approached variously, depending on the definitions used. Aschheim's essay cleverly shows how asking a different question produces different results: German Jewish intellectuals, on the one hand, French Jewish *hommes d'état* or *universitaires*, on the other.[2]

What I would argue more generally about comparative methods is two-fold. First of all, comparisons are important and useful insofar as they help bring into relief issues that may not be apparent when doing a single case study. Studying France, one might assume (thanks to Pierre Birnbaum's and Perinne Simon-Nahum's careful research) that smart Jews in general could become statesmen or university professors. Studying German Jews alone, one might infer that the creative tension of philosophical inquiry is inherent to Jewish intellectuals. Only in comparison is it apparent, as Aschheim points out, that "Jews took their opportunities according to what was contextually available". This, indeed, I take to be the most important statement in his paper, one that attributes more to context than to Jewishness and brings us back to questions of state, nation, and societal differences as the fundamental comparative sites for understanding the diversity of the Jewish condition.

As important as comparisons are, however, and as much as I am in favour of them for exactly this illuminating quality – that of pushing our initial logic and generalisations one step further, so that findings can be confirmed or contradicted across borders – we should nonetheless always be attentive to the construction of the comparative question itself. How we ask the question and the way in which it is framed has an impact on the answer.

One issue has to do with the level of generality chosen (local or national, as Uri Kaufmann's essay in this volume points out) and what John Stuart Mill called the two comparative methods: the Method of Accord and the Method of Difference.[3] There are times, as Eli Bar-Chen states carefully at the beginning of his contribution to this volume, when looking from the outside (or, I would add, from a certain more general perspective), similarities stand out, even though from closer up, from inside, differences may loom large. Thus, at the micro-historical level, we can compare *maskilim* (Simon Schwarzfuchs), actresses (Steven Aschheim), newspapers (Sil-

[2] Similarly, Jakob Vogel took Richard Cohen's temporal comparison (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) and, by asking different questions, comes up with different answers. Cohen asks what synagogue inaugurations tell us about the Jews' relationship to the state, while Vogel asks what they tell us about the state's relationship to religion. See their essays in this volume.

[3] John Stuart Mill, 'Two Methods of Comparison' (excerpt from *A System of Logic*, 1888), in Amitai Etzioni and Frederic L. DuBow (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives: Theories and Methods*, Boston 1970, pp. 205–13.

via Cresti), or sociologists (Pierre Birnbaum), but we have to ask questions about how representative the individuals and categories are.[4]

At a more mezzo-historical level, there is much discussion in this volume about the category of Jewish intellectuals. There, too, Aschheim shows that we have to define what we mean by "intellectuals", and how that definition may shift the terms – and conclusions – of comparison.

Much more generally, at a more macro level, we have been talking about emancipation and acculturation. Yet what are we actually comparing? Even the geographic boundaries of our comparative gaze have been mobile. As Frances Malino asks, are Paris and Berlin the best comparative sites for a study of the French and German emancipation? Why not Metz and Berlin, or Bordeaux and Berlin? Or, as Sylvie-Anne Goldberg and Paula Hyman both suggest, should we not specify the social groups that we are studying? Intellectuals and peddlers undoubtedly did not have the same relationship to, or ideas about emancipation. Furthermore, as Aron Rodrigue points out, the national, social, and university structures themselves have to be taken into account. Finally I would add, we need to question the term "emancipation" itself. What constitutes emancipation? Political rights? Becoming a professor or a colonel? The choice of definition affects the comparison. We as historians choose the comparisons we make, and we need to recognise both that there are choices and that they are ours.

Finally, I would add one last temporal consideration. Our comparisons are historically grounded in the time frame of the social scientist. As we have heard, the early Pierre Birnbaum analysed Emile Durkheim as a French sociologist, while the more recent Birnbaum sees Durkheim as a fundamentally Jewish scholar. Has Durkheim changed? Has the reader? Or more generally, have the times changed? From questions about assimilation to questions about difference, the context of our research has changed. This is simply a reminder to us all that the comparative questions we ask today are not necessarily those of yesteryear, nor undoubtedly those of tomorrow. But that does not mean we should not keep asking them.

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[4] See their respective articles in this volume.

Diana Pinto

Epilogue
French and German Jewries in the New Europe: Convergent Itineraries?

In the past, conferences addressing German Jewry ended, after the ritual paying of tribute to the rich past of a murdered tradition, with their Jewish participants leaving to go back to Israel, America or to the "acceptable" countries of Western Europe, most notably France and Great Britain, where one could resume life (and Jewish life) as usual. The relief of leaving problematic Germany behind was tempered by the fact that there were sympathetic German scholars with whom one could establish contact. But that constituted no problem, for one could soon meet them again elsewhere, since they were more than eager to travel to the Jewish agoras abroad.

It is a sign of the changing times that, after this conference ended, as the Jewish experts once again rushed off to the airport for flights for New York, Tel Aviv, London and Paris, two highly significant Jews, the organiser of the conference, Professor Michael Brenner, the holder of the Chair of Jewish History at the University of Munich, and his colleague, Assistant Professor Eli Bar-Chen stayed behind. If I refer to personal details here, it is because they are laden with historical significance, for they symbolise the Jewish future in Europe. Professor Brenner is a Bavarian-born, post-war German Jew with German and East European parentage. Professor Bar-Chen is an Israeli-born Moroccan Jew who now lives in Germany. Both are experts on the pre-Holocaust Jewish world that was supposed to have been utterly destroyed. Can one really make such a convenient, rigid break between the old, glorious French and German-Jewish past and its hybrid, some would say "bastard" present, when living Jews in Germany make the connection in their intellectual and personal lives?

To speak about French and German Jews in the same breath with respect to the present, despite the evidence, still constitutes a daunting challenge. Conjugating these two communities in a forward-looking perspective implies making a break with the "proper" post-war readings of the Jewish world. There was no place in such readings for the post-war Jews living in Germany. As a historically irrelevant presence that clouded the human and conceptual break with the Holocaust, they were, if anything, the object of the shame and pity of a reconstituted Jewish world. One had to know only one thing about such Jews: they had neither biological nor even cultural links to the glorious epoch of pre-war German Jewry. They were little more than an alien and alienated caste.

French Jews were even more adamant on this count than the rest of world Jewry. Not only had Germany destroyed its own Jews but historically it was also France's traditional enemy. The Franco-German post-war marriage might be the harbinger of a reconciled Europe, a marriage to which most French Jews could consent, even if reluctantly, for pragmatic political reasons. But it was out of the question to envisage any ties between post-war French and German Jewries, to dare to juxtapose a large, dynamic community with a long pedigree and major ties to the North African world, with a minuscule, pariah community. French Jews on this count belonged to those who went "home" to "normal settings". Their only viable post-war interlocutors were British Jews on a divided continent.

Non-French specialists of pre-Holocaust French and German Jewry could turn a sympathetic ear to such a contemporary comparison, provided it remained sociological. After all, they could accept a comparison of Jews in France and Germany today as based on a fundamental change of paradigms. Neither France nor Germany, nor the Jews inhabiting them were the same as in the pre-war past. Immigrant North African Sephardim had changed the face of French Jewry and had doubled the size of the old French-Jewish community. And then, no longer in negligible numbers, Jews arriving from the former Soviet Union brought a new identity to the pariah post-war community of Germany by raising its numbers at least fivefold. What better proof of an irremediably broken chain than Jews from the Arab world and diluted (lay and often intermarried) Jews from Russia giving new life to the predominantly spent Ashkenazi Alsatian *Israélites*, who had revered *la France éternelle* and the land of the Rights of Man, and their destroyed German-Jewish cousins, who had revered the *Kulturnation*? The story could not possibly be the same. New tribes were now living in the territories of old. Anthropology had replaced history.

I will argue that this is not the case. The weight of culture and history is making a spectacular comeback inside a Jewish world that is reconnecting to the past before Auschwitz. Nowhere is this more true than in France and Germany. The ties with the pre-Holocaust traditions of the French and German-Jewish past are once again coming to the fore, increasingly influencing the "new Jews", who in turn are influencing the non-Jewish French and German present. It is my belief that with time Russian Jews in Germany and North African Jews in France will take on many of the characteristics of their pre-Holocaust non-biological predecessors, since the challenges they will confront in the future are integrally connected to the new German and French national debates concerning pluralist identities and national belonging. And these debates are themselves the result of recently reinterpreted national histories in which the fate of the Jews both before and during the Holocaust have played a prominent role. The "new Jews" of France and Germany are thus necessarily confronted with the legacy and symbolic weight of their predecessors, and they will be called on to play a key role in the construction of a new, more pluralist national identity. As they do so, they will engage in a dialectical relationship with their country's past, including its Jewish past, which will take on a new political and cultural relevance.

The significance of this new Jewish presence in France and in Germany (and throughout Europe) is inherently linked to the coming to the fore in the last decade of two major intellectual and political debates. The first concerned the coming to terms with the national past. In the case of Germany, this implied confronting the pre-Nazi, the Nazi and the post-Nazi past from *within* as a vital, domestic piece of a reconfigured national identity, and no longer as an externally imposed exercise centred almost exclusively around spontaneous and not so spontaneous proclamations of guilt. In the case of France, this implied taking a true measure of the Vichy "parenthesis" by examining its domestic origins as well as its post-war legacy. The second debate is future-oriented and hinges around the key question of how to reconcile pluralist identities with a new sense of national belonging that would neither foster jingoism and xenophobia nor curtail personal and cultural identities.

In the first debate, Jews have been quintessential victims and litmus tests. In the second debate they are becoming Janus-faced central actors and not just symbols in a France and a Germany that oscillate, like much of the rest of Europe, between a pluralist and a multicultural identity. On both counts, Jews in France as well as in Germany are thus called upon to confront the historical weight and role of their communities, their links to the state, and increasingly their links to the "others" who now increasingly command the identity debates (whether they be Arabs in France or Turks in Germany). The pre-Holocaust Jewish past, with its assimilative strengths and weaknesses, has thus taken on a new future-oriented political and cultural relevance, albeit bereft of the old sentimental patriotism.

Jews in France and in Germany in the 1990s have just traversed a very long decade dedicated to the "politics of memory" linked to the Holocaust. In the future, however, they are destined to play a central role in the "memory of politics", in understanding how continental Europe's two most important states chose to integrate or come to terms with "their" Jews before the Holocaust, and the concomitant Jewish understanding of how they "belonged" in their respective nations – not so much for the sake of the Jews, but as a key reference with which to grasp the challenges posed by the new "others" in their midst. Both in France and Germany the old *Civilisation* versus *Kultur* debates that so determined Jewish life in the nineteenth century in both countries are thus taking on a new relevance. These debates, however, no longer pit both countries against each other as in the past. Rather, they permeate both societies at once, in what can be seen as a reversal of roles. Germany increasingly thinks of its national identity in terms of global Western values anchored in political democracy along the lines of Jürgen Habermas' *Verfassungspatriotismus*. France is instead increasingly tempted to define itself as a *Kulturnation* based on *la République*, whose slogan, "*liberté, égalité et fraternité*", compounded with the quasi-religious belief in *la laïcité*, is increasingly becoming a national trademark, rather than a French variation of a common Western political democracy. And in both cases, Jews, by their collective behaviour and official community stances, hold the balance and will play a key role in these debates.

The link between today's new Jewries in France and Germany and their non-biological, pre-Holocaust predecessors, however, is not uniquely moulded by the

wider political and cultural debates of their respective states. One is not just dealing with the symbolic relevance of recycled historical ghosts. There is a crucial, very much living missing link in this "anthropological" chain bridging the gap between the old French and German Jewries and the new Sephardi and Russian communities, and it is the same in both countries: the *Ostjuden*. Today they hold the key to the future Jewish identity of the first and third most populous Jewish communities of Western Europe, and, by ricochet, the key to how ethnic, cultural and religious "others" come to "belong" inside their respective wider body politics.

There are two reasons for this *Ostjuden* centrality. Chronologically, the *Ostjuden* presence in both countries straddled the purportedly unbridgeable Holocaust divide. They thus constitute the vital intermediary connection, for the *Ostjuden* started out in the late nineteenth and above all the early twentieth centuries in both countries as "outsiders", with respect to the old French-Jewish elites of Provençal and Alsatian origin, and to the old German communities of the Rhineland, Franconia and the eastern provinces. Initially, the fate of the *Ostjuden* was quite different in Germany and in France. In Germany they assimilated into the established Jewries by adopting the behaviour and values of the original German Jews. This was facilitated by the geographical proximity and the loose cultural borders between the two worlds. The proof of this assimilation occurred when the Nazis deported those Jews born in Poland back "home", essentially uprooting Jews who had become very German. In France, by contrast, the *Ostjuden* stood out far more radically and far longer from the *Israélites.* The assimilative phenomenon took place later, especially in the wake of World War II, when the *Ostjuden* Jewish elites, some through the Resistance, slowly rose within the community to form, with the old French Jews, a common "Ashkenazi" camp, with respect to the new Sephardi immigrants.

The stage was thus set for the classical, antithetical, post-war interpretation of Jewish life in France and in Germany: a truly "French", compact Ashkenazi Jewry versus a truly "non-German" *Ostjuden* presence that did not even bear any links with the old *Ostjuden* German Jews who had perished in the Holocaust, since these were the first to have been deported eastward. A Jewish world shocked by the fact that Jews would choose to live in post-war Germany was largely responsible, with the consensus of the German-Jewish exiles and the *Ostjuden* themselves, for the axiom that the post-war community of Jews in Germany bore no cultural links or physical relation to pre-Holocaust German Jewry.

Time, however, blurs axioms and gives new relevance to alternative readings of the past. The case of the *Ostjuden* is highly significant on this count. In the wake of the 1990s, it is possible to invert the original post-war readings to show that the descendants of the *Ostjuden* in France have taken on a new, more marked identity, while their equivalents in Germany are slowly establishing bridges with the old German-Jewish past. Thus, both stand poised between the past and the present in what can be seen as a rapprochement of attitudes and feelings.

Today's *Ostjuden* voices in France and Germany thus combine a very similar palette of cultural and political belonging and distancing. From very opposite positions they have come to share a common existential complexity based on three fun-

damental emotions. The first is a collective, absolute horror for the original "there" from whence they or their ancestors came, essentially the Polish lands of *Yiddishkeit*, with their inveterate antisemitism, which well preceded and even followed the Holocaust. For the *Ostjuden*, Nazi Germany could be compared to a 12-year attack of collective meningitis, whereas Poland suffered from an endemic, millennial case of antisemitic malaria.

This shared revulsion for their lands of origin produced a second shared feeling, that of gratitude towards the Western lands that welcomed them. Gratitude characterised the original *Ostjuden* immigrants to France before the Holocaust, especially those of the 1920s and 1930s, and it would also characterise their attitude towards post-war France after the Vichy "parenthesis", when the country took on the resistance status that de Gaulle chose to bestow on it. The *Ostjuden* who settled in post-war Germany were grateful to the American occupying power, in whose zone they settled, preferring life in the pariah country to a return "home" to post-1945 Poland. Pragmatic gratitude for life in post-war Germany emerged only slowly once the children of the original *Ostjuden* immigrants realised, starting in the mid-1980s, that they were there to stay. Both groups could thus speak of a 55-year-old, post-war success story very much along American lines in terms of material well-being and social mobility, with a type of integration that made heavy cultural demands in France and virtually none in Germany.

The third and most important emotion that both *Ostjuden* groups shared was a unique link to the Holocaust, which they turned into a virtually sacrosanct black light. That which they personally had lived through, or which their families and parents had experienced, both in Eastern Europe and as new immigrants in the occupied countries of Western Europe, reached such depths of horror that it made the experience of the older Jewries in the western part of the continent pale in comparison. The factoring in of the specific Holocaust experience of the *Ostjuden* within their respective national histories constituted the critical turning point in the history of both French and German post-war Jewries. In France, this implied stressing the *Ostjuden* specificity of a French-sponsored horror, as opposed to the official version of the German-run Vichy "parenthesis", which the old French Jews and even some of the *Ostjuden* elites, many of whom had participated in the Resistance, had helped to codify. In Germany, by contrast, it meant integrating, often against the objection of both camps, the collective *shtetl* experience of the Shoah into the official German narrative of the *Endlösung*. In both cases, this transformation was achieved during the "Jewish Decade" of the 1990s, as Holocaust commemoration penetrated into the internal and living histories of each European nation.

France

For most of the post-war period there was no public visibility of the *Ostjuden* identity inside the French-Jewish community, which remained governed solidly by the traditional *Israélite* elites. There was a clear upward mobility of *Ostjuden* in both

the governance of the Jewish community and society at large, but those who rose in the ranks adopted the vision of the traditional elites and did not seek to define or to establish any specific identity or collective claims for themselves. The power of the French assimilative cultural model and of the Gaullist/Resistance reading of the Vichy years served only to reinforce a classic vision of ongoing Jewish gratitude for the values of "eternal" France. French-Jewish outrage over de Gaulle's shift of alliances against Israel after the Six Days War in 1967, which remained a parallel, and even circumscribed event, did not tarnish the glow of eternal France on the domestic front.

No better proof of this can be found than in the writings of Alain Finkielkraut, a post-war, French-born philosopher and writer, the son of Polish Jews who had immigrated to France before the war. Finkielkraut became well known in French-Jewish circles when he wrote in 1980 *Le Juif imaginaire*, a personal essay in which he described the contrast between his own privileged and happy post-war life as a French Jew and the atmosphere of tragedy and sadness that pervaded his Holocaust-influenced family life. Finkielkraut was an "imaginary" Jew in his own eyes, because he proudly carried his vicarious, Polish family tragedy (those murdered were his grandparents and great-aunts and uncles) as a banner that gave him a nobler identity than his otherwise identical, non-Jewish peers. At a time when the Holocaust was still a minor and circumscribed historical memory, compared to the Resistance, and not a symbol occupying centre stage, Finkielkraut could refer to his *Ostjuden* roots as an imaginary past. His gratitude towards France was, instead, palpably present and real.

As late as 1987 Finkielkraut, by then a philosopher writing on non-Jewish topics, could still subscribe to the "Jewish gratitude to eternal France" vision of French history. On the question of whether the French code of nationality should be reformed to allow those children of North African immigrants who were born in France to become automatically French, Finkielkraut argued against the *jus soli* vision of citizenship, urging that such children should attach themselves voluntarily to the nation by requesting their citizenship. Such an elective espousal of nationality was precisely what distinguished France from the rest of Europe. Whereas in the past, French racists propounding an ethnic as opposed to a voluntary vision of the nation had argued that Jews could not understand the classical French playwright Racine because he did not come from their culture, history or blood, Finkielkraut thanked France for allowing him to mould his own personal, cultural identity irrespective of his ethnic origins. As he declared: "It is indeed France's historical merit to have offered to the world an elective theory of the nation and to have preferred such a theory in France's critical moments to the ethnic theory of the national genius".[1]

More than 40 years after the Holocaust, a post-war child of *Ostjuden* parents could still consider that the Vichy racial laws, willed, codified, enacted and carried

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[1] Alain Finkielkraut, 'Sur un vers de Racine', *Le Monde*, October 29, 1987, pp. 1–2. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge, MA 1992.

out by Frenchmen, were not part of the dark side of French history. For Finkielkraut, "eternal" France was apparently blissfully absent during the "critical moments" of the Vichy years. As late as 1987, this Frenchman with Jewish origins, preoccupied above all with the debates of the wider *res publica,* still felt no need to reconcile the life experience of his family entourage in wartime France with his public persona.

The official state rupture with this entrenched reading of the past did not come from the left, after the long Gaullist reign of power, but in July 1995. Jacques Chirac, newly elected president of France, in his speech commemorating the 53rd anniversary of the *Rafle du Vel d'Hiv*, broke with the official policy of the post-war French republics by openly recognising the responsibility of the French state and bureaucracy in the Final Solution, something which his predecessor, François Mitterrand, had always refused to do. This historic reversal of policy was not just significant for France: it was also crucial in the French-Jewish community, for it transformed the experience of the poorest *Ostjuden* immigrants into the emblematic experience of the Holocaust in France. The Jews that were herded by French gendarmes into the cycling stadium of Paris in July 1942 before being deported were the poorest immigrants, those who had no place to hide, no knowledge of the French countryside, no connections with the wider French-Christian or lay Resistance worlds. In other words, those living at the antipode of the world of the French *Israélites,* many of whom had been able to flee abroad, to retreat to the relative shelter of their country houses, or to adopt clandestine identities. Chirac's speech thus reversed the tables on the accepted account of the Vichy "parenthesis". The marginal, silent and humble *Ostjuden* memory of the Holocaust was thus enthroned as the official French memory. Rather than being adversely affected, the hallowed values of "eternal France" were transformed from rhetoric into reality.[2]

The second crucial transformation that occurred in France came about with the trial of Maurice Papon, a high ranking French civil servant who held important positions in post-war France in the ministry of the interior, and who had been Deputy Secretary General of the Bordeaux prefecture during the Vichy years. In this capacity, he had personally ordered the round-up of the Jews of the southwest region for deportation. But towards the end of the war, he had moved closer to the Resistance, sufficiently so to be decorated as a *résistant* by the Gaullist post-war government, which was seeking to carry out the reconciliation of its high ranking civil servants. Papon was thus able to pursue a glorious career in post-war France. It took the stubborn persistence of Maurice Slitinski, whose modest *Ostjuden* parents had been deported by Papon's order, to bring such an august official of the Fourth and Fifth Republics to trial, after a decade of delays clearly ordered from above. Slitinski's determination was not particularly appreciated by the French political and Jewish elites, who were afraid to rock the boat of the French state's resistance based post-war con-

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[2] On the impact of Chirac's 1995 speech see Annette Wieviorka, 'Deportation and Memory: Official History and the Rewriting of World War II', in Alvin H. Rosenfeld (ed.), *Thinking about the Holocaust: After Half a Century*, Bloomington, IN 1997, pp. 273–99.

sensus. But he finally won, and the trial, extensively covered by the media, took place. The grey reality of French participation in the Final Solution was thus brought out in full light. Papon's condemnation in 1998 marked the victory of civil society against the powers that be, and once again, France's Vichy wounds were re-opened with a "little man in the street" *Ostjuden* perspective.[3]

This new perspective also entered the formerly closed ranks of the French communist left, which, in the name of a universal proletarian outlook, traditionally condemned any particularist identity. There too, however, memories were unleashed in the 1990s. The Bundist background of many of the *Ostjuden* immigrants who had joined the party before the war, and who during the war had engaged in clandestine activities against the occupier, had long been buried within the glorious chapter of the Resistance, but now emerged in all of its specificity. It became clear that many of the sabotage activities of the clandestine Communist Party were performed by members of the MOI (*Main d'Œuvre Immigrée*, or Immigrants' Work Force), composed essentially of immigrants, while the past of communist leaders such as Georges Marchais was far less clear in terms of their possible collaboration with Vichy. In 1995, during the commemoration of the freeing of Auschwitz by the Soviet army, one could thus hear on French television a prominent trade union leader of the Communist Party, Charles Fiterman, who had always spoken of his deportation as a communist, evoke his *Ostjuden* identity and the deportation of his family as Jews from Central France.

The third event that transformed French memory was the appointment in 1995 by the then Prime Minister Alain Juppé of a commission headed by a prestigious *résistant*, Jean Matteoli, to fully investigate the complicity of the French state in the spoliation of France's Jews under Vichy, whether at the hands of the state itself or of its banks, insurance companies, museums, housing authorities or even copyright bureaus. The commission, which accomplished most of its work under Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, investigated not only the actions of Vichy but also the inaction of post-war French authorities in the various bureaucracies in seeking out the victims and rightful heirs of the spoliation. Once again, the brunt of the commission's work dealt with the cumulative weight of many small cases of spoliation; although the confiscated property of the Jews of old French stock had been largely returned after the war, the state held onto the property and bank accounts of the less well-to-do *Ostjuden*. The most important symbolic decision of the Matteoli Commission was to compensate the orphans of the Holocaust, many of whom had been hidden children, whose fate differed from that of other wartime orphans, including those with *résistant* parents, in that their entire family structure had been destroyed. After the war these children were generally left with no relatives to take care of them. Once again, the vast majority of those who filled these spoliation or orphan categories were the children of the modest *Ostjuden*, who, until the French state ac-

[3] In September 2002 a French appeals court released Papon from jail due to old age and poor health. See 'French Free Top Civilian Official Jailed for War Crimes', *New York Times*, September 19, 2002.

knowledged the particularity of their suffering, either were unaware that they had a right to compensation or did not know how to claim it.

These three seminal French events linked to the Holocaust not only brought out the *Ostjuden* specificity in French-Jewish history, but also reconciled *Ostjuden* memory with that of the *Israélites* and Jewish memory with that of "eternal" France. On this count, the first two years of the new millennium were rich in symbols. In November 2000, at the annual dinner of the Conseil Représentatif des Juifs de France, better known as CRIF, the umbrella organisation that groups together all Jewish organisations and has become the lay representative of French Jewry, the CRIF's outgoing president, Henri Hadjenberg, the son of *Ostjuden* immigrants, and best known in the past for his conflictual relationship with the traditional French-Jewish elites and the French government, praised the official guest, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, for France's honest reappraisal of the French state's actions during the Vichy years. And as a sign of Jewish gratitude, Hadjenberg bestowed the CRIF's "*Shalom*" medal to the members of the Matteoli Commission. His praise for the French state's efforts on behalf of its Jewish citizens was matched by the depth of his criticisms over the same state's attitude towards Israel in the Middle East conflict. Both the praise and the criticisms demonstrated, however, a new sense of Jewish "belonging" to the *République.* This sense of belonging was no longer based on a patriotic gratitude that minimized the particularist identity of French Jews, but rather on the fact that the French state had now righted a historical wrong. Jews could express themselves qua Jews in the public arena without having to minimise their own personal experiences or histories.

The best proof of this Franco-Jewish and intra-Jewish reconciliation took place in February 2001, when the elite of the French-Jewish community gathered inside the Elysée Palace to witness the decoration of one their key members, Adolphe Steg, who on that day received the insignia of *Grand Officier de la Légion d'Honneur* from Jacques Chirac. Born in Ruthenia in the mid-1920s and having arrived as a poor immigrant in France in 1934, Steg, a lifelong Jewish activist (past president of the CRIF, president of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* and vice-president of the Matteoli Commission) and a distinguished professor of Medicine, belongs to the *Ostjuden* who had made it to the top of French society. But the life history he described in his speech at the Elysée was that of a modest *Ostjude*, from whose ranks he had come. He and his family avoided deportation in July 1942 only because a classmate whose father had heard there would be a major roundup of Jews in the early morning braved the curfew to warn Steg, and because the concierge in their apartment building allowed his family to hide in an empty flat just before the French police came to get them. Neither his classmate nor the concierge knew about the death camps, but they knew Steg's family was in danger, and they moved to help them. Individuals had made the difference, and their courage could only be properly celebrated by revealing the selfishness and moral cowardice of those then in power, who subsequently hid behind the excuse that "they did not know". The gratitude that Steg expressed before President Chirac was thus a gratitude made possible by the president's 1995 speech and by the work of the Matteoli Commission, even

though Steg's speech assumed the classical style of such formal speeches. As Steg declared:

How can I not be overwhelmed when on this very breast upon which nearly sixty years ago, in an occupied and wounded France, the Germans had fixed the yellow star, today, in the same place, generous France, faithful to itself, places the most beautiful of insignia. If I dared I would take on the power of the Chief Rabbi of France, that of blessing our county, as do all rabbis Saturday morning at the synagogue in a prayer which begins with "may France live in joy and in prosperity, may she be strong and great among nations". But in this high place of the lay republican tradition, such a public blessing would be inappropriate. So, I simply wish to tell you, M. President, that I have always carried this blessing in my heart and shall continue to do so forever.[4]

Steg's moving tribute to France in the Elysée palace elicited tears of emotion from the prestigious *Israélites* present at the ceremony, men and women occupying the highest positions of the French state. A reconciliation had finally taken place, not just among different types of Jews but, more importantly, between private and public truths. In Steg's own words: "You, M. President, by allowing your heart to speak, have, through your courageous declaration, provoked a full awareness of this past, and in doing so not only have you not divided the French people, but instead you have reconciled them while also strengthening the nation's unity at the same time".

Purists might wince at the reference to the Germans rather than to the Vichy government placing the yellow star on Steg's chest, but what counted above all was that the life story of a poor *Ostjuden* immigrant rather than the glory of the *République* and the Resistance held centre stage amidst the gold and pomp of the Elysée Palace. It would be too easy to say that the *Ostjuden* have now been "co-opted" by the *Israélites*. The *Ostjuden*, while embracing the *République*, are doing so on their own terms. A taboo had been broken, which now allowed even the most prestigious of France's ministers, in this case the former Justice minister and member of the Constitutional Court, Robert Badinter, himself the son of *Ostjuden* immigrant parents, to begin to make references in public to his Yiddish-speaking grandmother and to his family's very Jewish desire that he succeed brilliantly in his studies. Such behaviour would have been unimaginable a decade earlier, when, according to the tradition of the *République,* personal family origins and sociological considerations were deemed inappropriate and irrelevant in the public realm.

The coming into its own of the *Ostjuden* specificity marked a critical turning point, whose ramifications are only now becoming apparent. Gratitude based on a personal history bears little resemblance to gratitude based on self-effacement. The new French-Jewish consensus that is emerging from this truthful confrontation with the past constitutes a healthier and even nobler form of belonging to a pluralist body politic. Furthermore, this Jewish achievement is now invoked as an example

[4] Adolphe Steg, 'Réponse au discours du Président de la République lors de la remise des insignes de grand officier de la Légion d'Honneur', February 26, 2001, *Editions du Nadir de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle*, Paris 2001, p. 23.

by many other groups in French society, whether they be Armenians, who have just succeeded in having their collective extermination in 1915 in the Ottoman empire recognised as a genocide by the French National Assembly; Algerians – whether independence fighters or those loyal to France (the Harkis), both of whom desire a truthful and just accounting of their past; and of course the Sephardi Jews, whose tribulations and uprooting from their historic North African lands have not yet entered the public consciousness.

Germany

The *Ostjuden* itinerary in post-war Germany, while in many respects diametrically opposed to the one in France, has begun to achieve the same result of reconciling the pre-Holocaust German Jewish tradition with the post-war *Ostjuden* reality, thereby allowing the full reinstatement of Jews into the wider body politic. In Germany, this itinerary entailed transforming a near-autonomous, self-enclosed world of *Ostjuden* coming from the shtetls of Poland – Jews who did not go to Israel when the displaced persons camps were closed, but instead stayed on in Germany and lived with "packed suitcases" as a near pariah caste – into active members of a new German nation and a new Jewish community. This transformation was made even more difficult by the fact that in contrast to France, it was no longer considered legitimate in Germany to plan a Jewish future, and there were virtually no Jews to serve as an "elite" example (except for a few heads of local communities, whose original purpose was to liquidate the last business of a destroyed German-Jewish life).

Furthermore, Western Germany's entire post-war existence was characterised by a foreign-imposed, ongoing evocation of its wartime crimes. The *Ostjuden* who settled in Germany did not have to shoulder this moral responsibility "to remember" a German-Jewish past that they had not known. That was Germany's own task, with the *Ostjude*n standing by as ersatz witnesses. The commemoration of the date of *Reichspogromnacht*, November 9, 1938, was one such event where the post-war Jews remembered an event that had taken place well before the onslaught of the Final Solution had hit them or their parents in Eastern Europe. There was a difference between participating in national commemorative celebrations and considering them as one's own. Such sentiments still prevailed inside the German-Jewish community when the German government decided in 1995 to build a memorial for the murdered Jews of Europe. The then president of the Central Council, Ignatz Bubis, reacted at the time by stating that the decision to create this memorial did not concern the community. It was a German question.[5]

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[5] I was present when Ignatz Bubis made these comments at the end of June 1995 in front of a delegation from the American Jewish Committee at the Headquarters of the Jewish Community in Frankfurt.

It was therefore natural that when the children of the *Ostjuden* immigrants came of age, the memory they sought to preserve was above all that of the lost world of their fathers, as demonstrated by Rachel Salamander's book on the lost world of *Yiddishkeit*.[6] It was also natural that their first collective entrance onto the German stage was a massive "self-defence" protest in Frankfurt in 1985 against the staging of a play by Rainer Werner Fassbinder, whose protagonist, a Jewish capitalist speculating in real estate, was purportedly inspired by the powerful leader of the Frankfurt Jewish Community, Ignatz Bubis. The *Ostjuden,* faced with a renascent German antisemitism, closed ranks around one of their own. Once again, as at all turning points, there was a bit of the new and a lot of the old. The protesters reacted against a German cultural production as outsiders who were slowly becoming concerned insiders. But they could only become true "insiders' when their own history – in this case, the chapter of the DP camps – entered the wider consciousness of the country as a whole.[7]

In 1989 German unification, the cultural and architectural debates surrounding the proper commemoration of the Holocaust, and the rise of right-wing xenophobic extremism and violence prodded the *Ostjuden* of Germany to assume a greater national role. It did not matter that all of the above events were fully covered by the international Jewish community, for whom the monitoring of Germany constituted one of the crucial aspects of the oft-repeated mantra of "never again". The new generation of *Ostjuden,* who, unlike the Greek chorus of foreign Jewish Cassandras, actually lived in the new Germany, found itself intervening in these passionate German debates no longer as an external actor protecting its own memory and present status, but as an internal German and Jewish voice, which often acted as a mediator between two increasingly polarised German camps.

The debate between Bubis and Martin Walser starting in the fall of 1998 over the instrumentalisation of Auschwitz turned into a national psychodrama, ostensibly pitting a well-known German writer, who was now accused by Jews of wishing to close the chapter on German guilt over Auschwitz, against the president of the Central Council, a self-made man of modest *Ostjude* background, as well as a Holocaust survivor. The members of this distrusted world of German *Kultur* who, from the perspective of the *Ostjuden,* had not reacted against the Nazi plague in the name of a nobler vision of Germany, were now accused of trying to put the Holocaust behind them. Bubis, who had become president of the Central Council proclaiming that he was a "German citizen of the Jewish faith", slowly came to the conclusion that such an identity was impossible in an increasingly racist country. Much was made of a pessimistic interview that he gave shortly before his death, which was widely interpreted as his last "testament". His non-belonging to Germany was, in the eyes of many, further confirmed by his wish to be buried in Israel. In reality, the

[6] Rachel Salamander (ed.), *The Jewish World of Yesterday, 1860–1938,* New York 1991. Salamander, born to East European survivors of a Bavarian DP-camp, became in 2001 the editor of the prestigious literary supplement to the newspaper *Die Welt.*

[7] Janusz Bodek, *Die Fassbinder-Kontroversen,* Frankfurt am Main 1991.

Walser-Bubis debate marked not the beginning but the end of the "Jewish versus German" debates inside Germany. Henceforth, new Jewish voices of a younger generation would come to the fore, attempting to build bridges rather than deepen abysses in a changed German context.[8]

This new era was perhaps inaugurated by the speech that Fritz Stern gave at the Paulskirche for the Frankfurt Peace Prize, exactly one year after Walser had given his. The distinguished American historian of Germany, who was forced to leave Germany as a child, reopened the corridors leading to the long list of Jewish contributions to Germany's national culture, this time not as epitaphs to a destroyed world but as living reflections of renewed relevance in a reunited country straddling Europe.[9] With the return of the third crucial actor – the heirs of the German-Jewish tradition – a double movement thus slowly emerged. As Germans rediscovered the relevance of their Jewish authors and past, the children of the post-war *Ostjuden*, educated, after all, in the German classics, also rediscovered the German words and references with which to express their feelings (whether specifically Jewish or not).

The result was a crucial literary reconciliation, whose greatest symbol is perhaps the best-selling status of Marcel Reich-Ranicki's memoirs and essays, which have consistently remained on the best seller lists (first in hardback and now in paperback) for the past two years.[10] That this "pope" of modern German literature, whose television show "Literary Quartet" helped mould German literary opinion, and who was well known for his reclusive private life, should have written a bestseller dealing with his Polish and German-Jewish background, marks a major transformation in the German and Jewish understanding of post-war Jewish life. What it basically confirms is that the bridges between the old *Ostjuden,* who had turned into "proper" German Jews before the advent of Nazism, and the new post-war *Ostjuden*, who purportedly had no German culture, had not died out entirely. The torchbearers had been there all along, and their life stories on a divided and amnesiac continent, which had once seemed irrelevant, began to come back into focus. Hence the effect of the publication of Reich-Ranicki's memoirs was not unlike that of the publication of Victor Klemperer's diaries in resuscitating a cosmopolitan, but in this case left-wing literary heritage from the dustbin of East German history. Perhaps in time even such a dour and complex character as the long-time post-war president of the Berlin Jewish community, the Auschwitz survivor Heinz Galinski, will be reconsidered as a bridge rather than as a remnant of a dead past.

The German component of the *Ostjuden* experience was further strengthened by the German confrontation with the historical reassessment of the deeds of the *Wehrmacht* in its push eastward towards the Soviet Union during operation Barba-

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[8] Frank Schirrmacher (ed.), *Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte*, Frankfurt am Main 1999.

[9] On Fritz Stern's speech see Fritz R. Stern, 'Germany 1933: Fifty Years Later', *Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture 27*, New York 1984.

[10] See Marcel Reich-Ranicki, *Mein Leben*, Stuttgart 1999. For the English translation see Reich-Ranicki, *The Author of Himself: The Life of Marcel Reich-Ranicki*, trans. by Ewald Osers, Princeton 2001.

rossa in June 1941. The convenient division that had traditionally distinguished between the horrendous *Waffen* SS and the honest soldiers of the German army, who were merely performing their duty on behalf of the fatherland, evaporated with the proof, furnished by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, that the Gestapo and the SS could never have carried out the Final Solution in eastern Europe without the help of the army. Suddenly, the fates of the old German *Ostjuden*, who had been exterminated by the Nazis in Eastern Europe, and the post-war *Ostjuden*, who had survived the same horrors in those same lands, were once again intertwined in a revamped collective German Jewish consciousness.

The "coming out" of the *Ostjuden* as a legitimate current of German and German-Jewish life, a current with its own historical pedigree, marks one of the fundamental transformations of these past few years. One person in particular incarnates this transformation – Salomon Korn, an architect by training, president of the Jewish community of Frankfurt and a board member of the Central Council of Jews of Germany. Writing at first on communal Jewish affairs and architectural questions linked to Jewish life, Korn has now become one of the intellectual voices of a new German setting in which the Jewish component is a living part of an emerging, pluralist agora and no longer the predictable reference to Jewish death. The title of his volume of collected essays, *Geteilte Erinnerung* (Divided Memory), remarkably conveys what constitutes both a "divided" and a "shared" memory with his fellow post-war Germans.[11]

Most important for the future, Korn has now entered the fray of German debates over the Holocaust with a voice that shies neither away from purely German references nor from what used to be the essence of the German-Jewish contribution to Germany's culture: wit. If the Walser-Bubis debate revolved primarily around a powerful symbol from the past – Auschwitz – the debate over *Leitkultur* that dominated the fall of 2000 proved just how fundamentally things had changed in less than two years. The Christian Democrats' attempt to claim that Germany should have a guiding or dominant culture, which all immigrants should adopt in order to become German, could have become just as tedious. It did not, however, because the culturally relativist and open "camp", which included both Jews and non-Jews opposed to the very idea of *Leitkultur*, decided to attack the concept in a humorous vein by referring to an alternative: "*Lightkultur*". No one from this camp was more outspoken than Salomon Korn, who composed a little poem along the lines of Wilhelm Busch for the German-Jewish Dialogue of the Bertelsmann Foundation, held in Berlin in February, 2001.[12] In a more serious vein, Korn accompanied his poem

[11] Salomon Korn, *Geteilte Errinerung: Beiträge zur deutsch-jüdischen Gegenwart*, Berlin 1999.

[12] The last three strophes run as follows:

Nur wo Kultur nicht leiten muss,
leitet Kultur Kulturgenuss
"Freilich" meint der Zuckerbäcker,
"Warum is Leitkultur nicht lecker!"
Selbst der gute Onkel Fritz
Wundert sich "Wo war ihr Witz?"

with an article in which he maintained that any country looking for social homogeneity was bound to become static and sterile. The question was not whether the immigrants were willing to adapt to German culture, but whether the German Republic could really make itself attractive for potential immigrants. In an earlier speech, delivered in Berlin for the day of Holocaust remembrance on January 27, 2001, Korn took up a theme that had previously been articulated by the German-Jewish exiles as they contemplated post-war Germany, namely that the country, by having extirpated the Jews from its bosom, had in reality performed a "self-amputation".[13]

The cycle was now in many ways complete. This child of *Ostjuden,* himself born in Poland in 1942, could now react not only from the standpoint of a committed German but also from what had been the cultural perspective of the pre-war German Jews. Similarly, Rachel Salamander, while still committed to preserving the world of *Yiddishkeit,* has now expanded through her chain of bookstores/salons (the *Literaturhandlung*) in Munich and Berlin to cover the entire Jewish heritage, with a particular emphasis on the pre-war German-Jewish authors, whose relevance is once again coming to the fore, as well as on new German questions in general.

This literary transformation is not limited, as it was in the pre-war German style, to culture without any political implications. On the contrary. One of the most powerful symbols of the renewed essence of Jewish life in Germany took place on November 9, 2000, the 62nd anniversary of *Reichspogromnacht.* On that occasion, the commemoration date took on a contemporary relevance beyond the ritualised aspects of the ceremony of the years past for all German Jews, past and present, as well as for all Germans. On this November 9, a long, massive march of Germans protesting against right-wing extremism and intolerance, led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, wound its way from the Oranienburger Straße synagogue towards the Brandenburg Gate. In the past, *kippah*-clad German leaders traditionally participated in commemorations inside synagogues, thus restricting the repentance of Germans for the crimes of the past to a uniquely Jewish context. In the year 2000, however, these ritualised gestures were eliminated and replaced by a powerful new symbol uniting the commemoration of November 9th by the German people in the streets with the November 9th commemoration of Jewish suffering in the synagogues. Bringing the Jewish "story" out into the streets in front of the most hallowed place of German unity, the Brandenburg Gate, powerfully signalled an internal national reconciliation. But not one based on sentimentality. On the contrary. When Paul Spiegel, who had replaced the late Ignatz Bubis as president of the Central Council, addressed the crowd, he did so

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Auch der brave Bauersmann
Denkt:"Wat geht Leitkultur meck an?"
Kurz, im ganzen Land herum
Geht ein freudiges Gebrumm:
"Gott sei Dank! Nun ist's vorbei
Mit der Leitkultur-Streiterei!!

[13] Korn, 'Schlicht als Deutsche', *Süddeutsche Zeitung,* January 26, 2001, p. 19.

with an impassioned speech in which he accused Germany's entire political class of passivity in the face of right-wing extremists. This was the speech of a German-Jewish insider, no longer the ritualised sermon of the equivalent of Banquo's ghost, the Jewish victim of the past. It was a speech that directly addressed the Germans in the audience, touching them not with respect to the past of their parents and grandparents but with respect to their own future. An important page had been turned.

Thus did the Jewish community of Germany, essentially composed of *Ostjuden*, leave its particularist ghetto to walk into the wider German agora, at the same time that the *Ostjuden* of France had abandoned their collective silence, masked for so long beneath the mantle of French universal values, in an effort to bring their particular identity into the French agora.

Were these diametrically opposed paths or converging itineraries? I would argue that in both cases, what has been achieved is a crucial reconciliation between the pre and post-Holocaust Jewish experiences, between the German Jews of old and the *Ostjuden* of today and between the *Israélites* and the French *Ostjuden*. Without this internal reconciliation between pre and post-Holocaust Jewish communities, the reconciliation between the Jews and their fellow German or French citizens would have remained limited to the realm of polite assertions and elegant rhetoric.

The tragic post-war Jewish reading of the German past as a continuum fractured by the abyss of the Holocaust, or the consensual French Jewish reading of an eternal France with a simple Vichy "parenthesis", have thus given way to a more rich and complex interpretation of the past. History has now become a Möbius strip, whose conceptual "bends" unite past and future. In the case of French and German Jewries, the *Ostjuden* have provided the "bend" through their contributions to and reconciliation with post-war France and Germany. The Russian Jews of Germany and the North African Jews of France, and perhaps more importantly, all the "others" in both countries, will now, thanks in part to the *Ostjuden* precedent, be able to assume their rightful place, both in terms of the memory of their pasts and hope for their future, not only in the reconfigured French and German agoras but above all in a new European public space.

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