Maximilian Klose

Why They Gave

CARE and American Aid for Germany after 1945

History

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A family opens a 'CARE packet', Berlin 1950
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Abbreviations

AADG	American Association for a Democratic Germany
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
ACVAFS	American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service
AFL	American Federation of Labor
ARA	American Relief Administration
ARC	American Red Cross
ARCH	American Relief Clearing House
CARE	Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (today Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere)
CGT	Confédération Générale du Travail
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIO	Council of Industrial Organizations
CRALOG	Council of Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in Germany
DPs	Displaced Persons
ERP	European Recovery Program
FTUC	Free Trade Union Committee
GARIOA	Government Appropriations and Relief in Occupied Areas
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GSP	German Society of Pennsylvania
GYA	German Youth Activities
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
OMGUS	Office of Military Government (U. S.)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information

SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of [East] Germany)
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions

Introduction

In Billy Wilder's 1948 motion picture *A Foreign Affair*, a delegation of U.S. congresspersons visits occupied Berlin. Due to rumors that the GIs stationed there engage in frivolous behavior and have an all too casual attitude towards the local women, the delegation has come to evaluate morale – and morality – among their military personnel in Germany's former capital city. Twelve years of fascist rule and almost six years of war have left their mark on the once thriving metropolis. People roam the streets in search of food, offering their valuables on the black market for a loaf of bread or a piece of butter, squatting in what little shelter they find in the ruins. Looking down upon the destroyed city from their airplane cabin, the politicians begin to discuss the best possible way to treat the remnants of the Third Reich. Some insist on thorough deindustrialization and a hard peace, like the one negotiated in Versailles in 1919, that would eradicate the country's war potential once and for all. Others argue that only a democratized and economically revitalized Germany can guarantee enduring peace on the European continent.

Soon, the conversation shifts to the responsibility of the United States government to sustain the occupied population. "I'm all for sending food, only let 'em know where it's from," exclaims one member of the delegation. "I object to dollar diplomacy," counters another. "If you give a hungry man bread, that's democracy. If you leave the wrapper on, it's imperialism."[1] This last comment, questioning the extent, purpose, and impact of U.S. engagement in postwar Europe, reverberates throughout the film. Upon the delegation's arrival in the city, a comedic but acerbic take on German Fräuleins and lonely GIs in dingy

1 Billy Wilder, *A Foreign Affair*, DVD, Los Angeles: Paramount Pictures Inc., 1948.

night clubs, on former Nazi mistresses, upright all-American girls, and, of course, love unfolds before the viewer, played by lead actors Jean Arthur, John Lund, and Marlene Dietrich. Amidst quick laughs and fast-paced dialogues, hunger and distress prevail as the crosses the German people must bear for the atrocious crimes their government had committed all over Europe. But the film does not build a simplistic narrative of virtuous conquerors and starving defeated enemies. Wilder's Berliners are also steadfast, resourceful, and often too proud to admit any complicity in Hitler's doings. Their U.S. American counterparts are not exactly heroic role models, either. GIs happily partake in the black-market economy, which their own military government has rendered illegal, to offer the Germans food in exchange for valuables and physical favors. They behave, as Ralph Willett calls it, like "materialistic colonizers of a citywide slum."[2] Wilder's story is a tale not of heroism or imperialism but of human imperfection.[3]

And yet, with the mere mention of imperialism, Billy Wilder pointed to a central challenge in postwar U.S.-German relations that concerned not only congresspersons but also large parts of the U.S. public. Food, and the lack thereof, was an indicator for the success of the United States as an occupation power and as a herald of democracy. If the German people were starving and needed food urgently, was it so bad for them to know where it came from? Would it be wrong of the United States government to use food aid as an image booster? Were goodwill and self-interest mutually exclusive, or could they form a synergetic relationship? In short, could and should food do something other than feed people?

Food has always been intrinsically connected to power. It shapes dominant discourses on regional or national identification by proclaiming a unique, and often superior, culinary culture that becomes a signpost for belonging. Eating, displaying, boycotting, providing, and withdrawing food are politicized practices of cultural transmission, reward, or discipline. Domestically and transnationally, such practices can enforce or erode ideals and stereotypes of class, gender, and race; they can shape behavior, influence everyday lives, and change cultural norms according to the power that actors exert on and through food.[4] Providing food aid to people in foreign countries, especially if it came with Wilder's metaphorical wrapper, consequentially had broad societal and

2 Ralph Willett, "Billy Wilder's 'A Foreign Affair' (1945–1948): 'The Trials and Tribulations of Berlin,'" *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 7 (1987): 5.

3 David Bathrick, "Billy Wilder's Cold War Berlin," *New German Critique* 37 (2010): 43.

4 On the interconnection of food and power, see Jürgen Martschukat and Bryant Simon, "Introduction: Food, Power, and Agency," in *Food, Power, and Agency*, ed. Jürgen Martschukat et al. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017); Helen Zoe Veit, *Modern Food, Moral Food: Self-Control, Science, and the Rise of Modern American Eating in the Early Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 58–76; Katharina Vester, *A Taste of Power: Food and American Identities* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), 1–5.

political implications. The wrapper signified a cultural environment to which both provider and consumer attached meanings, hopes, and intentions. Food aid transcended mere subsistence, as it exported cultural signifiers and often imposed them on its recipients.

Released in U. S. cinemas on June 30, 1948, *A Foreign Affair* addressed political concerns that had never before been so important in the United States. Three years into the military occupation of Germany, the grand alliance between the governments of the U. S., Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union lay in ruins, and all Allies had abandoned any hope of a continuing East-West partnership. In April, the U. S. government had launched the European Recovery Program (ERP), or Marshall Plan, to revive the shattered industries of the European continent and to express U. S. American commitment to leadership in a Western democratic alliance. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, emerged as the hegemon of an Eastern Bloc of socialist states. In between, divided Germany became the stage on which both camps tested their strengths. Just six days before the release of Wilder's film, the Soviet government had blocked all land and water routes to West Berlin, prompting the Western Allies to supply the city via air for the next eleven months. An entirely new geopolitical situation would develop before the end of the 1940s. Germany transformed from an occupied enemy territory into two sovereign states divided geographically and in their allegiance between East and West. In this terrain of the early Cold War, both U. S. policymakers and the U. S. American public searched for ways to make sense of their place in a new world order.

This study investigates the stories of people who provided food aid to Germany after World War II not just to feed the hungry abroad but precisely to make sense of the new geopolitical situation and their place within it. Like Wilder's film, it is not a tale of right or wrong, virtue or flaw, democracy or imperialism. It is a story of individuals and groups within the U. S. public who understood that food was much more than just material relief. Labor unionists, women's book clubs, university professors, immigrant organizations, preachers, and birth control activists – all of them understood that humanitarian aid for distant sufferers held many benefits for others as well as for themselves.[5] They could provide much needed assistance to people in dire need and, at the same time, satisfy their own desires, further their own agendas, and partake in their country's quest for political hegemony in the early Cold War – if they so pleased.

5 "Humanitarian aid" is understood according to Esther Möller et al. "as a field that covers a broad range of activities, including emergency relief, longer-term development and active response to famine, ill-health and poverty": Esther Möller, Johannes Paulmann and Katharina Stornig, "Gendering Twentieth-Century Humanitarianism: An Introduction," in *Gendering Global Humanitarianism in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Esther Möller et al. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 2.

Right after the end of armed conflict in Europe, the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) came into existence in New York City. In 1946, CARE started sending its soon-to-be famous food packages across the Atlantic to provide humanitarian assistance to the needy of the war-struck continent. The financial means for this endeavor came from private U. S. American donations. For a US$ 10 check, U. S. donors could have a CARE package sent not only to a country of their choice but to a specific recipient whose name they put on their order. This could be a friend or relative back in Europe, but it could also be someone unknown whose name the donor had received from neighbors or from local charities with contacts abroad. If they had no specific person in mind, donors could either ask for names at their local CARE office or they could just put down the profile of a person – like an orphan in rural Bavaria or a war widow in Paris – and let CARE find someone in need who fit the description. The packages, ready-made by the organization, contained an assortment of U. S. consumer goods, ranging from canned meats and dried dairy products to sweets and sanitation equipment.[6] Each of these parcels carried the name and address of the U. S. American donor and, upon receipt, CARE encouraged the beneficiaries to write a letter of appreciation to their benefactors. As a result, Europeans not only received desperately needed provisions, but they forged personal bonds with their benefactors in the United States, learning how they lived and how they thought.[7] In the case of CARE, the bread indeed came with a wrapper.

CARE soon turned out to be a major success – especially in Germany. U. S. Americans from all walks of life and across the country gave financial resources to aid the recently defeated enemy. In its first five years of operation, CARE shipped a total of ten million packages across the Atlantic, six million of which went to the four occupation zones and, after 1949, the two newly formed German states. This amounted to more packages than the total of all those received by the other sixteen European countries in which CARE operated.[8] On average, one out of fifteen Germans had received a CARE package by the fall of 1948.[9] When the organization closed its last German field office in West Berlin in 1963, the former war enemy had received aid worth more than

6 For an overview of the content of the earliest CARE packages, see "The Famous CARE Food Package," *The Washington Post*, October 4, 1946, 13.

7 Heike Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80: 'Showered with Kindness'?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 43–44.

8 CARE pamphlet, *Ten Million Ambassadors of Goodwill*, 1951, Papers of the Senats-Registratur Bremen, Staatsarchiv Bremen, Germany (hereafter Staatsarchiv Bremen).

9 Charles Bloomstein, German Mission Draft for the *History of CARE*, 37, 1949, CARE Records 1945–1985, Box 2, Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library, New York: NY, USA (hereafter cited as CARE Records).

US$ 80,000,000 from private donors in the United States.[10] Evidently, many people in the U.S. were eager to spend their money on Germany in this way.

But why was that so? Donating through CARE was not the same as dropping spare change in a collection box outside your local department store. Giving to a designated recipient in a specific country was a deliberate decision that could not be made in passing. It meant sacrificing financial resources for a faraway person that you might not even know, and it demanded a careful assessment of this person's physical need and worthiness. And still, people in the United States thought of feeding hungry Germans as a cause worthy of this financial sacrifice.

Uncovering the "why" is the purpose of this study. It treats humanitarian aid as an essentially reflective practice that not only considers the distant sufferer but pushes just as much, if not even more forcefully, for a reevaluation of the giver as an actor in a specific sociopolitical and transnational historical moment. Aid crosses spatial and cultural distances, which is why this study proposes two intertwined sets of motivations to investigate humanitarian giving: outbound motivations that targeted German hunger as well as social and political developments in Germany; and inbound ones that aimed at the consolidation or change of the actors' position within U.S. society, or the confirmation of their personal beliefs and ideological convictions. This distinction highlights a multifaceted dynamic in the ways people perceived and resorted to relief aid as a form of transatlantic engagement. Donors did not just understand CARE as a way to feed starving Germans but also as a means of engaging in the foreign policy interests of the United States' government. Some thought that humanitarianism could transform and bind Germany (which mostly meant West Germany) to the U.S. sphere of influence in the early Cold War. Others used CARE for their own purposes rather than as part of a grander political strategy. They found that the organization's unique person-to-person approach satisfied personal desires, offering direct access to a group of recipients that matched their own interests. In many cases, this form of aid was concerned with the donor at least as much as with the recipient.

CARE has not escaped the attention of other scholars who have contributed partial explanations for its popularity and its elevation to iconic status in the U.S. and Europe. In her history of CARE's development into a global humanitarian enterprise up to the 1980s, Heike Wieters argued that the organization owed its success to a quick adaptation to free market logics that focused on organizational efficiency, self-preservation, and strong government ties.[11] Karl-

10 This figure includes only the donations given to West Germany up to 1960, when CARE closed all but the West Berlin offices. Including the figures for West Berlin and East Germany would likely add US$ 10,000,000. See Press Release "CARE Will Close Service to West Germany June 30," April 24, 1960, CARE Records, Box 7.

11 Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*.

Ludwig Sommer equally stressed CARE's perseverance in legal and political struggles with occupation authorities and later the two German governments. He further credited its success to the tremendously positive psychological impact the packages had on German recipients and on public opinion towards the United States.[12] In his 1963 classic *American Philanthropy Abroad*, Merle Curti suggested that CARE's personalized package philosophy simply institutionalized the U.S. American tradition of "neighbor-helping-neighbor."[13] Godehard Weyerer and Philip Baur, by contrast, saw the success grounded in a large and compassionate German-American immigrant community, in CARE's potential use as a propaganda and re-education tool, and in a media image that shifted from Germany as a victim to Germany as a reformed transatlantic partner.[14]

While all these works hold great merit in their own right, this study aims to complement their findings with a much-needed perspective on individual donors and their motivations as reasons for CARE's success, thereby going beyond the purely organization-based approach. It seeks to demonstrate that the grassroots perspective of the giving individual allows for fascinating insights into how members of the U.S. public understood their own role and responsibility within the culture of their country and its proliferation across the Atlantic. People used CARE in ways that highlighted various pertinent debates on the virtues of the United States and its democracy and on the significance of these virtues in the endeavor to integrate Germany into a Western value system. Through their aid, donors reflected their understandings of education, religion, consumer capitalism, and political activism onto their transatlantic audience in the hope that it might serve their own, their country's, and their counterparts' interests. The diverse mélange of personal, public, domestic, and foreign objectives that donors pursued shows that they evidently understood humanitarian involvement as a form of active participation in debates on Germany's future. The reasons, as will become evident over the course of this analysis, were diverse. Goodwill intersected with reformist purposes, engagement in foreign policy clashed with personal gain and domestic interests, and paternalistic exertions of power overshadowed good-faith attempts at transatlantic cultural understanding. The decision to use CARE had not one "why" but many.

12 Karl-Ludwig Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft: CARE, CRALOG und die Entwicklung der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen nach Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs* (Bremen: Selbstverlag des Staatsarchivs Bremen, 1999).

13 Merle Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad: A History* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1963), 498.

14 Philipp Baur, "From Victim to Partner: CARE and the Portrayal of Postwar Germany," in *Die amerikanische Reeducation-Politik nach 1945: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf "America's Germany,"* ed. Katharina Gerund et al. (Bielefeld: Transcript-Verlag, 2015), 117, 126–37; Godehard Weyerer, "CARE Packages: Gifts from Overseas to a Defeated and Debilitated Nation," in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook,* vol. 1., ed. Detlef Junker et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 524.

Historians have so far shied away from investigating individual donors and their motivations. Gabriele Lingelbach argues that individual reasons for giving are difficult to analyze not only because they are poorly documented but also because archival documents might not reveal "true" motivations. A dominant consensus on charitable giving postulates compassion, pity, goodwill, and altruism as the only virtuous motivations, tempting people to conceal their potentially self-interested reasons for humanitarian engagement behind an idealistic façade.[15] Despite this well-founded concern, scholarly hesitancy to involve donors overlooks the manifold possibilities that their motivations offer to aid understanding of public and political debates at a crucial historical moment. A close reading of this moment and its determining social, cultural, and political structures can very well point to the motivations that lie beneath the donor's own written word. If we investigate donors not as a homogeneous entity but as individuals with specific biographies, regional and educational backgrounds, and personal convictions, we uncover underlying motivations that those people did not reveal on paper. These motivations in turn show how members of the public understood their role as partakers in debates on cultural values, national identification, or foreign policy objectives. They also tell us how these actors perceived their own sense of agency, as well as which means they employed to gain maximum influence. A study of CARE uncovers how people of diverse backgrounds, with different financial capabilities, of different classes, gender identifications, and ethnicities slipped into the role of the donor and used their transatlantic agency from a distance.

Certain motivations in humanitarian aid, be they the genuine desire to do good or a deep religious belief in charitable duty, may prevail over long periods of time. But it is important to point out that changing historical contexts perpetually redefine those motivations and produce new ones. In this regard, postwar Germany was an especially ambiguous and dynamic case. The country of the former fascist enemy quickly developed into the contested ideological battle ground of a new enmity. A developing Cold War consensus rallied U.S. American political and public opinion behind the front lines of the battle between democracy and communism.[16] Someone who, in early 1947, aided a hungry West German boy out of pity may have used CARE to recruit that

15 Gabriele Lingelbach, "Spenden als prosoziales Verhalten aus geschichtswissenschaftlicher Sicht," in *Prosoziales Verhalten: Spenden in interdisziplinärer Perspektive*, eds. Frank Adloff et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2016), 28–29, 34.

16 The Cold War consensus is understood as a bipartisan agreement, supported and publicly fostered by government-controlled and independent media outlets, emphasizing the need for a coherent U.S. foreign policy strategy towards communism that should take precedence over the opinions of the different political camps. See Daniel L. Lykins, *From Total War to Total Diplomacy: The Advertising Council and the Construction of the Cold War Consensus* (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 109; Wendy Wall, *Inventing the "American Way": The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 8–9.

same boy as a cold warrior in the battle for democratic freedom just two years later. This is to say that any glance donors cast across the Atlantic was necessarily also a reflection of their self-understanding as U.S. Americans, and we can only understand their humanitarian engagement within and because of these historical developments.[17]

Among the flood of works since the 1990s that have analyzed the origins and geopolitical facets of the Cold War and that have inquired into Germany's role in the conflict, a subset has increasingly focused on hunger, hygiene, and disease control in postwar Germany in the last decade.[18] Scholars like Atina Grossmann, Jessica Reinisch, and Alice Weinreb point to the connection of starvation and devastation to Allied occupation policies and public opinion.[19] The United States, as the only nation to come out of the Second World War economically stronger than it was before, became the central Allied power in debates on food supply and responsibility.[20] If the U.S. government failed to provide for its occupied subjects, it risked losing credibility within the emerging bipolar conflict, meaning that the proliferation of an entire political, economic, and cultural world view was at stake. For the U.S. government, Kaete

17 On the idea of foreign policy and foreign engagement as reflective practices that reveal domestic political and cultural understandings, see Thomas Reuther, *Die ambivalente Normalisierung*: *Deutschlanddiskurs und Deutschlandbilder in den USA, 1941–1955* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000), 19–20.

18 The number of historical studies on the origins of the Cold War and the U.S. occupation of Germany are too vast to elaborate on in detail. On the U.S. presence in Cold War Germany and its political, economic, military, social, and cultural aspects, see Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn and Hermann-Josef Rupieper, eds., *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*: *The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Junker et al., eds., *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990*; James McAllister, *No Exit*: *America and the German Problem, 1943–1954* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), Chs. 1–4. On the emergence of the Cold War with regard to security policy, economic interest, the influence of the main actors' biographies, and the role of emotions, see Frank Costigliola, *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances*: *How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know*: *Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe*: *Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*: *National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

19 On U.S. public health work in occupied Germany, see Atina Grossmann, "Grams, Calories, and Food: Languages of Victimization, Entitlement, and Human Rights in Occupied Germany, 1945–1949," *Central European History* 44 (2011): 118–48; Jessica Reinisch, *The Perils of Peace*: *The Public Health Crisis in Occupied Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 188–219; Alice Weinreb, "'For the Hungry Have No Past nor Do They Belong to a Political Party': Debates over German Hunger After World War II," *Central European History* 45, no. 1 (2012): 50–78. For debates on Allied responsibility and postwar German lobbying for food as a human right, see Weinreb, *Modern Hungers*: *Food and Power in Twentieth-Century Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 88–121.

20 Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 2.

O'Connell argues, postwar Germany served as an initial testing ground for the later success of U.S. food aid in containment policy during the 1950s.[21] The German people, diseased and hungry, became a focus of geopolitical struggles and domestic U.S. American deliberations on responsibility and leadership in the early Cold War.

Taking over responsibility for hungry Germans in this context meant maintaining or developing agency in transatlantic relations. But agency, as Donna Alvah, Petra Goedde, and others pointed out, works in different spatial and relational dimensions. Occupation officials, U.S. American military personnel, and their families interacted with Germans on site, establishing direct dialogue with the "other" and stimulating cross-cultural communication and even changes in occupation policy.[22] This direct relationship produced a power imbalance between the wealthy and militarily powerful U.S. American victors and their defeated, demoralized, and hungry German counterparts. U.S. actors often expressed their power in paternalistic or, at times, even suppressive behavior and applied tropes of vulnerability and femininity to objectify or belittle the local population.[23]

These relationships shared a proximity of the parties involved. Humanitarian donors, by contrast, present a physically detached group of actors that experienced Germany in a quite different way. Only a few documented donors went to visit their European recipients themselves. Transatlantic distance consequently left those who gave with a distinct and indirect set of sources for relating to Germany, including media coverage and thank-you notes from recipients. But, as this study will show, humanitarian aid created power struc-

21 Kaete M. O'Connell, "Weapon of War, Tool of Peace: U.S. Food Diplomacy in Postwar Germany" (PhD diss., Temple University, 2019), 5.

22 Donna Alvah, *Unofficial Ambassadors*: *American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946–1965* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 2–5; Petra Goedde, *GIs and Germans*: *Culture, Gender and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), xiv–xxiii; Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies*: *Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 19–21, 25–29; Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*: *The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 5–14; Thomas W. Maulucci and Detlef Junker, eds., *GIs in Germany*: *The Social, Economic, Cultural, and Political History of the American Military Presence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Adam R. Seipp, *Strangers in the Wild Place*: *Refugees, Americans, and a German Town, 1945–1952* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 97–108. As Robert Abzug showed, similar dynamics of on-site interaction and opinion-making were visible in the last days of World War II, as U.S. soldiers who liberated German concentration camps were directly confronted with the extent of the Nazi atrocities and took those impressions home, shaping public debates on the defeated enemy. See Robert H. Abzug, *Inside the Vicious Heart*: *Americans and the Liberation of Nazi Concentration Camps* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 154–55.

23 On paternalism and gendered language in humanitarian reasoning that excludes men and victimizes women and children as generally innocent, see R. Charli Carpenter, *'Innocent Women and Children'*: *Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), 1–2.

tures from a distance that closely resembled on-site contact. Donors, often knowingly, had the upper hand over their recipients. From a distance, the ability to provide or withhold aid gave donors the chance to exert power on their counterparts across the Atlantic.

How intrinsically donors, recipients, and media outlets connected CARE to notions of transnational agency becomes apparent in the fact that they often mentioned the organization in the same breath with the Marshall Plan, frequently perceiving both programs as one and the same. In 1947, for example, the *Saturday Evening Post* commented that through CARE, "every American can launch a Marshall Plan of his own."[24] Although both programs worked independently of one another, with one being a private and the other a state-driven venture, they did have similarities. The Marshall Plan, several scholars have argued, was only one factor among many that contributed to West Germany's economic rehabilitation after the war. But it bore psychological value in tying Western Europe to the United States economically and ideologically, creating a common sentiment of reliance and cooperation.[25] Similarly, CARE could only be a meager and mostly symbolic form of support given postwar Germany's immense food shortage; it could never solve existing problems single-handedly. It was not in terms of quantity but quality that CARE and the Marshall Plan were very alike: they offered influence, the former on a private level and the latter on a political one.

In the past thirty years, a fair amount of scholarship on U.S. cultural diplomacy in the early Cold War uncovered how state and nonstate actors tried to promote U.S. American conceptions of democracy, consumer capitalism, and cultural practices abroad. U.S. policymakers and cultural diplomats often tried to convey overtly idealized images of the United States that evoked criticism at home and abroad. European audiences would only adopt the parts of U.S. culture that followed their own preformulated ideas of the country, while cultural elites on both sides of the Atlantic would voice their disdain for U.S. mass culture. More often than not, cultural diplomats had difficulty reconciling European and U.S. American ideas of what culture actually meant.[26]

24 Henry F. Pringle, "The Nicest Gift You Can Buy;" *Saturday Evening Post*, November 29, 1947, 12.

25 Werner Abelshauser, *Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945–1948: Rekonstruktion und Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen und britischen Zone* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt GmbH, 1975), 19–31; Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51* (London: Methuen, 1987), preface and 56–61. For a brief but thorough historical and historiographical overview of the Marshall Plan in Germany and the research conducted through the early 1990s, see Charles S. Maier, "'Issue Then Is Germany and with It the Future of Europe,'" in *The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development Within the Framework of the European Recovery Program*, ed. Charles S. Maier (New York: Berg Press, 1991).

26 Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 95–115; Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone Between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy*

This scholarship shows how the interplay of U.S. cultural actions and European reactions urged actors to do what Brian Etheridge has called "inverting Americanization."[27] As U.S. values and ideologies spread overseas, prompting foreign audiences to reevaluate the pros and cons of their own cultures, the reactions of those audiences forced U.S. actors in politics and the public to do the same.

Looking at CARE reveals that transnational humanitarianism was part of this rule rather than the exception. CARE did not represent a simple sender-receiver model of European Americanization. To be sure, U.S. Americans sent something that Europeans literally received, but both parties held their own opinions on the meaning and significance of the packages that crossed the Atlantic. Aiding German democratization, for instance, may have been an objective shared by many CARE donors, but different actors can have different ideas of what democratization means and which aspects of democracy need promoting.[28] And recipients were not just passive vessels filled with U.S. American understandings of politics, culture, and society, either – even though in some cases it seemed like that was exactly what donors expected them to be. Recipients, as will become apparent in this study, attached their own meanings to the gifts from abroad and often acted in ways neither the sender nor the organization expected or appreciated.

While the analysis of CARE as a medium of communication and interaction urges us to reevaluate the U.S. public's role in postwar German-American relations, it also embeds the program and its donors in a growing body of literature on the history of humanitarian aid. As a response to the increasing

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), xiii–xiv, xvii; Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*: *American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 79–94; Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*: *Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–61* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), preface; Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us*: *How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York: BasicBooks, 2002), xiv–xv; Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Transmission of the United States in Austrian after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 275–96.

27 Brian C. Etheridge, "Die Antideutsche Welle: The Anti-German Wave, Public Diplomacy, and Intercultural Relations in Cold War America," in *Decentering America*, ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, 95–101 (New York: Berghahn, 2007). See also in the same volume Stefan Schwartzkopf, "Who Said 'Americanization'? The Case of Twentieth-Century Advertising and Mass Marketing from the British Perspective," 56–57. In another publication, Etheridge further demonstrates how much U.S. national identification since World War II was shaped by victory over and postwar relations with Germany: Brian C. Etheridge, *Enemies to Allies*: *Cold War Germany and American Memory* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 1–13.

28 On the idea of democratization as a constructivist, actor-based approach rather than a normative category, see Arnd Bauerkämper, Konrad H. Jarausch, and Marcus M. Payk, "Transatlantische Mittler und die kulturelle Demokratisierung Westdeutschlands 1945–1970," in *Demokratiewunder: Transatlantische Mittler und Die kulturelle Öffnung Westdeutschlands 1945–1970*, ed. Arnd Bauerkämper et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 13–14.

institutionalization and rapid growth of the humanitarian sector since the end of the Cold War, scholars in the humanities and social sciences have, in recent years, increasingly directed their attention at the phenomenon of giving to distant strangers.[29] Much of the scholarly debate of the last decade has focused on the ethical dilemmas in humanitarian self-perception. In 2010, David Ekbladh argued that the U. S. government's development programs in the "Third World" in the mid-twentieth century were "not always humanitarian, but strategic,"[30] implying that humanitarianism and strategy were mutually exclusive categories. Since then, scholars like Michael Barnett, Johannes Paulmann, and Silvia Salvatici have historically investigated the normative ideals of neutrality, impartiality, and apolitical action that still form the behavioral codex of the humanitarian sector. They argue that a look at humanitarianism's history reveals the impossibility and, often, the undesirability of adhering to these ideals. In their disregard of cultural and political contexts in receiving regions, humanitarian actors frequently created dependency, interfered in politics without expertise, and often deliberately forced their usually Western ideas of human progress onto different social and cultural environments.[31] Humanitarianism and strategy, they show, go together more often than they do not.

Other researchers have applied these debates to specific case studies that shed light on the often deliberate political involvement of U. S. humanitarian actors. The American Red Cross (ARC) during World War I, Julia Irwin argues, employed the trope of a "new Manifest Destiny" in its transnational aid to demonstrate and spread U. S. technological, political, and economic progress in Western Europe.[32] Similarly, Emily Rosenberg claimes that U. S. humanitarian actors developed sentiments of exceptionalism and superiority when exposed to foreign poverty and underdevelopment and came to understand their no-

29 For a historiographical overview of the field, see Matthew Hilton et al., "History and Humanitarianism: A Conversation," *Past & Present* 241, no. 1 (2018): e1–e38. For one of the earliest, albeit rather essayistic, accounts on the issue that first touched upon many of the debates taken up later by historians and social scientists, see David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night*: *Humanitarianism in Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).

30 David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*: *Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2.

31 Michael N. Barnett, *The Empire of Humanity*: *A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 5–15; Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, "Humanitarianism: A Brief History to the Present," in *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, ed. Michael Barnett et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 3–4; Johannes Paulmann, "Conjunctures in the History of International Humanitarian Aid During the Twentieth Century," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 4, no. 2 (2013): 215–38; see also Paulmann's edited volume *Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Silvia Salvatici, *A History of Humanitarianism, 1755–1989*: *In the Name of Others* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019).

32 Julia Irwin, *Making the World Safe*: *The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2–10.

tions of progress as a model for the world.[33] Bruno Cabanes finds that Herbert Hoover's government-sponsored aid during the Russian famine in 1921–23 was a distinctly anti-Bolshevist relief effort that aimed to prove the superiority of U. S. American democracy.[34] In all these instances, humanitarianism did more than just provide food, and it was often anything but neutral and impartial. Giving, be it in small-scale relief endeavors or in large philanthropic programs, carried political or reformist significance for the giver that served U. S. cultural diplomacy and notions of Americanization.[35]

Though all these scholars acknowledge that humanitarianism often deliberately stepped outside its self-prescribed idealist boundaries, neither intellectual histories on humanitarian ideals nor specific case studies trace this dynamic further than to the institutional level. Motivations and actions stay focused on organizations or activists in the field and their relation to national and international politics. Donors are seemingly unaffected by the debates sketched out in recent literature so that they rarely feature as actors – despite forming the financial backbone whose mobilization and motives for action are the basis for any humanitarian venture.

This becomes most evident in the literature on humanitarianism and media coverage. Pioneered by French sociologist Luc Boltanski's study on the medialization of "distant suffering," scholars like Heide Fehrenbach and Davide Rodogno have analyzed the relationship between humanitarian aid and the media – both regarding the use of media by humanitarian organizations and the display of aid and suffering in media outlets.[36] The central question discussed in all studies is how humanitarian organizations and the media construct emotional categories of pity, compassion, or guilt in their communication of distant suffering, if they succeed in evoking the audience's sense of responsibility for easing hardships abroad, and which implications this has for

33 Emily S. Rosenberg, "Missions to the World: American Philanthropy Abroad," in *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History*, ed. Lawrence J. Friedman et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 242–43, 256–57.

34 See the respective chapter on Hoover's aid in the Russian famine in Bruno Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918–1924* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 189–247.

35 Gregory R. Witkowsky and Arnd Bauerkämper, "German Philanthropy in International and Transatlantic Perspective," in *German Philanthropy in Transatlantic Perspective: Perceptions, Exchanges and Transfers Since the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Arnd Bauerkämper et al. (Cham: Springer, 2016), 12. See also Elisabeth Piller, "American War Relief, Cultural Mobilization, and the Myth of Impartial Humanitarianism, 1914–17," *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 17, no. 4 (2018): 621.

36 Luc Boltanski, *Distant Suffering*: *Morality, Media and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

the image of the recipient.[37] Humane emotion, or an absence thereof, always lies at the heart of this debate.

Emotions are undeniably a driving force behind many humanitarian endeavors. The purpose of a history of emotions, as Susan Matt and Peter Stearns rightly observe, is to not just look at the behavior of individuals but at the feelings in which they are grounded.[38] As such, emotions certainly shape and contribute to motivations, meaning that guilt, pity, or compassion have their rightful place in the history of humanitarianism. Not surprisingly, humanitarian organizations and journalists continue to tap into the emotional categories that have proven so effective among media consumers. Despite the undeniably important role that emotions play in the formation of motivations, the scholarly debate on humanitarian media coverage paradoxically perpetuates the logic it seeks to analyze. The exclusive scholarly fixation on emotional categories resembles the rhetoric on the humanitarian ideals of neutrality, impartiality, and apolitical action. Implying that donors react, or are expected to react, to witnessing gross injustice inflicted upon a fellow member of the human community presupposes this humanity to be universal and transcending racial or religious lines.

As a vibrant scholarly debate in the past fifteen years has shown, this supposed universality of humanity and of its products – human rights, humanitarian intervention, and aid – is not without ambiguity.[39] During the nineteenth

37 For edited volumes covering both historical and contemporary perspectives, see Heide Fehrenbach and Davide Rodogno, eds., *Humanitarian Photography*: *A History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Michael R. Lawrence and Rachel Tavernor, eds., *Global Humanitarianism and Media Culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019); Johannes Paulmann, ed., *Humanitarianism and Media*: *1900 to the Present* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2018). Pertinent monographs include Suzanne Franks, *Reporting Disasters*: *Famine, Aid, Politics and the Media* (London: Hurst & Company, 2013); Matthias Kuhnert, *Humanitäre Kommunikation*: *Entwicklung und Emotionen bei britischen NGOs 1945–1990* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2017); Keith Tester, *Humanitarianism and Modern Culture* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010). Additional sources include Richard A. Wilson and Richard D. Brown, "Introduction," in *Humanitarianism and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy*, ed. Richard A. Wilson et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2–3; Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason*: *A Moral History of the Present Times* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 1–13. On the notion of compassion fatigue as a reaction to overexposure to emotionalized accounts of suffering, see Susan D. Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*: *How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War, and Death* (New York: Routledge, 1999); Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 98–99.

38 Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns, "Introduction," in *Doing Emotions History*, ed. Susan J. Matt et al. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014), 1.

39 Fabian Klose and Mirjam Thulin, "European Concepts and Practices of Humanity in Historical Perspective," in *Humanity: A History of European Concepts in Practice from the Sixteenth Century to the Present*, ed. Fabian Klose et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 13–20. On the development of the term "humanity" in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the creation of the notion of human rights as a product of "humanity's" perceived universality, see the consecutive contributions by Bethencourt and Betts in the same volume: Francisco Bethen-

century, European powers did not understand humanity as a concept of inclusion. Rather, humanity was a logic that separated supposedly superior civilizations from religious and racial others whose humanity these powers contested in the interest of imperial and colonial expansion.[40] The universalist notion of humanity as encompassing all humankind only fully unfolded in the aftermath of World War II and found its legal expression in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And yet, Siep Stuurmann elaborately shows how universal humanity obstructs its own realization by its dual adherence to the human as an individual and humanity as a collective, thus constantly pitting diversity against unity.[41] The idea of universal humanity is trapped in a constant, albeit deliberate, conundrum of being at once all-encompassing and particularistic. Perhaps Samuel Moyn captured the problem best in his discussion of human rights as *The Last Utopia*, when he said that "they have done far more to transform the terrain of idealism than they have the world itself."[42]

Humanity may be universal in theory and international law, but humanitarianism reveals the concept's selective nature on the individual level. Lynn Hunt rightly remarks that it "requires a leap of faith" to imagine "that someone else is like you."[43] Yet, even if we come to terms with universal humanity despite its inherent contradictions, reality interferes as we can never save all people suffering across the globe and must decide who most closely corresponds to our own notions of need and worthiness. Those circumstances carry weight as we, consciously or unconsciously, prioritize and decide who deserves our aid and who does not – or at least not as much.[44] Put differently, we need to ignore most of humankind to act in the name of humanity.

court, "Humankind: From Division to Recomposition," 29–50; Paul Betts, "Universalism and Its Discontents: Humanity as a Twentieth-Century Concept," 51–70. For a concise overview of the development of the term from antiquity through the twentieth century and a comprehensive historiographical overview, see Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Sebastian Jobs, and Sönke Kunkel, "Visions of Humanity: Actors, Culture, Practices," in *Visions of Humanity: Historical Cultural Practices since 1850*, ed. Jessica Gienow-Hecht et al. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2023), 3–10.

40 Fabian Klose, *In the Cause of Humanity: A History of Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 14–16; Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914 – the Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 12.

41 Siep Stuurman, *The Invention of Humanity: Equality and Cultural Difference in World History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 486–87.

42 Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 9.

43 Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008), 32.

44 Didier Fassin, "Inequality of Lives, Hierarchies of Humanity: Moral Commitments and Ethical Dilemmas of Humanitarianism," in *In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care*, ed. Ilana Feldman et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 239–40.

But even though scholars have uncovered the defectiveness of universalism and of humanitarian idealism in showing that the relief sector followed strategic and political interests more often than it did not, donors remain confined within a logic in which strategy and personal gains are limited. Nevertheless, donors judge and act within specific national, historical, cultural, social, and political contexts. As Maria Kyriakidou observes: "Their responses are therefore mediated not only by media texts as representations but also by the viewers' evaluations of these representations, as well as broader discursive frameworks of their everyday life."[45] While concepts like compassion seem universal, ways of translating them into action are not. In fact, they depend heavily on the self-understanding of the giver. Focusing on the idea that seemingly universal categories guide humanitarian engagement thus leads to a scholarly blind spot because the utopian donor reactions prevail in a scholarly debate that has discarded the utopian ideals of action.

Only a few scholars have investigated donor engagement beyond idealistic emotional categories. Rachel McCleary argues that the act of giving requires the donor's evaluation of a charity's efficiency.[46] Kevin O'Sullivan et al. acknowledge that humanitarian giving serves not only altruistic and universal ideas of humanity but also, and equally, individual factors in our self-identification. While these works point to the underlying personal and societal factors in aid engagement, they argue that charitable organizations and *not* individual donors influence these factors through the use of media.[47] Humanitarian organizations thus construct what sociologist Monika Krause has termed "the good project," which donors consume and in which aid beneficiaries come to resemble commodities.[48] In this reading, donors choose an organization for its efficiency and specific media image. Although media images certainly contribute greatly to donor motivations and will also appear prominently in the present analysis, it is erroneous to assume that donors simply believe everything they are told. This purely organization-based approach neglects the ways in which those who give may appropriate aid for purposes that lie outside or beyond what the organization tries to communicate.

45 Maria Kyriakidou, "The Audience of Distant Suffering and the Question of (In)Action," in *Humanitarianism and Media*, ed. Paulmann, 282.

46 Rachel M. McCleary, *Global Compassion: Private Voluntary Organizations and U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 5. See also Janice Gross Stein, "Humanitarian Organizations: Accountable – Why, to Whom, for What, and How?," in *Humanitarianism in Question*, ed. Barnett et al. 130–32.

47 Kevin O'Sullivan, Matthew Hilton, and Juliano Fiori, "Humanitarianisms in Context," *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire* 23, 1–2 (2016): 3, 10. On mobilization by humanitarian organizations of donors as activists, see also Anna Bocking-Welch, "Youth Against Hunger: Service, Activism and the Mobilisation of Young Humanitarians in 1960s Britain," *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire* 23, 1–2 (2016): 154–66.

48 Monika Krause, *The Good Project: Humanitarian Relief NGOs and the Fragmentation of Reason* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), 4.

While historians have shied away from involving donors as humanitarian agents, scholars in other disciplines have taken up the question of donors' motivations. Economists Alberto Alesina and David Dollar analyzed how closely giving in industrialized nations is related to factors other than altruism – be they the receiving nation's promising attempts at democratization or its historic ties to the donor country as, for example, a former colonial possession.[49] While both address contexts of politicization and a sense of correlation, they treat donors as homogenous national entities and do not distinguish between the possible motivations of different demographics, let alone those of individuals. In her study on elite philanthropy, sociologist Francie Ostrower took the opposite approach, focusing on the particular group of New York City's wealthy upper class. She found that elites give according to class affiliation and status expectations that correspond to their classed self-identification.[50] When we try to synthesize both approaches, we find a point of friction in need of investigation. It remains as yet unclear how the national or transnational dimension relates to the individual, where greater geopolitical concerns meet very personal experiences of race, class, or gender, and how they come together in humanitarian motivations.

Answers to this problem can be found in sociological explorations of the notion of reciprocity as a connecting link between the outside and the inside, the personal and the public, the altruistic deed and the strategic interest. With his classic 1923 *Essai sur le don* (The Gift), French sociologist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss first drew attention to the notion of gift giving as a politicized and traditionalized form of social consolidation. Mauss argued that societies rely on customs of giving, receiving, and exchange as symbolic practices. Gifts carry a specific meaning and demonstrate the status and intention of the giver. Returning a gift is not a kindness but an expected necessity that perpetuates a gift giving economy. The expected returns for a gift can be material, but they can also be social in nature and involve expressions of gratitude, closeness, or – among the "archaic" societies that Mauss analyzed – peaceful coexistence.[51]

In the last fifteen years, a growing field of research around German sociologist Frank Adloff has applied Mauss's theory of gift giving and reciprocity to humanitarian aid and philanthropy. In reciprocity, he argues, humanitari-

49 Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," *Journal of Economic Growth* 5, no. 1 (2000): 33–63.

50 Francie Ostrower, *Why the Wealthy Give: The Culture of Elite Philanthropy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 6.

51 Marcel Mauss, *The Gift*: *The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (London: Routledge, 2002), 16–17, first published as Mauss, "Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques," *l'Année Sociologique* 1 (1923): 30–186. See also Theodore Caplow, "Rule Enforcement Without Visible Means: Christmas Gift Giving in Middletown," *American Journal of Sociology* 89, no. 6 (1984): 1313–16; William Burnell Waits, *The Modern Christmas in America*: *A Cultural History of Gift Giving* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 4, 14.

anism reaches beyond a dualism between altruism and self-interest. Instead, Adloff acknowledges the mutually beneficial character of gift giving that does not frown upon self-interest but indeed treats it as a prerequisite for productive interpersonal relations. An asymmetric power dynamic necessarily characterizes those relations. Humanitarian donors, by giving, prove they possess the financial means that recipients depend on; consequently, they can use this dependency to attach certain conditions to the gift. Donors can exert their power by directing their humanitarian attention in ways that promise the kind of reciprocity they most desire, be it gratitude, certain expected actions or actual material returns from the recipients, personal feelings of gratification, or approval from and higher esteem within the giver's immediate community. By including reciprocity, with the formulated expectations and power structures inherent to it, in the humanitarian logic, Adloff's model breaks down the dichotomy between altruism and self-interest, which no longer serves as a useful frame of reference.[52]

In the present case, the fact that CARE facilitated direct contact between benefactor and beneficiary, exposes the dynamics of reciprocity and their power asymmetry like no other humanitarian venture. Recipients certainly did not answer the donation with a gift of equal material value – this would have defeated the purpose of humanitarian giving – but they found other ways to return the favor. As Malte Zierenberg shows, the postwar black market made Germans aware of the logics of reciprocity when trading with Allied soldiers or accepting gifts, for which reciprocal action was often expected.[53] Germans could apply this knowledge to their transatlantic relations. Some would send their benefactors family photos, drawings made by their children, or handwritten Bible verses to adequately partake in reciprocal cultural practices.

52 Frank Adloff and Steffen Mau, "Zur Theorie und Gabe der Reziprozität," in *Vom Geben und Nehmen: Zur Soziologie der Reziprozität*, ed. idem (Frankfurt: Campus, 2005), 12–20; Adloff, *Philanthropisches Handeln*: *Eine historische Soziologie des Stiftens in Deutschland und den USA* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2010), 34–42; Adloff, "Die Institutionalisierung und Sakralisierung des Gebens: Ein kultursoziologischer Blick auf das Stiften und Spenden," in Adloff et al. *Prosoziales Verhalten*, 225–31; Adloff, "Philanthropic Giving: Reasons and Constellations," in Bauerkämper et al. *German Philanthropy in Transatlantic Perspective*, 41–54. See also Ilana Silber, "Modern Philanthropy: Reassessing the Viability of a Maussian Perspective," in *Marcel Mauss: A Centenary Tribute*, ed. Wendy James (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998), 139–45. Adloff's findings are also backed up by similar insights from psychology, philosophy, and marketing studies that expose altruism and self-interest as a false binary in charitable giving. See Neera Kapur Badhwar, "Altruism Versus Self-Interest: Sometimes a False Dichotomy," *Social Philosophy & Policy* 10, no. 1 (1993): 90–117; Brent Simpson, Kyle Irwin, and Peter Lawrence, "Does a 'Norm of Self-Interest' Discourage Prosocial Behavior? Rationality and Quid Pro Quo in Charitable Giving," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (2006): 296–306; Katherine White and John Peloza, "Self-Benefit versus Other-Benefit Marketing Appeals: Their Effectiveness in Generating Charitable Support," *Journal of Marketing* 73, no. 4 (2009): 109–24.

53 Malte Zierenberg, *Stadt der Schieber*: *Der Berliner Schwarzmarkt 1939–1950* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 25–26.

Many donors were clearly aware of CARE's reciprocal potential, as well, and formed certain expectations and desires around their aid. These could be demands for expected behavior and action on the recipients' part or aspirational social and political changes that donors hoped to precipitate or advance by aiding the "right" people. Or they directed their expectations towards the domestic sphere and even their own person as they hoped to affirm or uplift their social status or to follow socially expected forms of behavior. Reciprocity thus clearly exposes the interplay of outbound and inbound motivations as a set of expectations formulated by both donor and recipient.

To provide a comprehensive analysis of the developments and factors contributing to donor motivations, this study combines a top-down with a bottom-up approach. The first two chapters analyze CARE's donor relations through its historical development and media outreach. They hence follow the path most scholars of humanitarianism have taken as they largely focus on the organization's side of the story and show how CARE contributed to the construction of donor motivations from the top down. Chapter one analyzes CARE's organizational history since 1945 and describes its growth into a major humanitarian player with special regard to two intertwined factors: its work in Germany and its attention to donor desires and needs. The situation in postwar Germany was challenging for CARE as it not only involved mass starvation and a destroyed infrastructure but further demanded debates with occupation officials and German governmental authorities, forcing the organization to constantly adapt to shifting geopolitical circumstances. To deal with these challenges, CARE effectively fostered an organizational image as an indispensable contribution to U. S. foreign policy efforts and, in turn, politicized its donor base to argue that its humanitarian work followed the will of the U. S. American people.

The second chapter investigates CARE's media representation, which needed to adapt to both cultural and political debates and developments as much as to the likes, dislikes, and demands of a potential donor base. CARE, it becomes evident, did not primarily appeal to its audience through a seemingly universalized language of compassion and humanity. Rather, media outlets addressed donors in ways that gave them, or at least suggested, empowerment in humanitarian aid and international relations. The organization nurtured an image that depicted donors as ambassadors promoting America's cause abroad. At the same time, CARE integrated its program into domestic traditions of food consumption and consumerism to offer donors cultural reference points at home.

In chapters three through six, the study reaches beyond the organizational approach towards a bottom-up approach that foregrounds the giver. Four different case studies closely analyze individuals and groups of donors to show how CARE's image resonated in their charitable engagement, how their individual biographies reverberated in their giving, and how they perceived the

impact of their aid. Quantity is not a decisive factor in this selection. Some individuals and groups only sent two or three packages; others sent dozens or even hundreds. How much a person gave was not necessarily indicative of the importance they attributed to the act. Instead, donors often adjusted the quantity of their aid to the individual causes they pursued, some of which demanded more engagement than others. At other times, limited financial means dictated how much a donor could give. The important factor in this analysis is the decision to engage *at all* and to express a belief system that was specific to the donation, regardless of quantity.

Chapter three focuses on two women's social clubs – the Ohio Girls' Club of Washington, DC, and the Halcyon Literary Club from Durham, North Carolina. It investigates how the differences in the two clubs' regions and membership profiles reverberated in their aid engagement and which dominant domestic and transnational postwar discourses they employed and reflected onto their recipients. Both examples show how women used humanitarianism in collective assemblies to defy dominant postwar ideals of passive female domesticity. They reappropriated postwar cultural stereotypes of homemaking and recreation to develop a voice in both domestic and international affairs.

The fourth chapter sketches the humanitarian efforts of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In particular, it centers on the AFL's international outreach office – the Free Trade Union Committee – and its executive secretary Jay Lovestone. The chapter shows how Lovestone and the AFL deliberately resorted to CARE to gain direct access to the hearts and minds of West German labor unionists for the purpose of restructuring the German union landscape into a democratic postwar ally. In doing so, the AFL not only had a tremendous impact on Germany's social system but, in turn, also strengthened its own position vis-à-vis domestic competitors and the U. S. government.

While those first two case studies look at humanitarian engagement by collective assemblies and the people behind them, the two subsequent chapters focus on individual aid efforts. Chapter five compares the CARE activities of three renowned New York intellectuals and activists – Unitarian minister John Haynes Holmes, German Evangelical pastor and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, and birth control activist Margaret Sanger. Though these may seem like a disparate grouping, these three expressed strikingly similar humanitarian motivations indicative of a sense of mission that social reformers in the United States displayed through aid. They all sent CARE packages to Germany to confirm and further their own progressivist and activist ideologies. Along the way, they abandoned aid recipients and took on new ones who better fit their interests, and they often thoroughly disregarded cultural differences in favor of spreading their own reformist ideas.

Chapter six shows how members of the German immigrant community in the United States resorted to CARE to debate their own ethnicity in their peculiar circumstances – that is, caught between their victorious home country, the defeated country of their ancestors, and the atrocious crimes it had committed. This chapter again centers on individuals with very different personal relations towards Germany and its recent past. German Americans, the chapter consequently shows, by no means constituted a coherent donor group but expressed diverse motivations that depended on the time of their or their families' immigration, their political convictions, and their willingness to identify with their immigrant heritage in the first place. These short insights into the individual chapters already show that all the actors referred to in this study understood CARE as a reciprocal practice. Giving furthered their own agendas, convictions, and/or status at least as much as it contributed to fighting hunger abroad.

A comprehensive study that combines organizational and media history with personal accounts requires a broad range of source material. The CARE Records at the New York Public Library form the most wide-ranging collection, and it is of particular importance for the first two chapters. Comprising meeting minutes, discursive reports, and extensive holdings on donor relations and public outreach, they form the base for sketching the organization's historical development and for comprehending how CARE's decision makers understood their work and the significance of their endeavor. The case studies draw on material from the CARE Records as well, but they rely most heavily on a close reading of the papers of the individual donors and groups. Written correspondence of donors with recipients, family members, colleagues, and political decision makers reveal how these donors thought about themselves, about their place in U.S. society, and about the transatlantic context in which they found themselves through their aid. They expressed opinions on and towards their aid recipients that show which aims and desires they followed through humanitarian engagement. But the written word, to again reference Gabriele Lingelbach, can be deceiving, and it is often not the correspondence but the action that most clearly reveals motivations. The recipients that donors chose and those they neglected, as well as the moments when they began to give and when they stopped or withdrew their support, expose preferences, tactics, personal convictions, and emotional reactions that impacted their motivations.

Although the study almost exclusively relies on archival material from the United States, it does not leave German recipients without a voice. Thousands of thank-you letters by German recipients to their overseas benefactors shed light not only on the gratitude of these individuals but also on their personal circumstances and the hopes they placed in their newfound contacts in the United States. Some recipients would ask donors for additional support that was often material but sometimes also entailed professional interest across the Atlantic. Others soon learned how to play the game to ensure continuing atten-

tion from abroad. They not only emphasized the hardships they were enduring but also displayed favorable – meaning mostly antifascist or anticommunist – attitudes they hoped would appeal to their donors' sense of transatlantic agency. Through their actions and reactions, recipients triggered, promoted, or changed their donors' engagement, granting them an indispensable role in the formation of humanitarian motivations.

A few remarks on structure and scope are in order. Except for chapter one, which follows CARE from 1945 through the early 1960s, this study does not adhere to a chronological structure but focuses mostly on the time between 1946 and the early to mid-1950s. All the case studies, with only slight deviations, cover this period to explore the manifold political, cultural, and social factors that motivated donors to give to Germany at that time. This study hence offers a collection of thematic approaches to the same historical moment to show that, methodologically, humanitarian history needs to breach the borders of concepts and research areas. It is political, economic, cultural, religious, intellectual, media, and labor history, working in all these spheres simultaneously. It is both a history of humanitarian aid and one of the interests U. S. Americans of different backgrounds had in postwar Germany, and we need to acknowledge that these histories are necessarily intertwined. Humanitarian aid does not function in a secluded nexus of humanitarian history, guided only by humanitarian ideas and ideals.[54] It can only exist as part of the broadest imaginable spectrum of personal convictions and open discourses, and of everything that defines individual human characters and their understanding of their relationship to those around them and even to those unknown and far away.

Structuring the work in case studies points to an unavoidable conundrum in investigating donors and their motivations. We can neither attribute just one motivation to donors, nor can we subsume them under groups determined by political, cultural, or religious background. Persons may identify as belonging to one or several of these groups, but they also display character traits and have had unique experiences in life that lead to new motivations not shared by any other group members. Neither personalities nor motivations are one-dimensional, and it is impossible and undesirable to reduce giving individuals and groups to simply one factor. It is more accurate to adopt Clara West's idea of "clusters of motivation" (*Motivbündel*), which comprise givers' personal biographies, their individual values and virtues, and the desired outcomes of their aid.[55] Following this thinking, the motivations and characteristics of

54 Corinna Unger makes the same argument for government-organized development programs, arguing "that development policies and practices did not take place in a vacuum but were shaped by specific historical actors and situations." Corinna R. Unger, *International Development: A Postwar History* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 11.

55 Clara West, "Zur Erklärbarkeit und Erklärungskraft von Spendenmotiven," in *Prosoziales Verhalten*, ed. Adloff et al., 65.

the actors in the four case studies necessarily overlap. Pertinent political and public debates in the postwar U.S. resurface in different contexts because they shaped giving in various ways. A poignant example of this intricate connection between cases, personalities, and discourses is the prominent theologian Reinhold Niebuhr – the only actor who appears in two different chapters. His aid engagement was so diversified that it offers invaluable contributions to two consecutive case studies in chapters five and six: he appears once as an intellectual and politically minded activist and a second time as an American of German descent. His example shows that motivations and donor background, situated in and influenced by historical momentum, cannot be delicately disentangled.

The selection of cases follows this line of thinking. I chose them not because they are distinct but, on the contrary, because they are in dialogue with each other, build on overlapping concerns, and reveal how intricately individual actors wove humanitarian engagement into their personal and professional relations towards Germany and its people. To draw these connections out of the case studies, it was necessary to evaluate each actor's own position within U.S. society. All cases, thus, express both outbound and inbound motivations that, as will become apparent, always interacted and were often important to numerous actors across chapters.

In this selection, which can never be all-encompassing, some groups and debates receive more attention than others. For example, neither African Americans nor American Jewish actors will appear prominently, although they find peripheral mention. This should not imply that these groups were of minor importance in the postwar United States. Rather, their absence simply stems from a lack of source material that documents any engagement of these groups through CARE towards postwar Germany.[56] Religious charity, to give another example, undeniably plays a crucial role in the history of humanitarianism.[57] Still, the present study does not dedicate an individual chapter to religiosity and aid. It will, instead, investigate the relation of faith and giving in

56 The CARE Records at the New York Public Library include one small collection on donations by the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America to Seventh-day Adventists in Germany, many of whom were of Jewish origin, in the early 1950s. Apart from this collection, which is nonetheless waiting for further scholarly investigation, rather little is known about Jewish humanitarian engagement with Germany through CARE; CARE Records, Box 1009.

57 On the intersection of faith and humanitarianism, see Michael N. Barnett and Janice Gross Stein, eds., *Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Peter Stamatov, *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism*: *Religion, Empires, and Advocacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). See also the chapter on the interconnection of Christian faith, humanitarianism, and U.S. internationalism in in the late nineteenth century in Ian Tyrrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 98–119.

conjunction with political and cultural debates that take center stage in other chapters to again highlight the interconnectedness between cases and debates.

There are two reasons I chose to concentrate exclusively on CARE, the first being that the focus on only one organization evidently limits the analysis of motivations to a conceptual frame. This offers more analytic reliability. The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) or the American Red Cross (ARC), for instance, shared with CARE their humanitarianism, but they employed different media images, had distinct modes of operation, and worked for different recipients. Including other organizations, beyond the peripheral mention that they receive throughout the study, would increase the number of variables that could taint any inductive conclusions.

What is more, CARE's mode of operation grants unique access to the dynamics of reciprocity. Although these dynamics certainly reverberate in all humanitarian giving, they are nowhere else as visible. The personal contact that CARE facilitated between donor and recipient allows for in-depth analysis of the intentions and hopes of both sides, as well as of the lasting effect that aid had on both parties. It was also this unique form of contact that elevated the program to an iconic status in Germany, unmatched by any other organization. In terms of the relief goods supplied, CARE was not even the most successful humanitarian venture for occupied Germany. The privately funded Council of Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in Germany (CRALOG) and the U.S. War Department's Government Appropriations and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA), to name only two, brought more food to more people.[58] But those were anonymized relief endeavors that were unable to generate feelings of intimacy the way CARE did – not to mention that they had far less memorable acronyms. And so, CARE was the agency that both Germans and U.S. Americans came to associate with postwar transatlantic cooperation, generosity, and commitment.[59]

Besides the fact that CARE achieved an iconic status in Germany that lastingly shaped German-American relations after World War II, the focus on only one recipient country further puts aid within a well-defined regional, cultural, and historical frame. All donors and recipients moved within the same transatlantic postwar theater, experiencing the same political and cultural debates. Every humanitarian venture is the brainchild of specific historical circumstances that depend on cultural understandings, distance and interconnectedness, political and economic circumstances, and public debates in regional, national, and international contexts. The similarities and differences between the

58 Armin Grünbacher, "Sustaining the Island: Western Aid to 1950s West Berlin," *Cold War History* 3, no. 3 (2003): 3, 6–11; Konstanze Soch, *Eine grosse Freude? Der innerdeutsche Paketverkehr im Kalten Krieg (1949–1989)* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2018), 45–46.

59 Volker Ilgen, *CARE-Paket & Co*: *Von der Liebesgabe zum Westpaket* (Darmstadt: Primus-Verlag, 2011), 89–93.

individual cases unfold better here than if compared to CARE's aid efforts for Korea, India, or Greece as those recipient destinations again functioned within their own contexts. As such, the methodological framework of the study can be applied to other cases, but outcomes may differ.

What, then, do we learn from this framework? Billy Wilder may offer an answer. Although *A Foreign Affair* was a box office hit and topped the charts on the Fourth of July weekend of 1948, it stirred criticism. Not only some film critics but, interestingly, an official statement from the U. S. Congress condemned the film for displaying the heroic deeds of the GIs stationed in Germany in an unfavorable and unpatriotic light. In its ironic and open criticism of the exploitative behavior of the U. S. occupiers, so the critique, the film diverted the audience's gaze from their virtuous deeds and ridiculed the cause for which they had fought the war.[60] Wilder had never intended for the film to be apologetic of Hitler's crimes. He was a native Austrian Jew who had emigrated to the U. S. in 1934, leaving behind his mother, grandmother, and stepfather, who were later all murdered in concentration camps.[61] Wilder had experienced Nazi terror much more personally than most of his U. S. American audience, and he knew exactly what World War II had been fought for. With *A Foreign Affair* he wanted to show that, in the troublesome postwar years, all sides had their flaws and their own agenda, no matter how righteous the cause. Wilder's notion is also the point of departure for this book. Donors unproblematically reconciled postwar notions of universal humanity with their own selectivity. They did not differentiate between altruism and self-interest as proclaimed by humanitarian idealism, but rather accepted and often welcomed their synchronicity. Self-interest, that is to say, does not taint or relativize honorable deeds. It is simply a fact – sometimes latent, at other times glaringly visible – that deserves exploration.

60 Willett, "Billy Wilder's 'A Foreign Affair' (1945–1948): 'The Trials and Tribulations of Berlin,'" *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 7 (1987): 5–6.
61 Bathrick, "Billy Wilder's Cold War Berlin," 31.

1 – Packages and Politics: CARE and Germany Through 1963

Charles Bloomstein ventured on a challenging task. In 1952, he wrote the last pages of his *History of CARE* – the story of an organization formed in 1945 that Bloomstein himself had joined in 1948. At that time, the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe was by no means a relic of history, nor has it become one even today as it still operates under the name Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere. In fact, within those first few years of existence, CARE had grown from an ad-hoc relief effort into a major humanitarian player that had shipped relief goods worth more than US$ 120 million, equaling over US$ 1 billion today, to a long list of destinations all over Europe, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Now, after four years of extensive research of records and statistics, interviews with colleagues, and numerous, meticulously edited drafts, Bloomstein had put together roughly five hundred pages, sketching CARE's history to the last detail. He described how the organization came into being, where it worked, how and why its target countries were in need, which problems it encountered at home and abroad, and which successes its leaders could be proud of.

For unknown reasons, Bloomstein's history remained unpublished. But the mere fact that CARE would employ a man to spend the next several years chronicling its work expresses pride, self-confidence, and an astounding awareness of the massive overseas impact that would turn the organization into an icon. Since Bloomstein's history, other members of CARE have taken up the task to spread the gospel. Murray Lincoln, the organization's president

from 1945 to 1957, has sketched its development in his autobiography.[1] Wallace Campbell, a founding member and holder of several positions at CARE, including the presidency, would dedicate an entire book to its history in 1990.[2] That same year, the longtime CARE Director of Operations in the Midwest, Harold Gauer, also published an autobiographical account of his thirty-eight years with the organization.[3] And on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the first shipment of CARE packages across the Atlantic, longtime employee David Morris published an illustrated history that detailed the organization's development into a global icon of generosity.[4] Without exception, all these written accounts tell CARE's history as one of success – in terms of not only its humanitarian achievements but also its rapid growth and quick adaptation to donor desires and tastes. From the beginning, image-making and legacy-building were top priorities for the young humanitarian endeavor.

In all five accounts, CARE's work in Germany between 1946 and 1963 features so prominently that it seems as if the organization built its entire legacy around it. Germany, Bloomstein wrote, was the "most important […] country on CARE's list" and was "pivotal in terms of both need and potential remittances."[5] While Germans remember the *CARE-Pakete* for the material and psychological relief they brought to a population in postwar destitution, the people behind CARE remember the work in the four occupation zones and later the two German states as their most successful operation. CARE, it seems, needed Germany as much as Germany needed CARE.

A crucial factor in this success was undeniably the organization's mode of operation. Through its person-to-person contact, CARE provided the most individual form of humanitarian assistance because, according to Bloomstein, "Each package evokes a qualitative response." Donors could designate specific people or groups they deemed worthy of support, and they could trace the whereabouts of their donation up to the delivery, while recipients got the chance to share their stories with distant others. "CARE does not work through breadlines or other forms of mass feeding," but rather, Bloomstein continued, "enables the recipient to retain his individuality, his personal integrity and even

1 Murray D. Lincoln, *Vice President in Charge of Revolution*: *As Told to David Karp* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 204–16.

2 Wallace J. Campbell, *The History of CARE*: *A Personal Account* (New York: Praeger, 1990); on image- and myth-making by former CARE employees, see also Philipp Baur, "From Victim to Partner," 118–20.

3 Harold Gauer, *Selling Big Charity*: *The Story of C. A. R.E* (Glendale: Precision Process Books, 1990).

4 David Morris, *A Gift from America*: *The First 50 Years of CARE* (Atlanta: Longstreet Press, 1996).

5 Bloomstein, "History of CARE" (unpublished), ca. 1952, 85, CARE Records, Box 1.

his pride."[6] It was this sense of individuality and agency that set CARE apart from the anonymized relief efforts of its time.[7]

This chapter describes CARE's work in Germany from the first negotiations with the four occupation powers in 1945, through days of success in the late 1940s and the economic and geopolitical challenges of the 1950s, to the end of the operation in 1963. It begins with an account of the legacies of U.S. humanitarianism in World War I and the interwar years upon which CARE was built and from which it departed. The chapter then shows how CARE's decision makers constantly adapted the organization to changing geopolitical needs to please donors and government entities alike. Success with both groups depended less on Germany's actual needs than on its significance in the geopolitical debates of the postwar era. CARE's program had to move with the changing role of the occupied territories within the U.S. government's relationship to its Allied partners – first as the defeated fascist enemy and later as the focal point of the early Cold War. Politicizing aid as an asset to U.S. foreign policy was not just an advantage but a necessity. Aid needed to promote the U.S. government's interests in Germany to give potential donors a chance to participate in their country's foreign objectives. Only this synergy, as will become apparent, guaranteed enduring success.

* * *

Although CARE was arguably unique in its iconic status in the U.S. and in recipient countries where the "CARE package" became idiomatic beyond the humanitarian sector, it was part of a much longer humanitarian tradition in the United States. CARE relied on a deeply ingrained self-understanding of the U.S. as a charitable society.[8] Wallace Campbell said that "Our nation has a long and proud tradition of voluntary organizations through which ordinary citizens do what they can to share what they have with people in need,"[9] and Bloomstein argued that CARE represented "that basic humanitarianism which we have all come to look upon as a fundamental concept of Americanism."[10] CARE's founders and leading figures were clearly aware of the leeway this tradition presented in the postwar world, and they displayed their organization as

6 Bloomstein, "History of CARE," 456–47.

7 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 196.

8 The notion of charity as an integral part of U.S. American culture, from its beginnings in neighborly solidarity in the colonial period to the development of large-scale philanthropy at the turn of the twentieth century, has found much scholarly attention. This culture of giving as a primarily private rather than state-driven venture has found expression in federal legislation and the absence of a strong U.S. American welfare state. Voluntary giving, both at home and abroad, has become an essential pillar of U.S. American democratic culture. Cf. Olivier Zunz, *Philanthropy in America: A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 3–7, 296–99.

9 Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 3.

10 Bloomstein, "History of CARE," 471.

a vital factor in promoting U. S. economic, political, and ideological supremacy abroad. Giving through CARE was intended to be a humanitarian deed *and* an expression of U. S. national identity.

When CARE came into being in 1945, U. S. humanitarianism had undergone three decades of massive transition that would have a decisive impact on the organization's structure and mode of operation. World War I marked a first watershed that not only put the United States on the world map as an emerging political hegemon but also led to the country's "humanitarian awakening" and its rise as a global charitable player.[11] One consequential change was the scope of humanitarian involvement. Witnessing the horrors of European war from the other side of the Atlantic, U. S. Americans increasingly longed for war involvement by nonmilitary means. The American Red Cross (ARC), a still rather small but well-organized institution, began accepting donations for the European theater of war and, adhering to the humanitarian credo of neutrality, provided aid to all belligerent countries.[12] Starting in 1914, the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB), administered by the Quaker entrepreneur and later U. S. president Herbert Hoover, sent relief to alleviate Belgian suffering caused by the German occupation and the British naval blockade. Though funded largely by U. S. and European government loans, the CRB also accepted private donations and enjoyed immense popularity among the U. S. public.[13] Meanwhile, the U. S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau Sr., helped found the Near East Relief to respond to the Armenian genocide and severe famine in the Levant, which had also resulted from the ongoing war.[14] The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee simultaneously began collecting donations to protect Jews in that same region, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe, from prosecution.[15]

11 Irwin, *Making the World Safe*, 12. On the idea of the U. S. as a humanitarian superpower and its major influence on humanitarian work during and after World War I, see also Jaclyn Granick, *International Jewish Humanitarianism in the Age of the Great War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 15–22; Daniel Roger Maul, *The Politics of Service: US-amerikanische Quäker und internationale humanitäre Hilfe 1917–1945* (Munich: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2021), 2–3, 15–17.

12 Axel Jansen, *Individuelle Bewährung im Krieg: Amerikaner in Europa, 1914–1917* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2003), 36–37.

13 Elisabeth Piller, "Beyond Hoover: Rewriting the History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) through Female Involvement," *The International History Review* 45, no. 1 (2022): 207–208. For a brief overview of the CRB's work, see also Jansen, *Individuelle Bewährung im Krieg*, 233–44. The most comprehensive overview remains the second volume of George Nash's extensive Hoover biography: George H. Nash, *The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914–1917* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988).

14 Keith David Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 92.

15 Granick, *International Jewish Humanitarianism in the Age of the Great War*, 8.

The U.S. entry into the war in 1917 caused a new and unprecedented wave of charitable foundations and dramatic surges in membership and donation numbers. The ARC quickly developed into the largest national humanitarian agency ever, with roughly thirty-three million U.S. citizens enlisting in local Red Cross societies, donating money, food, and clothing, or leaving for Europe as nurses and volunteers.[16] The U.S. Quaker community founded the American Friends Service Committee, which became a leading supplier of food, clothing, and raw materials in the Allied countries and particularly in France. Though officially the relief branch of a pacifist Christian denomination, the committee cooperated closely with the ARC to be able to send relief workers directly behind the war lines.[17] Before the U.S. even entered the conflict, and more so afterwards, U.S. American humanitarian actors had begun to dominate the charitable landscape of Europe and the Middle East.

Visible in this trend of increased involvement is also a second major development towards more professionalization and institutional efficiency, political instrumentalization, and the use of aid to showcase U.S. American benevolence. Humanitarianism developed from a largely ad hoc and uncoordinated activity, often conducted by religious societies or local interest groups without much organizational proficiency, into an increasingly secularized and professionalized movement.[18] As early as 1914, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, though very cautious about the U.S. becoming overly involved in the conflict, understood the use of aid to showcase his country's good intentions, provided the charitable desires of the U.S. public could be sufficiently contained and channeled. Starting in November of that year, the American Relief Clearing House (ARCH) bundled and coordinated all private U.S. donations to the Allied countries. ARCH allowed U.S. donors to select a U.S.-founded relief agency on the ground to which the donation would be directed. Unlike the ARC or Hoover's CRB, which officially maintained neutrality, the ARCH catered exclusively to Allied countries.[19] The Clearing House thus set an early precedent for what CARE would do thirty years later: It personalized aid by giving donors a choice about how it would be distributed, and it politicized the act of giving according to regional preferences that served U.S. foreign objectives.

This trend continued after the U.S. entered the war when, in April 1917, Wilson made the ARC the official umbrella organization for coordinating all U.S. relief efforts to Europe, turning it into a de facto state-operated aid agency

16 Irwin, *Making the World Safe*, 67.

17 Daniel Roger Maul, "American Quakers, the Emergence of International Humanitarianism, and the Foundation of the American Friends Service Committee, 1890–1920," in *Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Paulmann, 80–81.

18 Steffen Werther, "Help Yourself by Helping Others: Self-interest in Appeals for Russian Famine Relief, 1921–23," *Disasters* 46, no. 3 (2022): 704.

19 Jansen, *Individuelle Bewährung im Krieg*, 49–53.

that relieved suffering as much as it supported U.S. war objectives. Through the ARC, foreign aid promoted U.S. technological, political, and economic progress with the aim of shaping the world according to its example and of creating cultural bonds between the peoples of the United States and receiving nations.[20] The CRB, though still claiming neutrality, also adopted a public image that branded the U.S. as a benevolent society, while the AFSC, in an effort to reconcile its pacifism with its war involvement, emphasized its professionalism, its universal and religious humanitarianism, and its display of U.S. generosity and progress.[21] Humanitarianism thus became a form of psychological warfare by benevolent means.

After World War I ended in 1918, the Senate's veto on joining the League of Nations put an end to the short moment of U.S. American wartime internationalism, ushering in two decades of relative political isolation. But private and semi-official humanitarian organizations continued to make the United States visible on the international stage, extending the trends that the war years had started. In February 1919, Wilson established the American Relief Administration (ARA) to provide aid to the formerly belligerent countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Again, Herbert Hoover, by now an established humanitarian broker, was called to lead the new semi-political aid mission. The ARA openly and forcefully promoted U.S. foreign policy interests. During the Soviet famine of 1921–23, Hoover made it no secret that his organization sought to convince the receiving population that U.S.-style liberal-capitalist democracy was superior and that the Bolshevik government was incapable of caring for its own people.[22] For the first time, aid became entangled with anticommunist political objectives. Meanwhile, the AFSC, which closely collaborated with Hoover's ARA, continued its relief work in defeated Germany and purposefully attempted a reorganization of the country away from its militaristic legacies towards a "new Pennsylvania" that mirrored the religious and pacifist beliefs of the Quaker community.[23] Female AFSC volunteers who sewed garments for delivery in France were urged to pay particular attention to quality and to ask themselves whether their work was "worthy of America."[24] Relief goods were

20 Irwin, *Making the World Safe*, 3–12, 209–12; Irwin, "Taming Total War: Great War-Era American Humanitarianism and Its Legacies," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 4 (2014): 768–71; Marian Moser Jones, *The American Red Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 157–58, 164–67.

21 Maul, *The Politics of Service*, 1; Maul, "American Quakers, the Emergence of International Humanitarianism, and the Foundation of the American Friends Service Committee, 1890–1920," 82; Piller, "Beyond Hoover," 211.

22 For a thorough and very extensive overview of the ARA and the Russian famine, see Bertrand M. Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

23 Maul, *The Politics of Service*, 75–76, 89.

24 Daniel Roger Maul, "The Rise of a Humanitarian Superpower: American NGOs and International Relief, 1917–1945," in *Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contempo-*

not supposed to just ease suffering; they were supposed to promote the wealth, culture, and political philosophy of the United States among aid beneficiaries.

The onset of World War II initiated a new wave of U.S. American humanitarian engagement with distant others. Already during the time of U.S. war neutrality, and not unlike developments twenty-five years earlier, calls by both governmental and nongovernmental institutions urged U.S. Americans to contribute to war relief charities. Attending relief rallies and concerts became a regular and popular pastime. Neighborhoods began collecting nonfood items, established sewing clubs, and canned vegetables for overseas distribution. By the end of the war, U.S. Americans would collect money and relief goods worth US$ 5 billion.[25]

In this private aid euphoria, donors poured their dollars into the war zones of Europe, Africa, and Asia and threatened to make the United States an all-too-visible player meddling in the theaters of war. They scattered their aid across hundreds of hastily created relief agencies. Between 1939 and the mid-1940s, the number of relief organizations registered in the U.S. jumped from 240 to more than 540. Often designed to help a specific religious or ethnic group, these agencies lacked management and communication skills, creating an increasingly overcrowded welfare landscape with dozens of agencies catering to the same clientele. What is more, both government authorities and many private agencies could no longer oversee the involvements of individual organizations and began to worry that their engagement might be financially misused or instrumentalized to support individual political factions that were actively involved in the conflict.[26]

At a time when the U.S. government found this upsurge in humanitarian engagement difficult to contain, public voices increasingly put pressure on the U.S. government to become more involved in world affairs. In February 1941, famed journalist and editor Henry Luce published "The American Century" in *LIFE Magazine*, in which he urged the U.S. government to enter World War II and to act as the world's herald of democracy.[27] Almost ten months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Luce argued that U.S. national security could only be guaranteed if the nation started to defend its values globally. This new wave of internationalist engagement, both in terms of charity and public debates, including those about isolationist decisions made after World War I, raised the pressure on the U.S. government to act.

rary World: The Pasts of the Present, ed. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo et al. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 127.

25 Stephen R. Porter, *Benevolent Empire*: *U.S. Power, Humanitarianism, and the World's Dispossessed* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 80; Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 15.

26 Porter, *Benevolent Empire*, 80–81; Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 15–16.

27 Henry R. Luce, "The American Century," *LIFE Magazine*, February 17, 1941, 61–65.

When the U. S. entered the war in late 1941, relief aid again became entangled with foreign policy objectives, further accelerating the professionalization and politicization of the humanitarian sector. A government agency whose aim was to supervise the work of private relief organizations was already established prior to U. S. war entry, in March 1941. Since the summer of 1942, this organization was known as the President's War Relief Control Board (PWRCB). The board was responsible for all registrations of new agencies as well as for overseeing their distribution of aid. It could demand that organizations with similar regional profiles merge and pressure them to include the words "American" or "United States" in their names to provide visible proof of U. S. involvement. Although complying with government regulations threatened to corrupt the political neutrality and operational freedom of relief organizations, they also benefited as it promised visibility, access, and, most importantly, money.[28]

Humanitarian organizations now faced pressure from the U. S. government to give up their humanitarian credo of neutrality and impartiality in return for oversight and financial security. Many, some even gladly, chose to submit to government control. In response to government regulation, the humanitarian market increasingly regulated itself, establishing the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service (ACVAFS). In preemptive obedience to the U. S. government, this umbrella association of private aid organizations coordinated the relief activities of its voluntary members to showcase the efficiency of the humanitarian sector.[29] Regulations and controls, both government-enforced and voluntary, signified a trend in war and postwar relief efforts – towards professionalism, growth, competition for funds, and increasing overlap of humanitarian and foreign policy interests – that would shape the aid industry for decades to come.

While U. S. humanitarianism became increasingly regulated by government interests during World War II, the fledgling international community came to find political consensus in humanitarian cooperation. In November 1943, forty-four participating governments – including the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China – founded the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). UNRRA was the result of lengthy negotiations on how to cope with the problems of war-induced destruction, hunger, and migration flows that would confront the postwar world. It was the first time that an official, internationally sanctioned organization used the term "United Nations" in its title. UNRRA did not exist long. U. S. support for an organization in which the USSR was also a member diminished with the

28 Porter, *Benevolent Empire*, 82–85; Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 16.

29 Brian H. Smith, *More Than Altruism*: *The Politics of Private Foreign Aid* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 41; Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 45.

beginning Cold War. UNRRA's relief efforts ended in June 1947, even though regions across the globe still required humanitarian attention.[30] The venture was nonetheless successful, having supplied relief worth billions of U. S. dollars first to countries attacked by the Axis powers and later to Displaced Persons in Eastern and Central Europe.[31] Through UNRRA, joint relief beyond national borders became one of the first intergovernmental cooperative endeavors after the war.[32]

Such was the humanitarian climate, domestically and internationally, into which CARE was born in 1945. Humanitarian aid had developed into a professionalized field in which public circles, politicians, and the fledgling United Nations realized a potential for cooperation, diplomacy, and furthering individual or political agendas. Washington policymakers came to understand humanitarianism's potential to further the political objectives and the image of the United States abroad. Aid organizations, in turn, adapted to growing public and political attention by bringing their images in line with popular demand and by accepting government control in return for access and financial incentives. Wilder's metaphorical wrapper, it seems, had a legacy in the United States that dated back at least thirsty years.[33]

The end of the war reinforced these developments. The PWRCB was replaced by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, which continued to impose governmental regulations of humanitarian agencies. Foundations from World War I, such as the ARC and the AFSC, continued to aid those whom the war had left hungry, orphaned, or homeless. But many of the smaller foundations that had emerged during World War II likewise kept becoming involved in a humanitarian sector that had never been so large. Together, these organizations formed what Stephen Porter has termed the "NGO revolution" of the of the mid- to late-twentieth century. The two wars had turned humanitarianism into a sector of its own that would come to shape global cultural and political developments.[34]

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30 Porter, *Benevolent Empire*, 89, 100; Jessica Reinisch, "'Auntie UNRRA' at the Crossroads," *Past & Present* 218, suppl. 8 (2013): 70–71.

31 For an overview of UNRRA's activities for European DPs, see Silvia Salvatici, "Professionals of Humanitarianism: UNRRA Relief Officers in Post-War Europe," in *Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Paulmann, 235–59; Salvatici, "'Help the People to Help Themselves': UNRRA Relief Workers and European Displaced Persons," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25, no. 3 (2012): 428–51. See also Gerard Daniel Cohen, *In War's Wake*: *Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 5.

32 Reinisch, "Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA," *Past and Present* 210, no. 6 (2011): 260.

33 On Billy Wilder's film *A Foreign Affair* and the idea that designating the origin of humanitarian aid through a wrapper presents a form of imperialism, see the introduction.

34 Porter, *Benevolent Empire*, 99–100.

When it comes to the exact circumstances of CARE's creation in 1945, fact often fuses with myth. Much of the organization's history, as previously mentioned, was recorded by former employees, who provided very personalized and arguably subjective versions of CARE's creation. But there are also elaborate organizational histories that focus less on the tales of, as Heike Wieters has put it, "a handful of men and women with vision and charitable hearts" than on institutional conditions and the contextualization of CARE within the postwar humanitarian community.[35] Yet, neither set of sources should be prioritized over the other. After all, the personal accounts of CARE employees were an integral part of the organization's image-making, and they deserve inclusion as testimonies of such.

What we know from both personal and scholarly accounts is that the initial idea for CARE came from Arthur C. Ringland. During World War II, Ringland had been a consultant of the PWRCB. In the 1920s, he had been an administrator in Herbert Hoover's ARA and had supervised relief efforts in Czechoslovakia and Turkey. This dual experience in humanitarian fieldwork and its institutional regulation certified Ringland as an expert in the conceptualization and creation of a new relief venture. Not surprisingly, Ringland envisioned a distribution system similar to the ones he had experienced. Both of Hoover's relief endeavors had previously attempted to forge closer connections between donor and recipient and enable donors to better identify with the aid they provided. CRB state committees had used ships named after the U.S. states in which the donations they contained had been collected to make aid tangible to U.S. donors and to allow for a certain playful rivalry with neighboring states. Belgian recipients, in turn, would often send gifts back to the United States – though not to specific donors – to express their appreciation.[36] In Czechoslovakia and under Ringland's supervision, the ARA had tried similar models and had conducted a small program of personalized package deliveries that would later become CARE's distinguishing feature.[37]

Even before hostilities ended in Europe, Ringland began planning to recreate this package program on a grander scale and started looking for supporters in Washington. He turned to Lincoln Clark, who was working as a U.S. official for UNRRA. According to company folklore, it was Clark's wife Alice who would later come up with the acronym CARE while ironing.[38] Rather than establishing a whole new organization, Ringland and Clark hoped to convince

35 Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 17.
36 Piller, "Beyond Hoover," 209, 212.
37 Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 18; Memorandum on the occasion of Ringland's passing from Wallace Campbell to the CARE Board of Directors, October 15, 1981, CARE Records, Box 4.
38 Oral History Interview with Wallace Campbell, August 29, 1980, CARE Records, Box 4; Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 15–16.

existing relief agencies to pool financial resources to support a joint organization while retaining their independence. In their search for supporters, they turned to the young Wallace Campbell, a staffer at the Cooperative League of the USA which had just pledged US$ 100,000 for a "Freedom Fund" to support cooperatives in liberated European countries. Unlike Ringland and Clark, Campbell had no humanitarian experience but profited from his network of connections in cooperative circles. Together, and due to Clark's connections, the three hoped to secure relief goods that were in UNRRA's possession. The U. S. government had submitted more than seven million food packages, which had originally been intended for a ground invasion of Japan, to UNRRA's authority.[39] Containing enough food to support one ground soldier for ten days, these packages had the fitting name "10-in-1 rations." With products like canned meat, vegetables, evaporated milk, butter, and cheese, as well as cereal and biscuits, candy, sugar, coffee, cocoa, and salt, they fit perfectly into a relief operation.[40] Ringland, Clark, and Campbell decided to bring the idea before the ACVAFS, which by then comprised about eighty relief agencies. Many of them expressed interest in the venture because CARE's aspired person-to-person aid was something they had wanted to offer but were unable to for logistical or technical constraints. This made them willing to invest funds and energy in this new relief organization. By October 1945, twenty-two relief organizations with diverse religious, secular, ethnic, and political backgrounds agreed to join and to provide a starting capital of US$ 750,000.[41]

Now that CARE was born, it had to be staffed. The board's choice of Murray Lincoln as first president was a safe one. Lincoln was president of the Cooperative League and thus came with Campbell's recommendations and the expertise to lead yet another cooperative effort. More curious was the choice of executive director. Donald M. Nelson had been a member of the War Production Board, president of the Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers, and executive vice-president of the nationally known mail-order catalog company Sears Roebuck. Choosing the former executive of one of America's largest retail enterprises certainly had its administrative advantages as Nelson knew how to handle package shipments in large quantities. But with the end of the war, UNRRA was fighting for its own survival and was reluctant to hand over all 7.7 million 10-in-1 rations to another organization. The dispute prolonged CARE's initiation through 1945. Nelson now believed that his profes-

39 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 52.

40 Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 47–48. Sommer finds that German recipients initially considered some of these products inedible, to which CARE responded by including recipes and offering cooking classes. Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 172.

41 Oral History Interview with Wallace Campbell, August 29, 1980, CARE Records, Box 4; Biographical sketch of Wallace Campbell, CARE Records, Box 883; Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 7–10, 15; Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 16–19.

sional background would have qualified him for a one-time aid stint, not for an ongoing humanitarian business with a lengthy initiation process. He resigned before the first donations even came in and was succeeded by General William Haskell – a former member of the ARA who was now president of the Save the Children Federation. Nelson's leadership may have been short-lived, but it clearly reveals the profile the founding members were seeking for the new organization. CARE was not supposed to be like other humanitarian agencies nor be perceived as one. Rather, U.S. Americans were to say its name in the same breath with a company like Sears Roebuck. Ringland and his colleagues wanted to approach donors as consumers, placing the organization firmly in a consumer market.[42]

In December, UNRRA finally transferred 2.8 million of the 10-in-1 rations, allowing CARE to start accepting donations.[43] But initial sales numbers were disappointing. Between May and September 1946, CARE sold and shipped only 50,000 of the almost three million parcels purchased from UNRRA.[44] One reason was the original package price of US$ 15, which weighed rather heavily on the average U.S. American wallet. This problem was remedied in October 1946 when CARE, the U.S. government, and UNRRA agreed to lower the price for the 10-in-1 rations to US$ 4.25 apiece. CARE could now offer the packages at a rate of US$ 10, opening its venture to donors who had been discouraged by the initially high price. As a result of the price reduction, 600,000 packages crossed the Atlantic in the last two months of 1946 – a twelve-fold increase in the remittances received through September.[45]

Another reason for this upsurge in donations was the beginning of CARE's program in Germany, which had been tedious to establish. Most other European governments, including in France, Italy, and Greece, had eagerly accepted U.S. relief shipments of all kinds and welcomed CARE as useful material support.[46] Germany, in being divided, presented an unexpected challenge. Negotiations with the U.S. War Department and the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), OMGUS for short, started in the spring of 1946.[47] Yet, CARE encountered some obstacles, both from home and abroad. For one thing, the Trading with the Enemy Act prohibited postal service to the occupied areas. More important than such bureaucratic obstacles was Germany's recent past. Millions of Europeans had lost their lives to Nazi aggression, and industries as well as infrastructures all over the continent lay in ruins. The de-

42 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 52; Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 20–23.
43 Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 21–22.
44 Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 26.
45 Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 29.
46 Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 40.
47 General William N. Haskell to Colonel Richard W. Bonnevalle, May 14, 1946, CARE Records, Box 13.

tails of the systematic annihilation of the European Jewry were still somewhat vague after the war, but the U. S. public had to face the brutality that Jews, other ethnic and religious minorities, and political opponents had encountered in Hitler's concentration and death camps through the media. These facts made it difficult to justify humanitarian assistance to the country responsible for such atrocities. The U. S. government, however, expressed willingness to cooperate and welcomed any attempt to send aid to Germany.[48] CARE's chances depended on its ability to bring aid in line with U. S. political objectives.

Much to the distress of the organization's decision makers, the political situation surrounding the negotiations did not work in CARE's favor. In early 1946, the three Western Allies, albeit to different degrees, were hopeful about continuing their wartime alliance with the Soviet Union to manage the postwar German occupation collectively. For the government of Great Britain, and particularly for its staunchly anti-Bolshevist wartime leader Winston Churchill, the alliance with the USSR had always been a marriage of convenience, and Churchill had long nurtured doubts about whether it would continue in peacetime. Suspicious of Joseph Stalin and afraid that British interests might get lost in a U. S.-Soviet alliance, he had courted Franklin D. Roosevelt to forge a special relationship between Britain and the United States. Churchill's Tories lost the election of July 1945 to the Labour Party under Clement Attlee, but the former prime minister's policy towards the Soviet Union continued to shape the British government's position in the grand alliance. Unlike Churchill, Harry S. Truman had just succeeded the deceased FDR in the spring of 1945 and had inherited from his predecessor a cautious but optimistic foreign policy towards the Soviet government that envisioned a continuation of wartime relations in the postwar era. Only gradually in the first year of his presidency did Truman and his Secretary of State James Byrnes begin to adopt the Churchillian approach and dispense with the Rooseveltian one.[49]

Tensions between the Allies increasingly hinted that there would be a falling out in the foreseeable future. But, for the time being, the fate of Germany was an issue the Allies debated collectively in the Allied Control Council – the four-power governing body for occupied Germany. An eventual German reunification was already unlikely but not yet off the table, either, as the members of the Council of Foreign Ministers, hesitant to put the alliance to a test, carefully tiptoed around a decision.[50] At this point, the Germans were still defeated war enemies, and the idea of German participation in a unified Western Bloc

48 CARE Board Meeting Minutes, November 30, 1945, CARE Records, Box 7.

49 Costigliola, *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances*, 13–14, 419–20.

50 Gunther Mai, "The United States in the Allied Control Council: From Dualism to Temporary Division," and Edmund Spevack, "The Allied Council of Foreign Ministers Conferences and the German Question, 1945–1947," both in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990*, ed. Junker et al., 1:50–52, and 1:45, respectively.

against the USSR had not yet taken hold. In this context, CARE's leaders faced the difficult task of gaining acceptance for humanitarian aid on behalf of a people who had just lost a war they had started and whom Washington diplomats viewed with suspicion.

At their three wartime conferences in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, the heads of the Allied governments had decided to deprive Germany of much of its eastern territories and to divide the remains among the four Allies for military occupation. The "Big Three" had agreed on the four "Ds" at the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945. Germany was to be demilitarized, its future governance decentralized, society and the bureaucratic apparatus denazified, and the people democratized under Allied supervision to prepare them for eventual participation in global postwar politics. The Soviet and especially the French government, not feeling bound to the Potsdam Agreement due to French absence from the conference, demanded the right to deindustrialize their future occupation zones and dismantle industrial facilities as reparation. Their colleagues in the United States and Britain, on the other hand, considered Allied financial support necessary to revive the German economy and to keep living standards at a bearable level to prevent the kind of political developments that had followed the Versailles Treaty in 1919. Although the Allies agreed that Germany should not be allowed to exceed the living standards of the neighbors it had plunged into war, it eventually would.[51]

For CARE to receive Allied consent, it was indispensable to prove that humanitarian service did not violate these objectives and, at best, even supported them. Despite this challenge, two factors worked in CARE's favor. The first was the basic humanitarian argument of relieving suffering without regard to political concerns. British and U.S. aerial bombing had destroyed most of Germany's infrastructure and, with it, access to sanitation facilities and clean drinking water. Health workers and medical supplies were scarce yet desperately needed.[52] An estimated twenty-six million Germans had lost their homes.[53] Many of them now lived in crowded housing conditions that promoted the spread of diseases, while about fourteen million – more than half of them children – found no home at all.[54] Nine to twelve million native German refugees from East-Central Europe and hundreds of thousands of innocent Nazi victims flocking into occupied territory or awaiting Allied action at Displaced Persons' camps further complicated the situation. Among them were liberated Jews, former political prisoners, and forced laborers from East-

51 For a thorough overview of Allied planning of the German occupation with a special emphasis on public health and nutrition, see the relevant chapter in Reinisch, *The Perils of Peace*, 19–58.
52 Reinisch, *The Perils of Peace*, 1–2.
53 Richard Bessel, *Germany 1945: From War to Peace* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 6.
54 Tara Zahra, *The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe's Families after World War II* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 4.

ern Europe.[55] Although the German food supply had been rationed since the start of the war in 1939, Germans had wanted for rather little under fascist rule due to the exploitation of resources in Nazi-occupied eastern territories. When this system of exploitation collapsed in 1945, it laid bare the full extent of defeat as hunger and malnutrition among both Germans and incoming DPs accelerated infection rates.[56] In this rapidly deteriorating situation, according to the credo of humanitarian idealism, the German people were entitled to humanitarian aid not despite but regardless of their past. After all, they were humans.

A second factor that proved favorable to CARE's cause was U.S. public sentiment towards the German people. Gruesome images of the German as the barbarous Hun, which had swept across the United States during World War I, did not experience a revival during the 1940s.[57] Instead, public hostility focused on the Japanese, who had initiated war with the United States and whose racial and cultural differences helped in the construction of a pronounced enemy image.[58] Meanwhile, the question of whether the German people were complicit in Nazi crimes remained a topic of public debate. The U.S. public's detachment from the theater of war, latent antisemitism, disbelief in the extent of Nazi cruelties, and general agreement on the unwarranted harshness of the Versailles Treaty meant that in the U.S. public debate, the evil Nazi government was differentiated from the impressionable people it had seduced.[59]

Not all parts of the U.S. government agreed about German collective guilt, so they had differing views on how the postwar occupation should be approached. This greatly helped to nurture this logic of separation between the German people and their Nazi leadership. The U.S. wartime propaganda

55 Cohen, *In War's Wake*, 5–6.

56 Manfred J. Enssle, "The Harsh Discipline of Food Scarcity in Postwar Stuttgart, 1945–1948," *German Studies Review* 10, no. 03 (1987): 482; Alice Weinreb, "'For the Hungry Have No Past nor Do They Belong to a Political Party': Debates over German Hunger After World War II," *Central European History* 45, no. 1 (2012): 51–52.

57 Bauerkämper, *Sicherheit und Humanität im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg: der Umgang mit zivilen Feindstaatenangehörigen im Ausnahmezustand* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2021), 487–88.

58 Astrid M. Eckert, *Feindbilder im Wandel*: *Ein Vergleich des Deutschland- und des Japanbildes in den USA 1945 und 1946* (Münster: Lit, 1999), 41–43.

59 On the debates about German responsibility and the reasons for popular differentiation between a guilty Nazi leadership and a suppressed and seduced German people, see Michaela Hoenicke Moore, *Know Your Enemy*: *The American Debate on Nazism, 1933–1945,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5–9, 177–93; Jörg Nagler, *Nationale Minoritäten im Krieg*: "*Feindliche Ausländer*" *und die amerikanische Heimatfront während des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000), 680–83; Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 31–41, 198–201. On antisemitism, disinterest in the fate of Jews among the U.S. public, and the hesitancy of the U.S. government to intervene on behalf of the murdered Jews, see Richard Breitman, *Official Secrets*: *What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 229; Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 19–29, 63–69.

outlet – the Office of War Information (OWI) – tried to communicate to the people that their war enemies were not the Germans but their gruesome leadership and the totalitarian ideology it represented. In the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) – the predecessor of the postwar Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – a group of influential émigré academics, including sociologist Herbert Marcuse and political scientist Franz Neumann, likewise lobbied the president to take a rehabilitative approach to the postwar German occupation.[60] The complicity of the German people remained a question on which the jury had not yet reached a verdict, but it looked as though, if they were convicted, the sentence would be mild.

U.S. media outlets therefore reacted harshly when, in 1944, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. presented a plan to limit Germany's war potential through territorial division and complete industrial dismantling, which public opponents quickly interpreted as a Carthaginian peace designed to throw the country back into agrarian feudalism.[61] In lieu of the Morgenthau Plan, large segments of the U.S. public favored a mildly punitive approach to reeducate the Germans and to make them aware of the crimes committed on their behalf. Backed by this public support for a pragmatic and sound policy towards Germany – after all, it was the public on which CARE's financial success depended – the organization's decision makers were able to forcefully argue that CARE aimed to act in the interest of the U.S. American people.

But to the disadvantage of the organization, the U.S. military and the occupation personnel in Germany did not initially favor such a forgiving approach. Shortly before VE Day – the unconditional surrender of the German Wehrmacht on May 8, 1945 – the U.S. War Department produced an orientation film for soldiers who would soon serve in the German occupation. *Your Job in Germany*, directed by Frank Capra and written by Theodor Geisel – better known as children's book author Dr. Seuss – urged GIs not to be fooled by the friendly and inviting character of the German people. Germany had plunged the world into war too many times. Its people had elected the Nazi elite to office, watched as they wreaked havoc on Europe, and they now deserved the hardships they were enduring. Behind every friendly German face, the film suggested, potentially lay the mind of a committed Nazi. It was the soldier's duty to be alert and suspicious in all interactions and to treat the occupied people as the defeated enemies they were.[62]

This suspicious depiction of the Germans, which contradicted the efforts of both the OWI and the OSS, found expression in military government policies.

60 Hoenicke Moore, *Know Your Enemy*, 140–41, 277–81.

61 Hoenicke Moore, *Know Your Enemy*, 311–14.

62 "Your Job in Germany," early 1945, Orientation Films, 1942–1949, Record Group 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860–1985, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, USA (hereafter NARA).

In April 1945, OMGUS took up operations under the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive JCS 1067, which set the agenda for Germany's future economic, cultural, political, and social development. JCS 1067 included both an organizational agenda for the coming occupation as well as rules of conduct for the relation of stationed personnel to the German population. The declaration adopted the principle, agreed upon by the Allies, to keep the German economy, and especially its industry, at a level no greater than that of neighboring countries, and it clarified that Germany was to be regarded as an occupied enemy and not as a liberated nation. The German people were to be thoroughly denazified, made aware of their crimes, and reeducated into a democratic society. To this end, JCS 1067 also clearly prohibited fraternal contact between U.S. military personnel and German citizens so that the relationship between occupier and occupied would not get muddled.[63]

Due to the directions of JCS 1067, and much to the distress of CARE's founders, OMGUS leadership was not as welcoming as they had hoped. Military Governor Dwight D. Eisenhower had appointed General Lucius D. Clay as his deputy and de facto leader of the U.S. zone. Though Clay had no combat experience and lacked military accolades, he had distinguished himself as one of the War Department's ablest administrators. Not too thrilled with his new position – Clay had frequently asked for a transfer to Japan to finally engage in combat – he was the War Department's favorite choice as leaders there expected him to successfully balance the military and civilian aspects of the occupied government.[64] Accordingly, Clay was in charge of the implementation of JCS 1067 and unfortunately viewed any private U.S. attempt to aid Germans with suspicion.

Clay himself rejected the Morgenthau Plan and was critical of JCS 1067 for its punitive agenda and its failure to grasp the necessity of German industrial reconstruction.[65] Nonetheless, he argued that "Some cold and hunger will be necessary to make the German people realize the consequences of a war which they started."[66] This is not to say that Clay regarded starvation as a useful disciplinary measure. He was aware that stable calorie quotas for the local population were strategically necessary to prevent resentment against the occupation and to gain acceptance for OMGUS policies. Clay advocated for and welcomed

63 Directive to Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany, April 26, 1945, in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, ed. US Department of State, 1945, vol. 3: European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 484 (hereafter FRUS).

64 John H. Backer, *Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983), 3–7.

65 Backer, *Winds of History*, 12.

66 From General Lucius D. Clay to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, June 16, 1945, in *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945–1949,* vol. 1, ed. Jean E. Smith et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 24.

food imports from the U.S. government.[67] To his frustration, large quantities of such imports had to be redirected to the British and French zones, while the French military officials allocated excessive amounts of their own zone's food production for personal use.[68] In March 1946, Clay even threatened to resign from his post if the War Department failed to deliver previously promised wheat rations.[69] It was not government support but aid from private circles he took issue with.[70]

Clay's opposition stemmed from his concern that private aid might advance a victim narrative among German recipients. He witnessed how large parts of the population failed to take any responsibility for the violence and atrocities of the past twelve years. The vastly destructive aerial bombing raids in the last months of the war, especially, had fortified this victim narrative, which now only grew stronger amidst a worsening food situation and increasing housing shortage.[71] In a cable to John Hilldring, Chief of the Army's Civil Affairs Division, Clay complained in July 1945 that "Germans blame [the] Nazis for losing [the] war, protest ignorance of [the] regime's crimes and shrug off their own support or silence as incidental and unavoidable."[72] With this on-site experience, Clay had trouble understanding why U.S. Americans, who saw Germany only from a distance, would want to provide aid in the first place. Private humanitarian assistance, he feared, might be interpreted as a sign of solidarity from abroad that confirmed the Germans in their victimhood and that ultimately hampered OMGUS's mildly punitive approach to the occupation.

Despite these well-founded concerns, Clay soon came to face opposition from home. The U.S. government was under pressure from German-American immigrant societies, political interest groups, and petitioning senators who demanded the reopening of regular postal service and operations permissions for relief agencies in the U.S. zone.[73] Such increasing pressure potentially pointed

67 While Wolfgang Krieger describes Clay's position on food supply and political strategy in great detail, he erroneously assumes that the general welcomed private contributions, and particularly CARE, from the very beginning of the occupation, which, as will become apparent, was not the case. Krieger, *General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1945–1949* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987), 166–69.

68 Backer, *Winds of History*, 110–11,

69 Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay: An American Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), 360.

70 O'Connell, "Weapon of War, Tool of Peace," 187–88.

71 Bessel, *Germany 1945*, 396–97.

72 From Clay to John H. Hilldring [Army's Civil Affairs Division], July 5, 1945, in *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, ed. Smith et al., vol. 1, 47.

73 Petition to the 79th US Congress to reopen postal service to Germany, December 12th, 1945, RG 46: Records of the U.S. Senate, 1789–2015, Petitions and Memorials, 1817–2000, National Archives Building, Washington, DC, USA; Petition by thirty-four US Senators for reopening postal service and allowing UNRRA to operate in Germany, December 7th, 1945 (see also ensuing correspondence between individual senators and President Truman in the same file), Harry S. Truman Papers, Presidential Papers, Official File 426, Box 1326, Harry S. Truman Presidential

toward the government's inability to act as a responsible occupation power and shone an unfavorable light on the presidency of Harry Truman, who had to prove to be a capable successor of FDR. Worsening food and living conditions in the winter of 1945–46 led Truman to commission Byron Price, the former director of the US Office of Censorship, to travel to Germany and provide a report on possible adjustments to Allied food policy. Price's report was released in December 1945. He advocated food aid to Germany, not to be soft on the German people in any way but rather to prevent unrest and riot among the population and ultimately support the safety of the stationed U.S. American personnel. From this perspective, food aid was no longer a question of benevolence or punishment but one of strategy.[74] In the same month Price's report was published, the War Department presented Clay with the request to admit private aid to Germany. Although he reluctantly admitted medical and sanitation supplies, he still opposed the idea of food aid.[75]

Two months later, the War Department and President Truman went over Clay's head and decided on the creation of the Council of Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in Germany (CRALOG) – the first humanitarian organization permitted to operate in the occupied territory. Clay met the decision with hostility and resistance, arguing that CRALOG "leaves the field of welfare and goes into the question of our policies in Germany," which was no longer the organization's area of expertise.[76] CRALOG represented exactly what Clay had tried to prevent from happening because private agencies, backed by popular support, now meddled with what he believed to be the objectives of his occupation policy.

But Clay's opposition began to crumble under emerging geopolitical pressures. On February 9, Joseph Stalin first publicly addressed the incompatibility of capitalism and communism as partnering systems.[77] Two weeks later, George F. Kennan, deputy chief of the U.S. mission in Moscow, sent his "Long Telegram" to James Byrnes. He advised the secretary of state to abandon hopes of U.S.-Soviet cooperation due to what he interpreted as an increasingly conspiratorial Soviet outlook on the foreign policy of the Western Allies, and par-

Library and Museum, Independence, MO, USA (hereafter Truman Papers); see also various appeals to Truman by individuals, German-American societies, women's clubs, etc., on this issue in Truman Papers, OF 426, Box 1328–29.

74 O'Connell, "Weapon of War, Tool of Peace," 177–78.

75 Clay to Major General Clarence Adcock, December 13, 1945, in *The Papers of General Lucius D.* Clay, ed., Smith et al., vol. 1, 135.

76 Clay to Hilldring, February 1, 1946, in *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany*, ed. Smith et al. vol. 1, 156.

77 Spevack, "The Allied Council of Foreign Ministers Conferences and the German Question, 1945–1947," 45.

ticularly the United States.[78] On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill, now leader of the opposition, followed an invitation to speak at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. He was joined by President Truman, who saw this as an opportunity to spread Kennan's words to the public by way of a prominent yet unofficial voice. To Truman's satisfaction, the former prime minister boldly responded to Stalin's declaration in a speech that would soon be known as "The Sinews of Peace." It was the first time that the wartime leader of a Western Allied nation publicly referred to an "iron curtain" descending over Europe from "Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic," ripping the continent apart geographically and ideologically – a development which Churchill blamed entirely on the Soviet government.[79]

That same month, now former U.S. president and declared anticommunist Herbert Hoover embarked on a trip through Europe as a representative of Truman's Famine Emergency Committee. A bad harvest and the harsh winter of 1945/46 had forced OMGUS to cut the calorie quota for the population of the U.S. zone. The U.S. government became increasingly weary of Clay's view on the issue of private relief. Backing the government's position, Hoover reported to Truman that all U.S. political objectives in Germany stood and fell with the population's food situation.[80] Growing Soviet influence in Central Europe could only be prevented and the German people could only be successfully democratized if the U.S. government proved capable of properly addressing the hunger issue.

With the Cold War slowly emerging and the hunger crisis threatening the power balance in divided Germany, CARE sent its deputy director, former U.S. Army Colonel Richard Bonnevalle, to Germany to secure agreements with all four occupation powers in May 1946. Much to his distress, Bonnevalle had to deal with what CARE's general counsel Alexander B. Hawes referred to as "the temperamental peculiarities of General Clay," who found CARE's mode of operation inacceptable.[81] To counter the public outcry that Clay saw coming over the uneven distribution of packages, he insisted on a general relief quota to prevent "discrimination between the German taxpayers in favor of the

78 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the secretary of state, February 22, 1946, FRUS, 1946, vol. 6: Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, 696–709. Kennan would publicly reiterate these opinions in an article in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947, outlining the idea of containment policy towards communism that would shape U.S. foreign relations for decades to come. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 179–81.

79 Winston S. Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace," March 5, 1946, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_16994.htm?selectedLocale=en.

80 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 211–13; Bloomstein, "History of CARE," 85–86, CARE Records, Box 1. See also the report by Herbert Hoover on the world food crisis, April 19, 1946, Truman Papers, OF 426, Box 1326. Hoover would also endorse CARE in 1947 as "the only sure and efficient way of sending packages." See CARE Annual Report 1947, CARE Records, Box 1.

81 Alexander Hawes to Newton Randolph, May 7, 1947, CARE Records, Box 13.

selected few who would receive those packages." Consequently, he demanded that "packages consigned to individuals must have a lower priority than general relief packages."[82] For each designated package sent through CARE, Clay demanded that the donor provide the same financial amount for packages that would be distributed according to need. This was unacceptable to CARE. Demanding money for additional orders based on need rather than designation threatened to become a potential inconvenience for donors, for whom CARE was intended to be a personalized and not an anonymized relief endeavor.

But in the larger contours of the emerging bipolar conflict, Clay was unable to uphold his resistance. The Soviet military government made great efforts to retain a stable supply of 1,500 calories in its occupation zone. If OMGUS failed to prove that a democratic occupation power could sustain its population in the same way, its entire reputation was at stake. Knowing that this issue had led to unease in Washington, CARE's Alexander Hawes had decided to ask the U.S. government for support in the dragging negotiations with General Clay. The War Department stepped in to convince Clay that his terms were unacceptable. Even the general had by now come to see the potential psychological benefits of private aid in OMGUS's democratization effort. In the spring of 1946, he worried that "there is no choice between becoming a Communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories."[83] With government support, Clay and Bonnevalle finally signed an agreement in June 1946. Certain concessions to the military authorities seemed more bearable than losing the profitable German market altogether, and Bonnevalle assured Clay that CARE would aspire to allocate fifty percent of its donations to general relief.[84]

After successfully reaching an agreement with OMGUS, Bonnevalle turned to the three remaining occupation powers. The Soviet authorities rebuffed CARE's attempts on the grounds that the organization refused to surrender control over deliveries in Berlin to the Allied Kommandatura – the Berlin counterpart to the all-German Allied Control Council. If CARE, representing the humanitarian attempts of just one occupation power, was given free rein over the distribution of relief goods, it "created undesirable competition," argued the Soviet Deputy Commandant in a Kommandatura meeting in September 1946. The fact that the Departments of War and State had both pressured Clay into admitting humanitarian aid to the U.S. zone fortified the notion that the U.S. government apparently saw deeper diplomatic value in the CARE packages. The Soviet military government cut negotiations with Bonnevalle short, arguing that CARE "created a political weapon, for influencing the people, in

82 From Clay to Oliver P. Echols, May 18, 1946, in *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, ed. Smith et al., vol. 1, 206.

83 From Clay to Echols, March 27, 1946, in *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay*, ed. Smith et al., vol. 1, 184.

84 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 70–75.

the hands of one power."[85] Responses from British and French authorities were much more favorable. Before the year was over, both military governments had followed Clay's example and signed the shipping agreements.[86]

* * *

Although the failure to come to an agreement with the Soviet authorities kept millions of potential recipients beyond CARE's reach, the organization's work became tremendously successful in the Western zones. By the end of 1946, sixty-seven percent of all CARE donations went to West Germany.[87] Soon, the organization had emptied its stock of 10-in-1 rations and began putting together its own packages in the spring of 1947; these took regionally specific tastes in recipient countries into consideration and were better suited to civilian use than the UNRRA packages.[88] In December, the city of Bremen celebrated the arrival of the two-millionth German parcel.[89]

For German recipients, the packages offered immense material and psychological support in a moment of postwar distress. Charles Bloomstein remarks in his *History* that "any relief package [in Germany] was automatically called a 'CARE packet.'"[90] From Bad Godesberg near Bonn, German Mission Chief Fred Cordova commended the organization: "[I]n the mind of the German people, the word which sums up all private aid from abroad is 'CARE' and CARE in turn is synonymous with 'the American people.'"[91] CARE's image, he suggested, had transformed from representing material relief to being an asset to the cultural representation of the United States abroad.

Bloomstein and Cordova's words were, of course, exaggerations. CARE was not the only U.S. American humanitarian relief program that operated in Germany at the time – there were at least fifteen.[92] Next to CRALOG, the U.S. government had just initiated the GARIOA program to provide state-funded relief to its occupation zones in Germany, Austria, and Japan.[93] At the same time, the AFSC's child feeding program, dubbed the *Quäkerspeisung*, provided

85 Minutes, Deputy Commanders Meeting, Allied Kommandatura Berlin, September 10, 1946, RG 260: Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II, General Records 1945–1949, NARA.

86 Operation agreement between the British military government and CARE, June 21, 1946, CARE Records, Box 13; Operation agreement between the French military government and CARE, November 8, 1946, CARE Records, Box 13.

87 Bloomstein, "History of CARE," 145, CARE Records, Box 1.

88 CARE Annual Report 1947, CARE Records, Box 1.

89 Press Release: 2,000,000th "CARE" parcel delivered in Bremen, December 1947, CARE Records, Box 899.

90 Bloomstein, "History of CARE," 267, CARE Records, Box 1.

91 Germany Discursive Report December 1951 – January 1952, CARE Records, Box 840.

92 James F. Tent, "Simple Gifts: The American Friends Service Committee and the Establishment of Neighborhood Centers in Post-1945 Germany," *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte* 2, no. 1 (1989): 64.

93 Porter, *Benevolent Empire*, 100.

many with what would later become fond childhood memories of the early postwar years.[94] Organizations like the Foster Parents' Plan or the Save the Children Federation meanwhile offered orphaned children in Germany and many other European countries financial aid and the psychological comfort of an occasional personal letter.[95] Non-humanitarian organizations also became involved in postwar German reconstruction. The Boy Scouts of America, for example, focused their attention on DPs in the U.S. zone, while the New York Girl Scouts helped with four hundred pounds of toys for Christmas.[96] Such programs made CARE part of a system of private and state-funded U.S. efforts at sustaining a society on the verge of collapse, both materially and psychologically.

Nonetheless, the rather romanticized effects of CARE that Bloomstein and Cordova implied were not without merit. What made CARE different from other relief programs was the peculiar nature of the organization's support. CARE packages were more popular than other feeding schemes because they contained popular U.S. American products and brands instead of basic foodstuffs. They did not require recipients to stand in line for alms from an anonymous source, but they could appear on their doorstep at any time if they only knew someone abroad or were lucky enough to be chosen by a benefactor they now came to know. Receiving a package was often a small public event that attracted attention from neighborhoods and communities.

What is more, the products were not only sought after for personal consumption, but also because they had an immense value on the black market. Black marketeering presented the most profitable source of income for many Germans, especially in urban centers where food was scarce and work opportunities rare. Chocolate, coffee, and especially cigarettes (which had been standard content in the 10-in-1 rations) became unofficial currencies that recipients traded for food and necessities. Surprisingly, this never led to serious problems between the organization and OMGUS. Through increased security personnel at pick-up stations and along transportation routes, CARE had been able to keep losses through looting and theft at a negligible two percent.[97] All the negative consequences black marketeering of CARE package contents may have had were apparently outweighed by the positive and desirable image of the United States that they conveyed, as well as by the psychological remedy they offered.

94 Tent, "Simple Gifts," 64.

95 Sara Fieldston, "Little Cold Warriors: Child Sponsorship and International Affairs," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 2 (2014): 241–42.

96 Jennifer Helgren, *American Girls and Global Responsibility: A New Relation to the World During the Early Cold War* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2017), 94; Mischa Honeck, *Our Frontier Is the World: The Boy Scouts in the Age of American Ascendancy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), 223.

97 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 173, 176.

CARE's German Mission soon understood the program's popularity as a media asset and regularly supplied its New York headquarters with human interest stories. In January 1947, for example, an elderly couple from Bavaria offered a trade to Felix Robert Mendelssohn, the principle at the Institute for Musical Arts in Baltimore. They were in possession of an original letter written by his great uncle, the famed composer Felix Mendelssohn, which they hoped to trade in for a CARE package. Touched by the gesture and the apparent need to sacrifice such a valuable document for food, Mendelssohn responded by sending a package, yet without asking for the letter in return.[98] The following year, a 28-year-old woman from northern Germany set up a matrimonial advertisement in a newspaper. Afraid to end up a spinster in a society with a disproportionately large female population, she said that she could offer a two-room apartment and two CARE packages per month. She received a total of 2,437 marriage proposals.[99] A few months later, the Berlin Motion Picture Association held a Greta Garbo double contest. The lucky winner, 27-year-old Gerda Genz from the American Sector, said that she had no aspirations to become a movie star but had entered the contest for the money. She would, however, have preferred a CARE package over the 350 West German marks. The story made it into a newspaper in Oakland, California, where it caught the eye of Miss Elaine Hetzel, who made out a check to CARE and got Gerda Genz her desired cardboard box.[100] Many of these accounts had their origin in thank-you letters sent to the German Mission or in oral testimonies received from member organizations or local affiliates, which makes them difficult to verify. The eagerness of CARE's media department to share such stories with the public nonetheless shows how important the factor of person-to-person contact was to both the organization and donors alike – be it to a friend, a family member, or a Greta Garbo lookalike.

And although aiding designated recipients was exactly what the organization had been created to do, the system caused a problem that threatened the organization's existence in 1948. Much to Clay's dislike, only five percent of German donations during the first year had been undesignated.[101] CARE argued that the general relief quota on which Clay had insisted was an aspiration for the future rather than a strict regulation for the present.[102] Nevertheless, that year CARE began advertising the option of undesignated packages more forcefully and received a surprisingly strong response. A steadily increasing

98 Press Release: Mendelssohn letter offered in exchange for CARE parcel in Germany, ca. January 1947, CARE Records, Box 899.

99 News Release: "CARE" package is temptation to matrimony in Germany, ca. April–July 1948, CARE Records.

100 Berlin Discursive Report February 1949, NYPL, CARE Records, Box 839.

101 Bloomstein, "History of CARE," CARE Records, Box 1.

102 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 114–17.

number of checks now mentioned only the country or profile of a person to be aided.[103] These numbers satisfied the military authorities in Germany, and even some CARE member agencies welcomed the potential growth that came with general relief. But about half the executive board regarded this potential change in profile as a violation of the original founding agreement. Eastburn Thompson of the AFSC, which was also one of CARE's original founding member agencies, voiced the concern that a growing number of undesignated orders "would present CARE with a problem impossible to solve."[104] CARE, Thompson and other critics pointed out, was intended to enable direct deliveries to specified recipients. Anything else meant an intrusion into the work of the member agencies. In January 1948, the executive boards' opponents of general relief secured a temporary victory. Achieving a majority by one vote, they decided to return all undesignated donations and to not accept any in the future.[105] This decision sparked criticism on several fronts. OMGUS and the State Department considered it a violation of the signed agreement.[106] Increasing pressure also came from the Union of CARE Employees and almost half the board members, who lamented that they had received thousands of undesignated donations, the reimbursement of which inhibited the organization's relief potential and financial security. As the problem threatened to tear CARE apart and to erode its most profitable relief market, the board reversed the decision in mid-1948.[107]

The outcome of the general relief debate was a turning point in the cooperative's professional outlook and its relations with its member agencies. CARE operations had grown big and significant enough for staff to dictate terms to erstwhile founders. It increasingly withdrew its own modus operandi from their control and occupied niches it had not been created to inhabit. This unexpected growth in power was the result of popular support by U.S. donors and international recipients alike. After donors had responded positively to the greater promotion of undesignated packages, the organization started sending out questionnaires, asking them about their prior relations to recipients and the development of those relations since the sending of the first package. The survey showed that 28.7 percent of packages for the three Western zones and 18.5 percent of those for Berlin went to persons without any prior ties to the donor. Although less than the designated donations, these figures translated into an immense number of packages, considering that Germany received more

103 Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 54–55.
104 Letter from Eastburn Thompson to Elmer Burland, August 12, 1946, CARE Records, Box 13.
105 Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 51–52.
106 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 116.
107 Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 52–54; Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 53–56.

than sixty percent of all CARE donations to Europe at that time.[108] The survey showed that U.S. donors were intrigued by the idea of reaching out to unknown people abroad. They could have sent undesignated donations through any CARE member agency had it not been for the appeal of having one's own name written on a food parcel. That label made CARE stand apart from the competition.

A steady increase of undesignated donations in the first two years of operation suggests that U.S. Americans became increasingly aware of Germany's changing geopolitical situation, as this development coincided with growing East-West tensions over the future of Germany. Since Kennan's telegram had arrived from Moscow, the Truman administration viewed Soviet policy in Germany and Eastern Europe with increasing suspicion. At the Paris Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the spring and summer of 1946, James Byrnes and his Soviet counterpart Vyacheslav Molotov failed again to come to an agreement over the future of German reparations and unity. The Truman administration regarded German economic rehabilitation as a vital factor in the political and economic stability of the entire European continent. Growing German industrial output, especially from the Ruhr area in the British zone with its vast coal resources, ought, it was believed, to be reinvested in the country's industrial revitalization instead of serving as reparations payment for the Allies – most importantly for France and the Soviet Union. This was especially troublesome for the Soviet government, for whom access to Ruhr coal was essential to compensating for the immense damage of World War II. Without it, the country would not be able to obtain the ten billion U.S. dollars of reparations that Stalin had been promised at the Yalta Conference. The Soviet delegates could not and would not agree to the plans lest they risk continuing economic deterioration in their own country.[109]

Accordingly, Molotov, at the Paris Conference instead demanded a unified German state and international governance over the Ruhr. Byrnes interpreted this as an attempt to gain control over Germany's economic output and to further disrupt European political stability.[110] The U.S. government came to increasingly assume that Stalin and Molotov were less interested in multilateral solutions than they were in expanding their country's influence over Central and Eastern Europe. Byrnes and his British colleague Ernest Bevin feared that continuing Soviet presence in the Ruhr might strengthen local communists and promote an eventual Soviet-German alliance. The U.S. and British governments thus abandoned hopes for an all-German solution and accelerated the

108 "Who gets the CARE packages?" – A Survey of Donor-Beneficiary Relationships conducted by the Statistical Section, 1949 or earlier (exact date unknown), CARE Records, Box 4.
109 Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 64–65.
110 Spevack, "The Allied Council of Foreign Ministers Conferences and the German Question, 1945–1947," 46–47.

development of an economic and military Western union that the three Western occupation zones would eventually join as a unified state.

On September 6, 1946, in a speech at the Stuttgart State Theater, James Byrnes declared that the governments of the U.S. and Britain had agreed on a merger of their zones to accelerate the economic and industrial output there. The French government refused to participate in this endeavor, fearing that German industrial recovery could revive the country's war potential. In his speech, Byrnes directed open criticism at both the Soviet and French governments for exploiting their occupation zones beyond the agreements on deindustrialization and reparations made at Potsdam, thus hindering Germany's eventual peaceful political participation. Through economic revitalization and support, Byrnes promised the German people "the right to manage their own internal affairs as soon as they were able to do so in a democratic way."[111] Without French participation, the U.S. and British zones merged into the *Bizone* in January 1947.[112]

The Stuttgart speech was nothing less than a bold turn in U.S. policy. Contrary to the Potsdam Agreement, which had clearly stated that German prosperity and living standards should not exceed those in the rest of Europe, Byrnes advocated for German economic growth not for the benefit of reparations but for the revival of Germany itself. What is more, the secretary of state gave Germans the prospect of political independence as a democratic state – less than one-and-a-half years after the end of the war. In Stuttgart, the U.S. government openly initiated the transition of Germany from enemy to future transatlantic partner in a democratic West.

Shortly after the creation of the *Bizone*, the British government announced to President Truman that the country could no longer financially sustain the still fragile Greek economy. The U.S. government feared that growing Soviet influence in Greece might also affect neighboring Turkey and eventually enable the government of the USSR to expand its influence into the entire Mediterranean. On March 12, 1947, the U.S. president reacted to the British announcement by pledging financial support to both countries in his Truman Doctrine, which laid the foundation for the policy of global communist containment. Byrnes's successor as secretary of state, George C. Marshall, thereupon outlined a large-scale financial aid program to strengthen the economies of the European continent. Announced in June 1947, the European Recovery Program, quickly referred to as the Marshall Plan, offered economic and financial support to all European countries, including those in the Soviet sphere of influence.

111 Speech by J.F. Byrnes, United States secretary of state, "Restatement of Policy on Germany," September 6, 1946, Embassy of the United States of America to Germany, https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga4-460906.htm.
112 Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 116–20.

As Marshall had anticipated, Stalin and Molotov declined the offer and demanded the same of their Eastern European neighbors. After the formation of the *Bizone* had largely excluded the Soviet government from the industrial centers along Rhine and Ruhr, they feared that the Marshall Plan would accelerate West Germany's economic revival without yielding any greater reparations payments, and that it would further exclude the Soviet government from Allied negotiations dealing with matters beyond their own zone. Moreover, they suspected that the plan was an attempt to ideologically infiltrate Eastern Europe while undermining communist influence in the West. Even U.S. policymakers like Marshall and Kennan admitted that these concerns were not unfounded as the plan did indeed accelerate the consolidation of the Western Bloc and, as a reaction, forced Stalin to do the same behind the Iron Curtain.[113]

After initial hesitation, the French government agreed to join the German zonal merger in early 1948 to create a trizonal entity that would soon become a West German state. Inter-Allied negotiations on the future of Germany again reached a low point. In 1946, all Allies had agreed that the four occupation zones were in dire need of a currency reform as a measure of economic revitalization, but the Allied Control Council had never come to a unanimous decision on the issue. Risking a breach in the council, Clay had set an ultimatum of January 1948 for resolving the issue and, when negotiations once again failed, was relieved of having to translate it into action as the Soviet delegates left the council on March 20 and dissolved the body for good.[114] Three months later, on June 16, the Soviet walkout from the Allied Kommandatura also marked the end of quadripartite governance in the city of Berlin. Clay reacted within two days and announced the currency reform in the Western zones, excluding West Berlin. The Soviets responded with the claim that Berlin lay entirely within their zone and, consequently, they distributed their own currency in the entire city, upon which Clay introduced the new *Deutsche Mark* in West Berlin, as well.[115] Estranged from his former Western partners and facing a tightening Western Allied hold on Germany and West Berlin, Stalin took the offensive and demanded control over the city. On July 24, 1948, he ordered a blockade of all land and water routes to the three Western sectors of Berlin, leaving the island right in the center of the Eastern zone without any chance of ground food supply, electricity, or coal.

For CARE and the U.S. military government, this shift in East-West relations became a publicity stunt. The Western Allies decided to supply the city by air. At three-minute intervals, Allied war planes brought food and necessities to the airfields of Tempelhof (U.S. sector), Gatow (British sector), and the

113 John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 30–32; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 184–86.
114 Mai, "The United States in the Allied Control Council," 55–56.
115 Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 217.

hastily constructed new airport in French-controlled Tegel. The airlift would become the only source of food, clothing, and medical supplies for the Western sectors over the next eleven months.[116] While declining stocks and insufficient financial resources forced most humanitarian agencies to sit out the blockade, CARE's personnel in Germany had spent the previous two years gaining the trust of the U.S. government and, finally, even of General Clay and his staff. With a bipolar conflict over Berlin on the horizon, Berlin Mission Chief Donald Ostrander had already begun working on an emergency delivery plan in April, preparing for the possibility that regular postal traffic could soon be cut off.[117] The former U.S. Navy Commander had run the mission since its inception in November 1946, and his military past now made him a suitable communicator with the U.S. authorities on site.[118] CARE packages contributed too little to the existing food need in Berlin to occupy space on military aircraft, but their popularity among German recipients made them potential sources of psychological comfort. Ostrander was able to obtain military government permission to make CARE the only humanitarian agency that operated its own airlift by chartering commercial airplanes to supply the city.[119]

The organization profited from the blockade in two ways. The first was a renewed increase in donations. With U.S. public attention focusing on the country's performance in Berlin, donor activity for the entire West German territory rose. During the blockade, Berlin received almost 200,000 packages, with German sales jumping to a total of over 1.2 million, equaling 62.1 percent of CARE's total output.[120] CARE was able to exploit its exclusive status as the U.S. military government's quasi-official humanitarian partner in media outlets back home. Donald Ostrander gave regular detailed accounts to the New York headquarters of the masses of international journalists who witnessed CARE's efforts on site and pointed out that the packages were "tremendous morale boosters" for the Berlin people.[121]

More important than the package output was the blockade's effect on CARE's image. Official government support and popularity among recipients in Berlin gave the agency a public profile as an asset to U.S. Cold War policy. As the Soviet Union's reputation deteriorated, donors could identify their aid with their country's political objective to fight communist aggression. West

116 Daniel F. Harrington, *Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 1–2; Deborah W. Larson, "The Origins of Commitment: Truman and West Berlin," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, no. 1 (2011): 180–81.

117 Berlin Discursive Report, April 5, 1948, CARE Records, Box 839.

118 Bloomstein, German Mission Draft, 45, CARE Records, Box 2.

119 Report on "CARE" airlift to Berlin, ca. June 1949, CARE Records, Box 839.

120 Bloomstein, "History of CARE," 363–64, CARE Records, Box 1; CARE Annual Report 1949 and Executive Director's Report, September 1, 1948, CARE Records, Box 1; Berlin Mission Discursive Report, June 10, 1948, CARE Records, Box 839.

121 Berlin Discursive Report, July 1948, CARE Records, Box 839.

Germany had not yet made a thorough transition from being a former fascist enemy to a new democratic partner, but U.S. policymakers agreed that it was a strategic necessity to include the country in the Western European community and prevent it from entering the Soviet orbit.[122] This political credo made things much easier for CARE, which no longer needed to justify humanitarian engagement to the defeated nation as a contribution to German denazification and democratization. The blockade now epitomized the importance of winning Germany for the democratic camp and allowed for a Manichean distinction between good democracy and evil communism.[123] Labeling Berlin an outpost in the fight against Soviet totalitarianism did not automatically put the Germans in the camp of good, but it at least declared any humanitarian action on their behalf a contribution to containment policy. After two years of ambiguous opinions about the German people and their responsibility in the crimes of the Nazi regime, this politicized call to action presented CARE with a much easier and simpler public communication strategy.

CARE's popularity among Berliners, like that of the Western Allies, grew immensely during the blockade. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, suffered a severe image loss among the population of West Berlin while a Western counterblockade put economic pressure on East Berlin and the Soviet occupation zone.[124] In May 1949, the government of the USSR was no longer able to uphold the blockade. When land routes to West Berlin reopened on May 12, CARE underlined its presence and effort during the preceding eleven months by sending two trucks of relief goods adorned with large banners reading "CARE for Berlin" (Figure 1). Not just for the population of Berlin but also for those watching from home, the banners were intended to demonstrate the organization's close association with the Allied effort that had secured the Western presence in the former German capital. Through the blockade, CARE's leaders had learned to intrinsically link their operations to global political developments, and they would continue to do so in the years to come.

The Berlin Blockade had only been the last in a long line of developments that had led to the estrangement of the four war victors over the German question. Anxious about the influence the Soviet government might have in a unified Germany, the Western Allies began carrying out their plan to turn their zones into an independent state that would advance the recovery and integration of Western Europe.[125] Between February and June 1948, the three Western

122 Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 231.

123 For an elaboration of the concept of Manicheism, see Detlef Junker, "Auf dem Weg zur imperialen Hypermacht? Die manichäische Falle ist besetzt. U.S.-Aussenpolitik nach dem 11. September," in *God Bless America: Politik und Religion in den USA*, ed. Manfred Brocker (Darmstadt: Primus-Verlag, 2005), 210, 212.

124 Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, 10.

125 Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, 488–91.

Fig. 1: West Berliners cheering the first truckloads of CARE packages entering the city after the end of the blockade, 1948, © CARE

Allies and delegates from the Benelux states convened in London to discuss the creation of a West German state and its political and economic integration into the Western community. After the conference, the military authorities presented the West German minister-presidents with the Frankfurt Documents, charging them with a reorganization of the federal states, the *Länder*, and the draft of a West German constitution.[126] After the ratification of the Basic Law by the *Länder* and the military authorities, the Federal Republic of Germany came into being on May 24, 1949. With the creation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) five months later, the ideological rift between East and West translated into a fortified border that would last for forty years. Quadripartite control over the once defeated enemy had failed.

Early postwar Germany had taught CARE's decision makers a valuable lesson: alignment with U.S. government interests had not only turned out to be practical; it had proven to be a necessity. They had constantly analyzed the political situation in Germany and had adapted CARE's image accordingly – first, as a positive contribution to democratization and the image of the United States among the German population, and later as a psychological weapon in the early bipolar conflict. In his 1950 memoir *Decision in Germany*, even Clay came to praise CARE as proof "that the bitterness of war had not destroyed our compassion for suffering."[127] This image as an asset of U.S. politics proved successful with donors, who rewarded CARE's politicization with increased donations.

And yet the high tide for CARE already seemed to be receding by 1949. With imminent war need in Europe decreasing, declining sales put the organization's entire existence into question. News of Germany's growing economy and Italy's revived tourism industry led many people in the U.S. to believe that the continent had overcome the worst of postwar hardships.[128] The press coverage following the introduction of the Marshall Plan in 1947 created the impression that the ERP sufficiently countered German poverty.[129] CARE's Executive Director Paul Comly French energetically tried to counter the narrative of German recovery in the media, assuring U.S. Americans that "[n]othing was further from the truth," with most Germans living on between "1,300 and 1,500 calories a day."[130] Indeed, many regions in Germany were still dramatically underdeveloped. West Berlin, in particular, faced an unemployment rate

126 Hermann-Josef Rupieper, "The United States and the Founding of the Federal Republic, 1948–1949," in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990*, ed. Junker et al., 1:85–87.

127 Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1950), 277.

128 Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 54–55.

129 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 253.

130 News Release: Americans fail to understand European Recovery Program, ca. June 7, 1948, CARE Records, Box 899.

of almost thirty percent in 1950.[131] Donations nonetheless dropped from almost twenty million dollars between July 1948 and June 1949 to a little over ten million dollars in the following twelve months.[132] This also affected the German mission, where the number of remittances declined by fifty percent between 1948 and 1949.[133]

For an organization that carried the word "Europe" in its name, the continent evidently no longer promised enough output for a continuing operation. CARE's leadership now faced two choices. They could either treat the organization as the temporary effort it had been created to be and close shop on a job well done, or they could attempt a thorough reorganization to carry the promising momentum of the 1940s into a new decade. Inspired by the quick success of the early years, CARE's executive board had by that point already abandoned the original notion of a short-term stint. But success would no longer come easy as the 1950s would bring new political and organizational challenges.

* * *

The division of Europe, especially, which became more visible in the late 1940s, heavily affected CARE's freedom of operation. The foundation of both German states in 1949 geographically manifested the ideological rift that had been developing between the four wartime Allies in the previous years. East and West Germany were emblematic of the fortification of a geopolitical order in which both sides tied their spheres of influence ever more closely to their respective economic and political systems. CARE had been able to operate in many countries behind the Iron Curtain without major obstacles up until then. This easy access was all the more surprising since Stalin had pressured the governments in Eastern European satellite states to refrain from participation in the Marshall Plan. While the motives for the Soviet government's laissez-faire approach towards CARE remain unclear, they seem to have stemmed from the notion that aid from private sources was preferable to government support. If the people of Hungary, Poland, and Romania depended on foreign support – which they did – it was preferable for them to turn to private U.S. citizens rather than to George Marshall himself.

Indicative of this assumption is the launch of the COMECON in 1949. The Eastern Bloc's own organization of economic cooperation was a counterpart to the Marshall Plan and aimed to make countries behind the Iron Curtain less dependent on Western aid. Several Eastern governments now started treating CARE as a medium of U.S. propaganda – which, in a certain way, it had become– and demanded the termination of its programs behind the

131 Information Sheet #10 from Public Relations Department, November 1950, CARE Records, Box 875.

132 Annual Reports of 1949 and 1950, CARE Records, Box 1.

133 Bloomstein, German Mission Draft, 107, CARE Records, Box 2.

Iron Curtain. Despite lengthy negotiations and assurances of purely altruistic intent, CARE had to withdraw from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania by 1950.[134] All told, those missions had only allocated a little over US$ 1 million of donations in the fiscal year 1948/49, as compared to over US$ 12 million for West Germany in the same period.[135] Nevertheless, their termination showed that CARE's increasing politicization for U. S. global interests in the last years was not without consequences. In the geopolitical situation of the early Cold War, it became clear that the organization could not carry an image as both American *and* altruistic.

Paradoxically, CARE began a complicated but somewhat effective operation in East Germany even while it was losing access to all other Eastern Bloc countries. Whereas donations to most other Eastern countries had been rather limited anyway, CARE's success in West Germany promised too much potential in the East for the organization to abandon operations there altogether. In East Germany, the Iron Curtain was more porous than in countries like Romania and Bulgaria, which did not share a border with a Western European country. Open postal service between East and West, and West Germans' habit of sending gift parcels to their Eastern friends and relatives, so-called *Westpakete*, gave CARE potential access not available to other countries of the Eastern Bloc.

After failing to secure an official agreement with Soviet authorities, CARE resorted to the fluid border in Berlin, where quadripartite governance allowed Easterners to visit the city's Western sectors. Before and after the Berlin Blockade, CARE arranged for Easterners to pick up packages at its West Berlin offices, advertising this option at home to secure at least a minimal package flow.[136] In the spring of 1949, CARE secured an agreement with Caritas Denmark, which had supplied relief funds to the Soviet zone unimpeded up until then, in the hope of increasing output to East Germany. Caritas had approached CARE in 1948, offering to send parcels through Copenhagen to disguise their origin and make it seem as if the relief supplies were coming from a region less ideologically tainted for Soviet authorities than the United States. While disguised as being of Danish origin, the donor's name would still feature on the package. This was important to CARE as anonymization might have discouraged donors from engaging in an East German operation. With the help of Caritas, CARE managed to secure deliveries to East Germany with very few complications at the border. This only ended in October 1949 when new postal regulations in the GDR put a halt to Danish deliveries.[137]

134 Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 57–59; Annual Report 1949, CARE Records, Box 1.
135 Annual Report 1949, CARE Records, Box 1.
136 Press Release: CARE accepts orders for residents of Russian sector in Berlin, ca. August–October 1946, CARE Records, Box 899.
137 Bloomstein, "History of CARE," 443–45, CARE Records, Box 1; Letter from Jorgen R. Holst to CARE, NY concerning Danish Caritas, November 1, 1948, CARE Records, Box 13.

The success of the Caritas program animated CARE to attempt direct deliveries of stocked packages from Bremen via the mission in West Berlin. As confirmation letters from Eastern recipients returned within a few days, CARE announced official package traffic to the GDR on October 31. Within merely the first five months, 30,000 packages successfully entered East Germany.[138] Deliveries continued until November 1952, when tightening restrictions in the GDR prohibited deliveries of coffee, tea, chocolate, and cigarettes. The organization tried to adjust accordingly and designed a special Budget Food package for GDR deliveries, excluding the prohibited products and instead focusing on bare necessities such as flour and lard. But the import restrictions proved to be a disguised attempt to stop CARE's work in East Germany altogether. Some package loss through confiscation at the border was an annoyance that affected CARE packages as much as any other delivery from Western countries. But by December, almost no recipient confirmations arrived at CARE's New York headquarters. The organization consequently saw no other option but to put East German deliveries on hold.[139]

By then, CARE had firmly established the East German program in public announcements and already received donations it could not afford to return for another 17,000 packages.[140] In an attempt to save the operation, CARE's Chief of the German Mission, George Mathues, suggested that the package contents be disguised by replacing CARE cartons with worn-out boxes without the organization's initials. They instead hired "reliable people" from West Germany to act as stand-ins and put their names on the parcels.[141] This way, the boxes looked like regular *Westpakete*, which were exempted from GDR import regulations. By November 1954, CARE was delivering three thousand packages of this kind per month.[142] Mathues hailed the operation as "the only loophole for gift packages in the whole Iron Curtain."[143] Packages were untraceable by Eastern authorities as they blended in through their disguise with the two million postal packages crossing from West to East Germany every month. Thus assured, Mathues suggested to New York headquarters that "you will be able to openly advertise and solicit donors for the East Zone." With minimal losses

138 Bloomstein, "History of CARE," 445, CARE Records, Box 1.

139 Warren Pinegar to Paul C. French, Subject: Status of Russian Zone Deliveries as of February 24, 1953, CARE records, Box 17. See also: Press Release: "CARE" quits East German zone, April 17, 1953, CARE Records, Box 901.

140 L. M. Wester to Paul C. French, Regarding: Russian Zone Deliveries, March 31, 1953, CARE Records, Box 17.

141 Discursive Report, Germany Headquarters, June 1954, CARE Records, Box 548.

142 Discursive Report, Germany Headquarters, November 1954, CARE Records, Box 548.

143 Discursive Report, Germany Headquarters, September 1954, CARE Records, Box 548, emphasis in original.

through confiscation, some 40,000 packages reached recipients in the GDR over the next three years.[144]

With the East German program picking up, it became a vital promotion issue to tell donors about the conditions in the country they had just aided. In standardized letters, Mathues informed them about "the grim evidence of what life is like in the Communist ruled part of this country" and urged them to spread the word because "CARE cannot carry it into newspapers, radio, television, etc. because we know that the Communists will confiscate our packages."[145] While these letters were allegedly based on incoming reports from Eastern recipients, their truth value was sometimes questionable as many reports expressed far more than what most East Germans would have dared to put on paper in light of large-scale government surveillance. In the spring of 1956, for example, an East German factory worker (no name or address provided) complained that colleagues who had joined the GDR's Socialist Unity Party received bonuses while all "upright, honest Germans" who are "not so politically minded" went home empty-handed and hungry.[146] While it is impossible to determine whether such accounts were entirely made up, such a letter, if intercepted by East German authorities, would have entailed harsh legal consequences for the sender. Regardless of their verisimilitude, such accounts reinforced a feeling of political agency among donors, framing aid as a form of resistance against communist suppression that was very similar to Herbert Hoover's interwar efforts in the ARA.

Although East German authorities were aware of CARE's scheme, there was little they could do other than shut down postal service from West Germany altogether. As a result, confiscations remained minimal in the mid-1950s. Yet, by 1957, the GDR's border control came to understand CARE's methods enough to target the disguised deliveries directly. Package confiscation dramatically increased over the following years, amounting to a financial loss of US$ 3,040 in the fiscal year 1957/58 compared to a mere US$ 520 two years before.[147] With this increase of almost six hundred percent, CARE was not able to uphold the East German program any longer and terminated it for good in early 1958.[148]

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144 George Mathues to Warren Pinegar, April 8, 1954, CARE Records, Box 548; "CARE uses subterfuge to deliver food packages in East Germany," Cooperative News Service, February 24, 1956, CARE Records, Box 17.

145 Standardized letter by George Mathues to donors of East German packages, February 1956, CARE Records, Box 561.

146 Discursive Report March, April, May 1956, CARE Records, Box 506.

147 Assistant Executive Director Lou Samia to Bertran Smucker, January 31, 1958, CARE Records, Box 17.

148 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 14.

With the GDR program only a moderate success and the rest of Eastern Europe outside of CARE's reach, the organization had to expand its geographical focus to secure its survival amid decreasing sales in Western Europe. Even though the Cold War had impeded the organization's work behind the Iron Curtain, it had also opened new and potentially profitable frontiers in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. CARE had already opened offices in Japan in 1948 and in South Korea in 1949. Missions in India, Pakistan, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and the communist yet anti-Stalinist Yugoslavia soon followed. With the start of the Korean War in June 1950 – the first U.S. armed involvement since the end of World War II – CARE again gained access to a Cold War battleground that animated increasing sales and diverted donors' gaze from the European theater. In July 1953, the conflict ended with an armistice that established an internal Korean border along almost the same lines that had previously marked the post-World War II occupation. The war had major implications for U.S. foreign policy as it shifted the focus of containment policy from Europe to East Asia. As CARE had sought strong government ties from the beginning, this also affected its operations. Like the logics of containment, CARE's regional outlook soon shifted to new Cold War crisis areas, as well. By the mid-1950s the organization had expanded into numerous countries in Central and South America, the Caribbean, and northern Africa, as well as into Hong Kong and Macao.[149]

This regional shift caused two changes. As Europe was no longer the only or even the most popular package destination, the board of directors agreed in 1952 to change the meaning of the "E" in CARE's name from "Europe" to "Everywhere" to free the organization of any regional constraints.[150] Three years later, the organization closed its missions in Austria, France, Great Britain, Italy, and the Benelux states as their growing economic strength suggested that humanitarian attention was no longer needed. Only West Germany, even if it was no longer the flagship mission it had been during the 1940s, was to remain open because it continued to enjoy popularity among U.S. donors. But need was decreasing there as well. CARE's board of directors consequently decided that the Federal Republic would henceforth only receive general relief and no more designated packages – which donors could now only send to West Berlin and the GDR.[151] After CARE had existed in Europe for more than a decade, the end of this phase was dawning.

The main justification for maintaining the German mission was the steady influx of refugees fleeing from political repression and lacking economic pros-

149 Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 65–66; Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 59, 65–66. For an elaborate analysis of CARE's work during and after the Korean War, see Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 92–108.
150 "'E' now means 'Everywhere'", *The New York Times*, November 23, 1952, 57.
151 Discursive Report July, August, September [1955], CARE Records, Box 554.

pects in the GDR. By 1953, an average of over two thousand refugees entered West Berlin each week.[152] Numbers peaked in the aftermath of the workers' riots of June 17 that year, as 33,000 East Germans entered the city after their government had violently ended the uprising with Soviet military assistance.[153] Three years later, a brutally suppressed free-speech protest of Budapest students led to the Hungarian Uprising, forcing thousands of regime critics and members of the opposition to leave their country for Germany.[154] Both events stirred up anticommunism in West Germany and the United States, while creating a continuing humanitarian problem. By 1956, refugees and the elderly without sufficient income constituted twenty percent of the Federal Republic's population.[155] These people demanded attention, but they did not offer enough relief potential for the German mission to keep its flagship status.

With non-European countries increasingly becoming the focus of U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy, CARE had to undergo regional and conceptual changes. The nonaligned nations of the "Third World" – especially newly decolonized states in South and Southeast Asia, with their vast natural resources and large populations – presented new Cold War actors courted by both East and West. After acknowledging the broader, global reach of the Cold War in the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the U.S. president demonstrated a new level of foreign engagement in his inaugural address in January 1949. Truman promised to make "the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."[156] What came to be known as the Point Four program was a series of financial and infrastructural aid projects to developing countries that aimed to promote the interests of the government of the United States through modernization and technological progress in countries perceived as underdeveloped.[157]

CARE quickly adapted to the developmental agenda of the Point Four program and expanded its assortment to promote aid as help for self-help.[158] The board of directors had already started broadening CARE's range of products since 1947, introducing new donation categories such as baby foods and wool packages, as well as others containing fabrics and knitting equipment.[159] To

152 HICOG Report to Charles H. Owsley, Chief of the Political Affairs Division, on the Refugee situation in West Berlin: August 30 – September 12, 1954, CARE Records, Box 539.
153 Berlin Discursive Report June 1953, CARE Records, Box 840.
154 German Discursive Report November 1957, CARE Records, Box 840.
155 Germany – Discursive Report October, November 1956, CARE Records, Box 506.
156 President Harry S. Truman's Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949, Truman Library, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/19/inaugural-address.
157 See the respective chapters in Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 77–113; Jason C. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices*: *U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 29, 32–35.
158 On the increasing development focus and CARE's developing ties to governmental objectives, see Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 59–62.
159 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 128.

further tie the organization's image to the government's new focus on development, donors could now, for example, send plows to farmers in Greece and India. "Resettler's Kits" contained gardening tools that allowed expellees from former Eastern German territories to grow their own foods, and "Carpenter's Kits" supplied aspiring craftsmen with equipment to learn the trade.[160] In the spring of 1949, a partnership with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) launched the CARE-UNESCO "Book Program," which offered educational and scholarly literature to war-damaged libraries, schools, and universities in Europe and Asia.[161] After CARE's PR Director Frank Murphy addressed a letter to the White House in which he praised the book program as "an ideal expression of Point 4 in the President's Inaugural Address,"[162] the program also received financial support from the State Department.[163] By 1954, CARE offered twenty-two different packages for shipment to Germany alone.[164]

As donor engagement receded, financial backing and material support from the U.S. government soon developed into CARE's main source of income. Struggling with agricultural overproduction, which deflated the prices for farm products, the Truman administration began referring large amounts of agrarian produce to CARE free of charge in 1949. Under the name "Food Crusade," CARE was able to advertise the packages at US$1 apiece to defray transportation costs, leading to a sharp increase in donor participation as more U.S. Americans with limited financial resources could now afford a contribution. Because of the organization's precarious financial situation, CARE's growing dependence on U.S. government sponsorship did not strike anyone on the board of directors as a conflict of interest. By the late 1950s, government-donated food contributed three times more to CARE's overall operations than donor support.[165]

160 Eleventh Annual Report of the Cooperative for Remittances to Everywhere, Inc. Fiscal Year Ending June 30th, 1957, CARE Records, Box 1; Wallace Campbell, George Xanthaky, and Harold Miner, Report to the Board of Directors, October 22, 1952, CARE Records, Box 1; Berlin Activities Report, ca. August 26, 1952, CARE Records, Box 839.

161 Bloomstein, "History of CARE," 356–61, CARE Records, Box 1.

162 Frank Murphy to Matthew Connelly [secretary to President Truman], May 10, 1949, Truman Papers, OF 992, Box 1616.

163 Book Program agreement between the US government and CARE, June 22, 1950, CARE Records, Box 13. See also several documents on negotiations between the State Department and CARE and the Bill H.R. 5953 of August 10, 1949, authorizing the State Department to allocate funds for supporting the CARE Book Program, Subject Files, 1948–1953; RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, 1763–2002, NARA.

164 Package list and prices for German headquarters, Berlin & Russian zone, 1954 (exact date unknown), CARE Records, Box 1006.

165 Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 63–68; Annual Report 1959, CARE Records, Box 1.

Even though the Food Crusade helped to increase donor engagement, it meant a bold turn in CARE's outlook. The original food packages, which had contained high-quality consumer products and luxury items like chocolate and coffee, were still in use and enjoyed great popularity among more affluent donors. But as financial difficulties started to make cheap supplies a necessity, the Food Crusade packages with their basic content stripped the organization of the glamour that had made it popular among foreign recipients. No longer was a CARE donation a way to introduce recipients to premium U. S. products – a feature that had set the organization apart from other humanitarian endeavors. The new credo to supply starving masses in underdeveloped countries with basic foods turned CARE into one in the crowd, hardly distinguishable from other relief agencies.[166]

This became an ever greater problem, especially in Germany. Most German recipients expressed gratitude for incoming packages, but some had already voiced harsh criticism during the early postwar years, displaying a surprising degree of entitlement and, thus, demonstrating the strength of the postwar victim narrative. "Checking the content of [the package]," wrote a recipient in the Rhineland in April 1948, "I found to my great surprise that the quality of the chocolate contained therein did not meet the requirements of quality of the previous shipment […]. I dare to expect that you are willing to submit to me 1 lb. of unobjectionable chocolate in exchange for it."[167] Such comments, despite seeming ungrateful, demanded careful consideration. The downside of the constant exchange that CARE facilitated between giver and receiver was that such criticism could directly reach donors, who, in turn, would complain to the organization or withhold their money altogether.

Amidst dwindling donation numbers, CARE could no longer risk such bad publicity in the 1950s. Germany's *Wirtschaftswunder*, the country's "economic miracle," did not just bring growing prosperity and full employment. It became a national mantra, cloaking the population of West Germany in a new confidence borne of having risen from the ashes of war and defeat.[168] The sense of recipient entitlement expressed in the late 1940s now became an economic reality generating demands that outpaced those of the postwar years. Recipients of Food Crusade packages began asking what a German housewife was supposed to do with eight pounds of milk powder, a product that was not in short supply, or four large paper bags of white beans. Products that would have sparked joy in the early days, or that could at least have been traded on the

166 Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 109–114, 130.

167 German letters of complaint to CARE (translated by CARE for internal distribution), April 1948, CARE Records, Box 17.

168 Jonathan S. Wiesen, "Miracles for Sale: Consumer Displays and Advertising in Postwar West Germany," in *Consuming Germany in the Cold War*, ed. David F. Crew (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 152–54.

black market, no longer held any value; CARE's previously carefully curated image devolved as recipients accused it of simply emptying its warehouses of unwanted leftovers.[169]

To bring changing but continuing demand in line with newfound economic prosperity, German Mission Chief George Mathues asked for products with a "not-to-be-had-here" effect.[170] In a statement that defied all the basic logic of humanitarianism, he pointed out that Germans were "not in need and would appreciate a 'gift' rather than a welfare package." He remarked that Germans especially appreciated products like SPAM pork luncheon but disliked goods such as "margarine that has a 'margarine' taste," which they considered inferior in quality.[171] Mathues particularly stressed the importance of high-quality coffee – an esteemed good that was still expensive in local grocery stores – to keep package sales for Germany at a regular rate.[172] Growing German demand for quality rather than quantity put CARE in the paradoxical position trying to please customers on both sides of the Atlantic.

As the 1950s progressed, this paradox increasingly put CARE's operation in Germany on trial. The Federal Republic had again risen to its prewar status as Europe's industrial powerhouse, and it now held the largest gold reserves on the continent. When West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer visited the United States in May 1957, he designated CARE headquarters in New York as his first destination and symbolically underpinned his country's newfound strength by donating a plow to a Greek farmer.[173] The formerly needy aid recipient had now officially become a strong and wealthy donor nation.

In 1959, CARE's president Harold Miner visited Germany to oversee the gradual closure of the former flagship mission. On a multi-day trip, he met with the U.S. ambassador, representatives of local welfare organizations, West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, and Chancellor Adenauer. Miner's conversational partners unanimously agreed that the Federal Republic had regained enough economic strength to handle its own welfare issues. Yet, they all expressed their desire for the continuation of the West Berlin program to support East German refugees – three to four hundred were arriving at the Refugee Reception Center in Berlin-Marienfelde each day.[174] Upon Miner's recommendation, the board voted to ultimately close the German Mission in 1960. At the end of CARE's operation in Germany, Dr. Heinrich Lübke, the president of the Federal Re-

169 Beneficiary remarks about basic food packages, January 5–13, 1955, CARE Records, Box 554.
170 George Mathues to CARE New York, April 22, 1954, CARE Records, Box 548; Discursive Report, Germany Headquarters, May 1954, CARE Records, Box 548.
171 George Mathues to Frank Goffio, May 16, 1953, CARE Records, Box 539.
172 George Mathues to Finley Wiseman and Frank Goffio, April 13, 1954, CARE Records, Box 548.
173 Press release on Konrad Adenauer's visit to CARE New York, March 24, 1957, CARE Records, Box 876.
174 Harold Miner, Report to CARE Board, November 2, 1959, CARE Records, Box 17.

public, thanked the organization for its contribution "to the establishment of strong and lasting bonds of friendship between our nations."[175] CARE's executive director Richard Reuter called the operation a "voluntary expression of humanity and reconciliation by the American people that has been unmatched in history."[176] Between 1946 and 1960, CARE had shipped 80,000 tons of food and nonfood items to the former war enemy and distributed aid totaling US$ 82,405,860.[177]

Even though the West Berlin site, unlike the German Mission, remained open without an end date, the situation changed dramatically in August 1961. "The Iron Curtain has clanged down! Hard!", wrote a stumped and baffled Willard Johnson from CARE's Berlin office to New York on August 16. Three days earlier the GDR had fortified the border around West Berlin and had started the construction of the first rudimentary Berlin Wall. "As a result," Johnson lamented, "the refugee flow is a trickle."[178] About 30,000 Eastern refugees who had arrived in West Berlin in July 1961 were still awaiting processing at the Marienfelde refugee camp.[179] But now the wall had reduced the number of incoming refugees to scarcely more than a dozen per day. These demanded special attention as they arrived with literally nothing but the shirts on their backs, but their numbers also indicated that CARE's Berlin mission soon have no purpose.

The board decided on a slow retreat by April 1963. After ten years of absence, Donald Ostrander, the former Mission Chief who had managed to keep the operation alive during the Berlin Blockade, replaced Johnson in February 1962 to coordinate the wrap-up.[180] In the search for a final project to commemorate CARE's contribution to the reconstruction of West Germany over the preceding seventeen years, Ostrander quickly found a fitting recipient. In 1948, the U.S. government had promoted the foundation of the Freie Universität in West Berlin as a reaction to increasing control by Soviet authorities over curricula and teaching staff at Berlin's old university in the Eastern sector. CARE had supported the institution from the very beginning, making it one of the first recipients of academic literature at the start of the Book Program in 1949. On April 2, Ostrander ceremoniously presented the "CARE Haus," a building at Brentanostrasse 50 in Berlin-Steglitz, which would function as a college and meeting house for international students. "I feel this is a fitting closing

175 Heinrich Lübke to Richard Reuter, May 18, 1960, CARE Records, Box 7.
176 CARE Annual Report 1960, CARE Records, Box 1.
177 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 11; Press Release "CARE will close service to West Germany June 30," April 24, 1960, CARE Records, Box 7.
178 Willard Johnson to Bertram Smucker, August 16, 1961, CARE Records, Box 599.
179 Berlin Discursive Report July 1961, CARE Records, Box 839; Willard Johnson to Richard Reuter, Bertram Smucker, and Donald Ostrander, December 19, 1961, CARE Records, Box 17.
180 Berlin Discursive Report February 1962, CARE Records, Box 17; Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 77–78.

to CARE's program in Berlin," Ostrander remarked at the ceremony, "because the principles that formed the Free University in West Berlin in 1948 are the principles for which Berlin is known best in the world today – the free way of life – the free unhindered way of learning."[181] The Freie Universität still uses the house as a learning center for its international students today.

* * *

From the day the first packages had arrived in Europe up to the termination of the Berlin mission, CARE had transformed itself from an ad hoc parcel service to war-torn Europe into a global humanitarian program with a name renowned in the United States and beyond. Meticulous attention to geopolitical developments and continuous efforts to garner U.S. government attention were crucial ingredients in this success. CARE moved with the Cold War – from Europe onto new stages of the bipolar conflict across the globe, as well as from relief to development – yet without ever fully abandoning one for the other. This desire to keep up with U.S. foreign policy came with many benefits as it guaranteed public visibility and provided special governmental support in times when the future looked bleak. The organization shrugged of its loss of humanitarian neutrality and the risk that policy circles would increasingly interfere in its operations due to its liaison with the government – or, in fact, these issues never seemed to come up for debate. This made CARE part of a trend towards the politicization of humanitarian aid that had been visible in the United States since World War I.

Although Germany was only one of many CARE missions in the early years and had to cede its flagship status in the 1950s, the operation had a crucial impact on both sides. For CARE, Germany presented a complex Cold War battleground that continuously demanded that the organization adapt to rapidly changing social, economic, and geopolitical circumstances. Postwar destruction, the Berlin Blockade, and the construction of the Berlin Wall presented organizational challenges and risks but also great opportunities for donor mobilization and political support that other missions did not provide. And Germans, as the recipients, equally came to cherish the organization as a part of collective postwar memory. CARE was not just a source of food but a source of hope, psychological comfort, and a fair number of luxurious items. Without the importance that both sides attributed to the endeavor, CARE would never have been so successful among its donor base.

181 News release from CARE, ca. March 1963, CARE Records, Box 617.

2 – The Appeal of Closeness: CARE and the Media

To celebrate the organization's tenth anniversary, CARE released a newsreel titled *The CARE Story* in 1955. In the film, packages move across assembly lines by the hundreds under the roar of opening fanfares, and workers rush around with a factory-like division of labor and precision, throwing each other empty boxes, filling them with item after item, packing, wrapping, and loading them on freighters, thousands at a time, to begin their journey across the Atlantic. Meanwhile, dozens of accountants and office clerks crowd CARE's headquarters in downtown Manhattan, gathering, ordering, and filing remittance slips, rushing in and out, and creating neat stacks and orderly folders filled with proof of U. S. American generosity.[1] At almost the same time and in much the same way as promotional films on the Marshall Plan brought the virtues of U. S. American economic progress to audiences all over Europe, CARE, the newsreel suggested to its viewers in the United States, had developed into a well-oiled machine.[2] It promised donors utmost professionalism and efficiency, and it made sure that not a single dollar of their compassionate investment would be wasted or misplaced.

1 *The CARE Story*, 1955 [Electronic Record], Moving Images Relating to International Development Programs and Activities, 1979–1991, RG 286: Records of the Agency for International Development, 1948–2003, NARA.

2 A digitized collection of the promotional films on the Marshall Plan made for all recipient countries in Western Europe between 1948 and 1953 can be found online on the website of the German Historical Museum [Deutsches Historisches Museum] in Berlin. https://www.dhm.de/zeughauskino/filmreihen/online-filmreihen/filme-des-marshall-plans/.

But professionalism and compassion are virtues that can only unfold their full potential once they find a purpose – particularly a contrasting circumstance toward which these virtues can be directed. Accordingly, *The CARE Story* also presented two contrasting images after portraying the industriousness of CARE's Manhattan staff. Accompanied by weeping strings, starving children and displaced families wander through the ruins of Europe in search of shelter and food. But right as the frame closes in on a family wrapped in rags and gathered around the little rations they have, a cut transports the viewer back home to display a housewife sweeping the neat porch of her spacious suburban home; in the scene, a postman brings her news of the destitution overseas. Concerned about the plight of suffering people in distant lands, she summons her checkbook to present the viewer, in the film's last shot, with a happy group of (white) European children sitting over bowls of much needed food.

As this narrative of U.S. American wealth and European destitution, connected through an act of compassion, unfolds on the screen, a narrator tells the story of "the job *you* have done and are doing through CARE."[3] That is, the film invokes the idea that the organization only works as an extension of the donor's will. Its workers, clerks, and secretaries in Manhattan have no agenda or interests of their own. They are merely connecting links that build bridges across the Atlantic to guarantee that the donors can develop their full potential. In this media image, CARE surrenders all humanitarian agency to those who give. It was this form of personalization that lay at the center of CARE's publicity and that proclaimed the donors rather than the organization or its workers in the field to be humanitarian actors.

But like the housewife depicted in *The CARE Story*, donors never left the comfort of their own homes. They were not actors in the same way as humanitarian field workers who traveled across the Atlantic and witnessed their organization's job first-hand. Humanitarian giving was a distanced practice, and geographical distance was something that CARE could not overcome. Unlike the gap in space, however, it could narrow the gap in people's minds. It enabled donors to feel connected to their recipients through something that bridged the Atlantic division if it aligned with the donors' immediate environment and with their desire to partake in the pertinent political, social, and cultural debates shaping the postwar United States. To fashion donors into actors who were as important as its overseas workers, and indeed even more so, CARE built its media image on the notion of closeness – closeness of donor and recipient, closeness of the donor to the objectives of U.S. foreign policy, and closeness of CARE to the cultural and national context its donors moved in. The organization referenced popular political and cultural tropes of its time to immerse donors in a sense of postwar Americanness. Participation in per-

3 Emphasis added by the author.

ceived U.S. political and cultural traditions, along with the chance to spread them overseas, were intended to give donors a sense of belonging to both their home society and to an emerging global community. In all those instances, the donors, their wishes, beliefs, and potential capabilities stood at the forefront of the organization's publicity.

* * *

In their competition for donor dollars, humanitarian organizations often resorted to the kind of imagery presented in *The CARE Story*. They juxtaposed the seemingly insurmountable differences between the coziness of donor wealth and the plight and suffering of unknown people in distant lands to forge notions of closeness and solidarity between two parties divided by an ocean. Media, both textual and audiovisual, developed into an indispensable part of humanitarian communication that not only provided information on humanitarian emergencies but also disseminated organizational profiles and set public agendas.[4] Indeed, the rise of large-scale international humanitarianism would be unthinkable without the growth of mass media. The invention and improvement of photographic technology, as Heide Fehrenbach and Davide Rodogno have pointed out, occurred in tandem with the emergence of modern humanitarianism in the second half of the nineteenth century, centering humanitarian publicity on the visualization of suffering and injustice.[5] Visual media presented the human body as a vulnerable object that experienced hunger, mutilation, expulsion, and destruction in remote corners of the globe. Among the audience, this sensory exposure to other people's plight was intended to invoke a sense of moral duty, pity, compassion, or at least guilt for being so much better off than those whose suffering they witnessed.[6]

Since the late nineteenth century, this humanitarian media complex relied on the depiction of horrors to exploit donors' emotional responsiveness and to collect their dollars. But horror has never been a universal concept. Observers may witness a person's plight with indifference if, for example, they think that this plight is self-induced. They might even feel satisfaction if they resent the suffering party on religious or racial grounds. Many organizations, including CARE, thus resorted to seemingly universal subjects, such as children (Figure 2), in order to transcend national and cultural contexts and to infer, in the words of Heide Fehrenbach, "a protracted stage of human development

4 Johannes Paulmann, "Humanitarianism and Media: Introduction to an Entangled History," in *Humanitarianism and Media*, ed. Paulmann, 1.
5 Heide Fehrenbach and Davide Rodogno, "The Morality of Sight: Humanitarian Photography in History," in *Humanitarian Photography*, ed. Fehrenbach et al., 3.
6 Fehrenbach and Rodogno, "The Morality of Sight," 15–16.

requiring protection and nurture."[7] As an object supposedly free of judgment and prejudice, the child, in this context, was to represent the clean slate on which all societies, classes, races, and religions could inscribe their own understandings of innocence. By creating such symbolic figures, humanitarian media coverage traps donors in a tension between action and passivity. On the one hand, the imagery of suffering innocence evokes notions of universality. It promotes action by creating a shared experience in which donors can identify with the subjects of their aid. However, this universal rallying call detaches media consumers from their specific sociocultural background, suggesting that only seemingly universal concepts trigger any response on their part. This logic excludes donors from their immediate surroundings and their personal beliefs so that humanitarianism becomes a purely reactive process in which they seem passive and devoid of agency.

The postwar media environment in which CARE operated continued this logic. In fact, most advertisements and media appearances of the time relied on universal tropes and highlighted either the plight of the victim or the good deeds of the humanitarian agency. Hollywood films of the 1940s frequently resorted to the symbol of the suffering child or, even more effectively, the suffering orphan to ignite viewers' compassion and garner their support for UNRRA and the fledgling United Nations.[8] Promotional films for the International Committee of the Red Cross similarly centered either on distressed victims or on the humanitarian fieldworkers who eased their suffering.[9] Newspaper ads equally showcased the distant sufferer and appealed to donors' moral duty. Oftentimes, pictures of starving or mutilated children appeared in the holiday season, urging readers to share their Thanksgiving dinners and Christmas presents with those in need.[10] In all these contexts, donors were cast to the sidelines as passive spectators without a background of their own, guided by seemingly universal notions of compassion, pity, or guilt.

Although CARE at times tapped into the same rhetoric, the organization crafted its own distinctive media image that set it apart from the humanitarian landscape of the postwar years. This image was at least as concerned with

7 Heide Fehrenbach, "Children and Other Civilians: Photography and the Politics of Humanitarian Image-Making," in *Humanitarian Photography*, ed. Fehrenbach et al.181. See also Katharina Stornig, "Promoting Distant Children in Need: Christian Imagery in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century," in *Humanitarianism and Media*, ed. Paulmann, 43.

8 Michael R. Lawrence, "'United Nations Children' in Hollywood Cinema: Juvenile Actors and Humanitarian Sentiment in the 1940s," in *Global Humanitarianism and Media Culture*, ed. Lawrence et al., 15–16.

9 Daniel Palmieri, "Humanitarianism on the Screen: The ICRC Films, 1921–1965," in *Humanitarianism and Media*, ed. Paulmann, 100.

10 See, for example, display ad by several religious U.S. charities, including the AFSC, "In the Name of Jesus Christ – On His Birthday," *The New York Times*, December 24, 1945, 9; display ad for the Church World Service, *Washington Post*, November 27, 1946, 2.

Fig. 2: The child as the universal symbol of innocence, Belgian-American Education Foundation Records (BAEF), Herbert Hoover Presidential Library & Museum, West Branch, IA, USA, ca. 1947, © CARE

the personal circumstances of the donor as it was with the plight of the recipient. It evoked the idea of closeness to demonstrate how aid to people suffering in distant lands also affected the donors and how it corresponded with their lives. Though unique, this image was not without precedent as it again followed trends that had been developing since the early twentieth century. During

World War I, the ARC had constructed a media image that portrayed aid as "a new patriotic obligation" to mobilize the home front for the war effort – a sense of being American through aid – and to offer a feeling of belonging through collective action.[11] Simultaneously, the rise of the motion picture industry tied the witnessing of distant suffering to the consumption of popular media.[12] Humanitarianism became, in the words of Kevin Rozario, part of "a sensationalistic mass culture" in which "donors began to be treated and courted as consumers who had to be entertained."[13] CARE catered to this sense of entertainment by employing celebrities like Ingrid Bergman and Leslie Townes "Bob" Hope, actor Douglas Fairbanks, and composer Cole Porter to advertise or endorse their packages.[14] By the mid-twentieth century, it appears, donors had gotten accustomed to experiencing humanitarianism within their own political and cultural understandings, expecting of it the same qualities of entertainment and recreation that they expected of the free market.

To a certain extent, the focus on closeness, Americanness, and the sense of donor agency arising from these stemmed from a simple fact: CARE did not cater to a specific group within U. S. society but tried to address the U. S. public at large. Most humanitarian organizations during the 1940s represented either certain religious or ethnic groups and saw little need to create the image of a potential constituency through public relations. Donors could identify with a certain organization and justify their humanitarian engagement on the grounds of their belonging to a certain group. For example, identifying as Catholic, Jewish, Swedish-American, or Irish often determined one's choice of charity as well as a designated group of recipients. Merle Curti once observed that this dynamic posed a challenge to CARE as "it had no well-defined constituency in the sense that religious and other secular relief agencies had."[15] Comprising more than twenty member organizations with different backgrounds, CARE had a potentially gigantic donor base drawing from numerous religiously or ethnically motivated sources. This diversity promised a much larger audience than any of its individual member organizations might have had, but it also left CARE with a constituency that came with no common denominator other than "American."

11 Irwin, *Making the World Safe*, 69, 78–90.

12 Michelle Tusan, "Genocide, Famine and Refugees on Film: Humanitarianism and The First World War," *Past & Present* 237, no. 1 (2017): 199–220.

13 Kevin Rozario, "'Delicious Horrors': Mass Culture, the Red Cross, and the Appeal of Modern American Humanitarianism," *American Quarterly* 55, no. 3 (2003): 418. Karen Halttunen traces the origins of this notion back to the late eighteenth century when a "pornography of pain" sensationalized displays of suffering for witnessing something that society deemed morally unacceptable. Karen Halttunen, "Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture," *American Historical Review* 100, no. 2 (1995): 304.

14 Sommer, *Humanitäre Auslandshilfe als Brücke zu atlantischer Partnerschaft*, 208–209.

15 Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*, 491.

The appeal of closeness presented a way to unite this disparate group. As no other country after World War II could boast of wealth and geopolitical power comparable to that of the United States, CARE provided a narrative that would allow U.S. Americans to come together in a shared purpose that was unique to their nation. In turn, they were supposed to connect with distant others whose stories and sorrows they learned of first-hand – people they could guide into a future that bore the hallmarks of U.S. culture and benevolence. In his *History of CARE*, Charles Bloomstein pointed out that the key "lay in presenting CARE as a real part of [the donors'] lives, rather than as an abstract instrument performing good deeds in remote areas. […] CARE as an activity in which they and their neighbors shared, CARE as a local function, CARE as human interest, was worth reams."[16] The organization's publicity chief Sam Kaufmann consequently urged his staff abroad to "[f]ind a family that is particularly in need," and to "give us the full names of parents and names and ages of the children; tell us their troubles; what they face in the coming winter."[17] Bloomstein and Kaufmann both went beyond the plight of the distant sufferer. The former urged donors to integrate CARE into their everyday practices, while the latter demanded a look at the person behind the hungry façade. They wanted media consumers to get to know these people like they knew their neighbors, so close and familiar that they might just as well be sitting at the same table sharing their story.

Accordingly, CARE focused on an elaborate publicity machine from the very beginning. Media and newspaper specialists sent news releases out to dozens of radio stations and more than 1,700 daily and 9,000 weekly newspapers and magazines across the country. Some were designed for a wide readership. Others specifically targeted individual groups, focusing on stories that were of potential interests to women's magazines, labor union papers, or specific immigrant communities.[18] Already by 1947, the public relations department had grown so rapidly that media output had tripled over the previous year.[19] It is hardly surprising that this success tempted Bloomstein to elaborate on CARE's industriousness:

> A press release will be prepared for the metropolitan dailies, and will be rewritten especially for the national publication of the order in question. Special stories will then be written for each of the state and local bulletins, stressing the accomplishments and goals on that level. Further revisions will provide material suitable for release in state capitals

16 Bloomstein, *History of CARE*, 250–51, CARE Records, Box 1.
17 Circular by Sam Kaufman to all Mission Chiefs, September 1, 1955, CARE Records, Box 555.
18 The CARE Records include a total of thirty-two boxes solely concerned with press releases, radio spots, and television scripts for general and specific audiences from 1945 up to the late 1950s. Cf. CARE Records, Boxes 899–931.
19 CARE Annual Report 1947, CARE Records, Box 1.

> and local papers. Hundreds of different releases come out of a single story, each tailored specifically for the needs of perhaps only a single outlet. And the whole process can be repeated at the conclusion of the campaign. This is the heart of good publicity work – taking a routine story, recognizing its possibilities and putting in the skilled and detailed work required.[20]

Humanitarian agencies today would not dare to boast about their exploitation of individual suffering for media purposes – although they exploit, nonetheless. Bloomstein, on the other hand, expressed a self-understanding of CARE at mid-century that did not regard humanitarian work and marketing logics as incompatible. On the contrary, he proudly presented CARE as a successful business venture proficient in the use of publicity mechanisms for its purposes. The end did not justify the means in this dynamic but, in fact, embraced the means as a self-evident part of humanitarian work. CARE hailed a uniquely U.S. American understanding of the centrality of publicity in capitalism and integrated its operation within this system to become a part of U.S. culture.

The idea of bringing CARE, its donors, and the people they aided in line with U.S. American cultural understandings found frequent expression in the organization's public imagery. Centering on the figure of the child as a symbol of innocence once again, Figure 3 used the same subject but with entirely different results. The text suggested a Christmas plan not just for "hungry people overseas" but "for you." In this phrasing, donors had agency that exceeded the merely reactive idea of compassion. They did not just do things to help others but also to feel better about themselves. This narrative required an alteration of the child trope. How could a donor feel self-satisfied if the overseas child is malnourished, sad, and covered in rags? The little girl sitting on a CARE package is instead well-fed, happy, and neatly dressed. In this context, understandings of the child as a universal trope of innocence corresponded with the immediate environment of the donor, displaying happiness and wealth rather than destitution and poverty. In this dual usage of the child trope, CARE pointed to plight and suffering of a universal subject but, at the same time, broke this universalism down to a uniquely U.S. American experience. This way, CARE fashioned donors into active participants rather than casting them off to the sidelines as mere financial enablers. Those who gave, or were targeted to be compelled to give, could do so because giving corresponded with their everyday lives and touched upon cultural signposts or pertinent societal and political debates in various ways.

* * *

20 Bloomstein, *History of CARE*, 250, CARE Records, Box 1.

Fig. 3: Aid promising instant returns "for you," BAEF, Hoover Library, ca. 1947, © CARE

CARE's media campaigns took several roads to empower donors and bridge the distance between them and their recipients. One way was for the program to correspond with postwar ideas of an international community. In his memoirs, CARE founding member and long-time executive Wallace Campbell reminisced about the founding conference of the United Nations. For two months between April and June 1945, San Francisco became the stage on which the Allied nations of World War II (including representatives form their colonies and protectorates) debated the future of world governance. Campbell and his fellow CARE founder Arthur Ringland followed the conference with excitement and worry. They regarded the establishment of a successor organization to the League of Nations, and the participation of the United States in it, as vital criteria for the establishment of their international humanitarian venture. If the U.S. government again failed to take up international responsibility and instead condemned the country to repeat the mistakes made after World War I, Campbell opined, then CARE would have failed before it could have even begun.[21]

Luckily for Campbell, the U.S. did join the ranks of the United Nations and assumed a position of leadership as one of its five foremost decision makers on the Security Council. Campbell's story aptly reflects what many U.S. Americans in both politics and civil society desired after World War II. A Gallup poll of April 1945, shortly before the start of the conference, had indicated that eighty-one percent of the U.S. public favored the country's entry into an international body of governance.[22] They lived in a moment Glenda Sluga has termed the "apogee of internationalism."[23] The future global community, they felt, ought to be based on "a liberal international world order compatible with national patriotism" in which nations would thrive in the convictions the people of the world shared and the individual qualities they each brought to the table.[24]

This postwar internationalist momentum, broadly defined by Akira Iriye as the conviction that international cooperation served the world's problems better than national solutions, was a reaction to U.S. political isolation from Europe in the interwar years.[25] Eleven months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would lead the country into World War II, President Roosevelt had first endorsed the idea of U.S. involvement in the conflict. The president had used his State of the Union Address before Congress in January 1941 to point to the impossibility and undesirability of his country's complete neutrality. According to Roosevelt, the first half of the twentieth century had taught U.S. Americans

21 Campbell, *The History of CARE*, 11–13.

22 Mark Mazower, *Governing the World*: *The History of an Idea* (London: Penguin Books, 2013), 208.

23 Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 79.

24 Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, 6.

25 Akira Iriye, *Global Community*: *The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 9–10.

that international cooperation was more beneficial to their country's interests than a renewed retreat to the Western hemisphere.[26] Rather than urging military intervention, which Roosevelt himself did not desire at that time, he had used the speech to defend the upcoming Lend-Lease Act for material support to the Allied nations. Involvement in the war, the president argued, was a matter of national security as the values of U. S. American democracy could only be protected if they were defended on a global scale. The "Four Freedoms" he outlined in his address – freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear – could only survive at home if they became the principles of a future world order based on U. S. American ideals.[27]

In August of that year, and only a few weeks after the German attack on the Soviet Union, FDR and Winston Churchill had met off the coast of Newfoundland to draft the Atlantic Charter, the first document that not only sketched out the ideological setup but also the political and economic structures of a future postwar world order. Both statesmen guaranteed the postwar world enduring peace and efforts at global disarmament, national sovereignty and self-determination, free trade, and access to raw materials that were necessary to safeguard economic prosperity of all peoples. The Atlantic Charter not only echoed Roosevelt's Four Freedoms in content but explicitly mentioned the right of all people to "live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."[28] Under the guardianship of the U. S. government, which took the lead as the more prosperous and militarily powerful signing party, the Atlantic Charter struck a decidedly internationalist tone that became the de facto ideological base of the subsequent United Nations.[29] Much more than the League of Nations, which the United States had not joined, the UN would bear a U. S. American imprint.[30]

Campbell and his fellow campaigners wanted to show potential donors that they, too, could partake in this U. S. American momentum and help shape the international community. Articles, advertisements, and caricatures on and by CARE promoted sentiments of closeness and internationalist agency and stressed the importance of individual giving in this endeavor. As late as 1950, almost a decade after Roosevelt had formulated the Four Freedoms, CARE's Executive Director Paul Comly French reiterated the president's words in the *New York Times*. Of all the democratic principles the United States was sup-

26 Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World*: *America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 14–15.

27 Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World*, 20–21.

28 "'The Atlantic Charter' Declaration of Principles issued by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom," August 14, 1941, NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_16912.htm.

29 Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World*, 4–5.

30 Even UNRRA, the first international organization to carry the phrase 'United Nations' in its name, came under the guidance of Herbert Lehmann, a former New York governor, in 1943. Mazower, *Governing the World*, 201.

posed to promote abroad, he said, "it is only freedom from want which can give a people freedom from fear."[31] The U.S. American sense of mission that Roosevelt had formulated in the troubles of war, French's remark shows, had made a lasting impression on political and public debates in the United States.

Internationalism was neither a new nor a uniquely U.S. American idea, but one that had changed in terms of scope and quality. In his "American Century," Henry Luce mapped out the internationalist vision that would guide the United States into the postwar years. In Luce's view, "Rome had a great internationalism. So had the Vatican and Genghis Khan and the Ottoman Turks and the Chinese Emperors and 19th Century England." But theirs had been state-driven and suppressive forms of internationalism, based, in his estimation, on "the vision of any one man."[32] Similarly, the League of Nations' attempt at global governance had succumbed to a Western civilizational logic that did not grant equal participation to Europe's colonies, mandates, and other non-white peoples. U.S. American postwar leadership, by contrast, ought to develop internationalism into a universal practice, Luce felt. "It must be the product of the imaginations of many men," he argued. "It must be a sharing with all peoples of our Bill of Rights, our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, our magnificent industrial products, our technical skills. It must be an internationalism of the people, by the people and for the people."[33]

The notion of U.S. responsibility as a guiding force in postwar internationalism found frequent expression in CARE's media coverage. The program was supposed to offer more than just compassion. It was a contribution to what Elizabeth Borgwardt has termed the United States' "New Deal for the world," implementing U.S. American ideas of governance, financial reform, and law on a global scale. Just as the Atlantic Charter had shaped the outlook of the United Nations, wholescale reform on the international stage was intended to pave the way for an interconnected, peaceful, and prosperous world community under U.S. guidance. In this spirit, the global financial system had undergone reform at the inter-Allied conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, which had led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and had established the US dollar as the global exchange anchor currency. International law underwent a thorough redefinition a year later when the Nuremberg Trials introduced the concept of crimes against humanity as a new charge to shape the notion that certain crimes exceeded national jurisdiction and demanded internationally accepted actions.[34] CARE,

31 "C. A. R. E. Asks Help to Europe's Needy," *New York Times*, May 3, 1950, 9.
32 Luce, "The American Century," *LIFE Magazine*, February 17, 1941, 64.
33 Luce, "The American Century," 64.
34 On U.S. influences on the restructuring of international law and the international economic and financial systems during and after World War II, see the respective chapters in Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World*, 114–40, 218–47.

of course, offered no such systematic and internationally sanctioned form of reorganization, but it offered the people the chance to contribute to their government's global reform agenda in a meaningful way.

Still, giving was not a duty that people in the United States were to feel obliged to perform. Instead, CARE summoned the notion of a historically grown U.S. culture of giving that was benign and purely benevolent. "One of the wonderful things about Americans is their natural generosity," praised a radio spot by CARE in 1948. "We are known all over the world for it … and loved for it."[35] In tandem with the idea of natural generosity, CARE evoked the idea of tightly knit communities that based their cohesion and shared identity on the idea of mutual support. CARE suggested that this custom had historical roots in the United States. "In the days of our forefathers, a community was a neighborhood, a village, or a town. Neighbors were the people next door or down the road," explained a radio spot that CARE had commissioned for NBC. Postwar internationalism had now broadened the idea of neighborhood to include unknown people across the ocean: "Today, the community in which we live has become the whole human race. We are neighbors of all people, everywhere."[36]

This notion of helping international neighbors became a leading trope to suggest closeness in CARE's public profile. In 1947, historian Henry F. Pringle, best known for his Pulitzer Price-winning biography of Theodore Roosevelt, wrote on CARE in the *Saturday Evening Post*: "People all over the United States are now corresponding with new-found friends in France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and other countries."[37] That same year, the *Washington Post* appealed to the notion of community by listing "[h]igh schools, Sunday schools, groups of workers, bands of neighborhood housewives, [and] women's clubs" as traditional U.S. American institutions of charitable giving now donating to CARE.[38] Through the organization, such comments suggested, people in the U.S. could export the idea of charity as a traditionally U.S. American form of social cohesion across the globe.

Despite grand claims to internationalism, the neighborhood that CARE described promoted a distinctive profile for donors and recipients that confirmed certain dominant understandings of postwar U.S. culture. An image the organization frequently proliferated on billboards and in newspaper ads across the country was of a couple that evoked idealized notions of the suburban nuclear family (Figure 4). The well-groomed man in a suit and tie and his

35 CARE radio program on hunger in Germany and Austria, ca. October–December 1948, CARE Records, Box 919.

36 CARE radio spot for NBC, December 23, 1959, CARE Records, Box 922.

37 Henry F. Pringle, "The Nicest Gift You Can Buy," *Saturday Evening Post*, November 29, 1947, 12.

38 Bessie Hackett, "Capitalites Rush Food Overseas to Aid Europe's Hunger Stricken," *Washington Post*, October 22, 1947, 5.

slender brunette partner subscribed to elitist understandings of wealth, safety, and orderliness. They epitomized the postwar American dream of personal fulfillment and stability in a globalizing world that was becoming increasingly complex and politically perilous.[39] In a welcoming gesture and with expectation in their eyes – tellingly, both gaze to the right, or eastward, across the Atlantic – the couple extends a CARE package toward "our friends abroad."

Fig. 4: The stereotypical CARE donor, advertisement created by the Advertising Council for CARE, Truman Papers, Charles W. Jackson Files, ca. 1948, © CARE

To a certain extent, this image reflected existing circumstances. CARE packages were cost-intensive and restricted those with low incomes to group donations. The possibility for European immigrant communities to extend goodwill to their ancestral lands made the program somewhat multiethnic, but advertisements displayed donor and recipient profiles that only allowed for association among an affluent and white middle class.[40] African Americans, for instance, rarely found images that allowed for racial identification. This advertising strategy catered to the market in which CARE moved, as Southern states with large African American populations contributed to CARE disproportionately less than New England, the Midwest, or the Pacific Coast.[41] And racial segregation and discrimination in the South excluded most Black Americans

39 For the emergence of the idealized and stable postwar nuclear family as a reaction to growing global political insecurity, see Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 3–15.

40 CARE advertised heavily in ethnic U. S. newspapers to cater specifically to individual immigrant groups. See, for example, a CARE advertisement in *Dirva*, a Lithuanian newspaper from Cleveland, August 13, 1946, 5; and an article in the Swedish-American *Vestkusten* from California, February 12, 1948, 4.

41 Compare press releases listing engagement by individual states for release to regional newspapers on the occasion of US$ 100 million raised for CARE in its first five years, April 25, 1951, CARE Records, Box 900.

from the social mobility that was necessary to obtain the financial resources for international humanitarianism. The international community, although tirelessly evoked by CARE, was essentially a racially idealized transatlantic community. Rather than praising difference, it reinforced the notion of European ancestry and of racial and cultural similarities.

This is not to say that African Americans were not interested in news from Germany. The fact that black GIs enjoyed more freedoms and found more social acceptance in Germany than they did in their home society was an issue that African-American newspapers frequently used to draw attention to racial segregation in the United States.[42] Intimate encounters with local white women, unthinkable in large parts of the U.S., led to a growing interest in the debate around "brown babies" – German children fathered by black GIs, some of whom could not or would not care for them. The issue sparked controversial debates in African-American newspapers, some of which, albeit very rarely, suggested helping these children with CARE packages.[43] Mostly, African Americans dedicated their energy to finding adoptive parents in the U.S. to care for the children. This, many believed, would serve the children better than a life in German society, which, being almost exclusively white, would treat them as outcasts.[44] Hence, African-American communities expressed comparatively little interest in a program that not only failed to offer them the same modes of cultural and racial identification as it did to white U.S. Americans but did not correspond to the causes they wished to pursue, either.[45]

Recipient profiles in the early 1950s likewise aligned with this dynamic. CARE was essentially a program focused on Europe, with the exceptions of Tokyo and Busan, and only started expanding into the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America in the 1950s, ignoring large parts of Africa well into the 1960s. And even then, as a survey conducted for CARE showed in 1958, most

42 Nadja Klopprogge, "The Sexualized Landscape of Post-War Germany and the Politics of Cross-Racial Intimacy in the US Zone," in *Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany: Politics, Everyday Life and Social Interactions, 1945–55*, ed. Camilo Erlichman et al. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 176.

43 Examples of articles on CARE and "brown babies" from the *Pittsburgh Courier* cited in Heide Fehrenbach, *Race After Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 133–34. Also see peripheral mentions of CARE in the *Detroit Tribune*, January 31, 1948, 5; October 1, 1949, 3.

44 Fehrenbach, *Race After Hitler,* 133–37; Nadja Klopprogge, "Intimate Histories: African Americans and Germany since 1933" (PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2018), 170–73.

45 It was not until 1953 that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) became interested in CARE, and then mostly on behalf of farmers in India and Pakistan once the program extended into Asia. See collected documents on CARE in National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Records, General Office File, 1940–1956, BOX II:A371, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. See also a transcript for a radio interview between Paul French and NAACP secretary Walter F. White on CARE's self-help projects, June 11, 1953, CARE Records, Box 920.

U.S. Americans (forty-one percent) were most interested in helping Western Europe, with the Middle East following at twenty-eight percent.[46] In accordance with the organization's geographical expansion in the 1950s, *The CARE Story* already featured a more diverse set of potential recipients, including an Andean farmer and Southeast-Asian villagers. Though only mildly, recipient profiles moved toward greater inclusion when CARE's regional outlook shifted with geopolitical circumstances. And yet, *The CARE Story*'s closing shot was of a white European child, again conforming to the organization's racial profile and target audience.

By promoting the idea of community, be it the entire globe or just the northern Atlantic, CARE's media image aimed at bridging the distance that had characterized the relationship between donor and recipient in the early twentieth century. It was not just a patriotic duty to help someone unknown and far way, nor was it a voyeuristic desire to glimpse distant horrors. Rather, it was the notion that the shared trauma of total war had brought the world closer together. CARE's publicity suggested that people abroad, despite spatial detachment, were more familiar and closer than one might have thought.

Establishing the notion of a transatlantic community, however, also demanded donors' empowerment in shaping CARE's ideological outlook. In a radio interview in November 1950, CARE's Assistant Executive Director Finley Wiseman remarked: "For a number of reasons, the peoples of the world have become skeptical about the gifts of governments. They look for the ulterior motive […] The CARE gift package is not vulnerable in this way. There are no strings attached to it – it is simply a meal, or a suit, or a book, or a plow – from an American friend."[47] The key advantage of humanitarian aid, Wiseman suggested, was that a donation through CARE made donors a trustworthy source of transnational contact, able to convey notions of goodwill more effectively than government services. Wiseman's portrayal encouraged donors to think of themselves as cultural diplomats contributing something that Washington politics could not provide, or at least not alone.

This notion of diplomacy was an integral part of CARE's media image. In 1951, the organization published its fifth anniversary pamphlet titled *Ten Million Ambassadors of Goodwill*, which gave a detailed history of its operations.[48] By the time the pamphlet was published, the ambassador trope was no longer new. Already in August 1946, the *New York Times* had named CARE "America's most eagerly sought ambassador of good-will, pointing out that it "did not evolve simply from charity. It sprang also out of self-interest – that by sending

46 Bennett – Chaikin, Incorporated, Summary Analysis of CARE Study Findings, December 1958, CARE Records, Box 6.

47 Radio interview with Finley Wiseman, WEVD radio station, November 15, 1950, CARE Records, Box 875.

48 CARE pamphlet, *Ten Million Ambassadors of Goodwill*, 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen.

food gifts to those overseas, the bond between peoples, and so the chances of peace, would be strengthened."[49] CARE became "the most effective American propaganda," exclaimed the *Washington Post* in 1948.[50] It was "truly […] the 'voice of America,'" the *New York Times* reiterated in 1950, "speaking straight from the hearts of the people here to the hearts of the people of Europe."[51] As ambassadors, diplomats, and propagandists – a term used with a purely positive connotation – donors were not simply to reach out to friends abroad but were to spread U.S. American ideals and interests overseas.

Through the ambassador trope, the organization again confronted donors with the narrative of politicization that had secured favorable government attention. "Americans are vitally concerned about democracy in Europe," remarked CARE's Executive Director Paul French in the *New York Times* in March 1947, "but you don't get peace and you don't get democracy with people who are starving to death."[52] French's remarks evoked similar ideas as those that General Clay had voiced about a year earlier. Food gifts were objects of mediation that overcame differences and provided common ground for communication. They brought stability and prospects as vital prerogatives for the establishment of liberal democratic values. Employing the ambassador narrative presented a win-win situation for all parties involved. The U.S. government had found a nongovernmental ally willing to abandon independence for political influence, while donors felt a sense of empowerment that, in turn, guaranteed CARE continuing success.

Germany's fragile democracy again set a precedent in this context. The Weimar Republic had survived merely twelve years and had ended in a global catastrophe. This made the quest for democracy nowhere as demanding as in the former enemy nation, which still fluctuated between the dangers of residual fascism and emerging communist aggression. Hence, Germany's future became a leading media motive for CARE. Since the Western occupation zones were the organization's largest market, Germany's recent precarious past demanded careful rhetoric. CARE had to make sure not to portray the Germans as pardoned Nazis who had first lived at the expense of a suppressed Europe and were now turning their hands towards the U.S. American occupiers. A continuing inflow of donations required an image of the innocent victim, or at least the repentant sinner. Accordingly, Paul French made the following remark in a radio announcement in 1951: "First of all, in order to understand the Germans, we must remember that Germany was by far the greatest victim of the last war, regardless of how it started." French was careful not to address the

49 Gertrude Samuels, "CARE for the Hungry," *The New York Times*, August 25, 1946, 99; see also "A Wider Role for CARE," *New York Times*, August 24, 1948, 22.
50 H. F. Kern, "CARE Results," *Washington Post*, June 20, 1948, B4.
51 "C. A. R. E. Week Brings Appeal for More Aid," *New York Times*, April 30, 1950, 83.
52 "Starvation Peril Is Seen in Europe," *New York Times*, May 23, 1947, 12.

atrocious details of the havoc the fascist regime had wreaked on its neighbors and instead focused on the people it had terrorized within its own borders. This formulation complied not only with West German tendencies of self-victimization. It also corresponded to the distinction between Germans and Nazis in prevalent U. S. public debates during and shortly after the war. "By supporting them spiritually as well as practically," French went on, "we will only be doing our share in bringing about a better future for our own children."[53] Prioritizing the image of the suppressed rather than the suppressing German furthered asymmetric power dynamics between donor and recipient. By separating the German victims from the Nazi perpetrators, the former were relieved of agency for the crimes of their rulers and but also lost agency in the future of their fate. French put the responsibility for German rehabilitation exclusively in U. S. American hands.

To fortify this notion of political responsibility, CARE looked for support among high-ranking political figures. Newspaper announcements regularly pointed out that the "government approves CARE" – a fact that was a necessity rather than an advantage of CARE since the State Department had demanded official government approval from aid agencies since World War II.[54] Support also came from President Truman who, in 1946, had jumpstarted CARE's operation by symbolically donating one hundred packages for delivery to the heads of all recipient countries. Newspapers reported that even Lucius D. Clay, initially a strong opponent of all private aid to Germany, had come to endorse CARE on account of its engagement during the Berlin Blockade, as did the future president Dwight D. Eisenhower.[55]

Another leading political figure in CARE's promotional materials was former U. S. President Herbert Hoover, the éminence grise of U. S. humanitarianism, who praised CARE openly as "the only sure and efficient way of sending packages to friends and relatives in Europe."[56] Just prior to making this statement, Hoover had completed his travels through Western Europe on behalf of President Truman to assess the local food need and reported that "If Western civilization is to survive in Europe, it must also survive in Germany."[57] Hoover's report appeared in all major news outlets, making the dire German situation apparent to U. S. American homes and minds. As a result, CARE presented

53 Remarks by Paul Comly French, WCFM radio station, April 14, 1951, CARE Records, Box 919.

54 See, for example, a CARE advertisement in *Boston Daily Globe*, August 6, 1946, 6; also in *New York Times*, August 14, 1946, 14.

55 "Advertising Drive to Help in Relief," *The New York Times*, July 21, 1947, 14; "CARE Says Clay Backs German Aid," *New York Times*, October 7, 1948, 2.

56 Herbert Hoover, cited in "12 Embassy Chefs Serve CARE Food," *New York Times*, March 5, 1947, 18. See also "CARE Is Sure Way to Help Overseas," *Scarsdale Inquirer*, August 22, 1947.

57 "Text of the Hoover Mission's Findings on the Food Requirement of Germany," *New York Times*, February 28, 1947, 13.

itself as "a small-scale Marshall Plan" that enabled donors to partake in the political restructuring of the former enemy nation.[58]

In the late 1940s, U.S. foreign policy efforts shifted from political restructuring to combat the residual threat of fascism to focusing primarily on the emerging Red Scare. In the last two years of the decade, media consumers in the United States witnessed a succession of events that brought the resilience of global communism to their front lawns. The start of the Berlin Blockade in June 1948 proved that the Soviet government would not shy away from extreme measures to consolidate its Eastern European sphere of influence. Western Allied commitment forced the gates to open in May 1949, but the moment of enthusiasm over Western political and moral superiority was short-lived. Already in August of that year, the first Soviet nuclear bomb was detonated, shocking the international community with the swiftness of its development. A few months later, it became clear that spying by the U.S. American couple Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had played a crucial role in this.[59] Shortly after, in October 1949, the Chinese Civil War ended after over twenty years with Mao Zedong's victory over the U.S.-backed forces of the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek. As Chiang's government retreated to the island of Taiwan, Mao transformed the mainland into the People's Republic of China, which brought the country with the world's largest population under communist rule. As the decade ended, the U.S. public had to recognize that the geopolitical situation had produced enemies inside and outside of the country and was no longer as advantageous as it had been at the end of the war.

Exploiting the global threat of communism as a publicity theme was both a blessing and a potential curse for CARE. The sharp increase in donations for West Germany during the Berlin Blockade proved that donors understood their aid as a contribution to the resistance against Soviet expansionism. Newspapers reported continuously on CARE's efforts to keep operations running during the airlift to remind readers in the U.S. that humanitarianism gave them a way to participate in global politics.[60] Even though the Red Scare was a selling point for Central and Western Europe, CARE officials had tried to remain silent, or at least vague, about it in the first years of operation. The organization was still working behind the Iron Curtain and did not want to risk estrangement from governments in Eastern Europe. Hence, CARE officials like Paul French never openly decried communist rule but only hinted at

58 Advertising Council Graphics Bulletin, July 1949, Truman Papers, Charles W. Jackson Files, Box 22.

59 Bauerkämper, *Sicherheit und Humanität im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 836–37.

60 See, for example, "U.S. Aid to Berlin Rises," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1948, 5; "CARE Flying Food to Aid Berlin," *New York Times*, July 15, 1948, 15; "Care Issues an Appeal," *Seminole Sentinel*, October 9, 1948, 3; "Clay Backs Drive to Send Food to German Youths," *Daily Boston Globe*, November 28, 1948, C4.

"other philosophies […] nourish[ing] themselves on misery and chaos" in media outlets.[61] The organization was reluctant to utilize anticommunist rhetoric to animate new sales since this threatened its inclusion in markets behind the Iron Curtain.

CARE came to embrace Red Scare rhetoric at the onset of the new decade, when most missions in Eastern Europe came to an end, also eliminating such tactical constraints. John Fousek has convincingly argued that U.S. national loyalty came to be equated with global anticommunism in the 1950s, resulting in foreign policy taking on an aggressively interventionist tone.[62] After Mao's victory in China and the start of the Korean War, containment in East and Southeast Asia, whether peacefully or by force, became the leading foreign policy rationale in the United States. Containment also had major implications for the recently founded Federal Republic of Germany. The Korean War had prompted the U.S. government to significantly increase its military presence in West Germany in case the Soviet government were to attempt a similar military expansion into Western Europe. The renewed U.S. military commitment accelerated not only the local economy but also West Germany's rearmament and its integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955.[63] This containment logic could also be observed in the shift of CARE's media rhetoric.

The decisive moment in this development was when the organization began cooperating with the Advertising Council – the association of leading U.S. advertising agencies that offered pro bono services to nonprofit institutions. The Ad Council had agreed to take over CARE's publicity work in 1947.[64] This cooperation between CARE and the Ad Council was indicative of a developing alignment of public and political interests in the early Cold War. As the 1950s began, information technology proliferated, leading increasingly to public-private partnerships as propagandists sought to convince the peoples of the world of the virtues of democracy and the evils of communism. Media outlets and private organizations, including the Ad Council, began to actively participate in the U.S. government's psychological warfare as a means of "winning" the Cold War. This included just as much propaganda among domestic audiences, involving the Ad Council's increasing cooperation with government entities

61 "Food Gifts Urged for France, Italy," *New York Times*, March 23, 1948, 29; Paul Comly French, "Hunger as Democracy's Foe," *New York Times*, August 18, 1950, Truman Papers, Jackson Files, Box 22.

62 John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 13.

63 Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, 17–18; Thomas Leurer, "U.S. Army Military Communities in Germany," in *GIs in Germany*, ed. Maulucci et al., 125.

64 Press release "Advertising Council Campaigns for CARE," July–August 1947, CARE Records, Box 899.

throughout the 1950s to instill the virtues of democracy in a Cold War home front.[65]

In the early 1950s, the Ad Council began focusing on CARE's potential as a foreign policy asset and started to heavily push the anticommunism trope. Council support, touted a bulletin on CARE from February 1951, eight months after the beginning of the Korean War, had helped "sell over 10,000,000 packages. […] This is more than three times the number of good communist party members that Russia has been able to develop in two of her most fertile breeding grounds – France and Italy." CARE had thus become "a tremendous contribution toward helping America take the offensive in this war of diplomacy."[66] Though not fought with weapons, this was very much still a war, the people of the United States were to be reminded.[67]

* * *

While CARE suggested closeness and donor agency in international political matters, it put similar effort into relating its activities to domestic culture. "CARE now has more packages than Heinz has soups," exclaimed Dick West, journalist for the *Desert Sun* from Palm Springs, California, in 1961.[68] Although Heinz was, by that time, almost one-hundred years old and CARE had just turned fifteen, West suggested that the two were almost equally familiar household names. The announcement expressed CARE's exponential growth and its achievement of having outpaced the assortment of one of the most popular U.S. brands in under two decades. West probably only meant for the Heinz comparison to be a witty example, but the statement reveals oddities that are difficult to reconcile with humanitarian reasoning. It blurred the lines between nonprofit aid and for-profit food production, despite the two having different business models that followed distinct market logics. Humanitarian aid became part of a capitalist mindset that measured the organizations' success not by their charitable achievements but by their ability to integrate themselves into the realms of mass marketing. By comparing CARE's assortment to that of a consumer brand, West made CARE a brand of its own. The packages, intended for an overseas recipient, turned into purchasable and consumable products just like any Heinz soup.

Consumerism, understood as an ideology centered around consumption as a cultural practice of national belonging, was an integral part of cultural understanding and self-definition in the postwar United States. After the country

65 Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 4, 90.
66 Advertising Council Outdoor Advertising Bulletin, February 1951, CARE Records, Box 872.
67 Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, "U.S. Culture and the Cold War," in *Rethinking Cold War Culture*, ed. Peter J. Kuznick et al. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 1.
68 Dick West, "Another American Institution," *Desert Sun*, January 18, 1961, 4A.

had ascended to the world's most powerful economy in the late nineteenth century, middle- and upper-class U. S. Americans, especially, developed a lifestyle that brought consumption and displays of affluence to the forefront of national identification. The concept gained particular importance during the 1940s. After the Great Depression had shattered the U. S. economy, sending unemployment rates soaring, the war economy of the 1940s boosted the country out of the recession and into a new era of prosperity.[69] Consumers emerged in this postwar euphoria as a visible and distinct social group, defined by "their aggregate purchasing power."[70] But consuming was not just a form of pleasure. The rise of right- and left-wing totalitarianism in Europe during the last economic crisis served as proof that only strong and growing economies could guarantee stable democracies. According to this logic, mass consumption furthered economic growth, which, in turn, ensured a healthy democracy. As the key to the preservation of freedom and a counterforce to mid-century totalitarianism, consumerism became a politicized postwar form of civic engagement. It was a performative manifestation of Roosevelt's freedoms from want and fear – being a cultural experience *and* a political action.[71]

CARE's media coverage often addressed notions of consumer consciousness and competence. Advertisements hailed CARE as a "big food bargain" that was "[h]uge […] for only $15."[72] Articles from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s declared the CARE package "a spectacle of dizzying riches compared with the usual food packages" and guaranteed "that the donor w[ould] get more for his money by buying and distributing through CARE than he could anywhere else."[73] The organization assured potential donors that "the value of each package [wa]s much higher than one could obtain at his neighborhood store," and that "[p]urchases [we]re made only from responsible producers, manufacturers and prime processors, with quality the first consideration."[74] CARE packages, these phrases suggested, were the best humanitarian deal one could get.

With a price of first US$ 15 and later US$ 10, a CARE package was a rather pricy venture compared to other organizations that accepted much smaller donations. The consumerist logics evoked in advertisements need to be under-

69 Gary S. Cross, *An All-Consuming Century*: *Why Commercialism Won in Modern America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 17–38, 67–68, 82–87.

70 Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic*: *The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Knopf, 2003), 54.

71 Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic*, 8, 54–55, 112–14.

72 "Just See What This Food Gift Means!" *Washington Post*, July 30, 1946, 7; also in *Boston Daily Globe*, August 6, 1946, 6; "Rush This Big Food Bargain to Friends and Relatives in Europe," *New York Times*, August 14, 1946, 14.

73 Gertrude Samuels, "CARE for the Hungry," *New York Times*, August 25, 1946, 99; Henry LaCossit, "Adventures of the Lively Samaritans," *Saturday Evening Post*, February 13, 1954, 52.

74 Henry F. Pringle, "The Nicest Gift You Can Buy," *Saturday Evening Post*, November 29, 1947, 12; "CARE Gifts Abroad Tripled in Year," *New York Times*, April 29, 1948, 11.

stood in relation to what CARE offered for the package price rather than in relation to the work of other humanitarian agencies. Among the products CARE included in the packages were many popular consumer goods. Advertisements featured lists of the package content, which included "such nationally-known brands as Hormel's sliced bacon, Libby's corned beef, Swift's canned ham, Del Monte corn, Borden's preserved butter, George Washington coffee, Welch's pineapple jam, [and] Chesterfield cigarettes."[75] Consumers knew the quality of these products and could easily assess whether the price for a CARE package matched the content. Instead of giving money to an intangible cause and without knowledge of how an organization might spend it, donors to CARE contributed something they were familiar with because they saw and maybe even consumed these products on a regular basis. Advertisements hailing low costs set the price of a CARE package in relation to the readers' consumer competence rather than in relation to its humanitarian qualities.

Praising these brands as "nationally-known" not only generated consumers' affinity through their consumer expertise but also through their sense of national identity – similar to the way Dick West had compared CARE to Heinz as one of the most popular U.S. food producers. By selling U.S. American brands, CARE also branded the United States. This again brought aid in line with political interests at home and abroad. Promoting the United States as a brand – with specific political, economic, cultural, and social signposts – affirmed the country's power to domestic and foreign audiences and legitimated its international predominance.[76] Donors as consumers could find products that presented the U.S. as a superior nation. They encountered a culture that praised foods not merely as subsistence but as lifestyle, and they could become part of this superior food culture by engaging with the packaged products. Across the Atlantic, recipients opened their packages, encountered these very same products – many of which they had never seen or heard of – and, the donors hoped, endorsed the cultural context they represented.

U.S. consumer logics had begun spreading across the Atlantic as early as the turn of the twentieth century. But it was only at mid-century that the intrinsic connection between consumption and democratic stability fully unfolded in political strategy.[77] The exporting of consumerism abroad, it was hoped, would help foreign audiences to understand its connection to democracy in the same way that people in the United States did. The global market, based on

75 "What an Overwhelming 'Thank You' You'll Get," *New York Times*, June 26, 1946, 13; also in *New York Herald Tribune*, June 28, 1946, 13.

76 Gienow-Hecht, "Nation Branding: A Useful Category for International History," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 30, no. 4 (2019): 755–74; Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht et al., "Beyond Marketing and Diplomacy: Exploring the Historical Origins of Nation Branding," in *Nation Branding in Modern History*, ed. Carolin Viktorin et al. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2018), 1–2.

77 Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advancement through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 3–5.

continuous economic growth, was supposed to become a guarantor for peace. In CARE, the people in the U.S. found a way to contribute to this dynamic, branding their country as one that defined itself through the pleasures and the virtues of consumerism.

CARE's promotion in the media reinforced this consumer branding of the U.S. Newspaper ads evoked narratives of desire and convenience, setting a decidedly consumerist tone. The package was "famous," its price reduced to "now only $10," and it came with "exclusive CARE features," such as guaranteed delivery.[78] Buying a CARE package for someone else, these phrases suggested, was hardly different from purchasing any of the products it contained for yourself. The ads followed the same consumerist appeal of desire and a good bargain that consumers looked for at home. A donation resembled an act of consumption as the products that crossed the Atlantic followed the logics of a competitive market economy and were part of a consumer society donors were quite familiar with.

Such accounts reflect a considerable discrepancy between donor desires and recipient needs, which again points to the asymmetry in CARE's depiction of the relationship between benefactor and beneficiary. They suggested that donors seek to save money on nationally known products, even though they bought the package for a distant recipient and never got to consume these products themselves. At a time when starving Europeans needed food in large quantities, CARE instead prioritized quality, or rather popularity. In sum, these products may indeed have been cheaper than they would have been at the local store, but they were still more expensive than large amounts of milk powder or white beans – the very products that German recipients, being used to the "luxury" CARE provided, would come to heavily criticize in the 1950s. Prioritizing quality over quantity again shifted attention to the donor, whose desire for those products and the chance to get them at a good price outweighed the needs of the recipients. Humanitarian engagement became an act of consuming popular goods, even though this act ultimately concerned another person in a distant land.

This approach, no matter how successfully it integrated CARE into domestic cultural practices, had its pitfalls. It promised to satisfy consumer desires that humanitarian aid simply could not fulfil because it promised no quantifiable returns for the donor. Since aiding remained an unnoticed act that did not fulfill materialistic desires, humanitarianism could only bring customer satisfaction if it promised qualifiable returns and appealed to donor desires of cultural belonging. Accordingly, various CARE advertisements portrayed the charitable act as a form of altruism that simultaneously fulfilled promises of cultural participation.

78 "The Famous CARE Food Package," *The Washington Post*, October 4, 1946, 13.

Fig. 5: Advertisement of collaboration between CARE and Texsun juice, *LIFE Magazine*, August 16, 1948

In 1948, for instance, CARE began a collaboration with Texsun, one of the largest juice producers in the United States. For every three cans of juice purchased by a consumer, the advertisement in Figure 5 proposed, Texsun sent one can of juice to CARE to help undernourished European orphans. The ambitious goal of one million shipped cans required the purchase of at least three million juices, providing the company with significant economies of scale. Such a call to mass purchasing enabled U. S. Americans to indulge in shopping for healthy

refreshments as it not only catered to their consumerist needs but also to their humanitarian conscience. Since "CARE gives this juice to orphans in Europe and YOUR NAME," as the ad exclaimed in bold letters, "goes to Europe in the package of juice," donors could satisfy their consumerist desires of benefit and self-expression through purchasing relief aid. These desires opened specifically national modes of identification as the smiling farmgirl and the pictures of vast fruit plantations referenced the geographical vastness and agricultural abundance of the United States. Conveniently, the donor's name would cross the Atlantic at a comparatively low expense and would bring with it very specific ideas of what a can of Texsun juice signified culturally.

Such lucrative cooperation between consumer brands and humanitarian organizations was not uncommon in the 1940s and 1950s. The AFSC, for example, collaborated with Heinz in 1947 to send one million packages of baby food to Europe, which attests to the growing centrality of consumerism in postwar U.S. American culture.[79] Yet, CARE stands out in two ways. The first was the sheer number of advertisements and collaborations it was involved in. CARE tapped into the notion of consumerism much more forcefully and frequently than any other humanitarian agency. Beyond this quantity of consumerist appeals, CARE had a unique associative quality because the organization not only collaborated with food producers for publicity stunts but included their products in the packages. This allowed donors to access CARE culturally as the package itself became a consumer product within U.S. American mass culture.

Four years after the Texsun collaboration, an advertisement for Armour canned meats (Figure 6) depicted a scene of a mother and daughter on a grocery shopping trip – the cart filled with a variety of Armour products. Recipes for light summer dishes accompanied a scene of richly filled supermarket shelves crowded with idealized depictions of suburban housewives. CARE had just started to include Armour products in its relief parcels, which is why the sentence "Send a CARE package overseas today!" appeared in fine print at the center-left of the page.

CARE featured only marginally in both advertisements, leaving consumerism enough room to unfold and to take precedence over the humanitarian emergency. The case of Armour enforces this dynamic even more strongly than the Texsun example as it confined CARE to a single and hardly visible sentence. Unaccompanied by pictures of starving European recipients or textual explanations of CARE's work, the ad suggests that the organization had become familiar enough by the early 1950s to be able to dispense with further elaboration. Instead of calling on U.S. responsibilities towards the needy or appealing to perceived U.S. American charitable traditions, the announcement

79 Display ad for the cooperation between Heinz and the American Friends Service Committee, *Los Angeles Times*, April 6, 1947, B7.

detached CARE from a humanitarian context to integrate the package into everyday purchasing rituals. Humanitarian engagement became a secondary feature of CARE's work, appearing as an action *en passant*. This almost clandestine way of providing aid enabled donors to engage charitably not because of the obligation to assist the needy but because humanitarian involvement fused with typical postwar consumerist practices.



Fig. 6: Advertisement of collaboration between CARE and Armour meats, *LIFE Magazine*, August 4, 1952

Both illustrations reveal features of CARE's brand image that indicated which modes of consumption the package appealed to. CARE could not be worn, driven, or expressed to others in any way unless donors shared their charitable actions publicly. Since purchasing a package remained a private and unnoticed act, CARE ads never appeared among advertisements for cars, watches, or expensive clothing – all products that publicly communicated the consumer's wealth or class consciousness – because they operated in a different consumerist sphere. Instead, CARE ads were always featured among edible products, such as beverages or convenience foods. For example, in 1956, a radio commercial for Schaefer Beer boasted: "Care, conscience and skill make Schaefer Beer a great beer. And those same things make a great organization with the appropriate name of CARE, C-A-R-E."[80] Like the Texsun and Armour advertisements, this association integrated CARE packages into modes of literal food consumption that linked the international humanitarian venture to domestic experiences at the dinner table.

Presenting CARE as edible placed the organization in a domain that was exclusively domestic and mundane. While CARE mostly appealed to a wealthy and white constituency, this approach made it possible for donors to have a universally shared experience. Although the types of products or the rituals of preparation and consumption may differ from one region to the next, food is a universal sensual experience familiar to all social groups regardless of race, class, region, or gender. Integrating CARE into advertising formats like those of Armour, Schaefer, and Texsun created a relationship between giver and receiver that enabled a form of proto-consumption as donors could identify with the taste of certain products and could attest to their quality.

In creating this relationship, CARE again conveyed a particular image of the United States abroad. Upon opening the packages, recipients encountered the country, or rather a version of it, through their senses. They saw, felt, smelled, and tasted the same foods that U.S. Americans consumed. In the postwar years, with unequal power relations between the occupiers and the occupied, these products defined and redefined the norms by which recipients measured not just the United States but the entire concept of proper food preparation and consumption. The sensory experience reflected U.S. American societal standards and propagated them among, or even pushed them onto, a distant audience.[81] The foods recipients got were the foods they should adapt their rituals of consumption to from now on.

This food came with distinctly U.S. American notions of quality. The Texsun advertisement, for example, sold its grapefruit juice as the "brimful

80 Radio commercial collaboration between CARE and Schaefer Beer, June 27, 1956, CARE Records, Box 921.

81 Andrew Rotter, "Empires of the Senses: How Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching Shaped Imperial Encounters," *Diplomatic History* 35, no. 1 (2011): 4.

of the Vitamin C you need every day." Logically, the same healthy ingredient crossed the Atlantic in every CARE package. Newspaper articles highlighted that a CARE package provided "enough for thirty well-planned meals, or some 40,000 calories (compared with a European's average daily diet of below 1,500 calories)."[82] These comments spoke to a focus on scientificity that was characteristic of postwar U.S. food consumption. Since the development of the calorie as a unit to translate food consumption into energy in 1896 and the discovery of the first vitamin in 1912, new modes of thinking about how and what people should eat emerged that increasingly emphasized vitamin and energy intake .[83] As these units, according to Nick Cullather, "represented food as uniform, composed of interchangeable parts, and comparable across time and between nations and races," taste took a back seat to efficiency.[84]

U.S. advances in nutritional science presented a way to improve global food standards efficiently and systematically, serving as a weapon of containment in postwar Europe and later in the Cold War crisis arenas of Asia and the Middle East. The calorie allowed U.S. Americans to manipulate diets in these distant lands without regard to local food cultures because it "conceptually rolled all commodities, all farms into one big farm and all markets into an aggregate national or even world market, as if all people were drawing provisions from a single larder."[85] Notions of consumerism intersected with the dominant postwar debates on internationalism, in which the presumably superior U.S. food culture could function as a model for the world.

Private humanitarian aid presented a convenient way for donors to share domestic understandings of food consumption with an international audience. As CARE not only sent basic foods but popular manufactured brands, donors could express not only what they ate at home but also why they followed a specific diet. In the first postwar years, especially, with many European societies on the brink of hunger-induced collapse, articles referred to CARE packages as invaluable nutritional contributions that could "provide a family of five with an extra 500 calories every day for over two weeks."[86] Such statements spoke to the packages' functionality and usefulness in the postwar fight against hunger and its consequences. They proved to readers how valuable their own dietary culture was at this specific moment in time and how U.S. practices of food consumption could bring about the end of global malnutrition. Such an approach

82 Samuels, *New York Times*, August 25, 1946, 99.

83 Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918–1924*, 223; Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 11; Harvey A. Levenstein, *Paradox of Plenty: A Social History of Eating in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9–16; Veit, *Modern Food, Moral Food*, 1–2.

84 Cullather, *The Hungry World*, 18.

85 Cullather, *The Hungry World*, 12–13.

86 "7 Countries Waive Duty on U.S. Food," *New York Times*, April 8, 1946, 30.

justified CARE's focus on quality rather than quantity because only the export of America's finest foods could acquaint transatlantic recipients with the superiority of U. S. food culture.

* * *

As the fanfares resounded in the film's last shot, the narrator of *The CARE Story* assured viewers that the "people who do CARE's work take deep satisfaction in serving your will to help, and great pride in the feeling that they serve you well."[87] This last sentence left donors with a clear image not only of CARE's work but of their own. In humble servitude, the organization and its staff merely carried out donors' will. This publicity strategy shows that humanitarian media coverage did not simply reduce donors to emotionalized reactors who opened their wallets in response to being bombarded with images of suffering. CARE deliberately employed a narrative of donor empowerment that spoke as much to the organization's self-understanding as an effective aid machinery as it did to the cultural and political awareness of postwar media consumers.

These consumers could choose from a variety of tropes that evoked notions of closeness and agency. CARE presented humanitarian giving as a uniquely U. S. American practice of communal cohesion extended beyond the borders of the U. S. by the internationalist momentum of the early postwar era. Donors became "ambassadors of good-will" who welcomed their new international neighbors into a community guided by U. S. American political and cultural ideals. This media image offered a form of political empowerment that either supported official U. S. diplomacy or even supplemented it at moments when international audiences viewed the country's meddling abroad with suspicion. In each case, relief aid departed from emotional categories of empathy or guilt to enter a politicized context that left little room for universalized humanitarian idealism.

Further branding the packages as consumer products brought the internationalist trope of the ambassador in line with the domestic level. U. S. consumers could engage in nation-branding in a twofold way. They could identify and hail their domestic culture, export it abroad, and convey the connection between consumerism, economic growth, and democratic stability. Nowhere was Billy Wilder's metaphorical wrapper more visible than in this logic. Through a unique combination of domestic virtues and international responsibility, CARE became a way to promote Roosevelt's Four Freedoms and to bring about Henry Luce's "American Century."

87 "The CARE Story," 1955, Moving Images Relating to International Development Programs and Activities, 1979–1991, RG 286: Records of the Agency for International Development, 1948–2003, NARA.

3 – Deliberating Femininity: Women's Social Clubs and Humanitarian Engagement

In the summer of 1948, CARE produced *Eavesdropping*, a short commercial radio play about the life of the Williamson family. In the play, Mrs. Williamson and her daughter Mary are busy preparing dinner. Mrs. Williamson is concerned about her brother-in-law Bob and his family in France. She has been sending them CARE packages every six weeks but she fears that this might not be enough. Her husband John "doesn't seem to realize how much time goes by between each package we send." When Mary asks her mother how to convince John of the urgency of the situation, Mrs. Williamson comes up with a plan. For dinner, she only serves her husband a piece of paper with the word "steak" written on it. As the flabbergasted John Williamson turns to his wife, she explains with seeming naiveté: "But this morning you said Bob's family didn't need another CARE package for a while, and I got the impression that you didn't think it would hurt anybody to skip a meal or two now and then." It dawns on John that "if I'm this hungry just because I'm missing one meal, what must it be like over there where food is scarce all of the time?" He takes out his checkbook to make another donation to CARE.[1]

The storytelling in *Eavesdropping* assigns its characters clearly defined gender roles that are specific to the historical moment of the postwar era.[2] Mrs.

1 Production sheet for radio program *Eavesdropping*, part 1 of 2, ca. August–September 1948, CARE Records, Box 919.

2 The use of the term "gender" is based on Joan Wallach Scott, who defines the use of gender as a category of analysis as follows: "The focus [when using gender as an analytic category] ought to be not on the roles assigned to women and men, but on the construction of sexual difference itself." Although *Eavesdropping* does not construct sexual differences but relies on a dominant

Williamson and Mary supposedly have better means to grasp the food shortage in Europe because they represent idealized models of female domesticity. Being the one to cook and go grocery shopping, Mrs. Williamson knows, unlike her husband, how much food a family needs, be it her own family or one in a distant land. She passes her knowledge as a homemaker on to Mary, whom she introduces to her social role as a nurturing woman and who becomes equally sensitive to hunger abroad.

Eavesdropping further presents Mrs. Williamson and Mary as the emotional family members who can empathize with the plight of their relatives across a spatial distance. According to Ute Frevert, gender "served as the most conspicuous category that 'naturalized' emotions while at the same time connecting them to distinct social practices and performances."[3] The radio play suggests that the ability of the Williamson women to feel empathy does not stem from their individual personalities but from the notion that this emotion is, supposedly, naturally connected to their femininity.[4] John Williamson does not deny the hunger crisis overseas, but he fails to notice his brother's suffering because empathy does not belong to a man's supposedly gendered emotional repertoire.

Closely tied to the emotionalization of the Williamson women is a supposedly natural female inclination to charity. As the radio play shows, domesticity and charity at this time fortified notions of women as inherently good, ascribing an indispensable but passive, role in U.S. society to them. Accordingly, Mrs. Williamson and Mary are the ones in the family who deem aid necessary, but they never think of just sending the CARE package themselves. Because CARE packages are rather expensive, both women assume that the decision of whether to send one should be left to the breadwinner. Consequently, the Williamson women are entrapped in a contradictory dynamic. Their emotional capabilities enable them to make decisions while their ascribed social role prohibits them from translating those decisions into action.

Women in the postwar United States may or may not have aligned themselves to this ideal of female domesticity. After all, they were not a homogeneous group. But advertisements such as *Eavesdropping* can be regarded as a depiction, albeit exaggerated, of contemporary societal norms and aspirations. This makes it safe to assume that many white and middle-class women whom

postwar discourse on idealized masculine and feminine gender roles, it does contribute to the definition of a gendered power dynamic within the practice of humanitarian aid. Joan Wallach Scott, "Gender: Still a Useful Category of Analysis?," *Diogenes* 57, no. 1 (2010): 10.

3 Ute Frevert, *Emotions in History – Lost and Found* (Budapest: The Central European University Press, 2011), 11.

4 Frevert, *Emotions in History*, 149. See also Frevert, "Gefühle Definieren: Begriffe und Debatten aus drei Jahrhunderten," in *Gefühlswissen: Eine lexikalische Spurensuche in der Moderne*, ed. Ute Frevert et al. (Frankfurt: Campus, 2011), 36–38; Jan Plamper, *History of Emotions: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 56, 121.

the radio play targeted felt the pressure, need, or desire to conform to this societal expectation. Yet, as Joanne Meyerowitz has argued, simply regarding women in the postwar U. S. as victims of conservatism and gender suppression bears the risk of downplaying or even outright ignoring their agency.[5] In a certain way, *Eavesdropping* also grants its female protagonists a voice in societal matters. They know that action must be taken and are aware that their means are restricted by their social role as women. Mrs. Williamson does not confront John with words but rather uses her responsibility for food preparation to physically show him what it means to go hungry. She deliberately surrenders agency to her husband as she waits for him to draw his conclusions and take the initiative. John ultimately writes another check to CARE, but the Williamson women have skillfully used the means at their disposal to shape the family's humanitarian involvement.

This intrinsic connection between charity and female agency was also evident in women's social clubs and their engagement with CARE. Collective assemblies in which women came together to pursue shared interests served as a platform on which club members could find common ground, express mutual support, and develop a unified voice in political or social matters. These clubs were primarily recreational in nature – they organized literary circles, crafts sales, or bazaars – but their members participated in transnational aid, and, in so doing, developed their political agency, confirming and furthering their role in postwar U. S. society. And although many of the humanitarian activities of these clubs once again confined their members to a feminized sphere of social and political action, they also show how aware women were of those constraints and how they used their limited means to exert influence.

The examples of two clubs – the Halcyon Literary Club from Durham, North Carolina and the Ohio Girls' Club of Washington DC – illustrate how assemblies with different regional backgrounds, sizes, and membership profiles used humanitarian aid to Germany as a form of social cohesion and political activism. CARE provided a way for these women to express solidarity with one another, to define and renegotiate their understandings of womanhood, and to find deeper meaning in their prescribed social roles. But they also used aid to demonstrate their significance in domestic and transnational debates on the core values of U. S. society and their place within it.

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5 Joanne J. Meyerowitz, "Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945–1960," in *Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945–1960*, ed. Joanne J. Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 4.

Women's associational culture influenced the United States socially and politically long before women gained the right to legal political participation.[6] Some, like the United Daughters of the Confederacy or the Daughters of the American Revolution, assembled to foster regional and national memory cultures and to commemorate the involvement of women in the history of the United States. Temperance associations and internationalist women's rights groups pursued much more defined reformist purposes at home and abroad, while the General Federation of Women's Clubs and its member agencies emphasized community engagement and the creation of shared female spaces of exchange and deliberation. What all these groups shared were distinct membership profiles in terms of class and race. Since dedication to a cause demanded enough leisure time to spare, members and supporters of such organizations hailed almost exclusively from the white middle and upper class.[7] Nonwhites were often excluded either passively – because the groups built their identification on the notion of shared European ancestry – or actively because their membership was denied on racial grounds.[8] Either way, ethnic homogeneity and an elite class consciousness resulting from this characterized the profiles of women's associations and guided their means of involvement.

This dynamic of elitism and activism also characterized women's charitable engagement. Since the Revolutionary era, white and predominantly Protestant women had come together to found orphanages and poorhouses. Charitable institutions were spaces in which women could, according to Kathleen McCarthy, "test the boundaries of Revolutionary egalitarianism."[9] In doing so, they worked for the proliferation of a greater good, but they also resorted to charity to express political and social agency in communities that legally barred them from equal participation.[10] Through the foundation of schools, homes for the

6 Kathleen McCarthy, "Women and Political Culture," in *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History*, ed. Friedman et al., 182.

7 Ruth Bordin, *Woman and Temperance: The Quest for Power and Liberty, 1873–1900* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), 10–11; Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 51–55; Ian Tyrell, *Woman's World / Woman's Empire: The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective 1880–1930* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 68; Simon Wendt, *The Daughters of the American Revolution and Patriotic Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2020), 1.

8 Mary Jane Smith, "The Fight to Protect Race and Regional Identity within the General Federation of Women's Clubs, 1895–1902," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 94, no. 4 (2010): 479–80; Jan Doolittle Wilson, "Disunity in Diversity: The Controversy Over the Admission of Black Women to the General Federation of Women's Clubs, 1900–1902," *Journal of Women's History* 23, no. 2 (2011): 41: Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, 69–70.

9 McCarthy, "Women and Political Culture," 182.

10 McCarthy, "Parallel Power Structures: Women and the Voluntary Sphere," in *Lady Bountiful Revisited: Women, Philanthropy, and Power*, ed. Kathleen D. McCarthy (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 1; also McCarthy, *American Creed: Philanthropy and the Rise of Civil Society, 1700–1865* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 30–31.

disabled, hospitals during the American Civil War, and halfway houses in the Progressive Era, women found niches in which they were able to further their own and their nation's cause concurrently.[11]

This trend, with its constraints and promises, continued well into the mid-twentieth century. While African-American women, particularly in the South, were subject to systemic or legal discrimination, white women across the nation had by that time overcome most legal hurdles barring them from equal political and economic participation. Nonetheless, social and cultural discrimination largely prohibited them from enjoying their legal equality and relegated them to a subordinate role – even in humanitarian contexts. The American Red Cross, for instance, targeted women for overseas relief programs in World War II and depicted their engagement as a contribution to the U.S. war effort but cast them to the second row as caretakers behind the lines of "real" war.[12] During the conflict, women had also entered the workforce in greater numbers due to the absence of men. This had increased the political significance and influence of nonelite women who worked in the previously male-dominated war industry, especially. Though massive wage discrimination remained a reality for these women, their numbers in the labor force rose by fifty percent. "Rosie the Riveter," with her rolled-up sleeves and determined look, became the symbol of the hands-on, female home front agent. However, both a dominant anti-emancipatory understanding of femininity and favoritism towards the labor needs of returning war veterans forced many women out of the work force and back into the domestic sphere when the war ended.[13]

Women were now cast in the idealized and elitist roles of mother and caretaker, which rendered them indispensable, though largely invisible, contributors to their country's social stability. Individual groups continued to work for the improvement of women's conditions in the labor force, but public discourse stressed the ideal of female domesticity and the joy that women should feel in fulfilling it.[14] As a result, charity again became a central element of public female involvement. Women during the 1940s and 1950s, in fact, volun-

11 Anne Firor Scott, "Women's Voluntary Associations: From Charity to Reform," in *Lady Bountiful Revisited*, ed. McCarthy, 36–46.

12 Möller, Paulmann, and Stornig, "Gendering Twentieth-Century Humanitarianism: An Introduction," in *Gendering Global Humanitarianism in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Möller et al. 1–2.

13 William Henry Chafe, *The Paradox of Change: American Women in the 20th Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 121–34, 154–63; Hanna Schissler, "German and American Women Between Domesticity and the Workplace," in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990*, ed. Junker et al., vol. 1, 561, 563.

14 For cases of activism on behalf of women's emancipation in the workplace, see Susan Hartmann's analysis of the National Manpower Council and the Commission on the Education of Women in the early to mid-1950s. Hartmann, "Women's Employment and the Domestic Ideal in the Early Cold War," in *Not June Cleaver*, ed. Meyerowitz, 84–100.

teered even more than previous generations had.[15] On the local level, women and women's clubs organized bazaars and fundraising fairs not only to gather money and support for topics they deemed important, but also to publicly demonstrate their role as active participants in and shapers of U.S. American society and politics.[16]

For this reason, it is not surprising that much of CARE's public outreach directly targeted a female audience. Emotionalized displays of women as charitable agents, like the one in *Eavesdropping*, had long been a common trope in humanitarian outreach. The CRB's Women's Section, itself the creation of elite women who built on philanthropic networks of the Progressive Era, had asked women during World War I to imagine their loved ones as suffering through the same hardships as the people of Belgium.[17] In doing so, they tapped into the same rhetorical imagery of the suffering child that organizations like CARE would also later employ, fusing notions of caring femininity and social activism. In the context of CARE, such appeals appeared prominently on the women's pages of local and national newspapers, which were designed to offer female readers a decidedly feminized reading environment. Women's pages surrounded news on CARE with articles that had no obvious connection to the humanitarian context. Instead, they featured news on women's church and club engagements, fashion trends, or interior design.[18] This reading environment reinforced idealized standards of femininity, but it also provided women with a space that contextualized their communal actions – and their humanitarian engagement – within a larger public debate.[19]

This tense dynamic, fluctuating between passivity and activism, domesticity and public visibility, also characterized the aid efforts of the Halcyon Literary Club and the Ohio Girls' Club, and it unfolded according to each club's public profile. The Halcyon Club had been founded in 1910 as an exclusive recreational assembly for Durham women with the objective of investigating artistic, social, and cultural issues through the lens of literature. Every month, the women would gather at the home of a different member in the afternoon

15 Monica K. Johnson, Kristie L. Foley, and Glen H. Elder, "Women's Community Service, 1940–1960: Insights from a Cohort of Gifted American Women," *The Sociological Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (2016): 47.

16 Beverly Gordon, *Bazaars and Fair Ladies: The History of the American Fundraising Fair* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1998), 209.

17 Piller, "Beyond Hoover," 209–10.

18 "U.S. Groups Urged to Help Send Food," *The New York Times*, July 18, 1946, 22; "Army Blankets Are Available in CARE Parcel for Europe," *The Washington Post*, February 19, 1947, 14; "Rosebush W.S.C.S. Entertained at Earl Willey Home Friday," *The Clare Sentinel*, December 26, 1947, 10; "Fashion Show to Aid CARE On Wednesday," *The New York Times*, January 19, 1948, 16; "Woman's Club Joins Korea Care Project," *The Tabor City Tribune*, November 21, 1951, 1.

19 Julie A. Golia, "Courting Women, Courting Advertisers: The Woman's Page and the Transformation of the American Newspaper, 1895–1935," *Journal of American History* 103, no. 3 (2016): 607.

to read short stories, give each other presentations on issues of history, society, and culture, or to invite outsiders from academia and business to share their expertise. All members had a distinct racial, class, and occupational profile. They were white, upper middle-class housewives whose husbands worked as lawyers, bankers, faculty members at Duke University (then Trinity College), or in the city's vibrant tobacco industry.[20]

In 1917, seven years after the inception of the Halcyon Club and simultaneous with the U.S. entry into World War I, the wives of the Ohio delegation to the U.S. Congress founded a club that boasted an entirely different member profile. They established the Ohio Girls' Club of Washington, DC, to create a social space for women from Ohio who lived and worked in the nation's capital. The original purpose of the organization was to entertain soldiers from Ohio who were stationed near the capital and to strengthen their morale before they took off for the Europe. But, like the Halcyon Club, the Ohio Girls' Club was also founded "with a recreational program its principal objective."[21] Its members pursued mutual hobbies, organized luncheons and social gatherings, and engaged in community and charitable activities. By the end of World War II, the club had roughly two-hundred members from different backgrounds. However, these members followed a different agenda than those of the Halcyon Club. They were not primarily housewives but "in business and professional pursuits."[22] The founders of the Ohio Girls' Club had created it "in honor of the girls from Ohio in the civil service here" to serve a patriotic duty.[23]

Hence, both clubs displayed differences in size, profile, and region. The Halcyon Literary Club was a recreational and intellectual assembly for the ladies of Durham's social elite that had no reformist vision. Its literary efforts did not aim at emancipating members to develop skills that opened the gates to men's professional domains – as especially many African-American and white working-class women's book clubs had done in the nineteenth century.[24] Rather, the Halcyons were part of a conservative tradition in the women's club movement that often opposed women's rights and gender equality and instead declared the domestic sphere to be the stage for female social engagement.[25]

20 List of all Halcyon topics for the years 1910–2011 collected for the club's centennial notebook, Halcyon Literary Club Records, 1910–2011, Box 1, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University Libraries, Durham, NC, USA (hereafter Halcyon Records). Also various profiles of former members' husbands, Halcyon Records, Box 8.

21 Frances Lide, "Ohio Girls' Club, Thriving on Recreational Motive, to Open 21st Season," *The Sunday Star*, November 27, 1938, D-11.

22 Lide, "Ohio Girls' Club, Thriving on Recreational Motive, to Open 21st Season," D-11.

23 "Jean Eliot's Chronicles of Capital Society Doings," *The Washington Times*, September 8, 1918, 13.

24 Anne Firor Scott, *Natural Allies*: *Women's Associations in American History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 111–13; Wilson, "Disunity in Diversity," 40–41.

25 Wendt, *The Daughters of the American Revolution and Patriotic Memory in the Twentieth Century*, 3–6; Wilson, "Disunity in Diversity," 41.

The club members even clearly stated in their meeting minutes that "the primary function of the Halcyons is not to reform the world."[26] These women were well educated and practiced their literary work for recreation, community cohesion, and to nurture an upper middle-class awareness through their engagement in a high-brow cultural practice.

The members were also keen on cultivating and preserving their Southern heritage in the club's activities. Annual topics frequently revolved around Southern literature or the history and culture of North Carolina. Presentations under their 1947 topic "Great Families" focused on "The Lees of Virginia" and "their service to Virginia, the colonies and the South" rather than, for example, on the Rockefellers of New York.[27] Such actions put the Halcyon members in decidedly Southern traditions of femininity and female club engagement. Southern women's clubs often perceived themselves as representing the pinnacle of the American leisure class and cultivated culture. Displays of Southern culture were often an integral part of their activities. In fact, Karen Cox has argued that Southern women had been the principal actors in the creation of a Confederate memory culture. As a part of this tradition, the Halcyon Club fostered its own form of female emancipation within the logics of conservative gender relations and ideals.[28]

Like the Halcyon members, most Ohio girls also came from what contemporaries called "respectable" families and cultivated a similar elite image as the "[f]airest daughters of the State of Presidents."[29] The club frequently appeared on the women's pages of Washington newspapers to announce its latest social events. In doing so, it publicly followed the same ideals of postwar femininity that the Halcyon Club adhered to, even though many of the members led lives that defied convention: Most pursued a career. They held positions as secretaries or administrators in the federal government, visited training schools, or took night classes at universities. With Frances P. Bolton, the club even had a congresswoman in its ranks.[30] Over two-thirds of the members were unmar-

26 Quote from meeting minutes of February 14, 1935, listed in a summary of mentions of Halcyon's charitable engagement collected by the club historian Lucy Grant, [ca. 2009], Halcyon Records, Box 7.

27 See meeting minutes, October 23, 1947, Halcyon Records, Box 5.

28 Karen L. Cox, *Dixie's Daughters: The United Daughters of the Confederacy and the Preservation of Confederate Culture* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 1–7; Anne Firor Scott, *The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics 1830–1930* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 4; Smith, "The Fight to Protect Race and Regional Identity within the General Federation of Women's Clubs," 487–88.

29 Caption of photograph of club members in *The Washington Herald Photogravure Magazine*, June 4, 1922, 5.

30 Script for the initiation of officers of the Ohio Girls' Club for the years 1948–1950, May 17, 1948, Ohio Girls' Club of Washington, DC Records, 1918–1983, Box 1, Manuscripts & Audiovisual Collections, Ohio History Center, Ohio History Connection (hereafter OGC Records).

ried and often remained so throughout their decades-long membership.[31] Being an Ohio girl meant performing a difficult balancing act between traditional and progressive understandings of womanhood. Members publicly engaged in typically female recreational activities, such as Bridge games and Thanksgiving banquets, while pursuing careers at the same time. They were home front patriots who did their duty in the war effort during World War I, even if fulfilling this duty meant entertaining men. The Ohio Girls' Club created a home away from home for those longing for a connection to their native state and for others trying to find their way between expectations and realities of postwar femininity.

Despite their differences, both clubs expressed striking similarities in their humanitarian engagement with its domestic as well as transnational implications grounded in notions of femininity and socially accepted female behavior. Sending their first packages in 1947 and 1948, respectively, both clubs began engaging in CARE at a crucial turning point in German-American relations. From the creation of the Bizone in January 1947, the launching of the Truman Doctrine in March, and the announcement of the Marshall Plan in June, and through the breakup of quadripartite governance and the Berlin Blockade, West Germany began a transition from enemy to ally. Though neither club boasted a political profile, they both reflected an interest in their country's foreign policy objectives in their aid activities. They participated in geopolitics and, at the same time, confirmed their own importance within U.S. society.

* * *

The history of the Halcyon Club's humanitarian engagement began on a Thursday afternoon in late October 1947, when transatlantic politics infiltrated the members' monthly gathering. A harsh winter and severe droughts in the summer had drastically reduced agricultural output in Central and Western Europe.[32] In response, President Truman had established a Cabinet Food Committee comprised of State Secretary George Marshall, Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman, and Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson. The committee had alerted Truman to the fact that grain production in the U.S. had fallen considerably beneath the previous year's quota and that exports to Europe would decrease drastically if the people of the United States did not cut back on food consumption. On October 5, the president announced the first food conservation program since the end of World War II, urging U.S. Americans to lower their meat consumption and food waste to "feed millions

31 Member roster of Ohio Girls' Club, 1949–1950, OGC Records, Box 1.

32 John E. Farquharson, *The Western Allies and the Politics of Food: Agrarian Management in Postwar Germany* (Warwickshire, UK: Berg Publishers, 1985), 159–60.

of hungry people."[33] The public met the conservation program with general support. A Gallup poll found that two-thirds of U.S. Americans believed that sacrifice on their part was justified to improve the food situation in Europe.[34]

Reacting to Truman's plea, the Halcyon Club members unanimously decided "that the hostesses limit the refreshments at each meeting to a beverage and a cookie" and that they "contribute $5 toward a 'Care' package […] to send one $10 'Care package' every other month from the $5 contributions."[35] Largely sending the donations to CARE without designating a specific recipient, members occasionally followed the requests of guest speakers from the monthly meeting asking for support for their friends and family abroad.[36] For the most part, and due to the fact that none of the Halcyon women had any European friends or family themselves, they left it to the CARE to distribute the aid where it was needed the most.[37] The European "winter of starvation" of 1946/47 had hit Germany especially hard, so it was there that CARE distributed the lion's share of the Halcyon donations.

The small gesture of limiting refreshments to benefit humanitarian aid marked a turning point for the club. By rationing food and saving money for transatlantic relief, the members sacrificed a considerable part of their feminine self-understanding. Being a club comprised of housewives, food had served a vital representational function at their assemblies. Meeting minutes had regularly emphasized how much work the hostesses had invested in preparing plenty of "colorful fruits" or "delicious coffee punch and other goodies from a lovely appointed table."[38] The preparation and display of food served a cultural context in which the effort of each hostess indicated wealth, status, and the fulfillment of standards of Southern hospitality. Giving up this food meant giving up an integral part of the social context in which these women moved.

It was not unusual for a small literary club of local housewives to feel personally addressed by the president's announcement of a food conservation program. After the war, women's organizations had been quick to address the centrality of food to postwar U.S. interests in Europe. Already in September 1945, for example, Katherine Fisher of the Illinois League of Women Voters had

33 "Texts of Truman's Food Plea and of the Cabinet Report," *The New York Times*, September 26, 1947, 3; "Pleas Made by Truman and His Aides Over Radio to Nation for Saving of Food," *The New York Times*, October 6, 1947, 5.

34 George Gallup, "Food Conservation Necessary to Aid Europe, Majority Feel," *The Washington Post*, October 24, 1947, 21.

35 See meeting minutes, October 23, 1947, Halcyon Records, Box 5.

36 In early 1949, W. F. Steinspring, professor for theology at Duke University, asked the Halcyon Club to consider a donation for his colleague Martin Roth at the University of Bonn after he gave a presentation at their monthly meeting. Meeting minutes, May 1949 [exact date unspecified], Halcyon Records, Box 5.

37 Meeting minutes, January 15, 1948, Halcyon Records, Box 5.

38 Compare Halcyon meeting minutes for November 1946 and February 1947, Halcyon Records, Box 5.

asked Truman for a public message on food rationing. Fisher had expressed the concern that many people in the United States did not understand that they needed to conserve food to send it abroad but rather seemed to think that "they can have their cake and send it, too." Fisher urged the president to explain to all that their "boys" would only come back home once Europe was strong enough to help itself.[39] In response to such appeals, Truman had used his speech to specifically target "housewives" as the gatekeepers of U. S. American food consumption. He honored them for having "already begun strict conservation measures" and urged them to "'Keep up the good work' and save even more when and where you can."[40]

Reacting to this appeal, the Halcyon Club members employed a diction not unlike that of Katherine Fisher. They noted feeling "guilty enjoying so many unnecessary calories while hunger still walked the earth" in their meeting minutes.[41] That club members reacted to Truman's address by sending a CARE package shows how well certain donor segments responded to the organization's image. They understood the CARE package as far more than a simple provision of food and, in fact, as a politicized practice and an active contribution to U. S. interests abroad. In both instances, the women appeared – and, indeed, presented themselves – to be the central agents of food. They displayed an awareness for its abundance in the United States, were sensitive to its lack in Europe, and understood its importance in domestic and foreign policy. Their statements expressed the same notion of food as a female responsibility that was central to *Eavesdropping* because they, just like Mrs. Williamson and Mary, grasped its importance in ways that men like John Williamson did not.

More specifically, they decided to invest "part of our abundance in Care Packages – the biggest bargain in the world."[42] In this statement, the Halcyon Club members employed the same consumerist rhetoric inherent to CARE's media image. Not only had they spoken of calories rather than food and highlighted the scientific understanding central to CARE's consumerist image, but they also made use – probably deliberately – of the same commercial slogan that CARE had utilized since the mid-1940s. By calling CARE "the biggest bargain in the world," they confirmed the organization's consumerist rhetoric, suggesting that donors actually saved money by investing in CARE. In doing so, the Halcyon members followed the logic of CARE's media profile and justified the price of the packages in terms of value rather than effectiveness.

39 Katherine Fisher [Illinois League of Women Voters] to Harry S. Truman, September 14, 1945, Truman Papers, OF 426, Box 1328.

40 "Pleas Made by Truman and His Aides Over Radio to Nation for Saving of Food," *The New York Times*, October 6, 1947, 5.

41 Meeting minutes, November 1956, Halcyon Records, Box 5.

42 Meeting minutes, November 1956, Halcyon Records, Box 5.

A closer look at CARE's consumerist image reveals how firmly the organization tied food purchasing, preparation, and consumption to ideals of femininity. This becomes obvious in the Armour and Texsun advertisements discussed in the previous chapter. Both ads made an intrinsic connection between CARE and American-style food consumption – praising both as superior and desirable. They also depicted a clearly gendered and racialized ideal of white women as the demographic with the most consumerist, and, thus, most humanitarian, agency. Armour utilized the white, suburban homemaker who followed her role as an empathetic caretaker and introduced her daughter to the exclusively female domain of the grocery store. Similarly, the Texsun advertisement featured a beautiful white farm girl who represented the health and natural bounty of the United States. Texsun juxtaposed this ideal with the picture of a suffering child to appeal to equally feminized notions of empathy and protectiveness. By combining tropes of consumerism and femininity, CARE emphasized the virtues of women's domesticity.

This should not imply that men were generally incapable of developing the same feelings for a hungry orphan. But advertisements and radio spots on humanitarian aid rarely appealed specifically to a male audience. Even *Eavesdropping*, although it ended with John's decision to send a CARE package, centered less on his giving than it did on Mrs. Williamson's struggle to convince him. John personified the role of men in humanitarian media coverage: he had the money to give but lacked the emotional capabilities to act. Men rarely featured as charitable agents in the media, quite simply because they did not need empowerment in this regard since they had most economic and political agency anyway. For women, domestic tropes such as consumerism were supposed to offer a cultural reference point around which they could construct notions of social and political significance. The Halcyon members understood that consumption and humanitarianism came together in CARE's public image, and that it was for women to connect the dots between both concepts.

Notions of consumerism and femininity shared a dynamic history in the United States. Since the early twentieth century, "Mrs. Consumer" had become a public figure that advertisers did not just manipulate – they had to acknowledge her buying power as agency and, thus, cater to her needs.[43] Before and during the New Deal, women had been vital actors in the consumer movement. Women's consumer societies had followed clearly feminist objectives of wage equality and better labor conditions, which set them apart from most women's clubs with their conservative objectives.[44] During World War II, women then featured as home front agents who supported the war effort through rationing

43 Golia, "Courting Women, Courting Advertisers," 609–10.

44 Landon R. Y. Storrs, *Civilizing Capitalism: The National Consumers' League, Women's Activism, and Labor Standards in the New Deal Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 2, 8, 42.

and moderate consumption.[45] As the postwar years recalibrated women's idealized social role towards domesticity, the meaning of consumerism changed as well – from a means of emancipatory activism to one of consolidating this ideal. This was especially true for white, middle- and upper-class women, who also constituted the largest group in U.S. American charitable activism. Although African-American and working-class women often participated in associational giving and reform, wealthy white women were those to whom the ideal of domesticity applied most often because they were the ones who experienced the least economic necessity to work.[46] Their status demanded that they find an occupation outside the workforce.

This image granted them a new role in consumerism as it imbued them with agency in social matters. Women became, as sociologist Anne Cronin has put it, "the epitome of consumer ideals, the prototypical consumer, the active subject who is newly empowered in the public realm of consumer culture."[47] Advertisers and women's magazines concentrated on topics of food preparation and consumption, which fortified the connection of domesticity and cooking. As the one purchasing and preparing food, the woman was the link that held the family together, equating food and love.[48] Advertisers suggested that women performed a patriotic deed through their role as food purchasers and preparers. Through their cooking, they furthered family cohesion and health, strengthened national cultural values, and consolidated or even improved their family's social status by consuming foods that signified an upper-class consciousness. Men supposedly acted as breadwinners who ensured their family's wealth in the first place, whereas women were the gatekeepers who decided how and what the family consumed.[49]

Consumerist agency further gave women a voice in matters of politics. The significance of consumption to postwar U.S. culture put women as consumer agents at the center of debates on economic growth, democratic stability, and the global proliferation of freedom. In this logic, female domesticity was not a confinement but rather a liberation as it allowed women to perform a patriotic deed through buying.[50] This notion fused the domestic significance of consumerism with its transnational potential as a means of spreading democratic values. It explains why the members of the Halcyon Literary Club did not object to aid for the recently defeated German enemy as it was, after all, the geographical center of the early Cold War. Consumption – which was what

45 Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic*, 75–83.
46 McCarthy, "Women and Political Culture," 188–89.
47 Anne M. Cronin, *Advertising and Consumer Citizenship*: *Gender, Images, and Rights* (London: Routledge, 2000), 6.
48 Levenstein, *Paradox of Plenty*, 31–34; Katherine J. Parkin, *Food Is Love*: *Food Advertising and Gender Roles in Modern America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 31–49.
49 Parkin, *Food Is Love*, 9.
50 Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic*, 135–50.

CARE declared humanitarian aid to be – on behalf of this geopolitically crucial country was an act that promoted democracy abroad. Sharing their consumer culture with distant others meant that women as primary consumer agents constructively participated in U.S. foreign policy. Their engagement in this context intersected most strongly with CARE's media profile because they used the interconnection of aid and consumption as nation branding, showcasing the superiority of their domestic culture and the political ideology it entailed.

In CARE, charity and consumption formed a synergetic relationship as both practices offered postwar U.S. women political and social agency. But this relationship also reinforced women's ambiguous role in humanitarianism. In both practices, women remained passive, largely invisible, and confined to domestic practices that lay outside the male-dominated labor market. At the same time, they created new dynamics of social, cultural, and political participation since their shared feminine connotation gave both consumption and charity broader meanings. Charity served consumerism by providing a way consumers could express selflessness in a practice characterized by constant desire. Consumerism, in turn, could add a feeling of pleasure and personal benefit to an otherwise external action. This reciprocal enrichment of each practice offered a female target audience new possibilities of public engagement. By appropriating CARE's consumerist image, the members of the Halcyon Club could embed their aid in U.S. political objectives and simultaneously use it to confirm their understandings of womanhood.

* * *

The members of the Ohio Girls' Club equally positioned their aid at the intersection of the domestic and international spheres in ways that confirmed the appeal of CARE's media image. They did so not through a consumerist rhetoric, but through a focus on religion. Although the central defining character of the club was regional origin and not religious cohesion, many of its activities revolved around expressions of a shared Christian faith. The club held almost all its major meetings at the Hospitality Center of St. John's Episcopal Church, which could be seen from the White House, and they regularly donated to the church's charitable activities.[51] They organized events in conjunction with the women's group of the Westmoreland Congregational Church on the outskirts of Washington and worked closely with local congregations of which they were often active members.[52] Religiosity was neither mandatory for membership nor crucial to the club's public profile, but it latently reverberated in many of its activities and in its self-understanding.

51 *Buckeye Briefs* [the OGC club newspaper], October 1947 and March 1949, OGC Records, Box 4.

52 Ohio Girls' Club orders to CARE on May 7, 1951, and July 9, 1951; Sara Zilz to Ohio Girls' Club, August 21, 1951, OGC Records, Box 1.

Several Ohio girls were members of the Cavalry Baptist Church in downtown Washington, and it was this connection that proved decisive in the club's relief efforts. The church closely collaborated with the Baptist World Alliance – a CARE member agency that also had its headquarters in the national capital. In its postwar humanitarian engagement, the alliance closely corresponded with Protestant congregations in Germany and, through this channel, frequently supplied the Ohio Girls' Club with names of potential recipients who seemed worthy and always deeply religious.[53] One, Karoline Röhrken, a deaconess from the British occupied Rhineland, reported that she was "shepherding a small group of Christians, leading Bible-classes, Childrens-meetings [sic] and visit[ing] the members of our little parish in their homes."[54] Another, Ernst Mogk, headed a church-run charity near Marburg in the U. S. zone. The father of four not only received packages himself but also coordinated their distribution to others, including a local priest with nine children and a war veteran in the Soviet zone.[55] Recipients often responded to their packages in ways that corresponded with their faith. Kaete Hoffmann from Nuremberg, for example, wrote in 1950: "So our prayers have been heared [sic] and Our Good Lord was leading you to help in a most christian [sic] way."[56] In their piety, attested by the Baptist World Alliance and demonstrated in their writings, recipients followed a clear profile of the faithful and deserving Christian.

Through their engagement in religiously motivated aid, the members of the Ohio Girls' Club catered to a characteristic coupling of femininity and religiosity that had been prevalent throughout U. S. history. Since the colonial period, women had made up an often significant majority of Christian congregants. Allegedly more pious than male worshippers, they were expected to practice their faith as obedient wives and devoted mothers.[57] Like charity, the Church had also been a central pillar of female activism in the United States since the Early Republic. Being one of few public spaces for women to take part in debates on religious and community matters, the church became a traditional hub of female charitable and social activism.[58]

53 Info sheet for CARE packages by the Baptist World Alliance including names of possible recipients, ca. spring 1949; Ohio Girls' Club order to CARE indicating that names of recipients came from Jessie R. Ford of the Baptist World Alliance, August 10, 1949; Adah Fink, Chairman, Welfare Committee, Ohio Girls' Club to CARE, August 10, 1949, OGC Records, Box 1.

54 Karoline Röhrken to Ohio Girls' Club, August 3, 1951, OGC Records, Box 1.

55 Ohio Girls' Club order to CARE, April 14, 1949; Ernst Mogk to Ohio Girls' Club regarding receipt of CARE package, May 31, 1949; postcard by Ernst Mogk to Ohio Girls' Club, August 18, 1951, OGC Records, Box 1.

56 Kaete Hoffmann to the Ohio Girls' Club, January 15, 1950, OGC Records, Box 1.

57 Ann Braude, *Sisters and Saints: Women and American Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1–2.

58 McCarthy, *American Creed*, 49–53.

Women in the United States often understood their faith as a call to action. When it came to matters of domestic or international political significance, it was easy for women to convert church networks into activist movements. Causes such a temperance, abolition, suffrage, and, of course, the large U.S. women's missionary movement that had developed over the course of the nineteenth century were heavily informed by Christian beliefs.[59] While Christianity became yet another way to engage in politics at home and abroad, religious women's societies also often emphasized an idea of motherly love and care for the less fortunate over increased political agency for women.[60] Their religious activism thus displayed the same dynamics inherent to female charitable engagement. It was a practice of mostly elite women that reinforced and confirmed their idealized social roles as pious, compassionate, and submissive, while offering them chances to engage more broadly in social and political matters.

Even though CARE was a secular organization, religious aid played an important role within it. Of the twenty-two original CARE founding members, ten were religious organizations. Among these, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee was the only one whose profile was not Christian. The nine remaining religious member organizations covered a broad spectrum of Catholics, Lutherans, Mennonites, Quakers, and Unitarians, as well as ecumenical organizations, such as the YWCA and the Church World Service, through which also the Baptist World Alliance was a member. These groups were a force to be reckoned with. Congregations from all over the United States were among the first and most outspoken groups that had demanded the repeal of the Trading with the Enemy Act and the reestablishment of postal service with Germany in 1945.[61] Christian and congregational papers often covered CARE in their publications, and church groups constituted one of the largest donor segments on which the organization relied.[62] Not as individuals but as

59 Bordin, *Woman and Temperance*, 9; Braude, *Sisters and Saints*, 76–84; Catherine A. Brekus, "Introduction: Searching for Women in Narratives of American Religious History," in *The Religious History of American Women: Reimagining the Past*, ed. Catherine A. Brekus (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 2; Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, 55–57; Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 74–78; Tyrell, *Woman's World / Woman's Empire*, 1–2. See also the literature survey on the interconnectedness of humanitarianism, femininity, and faith in Abigail Green, "Humanitarianism in Nineteenth-Century Context: Religious, Gendered, National," *The Historical Journal* 57, no. 4 (2014): 1165–69.

60 Priscilla Pope-Levison, "'Mothering Not Governing': Maternalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Methodist Women's Organizations," *Methodist History* 55, nos. 1 and 2 (2017): 33.

61 See, for example, correspondence between Glenn Roberts [Connecticut Council of Churches] to William Hassett [secretary to President Truman], December 19–21, 1945; Bishop Arthur J. Moore [Methodist Church of Atlanta, GA] to Harry S. Truman, December 14, 1945; Rev. D.D. Brady [Jackson, Michigan] to Earl C. Michener [House Representative for Michigan], January 21, 1946, Truman Papers, OF 426, Box 1328.

62 See, for example, J.N. Weaver, "CARE," *Mennonite Life*, January 1951, CARE Records, Box 1007.

large communities they often collected aid worth thousands of dollars, much of which went to congregations, church community centers, and church-run orphanages in Germany.[63] In their engagement through CARE, churches had developed a profound awareness of their potential influence on U.S. foreign relations.

Aid within this religious context allowed the members of the Ohio Girls' Club to justify their engagement for Germany as a confirmation of their country's intrinsic ideological connection between religious and democratic freedom. In many ways, church-going was the core of U.S. American altruistic culture, as it combined universal ideas of religious charity with specific convictions of community engagement as a pillar of the country's cultural heritage. Religious charities had been instrumental actors in the growing professionalization and media orientation of the humanitarian sector at the turn of the twentieth century as they capitalized on this U.S. American sense of mission and propagated it through increasingly sensationalistic and emotionalized coverage of distant suffering.[64] Religiosity, and particularly Christianity, thus became a major source of both individual and group identification. It proclaimed the United States as an altruistic nation under God, both guided by religious values and guiding others in their religiosity. The country thus boasted a long tradition of religion as a signifier of a functioning democracy. Freedom of religion and the freedom to choose one's denomination were essential founding ideals of the United States and a dominant and enduring source of national identification and pride.[65]

In the early and mid-twentieth century, this virtue of religious freedom found its counterpart in European totalitarianism. Regimes that sought to eradicate the influence of religion on public and political life in their pursuit of unrivaled and unrestricted authority revealed the inextricable relation between freedom of worship and democracy. With the war over, fascism in Germany and Italy defeated, and Soviet communism encroaching on Europe, religiosity became a tool not just to affirm democracy at home, but to extend it across the Atlantic in the hope that it would establish a counterforce to totalitarian resurgence.[66] While Hitler's regime had successfully destroyed or corrupted

63 See, for example, list of bulk orders in CARE General Manager's Report, December 4, 1946, CARE Records, Box 1; Warren Pinegar to Berlin Mission Chief Van S. Bowen concerning packages to Mennonite homes in Germany sent by the Mennonite Central Committee, December 11, 1953, CARE Records, Box 542.

64 Heather Curtis, *Holy Humanitarians: American Evangelicals and Global Aid* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 283–84.

65 Diane Kirby, "The Religious Cold War," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, ed. Richard H. Immerman et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 540.

66 James C. Enns, *Saving Germany: North American Protestants and Christian Mission to West Germany, 1945–1974* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2017), 34. On the developing notion in the United States of theology and faith as counterforces to totalitarianism, see Wall,

most forms of social organization that had posed a threat to its unlimited power – including trade unions, the media, and the education system – the Catholic and Lutheran Churches were among the few organized social systems that had survived the war more or less intact. Only twelve percent of regular churchgoers, an OMGUS survey found in early 1946, had been members of the Nazi Party.[67] The U.S. military government consequently valued the churches as the German social institution that had been least coopted by fascist ideology, even though most of the clergy had never openly opposed Hitler and were often complicit in the regime's crimes.[68] German organized religion, of whatever denomination, was a promising transnational ally for those who wanted to spread democracy because it presented the best-functioning social network the country still had.

CARE's public outreach frequently resorted to religious rhetoric to underpin the German need for a spiritual reconstruction. An illustrative example of CARE's religious outreach is the work of Dr. Charles R. Joy. A Unitarian minister by training, Joy had gathered previous experience in humanitarian fieldwork with the Save the Children Federation and the Unitarian Service Committee during World War II before joining CARE as a German field representative in 1950.[69] "The church situation is good material for me," Joy informed CARE's German Mission in 1951. "I should like to have interviews with high Lutheran and Catholic officials, particularly if there is some CARE angle, I should like to have copies of any important recent speeches by bishops and so on."[70] Joy specifically targeted Christian circles in Germany not only because of his German language skills and his general interest in the country, but specifically because he understood the connections between the country's spiritual reconstruction and its political fragility. In many of his writings, Joy appealed directly to the concerns of a Christian readership in the United States. He ref-

Inventing the "American Way," 9–10; Heather A. Warren, *Theologians of a New World Order*: *Reinhold Niebuhr and the Christian Realists, 1920–1948* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3–5, 130.

67 Anna J. Merrit and Richard L. Merrit, eds., *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 82.

68 Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der Westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie*, 334–41. It was only in October 1945 in its Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt that the German Protestant Church, although reluctantly, admitted its complicity in the rise of Nazism. Mark E. Ruff, "The German Churches and the Specter of Americanization," in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990*, ed. Junker et al., vol. 1, 544.

69 Joy had spent World War II mostly in Lisbon and Marseille where, together with figures such as Varian Fry, he had helped both prominent German refugees and children escape to the Americas. For a detailed account on Joy and his network, see Susan Elisabeth Subak, *Rescue & Flight: American Relief Workers Who Defied the Nazis* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010); Bloomstein, German Mission Draft, 126, CARE Record, Box 2.

70 Charles R. Joy to Erika Nebelung (CARE Berlin), July 2, 1951, Charles Rhind Joy Papers, Box 48, Andover-Harvard Theological Library, Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, MA.

erenced, for example, the tireless work of the West German relief council of the Lutheran Churches, the Evangelisches Hilfswerk, for East German refugees, which again evoked the idea of religiosity as an antidote to and a savior from totalitarianism.[71] Joy's work was indicative of a larger trend in the postwar U.S. to intrinsically connect a sense of missionary activism, both religiously and politically, to the country's role as an occupation power in Germany and as a herald of democracy across the globe.

Understood in this context, the fact that the members of the Ohio Girls' Club sent their packages to Germany rather than to another country was by no means coincidental. By aiding religious institutions in Germany, they confirmed domestic standards of femininity, expressed pride in their country's religious traditions, and, at the same time, contributed to Germany's democratic rehabilitation. Their relief efforts highlight the intricate connection between U.S. political objectives, public debates, CARE's media outreach, and individual donor profiles in the creation of humanitarian motivations. In this postwar dynamic, food packages became a way to spread the gospel.

Despite the career paths many members of the Ohio Girls' Club were taking, their religiously motivated humanitarian engagement attested to their consciousness for the roles they were expected to inhabit. They expressed piety, purity, and faith as cornerstones of idealized U.S. American femininity. Churches offered them an opportunity for social engagement, yet one that never challenged an established gender order as it separated female activism from the male domains of politics and labor. Club members demonstrated that they were aware of their socially expected place, which they did not set out to challenge. The club's profile as a recreational assembly provided a safe space for its members to come together in a socially accepted way that projected the image of expected female behavior to the outside.

Being unchallenging as well as unchallenged, the members of the Ohio Girls' Club, not unlike the women from the Halcyon Club, would use the self-imposed boundaries of their assemblies to practice political activism without publicly threatening a status quo. Within the socially accepted confines of religious charity, they discovered a meaningful way to participate in and shape the engagement of the United States in postwar Europe and, particularly, in Germany. Hence, religious aid served the same ambiguous interrelation of domestic and international concerns that the members of the Halcyon Club cultivated through their adherence to CARE's consumerist profile.

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71 Joy, Press Release on Germany, August 31, 1951, Charles Joy Papers, Box 48. For another use of Christian symbolism to justify German aid, see also Joy, "The Other Oberammergau," reprinted from *Zions Herald*, April 11, 1951, CARE Records, Box 1007.

By drawing clear connections between prevalent domestic and international discourses, both clubs expressed strikingly similar ideas of how aid could further their social and political significance, domestically as well as internationally. To assume that they only provided aid to claim a position as agents in their country's transatlantic interests would nonetheless distort the purpose of their engagement. The members of both clubs further used CARE to fulfill very personal desires that had no transatlantic implications. That is, they were grounded in domestic concerns that stemmed from their different membership profiles. For both the Halcyon and the Ohio Girls' Club, CARE also offered members a way to reconcile their personal understandings and public perceptions of social status.

It may seem odd for women's clubs to make use of the rather private business of humanitarian aid to renegotiate their members' social status. Sending CARE packages was, after all, not an action that promised much domestic visibility. Unlike large-scale local philanthropy that might put the donor's name above the entrance of a library, hospital, or museum, foreign aid held no such promise because it left the domestic sphere and directed visibility outward, not inward. Yet, CARE's media image and mode of operation again made this concern obsolete. In its branding as an endeavor to bring about an international community, CARE blurred the lines between the domestic and the foreign. Sending a package of familiar goods to a designated recipient resembled a gesture of welcoming somebody into the community – much like a gift basket or a homemade pie for the new neighbors across the street. Such courtesies signified hospitality and status, laying the foundation for future reciprocal relations. In evoking notions of a transatlantic neighborhood, CARE internationalized a tradition that women in the postwar U. S. practiced on the community level.

This notion of humanitarian aid as a reflection of the donor's self-understanding and social status reverberated in the engagement of the Ohio Girls' Club as well. As the club was comprised mostly of working and unmarried women, many of its members defied the dominant tropes of postwar female domesticity as presented in *Eavesdropping.* Embodying a societal exception rather than a rule, they used their club as a platform to express mutual solidarity. In the winter of 1948, the chairperson of the club's Welfare Committee, Adah Fink, received a letter from club member Kathryn Luginbuhl. Sometime in the mid-1930s, Luginbuhl had taken a trip to Germany. On the Zugspitze, the country's highest mountain in southern Bavaria, she had lost her luggage but was fortunate to run into a group of university students well versed in the English language who were able to relocate her belongings. Luginbuhl had stayed in touch with Hermann Baum, one of the students, until the beginning of the war put an end to their correspondence. Not knowing if Baum had survived the war, she was delighted when he reached out to her in 1948. Baum had just returned from three years of Soviet war captivity and was living with his sick

mother in the city of Leverkusen in the British zone. As Baum had spent his time as a prisoner of war working in coal mines and was still recovering from it, he asked Kathryn Luginbuhl for material assistance for himself and his aging mother. Luginbuhl, who was already sending CARE packages to acquaintances in France, asked the Ohio Girls' Club to take on the task of aiding Baum. The club agreed, and Baum received his CARE package in the spring of 1949.[72]

Kathryn Luginbuhl's was not the only case in which a club member's visit or relation to Germany sparked the Ohio Girls' Club's humanitarian engagement. Since the end of the war, quite a few members had come into contact with the recently defeated enemy. Club member Louise Mithoff had left for Germany in 1946 to work for the War Department. Dorothea Darmody, whose husband was stationed in the U.S. zone, had opened a kindergarten in the city of Darmstadt together with other military wives, and the club regularly supplied funds for this venture.[73] Upon their return to the United States, these women shared their experiences with the club, prepared slide shows of photographs they had taken, and brought back gifts like Meissen china or dolls in traditional Bavarian garments. While the stories they told were certainly selective and primarily focused on a picturesque display of German customs, it is safe to assume that poverty featured in these accounts as well. Had it not, the Ohio girls would hardly have taken up humanitarian aid. CARE thus became a way for the club to ease suffering while sharing in the experiences of members who had traveled abroad.

One apt example is that of Helen Huber, who had been the club's president from mid-1948 until the spring of 1950; she was truly a prime example of an Ohio girl. During World War II, she had enlisted in the Women's Army Corps and was stationed at a hospital in Fort Sam Houston, Texas, until October 1946.[74] After that, the native of Cincinnati returned to DC to work for the Federal Communications Commission.[75] Helen Huber had German roots, which was not uncommon for somebody coming from a city that boasted one of the largest German-American populations of the Midwest.[76] In July 1950, she went on a trip to visit distant family members who were scattered widely across the British zone and the GDR. Five years after the end of the war, many

72 Letter from Kathryn Luginbuhl to the Ohio Girls' Club, November 12, 1948; order for a CARE package by the club to Hermann Baum, December 8, 1948; response to the club by Baum, March 21, 1949, OGC Records, Box 1. For the rather limited biographical information on Kathryn Luginbuhl and her family, see "470 Get Diplomas at Central High," *The Evening Star*, June 21, 1923, 20; "P.C. Luginbuhl Retires from Income Tax Post," *The Sunday Star*, January 4, 1948, A-10.

73 *Buckeye Briefs*, November 1946 and November 1947, OGC Records, Box 4.

74 *Buckeye Briefs*, January and November 1946, OGC Records, Box 4.

75 *Buckeye Briefs*, September 1948, OGC Records, Box 4.

76 Katja Wüstenbecker, *Deutsch-Amerikaner im Ersten Weltkrieg: US-Politik und nationale Identitäten im Mittleren Westen* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2007), 13–14.

of her cousins, especially those living in East Germany, still suffered greatly under postwar hardships. Upon her return, Huber asked the club for support. Being a career woman, a former club president, and, on top of that, an honorably discharged member of the U. S. Army, Helen Huber was an ideal member who confirmed the club's understanding of womanhood. Not surprisingly, the club sent a total of sixteen CARE packages to ten of Huber's family members and friends over the next year.[77]

Interestingly, the club members never communicated their professional profiles to their recipients, despite the pride they took in them. Rather, contact to aid recipients helped the members of the Ohio Girls' Club to consolidate the club's public image as a society that followed accepted social standards of femininity and recreation. Beneficiaries frequently expressed an interest in learning more about the club or about U. S. American culture at large. That was also the case with Kathryn Luginbuhl's German acquaintance Hermann Baum, who not only shared his hardships in a thank-you letter but asked his donors to tell him "something abaout [sic] the Ohio Girls [sic] Club, as I am really interested to hear something about it and about your life over there." Baum received a response from Adah Fink, who explained to him that they were "a social group" that had "good times meeting people who come from the same section of the country that we do." Fink also pointed out that the club had been founded "to provide entertainment for the boys of Ohio who were here at that time – during the first world war [sic]."[78] With her response to Baum, Fink presented the same image of her club that its members nurtured publicly. She neglected the fact that most of them were unmarried professionals, of whom some had even contributed to the war effort, but instead highlighted the feminine qualities of an elite social group with enough time to spare to entertain "the boys." The Ohio girls used the CARE packages and ensuing correspondence as a new ritual to confirm and cultivate their public image and social position.

Similar dynamics are also visible in the aid of the Halcyon Club. For its members, reading out thank-you letters from recipients became a substitute ritual for the lavish displays of food that the club had abandoned in favor of humanitarian engagement. Clare Jones Webb, who had been a member of Halcyon since 1915 and whose husband was professor for literature at Duke University, had taken on the role of coordinator of the club's CARE efforts.[79] Whenever a new letter came in, it was Jones Webb who would read it before

77 Ohio Girls' Club orders to CARE on July 17 and September 11, 1950, January 8, February 9, and March 5, 1951; letters from several members of the Schindler family and other relatives of Helen Huber's to Ohio Girls' Club, October 3, September 10, and December 9, 1950, February 19, April 8, March 4, March 26, and October 26, 1951, OGC Records, Box 1.

78 Correspondence between Adah Fink and Hermann Baum, March 21 – July 19, 1949, OGC Records, Box 1.

79 See Halcyon's centennial notebook, Halcyon Records, Box 1.

the group. At their October 1948 meeting, a year after the decision to follow Truman's plea, the club read out the first thank-you letter it had received from a German recipient: Else Röttgen lived in the city of Münster in the British zone. She had six children, her youngest daughter had been suffering from a lung disease for the last two years while her husband, a former government clerk, was incapacitated and out of work. Röttgen attached two photos – one of her daughter Ingeborg and one of her son Willy – which circulated the room while Jones Webb read her letter. Apparently touched by Röttgen's sincere gratitude for receiving "a gift from strangers on the other side of the sea," the club carried a motion "to keep refreshments simple and to continue Care packages."[80] This way, donating through CARE became a form of affirmation for club members in two regards. It affirmed their role as respectable women engaging in activities that imbued their club with meaning and justified their monthly meeting beyond mere recreation. It also proved that they could interact with distant others in ways that conveyed and preserved their self-understanding through goodwill before an international audience.

Congruent with the overall trend in CARE's development, both clubs discontinued their aid to Germany in the early 1950s. Confirming their awareness of their political influence as consumers, the Halcyon women redirected their focus and kept their aid up to date with geopolitical developments. They donated to South Korea in 1951, at the height of the Korean War, and then moved with the U.S. government's increasing focus on development in the Third World by donating to India and Pakistan in the mid-1950s.[81] The members of the Ohio Girls' Club discontinued their aid after a delivery of nine packages in September 1951. Eight of those packages again went to Germany, while one was destined for Korea.[82] For a club that was politically motivated to some extent, it seems odd that it discontinued aid at a moment when Korea developed into a new Cold War battleground. The reason, it seems, was simply that members did not identify with South Koreans. Just like Germany, South Korea had been occupied by the U.S. Army, but it was neither a Christian-dominated country, nor did any of the Ohio members have familial or amicable relations to its people. Koreans, to put it bluntly, were cultural and racial "others." What is more, the Ohio girls never received a personal response from their Korean beneficiaries. In the midst of war, one could hardly blame the recipients for their inaction. But the silence on the other side deprived the women of the chance to communicate across a distance and to share their thoughts, beliefs,

80 Thank-you letter from Else Röttgen to the Halcyon Club, May 30, 1948, Halcyon Records, Box 7; meeting minutes, October 1948 [exact date unspecified], Halcyon Records, Box 5.

81 Meeting minutes, March 1, 1951; April and May 1955, Halcyon Records, Box 5.

82 Leona P. Shields, Chairman, Welfare Committee, Ohio Girls' Club, CARE packages sent during the calendar year 1951, OGC Records, Box 1.

and profiles. Without this possibility, CARE packages no longer provided the women with the ideological reference points central to the club's engagement.

* * *

In a second installment, *Eavesdropping* crosses the Atlantic into the apartment of Bob Williamson and his family in Paris. Although Bob makes a decent salary working for a U. S. company in the French capital, postwar destitution affects him and his family just as much as everyone else. It confuses Bob that he has not received a CARE package from his brother in a long time because "there isn't anything he wouldn't do to help us out." But his wife points out that John "doesn't understand that over here money can't buy the things in the CARE packages." At this moment, their son rushes in with a letter from his uncle. "I didn't realize that the CARE packages we have been sending were too few and far between," John apologizes. "Mary and her mother have just given me a very graphic demonstration of how little 'yesterday's' dinner means today." He promises to send another package immediately. "Thank you, John … Thank you, CARE," Bob's wife utters as the scene closes with musical arrangements.[83]

Interestingly, Bob and his family do not thank Mary and Mrs. Williamson but only John, who becomes the quintessential "uncle from America." Although, in the first installment, she had discussed the matter with her daughter and developed an elaborate plan to convince John to donate to the cause, Mrs. Williamson remained confined within domestic and passive ideals of postwar femininity. She did not directly demand action so that John would not dismiss her demands as too forceful. In doing so, Mrs. Williamson became the agent of her family's humanitarian engagement not despite her passivity but because of it. *Eavesdropping* clearly defined the ambiguous role women were supposed to play in humanitarian aid: participatory yet never on the frontlines, supportive rather than active, and, most importantly, never stepping outside the boundaries of idealized postwar femininity. The cases of the Halcyon Literary Club and the Ohio Girls' Club were not that different from Mrs. Williamson's. Neither club tried to garner public acknowledgement for their aid, although the Ohio Girls' Club, especially, made frequent appearances in the social sections of Washington newspapers. Charity was simply not their primary purpose. Both clubs were social societies, designed to bring women together in recreational or community-building activities that followed and confirmed ideals of female domesticity. This largely rendered the women and their actions invisible, but like Mrs. Williamson, they found ways to exert influence.

As charity was only a secondary purpose of both clubs, it confirmed the centrality of doing good to female self-understanding in postwar U. S. soci-

83 Production sheet for radio program *Eavesdropping*, part 2 of 2, ca. August–September 1948, CARE Records, Box 919.

ety. No matter the profile of a women's organization, giving was considered a mandatory action – something one must do to perform a vital role in and for society – even if only on a small scale. Both clubs nurtured rather conservative and elitist public profiles as white and middle-class assemblies – whereby they mirrored the donor ideal that CARE presented in the media – that inhabited a sphere of recreation and presumably feminine activities such as literature and arts. But transnational humanitarianism became a means for these women to find common ground with one other, to justify the usefulness of their coming together, and to confirm their role as actors in transatlantic politics. In their giving, they did not publicly defy tropes of domesticity. Rather, they reappropriated these tropes and expanded their meaning to establish a space for women's social and political engagement. In this engagement, outbound motivations to ease suffering and to spread certain benchmarks of U.S. democratic culture fused with the inbound desire for social consolidation and recognition. Together, they created an interface at which postwar feminine ideals met notions of activism.

4 – Workers' Bellies, Workers' Minds: The American Federation of Labor and the Quest for German Unionism

In November 1948, Dr. Herbert Bachmann from Munich wrote a thank-you letter for a CARE package he had just received. Bachmann expressed his deepest gratitude for this "precious gift" but remarked: "As the food situation has bettered in the US zone considerably, your gift allowed me to assist friends in the Sowjet [sic] zone who are very much in need."[1] The gift that Bachmann referred to had come from the American Federation of Labor – the largest trade union association in the United States with over eight million members and thousands of associated unions. Bachmann, who was the secretary for economic and social policy at the Bavarian Trade Union Federation when he wrote his letter, was only one of almost two thousand West German labor unionists who received CARE packages from the AFL. Between 1947 and the mid-1950s, the federation provided humanitarian funds on a gigantic scale, sending roughly five hundred packages per month to organized workers in West Germany.

Like all the thousands of thank-you letters that the AFL received, Bachmann's letter landed in New York on the desk of Jay Lovestone. Since 1944, Lovestone was the executive secretary of the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), the AFL's office of international cooperation. Although Lovestone's office tirelessly answered all these expressions of gratitude, Herbert Bachmann never received a response. After a month had passed, Lovestone's secretary in-

1 Letter from Herbert Bachmann to the Labor League for Human Rights [welfare branch of the AFL], November 3, 1948, George Meany Memorial AFL-CIO Archive, RG18–003, Box 17, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Maryland Libraries, College Park, MD, USA (hereafter GMMA).

stead addressed a short and aggressively written letter to the office responsible for the CARE donations and demanded to "immediately take off Dr. Herbert Bachmann […] from your German CARE food parcel list. He is, under no circumstances, to receive any parcels in the future."[2]

Bachmann's letter had indeed suggested that he was no longer in dire need of humanitarian attention while many other German unionists were living on the brink of starvation. Taking him off the recipient list seemed like an appropriate consequence. But the harsh instruction to "under no circumstances" send him "any parcels in the future" suggests that something about Bachmann or his actions had infuriated Lovestone so much that, even if his personal circumstances were to change dramatically for the worse, the AFL was never to support him again. What exactly had he done wrong to evoke such a reaction?

The AFL did not distribute CARE packages at random. Fascism and war had destroyed union movements all over Europe, which now desperately needed material and psychological support from abroad. But a new enemy was lurking in the east, ready to capture the hearts and minds of the continent's starving workers. As signs of solidarity, the CARE parcels were supposed to aid the federation in its endeavor to rebuild a democratic union landscape that could withstand both right- and left-wing extremism. This plan included not only Germany but also France, Italy, Austria, and the Benelux states (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg) – countries with diverse labor landscapes and varyingly strong tendencies to succumb to unfavorable ideologies. In this heated postwar climate, with workers scattered across the spectrum of political inclinations, only those who proved to be faithful democrats and were willing to rebuild their local unions in ways that corresponded to U. S. political ideas were deemed worthy of the AFL's humanitarian attention.

Bachmann certainly fit this profile. Born into a Munich-based Jewish family, he had spent the interwar period working for several trade associations until Hitler's ascent to power forced him to emigrate to Switzerland. Returning to Munich in 1946, he immediately followed his interwar calling and started working for the Bavarian labor movement. Not only had Bachmann endured much Nazi repression, but his work history certified him as a devoted labor activist. On paper, he matched the AFL's criteria in every way. But a closer look at the federation's postwar humanitarian engagement, and particularly at the people behind it, reveals a multifaceted story of control, rivalry, and, above all, fierce anticommunism. Lovestone's furious reaction to Bachmann stemmed not from his background, but from his decision to share the package with friends in the Soviet zone – outside of the federation's reach and inside Stalin's orbit of power.

2 Ann Larkin [secretary to Jay Lovestone] to Helen Greiff [Labor League for Human Rights], December 6, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.

To understand how and why the AFL utilized CARE as a form of international involvement, it is important to focus on both the biographies and actions of Jay Lovestone and his staff at the FTUC as the people who decisively shaped their organization's humanitarian engagement and, with it, its political agenda. They pursued their objectives on three consecutive and intertwined levels: First, the packages were supposed to contribute to a thorough reconstruction of the German union landscape, and its members were to realize that their future lay in a liberal democratic consensus and cooperation with their brothers and sisters in the United States. Second, the packages were to increase international support for AFL policies that gave the federation leeway in negotiating with the U.S. government and the U.S. military authorities in Germany – a context in which the AFL's liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the late 1940s and early 1950s cannot be neglected. And third, CARE packages were to fend off Soviet government control of the German and international labor networks. This also meant weakening the position of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) that, as the AFL's strongest domestic labor competitor, sought to cooperate with unions from the USSR on the international stage. The AFL, this chapter will show, gained just as much from humanitarian aid as its German recipients did, if not even more.

Even though the CARE engagement of both the AFL and the CIO has not gone unnoticed in the scholarly literature, most works mention the program only briefly within the larger context of U.S. American international labor affairs. In doing so, they disregard the multifaceted effects that humanitarian aid had on the federation's domestic power and on U.S.-German labor relations.[3] The federation would not have had the means to directly spread its liberal-democratic labor ideology in the complicated terrain of postwar Germany had it not been for Lovestone's relentless efforts to underline the AFL's dedication

3 For brief mentions of the AFL's humanitarian engagement in postwar Germany, see Julia Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*: *Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 127; Quenby Hughes, *"In the Interest of Democracy": The Rise and Fall of the Early Cold War Alliance Between the American Federation of Labor and the Central Intelligence Agency* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011), 85–86, 93; Michael Fichter, *Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften*: *Zur Entwicklung und Anwendung der US-Gewerkschaftspolitik in Deutschland 1944–1948* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1982), 215–16; Roy Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*: *The AFL as a Transnational Force* (New York: Crane Russak and Co, 1976), 3–4, 110; Horst Lademacher, "Konfrontation an der Nahtstelle des Ost-West-Konflikts: Aktivitäten in den westlichen Besatzungszonen," in *Gewerkschaften im Ost-West-Konflikt: Die Politik der American Federation of Labor im Europa der Nachkriegszeit*, ed. Angelos Augustidēs et al. (Melsungen: Schwartz, 1982), 28–30, 49, 62; Werner Link, *Deutsche und amerikanische Gewerkschaften und Geschäftsleute 1945–1975*: *Eine Studie über transnationale Beziehungen* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1978), 58–59; Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1969), 333, 337; Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie,* 253; Philip Taft, *Defending Freedom*: *American Labor and Foreign Affairs* (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1973), 81–82.

with material support. Both organizations formed a symbiotic relationship. CARE opened doors to direct communication with unionists in remote corners of the country that would otherwise have been unreachable. The AFL, in turn, shaped and willingly disseminated the same ideas of liberal internationalism and anticommunism that were inherent to CARE's media image. But the federation's engagement also fortified an asymmetrical power dynamic between donor and recipient. It provided psychological encouragement and material reward for appropriate behavior that could be easily withdrawn in case of disobedience and that could, if need be, bypass official political channels altogether. In CARE, Lovestone and the AFL found a way to directly refashion German labor in their own image.

* * *

When Wallace Campbell and his partners set out to gather the financial means that would persuade UNRRA to hand over the original 10-in-1 rations, the AFL was among the first to become one of CARE's original founding members, contributing US$ 15,000 to the organization's starting capital.[4] This eagerness for humanitarian engagement was the result of a consensus among AFL decision makers that their foreign policy of the interwar period had been a complete failure. From the sidelines, the federation had watched fascist regimes suppress union movements in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Only in 1938, after Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco had firmly established control over organized labor in their countries, had they begun to assist unionists from Axis countries who had found exile in Britain, the U.S., and Scandinavia.[5] Tardy as it was, this engagement aptly reflected the timidity of the AFL's leadership to engage in any foreign matters. The federation had occasionally sought to cooperate with European labor since the late nineteenth century, but no coherent foreign policy agenda had ever emerged.[6] Suspicion and estrangement, rather than internationalist verve, had characterized the AFL's unimpressive international record up to the late 1930s.

Organized labor in the U.S. and Germany, it seemed, shared little common ground for cooperation. The AFL had always pursued a nonradical agenda that

4 Pamphlet *Highlights of Labor's Foreign Relief Program from 1940 to the End of 1946*, ca. early 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 16.

5 Relief efforts for exiled unionists were undertaken by the Labor League for Human Rights. By the end of the war, the LLHR had rescued hundreds of European labor leaders, many of them Jews, from totalitarian oppression. Much of this happened in cooperation with the Jewish Labor Committee, a labor body that specifically lobbied for the interest of American Jewish workers. Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 62–63. For detailed profiles of German unionists in exile in the U.S. and Great Britain, their networks, and ideologies, see Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 252–69, 467–68.

6 For an overview of AFL activity in Europe until World War I, see Taft, *Defending Freedom*, 7–16.

was never outspokenly socialist but relied on close cooperation with the state. It was driven by workers' interests within the logics of economic and political liberalism, which it aimed to improve yet not to fundamentally change. Liberal unionism emphasized social plurality and the freedom of the individual, which should be protected from a collective and state-enforced will.[7] In most European countries, including Weimar Germany, unionists tended towards socialism and traditionally opposed political and economic liberalism. Freedom meant economic equality, which subordinated the individual to a collective cause and relied on the traditional Marxist thought of historical materialism to eventually overturn the capitalist system.[8] Regarding these ideologies as irreconcilable, the AFL's leadership had abstained from forming alliances with its European counterparts. In 1925, the federation even withdrew from the International Federation of Trade Unions – the only existing supranational labor body at the time – practically leaving U. S. labor without a voice in world affairs.[9]

But priorities among the AFL leadership shifted with the onset of World War II. Since the Great Depression, ever more U. S. workers had come to appreciate organized labor's support in an unstable and unpredictable free market. The federation's membership numbers rose from two million to almost eight million workers, which considerably increased its domestic political power.[10] This newfound leeway in national matters also brought a different perspective to international engagement. Labor leaders now began to share a concern that had gained increasing prominence among U. S. public and political figures alike: Had they only gotten involved in European affairs soon enough, they might have prevented the continent's workers from falling into fascist hands.[11] What the Treaty of Versailles and refusal to join the League of Nations had been for the U. S. government, withdrawal from the International Federation of Trade Unions had been for the AFL. It was a failure to assume international responsibility that might have prevented another war. As a result, trade unions and the government now followed almost congruent international agendas. They believed in the responsibility of the United States to avoid the isolationist mistakes of the interwar years and to spread U. S. American political culture as a universally beneficial system that guaranteed wealth and stability at home and abroad. Now the AFL sought to establish free unions that accepted liberal democracy as a prerogative for such political stability.[12]

7 Fichter, *Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften*, 36–37.
8 For a detailed analysis of the ideological differences between German and U. S. American organized labor, see Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 49–50, 119–20; Speech by Irving Brown before the American Club, February 17, 1949, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 11.
9 Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 5.
10 Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 32–33.
11 Hughes, *"In the Interest of Democracy,"* 55–57.
12 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 102–23.

But decades of isolation from Europe had left the federation in need of a competent international staff. In 1944, a US$1 million fund from the AFL established the Free Trade Union Committee as a new office within the federation's organizational structure to support noncommunist and democratic unions in postwar Europe.[13] The FTUC was supposed to handle all communication with international unions, familiarize them with the AFL's ideology, modus operandi, its agenda in the labor movement at home and abroad, and its attempts to further this agenda on a policy level. The FTUC thus became the AFL's de facto international intelligence service, gathering information on labor activities in Europe, Asia, and Latin America and steering their futures in unobtrusive ways. This made the AFL the first national union to ever establish international offices.[14]

Rather than at AFL headquarters in DC, the FTUC set up camp at the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union in New York City, headed by David Dubinsky. The Russian-Jewish émigré and former socialist, who had developed a strong anticommunist bent in the interwar period, was the one who pointed the AFL's secretary treasurer and later president George Meany towards Jay Lovestone,[15] who, as the son of a Polish rabbi, had regional and cultural heritage that closely overlapped with Dubinsky's. Lovestone, too, had been a founding member of the American Communist Party in 1919 and a dedicated communist for many years. Over the years, estrangement with Stalin's redirection of the Comintern and, finally, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the governments of the USSR and Nazi Germany in 1939 led Lovestone to relinquish his communist beliefs, which he no longer deemed compatible with U.S. political culture.[16] He now made a turn towards the U.S. American labor movement, finding shelter with Dubinsky and quickly climbing up the ladder as the AFL's advisor on international labor affairs. In 1944, he became the executive secretary of the newly formed FTUC.[17] It was because of Lovestone's knowledge of Soviet communism, and his conviction that psychological

13 Fichter, *Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften*, 39; Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 36–37; Hughes, *"In the Interest of Democracy,"* 58–60.

14 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 132; Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 37.

15 Hughes, *"In the Interest of Democracy,"* 62.

16 For a thorough analysis of Lovestone's development towards communist opposition of the interwar period and the early war years, see Robert J. Alexander, *The Right Opposition: The Lovestoneites and the International Communist Opposition of the 1930s* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981). See also Clarence Taylor, *Reds at the Blackboard: Communism, Civil Rights, and the New York City Teachers Union* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 13–14.

17 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 124–27; Fichter, *Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften*, 40–41; Hughes, *"In the Interest of Democracy,"* 21–37; Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, 308–309; Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 52–53.

warfare was crucial to its containment, that CARE packages made their way onto the committee's agenda.[18]

In this context, Germany's postwar labor landscape made for a potentially powerful ally. In November 1946, a study by the U.S. military government found that, between 1928 and 1933, organized labor had been by far the least supportive voters' group for the NSDAP in Germany.[19] In 1946, seventy-four percent of organized laborers favored democracy over any other political system, compared to only forty-nine percent of the overall German population.[20] The State Department counted the German labor movement among the most promising partners to assist in Germany's democratic reorientation. Rehabilitating the country meant strengthening a large and decidedly antifascist force.[21] The AFL estimated in 1948 that over four million workers had come together in unions in the Western zones since the end of the war.[22] The sheer numbers made these unionists a desirable target of all foreign labor movements with international ambitions that hoped to steer German unions in their ideological direction. For that reason, it is not surprising that German unionists received by far the largest share of the federation's CARE parcels destined for Europe.[23]

Being a CARE member organization, the AFL heavily influenced and promoted CARE's objectives and public profile. With Madeleine Dillon, the federation had its own representative in CARE's donor relations division; she not only handled all correspondence between the AFL, donating member unions, and CARE, but also drafted news releases and gave radio interviews specifically designed to attract attention among U.S. laborers.[24] Such targeted PR served three purposes: it reached an audience whose sheer size offered massive donation output; it actively integrated individual unions and their members into the AFL's foreign agenda; and it presented workers with the notion of international political participation central to CARE's image. In a radio interview in 1952, for example, Dillon said that it "isn't just the food and textiles in the parcels" that were important to the recipients but "the encouragement they bring." For unionists, especially, who "tended to be one of the real democratic forces at work" and were now exposed to "all kinds of political pressures," such packages, Dil-

18 Philip Taft traces the earliest AFL donation to Germany to November 1946. Taft, *Defending Freedom*, 81–82.

19 Albert H. Berman [Manpower Division, OMGUS], German Labor Unions – Democracy in Action, November 22, 1946, GMMA, RG98–002, Box 18.

20 Merrit and Merrit, eds., *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany*, 85.

21 Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie*, 252–53.

22 Report on the Labor situation in Germany by Arnold Zempel, ca. 1948, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53.

23 See several lists of donations divided by recipient country in 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 6.

24 See the press release for the *Carpenters and Builders Journal* of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America on apprentice kits for West Germany and Austria, August 13, 1952; Thanksgiving radio shorts for the AFL, October 11, 1950, CARE Records, Box 904; CARE brochure and news release for unionists, ca. 1948, CARE Records, Box 943.

lon maintained, offered the material and psychological relief they needed to make politically sound decisions rather than falling for populist promises.[25] Dillon's message summoned two central aspects of CARE's image: First, humanitarian aid aimed to enable organized workers to engage in a uniquely U. S. American internationalism practiced by the people and for the people. Second, and not coincidentally, her words echoed the instrumentalization of packages as anticommunist propaganda that CARE and the Advertising Council had adopted at the onset of the Korean War. Through its status as a member agency, this shows, the AFL shaped CARE's public image and used it specifically to mobilize its own member base.

The result of this outreach was impressive engagement by individual unions and their members. Some specifically directed their aid toward overseas peers of the same profession, as, for example, the United Textile Workers of America did for young textile workers in Germany in 1951.[26] Such engagement shows how keenly unionists responded to CARE's mode of operation, which fulfilled desires for self-identification by selecting a recipient group that aligned with donors' personal beliefs and experiences. Others would simply send packages to Madeleine Dillon with the request that she find suitable recipients in the German labor movement, upon which Dillon would inquire about worthy recipients within the FTUC and its extensive network of international contacts. The undesignated orders that arrived at CARE headquarters in ever greater quantities in 1948 were a major source of income. The AFL had been among the member agencies that had initially opposed the distribution of undesignated packages, showing that the federation prioritized targeted access to a desired recipient group over seemingly universal ideas of help for the needy.[27] Yet, Lovestone soon came to value the large share of undesignated orders, which were equally disseminated among member agencies, allowing them to label the packages with their own address and to distribute them at will.[28] Through the engagement of member unions and the FTUC's own budget, the AFL became one of CARE's most constant donors during the organization's first decade of

25 Interview with Madeleine Dillon and Ruth Shortell [CARE], WEVD radio station, November 12, 1952, CARE Records, Box 904. Dillon would appear in several of such interviews, especially during the early 1950s. Most of them aired on the left-leaning station WEVD, which had been founded by the Socialist Party of America and with considerable union support during the 1920s. See the panel discussion *The AF of L and Foreign Relief*, WEVD radio station, March 11, 1953, CARE Records, Box 904.

26 Press release: CARE Food Gifts from AF of L Local Helps German Workers, September 26, 1951, CARE Records, Box 900.

27 Matthew Woll to Murray Lincoln, June 9, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 16.

28 See the correspondence between Jay Lovestone (FTUC), Helen Greiff (LLHR), Reginald Kennedy (LLHR), and CARE representatives in spring 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 6.

existence, supplying five hundred packages monthly to over three times the number of German unionists.[29]

Lovestone was the central and most decisive figure in this humanitarian endeavor. The FTUC's executive secretary filled key positions in the organization with long-time companions who would follow his ideological lead. His right hand and leading international functionary was Irving Brown. A Bronx native, Brown had been part of Lovestone's communist opposition in the 1930s and had gathered prior labor experience within the AFL before the FTUC hired him to leave for Europe in 1945. Brown established his office in Brussels, where he was soon joined by his wife Lillie – Lovestone's Berlin-born former secretary of Hungarian descent. Within the next few years, Brown had traveled all European countries west of the Iron Curtain and forged ties with noncommunist labor leaders, governments, and every Marshall Plan administrator and U. S. ambassador in Europe.[30]

Brown officially oversaw all the committee's operations in Western Europe, but the West German situation demanded intensive care. The German American Henry Rutz, a former socialist and Lovestone's longtime companion, established the FTUC's office in West Germany. Rutz had returned to the land of his ancestors with the U. S. Army in 1944 to become Manpower Chief for the region of Wuerttemberg-Baden in the U. S. occupation zone, where he communicated between U. S. government interests and the fledgling German union movement. His command of the German language and extensive knowledge of labor circles brought the AFL an advantage in international union politics as they had a man stationed across the Atlantic who intimately knew the local labor scene.[31]

With their diverse migrant backgrounds, knowledge of European cultures, and extensive linguistic repertoires, Rutz and the Browns could easily move within the transatlantic theater, making them the ideal diplomats for the AFL's international agenda. They were the ones who supplied Lovestone with the names of potential CARE recipients they had met on their journeys in Germany. Others had been recommended to them by the German Labor Welfare Council, the Arbeiterwohlfahrt, and the German Red Cross.[32] With a talented

29 The FTUC received considerable funds from the AFL budget. The AFL provided capital of US$ 6,200 in 1947, increasing this to US$ 25,000 in 1948 and as high as US$ 55,000 in 1955. Additionally, individual member unions redirected parts of their budgets to the FTUC, amounting to over US$ 160,000 in 1947. See Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 125, Taft, *Defending Freedom*, 71–73. On the number of packages distributed in Germany, see Lademacher, "Konfrontation an der Nahtstelle des Ost-West-Konflikts," 37.

30 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 129–30; Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 37–38; Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer*, 53.

31 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 130–31, 181–82; Fichter, *Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften*, 123; Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 39.

32 See Henry Rutz to George Meany, June 17, 1947, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53.

staff and a closely-knit network of foreign correspondents and local administrators, Lovestone had created a well-functioning foreign aid machinery.

* * *

As soon as CARE reached its shipping agreements with the three Western military governments, the AFL began a targeted campaign for the stomachs and minds of Germany's organized laborers. Each incoming thank-you letter crossed the desk of Lovestone, who soon realized the immense promotional potential that came with this form of correspondence. German workers were starving – both for food and for recognition – and twelve years of Nazi rule had destroyed the institutional structures of their unions, which now lacked material, office space, and funds. Many unionists had spent the years of Nazism underground or in concentration camps. A gift from their union brothers and sisters overseas, their liberators, whom they could now directly correspond with, meant more than just material relief. It was a source of comfort – an opportunity for recognition, material assistance, and psychological remedy.

Many recipients testified to the moral support they had experienced through the expressions of solidarity from peers abroad. "For someone like me who arbitrarily suffered for years under the Nazi terror in prisons and concentration camps for demanding nothing but justice," wrote recipient Carl Heumann from Bremerhaven in September 1947, "it is most soothing when recognition comes from a faraway association that speaks up for the human right."[33] In CARE, as Heumann's words confirmed, Lovestone had found a convenient way of expressing U. S. American commitment in a seemingly non-propagandistic way as it was, after all, a contribution to the existing needs of its audience.

The exchange facilitated through the CARE packages proved to be the best international marketing the AFL could hope for. "Although the donars [sic] of the packages may have been organizations other than the A. F. of L.," remarked Henry Rutz to George Meany, "the recipients nevertheless appreciate the A. F. of L.'s assistance in routing the packages to a group which is seldom serviced by the two German religious relief organizations and the German Red Cross."[34] In responding to recipients, Lovestone accordingly expressed all the generosity he possibly could on behalf of the U. S. labor movement. "We feel that the best reward of our work of solidarity is the work done on behalf of our common ideals of democracy and free labor by the persons to whom our parcels are sent," he wrote to a recipient in March 1949.[35] At other times, Lovestone would remark that CARE packages were "gifts of the American working people," and that he himself was "only a channel through whom these expressions of sym-

33 Carl Heumann to Jay Lovestone [all translations by the author unless otherwise noted], September 29, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.
34 Rutz to Meany, February 26, 1949, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53.
35 Lovestone to Kurt Hujer, March 4, 1949, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 18.

pathy and solidarity are manifested to your war-wrecked labor movement and nation."[36]

This reciprocity resulted in a symbiotic relationship that served both donor and recipient, albeit in very different ways. "The CARE packages are a god-sent [sic], especially during this present food crisis," reported Henry Rutz in February 1948.[37] While the material and psychological relief for the recipients was undoubtedly tremendous, Lovestone profited from the CARE packages as an indispensable source of first-hand information. Many recipients poured out their hearts for the "colleague-like help [that] bids fair, that your trade union organization as well as your nation are willing to help us in a democratic way."[38] They told stories of suppression, suffering, and lives on the run, or they sent pictures of themselves and their families. Many recipients offered detailed reports of their living conditions and the state of their local labor movement, or they would provide information on the food supply, infrastructure, and the situation of Eastern refugees. Upon receipt of a CARE package in September 1947, Valentin Buchardt from Wilhelmshaven in the British zone, for example, gave a detailed account of the work of local unions and their lack of equipment. Lovestone replied that he was "especially appreciative to have gotten from you a more intimate picture of the situation in your country."[39] These accounts, coming from all over the Western zones, let Lovestone in on hundreds of debates and events on regional and local levels that would have been impossible to hear about through Brown's and Rutz's manpower alone.

Despite many recipients' desperate need and dire situations, it did not take long for German unionists to understand that the FTUC would reward them for displaying the "correct" political beliefs. In April 1948, Dr. Georg Reuter, who would later become vice president of the the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [the German Federation of Labor], was the secretary general of the Bavarian Trade Union Federation. He wrote Lovestone to request material support for a training center the union planned to open. Reuter was by no means a freeloader overemphasizing his commitment. His longtime work for the Social Democratic Party and his marriage to his Jewish wife had cost him years of Nazi torment in prison or under house arrest. Nonetheless, Reuter had understood the stakes well enough to give a lengthy summary of his engagement before asking Lovestone for support.

He even used his letter to forcefully discredit Dr. Johannes Semler, an officer for economic administration in the Bizone. On January 4, 1948, Semler

36 Lovestone to package recipient Marie Seib, December 10, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.
37 Rutz to Meany, February 9, 1948, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53.
38 Package recipient Hans Peter to Jay Lovestone, June 10, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.
39 Correspondence between Lovestone and Valentin Buchardt, September 27 – November 3, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17. See also Jay Lovestone to Heinz Neumann, August 11, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 37.

had openly criticized U. S. food policy and imports into Germany as inadequate for ensuring the country's self-sufficiency. While his grievances were not unfounded and even supported the arguments that Lucius D. Clay had made for over two years, it was an unfortunate word choice that eventually cost Semler his position. He had referred to U. S. corn imports as "chicken fodder," a statement that infuriated Clay but found much resonance among Germans who regarded low and inferior food rations as unjust punishment by the Allies.[40] Reuter was aware that general German public support for Semler's statement shone a very unfavorable light on the Germans as potential alms recipients. He pointed out that he found himself "appalled" by Semler's remarks, which had been an unjustifiable "blow with the fist" for the United States, its people, and its representatives in Germany. He emphasized the invaluable contribution that both state-financed and private U. S. aid had been to German survival after the war. His plan was successful – the training school received a set of CARE packages shortly thereafter.[41]

Reuter was not the only unionist to turn to CARE. Hundreds of unionists would contact Lovestone to express their deep commitment to the democratic cause. Although almost all of them pointed out that their intention was not to beg, they all went on to request CARE packages or other forms of material assistance.[42] Lovestone and his staff were not so naïve as to believe every grand expression of dedication to democracy, but they knew that any unionist they supported also increased their ideological influence. This again revealed the asymmetrical nature of the humanitarian relationship between benefactor and beneficiary, which Lovestone was only too aware of. He could demand loyalty from his recipients either as an expected return or even as a precondition for material assistance. The fact that recipients readily complied in this scheme shows their awareness of the degree of submissiveness they were expected to demonstrate in return for humanitarian assistance.

As word-of-mouth quickly spread the news of U. S. labor support for like-minded unionists abroad, more and more pleas for assistance arrived at the FTUC.[43] Many Germans had read about the AFL's engagement in magazines or had obtained the address from acquaintances who had previously enjoyed a package from the AFL. Irving Brown received hundreds of letters at his Brussels office, as well. Many pleas came from war invalids or refugees from Germany's former eastern territories. "We are flooded with thousands of appeals of this sort," lamented Lovestone to Lillie Brown, "and we simply cannot bay

40 O'Connell, "Weapon of War, Tool of Peace: U. S. Food Diplomacy in Postwar Germany," 262–63.

41 Correspondence between Georg Reuter and Jay Lovestone, March 22 – April 28, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 6.

42 See several letters of request in GMMA, RG18–003, Box 6.

43 See numerous letters in GMMA, RG18–003, Box 6.

[sic] any attention to them because we never can tell who's who."[44] As Lovestone and Brown both operated from afar – one in New York and the other in Brussels – the only one who could check the addressees' credibility was Henry Rutz. Through his contacts to individual unions and the Arbeiterwohlfahrt, which entertained its own chapter in the United States, Rutz could easily perform background checks on those who had approached Lovestone individually. And so, throughout its CARE engagement in postwar Germany, the AFL would direct the majority of its donations to high-ranking union functionaries. There were two reasons for this: First, union functionaries were often worse off than average union members. Workers employed in industrial plants usually received supplementary meals at canteens, while functionaries lived on an average of 1,000 to 1,500 calories.[45] But this was not necessarily the case for all high-ranking union officials, nor did all German workers receive sufficient food at work – especially if they did not work in industry but in the service sector. Second, aid to union officials was more appealing due to their potential influence. If functionaries could be physically strengthened and brought in line with the AFL's international interests, they could exert favorable influence on their union members to give the federation access to German labor policy debates. Hence, men in influential positions, like Georg Reuter, received most of the AFL's attention. "Simple" union members, on the other hand, would only enjoy Lovestone's generosity if their names came to the FTUC through the German labor and welfare landscape.[46] Despite Lovestone's grand gestures of workers' solidarity, he was selective in his choice of audience.

* * *

The decision to help influential union functionaries rather than "simple" workers also gave the AFL a political advantage because it reflected a general debate between the U.S. military authorities and the federation about the future of German unionism. OMGUS was pursuing a top-down approach to reconstructing the German labor landscape. It sought to generate a strong central umbrella organization to channel union activity from the individual federal German states into a single interest group to make German labor controllable, bureaucratically effective, and less vulnerable to corrosion from within. The AFL opposed such centralized reorganization from above and instead favored a federalist approach, grounded in the opinion that the hierarchical structure

44 Lovestone to Lillie Brown, October 11, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 11.
45 Taft, *Defending Freedom*, 81.
46 See, for example, Paul Mohaupt, whose plea for a CARE package included a confirmation of his neediness by the German Red Cross. Paul Mohaupt to the Labor League for Human Rights, March 9, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 6.

of the unions in the Weimar Republic had given workers too little freedom and agency to effectively resist Nazi oppression.[47]

Labor policies in the U.S. and OMGUS changed with growing East-West tension. Already by 1947, policies in Washington and Berlin had begun shifting in an antilabor direction that made the AFL fear for the freedoms of postwar unions at home and abroad. In reaction to strike waves across the U.S. in 1946, Congress had passed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, which seriously limited labor unions in their scope of action by prohibiting politically motivated strikes and labor donations to political campaigns.[48] In Berlin, General Clay interpreted the act as a directive for labor policy in the U.S. zone and set out to limit organized labor activities for their potential leftist threat.[49] Worrying that OMGUS would translate domestic U.S. policies into action abroad, the AFL became increasingly frustrated with what they perceived as Clay's "anti-labor bias," and Rutz lamented that the general did not "give a damn of what organized labor thinks of him either in Germany or in the United States."[50]

The CARE packages served both points of contention between the AFL and policy counterparts in Washington and Berlin. Giving aid specifically to individual unionists in the German federal states strengthened the federation's bonds with local organizations; these, in turn, found a strong partner across the Atlantic who promoted their decentralized agency. Partners on both sides could make use of this relationship to further both their own and each other's interests. German laborers could turn to Lovestone and the AFL in the hope that their influence in Washington would support or prevent certain labor policies within the military government. While the unionists could use their significance in the Cold War struggle as leverage to make demands of their U.S. American counterparts, the AFL welcomed such interventions as they underlined the significance of transnational labor networks to occupation policies. The closer the relationship got, despite its unequal power dynamic, the more influence each side had in furthering its interests before reluctant policymakers.[51] CARE became the direct contact that circumvented the halls of power to establish benevolent communication at a grassroots level.

Even more important than the solidarity that CARE expressed in this context was the uninhibited flow of information between donors and recipients. Lovestone used such information to mobilize his German counterparts for AFL interests. Whenever a thank-you letter arrived with Lovestone, he would

47 Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie*, 251.
48 Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 33.
49 Lademacher, "Konfrontation an der Nahtstelle des Ost-West-Konflikts," 52.
50 Rutz to George Meany, January 19, 1949, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53. On AFL opinion towards OMGUS, HICOG and the antilabor policies of the West German Adenauer administration, see also Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 205–207.
51 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 185–87.

take the opportunity to enrich his response with informational material that the federation produced for both domestic and international readerships. After twelve years of censorship, most German unionists were hungry for free expressions of opinion and welcomed any source of information from abroad. Lovestone put a great deal of hope in the thousands of copies of bills, declarations, and announcements that the AFL had fashioned for the U. S. government and the United Nations, and he believed they were read by "at least twenty times that number."[52] If package recipients especially praised AFL publications, Lovestone would send them multiple copies to distribute among their peers.[53]

By far the most widely distributed medium was the *International Free Trade Union News* – a paper that the FTUC had established in 1945. Besides an English version, the committee printed German, Italian, and French editions for international distribution.[54] Published monthly, the paper covered union-related news from the U. S. and across the world, as well as opinion pieces on policy and social issues that affected organized labor. Lovestone's forceful promotion quickly turned the *News* into an eagerly sought source of information among German workers. Without hesitation, he put any CARE package recipient who had responded to the FTUC on a regular mailing list – whether the recipients asked for it or not.[55] The paper enjoyed immense popularity among its German readers, many of whom would receive it every month for over a decade.[56]

CARE packages again proved to be helpful in opening the minds of German unionists to AFL aims. As signs of benevolence and solidarity, the packages made needy workers susceptible to the news that followed; this built a solid base of support for AFL policies among German laborers, evoking feelings of shared political action. Through the *News*, German workers constantly received information on how the AFL took on its new international responsibility to fight for the interest of German unionism. Issues the paper covered included German democratization, economic recovery, reunification, political sovereignty, resistance to the internationalization of the Ruhr, and direct AFL negotiations with military authorities.[57] The *News* not only spread such infor-

52 Lovestone to Brown, July 28, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 11.

53 See, for example, correspondence between Lovestone and Wilhelm Schönen, March 3 – April 13, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.

54 Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 109; Werner Link estimates that the FTUC distributed about eight thousand copies of the *News* in Germany monthly. See Link, *Deutsche und amerikanische Gewerkschaften und Geschäftsleute 1945–1975*, 84.

55 See, for example, correspondences between Hermann Rapp and Jay Lovestone, October 1–30, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.

56 See letter from Emil Bartsch to AFL-CIO [recipient unspecified] mentioning his still vivid interest in the paper, December 16, 1959, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 69.

57 In 1950, the FTUC published a German-language volume of all pertinent *News* publications on the AFL's objectives in Germany and widely distributed it among German workers. While this publication suggests immense interest among German unionists in transatlantic labor policy cooperation, it primarily demonstrates the FTUC's eagerness to display its public image as that

mation but contributed to opinion making among its readers – opinions that displayed the AFL and its policies in a favorable light while often criticizing or even discrediting other entities in labor and governance.

The AFL regularly used the *News* to lash out against policies of the Truman administration and the U.S. military government that they regarded as counterproductive to labor revitalization. In 1949, the paper lamented that OMGUS "expressed an unfortunate lack of understanding for the decisive role the labor movement plays in the development of democracy and the rebuilding of Germany as a decisive factor in European reconstruction." The article went on to criticize the military government for "deny[ing] German workers their right to be appropriately represented in the implementation of the E.R.P.," at least up until then.[58] This was a point of contention for the AFL not so much because it denied workers equal participation, but rather because it excluded labor unions from political decision-making. Ultimately, this meant that the federation would not be able to exert political influence on the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Germany, either.

At other times, articles covered and criticized inter-Allied policy to display labor under global attack. In an article of August 1948, the *News* lambasted the results of the London Six-Power Conference, which had ended a month earlier with the decision to form a West German state. The conference, at which the French government had agreed to merge its zone with those of the U.S. and Great Britain, had only achieved this result when the Allies agreed to two French preconditions: First, the Saarland in southwest Germany was to be split from the French occupation zone and should be economically integrated into France. Second – and what most antagonized the AFL – the Western Allies agreed to create the International Authority for the Ruhr, which would oversee and control the area's steel and coal production. According to the *News*, this decision meant that the Allies would continue to make efforts to deny Germany self-determination and "real" democratization. A few months earlier, the FTUC had presented a declaration on the future of Germany to President Truman, advocating for German self-government rather than international control of German industry, and for the empowerment of unions in collective bargaining.[59] The *News* article presented this document to showcase the AFL as

of a herald of the German workers and the only true defender of labor rights in Germany. *Die A.F. of L. und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung* [The A.F. of L. and the German Labor Movement], 1950 [exact date unknown], GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53.

58 "Zur Politik der amerikanischen Militärregierung in Deutschland" [On the Policies of the American Military Government in Germany], *Internationale Freigewerkschaftliche Nachrichten* 4, no. 1, January 1949, republished in *Die A.F. of L. und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung*, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53.

59 *For Freedom, Work, and Peace – Declaration by the Free Trade Union Committee of the American Federation of Labor*, presented by Matthew Woll to President Truman on May 26, 1948, Truman Papers, OF 198, Box 739.

the only truly benevolent actor in Allied-German relations. The AFL, the article suggested, empowered not only unionists but, with unions being a bedrock of true democracy, the entire cause of German rehabilitation.[60]

The feedback Lovestone received from Germany proved the success of his combination of humanitarian and informational support. Many German workers had, indeed, felt neglected by the occupation authorities. OMGUS continued to deny unions access to discussions on such pressing issues as the Marshall Plan or the currency reform. At the same time, the military authorities delayed compensation to unions for money and property that had been confiscated by the Nazis.[61] In this situation, many workers cherished the kind words of international support that the *News* provided. One recipient mentioned that he had "never read a better union newspaper" in his "25 years as a union secretary."[62] Another reader, who had just received the paper together with a CARE package, remarked that it "particularly serves our encouragement which we find in the fact that through your paper you stand up for us in the most important questions." Lovestone responded that he was "indeed glad to learn that our publication is of value to you in bringing you information about the international labor movement."[63] Such statements presented the AFL as the dependable ally from afar who intervened on behalf of the German workers when official policies seemed to fail. Humanitarian support functioned as a material manifestation of the federation's commitment and demonstrated that the AFL did not merely pay lip service to German labor interests. CARE packages proved that, if German workers had to make a choice, they should rely on their union brothers and sisters rather than on politicians in Washington and Berlin.

* * *

Paradoxically, it appears that a large portion of the funds the AFL allocated for CARE to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the U.S. government might have come from that source itself. In the past decade, scholars have uncovered a dynamic relationship between U.S. labor and the Central Intelligence Agency that started shortly after the founding of the CIA in July 1947.[64] Even though the agency's exact involvement in the AFL's international endeavors remains unclear, it is obvious that money changed hands. Jay Lovestone complained in

60 "Zwei Dokumente über Deutschland" [Two Documents on Germany], *Internationale Freigewerkschaftliche Nachrichten* [International Free Trade Union News] 3, no. 8, August 1948, Library of Congress.

61 Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie*, 263.

62 Josef Zenner to Jay Lovestone, October 6, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.

63 Correspondence between Gerhard Mager and Jay Lovestone, May 10 – June 15, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 6.

64 For the most elaborate analysis on the cooperation of AFL and CIA in the late 1940s and early 1950s, see Hughes, *"In the Interest of Democracy."* Also of interest is the respective chapter in Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer*, 52–69.

a meeting with CIA director Walter Bedell Smith in October 1950 that funds had diminished to a mere US$ 200,000, which implies that the federation had enjoyed much more financial attention between 1947 and 1949.[65] That Lovestone, of all people, served as a negotiator between the AFL and the CIA suggests that the Free Trade Union Committee was the main beneficiary of CIA funds, and that the committee may have used much of them for humanitarian relief. And while the AFL had been a member of CARE since 1945, it is further telling that it only started sending packages on a large scale around the same time the CIA came into being in 1947.

Despite providing a cash flow, the CIA seems to have had only limited influence on the federation's foreign activities and allocation of funds. In the first years of cooperation, both organizations shared an asymmetrical relationship in which the AFL kept the upper hand. The young CIA lacked the methods and routine it came to develop during the 1950s while the AFL, with its over sixty-year history, boasted more elaborate skills and connections.[66] Given this power discrepancy, it is probable that the CIA did not have much of a say in the way such funds were used. Intelligence support notwithstanding, the committee most likely followed its own interests and motivations in collaborating with European labor.

Their unequal power relations in the early years of cooperation notwithstanding, the AFL and the CIA profited from their similar ideological outlooks. The CIA found an ally in the federation, whose members did not need convincing to partake in the global fight against communism. The AFL had been skeptical of Soviet policies since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Its founder Samuel Gompers had supported the overthrow of the czarist regime but saw Bolshevism as an imminent threat to free unionism all over the world as it claimed to be the universal and global emancipator of workers. Posing as the herald of the working class and claiming to have reached a higher form of democracy, communism was a wolf in sheep's clothing, which made it incomparably more dangerous than fascism had been.[67] With the pace of the Cold War picking up in the late 1940s, the AFL and the U. S. government – and with it the CIA – thus shared a mutual objective, and the fairly new intelligence agency could profit from the AFL's extensive knowledge of the common enemy.

The AFL's leaders also understood the foreign threat of communism as a domestic issue. Already in December 1945, at a time when the future of the grand alliance was still undecided, George Meany used a speech before the Pennsylvania Council of Public Employees to point out that the Soviet gov-

65 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 156; Hughes, *"In the Interest of Democracy,"* 64–66, 75–76.

66 Hughes, *"In the Interest of Democracy,"* 97, 181–84.

67 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 114–15; Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 60; Taft, *Defending Freedom*, 2–5.

ernment was "exercising the prerogatives of a dictator." In the U.S., he argued, the Soviet Union was trying to infiltrate the minds of U.S. workers who were susceptible to socialist ideology and who were now starting to "organize their forces with firm discipline."[68] Facing the enemy abroad and at home became an intertwined task. Meany essentially described the logics of containment even before they became the U.S. government's leading foreign policy rationale. Any labor movement entering the orbit of Soviet government control, he argued, would immediately affect those in countries around it, eventually also in the United States.[69]

Many European labor movements, including in Scandinavia, Britain, and the Benelux states, expressed moderate democratic beliefs. But countries like France and Italy, where communist parties had won twenty percent of the vote in 1945, posed a potential threat since their political and geographical situation could open the door for the Soviet government to infiltrate Western Europe.[70] In occupied Germany, as well, fascism was less of an issue than the deep-seated Marxist ideology that had dominated the Weimar unions and threatened ideological exposure to Soviet communism. Although communists did not have nearly as much influence among postwar German unions as they had in France or Italy, where unions closely collaborated with the local communist parties, exposure to foreign influence put the Western occupation zones in a weak position.

This became particularly obvious in Berlin. Quadripartite control gave the government of the USSR much more influence there than it had in the Western zones. The city's first state election in October 1946 gave the Western Allies a sense of relief because the Kremlin-controlled Socialist Unity Party (SED) received only 19.8 percent of the votes, even though it had been highly propagated in the Soviet sector.[71] But the influence of Soviet communism on local labor organizations became glaringly evident in the 1947 election of the Berlin chapter of the Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [Free German Federation of Labor], which had resulted in a landslide victory for the SED.[72] The Berlin situation was indicative of West Germany's special position within the European labor landscape. Without national sovereignty, the Western zones depended on foreign control, making them susceptible to foreign political and ideological influence. Nevertheless, this unique situation also held potential benefits for the AFL. Contact to the U.S. military government, despite occasional differences, offered the AFL unique access that it did not have in any other European

68 Speech by George Meany before the Pennsylvania Council of Public Employees in Harrisburg, PA, December 4, 1945, Truman Papers, OF 142, Box 629.
69 Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 11–12.
70 Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 67–68, 75; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 7.
71 Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 139.
72 Fichter, *Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften*, 234.

country.[73] Accordingly, the AFL enjoyed unprecedented influence in West Germany, although union movements from other countries did, as well.

The influence of communists in the French labor landscape was particularly worrisome to the AFL. "Let no one underestimate Communist influence in the trade unions […] in the British and French zones," Irving Brown alerted Lovestone in April 1947. "In the French zone the Communists have made tremendous headway with tremendous aid from the French military government and the French C. G. T. [the French federation of labor, Confédération Générale du Travail], which has sent many German-speaking trade union leaders into the zone to arry [sic] on propaganda and organization."[74] Communist control of the unions, in the AFL's logic, would ultimately also enable the Soviet government to infiltrate West Germany's entire political and social apparatus. In 1948, Lovestone wrote in a report to the AFL executive board: "if the Communists were to dominate Germany with her vast skilled labor supply and her powerful industrial potential, then Russia would master Germany and thereby the entire continent."[75] That same year, an AFL report on Germany warned the Department of Labor that the communists were "attempting to use the labor movement to control the working classes and obstruct the occupation."[76] Like a weakened organism, attacked from all sides by harmful foreign agents, German labor needed to build a strong immune system to fight the spread of a potentially dangerous virus.[77]

Containing communism all over Europe and in the United States thus also meant winning the hearts and minds of German workers. Again, it was the FTUC's skilled international and fiercely anti-Soviet staff, with Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown leading the way, who brought the expertise for operating in the German theater. Both men had once been influential figures in U. S. American communism, and they put forward unparalleled inside knowledge of the minds and ways of the Soviet enemy. After witnessing how fiercely Joseph Stalin persecuted and silenced potential competitors within his own ranks, they had concluded that the Soviet Union could never become the herald of working people. Ideologically, however, Lovestone and Brown had remained leftist thinkers, sensitive to the needs of workers, alert to fellow travelers within leftist

73 Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 12–13.

74 Irving Brown to Jay Lovestone, April 7, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 11. For a thorough description of the AFL's activities in postwar France, see Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, 310–25.

75 Report on Germany by Jay Lovestone, ca. mid- to late-1948, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53; see also Jay Lovestone to Irving Brown, July 28, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 11.

76 Report on the Labor situation in Germany by Arnold Zempel, ca. 1948, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53.

77 On the vulnerability of Germany and Western Europe to communist influence, see the respective chapter in Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 15–31. See also Lademacher, "Konfrontation an der Nahtstelle des Ost-West-Konflikts," 63.

intellectual circles, and weary of conservative policies that favored industrial production over economic equality.

As starvation among German workers threatened to push many into the arms of the communists, it was hoped that CARE packages would help the AFL to steer their attention towards the virtues of democracy. At a time when even General Clay worried about losing a food battle with the Soviet government, German unionists shared very similar concerns. "You can very well imagine how difficult it is to agitate people or to turn a single person into a democrat," lamented a package recipient in April 1948 regarding the country's severe food shortages. "The communists have it easy right now. They only criticize, promise the people much, and blame the Americans for the hardships."[78] Lovestone often used such correspondences with recipients to discredit the Soviet Union and the "communist totalitarian microbes" in the East German labor movement.[79] Not only did CARE packages contribute to material relief, but their display of international workers' solidarity lent credibility to the AFL's information campaign. Humanitarian aid was supposed to prove that liberal democracy offered not just criticism, but also action.

The immediate threat that communist expansionism posed to West German unions became evident with the start of the Berlin Blockade in the summer of 1948. But the Soviet government's drastic measures in this case also presented an opportunity to discredit its policies and, hence, to diminish communist influence in the Western sectors. The speed with which the AFL answered the blockade with humanitarian action underlines the significance that CARE held within the federation's position in the East-West conflict. Mere days after the government of the USSR closed off the Western sectors, the AFL representative at CARE sent a circular to all member unions and appealed for help for the "free and democratic trade unionists in the beleaguered city."[80] At the same time, David Dubinsky, Jay Lovestone, and Henry Rutz accepted an invitation to Berlin by General Clay and arrived in the city in late July. Lovestone immediately started rallying support among local unionists and promised that one thousand CARE packages would be delivered. The response was expectedly favorable, and local functionaries thanked the FTUC for this "encouragement for the free and independent unionists of Berlin to continue their struggle."[81] Lovestone, too, was immensely pleased. "The highly inspiring and beneficial effect of the A. F. of L.'s 1,000 CARE parcels on the trade unionists and the populace

78 Johann Gräf to the Labor League for Human Rights, April 11, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.

79 Letter from Lovestone to package recipient Gerhard Mager, June 15, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 6.

80 Appeal by CARE's AFL representative Stanley C. Elsis to AFL member unions, ca. summer 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 16.

81 Thank-you letter by the Independent Union Organization of Berlin [Unabhängige Gewerkschaftsorganisation Gross-Berlin], October 29, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.

of Berlin cannot be exaggerated," he reported to the AFL's Executive Committee. "The German workers are learning that the American Federation of Labor is an organization that translates its premises and promises of international labor solidarity into positive and prompt performances."[82] No other region, neither in Germany nor elsewhere, ever had or would receive a comparable amount of aid from the AFL. The number of the packages alone elucidates how engaged and keenly aware Lovestone and the FTUC were of the psychological potential of humanitarian assistance.

While Lovestone's actions during the Berlin Blockade had proven how successfully the AFL could counter Soviet government influence through humanitarian aid, another pressing issue presented itself on the international labor stage that imperiled both the federation's domestic and foreign influence. After the International Federation of Trade Unions had forfeited political significance during World War II – for which the AFL's withdrawal in 1928 was partially to blame – a Soviet initiative had led to the creation of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) as a successor organization in October 1945. As expected, many communist unions in France and Italy enthusiastically welcomed the new labor venture. But also democratically inclined organizations, such as the British Trade Union Congress, had joined in the hope that the democratic and communist labor movements would cooperate. The AFL had been opposed to the World Federation since unions from the UK and the USSR had first suggested it be created in 1943, and they refused to join in 1945 on the grounds that the forum was firmly controlled by members from the Soviet Union and its satellite states.[83] Lovestone and Brown had vehemently urged the AFL leadership to refrain from joining. They discredited the organization as "an instrument of [Soviet] foreign policy" and a "Bolshevik caricature and perversion of an international labor movement."[84] Nevertheless, the World Federation was the only international labor body in existence, and unions across the globe thirsted for acknowledgment and cooperation beyond national borders.

Hopes of convincing French and Italian unionists to turn away from the World Federation seemed limited – after all, the organization's first president Louis Saillant was also head of the French union confederation CGT. Yet, the fate of the West German labor movement was undecided. Despite vehement resistance by AFL leaders such as George Meany, the Allies had allowed the World Federation to operate in Germany and to send a first delegation of

82 Report on Germany by Jay Lovestone, ca. mid- to late-1948, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53.
83 Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 72–74.
84 Memorandum by Irving Brown on his stay in England, February 3–11, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 11; Declaration for a United World Federation of Free Trade Unions by the International Labor Relations Committee, A. F. of L., April 7, 1949, Truman Papers, OF 142, Box 629.

functionaries to tour the Western zones in January 1946.[85] Meany feared that OMGUS's anti-union policy would make the fledgling labor movement vulnerable to undesired ideological infiltration.[86] Indeed, twelve years of Nazi isolation had fueled strong desires among German unionists to gain acceptance on the international stage. Brown warned Lovestone in April 1947 about the allure of the World Federation among German workers:

> It is not enough for us to merely oppose the WFTU in Germany. There is a great yearning for international recognition on the part of Germans. This is esp. true for German labor which once played a great role in international trade union organizations. This is the motive force and attractive power behind the WFTU in Germany.[87]

The key to getting unionists to join the AFL lay in proving that it was morally superior and that its support of German labor interests yielded greater results than membership in the World Federation. Again, humanitarian assistance presented a viable method for achieving that objective. As expected, many CARE package recipients expressed their desire for potential membership in an international organization. Anton Dreher from Schwäbisch Gmünd, for example, hoped that Germany might "sooner or later become a member of the World Federation of Trade Unions" to "express our solidarity with you colleagues across the pond."[88] As he had done on other occasions, Lovestone would again use the ensuing correspondence to express the AFL's stance on the issue, meticulously describing the ways in which the World Federation, as "an instrument of Russian imperialism," supported totalitarianism in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria.[89] Lovestone sent such hostile expositions on the issue to numerous unionists. They, in turn, must have found it difficult not to believe in the evil of the World Federation, given that the source of that information had just underlined the AFL's commitment to the German union movement with a humanitarian act.

And, indeed, Lovestone received the desired feedback from unionists. They noted that they valued the AFL's commitment through material support more than the mere printed statements of solidarity they had been receiving from the World Federation: "[T]hese packages give evidence of a fraternal relation with the A. F. of L. quite contrary to the attitude of the W. G. B. [German ac-

85 Fichter, *Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften*, 208–11. The AFL would not be able to send its own official delegation to Germany until the late fall of 1946. See the Report of the American Federation of Labor Mission to Germany, January 29, 1947, GMMA, RG2–006, Box 4; see also Link, *Deutsche und amerikanische Gewerkschaften und Geschäftsleute 1945–1975*, 51.

86 Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 75; Lademacher, "Konfrontation an der Nahtstelle des Ost-West-Konflikts," 31–33.

87 Irving Brown to Jay Lovestone, April 7, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 11.

88 Anton Dreher to Jay Lovestone, September 16, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.

89 Jay Lovestone to Anton Dreher, October 30, 1947, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17.

ronym for the World Federation]," wrote recipient Alfred Schwarz from the British-occupied Ruhr area. All the World Federation truly desired, according to Schwarz, was to drive the German workers "to the coal-pits."[90] His words echoed the overlapping interests of the AFL and the U.S. government to shield West Germany's industrial heartland from Soviet government control. Schwarz's comment revealed that organized labor, despite frequent criticism of OMGUS policies, held an indispensable position within the U.S. strategy as it fostered pro-democratic sentiments from within.

Discrediting Soviet policy through the World Federation was not the only objective that Lovestone and his peers pursued. While AFL leaders were vehemently trying to correct past mistakes and claim their ground on the international stage, the threat of the World Federation also extended into domestic issues. The AFL's largest domestic competitor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, had enthusiastically joined the new organization. Split off from the federation due to internal differences among member unions in 1935, the CIO had quickly established a solid supporter base among workers for whom the AFL was too moderate.[91] It was in competition with the CIO, both at home and abroad, that the AFL's outbound use of humanitarianism to shape labor internationally interlinked with the inbound motivation to establish and consolidate its dominance over domestic labor issues.

Unlike the AFL, the CIO accepted communists into its ranks to reconcile the labor movement across political camps. Its more leftist outlook proved very fruitful in the first three postwar years. With its socialist reform agenda, the CIO attracted the attention of French and Italian unionists, who were suspicious of the liberal capitalist stance of the AFL. Many German Social Democrats, as well – and with them unionists – initially found it easier to relate to the CIO because it appealed to their Marxist Weimar traditions and promised revolt against the system that the AFL was trying to sustain.[92] In contrast to the AFL, which denied any assistance to unionists in the Eastern zone in the belief that Soviet government control thwarted any chance of success, the CIO also tried to promote its cause behind the Iron Curtain. Already in the summer of 1948, the CIO had received 700,000 reichsmarks from OMGUS to strengthen multipartisan unions in the Eastern sector of Berlin.[93] This good-faith attempt

90 Alfred Schwarz to Jay Lovestone, February 3, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 17. See a similar response by package recipient Markus Schleicher, cited in Lademacher, "Konfrontation an der Nahtstelle des Ost-West-Konflikts," 36–37.

91 The AFL and CIO had split in 1935 mostly because the CIO did not see the needs of industrial labor satisfactorily acknowledged in the AFL, which put more emphasis on the service economy. Andrew Edmund Kersten, *Labor's Home Front: The American Federation of Labor During World War II* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 139–44.

92 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 133–37; Fichter, *Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften*, 43–47.

93 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 160.

at cooperation only fortified resentment against the CIO among AFL leaders, who not only saw the CIO's communist bias confirmed but feared that apparent support from the military government sanctioned such political deviations.

Like the AFL, the CIO was a CARE founding member and a regular contributor to its relief efforts. In the years 1947 and 1948, especially, the two labor organizations constantly competed to outmatch each other's donations and to put themselves forward as CARE's "true" labor member.[94] In 1948, for example, FTUC Chairman Matthew Woll was infuriated because the AFL was not represented on CARE's committee to reconcile member agencies over the general relief debate while the CIO had a seat at the table.[95] And as late as 1953, only two years before the rival organizations would again merge into the AFL-CIO, the federation's representative at CARE, Madeleine Dillon, asked President George Meany to provide a written endorsement of CARE's work because the CIO already had made such a statement.[96] On the stage of CARE's executive board, the rivaling union federations continued their domestic power struggle via humanitarian efforts for distant recipients.

To counter what its leaders perceived as both a domestic and an international threat, the AFL would again call upon the *International Free Trade Union News* to discredit both the CIO and the World Federation before international unionists. An article on the conference of the World Federation's Executive Committee in Rome in the spring of 1948 is a prime example of such efforts. The article lamented the World Federation's totalitarian character and simultaneously took direct aim at James Carey, the CIO's secretary treasurer. At the conference, Carey had presented himself as concerned about the USSR's delegation's attempts to dictate the World Federation's ideological outlook. Even though Carey had openly confronted the Soviet participants, the article argued, he merely paid lip service to democratic unionism and the interests of U. S. labor in his complaint. He failed to offer any strategy or a true initiative to change the World Federation's ideological outlook. His inability to follow words with action, the article claimed, revealed Carey and his organization to be playthings of Soviet global power politics.[97]

Although such criticism of the CIO was not uncommon in AFL publications, the *News* represented an especially fierce position within the labor spectrum. This was largely due to the men who supervised its publication. Lovestone's media mouthpiece depicted the feud between the rival organizations

94 See several documents in GMMA, RG18–002, Box 12; Press Release: CIO Steel Locals Helping Workers Abroad through "CARE," November 1950, CARE Records, Box 875; News Release – German Trade Unions to Get "CARE" Aid through CIO Free World Labor Fund, September 30, 1953, CARE Records, Box 901.

95 Matthew Woll to Murray Lincoln, June 9, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 16.

96 Madeleine Dillon to Virginia Tehas, August 7, 1953, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 25.

97 "Ist der W. G. B. tot oder lebendig?" [Is the W. F. T. U. dead or alive?], *Internationale Freigewerkschaftliche Nachrichten* 3, no. 8, August 1948, Library of Congress.

as a global struggle between totalitarianism and democracy, although it was truly a domestic rivalry about power and political influence. The CIO was not the Soviet government's puppet that Lovestone and his people made it out to be. Pro-Soviet forces were quite visible among the CIO's member agencies, but they always clashed with a larger and staunchly anticommunist camp. An estimated 1.4 million members belonged to outspokenly communist unions, while roughly more than 4 million belonged either to anticommunist or internally divided unions.[98] Membership in the World Federation was not a political statement but a move of realpolitik that aimed to help the CIO step out of the shadow of the larger and more influential AFL on the international scene.[99] In fact, the CIO even frequently complained about the favoritism shown by both the U. S. government and OMGUS towards the federation.[100]

CIO members had even made good-faith attempts at aligning the public images of both union federations. In October 1948, Henry Rutz took a trip to the U. S. military governments of Germany and Austria together with the CIO's Victor Reuther to prove that "American Labor was united on certain foreign issues."[101] Reuther was an influential figure within the CIO. Two years earlier, his brother Walter had been elected president of the largest CIO member union, the United Automobile Workers. Like Lovestone, the Reuthers were both former communists with an immigrant background. Their German father Valentine had been a pioneer in the U. S. American organized labor movement and had sensitized his sons to issues of social inequality and workers' rights since their early childhood.[102] During a fifteen-month residence as young men in the USSR in 1933–34, Walter and Victor Reuther had grown quite enthusiastic about the promises of Soviet communism but, like Lovestone, had relinquished their beliefs due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the beginning of World War II.[103] Upon their return, and as they climbed the ladder within the CIO, the brothers became the organization's most outspoken critics of communist members, even cooperating with Lovestone in their efforts to clear the CIO of pro-Soviet influence.[104] Yet, as long as the CIO leadership failed to take effective action on this issue, Lovestone could not allow open cooperation by an FTUC member like Rutz and CIO representatives, which contributed to an eventual break between him and Rutz. If the CIO continued to tolerate communist members, Lovestone concluded with his Manichean view of the issue,

98 Robert H. Zieger, *The CIO: 1935–1955* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 253–54.
99 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 139–41.
100 Rutz to Meany, April 2, 1948, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53. See also Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 137–38.
101 Rutz to Meany, October 3, 1948, GMMA, RG1–027, Box 53.
102 Anthony Carew, *Walter Reuther* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 1–3.
103 Carew, *Walter Reuther*, 10–11, 32.
104 Carew, *Walter Reuther*, 25–26; Zieger, *The CIO*, 259–60.

the organization had to be cast off as a potential enemy. He would not deviate from this stance unless the CIO left the World Federation for good.

Lovestone's tenacity in this regard at times even alienated AFL leaders in Washington, who hoped to at least find some common ground with the CIO.[105] But the FTUC's predominance in international matters and its operational freedom outside of the AFL's headquarters in DC proved successful in the end. The CIO never fully managed to find a foreign policy profile of its own because it had relied on international visibility through the World Federation from the beginning so that it was closely associated with the organization in the general public.[106] Michael Ross, a leading figure in the CIO's international outreach, noted that the thing that worried him about the success of the CARE program was "the fact that the AFL got so much more public notice than we did."[107] Lovestone's PR among German unionists through CARE packages and the *News* had successfully displayed the World Federation in an ever more unfavorable light, and it had simultaneously strengthened the AFL's position in public opinion and in relations to the U.S. military government.

While the AFL had managed to severely damage the image of the World Federation and the CIO at home and abroad, the World Federation's reputation in the U.S. government deteriorated with the discussion of the European Recovery Program (ERP) in 1948. Many member unions, first and foremost the Soviet ones, had rejected any discussion of the Marshall Plan on the international labor stage. The U.S. government interpreted the World Federation's position as an obvious stance against European economic reconstruction. For the AFL, which strongly supported the ERP as a catalyst of European economic growth to withstand communist infiltration, it was yet another reason to discredit the World Federation and the CIO as the false idols of labor empowerment.[108] The FTUC would repeatedly emphasize its support for the ERP in correspondence with German CARE package recipients, many of whom were sanguine that the program would improve their economic situation. Lovestone could use their enthusiasm not only to express his solidarity but to further discredit the World Federation and the CIO as working against the interests of German labor.[109] Many CIO leaders, including the Reuthers, in fact supported the Marshall Plan just as much as the AFL did. The anticommunist camp now used the heated debate over the ERP to gain ground over the pro-Soviet forces. By January 1949, internal pressure and the irreconcilable positions within the

105 Correspondence between CIO president Philip Murray and FTUC Chairman Matthew Woll, May 17 – June 4, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 11.

106 Fichter, *Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften*, 27.

107 Mike Ross to Leo Perils, June 26, 1948, GMMA, RG18–002, Box 12.

108 The AFL's position on the Marshall Plan is elaborately sketched out in a speech by Irving Brown before the American Club, February 17, 1949, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 11.

109 See various thank-you letters by package recipients in GMMA, RG18–003, Box 6, 17.

World Federation forced the CIO to leave the organization together with its British and Dutch colleagues.[110] In a lengthy published statement, the three parties described the World Federation's turn from a good-faith attempt at cooperation between communist and democratic unions into a totalitarian puppet of Soviet government control.[111] Over the next year, the CIO expelled eleven pro-Soviet affiliated unions with nearly a million members from its ranks.[112]

The road was now clear for an international federation of democratically inclined unions, which is what the AFL had aimed for since the foundation of the World Federation in 1945. Both the AFL and the CIO would join this new international federation – a major step towards the reunification of both organizations six years later. The new International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was by no means less ideologically tinged than the World Federation since only unions that were committed to the ideas of the Marshall Plan were eligible for membership. This was exactly what AFL leaders like George Meany and Jay Lovestone had worked for. To them, international unionism was never supposed to seek compromises to reconcile competing labor values. For the AFL, unionism was an ideological battle between right and wrong, good and bad. With the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the AFL's leaders had won a victory for what they perceived as the right side. Now that the AFL and the CIO shared some common ground, they agreed not to aspire to the presidency of the organization to forego any further rivalry and to set up headquarters in Europe to minimize any suspicion of U.S domination.[113] The international objectives of the AFL, it seemed, had been fulfilled.

With the end of the 1940s, the AFL had firmly consolidated its position as a herald of transatlantic labor. Accordingly, the high tide of the FTUC's humanitarian engagement in Germany also receded in the early 1950s. Congruent with the overall trend of CARE contributions, diminishing material need in the newly founded Federal Republic resulted in declining donations. Individual AFL member unions continued to donate to Germany well into the 1950s. With the Food Crusade offering a cheap way of contributing, smaller unions now started collecting primarily for Eastern refugees and Berliners. The last

110 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 142; Godson, *American Labor and European Politics*, 114–15.

111 Pamphlet *Free Trade Unions Leave the W. F. T. U.*, January 1949, GMMA, RG18–004, Box 39.

112 Zieger, *The CIO*, 277.

113 Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 142–43. Yet, already by 1950 the AFL came to distance its own objectives from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. With by far the most successful and far-reaching international influence of all major Western trade unions, they soon came to lament the decision to not have an AFL functionary among its leading ranks. The CIO complained about this break with agreements and, instead, focused ever more closely on working through the ICFTU while closing its own European branches in 1954. Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie*, 144–46.

documented checks for a donation by a U.S. labor union were sent to Madeleine Dillon at the CARE headquarters as late as 1959.[114]

Decreasing need among German unionists, it seems, was not the only reason for the FTUC to reduce its humanitarian involvement. At the turn of the decade, the power dynamic between the AFL and the CIA began to shift as well. The agency gained enough operational strength to demand more control over AFL undertakings. Lovestone and his associates grew increasingly estranged with what they perceived as the CIA's elitist, capitalist, and antilabor views and tactics. They accused the agency of working behind the back of federation personnel in Europe and of using the name of the FTUC without former consultation. A major point of contention in this clandestine liaison was the CIA's rapprochement with the CIO in the hope of securing additional labor contacts while attempting to headhunt for new intelligence personnel among FTUC members. After the cooperation had reached its peak in the late 1940s, the AFL loosened its ties to the CIA in 1951.

Cooperation continued throughout the decade on a much smaller scale, but labor's insistence on recognition as an equal partner by an organization that they suspected of elitism, thirst for power, and at times also antisemitism, struck a blow to a potentially fruitful anticommunist alliance.[115] Again, the fact that the committee reduced its humanitarian engagement at the same time as it loosened its ties to the CIA serves only as circumstantial evidence. It is unclear if CIA funds went directly into the CARE program. But even if they did not, one fact remains: for years, the AFL had received money from the CIA. This alone allowed the federation to allocate more funds for humanitarian assistance instead. Directly or indirectly, German workers profited from U.S. American intelligence support without being aware of it.

In 1952, Walter Reuther became president of the CIO, and rapprochement with the AFL towards an eventual unification began. Yet, Reuther had one crucial condition: Unification would only come if the AFL dissolved the FTUC, which had caused his own organization so much harm over the previous decade.[116] Lovestone, while working together with Reuther behind the scenes, had indeed done considerable damage to the CIO both at home and abroad. Through his tireless humanitarian and informational engagement in Germany, he had managed to discredit the CIO before his international audience and to successfully present his own organization as the U.S. herald of organized labor. Given that Walter and Victor Reuther had German ancestry and enjoyed a great deal of public visibility and influence, it seems odd that the CIO never managed to make its CARE engagement as successful as the AFL's

114 Anna C. Rimington [Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance] to Madeleine Dillon, March 19, 1959, CARE Records, Box 1005.
115 Hughes, *"In the Interest of Democracy,"* 165–75.
116 Carew, *Walter Reuther*, 78.

under Lovestone. But CIO leaders appear to have underestimated the massive material, psychological, and ideological impact of the packages; moreover, they had never put the Reuther brothers in charge of their humanitarian operation. Their miscalculation was Lovestone's blessing, and by the time Walter Reuther demanded the end of the FTUC, the committee's work in Europe was finished anyway.

* * *

In hindsight, it is obvious why the American Federation of Labor had been a CARE member agency from the beginning. Its principal international decision makers saw the relief packages as a crucial instrument for furthering their interest in Europe and particularly in West Germany. At times in cooperation with other actors, at other times against them, the leaders of the AFL and the FTUC around Jay Lovestone realized the potential of humanitarian engagement to increase their international influence and to establish their organization as an indispensable partner in transnational labor matters. The AFL's material support, and the informational material provided with it, opened the minds of the German workers to the organization through their stomachs. To recipients who had suffered political oppression and persecution during the Third Reich, the packages offered psychological comfort, expressed recognition of their efforts and suffering, and increased their susceptibility to the AFL's labor ideology and political objectives.

The AFL's participation in CARE and its aid campaign, as becomes apparent, influenced CARE's agenda and public image as much as it was shaped by them. Through the packages and the ensuing correspondence, Lovestone and his colleagues were able to convey a feeling of liberal internationalism. Both the U.S. labor unionists who provided the humanitarian support and their German colleagues who received it cooperated in a joint venture to build a lasting and peaceful transatlantic community. As it turned out, however, it was not a community of equals but one of asymmetric power relations, in which a voice was given only to those who supported a fiercely anticommunist vision of internationalism. The AFL expressed an elitism not only regarding the political influence its principal decision makers exerted, but also in terms of its desired recipient profile, which favored high-ranking functionaries over local workers and excluded all those without influence who were suffering behind the inner German border.

The AFL's adamant stance on East Germany proves how marginally compassion featured as a motivation for the federation's humanitarian efforts when compared to self-interest. Lovestone and his peers used CARE packages as a disciplinary measure to keep a desired group of recipients in line or punish them for stepping sideways. They expected very specific returns for their humanitarian efforts both from the recipients themselves and from the effect of

their aid in the overall context of German-American relations. These returns included loyalty, humility, and morale on the part of the recipients and visibility, influence, and access in the context of the occupation. Self-interest, it must be noted, was not congruent with selfishness. Reciprocity may have bordered on egoism had it not been for the fact that FTUC leaders believed in the benevolence of their actions. Assistance to starving workers revitalized unions as a crucial element of any democratic society and shielded this element from totalitarian influences that threatened its freedom. As much as Lovestone and the FTUC might have consciously used CARE to further their own and the AFL's influence at home and abroad, they also regarded this influence as serving a greater benevolent objective.

5 – Intellectuals and Activists: Transatlantic Agendas, Hopes, and Ideas

New York City was the beating heart of CARE's operation. It is where the organization came into being and established its headquarters. It was also where the FTUC issued checks for thousands of relief packages for West German unionists. The city and the state it lay in topped the list of CARE donations for years on end.[1] New York was a hub of leftist and progressivist thought, of ideas and ideals for a better postwar world. Consequently, it was a center for intellectuals and activists – figures in the public eye who held and voiced strong opinions on social and political reform.

Unlike the previous chapters, which looked at the collective aid efforts of groups and at the people who shaped their humanitarian engagement, the following pages shift the focus to giving individuals who belonged to New York's intellectual milieu. Three cases will illustrate how influential and prominent U.S. Americans considered their aid efforts a medium of activism but also of self-display. In doing so, they expressed the same elitist profiles and dynamics that also characterized the humanitarian engagement of women's clubs and, in a way, also the political elitism displayed by the leaders of the AFL. Their aid rested in their personal notions of influence and a sense of entitlement as intellectual and reformist gatekeepers; they understood humanitarianism as an almost missionary duty to bring about the changes they deemed socially or politically necessary. They were among the most eminent public figures in the mid-century United States, and they had all chosen New York as a home and

1 Special press release to New York papers on the occasion of 100 million US$ raised for CARE in its first five years, April 25, 1951, CARE Records, Box 900.

center for their work, which enabled them to translate their ideas for a brighter future into humanitarian action.

John Haynes Holmes, a Unitarian minister and one of the most outspoken social activists in the United States, had guided his Manhattan congregation through the troubles of two world wars and the Great Depression, preaching his convictions in pacifism, socialism, and racial equality. A friend of Mohandas Gandhi's, as well as a member and co-founder of several lastingly influential reform endeavors, Holmes was a progressive who fished in many ponds. Only a few subway stops away, at the distinguished Union Theological Seminary near Columbia University, Reinhold Niebuhr had just made a name for himself as the country's academic eminence on religion, morality, and U.S. war intervention. From the socially outspoken preacher at a small German Evangelical congregation in Detroit to an illustrious professor and publicly acclaimed voice of reason, Niebuhr had come a long way, culminating in a political influence no U.S. theologian had enjoyed before. Meanwhile, just north of Greenwich Village, the birth control activist Margaret Sanger had opened a research bureau in her name, looking back at a life's work dedicated to family planning and female emancipation. Over the previous decades, her cause had led her across the globe, resulting in a closely knit international network of supporters and friends.

Despite their very different career paths and discrepancies in the quantity of their aid engagements – Holmes and Sanger only sent CARE packages to a select few while Niebuhr aided dozens of recipients – these three formed a surprisingly coherent group. Born between the late 1870s and the early 1890s, all three had started or developed their careers during the Progressive Era. They had all internalized aspects of the time's reformist spirit, and they shared a very particular idea of their agency as public figures and of the value that humanitarian aid had for their individual causes. All three were decidedly leftist thinkers and had been members of the Socialist Party of America at one point or another. And, although their opinions diverged over issues of pacifism, war intervention, religion, and reform, they shared a deep conviction in international cooperation and expressed faith in their individual power to shape and steer the postwar order in directions that were favorable to others as well as to their own agendas.

Many progressivist activists believed that the success of reformist agendas at home demanded their implementation in the wider world.[2] The three actors' use of humanitarian aid very much followed this tradition, indulging in the idea that domestic concerns required inclusion in broader trans- and international developments. Much like the key decision makers of the AFL,

2 Alan Dawley, *Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 1.

they resorted to CARE in the postwar years to reach out to specific individuals in Germany whom they deemed worthy of humanitarian attention. In this, they conflated worthiness and need into a notion of reciprocal usefulness because they selected recipients who directly or indirectly furthered their own interests. In that sense, they all acted as the ambassadors that CARE's media image made them out to be because this image closely related to their progressivist philosophy. As Alan Dawley has remarked, social reform and foreign policy were so intrinsically linked in progressivist thought that they need to be considered within the same frame of analysis.[3] The interconnection of inbound and outbound motivations in CARE, therefore, mirrors the activist concerns that many progressives shared in other endeavors, linking their causes to broader debates in the outside world. To the three actors, humanitarianism became a way to steer social and political matters in the "right" direction.

* * *

Born in 1879, John Haynes Holmes was a child of the Gilded Age and, if the disparate movement even allows for textbook examples, he was a textbook progressive. A graduate of Harvard Divinity School, Holmes started his career as a Unitarian minister in Massachusetts.[4] In 1907, he accepted a call to the Community Church of New York (then the Church of the Messiah), where he preached until his retirement. In the interim, Holmes had risen to public prominence as one of the most outspoken spiritual leaders of the United States. He had pioneered the belief that the Christian faith unfolded best outside the Church one if one dedicated it to bringing about a more peaceful, socially, and racially just society.

For Holmes, as for many likeminded spiritual and social activists during the Progressive Era, the vision of social betterment emerged in the idea of the Social Gospel. This theologically inclined philosophy of social activism had developed in the late nineteenth century, when increasing industrial output and wealth in the United States also brought growing social inequality and, with it, growing vice and crime rates. Social Gospelers grounded their reform efforts in the belief that people were inherently good and that all human evil resulted from the corrupting environment in which it occurred. Consequently, they believed that the key to bringing people back to Christ was to improve their social and economic conditions.[5] Social Gospelers gave shelter and support to those the system left behind – building tenements and halfway houses – providing psychological and spiritual guidance for the purpose of social improvement.

3 Dawley, *Changing the World*, 5–6.
4 John Haynes Holmes, *I Speak for Myself*: *The Autobiography* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1959), 44–50.
5 Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*: *Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Anchor Books, 2012), 178.

This idea resonated in Holmes's activism from the early twentieth century as he dedicated many of his efforts to fighting racial and social injustice in pursuit of the kingdom of God. The politically leftist minister, who had first emphatically supported Robert La Follette's presidential candidacy for the Progressive Party in 1924 before joining the Socialist Party, had been a key figure in two long-lasting progressivist endeavors.[6] In 1909, Holmes became a founding member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Eleven years later, he joined the ranks of prominent progressive figures like Jane Addams, Felix Frankfurter, and Helen Keller in the establishment of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), for which he served as chairman of the board between 1939 and 1949.[7] As much as these two foundations reflect the enduring domestic effects of Holmes's socio-religious convictions, other more subtle and decidedly internationalist aspects of his ideology become apparent in his postwar relief efforts.

Holmes, it is safe to say, did not care much for Germany. Reminiscences in his 1959 autobiography display irritation or, at best, disinterest in the German people and their culture. Holmes had visited the country twice, once briefly in 1922 and again in 1935. The first encounter in 1922 had been remarkably uneventful. A trip to Moscow had required a short stopover in Berlin, which he described as "a dull city, mostly in the worst taste."[8] The second time, Nazi rule had given this dullness its appropriate political expression, and the trip, for obvious reasons, did not leave any more satisfactory impression.[9] After World War II, Holmes only took minimal interest in the country's future. Although he commented on Allied policy occasionally and called the dismantling of German factories as reparations "vastly destructive," it was less the fate of the German people and more the economic consequences for "our own country and the whole western world" that concerned him.[10] Yet, once the first dust of war had settled, Holmes became active in relief on behalf of Germans he had met along the way who likewise shared his social and ethical convictions.

His thorough disinterest in Germany calls for an evaluation of his humanitarian efforts different from that of, say, the AFL. Holmes was not a man who got involved in relief because he wanted to shape Germany into a postwar ally but because his engagement reflected his deepest religious, ethical, and social convictions. He saw himself as a herald of reform – an image that did not leave much room for humility. "Within me, as a spiritual heritage, settled a prophetic

6 Haynes Holmes, *I Speak for Myself*, 212–14; David M. Robinson, "Holmes, John Haynes," *American National Biography Online*, Oxford University Press, 2000, https://www.anb.org/view/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.001.0001/anb-9780198606697-e-1500339.

7 Haynes Holmes, *I Speak for Myself*, 187–201.

8 Haynes Holmes, *I Speak for Myself*, 125.

9 Haynes Holmes, *I Speak for Myself*, 147–49.

10 John Haynes Holmes to Christopher Emmet, January 22, 1948, John Haynes Holmes Papers, Box 225, Library of Congress (hereafter Holmes Papers).

passion for righteousness," he remarked in his autobiography to explain the intrinsic connection between faith and activism that had guided his life's work.[11] Rather than a refined idea about German reconstruction, it was his "prophetic passion" – his belief in a righteous way and the conviction that he was following it – that pointed him to CARE. The choice of his recipients and his communication with them reveal how deeply Holmes's aid reflected his innermost convictions in the social good but also how nostalgically he tried to revive the reformism of past days.

One idea that visibly shaped Holmes's humanitarian engagement was his lifelong belief in pacifism, which found expression in his CARE aid on behalf of the German lyricist and writer Fritz Diettrich. In 1930, Diettrich had edited a volume titled *The Gandhi Revolution*, to which Holmes had contributed the script of a sermon on the Indian freedom fighter.[12] Holmes defined his notion of pacifism as "not to fight for however good the cause, since violence wrecks or corrupts the very cause which it would save."[13] Even though his pacifist conviction had informed his preemptory opposition to U. S. entry into both world wars, it was not isolationist in nature. On the contrary, it reflected a prominent internationalist position in twentieth-century U. S. Christianity that promoted neutralism and nonviolence as better means of achieving world peace.[14] Very early in his life, Holmes's pacifism had pointed him towards the philosophy and work of Mohandas Gandhi, whom in 1922 he had called "the greatest man now living in the world."[15] The two men kept up a regular correspondence from the end of World War I and met twice – once in London in 1931 and again in New Delhi in 1947 – before Gandhi was assassinated in 1948.[16] Holmes had frequently referred to Gandhi in messianic ways. In his book *My Gandhi*, he wrote: "When I think of Gandhi, I think of Jesus […] Had the Mahatma not come into my life, I must sooner or later have been lost."[17] In the person of Gandhi, Holmes united his pacifist, spiritualist, and reformist ideas, making the Indian freedom fighter an epitome of the Social Gospel.

11 Haynes Holmes, *I Speak for Myself*, 77.

12 John Haynes Holmes, "Predigt über Gandhi," in *Die Gandhi-Revolution*, ed. Fritz Diettrich (Dresden: Jess, 1930), 133–48.

13 Haynes Holmes, *I Speak for Myself*, 171. On the pacifist tradition among U. S. liberal Protestants and their stance on nonintervention towards Nazi Germany, see Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*, 327.

14 Michael Glenn Thompson, *For God and Globe*: *Christian Internationalism in the United States Between the Great War and the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 3–7.

15 John Haynes Holmes, *The World Significance of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: Friends for Freedom for India, 1922), 2.

16 Leilah C. Danielson, "'In My Extremity I Turned to Gandhi': American Pacifists, Christianity, and Gandhian Nonviolence, 1915–1941," *Church History* 72, no. 2 (2003): 365.

17 Many pacifists and Social Gospelers joined Holmes in his admiration for Gandhi, in whom they often saw a Christ-like figure. Gandhi was, to many, a personification of their Social Gospel ideology. Danielson, "'In My Extremity I Turned to Gandhi,'" 364.

In April 1948, four months after Gandhi's death, Diettrich reached out to Holmes with a request. He had just returned from Soviet war captivity and found his only son missing and all but one copy of his book destroyed. He had decided to publish a second edition of *The Gandhi Revolution* because, "for a new edition of the Gandhi book the occasion is now more pressing than in the year 1930." Diettrich then asked Holmes if he might contribute a modified version of his original sermon.[18] Intrigued, Holmes replied: "I am eager with all my heart to cooperate with you." Over the years, he had collected hundreds of books on Gandhi and donated them to his alma mater, Harvard. Yet, Diettrich's *The Gandhi Revolution* was missing from the collection. Holmes asked him for a copy of the first edition "for it would be a priceless contribution to my Gandhi library" and would "enter into good company and be scrupulously protected and preserved." After posting announcements in various German literary and academic journals, Diettrich was able to acquire the desired copy. Holmes, in return, rewarded Diettrich's engagement with a new and extended version of his original sermon. But Diettrich needed more than financial and material resources for his endeavor. He and his wife were also struggling with hunger and health issues. In February 1949, they received a CARE package sent by Holmes, who wrote: "You have survived so much that you must now be guaranteed, so far as possible, a full recovery." Five months later, Diettrich secured a publisher for the second edition of his book.[19]

A certain self-interest is undeniably visible in Holmes's relationship with Diettrich. Even though the German writer had approached him to ask for a new contribution to the second edition of his book, Holmes barely addressed the issue at first. Instead, he answered with a request of his own, asking for an addition to his Gandhi library at Harvard. And even though Diettrich had already written about his precarious living conditions in April 1948, it was not until the following January, after *The Gandhi Revolution* had safely arrived in New York, that Holmes answered a renewed report on Diettrich's ill health with a CARE package. Humanitarian attention became a form of payment for a job fulfilled. Consciously or unconsciously, Holmes exploited the unequal power dynamic that clearly worked in his favor as he set demands and expected delivery before becoming active himself.

Once Diettrich had upheld his end of the bargain, the CARE package helped to accelerate the dreary process of securing a publisher as it provided him with the necessary physical and psychological support. Since aid helped Diettrich to secure a new publication on a topic close to Holmes's heart, it also clearly expressed a vital part of Holmes's socio-religious ideology. Spread-

18 Fritz Diettrich to John Haynes Holmes [translated by the author], April 24, 1948, Holmes Papers, Box 82.

19 Correspondence between Fritz Diettrich and John Haynes Holmes, February 25, 1948 – July 2, 1949, Holmes Papers, Box 82.

ing the word of Gandhi, which Holmes strongly associated with the word of Christ, meant spreading the Social Gospel among a population in dire need of pacifist ideology. But more than that, it allowed Holmes to reconnect with the activist achievements of his past. Since Gandhi had suffered a violent death, any engagement that continued to uphold his memory also preserved his pacifist teaching – teaching that Holmes had himself often shared with his congregation. Ultimately, reconnecting with Diettrich was, for Holmes, a form of self-preservation.

Diettrich did not remain the only recipient whose life's work struck the progressivist tone Holmes sought to further abroad. Around the same time Diettrich's letter arrived in New York, Holmes received another letter from a German friend. In 1927, Holmes had met the Berlin-based social reformer Betty Hirsch when she toured the United States and spoke about her activism before his congregation. Born into a Danish-Jewish family in 1873, Hirsch had been blinded in an accident at the age of twelve. She received an education in English, literature, and music and, up until World War I, made her living as a language teacher for visually impaired students. During the conflict, Hirsch opened a school for war-blinded soldiers in Berlin that expanded to accept civilian pupils in the interwar period. This endeavor also gave her international recognition and secured her invitations to the United States and Great Britain in 1927–28. Deprived of her citizenship in October 1933, she was the only one in her family who managed to emigrate to England; her two sisters were murdered in concentration camps. Despite these familial hardships, Hirsch decided to move back to Berlin in 1947.[20]

Twenty-one years after they had met, Betty Hirsch heard Holmes give a speech about Gandhi on the radio in the U.S. sector of Berlin and decided to reestablish contact.[21] The minister showed himself to be greatly moved by Hirsch's tragic past and her noble decision to return to Germany. "You have truly put by all hatred from your heart," he responded to her letter, "and thus made it possible in pity and compassion to do your great work. […] I am so moved by your letter […] that I must contribute what little I can to your help."[22] This time, it took Holmes only six weeks to respond with a CARE package for Hirsch and the pupils she had privately taken on in the meantime; and it was just the first of several to come. Their professional friendship, rekindled through humanitarian support, fruitfully enriched both their intellectual activities. For the next several years, Holmes and Hirsch regularly corresponded on

20 Hans E. Schulze, "Betty Hirsch: 'Mother' of the Blind," *British Journal of Visual Impairment* 20, no. 2 (2002): 84–87.

21 Betty Hirsch to Holmes, April 12, 1948, Holmes Papers, Box 85.

22 Holmes to Betty Hirsch, May 7, 1948, Holmes Papers, Box 226.

topics of mutual interest, exchanging views on Soviet communism, the Berlin Blockade, and the creation of the state of Israel.[23]

Three commonalities are striking in Holmes's aid to both Diettrich and Hirsch, and they are all intrinsically connected to the progressivist environment in which Holmes had worked and lived for most of his life. Just like Diettrich's pursuit of pacifism, Hirsch's activism, too, echoed Holmes's reformist ideology. Her endeavor to provide education for the less fortunate aptly reflected U. S. American progressivist visions of private institutionalized reform. Hirsch had created a sheltered place of gathering for those who were lost in the tumultuous terrain of an industrialized metropolis. Her actions mirrored those of two of Holmes's ACLU companions: Jane Addams, the famous founder of the Chicago Hull House, and disability rights advocate Helen Keller, who was also a friend and CARE benefactor of Hirsch's. Like Addams and Keller, Hirsch had made support for the world's disadvantaged her life's work.[24] Holmes's aid to Hirsch's cause, just like his aid to Diettrich, touched on crucial aspects of his reformist convictions and corresponded well with his self-perception as a spiritual activist.

A second feature visible in both instances is a particular, progressivist notion of friendship. In his first postwar letter to Hirsch, Holmes declared that he thought of her "so gratefully as a friend whom I have seen and known."[25] In equally admiring terms, he had told Diettrich that "I feel a certain thrill in knowing you and thus sharing, however humbly, the triumph of your life."[26] Turn-of-the-century social reformers often understood their relations to the less fortunate in terms of friendship. These friendships were not, as in a contemporary understanding, grounded in intimacy or commonalities in character. In fact, Holmes had met Hirsch only once and Diettrich never at all, which had given him little opportunity to develop close, amicable feelings for either of them. Rather, and despite unequal relations in terms of class and education, social reformers felt commonality with those they helped based on a shared humanity and a common origin and destiny as children of God – and they had the duty to guide those who could not help themselves into a better future. In relation to each other, social reformers expressed friendship as a union of a shared "cause, service, or commitment," in the words of Mark Peel, which "enabled them to sustain shared – and often deeply unpopular – political convictions."[27] Friendship, in its progressivist expression, was a relation

23 See correspondence between Hirsch and Holmes, June 25, 1948 – August 2, 1949, Holmes Papers, Box 226.

24 CARE Berlin Discursive Report, September 1950, CARE Records, Box 839.

25 Holmes to Hirsch, May 7, 1948, Holmes Papers, Box 226.

26 Holmes to Diettrich, June 2, 1948, Holmes Papers, Box 225.

27 Mark Peel, "New Worlds of Friendship: The Early Twentieth Century," in *Friendship: A History*, ed. Barbara Caine (London: Routledge, 2014), 284–90; quote 289.

understood in terms of transcendentality or universality as humans and, at the same time, in the interest-driven idea of a common pursuit of the greater good.

Interestingly, Holmes's friendships with Diettrich and Hirsch belonged to both of these categories. Diettrich and Hirsch were social reformers who pursued virtuous causes demonstrating the political and ethical convictions they shared with Holmes. At the same time, the war had made them unfortunates in need of help. This new position significantly changed their power dynamic with Holmes, who, as Diettrich's case shows, adhered to progressive notions of friendship while using this power imbalance to his own advantage. In his aid to both, Holmes could unfold his progressivism in the broadest possible sense. He drew on an early twentieth-century understanding of friendship that ascribed a dual role to Hirsch and Diettrich, marked by imagined equality and mutuality, but characterized by a discrepancy of power and agency.

Thirdly, and building on this progressivist notion of friendship, both aid engagements echoed U.S. American, rather than German, reformist traditions. U.S. debates on big or small government, the latter of which delegated the responsibility for welfare mostly to the private sector, had never developed in Germany. In fact, Germany looked back on a tradition of state-run welfare that had existed since the era of Bismarck, which is why the country lacked any real culture of private activism anywhere close to the turn-of-the-century progressivist United States. Holmes's support for Hirsch thus highlighted the minister's understanding of U.S. welfare culture as a private endeavor, and he now projected this understanding onto Germany.

The same holds true for the case of Diettrich. Public debates on pacifism had a much longer tradition in progressivist circles in the United States than they had in Germany. Progressives were, in fact, deeply divided over the issue of war. Self-proclaimed progressive policymakers like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson had frequently promoted U.S. military interventions abroad, although the former was a declared imperialist while the latter only cautiously came to embrace U.S. war involvement. On the other end, prominent social reformers like Jane Addams and Robert La Follette ardently opposed military intervention and voiced opposition to the War of 1898 and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines because these events echoed imperialist ideas that they could not reconcile with U.S. notions of democracy.[28] Germany had developed a very different relation to the issues of war and imperial expansion. The German Empire, born out of war with the French arch enemy in 1871, utilized armed force to enforce colonial control in Africa, China, and the South Pacific, and the nation's citizens seemed to accept this much more easily than many U.S. Americans did. The causes Holmes supported reflected the cultural un-

28 Dawley, *Changing the World*, 6–7; Patricia M. Shields, *Jane Addams: Progressive Pioneer of Peace, Philosophy, Sociology, Social Work and Public Administration* (Cham: Springer, 2017), 11.

derstanding of his home onto Germany and expressed little understanding of German political and social traditions. Although noble, they served less as a meaningful contribution to postwar German reconstruction than as an opportunity for Holmes to recreate his prewar progressivist idealism.

* * *

Only a few months before Holmes first heard from Diettrich and Hirsch, another letter from Germany arrived at an office near Columbia University, just where Manhattan met West Harlem. The addressor was Werner Flatter, a young postal clerk from a small town in the Rhineland. Flatter had secretly jotted the New York address down from a CARE package that a friend of his had recently received. He wanted to keep said friend anonymous as, he claimed, he did not want to create the impression of people going around Germany and propagating the names of their benefactors. Flatter did not know anybody in the United States and had no friends or relatives overseas. The address on the CARE package was, he said, his only chance at asking for urgently needed foods for himself, his wife, and their infant son, and he hoped the addressee would be able to afford yet another package or at least know someone who could.[29]

This addressee was Karl Paul Reinhold Niebuhr, usually referred to by his third name. Like Holmes, Niebuhr was a trained minister and now a professor for Practical Theology at Union Theological Seminary, the most prestigious Protestant theological research and education center of its time.[30] Born in small-town Missouri in 1892, he was the child of a first-generation German immigrant and evangelical pastor. Like his father, Niebuhr entered Eden Theological Seminary near St. Louis in 1910 to prepare for his B. A. and M. A. studies in theology at Yale University.[31] By the time Niebuhr received Flatter's letter, he had become the most prominent theological figure in the country and an eminence in public and political matters. A regular visitor in the halls of power, he enjoyed invitations from the State Department for his expertise on German politics and society and regularly attended George Kennan's Policy Planning Staff.[32] Never before had Washington politicians and the media so eagerly courted a man of faith.

Due to Niebuhr's prominence and ancestral heritage, Flatter's letter was not the only one he received in those days. His reputation had crossed the Atlantic, where media outlets held him in high regard as a spokesperson on behalf of the German people. Articles in newspapers such as the *Neue Zeitung* and

29 Letter from Werner Flatter to Niebuhr, October 22, 1947, Reinhold Niebuhr Papers, Box 6, Library of Congress (hereafter Niebuhr Papers).
30 Thompson, *For God and Globe*, 153.
31 Richard Wightman Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 3–5, 14, 18.
32 Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 238.

the *Amerikanische Rundschau*, both of which had been established by the U.S. military government, praised Niebuhr as a man who really understood the German situation: he was aware of postwar distress but not naïve to the complicity of the German people in their regime's activities, and he preached democracy without ever becoming moralistic or paternalist. Some articles and radio broadcasts even wrongly assumed that Niebuhr was related to the famed nineteenth-century German historian Barthold Georg Niebuhr.[33] Since most of these media reports cited Niebuhr as a professor at Union Theological Seminary, many Germans followed Flatter's example and sent pleas for help to his office address. Some also referenced relations with former recipients of Niebuhr's humanitarian attention, while others simply described him as their only chance to seek support from across the Atlantic.[34] By December 1948, the situation had gotten out of hand: Niebuhr had to refer incoming pleas for CARE packages to the Church World Service and stated that he had "sent about as many packages in the past three months as I can afford."[35]

Unlike Holmes, Niebuhr contributed to CARE on a large scale. Out of his own pocket but also with financial help from friends and acquaintances, he had over a hundred packages sent to a total of seventy-six recipients.[36] Despite quantitative differences, both men's humanitarian engagement started the same way. Before word about the generous professor from New York had spread and caused German pleas for help to pile up on his desk, Niebuhr had chosen his first recipients based on familiarity and shared professional and ideological profiles.

Many of Niebuhr's political and social beliefs were congruent with Holmes's. Like his Unitarian colleague, Niebuhr believed in the responsibility of using Christian faith for the social good. As a young pastor in Detroit, he had often voiced harsh criticism of working conditions in the U.S. American automobile industry and had supported local labor movements in their fight against Fordist exploitation.[37] Like Holmes, Niebuhr also became a member of the Socialist Party in the 1920s and, although unsuccessfully, even ran as

33 For example, the radio broadcast "Das Porträt: Reinhold Niebuhr" [The Portrait: Reinhold Niebuhr], manuscript by Dr. Friedrich Schulze-Maizier, Südwest-Funk, February 13, 1949, Niebuhr Papers, Box 10.

34 See, for example, the correspondence between Reinhold Niebuhr and Alfred Krämer, February 5 – March 5, 1948; correspondence between Job Kreutzer and Reinhold Niebuhr, February 23, 1947 – January 8, 1948, Niebuhr Papers, Box 8; Correspondence between Fritz Steinkuhle and Reinhold Niebuhr, September 17, 1947 – January 30, 1948, Niebuhr Papers, Box 11.

35 Niebuhr to the Church World Service, December 9, 1948, Niebuhr Papers, Box 3.

36 Many of these donations were only possible with financial help from Episcopalian Rev. Howard Chandler Robbins and his wife, who were close friends and intellectual companions of Niebuhr's at his summer home in Heath, Massachusetts. See a list of CARE donations sent by Niebuhr on September 24, 1947, Niebuhr Papers, Box 3.

37 Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 94–100.

the party's candidate for the Upper West Side of New York in 1930.[38] Both men were also friends for many years, but their friendship eventually ended over the issue of pacifism and war intervention. Unlike Holmes, Niebuhr had supported U.S. entry into World War I and toured military camps to preach to soldiers before they departed for Europe.[39] In his landmark 1932 publication *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, he attacked the Social Gospel that formed the core of Holmes's spiritual and activist philosophy as a liberal Christian illusion. Rather than preaching pacifism, Niebuhr argued that violence was justified if it served a virtuous cause.[40] In the years following the book's publication, the rise, expansion, and eventual aggression of Nazi Germany gave his words an almost prophetic quality. Failed appeasement towards Hitler had proven that nonviolence could not avert catastrophe. Rather, the fight against fascism presented exactly the kind of virtuous cause that justified a violent response. On these grounds, Niebuhr came to emphatically support U.S. entry into World War II and quickly became a leading public proponent of U.S. intervention in the debate on the issue.[41]

During the war, Niebuhr became a prominent spokesperson on the issue of Germany and published numerous articles describing the origins, ascent, and consequences of Nazi rule to the U.S. public.[42] He actively supported outspoken critics of the Nazi regime and secured teaching positions for prominent German theologians. One of them was Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a leading figure in the antifascist Bekennende Kirche [Confessing Church] whom Niebuhr had first met in 1930. Bonhoeffer did not stay long in the U.S.; rather, he soon returned to Germany to continue his fight in the underground resistance, paying for this with his life at the Flossenbürg concentration camp in April 1945.[43] Although Niebuhr's attempt to save Bonhoeffer was unsuccessful, it demonstrates that he put high hopes in religiosity as a counterforce to German fascism.[44]

38 June Bingham, *Courage to Change*: *An Introduction to the Life and Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961), 163.

39 Bingham, *Courage to Change*, 106–107; Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 49–51.

40 Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*: *A Study in Ethics and Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953 [1932]), 170, 172. For an elaborate analysis of this transition in Niebuhr's theology, see also David A. Hollinger, *After Cloven Tongues of Fire*: *Protestant Liberalism in Modern American History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 212.

41 In 1941, after having left the Socialist Party for its insistence on nonintervention, Niebuhr co-founded the Union for Democratic Action, which united leftist intellectuals and labor leaders, among them also the AFL's David Dubinsky, in their efforts to advocate for the U.S. to enter the war. Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 197–201, 230; Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*, 311.

42 See, for example, "Why German Socialism Crashed," *Christian Century*, April 5, 1933, 451–53, Niebuhr Papers, Box 19; "Hitlerism – A Devil's Brew," *World Tomorrow*, April 19, 1933, 369–70, Niebuhr Papers, Box 20.

43 Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 124–26, 187–88.

44 Niebuhr became similarly active on behalf of theologian Paul Tillich from Frankfurt University and Karl Frank (now living under his alias Paul Hagen), the founder of the socialist resist-

Niebuhr's activism on behalf of Germany soon captured the attention of the State Department, which approached him in pursuit of a mission that would decisively shape his postwar humanitarian engagement. The State Department had grown wary of Germany's multi-track secondary school system: since it only allowed a small elite to access higher education, it threatened to further the authoritarian segregation of the German population.[45] Seeking advice on the issue, the department had designed a mission for educational and clerical figures from the United States to travel to the U.S. occupation zone.[46] Headed by George F. Zook, president of the American Council on Education, the delegation aimed to assess potential adjustments that would further West Germany's democratic rehabilitation.[47]

Although Niebuhr had previously criticized the elitism of the German education system and had, therefore, agreed to join the delegation, he showed little enthusiasm for the trip.[48] He looked forward to doing his part in U.S. policy towards Germany, but he was aware that his visit was not only a mission to get expert opinions on German democratization. Education, though literally the essential component of "re-education," did not feature prominently on the agenda of the U.S. military government. The Education & Religious Affairs branch was a comparatively small and understaffed unit within the overall structure of OMGUS, and the State Department had pointed to the discrepancy between grand re-education objectives and insufficient education plans even before the occupation had formally begun.[49] "One thing they just obviously hope from us is influence on public and Congressional opinion in favor of more help to Germany," Niebuhr wrote to his wife shortly before his departure. He was aware that the State Department had selected him not only for his educational and linguistic expertise but also for his public visibility, which promised to draw more political attention to educational issues. As a publicly

ance group Neu Beginnen [Beginning Anew]. Bingham, *Courage to Change*, 168–70; Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 160–61, 201.

45 James F. Tent, "American Influences on the German Educational System," in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990*, ed. Junker et al., 1:394–95.

46 Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 114–15.

47 Next to Zook, the group included Bess Goodykoontz (Director, Division of Elementary Education, United States Office of Education), Henry H. Hill (President, George Peabody College for Teachers), Paul M. Limbert (YMCA College), Earl J. McGrath (Dean, University of Iowa), Rev. Felix Newton Pitt (Secretary, Catholic School Board), Lawrence Rogin (Textile Workers Union of America, CIO), T.V. Smith (Professor, University of Chicago), Helen C. White (Professor, University of Wisconsin). See the Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, September 21, 1946; United States Education Mission to Germany; Administrative Files, 1945–1951; RG 331: Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, 1907–1966, NARA.

48 Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, 22–23.

49 Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, 10.

outspoken proponent of German rehabilitation, Niebuhr had little objection to being an instrument in congressional politics. But he was not sure if the rest of the team was up to the task. Helen C. White, a professor of English at the University of Wisconsin, was the only delegate whose qualification he regarded as "first rate." He was not thrilled with Zook but admitted that it was "only fair" for him to be the leader of the group. Felix Newton Pitt, the secretary of the Catholic School Board, Niebuhr deemed "very conventional and not too intelligent," while he saw most other delegates as only "so so."[50]

His rather sardonic attitude changed once the journey commenced in the late summer of 1946.[51] Up until then, Niebuhr had observed the situation in wartime Germany from his New York office and had sought to help German friends and colleagues from the comfort of home. The trip, by contrast, meant a drastic physical exposure and unprecedented closeness to the country's material and psychological destruction. On September 1, 1946, the delegation arrived at Berlin's Tempelhof Airport. Niebuhr had read about the vast destruction of German cities, but the ruins of Berlin superseded the expectations he had formulated from a distance. Much like the congresspersons in *A Foreign Affair*, he looked down from his airplane cabin at "a ghostly sight, with thousands of buildings standing like empty honey-combs."[52] "Berlin is a city of the dead," he informed his wife the next day. "I am not enough of an artist to describe the destruction but I am sure world history has not seen its like before."[53]

During the ensuing weeks, the trip exposed Niebuhr to several of Germany's postwar problems. The group visited institutions of primary and higher education throughout the U.S. zone, including the universities of Munich, Frankfurt, Erlangen, Heidelberg, and Marburg, and walked past ruins that had once been grand university auditoriums and libraries. They met with professors, teachers, clerics, and pupils – many of whom were severely malnourished. German administrators informed them about material and educational needs while OMGUS personnel shared ideas about future education policies. The group also visited the border that was gradually taking shape between the Soviet and the three Western occupation zones. Niebuhr found not just a defeated Germany but a country on the verge of material and intellectual collapse.

Upon their return to the United States, the delegates composed a comprehensive report on their experiences, painting a grim picture of the German situation. Schools, they stated, were terribly understaffed and universities ill-equipped, while the whole education system clung to hierarchical structures

50 Niebuhr to his wife Ursula, August 26, 1946, Niebuhr Papers, Box 59.

51 Bingham, *Courage to Change*, 288; Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 227.

52 Letter from Reinhold to Ursula Niebuhr, September 1946 [exact date unknown, likely September 1], Niebuhr Papers, Box 59.

53 Letter from Reinhold Niebuhr to his wife Ursula [exact date unknown, likely September 2, 1946], Niebuhr Papers, Box 59.

unsuitable for democratization. The segregationist structure of the German system decided a child's future by the age of ten, selecting an elite group of about ten percent to enter the higher secondary school, the Gymnasium. Only those who attended Gymnasium had the chance of a future university education. What the mission report recommended for the country was a "methodology of democracy," which essentially meant substituting the multi-track system for the U.S. model of elementary school followed by a compulsory and inclusive secondary school.[54] Only this collective education, according to the report, could raise awareness for democracy in Germany's rising generation.[55]

In many respects, the report clearly bore the hallmarks of Niebuhr's thought. It cautioned against paternalism on the part of victorious nations on the grounds of Germany's tremendous achievements: no country, it stated, had "contributed more generously to the common treasures of our civilization [than Germany]. No approach to the German educational problem dare be blind to this achievement or lacking in gratitude for it."[56] Moreover, the report reflected Niebuhr's convictions about social action and individual responsibility: it argued that "the development of this [education] program is not the responsibility of the government alone. Equally, if not more, important is the intelligent backing of the American people in the reorientation of the German people."[57] But just as much as the report featured Niebuhr's signature, it is apparent that he had taken the experiences of the trip and the content of the report to heart. "The trip here has been very profitable. I would not have missed it," he noted in his diary in September 1946. "The future of western civilization will be decided here, in my opinion."[58]

This direct exposure to the German people and their role in the postwar world, coupled with the newfound political agency that the education mission had provided, prompted Niebuhr to engage in new debates on future engagement and eventually paved the way to his CARE actions. Before the pleas for help arriving at Niebuhr's office grew too numerous, his giving started in

54 Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, September 21, 1946; RG 331; NARA. The reformist and socially engaging tone of the report was favorably received by Washington authorities. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson expressed his deep appreciation of the report, among other things, for underscoring "the intimate relation between the revival of German education and the re-establishment of democratic institutions in that country." U.S. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to Dr. George F. Zook [American Council on Education and head of the educational mission to the US zone]; Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, September 21, 1946; RG 331; NARA.

55 Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, 116–18.

56 Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, September 21, 1946; RG 331; NARA.

57 Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, September 21, 1946; RG 331; NARA.

58 Diary entry by Reinhold Niebuhr, September 14, 1946 [wrongly transcribed in the typescript as 1947], Niebuhr Papers, Box 58.

the same selective way that had characterized Holmes's aid to Diettrich and Hirsch. Niebuhr could direct his aid specifically to a small group of people he had met on his recent trip to Germany and with whom he shared either professional or ideological reference points. Apart from a few school principals and clerics, most of his recipients were university professors, such as famed philosopher Karl Jaspers, sociologist Alfred Weber (brother of Max Weber), philologist Kurt Witte, and Lutheran theologists Rudolf Bultmann and Heinz-Horst Schrey.[59]

As with Holmes, familiarity lay at the heart of this endeavor. Niebuhr had talked to all these men personally and had convinced himself of their favorable democratic inclinations. Some of them were on the verge of retirement, and although they may have shared Niebuhr's ideological vision, they were by no means the future of Germany that had featured so prominently in the education mission's report. Even though Niebuhr had witnessed the material distress of schoolchildren and university students first-hand, he deliberately decided to share his humanitarian compassion with an academic elite instead of supporting the young students they were supposed to educate in democracy.

Still, Niebuhr's CARE donations prove that he had internalized the report's recommendation to ensure people are fed before educating them in democracy: "every educator knows that education is organically related to the whole fabric of man's social existence and that democratic life is not possible under condition of desperate economic need."[60] This thinking coincided with a tactical shift in the policies of the U.S. military government when General Clay, too, came to embrace the connection between food and democracy around the same time. Niebuhr's humanitarian engagement rested on this political calculation as he dedicated it to recipients who sat in potentially influential positions. In its selectivity, it was strikingly similar to Jay Lovestone's targeting of union functionaries. The recipients were, in modern terms, multipliers who could better serve the democratization of their students once their material needs were satisfied. Niebuhr displayed a very narrow materialism in his aid engagement, and he exposed a clear preference and selectivity that subordinated need to political strategy.

Even though this approach followed a certain logic, it also paradoxically reinforced the hierarchical structures that both OMGUS and the report had lamented. It did not break with outmoded traditions but rather consolidated old elitist models. Niebuhr expressed the same understanding of need that was central to CARE's image as an asset to U.S. foreign policy because he measured humanitarian success by its potential to further policy objectives rather than

59 Niebuhr posted all these donations, together with thirty others, on September 24, 1947; see the respective list to CARE in Niebuhr Papers, Box 3.

60 Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, September 21, 1946; RG 331; NARA.

evaluating it in terms of its actual potential for relief. Easing hunger was not a motivation itself but rather a means that served the grander prospect of Germany's democratic rehabilitation. Need, Niebuhr revealed, was not a universal concept but a matter of individual interpretation.

Niebuhr's direct contact with the German intellectual scene also equipped him with a refined view of the future of U. S.-Soviet political relations. His conversations with the local intelligentsia had furthered his belief that eventual Soviet government control of the entire occupied territory was inevitable without U. S. economic and ideological support. Back in New York, Niebuhr immediately drafted an article on the East-West struggle over postwar Germany that would significantly increase his visibility on both sides of the Atlantic. "The Fight for Germany" appeared in *LIFE Magazine* on October 21, 1946. Its clear anticommunist note reflected Niebuhr's realist Christian outlook and met with approval from policymakers across the political spectrum.[61] The trip, he reported, had convinced him "that the Russians are not, and will not be, satisfied with any system of Eastern European defenses but are seeking to extend their power over the whole of Europe."[62] "With small help from us the Germans have encompassed the provisional defeat of Russia's ideological ambitions," he admitted, but he also warned that "these gains cannot be held without a clear-cut and creative economic policy on our part."[63]

Soon, the article found its way across the Atlantic. In its appeal for Germany's reconversion from former enemy to future ally against leftist totalitarianism, it expressed a clear commitment to U. S. political objectives that resonated well with West German readers. "The Fight for Germany" became the initial spark for Niebuhr's growing public prominence in the Western occupation zones and aroused a great deal of attention from those seeking a sympathetic contact overseas. One of these readers was Lore Hinker, a young Silesian refugee who now lived in Munich. As the Western occupation zones suffered from an immense food shortage and a lack of employment opportunities, refugees from the Reich's former eastern provinces often faced harsh discrimination and social isolation. Hinker was, on top of that, a Protestant in Catholic-dominated Bavaria, so that she suffered tremendous social exclusion. She wrote that the Nazis had deported her parents from Silesia shortly before the arrival of the Soviet forces and that she escaped with an infant child. The *LIFE* article, she said, had given her renewed hope and the courage to contact Niebuhr directly. Hinker further mentioned that her grandmother had known a young cleric named Reinhold Niebuhr in her youth in rural Silesia and was convinced that said Reinhold must have been a relative of Niebuhr's. This was not the case as

61 Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 228–29.
62 Niebuhr, "The Fight for Germany," October 21, 1946, *LIFE Magazine*, 66.
63 Niebuhr, "The Fight for Germany," 68, 72.

Niebuhr's only German relatives had been farmers near the West German city of Detmold. Still, he decided to send Lore Hinker a CARE package.[64]

In the two years following the publication of "The Fight for Germany," quite a few Germans reached out to Niebuhr, and they received his humanitarian attention even though they had never met him. Many of them were intellectuals and eager readers of Niebuhr's theological literature who, like Lore Hinker and Werner Flatter, had obtained his address through media outlets or acquaintances.[65] Some recipients asked him to utilize his influence in media and publishing to provide contacts for possible jobs. Among those was also Heinz-Horst Schrey, one of the few selected original recipients of Niebuhr's first CARE engagement, who asked to have an article he had written on German remilitarization published in Niebuhr's own journal *Christianity and Crisis*.[66] Also Gert Lynch, a Bavarian journalist and writer, who asked for a CARE package for his young son Wolfgang, would regularly supply Niebuhr with articles and short stories he had written for German newspapers.[67] Other senders put high hopes in Niebuhr's political influence and asked for his recognition as resistance fighters against the Nazi regime. One such was theologist Adolf Gross, an active member of the church resistance against the Nazis, whose publication of antifascist pamphlets had led to his incarceration at the concentration camps Sachsenhausen and Dachau. In May 1948, Gross turned to Niebuhr with a written confirmation of his resistance by Martin Niemöller, the famed Protestant theologist whom Niebuhr had met through his activism on behalf of Bonhoeffer and the Confessing Church. This confirmation, Gross hoped, would increase his chances for humanitarian attention, which it did, in the end.[68]

Niebuhr's reasons for helping these people are diverse and not explicitly documented, but explanations for his behavior become apparent through his professional and ideological development. The selectivity he expressed in his aid to educators notwithstanding, one should not underestimate the impact of religious conviction. Like Holmes, Niebuhr was, after all, a Christian practitioner and thinker. Notions of agape and shared humanity featured in all his aid engagements, particularly in those to people who had suffered greatly

64 Lore Hinker to Reinhold Niebuhr, January 17, 1948, Niebuhr Papers, Box 9; Receipt of Niebuhr's CARE order to Hinker, February 25, 1948, Niebuhr Papers, Box 3. For further documentation of recipients who contacted Niebuhr after having read the *LIFE* article, see Eberhard Schulz to Reinhold Niebuhr, July 3, 1947, Niebuhr Papers, Box 10.

65 See, for example, Wolfgang Schwarz to Reinhold Niebuhr, December 25, 1947, Niebuhr Papers, Box 10.

66 Schrey to Niebuhr, May 27, 1950, Niebuhr Papers, Box 10; see also Karl Plumeyer to Reinhold Niebuhr, March 25, 1949, Niebuhr Papers, Box 10; correspondence between Ernst Surkau and Reinhold Niebuhr, August 20 – September 29, 1947, Niebuhr Papers, Box 11; Wilhelm Wacker to Reinhold Niebuhr, November 24, 1948, Niebuhr Papers, Box 13.

67 Correspondence between Gert Lynch and Reinhold Niebuhr, May 31, 1946 – October 31, 1953, Niebuhr Papers, Box 8.

68 Letter from Adolf Gross to Niebuhr, May 10, 1948, Niebuhr Papers, Box 6.

under the war and now turned to Niebuhr as a last resort. Turning his back on those least fortunate who called out for help would have violated his basic religious convictions concerning charity to the poor, particularly since he believed in practicing Christianity for the social good. This thinking, in turn, had a political connotation as it highlighted the significance of religious teaching to a free and healthy democracy. At least partially, Niebuhr was acting as the minister he was trained to be.

Turning the less fortunate away would have also contradicted Niebuhr's position as a political thinker informed by progressivist ideas of social equality. When Niebuhr had first entered the dining hall at OMGUS headquarters in Berlin on his State Department trip, he had been appalled by what he perceived as a "dreamland of luxury amidst destruction," lamenting to his wife that the "difference between conqueror and conquered does not change through the whole of history."[69] Such remarks, in relation to the content of the education mission's report or his article in *LIFE*, undeniably mark his aid as an expression of his progressivist thinking and his advocacy on behalf of the defeated enemy nation. Niebuhr could not preach material and moral reconstruction as a quest for U. S. and German interests and then fail to apply his preaching in his private life. Now that the education mission had awarded him the political influence and public standing to turn his words into action, he would not have been able to reconcile refusing aid with his newfound sense of agency in foreign matters.

Equally important was Niebuhr's recent rise to public prominence, both in the United States and Germany. He obviously enjoyed the State Department's acknowledgement of his proficiency in German matters and welcomed increased attention. Hence, "The Fight for Germany" represented an open display of his newfound confidence as a political influencer. The numerous German pleas for aid that resulted from this demonstration of expertise confirmed his sense of agency in the postwar transatlantic theater, making his aid engagement an expression of the power he now exerted in foreign matters. Niebuhr was, simply speaking, flattered by the overseas attention, especially since it came from the land of his ancestors.

Despite these reasons, Niebuhr's aid remained selective. Not one of the long lists of recipient names that he sent to CARE over the years featured the name and address of Werner Flatter, although the young postal clerk had appealed to Niebuhr's mercy the same way Lore Hinker, Adolf Gross, or Gert Lynch had done. None of those beneficiaries had previously met Niebuhr – a quality which had undeniably defined his first donations – and none of them held comparably influential positions that could have helped in the reconstruction of German democracy. But in one way or another, all the others

69 Letter from Reinhold to Ursula Niebuhr, September 1946 [exact date unknown, likely September 1], Niebuhr Papers, Box 59.

matched Niebuhr's professional and political convictions. They were faithful Protestants, eager readers of theological literature, Christian resistance fighters, teachers, preachers, and democratically inclined journalists. Their profiles offered Niebuhr associative intersections that corresponded with his own biography and ideology, and they matched his ideas about Germany's democratic rehabilitation in ways that a postal clerk without visible religious or political inclinations simply did not. Niebuhr's aid served his particular version of German rehabilitation and furthered a reformist purpose that strikingly mirrored his own persona. Much like Holmes, Niebuhr expressed inbound motivations as he confirmed his own values and virtues and reflected those onto Germany. In doing so, he used humanitarian aid within the logics of progressivist reform activism, merging personal desires and domestic concerns with larger visions for international reorganization.

* * *

While Niebuhr performed aid to create a new transatlantic network, and Holmes used CARE to rebuild bridges that the war had destroyed, a third New Yorker resorted to humanitarian aid in ways that were similar to both and yet distinct. Like Holmes, Margaret Sanger would come to the rescue of those with whom she had lost contact during the war. But her vision for the future did not express the abstract utopianism that fueled much of Holmes's progressivist approach. Hers was a specific cause in which she promoted her own convictions on the international stage, distributing and withholding aid, not unlike Niebuhr, to fit her personal reformist ideas. It was a clear activist agenda rooted in her life's work – work Sanger now tried to protect from utter collapse.

Margaret Sanger was a figurehead in the U.S. American fight for women's sexual emancipation and birth control. Her lifelong fight for the legalization of contraception put her in a field of activism rarely associated with Christian teaching. But Sanger and Holmes shared a friendship and mutual admiration that Holmes and Niebuhr never achieved. In his autobiography, Holmes called Margaret Sanger one "of the greatest women of our time, or of all time," and recalled that none of his social activism "stirred my soul with such conviction of worth and good, as the work for birth control."[70] Sanger, in turn, described Holmes as "a speaker second to none [who] brought the convincing force of his arguments and mind to our aid."[71]

By the end of World War II, as she – like her two fellow New Yorkers – reached for her checkbook to aid her acquaintances abroad, Sanger had largely

70 Haynes Holmes, *I Speak for Myself*, 201–202.

71 Margaret Sanger, *An Autobiography* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1938), 253. Holmes had first met and emphatically supported Sanger in 1921 when she became director of the American Birth Control League. Jean H. Baker, *Margaret Sanger*: *A Life of Passion* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011), 172.

retired from public life. She was writing her memoirs and looking back on a career that had given her national and international acclaim. Born in 1879, the same year as Holmes, Sanger had moved to New York as a young woman and worked there as a nurse, tending to pregnant women in the city's overcrowded tenements. Immense poverty and high mortality rates among working-class mothers furthered her interest in limiting family size, which she began to promote in speeches and pamphlets.[72] In "The Woman Rebel," her first feminist birth-control pamphlet published in 1914, Sanger lambasted existing sex conventions, women's confinement to the role of child-bearing and upbringing, and the legal and social circumstances that promoted this position.[73] Since Victorian morals rendered her cause illegal, "The Woman Rebel" was soon blacklisted for obscenity. Sanger escaped legal prosecution through a year-long, self-imposed exile in Great Britain. With London as her starting point, she spent the first year of World War I traveling to Spain, the Netherlands, and France, developing a wide network of supporters.[74] Sanger then began to build a vibrant international movement in the interwar years that led her across the entire globe, from the United States and Western Europe to Japan, India, and the Soviet Union. She organized international conferences and lectures across all continents and made powerful allies at home and abroad, ranging from social activists like W. E. B. DuBois and scientists such as Albert Einstein and John Maynard Keynes to Gandhi and Eleanor Roosevelt.[75] Through her journeys, Sanger realized that population control was a matter that demanded cooperation across national and racial borders.

In those years, Sanger grew increasingly attached to the birth control movement in Weimar Germany, which had expanded into a European hub for leftist sex reformers launching the field as a social movement and academic discipline. Germany was a forerunner in the development of contraceptives,

72 On Sanger's upbringing in upstate New York and her political radicalization in New York City in the early twentieth century, see Baker, *Margaret Sanger*, 46–70.

73 Dawley, *Changing the World*, 49–50.

74 Margaret Sanger, *My Fight for Birth Control* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1931), 96–113. See also Baker, *Margaret Sanger*, 91–100.

75 In 1925, Sanger organized the Sixth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference in New York City, which put her and her country on the map as leading actors in the international movement. Delegates from eighteen countries on all continents attended the conference that Sanger hailed as "the initiation of a new era of international thought and the beginning of a closely coordinated movement toward world-peace." Margaret Sanger, "The Sixth International Birth Control Conference," in *The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger*, Volume 4: *Round the World for Birth Control 1920–1966*, ed. Cathy M. Hajo et al. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2016), 74–76. On her circle of friends, see Baker, *Margaret Sanger*, 200. For a closer inspection of her relationship with Gandhi, see various documents in Hajo et al., *The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger*, 4: 277–345.

and Sanger smuggled them into the U. S. at a time when they were still illegal.[76] She had first visited the country in 1920 upon the recommendation of her close friend, the prominent English sexologist and eugenicist Havelock Ellis, who advised her to study the local birth control scene and to pursue its promising approaches in contraceptive medicine.[77] In Germany, Sanger saw the geopolitical dimensions of overpopulation most clearly articulated. Like Holmes, she was a committed pacifist who understood war as a consequence of uncontrolled population growth; overpopulation, she argued, would inevitably lead to violent conflict in the competition for resources. This had been especially true in imperial Germany. In Sanger's view, the country's constantly increasing birth rate and rapid industrial advancement had found geopolitical expression in ever greater claims to territory, culminating in World War I.[78] The once most powerful central European economy had now, as Sanger put it, turned into "no place for casual visitors in 1920" with a "grim silence everywhere; people had forgotten how to smile."[79] Nonetheless, she marveled at the progressive verve of the German movement and continued to expand her circle of contacts.

Her initial excitement cooled when Hitler ascended to power in 1933, forcing Sanger to put all her activities and objectives in Germany on hold. Since the early 1920s, she had funded and financed a birth control clinic run by a close friend – the U. S. journalist and activist Agnes Smedley – and for years she entertained thoughts of organizing an international conference in either Berlin or Dresden.[80] Shocked but also ever more convinced of her pacifist ideas, Sanger watched the German birth control movement shatter under Hitler's pursuit of racial hygiene and *Lebensraum*. Nazi legislation forced clinics and sex education centers to close, illegalized contraception, and propagated the ideal of the

76 Atina Grossmann, *Reforming Sex*: *The German Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform, 1920–1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 39.

77 Sanger took meticulous notes of her trip, the largest part of which she spent in the Berlin working-class district of Neukölln. Upon her return to the United States, she set out to publish her experiences in her own journal, *The Birth Control Review*, where two lengthy articles on the state of the German birth control movement with an emphasis on the precarious situation of working women appeared in the winter of 1920/21. Margaret Sanger, "Women in Germany," *The Birth Control Review*, no. 4, December 1920, 8–9; and no. 5, January 1921, 8–9, in Hajo et al., *The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger*, 4:7–18; see also Sanger, *An Autobiography*, 285.

78 Sanger, "Overpopulation as a Cause of War," in *The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger*, ed. Hajo et al., 4:34–40; see also Sanger, *An Autobiography*, 253–54; Baker, *Margaret Sanger*, 261.

79 Sanger, *An Autobiography*, 281.

80 On Smedley, see Ellen Chesler, *Woman of Valor: Margaret Sanger and the Birth Control Movement in America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 261. Sanger initially planned a conference in Berlin in 1930, but social and economic unrest after the stock market crash of 1929 forced her to resort to Zurich as an alternative location. She renewed her plans in 1932 but ultimately put the issue to rest after the Nazi takeover. Sanger to Agnes Smedley, March 30, 1928, in *The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger*, ed. Hajo et al., 4:139–42; Sanger to John Maynard Keynes, January 15, 1929, in ibid., 4:44–45; Sanger to Clinton F. Chance, September 7, 1929, in ibid., 4:161–65; Sanger to Edith How-Martyn, July 31, 1932, in ibid., 4:221.

fertile and dutiful Aryan mother. As the war ended and Sanger's once admired progressive Germany had first turned into an enemy before meeting total defeat and devastating destruction, her internationalist endeavor of population control was on the verge of collapse.

Now that the war had hit the German birth control movement as hard as the rest of the country, Sanger spent the early postwar years building new alliances and patching together the pieces that remained. But destruction and material distress in Germany severely limited her options. Birth control clinics were nonexistent, which made it impossible to simply recreate her prewar role as a financial patron. Travel to the occupied territories would have put too much strain on her already weakened health as Sanger suffered from chronic tuberculosis, which reoccurred whenever she was exposed to much physical and mental stress.[81] There was very little an aged U.S. activist in frail health could contribute to the destitute situation, let alone change or shape it, which left her without any influence on the future of the German birth control scene.

Like Holmes and Niebuhr, Sanger soon resorted to CARE. The opportunity to channel material assistance directly towards potential collaborators presented a unique form of long-distance influence because it was a helpful deed only a U.S. American could perform. Food packages contributed little to the actual birth control cause, but they could at least offer material and psychological support to those who might shape the local scene for her. And so, whenever Sanger initiated or resumed contact with potential postwar partners, a CARE package became her regular contribution.

One recipient Sanger selected was Eva Schumann, a translator who lived in a small town in the Soviet occupation zone. Due to her engagement with the Social Democratic Party in the interwar years, Schumann had spent the Third Reich years in British exile. In Britain, she met Sanger's close friend Havelock Ellis, whose book *The Dance of Life* she had translated into German in 1928. Ellis had introduced Schumann to Hugh de Selincourt, an Oxford-born novelist and one of Sanger's closest and most trusted companions, who got Schumann interested in the cause of birth control.[82] Since Sanger and Schumann had never met, de Selincourt initiated their contact after the war. Though he could not provide the financial means to support Schumann with a CARE package himself, he sensed that Sanger would step in not just out of kindness but in an effort to restore her European network. He described what it could mean to Sanger in October 1946:

81 Baker, *Margaret Sanger*, 32–34, 150–52, 237.

82 Baker, *Margaret Sanger*, 165–69. On the very intimate relation between Sanger and de Selincourt, see also Chesler, *Woman of Valor*, 183–86.

> This is a request, an appeal, and a beautiful link up with Havelock […] Eva Schumann [is] the person who had made the best translation of his work in any language. Eva has a friend in the American zone. An American citizen may send a "Care" parcel […] One of my cherished dreams is that you & she could meet.[83]

In her profession as a translator and with her knowledge of Ellis's work, Schumann was a potentially helpful partner in future international endeavors. Accordingly, Sanger answered de Selincourt's appeal promptly by sending a CARE package in December 1946. After Schumann received the donation the following April, Sanger approached her with specific suggestions for cooperation. She asked if Soviet authorities might permit Schumann a travel visa to come to England, for she "would be most helpful in the international field if we could work out some plans together."[84] Over the next two years, as Sanger regularly supplied Schumann with CARE aid, plans began to take shape. Sanger was preparing for another conference – this time in Cheltenham, England, in August 1948 – for which she hoped to gain Schumann's support, even offering her a six-month traineeship at what was now the Margaret Sanger Research Bureau in New York City.[85]

But travel restrictions in the Soviet occupation zone continued to put a strain on Sanger's efforts. In July 1949, almost a year after the Cheltenham conference that Schumann was not able to attend, she confessed to de Selincourt that it would "be a miracle if Eva can get to England again."[86] As a consequence, Sanger had begun limiting her correspondence with Schumann over the preceding one-and-a-half years. The failed attempt at productive cooperation had nullified the relationship's reciprocity; it no longer promised any benefit to her. Accordingly, Sanger had her last CARE package sent to Schumann in November 1948.[87] With work opportunities lost, her donations had forfeited their strategic influence and had transformed into mere material support to a distant stranger.

Productive relations with Eva Schumann did not materialize, but other potential candidates remained – even though the list of Sanger's old Weimar contacts had narrowed to only a few names. Fascist rule had driven many into an exile from which they never returned.[88] Germany in the 1920s, although one

83 Hugh de Selincourt to Margaret Sanger, October 2, 1946, Margaret Sanger Papers, Box 180, Library of Congress (hereafter Sanger Papers).
84 Sanger to Schumann, June 3, 1947, Sanger Papers, Box 180.
85 Schumann to Sanger, July 21, 1947, Sanger Papers, Box 180.
86 Sanger to de Selincourt, July 3, 1949, Sanger Papers, Box 2.
87 See the lists of CARE donations from Sanger to Schumann's acquaintances in West Berlin, Inge Mierendorff and Cecilie Dressler, between April 21, 1947, and November 1948, Sanger Papers, Box 180.
88 The most prominent of those was Martha Ruben-Wolf, a member of the German Communist Party and an outspoken advocate for the legalization of abortion. While Ruben-Wolf and Sanger

of the most promising destinations for Sanger, had also been difficult terrain. Much as in the United States, the birth control cause had found most of its supporters in liberal, socialist, and communist circles. Sanger had long sympathized with socialism and had, like Holmes and Niebuhr, become a member of the Socialist Party as a young woman. For the sake of her cause, she had resigned from the party in the interwar years, fearing that close entanglements with a controversial political camp might threaten the success she envisioned for her activism.[89]

Weimar Germany's heated political climate had produced an especially precarious situation in this respect. To Sanger's distress, the success of the movement stood and fell with the strength of leftist circles, within which she had an ambivalent reputation. Many local practitioners had not shared her views and had frowned upon the unpolitical nature of her activism, while others had rejected U. S. influence, particularly of a financial kind, altogether. Despite their differences, Sanger depended on political radicals because they were the ones furthering her cause abroad. "Berlin still worries me," she had written to her friend, the British suffragist Edith How-Martyn, in 1929, "but I'd rather have three birth control clinics going there even by the Socialists than to have none."[90] Due to her lack of moderate allies, Sanger had reluctantly agreed to cooperate with both socialists and communists. While such individuals certainly had more expertise than the industrious but ultimately inexperienced Eva Schumann, their companionship demanded compromise.

The case of Anne-Marie Durand-Wever is telling in this regard. The left-leaning, University of Chicago-trained German gynecologist had spent the interwar period advocating for population control and the right to abortion. Sanger and Durand-Wever had first met in Berlin in 1927, shortly after Sanger had organized a conference on world population control in Geneva. In Berlin, she had accepted an invitation to speak before the Association of German Medical Women at the Charlottenburg town hall, where Durand-Wever had served as her interpreter.[91] The two activists had not always agreed on pressing issues. Sanger strictly rejected abortion beyond medically necessary cases, while Durand-Wever had joined most socialist and communist female doctors in Weimar to repeatedly advocate for its legalization. She opposed the exclusive fixation on birth control in the American-style clinics as envisioned by Sanger

were never friends because their political opinions and stances on abortion differed greatly, the two women had cooperated professionally and fruitfully, especially after Ruben-Wolf took over Agnes Smedley's Berlin birth control clinic. Ruben-Wolf and her family escaped to Moscow in 1933, where she committed suicide in 1939. See Grossmann, *Reforming Sex*, 181.

89 Dawley, *Changing the World*, 50.

90 Sanger to Edith How-Martyn, February 15, 1929, in *The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger* ed. Hajo et al., 4:149–52.

91 Sanger to Edith How-Martyn, December 11, 1927, in ibid., 4:126; see also Sanger, *An Autobiography*, 388, and a poster for the lecture in Sanger Papers, Box 248.

and Smedley and favored a more comprehensive approach, including thorough sex education, venereal disease prevention, and abortion. It was also Durand-Wever who, in 1930, tried to prevent Sanger from organizing a conference in Berlin and redirected her focus towards Zurich as a possible location instead.[92]

Despite their differences, both women believed in the internationalist momentum of their cause. Durand-Wever, especially, who had spent the Nazi years in a private practice and abstained from public activism, knew that the German birth control movement could not regain strength without international support. After the war, she opened a first-aid clinic to treat women for venereal disease, as well as to offer contraception and even abortions, if necessary.[93] In 1946, she first reestablished contact with Margaret Sanger to ask for urgently needed contraceptive supplies. Sanger, unable to be of much help from a distance, was thrilled at this opportunity to "do anything possible to be of assistance" and provided as much material as possible through a befriended Dutch supplier, given the postal restrictions between the United States and Germany still in effect at that time.[94] What is more, by the end of the war Durand-Wever had adopted a view on abortion that was more favorable to Sanger. Though she still supported abortions and argued that certain cases might make them medically necessary, she argued that repeated procedures would severely affect female physical and mental health.[95] This change of heart certainly made cooperation between the two women easier.

Sanger started supplying Durand-Wever with CARE packages shortly after they resumed contact.[96] This deed was as much a sign of her active involvement in the German movement as it was simply a way to offer her German companion physical and financial relief. Sanger was preparing for the Cheltenham conference at that time, which was to be the first major international meeting of the postwar years. Having a German doctor and outspoken antifascist attend the event would powerfully signal the ascendance of the movement from the ashes of Nazi terror. It would also raise attention for postwar Germany's central challenges in population control. Even before the repeal of nonfraternization, Allied soldiers had begun consensual relations with the local female population,

92 Grossmann, *Reforming Sex*, 40–41, 51–52; see also Sanger to Clinton F. Chance, September 7, 1929, in *The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger*, ed. Hajo et al., 4:161–65.

93 Grossmann, *Reforming Sex*, 159; Annette F. Timm, "The Legacy of *Bevölkerungspolitik*: Venereal Disease Control and Marriage Counselling in Post-WWII Berlin," *Canadian Journal of History* 33, no. 2 (1998): 200–203.

94 Sanger to Anne-Marie Durand-Wever, March 30, 1946, in *The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger*, ed. Hajo et al., 4:417–18.

95 While Atina Grossmann traces this postwar change of heart in Durand-Wever's writings, which point to her increased concern with the psychological and physical effects of repeated abortions, the exact reasons for this change remain unknown. Grossmann, *Reforming Sex*, 196.

96 Mary Compton [secretary to Margaret Sanger] to CARE, July 19, 1946, Sanger Papers, Box 180.

but thousands of German women, in both East and West, had become victims of rape by members of the armed forces. Apart from the psychological trauma inflicted on the victims, both these voluntary and forced sexual encounters had resulted in increased rates of venereal disease and a generation of illegitimate and fatherless children.[97] With her CARE packages, Sanger used her limited means to improve Durand-Wever's situation, hoping that it would increase her chances to join in the conference and address these topics before an international audience. She was all the more pleased when Durand-Wever was physically and financially able to come to Cheltenham and deliver "a tragic report that abortions, rape & illegitimate children were rife in the American zone."[98]

But Durand-Wever's renewed political activism quickly gained public coverage that Sanger considered unfavorable to the birth control cause. In March 1947, Durand-Wever became the president of the newly formed Democratic Women's Society of Germany. The organization, which came together at a founding event in East Berlin, enjoyed the promotional and financial support of the local socialist SED party.[99] Durand-Wever greeted the foundation as an attempt to unite the remains of the interwar women's movement, which had been too disparate to withstand Nazi pressure. To her dismay, the society gradually came under communist control in the following years. Durand-Wever eventually withdrew from its leadership, but Sanger remained worried about the leftist stigma, which had grown more pronounced after the war.[100]

She stopped her CARE donations to Durand-Wever in December 1948, only months after the Cheltenham conference – a decision that reflected a change in Sanger's priorities as she did not want to expose her cause to political criticism in the dawning Cold War. Overly close relations with a woman who associated with East German socialism presented an increasing risk. Both women continued to collaborate into the 1950s, and Durand-Wever remained an instrumental figure in the German birth control movement. But Sanger's decision to stop her humanitarian support right when Durand-Wever's political activism brought her into close proximity to unfavorable ideologies indicates that Sanger had begun to think of her German colleague as a political liability. Their relationship, if only temporarily, had become potentially harmful to Sanger's cause.

97 Jennifer V. Evans, "Protection from the Protector: Court-Martial Cases and the Lawlessness of Occupation in American-Controlled Berlin, 1945–1948," in *GIs in Germany*, ed. Maulucci et al., 213–16; Petra Goedde, "From Villains to Victims: Fraternization and the Feminization of Germany, 1945–1947," *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 1 (1999): 5, 9–10.

98 Margaret Sanger to Mary Worley Compton, August 28, 1948, in *The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger*, ed. Hajo et al., 4:437.

99 "Women in Germany Form a Peace Group; Gathering is Under Soviet-Zone Guidance," *New York Times*, March 11, 1947, 16.

100 Grossmann, *Reforming Sex*, 192.

In March 1948, tellingly at a time when relations with Durand-Wever began to cool, Sanger began directing her humanitarian attention at another former colleague – the social hygienist Hans Harmsen.[101] After almost fifteen years of silence, Sanger sent a CARE package that revived a formerly fruitful relationship. Sanger and Harmsen had first met at the 1927 World Population Conference in Geneva and encountered one another again shortly thereafter, during Sanger's lecture in Berlin. But the established U.S. activist and the young German scholar, who at that time was the director of the Lutheran Churches' social welfare branch, had gotten off to a rough start. As Sanger stood on the podium at the Charlottenburg town hall, advocating for family limitation to promote peace and social improvement, Harmsen countered that Weimar Germany was suffering from underpopulation rather than its opposite and that there was little correlation between high birth rates and low income. He received fierce backlash from the audience, including from attending gynecologists such as Durand-Wever.[102] Yet, such resistance was also a fate that Sanger and Harmsen shared since both rejected liberalized abortion rights. This fact united them as outsiders in the predominantly leftist environment of the German movement.[103]

Another passion both shared between the wars was their interest in eugenics. The inclusion of ideas from eugenics in the birth control movement had not been uncommon in the interwar period since both causes aimed at social improvement through reproduction control. A crucial difference was that most birth control activists regarded it as a matter of class, believing that better population control among low-income families would benefit the overall health of a population.[104] Eugenicists pursued this goal instead by limiting reproduction among people they deemed racially or genetically inferior. Sanger endorsed eugenics insofar as she believed that better family planning would help to improve the conditions in the slums she had worked in as a young nurse.[105] In her 1938 autobiography, she had attacked the Catholic Church's rejection of birth control in especially fierce eugenicist rhetoric, calling it a "monstrous doctrine and one abhorrent to every civilized instinct, that children, misshapen, deformed, hideous to the eye, either mentally or constitutionally unequipped for life, should continue to be born in the hope that Heaven might be filled."[106] Even so, Sanger, like many of her colleagues, began distancing her activism from such remarks in the 1930s and 1940s. U.S. organizations and activists

101 Letter from the Margaret Sanger Research Bureau to CARE, March 1948, Sanger Papers, Box 180.

102 Sanger to Edith How-Martyn, December 11 and December 18, 1927, in *The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger*, ed. Hajo et al., 4:126–29.

103 Grossmann, *Reforming Sex*, 76–77.

104 Claudia Roesch, *Wunschkinder: Eine transnationale Geschichte der Familienplanung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2022), 34.

105 Baker, *Margaret Sanger*, 143–47.

106 Sanger, *An Autobiography*, 309.

like Sanger even began preferring terms like "Planned Parenthood" or "Family Planning" over "birth control," which had begun conjuring up unwanted associations with Nazi ideology.

Harmsen, on the other hand, found his career flourishing under National Socialist rule. He played a significant part in the enforcement of sterilization laws as he toured Germany and advised doctors on how to detect unfavorable hereditary traits. His exact role in the regime, however, remains a subject of scholarly debate. Atina Grossmann argued that Harmsen spent the war years as one of the most powerful eugenicists in Hitler's Germany, influencing racial legislation and promoting its antisemitic use. In her study on family planning in the Federal Republic, by contrast, Claudia Roesch concluded that Harmsen did not necessarily support Nazi ideology. Although he later admitted to having sympathized with Nazi approaches to eugenics and population control before 1933, he also openly opposed Nazi measures like euthanasia and forced abortions for eugenicist purposes in medical journals. It seems, ultimately, like Harmsen was opportunistic about Nazism, utilizing his new influence in the regime to put his pre-1933 ideas about eugenics into action. Luckily for Harmsen, he never became a member of the NSDAP, so when the war ended and the Allies only superficially enforced denazification measures, he could smoothly continue his career under the radar of Allied scrutiny. Now, he held a professorship at the Institute for Social Hygiene in Hamburg, which made him an influential ally in the sparse birth control landscape of the postwar years. His ambiguous past involvements were largely disregarded.[107]

Harmsen's academic position may have made CARE aid less pressing than it had been for Durand-Wever or Schumann, but Sanger cared less about need than she did about keeping the right company to carry the birth control movement into the Cold War. The extent of her knowledge of Harmsen's recent past and her opinion of it remain unknown. But she knew that Durand-Wever, as a women's activist whom the press accused of collaborating with the East German communists, did not fit the climate of the emerging Red Scare. Harmsen, as an established scientist, whatever role he may have played in the Nazi regime, seemed like the safer choice – especially if he came with an OMGUS-attested clean slate. Four years after her last donation to Durand-Wever and her first to Harmsen, Sanger helped found the International Planned Parenthood Federation. It was ceremoniously formed at a conference in the Indian metropolis of Bombay. By that time, Sanger's relations to Durand-Wever had recovered to the point that Durand-Wever sat on the event's planning committee and played a key role in the creation of the federation's German chapter, ProFamilia. Due to her poor health, she was not able to attend the conference in Bombay, although Sanger had offered to cover her travel costs, whereas Harmsen made

107 Grossmann, *Reforming Sex*, 154, 204; Roesch, *Wunschkinder*, 43–48, 51–52.

his way to India.[108] With Sanger's support, Harmsen also became the president of ProFamilia.

It is striking that Sanger directed both her activist and humanitarian attention towards Harmsen right when she began distancing herself from Durand-Wever. She kept both of them close well into the 1950s and, indeed, came to regret her preference for Harmsen over Durand-Wever by the end of the decade.[109] But her CARE donations in the late 1940s clearly expressed Sanger's shift in political strategy to adapt to changing postwar needs: she moved toward conservatism, influence, and loyalty rather than utopian radicalism and experiments.

* * *

Holmes, Niebuhr, and Sanger discontinued aid to their transatlantic peers before the 1940s ended. Holmes had, at this point, put the activism of his youth to rest. Sanger was just opening a new and successful chapter in her life with the Planned Parenthood Conference in Bombay. For Niebuhr, fifteen years younger than the two others, the postwar era brought a rise in his public visibility, making him a regular visitor in Washington's halls of power, where he would continue to promote a renewal of the German education system.[110] Despite visible differences in quantity, the quality of their engagement in those few postwar years was strikingly similar. All three were leftist and progressivist thinkers, internationalist globetrotters, and, most importantly, very influential figures in their respective fields. The fact that all three engaged in autobiographical works speaks to their sense of agency.[111] Although they all present themselves as humble in those writings, none of them was truly humble. All three were keenly aware of their influence. Unlike, for example, the members of the Halcyon and Ohio Girls' Club, they nurtured pre-existing ideas and visions that they had already propagated before the war. After the war, then, CARE became a convenient vehicle for them to express their status as worldly people and to create images of themselves as key figures in some of the most pressing debates of the postwar era.

Their visions, it must be noted, bore a characteristically U.S. American handwriting that did not always correspond with German traditions and was only partially applicable to the country's problems. And still, none of the three ever seriously considered reconciling these cultural differences. Instead, they

108 Roesch, *Wunschkinder*, 90.

109 Grossmann, *Reforming Sex* , 205–209.

110 Draft of statement for the Coordinating Council on German Democracy, September 26, 1949, Niebuhr Papers, Box 1.

111 Niebuhr never put his complete life's work into writing, but his *Leaves from the Notebooks of a Tamed Cynic*, a published collection of diary entries from 1915 to 1928, closely resembles a biographical work. Niebuhr, *Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic* (New York: Meridian Books, 1957).

continued to impose their own ideas on a foreign system, convinced that this was the best approach. Transatlantic engagement yielded success in all cases, even though it is difficult to tell exactly which part CARE played in it. That all three decided to give aid to promote the fulfillment of their objectives underscores the importance they ascribed to humanitarian involvement. Without CARE as a means of promotion, incentive, or bribe, none of them might have pursued their causes as successfully as they did. They all resorted to CARE rather than to anonymized aid efforts because it offered the chance to tie their benevolence to causes they deemed worthy for themselves and for others, and they came to identify with their aid in ways that rendered discussions on altruism and need irrelevant.

6 – More Than "Smith to Schmidt": German Americans, CARE, and the Fate of the Homeland

In January 1947, the *Baltimore Correspondent* – the largest German newspaper in the state of Maryland – ran an article on the hunger crisis in occupied Germany. "Horror Camp Germany" was accompanied by images that the average US newspaper reader was only too familiar with. They showed emaciated, naked bodies, the skin loosely hanging from bony arms and legs. In one picture, three skeletal figures stand with their backs to the camera, their shoulders raised to their ears in a posture of freezing discomfort. In another, the hollow eyes of a ghostly figure squatting on a plank bed avert the camera's gaze in shame. "Do these pictures remind you of some that were shown in American newspapers and magazines about a year ago, representing victims of Hitler's horror camps?" asked the author. "Today, the whole of Germany is a horror camp," full of "starving victims of an occupation policy in comparison to which Hitler's horror methods were gentle and blissful treatment."[1] By using images that appropriated and reversed the recent visual memory of Nazi atrocities, the newspaper offered readers the opportunity to blame postwar hardships on the failures of Allied governance. This discouraged them from looking for the roots of the problem among the German people or the fascist regime that had ruled them for twelve years.

This drastic example of German victimization and relativization of Nazi atrocities highlights a question in postwar U.S. society that particularly affected members of the German-American immigrant community: Where, on

1 Karl Schauermann, "Horror Camp Germany," *Baltimore Correspondent*, January 8, 1947, reprint from the *Milwaukee Deutsche Zeitung* [Milwaukee German Newspaper].

the scale between perpetrator and victim, did the German people belong? This question had immediate effects on U.S. Americans who identified with their German descent because the answer reflected and defined each individual's role as a descendant of the former enemy nation within the culture of their U.S. American home. The article in the *Baltimore Correspondent* allowed its readers, if they so pleased, to construct a postwar understanding of their own Germanness along the lines of victimhood rather than perpetration. Not everyone may have approved of the drastic comparison with concentration camp survivors, and other voices in the media and the public, as this chapter will also show, did, indeed, voice different opinions. Nonetheless, for German Americans after World War II, the Nazis, the Germans, and their crimes were the reference points that defined their understanding of their ancestry.

After the war, CARE became a way for many members of the German immigrant community to renegotiate and rediscover their ancestral heritage. Humanitarian aid granted them the opportunity to express immigrant awareness privately, without overt political action. Its seemingly universal qualities stressed the suffering of fellow human beings without regard for their nationality, leaving little room for criticism. How, after all, could anyone deny a starving child or a widowed mother food just because they were German? This dynamic was already observable among German Americans during World War I.[2] Faced with fierce anti-German war propaganda, many immigrants had resorted to humanitarian aid to their ancestral home to express a self-understanding, in the words of Elisabeth Piller, as both "American citizens *and* ethnic Germans."[3] Humanitarianism allowed them to identify with and to preserve immigrant culture within a practice that was reconcilable with U.S. American nationality.

The German-American community is the main reason scholars have neglected the question of motivation in CARE's massive aid endeavor to Germany thus far. German immigrants and their descendants formed the largest ethnic group in the United States. More than eight million first- and second-generation German Americans lived in the U.S. prior to World War I, and during the 1940 national census, more than 4.9 million people in the United States mentioned German as their first language.[4] Germans were a massive ethnic

2 For a detailed history of German-Americans during WWI, social discrimination, and U.S. government policies towards them, see Nagler, *Nationale Minoritäten im Krieg*, 13–26; Wüstenbecker, *Deutsch-Amerikaner im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 12–21.

3 Elisabeth M. Piller, "To Aid the Fatherland: German-Americans, Transatlantic Relief Work and American Neutrality, 1914–17," *Immigrants & Minorities* 35, no. 3 (2017): 197. On German-American relief activities for Germany after World War I, see also Barbara Wiedemann-Citera, *Die Auswirkungen des Ersten Weltkrieges auf die Deutsch-Amerikaner im Spiegel der New Yorker Staatszeitung, der New Yorker Volkszeitung und der New York Times 1914–1926* (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin: Lang, 1993), 54–59, 202–10.

4 For pre-World War I numbers, see Piller, "To Aid the Fatherland," 198. For the 1940s census, see "The German-American Situation" [ca. mid-1943], Philleo Nash Papers, Box 23, Truman Library.

presence in large parts of the Midwest, at the Great Lakes, and along the Eastern Seaboard. Accordingly, U.S. Americans of German descent also formed CARE's largest ethnically identifiable donor group. In its first five years of existence, the organization received most of its donations from states with large German-American populations. New York topped the list with over US$ 24 million, followed by California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin, almost all of which boasted large German immigrant populations. Given their considerably lower population numbers, other states with large German-American communities, like Kansas, Missouri, and Indiana, also donated significant amounts.[5] Because many German Americans found CARE the easiest way to engage in aid for their friends and relatives overseas, even a State Department official termed the program an "overwhelmingly Smith to Schmidt" endeavor.[6] This characterization has tempted scholars to dismiss the massive success of the German campaign as largely a story of kinship with motivations predominantly, or even exclusively, grounded in blood relations.

Based on mere numbers, this statistical approach reveals its shortcomings upon closer inspection of individuals within the German-American community. One flaw lies in the presupposition that German immigrants formed a homogeneous group in which all members shared a common understanding of their ancestry. The vast literature on German immigration to the United States has shown this perception to be inadequate as German-Americans were a rather diverse group. They had come not from one but from many Germanies – from the scattered kingdoms and principalities of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from the German Empire after 1871, the Weimar Republic, or the Third Reich – and each generation had brought with it very different understandings of the country of origin.[7] German immigrants did not present a united voting bloc, they were divided among Catholic and Protestant churches, and they did not remain confined to one social class.[8] The Smith-to-Schmidt analogy is mis-

5 Press releases for regional newspapers of all fifty states on the occasion of US$ 100 million raised for CARE in its first five years, April 25, 1951, CARE Records, Box 900.

6 Citation mentioned in a letter form Arthur Ringland to Paul Comly French, February 10, 1949, CARE Records, Box 26, cited in Wieters, *The NGO CARE and Food Aid from America, 1945–80*, 18.

7 The largest wave of German immigration to the U.S. occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century. Nagler, *Nationale Minoritäten im Krieg*, 68.

8 Willi Paul Adams and LaVern J. Rippley, *The German-Americans*: *An Ethnic Experience* (Bloomington: Indiana University Printing Services, 1993), 7, 22, 30–32; James M. Bergquist, "German Americans," in *Multiculturalism in the United States: A Comparative Guide to Acculturation and Ethnicity*, ed. John D. Buenker et al. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 163; Dirk Hoerder, "The German-Language Diasporas: A Survey, Critique, and Interpretation," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 11, no. 1 (2002): 8–26. On the construction of German-American ethnicity more broadly, see Heike Bungert, *Festkultur und Gedächtnis*: *Die Konstruktion einer deutschamerikanischen Ethnizität 1848–1914* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016).

leading insofar as the Smiths by no means shared a homogenous approach to their German heritage, neither in terms of cultural and linguistic practice, nor in relation to their own class-consciousness and region of residence. This led to very different opinions on the Schmidts across the Atlantic.

Accordingly, the humanitarian motivations of members of this group were not simply grounded in their German descent but in the ways in which they chose to identify *with* it. Some, of course, used CARE to aid their loved ones across the Atlantic. Others resorted to relief aid to deliberate their own Germanness in the light of the recent war or, much more practically, because they were pursuing professional or personal interests. This directed the purpose of aid inwards toward the donor's cultural self-understanding rather than outwards toward the recipient in need.

* * *

In the wake of World War II, the German-American community was hardly visible anymore as a distinctive element of U. S. immigrant culture. Public expressions of German immigrant awareness had, in fact, been in decline since the late nineteenth century. Many immigrants had assimilated to avoid association with newcomers from Poland, Italy, and other countries of Southern and Eastern Europe whose public reputation was questionable, giving the term "immigrant" an undesirable smack.[9] As Markus Bierkoch has found, chances of upward mobility motivated many to adapt to Anglo-American culture.[10] An equally decisive factor was generational difference. Most Germans had come to the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century. Their children and grandchildren often expressed little interest in nurturing their heritage. Second-generation immigrants, especially, often tried to abandon any visible cultural or linguistic association with their ancestry altogether.[11]

Alongside these reasons, the troubled first half of the twentieth century weighed particularly hard on the German-American community. Anti-German war propaganda and the ensuing mass internment of first- and second-generation Germans as enemy aliens in World War I had motivated many immigrants to conceal their roots.[12] The Third Reich had struck the final blow.

9 Russell Andrew Kazal, *Becoming Old Stock*: *The Paradox of German-American Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 6.

10 Markus Bierkoch, *Alldeutsche in den USA: Die New Yorker Ortsgruppe im frühen 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2018), 17–20.

11 On the notion of generation as a central element in assimilation, see Bergquist, "German Americans," 163; Peter Kivisto, "Ethnicity and the Problem of Generations in American History," in *American Immigrants and Their Generations: Studies and Commentaries on the Hansen Thesis After Fifty Years*, ed. Peter Kivisto (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 2–7.

12 See the editors' introduction to Krista O'Donnell, Nancy R. Reagin, and Renate Bridenthal, eds., *The Heimat Abroad*: *The Boundaries of Germanness* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 4.

Individual right-wing groups, like the German American Bund and the Friends of the New Germany, openly supported the Nazi regime, but those organizations represented only a small faction within the German-American community, albeit a very visible one.[13] After Nazi Germany's declaration of war against the United States on December 11, 1941, internment again singled German immigrants out as a potential threat to national security. But rapid assimilation in the interwar period and the predominant focus of war hostility on Japanese Americans made the numbers negligible when compared to World War I. By and large, two world wars had caused public displays and celebrations of Germanness to vanish almost completely from the U.S. immigrant landscape.[14]

Nevertheless, German-American involvement in humanitarian aid shows that many immigrants still privately nurtured individual and diverse understandings of their heritage. Already in the spring of 1945, when CARE's founders struggled to consolidate their humanitarian venture, members of the German-American community began lobbying the U.S. government for political action on behalf of those suffering in postwar Germany. On May 16, 1945, only eight days after the surrender of the Wehrmacht, Gustav Faber, the secretary treasurer of the National Council of German Americans, had asked State Secretary Edward Stettinius to permit a delegation of German Americans to personally evaluate distress in the homeland. Faber pointed out that his association had never supported Hitler's regime. Assuring Stettinius that "the unconditional surrender and other terms demanded by the Allied Governments is just and must be carried through if Germany is ever to become a member of the democratic nations," Faber emphasized his commitment to the policy and culture of the United States.[15]

Similarly, German-American communities across the country began to demand government action on behalf of their friends and families abroad. Senators and congresspersons from all over the Midwest and the Great Lakes region were pressured by their German-American constituencies to urge the president to reestablish a functioning postal service to Germany. They pointed out that the United States was a nation with "great humanitarian principles" that had the duty to serve the concerns of an immigrant community "as nobly and as patriotically as […] Americans of any other national heritage."[16] At the same

13 Bauerkämper, *Sicherheit und Humanität im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 813.

14 Bauerkämper, *Sicherheit und Humanität im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 817–20; Kazal, *Becoming Old Stock*, 264–65; Nagler, *Nationale Minoritäten im Krieg*, 680–83; Cornelia Wilhelm, *Bewegung oder Verein? Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik in den USA* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998), 287.

15 Gustav Faber to Edward Stettinius, Jr., May 16, 1945, GMMA, RG18–002, Box 12.

16 Albert Hawkes [Senator New Jersey] to Harry S. Truman, December 14, 1945, Truman Papers, OF 198, Box 738; Milton R. Young [Senator North Dakota] to Harry S. Truman, December 3, 1945, Truman Papers, OF 198, Box 738. Also compare numerous such appeals to the president in Truman Papers, OF 426, Boxes 1326, 1327.

time, petitions by immigrant organizations on the local level collected thousands of signatures "to grant us permission now to organize for relief […] to be ready for shipment without delay as soon as transportation and distribution is possible."[17] With these demands, German-American interest groups displayed a strong desire for active participation in U.S. policies that concerned their ancestral home.

Their actions also highlighted how members of the community understood their dual role as citizens of a victorious nation with linguistic and cultural roots in the land of the defeated enemy. Some acknowledged the partial complicity of the German people in their government's crimes and supported a just but forgiving occupation. Others counted the entire German population among Hitler's first victims who were now suffering just as much as the rest of Europe. In doing so, they either promoted a look forward that prioritized Germany's postwar reconstruction over redemption, or they downplayed the Nazi crimes all over Europe to show that the end of the war had not brought an end to German distress. A policy of victimization of the German population that emphasized the innocence of those suffering from the consequences of war not only justified humanitarian engagement. It also shed a favorable light on the German-American community for aiding the victims rather than the supporters of Nazi aggression. The fact that German-American interest groups employed the narrative of the innocent victim seeking peace and democracy is telling with regard to their self-perception within U.S. society. It reveals how tightly the community saw its fate entangled with its ancestral homeland's history of aggression and, more specifically, with the degree to which U.S. society held the German people accountable for it.

German-language newspapers in the United States employed this dual narrative as well. The German food situation was highlighted as being among the most pressing political issues of the postwar occupation. In the largest German daily in the United States, the *New Yorker Staatszeitung und Herold*, for example, news of the price reduction of CARE packages from US$ 15 to US$ 10 featured on the cover page right underneath a headline on the sentences from the Nuremberg Trials.[18] The gruesome past of the ancestral land fused with its imminent needs as an occupied territory, feeding a narrative on Germany that looked forward rather than backward. Although in decline since World War I, German-language papers continued to attract large readerships in metropoli-

17 Resolution by the German-Austrian Relief Committee, Milwaukee November 10, 1945, Truman Papers, OF 198, Box 738. Similar petitions also came from other states with large German immigrant communities. See, for example, a petition from Michigan to the U.S. Senate (79th Congress), signed almost exclusively by citizens with German last names. Petition to reopen postal service to Germany, Austria, and Hungary, November 12, 1945; Petitions and Memorials, 1817–2000; RG 46: Records of the U.S. Senate, 1789–2015, National Archives Building.

18 "Preis der CARE-Pakete ist auf 10 Dollar herabgesetzt" [Price of CARE Packages Reduced to 10 Dollars], *New Yorker Staatszeitung und Herold*, October 1, 1946, 1.

tan areas on the East Coast and in small-town communities along the Great Lakes and in the Midwest. As a source of ethnic identification, they presented "the most effective publicity channel for CARE," as Executive Director Paul French remarked in his annual report to the board for the year 1947.[19] Through such papers, many German communities preserved their cultural and linguistic traditions. Many of them still printed in the traditional German *Fraktur* letters and were hard for the Anglo-American eye to decipher. CARE's public relations department translated and published press releases specifically for the German-language press to compete in a highly competitive relief market. Many local German rival businesses and travel agencies ran advertisements for their own relief packages in papers while private firms offered shipment and insurance services for self-packed parcels.[20] German-language newspapers fused politics, tradition, and relief to the homeland into an immigrant conscience oscillating between allegiances to the old and the new home.

In November 1946, the *Staatszeitung* published an article on a luncheon of the American Association for a Democratic Germany (AADG). At the event, the association had called on the U.S. government to acknowledge the German resistance to Hitler's regime. The newspaper report presented the German underground resistance movement as a democratic element "that was not recognized as an ally in the war against Hitler" at a time when the dictator "was still considered respectable and moving from one foreign policy success to the next."[21] Far from being complicit in Nazism, the article suggested, the German people had launched a vital anti-Nazi resistance; it was the failure of the international community to recognize this resistance that had allowed Nazism to spread its horrors all over the European continent.

At length, the article cited Reinhold Niebuhr, who had co-founded the AADG in the early days of Nazism and spoken at the luncheon. The prominent theologian had just returned from a trip to Germany with the State Department.[22] He reported that "behind the dreary Hitler-façade there are men and women who have stayed faithful to democracy." Even so, Niebuhr warned that "democracy will remain an empty word if it cannot give the people a mini-

19 CARE Annual Report 1947, CARE Records, Box 1.

20 See, for example, advertisements for relief packages by Robert Landis Co. of Milwaukee sending relief parcels between three and seven U.S. dollars, *America Herold und Lincoln Freie Presse*, March 3, 1948; advertisement for Hudson Liebesgaben-Pakete [Hudson Relief Packages], *America Herold und Lincoln Freie Presse*, October 27, 1948; "Das Val J. Peter Reisebüro übernimmt den Versand von Lebensmittelpaketen nach Deutschland" [The Val J. Peter Travel Agency Takes Over Shipment of Food Parcels to Germany], *Baltimore Correspondent*, August 14, 1946; advertisement by Wisconsin Farms, NY, *New Yorker Staatszeitung und Herold*, July 11, 1948.

21 "Neue Deutsche Demokratie bedarf der Hilfe der U.S." [New German Democracy Needs US Help; all quotes translated by the author], *New Yorker Staatszeitung und Herold*, November 4, 1946.

22 See chapter 5 for an account of Niebuhr's State Department-financed trip to Germany.

mum of economic security."[23] Such statements were not new for Niebuhr, who had previously voiced the opinion that the democratic rehabilitation of Germany lay in the hands of the Allies. Yet, his words at the AADG event did not deliberately feed the victim narrative presented by the *Staatszeitung*. Niebuhr had published extensively on Germany in the past and had always argued for a careful differentiation between the Nazis and the German people. Only this differentiation, he argued, could guarantee the success of Allied re-education efforts that did not absolve the Germans of their guilt. He acted as an informed citizen with vast knowledge of the recently defeated enemy rather than as its apologetic advocate.

Nevertheless, one cannot neglect the fact that Niebuhr was also a U. S. American of German descent. After all, one must analyze humanitarian motivations as rooted within an individual's identification in a specific national, political, and cultural context. Niebuhr's German heritage inevitably raises the question of how it may have factored into his humanitarian aid for Germany. Did it become a way for him to debate and reflect his immigrant heritage? While his aid to clerics, professors, and schoolteachers stemmed from professional and ideological commonality, parts of his aid engagement in postwar Germany display a rather ambiguous relationship with the country of his ancestors. After his article in *LIFE Magazine* had increased his visibility overseas, many of the pleas that Niebuhr received from Germany came from senders who shared his last name. "Niebuhrs" from across the four occupation zones turned to the New York professor, hoping that they might somehow be related or that their shared name at least provided enough identification to yield help. The relations he formed with his namesakes across the ocean suggest that Niebuhr deliberated his immigrant heritage in ways that had not become obvious in his aid to educators and clerics.

One of those unknown namesakes who sent a letter to New York was Wilhelm Niebuhr. The grandson of a Lutheran pastor from the French occupation zone said that a friend had given him a magazine with Niebuhr's picture in which he had "observed some resemblance." Wilhelm went on to state that he had distant relatives in the United States and wondered if there might be a family connection. Reinhold Niebuhr responded quickly: "I doubt whether there is any relationship between us. My father immigrated to this country from Detmold-Lippe, and all of his family are in that principality," he explained. "I am sending you a CARE package, knowing that you will be able to make good use of it."[24]

23 "Neue Deutsche Demokratie bedarf der Hilfe der U. S.," *New Yorker Staatszeitung und Herold*, November 4, 1946.

24 Correspondence between Wilhelm and Reinhold Niebuhr, October 10 – November 12, 1947, Niebuhr Papers, Box 9.

Niebuhr did not explain how he had come to this conclusion. In fact, he could not possibly know if Wilhelm would make good use of the package. Wilhelm had mentioned how hard the consequences of war weighed on his health, but there was no telling if this was the truth. The war may have left his wealth and property untouched, he might have been a passionate Nazi supporter, or even a member of the SS. Nothing in Wilhelm's letter, other than the fact that he was the grandson of a Lutheran pastor, attested to a political or spiritual ideology that followed Niebuhr's principles, nor did it give proof of his need. Niebuhr still went ahead and sent Wilhelm a CARE package. The name, as a commonality shared across cultures and geographical distance, apparently presented sufficient justification for Niebuhr to interact.

Wilhelm was not the only one with whom Niebuhr established this kind of relationship. A total of seven people with the same family name wrote letters to New York. Even though none of them turned out to be a distant relative, they all received CARE packages.[25] One recipient by the name of Luise Bode-Jacobsen even received a CARE package because she was living on Niebuhrstrasse in Berlin, named in honor of the German historian Barthold Georg Niebuhr.[26] These donations are somewhat odd because they express an awareness of, and maybe even a longing for, an immigrant identification that Niebuhr had never publicly displayed and which he had even rejected since his early days as a minister in Detroit.

As mentioned above, it was not uncommon for second-generation immigrants to abandon their ancestral identity. In Niebuhr's case, though, it seems like there was not much ancestry to abandon in the first place. Niebuhr had inherited a profound dislike for German militaristic and subservient culture from his father. Gustav Niebuhr, himself an Evangelical minister, had emigrated to the U.S. in 1881 out of disdain for what he perceived as a German cultural fetishism with hierarchy, imperiousness, and obedience.[27] Reinhold Niebuhr grew up with German as his first language, and his first name alone proves that his parents tried to sustain some sense of Germanness among their children. However, he harbored no romantic feelings for his father's land of birth, and it was easy for Niebuhr to break away from his immigrant identity in his adulthood. After the United States entered World War I in 1917, he began to convince members of his own German-speaking congregation to abandon

25 Correspondence between Gustav Niebuhr and Reinhold Niebuhr, February 26 – April 24, 1947; between Walter Niebuhr and Reinhold Niebuhr, October 10 – November 12, 1947; between Xenia and Tatiana Niebuhr [mother and daughter] and Reinhold Niebuhr, March 18, 1947 – April 27, 1949; correspondence with Ruth Niebuhr, December 28, 1946 – April 27, 1949, Niebuhr Papers Box 9; donation receipts for Auguste Niebuhr, February 10, 1949, Niebuhr Papers, Box 3.

26 Letter by Luise Bode-Jacobsen to Reinhold Niebuhr, September 12, 1948, Niebuhr Papers, Box 3.

27 Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 3–5.

their linguistic and cultural heritage. In a similar vein, he promoted U.S. entry into World War II two decades later.[28] While many German immigrants refrained from public displays of Germanness for fear of hostility, Niebuhr, it seems, had never felt much ancestral longing to begin with. Even Niebuhr's longtime friend and biographer June Bingham remarked that, despite his upbringing in one of the most German-dominated parts of the Midwest and his close linguistic relations to the country of his ancestors, "his writings on Germany over the years have been remarkably objective."[29]

In letters that Niebuhr wrote to his family on a trip to the United Kingdom in August 1939, he showed no signs of personal consternation about rumors of a possible German invasion of Poland, which, in fact, was only days away. Simply referring to "the Germans" and their potential war of aggression, he seemed completely detached from his ancestral heritage, which otherwise might have evoked feelings of concern or distress. Niebuhr saw himself as a U.S. American, and his family background did not trigger any personal feelings of sorrow or compassion. He observed the war merely from the perspective of an intellectual concerned with world affairs, not as an immigrant's son with any emotional attachment to his father's place of birth.[30]

This makes his aid for people who simply shared his last name especially odd since it suggests that Niebuhr came to somehow identify with his immigrant heritage between the start of World War II and the beginning of his CARE engagement in 1947, which he now used to symbolically enact his ethnicity. Judging from the timing of his aid engagement, the moment of change came, as in his action on behalf of German intellectuals, during his trip for the State Department. The trip exposed Niebuhr to the imminent effects of fascist rule, which appealed to his sense of responsibility – not just as a socially active intellectual but also as an immigrant child with vast cultural and linguistic expertise of the country. One could say that this experience triggered a politically motivated form of ethnic identification with those who shared his heritage.

Niebuhr provided humanitarian aid in a way that corresponded with the engagement of many German Americans during World War I. CARE became a substitute for the public display of traditions and practices that had previously defined immigrant consciousness. Practicing humanitarianism, however, is not a decidedly ethnic action because humanitarianism itself has no ethnic quality. Giving relief aid is not particularly German, Irish, or Italian. On the contrary, humanitarianism aspires to universalism. Nonetheless, in a cultural climate of receding Germanness, forced or voluntary, humanitarianism became an ethnic practice. Germans who wanted to express ethnicity but who

28 Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 50–51, 60–61, 193, 207, 209.
29 Bingham, *Courage to Change*, 81.
30 Compare Reinhold to his sister Hulda Niebuhr, August 1939 [exact date unknown], Niebuhr Papers, Box 58.

felt pressured to abstain from it due to Germany's wars and crimes in the first half of the twentieth century used humanitarianism to express privately what society frowned upon publicly.[31]

CARE allowed Niebuhr to take a similar approach after World War II. It presented itself as a meaningful endeavor for the collective good since it appealed to a universally shared human experience. Niebuhr could or would not engage in aid to all those who appealed to him, as his refusal to send CARE packages to the young postal clerk Werner Flatter shows.[32] Instead, he decided to aid the few who shared his last name or some relation to it. Based on this ancestral and pseudo-familial commonality, he used the universal act of humanitarianism as an ethnic symbol that enabled him to identify with the distant other. This engagement shows that, even though Niebuhr never expressed much desire to deal with his immigrant heritage before, the opportunity to aid namesakes offered a sense of belonging that was different from the aid that he provided for intellectuals and clerics. The latter served a transnational identification with a political agenda and a shared ideological mindset, while the former was a much more personal, inbound act. Aid to namesakes helped Niebuhr to make sense of his dual role as a German immigrant and a respected U. S. American scholar who had emphatically endorsed U. S. war intervention against the land of his ancestors.

Interestingly, this rather peculiar choice of recipients reflects a notion of kinship that Niebuhr could have satisfied more easily. He had relatives living in Germany he could have aided, had he wanted to. While Niebuhr sacrificed financial resources to aid unknown namesakes, he did not try to contact his own distant relatives living in Detmold-Lippe, nor did he consider sending them a CARE package. In fact, Niebuhr had never aspired to close relations with his family back in Germany and visited their farm only once in 1923. On this visit, the autocratic demeanor Niebuhr sensed in his cousins then managing the grounds confirmed his father's decision to trade German subservience to authority for U. S. American democratic freedom. What is more, Niebuhr would learn after the war that his German relatives had become enthusiastic

31 Humanitarianism as a substitute for ethnic practices should not be confused with the idea of "symbolic ethnicity," defined by Herbert Gans as "an ethnicity of last resort" observable mostly among third- or fourth-generation immigrants who no longer practice the cultural or linguistic traditions of their ancestors in their everyday life but instead preserve an awareness of their ethnicity only through occasional enactments of popular cultural practices on holidays or in parades. Symbolic ethnicity does not apply to German Americans in the mid-twentieth century engaging in CARE because humanitarianism as such bears no ethnic qualities. Herbert J. Gans, "Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, no. 1 (1979), 1.

32 See previous chapter for details on Flatter's unanswered appeal for a CARE package to Niebuhr.

Nazi supporters.[33] Despite his family relations, aiding his cousins would have violated Niebuhr's political beliefs and would have made a mockery of the activist agenda he had pursued with his other donations. As he still seemed willing to engage with his German heritage through humanitarian aid, he turned to substitutes. "Niebuhr to Niebuhr," sans direct family ties, was what most closely resembled "Smith to Schmidt."

* * *

Cases like Niebuhr's show how diverse German-American understandings of ethnic identity were, as well as the various ways these motivated humanitarian engagement. Niebuhr did not use aid to peacefully express and preserve his German heritage in the same way many German Americans had done during World War I. After all, he had never shown much interest in this heritage. Rather, it was only when namesakes reached out to him and asked for assistance that he began enacting his immigrant awareness through CARE. Such cases posed a problem to CARE. Feeling pressured to abdicate public displays of their immigrant heritage, postwar German Americans had assimilated so thoroughly that CARE's donor relations division found it difficult to get an overview of their relief potential. The public relations department, therefore, invested heavily in market research to find out what exactly a German American was, how many there were, and what they wished to achieve through their donations.

In late 1946, the organization commissioned a study to ascertain its image among immigrants in New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit. All four cities were major industrial centers with ethnically diverse populations. The study showed that U.S. Americans of German descent contributed to CARE disproportionately more than other immigrant communities. More than half of the German-American population in these cities regularly sent ready-made food parcels to Germany, and sixty-seven percent of those did so through CARE.[34] Based on the study's findings, CARE tried to cater to the affluence of its German readers. German Americans often made different demands concerning the impact of a package – a fact that CARE tried to address in public outreach. Press releases emphasized how much adult recipients had enjoyed the cigarettes in packages from American relatives, while children were most delighted about the candy.[35] Other groups favored CARE as a medium for bringing luxury items overseas, as well. But German Americans, in particular, envisioned their aid as a way not just to feed their relatives abroad but to enable them to enjoy the lifestyle they had become accustomed to before the war.

33 Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, 80.
34 CARE survey conducted by THE PULSE, Inc., ca. September 1946, CARE Records, Box 1031.
35 Press Release: "Letters from Germany," ca. August–November 1946, CARE Files, Box 899.

To further exploit the profitable German-American market, CARE opened a branch office in the traditionally German-dominated Yorkville neighborhood in upper Manhattan in September 1946 and a second one in Brooklyn the following November – both of which employed German-speaking clerks.[36] For the following Christmas alone, Yorkville residents donated eleven thousand packages.[37] This success prompted CARE to commission a second study in September 1947 that was exclusively concerned with German Americans. The study collected interviews with 214 native-born Germans in Yorkville. It found that at least every fifth Yorkville family of German descent sent CARE packages to their native land. As reasons for their engagement, interviewees listed convenience, guaranteed delivery, and the comparatively high value of the contained foodstuffs, thus fusing ethnic identification as immigrants with CARE's consumerist media image in their motivations.[38]

CARE's focus on first-generation immigrants was certainly intentional. From the perspective of market research, later generations came with too many variables as they all identified with their German ancestry differently. The case of Reinhold Niebuhr highlights this. German-born immigrants, though they may have left their country of origin for different reasons and had their individual opinions on it, promised a more reliable sample. But CARE's PR department apparently also made this choice under the assumption that German-born immigrants presented a coherent bloc in terms of their motivation. Nowhere did the questionnaire ask for the recipients of the packages, whose profiles might have indicated the donors' political interest or possibly just altruistic feelings towards the less fortunate. CARE's disinterest in the receiving end suggests that it presupposed the kinship motivation.

Not all first-generation immigrants used CARE simply to feed their loved ones abroad; rather, many practiced aid self-interestedly to reconnect with their own heritage. This becomes apparent in the case of the writer and political scientist Waldemar Gurian. Born in 1902 to a Jewish family in Saint Petersburg in imperial Russia, Gurian had moved with his mother and sister to Berlin in 1911, where, for undocumented reasons, they all converted to Catholicism in 1914. After studies in Berlin, Munich, Breslau, Bonn, and Cologne, Gurian received his PhD in anthropology with a dissertation on the youth movement in imperial Germany. Already in his youth, he began publishing articles in literary and philosophical magazines, and after his studies he pursued a career in

36 "Morgen eröffnet die C. A. R. E. eine Zweigstelle in Yorkville" [CARE opens branch office in Yorkville tomorrow, *New Yorker Staatszeitung und Herold*, September 15, 1946; "Brooklyn erhält CARE-Zentrum" [Brooklyn Gets CARE Center], *New Yorker Staatszeitung und Herold*, November 10, 1946.

37 Press Release: "11,000 CARE Food Packages Are Yule Gifts in Germany from Yorkville Store," December 20, 1946, CARE Records, Box 899.

38 Personal interview survey among 214 German-American families in the Yorkville section of New York City for CARE, October 1, 1947, CARE Records, Box 1031.

journalism at a Cologne newspaper. His Jewish origin and his opposition to Nazism, which he regularly voiced in publications, forced him to emigrate to Switzerland in 1934.[39] But his writings and close intellectual contacts to U.S. scholars like Hannah Arendt attracted the attention of the University of Notre Dame, which offered him a professorship in political science.[40] Gurian arrived at the prestigious university in Indiana in 1937. Two years later, he founded the *Review of Politics*, which soon developed into one of the most reputable political journals in the country.[41]

Gurian began sending CARE packages in mid-1946, right when the organization started offering donations to occupied Germany. Despite rather similar occupations and a shared German heritage, Niebuhr and Gurian were not so alike. Gurian had only come to the United States in 1937 to escape Nazi persecution. His English was proficient for academic writing, but it had not achieved the linguistic finesse of his German. In Germany, he had often been given the impression that he did not belong. During World War I, anti-Russian legislation had forced him to attend school in the Netherlands, and twenty years later, National Socialism had forced him into Swiss exile. Regardless of this experience of discrimination, Germany was where Gurian felt most at home, much more than he did in the Russian-Jewish culture of his place of birth or in the U.S. American society in which he now lived..[42] Niebuhr, by contrast, had actively distanced himself from his German heritage as a young man to the extent that he had even started preaching in English, and had resorted to CARE as a symbolic practice of a rather newfound immigrant awareness only in his fifties. Gurian did not need to use relief aid to consider his own immigrant identity because, unlike Niebuhr, he had never attempted to disconnect from his linguistic and cultural German upbringing in the first place. Gurian, consequently, did not send aid as a form of ethnic rediscovery but followed a much more familial approach that he hoped would enrich his own professional life and recreate a home away from home.

His tenured position at Notre Dame offered too much security to ever make him consider a permanent return to Germany, but Gurian aspired to gain permanent professional connections to his homeland and began providing humanitarian aid to friends and colleagues in journalism, publishing, and

39 Heinz Hürten, *Waldemar Gurian*: *Ein Zeuge der Krise unserer Welt in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1972), 3–5, 11–12, 70–87. In exile in Lucerne, Gurian teamed up with fellow German expatriate Catholic writer Otto Knab to publish a weekly paper on political and cultural life titled *German Letters* [Deutsche Briefe]. The *German Letters* collected information from major National Socialist newspapers and used them to give detailed accounts of life under the swastika. Heinz Hürten, *Waldemar Gurian*, 96–97.

40 Arendt and Gurian had first met in Germany in the early 1930s. Hannah Arendt, "The Personality of Waldemar Gurian," *Review of Politics* 17, no. 1 (1955): 34.

41 Hürten, *Waldemar Gurian*, 149–51.

42 Hürten, *Waldemar Gurian*, 4–5, 149.

academia. His Swiss exile and emigration to the United States had ended all his personal and professional contacts in Germany. Now, the end of the war granted him the opportunity to reconnect with the life he had left behind and to reestablish his name on the German publishing market. In October 1946, he sent a letter to Alfons Erb, an old friend and fellow Catholic journalist he had lost contact with in 1935.[43] By the time Gurian contacted him eleven years later, Erb had found a position as editor-in-chief at the German-French journal *Dokumente/Documents*. Gurian had published extensively on the political and social influence of the French Catholic Church in the interwar years and saw *Dokumente* as an opportunity to regain visibility across the Atlantic.[44] With his first letter, Gurian offered to write a piece for Erb's journal and promised him support in the form of CARE donations. The latter greeted both prospects enthusiastically. Correspondence and humanitarian support, both of which would continue until 1948, held benefits for both.[45] While Erb received desperately needed material assistance, Gurian could express his commitment and affection for his homeland through humanitarian aid that rewarded him with renewed access to the German publishing market.

Now that Gurian's position at Notre Dame had led to a professional transition from freelance journalism to academia, he also tried to reconnect with his scholarly friends and acquaintances. This, too, held potential benefits. It promised more international recognition for his recently founded *Review of Politics*, which had not expanded into Germany under Nazi censorship. What is more, these contacts offered Gurian the opportunity to cooperate with his German peers, facilitated by his fluency in both German and English. Accordingly, Gurian approached OMGUS in late 1946 to inquire about a potential research stay in Germany. The U. S. military authorities informed him that the Rockefeller Foundation would fund such an endeavor if Gurian received an invitation from a German university.[46]

A correspondence that proved very fruitful in this regard was a renewed relation with Erwin von Beckerath. Now a professor for law at the University of Bonn, von Beckerath had first met Gurian at the University of Cologne in

43 The exact nature of Gurian's relation to Alfons Erb is unknown. However, both men worked in rather similar circles and were both friends of Ernst Thrasolt's – a Catholic priest and anti-Nazi activist who published a Catholic monthly in Weimar Germany at which Erb worked as editor-in-chief from 1929. See several letters hinting at their relationship before the war, in Waldemar Gurian Papers, Box 3, Folder 5, Library of Congress (hereafter Gurian Papers).

44 On Gurian's writings on French Catholicism, see Hürten, *Waldemar Gurian*, 34–52; Thümmler, *Katholischer Publizist und amerikanischer Politikwissenschaftler*, 41–80.

45 Correspondence between Gurian and Alfons and Elisabeth Erb, October 28, 1946 – May 9, 1948, Gurian Papers, Box 3.

46 See letters from OMG for Greater Hesse and the OMGUS Internal Affairs and Communications Division – Education and Religious Affairs Branch, December 31, 1946 and December 3, 1947, Gurian Papers, Box 16.

the 1920s. He was delighted to hear from his old friend again, asked for copies of the *Review of Politics* to satisfy "a strong desire for the printed word from abroad," and inquired if Gurian might want to visit Europe even though he would "find it painfully transformed."[47] Von Beckerath's interests corresponded perfectly with Gurian's own objectives; accordingly, Gurian started sending not only copies of the *Review of Politics* but also CARE packages in 1947. As Gurian had desired, the Bonn professor acknowledged the signs of commitment with an invitation to teach at the university's Law Faculty in the summer of 1948.[48]

In the meantime, von Beckerath had handed his position as dean of the Law Faculty over to Ernst Friesenhahn, who once was Gurian's classmate at the University of Bonn. The men's longstanding friendship worked to Gurian's advantage: Before Gurian could undertake the trip, the Rockefeller Foundation began to question the necessity of his journey across the Atlantic and threatened to withdraw funding. Gurian asked for Friesenhahn's help and again underlined his plea with a CARE package, which Friesenhahn received in early March 1948.[49] Friesenhahn immediately addressed a letter to the Rockefeller Foundation's director Robert J. Havinghurst. Given the increasing East-West tension at the time, Friesenhahn skillfully expressed his support of Gurian's endeavor in Cold War rhetoric. Gurian had written extensively on both bolshevism and fascism since the mid-1920s and had been a pioneer in the study of totalitarianism.[50] Friesenhahn argued that Gurian was "an expert in Eastern European questions" who would enrich the Bonn curriculum with "a seminar on the origins of the totalitarian state."[51] Friesenhahn's rhetorical focus on Cold War issues was successful, and Gurian embarked on his first postwar trip to his homeland in the summer of 1948.

As Gurian had already been mentally preparing for a trip to Germany since 1946, he had consulted other friends and former colleagues who might provide him entrée to other German universities and intellectual circles. Among his aid recipients was the author Eugen Kogon – a survivor of the Buchenwald concentration camp who had just published his landmark study *The SS State: The System of German Concentration Camps*. Historian Friedrich Meinecke, who would become the first president of the newly formed Freie Universität in West

47 While Gurians letter to von Beckerath has not been archived, the latter's response is dated June 4, 1946. Gurian Papers, Box 1.

48 Correspondence between Gurian and Erwin von Beckerath, June 4, 1946 – February 18, 1948, Gurian Papers; Invitation by university president Heinrich Konen, October 21, 1947, Gurian Papers, Box 16.

49 Ernst Friesenhahn to Waldemar Gurian, March 7, 1948, Gurian Papers, Box 3.

50 See, for example, Waldemar Gurian, "Russia and the Peace," *Review of Politics* 7, no. 2 (1945): 166; also compare several articles and writings from 1925 to 1937, Gurian Papers, Box 9.

51 Ernst Friesenhahn to Robert J. Havinghurst, March 12, 1948, Gurian Papers, Box 3.

Berlin in 1948, received a package as well.[52] Besides contacts like Meinecke in Berlin, he had approached Michael Freund, an old acquaintance and lecturer of political science and history at the University of Freiburg.[53] Freund had neglected Gurian's advice to leave Germany after Hitler's election. Instead, he had remained and worked for several academic journals until growing political pressure had forced him to join the NSDAP to continue his work. Now, in 1946, Gurian began reaching out to him and sent him the first of many CARE packages that Freund would enjoy until 1949. While aiding a friend in need, Gurian again reaped personal benefits from his donation. Like Lovestone's union functionaries and Niebuhr's professors, Freund thirsted for international contact and the uninhibited flow of information from abroad. He asked Gurian for copies of the *Review of Politics* and planned to write a comprehensive article about the journal for the German academic market – which he did in 1948. That same year, Freund arranged what was most important to Gurian: an invitation to lecture in Freiburg on his first postwar trip to Germany.[54]

Knowing that relief aid was the best material and psychological currency in postwar Germany, Gurian made use of the dreadful local food situation to engage in a way that benefited both parties. His recipients, many of whom had not been able to fully pursue their academic careers under Nazi rule, found CARE to be a sign of hope in a renewed transatlantic intellectual partnership. For Gurian himself, the engagement proved to be a worthwhile investment in his professional future. Until his death in 1954, he embarked on lecture series to Germany almost every year, and he could count on the support of those he had previously aided.[55] Friesenhahn again welcomed him to Bonn in 1949. Freund, who had accepted a professorship in political science and history at the University of Kiel in 1950, sent invitations for the years 1949 and 1952.[56]

It is tempting to assume that Gurian, in his aid to intellectuals and academics, followed an activist logic of democratization similar to the one that had informed Niebuhr's early engagement in CARE. But Gurian's view of democracy was quite different from that of other CARE donors. Having only recently come to the United States, he had not grown up with the country's missionary

52 Eugen Kogon to Waldemar Gurian, August 25, 1946, Gurian Papers, Box 5; remittance slip for CARE donation to Friedrich Meinecke, Gurian Papers, Box 16. The remittance slip only indicates the day of the donation as October 15 without mentioning the exact year. Judging from information on other CARE packages sent by Gurian, the year was either 1946 or 1947.

53 We do not know the exact time they met but the earliest remaining letter by Freund is dated March 6, 1935. Gurian Papers, Box 3.

54 Correspondence between Waldemar Gurian and Michael Freund, June 30, 1946 – January 31, 1948, Gurian Papers, Box 3.

55 Hürten, *Waldemar Gurian*, 171.

56 Correspondence between Gurian and Friesenhahn, February 3, 1949; correspondence with Michael Freund, February 15, 1949 – July 7, 1952, Gurian Papers, Box 3; see also Marie Schieders, Chief, OMGUS Cultural Exchange Branch to Waldemar Gurian regarding entry permit for three-month research visit to Frankfurt University, March 30, 1949, Gurian Papers, Box 16.

awe for democracy. Gurian was not antidemocratic, and he saw the potential good that the system held over the authoritarianism of the imperial Germany of his childhood. But he had been carefully skeptical of democracy since the early days of his career. In June 1925, for example, he wrote: "The people's will does the only smart thing it has the ability to do: It relinquishes its own power. That it performs this abdication in periodic intervals is the only difference between democracy and Caesarism."[57] Twenty years later, he similarly tiptoed around the issue of democracy when he referred to the Allied re-education measures as "an exterior acceptance of humanitarian and pacific ideologies," but not as a form of real democratization.[58]

His caution about the political system stemmed not from his support of any alternative but from his strong identification with Christianity as the guiding principle of social order. Unlike Niebuhr, who had always been a strong believer in democracy and practiced his religious philosophy within political liberalism, Gurian had long positioned his theology outside of any specific political framework. In fact, in his writings from the Weimar Republic and his Swiss exile, he presented practically every political regime as potentially harmful to the Christian ethics that he considered the foundation of human coexistence: faith, family, and congregational cohesion. In Gurian's view, the political liberalism that dawned in imperial Germany and found full expression in Weimar had undermined faith-based communities through secularization. National Socialism had publicly posed as a herald of Christian ethics, such as traditional family values, while increasingly undermining the power and meaning of the Church in public life. Communism was the outright Antichrist, which substituted religiosity with Bolshevism as the sole source of shared faith.[59] In all these expositions, Gurian never criticized certain forms of governance for their impact on human freedom or self-determination but only for their consequences on Christian worship.

This understanding of the interconnection of religion and politics again shows that Gurian did not think or act as a German American, but as a German. For many U.S. donors, as previous chapters have outlined, religion and democracy were inseparably intertwined. The oft-evoked "Nation under God" had been a safe haven for those who could not freely practice their faith elsewhere. Freedom of choice, the most basic precondition for democracy, was also the freedom of worship. European fascist and communist totalitarianism had made this abundantly clear in their godless persecution of any faith other

57 Gurian, "Die Soziologie der Wahlpropaganda" [The Sociology of Voting Propaganda], *Sonderdruck aus dem Archiv für Politik und Geschichte* 3, no. 6, June 1925, 589, Gurian Papers, Box 9.
58 Gurian, "On the Future of Germany," *Review of Politics* 7, no. 1 (1945): 12, Gurian Papers, Box 9.
59 Compare several articles and writings from 1925 to 1937, Gurian Papers, Box 9.

than that in the state. Only a country that allowed individual expressions of worship could thus be truly democratic – and vice versa.

Gurian perceived the situation differently. His German, or even European, socialization had taught him that religiosity was in no way bound to a specific political system. Totalitarianism may have been irreconcilable with religious ethics, but other undemocratic political systems had, in the past, allowed worship without granting other freedoms. Christianity had thrived in absolutist European monarchies just as well as it did under democracy, if not better. To Gurian, religion was not tied to any political belief. On the contrary, it formed the basis for any functioning form of governance. Gurian's aid should not be confused with the U. S. American sense of mission expressed by other donors because he simply did not make the same connection between religion, activism, and Americanness. His aid was practical rather than idealistic.

Nonetheless, with all the practical benefits it entailed, Gurian's humanitarian activity did more than merely further his professional self-interest. It also satisfied his personal longing for cultural connection. In September 1946, for example, he received a letter from Grete and Heinrich Schäfer, who had obtained his Notre Dame address from a local newspaper. The Schäfers had owned a little stationery store in Bonn that Gurian had frequented as a university student. After staying in contact with the Schäfers throughout his time in Swiss exile, he had lost touch with them during the war.[60] Gurian very well remembered the Schäfers who, as he learned, had lost their store in an air raid. For the next two years, Gurian sent the couple CARE packages on a regular basis, which the Schäfers greeted with immense gratitude and regular updates on developments in Bonn's intellectual and academic circles.[61] Although the relation did not yield any professional results, it apparently held great psychological value for Gurian. It allowed him to reconnect with the everyday life of his former place of residence, the site of his intellectual development in the 1920s and where he felt the most intimate connection.

When Gurian died in 1954, Hannah Arendt wrote about him: "Friendship was what made him at home in this world and he felt at home wherever his friends were, regardless of country, language or social background."[62] Arendt, as it turns out, was not quite right. Gurian's aid efforts prove that throughout his time in the United States, he longed for the Germany of his youth, and aid allowed him, as in the case of the Schäfers, to carry a part of this home over to the United States. Although different from Niebuhr's in many ways, his aid

60 In case he had forgotten them, Grete Schäfer had added a letter that Gurian had sent them on New Year's Eve 1934, Gurian Papers, Box 7.

61 Correspondence between Grete and Heinrich Schäfer and Waldemar Gurian, September 18, 1946 – January 28, 1948, Gurian Papers, Box 7.

62 Arendt, "The Personality of Waldemar Gurian," 33.

efforts, too, were a form of symbolic ethnic engagement that allowed him to enact and preserve his heritage.

* * *

Both Niebuhr and Gurian represented outspoken antifascist parts of the German immigrant community. But, as the earlier example of the article from the *Baltimore Correspondent* has already shown, many German Americans held more favorable views of the Nazi regime, or they relativized its crimes while downplaying the complicity of the German people. Already in August 1945, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had presented President Truman with a grim overview of "The Plight of the Homeland in the German-American Community Press." The report lamented that virtually all German-language news outlets either ignored the responsibility of the German people for their own fate or completely shrugged complicity off as a matter of Nazi brutality towards the Germans as "Hitler's first victims." Some papers banished mentions of Hitler's responsibility for the war to picture captions while accompanying texts focused on Allied destruction of German cultural heritage. Others put the blame on the international community's inability to understand the significance of Germany as a center of European economic vitality.

All this was not exactly surprising as the idea of the guilty Nazis and the innocent Germans followed prevalent trends in U.S. public opinion and even found considerable resonance in government circles. What worried the OSS was not so much this distinction but rather the nature of the blame that German-American newspapers put on the Nazis. "In general Hitler was not condemned for having started the war," the report pointed out, "but for continuing it once defeat had become inevitable."[63] Thus, it seemed that large parts of the German immigrant community had sympathized with fascist ideology and longed for the grandness it had promised to their ancestral homeland – at least as long as it had been successful.

Desires for German greatness and a tendency to neglect, downplay, or even deny the war guilt of the German people were most visible among German-American organizations concerned with preserving their immigrant heritage. Traditionally one of the most highly organized ethnic groups in the country, German immigrants formed political interest groups, community societies, choirs, and the famous gymnastics clubs, the *Turnvereine*, to preserve and spread their ancestral culture in the United States. Such organizations had an interest in sustaining a positive image of Germanness among their members, and they wished to share this image with the broader public. In this pursuit, immigrant organizations offered celebrations for German holidays, *Oktober-*

63 OSS Report "The Plight of the Homeland in the German-American Community Press," August 13, 1945, Truman Papers, Staff Members and Office Files, Rose Conway Files, Box 10.

fest, and memorial ceremonies for the birthdays of German poets and composers to provide what Kathleen Conzen has called "secular sacraments" in the building of immigrant ethnicity.[64] They intentionally only presented a selective and idealized version of the homeland – after all, migrants had left Germany for a reason and had no desire to identically recreate it overseas.[65] This self-understanding often prohibited criticism of Nazism as the issue did not correspond with the romanticized ideas of Germanness that many organizations wanted to foster.

Rather than openly deliberating their position toward Nazi atrocities, immigrant organizations accordingly silenced or even questioned German war guilt and discussion of Nazi crimes.[66] A prominent example was the Steuben Society of America, which had formed in 1919 as a response to the anti-Germanism of World War I to lobby for the interests of the German-American community. Organizations that, like the Steuben Society, had formed after World War I often evoked nationalist tendencies of *Deutschtum* to revive an immigrant consciousness that they had seen fading with the war. They presented a rather ethnic-nationalist strand within the generally well assimilated German immigrant community.[67] Steuben's national chairman Theodore Hoffmann had at first even played with the thought of openly supporting the Nazi regime. He had met with Adolf Hitler in 1934 and expressed his liking of the "New Germany." Only when U.S. American news coverage on Nazi violence began to take off did Hoffmann retreat from this position and, in 1941, support U.S. war entry.[68] After the end of the war, he joined the ranks of those propagating the German victim narrative. On November 9, 1945 – tellingly, the anniversary of Hitler's first attempted coup in 1923 and of the November pogroms of 1938 – he sent President Truman a scathing message: "Requests are coming in daily to us not only from our members, but from those not of Germanic ancestry […] Thousands of innocent women and children in Germany and Austria are dying daily while we procrastinate."[69] Although existing need among the populations of Germany and Austria was undeniable, Hoffmann did not once mention the Nazis and the destructive war they had waged on the entire

64 Kathleen Neils Conzen, "Ethnicity as Festive Culture: Nineteenth-Century German America on Parade," in *The Invention of Ethnicity*, ed. Werner Sollors (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 50.

65 Hoerder, "The German-Language Diasporas," 11.

66 Wilhelm, *Bewegung oder Verein?*, 287.

67 Wilhelm, *Bewegung oder Verein?*, 23–24.

68 Wilhelm, *Bewegung oder Verein?*, 26–27, 105; Julia Lange, "How to Cope with It? The Steuben Society of America's Politics of Memory and the Holocaust," in *Reverberations of Nazi Violence in Germany and Beyond: Disturbing Pasts*, ed. Stephanie Bird et al. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 252.

69 Theo Hoffmann to Matthew Connelly [secretary to President Truman], November 9, 1945, Truman Papers, OF 426, Box 1328.

European continent. Nor did he refer to the events of 1938, in which SS and SA troops, supported by German civilians, had destroyed thousands of synagogues, Jewish businesses, and hospitals, attacked and murdered hundreds of German Jews or had sent them to concentration camps. Hoffmann presented the destitute situation of the former Reich's population simply as a fact, and he refrained from mentioning the war that had brought this situation about. The Steuben Society was exemplary for the hesitancy of heritage organizations to allow Nazi crimes to affect their ancestral self-understanding.

In part, CARE's media image supported this distinction between Germanness and Nazism. In 1946, the U.S. military government had founded the German Youth Activities (GYA) – a program that established mock parliaments, Boys' and Girls' Clubs, student papers, and discussion groups to familiarize German children with democratic practices.[70] CARE began cooperating with the GYA in 1947, supplying the program with funds for meals and educational material. In a pamphlet that promoted the cooperation, CARE told the story of thirteen-year-old Hans. Just two years before, the story read, Hans "was a perfect little Nazi" who "had been told that war was glorious […] But today he is different. With the help of GYA […] Hans is learning for the first time how to get along with others on an equal, give-and-take basis."[71] Although declaring Hans "a perfect little Nazi" was a controversial statement – after all, the boy was only eleven years old when the war ended – the story admitted that he had not become one of his own free will. As a young and impressionable boy, Hans combined two tropes: he was a Nazi and a victim of Nazism at the same time. His youth rendered him powerless. Hans and his Nazi indoctrination symbolized the relation between Germanness and fascism. Rather than being a product of German culture, Nazism was an outside force that had preyed on the German people just as it had preyed on little Hans. Victimization of the German people protected notions of Germanness from the stain of Hitler's rule.

Individual members of German heritage organizations reflected such opinions in their humanitarian efforts. One example is that of the couple Conrad and Marian Linke. Both were of German origin – Conrad was a first- and Marian a second-generation U.S. American – and both strongly identified and actively engaged with their immigrant heritage. The painter and his wife lived in Philadelphia and were both members of the Steuben Society's local branch. Conrad even was the Steuben Society's national secretary in 1944. They were also active in the German Society of Pennsylvania (GSP) – the oldest German-

70 For an overview of the development and programs of the GYA, see Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie: Der amerikanische Beitrag 1945–1952* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1993), 156–62.

71 GYA pamphlet "As the Twig Is Bent," ca. 1947, CARE Records, Box 1000.

American organization in the country, founded in 1764, which prided itself on being even older than the United States.[72]

After the German attack on Poland in 1933, Conrad and Marian Linke frequently advocated U. S. neutrality in World War II and drafted open statements for the impeachment of President Roosevelt, whose policies they perceived as increasingly pro-British and unjustly anti-German. Conrad voiced harsh anti-British and anti-French sentiment before and during the war. He argued that British propaganda and Anglophilia among Washington administrators and the press were responsible for the war that, he felt, only served Britain's imperial interests. At one point, Conrad even suggested that Great Britain was purposefully surrounding the United States with military bases in Canada and the Caribbean to prepare an eventual takeover.[73]

What is more, Conrad Linke expressed antisemitic opinions that he weaved into a narrative of the unfair and propagandistic treatment of Germany in the U. S. press. In 1939, he complained about the disproportionate news coverage that Nazi actions against the Jewish population received in the United States. "[The] spectacle of hundreds of thousands of people killing one another in China […] is not news," Linke remarked about the slim U. S. news coverage on the Chinese Civil War. "But when a people [meaning "the Germans"] succeeded in taking away business opportunities and money from a race [meaning "the Jews"] that has built up a reputation for itself for shrewdness in business and finance down through the centuries, that is news."[74]

Such thinking was not uncommon in the mid-century United States. Immigration restrictions in the interwar period had deemed Jews, and particularly those of Slavic origin, undesirable newcomers.[75] When the U. S. entered World War II, Roosevelt was aware of the systematic annihilation of the European Jewry yet did not choose to change the war strategy because of it.[76] The Jewish fate was not something that aroused much attention, let alone sympathy, in the United States. Linke's comment was peculiar not in its defense of antisemitism but in its accusation that the U. S. press was unfairly exaggerating the extent of pogroms in Germany. His words revealed that, if it came down to it, he would

72 See the organization's self-published history for the bicentennial of 1964 written by longtime GSP president Harry W. Pfund, *A History of the German Society of Pennsylvania, 1764–1964* (Philadelphia: The German Society of Pennsylvania, 1964).

73 See several handwritten scripts about neutrality, the impeachment of Franklin Roosevelt, and the alleged British "Redcoats" infiltrating the U. S. from without and within, c. late 1930s [mostly after the beginning of World War II], Conrad J. and Marian Linke Papers, Box 1, Joseph P. Horner Memorial Library, German Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA (hereafter Linke Papers).

74 Handwritten note by Conrad Linke, 1939, Linke Papers, Box 1.

75 Bauerkämper, *Sicherheit und Humanität im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 807.

76 Breitman, *Official Secrets*, 228–29.

not speak and act from the position of a U.S. American but from that of an exiled German who found his worldview and his culture under attack.

Conrad and Marian Linke were aware that such pro-German and racist opinions were unpopular once the extent of Nazi atrocities had been laid bare. They came to realize that future engagement on behalf of their ancestral home required a peaceful method that neither publicly belittled nor praised the actions of Hitler's regime. Like many German immigrant groups had done after World War I, the Linkes began resorting to relief aid as a peaceful and seemingly unpolitical expression of solidarity with their German ancestral home. But the form of their engagement displays a strong discrepancy between their private and their public expression of heritage. Privately, the Linkes donated via CARE to aid their direct relatives overseas. Conrad's parents had both been Sudeten Germans – a culturally and linguistically German ethnic group that had traditionally lived in the Czech and Austrian borderlands to Germany. They had emigrated from the Austro-Hungarian Empire around the turn of the century. This meant that, strictly speaking, Conrad was not nationally German but of Austrian descent. Still, he understood himself as having German heritage, based on the notion that the Sudeten Germans had been a marginalized, racially German group living outside the Reich. In the fall of 1946, Conrad and Marian Linke started sending CARE packages to Conrad's cousin Anna Ullmann. Herself a Sudeten German, Anna was among the roughly three million expellees who had been forced to leave their homes in Czechoslovakia after the defeat of the Third Reich. She now lived in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany.[77]

The Linkes' engagement was not surprising as CARE offered a convenient way to direct aid specifically to Conrad's overseas relative. At first glance, it seems like they followed the motivation of kinship that the organization expected. What is surprising, however, is that the Linkes seem to have had little or no prior contact with Anna Ullmann. In her thank-you letters, Anna shared no personal memories of meeting Conrad but instead mentioned older relatives who remembered him from visits when he was a young man. She frequently inquired about Conrad's life in the United States, where the couple lived, and whether they had children. Her questions suggest that Conrad and Anna had never been in contact before, or at least not for a very long time. The Linkes thus only reached out to overseas relatives after the war had ended in German defeat and the international community had uncovered the extent of the Nazi atrocities. They came to Anna's rescue right when the same crimes they had relativized during the 1930s had put their understanding of Germany and of their own heritage on trial. Aiding Anna Ullmann through CARE was not just

77 See correspondence between Conrad and Marian Linke and Anna Ullmann [first letter by Ullmann dated September 1, 1946], Linke Papers, Box 6.

an altruistic deed to help a relative they had neglected before and during the war. It was also a form of romanticized ethnic reconnection since Anna's fate as an expellee confirmed the Linkes' belief in the victimhood of the German people. Their aid shows that CARE's assumed motivation of kinship was not singular but coupled with the donor's individual political concerns and understandings of heritage.

Interestingly, the Linkes did not utilize CARE in their public positions as members of renowned German-American organizations, although both engaged in relief for Germany in those functions, as well. Marian was president of the Philadelphia chapter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, through which she coordinated the distribution of self-packed relief parcels abroad. She then acted as president of the Women's Auxiliary of the GSP, supervising relief activities in Philadelphia and Germany between 1951 and 1954.[78] Conrad, in his position as a representative of German-American organizations, engaged in relief after World War II as well, but he chose other agencies over CARE. This choice echoed the preferences of the German-American organizations he served.[79] In fact, neither the Steuben Society nor the GSP resorted to CARE in their aid engagements in the late 1940s. Instead, they made use of different agencies, one being the American Relief for Germany, co-founded by the Steuben Society after the war, and the American Relief for Central Europe.[80]

These organizations held three advantages over CARE. First, they lobbied more strongly for German interests than the secular and regionally diverse CARE, and they echoed the apologetic and relativistic narrative that had gained much popularity among German-American groups and media outlets. In the spring of 1946, the American Relief for Germany published an open letter demanding that postal service to Germany be restored. Quoting from a recent speech by North Dakota Senator William Langer, who was a fellow German-American, the letter justified aid to the recently defeated enemy by twisting the Nazi extermination campaign against European Jewry into a picture of universal hardship. "Mr. President, Catholic, Protestant, Jew alike are caught in this vast maelstrom of human suffering," the letter said. "The disintegration of human society has cut across all racial and religious lines; it has cut across all boundaries of distinction between the strong and the weak, the ex-enemy and the ally, and the guilty and the innocent alike."[81] Equally apologetic was the

78 See various documents on Marian Linke's relief engagement with the Women's International League and the Women's Auxiliary, as well as letters from German recipients in Linke Papers, Box 6.

79 See various correspondences, clippings, and collected pamphlets on and by Conrad Linke concerning his humanitarian engagement in postwar Germany in Linke Papers, Box 1.

80 Lange, "How to Cope with It?," 252.

81 Open letter by the American Relief for Germany, Inc. to President Truman, ca. spring 1946, Linke Papers, Box 1.

organization's president Otto R. Hauser, who wrote in a report about his visit to Germany in the spring of 1946: "I have found no one in Germany who had a word of condonement for Hitler […] In the first place only 43.9 % had voted for Hitler March 5, 1933. […] What effect must it have had on the German people to see one foreign government after another accept the Hitler regime officially as fully trustworthy."[82] Hauser's words reflected the sentiments expressed in the *Staatszeitung*'s article on the AADG: They put the blame for the crimes of the Nazi regime on the inaction of the international community rather than on the regime itself or on those who had elected it.

Hauser, one must remark, was not a Nazi sympathizer. The first-generation immigrant, who had come to the U.S. in 1906, was a committed socialist. In 1928, he had even unsuccessfully run for the office of governor of Wisconsin on the ticket of the Socialist Party.[83] Being a socialist, antifascist, and pacifist, Hauser's words were not meant to downplay the atrocious crimes of the Nazi regime. Rather, they were characteristic of his role as an active member of the German-American community. Those who actively nurtured their immigrant heritage shielded Germans of whatever political affiliation from accusations of complicity because doing so also protected their understandings of Germanness.

To a certain degree, CARE fed this narrative by displaying Germans as victims of Nazi propaganda who needed humanitarian aid as a form of re-education. But the victim narrative – as the organization employed it in the debate on the German Youth Activities – was not relativistic in the way Hauser's comment was. Unlike the American Relief for Germany, CARE's PR never denied German public support for Hitler. In this logic, the German people were entitled to humanitarian aid not because they were generally innocent, but because they could repent and redeem themselves with a little help from abroad. The victim narrative served as a support for the organization's profile as an asset to U.S. foreign policy objectives. The apologetic lobbying of the American Relief for Germany expressed a different quality. While CARE had admitted German complicity insofar as the Germans had been seduced by Nazism, Hauser presented the Germans not as seduced but as brutally suppressed by an ideology for which they had harbored no sympathy. This was a degree of relativism that CARE did not and could not condone lest the organization alienate its politically and ethnically diverse donor base.

82 Otto R. Hauser, National President, American Relief for Germany, Inc. Tours Germany Under OMGUS Travel Orders to Survey the Need for and Administration of Relief to Germany, ca. spring 1946, Linke Papers, Box 1.

83 "Otto Hauser to get Medal – Helped Germans," *The Milwaukee Journal*, November 12, 1955, Otto Robert Hauser Papers, Box 1, Libraries' Archive Department, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

What is more, groups and organizations concerned with preserving immigrant heritage did not utilize CARE for the exact reason that made the program so popular among the public: it was designed to facilitate direct contact between a donor in the United States and a specific recipient in Europe. CARE was simply not suitable for an organization that did not focus on individual Germans but on a more abstract idea of Germanness. Other humanitarian organizations were better suited to this idea because they provided anonymized mass relief that benefactors associated with an idea of the entire German nation and its people. These organizations frequently made public statements that tied notions of Germanness to a specific way of doing humanitarianism, which was not the way CARE did it. In 1946, for example, the American Relief for Central Europe issued this statement: "So, you would like to help those poor people in the old country but only your own relatives; I am sure you don't really mean it when you give it a little more thought […] I am sure your folks in the old country would want you to support general relief agencies who guarantee equitable distribution according to need."[84] While not directly articulating it, the statement shamed donors for favoring the individualist approach that made CARE so popular. No upright descendant of German immigrants, it implied, would prioritize the needs of their immediate family over those of the German people. This approach moved the individual into the background and pushed "the Germans" as an entire people into the spotlight.

Others discredited CARE's mode of operation much more bluntly. In August 1948, the German-language *America Herold und Lincoln Freie Presse* from Winona, Minnesota, published a promotion article on CRALOG, which, unlike CARE, offered only general relief. The author exclaimed: "I was never of the opinion that CARE was a real charity. CARE never acted on the basis of need. […] And whoever did not have relatives or good friends in the United States was out of luck."[85] Since the article aimed at garnering support for CRALOG, it was somewhat logical for it to take a straight shot at CARE, its largest competitor in German relief. But, like the statement of the American Relief for Central Europe, the comment suggested that aid for certain individuals or groups defied the logics of German-American ethnicity, which meant solidarity with the idea of Germany as a whole.

Most importantly, CARE's media image as an ambassador of U.S. American political and cultural values was not the image immigrant organizations wanted to convey with their aid. Through their contents and the personal connections they offered, CARE packages always presented an idealized version of the United States. German-American organizations, however, had no interest

84 German Relief for Central Europe statement issued through the American Friends Service Committee's German Relief News #7, Foreign Service Section, June 1, 1946, Linke Papers, Box 1.
85 Henry Wilbe, "Was ist CRALOG?" [What is CRALOG?], *America Herold und Lincoln Freie Presse*, August 18, 1948.

in nation branding that spread U.S. American culture overseas. On the contrary, associations that aimed to preserve immigrant heritage had an interest in seeing this heritage preserved in the native land. Their aim was not to brand their nation or to confront German recipients with the virtues of the United States. They did not want to Americanize the German population in any way. CARE was unpopular among heritage organizations because it came with Billy Wilder's metaphorical wrapper.[86]

For that reason, it is not surprising that the Linkes confined their engagement in CARE to the private sphere. With their aid to Anna Ullmann, they could satisfy their desire for ancestral connections and confirm their political views on the extent and impact of World War II by victimizing Anna as a refugee. Their public positions did not allow for humanitarian engagement through the same channel as CARE could not cater to the idea of heritage preservation on a large scale. Private and public understandings of Germanness demanded different modes of action, with CARE serving as a symbolic practice of intimate deliberations on the donor's self-understanding. Only in the mid-1950s did Hauser's GSP become active through CARE, when its members started sending Food Crusade packages to West German orphanages. Turning to CARE at that time was logical. The organization had just terminated its designated deliveries to West Germany, meaning that donors could no longer send packages to specific recipients. The Food Crusade now offered a cheap way to provide mass relief with basic foods. Unlike the popular brands that had been shipped in the original packages, the basic foods in the new design did not carry an air of Americanization. While the designated deliveries had suited individual German Americans who wanted to aid friends and relatives abroad, the Food Crusade opened CARE's market to organizations dedicated to the preservation of German heritage and the notion of solidarity with the ancestral homeland.[87]

* * *

Although Reinhold Niebuhr, Waldemar Gurian, and the Linkes all belonged to a group that both CARE and scholars of humanitarianism categorized ethnically by their German heritage, their individual cases show the manifold motivations among members of this group, which defied the simplistic Smith-to-Schmidt analogy. Giving, whether to friends and family or to strangers abroad, was not just an act of feeding but was always also a chance to develop or preserve an individual understanding of German heritage. It was an inbound deed

86 See the introduction to this book for an explanation of the wrapper as a metaphor of imperialism in humanitarian aid in the opening scene of Billy Wilder's motion picture *A Foreign Affair*.
87 See correspondences for donations to Das Rauhe Haus in Hamburg and Bodelschwinghsche Anstalten 'Bethel' in Bethel bei Bielefeld, November 2, 1954 – April 16, 1956, German Society of Pennsylvania uncatalogued Legal Pamphlets, Box 2.

that did not reflect understandings of U.S. American politics and culture onto Germany. This made it different from the aid endeavors of the AFL or from Niebuhr's support for German academics and clerics. Rather, humanitarian aid served purposes similar to those during World War I as it allowed for peaceful deliberations of ethnic belonging that could express allegiance to either culture as well as to both.

Indeed, the way all three parties used CARE reveals how differently members of the German-American community felt about their country of origin. Some had tried to abandon their German heritage altogether while others never came to think of themselves as U.S. Americans. First- and second-generation immigrants practiced their German cultural and linguistic heritage in different ways, resulting in different self-perceptions of Germanness. Those who would engage in CARE did so in different quantities and positions, acting alone or collectively in clubs and organizations. They directed their aid specifically at relatives or more vaguely at unknown recipients to express different understandings of their ancestral relations. Their stories show how diversely aspects like generation, political inclination, and personal biography factored into their motivations for sending CARE packages to their ancestral home. They could use aid to preserve their heritage, to emphasize postwar German suffering over wartime guilt, to renegotiate ambiguous relations to their immigrant heritage, or, rather practically, to revive professional and amicable ties to a country to which they had previously felt dearly connected.

Conclusion – Why They Gave

Thirteen years after *A Foreign Affair*, Billy Wilder returned to Berlin once more. His 1961 comedy *One, Two, Three* opens on an event that had blindsided Wilder's film team as they were shooting in the city: the construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13. The film follows C. R. "Mac" McNamara, a grumpy U. S. executive of the West Berlin branch of the Coca-Cola Company, who is determined to make the soda a hit behind the Iron Curtain. Mac hopes that this move will finally lead to his promotion to the company's London office. But when his boss in Atlanta asks Mac to take care of his daughter Scarlett as she visits the divided city, he sees his career plans falling apart. As Scarlett's trip stretches from two weeks to two months, Mac discovers that she secretly married a young Berliner by the name of Otto. This Otto, to make things worse, is a devoted communist from the Soviet sector. Concerned about his professional fate, Mac tries to drive a wedge between the newlyweds, but he soon discovers that Scarlett is already pregnant. His only chance, he realizes, is to lure Otto away from his political beliefs and to convince him of the virtues of U. S. American capitalism.

Like *A Foreign Affair*, *One, Two, Three* also received mixed reviews. The film reduced its characters to stubborn and simplistic caricatures: the self-righteous U. S. American capitalists taking on the constantly cheerless Soviet propagandists. But what contemporary critics lamented as an abandonment of complex character profiles in exchange for quick laughs can also be read as a symbol of the hardened ideological fronts of the Cold War that had developed by the early 1960s. The protagonists, David Bathrick noted, are not so much

characters as they are "delivery systems of a de- and reconstructed discourse."[1] Comically, though with a keen eye for the absurdity of Berlin's political situation, Wilder used his stereotypical figures to contrast Eastern socialist indoctrination with the equally ideologized Western celebration of capitalist wealth. In the film, West Berlin is no longer the rubble heap of the late 1940s. There are no debates among U.S. politicians about questions of food and responsibility – let alone reservations about imperialism. In fact, the city has become something of a thriving metropolitan outpost of the American empire.

The geopolitical events that led to West Berlin's astounding transition by the early 1960s also formed the context in which CARE's program developed and changed over the years. After the end of World War II, the four victorious powers debated how to proceed with the recently defeated enemy and its people and, in turn, deliberated their positions towards one another. The interests of East and West diverged ever more in the first postwar years over issues of German deindustrialization, reparations, and quadripartite control. Suspicion about the other powers' motives, diverging economic interests, irritation about unilateral actions on both sides, and fury over broken promises led to the eventual breakup of the Allied Control Council, animating the Western Allies and the government of the USSR to shield their spheres of influence from one another's interference. As the Soviet government consolidated its hegemony over Eastern Europe and its German occupation zone, the governments of the U.S., Great Britain, and France advanced the integration of their zones into a liberal-capitalist alliance of Western democracies. With the foundation of the two German states in 1949, the wartime alliance had ultimately dissolved into a bipolar conflict. West Germany's role gradually changed from defeated fascist enemy to future ally in the fight against the spread of communism. The Federal Republic, spurred by rapid economic revitalization and tightening cultural and political bonds with the United States, regained Germany's prewar status as Europe's strongest economy, while the German Democratic Republic tried to keep its people from fleeing its suppressive and economically weak regime. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 was only the last and most literal example in a long list of events that had divided Germany and the wartime Allies territorially and ideologically.

As Wilder's story unfolded before moviegoers on the silver screen, CARE's executive board decided that the end of the organization's German operation was unavoidable. For too long, it had clung to this former flagship mission that was doomed to forfeit its purpose. Despite the grand claims made by the Allies in preparation for their military occupation, West Germany had outpaced its European neighbors in terms of economic output and living standards in the 1950s. The construction of the wall had put an end to the constant influx of

1 Bathrick, "Billy Wilder's Cold War Berlin," 42–47, quote 46.

Eastern refugees and had deprived CARE of the only real humanitarian crisis that provided a reason to stay. A country that was wealthy enough to have its own Coca-Cola branch and to enjoy a consumerist lifestyle comparable to its U.S. American role model was not one CARE's executives could align with a humanitarian purpose any longer.

Since 1946, the organization had managed to navigate through the tumultuous waters of German and transatlantic affairs and had achieved much of its success by bringing aid in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives. Pressured by a growing donor base that demanded service to Germany, CARE's decision makers had first framed humanitarian engagement as a contribution to Allied re-education efforts that were intended to promote the virtues of a capitalist democracy among recipients. Such reasoning proved successful in garnering federal government support against the initial resentment of the U.S. military administration under General Lucius D. Clay. To CARE's advantage, the U.S. government's strategy in Germany shifted with the dawning Cold War, as West German economic revitalization became the leading U.S. policy rationale to limit the influence of the Soviet government beyond its own zone. The start of the Berlin Blockade in the summer of 1948 brought the threat of Stalin's expansionist policy home to the public, and CARE's engagement in the Allied airlift became emblematic for the organization's assistance in U.S. foreign policy. A tremendous donation output proved that donors understood humanitarianism as a good way to support their country's struggle in the Cold War and to spread favorable images of it overseas.

As the bipolar conflict became global in the 1950s, U.S. political objectives and, simultaneously, CARE's humanitarian operation changed in style and regional focus. Priorities shifted from relief to development aid as a form of ideological conquest, changing CARE's program and geographical outlook with the expansion into new Cold War crisis areas in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The German program profited from the new focus on development as well since it portrayed the country as a newfound ally across the Atlantic that needed modernization, education, and long-term change to withstand the temptations of communism. Continuously high sales in West Germany also animated CARE's decision makers to conduct sometimes open and sometimes stealthy operations in the Soviet zone and, later, the GDR. The program had only limited success, with CARE terminating all East German efforts in 1958. But the mere fact that the organization went to great lengths to sustain the operation shows how keen donors were on engaging in German matters through humanitarian aid and how eager the organization was to take maximum advantage of this opportunity for growth and influence.

While West German need diminished in the early to mid-1950s, donor engagement for the country was still high. CARE had to bridge the rift that was developing between humanitarian objectives of relief and the consumerist de-

sires among economically recovering recipients, who increasingly demanded luxury products. As it seems, nobody at CARE regarded these two as incompatible. On the contrary, the personnel at the German Mission openly admitted that a continuation of the popular German program called for the packages to be adapted to better meet recipients' demands for luxury. To some degree, CARE's decision makers deliberately forfeited humanitarian purposes for the sake of commercial success. Yet, as the 1950s came to a close, even continuing donor engagement could no longer disguise the fact that the Federal Republic had economically outgrown its role as an alms recipient.

CARE's last office in West Berlin closed in April 1963. But the organization's expansion was by no means over. While a Canadian CARE office had opened as early as 1946, the 1970s brought further expansion. CARE Germany opened its doors in Bonn in 1979, and more branches followed in the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Norway.[2] The contemporary umbrella organization CARE International came into being in 1982. Successful branding and massive donor engagement had turned the once ad-hoc relief effort into one of the world's largest humanitarian players. Much of this success rested on CARE's iconic achievements in postwar Germany, which would have been unthinkable without the enthusiastic engagement of U. S. Americans on behalf of their former war enemies.

But why did they give? Answering this question has been the purpose of this study. Humanitarian aid, it has shown, was never just an act of feeding others. Providing material support and psychological comfort allowed donors to gain influence at home and abroad, or to deliberate their own position in their home society and in a rapidly changing geopolitical situation. Aid did not follow normative standards of goodwill but rather enabled those who gave to situate themselves and their actions in prevalent public and political discussions. It was not based on universality but on the specificity of the regional setting in which it occurred at a particular historical moment. Unlike Wilder's cautious congressman, donors had no reservations about sending their food in a wrapper because this very wrapper was the instrument that allowed them to exert power in their individual contexts. To understand why they gave requires an understanding of these contexts – it entails asking who they were, when they became active, where, and to whom they dedicated their humanitarian attention.

As the previous chapters have revealed, the answers to these questions cannot be found in a single factor, a primary desire, or in preformulated humanitarian standards of compassion and altruism. People gave and continue to give today for various reasons, many of which defy the aid sector's credo of neutral, impartial, and apolitical action. A look at the sheer numbers makes this ob-

2 Fact Sheet: CARE Aid to Germany, January 25, 1983, CARE Records, Box 882.

vious. Apparently, many U.S. Americans felt that Germany needed aid more badly than any other European recipient destination, even though the consequences of Nazism and war had been at least as devastating in many other European countries. But none of these countries enjoyed CARE packages in quantities that even remotely matched the German numbers. No matter how much more the German people or their country's infrastructure had suffered in comparison to these others, the existing need did not justify such immense discrepancies in donor involvement. Humanitarian actors, it seems, often defined need in very different ways.

Beyond numbers, it is worthwhile to look at CARE's person-to-person approach as a factor that appealed to all donors. The organization gave them direct access to a desired group of people. Not only could they choose a specific person they deemed worthy, but they knew that CARE encouraged recipients to get in touch with their benefactors. Both parties became acquainted with each other, or at least a version of the other, generated through the package and the response to it. Donors received largely direct accounts of conditions in Germany that revealed postwar destitution and political grievances; if so desired, they could try to counter these conditions through continuing aid. As CARE's internal quarrels over the acceptance of undesignated orders in 1948 prove, donors wanted to come to the rescue of unknown persons through whom they could exert political influence or on whom they could project personal desires and objectives. Direct communication with distant others, and the gratification that came with it, were the central dynamics on which all donor motivations rested.

The four case studies arranged these motivations along prevalent narratives that featured prominently in CARE's aid to postwar Germany. Through deliberations on the importance of religiosity, consumerism, labor unionism, education, and social reform to German postwar reconstruction, coupled with deliberations on German guilt, all actors imbued their aid with meaning beyond altruism and mere subsistence. The members of the Halcyon Literary Club and the Ohio Girls' Club responded to prominent debates on consumer culture and religious freedom that policymakers, public thinkers, and media outlets considered important for German postwar reconstruction. Jay Lovestone and the American Federation of Labor used CARE to win the hearts and minds of West German unionists, whom OMGUS studies had identified as a vital group in German democratization. The three intellectuals and activists in New York aided the causes of sex reform, pacifism, and the improvement of education, which they individually believed to be socially and politically relevant in the defeated enemy nation. And members of the German-American community used aid to further deliberations on German victimization, prioritizing the occupied population's present needs over their past crimes. Their donor engagement only worked in the German context since they touched on

different debates about the future of Germany and, with it, the future of the United States as a global power.

But this study has also demonstrated that motivations are as diverse as people. There was never just one impetus for giving as donors built their self-understanding on more than one factor. Within the contexts that shaped their giving, all actors displayed a variety of reasons. These are summarized best by the division into outbound motivations, targeting the recipients and the specific political or sociocultural structures they live in, and inbound ones, concerning the donors' self-understanding and self-expression, their domestic environment, and their place within it. This is not to say that only the latter category held benefits for the donor. Outbound and inbound motivations formed an inextricable and interactive relation in which the benefits of one fostered the benefits of the other.

In this sense, transnational humanitarianism was inherently reciprocal. "Selfless" and "selfish" were not mutually exclusive categories in foreign aid, even though that is exactly what humanitarian idealism made them out to be (and still does today). But, as scholars like Samuel Moyn or Siep Stuurman have shown, any concept that invokes the idea of humanity necessarily struggles with the term's contradictions, fluctuating between diversity and unity as its frame of reference. It is in this apparent contradiction that the perceived opposites of self-interest and selflessness in humanitarian aid find their connective link. Just as understandings of humanity oscillated between the individual and the collective, so humanitarian was aid shaped by a tension between the selective and the universal, the self and the other, the practice and the ideal. These pairs are, in fact, not contradictions as much as they are synergetic partners. After all, as Johannes Paulmann asked, "If it were not for the utopia, how could a practicable goal be achieved?"[3] The existence of counterparts is what forms the reciprocal dynamic that fuels humanitarian action.

Scholars in history, political science, and sociology have rightly debunked this perceived dualism in their investigations on the work of aid agencies and governments, showing that both categories go hand in hand rather naturally. Donors, however, are largely missing from these scholarly accounts. The notion that they react to distant suffering out of compassion, pity, or a sense of justice continues to fuel a humanitarian myth of the selfless and rather inactive donor. Giving to ease a guilty conscience is the only self-interested motivation included in this logic, which does not acknowledge mutual interest as a necessary factor in the self-perpetuating dynamic of giving and taking. This is not to say that reciprocity necessarily means balance. In humanitarianism, an asymmetric power dynamic between a wealthy benefactor and an impov-

3 Johannes Paulmann, "Humanity – Humanitarian Reason – Imperial Humanitarianism: European Concepts in Practice," in *Humanity*, ed. Klose et al., 311.

erished beneficiary often works to the advantage of the donor, who can exert influence and make demands at will. In the context of donors to CARE's German Mission, humanitarian acts undoubtedly relieved suffering abroad, and donors' conscious decision to resort to aid as the form of their foreign engagement shows that they were keenly aware of hunger and hardship abroad. Still, all donors expected a certain form of return for their generosity, which was supposed to come from abroad, from home, or from within themselves.

The predominant outbound motivation certainly was a desire for political influence. Postwar Germany intricately linked need and political significance. Donors could easily engage in humanitarian aid to the recently defeated enemy not only on grounds of universal humanity but because giving was a productive contribution to U.S. foreign policy. Just as the OWI and the OSS had throughout the war cautioned for a separation of the German people from a Nazi elite as a precondition for the successful rehabilitation of the former, so had many donors begun to understand the geopolitical significance of their engagement in the same terms. With their aid, they revealed a conception of Germany as a country in need of both food and guidance, and they expressed an awareness of its significance in a particular historical moment with massive implications for transatlantic relations. Many donors understood a full stomach as the quickest way to a susceptible mind. Were OMGUS to fail to sustain the German population, the U.S. government would prove incapable of successful democratization and would eventually forfeit much of its ideological influence to Soviet communism. Donors displayed a decidedly democratic understanding of the role they could play in furthering or altering their country's political objectives, and they were keen on leaving their mark on U.S.-German relations after World War II. Their actions nurtured an emerging Cold War consensus in which humanitarian aid spread personal convictions of U.S. American values and virtues overseas. This politicization allowed donors to include personal interests and desires in their aid without feeling guilty for displaying motives that defied humanitarian idealism because it did, after all, contribute to the political stabilization of Germany.

As this study has shown, CARE enabled people in the U.S. to develop agency in postwar transatlantic relations from a distance, which many consciously acquired. Some of CARE's donors shaped, or at least attempted to shape, U.S.-German relations in their very own ways – reforming on a small scale or trying to bring about grand systemic changes. For the AFL, for example, CARE was helpful in establishing a transnational union movement that the federation had regretfully neglected during the interwar period. Hoping that stronger international ties might shield labor unions in Europe and the U.S. from totalitarian infiltration, Jay Lovestone and his Free Trade Union Committee set out to establish U.S.-style unions in the Western zones and the later Federal Republic. They discovered CARE's person-to-person approach as a

convenient way of spreading their ideology on a grassroots level. In their correspondence with package recipients, Lovestone and the AFL directly channeled informational material, performing outright propaganda for their own cause and against lurking communist tendencies encroaching on West German unionists from the Eastern zone, France, and Italy.

Other donors projected personal understandings of reform or political and social betterment on the German stage as well, though arguably less systematically. The members of the Ohio Girls' Club, many of whom were active members in their Christian congregations, directly targeted religious recipients and institutions in West Germany that came with the recommendation of the Baptist World Alliance. In doing so, they spread the U.S. American notion of worship as a central pillar of democratic freedom in a country that had suffered from religious repression for the last twelve years. For Reinhold Niebuhr, the former German Evangelical pastor who had become a professor in New York, the 1940s had brought massive public and political visibility not only as an eminence in theological scholarship but also as one of the country's most prominent spokespersons on Nazi and postwar Germany. After his trip to the U.S. occupation zone with the State Department, during which he was supposed to assess the education system's potential for democratic reform, Niebuhr used his newfound agency to aid German academics and educators in ways he saw fit for the future of German re-education. The pastor and progressivist reformer John Haynes Holmes, who had long preached the virtues of the Social Gospel to his New York congregation, now applied his ideas to Germany by aiding former friends and colleagues who shared his vision of pacifism and institutional social reform. And Margaret Sanger, the nation's leading activist for sex reform and female emancipation, aided key figures in West Germany's shattered birth control movement to fight global overpopulation and to prevent another world war. She also helped those activists she considered most suitable for rebuilding the movement's international network. All these actors demonstrated a keen awareness for Germany's destitution – not just regarding food but also the country's social and political fabric – and all helped in ways they found useful in furthering a functioning and peaceful postwar society.

In different expressions, all these cases disclose how aware donors were of their donation's power to spread images of U.S. democracy and goodwill abroad. CARE actively promoted this use of packages beyond mere food supply in a media image that evoked an ambassadorial sense of mission among donors. Media coverage fashioned the donor rather than the agency into the main humanitarian protagonist and went beyond compassion as a desired donor reaction to focus on empowerment and identification with the aid provided. In pursuit of donor approval, the organization tried to holistically cater to all possible donor segments. Press releases embedded the idea of transatlantic agency in the most varied contexts – be they labor union bulletins, women's

pages, religious publications, or German-American newspapers – each time successfully spreading the idea that giving meant influence, giving meant change, and giving meant community. CARE brought two parties divided by an ocean together in the notion of an internationalist neighborhood that, in fact, was less internationalist than it was American as it projected U. S. ideas of political culture onto an international audience. Donors became ambassadors spreading the image of U. S. American benevolence and moral fitness for global leadership abroad.

More specifically, this image conveyed an idealized white and middle-class version of the United States. Economic inequality and racial segregation did not feature in the image that donors transmitted abroad. Those giving to Germany predominantly hailed from well-off and white backgrounds. Racial and religious minorities rarely gave to the recently defeated enemy, or when they did, they did not share these factors with their donors. Jay Lovestone, for example, never mentioned his Eastern European Jewish ancestry to German unionists. Maybe he considered his ancestry irrelevant in the context of transnational aid, or he feared that German antisemitism and Russophobia might hamper his cause. Either way, his case is indicative of the image donors projected onto their audience. The white and wealthy Christian became the demographic recipients associated with the United States through the packages and the people who sent them.

Even so, aid did not always neatly correspond with U. S. foreign policy objectives. Lovestone and the AFL, witnessing increasingly antilabor sentiments in the federal government that, they feared, might take hold in the military administration in Germany, used CARE to bypass official governmental channels and to directly reach their desired audience. In a similar vein, German-American immigrant organizations and German-language newspapers employed the trope of the German people as innocent Nazi victims to demand government action on their behalf; and some resorted to CARE to fill in for what they considered Washington's insufficient response. Like many U. S. humanitarian activities that had countered isolationism in the interwar period, CARE packages often did not support U. S. objectives in Germany but became means of adjustment when donors saw their country's governmental entities fail.

The fact that CARE offered such influence from a distance was not just a convenient feature but often a crucial factor in donor motivations. For many actors, this opportunity for agency proved more suitable than other forms of distant or even on-site action. German expatriate and political scientist Waldemar Gurian, for example, longed for the country of his youth, which he had been forced to leave after Hitler's ascent to power. Gurian now used the material incentive of his aid in the hope that his friends in academia would invite him to teach at German universities. With infrastructure destroyed and multiple military government entities to deal with, the AFL would have needed

a giant local staff to address the thousands of West German unionists, and they could have never reached as many people through direct interpersonal relations as they did through package traffic. Margaret Sanger, aged and incapacitated by tuberculosis, similarly could not have moved in this postwar German theater, which lacked the comfort and the medical care she likely needed. Without CARE as a material manifestation of their dedication, these donors' means to engage in transatlantic contact would have largely been limited to simple written correspondence, which would have lacked the incentive qualities that came with sending food to people in need.

CARE's infrastructure enabled new forms of transatlantic donation and provided philanthropic agency to U.S. Americans, who, if they so pleased, could also use this agency as a means of social control and discipline. When it became clear to Margaret Sanger that her German colleague, the gynecologist and birth control activist Anne-Marie Durand-Wever, was attracting unfavorable press attention for her collaboration in the East German women's movement, she withdrew her humanitarian support to shield her own activism from harmful political involvement. Instead, Sanger began investing in the eugenicist Hans Harmsen, a careerist in Nazi Germany who had escaped denazification efforts and whose political profile thus corresponded better with the Red Scare of the early Cold War. Similarly, Jay Lovestone saw his fiercely anticommunist agenda violated by recipient Herbert Bachmann's single-handed decision to share his CARE package with friends in the Soviet zone. As the AFL deliberately excluded the Eastern zone from its aid efforts, Bachmann's action ran contrary to the federation's use of aid, and Lovestone made him suffer the consequences by denying him any further humanitarian attention. Reinhold Niebuhr's decision not to aid the young postal clerk Werner Flatter, despite his desperate plea for help, can also be read as an indirect form of punishment for not expressing the expected and appropriate ideological fitness, especially because Niebuhr aided others whose need was not evidently greater. Providing, withholding, or even withdrawing aid corresponded with donors' perceptions of usefulness, their recipients' obedience, and their ideological fitness.

In many cases where donors sought to exert political influence, it is safe to say that tactics came to trump need. Many of Niebuhr's recipients in academia were less imperiled by postwar poverty than the young students they were supposed to educate. But the professors he aided were the ones who could stand on a podium and spread the gospel of democracy to the next generation. The AFL similarly prioritized effectiveness by targeting high-ranking labor functionaries whom they considered most influential in disseminating favorable opinions among their unionists. In July 1948, to give one example, Lovestone received a letter from Lillie Brown, the wife of his overseas AFL representative Irving Brown. She reported on two German union functionaries who, she thought, ought to receive CARE packages because they were "in desperate

need, especially of coffee."[4] How destitute could a person be, one might ask, if coffee was their gravest concern? Need, as this remark shows, is a malleable concept. Although coffee may not have met preformulated humanitarian standards of need, it was a good that Lillie Brown felt was needed because it was in high demand in Germany and thus fostered a positive image of U.S. unions.[5] In an environment in which donors used humanitarianism for political purposes, need transformed from a universal into an individualized category.

Influence on political and social developments in Germany was, of course, not always a donor's only objective but rather a factor that came with benefits back home in the United States. A large nongovernmental player like the AFL could use strengthened transatlantic ties to increase domestic influence in politics and towards the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the AFL's largest domestic competitor, which held much more liberal views on cooperation with communist unions. Margaret Sanger, too, could hope for personal benefits as her aid furthered a movement to which she had dedicated her life's work, now fearing that fascism and war might have rendered decades of activism obsolete. Other donors, however, did not so obviously gain from shaping and changing conditions in Germany. The Ohio Girls' Club and the Halcyon Literary Club, for example, were women's recreational assemblies and not political interest groups pursuing refined transnational agendas. They had no professional interests in promoting certain values or bringing about systemic changes abroad. Yet, these groups also could develop very personal inbound motivations that corresponded with their own self-understanding and their position within U.S. society.

Germany's centrality to U.S. political and public debates in the postwar years could have manifold inbound ramifications for donors, ranging from gratification and self-affirmation to consolidation or change of one's social position. By aiding a geopolitically significant country both materially and ideologically, donors proved to themselves and to others that their identities, thoughts, and actions actually mattered. As an inbound action, CARE engagement was a reason and sometimes also an excuse for self-proliferation and for furthering personal agendas, which donors often regarded as simultaneously contributing to a greater good.

A poignant example of this dynamic is CARE's use of consumerism as a media trope. Donors could combine the outbound motivation of foreign engagement with the inbound one of domestic desires. Being filled with popular

4 Lillie Brown to Jay Lovestone, July 8, 1948, GMMA, RG18–003, Box 11.

5 As Andrew Kloiber has shown, coffee was held in such high esteem by Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain that even GDR authorities tried to ensure its steady supply, lest they confront the East German population with the shortcomings of a socialist economy. Andrew Kloiber, *Brewing Socialism: Coffee, East Germans, and Twentieth-Century Globalization* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2023), 1–4.

U. S. brands that, as CARE continuously pointed out, were much cheaper than if purchased in a local store suggested a clear connection between consumption and aid. Consuming was an everyday cultural practice that proved the wealth and abundance of the United States and made the donation a sensory and familiar experience. In this regard, it was almost a recreational activity that followed the same market logics of desire and pleasure as any other consumer good. At the same time, consumption was politicized as a means of economic growth and a bulwark against totalitarianism. This made it both a cultural and a political practice in which donors could participate through humanitarian aid to share it with people in distant lands. At home as well as abroad, CARE branded not just itself and the products that the packages offered. CARE also branded the United States. Donors could patriotically confirm the superiority of their consumer economy while sharing this economy – this lifestyle – with distant others.

This image resonated most strongly with white and middle-class women, whom CARE's media image deliberately situated at the intersection of consumption and humanitarianism. Charity was a traditionally female domain, which women in the United States had used to make their voices heard publicly since the Early Republic. Advertisements, newspaper articles, and radio programs commissioned by the organization frequently portrayed women as emotionally capable and morally responsible to help those in need but also as primary household consumers. Promoting images of consumerism confined women to a domestic sphere that promoted homemaking rather than paid occupations, but it did not prohibit them from becoming socially and politically active. With consumerism being an economic-political ideology as well as a cultural one, women partook in political deliberations on German rehabilitation through their dual role as charitable actors and consumer agents. The members of the Halcyon Literary Club, for example, justified their aid to Germany through a rhetoric that fortified their image as consumers specifically within the political context of President Truman's 1947 food conservation program. After the president publicly asked U. S. Americans to reduce their food intake so that desperately needed provisions could be sent to Europe, the members of the club decided to forgo lavish displays of food at their monthly meetings and to invest the saved money in CARE packages. In doing so, they reaffirmed their role as wealthy and educated housewives who were primary agents of food consumption. Through aid, these women consolidated their ascribed female social position, but they reappropriated their domestic role to gain political agency at the same time. The members of the Halcyon Club used aid for both self-affirmation and integration into domestic debates.

Other actors equally used the prominence of Germany in U. S. political debates to further their own inbound motivations. Niebuhr's aid to German educators, for example, targeted a reform of Germany's educational system, but

it fortified his own sense of importance and the significance of his profession just as much. Increasing public visibility, also in Germany, evidently flattered Niebuhr into activism. After first aiding only the men to whom he could relate, having personally met them on his trip for the State Department, he later increasingly gave to unknown recipients. Not only had those recipients spoken of their admiration for Niebuhr, but they also met his ideological, religious, or political standards because they were antifascist journalists, former resistance fighters, or just eager readers of his theological literature. Similarly, the members of the Ohio Girls' Club employed tropes of political agency through aid to German religious institutions, while they also engaged to reinforce the traditional interconnection of female charity and religiosity in U.S. culture. In doing so, they demonstrated that they followed gendered social standards of female piety and virtue even though, being unmarried working women, many members defied postwar convention. Both instances highlight how the positive impact they ascribed to the causes they pursued in Germany reflected each donor's own sense of importance at home.

The actors who most visibly drew on debates about Germany, its people, and their guilt to fulfill inbound motivations hailed from the German-American immigrant community. CARE allowed for a peaceful construction and commemoration of ancestral heritage by furthering a symbolic enactment of ethnicity. Niebuhr, this time in a different context as the son of a German immigrant, deliberated an immigrant awareness that he had not openly displayed before. Even though he had grown up speaking German, his parents had never nurtured a particularly romantic notion of Germanness in their children. On the contrary, Niebuhr had grown up with a profound dislike for German military fetishism and subservience. This had made it rather easy for him to abandon his linguistic heritage, the most obvious signifier of his Germanness, during World War I and to convince his German-speaking congregation to do the same. It was only with his postwar trip for the State Department that Niebuhr seems to have developed a sense of responsibility, which now translated into a form of politically motivated ethnic identification. Niebuhr rediscovered his ancestral heritage but, at the same time, reconciled notions of ancestry with his political and religious convictions. He deliberately did not support his immediate German family, who had strongly sympathized with the Nazis, but instead opted for people who shared his last name as a substitute.

A different expression of immigrant awareness becomes apparent in the case of Conrad and Marian Linke. The couple from Philadelphia was active in several German immigrant associations, so their aid choices reveal how they engaged in humanitarianism in different ways as private individuals or as members of heritage groups to confirm their beliefs. Conrad Linke, who before and during the war had expressed fascist, antisemitic, and anti-British opinions, used CARE in a private capacity to support his cousin Anna Ullmann,

who was a Sudeten German refugee. Having had little or no contact with Anna before the war, Conrad now aided her not only out of familial solidarity but also to confirm his own conviction of German victimhood. The German-language media helped CARE and Conrad Linke in this regard by employing a narrative that prioritized German starvation over guilt.

But the work of the Linkes as representatives of German-American organizations also exposes CARE's limitations. Whereas it offered *individuals* the possibility of expressing notions of ideology or ancestry, giving Niebuhr, the Linkes, and also Waldemar Gurian a chance to discover or reconnect with their immigrant heritage and their ancestral home, its selective person-to-person approach was not suitable for German heritage organizations that aimed to preserve general feelings of Germanness. This was due to its focus on individuals rather than the Germans as a people. Those who actively worked to preserve German traditions in the United States evidently wanted to see them preserved in the land of ancestral origin, as well. In their official functions for the German Society of Pennsylvania and the Steuben Society of America, the Linkes consequently never utilized CARE but anonymized relief endeavors instead. German-American immigrant organizations simply did not wish to use a program that disseminated ideas of Americanness abroad.

Another set of actors took very little issue with spreading, or rather reinforcing, U.S. American values overseas. They cared less about integrating their aid into a specifically German context but instead imposed their particularly U.S. American notions of reform onto Germany without questioning their compatibility. John Haynes Holmes, for example, secured the legacy of his own progressivist convictions and aided people who corresponded with his beliefs in pacifism, equality, and social reform. But he did not deliberately choose Germany as the surface on which to project these beliefs. Not Holmes himself but the pacifist writer Fritz Diettrich and the social reformer Betty Hirsch had initiated contact. The fact that his recipients were Germans was a coincidence rather than Holmes's choice as Diettrich and Hirsch may just as well have been living in any other European country. Holmes's aid was directed at himself and his ideology rather than at the fate of the country to which he sent it. Similarly, Margaret Sanger tried to preserve her legacy and insisted on her apolitical and anti-abortion approach to birth control instead of nurturing the German movement in ways that would have acknowledged its different ideological setup. Furthering her own ideals and ideas took precedence over intercultural compromise. In both cases, the preservation of personal convictions featured as a strong inbound motivation that blinded donors to their own paternalism in pushing their desires on a foreign audience.

One last inbound motivation should not be neglected: All the actors who appeared in this study deliberately archived proof of their engagement for the public to find. In doing so, they expressed a sense of mission that testified to

their awareness of power. This was most obvious among the actors of the AFL and the three New York intellectuals, who were publicly visible and thought of themselves and their cause as socially or politically relevant. But women's clubs without much desire for public visibility archived their aid activities as well. They demonstrated that they played their part as responsible citizens who contributed to their country's foreign engagements and its moral elevation. Their actions expressed a certain pride and awareness for self-display as engaged and selfless U.S. citizens. Making a meaningful contribution that would lastingly shape and preserve their public image was undeniably a visible motivation in all cases, becoming yet another form of reciprocal usefulness.

Recipients soon learned to partake in the culture of humanitarian reciprocity, aligning themselves with the outbound and inbound motivations of their donors and proving that they matched the desired selective profiles. To receive aid, many understood that their ideological worthiness – their loyalty to and support of the United States in the Cold War – was a more decisive factor than their actual need. Some of the petitioners Niebuhr chose to support stressed their piety or their interest in theological matters, while German union functionaries tried to convince Lovestone of their devotion to democratic reconstruction. These people knew that continuing humanitarian attention depended on more than just their need. They may not have always been entirely clear about the motivations their donors sought to fulfill, but they understood that receiving was a matter of worthiness, compliance, and in some cases even outright submission to donors and their demands.

Despite this unique personal dynamic that CARE generated between donor and recipient, certain elements of its donors' engagement are characteristic of all humanitarian giving and deserve more exploration in the future. Like any other relief endeavor, be it domestic or transnational, CARE operated within a particular regional and historical context that influenced how the organization's decision makers, donors, and recipients perceived and evaluated the impact and consequences of aid. To be sure, CARE's personal connection between two spatially divided parties, whether they were familiar or mutually anonymous, exposed the asymmetrical power relations of humanitarianism, yet such asymmetrical power relations have always been inherent in humanitarianism. In every humanitarian context, past and present, donors have (and have had) influence. They decide who is deserving and who is not, which causes merit more support than others, and how these causes are best served. Some donors are certainly considerate of the cultural and regional context in which their aid unfolds, and they pay attention to their recipient's particular needs and social environments. Others quite unreflectingly reinforce their visions of betterment and progress on contexts in which they, in the end, do as much harm as good. While aid helps to relieve suffering, it also always has political and cultural implications for donors. In any given humanitarian context, the deliberate de-

cision to engage for and with someone in a distant land is a way for donors to make sense of the world in which they live, to find their place within it, and to change it in ways they consider favorable to themselves and to others.

Since all the discussed acts of giving here pertain to Germany, they worked in a specific regional frame characterized by the aid of one Western country to another that always also referenced and aimed to combat the developing Eastern enemy. It is a transatlantic history that predates the heyday of humanitarianism in the post-Cold War era, when the field increasingly shifted from an East-West to a North-South focus. Hopefully, future studies will help embed the case of CARE engagement globally – looking at donor motivations in U. S. humanitarianism in other countries or investigating how people in, for example, China, Israel, Australia, or Germany understood their aid in broader social, political, cultural, and regional contexts. Their inclusion in future research would greatly contribute to a more refined understanding of the connection between humanitarianism and global political and social concerns that has attracted so much scholarly attention in the past years.

It is, of course, difficult to say what impact humanitarian aid had on recipients beyond sustenance and whether it brought about the changes that donors had hoped for. CARE aid, it is safe to say, did not singlehandedly bring about the grand systemic changes that many donors had in mind. The packages did not suffice to westernize German unions. They alone did not revive the local birth control movement, usher in education reform, or convince Germans of the virtues of consumerism. But they certainly contributed to all these causes. The people who had the packages sent considered this action worthwhile because they understood its usefulness in furthering issues that were important to them, such as favorable attitudes among organized workers, gratitude among impoverished Christian families, or peace of mind for local educators.

Despite the intangible character of cultural impact, one concluding example highlights the psychological influence of CARE as a sign of U. S. American generosity and commitment after World War II. The German Historical Museum on Berlin's Unter den Linden boulevard is the country's most important museum of national history. It features exhibitions from the medieval period all the way up to the end of the Cold War that present German history in broad strokes. But visitors to the museum at one point all find themselves in front of a seventy-five-year-old cardboard box – a CARE package. Apparently, the museum's curators felt that, next to Charlemagne, Martin Luther and the Reformation, the Napoleonic Wars, and twelve years of Nazi terror, this was something that visitors ought to know about if they wish to understand German history. The fact that a CARE package is on display in a museum located at the heart of Germany's capital city testifies to the immense influence such packages had on German memory of the early postwar years. Materially worthless as this old cardboard box must now be, its psychological value is inestimable. It tells us

that the engagement of the actors in this study, and of countless others whose names we will never know, continued to reverberate in the country of destination long after they gave.

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Anna Corsten

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Als Folge der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung flohen zahlreiche jüdische Historiker aus Deutschland und Österreich in die USA. Nach 1945 setzten sie sich für die wissenschaftliche Aufarbeitung des Nationalsozialismus und des Holocaust ein. In den USA avancierten sie rasch zu Pionieren für die deutsche Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Obwohl sich die Wissenschaftler um einen Austausch mit in Deutschland verbliebenen Historikern bemühten, blieben ihre Bücher in ihrem Herkunftsland teilweise über Jahrzehnte unbeachtet. Die Gründe für die Missachtung waren vielfältig: Umstritten war vor allem, wer deutsche Geschichte schreiben darf, wie deutsche Geschichte geschrieben werden soll, insbesondere ob und wie der Holocaust zu erforschen sei. Erst durch Generationswechsel sowie ein gestiegenes öffentliches Interesse intensivierte sich der Austausch zwischen den in Deutschland verbliebenen und den emigrierten Historikern. Letztere trugen wesentlich zu der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des Nationalsozialismus und des Holocaust bei. Sie zielten auf eine lückenlose Aufklärung der deutschen Vergangenheit, um das Demokratiebewusstsein in Gegenwart und Zukunft zu stärken.

DIE AUTORIN

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Ideale und Interessen

Die mitteleuropäische Wirtschaft
im Amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg

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Der Amerikanische Bürgerkrieg (1861–65) war ein Konflikt von transatlantischen Ausmaßen. Auch für Mitteleuropa hatte er spürbare, bis jetzt nur wenig erforschte Konsequenzen. Patrick Gaul widmet sich den grenzüberschreitenden Auswirkungen dieses Krieges aus wirtschafts- und kulturhistorischen Blickwinkeln, untersucht bisher unberücksichtigte Quellen und fördert dadurch neue Facetten zu Tage. Anhand von Schlaglichtern auf die Städte Hamburg, Bremen und Frankfurt zeigt Gaul unter anderem, wie Mitteleuropäerinnen und Mitteleuropäer durch Kredite, Schmuggel, humanitäre Hilfe und Waffenlieferungen in den Bürgerkrieg verwickelt waren und dass US-amerikanische Agenten und Konsuln vor Ort eifrig für die Interessen der Union beziehungsweise der sklavenhaltenden Südstaaten warben. Es wird deutlich, dass längst nicht alle deutschsprachigen Beteiligten vorbehaltlose Unterstützer der Nordstaaten oder Befürworter der Sklavenemanzipation waren. Gaul geht zudem den Fragen nach, wie der *Civil War* auf den Deutschen „Bürgerkrieg" von 1866 wirkte und welche Folgen die Emanzipation der Afroamerikanerinnen und Afroamerikaner auf mitteleuropäische Diskurse über Arbeit, Freiheit und den Umgang mit Minderheiten provozierte.

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