



Officers, Entrepreneurs, Career Migrants, and Diplomats

Military Entrepreneurs in the Early Modern World

*Edited by Philippe Rogger
and André Holenstein*

Officers, Entrepreneurs, Career Migrants, and Diplomats

History of Warfare

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Edited by

Philippe Rogger
André Holenstein

In collaboration with

Noah Businger
Daniel Kleis



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Acknowledgements

The present volume is a contribution to understanding early modern warfare in terms of privatisation and commercialisation: topics which have attracted the interest of a number of international researchers in recent years. It is the product of the research project on “Military Entrepreneurship & Entanglement: Structures, Interests and Fields of Action in the Transnational Relations of the *Corpus Helveticum* in the Early Modern Period”. The project, which was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), focuses on Swiss military entrepreneurs who recruited, paid, and equipped mercenaries for foreign powers and commanded them in battle. However, the mercenary business is only one aspect of the business of war in the early modern period. In order to grasp the multifaceted business practices of early modern military entrepreneurs and to define the figure of the military entrepreneur more precisely, an international conference was planned in Bern for the summer of 2020. It would have brought together current research debates on the actors and forms of military entrepreneurship, as well as the transnational fields of action involved in it. David Parrott, the leading expert on the topic, was invited to give the keynote speech. The conference was meant to offer both established researchers and young scholars a platform for getting to know one another and networking. Last but not least, we hoped to intensify cooperation with the ERC-project on “The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870” under the direction of Peter H. Wilson (Oxford), with which a fruitful exchange had developed in recent years, by meeting in person at the conference. But, unfortunately, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we had to cancel the conference. We decided – for organisational reasons – not to postpone the meeting to a later date. Instead, we started working on the present volume, which had been planned from the beginning. We appreciate very much that almost all our colleagues who would have spoken at the conference agreed to contribute. Fortunately, Regula Schmid, head of the SNSF project on “Martial Cultures in Medieval Towns” at the University of Bern, also agreed to write her planned conference commentary based on the contributions to the volume. Several of the essays benefited from valuable linguistic and substantive clarifications thanks to her expert comments and suggestions. With Michael Depreter, we were also able to win another contributor for the book. Our authors deserve our deepest gratitude.

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Bern, February 2024

Philippe Rogger and André Holenstein

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Mobilising Resources for War: Early Modern Military Entrepreneurs and Their Transnational Fields of Action

Philippe Rogger, André Holenstein

The contributions to the current volume look at various facets and practices of a historical figure that the research literature, since Fritz Redlich's pioneering work in the 1960s, knows as the 'military entrepreneur'. The focus of Redlich's study was military commanders who raised troops in the service of a warring prince and led them as entrepreneurs.¹ Redlich was particularly interested in the "large-scale military enterpriser", as perfectly embodied by Wallenstein, Tilly, or Bernard of Saxe-Weimar in the Empire during the Thirty Years' War. They commanded whole regiments and armies and equipped them with all the goods required for warfare. Redlich's history-of-entrepreneurship perspective heightened our understanding of the fact that premodern warfare, apart from having complex power-political implications, also represented a business. Military entrepreneurs met the demand for militarily relevant resources and services. "Military entrepreneurship", Redlich noted, "is predicated on the existence of 'business', defined here as the organized provision of goods or services for the sake of more than picayune profit."² Although Redlich's *German Military Enterpriser* is one of the classics of military historiography, the figure of the military entrepreneur long remained underdeveloped in

-
- 1 "Thus the military enterpriser, as we meet him from at least the fifteenth century on, represented a personal union of officer and enterpriser, because he himself on a business basis organized the necessary wherewithal of warfare, especially bodies of troops. The military enterpriser was a man who himself or through a 'locum tenens' led the troops which he had raised for profit's sake." See Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 1 (Wiesbaden, 1964), p. 3 [Redlich first formulated this definition in a project description, *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History*, VIII (1955–56), pp. 252 ff]. See also Ronald G. Asch, "Kriegsunternehmer," in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online*. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_COM_298427. Accessed 22 November 2022; Hermann Romer, "Militärunternehmer," 2009, in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* [HLS]. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/024643/2009-11-10/>. Accessed 29 September 2022.
 - 2 Redlich, *Military Enterpriser*, 1, p. 4. See also Werner Sombart, *Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des modernen Kapitalismus, 2: Krieg und Kapitalismus* (Munich/Leipzig, 1913).

German-language historical research. Interest in military entrepreneurship vanished again for decades amidst the discussion about the standing armies of the 'absolutist' states that emerged after the Peace of Westphalia.³ Moreover, in contrast to the continuity of Anglo-Saxon research in military history ('military revolution', 'fiscal-military state'), after two world wars, continental European military history was generally in poor condition and its significance declined further for several decades with the rise of social history in German-language historiography in the 1960s.⁴ In the view of Jeff Fynn-Paul, Marjolein 't Hart, and Griet Vermeesch, teleological fallacies of the historians' profession are responsible for these lacunae: "Part of the reason why the military entrepreneur has mostly escaped historians' notice until recently is the fact that, when one takes the nationalized military as the normative, teleological 'end' of the process of modernization, common sense dictates that such entrepreneurs would play only a minor supporting role."⁵

A few years ago, the Oxford-based military historian David Parrott revived the discussion about military entrepreneurs in the early modern period by decidedly rejecting the view that the outsourcing of military tasks to the private sector represented a historical dead end.⁶ The involvement of private entrepreneurs in the business of war, he argued, led neither to particularly corrupt nor particularly inefficient armed forces compared to nationally organised citizen armies. For Parrott, it was not the business of war that represented a military-historical anomaly in the long-term historical perspective, but rather governments' efforts to nationalise the armed forces. These efforts began in the late 18th century and continued until about the middle of the 20th century. If national armies based on universal conscription were introduced in Europe after the French Revolution, the pendulum swung back to the other side after the end of the Cold War. Governments responded to the disappearance of mass

3 For an overview of the current state of research, see Matthias Meinhardt, Markus Meumann, "Kriegsunternehmer und die Kapitalisierung des Krieges vom späten Mittelalter bis zum 18. Jahrhundert," in *Die Kapitalisierung des Krieges: Kriegsunternehmer im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Matthias Meinhardt, Markus Meumann (Berlin, 2021), 5–43, pp. 24–26. For the relatively early interest in Redlich in Swiss research, however, see Hermann Suter, *Innerschweizerisches Militär-Unternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 1971).

4 Bernhard R. Kroener, *Kriegswesen, Herrschaft und Gesellschaft 1300–1800* (Munich, 2013), pp. 74–129.

5 Jeff Fynn-Paul, Marjolein 't Hart, and Griet Vermeesch, "Entrepreneurs, Military Supply, and State Formation in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods: New Directions," in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden/Boston, 2014), 1–12, p. 3.

6 David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012).

armies based on universal conscription, to the marginalisation of the military in society and to shrinking army budgets with a “widespread and comprehensive return to military outsourcing and the military contractor-state, embraced with all the political, financial and organisational pragmatism of the states that moved in this direction from the sixteenth to late eighteenth century.”⁷

But it is not only this sort of relevance to the present day that is giving new impetus to the subject in the scholarly debate. Stimulus for reassessing military entrepreneurship also came from different sub-disciplines of history. Current questions about the spatial and social mobility of military entrepreneurial actors are closely related to the conceptual expansion of the ‘new’ diplomatic history, i.e. which focuses on the micropolitical practices of actors, and to the turn of German-language military history towards social history. For some time now, the narrow treatment of the military and warfare as matters of state and an exclusively male domain has been challenged by the history of migration and gender history in particular.⁸ This pluridisciplinary approach to the topic, as well as country-specific differences in the formation and development of military entrepreneurship in early modern Europe, encourages us to compare the latest research results diachronically in a way that cuts across countries and constitutional structures and to demonstrate perspectives for future research. The contributions to this volume cover military entrepreneurial activity in all its diversity, while at the same time identifying the blind spots of a national perspective on the history of military entrepreneurs. A concrete example can help us to understand how unproductive a nationally oriented approach is or, conversely, how productive a transnational perspective on the topic can be. To this end, it is worth taking a look at the book cover.

7 Parrott, *Business*, pp. 2, 326–327, quote p. 327. On the extensive debate on the reprivatisation of modern wars with relevant references, see Meinhardt, Meumann, “Kriegsunternehmer,” pp. 7–14, and the epoch-spanning significance of entrepreneurial forces and the economic implications of warfare in general, see for example, *Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftskriege*, eds. Valentin Groebner, Sébastien Guex, and Jakob Tanner (Zurich, 2008). On the “return of the condottieri” in particular, see *Rückkehr der Condottieri? Krieg und Militär zwischen staatlichem Monopol und Privatisierung: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, eds. Stig Förster et al. (Paderborn, 2010).

8 See also the contribution by André Holenstein and Philippe Rogger in this volume. The relevant references are to be found in the related passages in the text below. Here we provide only the most important reference on the German debate on the ‘new’ military history: Ralf Pröve, “Vom Schmuddelkind zur anerkannten Subdisziplin? Die ‘neue Militärgeschichte’ der Frühen Neuzeit: Perspektiven, Entwicklungen, Probleme,” in Ralf Pröve, *Lebenswelten: Militärische Milieus in der Neuzeit. Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, eds. Bernhard R. Kroener, Angela Strauß (Berlin, 2010), 105–123. For the relationship between the Enlightenment and the development of the military, which we do not discuss specifically in this introduction, see Armstrong Starkey, *War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700–1789* (Westport, Conn., 2003) and Christy Pichichero, *The Military Enlightenment: War and Culture in the French Empire from Louis XIV to Napoleon* (Ithaca, 2017).

Who is the guy? The portrait painted around 1695 by Hyacinthe Rigaud shows Johann Balthasar Keller (1638–1702). Keller was a cannon maker and military entrepreneur from Zurich who had an impressive career in France. A trained founder and weapons expert who very likely learned his trade at the Füssli bell and gun foundry in Zurich, he followed his brother, Johann Jakob Keller (1635–1700), to France. Known as *les Kellers*, the brothers together directed the arsenal in Paris in 1666 and, starting in 1669, also operated the foundries in Douai, Besançon, Pignerol, and Breisach. After their return to Paris, Johann Balthasar won the special favour of Louis XIV when in 1692 he succeeded in making an almost seven-metre-high equestrian statue of Louis from a single mould. The monument was unveiled in 1699 in Place Louis-le-Grand (the current Place Vendôme). Louis XIV thanked Keller for the sculpture by appointing him *Commissaire général des fontes de l'Artillerie de France*. But the brilliant career of the Keller brothers also involved setbacks and plots against them; Johann Jakob even faced accusations of fraud. In 1792, the statue fell victim to the iconoclastic fury of the radical Parisian revolutionaries.⁹

The portrait of the Swiss armaments manufacturer and arsenal administrator in the French service provides a condensation of the three constitutive factors of early modern military entrepreneurship. It shows the military entrepreneur, the service he provides (or the product ordered), and king Louis XIV in the form of the equestrian statue as his (art) patron. Rigaud places the three elements in relation to one another by having one of Keller's hands resting on the cannon he has cast, while the other hand points to the art patron in the background of the picture. The entrepreneur Keller is the focal point of this arrangement. This pictorial composition raises a number of questions that determine the conceptual orientation of the present volume: Who were the military entrepreneurs? Who were their clients? What services did the military entrepreneurs provide? What was the form of the enterprise? What kind of

9 Tapan Bhattacharya, "Keller, Johann Balthasar," 2008, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/019127/2008-10-14/>. Accessed 5 October 2022; Agnès Étienne-Magnen, "Une fonderie de canons au XVII^e siècle: les frères Keller à Douai (1669–1696)," *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 149 (1991), 91–105; Friedrich O. Pestalozzi, "Zwei Zürcher im Dienste des 'Roi Soleil' (Joh. Jakob und Joh. Balthasar Keller)," *Zürcher Taschenbuch*, n.s., 28 (1905), 1–69. On the entrepreneurial aspect in the foundry industry, see Pestalozzi, "Zwei Zürcher," pp. 15–16: France provided buildings, furnaces, larger infrastructure, and metal to the founders. The founders themselves supplied staff, tools, and machines. Payment per gun accepted was made according to fixed rates. If the quality of the cannons was inadequate and the guns were rejected, the manufacturers risked high financial losses. Profit could be further maximised by savings on wood, machines, and staff.

expertise did they possess? What were the characteristics of the capital and goods markets on which they acted? Of what networks did they form a part?

Although the image of the peasant's son rising to the position of commander of mercenary forces corresponded less and less to the reality over the course of the early modern period, as Meinhardt and Meumann write in the introduction to their 2021 collective volume on the capitalisation of war, storybook careers in military entrepreneurship occurred again and again.¹⁰ The above-mentioned portrait of Keller by Rigaud illustrates how symbolic capital could be generated through a successful career in military entrepreneurship. It depicts a social parvenu who obtained the favour of the French king thanks to his accomplishments as military entrepreneur. Keller's career migration exemplifies how much a career path in military entrepreneurship was shaped by the striving to achieve a higher social status.¹¹ Like many military entrepreneurs, Johann Balthasar Keller left his homeland and his native social milieu to pursue a career as expert and entrepreneur abroad. Keller was a career emigrant *par excellence*.¹² In Keller's case, spatial and social mobility were felicitously combined, whereby it can be assumed that Switzerland's tight political, economic, and military ties (alliances) with France influenced the decision of the two Keller brothers to emigrate to France as pull-factor.¹³ Moreover, it does not seem out-of-line to presume that apart from a business relationship, Rigaud's portrait also depicts a patronage relationship. The royal favour that Louis XIV showed his gifted founder from Zurich by appointing him Commissioner General corresponded to the pattern of contemporary patronage practices. In addition to expertise, patronage appears also to have determined the careers paths of early modern military entrepreneurs. The painting symbolises how princes used foreign relations and patronage networks to secure the services of military experts and entrepreneurs. Diplomacy and patronage as factors involved

10 Meinhardt, Meumann, "Kriegsunternehmer," p. 35; see also Parrott, *Business*, pp. 249–250.

11 See also Meinhardt, Meumann, "Kriegsunternehmer," pp. 34–35; see also Parrott, *Business*, pp. 250–251.

12 André Holenstein, Patrick Kury, and Kristina Schulz, *Schweizer Migrationsgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Baden, 2018), pp. 47–59; André Holenstein, "Militärunternehmer, gelehrte Geistliche und Fürstendiener: Karrieremigranten als Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen im Corpus Helveticum der frühen Neuzeit," in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 154–165; Jan Lucassen, Leo Lucassen, "Karrieremigration," in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online*. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_COM_290132. Accessed 22 November 2022.

13 André Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa: Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der Schweizer Geschichte* (Baden, 2014).

in military entrepreneurial fields of action and careers draw our attention in turn to the spatial and social dimensions of this business.

Conceptually, this volume argues that we should look at the business of war in terms of a variety of interconnections. Taking into account recent research perspectives, it aims to define the figure of the military entrepreneur more precisely and to show the transnational fields of action of military entrepreneurs that are crucial for the mobilisation of important military resources.¹⁴ Consequently, our argumentation in this introduction is split into two phases. The first section deals with actors and forms of the enterprise in the European war economy, after which the second section looks at the transnational fields of action of military entrepreneurs.

1 Chances and Challenges: Actors and Forms of the Enterprise

Constant war in Europe in the early modern period created an unending demand for materials, ammunition, money, and credit.¹⁵ The question of how rulers' intent on war mobilised the enormous resources needed for their armies and fleets and what consequences this had for the development of bureaucratic structures represents a key factor in the process of state formation in the early modern period. In discussing the relationship between state formation and army formation in a famous essay from 1906, Otto Hintze formulated the thesis that war or armed power was the propulsive "flywheel in the machinery of the state" in early modern European history.¹⁶ In the tradition of Hintze, Charles Tilly spoke much later of a so-called "extraction-coercion-cycle".¹⁷ In the long run, according to Tilly, only those polities could keep pace with the development of military technology and warfare (the so-called 'military revolution') and prevail against rival powers in the early modern period that were

14 See the project "Militärunternehmertum & Verflechtung: Strukturen, Interessenlagen und Handlungsräume in den transnationalen Beziehungen des Corpus Helveticum in der frühen Neuzeit" at the University of Bern under the direction of André Holenstein. The project was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). Further details available at https://www.hist.unibe.ch/forschung/forschungsprojekte/militaerunternehmertum_verflechtung/index_ger.html. Accessed 10 October 2022.

15 Johannes Burkhardt, "Die Friedlosigkeit der frühen Neuzeit: Grundlegung einer Theorie der Bellizität Europas," *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 4 (1997), 509–574.

16 Otto Hintze, *Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung* (Dresden, 1906).

17 *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, 1975); Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990).

able to obtain the needed resources, even by force if necessary. War made the state and the state made war. In 1999 in his standard work on the history of state power, Wolfgang Reinhard noted: “The history of Europe was a constant arms race ... This is why the economic and political ability to assemble the required resources was crucial, which ... is what provided the decisive impetus for state formation and led to the selection of those that were ultimately successful from among hundreds of rival powers.”¹⁸ Consequently, as the military historian Bernhard R. Kroener summed up the discussion, the ability to “assemble the required means for waging war externally within its own territory” was the presupposition for the formation of the state and the expansion of state power in the modern period: “One could only hope to remain successful in the competitive struggle of the emerging state system by managing to bundle the forces required for waging war in a competitive army in terms of size, discipline, armament and equipment by way of a central authority, efficient administration and taxation.”¹⁹ The state-centred view was particularly pronounced in Anglo-Saxon research, as succinctly and pointedly expressed in John Brewer’s notion of the ‘fiscal-military state’.²⁰ Brewer uses this term to describe a state whose policy is guided by the maximum mobilisation of resources for war. The concept undoubtedly sheds light on the political implications of early modern resource mobilisation (taxes),²¹ however it neglects the role of non-state actors in provisioning the army. In recent years, doubts have thus rightly been raised about the thesis of war as the ‘father of all things’.

1.1 *Military and Non-Military Entrepreneurs*

The early modern state or ruler left the procurement of resources for war largely to the private sector, as is emphatically made clear by David Parrott’s pathbreaking study on the rise, success, and transformation of the “enterpriser-colonel”

18 Wolfgang Reinhard, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt* (Munich, 1999), p. 343.

19 Kroener, *Kriegswesen*, pp. 79, 85, and 98–99, quote p. 99.

20 John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688–1783* (London, 1989).

21 Rafael Torres-Sánchez, Pepijn Brandon, and Marjolein ‘t Hart, “War and Economy: Rediscovering the Eighteenth-Century Military Entrepreneur,” *Business History* 60 (2018), 4–22, p. 6; See also *War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Rafael Torres Sánchez (Pamplona, 2007); *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Honour of P.G.M. Dickson*, ed. Christopher Storrs (Farnham, 2009); *The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660–c.1783*, eds. Aaron Graham, Patrick Walsh (Abingdon, 2016); *The War Within: Private Interests and the Fiscal State in Early-Modern Europe*, eds. Joël Félix, Anne Dubet (Cham, 2018); *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Fiscal-Military State 1648–1815: Contours and Perspectives*, eds. William D. Godsey, Petr Mat’ a (Oxford, 2022).

and his business model from 1500 to 1700. The business of the military entrepreneurs encompassed a wide array of services.

Military enterprise ... amounts to a lot more than hiring mercenaries to serve in the ranks of a state-run army or using privateers to supplement or stand in for the state's navy. Enterprise includes a more extensive delegation of responsibility and authority to include the supply of food, clothes and equipment to troops, and the manufacturing and distribution of munitions and weapons. Warship and fortress building were outsourced, as were entire naval operations. Garrisoning and siegeworks were put out to contract. A large part of this process did involve the hiring and maintenance of soldiers or sailors, but the terms of many of the recruitment contracts drawn up with the field and unit commanders reveal significant differences from those before and after this period. Moreover the way in which these commanders interpreted their authority and autonomy in waging war on behalf of their employers was significantly changed. They acted through their own creditors to raise the funds required for recruitment and military operations, and they drew on networks of private manufacturers, merchants and transport operatives to ensure that their troops were fed and equipped. Some fundamental aspects of the financing of war were placed in the hands of private military contractors or their agents, who also ensured that their credit and costs were recovered, by force if necessary, even when the army was on the territory of its notional employer.²²

The contractual delegation of war economy tasks to private individuals points to the specific role of the early modern state in mobilising resources for war: The state was the contracting authority in war. It called upon the services of private actors, because the latter could assemble the required resources more efficiently and quickly than state authorities.²³ The research literature describes the early modern state as a 'contractor state' in this connection.²⁴

22 Parrott, *Business*, p. 1; see also David Parrott, "The Military Enterpriser in the Thirty Years' War," in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden/Boston, 2014), 63–86.

23 See Parrott, *Business*, pp. 196–202.

24 For an overview of the research literature, see Torres-Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart, "War". See also the homepage of the 'Contractor State' research group at the Universidad de Navarra. Available at <https://www.unav.edu/web/contractor-state-group>. Accessed 21 November 2022. Also relevant: Gordon E. Bannerman, *Merchants and the Military in Eighteenth-Century Britain: British Army Contracts and Domestic Supply*,

Not only does this argumentation relativise the state authorities' loss of control in army provisioning as a temporary deficit of early modern state formation, it also underestimates the organisational, technological, logistical, and financial challenges of the 'military revolution' that confronted warring states in the early modern period.²⁵

Military history uses the easily misunderstood term 'military revolution' to refer not to a singular event, but rather to a long-term process that altered the presuppositions of warfare in Europe in technical, organisational, strategic and economic terms from the late Middle Ages to the 17th and 18th centuries – with a key phase from around 1560 to 1660. The following facts should be mentioned.²⁶ With the advent of the new sort of fortifications that originated in Italy in the 16th century, the so-called *trace italienne*, siege and the use of mobile artillery became more important to waging war. Battles in the open field lost significance and hence so too did the use of the compact and ponderous *Gevierthaufen* or, literally, 'square crowd' battle formations, which in the late Middle Ages still constituted the superiority of infantry troops, not least those of the Swiss communes, over armoured armies of knights. Towards the end of the 17th century, the infantry squares composed of pikemen, halberdiers, and musketeers were replaced by line formations that were less deeply staggered and equipped with small arms (linear tactics). Since the middle of the 16th century, the wars of the major princes were lasting longer and longer. They were taking place simultaneously in several, sometimes widely separated,

1739–1763 (London, 2008); Roger Knight, Martin Wilcox, *Sustaining the Fleet, 1793–1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State* (Woodbridge, 2010); *The Contractor State and its Implications, 1659–1815*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012); H. V. Bowen et al., "Forum: the Contractor State, c. 1650–1815," *International Journal of Maritime History* 25 (2013), 239–274; Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2016).

25 On the logistical challenges, see Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (New York, 1977); *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, ed. John A. Lynn (Boulder, Colorado, 1993); Olaf van Nimwegen, *De subsistentie van het leger: Logistiek en strategie van het Geallieerde en met name het Staatse leger tijdens de Spaanse Successieoorlog in de Nederlanden en het Heilige Roomse Rijk (1701–1712)* (Amsterdam, 1995); John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army 1610–1715* (Cambridge, 1997); Markus Warnke, *Logistik und friderizianische Kriegsführung: Eine Studie zur Verteilung, Mobilisierung und Wirkungsmächtigkeit militärisch relevanter Ressourcen im Siebenjährigen Krieg am Beispiel des Jahres 1757* (Berlin, 2018); Torres-Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart, "War," pp. 4–6.

26 For a critical discussion of the use of the concept of 'military revolution' in the research literature, see Markus Meumann, "Militärische Revolution," in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online*. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_COM_311411. Accessed 22 November 2022; Kroener, *Kriegswesen*, pp. 62–74.

theatres – in Upper Italy, Southern Germany, Flanders, and Spain. It was not a single decisive battle that brought them to an end, but rather exhaustion. In any case, princes and military entrepreneurs tried to avoid battles involving heavy losses as much as possible, since these destroyed their substantial investments in mercenary armies. To persevere in such wars, the warring princes massively increased the size of their armies and put themselves in a position to keep them under arms as long as possible – sometimes for years. At the same time, they had to be able to react to threats in the short run. Both factors reinforced the tendency toward raising standing armies and professionalisation of the military. The new style of war and the new form of the army forced the princes to markedly improve their income. Taxes and levies were introduced or existing ones were increased, and the requisite bureaucratic and military enforcement mechanisms were expanded, the princes strained their credit, and the debts of the state grew enormously.²⁷

Parrott's comprehensive perspective and the 'contractor state' concept had a major impact on research. In the latest German-language study on the capitalisation of war in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, Matthias Meinhardt and Markus Meumann also include actors "who were entrusted more with financial, logistical, organisational or even diplomatic problems, but who are just as indispensable for the overall understanding of the topic as the mercenary commanders."²⁸ In her contribution on Bernard of Saxe-Weimar (1604–39), ASTRID ACKERMANN examines the logistical challenges of entrepreneurial military commanders. The study provides an exemplary illustration of how logistical structures had to be developed and how existing infrastructures were used under the specific conditions of the Thirty Years' War. For unlike most princely military entrepreneurs, the landless duke, who first deployed his troops against the Emperor in the service of Sweden and then of France, had no state infrastructure at his disposal which he could have used to organise provisioning of the army. Since supplying the army from out of the operational theatres around Breisach and in the High Rhine area proved difficult, he procured access to arms and financial markets in the Swiss Confederation and in Basel in particular. For the purpose of mobilising militarily relevant goods from the Swiss cantons, he relied on military entrepreneurs from his entourage and his officer corps, who had close ties to mercantile networks in Switzerland. This arrangement proved to be a practicable solution

27 Brewer, *Sinews*; Richard Bonney, *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe 1200–1815* (Oxford, 1999); *The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 1500–1914*, eds. Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, Patrick K. O'Brien (Cambridge, 2012).

28 Meinhardt, Meumann, "Kriegsunternehmer," pp. 31–32.

for supplying the Weimar troops and also paid heed to political concerns on the part of the neighbouring Swiss cantons. In the border region with Basel, Bernhard not only acted as a military contractor but also aimed to establish territorial dominion in Breisach. The Weimar army was both an economic factor and a threatening power factor in the High and Upper Rhine areas, whereby commercial opportunities and profit expectations ultimately contained the risk of an escalation of conflict between Saxony-Weimar and the Swiss Confederation. The study by PHILIPPE ROGGER on the Breisach fortress commander Hans Ludwig von Erlach (1595–1650), who assumed both the military command and the provisioning of the Breisach fortress after the death of Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, follows on chronologically from these events. The favourable situation for the transfer reflects the complexity of the logistical challenges of a fortress commander. Securing connection to regional and transnational supply chains as well as access to international financial markets via the nearby commercial centre of Basel proved to be a particularly demanding task, in order to ensure the functioning of this important military infrastructure in the south of the Empire. Both aspects largely depended on the commander's business relationships, whereby von Erlach was able mainly to rely on a network of Protestant *marchand-banquiers* for the purpose of resource mobilisation.

After 1648, the big private armies of the large-scale military enterprisers, who supplied their troops with soldiers, weapons, ammunition, equipment, money, and food via a differentiated subcontractor network, gradually disappeared from the picture. The development of bureaucratic control over standing armies, which had to be maintained, equipped and paid also in peacetime, severely restricted the colonel-enterpriser's entrepreneurial margin of manoeuvre and profit outlook.²⁹ From now on, their entrepreneurial activity was essentially limited to the purchase and possession of military ranks and the provision of loans.³⁰ The services of captains, who continued to supply mercenaries to the armies, and especially of private financiers, food suppliers and transporters continued to be in demand in the late 17th and 18th centuries. It is above all such civilian actors that have been the focus of English-language military history for some years now. In particular, the change in perspective in recent research, which does not deal with the 'fiscal-military state' and its resource mobilisation, but increasingly rather with the expenditure side of the

29 Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 2 (Wiesbaden, 1965).

30 See also Redlich, *Military Enterpriser*, 2; David Parrott, "From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies: War, State, and Society in Western Europe, 1600–1700," in *European Warfare, 1350–1750*, eds. Frank Tallett, David J.B. Trim (Cambridge, 2010), 74–95.

state budget, helped to bring this about.³¹ This change in perspective revealed that the development of military technology called into action a whole series of civilian producers and entrepreneurs, who produced militarily relevant goods, contributed technical know-how or invested capital in the state's war economy.³² Entrepreneurs like *les Kellers*, who were almost completely neglected in earlier studies of early modern processes of state formation, became key actors in more recent studies.³³ These civilian contractors changed the dynamic

31 *The Spending of States: Military Expenditure during the Long Eighteenth Century. Patterns, Organization and Consequences, 1650–1815*, eds. Stephen Conway, Rafael Torres Sánchez (Saarbrücken, 2011); Pepijn Brandon, *War, Capital, and the Dutch State (1588–1795)* (Leiden, 2015); Aaron Graham, *Corruption, Party, and Government in Britain, 1702–1713* (Oxford, 2015).

32 It is, in particular, a relatively new finding that the technological innovations of civilian entrepreneurs significantly contributed to the developments of the 'military revolution', see Torres-Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart, "War," pp. 5–6.

33 Meinhardt, Meumann, "Kriegsunternehmer," pp. 23–24, and for other relevant studies, see Norman Baker, *Government and Contractors: The British Treasury and War Supplies, 1775–1783* (London, 1971); Bernhard R. Kroener, "Rechtsstellung und Profite französischer Heereslieferanten in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 76 (1989), 457–493; Jean Peter, *L'artillerie et les fonderies de la marine sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1995); Stephen Conway, "Provisioning the Combined Army in Germany, 1758–1762: Who Benefited?," in *The Contractor State and its Implications, 1659–1815*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012), 81–102; Stephen Conway, "Entrepreneurs and the recruitment of the British army in the War of American Independence, 1775–1783," in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden/Boston, 2014), 11–130; Aaron Graham, "Public Service and Private Profit: British Fiscal-Military Entrepreneurship Overseas, 1707–1712," in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden/Boston, 2014), 87–110; Helen J. Paul, "Suppliers to the Royal African Company and the Royal Navy in the Early Eighteenth Century," in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden/Boston, 2014), 131–150; Aaron Graham, "Military Contractors and the Money Markets, 1700–15," in *The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660–c.1783*, eds. Aaron Graham, Patrick Walsh (London, 2016), 83–112; Gordan Bannerman, "The Impact of War: New Business Networks and Small-Scale Contractors in Britain, 1739–1770," *Business History* 60 (2018), 23–40; David Plouviez, "The French Navy and War Entrepreneurs: Identity, Business Relations, Conflicts, and Cooperation in the Eighteenth Century," *Business History* 60 (2018), 41–56; Aaron Graham, "Corruption and Contractors in the Atlantic World, 1754–1763," *English Historical Review* 133 (2018), 1093–1119; Pierrick Pourchasse, "Military Entrepreneurs and the Development of the French Economy in the Eighteenth century," *Business History* 60 (2018), 57–71; Benoît Maréchaux, "Business Organisation in the Mediterranean Sea: Genoese Galley Entrepreneurs in the Service of the Spanish Empire (Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries)," *Business History* 65 (2023), 56–87; Giulio Ongaro, "Military Food Supply in the Republic of Venice in the Eighteenth Century: Entrepreneurs, Merchants, and the State," *Business History* 62 (2020), 1255–1278; Aaron

involved in army provisioning, because their services encompassed trade, production and financing.³⁴ Country-specific types of entrepreneurs came into being, who supplied the armies with goods, money and other services according to entrepreneurial criteria: like, for example, the ‘regimental agents’ in England, the ‘military solicitors’ in the Netherlands, the ‘asentistas’ in Spain or the ‘fisco-financiers’ in France.³⁵

The activities of these entrepreneurs covered all the needs of the war economy.³⁶ A recent attempt to broaden the concept of military entrepreneurship and to provide a more systematic approach to the different fields of military-entrepreneurial activity confirms this observation. On the basis of the case studies collected in the volume *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, Fynn-Paul, ‘t Hart, and Vermeesch distinguish between three different fields in which military entrepreneurs operated: “a) entrepreneurs could supply the state with increased financial capacity; b) they might undertake to provide troop levies; or else c) they could supply arms, food, uniforms, or other material requirements.”³⁷ While some of the entrepreneurs were active in all three fields, others specialised in one of the three.³⁸ Rafael Torres-Sánchez, Pepijn Brandon, and Marjolein ‘t Hart see this diversification as a key strategy in the risk management of military

Graham, “Huguenots, Jacobites, Prisoners and the Challenge of Military Remittances in Early Modern Warfare,” *War & Society* 40 (2021), 171–187; Michael P. Martocchio, “A man of particular ability’: A Jewish-Genoese Military Contractor in the Fiscal-Military System,” *Business History* [no number] (2021), 1–28. See also the extensive bibliography of the ERC-project “The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870” at the University of Oxford under the direction of Peter H. Wilson. Available at <https://fiscalmilitary.history.ox.ac.uk/publications#tab-3052066>. Accessed 23 October 2022.

34 See Torres-Sánchez, Brandon, and ‘t Hart, “War,” pp. 4–6, 10–12, and 14.

35 See Torres-Sánchez, Brandon, and ‘t Hart, “War,” pp. 9–10. On ‘regimental agents’, see Alan J. Guy, “Regimental Agency in the British Standing Army, 1714–1763,” *Bulletin of John Rylands University Library of Manchester* 62/63 (1980), 423–453/31–57; on ‘military solicitors’, see Pepijn Brandon, “Finding Solid Ground for Soldier’s Payment. ‘Military Soliciting’ as Brokerage Practice in the Dutch Republic (c. 1600–1795),” in *The Spending of States: Military Expenditure during the Long Eighteenth Century. Patterns, Organization and Consequences, 1650–1815*, eds. Stephen Conway, Rafael Torres Sánchez (Saarbrücken, 2011), 51–82, Brandon, *War*; Pepijn Brandon, “‘The Whole Art of War Is Reduced to Money’: Remittances, Short-Term Credit and Financial Intermediation in Anglo-Dutch Military Finance, 1688–1713,” *Financial History Review* 25 (2018), 19–41, Aaron Graham, Jeannette Kamp, “Exploiting the Urban System? The Frictions of Military Finance and Diplomacy in the Dutch Republic, 1688–1714,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 26 (2022), 377–402; on ‘asentistas’, see Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs*; on ‘fisco-financiers’, see below.

36 See Torres-Sánchez, Brandon, and ‘t Hart, “War,” pp. 4–6, 10–12, and 14.

37 Fynn-Paul, ‘t Hart, and Vermeesch, “Entrepreneurs,” p. 8.

38 Fynn-Paul, ‘t Hart, and Vermeesch, “Entrepreneurs,” p. 8.

entrepreneurs. In order to minimise financial risks, the contractors relied on a broad portfolio, on the one hand. On the other hand, they worked not only for military but also for civilian markets. The simultaneous or temporary combination of production, trade, and financing in the service of civilian and/or military-state clients made it at least theoretically possible for entrepreneurs to offset financial losses in one business area with profits in another.³⁹ This served to transform the *military* entrepreneur into an ‘ordinary’ entrepreneur in the 18th century. Thus, according to Torres-Sánchez, Brandon, and ‘t Hart: “Contrary to the persistent image of the military-entrepreneur as a ‘special category’ of businessperson, motivated by a rent-seeking attitude and extraordinary opportunities to profit from corruption, in the application of diversification strategies integrating production, trade, and finance, military entrepreneurs acted as the quintessential 18th-century capitalists.”⁴⁰ These are the capitalist entrepreneurs of the 18th century that MARIAN FÜSSEL looks at in his contribution on the profit opportunities and challenges of army suppliers and war commissioners in the Seven Years’ War (1756–63). The global dimensions of the war required logistical structures which the Prussian army was only able to harness via merchants and bankers and the British army via “commissaries” (officers responsible for provisioning) and “contractors” (civilian merchants). On closer inspection, however, the distinction between these three groups of actors often becomes hazy.⁴¹ Füssel describes the *modus operandi* of war entrepreneurs and war profiteers as well as the dynamics of entrepreneurial failure in connection with the so-called *Affaire du Canada*. At the time, a group of French colonial officials who were blamed for the loss of Nouvelle-France (French territories in North America) and accused of profiteering, embezzlement and fraud, were put on trial in Paris (from November 1761 to December 1763) in a sensational court case. What all these entrepreneurial profiteers have in common – apart from the losers in the *Affaire du Canada* – is that they were able to use war for the purpose of social advancement. They invested in prestigious townhouses, country estates and businesses, were ennobled and rose to the rank of barons or counts. Military-entrepreneurial activity paved their way into the nobility and the circle of gentlemen. The business practices of army

39 Torres-Sánchez, Brandon, and ‘t Hart, “War,” pp. 7–8; see also the contribution by Marian Füssel.

40 Torres-Sánchez, Brandon, and ‘t Hart, “War,” p. 8.

41 On military entrepreneurship in the global context, see also Marian Füssel, “Händler und Krieger? Robert Clive, die East India Company und die Kapitalisierung des Siebenjährigen Krieges in Indien,” in *Die Kapitalisierung des Krieges: Kriegsunternehmer im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Matthias Meinhardt, Markus Meumann (Berlin, 2021), 133–153; Bannerman, *Merchants*, pp. 89–102; Knight, Wilcox, *Fleet*, pp. 155–176.

suppliers, bankers, commissaries, contractors, and colonial officials also show how permeable civilian and military profit strategies and markets were in the global context. Thus, for example, John Kennion (1726–85) of Liverpool, a commissary during the 1762 Havana expedition, secured the lucrative concession for the slave trade to Cuba from General Albemarle, and Heinrich Karl von Schimmelmann (1724–82), who made an enormous fortune as grain supplier to the Prussian army, entered the triangular trade between Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean in a big way after the end of the war.

The Keller brothers also diversified their offerings and produced for both the military and the civilian market. While Balthasar specialised in the production of bronze statues, in particular for the Palace of Versailles, Johann Jakob took care of cannon production.⁴² The brand name *les Kellers* under which the brothers were known makes clear that it was a family business. Johann Balthasar Keller owed his brilliant entrepreneurial career in France not least to his brother Johann Jakob, who brought the younger brother to France and made him his business partner.⁴³ The cooperation of the Keller brothers puts the spotlight on the family as framework for military entrepreneurial activities. This connection has been extensively studied in the case of Swiss mercenary entrepreneurship.⁴⁴ The extended family network of the mercenary entrepreneur was decisive for the functioning of a mercenary business in the *Corpus helveticum*. It formed the socio-cultural and economic foundation of the business model. On the one hand, as BENJAMIN RYSER'S contribution shows using the example of the Guard company of the Bernese von Erlach family, who were military entrepreneurs in the French service in the 17th and 18th centuries, the exploitation of companies in foreign service was intergenerationally arranged. Swiss military entrepreneurs specialised in foreign service and founded family traditions that lasted over several generations. Investment was planned beyond their own lifetimes and profit targets were shifted to future generations. The fact that companies were not the property of military entrepreneurs and their families, but rather, like in the case of the Guard company, were freely granted by the French king and could also be withdrawn again, entailed major entrepreneurial risks, and made military entrepreneurs highly dependent on

42 Olivier Chaline, *Les armées du Roi: Le grand chantier XVII^e–XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 2016), p. 254.

43 Pestalozzi, "Zwei Zürcher," pp. 30–31.

44 *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018); Benjamin Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten: Berner Militärunternehmer im Dienst des Sonnenkönigs Ludwig XIV.* (Zurich, 2021).

the princes they served. On the other hand, the business functioned within the family network by way of a division of labour. This division of labour also included the female members of the family. Women participated in company business by running the estates for their absent husbands, investing their own capital in the company, ensuring the transfer of information and money, or, as JASMINA CORNUT'S contribution shows, promoting the military careers of male offspring in foreign service by means of letters of recommendation and solicitation or by mobilising personal relationships with influential figures.⁴⁵ In the process, women from families of the military elite in Valais, Vaud, and Fribourg in the 18th and 19th centuries made use of specific margins of manoeuvre which gender-specific forms of sociability, kinship and patronage afforded them. Collective, intergenerational logics of military entrepreneurship were also apparent where:

in particular younger sons from noble families were active as war entrepreneurs. For those who could neither hope to make an ecclesiastical career nor to eke out their existence as appanage princes in a family backwater, war entrepreneurship often seemed like an attractive way out. A military career promised a livelihood and lifestyle befitting their status, and the independence of a war entrepreneur even created certain political margins for manoeuvre in some cases. When there was also then a favourable combination of military ability and luck, fame and honour could also be obtained and stepping out of the shadow of older brothers was an entirely realistic possibility.⁴⁶

Family-run businesses and dynastic power logics show that military entrepreneurs were not always individual actors, but rather that in the late Middle Ages

45 On female participation in the company management in the Swiss context, see Nathalie Büsser, "Drängende Geschäfte. Die Söldnerwerbungen Maria Jakobea Zurlaubens um 1700 und ihr verwandtschaftliches Beziehungsnetz," *Der Geschichtsfreund* 161 (2008), 189–224; Nathalie Büsser, "Klare Linien und komplexe Geflechte. Verwandtschaftsorganisation und Soldgeschäft in der Eidgenossenschaft (17.-18. Jahrhundert)," in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018), 185–237; Nathalie Büsser, *Adel in einem Land ohne Adel: Soziale Dominanz, Fürstendienst und Verwandtschaft in der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (15.-18. Jhd.)* (Ph.D. diss., University of Zurich, 2020). See also more recently: Jasmina Cornut, *Femmes d'officiers militaires en Suisse romande: Implications, enjeux et stratégies de l'absence, XVIIe–XIXe siècles* (unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Lausanne, 2023).

46 Meinhardt, Meumann, "Kriegsunternehmer," pp. 34–35.

and the early modern period military-entrepreneurial collective actors also appeared. The spectrum of collective actors is wide, ranging from the aforementioned extended families via mercenary units and powerful consortia to cities, noble houses and the Swiss federal cantons.⁴⁷

1.2 *Public-Private Partnership, Feudal Patterns, and the Relativity of 'State' and 'Private'*

When a contractor state organised the provisioning of the army via private entrepreneurs and thus outsourced core competencies of state action to the market, it acted efficiently in an economic sense and rationally in political terms. The warring princes were at most only partially able to react to the sometimes, in times of war, extremely volatile demand for weapons, ammunition and other militarily relevant goods using factories that were run, financed, and staffed by the state. Even in those branches of production that exhibited relatively stable demand, such as cannon production, states showed little inclination to assume control over production and distribution. It was safer for state actors to rely on the services of private entrepreneurs who could supply the required armaments quickly at the optimal price and in adequate quality and quantity.⁴⁸ According to Parrott, in its basic outlines, the cooperation between state authorities and private contractors can be characterised as a “private-public partnership”.⁴⁹ The fact that the early modern state cooperated with private actors in fulfilling its tasks is not, however, a peculiarity of army provisioning, but corresponds rather to a widespread model. The responsibility for the postal system or the salt trade, which public administrations took care of in the 19th century, was also given or leased to private actors in the

47 Meinhardt, Meumann, “Kriegsunternehmer,” p. 33; Romer, “Militärunternehmer”; Andrea Thiele, “The Prince as Military Entrepreneur? Why Smaller Saxon Territories Sent ‘Holländische Regimenter’ (Dutch Regiments) to the Dutch Republic,” in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden/Boston, 2014), 170–192; Steffen Leins, “Das Prager Münzkonsortium von 1622/23: Über Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Kriegsfinanzierung durch eine ‘Kapitalgesellschaft’ im 17. Jahrhundert,” in *Die Kapitalisierung des Krieges: Kriegsunternehmer im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Matthias Meinhardt, Markus Meumann (Berlin, 2021), 249–268; Stefanie Rüter, “Reichsstädte als Kriegsunternehmer? Ratsherren, Bürger und Büchsenmeister als Profiteure der süddeutschen Städtekriege (1376–1390),” in *Die Kapitalisierung des Krieges: Kriegsunternehmer im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Matthias Meinhardt, Markus Meumann (Berlin, 2021), 47–60.

48 Parrott, *Business*, pp. 200–202, 219–220.

49 Parrott, *Business*, pp. 2, 101–102, and 228–241.

early modern period.⁵⁰ State authorities used the potential of private actors and accepted that this would restrict their autonomy to some extent. There is a broad consensus in the research literature that the ability to wage war was very largely based on cooperation between private producers, financiers, and service providers, on the one hand, and state authorities, on the other.⁵¹ This arrangement formed the key precondition for the wars of the late 17th and 18th centuries.

The fact that the state relied or had to rely on the services and know-how of private entrepreneurs in order to wage war placed structural limits on the expansion of the state's monopoly on the use of violence, which was only just coming into being in the early modern period. The persistence of the "public-private partnership" arrangement makes clear how meagre the state's capacity for army provisioning was in the early modern period. It is apparent how dependent the state actors were on the private sector to achieve their power-political and military objectives. But the need to obtain militarily relevant resources from the private sector did not lead to the same outcome everywhere. DAVID PARROTT's contribution on the tension between military privatisation and monopoly on the use of violence in France in the mid-17th century clearly illustrates this. Due to the experience of the religious wars of the 16th century, the Crown had an understandable interest in restricting the military entrepreneurial activities of the nobility and bringing them under its control. This did not lead to a centralised military apparatus in the 17th century, however, but rather the Crown relied on the creation of a system that required substantial investment in the troops from applicants for an officer's commission, without, however, granting the holders of the posts ownership rights over their units.⁵² Although these military formations were formally under the authority of the Crown, their funding and maintenance were highly dependent on the family networks, financial resources and administrative abilities of their commanders, who were recruited from the upper nobility. The devastating political costs of this system, which did not only tolerate the

50 The Taxis, who ran the imperial postal network as postmasters general on behalf of the Emperor, are a well-known example, see Wolfgang Behringer, *Thurn und Taxis: Die Geschichte ihrer Post und ihrer Unternehmen* (Munich, 1990). A close partnership between the authorities and private individuals, who leased the lucrative salt trade, also existed in the Swiss salt trade. Most of these 'private individuals', however, were members of the leading families in cantonal politics, see Jean-François Bergier, "Salz," 2020, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/014041/2020-03-12/>. Accessed 27 September 2022.

51 See Meinhardt, Meumann, "Kriegsunternehmer," pp. 23, 25–26.

52 See also David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge, 2001).

military entrepreneurial activities of the nobility, but counted on them, were made evident in the noble revolts of the 1640s and the Fronde of 1648–52. But even after these experiences, the Crown continued to rely on the resources of its officers and regimental commanders to finance the army. The creation of a rule-governed market for colonel and captain posts in the 1660s legitimised financial investment by French officers in their units and at the same time created incentives to maintain operational capability, since the price for the military posts depended on the status and condition of each unit.⁵³ Although increased centralisation of the army and a controlled purchasability of military posts under Louis XIV brought a certain stability, this policy makes clear how dependent the King continued to be on the private resources of his officers and the potential risks he thus assumed.

The limited capacity of the state and market logics set narrow limits to the sovereign's ability to influence the military goods and capital markets. The rulers were often left no other option than to try to offset the lack of control by way of a strategic contracting policy. One possibility for exerting influence on the supply side was to reduce the circle of producers, traders, and financiers with whom they concluded contracts. The contractor state favoured monopolies, the use of which it conferred on individual entrepreneurs like the Kellers.⁵⁴ This relationship is particularly well documented for Spain.⁵⁵ The creation of monopolies allowed the contracting authorities to influence prices or delay payment obligations. Moreover, Torres-Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart argue that by way of monopolies, the contractor state benefited from a credit pyramid that included many smaller entrepreneurs who did not deal with the state

53 See Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661–1701* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 166–171; Hervé Drévillon, *L'impôt du sang: Le métier des armes sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 2005), pp. 179–211.

54 See Parrott, *Business*, pp. 214, 221, 236–239, 278, and 324; Chaline, *Armées*, pp. 220–223, 235–236, and 254–255 (on the Kellers).

55 Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs*; Carlos Álvarez-Nogal, “Centralized Funding of the Army in Spain: The Garrison *Factoría* in the Seventeenth Century,” in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden/Boston, 2014), 235–259; Rafael Torres Sánchez, “In the Shadow of Power: Monopolist Entrepreneurs, the State and Spanish Military Victualing in the Eighteenth Century,” in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden/Boston, 2014), 260–283; Torres-Sánchez; Brandon, and 't Hart, “War,” pp. 9–10; Sergio Solbes Ferri, “The Spanish Monarchy as a Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century: Interaction of Political Power with the Market,” *Business History* 60 (2018), 72–86; Iván Valdez-Bubnov, “Shipbuilding administration under the Spanish Habsburg and Bourbon regimes (1590–1834): A comparative perspective,” *Business History* 60 (2018), 105–125.

authorities directly, but rather with the main recipients of the contracts.⁵⁶ The monopolisation processes were fraught with pitfalls, however, since the mutual dependence between state and entrepreneurs increased. Warring rulers thus found themselves facing the problem of ‘too big to fail’ as soon as the monopolists reached a systemically relevant size.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the market-distorting monopolies restricted entrepreneurial competition with sometimes negative effects for the contracting authority (quality, corruption, etc.).⁵⁸ The contribution by GUY ROWLANDS relates to this very aspect, inasmuch as his study of the French arms producer Maximilien Titon (1632–1711) precisely measures the military-entrepreneurial room for manoeuvre of a major entrepreneur and monopolist⁵⁹ within the French “defence industrial base”. Using Titon’s well-documented biography, Rowlands succeeds in showing that Louis XIV achieved the massive expansion of arms production by employing large-scale entrepreneurial manufacturers, but without subjecting them to strict controls. In Titon’s case, those who paid the price for the mistaken assumption that ministers could monitor the details of the contracts with the entrepreneurs, for the faulty oversight of the contractors’ accounting, for rampant nepotism and then for the disintegration of the administrative structure of public finances in the 1700s were, on the one hand, the soldiers, who were equipped with qualitatively inferior firearms and, on the other, the craftsmen, who were poorly paid for their services. Titon, however, profited from the lax control. He amassed an immense fortune over his lifetime not despite but precisely because of his gross disregard for quality requirements and appropriate pricing, as well as his sloppy bookkeeping. The Crown’s dependence upon him for equipping the French infantry made him indispensable as hegemonic arms supplier.

But the contractual monopolies also entailed entrepreneurial risks for the entrepreneurs who saw the opportunity to achieve a dominant market position in the privileged supply contracts. Dependence on the state client increased

56 See Torres-Sánchez; Brandon, and 't Hart, “War,” p. 12.

57 Jôel Félix, “Victualling Louis XV’s armies. The Munitionnaire des Vivres de Flandres et d’Allemagne and the Military Supply System,” in *The Contractor State and its Implications, 1659–1815*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012), 99–125; Guy Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men: The International Bankers of Louis XIV’s France* (Basingstoke, 2015), p. 147 (on Louis XIV’s most important banker in the War of the Spanish Succession Samuel Bernard); David Parrott, review of *The Contractor State and its Implications, 1659–1815*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri, *The Journal of Economic History* 75 (2015), 279–281.

58 Torres Sánchez, “Shadow,” pp. 260–283.

59 Chaline, *Armées*, pp. 244–245 speaks of a “quasi-monopoly” of firearms production for the infantry that was given to Titon.

the danger of quickly getting into existentially dire financial difficulties if the state suffered liquidity bottlenecks. The cooperative business environment of the military entrepreneurs bore maximum risk, because war expenditure almost always overstretched the state budgets.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, military entrepreneurs could achieve exorbitant profits, as shown by the fortunes of individual military entrepreneurs from the Thirty Years' War: such as Tilly (1631: 500,000–600,000 thalers), Bernard of Saxe-Weimar (1639: 1 million livres), and Major General Hans Ludwig von Erlach (deposit of 312,000 livres in the Herwart Bank in Lyon).⁶¹ At the same time, the list of bankruptcies in this business is long.⁶² But military entrepreneurs were not only and not always guided by material gain.⁶³ In France, substantial investment in the army by the nobility was not tied to the expectation of financial reward. Not just financial incentives were intrinsic to the military-entrepreneurial activity and investment of French nobles in the French army, but also dynastic-feudal logics. The great sums spent by French nobles on military positions, and with which Louis XIV financed the army, undoubtedly only paid off for the officers in economic terms in exceptional cases. Military service was, however, a key component of noble self-image and dynastic power strategies. Moreover, going into debt for the King's benefit was regarded as an expression of the vassal's honourable princely service.⁶⁴ The same logic can be observed in Spain or in the Empire.⁶⁵ The investment of German nobility in standing armies in the 17th and 18th centuries is the subject of the contribution by ALEXANDER QUERENGÄSSER. The author shows that the widespread phenomenon of misappropriation of company funds by officers was not always a matter of pure avarice, but rather of attempts by the officers in question to partially offset the losses on their investments in the companies. The financial losses were the price paid for career advancement in the military and to generate social prestige.

60 Mauricio Drelichmann, Hans-Joachim Voth, *Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Debt, Taxes and Default in the Age of Philip II* (Princeton, 2014).

61 Parrott, *Business*, pp. 242, 243 (for further examples, pp. 241–244).

62 See, for example, the famous case of Hans de Witte: Anton Ernstberger, *Hans de Witte: Finanzmann Wallensteins* (Wiesbaden, 1954).

63 In addition to financial profit objectives, we also have to consider social, religious, and political motives for involvement in military entrepreneurship, which could overlap in various ways, see Meinhardt, Meumann, "Kriegsunternehmer," pp. 33–34.

64 For a thorough treatment of the key role of officers in the French army, see Rowlands, *Dynastic State*; Drévilion, *Impôt*. See also Lynn, *Giant*, pp. 221–247 (chapter "The Costs of Regimental Command"); Parrott, "Military Enterprise," pp. 89–90.

65 On the Spanish army, see Christopher Storrs, *The Spanish Resurgence 1713–1748* (New Haven/London, 2016), pp. 29–31.

Brewer's notion of the fiscal-military state makes the different national capabilities for financial resource mobilisation visible, whereby the contrast between France and England is particularly striking.⁶⁶ After the Glorious Revolution, England's financial capacity was nearly unlimited, because along with Parliament the entire British elite stood surety for the country's creditworthiness. Public debt could be covered by tax increases, which were socially better legitimised thanks to parliamentary oversight. A well-functioning administrative apparatus collected the taxes.⁶⁷ In France, which under Louis XIV was pursuing an aggressive expansionist policy (War of Devolution, Dutch War, War of the Palatine Succession, War of the Spanish Succession), the capacity to mobilise financial resources was in considerably worse shape.⁶⁸ There were structural reasons for the Sun King's poor payment record. The high expenditure and erratic generation of tax revenues and the loss of time involved in the physical transfer of these revenues resulted in the money often not being available in the right place at the right time: for instance, to pay the troops. A mechanism comes into play here that Guy Rowlands describes as "agency government".⁶⁹ In France, social networks had to be tapped via so-called *fisco-financiers*, in order to be able to service loans in the short term.

There was thus a structural time lag between revenue-raising and the disbursing of state expenditure that had to be filled with credit, and that credit was offered by the men who organized the state's collection of taxes: the *fermiers*, the *receveurs généraux*, the *traitants* who took on one-off extraordinary revenue contracts, and those men who worked for them or were subcontracted by them. These personages not only stumped up advances to the king on a short-term and systematic basis, they also

66 A synthesis on resource mobilisation in France in the 17th and 18th centuries is provided by Chaline, *Armées*, pp. 193–217, 219–247, and 249–272 (chapters "Qui supporte l'effort militaire?", "Le roi, producteur et acheteur", and "Géographies et durées des approvisionnements").

67 Brewer, *Sinews*; Peter H. Wilson, "Competition through Cooperation: The European Fiscal-Military System, 1560–1850 (Inaugural lecture at the University of Oxford, 30 January 2017)," 2017. Available at <https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/article/peter-h-wilson-inaugural-lecture>. Accessed 15 October 2022.

68 Guy Rowlands, *The Financial Decline of a Great Power: War, Influence, and Money in Louis XIV's France* (Oxford, 2012).

69 Guy Rowlands, "Agency Government in Louis XIV's France: The Military Treasurers of the Elite Forces," in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden/Boston, 2014), 215–234.

loaned the king his own money and raised loans from a widening circle of people.⁷⁰

These *fisco-financiers* conducted their credit transactions as ‘private’ contractors but drew the required resources from the state. Their administrative function brought them capital and credit, thus minimising the transfer costs for their contractually based investment in the state’s war funding. The entrepreneurial risk of these ‘state-affiliated’ or ‘semi-private’ entrepreneurs was considerably smaller compared to the military entrepreneurs who provided advances to the rulers out of their own funds. The figure of the *fisco-financiers* makes clear that a rigid distinction between state and private individuals is ill-suited for describing military entrepreneurial fields of action. Focusing the analysis of military contracting on the state is likewise problematic, since it suggests a national self-sufficiency in building and maintaining the armed forces that did not exist in the early modern period. Resource mobilisation for war took place in a transnational context.

2 Transnational Fields of Action

The notions of the fiscal-military state and the contractor state have deepened our knowledge about early modern war-making in two directions. They explain the political implications of resource mobilisation for war and situate the role of the state in war as contracting authority. In terms of its basic features, military contracting, in which the state as contracting authority involved the private sector in supplying the armed forces, is reminiscent of the ‘military-industrial complex’ of the late 19th and 20th centuries.⁷¹ The tight interconnections between politics, the military, society, and business in the

70 Rowlands, “Agency Government,” p. 218; cf. Rowlands, *Financial Decline*, pp. 109–112.

71 Parrott, *Business*, p. 324: “The increasingly large scale of military activity which had originally served as the spur to private enterprise, making substantial capital investment in the business of war viable and financially attractive, thus had a paradoxical consequence. When contracts started to draw upon those directly involved in – or closely linked to – government as contractors, organizers and suppliers, the ability to offer a military option that was responsive, flexible and tailored to a particular set of circumstances was no longer a recognized priority. A process of institutionalization took place which did not lead to a conventionally understood ‘monopoly over the means of violence’, but involved a private sector which was heavily infiltrated by the capital and interests of members of government and other established political elites; this is only a few steps away from the institutional ‘military-industrial complex’ of the late nineteenth and twentieth century.” See also Brandon, *War*, pp. 41–82; Chaline, *Armées*, pp. 236–237.

'contractor state' are obvious, but the political, military and business networks did not stop at national borders. The 'fiscal-military state' and the 'military contractor state' as its counterpart are too narrowly conceived, because they are thought of in national categories. Both concepts' notions overlook the fact that the transactions involved in mobilising militarily important goods and capital were conducted across national borders. The focus on the state overlooks the high degree of mobility of military entrepreneurs, obscures the transnational fields of action in early modern arms and financial markets, and neglects the importance of foreign relations in mobilising resources for war. This narrow national view of the history of the early modern war business is not helpful and distracts from what is essential. For the tightly woven network among early modern merchants that was created via the highly developed channels of trade, financial instruments (bills of exchange, banks) and financial centres of the civilian economy can also be readily observed in trade in militarily relevant resources.⁷² It is only with the help of the concept of transnationality that we can adequately describe the logics of the European war economy. Transnationality puts the focus – broadly speaking – on phenomena of cross-border mobility, interaction, and communication. The related concepts do not, however, deny the significance of borders for human action. Instead, they sensitise historical analysis to the need for recognising and taking into account borders in the (geographical and social) spaces of the past where they actually existed and were important.⁷³

72 Roman Köster, "Handelskapitalismus", in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online*. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_SIM_360531. Accessed 30 January 2023; Peter Kriedte, "Handelskapital und Handelskapitalismus: Zur Theorie des frühen europäischen Kapitalismus," *Prokla: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft* 32 (2002), 491–507; see also Parrott, *Business*, p. 216.

73 For critical reflections on the usefulness of the concept for the pre-modern period, we can refer readers to the following literature: Martin Krieger, "'Transnationalität' in vorkolonialer Zeit? Ein Plädoyer für eine erweiterte Gesellschaftsgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 30 (2004), 125–136; Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, "'Localism', Global History and Transnational History: A Reflection from the Historian of Early Modern Europe," *Historisk Tidskrift* 127 (2007) 659–676; *Transkulturalität, Transnationalität, Transstaatlichkeit, Translokalität: Theoretische und empirische Begriffsbestimmungen*, eds. Melanie Hühn et al. (Berlin, 2010); Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, "Transnational History: What Lies Behind the Label? Some Reflections from the Early Modernist's Point of View," *Culture & History Digital Journal* 3:2 (2014); *Verflechtungen in Politik, Kultur und Wirtschaft im östlichen Europa: Transnationalität als Forschungsproblem*, eds. Jörg Hackmann, Peter Oliver Loew (Wiesbaden, 2018); André Holenstein, *Transnationale Schweizer Nationalgeschichte: Widerspruch in sich oder Erweiterung der Perspektiven?* (Bern, 2018).

2.1 *Networks, Hubs, Markets*

Because of the religious division of Europe in the early 16th century, new confessional networks emerged which cut across geographical, social, and linguistic borders. In addition to networks of scholars (the ‘Republic of Letters’), in particular cross-border commercial networks consisting of producers, financiers, and merchants were also established. Apart from purely economic logics, the experience of exile and the duty to defend the common confessional interest, or ‘common cause’, is likely to have further consolidated these commercial networks, especially in times of the religious wars and wars of independence of the 16th and 17th centuries.⁷⁴ “Confessional solidarity forged new connections with previously geographically and politically distant groups, while violence and persecution displaced refugees whose relocation to cities helped disseminate commercial practices and establish new communication networks.”⁷⁵ As Parrott was able to show in his study, the individuals, families and companies integrated into transnational networks were able to pool enormous amounts of capital, technical knowledge and market influence. This made it possible for these mercantile networks to marshal military resources regardless of military and confessional antagonisms.⁷⁶ “In an early modern context of rudimentary and limited administrative capacity on the part of governments, the supply of armies was being integrated into a remarkable structure of mercantile experience and organisational skill and knowledge about supplies, available production capacity and transport options.”⁷⁷ Peter Hug, Julia Zunckel, David Parrott, and Marianne B. Klerk and Peter H. Wilson describe this Europe-wide system of war economy and war financing.⁷⁸ In this context, Wilson and Klerk

74 Peter H. Wilson, Marianne B. Klerk, “The Business of War Untangled: Cities as Fiscal-Military Hubs in Europe, 1530s–1860s,” *War in History* 29 (2020), 80–103, p. 91.

75 Wilson, Klerk, “Business,” p. 91. As an example, see also Herbert Lüthy, *La banque protestante en France de la Révocation de l’Édit de Nantes à la Révolution*, 1–2 (Paris, 1959–61); Regina Schulte, “Rüstung, Zins und Frömmigkeit: Niederländische Calvinisten als Finanziers des Dreissigjährigen Krieges,” *Bohemia* 35 (1994), 46–62; Martoccio, “Man”; Graham, “Huguenots”.

76 Parrott, *Business*, pp. 213, 216.

77 Parrott, *Business*, p. 216.

78 Peter Hug, *Zur Geschichte des Kriegsmaterialhandels: Märkte und Regulationen vor 1800* (unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Bern, 1996); Julia Zunckel, *Rüstungsgeschäfte im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Unternehmerkräfte, Militärgüter und Marktstrategien im Handel zwischen Genua, Amsterdam und Hamburg* (Berlin, 1997); Parrott, *Business*, pp. 212–219; Wilson, Klerk, “Business”; Wilson, “Competition”; see also the blog post by Peter H. Wilson on his forthcoming book “Cooperation amidst Competition: Europe’s Fiscal-Military System and the Nationalisation of Warfare 1530–1870”. Available at <https://fiscalmilitary.history.ox.ac.uk/article/cooperation-amidst-competition-europes-fiscal-military-system-and-nationalisation-warfare>. Accessed 20 November 2022.

speak of a ‘fiscal-military system’ involving financial and commercial centres as ‘fiscal-military hubs’: London, Amsterdam, Brussels, Genoa, Hamburg, and the Swiss cantons were centres for financial and military services. Diplomatic, mercantile, and financial ties were concentrated here forming cross-border networks of military entrepreneurs; this is where the required resources for war were traded.⁷⁹ The contribution by ANDRÉ HOLENSTEIN and PHILIPPE ROGGER is devoted to the genesis of one such hub. They depict how the Swiss cantons, by exploiting their favourable geopolitical position in the middle of Europe, integrated themselves into the European fiscal-military system as neutral market actors and profited from the transnational war economy. The conglomeration of alliance systems of the Swiss cantons stayed out of the European wars from the early 16th century onwards, did not itself participate in the arms race and let the warring European princes or their taxpayers pay for the modernisation of its troops in foreign service. As a consequence, the militia troops fell further and further behind the latest developments in military technology and ultimately became structurally incapable of making war. As a neutral centre for services, however, the *Corpus helveticum* remained part of the European market in mercenaries and armaments and thus part of military conflict on the continent. Military entrepreneurs, officers, mercenaries, merchants, bankers, fortress builders, arms manufacturers, and politicians were directly or indirectly involved in cross-border and often also cross-confessional business networks. Geneva also drew special benefit from its unique and favourable geopolitical position between France, Italy, and Switzerland, as the contribution by JOHN CONDREN shows. The neutral city-state and Calvinist stronghold was an allied territory of the Confederation and played a prominent role in the fiscal-military system as a centre for trade and financial services, as well as a hub for diplomatic intelligence services (a French envoy or *résident* had been based in the city since 1679). The Genevan merchant and banker families, the Fatios and the Lullins, who were very well-connected throughout Europe, had a significant part in this rise of Geneva, for instance. They supplied all the

79 Wilson, Klerk, “Business”; see also the case studies by Marianne Klerk, “The ‘Fiscal-Military Hub’ of Amsterdam: Intermediating the French Subsidies to Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War,” in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 213–233; Michael P. Martocchio, “The Place for such Business’: The Business of War in the City of Genoa, 1701–1714,” *War in History* 29 (2021). See also the research projects of the ongoing ERC-project “The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870” at the University of Oxford under the direction of Peter H. Wilson. Available at <https://fiscalmilitary.history.ox.ac.uk/publications#tab-3052066>. Accessed 23 October 2022. On the fiscal-military hubs Amsterdam, Geneva, Genoa, London, Vienna, and the Baltic States, see *ibid.*

militarily relevant needs of Louis XIV, who massively stimulated demand on the European arms and financial markets at the beginning of the 18th century.

Over the course of the early modern period, army provisioning took on increasingly global features. Caribbean islands like the Dutch island of Sint Eustatius, for instance, served as hub for supplying the American and French armies during the American Revolutionary War.⁸⁰ The global dimension of army provisioning also becomes clearly apparent in the imperial context, as new research shows: for instance, when Spain and England tried to introduce hemp cultivation for shipbuilding in their American colonies or outsourced it to colonial zones of influence.⁸¹ It is readily understandable that the global conflicts between the European great powers necessarily required global logistics and infrastructure.

Following the people, material, and money, it is very clear that the early modern state obtained the resources for war not only domestically, but also on transnational markets.

2.1.1 People

War mobilised a variety of military specialists who crossed territorial and also confessional borders in the early modern period for commercial reasons. On the one hand, arms manufacturers like *les Kellers*, as well as engineers and architects, entered the service of foreign warring princes.⁸² On the other, millions of fighters left their homes in the early modern period, in order to enlist in mercenary armies. The prospect of pay and booty undoubtedly represented the most important pull factor for military migration in the early modern period and turned mercenary migration into a mass phenomenon. The individual motivations of the mercenaries and even the question of what exactly is to be understood by the figure of the mercenary and how it is distinguished from other

80 Aaron Graham, "The European Fiscal-Military System and the Wider World, 1530–1870", 2021, in *Research Blog "The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870"*. Available at <https://fiscalmilitary.history.ox.ac.uk/article/european-fiscal-military-system-and-wider-world-1530-1870>. Accessed 2023 February 2023.

81 Pepijn Brandon, Sergio Solbes Ferri, and Iván Valdez-Bubnov, "Introduction: Mobilising Resources for the Army and Navy in the Eighteenth-Century Spanish Empire: Comparative, Transnational and Imperial Dimensions," *War & Society* 40 (2021), 1–8.

82 See the examples in the contribution by André Holenstein and Philippe Rogger; see also Marian Füssel, "Wissen, Märkte und Kanonen: Europäische Militärexperten im Südasien der Frühen Neuzeit," in *Wissen und Wirtschaft: Expertenkulturen und Märkte vom 13. bis 18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Marian Füssel, Philip Knäble, and Nina Elsemann (Göttingen, 2017), 217–241. On innovators of military technology in the 18th century, see Stefan Droste, *Offensive Engines. Projektentwickler und Militärtechnik im langen 18. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 2022).

types of soldiers continues to be debated in the research literature still today.⁸³ The individual decision to enter the military service of a warring prince for uncertain pay and possible booty undoubtedly involved regionally specific and social-strata-specific reasons. The fact is that a transnational labour market for mercenaries began to coalesce at the end of the Middle Ages.⁸⁴ The place of origin and the place of service of mercenaries were often – but by no means always – geographically distinct.⁸⁵ The military services of Swiss recruits are regarded as a prominent example of early modern mercenary service. From the 15th century onwards, hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of the Confederation set off on war journeys (*Kriegsreise*) as so-called *Reisläufer*. Swiss mercenary commanders made the services of their mercenary units available on a cross-border market for military power in return for payment. They led their mercenary forces in the service of France, Spain, Naples, Savoy, the Netherlands, or the Pope. For the Swiss cantons and their political-military elites, the export of mercenaries developed into a lucrative business model. The contribution by SÉBASTIEN DUPUIS deals with the interesting case of the Republic of Geneva, one of the allied territories (*Zugewandte Orte*) of the Confederation, whose role as financial services centre and hotspot for diplomatic intelligence services has been thoroughly studied, but has hardly gotten any attention in the research literature as a supplier of mercenaries. In light of the small size of the territory and the good employment opportunities in its dynamic proto-industry, the conditions for a flourishing market in mercenaries were suboptimal. Nevertheless, as the study shows, numerous well-known families of the Genevan elites were also involved in the mercenary business, in addition to their activities in government or as *marchand-banquiers*. But attracting recruits represented a major problem for the Geneva military entrepreneurs, which is why they were not so particular about the geographical origin of the mercenaries and recruited Savoyards for their companies in the neighbouring bishopric of Geneva. The Genevan military entrepreneurs thus systematically

83 For example: Michael Sikora, "Söldner: historische Annäherungen an einen Kriegertypus," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29 (2003), 210–238; *Miliz oder Söldner? Wehrpflicht und Solddienst in Stadt, Republik und Fürstenstaat, 13.-18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Regula Schmid (Paderborn, 2019).

84 Peter H. Wilson, "Foreign Military Labour in Europe's Transition to Modernity," *European Review of History* 27 (2020), 12–32; Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative History of Military Labour, 1500–2000* (Amsterdam, 2013).

85 Philippe Rogger, Benjamin Hitz, "Söldnerlandschaften: räumliche Logiken und Gewaltmärkte in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive: Eine Einführung," in *Söldnerlandschaften: Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Benjamin Hitz (Berlin, 2014), 9–43.

circumvented the minimum proportion of ‘Swiss’ in the Swiss mercenary companies demanded by France. As the example shows, the national designation of mercenary units was nothing but a label that often concealed the actual origin of the mercenaries more than revealing it.

Although the *Corpus helveticum* was a well-known mercenary market, it was by no means the only important hub for mercenary services in early modern Europe. Other political spaces also developed into important markets for mercenaries, in which military entrepreneurs specialised in foreign military service and recruited fighters for foreign services.⁸⁶ Scots, Germans, Irish, Poles, and Italians served in France, German troops were in Hungarian or British service, Poles and Ukrainians served the Emperor. The examples can easily be multiplied, as PETER H. WILSON’s contribution clearly shows. But this was a contractually regulated labour market, so there is no question of a free market in mercenaries on which the highest bidder got the mercenaries.⁸⁷ Market access was controlled by various forms of contracts, whereby access to military labour-power was mediated by contractors, without whose help the warring princes would not have been able to strengthen their armies with mercenary units. In the process, patterns emerged in relationships of mercenary service, according to which men from certain areas predominantly served as mercenaries in certain armies.

But the transnational market in mercenaries was not limited to Europe in the early modern period. Imperial powers recruited their mercenaries both in Europe and in colonial zones of influence overseas, in order to secure their dominion. English and Dutch trading companies employed the services of German regiments to defend their commercial interests overseas.⁸⁸ Finally, a well-known example of the global trade in mercenaries is the Hessians shipped to America in the English service during the American War of Independence (1775–83).⁸⁹

86 On France, see, for example, Guy Rowlands, “Foreign Service in the Age of Absolute Monarchy: Louis XIV and His Forces Étrangères,” *War in History* 17 (2010), 141–165.

87 See also Peter H. Wilson, “Mercenary’ Contracts as Fiscal-Military Instruments,” in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 68–92.

88 Parrott, *Business*, pp. 320–321; Marian Füssel, “Händler, Söldner und Sepoys: Transkulturelle Kampfverbände auf den südasiatischen Schauplätzen des Siebenjährigen Krieges,” in *Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute: Strukturen – Akteure – Lernprozesse*, eds. Tanja Bühner, Christian Stachelbeck, and Dierk Walter (Paderborn, 2011), 307–324.

89 *Die “Hessians” im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (1776–1783): Neue Quellen, neue Medien, neue Forschungen*, eds. Holger T. Gräf, Andreas Hedwig, and Annegret Wenz-Haubfleisch (Marburg, 2014).

2.1.2 Material

The preconditions for rulers to be able to mobilise militarily important resources within the borders of their territories varied greatly from country to country. France, for instance, benefited from its size and its wealth of natural resources. The arsenals, foundries, and factories spread across the whole country all had their own 'hinterland' that supplied them with raw materials.⁹⁰ Iron was taken from the mines of Périgord, Burgundy, Dauphiné, and Lorraine, and the hemp came from Brittany, Champagne, Alsace, Burgundy, Mâconnais, Auvergne, Poitou, and the Agenais region around Tonneins, to give just two examples.⁹¹ Although Colbert promoted national production, in order to minimise France's dependence on militarily important resources from other countries, the French army continued to depend on foreign imports.⁹² The French war economy had recourse both to domestic supplies of raw materials and inevitably also to imports from abroad. Under Louis XIV, only the national production of cloth for uniforms was sufficient to meet the army's needs. This, for instance, enabled the army supplier Sabatier from Languedoc to export surplus goods to Spain and Italy starting in 1719.⁹³ The foundry in Douai, for example, which Louis XIV gave to the Kellers to run in 1669, was supplied with wood from the region, hemp, which was used to make the rope to pull the cannons, from Flanders, copper from Sweden and tin from England, which arrived via Dunkirk (often via Holland).⁹⁴ In the early modern period, France imported powder from Italy, sulphur from Italy, Iceland and Sweden, saltpetre from Sicily and Naples, cannons from Sweden, the Netherlands and the Swiss cantons, wood, tar, and pitch from the Baltic region (Scandinavia), ships from the Netherlands, copper and ship ammunition from Sweden, tin and lead from England, iron from England and the Holy Roman Empire, iron and copper from the Baltics (especially Sweden) and Spain, blades from Solingen, coal from England, and horses from the Swiss Jura, Friesland, Denmark, Flanders, Navarre, and Germany.⁹⁵ According to David Parrott, already in the 17th century, it's possible to observe efforts "to bring together the production and distribution of military *matériel* and to concentrate it in certain centres, from where distribution to armies would be both easier and more able to meet

90 Chaline, *Armées*, pp. 262–269. The maps "Les zones de fourniture de la Marine royale fin XVII^e siècle" (ibid., p. 263) and "L'emprise spatiale de l'approvisionnement de la marine de guerre française" (ibid., p. 269) are instructive.

91 Chaline, *Armées*, pp. 255, 265.

92 Chaline, *Armées*, p. 249.

93 Chaline, *Armées*, p. 261.

94 Chaline, *Armées*, p. 254.

95 Chaline, *Armées*, pp. 235–236, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 265, and 270.

sudden peaks of demand.”⁹⁶ Julia Zunckel has reconstructed the basic structures of the trade in military goods for the first half of the 17th century.⁹⁷ A close connection can be observed between India and Sweden as centres of raw material production (copper, saltpetre) and the centres of arms production (England, Sweden, the southern Netherlands, the Lower Rhine, Nuremberg, Suhl) as well as the centres of trade in war materials (Amsterdam, Antwerp, Danzig, Hamburg). The military goods destined for Spain, Italy and Austria readily crossed territorial and confessional boundaries. The integration of India, which played a role as an exporter of saltpetre starting in the 1620s, into the transnational trade in military goods shows that the supply chains and trade networks for war-related goods assumed intercontinental dimensions after 1600.

Transport entrepreneurs occupied a key position in this system of transnational trade. They exploited the transport routes of war by organising the physical transfer of goods between producers and traders, on the one hand, and their clients, on the other. Simply put, their business model consisted of transporting, on assignment, a wide variety of armaments, grain, horses or money, by foot, on pack animals, carts or ships, on roads, rivers, lakes and seas, over short or also very long distances, safely and punctually from point A to point B. Crossing borders was part of their daily operations, which is why the transnational flows of goods can be understood by following the traces of carters, muleteers and shippers. Following the material above all means following the transporters. Their services made a decisive contribution to the survival and operational capability of early modern armies. The contribution by MICHAEL PAUL MARTOCCIO on Genoese military transporters in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14) addresses the pre-eminent role of transport entrepreneurs in the logistics of war. The focus of the study is not the Genoese navy or the permanently-hired, private naval entrepreneurs (*asientistas de galeras*), but rather “small-scale” naval transporters hired on a temporary basis like Francesco Decotto, Giovanni Battista Merizano, and Valentino Mingotti, who met short-term spikes in demand and were thus of great importance for the warring parties. When transporting troops, horses, and other militarily important resources, they did so within the framework of a variety of poorly regulated labour relations that oscillated between coercion and voluntary contracts. They acted as Genoese subjects, as smugglers hired by France (against the will of the Republic), as temporary private hires transporting German-speaking soldiers accompanied by Dutch and English ships, or as subcontractors of

96 Parrott, *Business*, p. 214.

97 Zunckel, *Rüstungsgeschäfte*, p. 76 (Fig. 1).

Genoese *asientisti*. The “small-scale” Genoese captains thus defy conventional categorisations like “state employee”, “privateer”, “smuggler”, “contractor”, “*asientista*” or “military entrepreneur”, Martoccio argues, and shed light on the question of how war promoted the development of new business practices of early modern entrepreneurs.

2.1.3 Money

Cities, above all, played the role of financial services centres. In the early 17th century, Amsterdam, Augsburg, Genoa, Hamburg, Cologne, Liège, Nuremberg, and London served as centres for both arms trade and financial services. Antwerp, Frankfurt am Main, Leipzig, Lyon, Prague, Strasbourg, Venice, and Vienna, on the other hand, mainly provided financial services in the fiscal-military system of the Thirty Years’ War.⁹⁸ Privatised army provisioning, David Parrott argues, also had decisive advantages with respect to army financing. On the one hand, the private financial sector made it easier for military entrepreneurs to obtain affordable loans and made it cheap and simple to transfer money, in order to organise and pay for the delivery of food, weapons, ammunition and soldiers’ wages. The steady concentration of capital in the hands of landowning strata, merchants, manufacturers, and officials increased the demand for investment opportunities and led to a wave of foundings of private banks between the 1580s and the early 1620s. This gave rise, on the other hand, to an internationalisation of the financial system, which was characterised by more sophisticated use of bills of exchange and credit notes, as well as mechanisms that facilitated currency exchange.⁹⁹

Just how significant a well-functioning, transnational cashless payment system was for carrying out military campaigns can be illustrated by France’s financial transactions in the War of the Spanish Succession.¹⁰⁰ According to Guy Rowlands, in the age of Louis XIV, European rulers could already look back on a century and a half of experience with banking and the use of bills of exchange, and yet the French, British, and Dutch governments saw themselves confronted by entirely new challenges, since trade in bills of exchange took on completely new dimensions in quantitative terms in the years around 1700. In addition, the armies raised by the European states reached unprecedented size, creating previously unknown financial requirements for their maintenance.

98 Parrott, *Business*, p. 213 (Map 5.1 Key centres of arms production and finance in Europe, early seventeenth century).

99 Parrott, *Business*, pp. 239–241; see also Markus A. Denzel, *Das System des bargeldlosen Zahlungsverkehrs europäischer Prägung vom Mittelalter bis 1914* (Stuttgart, 2008).

100 Rowlands, *Men*, pp. 6–9.

The figures cited by Rowland for the France of Louis XIV are indeed impressive. Thus, from 1701 to 1707, an average of 73 per cent of the expenditure of the French state (around 156 million livres per year) went into the army. During the War of the Spanish Succession, Louis XIV's forces undertook major campaigns in the Netherlands, northern Italy, the Empire, and Spain, which is why more than half of this expenditure was transferred abroad between 1703 and 1706, about a third between 1707 and 1709, and about a quarter between 1709 and 1713. The forces operating abroad depended on these transfers, because they could not raise the funds in allied countries nor in the theatres of war themselves. To overcome the sometimes huge geographical distances, most of the money was transferred in the form of bills of exchange via Amsterdam, Geneva, Lyon, and Paris, but also via medium-sized (Genoa, Madrid, Milan, etc.) and smaller (Antwerp, Augsburg, Basel, Brussels, London, Munich, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen, Turin, Venice, etc.) centres of French war financing during the War of the Spanish Succession.¹⁰¹ In order to make the transfers, the King relied on private bankers who were supposed to deliver the funds abroad on precisely determined dates and at agreed exchange rates. By drawing bills of exchange, it was possible to provide the treasurers of the *Extraordinaire des Guerres*, the main French war fund, with money to pay the troops on the ground. The Huguenot commercial and financial diaspora, which Louis XIV had himself created by expelling the Huguenots after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, played a key role in these transactions. These well-funded financial experts continued to have close relations with their funders who had converted to Catholicism and remained in France, and together they formed a transnational foreign exchange network.¹⁰²

Bills of exchange also played a key role when empires wanted to defend themselves or expand by using armed forces, as the contribution by TIM NEU shows. Despite the great distance, the armies in the colonies were dependent on financial resources from the country of origin. The London-based firm of Harley & Drummond – the partners were Thomas Harley (1730–1804) and John Drummond (1723–74), who was later replaced by his cousin Henry Drummond (1730–95) – specialised in transatlantic money transfer. Functioning as “remittance contractors”, from 1769 to 1783, they supplied the most important British military bases of operations in North America after the Seven Years' War: New York, Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Montreal. Shipping cash already proved no longer to be practicable at the beginning of the 18th century, which is why the

101 Rowlands, *Men*, p. XIV (Map 2: Primary, secondary and other significant financial centres for French remitting, 1701–14).

102 See also Lüthy, *Banque*.

crown relied mainly on bills of exchange. The Treasury in London paid certain sums to Harley & Drummond and the remittance contractors issued bills of exchange to their American business partners in the same amounts. The bills were then shipped across the Atlantic by the Pay Office to the army command, which handed them over to Harley & Drummond's American business partners in exchange for cash. In order for the latter – Gordon & Crowder in New York, for example – to be able to produce the large sums of cash, they in turn drew bills of exchange on their clients Harley & Drummond in London, which were sold to locally based merchants. These bills then made their way back across the Atlantic to merchants in London, who presented them to Harley & Drummond and demanded payment of the sums in question. The activity of the remittance contractors was lucrative. There was the prospect of fat commissions, exchange rate profits and income from lending and financial market investments which they financed with public money from their business in bills of exchange. The business model of the London remittance contractors and their mercantile networks in North America was vital for the colonial policy of the British government, since it ensured a permanent transatlantic currency circuit which supplied the British army overseas with urgently needed foreign exchange.¹⁰³

Trade in bills of exchange was also employed in another area which was of utmost importance for the warmaking of the early modern princes. So-called subsidies, contractually agreed payments of one state to a friendly state for its military services (provision of troops), were a common method of war financing in the early modern period.¹⁰⁴ Subsidies paid by France to Sweden or by Spain to the Emperor in the Thirty Years' War, by the Habsburgs to Prussia in the War of the Spanish Succession, by France to the Emperor in the War of the Austrian Succession, by England to Prussia in the Seven Years' War or by England to Hesse-Kassel in the American War of Independence are just

103 Tim Neu, "Accounting Things Together: Die Globalisierung von Kaufkraft im British Empire um 1700," in *Techniken der Globalisierung: Globalgeschichte meets Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie*, eds. Debora Gerstenberger, Joël Glasman (Bielefeld, 2016), 41–66; Tim Neu, "Glocal Credit: Die britische Finanzlogistik als fraktales Phänomen am Beispiel des Siebenjährigen Krieges," *Der Siebenjährige Krieg 1756–1763: Mikro- und Makroperspektiven* (Berlin, 2021), ed. Marian Füssel, 75–93.

104 Michael Busch, "Subsidien," in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online*, Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_SIM_360531. Accessed 23 March 2023; for an example, see Holger T. Gräf, "Ce corps de troupes fait notre Pérou: Die Subsidienverträge der Landgrafen von Hessen-Kassel im Überblick," in *Die "Hessians" im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (1776–1783): Neue Quellen, neue Medien, neue Forschungen*, eds. Holger T. Gräf, Andreas Hedwig, and Annegret Wenz-Haubfleisch (Marburg, 2014), 41–57.

a few prominent examples of the use of this transnational arrangement for war financing. These payments were made using bills of exchange via Geneva, Amsterdam, Genoa, Frankfurt, and Hamburg.¹⁰⁵ The so-called pensions which powers like France paid to the Swiss cantons for the right to recruit mercenaries were also transferred via financial centres.¹⁰⁶ The pension money agreed in the treaties of alliance and intended for the public coffers of the cantons went to Lyon to be paid out.¹⁰⁷ The provision of these funds not only opened up another interesting field of business for military entrepreneurs,¹⁰⁸ but also brought another aspect of military entrepreneurial activity into play: diplomacy and patronage.

2.2 *Diplomacy and Patronage*

The major wars of the early modern period were for the most part wars of succession between related dynasties.¹⁰⁹ Just as it is obvious that military and civilian markets overlapped and interlaced with one another across national borders, the connection between the army provisioning and the foreign relations of the warring states is also, for this very reason, self-evident.¹¹⁰ In early modern Europe, resource mobilisation by military alliances took place by way of princely families who were closely intertwined by arranged marriages. By concluding alliances, the warring parties secured not only forms of military support, but also access to markets for armaments and mercenaries in the allied territories of their relatives. Or in other words: Monarchical Europe in the early modern period can be thought of as a family history, which was of the utmost importance for resource mobilisation in war within the framework of

105 Busch, "Subsidien"; Peter C. Hartmann, "Die Rolle europäischer Bankiers und Bankzentren bei der Überweisung von Subsidien im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Stadt und Handel: City in History*, eds. Bernhard Kirchgässner, Hans-Peter Becht (Sigmaringen, 1995), 107–114; Klerk, "Fiscal-Military Hub".

106 Valentin Groebner, "Pensionen," 2011, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/010241/2011-11-03/>. Accessed 23 March 2023.

107 See for example the military alliance of the Swiss cantons with France of 1663 in *Die eidgenössischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1649 bis 1680*, eds. Johann A. Pupikofer, Jakob Kaiser (Einsiedeln, 1882), p. 1651 (*Amtliche Sammlung der ältern eidgenössischen Abschiede*, 61).

108 Parrott, *Business*, p. 232; Erik Thomson, "Jean Hoeufft, French subsidies, and the Thirty Years' War," in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 234–258.

109 Lucien Bély, *La société des princes, XVI^e–XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1999).

110 *Handbuch der Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen*, 1–6, eds. Heinz Duchhardt, Franz Knipping (Paderborn, 1997–2012).

a policy of princely alliances.¹¹¹ No state, writes Peter H. Wilson, waged war in the early modern period without external help:

This is the paradox of European history. Competition was possible only through co-operation with allies, neutrals, and even enemies, since states have rarely obtained all they needed for warfare from their own populations, while governments have generally been unable to prevent their own subjects from aiding other powers. The 'success' of each state has depended not only on its ability to assert itself militarily but also on its being recognized as a 'state' by its neighbours. The emergence of diplomatic conventions and international law is only one aspect of this process. Europe contained a host of semi-sovereign entities, like the German and Italian principalities and city-states, which not only struggled to preserve or enhance their autonomy but also provided war-making resources to other, larger states.¹¹²

A diplomatic-history perspective that is limited to the identification of formal alliances is inadequate for grasping the foreign-policy implications of military entrepreneurship in two respects.

Firstly, Wilson's notion of the fiscal-military system shows that transnational relationships were far more complex and far-reaching and involved a multitude of non-state actors. Merchants, entrepreneurs, bankers, experts, and agents organised the cross-border transfer of war material, mercenaries, and money and credit. In addition, the connections included a number of further services like the right to have troops traverse neutral territory or to use special facilities such as ports, as well as the exchange of intelligence and technical know-how.¹¹³ The cross-border exploitation of military resources took place via a wide repertoire of contractual arrangements, which Wilson calls "fiscal-military instruments". These include subsidy contracts, mercenary contracts of all kinds, contracts for the provision of war material, contracts for the use of ports and transport routes for the transit of troops and armaments, agreements on the sharing of information and expertise, and elaborate financial instruments like bills of exchange, bonds, and all kinds of loans and debts.¹¹⁴ The contribution by MICHAEL DEPRETER deals with one

111 For an instructive treatment, see Leonhard Horowski, *Das Europa der Könige: Macht und Spiel an den Höfen des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, 2nd ed. (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2017).

112 Wilson, "Mercenary' contracts," p. 71.

113 Wilson, "Mercenary' contracts," p. 71.

114 Wilson, "Mercenary' contracts," pp. 73–91; see also Wilson, Klerk, "Business".

particular fiscal-military instrument. The study examines private and official capitulations using the example of Swiss mercenary services in the Netherlands under the *Ancien régime* and the Restoration. It is shown that the entrepreneurial capacity of Swiss mercenary leaders declined over the course of the 18th century. On the one hand, the Dutch required the standardisation of contracts and troop units, and, on the other, they also came under more pressure from the cantonal authorities, who each had their own financial and military agenda. The gradual nationalisation of military entrepreneurship can also be seen in, among other things, the fact that capitulations were increasingly concluded in the political centres where the political and economic elites were to be found. The experienced Dutch diplomat Petrus Valkenier (1641–1712), for instance, negotiated private capitulations with the Swiss mercenary leaders Capol, Lochmann, Goumoëns, and Sacconay in Zurich in 1693–94. The cities represented important “knowledge reservoirs of a fiscal-military documentary culture and practices”, as Depreter puts it, which were eagerly used when concluding contracts.

Secondly, the new history of diplomacy has turned away from the classical history of events involving ‘main and state actions’. It no longer regards early modern foreign relations as relations between sovereign states, but instead emphasises the importance of cross-border personal networks.¹¹⁵ Under the heading ‘cultural history of the political’,¹¹⁶ increasing attention was also given to the role of non-state actors in establishing and maintaining relations between ruling families and their political decision-making instances.¹¹⁷ As a result, foreign relations were a field of action that was not only occupied by sovereign princes, councils, foreign ministers and diplomats, but was also shaped by a multitude of non-state actors. In the case of the Swiss Confederation, this becomes especially clear when military entrepreneurs, merchants, bankers, or their family members sought to influence foreign relations in accordance with their interests.¹¹⁸ The conclusion of capitulations and military alliances was in the interest of the politically influential military-entrepreneur families. They

115 *Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Hillard von Thiessen, Christian Windler (Berlin, 2005).

116 *Was heisst Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?*, ed. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger (Berlin, 2005).

117 *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, eds. Hillard von Thiessen, Christian Windler (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna, 2010).

118 Daniel Schläppi, “In allem Übrigen werden sich die Gesandten zu verhalten wissen.’ Akteure in der eidgenössischen Aussenpolitik des 17. Jahrhunderts: Strukturen, Ziele, Strategien am Beispiel der Familie Zurlauben von Zug,” *Der Geschichtsfreund* 151 (1998), 5–90; *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018).

were in a certain way the resultant of these family interests. For foreign envoys, the *Corpus helveticum*, which, in addition to the 13 cantons enjoying full rights, also included variously constituted allied territories, was a tough assignment. They were confronted by a complex and confusing political system. There was neither a monarch nor a foreign minister with which to negotiate, nor was there any clear centre of power (like a royal court). The complex structures (different confessions, languages, and political cultures) in the urban and rural territories, in which sometimes the cantonal assembly, sometimes the citizenry of a city and sometimes even just the patrician elite exercised sovereign powers, required a flexible negotiating strategy and specific political knowledge, in order to be able to represent interests in this space.¹¹⁹ These requirements created particular military-entrepreneurial career opportunities for individual actors in the field of diplomacy. A good example is the rapid rise of the subject of the Grisons Johann Peter Stuppa (1621–1701) from Chiavenna. Stuppa already entered the French service in his youth. The Swiss cantons had been in a close mercenary and alliance relationship with France since the early 16th century.¹²⁰ After Stuppa gained the favour of Louis XIV by recruiting cheap *compagnies franches* in violation of the alliance agreement as a French broker in the 1660s, he was again sent on a recruiting mission to the Confederation in 1671. Although Stuppa was equipped with a letter authorising him to negotiate with the cantons and to recruit on the King's behalf, this did not give him any sort of diplomatic *caractère*. He did not correspond with the foreign minister but with the minister of war and acted outside the channels of the ambassador in Solothurn, who usually played the leading role in distributing captain posts and organising the recruitment of mercenaries.¹²¹ Thanks to his personal relationships as an officer with the patrician families who were also involved in the mercenary business and his profound knowledge of the political conditions in the cantons, he succeeded in recruiting around 10,000 mercenaries within a few months. By skilfully assigning captain posts to influential

119 Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa*, pp. 133–141; Nadir Weber, Philippe Rogger, “Unbekannte inmitten Europas? Zur aussenpolitischen Kultur der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft,” in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 9–44.

120 Andreas Würigler, *Symbiose ungleicher Partner: Die französisch-eidgenössische Allianz 1516–1798/1815*, *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte* 12 (2011), 53–75; *Après Marignan: La paix perpétuelle entre la France et la Suisse*, eds. Alexandre Dafflon, Lionel Dorthe, Claire Gantet (Lausanne, 2018).

121 André Schluchter, “Ambassador,” 2001, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/028697/2001-07-09/>. Accessed 4 April 2023.

military-entrepreneur families, he recommended himself for further jobs as agent of French interests in the *Corpus helveticum*. Just one year after the successful recruitment mission, his career took off even further. In 1672, he was promoted to colonel and brigadier, in 1676 to *Maréchal de camp*, in 1678 to *Lieutenant général*, and in 1685 to Colonel of the Swiss Guard Regiment. 1674 marked the high point of his career when Louis XIV assigned him the position of *Colonel général des Suisses et des Grisons* on an interim basis. In this capacity, he acted as direct advisor to the French king and had a decisive influence on the allocation of Swiss mercenary companies in France. Although the Duc du Maine officially assumed the position of *Colonel général* in 1688 after reaching the age of majority, Stuppa remained de facto in charge until his death in Paris in 1701.¹²² As an agent of French foreign relations, Stuppa had a special value for the King, because, as a subject of the Grisons and citizen of an allied territory, as well as a royal *créature*, he was more dependable in the service of his patron than the officers from the political elite of the cantons. For the latter found themselves again and again torn between their loyalty to the cantons and their loyalty to the King: for instance, when Louis XIV used their units for wars of aggression in violation of the treaty and the Federal Diet (*Tagsatzung*) called on them to refuse to obey the King's orders. In her contribution, KATRIN KELLER looks at Stuppa's career before the career. As Keller's research makes clear, Stuppa was a powerful factor in the Swiss mercenary forces in France and in Franco-Swiss relations under Louis XIV. Keller examines the rise of Stuppa, who appears on the scene, seemingly out of nowhere, in 1671 as an influential figure in the French army and at the court, and his path to becoming a royal *créature*. To this end, the article begins in the 1650s and early 1660s, i.e. during Stuppa's time in the Swiss Guard Regiment, and elaborates the most important factors that favoured his rise. According to Keller, these included his wealth of experience as an officer and intermediary, his broad network of contacts among the Swiss military-entrepreneur families and power elites, and his influence and credit at court and in the cantons. Moreover, in 1673 he found himself in the right place at the right time to assume the succession of the *Colonel général* on an interim basis upon the latter's death, and – which was not entirely insignificant – he also had the talent required for this key function in Franco-Swiss mercenary relations.

122 Katrin Keller, "Ein Schweizer Gardehauptmann als französischer Unterhändler: Johann Peter Stuppas Werbeverhandlungen in der Eidgenossenschaft 1671," in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 92–115.

The emergence of transnational informal networks for recruiting mercenaries in the *Corpus helveticum* usually took place via the establishment of patronage relationships.¹²³ These asymmetrical relationships between a more powerful patron and his lower-ranking or less powerful clients were exclusive and devised for longer-term exchange of material goods, information, and loyalty services.¹²⁴ Stuppa was not the only one to act as a shrewd broker of French patronage resources (captain posts) in the Swiss Confederation. Allocating patronage resources (money in the form of private pensions, mercenary companies and military ranks, noble titles, salt concessions) also formed the main business of the French and Spanish envoys to the Confederation in particular.¹²⁵ The patronage of the warring princes secured wealth, status, power, and prestige for the military-entrepreneur families. Just how stable these informal relationships between patrons and individual military-entrepreneur families remained over centuries, despite institutional changes in mercenary service and political upheavals, is made clear by JULIEN GRAND'S contribution on the Besenval family in Solothurn. With just a brief interruption between 1661 and 1671, the family provided officers in the French service from the 1650s until 1830.

Transnational patronage relationships did not rule out a multiplicity of ties in principle. Cultivating multiple loyalties even gave rise to a lucrative business model for military entrepreneurs under certain circumstances, but one that was connected to not inconsiderable risks. The Bernese double agent Hieronymus von Erlach (1667–1748) may serve as an example here. The offspring of an influential Bernese patrician family began his military career at the age of just 13 in his uncle's company in the von Erlach regiment in France, in which he made the rank of captain in 1692. Starting in 1702, he was a colonel in a guard regiment in the service of the Austrian Empire and in 1704 was appointed

123 Christian Windler, "Ohne Geld keine Schweizer": Pensionen und Söldnerrekrutierung auf den eidgenössischen Patronagemärkten," in *Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Hillard von Thiessen, Christian Windler (Berlin, 2005), 105–133.

124 Weber, Rogger, "Unbekannte," pp. 36–40.

125 Windler, "Geld"; Carlo Steiner, "Informelle Netzwerke in der Aussenpolitik der eidgenössischen Orte: Das labile Kräfteverhältnis in der Beziehung zwischen dem Zuger Solddienstunternehmer Beat II. Zurlauben und dem französischen Ambassador Jean de la Barde," *Argovia* 22 (2010), 45–65; Andreas Affolter, *Verhandeln mit Republiken: Die französisch-eidgenössischen Beziehungen im frühen 18. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2017); Andreas Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft: Die Casati als spanisch-mailändische Gesandte in Luzern und Chur (1660–1700)* (Zurich, 2015).

major general and field marshal lieutenant.¹²⁶ Using the pseudonym Baron d'Elcin, he sent a coded letter from the imperial camp to the French in the run-up to the battle of Rümersheim (26 August 1709), in which he revealed the exact battle plan and troop strength of the imperial army. Thanks to this information, the French managed to send reinforcements to the Rhine in time and won the battle. This was undoubtedly von Erlach's most spectacular, but not his first act of espionage. He had already sent secret letters with insider knowledge to French envoys and military commanders before, for which he was paid 1,000 livres per month by France. At the same time, he kept the English representative in Frankfurt am Main posted about developments in the war. The machinations of the double agent went undetected in Vienna, so that nothing stood in the way of his rise to the rank of Chamberlain and Imperial Count on the strength of his military merits.¹²⁷



The contributions brought together in this volume make clear that the ongoing process of state formation in the early modern period did not lead to the end of military entrepreneurship. To mobilise resources for war, rulers relied on entrepreneurial forces and mercantile networks constituting a transnational fiscal-military system. In order to achieve efficient army provisioning within the framework of a public-private partnership, the sovereigns accepted encroachments upon their monopoly on the use of violence in practice. Although some states enjoyed more favourable territorial conditions than others for equipping their armies with personnel and armaments, autarky in the field of army provisioning remained an illusion for every warring prince throughout the early modern period. Even states like Prussia or Sweden, which accelerated the nationalisation of their armies in the 18th century, remained part of the fiscal-military system. The militarisation of civil society through the institutional reform of recruitment – in Prussia via the cantonal system

126 Barbara Braun-Bucher, "Erlach, Hieronymus von," 2015, *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/016677/2015-12-22/>. Accessed 2023 April 5; Ryser, *Fronten*, p. 202.

127 Nadir Weber, "Er nannte sich Baron d'Elcin," *NZZ Geschichte* 29 (2020), 86–93. On his conversion to Catholicism in France and his marriage to a French woman, which he kept secret on his return to Bern, making him susceptible to blackmail by the French, see Ryser, *Fronten*, p. 204. For an extensive treatment of von Erlach's spy activities, see Henry Mercier, *Un secret d'Etat sous Louis XIV et Louis XV: La double vie de Jérôme d'Erlach* (Paris, 1934); and on the importance of espionage in the age of Louis XIV, see Lucien Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1990).

(*Kantonsystem*) and in Sweden via the allotment system (*indelningsverk*)¹²⁸ – did not change the fact that both countries received subsidies and used the services of foreign mercenaries.¹²⁹ The interplay of state production and transnational markets for the supply of early modern armies created new entrepreneurial opportunities and profit prospects for non-military actors. The services of these civilian entrepreneurs mark a gradual demilitarisation of military entrepreneurs in the early modern period. As Swiss career emigrants, *les Kellers* may serve as ideal type for this transformation of a historical figure. This trend did not, however, make Redlich's military enterpriser who led troops into battle superfluous.

128 Dierk Walter, "Heeresreformen," in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online*. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_COM_298807. Accessed 2023 January 18.

129 On Prussian receipt of subsidies, see Walter, "Heeresreformen," and on recruitment of mercenaries, Rudolf Gugger, *Preussische Werbungen in der Eidgenossenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1997). Aside from this, private entrepreneurial activities can also be observed in Prussia in the 18th century at the level of company business. See Meinhardt, Meumann, "Kriegsunternehmer," p. 26. On Swedish recruitment of mercenaries, see Walter, "Heeresreformen," and on French subsidies for Sweden from 1631 to 1758, see Svante Norrhem, "The use of French Subsidies in Sweden, 1632–1729," in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 93–117, p. 117.

PART 1

*Chances and Challenges: Actors and Forms of the
Enterprise*



SECTION

Military and Non-Military Entrepreneurs



Logistics, Politics, and War: The Military Entrepreneur Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar and Supplying the Army from the Swiss Confederation in the Thirty Years' War

Astrid Ackermann

One of the basic tasks of early modern military contractors was to keep their troops operational. Money had to be provided, and soldiers and officers had to be equipped with food, military material, and animals as well as fodder for those animals. At the same time, the armies were in competition with the civilian population, whose considerable misery was intimately linked to the Thirty Years' War. Procuring these goods was complex and often caused great difficulties that only increased as the war progressed. This was also true, indeed even more so, for the necessary transports. Supply issues, however, could be decisive for the war.¹

Contemporaries were aware of this problem.² There are numerous reports about hunger in the armies, poorly clothed soldiers, or lack of means of transport. Politicians and the public knew that poor supply increased the risk of mutinies.³ Even if one can sometimes speak of stereotypical descriptions and army leaders could have a vested interest in presenting the condition of their army as difficult in order to induce their donors to make payments: The shortage of supplies was real.⁴ Slumps in the economy, especially from the 1630s

1 See, e.g. the defeat of the League in the Battle of Breitenfeld due to the lack of food, Anton Ernstberger, "Wallensteins Heeressabotage und die Breitenfelder Schlacht (1631)," *Historische Zeitschrift* 142:1 (1930), 41–72, pp. 61–62; for the following, cf. also Astrid Ackermann, *Herzog Bernhard von Weimar. Militärunternehmer und politischer Stratege im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Berlin, 2023).

2 According to Richelieu, "the subsistence of armies and, very often, of the state" depended on "taking care of provisions", Armand Jean du Plessis de Richelieu, *Testament de Richelieu*, ed. Françoise Hildesheimer (Paris, 1995), p. 318.

3 Michael Kaiser, *Politik und Kriegführung: Maximilian von Bayern, Tilly und die Katholische Liga im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Münster, 1999), p. 146.

4 Geoffrey Parker, *Die militärische Revolution: Die Kriegskunst und der Aufstieg des Westens 1500–1800* (Frankfurt a.M., 1990), pp. 92–97, 101–103; David A. Parrott, "Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The 'Military Revolution,'" *Militärhistorische Mitteilungen* 38:2 (1985),

onwards, also had a negative impact on troop maintenance (due to the loss of supplies, decline in production, destruction of capital, outflow of money, and the collapse of trade networks).⁵

How did army leaders deal with these challenges, what role did logistics play for an army in the early 17th century and how were these logistics organised?

Logistics, understood as “the supply of an army ..., whether in the field, on the march or in garrison or winter quarters”,⁶ thus generally encompassed “efforts to organise things”,⁷ but primarily “the supply of food and organising the routes of march and billets”.⁸ Even if supplying the troops proved difficult in some situations,⁹ politicians and military entrepreneurs were aware of its importance for army maintenance. Richelieu declared in his political testament that an army commander must also take special care of the details of equipment – for example, he must know about the possible uses of various transport wagons – and that no one was of too high a standing to take care of these tasks of army supply.¹⁰ Logistics was also an element of strategic considerations in the first half of the 17th century.¹¹ It was eminently political, as well.

7–25, p. 17; 1636 – ihre letzte Schlacht: Leben im Dreißigjährigen Krieg, eds. Sabine Eckhoff, Franz Schopper (Stuttgart, 2012), pp. 110–113; Hildegard Ernst, *Madrid und Wien 1632–1637: Politik und Finanzen in den Beziehungen zwischen Philipp IV. und Ferdinand II.* (Münster, 1991), pp. 293–301; Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), p. 562.

- 5 Markus A. Denzel, “Stockalpers internationaler Handel und Zahlungsverkehr: Versuch einer Synopse,” in *Tradition – Vision – Innovation: Hommage zum 400. Geburtstag von Kaspar Stockalper*, eds. Heinrich Bortis, Marie-Claude Schöpfer (Brig, 2013), 81–102, p. 85.
- 6 Horst Carl, “Logistik in Zeiten des Krieges: Der Kriegsunternehmer Wallenstein und das Geschäft der Heeresversorgung,” in *Wallenstein: Mensch – Mythos – Memoria*, eds. Birgit Emich et al. (Berlin, 2018), pp. 31–47, here p. 33; Robert Rebitsch, “Die Typologie der Kriegführung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg,” in *Vor 400 Jahren: Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*, eds. Robert Rebitsch, Lothar Höbelt, and Erwin A. Schmidt (Innsbruck, 2019), 27–54, pp. 39–42. All quotes originally in German and French have been translated into English for this chapter.
- 7 Chandra Mukerji, *Impossible Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on the Canal du Midi* (Princeton, 2009), p. 214.
- 8 On the time before the 20th century, see Bernd Kroener, John Childs, “Logistics,” *A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War*, ed. André Corvisier (Oxford, 1994), p. 460, who, however, assume that logistics did not become decisive until modern wars.
- 9 The military literature hardly addressed this issue, but it did list the foodstuffs that needed to be stockpiled.
- 10 Richelieu, *Testament*, pp. 319–320. See on Sweden: Jens E. Olesen, “The Swedish Power State as War Entrepreneur 1620–1660,” in *Gustav Adolf: König von Schweden: Die Kraft der Erinnerung 1632–2007*, eds. Maik Reichel, Inger Schuberth (Dössel, 2007), 49–60.
- 11 The strategy can be seen as defining goals and planning the places of deployment and use of resources, whereby political considerations and the use of force were combined, see Beatrice Heuser, *Strategy before Clausewitz: Linking Warfare and Statecraft, 1400–1830* (London, 2018).

Research has understood the logistical and supply problems in the military, that is, the “overtaxing as a permanent solution”,¹² as an ‘administrative void’ of the early modern state.¹³ However, when statements are made about a deficient statehood, they are often oriented on an ideal-typical image of the absolutist state or the nation-state of the 19th century. In comparison, the early modern states appear to be deficient. The same applies to research that transfers political science concepts of the ‘failed state’ or warlord-led wars of today to the early modern period.¹⁴ Nevertheless, links back to the state and methods of rule were important for financing war.¹⁵ Most of the armies of the time can be understood – admittedly in different forms – as ‘private-public partnerships’,¹⁶ a model that has proven successful in the long term.¹⁷

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- 12 Mark Hengerer, *Kaiser Ferdinand III. 1608–1657: Eine Biographie* (Vienna, 2012), p. 201, on the imperial side.
- 13 Gundula Gahlen, Carmen Winkel, “Militärische Eliten in der Frühen Neuzeit: Einführung,” in *Themenheft Militärische Eliten in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Gundula Gahlen, Carmen Winkel (Potsdam, 2010), 7–31, p. 14.
- 14 See Herfried Münkler, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg: Europäische Katastrophe, deutsches Trauma 1618–1648*, 8th ed. (Berlin, 2017).
- 15 On the financing of the armies of military entrepreneurs, see Parker, *Militärische Revolution*, pp. 90–92; on the financial side of army maintenance, e.g. see Herbert Langer, “Heeresfinanzierung: Produktion und Märkte für die Kriegsführung,” in *1648: Krieg und Frieden in Europa*, 1, eds. Klaus Bussmann, Heinz Schilling (Münster, 1998), 293–299; Kersten Krüger, “Schwedische und dänische Kriegsfinanzierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis 1635,” in *Krieg und Politik 1618–1648: Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven*, ed. Konrad Repgen (Munich, 1988), 275–298; Klaus-Richard Böhme, “Schwedische Finanzbürokratie und Kriegsführung 1611–1721,” in *Europe and Scandinavia: Aspects of the Process of Integration in the 17th Century*, ed. Göran Rystad (Lund, 1983), 51–58; Dieter Albrecht, “Zur Finanzierung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges: Die Subsidien der Kurie für Kaiser und Liga 1618–1635 (1956),” in *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg: Perspektiven und Strukturen*, ed. Hans Ulrich Rudolf (Darmstadt, 1977), 368–412; Hubert Salm, *Armeefinanzierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Der niederrheinisch-westfälische Reichskreis 1635–1650* (Münster, 1990).
- 16 David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 102; Philippe Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft, Verflechtungszusammenhänge, familiäre Unternehmensorganisation: Die Zurlauben als Militärunternehmer auf den eidgenössischen Söldnermärkten um 1700,” in *Soldateschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben in schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018), 211–238; Ronald G. Asch, “Albrecht von Wallenstein: Der letzte der großen Kriegsunternehmer?,” in *Wallenstein: Mensch – Mythos – Memoria*, eds. Birgit Emich et al. (Berlin, 2018), 239–252, p. 241: Since this also applies “to the administration of taxes and customs or the credit system”, this also includes the state-building process.
- 17 Parrott: *Business of War*; for the ‘private sector’ organisation of the military in the Prussian ‘company economy’, see Johannes Burkhardt, “Die Friedlosigkeit der Frühen Neuzeit: Grundlegung einer Theorie der Bellizität Europas,” *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 24:4 (1997), 509–574, p. 545; Stefan Kroll, “Kompaniewirtschaft,” in *Enzyklopädie der*

Matters of logistics and infrastructure have, however, not been studied in detail or systematically. A number of studies have looked primarily at Wallenstein and the supplying of the army by the Duke of Friedland himself and by Hans de Witte.¹⁸ In the case of the merchant and soldier entrepreneur Kaspar Stockalper, it has been shown that he was able to attain his key position not least by organising the transport routes on the Simplon and in the Valais.¹⁹ The focus is also on the supply depot system, especially in the case of France, which had already used basic features of ‘regulated depot rations’ based on a network of buildings set up for supplying troops for some time, although here too it was mainly maladministration that was alleviated.²⁰ Supply depots also

Neuzeit Online, ed. Friedrich Jaeger; Otto Büsch, *Militärsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preußen 1713–1807: Die Anfänge der sozialen Militarisierung der preußisch-deutschen Gesellschaft*, revised and expanded ed. (Frankfurt a.M., 1981). Recent research in particular has moved away from the state-oriented perspective on army provision, see the Oxford project “The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870” led by Peter Wilson and others. Available at <https://fiscalmilitary.history.ox.ac.uk/home>. Accessed 9 June 2024; Pepijn Brandon, Marjolein ‘t Hart, and Rafael Torres-Sánchez, “War and Economy: Rediscovering the Eighteenth-Century Military Entrepreneur,” *Business History* 60:1 (2018), 4–22; Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2016); *Die Kapitalisierung des Krieges: Kriegsunternehmer in Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit / The Capitalisation of War: Military Entrepreneurs in the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period*, eds. Markus Meumann, Matthias Meinhardt (Berlin, 2021).

- 18 Anton Ernstberger, *Hans de Witte: Finanzmann Wallensteins* (Wiesbaden, 1954); Langer, “Heeresfinanzierung”. The League’s ‘supply system’ had been “much more dependent on secure backward networks”, see Kaiser, *Politik*, p. 134, at the same time the question of quarters was of central relevance here, see pp. 123, 128.
- 19 Helmut Stalder, *Der Günstling: Kaspar Stockalper: Eine Geschichte von Raffgier, Macht und Hinterlist* (Zurich, 2019); Denzel, “Stockalpers internationaler Handel,” pp. 86–91.
- 20 Bernhard Kroener: “Magazin,” in: *Zyklusopädie der Neuzeit Online*, ed. Friedrich Jaeger. Available at DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_SIM_306076. Accessed 9 June 2024; idem, *Les routes et les étapes: Die Versorgung der französischen Armeen in Nordostfrankreich (1635–1661): Ein Beitrag zur Verwaltungsgeschichte des Ancien Régime* (Münster, 1980); David Parrott, *Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge, 2004). On desertions from the French army due to supply problems, see Wilson, *Thirty Years War*, p. 562.

increased the functionality and thus the strategic importance of the Spanish Road.²¹ Research has taken transport problems into account, as well.²²

Additionally, there is a lack of clarity about what consequences the supply problems had for warfare. Thus, there has been talk of a ‘dictatorship of logistics’, as military strategies would have had to be aligned according to the “possibilities of supply and resupply”²³ and logistical questions would have dominated over strategic ones,²⁴ although logistics and strategy seem to be difficult to clearly separate. Others have qualified this thesis²⁵ or primarily emphasised the failure of military projects due to the supply lines not functioning.²⁶

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- 21 Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 42–90; on the Spanish Road, see also Markus Meumann, “Spanische Straße,” in *Encyclopaedia of Modern Times Online*, ed. Friedrich Jaeger. Available at DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_SIM_352087. Accessed 9 June 2024; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500–1800*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1996), p. 80, according to which at least the Spanish army in Flanders in the second half of the century was apparently able to solve the supply problem quite well. The Habsburgs planned the construction of storage depots in Donauwörth and Worms for the campaign of 1637, Ernst, *Madrid*, pp. 300–301; however, it was not until the reign of Leopold I that military supply procedures in Austria were standardised to a greater extent, see William D. Godsey, “Stände, Militärwesen und Staatsbildung in Österreich zwischen Dreißigjährigem Krieg und Maria Theresia,” in *Bündnispartner und Konkurrenten der Landesfürsten? Die Stände in der Habsburgermonarchie*, eds. William D. Godsey et al. (Munich, 2007), 233–267, pp. 255–256.
- 22 Lothar Löbelt, “Pommerland ist abgebrannt ...’: Finanzen und Logistik in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts,” in *Sintflut und Simplicissimus: Österreich und Polen im 17. Jahrhundert*, ed. Heeresgeschichtliches Museum Wien (Vienna, 2013), pp. 64–67; Ernstberger, *De Witte*, pp. 234–236.
- 23 Rebitsch, “Typologie,” pp. 51–52; Parrott, “Strategy and Tactics”.
- 24 Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge, 1977), p. 14.
- 25 See, e.g. Hans Schmidt, “Wallenstein als Feldherr,” *Mitteilungen des Oberösterreichischen Landesarchivs* 14 (1984), pp. 249–250.
- 26 The causal relationship between the growing size of armies for the second half of the 17th century and an improvement in supply systems has also been discussed, see John A. Lynn, *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present* (San Francisco, 1993), pp. 103–107; for an emphasis on the effectiveness of the French army’s logistics system, see idem, *Giant of the Grand Siecle: The French Army 1610–1715* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 107–146; for a different perspective, cf. Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution, 1560–1660’: A Myth?,” in *The Military Revolution Debate*, ed. Clifford Rogers (Boulder, 1995), 37–54, pp. 45–48; Geoff Mortimer, “War by Contract, Credit and Contribution: The Thirty Years War,” in *Early Modern Military History, 1450–1815* (Basingstoke, 2004), p. 115.

Supply problems were also related to those of the infrastructure. A close connection between war and infrastructure has been emphasised above all for the wars of the 19th and 20th centuries.²⁷ However, infrastructure and its destruction were also relevant to the events of the Thirty Years' War, to the deployment options of the armies and to which areas were affected in what ways.²⁸ This war, too, was partly fought as a war over infrastructure, over "central facilities ... of supply",²⁹ when mills³⁰ and "hydraulic engineering" – ponds, canals, and weirs – were attacked,³¹ communication routes were also in focus in regard to

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- 27 Dirk van Laak, "Infra-Strukturgeschichte," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27:3 (2001), 367–393, pp. 373–374. Infrastructure is thereby tied to the modern state, to the existence of "concept[s]" and the "provision" of infrastructure "for anonymous use", see Dirk van Laak, "Infrastructures," 2021, in *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte*. Available at http://docupedia.de/zg/laak_infrastructures_v1_en_2021. Accessed 9 June 2024. On the purposeful development of infrastructure in the early modern period, see Christian Wieland, "Höfische Repräsentation, soziale Exklusion und die (symbolische) Beherrschung des Landes: Zur Funktion von Infrastrukturen in der Frühen Neuzeit," in *Wasserinfrastrukturen und Macht von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, eds. Birte Förster, Martin Bauch, (*Historische Zeitschrift: Beihefte*, n.s., 63) (Berlin, 2015), 187–205. See also Matthias Pohlig, *Marlboroughs Geheimnis: Strukturen und Funktionen der Informationsgewinnung im Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg* (Göttingen, 2016), pp. 90–92. On communication, see Kai Lohsträter, "an einer Minut ein großes gelegen': Militärische Kommunikation, Kriegsberichterstattung und Zeit vom 16. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert," *Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit* 21 (2017), 97–145.
- 28 A narrower definition of infrastructure, referring to "technical infrastructure with a network character that can be understood as socio-technical systems", lends itself to Jens I. Engels, Gerrit J. Schenk, "Infrastrukturen der Macht – Macht der Infrastrukturen: Überlegungen zu einem Forschungsfeld," in *Wasserinfrastrukturen und Macht von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, eds. Birte Förster, Martin Bauch, (*Historische Zeitschrift: Beihefte*, n.s., 63) (Berlin, 2015), 22–60, p. 40; this also includes "person-related structures", see Pohlig, *Marlboroughs Geheimnis*, p. 89. See also Klaus Beyrer, Andreas Weigl, "Infrastruktur," 2019, in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online*, ed. Friedrich Jaeger. Available at DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_COM_284531. Accessed 9 June 2024; for German-language studies, see Lina Schröder, *Der Rhein-(Maas-)Schelde-Kanal als geplante Infrastrukturzelle von 1946 bis 1986: Eine Studie zur Infrastruktur- und Netzwerkgeschichte* (Münster, 2017), pp. 27–38.
- 29 Van Laak, "Infra-Strukturgeschichte," p. 373.
- 30 Jörg Wöllper, "und daher/ weil es mit Hand- und Roßmühlen zimlich versehen': Getreidemühlen auf Festungen in Süddeutschland," in *Kasernen – Lazarette – Magazine: Gebäude hinter den Wällen*, ed. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Festungsforschung (Regensburg, 2012), 235–266; Jürgen Pohl, "Die Profiantirung der Keyserlichen Armaden ahnbelangendt": *Studien zur Versorgung der kaiserlichen Armee 1634/35* (Vienna, 1994), p. 60.
- 31 "Wasserbau," in *Oeconomische Encyclopädie oder allgemeines System der Staats- Stadt-Haus und Landwirthschaft*, 233, ed. Johann Georg Krünitz (Berlin, 1856), p. 574. On the destruction of pond farming, in this case in Franconia: Rudolf Endres, "Die Folgen des

postal routes. Last but not least, it was about the forts. Roads, bridges, wagons, and ships were also destroyed by the military for strategic reasons.³² Thus, by the middle of 1635, there was only one “intact Rhine bridge” in the German southwest, in Strasbourg.³³ Destruction was also caused by the inhabitants – for example, in 1632 the inhabitants of the Bohemian town of Krupka were supposed to “dig out all the carriage roads ... and throw stones on them so that they could not be driven on” in order to protect the village from soldiers.³⁴

In the following, we will therefore use the example of the Weimar army to look into logistics in war and its political implications. To this end, we will firstly look at the supply of the army by the Confederation; secondly examine the supply of the army as the subject of political disputes; thirdly ask about the supporting actors; fourthly look at transport routes and logistical problems; and finally, we will explore politically motivated resistance to military supply.

1 The Weimar Army under Duke Bernhard of Weimar

As a military entrepreneur, Duke Bernhard of Weimar (1604–39) provides an example of how variable logistical structures – adapted to the situation – were developed and infrastructures were used during the Thirty Years’ War and how this at the same time markedly affected the political sphere. In the second half of the 1630s, the duke supplied his army substantially from the Confederation. Indeed, this case exemplifies aspects of the Confederation’s indirect involvement in the Thirty Years’ War. Although older accounts saw it as a point of calm in this war,³⁵ that is, with the exception of the Prince-Bishopric of Basel, the Grisons, and the Valtellina,³⁶ for some time now, its place in the European

30jährigen Kriegen in Franken,” *Mitteilungen der Fränkischen Geographischen Gesellschaft*, vol. 35/36 (1988/89), pp. 360–361.

32 Rebitsch, *Typologie*, pp. 51–52, speaks of a “war of destruction”.

33 Georg Schmidt, “Nördlingen 1634: Die Folgen einer Schlacht für Kaiser, Reich und Nation,” *Historischer Verein für Nördlingen und das Ries* 32 (2009), 67–88, p. 83.

34 Michel Stüelers *Gedenkbuch (1629–1649): Alltagsleben in Böhmen zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, ed. Jan Kilián (Göttingen, 2014), p. 125.

35 See, e.g. Thomas Maissen, *Geschichte der Schweiz* (Baden, 2010), p. 115.

36 On this, see Andreas Wendland, *Der Nutzen der Pässe und die Gefährdung der Seelen: Spanien, Mailand und der Kampf ums Veltlin (1620–1641)* (Zurich, 1995).

constellation of powers has been discussed in more detail.³⁷ Some studies explicitly investigate the effects of the Confederation's war entrepreneurs.³⁸

The Duke of Weimar repeatedly explored various political options. In the process, he developed the supply of his army largely independently, especially during the period of his alliance with the French crown from 1635 onwards. His ultimate goals were thus to achieve as independent a military position as possible and to become a sovereign,³⁹ and his primary means of exerting pressure and exercising power always remained the army, including in the political arena.

37 This has included an illumination of the constellations of alliances, the discussions within Switzerland and imperial policy. On the politics of the *Tagsatzung*, see also Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, "Der 'Rathsschlag von Wyl': Zur Problematik der bewaffneten Neutralität der Eidgenossenschaft im Dreißigjährigen Krieg," in *Vor 400 Jahren: Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*, eds. Robert Rebitsch, Lothar Höbelt, and Erwin A. Schmidt (Innsbruck, 2019), 165–188.

38 Herman Romer, "Militärunternehmer," 2009, in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* [HLS]. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/024643/2009-11-10>. Accessed 14 February 2022; Philippe Rogger on Hans Ludwig von Erlach, in this volume among other sources; Philippe Rogger, "Erlach, Hans Ludwig von," 2015, in *Lexikon der Heerführer und hohen Offiziere des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, ed. Markus Meumann. Available at <https://thirty-years-war-online.net/prosopographie/heerfuehrer-und-offiziere/erlach-hans-ludwig-von/>. Accessed 26 January 2022; Nathalie Büsser, "Militärunternehmertum, Außenbeziehungen und fremdes Geld," in *Geschichte des Kantons Schwyz*, 3, ed. Historischer Verein des Kantons Schwyz (Zurich, 2012), 69–127; *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018); *Im Auge des Hurrikans: Eidgenössische Machteliten und der Dreißigjährige Krieg*, eds. André Holenstein, Georg von Erlach, and Sarah Rindlisbacher (Baden, 2015); André Holenstein, "Militärunternehmer, gelehrte Geistliche und Fürstendiener. Karrieremigranten als Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen im Corpus Helveticum der frühen Neuzeit," in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 154–165.

39 Bernhard had little chance of significant government participation in Saxony-Weimar. In 1633 he succeeded in becoming Duke of Franconia as a Swedish liegeman; however, at the latest with the Battle of Nördlingen in 1634, this duchy, formed from the Prince-Bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg, was lost to him again. Starting from Breisach, he subsequently strove to establish a dominion on the Upper Rhine and in Alsace. See on Tilly's goal of becoming a sovereign ruler Thomas Kossert, "Krieg für Land und Lehen: Tilly und der Casus Brunsvicensis," in *Die Kapitalisierung des Krieges: Kriegsunternehmer in Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit / The Capitalisation of War: Military Entrepreneurs in the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period*, eds. Markus Meumann, Matthias Meinhardt (Berlin, 2021), 105–118.

David Parrott has argued that logistical problems were more manageable for the Weimar army than other armies due to its comparatively smaller size and the duke's military tactics, which relied on speed.⁴⁰ The basis for Bernhard being able to act more independently than before in matters of supply from the mid-1630s onwards, and at the same time having to do so, was the total budget he received from France.⁴¹ In principle, the supply of the Weimar army was oriented towards ideas of efficiency. It was about the rapid procurement of the goods and services needed as well as their costs. This also gave Bernhard the opportunity to increase his profit.

To be sure, the duke and his commanding officers did not assume that comprehensive control was possible and did not expect it. The principle behind their actions was foresight – Richelieu spoke comparably of *prévoyance* as indispensable to a state's government.⁴² In the Weimar army, this included low-cost purchases, building up stocks (including for expected future scenarios), and a perspective on more permanent structures in order to simplify processes. However, all of this was repeatedly overtaken by the events of the war, and only rudimentarily did it go hand in hand with a fixed organisational structure or the delegation of clearly delimited areas of responsibility to the officers and members of the court. This also does not mean that modern criteria of rationality overrode aspects such as those of the class hierarchy, which was also decisive for the army.⁴³ Ultimately, the constellation of people supporting the army supply proved to be relatively effective in the case of the Weimar army. The 'Bernhardian' organisation, however, by no means reached the degree of Wallenstein's "modern systematisation of logistics".⁴⁴ The conditions for this were already different enough to make it unrealistic – the duke lacked his own territory, except for his short phase as Duke of Franconia.⁴⁵ Likewise, he is not comparable to Ambrosio Spinola as a "banker and financier" who was

40 Parrott, *Business of War*, p. 109. It is unlikely that the target number of 18,000 men was reached.

41 Lynn, *Giant*, p. 286, calls Bernhard a "large-scale contractor" of the 17th century.

42 Richelieu, *Testament*, p. 253. Ultimately, however, only God can "see the ultimate purpose of things" (p. 255); the term 'efficiency' is admittedly not a contemporary term. Kroener, Childs, "Logistics," p. 460, however, assume that there was no need for forward planning in the military of the time.

43 Linking the concept of system, also used in the following, with ideas of efficiency is not mandatory, see also Pohlig, *Marlborough's Secret*, p. 88.

44 Carl, "Logistics," p. 37.

45 After the Peace of Prague in 1635, he also had little contact with his brothers ruling in Saxe-Weimar, from which he had still obtained goods for the army in earlier years.

able to advance funds to the Spanish crown on a large scale during the Eighty Years' War.⁴⁶

2 Supplies from the Confederation

Bernhard of Weimar waged war on the Upper Rhine, Alsace, and the Franche-Comté from the mid-1630s. The initial aim was to be able to control central connecting routes in this area, to gain secure bases for his own military operations and army supplies, and to prevent actions by opposing armies. From the end of 1637 to the end of 1638, steps in this direction included the takeover of the Württemberg fortress of Hohentwiel, then moving on to Rheinfelden, Waldshut, Neuenburg on the Rhine, which is located on the Rhine between Breisach and Basel, then Freiburg and finally the Anterior Austrian fortress of Breisach on the Rhine, all of which had high military-strategic value. From Hohentwiel, the route to Switzerland could be monitored; Neuenburg and even more so Breisach made it possible to control the Rhine waterway and the border region.⁴⁷

The resources in the Upper Rhine region had been exhausted for some time because this area had been affected early and intensively by the war. Since the advance of the Swedes in 1632, this also applied to the Lake Constance region.⁴⁸ Army supplies could hardly be afforded from the war zones. The war affected the close trade links between the Confederation and imperial territories, such as the grain and salt trade across Lake Constance.⁴⁹ As a European 'transit region', however, the Alpine area remained relevant during the war – to

46 Asch, *Wallenstein*, pp. 242–245, quote from p. 244.

47 "Journal der Armee des Herzogs Bernhard von Sachsen-Weimar aus den Jahren 1637 und 1638," ed. Edward Leupold, *Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 11 (1912), 253–362, p. 266.

48 Frank Göttmann, *Getreidemarkt am Bodensee: Raum, Wirtschaft, Politik, Gesellschaft (1650–1810)* (Konstanz, 1991), p. 19.

49 Johanna Möllenberg, "Überlingen im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Die Auswirkungen des Krieges auf das Wirtschaftsleben der ehemaligen Reichsstadt," *Schriften des Vereins für Geschichte des Bodensees und seiner Umgebung* 74 (1956), 25–68, pp. 41–43; Max Messerschmidt, "Buchhorn-Hofen im Dreißigjährigen Krieg," *Schriften des Vereins für Geschichte des Bodensees und seiner Umgebung* 89 (1971), 23–48, pp. 25–26; Göttmann, *Getreidemarkt*, pp. 17–18; Eberhard Fritz, "Konrad Widerholt, Kommandant der Festung Hohentwiel (1634–1650): Ein Kriegsunternehmer im europäischen Machtgefüge," *Zeitschrift für Württembergische Landesgeschichte* 76 (2017), 217–267, pp. 260–262.

the benefit of the merchants there.⁵⁰ The warring parties took advantage of this and thus contributed to the economy that developed there, and as a result, large parts of the Confederation prospered during these years. At the same time, Switzerland became a place of refuge for people from the border region and offered itself as a shelter for animals and goods.⁵¹

Army commanders of the different parties supplied themselves here with grain and other foodstuffs, livestock, animal fodder, and war material. These parties included the imperial side,⁵² Sweden,⁵³ and France as well as protagonists such as Konrad Widerholt, the commander of Hohentwiel.⁵⁴ This led to price increases.⁵⁵ Princes,⁵⁶ commonwealths,⁵⁷ military entrepreneurs,⁵⁸ and private individuals took out loans here. The Weimar army acquired weapons and ammunition in Bern,⁵⁹ Geneva, and Zurzach.⁶⁰ Thus, it was not only the large European trading centres and transshipment points such as Amsterdam

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- 50 Denzel, "Stockalpers internationaler Handel," pp. 81–101; on the intermediate trade of the Confederates between France and Germany, see Niklaus Röthlin, *Die Basler Handelspolitik und deren Träger in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. und im 18. Jahrhundert* (Basel, 1986), p. 10.
- 51 Hermann Baier, "Akten zur Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges am Bodensee," *Schriften des Vereins für die Geschichte des Bodensees und seiner Umgebung* 44 (1915), 129–162, pp. 136, 139–140.
- 52 See also *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius*, 9, ed. Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, 1973), p. 749, Hugo Grotius to Nicolaas van Reigersberg, Paris, 11 December 1638.
- 53 See also Leonhard Haas, "Schwedens Politik gegenüber der Eidgenossenschaft während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges," *Schweizer Beiträge zur Allgemeinen Geschichte* 9 (1951), 64–160.
- 54 Fritz, "Widerholt," pp. 221, 224, 227, and 234.
- 55 *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 783, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 27 December 1638. Marini, however, was concerned here with his own salary.
- 56 Fritz, "Widerholt," pp. 224, 227.
- 57 Möllenberg, "Überlingen," pp. 35, 38, 40, and 60.
- 58 Fritz, "Widerholt," pp. 221, 234; Hans C. Peyer, "Schweizer in fremden Diensten: Ein Überblick," *Schweizer Soldat und MFD* 67:6 (1992), 4–8, p. 4.
- 59 *Quellen und Regesten zu den Augsburger Handelshäusern Paler und Rehlinger 1539–1642: Wirtschaft und Politik im 16./17. Jahrhundert*, 2, ed. Reinhard Hildebrandt (Stuttgart, 2004), p. 219, no. 528, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, 21 February 1638.
- 60 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 224, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, 17 May 1638.

or Genoa that were important as ‘hubs’ for military goods,⁶¹ but also “mid-sized centres” near the area of operation of an army.⁶²

Additionally, the Weimar army bought food on a large scale: mainly grain,⁶³ also in Geneva,⁶⁴ Bern, in Basel,⁶⁵ and Schaffhausen⁶⁶ and products such as rice, butter, oil, cheese, and wine, among other places from the Königsfelden monastery near Brugg.⁶⁷ These foodstuffs were also intended for common army supplies.⁶⁸ Confederate cantons were used as stopovers for deliveries to the duke, for example for mules, artillery horses, or cloth.⁶⁹ The army received other supplies from the Margraviate of Baden and probably from Savoy.⁷⁰ These deliveries worked quite successfully overall. However, these supply

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- 61 Marianne Klerk, “The ‘Fiscal-Military Hub’ of Amsterdam: Intermediating the French Subsidies to Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War,” in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 213–233; Julia Zunckel, *Rüstungsgeschäfte im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Unternehmerkräfte, Militärgüter und Marktstrategien im Handel zwischen Genua, Amsterdam und Hamburg* (Berlin, 1997); Oxford project “The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870” (cf. footnote 17); Hans-Wolfgang Bergerhausen, *Köln in einem eisernen Zeitalter* (Cologne, 2010), p. 83.
- 62 Langer, “Heeresfinanzierung”; on Suhl arms production, see also Georg Schmidt, *The Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Munich, 2018), pp. 278, 280.
- 63 Weimar, Hauptstaatsarchiv [LATH-HSTAW], Fürstenhaus, A 343, fols. 522r–522v, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Basel, 7 October 1638; *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, pp. 224–225.
- 64 See, e.g. *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, pp. 224–225, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, 20 May 1638.
- 65 See, e.g. *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 315, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 27 May 1638.
- 66 LATH-HSTAW, Fürstenhaus, A 343, fols. 522r–522v, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Basel, 7 October 1638; *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 225, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, 7 June 1638; on other supplying locations, see J. J. Metzger, “Die Stellung und Geschieke des Kantons Schaffhausen während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges,” *Jahrbuch für schweizerische Geschichte* 9 (1884), 109–168, pp. 146–147.
- 67 August von Gonzenbach, *Der General Hans Ludwig von Erlach von Castelen: Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild aus den Zeiten des dreißigjährigen Krieges*, 1 (Bern, 1880), pp. 12–16.
- 68 See, e.g. Adam Freitag, *Architectvra, Architectvra Militaris, Nova et aucta oder Neue vermehrte Fortification Von Regular Vestungen, Von Irregular Vestungen und Aussen wercken, von praxi Offensivâ und Defensivâ*, revised ed. (Leiden, 1642), pp. 66–67; Bonaiuto Lorini, *Fünff Bücher Von Vestung Bauwen ... In denen/ durch die allerleichtesten Regeln/ die Wissenschaftte sampt der Practick/ gelehrt wird/ wie man Städte vnd anderer örter/ vff vnterter-schiedliche Situs gelegenheit sol befestigen* (Frankfurt a.M., 1607), p. 145.
- 69 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, no. 536.
- 70 LATH-HSTAW, Fürstenhaus, A 343, fols. 522r–522v, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Basel, 7 October 1638.

chains were not secured and were subject to various kinds of disturbances. At least for a time, Switzerland was considered the only reliable supply base to ensure the survival of the Weimar army.⁷¹

The armies were watching the markets.⁷² If there was an expectation that prices would fall, purchases were often postponed.⁷³ The strategy of causing economic difficulties for the opponent or hindering his supply⁷⁴ also included targeted purchases. When the imperial side purchased wheat in Switzerland on a large scale, a representative of the Weimar army recommended that it should buy several thousand sacks of grain itself and store them in Basel, especially as the prices were favourable.⁷⁵ Conversely, according to the Swedish ambassador in France, Hugo Grotius, the imperial army allegedly bought food from the Swiss partly so that the Duke of Weimar would not receive it.⁷⁶

3 Military Supply and Politics

Since supplying the army could not be separated from political issues, it also became a topic of politics in the Confederation. Conflicts over supporting Bernhard arose in affected localities as well as in federal politics. On the one hand, this was due to the problem of ensuring the supply of 'commodities' for their own population⁷⁷ and security risks when soldiers were on site and, on

71 *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 774, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 25 December 1638.

72 See, e.g. Gotha, Forschungsbibliothek, Chart A 725, fols. 56–57v, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, 17 May 1638; Information about wheat purchases by Catholic cantons, see Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, source appendix, p. 32, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, Rötelen, 25 May 1638.

73 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, 20 May 1638.

74 See, e.g. *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 681, Hugo Grotius to Nicolaas van Reigersberg, Paris, 6 December 1638; see Kaiser, *Politik*, p. 263. On 19th and 20th century wars, see Jakob Tanner, Valentin Groebner, and Sébastien Guex, "Einleitung: Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftskriege: Forschungsperspektiven und Untersuchungsfelder," in *Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftskriege*, eds. Jakob Tanner, Valentin Groebner, and Sébastien Guex (Zurich, 2008), 9–21.

75 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 219, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Basel, 30 January 1638.

76 *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 764, Hugo Grotius to Nicolaas van Reigersberg, 18 December 1638.

77 Andreas Würzler, *Die Tagsatzung der Eidgenossen: Politik, Kommunikation und Symbolik einer repräsentativen Institution im europäischen Kontext* (Epfendorf, 2003), p. 564. Basel also set quotas on "the grain exports for purchasers from other areas of the Confederation",

the other hand, the interests of the merchants. At the level of Confederation politics, there were concerns about being more involved in the war, about the loss of room for manoeuvre and freedoms, and about alliance obligations and profit expectations. The Emperor, France, Sweden, Spain, and other powers' influences also affected the atmosphere,⁷⁸ with the dividing line primarily lying between the Protestant and Catholic cantons.⁷⁹ Foreign policy pressure and divergences of interest within Switzerland played a role here. The duke's appearance in the region, which was on the side of Sweden at the time, had already been observed in the early 1630s;⁸⁰ now his renewed rise to power was being followed. The capture of Breisach worried the Catholic cantons in particular,⁸¹ and the army's offensive approach that in part displayed military aggression upset many cantons.⁸²

Different perceptions and political actions can be seen in the case of the Prince-Bishopric and canton of Basel. The former was particularly affected by Bernhard's war. The duke used the bishop's territory for the passage of troops and as a place for his soldiers to retreat, and he had taxes that were due to the bishop collected.⁸³ The bishop then defended himself by sending petitions to the French king. Solothurn, where France had maintained a permanent representative since the early 16th century,⁸⁴ also protested repeatedly on behalf of

see Bernard Degen, "Kriegswirtschaft," 2008 in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/013781/2008-11-04/>. Accessed 9 June 2024.

- 78 Kaspar von Greyerz, "Die Schweiz während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges," in *1648: Krieg und Frieden in Europa*, 1, eds. Klaus Bussmann, Heinz Schilling (Münster, 1998), 133–140; Frieda Gallati, *Die Eidgenossenschaft und der Kaiserhof zur Zeit Ferdinands II. und Ferdinands III.: 1619–1657: Geschichte der formellen Lostrennung der Schweiz vom Deutschen Reich im Westfälischen Frieden* (Zurich, 1932).
- 79 Maissen, *Geschichte*, p. 116; Kaiser, *Politik*, p. 128.
- 80 See, e.g. *Die Eidgenössischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1618 bis 1648*, 5:2 (Basel, 1875), p. 703, Konferenz von XI Orten, Baden, 1 August 1632; *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 779, Konferenz der ev. Städte und Orte aus Anlaß der gemeineidgenössischen Tagsatzung zu Baden, 29 September 1633.
- 81 *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 112, Konferenz der katholischen Orte, Lucerne, 10–11 January 1639.
- 82 The situation in the Confederation was incredibly tense; there was a danger of war between the confessional blocs (e.g. the Kesselring trade in 1633) – I thank Philippe Rogger for this reference.
- 83 "Journal," ed. Leupold, pp. 261–263; Maissen, *Geschichte*, pp. 116–117; André Holenstein, "Transnationale Politik: Eidgenössische Machteliten und der Dreissigjährige Krieg," in *Im Auge des Hurrikans: Eidgenössische Machteliten und der Dreissigjährige Krieg*, eds. André Holenstein, Georg von Erlach, and Sarah Rindlisbacher (Baden, 2015), 51–64; Bernhard also occupied the bishop's castles Angenstein, Pfeffingen, and Zwingen. His approach was based on plans by Hans Ludwig von Erlach.
- 84 Thomas Lau, "Fremdwahrnehmung und Kulturtransfer: Der Ambassadorshof in Solothurn," in *Wahrnehmungen des Fremden: Differenzenerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. und*

the Catholic cantons to Bernhard and the French crown;⁸⁵ likewise, the apostolic nuncio Ranutius Scotti was informed.⁸⁶ Louis XIII of France admonished the duke, saying that political consideration should be given to the Catholic cantons.⁸⁷ For France, Switzerland was important not only because of its interest in the war and geostrategic matters, but also because of the Spanish-Austrian influence on the Confederation, trade issues and as a mercenary market.⁸⁸ Hardly anything changed. An episcopal envoy therefore argued in the summer of 1639 that the duke was endangering the Confederation as a whole with his warfare,⁸⁹ and the *Tagsatzung*, which emphasised Confederation cooperation, also addressed Bernhard several times by letter or by means of legations.⁹⁰

The city of Basel was just as much affected by the war because of its location on European trade routes and in the border region,⁹¹ although it experienced

17. *Jahrhundert*, eds. Michael Rohrschneider, Arno Strohschneider (Münster, 2007), 313–344.

- 85 *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1055, Konferenz der VII kath. Orten, Lucerne, 6–7 November 1637; *ibid.*, p. 1058; Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 16–18 November 1637; *ibid.*, p. 1076, Konferenz der V [*sic*] katholischen Orte, Lucerne, 26–27 March 1638; *ibid.*, p. 1115, Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Solothurn, 17–20 January 1639. On the attempt to influence him via Méliand and thus via France, see *ibid.*, p. 1055, Konferenz der VII kath. Orte, Lucerne, 6–7 Nov. 1637.
- 86 *Ibid.*, p. 1088, Konferenz der VII kath. Orte, Lucerne, 21–22 May 1638.
- 87 See among others LATH-HSTAW, Fürstenhaus, A 343, fols. 316v–317r, Louis XIII to Bernhard of Weimar, St. Germain en Laye, 18 July 1638; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Manuscrits français, no. 3767, fols. 142r–142v, Louis XIII (Sublet) to Bernhard of Weimar, Abbeville, 5 June 1639 (copy).
- 88 Lau, “Fremdwahrnehmung,” p. 315, see also p. 326.
- 89 *Abschiede*, 5:2, pp. 1135–1136, Konferenz der VI mit dem Bischof von Basel verbündeten Orte, Lucerne, 7–8 June 1639.
- 90 Thus he was ordered to vacate the possessions of the Bishop of Basel, to remove his troops from the Confederate borders and not to touch “the revenues and fruits on the Confederation’s territory”, see, e.g. Georg Müller to Hugo Grotius, Delsberg, 22 November 1637, *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius*, 8, ed. Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, 1971), p. 746; *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1058, Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 16–18. November 1637; *ibid.*, p. 1121, Konferenz der katholischen mit Spanien verbündeten Orte, Lucerne, 25–26 February 1639. See also the discussion on such an approach *ibid.*, p. 1047, Konferenz von sieben Orten, Basel, 1–6 August 1637; *ibid.*, pp. 1066–1067, Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 2 February 1638. Bernhard certainly did answer the letters, but he did not change his actions in any notable way. When it came to understanding the events, the problem of conflicting information from the Weimar as well as the imperial side also arose, *ibid.*, pp. 1097–1098, Konferenz der IV evangelischen Städte, Aarau, 16–17 August 1638.
- 91 Robert Stritmatter, *Die Stadt Basel während des Dreissigjährigen Krieges: Politik, Wirtschaft, Finanzen* (Bern, 1977); Bernard Degen et al., “Basel (Kanton),” 2016, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/007387/2016-01-13/>. Accessed 9 June 2024.

a favourable war economy.⁹² There, too, the actions and demands of the Weimar army were viewed with concern, for example in the summer of 1637 when its commissioner General Bernhard Schaffelitzky von Mukadell demanded that the city let him buy grain for a favourable price.⁹³ In the end, however, the army did not only obtain grain from Basel.⁹⁴ The Council also repeatedly allowed the army to have bread baked in the city,⁹⁵ French subsidies were delivered here,⁹⁶ and the duke maintained storage depots in the city – as well as in other places.⁹⁷

The imperial side threatened consequences through various channels because of the Protestant cantons' support of the duke. Among other measures, envoys of the emperor complained to the *Tagsatzung*.⁹⁸ They claimed that Bernhard had received “about 10,000 pieces of fruit, 1,000 barrels of salt and several thousand slabs of bacon” as well as ammunition from Basel.⁹⁹ The Confederation was to stop any material support for the emperor's opponents.¹⁰⁰ Basel, which at the same time was conducting “lucrative business” with the Habsburg commandant's office in Breisach,¹⁰¹ declared itself unable

92 Susanna Burghartz, “Das ‘Ancien Régime,’” in: *Basel: Geschichte einer städtischen Gesellschaft*, eds. Georg Kreis, Beat von Wartburg (Basel, 2000), 116–148, pp. 122–123.

93 *Abschiede*, 5:2, pp. 1041–1042, Gemeineidgenössische Jahrsrechnungstagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 28 June–18 July 1637. The considerations focussed on how to get rid of the soldiers.

94 LATH-HSTAW, Fürstenhaus, A 343, fols. 522r–522v, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Basel, 7 October 1638, also with regard to horse feed; *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, pp. 224–225.

95 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, pp. 224–225.

96 “Straßburg, den 17. Dito [Juni 1639]”, *Wochentliche Post-Ordinari-Zeitung*, June 17, 1639.

97 *Abschiede*, 5:2, pp. 1128, 1133, Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 27 March–5 April 1639. They must have incurred storage costs accordingly. Supplies were also stored on Hohentwiel; for other storage depots, see e.g. *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 737, Hugo Grotius to Nicolaas van Reigersberg, Paris, 5 December 1638.

98 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, pp. 202–203, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, n.d. [after 16 January 1637]; on threats made by General Götz to the Swiss cantons, see *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 326, Hugo Grotius to Nicolaas van Reigersberg, Paris, 28 May 1638.

99 *Abschiede*, 5:2, pp. 1128–1129, see also pp. 1126–1127, Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 27 March–5 April 1639; *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1125, Konferenz der katholischen Orte, Lucerne, 22–23 March 1639.

100 *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1123, Konferenz der IV evangelischen Städte, Aarau, 15 March 1639.

101 Tobias Büchi, “Die Festung Basel im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Leitbilder, Ausführung und Rahmenbedingungen,” in *Basel und der Dreißigjährige Krieg: Zuwanderung, Zerstörung, Festungsbau und neue Konzepte im Städtebau und Bauwesen Europas vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Daniel Schneller, Guido Lassau (Basel, 2021), 26–46, p. 43. As Büchi writes, these deals did not remain “secret”, or at least not for long.

to do so; it argued with its geography and the military power of France as well as Sweden; moreover, its own trade had to continue.¹⁰²

Protestant locations' support for the duke ran through more or less indirect channels, ranging from permission to manufacture products for the army and purchase goods for it, to export permits¹⁰³ or permission to transport goods to army bases, to not preventing purchases and deliveries to the army. This was partly due to partisanship for the Protestant side, but was also a reaction to Bernhard's alliance with France, with whom there had long been agreements in the Confederation, as well as to his continuing connections with Sweden¹⁰⁴ and his potential to exert military pressure.¹⁰⁵ To outsiders, it was argued that the respective suppliers conducted their business as private individuals.¹⁰⁶ In order to circumvent trade or purchase bans, the army made purchases through intermediaries; and deliveries often were declared misleadingly.¹⁰⁷ This seemed expressly advisable so that the situation would not escalate politically even within Switzerland.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, the Swedish commander James Ramsay covertly supported the French-occupied Ehrenbreitstein fortress with grain transports.¹⁰⁹

The individual cantons also negotiated directly with the Weimar army. Zurich allegedly assured as early as the end of 1637 that the Swiss would

102 *Abschiede*, 5:2, pp. 1128–1129, see also pp. 1126–1127, Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 27 March–5 April 1639.

103 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 225, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, 7 June 1638.

104 Astrid Ackermann, "Schweden, Bernhard von Weimar und sein oberrheinisches Fürstentum (1636–1639)," in *Die Schweden im deutschen Südwesten: Vorgeschichte – Dreißigjähriger Krieg – Erinnerung*, eds. Ralph Tuchtenhagen, Volker Rödel (Stuttgart, 2020), 201–231.

105 Cooperation between the armies and the authorities or professional organisations also existed in occupied territories, not least in order to organise the collection of tribute with as little conflict as possible, see Alexander Zirr, "Leben und Handeln unter fremder Herrschaft: Handlungs- und Handelsspielräume der Leipziger Bürgerschaft während der schwedischen Besetzung 1642–1650," in *Mitten in Deutschland, mitten im Krieg. Bewältigungspraktiken und Handlungsoptionen im Dreißigjährigen Krieg*, eds. Astrid Ackermann, Julia A. Schmidt-Funke, Markus Meumann, Siegrid Westphal (Berlin, 2024), 235–273.

106 Fritz, "Widerholt," p. 235. See also *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1127, Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 27 March–5 April 1639.

107 E.g. under the name 'von Nidau,' see *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 225, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, 20 May 1638.

108 *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 27 May 1638; see also *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 10 June 1638.

109 Schmidt, *Reiter*, p. 494.

“conclude or undertake nothing against the duke’s army”.¹¹⁰ The Swedish side later assumed that Bern would supply the duke with everything he needed;¹¹¹ “our Bernese are doing a good job supplying provisions to the Duke of Weimar”, declared the news correspondent Charles Marini.¹¹² Last but not least, Bern was important in the siege of Breisach.¹¹³ Nevertheless, the Weimar army had repeatedly tried to obtain weapons and ammunition from Bern without success, since the “Council want[ed] to remain completely neutral in these matters”. Moreover, the Bernese themselves lacked military equipment, claimed the Council.¹¹⁴

The duke’s actions were characterised by the combination of political and trade measures. He used indirect access to decision-makers and merchants through members of his army, flanked by mediation through people in political office¹¹⁵ and thus made use of possibilities of political informality.¹¹⁶ At the same time, he sought to simplify the procedure of negotiating with various places by trying to initiate negotiations with the *Tagsatzung* and the special conference of the Protestant cantons in Aarau in order to obtain general regulations for purchases and transports. The regulations were sought to avoid the costly and time-consuming individual case arrangements and the ‘back and forth’ sending of mail, people, and goods. His attempts were not successful,

110 *Briefwisseling*, 8, ed. Nijhoff, p. 745, Georg Müller to Hugo Grotius, Delsberg, 22 November 1637.

111 *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius*, 10, ed. Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, 1976), p. 69, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 31 January 1639; *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 433, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 7 July 1638.

112 *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 755, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 16 December 1638; see *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 768, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 23 December 1638.

113 *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 768, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 23 December 1638. He associated this with the hope that with the surrender of Breisach, the other Protestant cantons would also increase their supplies to the army.

114 And “nothing can be obtained from private persons, and the merchants also have nothing to spare”, see Forschungsbibliothek, Chart A 725, fols. 28–29v, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, 21 February 1638; Bern, Burgerbibliothek Bern [BBB], Manuscripta historica helvetica [Mss.h.h.], xxvii/88, no. 59. Others, like Zurich, also had to preserve “the favour of both parties”, see *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 702, Charles Marini to Hugo Grotius, Zurich, 17 November 1638.

115 On these structures, see also Astrid Ackermann, “Strategien für den Krieg: Das diplomatische Netzwerk Herzog Bernhards von Weimar,” in *Wissen und Strategien frühneuzeitlicher Diplomatie*, eds. Stefanie Freyer, Siegrid Westphal (Berlin, 2020), 135–164.

116 Philip Hoffmann-Rehntz, “Die Geschichte politischer Informalität: Ansätze und Perspektiven neuerer Forschungen,” *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 42:4 (2015), 661–673. On the ability to blackmail trade, see Bergerhausen, *Köln*, p. 19. In this, the Duke of Weimar also relied on mechanisms of securing loyalty through patronage.

however, not even after he called in the French ambassador in Solothurn, Blaise Méliand.¹¹⁷ Pressure was also put on the Swiss with the threat of a trade boycott. At times, the Weimar side considered a blockade of Swiss salt imports.¹¹⁸

4 Organisers and Traders

At its core, Bernhard's organisation was oriented on people when it came to supplies, as well: Supplying the army and the personal business of the duke were incumbent on a circle of confidants that changed over the course of time. Their tasks were not formalised to any great degree and often overlapped. They had to procure goods, organise their transport, ensure the transfer of the necessary funds, and carry out political work in the background. The duke tried to maintain control; he often gave orders to have a task carried out and had the results reported to him.¹¹⁹ The high-ranking employees could hope for profits, power, land, and for their family's position to be strengthened.

The relevant members of the circle were Hans [Johann] Ludwig von Erlach and Marx Conrad von Rehlingen [Rehlinger] as well as Joachim von Wicquefort¹²⁰ and Bernhard Schaffelitzky. The Bernese von Erlach, who

117 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, p. 16, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, [Schloss] Beuggen, 16 March 1638; Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, p. 17, Hans Ludwig von Erlach to Bernhard von Weimar, n.p., 27 [March] 1638; Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 19–20, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, in camp by Freiburg, 31 March 1638. However, even later the *Tagsatzung* was hardly suitable as a forum for resolving trade conflicts, see Röthlin, *Basler Handelspolitik*, p. 80.

118 LATH-HSTAW, Fürstenhaus, A 344, fol. 23r, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Basel, 2 January 1639. Switzerland imported salt mainly from Franche-Comté until 1637, then from France and Austria, see Würzler, *Tagsatzung*, pp. 564–565. Imports of salt became more expensive for many places anyway due to the war.

119 See, e.g. BBB, Mss.h.h.XV. 29, p. 105 (Correspondence Erlach-Bernhard von Weimar et al.), Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, in camp by Freiburg, 31 May 1638.

120 On Wicquefort, see Pierre-François Burger, "Res angusta Domi, les Wicquefort et leurs Métiers bien délicats entre Paris, Amsterdam et Pärnu," *Francia* 27:2 (2000), 25–58; "Wicquefort, Abraham and Joachim de," in *The Peace of Westphalia: A historical Dictionary*, eds. Derek Croxton, Anuschka Tischer (Westport, 2002), 321–322; Louise van Tongerloo, "Beziehungen zwischen Hessen-Kassel und den Vereinigten Niederlanden während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges," *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte* 14 (1964), 205–209. Wicquefort, an important contemporary merchant banker with good connections in the Dutch Republic, which was a centre of the arms trade, helped organise the transfer of French subsidies and handled commercial transactions, see e.g. LATH-HSTAW, Fürstenhaus, A 342, fols. 113r–115v, Joachim von Wicquefort to Bernhard von Weimar, Amsterdam, 14 July 1637; LATH-HSTAW, Fürstenhaus, A 342, fols. 167r–175v, Joachim von Wicquefort to Bernhard von Weimar, Amsterdam, 15 September 1637.

became Bernhard's agent in 1637, had been responsible for procuring military supplies as a major general since 1638; it was through him that the duke had access to the complex political fabric of the Confederation,¹²¹ local authorities, and merchants; he became Bernhard's most important diplomat.¹²² On this basis, von Rehlingen organised purchases and the transport of food and armaments for von Erlach. Von Rehlingen – who came from an Augsburg patrician family active in long-distance trade, worked for the Heilbronn League and had international contacts with banking and trading houses – unintentionally became the army's "treasurer and paymaster, master storeman and munitions director, Particular Commissaria and rations officer".¹²³

For purchases and supplies, the army worked with various businessmen. Among the more significant ones was Alexander Ziegler, who had branches in Schaffhausen and Lyon and supplied several warring parties.¹²⁴ In the interests of his trade, he also mediated between the duke and Ziegler's home town of Schaffhausen.¹²⁵ Grain was delivered by other traders such as the company of the Leret family¹²⁶ and the Basel merchant Ringler.¹²⁷ Merchants'

121 Andreas Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft: Die Casati als spanisch-mailändische Gesandte in Luzern und Chur (1660–1700)* (Zurich, 2015), pp. 141–142. It remains unclear whether the duke was aware that the cantons decided on the implementation of the *Tagsatzung's* decisions.

122 He can stand for how military entrepreneurs often followed the "little formalised diplomacy" of the Confederation, see Holenstein, "Militärunternehmer," p. 155.

123 Cited in Reinhard Hildebrandt, "Einleitung," in *Quellen und Regesten zu den Augsburger Handelshäusern Paler und Rehlinger 1539–1642: Wirtschaft und Politik im 16./17. Jahrhundert*, 2, ed. Reinhard Hildebrandt (Stuttgart, 2004), 15–40; Franz Josef Schöningh, *Die Rehlinger von Augsburg: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Wirtschaftsgeschichte des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts* (Paderborn, 1927), pp. 52, 42–43, and 45–49. Rehlingen himself invested heavily in the Dutch trading companies, the VOC and the WIC, see Klaus Weber, "Deutschland, der atlantische Sklavenhandel und die Plantagenwirtschaft der Neuen Welt (15. bis 19. Jahrhundert)," *Journal of Modern European History* 7:1 (2009), 37–67, p. 43.

124 See e.g. Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 14–16, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, n.p. [probably 26/27 February 1638]. On Ziegler, see Michel Guisolan, "Ziegler, Alexander," 2015, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/021732/2015-11-17>. Accessed 16 March 2022; Karl Schmuki, "Alexander Ziegler," *Schaffhauser Beiträge zur Geschichte* 68 (1991), 236–242.

125 See also Metzger, "Stellung," pp. 146–147, after the Battle of Rheinfelden, the Schaffhausen Council had welcomed Bernhard not far from the city.

126 LATH-HSTAW, Fürstenhaus, A 344, fol. 24v, delivery order dated 3 February 1639.

127 Bernhard Röse, *Herzog Bernhard der Große*, 2 (Weimar, 1829), p. 213; BBB, Mss.h.h.xv. 29, pp. 104–105, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, au Faubourg de Fribourg, 29 March 1638.

establishments also became temporary facilities for safekeeping, for example when the merchant family Abel Socin kept cash for Bernhard.¹²⁸

5 Transports

The Rhine itself and the Aare, which flows into the Rhine at Koblenz in north-western Switzerland, played an important role in the duke's war during these years. The navigable waterways are also considered by researchers to have been the most favourable supply routes in financial and organisational terms.¹²⁹ While Wallenstein set up his early operations along the Elbe to supply himself from his Duchy of Friedland and was able to make the river the basis of large-scale territorial control through "fortifications and supply depots" along its course,¹³⁰ the imperial armies used the Danube and the Rhine for their supplies on the Upper Rhine.¹³¹ Bernhard then had goods brought from Zurich or Geneva to Laufenburg, from Geneva to Rheinfelden, or from Pontarlier across the Aare and then close to Laufenburg on the Rhine. Repeated positional gains by the imperial troops limited this, however.¹³² In addition, many

128 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 224, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, 17 May 1638.

129 On the transport routes, see among others, Pohl, *Profiantirung*, pp. 55–61; Rebtsch, "Typologie," p. 41; Höbelt, "Pommernland," p. 64; Walter Krüssmann, *Ernst von Mansfeld (1580–1626): Grafensohn, Söldnerführer, Kriegsunternehmer gegen Habsburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Berlin, 2010), p. 506. For examples of particularly long transport routes, see Ernst, *Madrid*, p. 296; Robert A. Stradling, "Spain's Military Failure and the Supply of Horses, 1600–1660," *History* 69 (1984), 208–221, p. 213; on the use of sea access, see William P. Guthrie, *The later Thirty Years War* (Westport, 2003), p. 59. On the discussion about the use of waterways or land routes for the (early) Middle Ages, see Pierre Fütterer, "Wasserstraße oder Landweg? Neue Befunde zu einer alten Streitfrage," in *Flusstäler, Flussschifffahrt, Flusshäfen: Befunde aus Antike und Mittelalter*, eds. Peter Ettl, Achim T. Hack (Mainz, 2019), 61–78, pp. 65–66.

130 Johannes Burkhardt, *Der Krieg der Kriege: Eine neue Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2018), p. 115; Ernstberger, "Wallensteins Heeressabotage," pp. 46, 57; Pohl, *Profiantirung*, p. 73.

131 Even though the maintenance of the towpaths along the Rhine had been neglected due to the war, see Höbelt, "Pommernland," pp. 64–65; Hermann Kellenbenz, "Das Verkehrswesen zwischen den deutschen Nord- und Ostseehäfen und dem Mittelmeer im 16. und in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts," in *Trasporti e sviluppo economico, secoli XIII–XVIII*, ed. Anna Vannini Marx (Florence, 1986), 99–122, p. 103.

132 In order to obtain the *pasports* of Strasbourg for the other direction, which all the troops needed, he too relied on the political path, Schaffalitzky was therefore sent to the city, see *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 62, Hugo Grotius to Nicolaas van Reigersberg,

places were not accessible by water or only to a limited extent,¹³³ so that goods had to be transported over longer distances by wagons and oxen or horses, which required more time and incurred higher transport costs.¹³⁴ However, the temporary bridges that were repeatedly erected could also be used for these deliveries.¹³⁵

Not infrequently, there were transport shortages: At the beginning of 1639, the duke wanted to send “summer seed, barley and oats” on a large scale from the Pontarlier area but did not know how to solve the transport problem.¹³⁶ When considering sourcing salt for the Weimar troops from salt works in Burgundy, once again transport proved to be the real problem. The situation seemed critical at the end of 1638, when an attack by the Duke of Lorraine seemed imminent and Bernhard needed extensive supplies for his camp in Neuenburg on the Upper Rhine as well as provisions to be able to supply Breisach, which he had been besieging since the summer, to a “large extent” after the expected capture.¹³⁷ The grain was there, but there was a lack of ships, carts

Paris, 30 January 1638; not least, the duke sought to gain influence through influential pro-French citizens and scholars.

- 133 Also Leipzig and Nuremberg, see Manfred Straube, *Geleitswesen und Warenverkehr im thüringisch-sächsischen Raum zu Beginn der Frühen Neuzeit* (Göttingen, 2015), p. 430.
- 134 See also the transport routes, some of which were unusable for army goods, e.g. in the run-up to the Battle of Rheinfelden against the Duke of Weimar, the imperial army brought ammunition and provisions through stretches of the Upper Black Forest on pack horses because carts could not cope with the roads, see Ernst Münch, *Geschichte des Hauses und Landes Fürstenberg: Aus Urkunden und den besten Quellen*, 3 (Aachen, 1832), pp. 5–7, Count Friedrich Rudolf von Fürstenberg to Archduchess Claudia [after 3 March 1638].
- 135 Bernhard repeatedly had makeshift bridges built, see e.g. BBB, Mss.h.h.xv. 29, p. 126, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, in camp by Neuburg, 2 June 1638. Such makeshift and dismountable ship bridges were also passed among allies, see *Briefe des Herzogs Bernhard von Weimar und des Landgrafen Wilhelm V. von Hessen an den Reichskanzler Axel Oxenstierna* (Stockholm, 1895), p. 250, Bernhard von Weimar to Axel Oxenstierna, Gross-Gerau, 23 November 1634. Parker considers these bridges to be particularly cheap, see Parker, *Army of Flanders* (Cambridge, 1972), p. 82; in contrast, cf. Schmidt, “Wallenstein,” p. 250.
- 136 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 134–135, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, [presumably Pontarlier] [shortly after 14 January 1639]; Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, p. 189, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, Pontarlier, 19 June 1639; *Briefwisseling*, 10, ed. Nijhoff, p. 83, Dietrich de Groot to Hugo Grotius, Pontarlier, [7] February 1639.
- 137 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, p. 118, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, 24 November 1638; LATH-HSTAW, Fürstenhaus, A 343, unpaginated, Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, 7 October 1638.

or waggons¹³⁸ and military escorts. After all, military supply or cash transports had to be accompanied by escorts for security reasons.¹³⁹ Grain and flour were to be brought from Brugg across the Aare and then down the Rhine by 12 ships. Since their trading partner Zimmermann could not get away from there, von Erlach was to send “quite quickly to Basel the spitz ships” suitable for both uphill and downhill travel and to “order the major at Neuenburg that as soon as a spitz ship arrives there from upriver, he should unload it into another of the large ones, send it down, and let the spitz ship go back upriver.”¹⁴⁰ In addition, horses were to bring as much bread and flour as possible from Colmar to the camp.¹⁴¹ A little later, the duke suggested to Erlach that the duke send him a dozen good carriages and the dragoons of the late Rhinegrave Johann Philipp for this purpose. Likewise, projectiles and ammunition were to be sent to Neuenburg and to the Benfeld camp.¹⁴² However, the provision transports from Colmar never came. It therefore became all the more important that the ships loaded by Zimmermann could pass; in camp, the bread rations had already been halved.¹⁴³ Finally, the duke himself felt compelled to intervene and travelled to Rheinfelden to have ships loaded there immediately.¹⁴⁴

138 An “efficient transport industry” had developed since the late Middle Ages, see Mark Häberlein, “Fuhrleute, Säumer, Flösser und Schiffer: Logistische Probleme und Praktiken der Augsburger Welser und Fugger im 16. Jahrhundert,” in *Ferrum: Nachrichten aus der Eisenbibliothek* 88 (2016), 28–37, p. 29. For implementation and protection, army units (sometimes large ones) or residents were used in part. On the organisation of escorts, see also Ernstberger, *De Witte*, pp. 229–230, 234.

139 See, e.g. *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 225 (comment on doc. 536); Ernst, *Madrid*, p. 301. They should also not be used for a “predetermined day”, see Henri Duc de Rohan, *Le parfait capitaine: Autrement l’abrégé des guerres de Gaule des commentaires de César*, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Osnabrück, 1972), pp. 331–334. For attacks on supply wagons, stations and routes as part of war tactics, see e.g. Peter H. Wilson, *Lützen* (Oxford, 2018), pp. 51, 54–55. Besides the transport of cash, the transport of weapons was particularly risky.

140 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, p. 99, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, Rheinfelden, 9 November 1638; see *ibid.*, p. 97, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, Rheinfelden, 8 November 1638. Elsewhere there is talk of 13 ships.

141 *Ibid.*, p. 101, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, Rheinfelden, 10 November 1638.

142 *Ibid.*, p. 107, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, Neuenburg, 25 November 1638; *ibid.*, pp. 111–112, Bernhard’s secretary, Michael John to Obristleutnant Thomas Kluge, Neuenburg, 20 November 1638.

143 *Ibid.*, p. 111, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, Neuenburg, 19 November 1638. He was to immediately send as many ships as possible. There was “enough” personnel to man them.

144 *Ibid.*, p. 117, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, Hüniger Schanze, 24 November 1638; *ibid.*, pp. 19–20, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, in camp by Freiburg, 31 March 1638.

6 Actions of Resistance

The direct and indirect war aid to Bernhard also met with resistance from the Swiss side beyond the political-diplomatic protests and prohibited deliveries. However, threats of military action were not taken seriously: The Swedish court councillor Georg Müller, who worked for the duke, stated ironically that “one should not hope that they [the Swiss] should strike”, otherwise it would “make for a strange show”.¹⁴⁵ Other measures such as supply restrictions and confiscations nevertheless had an impact on the Weimar army. Like other authorities, the localities tried to prevent subjects from buying goods looted and offered again by soldiers;¹⁴⁶ they wanted to break this cycle and the incentive system for the soldiers. The Catholic cantons obstructed trade with the forest towns (*Waldstädte*) conquered by Bernhard¹⁴⁷ and at times threatened to cut off deliveries via the Aare.¹⁴⁸ Last but not least, there was resistance to Bernhard’s customs policy – and that resistance also came from Zurich, Basel, and Schaffhausen. In order to generate revenue, he had arranged for customs duties to be increased after the capture of Breisach and had established a new customs post near Neuenburg.¹⁴⁹ This was common policy,¹⁵⁰ but it burdened trade and made the transport of goods more expensive.¹⁵¹ Even after the war, overall trade on the Rhine remained severely restricted. Complaints were also made that the toll booth commanders acted on their own authority and

145 *Briefwisseling*, 8, ed. Nijhoff, p. 746, Georg Müller to Hugo Grotius, Delsberg, 22 November 1637. On the discussion of a violent reaction to Bernhard’s actions, see *Abschiede*, 5:2, pp. 987–991, Konferenz der evangelischen Orte und Zugewandten, Aarau, 18–21 September 1634.

146 *Abschiede*, 5:2, pp. 1068, 1128, Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 2 March–1638 April 1639. A reference to mandates in the empire, see Schormann, *Krieg*, p. 107.

147 *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1077, Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 11–17 April 1638.

148 Sebastian Burkart, *Geschichte der Stadt Rheinfelden bis zu ihrer Vereinigung mit dem Kanton Aargau* (Aarau, 1909), p. 416.

149 *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1121, Konferenz der katholischen mit Spanien verbündeten Orte, Lucerne, 25–26 February 1639; *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1133, Konferenz der IV evangelischen Städte, Aarau, 6 May 1639.

150 In 1637, customs duties had been increased under Archduchess Claudia of Austria; see also e.g. Bergerhausen, *Köln*, pp. 269–276.

151 Complaints about interference with navigation on the Rhine by the Anterior Austrian commander of Breisach, Reinach, and Widerholt, see *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1048, Konferenz von sieben Orten, Basel, 1–6 August 1637; *ibid.*, p. 1155, Konferenz der Städte Zürich und Schaffhausen, Restenbach, 26 December 1639.

collected tolls of varying amounts; apparently, they also took bribes.¹⁵² During this time, Rehlingen even issued the “permit for the ships going downriver” from Basel.¹⁵³ However, when Basel planned to impose customs duties on deliveries to the Weimar army, as well, Rehlingen proposed an exemption in view of the importance of the city for the army.¹⁵⁴

Likewise, deliveries of goods for the duke were blocked or confiscated. For example, the bailiff of the County of Baden requisitioned “several barrels of gunpowder and Lenten food” that were intended for Bernhard.¹⁵⁵ The French ambassador intervened on Bernhard’s behalf but received evasive answers. Various cantons declared that they were not responsible; they were also only aware “that this cargo had been unloaded in an unusual place in a thicket, bypassing customs and denying the goods at the usual customs point at Kaiserstuhl on the eight governing cantons’ land on the other side of the Rhine”.¹⁵⁶ The Swiss *Tagsatzung*, to which the ambassador turned with the demand that the ammunition be handed over, argued with tax law: The delivery had been identified neither as goods of the duke nor of the French king and had been “confiscated from customs as contraband” and was therefore “to be awarded to the fiscus”. It maintained the fiction that these were actions by individuals, as ammunition could not be transported without official approval.¹⁵⁷

While the Confederation’s cantons were striving for a balance in the structure of the warring parties, the duke expected more from them: From his point

152 Ibid., p. 1124, March 1639.

153 Ibid., p. 1124, Konferenz der IV evangelischen Städte, Aarau, 15 March 1639. However, von Rehlingen had not had permission to settle in Basel. The Protestant cantons therefore wanted to turn to Major General von Erlach, see *ibid.*, p. 1130, Konferenz der evangelischen Orte während der gemeineidgenössischen Tagsatzung in Baden, March 1639.

154 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 234; see Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 12–13, Bernhard von Weimar to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, in camp by Rheinfelden, 7 February 1638.

155 *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1072, Konferenz von Zürich, Bern, Luzern, Freiburg und Solothurn, Solothurn, 16 March 1638. The bailiff asked Catholic cantons for recommendations on what to do, see *Die Eidgenössischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1618 bis 1648*, 5:2/11 (Basel, 1877), p. 703, Abschied 850a, 1638. See *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1074, Konferenz der IV evangelischen Städte, Aarau, 23–24 March 1638. In Klingnau on the Aare, a ship with grain for the duke had been stopped.

156 *Abschiede*, 5:2, p. 1072, Konferenz von Zürich, Bern, Luzern, Freiburg und Solothurn, Solothurn, 16 March 1638; *ibid.*, p. 1074, Konferenz der IV evangelischen Städte, Aarau, 23–24 March 1638.

157 *Ibid.*, p. 1077, Gemeineidgenössische Tagsatzung der XIII Orte, Baden, 11–17 April 1638. In order not to risk any impairment of trade (including by the duke or France), a distinction was to be made between freely tradable goods and arms and ammunition when transporting goods for a warring party, see *ibid.*, pp. 1074–1075, Konferenz der IV evangelischen Städte, Aarau, 23–24 March 1638.

of view and that of those around him, the Confederation cultivated an annoying inclination towards peace. His advisers had nevertheless warned him.¹⁵⁸ Even after Breisach's capitulation, the Protestant cantons were largely reticent. The balance of power was developing uncertainly, and a ruler in Breisach who was possibly dependent on France was not an attractive prospect for Switzerland.¹⁵⁹

7 Conclusion

The war entrepreneur Bernhard of Weimar and army leadership had almost no state structures to fall back on to alleviate the almost omnipresent difficulties in supplying the army even though they were supported by France and Sweden and tried to take advantage of the Swiss political system. The duke himself was essentially an actor outside state structures.¹⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the fluid transition between 'private' and 'state' spheres of influence became apparent in the case of army supply and the actors supporting it. Bernhard's closer 'working environment' – the court, the officers, and military businessmen – was profit-oriented, whereby the businessmen in particular also invested a great deal and took risks. These associates organised the war with their connections to merchants and bankers in the political-diplomatic sphere associated with them and to high-ranking military officers of allies. Some connections between them continued after the duke's death in 1639¹⁶¹ and proved to be beneficial to their careers.

158 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, pp. 202–203, Marx Conrad von Rehlingen to Bernhard von Weimar, Bern, n.d. [after 16 Januar 1637]; *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius*, 17, ed. Henk J.M. Nellen (The Hague, 2001), p. 441, Hugo Grotius to Georg Müller, n.p., 8 December 1637.

159 *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale illustrantia*, 6, eds. Bohumil Bad'ura et al. (Prague, 1978), pp. 277–278, Henry Lehlin to Ludwig Camerarius, n.p., 8 January 1639.

160 And to that extent also removed from the fiscal-military state with its particularly high military expenditures which was to develop after the Thirty Years' War with the development of standing armies, see *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Fiscal-Military State c. 1648–1815: Contours and Perspectives*, eds. William D. Godsey, Petr Maťa (Oxford, 2022); William D. Godsey, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power: Lower Austria in a Fiscal-Military State 1650–1820* (Oxford, 2018). This fiscal-military state also remained primarily limited to the great powers, see Hamish Scott, "The Fiscal-Military State and International Rivalry during the Long Eighteenth Century," in *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe: Essays in honour of P.G.M. Dickson*, ed. Christopher Storrs (Aldershot, 2009), 23–54.

161 For example between Erlach and Rehlingen or his family, see BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII. 53; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.3 (Correspondence Erlach-Rehlinger). Alexander Ziegler also had contacts with Erlach even later. Rehlingen sought to use his connection to Grotius for one of his sons.

Their networks and the political-military exercise of power brought access to markets and enabled the mobilisation of existing resources.¹⁶² Cooperation with various traders in the cantons of the Confederation was admittedly born not least out of necessity because it had become difficult to obtain supplies from other neighbouring areas. At the same time, however, it lent itself to this purpose due to its geographical proximity and proved practicable because of the river routes; Switzerland was also suitable as a hub for the war material trade due to its connection to larger trading and financial centres such as Lyon. The Swiss federal trade barriers could be circumvented. Indirectly, these diverse trade relations also had the effect of spreading risk. The Weimar army did not achieve a stabilisation of trade relations and logistical processes. The supply organised by the army command nevertheless had a much stronger planning character than the elements of the “informal war economy”¹⁶³ which also contributed to supply: random spoils such as the captured supplies of an enemy¹⁶⁴ or officially covered raids on merchants and their goods.¹⁶⁵ The Weimar army primarily used existing infrastructures for its warfare. The use of rivers, moorings and harbours, existing ships and wagons, fortifications, roads and the markets was at the same time a question of power.¹⁶⁶ In addition, infrastructure was expanded or created such as the reinforcement of fortresses like Breisach, Joux, or Hohentwiel, the use of transportable bridges and the construction of supply depots. As “logistical work with ‘strategic’ purposes”, they served “military ends quite explicitly”.¹⁶⁷ The Weimar army attempted to respond to the logistical overload of the army regarding matters of supply with specific, new adaptations. This lack of logistical capacity remained a general problem even

162 Markus Meumann, Matthias Meinhardt, “Einleitung,” in *Die Kapitalisierung des Krieges: Kriegsunternehmer in Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit / The Capitalisation of War: Military Entrepreneurs in the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period*, eds. Markus Meumann, Matthias Meinhardt (Berlin, 2021), 5–46, p. 40.

163 Tanner, Groebner, and Guex, “Einleitung,” p. 13.

164 See, e.g. *Briefwisseling*, 9, ed. Nijhoff, p. 522, Bernhard von Weimar to Hugo Grotius, Mittenweyer [Wittenweiher], 11 August 1638. He had captured “all supplies and supply wagons” of the army of Savelli and Goetz; see Fritz Redlich, *De praeda militari: Looting and Booty 1500–1815* (Wiesbaden, 1956).

165 See the army journal: “Numerous ‘new pistols’ were captured during a looting of ‘merchants’ goods that wanted to go to the fair in Rheinfelden and to Breisach”. On the participation of officers, see Michael Kaiser, “Generalstaatliche Söldner und der Dreißigjährige Krieg: Eine übersehene Kriegspartei im Licht rheinischer Befunde,” in *Krieg und Kriegserfahrung im Westen des Reiches 1568–1714*, ed. Andreas Rutz (Göttingen, 2016), 65–100, pp. 74–76.

166 Engels, Schenk, “Infrastrukturen der Macht”.

167 On Colbert, see Mukerji, *Impossible Engineering*, p. 214.

after the Thirty Years' War,¹⁶⁸ although the economic calculations associated with logistical issues intensified.¹⁶⁹ While Wallenstein's system involved a clear limitation of the army's mobility,¹⁷⁰ Bernhard did not restrict his military radius on the basis of a fixed logistical structure.

The close link between military supply and politics is particularly visible in the case of the Duke of Weimar, who waged war outside a territory of his own. On the side of the Confederation, opportunities and constraints such as profit expectations are evident; ultimately, pragmatism dominated. The profiteers were especially high-ranking members of the military leadership such as the duke himself or von Erlach and merchants such as Ziegler. Increased security and clearing the places occupied by Weimar troops, which was partly hoped for in the Confederation after the death of the duke, failed to materialise, however, under the generals who succeeded Bernhard in the command of the army and entered the service of France.¹⁷¹

168 See also Mortimer, "War by Contract," p. 116.

169 On Vauban's considerations on the supply of fortified squares, see Michèle Virol, *Vauban: De la gloire du Roi au service de l'État* (Seyssel, 2003), p. 167.

170 Carl, "Logistik," pp. 38, 42; van Creveld, *Supplying War*, p. 10. Comparable considerations apply to the French army in the second half of the century, see Lynn, *Giant*.

171 They also did not vacate the Delsberg Valley, the castles of the Bishop of Basel, see *Abschiede*, 5:2, pp. 1152–1153, Konferenz der katholischen Orte, Lucerne, 3–6 November 1639.

Feeding Breisach: Hans Ludwig von Erlach's Fortress Management and Military Enterprise in the Thirty Years' War

Philippe Rogger

1 Introduction

Despite the increasingly important role played by fortified towns from the 16th century onwards, previous studies of military history have neglected the challenges that fortresses posed in terms of military enterprise.¹ Accounts of how armies were supplied and wars were funded in the early modern period rarely touch on the administrative and entrepreneurial aspects of fortress management in any depth.² Far more attention is paid to the construction of fortresses, military tactics and technology, the staged resupply (*Etappen*) system, the maintenance of order and security, 'garrison society', and the relationship between garrisons and the local population than to how fortresses were supplied with war-critical resources.³ But fortresses and their garrisons were

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- 1 Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 6–44.
 - 2 See for example Bernhard Kroener, *Les Routes et les Étapes: Die Versorgung der französischen Armeen in Nordostfrankreich (1635–1661): Ein Beitrag zur Verwaltungsgeschichte des Ancien Régime* (Münster, 1980); Carlos Álvarez-Nogal, "Centralised Funding of the Army in Spain: The Garrison 'Factoría' in the Seventeenth Century," in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden, 2014), 235–259; Astrid Ackermann, "Die Festung – Verpflegungswesen und Ausrüstung," in *Die Festung der Neuzeit in historischen Quellen*, ed. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Festungsforschung (Regensburg, 2018), 253–265; see also the index entries on 'fortresses' and 'garrisons' in David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012).
 - 3 Christopher Duffy, *The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494–1660* (London, 1979); Kroener, *Routes*; *Beiträge zur Geschichte der frühneuzeitlichen Garnisons- und Festungsstadt*, eds. Hans-Walter Herrmann, Franz Irsigler (Saarbrücken, 1983); Parker, *Revolution*; Stefan Kroll, *Stadtgesellschaft und Krieg: Sozialstruktur, Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft in Stralsund und Stade 1700 bis 1715* (Göttingen, 1997); Beate Engelen, *Soldatenfrauen in Preussen: Eine Strukturanalyse der Garnisonsgesellschaft im späten 17. und im 18. Jahrhundert* (Münster, 2005); *Festung und Innovation*, eds. Harald Heppner, Wolfgang Schmale (Bochum, 2005); Julien Alerini, "Forteresses et insécurité publique: Mise en ordre et désordres des États piémonto-savoyards

key strategic and infrastructural factors in early modern warfare,⁴ and fortress management involved complex administrative and logistical demands. The fortresses themselves needed to be maintained and their garrisons furnished with various resources, while any passing troops had to be supplied with food and materials. Both factors presented fortress commanders with specific infrastructural challenges, solving which required a knack for administration, an extensive mercantile network and access to financial capital. The present essay seeks to address this gap in the literature by examining the military entrepreneurial activities of fortress commander Hans Ludwig von Erlach (1595–1650), which are well documented in historical sources. In the Thirty Years' War, von Erlach served first under Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar (1604–39) and then under the king of France as governor of Breisach, an important fortress in Breisgau.

Von Erlach's administrative and entrepreneurial activities in Breisach have been reconstructed based on the collection of his private documents held by the Burgerbibliothek Bern.⁵ This extensive collection, with over 120 manuscript volumes, mainly comprises correspondence (which has been systematically indexed). Only some of the documents, including various lists, tables, and bills/accounts, relate to military enterprise in the strict sense. But it is characteristic of military enterprise that it cannot be neatly disentangled from other areas. The Bern collection shows the myriad intersections that existed between economics and enterprise, family and kinship, politics and power, diplomacy, religion, and foreign affairs, which defy attempts to apply sharp analytic distinctions between the categories. However, the sheer abundance of material forces us to restrict the scope of our investigation, and so this essay focuses on selected administrative and entrepreneurial aspects of the fortress's management.

(1559–1610),” in *Sicherheitsprobleme im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert: Bedrohungen, Konzepte, Ambivalenzen*, eds. Horst Carl, Rainer Babel, and Christoph Kampmann (Baden-Baden, 2019), 443–465; Sven Externbrink, “Von Richelieu zu Vauban: Sicherheit, Festungen, Grenzen und Strategie im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV.,” in *Sicherheitsprobleme im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert: Bedrohungen, Konzepte, Ambivalenzen*, eds. Horst Carl, Rainer Babel, and Christoph Kampmann (Baden-Baden, 2019), 213–239.

4 Katrin Keller, “Festungsstadt,” 2019, in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online* [EN]. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_SIM_264351. Accessed 3 May 2021; Stefan Kroll, “Garnisonsstadt,” 2019, in *EN*. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_SIM_268506. Accessed 3 May 2021.

5 Bern, Burgerbibliothek Bern [BBB], *Manuscripta historica helvetica* [Mss.h.h.], xv.29–43, xxvii.1–107a. On the collection's history, see Hans Ulrich von Erlach, *800 Jahre Berner von Erlach: Die Geschichte einer Familie* (Bern, 1989), p. 248.

It begins by briefly introducing von Erlach and the fortress of Breisach that he commanded (second section). The third section then describes the many and varied logistical challenges he faced as the fortress's governor, while the fourth discusses the mercantile network he was part of and that he relied on for procuring supplies, making payments, and obtaining loans. The fifth section concerns von Erlach's private investments in connection with his position as fortress commander.

2 Hans Ludwig von Erlach: Governor of Breisach

Hans Ludwig von Erlach came from one of Bern's old, influential patrician families.⁶ After war broke out in 1618, he initially served under German Protestant princes, and later under Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden as colonel and quartermaster general. In 1627, he returned to Bern, where thanks to his family and military experience he quickly rose to high political and military office. That same year, 1627, he was elected to the Grand Council and two years later, in 1629, the Small Council. In 1633, he assumed chief command of the Bernese militias in Aargau. The same year, he purchased the bailiwick of Kasteln near Schinznach (also in Aargau). His political and military duties for his home city did not prevent him from pursuing a military career in the service of foreign, anti-Imperial powers. In 1630, he served France as a regimental commander, and then in 1635 entered the service of Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who (initially for Sweden and later for France) fought the Habsburg emperor in Alsace and Sundgau.⁷ Holding high political office in Berne while simultaneously serving in the military on the French/Protestant side led to conflicts of loyalty, especially as the 1630s saw the theatre of war drift dangerously close to the Swiss border. In 1632, the Swedish invaded Alsace, and in 1635 France too made a military intervention in the High/Upper Rhine region. Von Erlach played a key part in the Swiss Confederacy eventually becoming directly embroiled in the events of the war along its northern border on the High Rhine. It was he who advised Duke Bernard to occupy the Prince-Bishopric of Basel, an Imperial principality that was also an allied canton (*Zugewandter Ort*) of the Swiss Confederacy,

6 August von Gonzenbach, *Der General Hans Ludwig von Erlach von Castelen: Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild aus den Zeiten des dreißigjährigen Kriegs*, 1–3 (Bern, 1880–82); Marco Jorio, "Erlach, Johann Ludwig von," 2005, in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/019678/2005-11-15>. Accessed 25 March 2021.

7 Astrid Ackermann, "Schweden, Bernhard von Weimar und sein oberrheinisches Fürstentum (1636–1639)," in *Die Schweden im deutschen Südwesten: Vorgeschichte – Dreißigjähriger Krieg – Erinnerung*, eds. Volker Rödel, Ralph Tuchtenhagen (Stuttgart, 2020), 201–231.

and station troops there. The gifted military tactician also planned the conquest of the Fricktal and the Further Austrian ‘forest towns’ (*Waldstädte*) of Rheinfelden, Säkingen, Laufenburg, and Waldshut. The campaign took place in early 1638 across the territory of Basel and represented a massive border violation. Bern came under increasing pressure due to the close ties between von Erlach and the duke. In the Swiss Confederacy’s Catholic cantons, which for denominational reasons sympathised with the Imperial side, there was great antipathy towards von Erlach due to his service for the Protestant forces. In late April 1638, von Erlach stood down from Bern’s Small Council so as to continue his military career under Duke Bernard. Holding the rank of major general in the Weimar army, he then took part in the siege of Breisach, a Further Austrian fortress on the banks of the Rhine.⁸ The fortress linked the Austrian holdings in Alsace and Breisgau, and was of key strategic importance for the anti-Imperial forces as a potential staging point for attacking Bavaria and Upper Swabia. The control of Breisach was also of concern to Spain, which had a strong interest in being able to make unrestricted use of the ‘Spanish Road’ to move troops and transport critical supplies between northern Italy and the Netherlands.⁹ In December 1638, Weimar troops took the fortress after an eight-month siege. Bernard flatly rejected France’s demand to cede the conquered territory to the French crown. The duke instead planned to establish a Weimarian principality in Alsace and along the banks of the Upper Rhine, with Breisach as its capital.¹⁰ After Breisach fell to Bernard, he appointed von Erlach the fortress’s governor without consulting the French court. The duke underscored his sole claim to the conquest by refusing to station French occupying forces in the fortress.¹¹ Why did he choose a Swiss, von Erlach, as his governor? There are probably several reasons for this. Von Erlach’s Swiss birth and political and mercantile ties in the Confederacy were likely actually factors in his favour. Switzerland had a crucial role to play not just for moving and quartering troops, but also for supplying Bernard’s forces.¹² Another factor that undoubtedly helped secure von Erlach the appointment was his exceptional military skills, from which the

8 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 12–184; André Holenstein, “Transnationale Politik: Eidgenössische Machteliten und der Dreissigjährige Krieg,” *Berner Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 77 (2015), 51–64, pp. 55–58.

9 Claude Dulong, *Mazarin et l’argent: Banquiers et prête-noms* (Paris, 2002), p. 151; Holenstein, “Transnationale Politik,” pp. 55–56; Ackermann, “Schweden,” pp. 204, 217.

10 Ackermann, “Schweden”.

11 Günther Haselier, *Geschichte der Stadt Breisach am Rhein: 1. Halbband: Von den Anfängen bis zum Jahr 1700* (Breisach, 1969), p. 372; Dulong, *Mazarin*, p. 151.

12 See the contribution by Astrid Ackermann in this volume and Astrid Ackermann, “Strategien für den Krieg: Das diplomatische Netzwerk Herzog Bernhards von Weimar,” in

duke had repeatedly benefited.¹³ Von Erlach's diplomatic experience and contacts were a final point in his favour. By that point, he had already undertaken two diplomatic missions to the royal court in Paris: in 1634–35 in the service of the Reformed cities of Zurich, Bern, and Schaffhausen, and in spring 1638 on behalf of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar. He also had connections with the Swedish resident in Alsace and the French ambassador to the Swiss Confederacy.¹⁴ The project of a Weimarian principality on the Upper Rhine came to an abrupt end, however, with Bernard's death in the summer of 1639. But that was no impediment to von Erlach's career. In the duke's will, von Erlach was named one of four directors who would share command of the Weimar army after Bernard's death.¹⁵ Von Erlach remained commander of the fortress until he himself died in 1650. During that time, Breisach first passed to French control (treaty of 29 September/9 October 1639) and was then wholly ceded to France following the ratification of the Treaty of Münster,¹⁶ while von Erlach rose up the ranks, becoming lieutenant general (1647) and commander of the French forces in the Empire (1649). The fact that von Erlach was kept in post as governor of Breisach even under French rule is testament to how highly the French crown regarded the Swiss émigré's administrative, diplomatic, and military abilities.¹⁷

3 Logistical Challenges

3.1 *The Wider Context*

Fortresses were of high strategic importance when it came to securing militarily contested regions and resupplying armies. As Geoffrey Parker notes,

The 'military revolution' had, in effect, created strategic problems to which there was no easy solution. A heavily defended fortress or town, sheltering perhaps 10,000 men and supported by lesser strongholds in the vicinity, was far too dangerous to be left in the wake of an advancing army: it had to be taken, whatever the cost. And yet there was no shortcut to capture, however powerful the besieging army might be. This simple paradox rendered battles more or less irrelevant in all areas where the

Wissen und Strategien frühneuzeitlicher Diplomatie, eds. Stefanie Freyer, Siegrid Westphal (Berlin, 2020), 135–164, p. 155.

13 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, p. 175.

14 Ackermann, "Strategien," pp. 155–157; Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 28–32.

15 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 351.

16 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 511–518; Haselier, *Geschichte*, p. 414.

17 See Kroener, *Routes*, pp. 45–46.

new fortifications were built, except (as often occurred) when they were fought between a besieging army and a relief column, so that the result decided the outcome of the siege.¹⁸

Well-organised logistics was thus a key strategic element to successfully defending a fortress, which required “a functioning system for the provision of food and a secure supply of necessary equipment”.¹⁹ It was essential to prevent any supply bottlenecks, which in the worst-case scenario could force a besieged fortress to surrender.²⁰ However, in the second half of the 17th century, it was still not common practice to maintain food reserves – with the exception of France, which had systematically operated *magasins* since the mid-16th century.²¹ It was not just during a siege that poor resource management could have grave consequences. Commanders who failed to pay their soldiers or feed them properly (cutting their bread ration, for instance) could expect disquiet or unrest among the troops. In the worst-case scenario, resource shortages could spark mutinies, as von Erlach discovered in Breisach in 1644 when the French garrison troops staged a violent uprising against the military command due to pay arrears and reduced bread rations.²² So the internal and external security of a fortified town depended not just on maintaining and extending the fortifications; it was equally important to ensure that the troops stationed at the fortress and any units passing through had adequate food and quarters.²³

As fortress commander, von Erlach had a key role in organising and procuring supplies. He was responsible both for calculating the quantities that were needed and for organising the supply flows as economically as possible.²⁴ Some initial evidence of this can be seen in the Weimarian and French decrees of appointment. Duke Bernard’s decree of 20 December 1638 gave Major General von Erlach, in his function as governor, “control and command not just over this town and fortress but all our surrounding garrisons”, and ordered him

18 Parker, *Revolution*, p. 16.

19 Ackermann, “Festung,” p. 253; on logistics in general, see Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (New York, 1977); *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, ed. John A. Lynn (Boulder, 1993); John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army 1610–1715* (Cambridge, 1997).

20 Bernhard Kroener, “Magazin,” 2009, in *EN*. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_SIM_306076. Accessed 16 June 2021.

21 Kroener, “Magazin”; Ackermann, “Festung,” p. 253.

22 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 375–383, 429–430; Haselier, *Geschichte*, pp. 396, 399–401.

23 Kroener, *Routes*, p. 46.

24 For a general account of the role of a governor, see Kroener, *Routes*, pp. 45–48.

to do everything necessary for the maintenance of these garrisons and strengthening of the regiment, as well as for administration, effective justice, transportation of food, extension of the fortifications, ordering of artillery and in sum whatever else circumstances demand, and to do what he and our other councillors who have been left behind deem good to cultivate the land and restore good order, and to inform us forthwith of any changes affecting the garrisons until we decree otherwise as well as to report immediately any news that is received, and to conduct himself in all matters in accordance with the adroitness for which he is known and our firm trust. And we order all our senior and junior officers, commissaries and officials from this and our other surrounding garrisons to defer to and obey our general in each and every of these matters.²⁵

The decree gave von Erlach control and military command over the territory under his governorship. For present purposes, the most important part is his duty to maintain and expand the military infrastructure (fortifications) and supply the fortress with munitions and food. After Breisach passed into French control, von Erlach was confirmed in the post of governor by a French decree of 1639;²⁶ this decree, however, was extremely vague about the governor's logistical duties. A supplementary document dated 28 November 1639 was worded just as imprecisely, and merely affirmed that he had the same status as the previous governors under Austrian rule. However, it does include a list of the towns belonging to Breisach and placed their garrisons' officers under his

25 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 129–130 (Urkunde 66): “Die Oberaufsicht und Comando nicht allein über hiesiger Stadt und Vestung sondern auch alle umliegende unsere Garnisonen aufgetragen und dabei befohlen, daß er Alles was zur Erhaltung gedachter unserer Garnisonen und Bestärkung des Regiments, wie auch Administration, guter Justiz, Beförderung des Proviants, Vortsetzung der fortifikation, Bestellung der Artillerie, und in Summa was die Nothdurft und Gelegenheit der Zeit, wie auch andere Umstände sonsten erheischen werden, fürnehmen und verrichten, was von Ihme und andern Unsern hinterlassenen Räthen zu Bestellung des Landes, und Wiederaufrichtung guter Polizei für gut befunden wird, handhaben, und so etwas einfiele so die Aenderung der Garnisonen antreffen möchte, Uns dasselbe alsobalden zu vernerer Unserer Verordnung avisiren, wie auch dasjenige was von Kundschaften einkommen würde unverzüglich berichten, und sich in allem was, seiner bekannten dexterität und Unserm Vesten Vertrauen nach, verhalten solle. Und befehlen darauf allen unsern hohen und niedern Kriegsofficieren, Commissarien und Beamten, dieser und anderer Unser umliegenden Garnisonen, daß sie vorbemeldten unserm General in allen und jeden obgedachten Sachen pariren und gehorsamen sollen.”

26 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 1–2 (Urkunde 1). The document is dated 29 July 1639, but von Erlach only entered French service on 12/22 October 1639, *ibid.*, p. 2.

command.²⁷ The principal towns and places were Freiburg, Neuenburg, Rheinfelden, Laufenburg, Thann, Landskron, Säckingen, and Hohentwiel.²⁸ When Breisach passed to France, the conditions of von Erlach's governorship changed significantly. He went from enjoying relative independence and wide-ranging authority as Duke Bernard's representative to being subject to orders from the military administration of a major power, which had a clear hierarchical structure and a chain of command that led right to the French court.²⁹ Clashes over rank and authority were inevitable, especially with the *lieutenant du roi* that France installed in Breisach (whose appointment prompted von Erlach to complain to Cardinal Richelieu in March 1640 and threaten his resignation).³⁰ For instance, it was the *lieutenant du roi* who collected contributions in the area under von Erlach's command and had discretion over how to spend the funds provided by France to maintain the garrisons and fortifications.³¹ His control over all the crown's financial matters regarding the fortress was a source of considerable tension. Von Erlach was unhappy with the financial mismanagement (pay arrears, erratic use of funds) by the first *lieutenant du roi*, Paul Le Prévost, Baron d'Oysonville (1606–77), which led to great personal hostility between the two men and eventually to d'Oysonville's dismissal.³² He was succeeded in 1645 by Pierre de Charlevoix.³³ By contrast with the French military administration, von Erlach probably only had direct dealings with Breisach's mayor and town council on rare occasions. The auditor general and town major (local commander) served as the main intermediaries between the army and the civic authorities. The billeting of soldiers, the *corvée* imposed on the town's residents (transporting goods, manual labour), the townspeople's demands for the walls to be repaired, and officers' use of private land led to frequent conflicts between town and governor.³⁴

27 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 2–3 (Urkunde 2).

28 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 6–7. On von Erlach's relationship with his subordinate commanders of the associated fortresses, see the example of Konrad Widerholt (1598–1667), commander of Hohentwiel, in Roland Kessinger, Jörg Wöllper, *Festung Hohentwiel: Wehrbaukunst und Festungsalltag am Beispiel einer württembergischen Landesfestung* (Petersberg, 2021), pp. 88–108.

29 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 3–5.

30 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, p. 71.

31 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 270, 329.

32 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 69–71, 108, 268, and 364–372; Haselier, *Geschichte*, pp. 394–396.

33 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 418–419, 432–439; Haselier, *Geschichte*, pp. 396–397.

34 Haselier, *Geschichte*, pp. 382–383, 393. See on this point BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, pp. 7–10, 39–40 (complaints about quartering of soldiers and contributions), 543–545, 547–549.

3.2 *Documenting War-Critical Supplies and Services*

The main logistical challenge for a fortress commander was to keep constant track of complex flows of goods, and so precise records were kept of critical resources in the fortress of Breisach and the garrisons belonging to it. These resources included people (soldiers, specialists), money (coin, loans), materials (weapons, munitions), information, and services.³⁵ Just how meticulous the record-keeping was is illustrated by a volume of Erlach's documents entitled "Breisach: / Herein the [struck out: sentry records] ordinances and / decrees. / Forms *du serment de fidélité* / Homage or oath of allegiance".³⁶ This title might be somewhat misleading as to the volume's content: it does indeed contain oaths, watch ordinances and other material such as court records, petitions, correspondence, and decrees. But it also includes a series of documents that systematically catalogue war-critical resources and precisely enumerate the costs and the quantities consumed. The documents in the volume are chronologically arranged and cover the period from 1639 to 1650.³⁷ There are some gaps, such as inventories of armaments for Breisach and the fortified towns.³⁸ However, it is entirely possible that these inventories and other documents relevant to the fortress's logistics can be found in other volumes. Whether von Erlach dealt with procurement of the resources himself or delegated the task to secretaries, commissaries or *gardes*, is not always clear from the records. However, as governor of Breisach he was responsible for the transactions and made sure to document transfers of critical resources and services, to regularly take inventories and to maintain archives of the catalogues, lists and tables that were produced.³⁹ The purpose of this record-keeping was not merely to provide evidence to his superiors of his administration of the fortress, but also to allow him to procure the necessary supplies and to identify the restrictions and options he had to work with when planning military strategy. In this key

759–764 (town residents' demands for land farmed by officers to be returned), and 847–850 (appointment of town major).

35 See Peter H. Wilson, "Competition through Cooperation: The European Fiscal-Military System, 1560–1850 (Inaugural lecture at the University of Oxford, 30 January 2017)," 2017. Available at <https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/article/peter-h-wilson-inaugural-lecture>. Accessed 17 June 2021.

36 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.47, Breisach: / Hiebey die [gestrichen: Wachten verzeich= / nußen] Ordinantz[en] und / Decreta. / Forme du serment de fidélité / Huldigung od[er] Pflichteidsform, various hands (*Kurrent*, roman).

37 Only the first document in the volume dates from 1632.

38 See Guido von Büren, Andreas Kupka, "Die Inventare zur Armierung der Festung Jülich aus dem 17. Jahrhundert," in *Die Festung der Neuzeit in historischen Quellen*, ed. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Festungsforschung (Regensburg, 2018), 79–105.

39 See Kroener, *Routes*, pp. 45–53.

military location, the effectiveness of military infrastructure depended crucially on keeping track of available resources, and so the meticulous record-keeping was also a sophisticated form of security management.⁴⁰

3.2.1 Cash Flows

Several sets of accounts detailing income and expenses shed light on the fortress's finances. They provide a relatively precise picture of how much money was coming into the fortress and what it was used for. The fortress's official tax accounts (*Generaleinnehmeramtsrechnung*) from 25 September 1639, dating from the Weimarian period, show income of around 30,750 guilders since the taking of Breisach in December 1638,⁴¹ compared with expenditure of around 30,330 guilders. The income is made up of taxes (agricultural levies, departure tax), sales, fines, various tolls and duties, and funds provided by Marx Conrad von Rehlingen (on whom more below). The money was spent on fortifications, exterior building works and entrenchments, food, arsenals, soldiers' wages, a payment to von Rehlingen, the bridgmaster, salaries for councillors and other officials, fees, travel costs, and debts (*Extanzen*).⁴² According to the "Estat de la Recepte et despense des garnisons du gouvernement de Brisac", in 1643 (i.e. during the French period) the income amounted to 713,270 livres.⁴³ This income was made up of quarterly payments from Paris (412,000 livres in total), contributions (149,200 livres), *les daces*⁴⁴ (32,070 livres), wine levies (20,000 livres), *extraordinaire* (40,000 livres), and grain levies (60,000 livres). Expenses, meanwhile, came to 465,380 livres for the garrisons and infantry. The difference of 247,890 livres ("left with the treasurers of the King or of Lord

40 For von Erlach, written records were a vital tool to guide his decisions and help him navigate a highly complex military and strategic environment. In this respect, the record-keeping in Breisach differs fundamentally from that of Maximilien Titon (1632–1711), an arms supplier who used opaque, sometimes chaotic record-keeping to enrich himself at the expense of the French crown, see Guy Rowlands's chapter in the present volume.

41 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 119.

42 A document listing the "extraordinary expenses" for the French army in 1638 and 1639 illustrates some of the other costs that could be incurred: bread rations, oats, hand mills, sacks, ships, artillery horses, recruitment measures, fees for postal services, messengers, and scouts, BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, pp. 199–207. On other expenses, such as the "Frais pour les vendanges et Tonneliers", see BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 835, *Estat de la despense Extraor[dinai]re faite à la Chambre de Brisac l'année dernière 1646*.

43 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 459. The following quotes *ibid*.

44 This was a tax "qui se leve sur le peuple", see the article "Dace," 1694, in *Le Dictionnaire de l'Académie française*. Available at <https://www.dictionnaire-academie.fr/article/A1D0003>. Accessed 28 November 2021.

d'Oysonville") was to be used to settle debts: "Out of this amount [the *tresorier du roi* or *lieutenant du roi*] may satisfy the garrisons with what is their due from the army [for] 1643." A comment at the end of the accounts provides further detail: "And to make this more clearly seen, the state of the expenditure of the whole governorship of Breisach rose to 49,210 livres per month, which makes 590,520 [livres] in twelve months. / If these 590,520 livres are deducted from its receipts, it is left with 122,750 [livres] to pay the taxation of the commissaries and other exceptional expenses." To help plan for the future, lists of expected income and expenses were drawn up.⁴⁵ Planning and accounting periods were divided into three-month blocks ("premier quarter", etc.). Alongside the quarterly payments from the French court, the expenses were mainly covered with contributions from the various garrisoned towns.⁴⁶ In the first quarter of 1646, income comprised a payment from the French court of 103,000 livres, contributions from Rheinfelden (12,516 livres), Laufenburg (5,700 livres), Tann and Neuenburg (5,865 livres), and the *daces* tax (6,924 livres).⁴⁷ In the second quarter, the quarterly payment from the court (103,000 livres) was supplemented by contributions from Laufenburg (5,500 livres), Rheinfelden (7,268 livres), Delémont (3,506 livres), Huningue (2,941 livres), Neuenburg (3,428 livres), Tann (7,815 livres) and Dachstein (6,580 livres), and by *daces* (7,439 livres). The contributions were meticulously broken down by individual municipality and *Talschaft* (i.e. the inhabitants of a valley, *Tal*, considered collectively). For instance, Fricktal, which came under the town of Rheinfelden, paid 481 reichsthalers in January and February and 225 in March, while Säckingen paid 125 and 85 reichsthalers respectively. While income for these two quarters came to around 281,486 livres, there were 295,023 livres in expenses for the various garrisons, the cavalry, "taxation of the commissaries and controllers", "conversions", "exceptional expenses", and reserves "kept for the commissaries' and controllers' man" and "kept for money conversion", resulting in a deficit of some 13,537 livres.

3.2.2 Technical Expertise: Engineers and Builders

In December 1638, immediately after Weimarian forces took the fortress, von Erlach summoned fortification experts to Breisach to bring the town's defences up to date. This transfer of military expertise cut across borders: taking advantage of his good relations with Bern, he asked his home city for permission to

45 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.47, pp. 775–778, Supputation pour le payement du premier quartier de l'année 1646 des garnisons du gouvernement de Brisach.

46 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.47, pp. 721–722.

47 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.47, pp. 779–787. The following information and quotes *ibid.*

engage the services of the engineer Wolf Friedrich Löscher.⁴⁸ He also hired the French Huguenot Jean-Jacques de Serres, who since May 1638 had also been advising the Reformed cities of Bern and Zurich on fortress engineering.⁴⁹

It was not just the fortress of Breisach that von Erlach was responsible for maintaining; in 1641, he presented plans to d'Oysonville for works to strengthen the fortifications in Waldshut, which von Erlach deemed to be urgently needed.⁵⁰ Sometimes, plans for fortification works had to be submitted to specialists at the French court. In March 1641, for instance, the French secretary of war, François Sublet de Noyers (1589–1645), requested that von Erlach “send the plan and elevation of the Breisach Gate to Monsieur the First Architect of the King, so that he can rectify it if need be.”⁵¹

Back in Breisach, the governor drew on the expertise of builders and craftsmen to make the engineers' plans a reality. In 1639, Matthias Staudt and a ‘Cornelius’ served as master builders in Breisach. Rather like a principal contractor, they billed von Erlach for the fortification and entrenchment work carried out by various craftsmen (masons, carpenters, joiners, brickmakers, lime-burners, cartwrights, blacksmiths, saddlers, ropemakers, etc.) and soldiers, for the services of stable hands, messengers and boatmen, and for materials for nails, paper, pens, ink, and hay for the oxen.⁵² Investment in the fortification and entrenchment work was high, and was precisely documented under French rule too. The payments for fortification work (*massonnerie et terre*) made at the order of d'Oysonville and the *trésorier general des fortifications de France*, François Genffronneau, came to around 130,274 livres for Breisach between 1640 and 1642, around 1,333 livres for Freiburg between 1640 and 1641, around 3,041 livres for Neuenburg between 1640 and 1642 and around 16,140 livres for Rheinfelden and 5,664 for Laufenburg in the same period.⁵³

48 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 130–131 (Urkunde 67).

49 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 185–186; Alfred Mantel, *Geschichte der Zürcher Stadtbefestigung*, 1 (Zurich, 1919), pp. 39–40.

50 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 102–103.

51 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, p. 103 (note 2).

52 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.47, pp. 45–52, 189–196 (bill from Matthias Staudt, May to December 1639), and 179–186 (bill from Cornelius, January to December 1639).

53 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.47, pp. 463–466. *Ibid.*, p. 463: “Estat au vray de la depense faicte par Mr. Francois Geoffronneau, Cons[eil]ler du Roy, trésorier gen[er]al des fortifications de France par les mains de son Commis p[ou]r le payem[en]t des fortifica[tions] tant de massonnerie que de terre de Brisac, Fribourg, Neubourg, Rhinfeld et Lauffenbourg pendant les années 1640, 1641 et 1642, suivant les ordres de Mons. le Baron d'Oysonville, Lieutenant de Roy au gouvernement de Brisac, pays et places en dependantes, ainsi qu'il en suite.”

3.2.3 Soldiers

The fortress's troop strength was key to its military readiness, and so the numbers of men were regularly reviewed. Muster rolls of garrisons,⁵⁴ companies,⁵⁵ and specialists (artillery)⁵⁶ and documentation of troops' pay⁵⁷ occupied an important place in the fortress's record-keeping. A summary for November 1640 lists the number of German and French companies, their respective strength, monthly wage costs and the contributions and subsidies that went towards these costs for the garrisons in Breisgau, Sundgau, the *Waldstädte*, and the Bishopric of Basel (see Table 2.1).

According to this summary, in November 1640 there were a total of 3,874 men serving in the governorship of Breisach. This figure remained more or less constant over the years. In June 1647, the occupying troops in Breisach, Laufenburg, Rheinfeld, Landskron, Pfeffingen, Huningue, Neuenburg, Thann, Stollhofen, and Hohentwiel came to 3,580 men (3,526 men divided into 41 companies plus 70 cavalymen and an artillery company). The governor's staff, incidentally, included von Erlach's nephew Colonel Sigmund von Erlach (1614–99), who commanded the garrisons in Landskron, Pfeffingen, and Huningue.⁵⁸

3.2.4 Weapons, Munitions, Powder, and Fuses

The analysed volume does not contain sensitive information about armaments in the fortresses under von Erlach's governorship. But it does include numerous lists of assembly places,⁵⁹ a list of strategically important locations (towers, gates) that served as powder or weapon stores or artillery stations (*sozu der Artilleria*) and an inventory of supplies held in the *zuer Dannen* arsenal and in the vault of the *Kupfertor*.⁶⁰ In terms of logistics, the lists documenting the use and cost of munitions, powder, and fuses are of particular interest. In Breisach,

54 See for example BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, pp. 739–741, Muster Roll. Vber folgende Compagnien des königl. Breisachischen Gouuernements, 16, 17, and 18 September 1645.

55 See for example BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 79, Obristen Hattsteins Compagnie ist gemustert, n.d.

56 See for example BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 518, Extract vber die in der vestung Breÿsach vnnd anderen dar zu geherigen Guarnisonen, befindliche Artillerie Personen wie solche bey beschehener Musterung den 28. Febr. A[nn]o 1644 befunden worden.

57 See for example BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, pp. 233–235, Waß iede Lehung vff nachgesetzter Guarnisonen an gelt ergethet, vnd wie selbige bezahlt werden.

58 Gonzenbach, *General*, 3, p. 33 (note 1). On the French king's giving Sigmund command of an infantry regiment, see Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, p. 423.

59 See for example BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 5, Verzeichnuß der Alarmen Plätz allhier in Breisach A[nn]o 1639.

60 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, pp. 255–264; see also *ibid.*, p. 685, Extract Waß noch vor Puluer in den Puluer Thürmen alhier sich befindet, 25 September 1644.

TABLE 2.1 Summary of the garrisons in Breisgau, Sundgau, the Waldstädte, and the Bishopric of Basel in November 1640

Garrison	Companies	Troop strength	Monthly wages (reichsthalers/ batzen)	Monthly contributions (reichsthalers/ batzen)	Subsidies (reichsthalers/ batzen)
Breisach	10 French	972	2,969	–	–
	9 German	916	2,979/6	–	–
			Total 5,948/6		
Freiburg	6	542	1,774/15	725	1,049/15
Neuenburg	2	185	650/9	28/12	621/21
Rheinfelden	4	427	1,579/12	1,373/12	–
Delsberg	1	98	300/3	400	–
Landskron	1	62	234/15	360/4 1/2	–
			Total 2,114/6		Total 2,133/16 1/2
Laufenburg	2	211	704/15	612/12	92/3
Thann	1 foot	116	410/15	503/8	348/13
	1 mounted	44	441/6 = 117 pistoles 4 f.		
			Total 851/21		
Dachstein and Plessian riders	Infantry	50	186/21	195	53/18
	Cavalry	–	61/21		
			Total 248/18		
Mahlberg	Dragoons	35	94/18	86	8/18
Major General von Erlach's mounted company	1	108, 13 unmounted	1,443/18 = 385 pistoles	–	–
Baron d'Oysonville's mounted company	–	–	–	–	–

TABLE 2.1 Summary of the garrisons in Breisgau, Sundgau, the Waldstädte, and the Bishopric of Basel in November 1640 (*Cont.*)

Garrison	Companies	Troop strength	Monthly wages (reichsthalers/batzen)	Monthly contributions (reichsthalers/batzen)	Subsidies (reichsthalers/batzen)
Lieutenant Colonel Rosen's mounted company	–	53	232/12 = 62 pistoles	–	–
Artillery	–	79	505/8	–	–
Magazine costs	–	–	185 ordinary and extraordinary	–	–
Ship costs	–	10 crewmen 1 corporal	10 thalers each 15 thalers		
			Total 115		
Total			14,869/2 4,284/+ 10,585/1 1/2	4,284/+	

SOURCE: BBB, MSS.H.H.XXVII.47, P. 325.

Note: The total wages for Breisach, Freiburg, Neuenburg, Rheinfelden, Delsberg, Landskron, and Thann (infantry) include the staff.

detailed records, including precisely enumerated costs, were kept on the use of munitions for individual military campaigns⁶¹ and the expenses for equipping passing troops with supplies from the arsenal (metal, powder, fuses, lead, cannonballs, pikes, muskets, bandoliers, and bigger guns like half-kartouwes).⁶²

61 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 717, Specification Waß bey üngster belägerung deß Schloßes Liechtenaw vndt deß Stättlenß Kuppenheim an Puluer, Lunth[en], Kuglen, vndt sonsten vf die Commandierte Völkher für monition vfgang[en] vndt verschoßen word[en], 11 April 1645.

62 See for example BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, pp. 641–643, Auff die Königliche Arméen ist von Breisach in diesem 1644te Jar folgendes metall, munition und gewehr geliefert, mit Herren von Tracy und Herren von Champlastreux verrechnet, bezalt und zu bezalen versprochen worden. The powder was supplied from Berne, Schaffhausen, and Benfeld, see also the Breisach arsenal accounts from 1644, *ibid.*, pp. 681–682.

This information was recorded in tables showing total consumption over a certain period.⁶³ In April 1650, three months after von Erlach's death, the figures collected under the former governor on the quantities of powder and fuses used between 1645 and 1649 were compiled in a table. Jean Sebiger,⁶⁴ who had been *garde-magasin* during that period, took the inventories and confirmed the accuracy of the figures to Girolles, the royal intendant (see Table 2.2).

The volume also includes inventories that may seem less relevant to Breisach's military strength, but whose importance for the fortress's defences and the army's readiness for action should not be overlooked. For instance, the documents include lists detailing the lights (*Lichter*) and firewood (*Wachtholz*) issued to the strictly regulated sentry posts⁶⁵ and the costs of fodder for German or French cavalry horses temporarily stabled in Breisach.⁶⁶

3.2.5 Bread

During the period of Weimar control, von Erlach played a major role in arranging grain supplies for the Weimar army. He organised the provisioning of the fortress, with Switzerland (and in particular Basel) serving as both the hub for trading grain and as the army's bakery.⁶⁷ The French army likewise relied on private businesses to supply bread until the end of the Ancien Régime.⁶⁸

63 See for example BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, pp. 391–393, Summarische Verzeichnuß Was wol auff die Armée, alß die Vestung Breisach, vnd zuegehörige Guarnisonen an Stücken, Munition vnd Materialien geliefert vnd verbraucht worden, n.d.; see also *ibid.*, pp. 461–462 for a catalogue of monthly use of powder, fuses, and lead (*Ausgab Anno 1643*).

64 On the *garde-magasin*, see Kroener, *Routes*, pp. 48–50.

65 The "Register of wood for sentries and officers in Breisach, 1645" records that the fortress of Breisach used three cords (*Klafter*) and 2,200 bundles (*Wellen*) in winter and three cords and 1,000 bundles in summer. The governor received ten cords on top of that. Five cords went to Colonel Sigmund von Erlach, three to the town major and another three to the prison guard (*gewaltiger zue den gefangenen*), BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, pp. 724–725. In August 1639, the sentries in Breisach used 42 pounds of lights (*Lichter*) per week, *ibid.*, p. 65, Memoriale Ahn Ihr Ex[cellenti]a Herren General von Erlach. Betreffendt waß für, wie viel, vndt weme durch die wochen Holtz gelüffert werde, waß dasßelbige vndt die wachlichter dz Gemeine Stattweeßen Breÿsach Costen Thue, 21/31 August 1639. For examples of the well-organised German and French sentries in Breisach, see *ibid.*, pp. 59–61, 89, 169, 371–374, 375–380, 381–385, 389, 411, 434, 433, 445, 447, 551, 629, 651, 653, and 675 (commandeered sentries from Neuenburg and Landskron in Huningue).

66 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 227 (1639).

67 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 16–17 (Urkunde 12), 19–20 (Urkunde 14b), and 262; Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 1 (Wiesbaden, 1964), pp. 252–253.

68 Bernhard Kroener, "Rechtsstellung und Profite französischer Heereslieferanten in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 76 (1989), 457–493. Precise records were also kept of agricultural levies in his

TABLE 2.2 State of the armaments that Mons[ieur] D'Erlach, Lieutenant General of the King and his army in Germany, Governor of Breisach and its dependent places, had purchased and put in the depots of His Majesty in said places of his governorship during the years 1645 46 47 48 and 1649 [29 April 1650]

	Powder in pounds	Fuses in pounds
1645	14,750	5,119
1646	18,553	11,591
1647	17,364	10,467
1648	16,471	11,740
1649	9,827	10,409
<i>Total</i>	76,965	49,326
Cost	30,785 livres	4,932 livres 11 sols

SOURCE: BBB, MSS.H.H.XXVII.47, PP. 979–980.

Grain purchases in Breisach were arranged between von Erlach and Girolles.⁶⁹ Normally, the *garde-magasin* was responsible for storing, conserving, and distributing bread grain in a fortress, and the governor only rarely had influence over their appointment.⁷⁰ Generally speaking, it was only during a siege that the governor had authority to give orders to the *garde-magasin*. Otherwise, the governor's task was merely to regularly inspect the magazines and take stock of the inventory.⁷¹ Von Erlach, however, appears to have had more control over the grain magazines in Breisach. For instance, an *ordre* of 17/27 June 1648 explicitly transferred various duties and tasks to the *garde-magasin* Hans Conrad Müller during von Erlach's absence. The terms of this *ordre* suggest that von Erlach was normally responsible for administering the grain magazines.⁷² Moreover, in July 1649, it was to von Erlach that Müller submitted his final accounts and from whom he requested permission to depart Breisach.⁷³ Under von Erlach's

governorship, see BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 727, Summarische Magasin Frucht Zehend Verleihung über nach Specificirte Örter de Anno 1645.

69 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 418, 420.

70 Kroener, *Routes*, pp. 48–50.

71 Kroener, *Routes*, pp. 49–50.

72 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 879.

73 See BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 929, memorandum from Müller.

supervision, the bread rations for Breisach and the associated garrisons were minutely documented for a particular day⁷⁴ or period of time (see Table 2.3).

The inventories of selected critical resources presented in this section make clear the scale von Erlach was operating at in Breisach in terms of men, quantities, and costs. Being able to transport the necessary supplies smoothly and

TABLE 2.3 Summary of bread rations for garrisons from 1 October to 31 December 1639

	Bread rations (of 1.5 pounds each): daily	Bread rations: 1 October to 31 December 1639
Breisach	1,992	183,264
Artillery in Breisach	-	7,103
Freiburg	593	54,556
Neuenburg	300	27,600
Rheinfelden	400	36,800
Thann	113	10,396
Laufenburg	119	10,948
Hohentwiel	300	27,600
Landskron and Burg	73	6,716
Delsberg, Zwingen and Pfeffingen	113	10,396
Dachstein	113	10,396
Mahlberg	39	3,588
Ensisheim	10	920
Liechteneck	14	1,288
<i>Total</i>		<i>391,571</i>
Less the Dachstein and Thann garrisons		20,792
Remainder		370,779

At an estimated sixteen loaves per reichsthaler, the cost of bread rations comes to 23,173 reichsthalers and two batzen.

SOURCE: BBB, MSS.H.H.XXVII.47, PP. 223–224 (IN GERMAN), P. 231 (IN FRENCH).

74 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 839, Die commendirten Völcker haben den 30 January 1648 Brodt empfangen. Passing troops also needed to be supplied with bread, of course. For an example of the quantities involved, see *ibid.*, pp. 199–200, Extraordinari Ausgaben Brodt auff die Frantzösische Troupen.

reliably was thus an essential aspect of fortress management. The Rhine played a critical role in supplying the fortress and troops, as evidenced by lists of Breisach sailors⁷⁵ and breakdowns of shipping costs.⁷⁶

The logistical challenge for the governor was that not only did he need to keep track of stocks of critical resources in Breisach so he was aware of current demand, he also had to organise the procurement of those resources for the fortress and troops. For this task, he relied on a transnational network of private merchant bankers and businessmen.

4 Von Erlach's Mercantile Network

Various studies of military history have established that warring monarchs in the early modern period outsourced the procurement for their armies to private entrepreneurs, who were able to mobilise the necessary resources more efficiently than state bodies. Thus, prior to the nationalisation of armies from the late 18th century onwards, states relied on competitive transnational markets to secure the resources they needed for their war efforts, whether that be financial capital, goods, or mercenaries.⁷⁷ This section explores how this procurement process functioned in Breisach on a day-to-day level, with a particular focus on the approaches and instruments that were used to finance

75 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 41.

76 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 393.

77 Anton Ernstberger, *Hans de Witte: Finanzmann Wallensteins* (Wiesbaden, 1954); Redlich, *Enterpriser*; Peter Hug, *Zur Geschichte des Kriegsmaterialhandels: Märkte und Regulationen vor 1800* (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Bern, 1996); Julia Zunckel, *Rüstungsgeschäfte im Dreissigjährigen Krieg: Unternehmerkräfte, Militärgüter und Marktstrategien im Handel zwischen Genua, Amsterdam und Hamburg* (Berlin, 1997); Parrott, *Business*, pp. 196–259; *Söldnerlandschaften: Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Benjamin Hitz (Berlin, 2014); Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2016); Peter H. Wilson, "Competition"; Rafael Torres Sánchez, Pepijn Brandon, and Marjolein 't Hart, "War and Economy: Rediscovering the Eighteenth-Century Military Entrepreneur," *Business History* 60:1 (2018), 41–56; Nathalie Büsser, "Salpeter, Kupfer, Spitzeldienste und Stimmenkauf: Die kriegswirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten des Zuger Militärunternehmers und Magistraten Beat Jakob II. Zurlauben um 1700 für Frankreich," in *Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftskriege*, eds. Valentin Groebner, Sébastien Guex, and Jakob Tanner (Zurich, 2008), 71–84; Horst Carl, "Logistik in Zeiten des Krieges: Der Kriegsunternehmer Wallenstein und das Geschäft der Heeresversorgung," in *Wallenstein: Mensch – Mythos – Memoria*, eds. Birgit Emich et al. (Berlin, 2018), 31–47; *Die Kapitalisierung des Krieges: Kriegsunternehmer im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Matthias Meinhardt, Markus Meumann (Berlin, 2021).

provisions for the fortress and the Weimar/French army.⁷⁸ Von Erlach's relationships with businessmen, consortiums, financiers, and service providers broadly construed were critical for securing Breisach's supplies.⁷⁹ Before proceeding, it should be stressed that "there were no 'war suppliers' *per se*, with firmly established tasks and responsibilities".⁸⁰ In practice, von Erlach dealt with a diverse range of business partners, from large, transnational trading and banking houses to simple merchants, arms manufacturers, local craftsmen and hauliers. Below, I will outline the basic features of his mercantile network by looking at a few selected figures involved in it.

Marx Conrad von Rehlingen (1576–1642), former financier to the Swedish army in Germany and the Heilbronn League, held a pivotal position in von Erlach's mercantile network. Originally hailing from Augsburg, the Protestant businessman had fled to Switzerland and was a member of Duke Bernard's privy council. From 1637 onwards, he was chiefly responsible for the Weimar army's logistics and the duke's private financial affairs.⁸¹ He arranged loans for the duke's army and organised the transfer of French subsidies to Switzerland via the Lyon fairs, which functioned as the "connecting link between Venice, Paris and Amsterdam"⁸² for transnational financial transactions.⁸³ Between 1638 and 1640, he conducted much of his business for Breisach in Basel, from where he wrote many of his letters to von Erlach.⁸⁴ The two cities on the Rhine are

78 Fortification literature from the 17th century provides few details on how fortress commanders procured war-critical supplies, see Ackermann, "Strategien," pp. 254–255.

79 Parrott, *Business*, p. 211; Torres Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart, "War," pp. 8–10.

80 Kroener, "Rechtsstellung," p. 458.

81 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 187–188; Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, pp. 248–249; Reinhard Hildebrandt, "Einleitung," in *Quellen und Regesten zu den Augsburger Handelshäusern Paler und Rehlinger 1539–1642: Wirtschaft und Politik im 16./17. Jahrhundert*, 2, ed. Reinhard Hildebrandt (Stuttgart, 2004), 15–40, pp. 30–31; Ackermann, "Schweden," pp. 228–229. For examples, see BBB, Mss.h.h.XXXVII.53, nos. 25, 35 and 99.

82 Hildebrandt, "Einleitung," p. 19.

83 Von Rehlingen did most of his business via Lyon. In 1638, however, von Rehlingen evidently had difficulties sending larger sums by bills of exchange from Lyon to Basel, Zurich, and St Gallen, and believed it would be better to temporarily deposit the funds in Frankfurt, as the "Swiss cities would rather [have] the money there than in Lyon," cited in Hildebrandt, "Einleitung," p. 20. See Markus A. Denzel, "Die Integration der Schweizer Finanzplätze in das internationale Zahlungsverkehrssystem vom 17. Jahrhundert bis 1914," *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 48 (1998), 177–235.

84 After fleeing from Augsburg to Switzerland, he stayed for spells in Zurich, Bern, and Geneva, where he eventually settled, see Hildebrandt, "Einleitung," p. 31. Von Rehlingen had personal ties to the von Erlach family; Marx Conrad and Rosina von Rehlingen were godparents to three of Franz Ludwig von Erlach's (1574–1651) children, see Holenstein, "Transnationale Politik," p. 57 (note 10).

just 60 kilometres apart. The two men's correspondence reveals, among other things, how important bills of exchange were for Breisach's financing needs. But being dependent on European financial centres was not without its risks. The reliability of financial transactions hinged on having trustworthy business partners and on the behaviour of competitors on the finance markets.⁸⁵ Von Rehlingen regularly provided Major General von Erlach with urgently needed loans, since the funds from France were often insufficient to cover the Weimar army's costs⁸⁶ At one point, these loans put von Rehlingen into such dire financial straits that in November 1639 he had to ask von Erlach not to rely on him for any further payments for the time being.⁸⁷ Von Rehlingen and von Erlach's partnership also extended to supplying Weimar troops and the fortified towns on the Rhine with food and munitions. Together, they arranged for the fortresses to be supplied with fuses and powder, which were packed in barrels and dispatched to Breisach from Lyon via Geneva (among other routes).⁸⁸ Von Rehlingen would provide von Erlach with assistance and advice concerning the procurement of grain from Switzerland and Alsace,⁸⁹ or loan him money to buy grain,⁹⁰ which was sometimes transported under Swiss cover from Geneva via Nidau near Bern to the fortresses on the Rhine.⁹¹ He settled a bill from a cannon foundry in Benfeld, Alsace, and coordinated the procurement of

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- 85 In November 1639, a transfer from Strasbourg to Frankfurt via Claudio and Reinhard Passavant failed because they "rejected it under a false pretext for the sake of a little profit". Von Rehlingen felt compelled to promise von Erlach he would make "absolutely sure" the missing money got from Basel to Breisach, if von Erlach did not have sufficient coin left there, see *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 242, no. 564, letter from von Rehlingen (Basel) to von Erlach (Breisach), 7 November 1639; see also *ibid.*, no. 565. Sometimes, when a transfer by bill of exchange was expected, other merchants would manipulate the exchange rate. In spring 1638, the "Lumagas [Marc Antonio, Bartolomeo, Carlo] and other banking houses in Lyon, believing that Duke Bernard planned to transfer these funds from Lyon to St Gallen, made the exchange rate in St Gallen less favourable. M. C. v. Rehlingen therefore endeavoured to redirect at least a portion of the money from Lyon to Basel, 'but alongside that it [would] also be necessary to send funds in cash.'" *Ibid.*, p. 222, no. 532.
- 86 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 240, no. 560, loan for 1,000 sacks of grain, 14/24 July 1639; p. 241, no. 561, twice 5,000 pistoles for payment of wages, 19 July 1639. According to Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, p. 248, in 1638 von Rehlingen lent a total of 6,000 thalers to von Erlach.
- 87 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 243, no. 565. See also *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, pp. 244–245, no. 568; Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 187–188.
- 88 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.53, nos. 43, 67; *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 243, no. 566.
- 89 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 234, no. 551; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.53, nos. 47, 17.
- 90 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 240, no. 560.
- 91 Von Rehlingen wrote to Duke Bernard on 20 May 1638 that he was trying to have the grain that the Lyon trading house Hervart had bought in Geneva at the order of von Erlach sent "under Swiss name from Nidau [Canton of Bern] to Rheinfelden and Laufenburg", see *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, pp. 224–225, no. 536.

muskets, fuses, and ammunition.⁹² The governor also arranged salt deliveries from Bern and Schaffhausen with von Rehlingen⁹³ and had a hand in buying horses in the Bishopric of Basel or in the Margraviate of Baden when the export of horses from Basel was strictly prohibited in April 1639.⁹⁴ Difficulties with exporting goods from Switzerland were a frequent subject of correspondence between von Erlach and von Rehlingen. For instance, the transport of grain or fuses through the 'neutral' Swiss Confederacy could run into problems if individual cantons refused to allow these goods to pass through their territory; in some cases, they unceremoniously confiscated them.⁹⁵ Last but not least, the well-connected von Rehlingen regularly supplied the duke with commercially relevant information (such as falling grain prices)⁹⁶ and military news (such as in 1640, when he passed on reports from Schaffhausen and St Gallen about the Spanish forces assembling near Lake Constance).⁹⁷ From early 1640, as his health declined, von Rehlingen gradually withdrew from his Breisach dealings and asked von Erlach to settle his final accounts.⁹⁸ He died in Geneva in 1642.⁹⁹

The Hervarts were a Huguenot merchant and banking family based in Lyon who also had business dealings with Duke Bernard. Like von Rehlingen, they originally hailed from Augsburg.¹⁰⁰ From 1638 onwards, the brothers Jean Henri Hervart (born 1609) and Barthélemy Hervart (1607–76) served respectively as munitioner for the Weimar army and as the duke's treasurer and paymaster. Presumably, they owed these important positions to a recommendation by von Rehlingen, whose daughter married Jean Henri.¹⁰¹ After Duke Bernard's death in 1639, von Erlach continued this business relationship with the Hervart brothers.¹⁰² With regard to the fortress of Breisach, the brothers' main significance was as intermediaries for the transfer of French subsidies to Lyon using bills of exchange. They also provided advance payments if the funds

92 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.53, nos. 65, 96.

93 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.53, no. 96.

94 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 237, no. 555.

95 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 226, no. 539, Solothurn and other cantons refuse passage of grain, 1638; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.53, nos. 65–67, Solothurn confiscates thirty barrels of fuses, 1639/40.

96 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 234, no. 551.

97 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.53, nos. 91, 103, and 108.

98 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.53, nos. 78, 95; *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, nos. 560, 570, 572, and 580.

99 Hildebrandt, "Einleitung," p. 34.

100 Dulong, *Mazarin*, pp. 149–211.

101 Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, p. 252; Dulong, *Mazarin*, pp. 150–151.

102 Parrott, *Business*, p. 232.

from France failed to arrive.¹⁰³ The Hervarts' financial transactions, loans, and postal services¹⁰⁴ were handled by merchants (*commis*) based in Basel. They included Daniel Zollikofer (also known as Daniel de Herman Sollicoffre), a nephew of the Hervart brothers,¹⁰⁵ Daniel Iselin (1607–61)¹⁰⁶ and two business agents, Ammon¹⁰⁷ and Ernelin.¹⁰⁸ The funds transferred from France by bill of exchange or advanced by the Hervarts were used for wages,¹⁰⁹ recruitment expenses,¹¹⁰ fortification works,¹¹¹ grain purchases (from Benfeld in Alsace, among other sources),¹¹² and textiles.¹¹³ In 1644, Jean Henri also served as von Erlach's recruitment agent,¹¹⁴ and in 1645 both Hervarts personally petitioned the French minister of war, Michel Le Tellier (1603–85), in Paris regarding von Erlach's affairs in Breisach.¹¹⁵

The transfer of French funds to Breisach inevitably also involved the leading figure in the French subsidies market: the Dutch financier Jean Hoeffft (1578–1651).¹¹⁶ Roughly speaking, the transfers worked as follows: Hoeffft remitted the funds to the Hervarts, who then used a portion of the money to directly purchase food or munitions. They sent the remainder to von Rehlingen, "who transmitted coin for wages and salaries to the army and paid out certain sums in Switzerland for grain and for baking bread for Bernhard's army".¹¹⁷ The complex transfers required great flexibility from everyone involved, since transactions on the finance markets were affected by a variety of factors. In

103 Gonzenbach, *General*, 3, pp. 66–67; Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, pp. 252–253; Hildebrandt, "Einleitung," p. 24; Parrott, *Business*, p. 232.

104 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 164, 170, and 192.

105 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 169 (which confirms that the Hervarts were his uncles), 170, and 173; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.83, nos. 327–328; Gonzenbach, *General*, 3, pp. 66–67. On the kinship between the Hervarts and Zollikofer, see Dulong, *Mazarin*, pp. 150, 203.

106 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 38, 39, and 96.

107 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 142, 154, 166, 167, 179, and 180.

108 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 31, 32, and 36.

109 Gonzenbach, *General*, 3, pp. 66–67.

110 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, no. 31.

111 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, no. 25.

112 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 37, 45, 55, and 174.

113 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, no. 180.

114 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 114–120. See also *ibid.*, no. 231.

115 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 144, 145, and 151; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.106, pp. 427–428.

116 From 1633, Jean Hoeffft was responsible for assuring the punctual remittance of subsidies from France to its allies, see Erik Thomson, "Jean Hoeffft, French Subsidies, and the Thirty Years' War," in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 234–258; Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 365–366; Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, pp. 251–252.

117 Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, pp. 252–253.

April 1639, for instance, Duke Bernard instructed von Rehlingen to have the Hervarts draw a bill of 300,000 livres tournois on Hoeffft in Paris. Part of this amount would then be transferred to Basel. Because transporting coin at that point was difficult and expensive and Basel was not accepting bills of exchange from Lyon, von Rehlingen suggested transferring the money via Zurich and the Zurzach fairs.¹¹⁸ For the Weimar army, which at least in theory had been funded by French subsidies since 1635,¹¹⁹ both the relationship with the Hervarts (with von Rehlingen as intermediary) and Hoeffft's business ventures in Paris and Amsterdam were of vital importance: "Both were crucial in allowing Saxe-Weimar to convert French subsidies via letters of exchange into pay for his troops in Germany, and to maintain a steady supply of munitions to his army from well-established Amsterdam sources."¹²⁰ However, the business relations were not entirely free of mutual mistrust. After the duke's death, von Rehlingen advised von Erlach to contact Hoeffft because he feared the latter might obstruct (*difficultirn*) their bills of exchange.¹²¹ Suspicions that Hoeffft deliberately and self-interestedly delayed payments lingered for a long time.¹²²

Another figure in the northern Netherlands who was of central importance for Saxe-Weimar and Breisach was Joachim von Wicquefort. He handled "commercial transactions" for the duke, "helped administer the transfer of French subsidies, managed large parts of the duke's assets and passed on news."¹²³ Wicquefort gave the duke access to the Amsterdam market and the Dutch republic's political circles, which held an important place in the transnational business of war.¹²⁴ After the occupation of Breisach, Wicquefort

118 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, pp. 236–237, no. 555.

119 Parrott, *Business*, p. 232.

120 Parrott, *Business*, p. 232. On Amsterdam, see Marianne Klerk's recent study, "The 'Fiscal-Military Hub' of Amsterdam: Intermediating the French Subsidies to Sweden during the Thirty Years' War," in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 213–233. For his service of arranging a bill of exchange via the Hervarts in Lyon for the French subsidies intended for Duke Bernard, Hoeffft received a one per cent commission and one per cent risk premium, as he was liable for the bill's redemption, see *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, pp. 218–219, no. 555.

121 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 240, no. 555 (note).

122 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 225, no. 536. See also *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, nos. 527, 532. The (outstanding) funds from France remained a topic of correspondence between von Erlach and Hoeffft even after the duke's death, see for example BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.23, nos. 28, 31, 69, and 234; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.62, no. 46; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.75, no. 125.

123 Ackermann, "Strategien," p. 148.

124 Ackermann, "Strategien," p. 150.

(and later von Erlach) lobbied in Paris for the fortress to be given to the duke.¹²⁵ From October to December 1638, Wicquefort was in Basel, from where he and von Rehlingen supplied the duke with military news and with grain from the region, which they had baked into bread in Basel and shipped to Huningue and Neuenburg.¹²⁶ Immediately after the duke's death, von Erlach sought to get the funds the duke had left in Amsterdam back from Wicquefort.¹²⁷

The intermediate trade in war-critical goods via Switzerland/Basel could be fraught with risks and uncertainties, as Daniel Iselin, who had business dealings with von Erlach and von Rehlingen, discovered. The sale of grain in Basel was closely scrutinised. In November 1639, for instance, the Archduchess of Austria, Claudia de' Medici (1604–48), complained personally to the Basel authorities about Iselin's trade in grain, as she feared he was supplying the emperor's enemies. An official was appointed to escort Iselin and ensure that the (in this case, low-quality French) grain was sold solely to Basel citizens. This caused delays to Breisach's efforts to procure new grain in Basel.¹²⁸ In summer 1644, Iselin was even briefly arrested due to his involvement in trading grain with the French army. Eventually, no less a personage than the French marshal Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne (1611–75), intervened with the Basel authorities and demanded the release of 500 sacks of grain that Iselin had purchased for the French army.¹²⁹ Apart from that, as a good businessman Iselin wanted to move his wares (which also included tin, copper, cooking oil and fuses) to Breisach with the lowest possible tolls and duties, and so in November 1639 asked von Erlach "to be exempted from the newly imposed charges and only subject to the old, customary Swiss one".¹³⁰ The Rhine tolls in the region around Breisach had been raised to fund the Weimar army, "which prompted complaints from Switzerland. The tolls were lucrative, not least because they were levied on trade and commerce in the region around Basel, which stood at an intersection of European trade routes and was benefiting from a 'war boom'".¹³¹ Von Erlach's Basel connection comprised a series of other financiers, suppliers, and service providers, including members of merchant and banking

125 Ackermann, "Strategien," pp. 150–155.

126 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 197, 262.

127 *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, p. 248, no. 573.

128 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.53, no. 44; see also *Quellen*, 2, ed. Hildebrandt, no. 566.

129 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 101, 102.

130 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.53, no. 44, Iselin to von Erlach, 24 November 1639. On his role in supplying fuses, see BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.53, nos. 65, 67.

131 Ackermann, "Schweden," pp. 227–228.

families such as Theobald Emanuel and Hans Jakob Schönauer¹³² and Jacques and Pierre Battier,¹³³ the cloth trader Theobald Scheppelin,¹³⁴ and the hauliers Hans Georg Sauter and Hans Jakob Wagner.¹³⁵ In 1640, he had 1,000 pairs of shoes and 1,000 shirts delivered from Lyon by the Maserannys via the Faesches in Basel.¹³⁶ In Basel, to conclude, the network of commercial bankers and service providers became a central hub for supplying Breisach with war-critical resources.¹³⁷

However, Breisach's wartime business dealings with the Swiss Confederacy were not solely centred on Basel. In early 1638, when the siege of Breisach was still underway, Duke Bernard tasked von Erlach with buying powder and ammunition from Schaffhausen, Bern, or Zurich.¹³⁸ In Schaffhausen, von Erlach had close business ties with the Zieglers, a family of merchants and bankers. Alexander Ziegler (1596–1673) and his nephews Christoph and Heinrich Ziegler supplied Breisach and the associated towns with powder, saltpetre, fuses, ammunition, cloth, bed linen, horses, and salt;¹³⁹ unsurprisingly, they also did business with the Hervarts.¹⁴⁰ Another Schaffhausen businessman involved in the munitions trade was Ludwig Oswald,¹⁴¹ who worked closely with Daniel Iselin in Basel to supply Breisach with powder.¹⁴² Trade in war-critical resources between Schaffhausen and Breisach flourished, despite the political sensitivities that forced it to be carried out more or less

132 Gonzenbach, *General*, 3:434; BBB, Mss.h.h.XV.33, no. 20, Mss.h.h.XV.42, nos. 93, 183, and 197; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.63, no. 7; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.73, no. 44a.

133 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.2, nos 211–212.

134 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, p. 821; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 167, 167a, 168, and 168a.

135 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.63, no. 86.

136 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, no. 8.

137 See Hug, *Geschichte*, pp. 121–122.

138 Gonzenbach, *General*, 1, pp. 12–15 (Urkunden 9–11), 17 (Urkunde 13), and 60–61.

139 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, nos. 35, 44, 173, 174, 181, 209, 212, 216, 257, and 260. On the Zieglers' salt business with Breisach, see the section "Private Investments" below. In 1643, d'Oysonville requested a loan from the Zieglers, but von Erlach advised them against it, see BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, nos. 1–2.

140 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, nos. 16, 107. On the enterprise Alexander Ziegler & Mitverwandte, in which, alongside Alexander and Hans, Johann Jakob was also involved as a silent partner, and which was dissolved in 1643, see Karl Schmuki, "Alexander Ziegler," *Schaffhauser Beiträge zur Geschichte* 68 (1991), 236–242. Alexander continued trading on a reduced scale even after the dissolution.

141 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, nos. 21, 25, 36, and 49. Oswald frequently corresponded with von Erlach's secretary Thomas Stotz in Breisach, see also BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, fol. 168r–172r. The nature of the relationship between Oswald and the Zieglers is not yet clear and requires further study.

142 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, no. 98 (annex).

surreptitiously. Supplying Breisach with munitions contravened Switzerland's treaty with Austria and was particularly delicate for Schaffhausen due to its exposed location on the border, which Alexander was apparently well aware of.¹⁴³ Nonetheless, "Ziegler was able, usually with the greatest discretion, to continue supplying war materials with the tacit acceptance of the authorities".¹⁴⁴ Alexander Ziegler and Ludwig Oschwald's business dealings with Breisach did not always, however, proceed to both sides' satisfaction. In September of 1645, von Erlach (or rather his secretary, Thomas Stotz) complained of facing financial losses after receiving poor-quality musket powder from Schaffhausen and being unable to sell it before the army moved on; the powder von Erlach had bought for five Spanish pistoles per centner was now selling for just four.¹⁴⁵ He was adamant that he would not bear the resulting losses, and it would appear he got his way.¹⁴⁶ The Schaffhausen correspondence reveals that the powder, fuses, and munitions were produced, among other places, in Appenzell (powder and fuses), St Peterzell in Toggenburg (powder), the Black Forest (powder, saltpetre), Delémont (cannonballs) and Tyrol and Styria (lead).¹⁴⁷

Von Erlach's network for procuring munitions eventually stretched as far as Bern and Alsace. One crucial source of powder was his home city of Bern.¹⁴⁸ From 1 October 1644 to 21 April 1645, Bern exported a total of 16,736 $\frac{7}{8}$ Bernese pounds of powder to Breisach for a total of 795 Spanish pistoles.¹⁴⁹ The Bernese powder exports appear to have been handled by Abraham Lüthart and Burkhard von Erlach. Alongside Switzerland and southern Germany, Alsace was another key market for munitions. In 1641, for instance, Jann Christian Quinkelberger supplied 100 muskets from Benfeld to von Erlach. Quinkelberger also sold fuses, powder, and grain.¹⁵⁰ Von Erlach also had dealings with Peter Triponnet,

143 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.85, p. 381.

144 Schmuki, "Alexander Ziegler," p. 238.

145 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, no. 53: "... daß mir an Statt gut angedingeten guten probhaltenden Mußqueten Pulvers, und daruff gleich vorauß beschehener baren bezahlung, so schlechte wahr geliferet, und ich damit so lang aufgehalten worden, biß die Zeit voruber gelauffen, und die armee hinweg gegangen, daß ich das Pulver, so darauff bestellet gewesen, nicht mehr von der Hand bringen kan, welches anietzo umb so viel in abschlag kommen, daß man den Centner umb 4 S[panische] Pist[olen] hierunden haben kann, welchen ich dem H[ern] umb 5 S[panische] Pist[olen] bezalt".

146 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, no. 54. The barrels of bad powder apparently came from a Marx Zollikofer of St Gallen. On this matter, see BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, nos. 58, 96, and 107.

147 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, nos. 44, 181, and 212; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.85, p. 381.

148 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, fols. 62r, 69r, and 71r, p. 173.

149 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50, p. 177.

150 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.10, nos. 20, 37, 43, 44a, 47, 50, 52, and 53.

a Strasbourg-based merchant who handled other war-related business and transactions in Alsace.¹⁵¹

5 Private Investments

Von Erlach was a military entrepreneur, who invested his own capital in the war and speculated for financial profit. He managed one of the nine German companies in the Breisach garrison (in July 1640, von Erlach's company had a strength of 108 men)¹⁵² and over the course of his French military career was given command of an infantry and a cavalry regiment.¹⁵³ Both in his capacity as governor and as military commander, he acted like a businessman, managing the affairs entrusted to him with funds from France, with loans from his banking and trade network – or with his own personal means, depending on his needs and the available options.¹⁵⁴ Von Erlach was a major creditor of the French crown.¹⁵⁵ His loans to France were, so to speak, the price for his career as a military entrepreneur and are reminiscent of the practice of venality (or the sale of offices).¹⁵⁶ The French crown's dependence on credit from military entrepreneurs like von Erlach is attributable, firstly, to the exorbitant costs of warfare at that time, which placed a continual strain on the royal coffers throughout the 17th century, and, secondly, to systemic factors:

The erratic generation of tax revenues meant that the revenue flow was even less synchronized with temporal expenditure patterns than it is today, and, on top of this, it took time to move money from where it was to be disbursed: to troops for pay, for example. There was thus a structural

151 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.8, nos. 65, 96, 102, and 154; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.73, no. 29.

152 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.47, pp. 289, 327–328, 365, *Lista vber nachvolgende Compag. zu Pferdt*, 5 April 1641.

153 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 423, 605–609, and 627; Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, p. 291.

154 An example of this practice of 'blended' financing can be seen in the establishment and recruitment of his regiment in 1648, see Gonzenbach, *General*, 3, pp. 36–45; Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, p. 253.

155 Françoise Bayard, *Le monde des financiers au XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1988), p. 253.

156 David Parrott, "From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies: War, State, and Society in Western Europe, 1600–1700," in *European Warfare, 1350–1750*, eds. Frank Tallett, David J.B. Trim (Cambridge, 2010), 74–95, pp. 89–91.

time lag between revenue-raising and the disbursing of state expenditure that had to be filled with credit.¹⁵⁷

When rumours circulated in Paris in 1646 that the fortress commander was earning 100,000 livres a year from his governorship, von Erlach immediately went on the counterattack. He sent the minister of war, Le Tellier, detailed accounts showing his outstanding credit, including 15,000 livres he had advanced to fortify Neuenburg and 11,000 livres of his personal means he had spent on munitions.¹⁵⁸ The arrears on payments from Paris rose sharply in 1648, and after protracted negotiations von Erlach received just two months' pay for his infantry in 1649 despite the crown owing him over a year's wages.¹⁵⁹ So to cover the soldiers' outstanding pay, he contributed some of his own money, supplemented by proceeds from the sale of cannons to Switzerland.¹⁶⁰ In 1649, the French king's outstanding debts to von Erlach is said to have amounted to 300,000 livres.¹⁶¹

To at least partially compensate von Erlach for his substantial investments, the French crown granted him the bailiwicks of Altkirch, Landser, and Landskron.¹⁶² Furthermore, a 1640 decree authorised him to operate the iron mines in Breisgau, Alsace, Münster and Delémont for his own profit. As a 'contractor' to the French king, he produced bombs, shells, and cannonballs, which he sold to the magazines of the Breisach fortresses.¹⁶³ The text of the decree, issued 19 March 1640, was as follows:

Wanting to gratify and bestow favourable treatment upon Lord d'Erlach, governor of the town and fortress of Breisach and its dependent territories, in recognition of the faithful and commendable service that he has long rendered us and that we continue to receive from him in said office, and of the great expenses that he has to bear in it and knowing that there are a large quantity of iron mines in said Breisach and in Alsace, also in

157 Guy Rowlands, "Agency Government in Louis XIV's France: The Military Treasurers of the Elite Forces," in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden, 2014), 215–234, p. 218.

158 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, p. 477.

159 Kroener, *Routes*, p. 131.

160 Gonzenbach, *General*, 3, pp. 333, 351.

161 Gonzenbach, *General*, 3, pp. 360. On von Erlach's advance payments, see also Gonzenbach, *General*, 3, pp. 348–368, 434; Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, p. 241 (note 7), 243, 264, and 266.

162 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 66–67. See also Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, p. 356.

163 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, p. 67. See also Dulong, *Mazarin*, p. 152; Parrott, *Business*, p. 222; Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs*.

Munster and Delémont, from which said Lord d'Erlach will be able to derive utility and benefit. And in so doing to provide the arsenals of the places under his governorship with the bombs, shells and cannonballs that will be needed, we let it be known that for these reasons and other due considerations that have so moved us, we have accorded, given and granted; we accord, give and grant by the present [document], signed by our hand, to said Lord d'Erlach the usufruct of these iron mines and deposits which are in the territory and ambit of the governorship of Breisach, whether in Alsace, Munster or Delémont, to use and dispose of what will come from said mines, as he deems right, on the condition that, as much as will be possible, he will have put in our arsenals of the places of Breisach, Rheinfelden, Fribourg, Hohentwiel, Thann, Dachstein and other places and fortresses of the said territory of Breisach the bombs, shells and cannonballs that will be needed for the security and defence of said places and fortresses and have them replaced as they come to be consumed. And we give the order to our lieutenant generals in our armies in Germany, intendants of justice, police and finances and our other officers that it will be their duty from the present grant and concession to have, tolerate and allow said Lord d'Erlach to enjoy and use [them] fully and peaceably without making or allowing to be made any trouble or impediment for him, for this is our will.¹⁶⁴

164 Gonzenbach, General, 2, pp. 4–5 (Urkunde 3): “Désirant gratifier et favorablement traiter le Sieur d'Erlach, Gouverneur de la ville et forteresse de Brisach et pays en dépendants, en considérations des fidèles et recommandables services, qu'ils nous a depuis longtems rendus, et que nous recevons continuellement de lui en ladite charge, et des grandes dépenses qu'il est obligé d'y supporter et sachant qu'il y a une bonne quantité de mines de fer, dans le dit Brisach et en Alsace même à Munster et Delémont, desquels le dit Sieur d'Erlach pourra retirer utilité et avantage. Et en ce faisant, pourvoir les arsenaux des places de son gouvernement de bombes, grenades et boulets que y seront nécessaires, savoir faisons, que nous pour ces causes et autres bonnes considérations à ce nous mouvans avons accordé, donné et octroyé; accordons donnons et octroyons par ces présentes, signées de notre main au dit Sieur d'Erlach la jouissance des mines, minières de fer qui sont dans le pays et étendue du Gouvernement de Brisach, que dans l'Alsace, à Munster et Delémont, pour user et disposer de ce qui proviendra des dites mines, ainsi qu'il avisera bon être, à condition qu'il fera mettre le plutôt qu'il se pourra dans nos arsenaux des places de Brisach, Rhinfeld, Fribourg, Hohentwiel, Thann, Dachstein et autres places et chateaux du dit pays de Brisach, les bombes, grenades et boulets qui y seront nécessaires pour la sureté et défense des dites places et chateaux et de les remplacer à mesure qu'ils viendront à être consommés. Si, donnons en mandement à nos lieutenants généraux en nos armées d'Allemagne, intendans de la justice, police et finances et autres nos officiers, qu'il appartiendra que du présent don et concession, ils fassent, souffrent et laissent jouir

As well as producing arms and munitions, von Erlach appears to have invested in the Chéromagne and Blanchiers silver mines in Alsace. In any case, he commissioned a detailed report from Christoph Empel, an expert in mining and coin production, on the feasibility of using the silver to mint coins.¹⁶⁵

In 1639–40, von Erlach also entered the salt trade. Following a request in November 1639 from Alexander Ziegler & Mitverwandte in Schaffhausen “to authorise trade in salt” in Breisach,¹⁶⁶ von Erlach became a partner in the Zieglers’ salt business. The partnership was formalised on 22 January 1640 when the Zieglers consented to share half the profits and losses on salt traded in the territories under von Erlach’s command.¹⁶⁷ Prior to that, the Zieglers gave their new business partner a detailed account of salt prices: sending half a barrel of Austrian or Bavarian salt to Laufenburg would cost 25 guilders, or 50 for a whole barrel, with half a barrel selling for 34 guilders in Basel, while being “tolerably or entirely freed of tolls and duties” in Laufenburg, Säckingen, Rheinfeld, Basel, and Breisach would mean the salt could be sold at a lower price or greater profit.¹⁶⁸ In 1640, Ziegler and von Erlach supplied Breisach with 112 barrels of salt¹⁶⁹ from Landsberg in Bavaria.¹⁷⁰ The payments for the transaction were handled by Benedict Socin and Christoph Ringler in Basel.¹⁷¹

et user pleinement et paisiblement le dit Sieur d’Erlach, sans lui faire ni permettre qu’il lui soit fait aucun trouble, ou empèchement contraire, car tel est notre plaisir”.

- 165 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.47, pp. 241–247. See also Gonzenbach, General, 2, pp. 67–68. In 1649, Empel produced a report on the state of the mine in Masmünster, see BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.47, pp. 945–948.
- 166 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.48, p. 618, Alexander Ziegler & Mitverwandte to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, 12 November 1639.
- 167 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.48, p. 629, Alexander Ziegler & Mitverwandte to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, 22 January 1640. The original proposal had been that von Erlach would only receive a one-third share, see *ibid.*, p. 621.
- 168 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.48, p. 621, Alexander Ziegler & Mitverwandte to Hans Ludwig von Erlach, 11 December 1639: “... dass ein halb Feßli Österreichisch oder Beýerisch Saltz mit allem Cost vnd vncosten gen Louffenburg gelegt 25 fol. gestehet, oder ein ganztes Fass bemeltet Saltz 50 fol. costet, daß halb Feßli würdt in Basel p[e]r 34 fol. verkouff[t] gestalten die von Reinfeld[en], da sie daran mangel haben, es also bezallen müeßen. Wouer man nun zu Louffenburg, Seckhingen, vnd Reinfeld, wie ouch zu Baßel vnd Preißach mit den Zöllen würdt leidenlich oder gar freý gehalten, kan daß Saltz vmb souil wolfeiller verkoufft oder daran gewunen werden.” An undated “estimate” likewise gives the figure of around 25 guilders for transporting a whole barrel of Bavarian salt from Lindau to Basel, see *ibid.*, p. 689.
- 169 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.48, pp. 659, 665, 673, 677, 683, 691, and 697.
- 170 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.48, p. 629.
- 171 BBB, Mss.h.h.xxvii.48, pp. 641, 649, 651, 659, 665, and 677.

There is one final category of von Erlach's portfolio worth mentioning, namely (to quote Fritz Redlich's comprehensive study, *The German Military Enterpriser*) "bank deposits or, more correctly, deposits with merchant bankers".¹⁷² In 1649, von Erlach's deposits with the Hervarts totalled 312,000 livres.¹⁷³ According to the Hervarts, the vast majority of this amount (300,000 livres) was invested in Italy. However, when von Erlach attempted to withdraw a large sum in 1649, there were difficulties. Another incident, when the St Gallen trading house Zollikofer-Schlumpf went bankrupt, illustrates the risks that could attend these kinds of financial transactions.¹⁷⁴ Von Erlach briefly described his predicament in a letter of July 1646 to his relative Franz Ludwig von Erlach (1574–1651), mayor of Bern:

Large sums of the money that I had deposited with the Zieglers had been lent to the bankrupts in St Gallen, and I cannot demand this money back from the Zieglers since it was lent at my risk, not theirs. And although my name does not appear in the bankrupts' books, that has no effect on my rights. It is very common for merchants to loan such money under other names.¹⁷⁵

In his efforts to get back the 15,000 francs of his money that the Zieglers had invested in Zollikofer-Schlumpf,¹⁷⁶ von Erlach even went so far as to personally detain Peter Zollikofer, a *commis* of the trading house. Von Erlach's claims were not settled until 1648.

172 From the chapter "Accumulation and Investments", listed under the heading "Other Investments" alongside "Hoards" and "Purchases of Land", see Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, p. 407.

173 Gonzenbach, *General*, 3, pp. 362–368; Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 1, p. 408; Dulong, *Mazarin*, p. 202; Hildebrandt, "Einleitung," p. 19 (note 26).

174 Gonzenbach, *General*, 2, pp. 528–530. See also *Togatus miles: Materialien zum politischen Handeln Franz Ludwig von Erlachs (1574–1651)*, 1, ed. Norbert Furrer (typescript, Universität Bern, 2015), pp. 96–109; BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.50 (contains numerous documents about the incident).

175 BBB, Mss.h.h.XV.21, no. 57, Hans Ludwig von Erlach to Franz Ludwig von Erlach, 8/18 July 1646, cited in *Togatus miles*, 1, ed. Furrer, p. 98: "... daß den falliten zue St. Gallen von meinen geltern, so die herren Ziegler in deposito hatten, zimliche Summen geliehen worden, welche ich nicht von den herren Zieglern erfordern kan, seitemalen sie die gelter nicht auff ihre, sondern meine gefahr außgeliehen. Und ob gleich mein nam in der falliten büchern nicht gefunden wird, so kan doch solches mir an meinem rechten nichts benommen. Es ist sehr gebräuchlich, daß den kauffleuten dergleichen gelter under fremden namen geliehen werden."

176 BBB, Mss.h.h.XXVII.101, p. 24, no. [19bis], cited in *Togatus miles*, 1, ed. Furrer, p. 96.

6 Conclusion

The administrative record-keeping in Breisach was of utmost military and strategic importance. The records served as a crucial tool and decision-making aid in the governor's efforts to secure this militarily important region. Hans Ludwig von Erlach's extensive private records reveal the military entrepreneurial activities of a fortress commander in their full logistical, operational, material, and financial complexity. The key factors to maintaining this important piece of military infrastructure on the Empire's southern border during the Thirty Years' War were having functioning supply chains and access to transnational finance flows. Both depended crucially on the governor and commander's knack for logistics and his mercantile network. As a military entrepreneur, he supplied the Weimar/French army with soldiers, weapons, munitions, food, uniforms, credit, and other war-critical resources.¹⁷⁷ The basis for von Erlach's business model as a military entrepreneur appears to have been the combination of high military rank and private investments. Although this essay only gives a partial account of von Erlach's regional and European mercantile network, it does show that in the service of both Saxe-Weimar and France he worked with a transnational financial and commercial network of Protestant private and merchant bankers – the Thirty Years' War's *banque protestante*, as it were – in order to keep Breisach provisioned.¹⁷⁸ It also shows Basel's vital importance in linking Breisach to the centres of European high finance.¹⁷⁹ This mercantile network was held together even over great geographic distances by the need to work together to supply Breisach with the resources it needed and by the many outstanding bills and mutual loans. In conclusion: Hans Ludwig von Erlach's military entrepreneurial activities in Breisach offer us an illustrative example of the transnational and cooperative practices of military enterprise in the early modern era.

177 See Parrott, *Business*, p. 222; Torres Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart, "War," p. 7.

178 See Herbert Lüthy, *La banque protestante en France de la Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes à la Révolution*, 1–2 (Paris, 1959–61); Regina Schulte, "Rüstung, Zins und Frömmigkeit: Niederländische Calvinisten als Finanziers des Dreissigjährigen Krieges," *Bohemia* 35 (1994), 46–62.

179 See Klerk, "Amsterdam," pp. 213–233; Peter H. Wilson, "'Mercenary' Contracts as Fiscal-Military Instruments," in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 68–92.

“*Quelques malhonêtes particuliers*”? Army Suppliers and War Commissaries as Profiteers of the Seven Years’ War

Marian Füssel

In the midst of the Seven Years’ War (1756–63), Luise-Dorothee, Duchess of Saxe-Gotha-Altenburg, wrote in October 1758 in a letter to Voltaire: “You can bet a hundred to one that none of the belligerent powers will win in this turmoil and there will only be some dishonourable private individuals like some food entrepreneurs or money dealers who will benefit.”¹ The Seven Years’ War can in fact be considered as a cultural laboratory, which created hitherto unimagined opportunities from an economic point of view as well.² The global conflict thus provides numerous insights into the way in which early modern war entrepreneurs and war profiteers worked, as well as into the dynamics of financial crises and bankruptcies.³

In the usage of the early modern period, army suppliers usually operated under the French term ‘entrepreneur’. The Zedler lexicon thus defined the entrepreneur as someone “who takes on a certain delivery of clothing, grains, horses, etc.”⁴ Works especially devoted to this emerged in the literature on military theory, “to serve as guide to those who intend to become entrepreneurs”.⁵ In modern terminology, the army supplier or military entrepreneur can be

1 Voltaire’s *Correspondence*, 34, ed. Theodore Besterman (Geneva, 1958), p. 146: “il y a à parier cent contre un qu’aucune des puissances beligerantes gagnera de ces troubles et qu’il n’y aura peut-être que quelques malhonêtes particuliers, par exemple, quelques entrepreneurs des subsistances ou négociant d’argent qui en profitrons”.

2 Marian Füssel, *Der Preis des Ruhms: Eine Weltgeschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 2020).

3 Isabel Schnabel, Hyun Song Shin, “Liquidity and Contagion: The Crisis of 1763,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2:6 (2004), 929–968; Stephan Skalweit, *Die Berliner Wirtschaftskrise von 1763 und ihre Hintergründe* (Stuttgart, 1937); Hugo Rachel, Paul Wallich, *Berliner Grosskaufleute und Kapitalisten*, 2 (Berlin, 1938; repr. Berlin, 1967); more generally, also Rolf Straubel, *Zwischen monarchischer Autokratie und bürgerlichem Emanzipationsstreben: Beamte und Kaufleute als Träger handels- und gewerbepolitischer Veränderungen im friederizianischen Preußen (1740–1806)* (Berlin, 2012).

4 “Entrepreneur,” in *Universal-Lexicon ...*, 8, ed. Johann H. Zedler (Leipzig/Halle, 1734), col. 1295.

5 Louis Dupré d’Aulnay, *Traité général des subsistances militaires*, 1–2 (Paris, 1744), pp. V, 187.

defined as a ‘private entrepreneur’ (in the contemporary sense) “whose business was the procurement and/or production of food, armaments and equipment for a (standing) army.”⁶ Even if the semantic frame was stretched further, possibly also referring at first to commissions in fleet or fortress building, and was later extended, in general, to “a certain transaction, a lease, a deal, a manufactory, plant, an establishment, etc.,” the original military content of the term is, nonetheless, notable.⁷

Contemporaries in the 18th century already noticed how the art of war was developing into a mercantile art of trade.⁸ Precisely a globally interconnected conflict like the Seven Years’ War increased the need for logistical structures such as only major merchants involved in long-distance trade provided. Globally expanded markets did not only bring new opportunities for profits, however, but also new risks and challenges. Obtaining relevant information or controlling monetary flows thus became more exacting.⁹ The tight intertwining of early modern warfare and economics involved a process of co-evolution of the ‘striving for infinity’ (*Unendlichkeitsstreben*) of the prince and of the ‘capitalist entrepreneur’ to which Werner Sombart already called attention: “Enlarging an army and capital accumulation” are indeed, according to Sombart, “related processes: amassing quantities: extending the sphere of power beyond one’s personal, individual assets: breaking through the physical and mental limits of the individual being, etc., etc.”¹⁰ The recent research on the ‘contractor state’ emphasises that contracting out the task served, above all, to increase efficiency in the procurement of militarily important goods for the army. On account of their capabilities and networks, private entrepreneurs simply took care of the provision of militarily important resources more

6 Markus Meumann, “Heereslieferant,” in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit*, 5 (Stuttgart/Weimar, 2007), col. 275–277, here, in particular, col. 275; as standard work, still see Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 1–2 (Wiesbaden, 1964–65); more recent studies are collected in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean: 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden, 2014).

7 Johann G. Krünitz, “Entrepreneur,” in *Oeconomische Encyclopädie*, 11 (Berlin, 1777), pp. 75–76.

8 David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 230.

9 Tim Neu, “Glocal Credit: Die britische Finanzlogistik als fraktales Phänomen am Beispiel des Siebenjährigen Krieges,” in *Der Siebenjährige Krieg 1756–1763: Mikro- und Makroperspektiven*, ed. Marian Füssel (Berlin/Boston, 2021), 75–93.

10 Werner Sombart, *Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des modernen Kapitalismus*, 2 (Munich/Leipzig, 1913), pp. 32–33.

efficiently than the state.¹¹ The state purchased its logistical capacity for action with calculated losses of control, entailing an early modern ‘outsourcing’ of competencies. In his *General Principles of War* (1753), Frederick II (1712–86) tried to counter this by way of the instructions: “One has to be very careful when choosing commissariat officials. For if they are swindlers, the state loses too much. This is why one has to have them supervised by honest people.”¹²

The profiteers of the Seven Years’ War discussed in detail in what follows include men such as Heinrich Carl von Schimmelmann (1724–82) as grain supplier of the Prussian army, the intendant of *Nouvelle-France* François Bigot (1703–78), and the Scottish businessman Sir Lawrence Dundas (1710/12–81). Related examples of entrepreneurs will be discussed in what follows, in order to show *how* the war enabled *whom* to make profits and how civil and military profit strategies and markets played into one other. Moreover, the example of the *Affaire du Canada*, an almost two-year-long trial (1761–63) in Paris involving charges that the Crown brought against the actors who were attributed responsibility for the loss of Canada, will allow us to examine what potential limits were set to war-entrepreneurship and how its deviant forms could be sanctioned by the princely state.

1 Army Suppliers and Bankers in Prussia

1.1 *Schimmelmann: Porcelain and Slave Trade*

In 2008, in the course of the postcolonial reassessment of the culture of remembrance of German colonial history, one of the most dazzling personalities of 18th-century entrepreneurship, whose social rise is closely linked to the history of the Seven Years’ War, also became the target of criticism: Heinrich Carl Schimmelmann (1724–82).¹³ He is regarded by researchers as the “the most

11 Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2016); *The Contractor States and its Implications (1659–1815)*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012); Peter H. Wilson, “The European Fiscal-Military System and the Habsburg Monarchy,” in *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Fiscal-Military State c. 1648–1815*, eds. William Godsey, Petr Mat’ a, and Thomas Winkelbauer (Oxford, 2022), 85–103.

12 “Die Generalprinzipien des Krieges,” in *Die Werke Friedrichs des Großen*, ed. Gustav B. Volz, 6 (Berlin, 1913), 1–86, p. 15.

13 Martin Krieger, “Heinrich Carl von Schimmelmann,” in *Kein Platz an der Sonne: Erinnerungsorte der deutschen Kolonialgeschichte*, ed. Jürgen Zimmerer (Frankfurt a.M., 2013), 311–322.

important war profiteer of the Seven Years' War".¹⁴ A bust of Schimmelmann, which was first unveiled in the Hamburg-Wandsbek neighbourhood in 2006, was removed in 2008 after repeatedly having coloured paint splashed over it.¹⁵

Schimmelmann came from a Pomeranian merchant family and as a young man he first ran some businesses that ended in bankruptcy: among others, a transport business on the Elbe River.¹⁶ In the Second Silesian War (1744–45), he turned up as a Prussian army supplier, was robbed by Saxon Uhlans in a spectacular action, but then got everything restored to him after the 1745 Peace of Dresden. Schimmelmann settled in Dresden, married, and got involved in trade in colonial goods with sugar, coffee, and tobacco.¹⁷ He already took advantage of the previous situation of war here, purchasing devalued Saxon treasury bonds (debentures), which could be redeemed by Prussian subjects at their full value. Schimmelmann invested the resulting profits in a sugar refinery owned by the Berlin trading company Splittgerber & Daum, which we will meet again later. In Dresden, he first leased the excise tax on coffee in 1753 and then petitioned for a monopoly on sugar production in early 1756. But the Seven Years' War began soon after, and in August 1756 Prussian troops invaded Saxony.¹⁸ The Prussians were counting on Schimmelmann's local economic expertise, and on 19 September 1756, the King appointed him Prussian Privy Councillor (*Geheimer Rat*). His job was to ensure the provisioning of the Prussian army, which was supposed to be organised not only by way of requisitioning of grain, but also purchasing it.¹⁹ Along with his staff of 30, Schimmelmann managed to purchase cheaply from frightened peasants all over Saxony and to amass a fortune from the profit margin: the literature speaks of 1.5 million thalers.²⁰ In the long run, however, another coup of the young entrepreneur

14 Horst Carl, *Okkupation und Regionalismus: Die preussischen Westprovinzen im Siebenjährigen Krieg* (Mainz, 1993), p. 220.

15 *Schimmelmann – PP: Hamburg entfernt ein Kolonialdenkmal: Lesungen, Vorträge, Kurzfilme: Beiträge zur Veranstaltungsreihe vom 28. bis 30. November 2008 im FRISE-Künstlerhaus /Abbildungszentrum Hamburg im Rahmen des Projekts Wandsbektransformance – Die Gegenwart des Kolonialen*, ed. Hanni Jokinen (Hamburg, 2009).

16 Christian Degn, *Die Schimmelmanns im atlantischen Dreieckshandel: Gewinn und Gewissen* (Neumünster, 1974).

17 On the context, see Christian Hochmuth, *Globale Güter – lokale Aneignung: Kaffee, Tee, Schokolade und Tabak im frühneuzeitlichen Dresden* (Konstanz, 2008).

18 Füssel, *Preis des Ruhms*, pp. 112–115.

19 For a recent study on Prussian logistics, see Marcus Warnke, *Logistik und friderizianische Kriegsführung: Eine Studie zur Verteilung, Mobilisierung und Wirkungsmächtigkeit militärisch relevanter Ressourcen im Siebenjährigen Krieg am Beispiel des Jahres 1757* (Berlin, 2018).

20 Wilhelm Treue, *Wirtschafts- und Technikgeschichte Preußens* (Berlin, 1984), p. 97.

proved far more consequential: During the invasion of Saxony, Frederick II had the entire inventory of Meissen porcelain confiscated and offered to sell it to Schimmelmänn.²¹ They agreed on a price of 120,000 thalers and Schimmelmänn was granted the right to have missing pieces redone at his own expense and to export his porcelain to Prussia. Prussia, however, already had its own porcelain factory, with which Schimmelmänn was now entering into competition.²² He avoided this by selling all the inventory for 160,000 thalers to a consortium of three men, which included the former director of the factory. Nonetheless, Schimmelmänn retained a large quantity of porcelain on preferential conditions. The Prussians now tried to get Schimmelmänn to sell his porcelain in Prussia, but the latter had no intention of doing so and instead left for neutral Hamburg.²³ The enormous quantities of other porcelain that were obtained is made clear by the fact that Frederick II himself transferred porcelain worth 283,687 thalers to Berlin, and that the 'Old Dessauer', Leopold I of Anhalt-Dessau (1676–1747), alone obtained 56 chests.²⁴

Although the city council of the Hanseatic city refused to give Schimmelmänn citizenship, the entrepreneur, nonetheless, set up business there with his own staff in a centrally located palace with its own trading office (*Kontor*). In 1758, Schimmelmänn's brokers publicly auctioned off a large part of the porcelain stocks at prices including substantial profit margins.²⁵ This did not do any long-term harm to his contact with Prussia; Schimmelmänn continued to be too important as army supplier. His next field of activity as a war profiteer would be manipulation of coinage. In 1755, Frederick II had already leased the Prussian mints to Jewish monetary entrepreneurs.²⁶ Schimmelmänn now got himself involved and entered negotiations with these so-called *Münzjuden*

21 Alessandro Monti, *Der Preis des 'weißen Goldes': Preispolitik und -strategie im Merkantilssystem am Beispiel der Porzellanmanufaktur Meißen 1710–1830* (Munich, 2011), p. 176.

22 Gisela Zick, *Berliner Porzellan der Manufaktur von Wilhelm Caspar Wegely 1751–1757* (Berlin, 1978); Friedrich Wilckens, *Krepon, Kredit und Porzellan: Vom steilen Aufstieg und tiefen Fall der Unternehmerfamilie Wegeli aus Diessenhofen in Berlin des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Frauenfeld, 2008).

23 Isabelle Pantel, *Die hamburgische Neutralität im Siebenjährigen Krieg* (Münster, 2011).

24 Richard Haehl, *Samuel Hahnemann: Sein Leben und Schaffen* (Leipzig, 1922), p. 8.

25 Advertisements from the *Hamburgischer Correspondent* in Degn, *Schimmelmänn*, p. 8.

26 Reinhold Koser, "Die preußischen Finanzen im Siebenjährigen Krieg," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte* 13 (1900), 153–217, 329–375; Jörg K. Hoensch, "Friedrichs II. Währungsmanipulationen im Siebenjährigen Krieg und ihre Auswirkungen auf die polnische Münzreform von 1765/66," *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands* 22 (1973), 110–175; Peter Blastenbrei, "Der König und das Geld: Studien zur Finanzpolitik Friedrichs II. von Preußen," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte*, n.s., 6 (1996), 55–82.

(literally: coin Jews). Their business model consisted of adding less precious metal in gold and silver to the coins and making up the difference with copper. Schimmelmann yet again made effective use of his well-connected staff: for example, by having gold and silver purchased in Holland and then sold in turn at the mints in Prussia – all, of course, without putting his own name on the contracts.²⁷ This means he did not mint coins himself, but acted as a middleman for gold and silver from the Netherlands and took care of the distribution of the inferior coins far from their actual mints.²⁸ He generated his profit margin from this precious metal trade and the control of the distribution rooms of the inferior coins.

Schimmelmann, who had in the meanwhile become a millionaire, was wooed by the Prussian, Saxon, and Danish courts, but preferred at first to stay in the Hamburg area. In 1759, he acquired a property with a magnificent palace for 180,000 thalers in Ahrensburg, which was Danish at the time, and he lived like a prince, with a residence in Hamburg and a small ‘royal seat’ in Ahrensburg. In 1761, while the palace was being renovated, Schimmelmann travelled with his family to Copenhagen, where Foreign Minister Bernstorff had great admiration for “this famous entrepreneur who made almost one and half million in the present war”.²⁹ In no time, Schimmelmann rose from chamberlain to General Commercial Intendant to the Danish Crown. In 1762, the Seven Years’ War flared up again in Danish northern Germany, as Tsar Peter III pondered going to war against Denmark; thanks to his quick overthrow, however, this remained a minor episode and the war came to an end in 1763 with the Peace of Hubertusburg.³⁰ For Schimmelmann, this brought a phase as war profiteer to a close, but his social and economic rise knew no bounds.

In Denmark too, the parvenu made a display in terms of courtly prestige by acquiring a residence in Copenhagen in 1761 and the Lindenberg estate near Aalborg in 1762.³¹ He was subsequently accorded the rank of a hereditary baron or *Freiherr* and made a knight of the Order of Dannebrog. The Danish king had taken over the West Indies Guinean Company in 1755 and thus possessed four plantations on the Virgin Islands in the Danish West Indies. Since

27 Konrad Schneider, “Zum Geldhandel in Hamburg zur Zeit des Siebenjährigen Krieges,” *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte* 69 (1983), 62–82. Besides the money trade, the neutral Netherlands also played a role in the grain trade and logistics of various warring parties, see Alice Clare Carter, *The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years’ War* (London, 1972), pp. 129–152.

28 Degn, *Schimmelmanns*, pp. 8–9.

29 Degn, *Schimmelmanns*, p. 12.

30 Füssel, *Preis des Ruhms*, p. 442–443.

31 Degn, *Schimmelmanns*, pp. 14–15.

they were not profitable for the Crown, however, the decision was taken to sell them. On 22 March 1763, just over a month after the end of the Seven Years' War, the following resolution was adopted: "The Royal Refinery, along with storehouse, on Christianshavn and four plantations in the West Indies shall be sold to the General Intendant of Commerce and Extraordinaire Envoyé to the Lower Saxony [Imperial] Circle, Baron von Schimmelmann."³² The plantations in question were two plantations on Saint Croix (*La Grande Princesse* and *La Grange*), the plantations on Saint Thomas and the *Carolina* plantation on Saint John. Schimmelmann doubled the number of slaves from 500 to almost 1,000 and had the letters BvS (Baron von Schimmelmann) burned into their skin.³³ Schimmelmann subsequently became one of the richest men in Europe. He commanded a fleet of 14 ships. The now Danish entrepreneur occupied key positions in the so-called triangular trade between Europe, Africa and the Caribbean: He had his own rifle factory and exported arms, alcohol, and calico from Europe to Africa, where he acquired slaves for the plantations on the sugar islands. Sugar, rum, and cotton were shipped from the Caribbean to Hamburg. Some of the raw materials were first transformed into the end products such as rum or textiles at factories in Hamburg; the profits were then invested in turn in the slave trade in Africa.

1.2 *Von Brenkenhoff: Horse Trade*

Franz Balthasar Schönberg von Brenkenhoff (1723–80) was born the son of a Saxon cavalry officer, but he soon lost his parents and ended up in the custody of Leopold I of Anhalt-Dessau as a page.³⁴ Brenkenhoff remained in the service of the Dessauers also under the latter's successors and gained experience in agriculture, hydraulics, and administration. His first biographer, August Gottlieb Meißner, called the Seven Years' War a "coincidence that allowed him to earn more in a few days than he probably otherwise could have expected from the hard work of many years or even of his whole life."³⁵ During the siege of Prague, Prince Moritz of Anhalt-Dessau (1712–60), the fifth son of the Old Dessauer, allegedly asked him: "Whether he was inclined to take over the deliveries for the army? But before he could make up his mind, Schimmelmann had

32 Degn, *Schimmelmanns*, p. 67.

33 Denmark first abolished the slave trade in 1792, see Erik Gøbel, *The Danish Slave Trade and Its Abolition* (Leiden/Boston, 2017).

34 Benno von Knobelsdorff-Brenkenhoff, *Eine Provinz im Frieden erobert: Brenkenhoff als Leiter des friderizianischen Retablissemments in Pommern 1762–1780* (Cologne, 1984), pp. 11–13.

35 August Gottlieb Meißner, *Leben Franz Balthasar Schönberg von Brenkenhoff, Königl. Preuß. geheim. Ober-Finanz-Kriegs- und Domainenrath* (Leipzig, 1782), p. 16.

already gotten into contact, and Brenkenhof, who, in part, shied away from the risk that was, however, associated with this venture and, in part, was completely unprepared for and surprised by the proposal, only took over approximately one thousand *Wispel*.³⁶ Meißner describes a dramatic neck-and-neck race between the two rivals Brenkenhoff and Schimmelmann. Brenkenhoff ultimately got the upper hand. Within two days “every bushel of grain lying in stock in an area of several miles running through the whole of Anhalt, up to Magdeburg, beyond Naumburg and deep into Thuringia had been made available for sale and purchased. Schimmelmann’s plenipotentiaries were right behind and came up empty everywhere.”³⁷ Schimmelmann is said to have then personally approached Brenkenhoff and asked him not to ruin him and instead to share the profit.³⁸ Brenkenhoff seems to have agreed, and the two men are said to have worked together until Schimmelmann entered the service of the Danish Crown. The next step in the story of Brenkenhoff’s rise was the procurement of horses for Frederick II during the Bohemian campaign, inasmuch as the “poor condition of the individual horses and the draft horses” purportedly limited the King’s operations. Brenkenhoff now pointed out that “a large number of people” kept “riding and carriage horses” in the cities without “necessarily needing them”. Soon after the King gave his agreement, Brenkenhoff is reported to have sent him “several thousand of the handsomest, most hard-working steeds”.³⁹ But his biographer is able to present an even far more spectacular story: In the context of the Battle of Torgau, the Austrians held territory in Dessau where Brenkenhoff was, more or less, a prisoner. He developed a relationship of trust with the Austrian commissioner, and as Frederick II was getting ready to try to reconquer the territory, Brenkenhoff is said to have encouraged the commissioner to have a large amount of bread baked. His aim was for the bread to fall into the Prussians’ hands, which, according to the biography, then in fact occurred. His biographer insists that the loyal businessman even put his life at risk when communicating with the King across enemy lines.⁴⁰ In 1762, Brenkenhoff was rewarded for his efforts and appointed “High Privy Councillor for Finance, War and Estates” (*Wirklicher Geheimer Oberfinanz-, Kriegs- und Domänenrat*).⁴¹ Henceforth, he would manage the reconstruction of Pomerania and the Neumark, regions that had been hard

36 Meißner, *Leben*, pp. 16–17. The *Wispel* was a grain measure differing from territory to territory. A Prussian *Wispel* equalled 24 *Scheffel* (bushel) which is about 1,319.1 litres.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 32.

40 *Ibid.*, pp. 32–37.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 38; Knobelsdorff-Brenkenhoff, *Provinz*, pp. 13–29.

hit by the war.⁴² The last years of his life were marked by massive economic miscalculations and mistakes, which have become famous in the expression the ‘Brenkenhoff defect’.⁴³

1.3 *Splitgerber: Trader and Banker*

David Splitgerber was the son of a miller and founded the trading company Splitgerber & Daum in Berlin in 1712.⁴⁴ The firm experienced a gradual rise under the ‘Soldier King’ Frederick William I thanks, among other things, to arms trade and provisioning of the court. As crown prince Frederick II was already in debt to Splitgerber & Daum, but he settled all his debts when coming to power.⁴⁵ Under Frederick II, the company experienced a rapid rise, which was essentially due to the three Silesian Wars: Turnover rose from 641,000 thalers (1738) to 804,000 thalers (1740) and reached over 4 million thalers in 1762.⁴⁶ Profits from the Seven Years’ War of 1 million thalers were transferred to a reserve account. Crucial factors were the procurement of cash for the army and, like in Schimmelmann’s case, involvement in the ‘coin business’ with Jewish monetary entrepreneurs like Herz Moses Gompertz (1716–60), Moses Issac (1708–99), Daniel Itzig (1723–99) and Veitel Heine Ephraim (1703–75). After the death of Gottfried Adolf Daum, Splitgerber transformed the firm into a family business and in 1745 hired the Alsatian Johann Jacob Schickler (1711–75) and in 1748 the Berliner Friedrich Heinrich Berendes (1729–71), both of whom became his sons-in-law and co-owners of the company.⁴⁷ Splitgerber acquired, among other things, the Palais Beauvryé on today’s Pariser Platz in Berlin in 1741 and the Schickler House on Dönhoffplatz (1746), and he owned country estates and knightly estates in Lichterfelde and Strahlau and a baroque garden adjacent to the city’s fortifications (1748). He succeeded in developing a close business relationship with the King, who made him into a multitasker. He acted as a victuals supplier, as well as a trader in arms and raw materials, and as a banker. In July 1740, he delivered grain from the Baltics, England, and the Netherlands for 400,000 thalers; in the first Silesian War, he procured “saltpetre, powder,

42 Knobelsdorff-Brenkenhoff, *Provinz*.

43 Richard Berg, “Der Brenkenhoffsche Defekt: Nach den Akten des Pommerschen und des Geheimen Staatsarchivs,” *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte* 11 (1898), 493–525.

44 Wilhelm Treue, “David Splitgerber (1683–1764): Ein Unternehmer im preußischen Merkantilstaat,” *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 41 (1954), 235–267.

45 Treue, “Splitgerber,” p. 261.

46 Treue, “Splitgerber”.

47 Friedrich Lenz, Otto Unholtz, *Die Geschichte des Bankhauses Gebrüder Schickler: Festschrift zum 200-jährigen Bestehen* (Berlin, 1912).

lead and money for the recruits”, in 1759, “American sulphur, Polish and ‘Indian’ saltpetre” for 49,000 thalers; and the rifle factory had particularly high sales.⁴⁸ As the King’s ‘chief banker’, he paid levies, accepted the English subsidies in exchange for gold deliveries and transferred payments for negotiations with the Ottomans to the Prussian envoy in Istanbul.⁴⁹ According to Wilhelm Treue, unlike suppliers such as Schimmelmann, he never went too far, but instead was satisfied with moderate, but regular returns, which further strengthened the King’s trust in him.⁵⁰ The Splitgerber & Daum firm even got through the financial crisis that followed the Seven Years’ War unscathed and, at the time of Splitgerber’s death in 1764, registered net profits of 560,000 thalers for the period 1759–63.⁵¹

It is striking that none of the well-known Prussian war profiteers came from the western provinces. There were good reasons for this, according to Horst Carl, since the pieces did not come together here, “neither for supplying war materials nor for coin transactions”, since “a merchant class disposing of sufficient capital” for “business on this sort of scale” was simply lacking.⁵² How the allied army in northwest Germany organised its provisioning is the subject of the following section.

2 “Commissaries and Contractors, Who Have Fattened ... on the Blood of the Nation”: British and Hanoverians

Every upstart of fortune, harnessed in the trappings of the mode, presents himself at Bath, as in the very focus of observation Clerks and factors from the East Indies loaded with the spoil of plundered provinces; planters, negro-drivers, and hucksters, from the American plantations, enriched they know not how; agents commissaries, and contractors, who have fattened, in two successive wars, on the blood of the nation; usurers, brokers and jobbers of every kind, men of low birth, and no breeding, have found themselves suddenly translated into a state of affluence, unknown to former ages; and no wonder that their brains should be intoxicated with pride, vanity, and presumption. Knowing no other criterion of greatness, but the ostentation of wealth, they discharge their

48 Lenz, Unholtz, *Gebrüder Schickler*, p. 264.

49 Füssel, *Preis des Ruhms*, pp. 215–216, 443–445.

50 Treue, “Splitgerber,” p. 266.

51 Treue, “Splitgerber”.

52 Carl, *Okkupation*, p. 359.

affluence without taste or conduct, through every channel of the most absurd extravagance.⁵³

The Scottish physician and writer Tobias Smollet (1721–71) used this biting mixture of ridicule and ‘cultural sociology’ *avant la lettre* in 1771 to describe the *nouveaux riches*.⁵⁴ In Great Britain, entrepreneurs got rich thanks to, among other things, the opportunities in the slave trade that were created during the war, the profits that the East India Company derived from the war or by acting as army suppliers in Germany, and they made no secret of it.⁵⁵ John Kennion (1726–85) of Liverpool was thus another well-off slave trader who owed his initial capital to the war. In the 1750s, he had already invested in shares in slave ships and purchased sugar plantations in Jamaica; during the 1762 Havana Expedition, he was then responsible as commissary for supplying the armed forces with food, clothing, and munitions.⁵⁶ On Cuba, he secured the concession for supplying the north of Cuba with slaves, which proved to be a lucrative business. Among the actors involved in supplying the British army, we can theoretically distinguish between commissaries and contractors, although the boundaries are fuzzy in practice. Contractors were merchants who were paid a certain amount of money for providing products, whereas commissaries were officers whose function was to procure the army’s supplies.⁵⁷ Jeffrey Amherst, followed by Robert Boyd and Thomas Orby Hunters (c. 1716–69), served as commissaries; Lawrence Dundas (1712–81) or Richard Oswald (1705–84) acted as contractors, the latter in the dual role of contractor and commissary. These

53 Tobias Smollet, *The Expedition of Humphrey Clinker*, 1 (Dublin, 1771), p. 56.

54 By ‘cultural sociology’, I mean classical analyses of parvenus, consumption behaviour and prestige, see Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York/London, 1899); Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (London, 1986).

55 See for example, Marian Füssel, “Händler und Krieger? Robert Clive, die East India Company und die Kapitalisierung des Siebenjährigen Krieges in Indien,” *Die Kapitalisierung des Krieges: Kriegsunternehmer in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit*, eds. Markus Meumann, Matthias Meinhardt (Berlin, 2021), 133–156.

56 Nikolaus Böttcher, *As Ship Laden with Dollars: Britische Handelsinteressen in Kuba (1762–1825)* (Frankfurt a.M., 2007); Elena A. Schneider, *The Occupation of Havana: War, Trade, and Slavery in the Atlantic World* (Williamsburg, Virginia, 2018), p. 206.

57 Hancock, *Citizens*, pp. 225–226; Gordon E. Bannerman, *Merchants and the Military in Eighteenth-Century Britain: British Army Contracts and Domestic Supply, 1739–1763* (London, 2008); Stephen Conway, “Provisioning the Combined Army in Germany, 1758–1762: Who Benefited?,” in *The Contractor State and its Implications, 1659–1815*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Canaria, 2012), 81–102, p. 83; Walter Mediger, *Herzog Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lüneburg und die alliierte Armee im Siebenjährigen Krieg (1757–1762)*. Für die Publikation aufbereitet und vollendet von Thomas Klingebiel (Hannover, 2011), pp. 911–971.

entrepreneurs were responsible for provisioning the British-allied army in north-west Germany from 1758 on.⁵⁸ They offer astonishing examples of social mobility: Dundas, for instance, was made a baronet in 1762.⁵⁹ The Seven Years' War first gave rise to demands for more stable institutional structures for provisioning the British army, which, in light of the latent British unease about a standing army in one's own country, tended to have an ad hoc character previously. This was also apparent again and again in the area of holding prisoners of war: a constantly recurring situation in the 18th century, to which, however, the authorities long responded in a more or less improvised fashion. Here too, contractors were employed for the purpose of provisioning the prisoners, which, given widespread corruption, sometimes led to disastrous conditions.⁶⁰ The unexpected dimensions of the global war now created additional pressure on logistics functioning over vast distances.⁶¹ But it was precisely the need to make use of the professional infrastructures of private merchants that would further delay consistent institutionalisation, such as was already more developed in Prussia, for instance.⁶²

2.1 *Taylor: Paymaster*

Many of the protagonists mentioned amassed considerable fortunes during the war: like, for instance, the paymaster Peter Taylor (1714–77), a former silversmith who spent five years as deputy paymaster in Germany during the war.⁶³ His quick profits were a mystery even for his contemporaries. Thus, in March 1760, the Duke of Newcastle wrote to General John Mostyn (c. 1709–79): “By the by, the proceedings of this Mr. Taylor are something mysterious, the length of

58 Starting in 1758, Hanoverian and British troops were jointly provisioned by an English commissariat, Medinger, *Ferdinand*, p. 929; see too Hamish D. Little, *The Treasury, the Commissariat and the Supply of the Combined Army in Germany during the Seven Years War (1756–1763)* (unpublished PhD diss., University of London, 1981); on the commissaries, Little, *The Treasury*, pp. 98–141, 348–361.

59 Stephen Conway, *War, State, and Society in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland* (New York, 2006), pp. 121–126; On Dundas, see Bannerman, *Merchants*.

60 Renaud Morieux, *The Society of Prisoners: Anglo-French War and Incarceration in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2019), pp. 313–321.

61 Bannerman, *Merchants*, pp. 31–33; Hancock, *Citizens*, pp. 222–225.

62 Bannerman, *Merchants*, p. 139. On the differences between the Prussian and the British-Hanoverian commissariat system, see *Geschichte der Feldzüge Herzog Ferdinands von Braunschweig-Lüneburg*, 1, ed. Ferdinand von Westphalen (Berlin, 1859), pp. 119–121.

63 James A. Oughton, *By Dint of Labour and Perseverance: A Journal Recording Two Months in Northern Germany Kept by Lieutenant Colonel James Adolphus Oughton, Commanding 1st Battalion, 37th Regiment of Foot, 1758*, ed. Stephen Wood (London, 1997), pp. 52–53 (note 131); Conway, *War*, pp. 123–124.

time that the money is coming from Amsterdam to the army, the payment in light dollars instead of heavy ones ... has some mystery in it which I cannot yet fathom."⁶⁴ But the general evidently found the matter less puzzling, when he replied: "I don't think there is quite so much mystery in the affair your Grace mentions, of light ducats, as roguery."⁶⁵ In May 1760, Newcastle also wrote to the Marquess of Granby in Germany: "I must beg you to enquire into the truth of a report which has reached me, that Mr. Taylor, the deputy paymaster, makes a deduction of six or seven per cent, out of his payments, retaining that sum for himself."⁶⁶ In August of that year, the enterprising British army agent John Calcraft the Elder (1726–72) told Taylor: "Your getting rich, which makes other people envy you, gives me infinite pleasure."⁶⁷ Taylor's reputation was not the best after his return. During a dinner at Lord Shelburne's, he evidently made no secret of his riches: "Many facts he related, and had an openness in his manner and a freedom of speech, which had carried more conviction, had he not overpraised himself, and had not the idea of £400,000 got in four years been perpetually present to my mind's eye as he talked."⁶⁸ Taylor had enough money after the war to buy two estates near Wells and near Portsmouth and a seat in parliament. He sat in the House of Commons from 1765 to 1777 and he had star architect Sir Robert Taylor (1714–88) construct a prestigious manor on his property near Portsmouth. A widespread pattern among the parvenus, as we shall see.

2.2 *Oswald: Slave Trader and Baker*

One of the most powerful British contractors was the London merchant and slave trader Richard Oswald (1705–84).⁶⁹ Oswald already supplied the Navy with tar and turpentine before the war; but his great hour as army supplier first arrived with the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. Many years of experience in "shipping and trade, plantation economy and slave trade" helped him and his partner John Mill to fulfil their contracts with "distinction".⁷⁰ When the British military involvement in the German territories expanded then in 1758, the

64 John A. Cannon, "Taylor, Peter," in *The House of Commons 1754–1790*, 3, eds. Lewis Namier, John Brooke (London, 1985), 517–518, p. 517.

65 Cannon, "Taylor".

66 *The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Rutland*, 2 (London, 1889), p. 214; on the investigations of the governments, see too Little, *Treasury*, pp. 57–58.

67 Cannon, "Taylor," p. 517.

68 Cannon, "Taylor".

69 On the following, see Hancock, *Citizens*, pp. 221–239; Bannerman, *Merchants*, pp. 62–63; 85–87; Little, *Treasury*, p. 103.

70 Hancock, *Citizens*, pp. 226–227.

Treasury sought out suitable “persons of credit and character” as contractors, who were supposed, above all, to have military experience abroad. Oswald did not meet the search criteria, but no other merchant volunteered either. The Lords of the Treasury thus resorted to a public tender in the *London Gazette* and solicited “Proposals for Furnishing Bread wagons and Bread for the use of his Majesty’s Troops now going abroad.”⁷¹ Two bids were received; Oswald submitted the cheaper one and was chosen. Matters were not so simple, however, since the losing bidder, Abraham Prado, went to Germany on his own initiative and proposed his services to the allied army under Ferdinand of Brunswick. It was only in August 1758 that the well-connected Oswald managed to underbid him yet again on the ground in Germany. The business then started with the supplying of self-baked bread and later expanded to coaches and all sorts of means of transport, from artillery wagons to hospital wagons.⁷² The fact that Oswald operated for the first year merely on the basis of a verbal agreement is both astonishing and revelatory of the degree of informality of the trade; a written contract only followed in May 1759.⁷³ By March 1763, Oswald had delivered around 5 million loaves of bread; he employed an ‘army of bakers’ and controlled about a third of the 55 British army depots in northwest Germany.⁷⁴ Just the bread earned Oswald 112,000 pounds. But it took years before all the invoices were paid.⁷⁵ It was not until 1771 that a sort of final settlement took place, and it was not until 1804 that his estates were paid off.⁷⁶ For Oswald was no less prone to conspicuous status-related consumption than the other army suppliers and war profiteers. In 1764, he acquired Auchincruive House in South Ayrshire, Scotland and had it expanded in the years to come into a Palladian-style villa.⁷⁷ The latter was equipped with an extensive art collection and a magnificent English garden with tea house and greenhouse, which earned him the reputation in 1774 of owning the “finest Garden & most elegant Glass House and Hot House” in all of Scotland.⁷⁸ Oswald was not spared critical observations by his contemporaries either, one of whom caricatured him as a “Plunderer of Armies”. But in comparison to the upstart Taylor, he had a

71 Hancock, *Citizens*, p. 227; this was already a long-established procedure see Bannerman, *Merchants*, p. 46.

72 On transport, see Little, *Treasury*, pp. 259–298.

73 Hancock, *Citizens*, p. 229; Little, *Treasury*, pp. 240–241.

74 See the map *ibid.*, p. 232.

75 *Ibid.*, p. 237.

76 *Ibid.*, p. 235.

77 *Ibid.*, pp. 321–347.

78 *Ibid.*, pp. 353–354 (collections), 376–381 (garden), and 380 (quote).

rather solid image: Ferdinand of Brunswick, for instance, evidently had a high opinion of him as a businessman with integrity.⁷⁹

2.3 *Uckermann: Army Supplier, Merchant, and Project Maker*

A name that turns up repeatedly in the files of the Hanoverian administration during the war is Johann Jacob Uckermann (1718–81). His father of the same name (1682–1749) already possessed extensive real estate holdings in Wanfried as merchant and mayor.⁸⁰ The turning point for the younger Uckermann came with the Seven Years' War, during which he acted as army supplier for both at first, in 1757, the French army and, from 1759 on, the allied army and obtained enormous riches thanks in no small measure to creating monopolies and manipulating settlements.⁸¹ The Hessian Landgrave had awarded him the title of major for loyal service during the French occupation, which, given the military's scepticism towards civilian entrepreneurs, undoubtedly was advantageous for him. His businesses started in spring 1759 with the mission of supplying bread to the Imhoff Corps in Hesse. But the first bottlenecks soon appeared; in winter 1759, supplies were running low during the siege of Krofdorf (near Giessen). Uckermann himself, however, interpreted the situation as being under control, viewed himself as a do-gooder and wrote to his brother in November 1759 from the allied camp near Krofdorf: "The enterprise is very important, which means that it amounts to 600,000 Dutch guilders a month, and it has held off the worst times without the whole army suffering one day of want. And it was assumed by all the people, indeed by all the generals, that I was doing the impossible. They look at it with astonishment and show me the greatest respect."⁸² In reality, the soldiers were starving, Uckermann's suppliers were waiting for his payments and did not make deliveries. The general of the Hanoverian troops, August Friedrich von Spörcken (1698–1776), noted: "Major Uckermann financially ruined and robbed the army with impunity during the siege of Krofdorf."⁸³ Even Oswald found that his colleague was acting only out of self-interest and without regard for the troops. But Uckermann obtained contract after contract and even went so far as to demand an exemption from

79 Ibid., p. 238.

80 Hendrik Bärnighausen, "Das 'Museum' des Freiherrn Johann Jacob von Uckermann und seine Übernahme durch die Universität Leipzig," *Jahrbuch der Staatlichen Schlösser, Burgen und Gärten Sachsen* 13 (2005), 128–152, p. 129.

81 Otfried Dascher, "Die Hessische Handelskompagnie zu Karlshafen (1771–1789)," *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte* 22 (1972), 229–253, pp. 230–231.

82 Dascher, "Handelskompagnie," p. 231.

83 Mediger, *Ferdinand*, p. 946.

the excise tax (*Akzis-Freiheit*).⁸⁴ His request, however, met with a clear rejection by Ferdinand of Brunswick:

If I am correctly judging Uckermann's design, he wants to establish a monopoly of victuals at Kassel. For if I could procure freedom from excise for him, first no other merchant would be able to match his price, then, however, when he had mastered the trade, no soldier would be able to pay for his victuals. I cannot allow myself to be involved in this project.⁸⁵

Despite numerous critical voices, Uckermann consolidated his position, and he was named *Entrepreneur Général*.⁸⁶ Illegal trade in receipts represented a massive problem: Contractors purchased the receipts cheap from peasants and then later submitted them as if they had had provided the full delivery, thus pocketing the difference.⁸⁷ In December 1760, Gerlach Adolph von Münchhausen complained to his brother Philipp Adolph:

The misfortune stems from the indescribably wicked English commissariat, which partly out of clumsiness, but still more due to self-interested intentions and by way of deceitful entrepreneurs does not take suitable precaution and then, when there is hardship, pounces on the poor country ... One's heart bleeds when one considers that to make such people as Massau and Uckermann rich, so many thousands of the King's loyal subjects have been reduced to beggary in proprio sensu.⁸⁸

84 On the contracts and sums, see Little, *Treasury*, pp. 363–366.

85 Mediger, *Ferdinand*, p. 947: “Wenn ich von dem Dessenin des Uckermanns recht urteile, so will derselbe ein Monopolium von Viktualien zu Kassel etablieren. Denn im Fall ich ihm die Akzise-Freiheit verschaffen könnte, so würde ihm kein anderer Kaufmann anfangs Preis halten, hernach aber, wenn er sich des Handels bemeistert hätte, kein Soldat seine Viktualien bezahlen können. Ich kann mich nicht wohl auf dieses Projekt einlassen.”

86 Mediger, *Ferdinand*, p. 948.

87 Little, *Treasury*, pp. 255–256.

88 8 December 1760, as cited in Mediger, *Ferdinand*, p. 965: “Das Unglück rühret von dem unbeschreiblich bösen englischen Kommissariat her, welches theils aus Ungeschicklichkeit, noch mehr aber aus interessierten Absichten und durch betriegerische Entrepreneurs die gehörige Vorsicht nicht nimmt und alsdann, wann Not vorhanden ist, auf das arme Land fällt ... Das Herze blutet, wenn man erwäget, daß um dergleichen Leute, als Massau und Uckermann sind, zu bereichern, so viel Tausend getreue Untertanen des Königs an den Bettelstab in proprio sensu gebracht werden.” On criticism of Uckermann, see Little, *Treasury*, pp. 136–139, 177–179.

Uckermann, the “deceitful entrepreneur”, was not harmed by this; on the contrary, he earned the trust of Landgrave Frederick II of Hesse-Kassel and, after the war, directed the reconstruction of the decrepit Hessian postal service as postmaster general.⁸⁹ The successful businessman rose to the rank of Councillor for Commerce in 1763 and that of Privy Councillor for War in 1766; in 1769, he was made a member of the nobility and in 1770 an imperial baron (*Reichsfreiherr*).⁹⁰ In 1762, the family acquired the Bendeleben estate in Electoral Saxony and built a manor on the property; further knightly estates were then acquired in Weesenstein and Meusegast near Dresden. In the last ten years of his life, however, Uckermann ruined himself financially through his involvement with the Trading Company in Karlshafen.⁹¹

3 Profiteers on Trial: The *Affaire du Canada*

Military corruption was particularly pronounced in the army of the country that suffered the greatest territorial losses in the Seven Years' War: namely, France.⁹² During the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), the French monarchy had abandoned the *régie* system, i.e. central administration of army provisioning, and revived the institution of *munitionnaires généraux*.⁹³ A group of around a dozen merchants thus acquired influence as monopolists. At the end of the Seven Years' War, Étienne-François de Choiseul (1719–85) went back to the *régie* system, since trust in the private entrepreneurs had suffered badly.⁹⁴ The provisioning of the French army in Germany was carried out by a special firm named *Mmunitionnaires généraux des vivres de Flandres et d'Allemagne* under director Jacques Marquet de Bourgade (1718–84). While it was done in such a way that, despite some critical voices, its profiteers were not exposed to any public sanctions, the government increasingly set its sights

89 Joseph Ruhl, “Der fürstlich hessische General-Post-Intendant Johann Jacob Freiherr von Uckermann,” *Archiv für Post und Telegraphie* 12 (1884), pp. 338–343.

90 Dascher, “Handelskompagnie,” p. 233.

91 Dascher, “Handelskompagnie”.

92 Horst Carl, “‘Pavillon de Hanovre’: Korruption im Militär im 18. Jahrhundert,” in *Integration – Legitimation – Korruption: Politische Patronage in Früher Neuzeit und Moderne*, eds. Ronald Asch, Birgit Emich, and Jens Ivo Engels (Frankfurt a.M., 2011), 233–246.

93 Joël Félix, “Victualling Louis xv’s Armies: The Munitionnaire des Vivres de Flandres et d’Allemagne and the Military Supply System,” *The Contractor State and its Implications, 1659–1815*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Canaria, 2012), 99–125, p. 103.

94 Félix, “Victualling,” p. 122.

on the entrepreneurs in the colonies. A spectacular trial of a group of Canadian colonial officials, whom one wanted to hold accountable for the loss of *Nouvelle-France*, got underway in Paris even before the war was over.⁹⁵ Profiteering, embezzlement, and fraud were the serious charges. A 27-person expert commission formed to prosecute the charges began its work in mid-November 1761 in the Grand Châtelet building in Paris. The defendants in the *Affaire du Canada* case included Governor-General Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil (1698–1778),⁹⁶ the Intendant of Nouvelle-France François Bigot (1703–78), the royal army supplier Joseph Michel Cadet (1719–81), and Michel-Jean-Hugues Péan (1723–82),⁹⁷ *Aide-Major* of the naval troops.⁹⁸ The trial, which mainly focused on money, lasted almost two years; the verdict was handed down on 10 December 1763 and published in virtually novelistic form.⁹⁹

3.1 *François Bigot: Intendant of Nouvelle-France*

François Bigot came from a family in Bordeaux that had already been well-established in the commercial and financial sector for many generations.¹⁰⁰ The young Bigot began his career in naval administration and rose to the position of “resident commissary of the Marine” in Rochefort.¹⁰¹ On 1 May 1739, he was promoted to the position of Financial Commissary of Louisbourg,

95 John F. Boshier, “A Québec Merchant’s Trading Circles in France and Canada: Jean-André Lamaletie before 1763,” *Histoire Sociale / Social History* 10:1 (1977), 24–44; *ibid.*, “The French Government’s Motives in the *Affaire du Canada*, 1761–1763,” *English Historical Review* 96:1 (1981), 59–78; André Côté, “L’affaire du Canada (1761–1763),” *Cap-aux-Diamants* 83:4 (2005), 10–14; Christian Ayne Crouch, *Nobility Lost: French and Canadian Martial Cultures, Indians, and the End of New France* (Ithaca/London, 2014), pp. 128–136.

96 Guy Frégault, *Le Grand marquis: Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil et la Louisiane* (Montréal/Paris, 1952).

97 Guy Dinel, “Péan, Michel-Jean-Hugues,” 2003, in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* [DCB]. Available at http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/pean_michel_jean_hugues_4E.html. Accessed 26 April 2021.

98 Pierre-Georges Roy, *Bigot et sa bande et l’Affaire du Canada* (Lévis, 1950).

99 *Jugement rendu souverainement et en dernier ressort, dans l’affaire du Canada ...* (Paris, 1763).

100 Gustave Lanctot, “L’Affaire du Canada: Bibliographie du procès de Bigot,” *Bulletin des Recherches Historiques* 38 (1932), 8–17; Guy Frégault, *François Bigot: Administrateur français*, 1–2 (Montréal, 1948); Denis Vaugeois, “François Bigot: Son exil et sa mort,” *Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française* 21:4 (1968), 731–748; John F. Boshier, Jean-Claude Dubé, “Bigot, François (d. 1778),” 2003, in *DCB*. Available at http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/bigot_francois_1778_4E.html. Accessed 26 April 2021.

101 Frégault, *Bigot*, 1, pp. 53–68.

Île Royale.¹⁰² During the War of Austrian Succession, he invested in privateering expeditions, but his main job was to secure the supplies situation for the military and civilian population. Except between 1745 and 1748, he was almost always active in *Nouvelle-France*; in 1748, he was appointed the intendant of the latter.¹⁰³ As *officier de plume*, he was responsible for the administration of “funds, supplies, equipment, timber, shipbuilding, housing, hospitals, the populace in general, and everything, indeed, except fighting”.¹⁰⁴ Bigot presented himself as a kind of viceroy, organised sumptuous balls and acted as a powerful patron. He profited from awarding trading posts and commercial contracts, and got involved in the fur trade, while Canada’s population was suffering from excessive prices and the consequences of inflation. There is no doubt that Bigot also lined his own pockets during the Seven Years’ War and contemporaries already accused him of starving the population. The list of his critics is long and ranges from the French commander-in-chief Louis-Joseph de Montcalm (1712–59) to the latter’s adjutant Louis Antoine de Bougainville (1729–1811), who would later sail around the world.¹⁰⁵ Modern researchers, however, also stress the efficiency of his supply policy. He was evidently more effective in matters of policy and administration than in those of economics. Contemporary research is constantly pointing to the generally high degree of corruption in the 18th-century French administration and tries to rectify the image of the protagonists of the *Affaire du Canada*.¹⁰⁶ Thus, according to Boshier and Dubé, we need to ask whether Bigot “was a particularly corrupt intendant or merely a typical intendant in a corrupt system”. On their view, the fraud of which Bigot was accused in Paris was “not based upon mere forgery or a surreptitious misuse of funds; it was a system of private enterprise on a grand scale with the collaboration of most of the other colonial officials and many army officers and merchants working under the terms of personal understandings or even formal companies.”¹⁰⁷

On 21 September 1760, Bigot set off on his way back to France; on 17 November, he was arrested and put on trial in the case that made legal history as the *Affaire du Canada*.¹⁰⁸ On 10 December 1763, the verdict was handed down: Bigot was banished and all his possessions were confiscated. He was given a fine of 1.5 million livres. It was difficult for the government to obtain information

102 Frégault, *Bigot*, 1, pp. 69–75.

103 Frégault, *Bigot*, 1, pp. 293–289.

104 Boshier, Dubé, “Bigot”.

105 Frégault, *Bigot*, 2, pp. 219–273.

106 Boshier, Dubé, “Bigot”.

107 Boshier, Dubé, “Bigot”.

108 Frégault, *Bigot*, 2, pp. 341–388.

on his actual financial situation, since Bigot had cleverly distributed his earnings among numerous items: some of them flowed into real estate and a palace and some of them were invested, partly under the names of front men, in a variety of trading companies, banks, and notaries throughout the country. The office of “controller for the recovery of crown assets” was even filled again from 1761 to 1774, in order to be able to recover the money in question. Bigot had lost most of his fortune, and immediately after the verdict was announced, he left for Switzerland, where he settled in Neuchâtel under the name of his brother-in-law François de Barre. He acquired a house and was by no means impoverished; but he continued to be denied the possibility of rehabilitation and a return to France.

3.2 *Joseph-Michel Cadet: Merchant Butcher, Businessman, and Purveyor General*

Another member of Bigot’s ‘gang’, Joseph Michel Cadet, was born in Quebec and came from a well-connected family of merchant butchers.¹⁰⁹ During the Seven Years’ War, he acted as purveyor general of the French army in Canada. In 1745, during the War of Austrian Succession, he had already begun supplying meat to the army. He accumulated so much capital during this time that he was able to act as a general contractor who chartered his own ships and whose supply of goods was almost limitless. With the support of the French intendant François Bigot, on 25 October 1756, Cadet managed to negotiate a contract with the Crown that secured him the privileges of a general supplier for the next nine years. In it, Cadet undertook to provide each soldier in the field with a daily ration of “two pounds of bread, a quarter of a pound of dried peas, and either a pound of beef or half a pound of bacon”. There were other secret contracts lying behind this contract and a whole group of profiteers, including Péan, Intendant Bigot, and Governor Vaudreuil, benefited from them. Cadet initially got a one-fifth share, but in 1759 he secured a further one-fifth from partners who had withdrawn from the arrangement. During the war, Cadet assured the trade with the motherland using his own fleet of ships, half of which did not make it through, but thanks to which he, nonetheless, made an essential contribution to the resilience of *Nouvelle-France* up to 1759. At the same time, this was an affront to the French navy, since it did not succeed in

109 Alfred Barbier, “Un munitionnaire du roi à la Nouvelle France: Joseph Cadet, 1756–1781,” *Bulletins de la Société des Antiquaires de l’Ouest* 8 (1901), 399–412; John F. Boshier, “Cadet, Joseph-Michel,” 2003, in *DCB*. Available at http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/cadet_joseph_michel_4E.html. Accessed 26 April 2021; André Côté, *Joseph-Michel Cadet (1719–1781): Négociant et munitionnaire du roi en Nouvelle-France* (Sillery/Paris, 1998).

maintaining the connection to Canada. After Quebec had capitulated in 1759, Cadet set off on his way back to France aboard a British vessel in October 1760. Just four days after he reached Paris on 21 January 1761, he was imprisoned in the Bastille like most of his Canadian colleagues. Scapegoats were being sought for the enormous territorial losses in the colonies from India to Canada. On 10 December 1763, the criminal court of Châtelet handed down a sentence including ten years' banishment from France and a fine of 6 million livres. Just a few months later, on 5 March 1764, the banishment was revoked and the fine was cut in half. Vaudreuil left the Bastille on 22 May 1762, Bigot on 18 December 1763, Cadet on 28 March 1764, and Péan on 30 June 1764.

Cadet was now confronted by huge debt claims, which he paid in part by selling his real estate holdings in Quebec. But this did not prevent him from entering the French real estate business himself, sometimes surreptitiously, in a big way. Already at the start of 1767, he succeeded in acquiring various estates "consisting of ancient castles partly demolished, share-croppers' houses, farms, water-mills, forests, arable lands, meadows, vineyards, thatched cottages, feudal dues ... in Poitou, Maine and Touraine."¹¹⁰ Much like his British colleagues, he spent half his time conducting business in the suburbs of Paris and half on his estate near Blois in the Loire Valley.¹¹¹ Whether Cadet would have been "acclaimed as a hero and a public benefactor" in the event of French success in the Seven Years' War, as John Francis Bosher claims, strikes me as rather questionable when comparison is made to the other war profiteers discussed, although the government would certainly not have been as persistent in making demands of him.

For even in victorious Great Britain, the government was on the tracks of the deviant commissaries and contractors. Already during the war, commissions were formed again and again to get to the bottom of possible irregularities.¹¹² Opponents of military involvement in Germany fueled the British public debate. The greed of the commissaries was, for instance, informally sanctioned in plays like Samuel Foote's comedy *The Commissary* (1765), which was modelled on Dundas.¹¹³ It is striking that the critical voices in the British public debate got articulated not during, but only after the war, at a time when the rapid increase in public debt encouraged having a look back into the

110 Bosher, "Cadet".

111 He evidently was homesick for Canada and had typical Canadian objects, like, for instance, canoes, sent to him, see Louis-François-Georges Baby, "Une lettre de Cadet, le munitionnaire de la Nouvelle-France," *Canadian Antiquarian and Numismatic Journal*, 3rd s., 1:4 (1898), 173–187.

112 Little, *Treasury*, pp. 57–58; Conway, "Provisioning," pp. 84–85; Mediger, *Ferdinand*, pp. 965–967.

113 Samuel Foote, *The Commissary: A Comedy in Three Acts* (London, 1765).

war ledgers.¹¹⁴ Thus, there was reason to suspect that some private profiteers had gotten rich at the expense of the general public. The assessment varied depending on context between acceptance of the merchants by the old aristocratic elites as “gentleman contractors” and mockery of them as avaricious social climbers: for instance, when Dundas was ridiculed, using a term coined for rich returnees from the South Asian colonies, as “Nabob of the North”.¹¹⁵

4 Conclusion

Although, in and of themselves, many of the careers presented seem to have something unique about them – “the richest man from”, “the biggest war profiteer in” or “the greatest fall” – from a comparative perspective, the profiteers exhibit some common patterns: patterns that reveal structural mechanisms and cultural models of interpretation, evaluation and action lying behind the individual biographical trajectories. All of them invested in spectacular real estate holdings and acquired lavish urban residences, country estates and businesses. This was, on the one hand, a symbolic expression of their ascent into the ranks of nobles and gentlemen; at the same time, it was also an economic investment, that was, for instance, supposed to be of long-term benefit for their family.¹¹⁶ Not many entrepreneurs will have intended to shift the centre of their existence to the countryside; they continued to rely on their urban contacts and networks.¹¹⁷ Their rise in status was also legally consolidated: Brenkenhoff was already part of the nobility, Schimmelmann rose to the status of a baron and later a count, Uckermann rose into the ranks of the imperial baronry (*Reichsfreiherrnstand*), Dundas became a baronet and in the case of Splitgerber, his son was made David von Splitgerber (1741–1826) and a member of the hereditary Prussian nobility in 1789.¹¹⁸

Another commonality, although not of all the entrepreneurs mentioned, was that they again and again slipped into the role of expert.¹¹⁹ This was perhaps most pronounced in the case of Splitgerber, who was frequently asked

114 Bannerman, *Merchants*, p. 139.

115 Bannerman, *Merchants*, pp. 129, 142. On the Nabobs, see Tillman W. Nechtman, *Nabobs: Empire and Identity in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge, 2010).

116 Bannerman, *Merchants*, pp. 131–133.

117 Bannerman, *Merchants*, pp. 131–132.

118 Johannes Barnick, *Ein schweigsamer Ahn: Leben und Geheimnis des Jägermeisters David von Splitgerber* (Munich/Berlin, 2001).

119 On the relationship between early modern experts and economics, see *Wissen und Wirtschaft: Expertenkulturen und Märkte vom 13. bis 18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Marian Füssel, Philip Knäble, Nina Elsemann (Göttingen, 2017).

for counsel in all kinds of projects, but Brenkenhoff also repeatedly acted as an expert. Knowledge and knowledge transfer played a key role, but, above all, networks and logistics, which undoubtedly presupposed knowledge and information in turn. There were fluid transitions between areas of civil and military business, and it is hardly possible to separate them fully and distinctly. For purposes of warfare, the early modern princely state was dependent on those *malhonêtes particuliers* in the form of merchants and bankers who provided it with the required logistics. Frederick II's assessment after the Seven Years' War was even more detailed and no less critical, as the paragraph on the commissariat in the *Political Testament* of 1768 makes clear: "Those who are at the head of the commissariat have to watch over their subordinates There are no scoundrels like these sub-commissaries; the eyes of Argus cannot detect their schemes; they have a hundred ways of hiding their thievery. ... One needs overseers, both military and civilian officials, who monitor their actions, which is easy when one does not have to fight a war as desperate as the one that just ended."¹²⁰ The scepticism of many army commanders and officers, like Ferdinand of Brunswick or the Comte de Guibert, about becoming dependent upon civilian merchants as partners points in the same direction.¹²¹ The title of major awarded to Uckermann – although 'real' military people were immediately leery of it – at least potentially created a sort of capital in trust, since the title held out the promise of integration into the military hierarchy of command and honour and thus suggested oversight. Choiseul's returning to the *régie* system also indicates the desire for government oversight.

If this was lacking, margins for manoeuvre appeared that were exploited in a variety of ways, were viewed critically in the contemporary public debate, and were severely sanctioned by the authorities in the event of military failure.

War became an engine of social mobility for a group of war profiteers. It is notable that in the contemporary assessment, crass parvenus like Schimmelmann, Taylor, and Uckermann were more often depicted as deviant than more established actors like Splitgerber or Oswald; indeed Oswald himself warned directly about Uckermann's behaviour. There can, however, be different reasons for this. On the one hand, the parvenus may have encountered prejudice and greater scepticism because they were rapidly altering social power relations. On the other hand, it may also be the case that they really had not yet internalised the rules of the entrepreneurial game that well, such that they made mistakes. When addressing the question of punishment of deviant, personal

120 "Politisches Testament Friedrichs des Großen (1768)," in *Politische Testamente der Hohenzollern*, ed. Richard Dietrich (Munich, 1981), 256–397, p. 285.

121 Jacques Antoine Hippolyte de Guibert, *Écrits militaires 1772–1790* (Paris, 1977), pp. 231–238.

enrichment behaviour, we have, moreover, always to keep in mind the structural context of courtly power relations, within which “personal honesty or dishonesty weighed less” than “personal loyalty, patronage, family reputation, the accidents of circumstances, and the ups and downs of the struggling factions which ramified throughout the social and political hierarchies.”¹²² This helps to explain, in particular, the sudden fall of the French war profiteers in the *Affaire du Canada*, without, however, whitewashing their individual ways of enriching themselves.

Looking at the Seven Years' War placed the focus on a specific time span, which often represented merely a segment of the careers in war profiteering of the entrepreneurs discussed, many of whom had already been active in the War of Austrian Succession or in the first two Silesian Wars and whose entrepreneurial activity – with some exceptions from the *Affaire du Canada* case – continued well beyond the end of the Seven Years' War. The Seven Years' War was, nonetheless, a crucial event that served to consolidate certain logistical requirements and resulting margins of manoeuvre for private entrepreneurs, and it can serve as a measure of the fragile condition of political economy in the early modern princely state.

122 Boshier, Dubé, “Bigot”.

Intergenerationality as a Challenge: The Swiss Guard Company of the Erlach Family, 1639–1770

Benjamin Ryser

The elites of the Swiss Confederacy formed an intrinsic part of a transnational war economy, as has been repeatedly underlined by recent research on Confederate mercenaries in the early modern period.¹ Confederate patrician families raised and fed companies for European warlords, although often, the family associations did not own these units.² Instead, they were dependent on the respective employer, who decided how long they would serve. In order for their investments in the war business to pay off in the long term, the family associations thus had to be in a position to retain command of a company for as long as possible. This holds especially for the era of standing armies that emerged in Europe in the late 17th century. Research has thus examined the question as to how Confederate families managed to retain control of military units for several generations.³ This question also forms the focus of the present essay.

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- 1 *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmen der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018); *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühenzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018).
 - 2 Philippe Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft, Verflechtungszusammenhänge, familiäre Unternehmensorganisation: Die Zurlauben als Militärunternehmer auf den eidgenössischen Söldnermärkten um 1700,” in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmen der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018), 211–238, pp. 236–238.
 - 3 Nathalie Büsser, “Klare Linien und komplexe Geflechte: Verwandtschaftsorganisation und Soldgeschäfte in der Eidgenossenschaft (17.-18. Jahrhundert),” in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmen der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018), 185–210, p. 189; André Holenstein, “Militärunternehmer, gelehrte Geistliche und Fürstendiener: Karrieremigranten als Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen im Corpus Helveticum der frühen Neuzeit,” in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühenzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 154–165, p. 161.

To this end, the essay investigates a Swiss Guard company at the French court. In 1616, Louis XIII (1601–43) set up the Swiss Guard Regiment. This standing unit formed part of the *Maison du Roi* and was responsible for the personal protection of the king and his family. Leadership of the Guard Company was thus associated not only with economic profit, but also prestige and reputation. The Bernese patrician family von Erlach commanded a company of this regiment without interruption between 1639 and 1770.⁴ The present essay describes how the von Erlach family managed to ensure that command remained assigned to themselves and how they benefited from this. It further demonstrates how family members went about furthering their careers and how they were rewarded as long-term clients of the French crown. The essay also shows how the resources obtained from mercenary service were a subject of discussions within the family.

1 Foreign Service as a Career Springboard

Of the von Erlach family, two actors in particular found themselves in influential positions during the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), in Berne, the Confederacy, and beyond. While Franz Ludwig von Erlach (1574–1651) held the office of *Schultheiss* of Berne, Hans Ludwig von Erlach (1595–1650) was a successful military entrepreneur in the service of Saxe-Weimar and later France. At the height of his career, he temporarily took over leadership of the French army in the Holy Roman Empire from Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne (1611–75) in 1649.⁵ Hence the French kings strove to secure the services of these influential Bernese patrician families by appointing them commanders.⁶ It was for this reason that Louis XIII made Franz Ludwig von Erlach commander of a Swiss Guard company at the French court in 1639. He immediately passed on the position to his eldest son from his second marriage, Albrecht von Erlach

4 The study is based on findings of the SNSF project "Militärunternehmertum & Verflechtung" (University of Bern, Prof. Dr. André Holenstein) and the doctoral thesis Benjamin Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten: Berner Militärunternehmer im Dienst des Sonnenkönigs Ludwig XIV.* (Zurich, 2021).

5 Philippe Rogger, "Hans Ludwig von Erlach," in *Lexikon der Heerführer und hohen Offiziere des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, ed. Markus Meumann. Available at <https://thirty-years-war-online.net/prosopographie/heerfuehrer-und-offiziere/erlach-hans-ludwig-von/>. Accessed 9 April 2021.

6 On the von Erlach family's role in the Thirty Years' War: *Im Auge des Hurrikans. Eidgenössische Machteliten und der Dreissigjährige Krieg*, eds. André Holenstein, Georg von Erlach, and Sarah Rindlisbacher (Baden, 2015).

(1614–52).⁷ The official reason was Franz Ludwig's age, which does not seem very convincing; he had been *Schultheiss* of the city of Bern since 1629, and the real reason was probably that holding this office was not compatible with absence, and hence he directly handed over command of the Guard Company to a son.

Franz Ludwig von Erlach used the Guard Company for his sons' military education. Along with Albrecht, another son, Johann Jakob von Erlach (1628–94), joined the company's cadets at the age of twelve.⁸ In 1645, he also attended an academy in Paris, for which his father paid. Johann Jakob was well aware of the investment that had been made in him.⁹ The purpose of this education was for him to learn the French language and culture and the habitus of courtly society. During his time in Paris, he regularly reported to the family on the state of the company, its military campaigns, or outstanding mercenary salaries. This information was extremely important for keeping the company supplied, since the recruitment of new guardsmen was organised in Bern.¹⁰

In Confederate units in French service, appointments to subaltern officers' ranks were a decision for the commander.¹¹ After being elected *Schultheiss* of the Bernese town of Thun in 1644, Albrecht von Erlach could only command the Guard Company in France on an irregular basis. In order to avoid a potential vacancy in the company's command, in 1646 he consented to the promotion of his younger brother Johann Jakob to ensign in the Guard Company. Johann Jakob thereby also took over economic leadership of the company.¹² He subsequently proved very ambitious about furthering his officer's career. However, he declined a position as lieutenant of the *Hundertschweizer* (*Cent Suisses*); he was concerned that it would be more difficult to gain promotion as

7 Bern, Staatsarchiv Bern [StABE], Familienarchiv [FA] von Erlach I 282. Transcription in: Norbert Furrer, *Franz Ludwig von Erlach (1574–1651) und seine Mitmenschen: Materialien für die Dauerausstellung im Schloss Spiez* (Bern, 2015), p. 350.

8 Barbara Braun-Bucher, "Johann Jakob von Erlach," 2002, in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* [HLS]. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/023640/2002-10-03/>. Accessed 25 October 2021.

9 Bern, Burgerbibliothek Bern [BBB], Mss.h.h.xv.20 (65), Johann Jakob I. von Erlach to Franz Ludwig von Erlach, 2 February 1645.

10 Andreas Würzler, "Familien-Lobbying in Bern zur Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Kriegs," in *Lobbying: Die Vorräume der Macht*, eds. Gisela Hürlimann et al. (Zurich, 2016), 61–74, pp. 66–68.

11 BBB, Mss.h.h.xv.20 (79, 82, 84, and 85), Johann Jakob I. von Erlach to Franz Ludwig von Erlach, 17 December 1646, 8 February 1647, 18 February 1647, and 27 February 1647.

12 BBB, Mss.h.h.xv.20 (74), Albrecht von Erlach to Franz Ludwig von Erlach, 19 May 1646.

an officer in this specific unit of the Guard than in his family's own company.¹³ Unlike the guard companies, the *Hundertschweizer* had a French commander,¹⁴ and hence Johann Jakob would have been dependent on an external figure when it came to promotion within the subaltern ranks. In several letters to his father he asked him to put in a good word for him with his brother who decided about the subaltern ranks. Johann Jakob von Erlach thus continued his officer's career in his family's own guard company: he became a lieutenant in 1648. Two years later, on 27 December 1649, he was confirmed by the French monarchy in the role of commander of the guard units.¹⁵ Albrecht von Erlach, whose term as *Schultheiss* of Thun ended in 1650, forewent the command in favour of his younger brother.¹⁶ At this point, Albrecht was already pursuing a political career in Bern. Via his promotion through the subaltern ranks, the family had been able to train the younger brother and manoeuvre him into position as commander of the Guard Company.

In the self-understanding of the noble Bernese patrician families, learning how to fight a war as a mercenary in the service of foreign powers was one of the duties marking their social status.¹⁷ This made the magistrate families of Bern an exception among the Protestant cantons of the Confederacy. The elites in Zurich, Basel, and Schaffhausen relied more on trade, protoindustry, and finance, while the patrician families of Bern considered mercenary service for foreign powers a task befitting their estate. Further motives for a military career were "continuing a family tradition, amassing property, glory and prestige, making use of opportunities to supply [a company] or the attraction of the associated noble lifestyle".¹⁸

Commanding a military unit in foreign service gave magistrate families with many children the opportunity to entrust their numerous progeny with duties befitting their estate. Command of units was used to provide sons with military training and promote their military careers.¹⁹ This was extremely important,

13 BBB, Mss.h.h.xv.20 (96), Johann Jakob I. von Erlach to Franz Ludwig von Erlach, 30 September 1647.

14 Rémi Masson, *Défendre le Roi: La Maison Militaire au XVII^e Siècle* (Ceyzérieu, 2017), pp. 27, 105–106.

15 Beat Fidel Zurlauben, *Histoire Militaire des Suisses au Service de la France*, 1 (Paris, 1751), p. 165.

16 StABE, FA von Erlach IV 19, p. 98.

17 Carmen Winkel, *Im Netz des König: Netzwerke und Patronage in der preussischen Armee 1713–1786* (Paderborn, 2013), p. 16.

18 Rita Binz-Wohlhauser, *Zwischen Glanz und Elend: Städtische Elite in Freiburg im Üchtland (18. Jahrhundert)* (Zurich, 2014), p. 129.

19 Jasmina Cornut, "Parenté dans l'élite Valaisanne des Lumières: La Famille de Courten entre stratégies, solidarité et amour," *Vallesia* 68 (2013), 205–335, p. 291.

since if an older family member died or left service, a younger relative had to be ready to secure the family's control of the company's command and its finances. In this way, their position could be defended against rival families from the same or other cantons in the Confederacy and secured for the next generation. For instance, in 1660, Gabriel von Erlach (1639–73) received the position of ensign in his family's guard company from his elder brother Johann Jakob – just as Johann Jakob had succeeded his elder brother Albrecht in 1646.²⁰ Close ties to a confidant must have been vitally important for a career as an officer.

The practice of appointing one's own brothers and cousins to subaltern ranks prevailed during the 17th and 18th centuries, as the table below demonstrates (see Table 4.1). At least 25 von Erlachs served as subaltern officers in the Swiss Guard Regiment between 1639 and 1770.²¹ Five of them died in service.

2 A Failed Career Move

Johann Jakob von Erlach distinguished himself as commander of the Guard Company in various battles in the Franco-Spanish War (1635–59) and the War of Devolution (1667–68). He was said to have a very good relationship with army commandant Louis II. de Bourbon, Prince de Condé (1621–86).²² Thanks to his good relations with the army leadership, his loyalty and the military abilities he was able to demonstrate on numerous occasions, he became the first officer from the Confederacy to be promoted to the newly created rank of brigadier in the French armies.²³ The next step on the career ladder after he had been made colonel of an entire regiment in 1671 would have been to become a colonel in the Swiss Guard Regiment. In the early 1680s, it was foreseeable that at over 70 years of age, the incumbent commandant, Lorenz von Stäffis-Montet, Lord of Molondin (1608–86), would not remain in service

20 BBB, Mss.h.h.xv.20. (153), Letter from Gabriel von Erlach to Johanna von Erlach, 17/27 April 1660.

21 Hans Ulrich von Erlach, *800 Jahre Berner von Erlach: Die Geschichte einer Familie* (Bern, 1989), p. 392.

22 François Girard, *Histoire Abrégée des Officiers Suisses qui se sont Distingués aux Services Étrangers dans des Grades Supérieurs: Rangée par Ordre Alphabétique sur des Mémoires et Ouvrages Autentiques, depuis le Commencement du xvie Siècle Jusqu'à nos Jours, avec des Notes Généalogiques sur Chaque Famille*, 1 (Fribourg, 1781), p. 205.

23 M. Pinar, *Chronologie Historique-Militaire*, 4 (Paris, 1761), p. 321.

TABLE 4.1 List of officers of the von Erlach family who joined the Swiss Guard Regiment during the 17th and 18th centuries

No.	Forename	Lived	Swiss Guard Regiment	Died in service	Relation
1	Franz Ludwig	1575–1651	X	–	–
2	Albrecht	1614–52	X	–	Son of 1
3	Johann Jakob	1628–94	X	–	Son of 1
4	Gabriel	1639–73	X	X	Son of 1
5	Sigismund	1660–1727	X	–	Grandson of 1
6	Jean Barthelemy	1668–93	X	X	Grandson of 1
7	Jacques Antoine	1670–1715	X	–	Grandson of 1
8	Jean Jacques III	1681–1742	X	–	Grandson of 1
9	Sigismund	1671–1722	X	–	Grandson of 1
10	Viktor	1672–1745	X	–	Grandson of 1
11	Hieronymus	1667–1748	X	–	Nephew of 5
12	Sigmund	1692–1758	X	–	Son of 5
13	Albrecht	1713–48	X	–	Cousin of 11
14	Abraham	1716–82	X	–	Cousin of 11
15	Pierre Jacques Antoine	1698–1741	X	–	Great-grandson of 1
16	Sigmund	1710–83	X	–	Great-grandson of 1
17	Samuel Friedrich	1721–43	X	X	Great-grandson of 1
18	Gabriel Albrecht	1739–1802	X	–	Son of 13
19	Rudolf	1742/43–60	X	X	Son of 13
20	Abraham Friedrich	1761–1845	X	–	Son of 14
21	Albrecht Karl Ferdinand	1765–1801	X	–	Son of 14
22	Louis Auguste	†1748	X	–	Great-great-grandson of 1
23	Philippe Louis Auguste	1741–70	X	–	Great-great-grandson of 1
24	Karl	1753–92	X	X	Great-great-grandson of 1
25	Karl Ludwig	1746–98	X	–	Great-grandson of 11

SOURCE: ERLACH, *800 JAHRE*, PP. 392, 661–708 (GENEALOGY); STABE, FA VON ERLACH IV 19.

much longer.²⁴ Up to this point, all colonels in the Swiss Guard Regiment had been from Catholic cantons.²⁵ In 1683, Bernese commanders had informed the Small Council that von Erlach publicly professed to be a Catholic, which caused problems for him in Bern, since the political body now immediately felt the need to debate whether as a Catholic, von Erlach could remain colonel of a Bernese regiment and, moreover, whether he should lose rights as a Bernese citizen. Quite how delicate a situation this was is well demonstrated by the fact that the Small Council passed the matter to the Privy Council (*Geheimer Rat*).²⁶ The Privy Council, however, put off discussing the issue and had to be prompted by the Small Council to finally deal with the case of von Erlach in the spring of 1684.²⁷ On the one hand, the reticent response shown by the authorities might suggest they did not know what to do or were overwhelmed by the question, but on the other hand, it could also be read as deliberate passivity with the aim of avoiding making it a public issue. Whether and to what extent the von Erlach family was involved remains unclear.²⁸ In the summer of 1684, the Small Council decided that when writing letters to Colonel von Erlach, it would no longer address him as “Our dear and loyal citizen”.²⁹ The authorities did not shy away from withdrawing his Bernese citizen’s rights, then. However, von Erlach remained colonel of the regiment until his death in 1694, since it was the French king who decided on the position of commandant.

Louis XIV’s anti-Protestant stance had been well known since 1661 at the latest.³⁰ The Swiss Guard commanders at the court were thus aware of the king’s confessional preference. Neither Johann Jakob von Erlach’s marriage in France nor the baptism of his first child in 1665 led to his public conversion. His decision to convert publicly in 1683 must thus have been for purely pragmatic reasons in order to further his career. He was certainly no exception in that

24 Erich Meyer, “Lorenz von Stäffis-Montet,” 2011, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/017585/2011-12-07/>. Accessed 9 April 2021.

25 Emmanuel May, *Histoire Militaire de la Suisse, et celle des Suisses dans les Différens Services de l’Europe*, 6 (Lausanne, 1788), pp. 383–390.

26 StABE, A II 509, p. 541.

27 StABE, A II 511, p. 168.

28 StABE, B I 2, p. 85.

29 StABE, A II 511, p. 601.

30 Leonhard Horowski, “Konversion und dynastische Strategie: Turenne und das Ende des französischen Hochadelscalvinismus,” in *Konversion und Konfession in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Ute Lotz-Heumann, Jan-Friedrich Missfelder, and Matthias Pohligh (Heidelberg, 2007), 171–211, p. 185.

regard; other Bernese officers also converted to the Catholic faith in the king's service.³¹

On 30 September 1685, Colonel Molondin retired from the Swiss Guard Regiment on account of his advanced years. Besides von Erlach, the Grisonian subject from Chiavenna, Johann Peter Stuppa (1621–1701), also applied for the position of colonel. The position was not only prestigious but also financially lucrative, with an annual pension of 30,000 livres.³² Both candidates had been colonels of Confederate regiments in French service, Erlach since 1671, Stuppa since 1672, and had also led companies in the Swiss Guard Regiment for decades. Erlach's advantage was that he had been in service longer, holding these ranks before Stuppa. However, as a French negotiator, Stuppa had managed to engineer the controversial recruitment of several Confederate regiments in 1671–72. He had a wide network of contacts and proved to be an extremely useful and reliable representative of royal interests in the *Corpus helveticum*.³³ His marriage to the noblewoman Anne-Charlotte de Gondi (1627–94) in 1661 further expanded his network at the court in Versailles, and he enjoyed the support of an influential patron in Louvois. On 1 October 1685, Louis XIV thus decided to entrust Johann Peter Stuppa with command of the Swiss Guard Regiment.³⁴ Von Erlach's strategy of conversion had failed. At this point, he was already afflicted so badly with gout that he was barely able to serve in the field.³⁵ His official conversion had also been somewhat belated, which had been noted at the court in Versailles and was held against him.³⁶ Since we do not have the family's correspondence from this period, we do not know whether Johann Jakob discussed his conversion with his family in Bern, particularly with *Schultheiss* and cousin Sigmund von Erlach (1614–99). Nor are there archival records confirming whether he did indeed lose his Bernese citizen's rights and was accepted into neighbouring Catholic Fribourg, as research

31 E.g. Jean-François Gaudard (1651–1738), see Beat Fidel Zurlauben, *Histoire Militaire des Suisses au Service de la France*, 3 (Paris, 1751), p. 48.

32 *Journal du Marquis de Dangeau, avec les Additions de Duc de Saint-Simon*, 1, ed. Eudore Soulié (Paris, 1854), p. 225.

33 Katrin Keller, "Ein Schweizer Gardehauptmann als französischer Unterhändler: Johann Peter Stuppas Werbeverhandlungen in der Eidgenossenschaft 1671," in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der früneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 92–115, p. 100.

34 Mathieu Da Vinha, *Au Service du Roi: Les Métiers à la Cour de Versailles*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 2018), pp. 66–69.

35 *Mémoires du Marquis de Sourches sur le Règne de Louis XIV*, 1, eds. Gabriel-Jules Cosnac, Arthur Bertrand (Paris, 1882), p. 308.

36 *Journal*, ed. Soulié, p. 225.

claims.³⁷ What we do know is that in the summer of 1693, at the age of 65, Johann Jakob travelled from Paris to Bern to enquire as to whether he could reconvert to the Protestant faith:³⁸

Colonel d'Erlach who has constantly had gout since he is in Bern was visited by religious ministers who, after the initial civilities, suggested to him what they thought would be most able to help him to return to the religion that he left. He responded to this discourse like a man who is hardly embarrassed by the matter and far from being rattled by it. Moreover, it appears to me from several things that I have heard from Bern that the said sire d'Erlach, although full of zeal for the service of Your Majesty, would do well to shorten his stay in this country.³⁹

The decision lay with the Bernese ecclesiastic authorities, which also consulted a relative of Johann Jakob's – *Schultheiss* Sigmund von Erlach, no less, but Johann Jakob's request was rejected. The minutes of the meeting do not provide a reason, however.⁴⁰ The matter was obviously too controversial for Sigmund von Erlach to persuade the committee to decide in his cousin's favour; the case was clearly a subject of lively debate among the Bernese elite.⁴¹ His attempt to reconvert amounted to a desire to at least secure Bernese citizen's privileges for his offspring, however, during his military career, Johann Jakob von Erlach had already put down roots in Argenteuil, a suburb of Paris.

37 Barbara Braun-Bucher, "Johann Jakob von Erlach," 2002, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/023640/2002-10-03/>. Accessed 9 April 2021.

38 *StABE*, A II 548, p. 11.

39 "Le Colonel d'Erlach qui a toujours eu la goutte depuis qu'il est a Berne, a receu une visite des Ministres Predicans, qui après les premieres civilitez, luy ont insinué ce qu'ils ont cru le plus capable de le porter a rentrer dans la religion dont il est sorti. Il a repondu a ce discours en homme qui ne s'en embarasse gueres et qui est bien éloigné d'en estre ébranlé. Du reste il me paroist par plusieurs choses qui me reviennent de Berne, que ledit Sieur d'Erlach quoyque plein de zele pour le service de Vostre Majesté, ferait bien d'abrèger son sejour en ce pays cy," Bern, Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv [BAF], PO#1000/1463, France, Correspondance Politique [CP], vol. 123, Letter from Amelot to Louis XIV, 23 August 1693 (Paris, Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères [MAE], Correspondance Politique [CP] Suisse, vol. 100, fol. 69).

40 *StABE*, A II 584, p. 169.

41 *StABE*, D N J.R. von Sinner 22, Letter from Johann Rudolf Sinner II to Johann Rudolf Sinner I, 12 July 1693.

3 Integration into Argenteuil

Johann Jakob's wife, Marie Catherine d'Auzout, whom he seems to have married in 1665, gave birth to at least eight children in the Paris suburb. Marie Catherine d'Auzout was probably from the circle of employees in Versailles.⁴² Besides marrying, appointing godparents was another important instrument of integration employed by Swiss officers in France; they offered the opportunity to construct family relations and weave oneself into the social fabric.⁴³ Godparenthood provides insights into the family's social integration into Argenteuil. Godparents to von Erlach's children were usually officers in the Swiss Guard, for instance the Lucerne Guard commander Georg Keller (1622–88), the Solothurn Guard commander Josef Sury von Steinbrugg (1633–72), the Fribourg Guard officer Nicolas de Castella, the Guard commander Johann Heinrich de Mont (1628–90) from the Grisons, and the Guard commander Jean Jacques d'Hemel (1622–92). The latter was from Alsace, had obtained citizen's rights in St. Gallen and also lived in Argenteuil.⁴⁴ Only two godparents were not commanders in the Swiss Guard Regiment: Jean Croiset, who served as *porte manteau du Roi* and *Chevalier* Antoine Rossignol. It is more difficult to establish who the godmothers were due to a lack of precise records. They are described, for instance, as daughters of Parisian citizens.⁴⁵ In one case, the wife of Guard Commander Jacques d'Hemel, Marie Angouillan, served as a godmother.⁴⁶ When von Erlach's first child was baptised, the godmother was one Esperance Cardon, described as the wife of *Huissier* Jean Bourdon. Besides

42 Francine Egarteler, "Les Familles des Officiers des Gardes Suisses à Argenteuil," *Bulletin S.H.A.P.P.* 32 (1992–93), p. 61. His wife's identity could be established from the marriage contract of Jacques Antoine von Erlach, one of their sons, see Paris, Archives nationales [AN], MC-ET-LXXXVIII/312. In the von Erlach family archive in Berne she is referred to as "Magdalena von Ozou", see STABE, FA von Erlach I 494, p. 179. Hans-Ulrich von Erlach referred to her as "Marie Catherine d'Auzon", see Erlach, *800 Jahre*, p. 385. She was most likely the daughter of the *comédien* Nicolas Auzout, Sieur de la Plesse and his wife Marie Salary. They had two daughters, both called Marie. One of the two was no longer employed by the family theatre group from 1665 on, see AN, MC-ET-LXXXI/71, 73, and 82. It is not known when they were born and when they died.

43 Wolfgang Reinhard, *Freunde und Kreaturen: 'Verflechtung' als Konzept zur Erforschung historischer Führungsgruppen: Römische Oligarchie um 1600* (Munich, 1979), p. 36.

44 Egarteler, "Familles," pp. 63–67.

45 Argenteuil, Archives municipales d'Argenteuil [AMA], 2 Mi EC 4. Baptisms of Jacques Antoine d'Erlach 13 April 1670 and Henry d'Erlach 8 April 1671.

46 Egarteler, "Familles," p. 61.

the Guard officers and their wives, the staff of the *Maison du Roi*⁴⁷ also played an important role in the network of godparents established by Johann Jakob von Erlach and Marie Catherine d'Auzout.⁴⁸ With these connections, the couple secured high-ranking officers of the Swiss Guards, attendants at the court in Versailles and local personalities in Paris or Argenteuil as intermediaries.⁴⁹

The Confederate military entrepreneur families banded together with other mercenary families from the Confederacy and French families who were of lower rank at the court but were nevertheless close to Louis XIV. In this way, the Confederate officers were able to obtain plenty of information from French court circles, and were thus extremely interesting actors for both their own rulers and family members at home.

Integration was also a result of the practice of billeting officers and soldiers of the Swiss Guard Regiment with the local population. Barracks had yet to be built and the Guard units were stationed around Paris.⁵⁰ As early as 1650, soldiers from Johann Jakob von Erlach's Guard Company were accommodated in civilian households in Argenteuil.⁵¹ Johann Jakob von Erlach himself owned an estate in Argenteuil with four houses and two hectares of land. He even had his own mill on his property.⁵² How and precisely when he came to own the estate cannot be reconstructed. He and his sons had wine produced and gypsum mined in Argenteuil in order to boost their income.⁵³ They skilfully exploited the economic privileges of the alliance agreements between the Confederacy and France; for example, they did not pay custom duties to transport the gypsum. It is said that the plasterboards were traded across the Seine as far as

47 On the composition of the military units of the *Maison du Roi*, see Masson, *Défendre*, p. 48.

48 Egarteler, "Familles," p. 64. Johann Jakob von Erlach himself was also godfather to children of other Confederate mercenary officers.

49 Andreas Affolter, *Verhandeln mit Republiken: Die französisch-eidgenössischen Beziehungen im frühen 18. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2017), p. 204.

50 Anne-Lise Head-König, "Intégration ou Exclusion: Le Dilemme des Soldats Suisses au Service de France," in *Die Schweiz in der Weltwirtschaft*, eds. Paul Bairoch, Martin Körner (Zurich, 1990), 37–56, p. 44; Francine Egarteler, "Les Gardes Suisses au Fil des Registres Paroissiaux d'Argenteuil," *Bulletin S.H.A.A.P.* 30 (1988–89), pp. 61–68; idem, "Les Gardes Suisses au Fil des Registres Paroissiaux d'Argenteuil," *Bulletin S.H.A.A.P.* 31 (1990–91), pp. 32–40.

51 Edmond Rhétoré, "Les Gardes Suisses à Argenteuil et leur Influence Sociale," *Bulletin S.H.A.A.P.* 17 (1950–51), p. 8; Francine Egarteler, "Familles," p. 61.

52 Egarteler, "Familles," p. 63.

53 Hans Ulrich von Erlach, "Une Famille Bernoise au Service de la France," in *Les Gardes Suisses et leurs Familles au XVIIe et XVIIIe Siècles en Région Parisienne*, ed. Société Historique de Rueil-Malmaison (Paris, 1989), p. 23.

England.⁵⁴ For the same reason, the French wine trade was a lucrative sideline for the Swiss in France.⁵⁵ These secondary income streams probably partly covered the family's military enterprise expenses, and vice versa, although there is a lack of detailed accounting. Johann Jakob von Erlach's children continued this business model and retained income from lease agreements with local vintners.⁵⁶ As in the case of the Guard Company, this civilian business was organised such that it could be perpetuated by his offspring. Historical family research has established that the estates securing status were bequeathed to the male descendants while the females received liquid assets and real estate of equal value.⁵⁷ In the case of Johann Jakob von Erlach's heirs, however, the Guard Company was the asset guaranteeing status that was preserved intergenerationally by the male line, not the estate and property in Argenteuil.

On 29 October 1694, Johann Jakob von Erlach died in Argenteuil and was buried in the local Catholic church the next day.⁵⁸ Louis XIV handed command of his units, a guard company and a colonel's company (*compagnie colonelle*) to Johann Jakob's children. However, in 1694 the sons Jacques Antoine von Erlach (1670–1715) and Jean Jacques von Erlach (1681–1742) were either too young or were of insufficient military rank to take command themselves. Hence Johann Jakob Dysli from Burgdorf led the companies until 1697 as a lieutenant captain.⁵⁹ Otherwise it would not have been possible for the children to inherit the companies during the reign of Louis XIV, as repeatedly stated in the older literature on Confederate mercenaries.⁶⁰ The French king decided who was to be entrusted with leading the company at the recommendation of the colonel general in charge of all Swiss troops.⁶¹ The capital invested in the companies

54 Rhétoré, "Gardes," pp. 13–15.

55 Jean Chagniot, *Paris et l'Armée au XVIIIe Siècle: Étude Politique et Sociale* (Paris, 1985), pp. 365–368.

56 AMA, Archives Privées Société d'Argenteuil, Lease agreement of 19 June 1717 of 41 livres.

57 Büsser, "Linien," p. 200.

58 AMA, 2 Mi EC 6, ADVO 3E6 2, p. 106v.

59 Vincennes, Service historique de la Défense [SHD], YB 847, pp. 49, 56, Jacques Antoine von Erlach (1670–1715) became a commander in the Swiss Guard Regiment a month after his father's death on 29 November 1694. SHD, Y^a 378, p. 12, Johann Jakob von Erlach III (1681–1742) was not made a commander until November 1697.

60 Philippe Rogger, "Kompaniewirtschaft, Verflechtungszusammenhänge, familiäre Unternehmensorganisation: Die Urlaube als Militärunternehmer auf den eidgenössischen Söldnermärkten um 1700," in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmen der Familie Urlaube im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018), 211–238, pp. 236–238.

61 The selection processes for commanders are very well documented for the 18th century, see SHD, YB 847–851, *Enregistrement des mémoires présentés au roi pour l'organisation*

and the associated credit, debts and interest could still be inherited, however. Ideally, Louis XIV transferred the rank of commander to his offspring; hence it was important that the deceased had distinguished himself as a reliable client and a loyal officer of the French crown and that his family and relatives were politically useful for Louis XIV's interests.⁶²

Three of Johann Jakob von Erlach's sons embarked on military careers:⁶³ Jean Barthélemy von Erlach (1668–93) died before his father in the summer of 1693 in the Nine Years' War, at the Battle of Neerwinden. Jacques Antoine von Erlach and Jean Jacques von Erlach each took on the leadership of half companies of their father's units. Louis XIV awarded them these positions on the basis of their father's merits. In 1693, Jean Jacques von Erlach had entered military service at the tender age of 12 – the same age his father had been. At the age of 16-and-a-half, he was made a commander on 15 November 1697, thus taking over leadership of the half companies that had been transferred to him.⁶⁴ Jacques Antoine von Erlach did not enter service until 1694 and in 1705, and when he was dubbed a knight of the Order of Saint Louis, war had already left him physically impaired.⁶⁵ Jean Jacques von Erlach succeeded in achieving what the family had not been able to manage in 1654 and 1685: in 1736 he became colonel of the Swiss Guard Regiment in French service.⁶⁶ He thus achieved a long-sought aim of the von Erlach family – albeit not as a Reformed Bernese, but as a Catholic citizen of Fribourg. He received Fribourg citizen's rights in 1703, as the next section will illustrate.

4 Differences within the Family

Due to Johann Jakob's conversion, after his death his son Commander Jacques Antoine von Erlach was no longer considered a Bernese citizen by the Bernese Council.⁶⁷ Hence he could not recruit soldiers from Bernese territory for his

des troupes suisses et pour les demandes particulières en faveur des officiers (avancement, mutations, décorations, grâces et pensions) 1701–1792.

62 Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661–1701* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 168.

63 We do not know how his other children's careers developed. The first son died early: Jean Jacques von Erlach II (1665–68). The other children were: Jean Joseph von Erlach (1666*), Marie Louise von Erlach (1667*), Henry von Erlach (1671*), and Lubin von Erlach (1680*), see Egarteler, "Familles," p. 61.

64 SHD, YB 847, p. 207.

65 SHD, YB 847, p. 97.

66 SHD, YB 848, 15 March 1736.

67 SHD, Y^a 378, p. 12.

companies. The French ambassador to the Swiss Confederacy thus planned for him to become a citizen of Fribourg. In future, troops would be recruited on Fribourg territory. The French ambassador stressed, however, that he would prefer it if the Guard Company still belonged to Bern.⁶⁸ This would have retained an important source of patronage in the powerful state of Bern on which he could draw to realise his political aims. The von Erlachs disagreed on the strategy for preserving the Guard Company within the family association and especially on the question of who had better lead it. Conflicts between different branches of the family can indirectly be observed.⁶⁹

At this point, the Company consisted of 165 men, some 100 to 120 of whom were soldiers from the “Bern area” and were “the best and oldest soldiers”. The recruitment office feared that if the canton of Bern lost the company, it too could lose these soldiers whose experience would be of great benefit to the Bernese militia.⁷⁰ The recruitment office thus advised the Council to send the Company two new recruits for every returning soldier and to insist that all officer’s positions in the Guard Company be filled with Bernese citizens as soon as they became vacant.⁷¹ They reasoned this would be of twofold benefit to the *Stand Bern*: the officers’ training would cost the authorities nothing, and the experienced officers could be integrated into their home militia formations when their service in France had ended.⁷² The recruitment office thought another advantage was that in the form of the Guard Company officers, the authorities would have important informers at the French court without having to employ and pay them themselves,⁷³ thereby explicitly emphasising the informal diplomatic role of the officers in foreign service.

The Bernese members of the Small Council were well aware that Johann Jakob von Erlach’s offspring could change their site of citizenship to avoid the problem of recruiting in Bern. They were also aware that such a manoeuvre could mean the Guard Company was lost to the *Stand Bern* for a long time.⁷⁴

68 Chavannes-près-Renens, Archives cantonales vaudoises [ACV], P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 1630, Amelot to Villars-Chandieu, 25 January 1697.

69 E.g. BA1, P0#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 128, Stuppa to Puyssieux, 20 March 1699 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 120, fol. 214).

70 StABE, A V 77, pp. 123–128.

71 StABE, A V 77, p. 130.

72 Danièle Tosato-Rigo, “Abwehr, Aufbruch und frühe Aufklärung (1618–1712),” in *Die Geschichte der Schweiz*, eds. Georg Kreis et al. (Basel, 2014), 254–301, p. 264. Philippe Rogger, “Söldneroffiziere als gefragte Militärexperten: Zum Transfer militärischer Kultur in die frühneuzeitliche Eidgenossenschaft,” in *Miliz oder Söldner? Wehrpflicht und Solddienst in Stadt, Republik und Fürstentum 13.–18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Regula Schmid (Paderborn, 2019), 141–172, pp. 162–165.

73 StABE, A V 77, p. 124.

74 StABE, A V 77, pp. 129–130.

Fewer officers' positions meant fewer career opportunities for young patricians. In turn, this would increase the competition for seats in the Grand Council and *Landvogtei* offices in Bern, from which the remaining patricians' sons lived.

It was not only the Bernese authorities that discussed the von Erlach Guard Company. There was also intensive exchange on the subject between the French ambassador and Stuppa.⁷⁵ Viktor von Erlach (1672–1745), a lieutenant in the unit between 1695 and 1701, served as an informer to them both.⁷⁶ Stuppa described him as a “*garçon d'esprit*” and von Erlach's mother, Elisabeth von Erlach (1649–1714), as “a woman who has a lot of spirit and credit with people who can be us greater use to it [the king's service – BR]”.⁷⁷ She was the sister of the influential anti-French brothers Emanuel Steiger (1642–1709), Christoph Steiger (1651–1731), and Sigmund Steiger (1653–1723) and the niece of Niklaus Dachselhofer (1634–1707), and had influential relatives in the anti-French faction within the Bernese ruling elite.⁷⁸ This was probably the reason why the ambassador was extremely interested in winning her as a client.

Her son, Lieutenant Viktor von Erlach, regularly provided the French ambassador Puysieux in Solothurn with political news from Bern. The ambassador was so taken with Viktor's dedicated service that he asked Stuppa to put a word in for him.⁷⁹ Stuppa also turned directly to Viktor von Erlach, requesting his support for the recruitment of his great cousins from Argenteuil.⁸⁰ According to Puysieux, von Erlach's opponents spread the news that he himself was interested in leading his relatives' Guard Company, and hence the French ambassador defended the young officer.⁸¹ But the rumours proved to be true: “He [Viktor von Erlach – BR] really is trying to get ahead, but whether it is to the detriment of his cousins, I will not get into.” Viktor von Erlach proposed the ambassador give him a *commission de capitaine* for the Guard Company so that he could recruit in Bern.⁸² Stuppa forwarded the proposal to Louis XIV, who

75 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 114, 115).

76 SHD, XG 29 (2).

77 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letter from Stuppa to Puysieux, 24 August 1698 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 115, fol. 191).

78 Thomas Lau, ‘*Stiefbrüder*’: *Nation und Konfession in der Schweiz und Europa (1656–1712)* (Cologne, 2008), pp. 353–355.

79 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letters from Puysieux to Stuppa, 13 September 1698 and 22 October 1698 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 114, fols. 95, 131).

80 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letter from Stuppa to Puysieux, 31 October 1698 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 115, fol. 330).

81 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letter Stuppa to Puysieux, 18 November 1698 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 115, fol. 354).

82 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letter from Puysieux to Stuppa, 25 December 1698 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 114, fol. 187).

rejected it, however, since he did not wish to create a precedent other Swiss officers could potentially refer to.⁸³

In the spring of 1700, a recruitment application to the Bernese authorities was again unsuccessful.⁸⁴ Since the authorities continued to block these efforts, Louis XIV threatened to release the four Bernese officers from the von Erlach Guard Company.⁸⁵ He had already threatened to remove these officers from the König, von Erlach, Stürler, and Tscharner families in December 1698⁸⁶ with the aim of forcing these officers' clients to lend France their political support on the issue.⁸⁷

The lieutenant's father, Viktor von Erlach (1648–1730), also became involved in the debate and supported promoting his son to commander.⁸⁸ But the question of recruitment to the Guard Company faded into the background, since Bern was busy discussing the successor to the deceased Regiment Colonel Albrecht Manuel (1656–1700). The French ambassador proposed Lieutenant Viktor von Erlach as successor to the Colonel's Company in the Manuel Regiment.⁸⁹ This would have rewarded Viktor von Erlach for his services as a client by promoting him to a higher rank; as a result, he would no longer have to have his eye on the position of commander of the Guard Company.

In the summer of 1700, Puyzieux began to hope that if the authorities would not officially allow recruitment for the Guard Company, they would at least tolerate it.⁹⁰ The best and simplest way to ensure the von Erlach brothers in Argenteuil obtained recruits would be to entrust Viktor von Erlach with the command of half of the company formerly belonging to Albrecht Manuel (and before then to von Erlach). If he needed 15 men, he should apply for, say, 40. He

83 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 128, letter from Stuppa to Puyzieux, 14 January 1699 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 120, fol. 23).

84 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letter from Puyzieux to Stuppa, 15 March 1699 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 114, fol. 241).

85 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 129, letters from Stuppa to Puyzieux, 17 March 1700 and 25 June 1700 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 125, fols. 95, 248).

86 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letter from Puyzieux to Stuppa, 13 December 1698 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 114, fol. 173).

87 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letter from Puyzieux to Stuppa, 27 March 1700 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 114, fol. 433).

88 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 129, letter from Stuppa to Puyzieux, 25 June 1700 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 125, fol. 248).

89 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letter from Puyzieux to Stuppa, 3 July 1700 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 114, fol. 475).

90 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letters from Puyzieux to Stuppa, 28 July 1700, 22 August 1700, and 11 September 1700 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 114, fols. 484, 490, and 495); BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 129, letters from Puyzieux to Louis XIV, 24 August 1700 and 14 September 1700 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 123, fols. 12 (46), 27 (98)).

would then pass on the most suitable recruits to his relatives' guard company.⁹¹ In late October of 1700, Stuppa supported this approach.⁹² Pუსyieux insisted to Stuppa that Viktor von Erlach deserved the rank due to his "good qualities" and "thanks to the credit of his family in his Canton".⁹³ It was the family's status on which French diplomacy particularly depended. Accordingly, Pუსyieux told the Duc du Maine, who upon the death of Johann Peter Stuppa succeeded him in his hereditary position as colonel general over all Swiss and Grisonian troops: "the family of Messieurs d'Erlach being very numerous and having a great deal of credit in Bern."⁹⁴ Viktor von Erlach was thus promised the command of half the Colonel's Company of the deceased Albrecht Manuel in the Manuel (formerly von Erlach) Regiment due to his family's standing within the Bernese elite.⁹⁵

Competition led to short-term tensions within family associations and particularly between different branches of the family. Despite internal discord, family members continued to serve as subaltern officers in the Erlach Guard Company throughout the 18th century.⁹⁶ Relatives from Argenteuil also remained in favour with the Duc du Maine and Louis XIV, and hence their positions were never really in jeopardy. While the other family members were able to obtain positions as useful and committed informers, when it came to appointing commanders, the French king always chose the descendants of Johann Jakob von Erlach.

As to whether Viktor von Erlach actually organised recruits in Bern for his great cousin's guard company via his half regiment company, we can say this: officially, Viktor von Erlach did not receive more recruits than he needed. On the contrary, his own company sometimes lacked over 20 soldiers.⁹⁷ The plan for him to recruit for his relatives did not come to fruition, then.

The colonel general in charge of the Swiss and Grisonian troops in France from 1701 on, the Duc du Maine, thus tasked the French ambassador to

91 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letters from Pუსyieux to Stuppa, 3 October 1700, 17 October 1700, and 20 October 1700 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 114, fols. 497, 501, and 504).

92 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 130, letter from Stuppa to Pუსyieux, 31 October 1700 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 126, fol. 238).

93 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 127, letter from Pუსyieux to Stuppa, 10 November 1700 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 114, fol. 512).

94 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 131, letter from Maine to Pუსyieux, 28 September 1701 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 131, fol. 237).

95 BAR, Po#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 131, letter from Maine to Pუსyieux, 28 September 1701 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 131, fol. 237).

96 Fribourg, Archives de l'Etat de Fribourg [AEF], SE 209 (2).

97 STABE, B II 1174; STABE, B II 973, p. 264.

Solothurn to help the two von Erlach Guard commanders from Argenteuil obtain Fribourgian citizen's rights. In return, Fribourg was promised command of the Guard Company as soon as the position became vacant, as had been planned in 1697.⁹⁸

On 1 December 1702, Fribourg entrusted a certain Frémot with the task of conferring citizen's rights on the two commanders.⁹⁹ The Fribourg magistrates could not resist the temptation of their *Stand* receiving an additional guard company. It can be neither ruled out nor confirmed whether further financing also played a role. The two brothers, Jacques Antoine von Erlach und Jean Jacques von Erlach, expressed their thanks for obtaining Fribourg citizen's rights in a formal letter from Paris on 20 January 1703. In it, they also recognised their subordination to the Fribourgian authorities.¹⁰⁰ The latter sought official written assurance from Louis XIV that the company would be handed over to the *Stand* Fribourg as soon as the command became vacant. They received their guarantee on 6 July 1703.¹⁰¹ In it, the Fribourgian councillors not only granted the von Erlach brothers citizen's rights, "but also the power to raise the recruits in their canton of which the exponents will have need to maintain the company of the said regiment of the Swiss Guards that they have the honour of commanding".¹⁰² The Fribourgian council manuals of subsequent years reveal that the von Erlach brothers did not participate in official recruitment.¹⁰³ It is not until 1743 that recruitment lists for the two half companies of the von Erlach Guard Company can be found.¹⁰⁴ The second list contains the remark: "24th January 1744 in the chancelleries that were duly examined and in which only five Fribourgians were found." Some four decades after the Guard Company had been released from the *Stand* Berne, the Fribourg chancellery staff were surprised by the low number of Fribourgian soldiers.

The two half companies were somewhat heterogeneous in their composition; over a quarter of the soldiers were still from the city of Bern and the wider region under Bernese rule. Strikingly, many soldiers were from towns and cities bordering France: together, Neuchâtel, Geneva, Basel, and the Prince-Bishopric of Basel provided over a third of the soldiers. This heterogeneity was also reflected in the allocation of officers, for which we have records from 1716, for

98 BAR, P0#1000/1463, France, CP, vol. 133, letter from Maine to Puyssieux, 9 September 1702 (MAE, CP Suisse, vol. 137, fol. 134).

99 AEF, RM 253, p. 621.

100 AEF, *Papiers de France 1695–1703*.

101 AEF, RM 254, p. 356.

102 AEF, *Lettres des Rois de France, Louis XIV* N24.

103 AEF, RM 255, 256, 257, and 258.

104 AEF, SE 209 (1), (2).

instance:¹⁰⁵ with Sigmund Stürler (1685–1726), a Bernese served as first lieutenant. Marc Louis Isaac de Balthazar, Baron of Vesancy (1688–1742), from the Franco-Bernese border region, was made second lieutenant.¹⁰⁶ Sub-lieutenant Ludwig Cadusch hailed from the Grisons.¹⁰⁷

At this point, it is also interesting to consider why the command of the Guard Company remained in the hands of the von Erlach family despite Louis XIV's promise to transfer it to the *Stand* Fribourg upon the next vacancy. The French king received proposals from the colonel general of the Swiss and Grisonian troops for potential successors to the various vacant units of the Confederate troops. Detailed records of these proposals are available for the 18th century (1701–92).¹⁰⁸ On 12 April 1715, the Duc du Maine gave the following reason for keeping command of the half Guard Company within the von Erlach family:

... the affection that this family, which is one of the most important in all of Switzerland, has always had for the service of the King, and the circumstance that the loss of his property [Jaques Antoine von Erlach (1670–1715), BR] due to the conversion of sire d'Erlach, the Lieutenant general, who was the father of the one who just died, does not allow me to depart from said family to share the remains of the deceased unless there is a positive order of His Majesty.¹⁰⁹

For many decades, the descendants of Johann Jakob von Erlach enjoyed the patronage of the French military leadership and the French kings. The various colonel generals repeatedly advocated that command should remain in the hands of the Fribourg branch of the von Erlach family.

5 Conclusion

Since Swiss Confederate commanders themselves appointed subaltern officers, they could open up such career prospects to family members and ensure

105 SHD, XG 5 (11), *Troupes Suisses 1716*.

106 Zurlauben, *Histoire*, 3, p. 105.

107 *Historisch-Biographisches Lexikon der Schweiz* [HBLs], 2 (Neuchâtel, 1924), p. 470.

108 SHD, YB 847–851.

109 "... l'affection que cette famille, qui est une des principales de toute la Suisse, a toujours eu pour le service du Roy, et la circonstance de la perte de ses biens [Jaques Antoine von Erlach (1670–1715), BR] a cause de la conversion du S d'Erlach Le Lieutenant general, qui estoit le père de celuy qui vient de mourir, ne me permet pas de sortir de laditte famille pour partager la depouille du deffunt, a moins d'un ordre positif de Sa Majesté", SHD, YB 847, p. 291.

they received training. From the outset, the von Erlach family used their command of a Guard Company in French service to install their own offspring in the ranks of military officers. Johann Jakob von Erlach served in this unit for over 50 years. However, his grandsons and great-grandsons were faced with the consequences of his conversion, the aim of which had been to gain further promotion. In the long term, they had to migrate to Argenteuil near Paris, as the *Stand* Bern no longer recognised them as legal citizens. These circumstances proved challenging for the military entrepreneurs, especially in their search for new recruits to the Guard Company. As a result, the sons of Johann Jakob von Erlach applied for citizen's rights in Fribourg with the support of the French king and ambassadors, and in the long-term Bern lost a guard company. Hence Johann Jakob von Erlach's offspring were now entirely dependent on the good will of the French crown, retaining hardly any political influence in Fribourg. The point of no return had been crossed.

While small family associations struggled to lever their sons into officer's positions, larger family associations had to deal with internal competition. Although the family name was a source of shared social capital maintained by every individual family member, vacancies in companies offered potential for conflict. To pass on command of military units, it was important to be able to install relatives in subaltern ranks in the same company as potential successors. It also became increasingly important to have long-term patron–client relationships, as can be observed in the example of the Fribourg branch of the von Erlach family. The example of the von Erlach Guard Company confirms that it was not companies that were inherited but, at most, the associated debts and profits. The employer appointed the successor to the post of commander. This meant that individual family associations became heavily dependent on the French kings, especially if they did not have any other sources of income, as in the example of the Fribourg branch of the von Erlach family. Ultimately, however, the French kings used their patronage and the strategy of awarding companies to relatives to secure the support of extremely loyal officers. At the same time, patronage was a way of obtaining entire networks of clients in the Confederacy that supported French interests in the political bodies. For the Confederate family associations, loss of political influence at home thus always entailed the risk of losing command of military units – such was the close correlation between politics and mercenary service in the early modern Swiss Confederacy.

Beyond Gender Boundaries: Women's Involvement in Military Careers in the Swiss Foreign Service (18th–19th Centuries)

Jasmina Cornut

In 18th and 19th centuries Switzerland, officer positions in the foreign service, especially starting from the rank of captain,¹ often involved heavy competition. The “social and symbolic benefits”² or “cultural capital”³ of the career of a high-ranking officer were still important for some families in the aristocratic or patrician elites, despite the onset of a certain economic and social decline in the Swiss foreign service. The 18th century, the century of the Enlightenment, was in fact characterised by institutional changes in military entrepreneurship: such as reforms in “army regulations, which become more restrictive and more structured”, as well as stricter discipline and a worsening of soldiers’ living conditions, in particular.⁴ The financial situation of war entrepreneurs was deteriorating: The investments costs for raising a company were increasing and recruitment was becoming difficult in a society that had an increasingly negative perception of the military profession⁵ and in which the wages paid by emerging domestic industry offered an attractive alternative to military

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- 1 A captain's position represented an important step in a military career: An officer who became a captain left behind the subordinate ranks (cadet, ensign, second lieutenant, and lieutenant) to obtain command over a company, see Louiselle Gally-de Riedmatten, *Du Sang contre de l'or: Le service étranger en Valais sous l'Ancien Régime* (unpublished PhD diss., University of Bern, 2014), p. 704.
 - 2 Marianne Stubenvoll, “La noblesse vaudoise: jalon d'une recherche,” in *De l'Ours à la Cocarde: Régime bernois et révolution en pays de Vaud (1536–1798)*, eds. François Flouck et al. (Lausanne, 1998), 311–323, p. 320.
 - 3 Nathalie Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum, Aussenbeziehungen und fremdes Geld,” in *Geschichte des Kantons Schwyz: Herren und Bauern 1550–1712*, 3, ed. Historischer Verein des Kantons Schwyz (Zurich, 2012), 69–127, p. 122.
 - 4 Nathalie Büsser, “Drängende Geschäfte: Die Söldnerwerbungen Maria Jakobea Zurlaubens um 1700 und ihr verwandtschaftliches Beziehungsnetz,” *Der Geschichtsfreund: Mitteilungen des Historischen Vereins Zentralschweiz* 161 (2008), 189–224, p. 194.
 - 5 Philippe Henry, “Service étranger,” 2017, in *Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse* [DHS]. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/008608/2017-12-08/>. Accessed 14 July 2020.

service.⁶ The Revolution and the Empire were going to accelerate the decline and fall of foreign service “at a time when the modern national army and compulsory service were emerging”; particular conventions or ‘capitulations’ or individual commitments in Piedmont-Sardinia, Naples or France would replace the old alliances between states from now on.⁷

In this context of institutional, economic, and social transition in the foreign service, if “name and social origin”⁸ were an undeniable asset for the men of the Swiss elites, they were not necessarily a guarantee of promising and rapid professional advancement. Firstly, it should be noted that companies and regiments constituted important ‘patronage resources’ that could be freely attributed or withdrawn by the sponsoring European states: thus the King of France, the main employer of the officers dealt with in this chapter, could grant or abolish companies or divide them in two as he saw fit and the Swiss officers did not have any influence in the matter.⁹ As for the subordinate ranks below that of captain, they could be assigned by the company commanders. Military careers in the foreign service were organised around ties of solidarity and established networks, both in the army – “service clienteles based on connections and hierarchies” – and in “durable, highly supportive, social groups based on kinship”.¹⁰ Some young nobles or young men from patrician families thus started their career in a company or regiment that was under the command of a relative. But their more or less rapid progression through the ranks depended as much on family ties as on patronage ties that family members or they themselves had developed over the years, as well as on their financial resources and, to a lesser extent, their individual abilities. Even if they were neither the

6 In central Switzerland, the nascent textile industry offered the rural population a secondary source of income, according to Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum,” p. 121.

7 Henry, “Service étranger”.

8 Laura Bottiglieri, Louiselle Gally-de Riedmatten, “Jean Melchior Wyrsh: suite militaire: Les portraits des officiers du régiment de Courten 1768–1780,” *Vallesia* 66 (2011), 301–377, p. 319.

9 Philippe Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft, Verflechtungszusammenhänge, familiale Unternehmensorganisation: Die Urlaube als Militärunternehmer auf den eidgenössischen Söldnermärkten um 1700,” in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Urlaube im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018), 211–237, p. 213.

10 Anne-Lise Head-König, “L’ascension des entrepreneurs militaires: Jost Brendlé lieutenant-général au service de France,” in *1291–1991: L’économie Suisse: histoire en trois actes*, ed. Gérard Geiger (St-Sulpice, 1991), 82–85, p. 82; François Cojonnex, “Entre la France et la Hollande, un destin mercenaire: Esaie de Chandieu (1660–1706),” in *Mercenariat et service étranger: Actes du Symposium 2008*, eds. Michel Chabloy et al. (Pully, 2010), 171–189, p. 175.

only factors nor sufficient,¹¹ family ties in fact constituted important factors in a career: fathers, uncles, brothers, brothers-in-law, cousins, or godparents who were already established in military circles helped male relatives to get ahead.¹² However, within the family support networks in this field, women who stayed at home in Switzerland and looked after the interests of the absent male – notably, by managing properties and employees – also played an active part in military entrepreneurship.

If recent historical research tends to look more and more at the question of the importance of family both in careers and in the organisation of companies and regiments,¹³ the historian Nathalie Büsser is the first to have undertaken a finely-grained analysis of the economic and professional involvement of female members of the military elites in the context of foreign service.¹⁴ Her studies on the French service of the Zurlauben family from Zug and the Reding family from Schwyz have shed light on the role played by women in recruiting soldiers and managing the administrative tasks of companies from

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- 11 For Valais and Vaud, both Louiselle Gally-de Riedmatten and François Cojonnex have shown how much the aspects influencing the careers of higher-ranking officers go beyond family strategies. Both of them analyse the impact of patronage ties, as well as political factors: respectively, on the appointment of six colonels in the Courten regiment and, in the case of Cojonnex, on that of Charles de Chandieu from Vaud to head the Manuel regiment, the first permanent army unit composed of Swiss in France, see Gally-de Riedmatten, *Du sang*, pp. 529–537; François Cojonnex, *Un Vaudois à la tête d'un régiment bernois: Charles de Chandieu (1658–1728)* (Pully, 2006).
- 12 Jasmina Cornut, "Parenté dans l'élite valaisanne des Lumières: la famille de Courten, entre stratégies, solidarité et amour," *Vallesia* 68 (2013), 205–335, pp. 286–295.
- 13 Among others: Rita Binz-Wohlhauser, "Netzwerke der militärischen Karriereplanung," in *Zwischen Glanz und Elend: Städtische Eliten in Freiburg im Üchtland (18. Jahrhundert)* (Zurich, 2014), p. 162–167; Gally-de Riedmatten, "La carrière, b. La force du réseau," in *Du sang contre de l'or*, pp. 704–719; Marc Höchner, "Familienökonomie," in *Selbstzeugnisse von Schweizer Söldneroffizieren im 18. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2015), pp. 155–167; Rogger, "Kompaniewirtschaft".
- 14 Among others, we can cite the following works by Nathalie Büsser: "Drängende Geschäfte"; idem, "'Die Frau Hauptmannin' als Schaltstelle für Rekrutenwerbungen, Geldtransfer und Informationsaustausch: Geschäftliche Tätigkeiten weiblicher Angehöriger der Zuger Zurlauben im familieneigenen Solddienstunternehmen um 1700," in *Dienstleistungen: Expansion und Transformation des "dritten Sektors" (15–20. Jahrhundert)*, eds. Hans-Jörg Gilomen, Margrit Müller, and Laurent Tissot (Zurich, 2007), 143–153; or idem, "Militärunternehmertum," p. 121. As precursor, we can also cite the earlier article by Louiselle Gally-de Riedmatten, "Lettres à l'absent bien-aimé: Essai sur la correspondance de Jeanne Barbe de Preux à son mari, Gaspard Antoine Quartéry, capitaine en Sardaigne," in *Gente ferocissima: Mercenariat et société en Suisse (XVe–XIXe siècle)*, eds. Norbert Furrer et al. (Zurich/Lausanne, 1997), 41–59.

Switzerland. In the meanwhile, Büsser's findings have been confirmed for other military families from the territories of the Swiss Confederation.¹⁵

In line with these studies, the present contribution aims to analyse the involvement of women from the families of the military elites of Valais, Vaud, and Fribourg (i.e. much of the French-speaking part of today's Switzerland)¹⁶ in promoting the careers of the men in their circles in the 18th and 19th centuries. It is thus interesting to examine this period of fundamental transformation for the Swiss foreign service, but also for the logics of kinship that "directly affect the role of women ... in the family",¹⁷ through the prism of gender. In a context of greater economic and social pressure, gendered spheres are more permeable than expected, and the role of relatives proves to be more decisive than gender in the family career strategies of the military elites.

The present study thus proposes to examine these female intercessions, which are both indirect and informal, in careers in the foreign service and then to show how they form part of a broader network of intra-family support and are found in practices and venues of both female and mixed sociability. We will also highlight the economic character of women's support for the military careers of their family members who are mainly serving in France, but also in the Dutch Republic or Naples. Personal documents in the family archival collections held by Swiss cantonal archives and libraries constitute the privileged material for identifying these manoeuvres and their contexts.¹⁸

15 Jasmina Cornut, "Implications féminines dans l'entrepreneuriat militaire familial en Suisse romande (XVII^e–XVIII^e siècles)," *Genre & Histoire* 19 (2017). Available at <http://journals.openedition.org/genrehistoire/2670>. Accessed 10 November 2021; Philippe Rogger, "Militärunternehmertum und Verflechtung: Auf den archivalischen Spuren der Salis" (unpublished paper presented at the Rätisches Museum in Chur, 22 October 2019).

16 In the 18th century, these three territories had different religions and different statuses. Whereas Fribourg was a canton since 1481 and remained Catholic after the Reformation, Valais, although likewise Catholic (Republic of the Seven Tithings with its subject territories like the Lower Valais) was an allied territory of the old Confederation that would only become a canton in 1815. As for the Pays de Vaud, it was ruled by Bern, which imposed the Protestant faith after conquering the territory in 1536. Vaud became a canton in 1803.

17 Sandro Guzzi-Heeb, "Mère aimée, mère domestiquée? Mères valaisannes du XVIII^e siècle et leurs fonctions sociales," *Micrologus: Natura, scienze e società medievali: La Madre – The Mother* 17 (2009), 437–462, p. 445. We will return to the transformations undergone by modern kinship in greater detail in the section on "Networks of Family Support for Military Careers". See the works by David Sabeau, Simon Teuscher, and Sandro Guzzi-Heeb cited in notes 68, 69, and 70.

18 The present contribution derives from a thesis chapter: Jasmina Cornut, *Femmes d'officiers militaires en Suisse romande: implications, enjeux et stratégies de l'absence, XVII^e–XIX^e siècles* (unpublished PhD diss., University of Lausanne, October 2023). The treatment of the topic is based on sources found in the family collections held by the Valais public

1 'Indirect' Female Interventions

Several studies on the old Swiss Confederation underscore the importance that matrimonial ties could have for military careers. In her analysis of the Courten regiment, a regiment in the French service from Valais, Louiselle Gally-de Riedmatten highlights the role played by marriage, as well as the connections between parents and godparents, in the clientelistic ties with the military entrepreneurs of the de Courten family: thus “for the men of the regiment from Valais, women were an important vector for creating connections” in career terms.¹⁹ Similarly, and still in Valais, some of the sons of the Torrenté family appear to have undertaken a military career because their mothers had ties with the Kalbermatten family who were recruiting and were in command of a regiment from Valais in the service of Sardinia.²⁰ The same observation can be made for other major lines of Swiss officers like the D’Affrys or the Diesbachs from Fribourg: the repeated marriages between these two families allowed the Diesbachs to pass positions of lieutenant in the Compagnie des Cent-Suisses in the French service from one generation to the next, whereas the “D’Affrys prospered in the Guards”.²¹

In this contribution, we want, however, to grasp the more “active” roles that women were able to play in the career advancement of their male relatives. Studying the Parisian nobility, Mathieu Marraud notes that “the exclusively male constitution of the professional [military] sphere in no way prevented the intervention ... of women. Given that the market in officer positions to some extent aligned with matrimonial policies, it is normal that female intercession played a large part in it”.²² In our view, the same applies for the Swiss foreign service, in which – often indirect and informal – female interventions in military careers could be clearly observed. The Riedmatten family collection at the Archives de l’Etat du Valais contains nearly 150 letters addressed to

archives (Archives de l’État du Valais [AEV]) in Sion, the Vaud cantonal archives in Lausanne [ACV], and the cantonal and university libraries of Lausanne [BCU] and Fribourg [BCUF].

19 Louiselle Gally-de Riedmatten notes several examples of godfathers or godmothers who probably encouraged or even propelled the career of their godson in the Courten regiment. See Gally-de Riedmatten, *Du sang contre de l’or*, pp. 710–711.

20 Janine Fayard Duchêne, “Du val d’Anniviers à Sion: La famille de Torrenté des origines à nos jours,” *Vallesia* 61 (2006), 1–299, pp. 105–106.

21 Ghislain de Diesbach, “Un esprit de famille,” in *Les gardes suisses et leurs familles aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles en région parisienne*, ed. Société historique de Rueil-Malmaison (Rueil-Malmaison, 1989), 39–43, p. 39.

22 Mathieu Marraud, *La noblesse de Paris au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 2000), p. 234.

Augustin de Riedmatten (1796–1867), a colonel since 1848 in a Swiss regiment in the service of Naples (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies), comprising thank-you notes, but above all solicitation letters and letters of recommendation.²³ The letters come from individuals who were seeking employment for themselves, their children or one of their relatives. Analysis of this corpus shows that the great majority of the writers are men: former or still active officers, sometimes notables in the local political instances in Valais. When the writers are relatives of the colonel, which is quite common, the family tie is explicitly referred to at the beginning of the letter and frequently repeated in the body of the text. The few solicitation letters written by women – in particular, by mothers trying to obtain a place for their son – appear ‘atypical’ in this collection. Thus, Anne Gard, née Macognin de la Pierre (1792–1856), and Adèle Chapelet, née Bioley (1810–64) each request a place for their son in the colonel’s regiment in 1850 and 1851 respectively. Both women write directly to Augustin de Riedmatten in Naples, whereas it is interesting to note that their respective husbands are alive and are former army officers.²⁴ Given that the majority of the solicitation letters and letters of recommendation come from male relatives, most of them in the military profession, this raises the following question: Why did the fathers not write to the colonel themselves on their son’s behalf? Obviously, we are not in a position to establish possible physical reasons (illness, old age, etc.) or personal reasons that might explain this. Nonetheless, by analysing the content of these women’s letters, like the plea of Anne Gard, as well as the couple’s familial and political milieu, we are able to formulate a hypothesis:

Monsieur le Colonel.

Although I do not have the honour of being known to you, I rely on the title of being the sister-in-law of Monsieur le Major Meinrad de Werra with whom you served in France and for whom my sister, his widow, tells me that he had a great deal of affection for you; In this capacity, Monsieur le Colonel, I dare to take the liberty of presenting to you the request that

23 AEV, Fonds Augustin de Riedmatten II, 7, Correspondance officielle: Lettres de remerciement, recommandation, sollicitations, etc. adressées à Augustin de Riedmatten (1828–1867).

24 Eugène-Arnold Gard (1776–1854), “surgeon-major in the Swiss federal contingent, asks in 1826 for a place in the French service in the 3rd Swiss [regiment], knight of the royal order of Spain” in Jacques Schalbetter, “Le Régiment valaisan au service de l’Espagne, 1796–1808,” *Annales valaisannes* 15:3 (1969), 283–369, p. 358 and Jean-Joseph Chapelet (1802–71) a former lieutenant in the French service who would have a political career in St-Maurice: notably, as a municipal councillor and then president of St-Maurice in 1847, see Albert de Wolf, *Le portrait valaisan* (n.p., 1957), p. 274.

my concern as mother for a son without status and whom our wealth does not allow us to keep at home without a means to earn his living. I am thus asking for your protection, Monsieur le Colonel; If there was a place open in your regiment, my son served honourably in the Sonderbund, holds very conservative principles, the young gentlemen serving in Naples will do him justice in this regard. I hope, Monsieur le Colonel, that you will not reject the prayer of a poor mother and of her family who will bless you every instant of her life if, thanks to your protection, my son can find a status in Naples that we are seeking in vain in Valais. The hope for a favourable response will provide comfort to my heart, and I pray God to protect you always. Please accept, Monsieur le Colonel, the deep respect with which I have the honour of being Anne Gard, née de la Pierre. St-Maurice, 16 January 1850.²⁵

It is clear that the Gards could neither claim to know the colonel personally nor to be related to him, which represented a definite handicap in this era and in this particular milieu. In effect, a kinship tie, even by marriage and distant, seems like a strong argument in a request.²⁶ Nonetheless, Madame Gard succeeded in establishing a connection to Augustin de Riedmatten via her late brother-in-law, who had ties of military camaraderie with the colonel.

25 AEV, Fonds Augustin de Riedmatten II, 7/1/14, Lettre d'Anne Gard à Augustin de Riedmatten, St-Maurice, 16 January 1850: "Monsieur le Colonel. Quoique je n'aie pas l'honneur d'être connue de vous, je m'appuie du titre de belle-sœur de Monsieur le Major Meinrad de Werra avec qui vous avez servi en France et pour lequel ma sœur, sa veuve, me dit qu'il avait beaucoup d'affection pour vous; à ce titre Monsieur le Colonel j'ose prendre la liberté de vous présenter la requête que ma sollicitude de mère, pour un fils sans état, et dont notre fortune ne nous permet pas de garder auprès de nous, sans moyen de gagner sa vie. Je viens donc, Monsieur le Colonel, vous demander votre protection; s'il y avait une place vacante dans votre régiment, mon fils a servi avec honneur dans le Sonderbund, ses principes sont très conservateurs, ces jeunes Messieurs qui sont au service de Naples lui rendront justice à cet égard. J'espère Monsieur le Colonel que vous ne rejetterez pas la prière d'une pauvre mère et de sa famille qui vous bénira dans tous les instants de sa vie si par votre protection mon fils peut trouver à Naples, un état que l'on cherche en vain en Valais. L'espérance d'une réponse favorable soulagera mon cœur, et je prie Dieu de vous protéger toujours. Agréez, Monsieur le Colonel, l'hommage du profond respect avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être Anne Gard, née de la Pierre. St-Maurice, le 16 janvier 1850" (spelling and punctuation modernised and corrected here and in other French original citations in the footnotes, apart from the capitalisation in some mentions of military ranks).

26 This is made clear by our analysis of the solicitation letters addressed to the lieutenant-colonel and then colonel in the English service, Eugène de Courten, who was from Valais, see Cornut, "Parenté dans l'élite valaisanne des Lumières," p. 293.

By mentioning that she “dares” to write to him “in this capacity”, we grasp the importance that personal relationships had in legitimating this sort of request. But another point on which this mother insists merits our attention. Madame Gard takes pains to indicate that her son served in the Sonderbund²⁷ and specifies the nature of his “very conservative” principles. We need to note an important fact here: Her interlocutor was a fervent conservative and legitimist. Hence, Anne’s married name, Gard, risked putting off Colonel Augustin de Riedmatten: The closest relatives of her spouse, Eugène Arnold Gard, included fervent liberal radicals who had expressed virulent public criticism of the Swiss foreign service.²⁸ Is this why Anne Gard decided to write to the colonel herself? Her maiden name, Macognin de la Pierre, which she mentions at the bottom of the letter – a common practice among women from Valais – lets the colonel know that they both come from the same social and political milieu. Anne, née Macognin de la Pierre, was in fact a member of an important patrician family from the Lower Valais (*Bas-Valais*), which included a long line of army officers.²⁹

27 The Sonderbund was an alliance that, in 1845, brought together seven conservative, Catholic Swiss cantons aiming to safeguard the Catholic religion and cantonal sovereignty and rejecting the idea of a federal state. The radicals, who had a majority in the Diet in 1847, decided to dissolve the Sonderbund. This led to a civil war between federal troops and Catholic conservatives. Valais thus mobilised to defend the Sonderbund, even though the population was divided between conservatives and radicals. The conservative cantons would be defeated, see René Roca, “Sonderbund,” 2012, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/017241/2012-12-20/#HVerlaguerrecivile>. Accessed 28 June 2020.

28 His brother, Frédéric Gard (1767–1848), was a well-known political figure in the canton. He held numerous positions: notably, the post of the châtelain de Bagnes (1815–18), that of president of the Tithings (1807–10) and delegate to the cantonal parliament or Grand Council. He “helped to spread liberal ideas in the valley [of Bagnes]”. Frédéric’s son, Louis Gard (1799–1855), who was an officer in Naples for some time, a notary, a journalist, and a well-known chansonnier, took part in the brawl known as the *Bastonnade de Martigny* in 1833 on the liberal side and militated on behalf of the *Jeune Suisse* up to 1844. He expressed extremely virulent positions against the foreign service. See Pierre-Alain Putallaz, “Le service étranger vu à travers l’étude des enfants du grand bailli Michel Dufour: Louis, Pierre-Marie, Adrien, Marguerite, Casimir, Joseph, Frédéric et Pauline, dite aussi Henriette,” *Vallesia* 58 (2003), 1–230, pp. 137–138. See also Sandro Guzzi-Heeb, *Passions alpines: Sexualité et pouvoirs dans les montagnes suisses (1700–1900)* (Rennes, 2014), pp. 132, 148–150.

29 On her father’s side of the family, her father himself, Etienne-Louis Macognin de la Pierre (1731–93), had a successful career as officer in the Courten regiment in France, as did her three de la Pierre uncles. One of his brothers served in the Napoleonic armies. All of them were deceased at the time when Anne was requesting the place for her son. She was also, via her mother Marie-Françoise de Rivaz, the niece of the late Charles Emmanuel de Rivaz, who was in his day the grand bailli of Valais and came from one of the most important

The case of Adèle Chapelet, who requested a place as standard bearer for her “19 and a half” year old son, exhibits certain similarities to the situation of Anne Gard: a living spouse who served in France in his youth and a family of the liberal persuasion. Her older son Maurice is indeed a moderate liberal.³⁰ Like the Gards, the Chapelets could not call upon any kinship tie to justify their request. Hence, to ensure her son’s “zeal” and “good conduct”, Adèle invokes ties by marriage with one of the most powerful families of the *Haut-Valais* (Upper Valais):³¹ “You could, Monsieur le Colonel, obtain information from all the Stockalper gentlemen who are his friends and relatives if you are afraid of nominating a subject who does not do his duties well in every respect”.³² Great defenders of Catholicism – like Augustin de Riedmatten – the Stockalper family held important military and political positions in the canton during the 19th century.³³ If the political inclinations of their spouses – or at least of the families of the latter – may explain why Anne Gard and Adèle Chapelet took up their pens to write, it is still difficult for the historian to identify their strategies or motives. We should emphasise that in both these cases, the women, who are not directly related to Colonel de Riedmatten, only “dared” to ask for positions of subordinate officers.

Do women prefer to appeal to intermediaries whom they know and frequent in person? This is what is suggested by the case of Joséphine de Roten, née Gottrau (1800–86), the widow of a patrician from Valais. Madame de Roten is going to push her deceased husband’s brother-in-law, Adrien de Riedmatten, to try to obtain an officer’s position for her son Josef Roten. Joséphine de Roten probably chose him as intermediary because her brother-in-law and Augustin

families of the Lower Valais. Note that one year later, in 1851, his nephew, Maurice-Charles Macognin de la Pierre, would enter into the service of Naples as a second lieutenant, see André Donnet, Charles Zimmermann, “Etienne-Louis Macognin de la Pierre (1731–1793), sa famille et ses constructions de Saint-Maurice,” *Vallesia* 14 (1959), 189–244.

30 A few years earlier, moreover, he had married Marie Joséphine, daughter of Jean-Didier Parvex, a notary and lieutenant commander of the advance guard of the *Jeune Suisse*, who was killed in the Battle of Trient by the conservatives of the *Vieille Suisse*. See Joseph-Nicolas Hubert, “Précis historique des événements d’Entremont arrivés en mai 1844,” *Vallesia* 24 (1969), 1–94, pp. 51, 92.

31 My genealogical research did not allow me to find the marriage or kinship ties between the Chapelet and the Stockalper families that Adèle mentions. It should be noted that it was not until 1866 that one of Adèle’s daughters will marry Joseph von Stockalper (1826–99).

32 AEV, Fonds Augustin de Riedmatten 11, 7/1/25, Lettre d’Adèle Chapelet à Augustin de Riedmatten, St-Maurice, 11 September 1851.

33 Marie-Claude Schöpfer Pfaffen, “Stockalper, Stockalper de la Tour,” 2012, in DHS. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/023600/2012-05-29/>. Accessed 9 March 2020.

de Riedmatten were related: Adrien de Riedmatten was in fact the colonel's uncle by marriage and the godfather of one of his children.³⁴ After having, on his account, been subjected to intense pressure from his sister-in-law and her family, Adrien de Riedmatten agreed to intercede on behalf of his nephew Josef with his other nephew Augustin de Riedmatten.³⁵ Among the patrician elites of Valais, uncles and aunts had a duty of assistance that is not juridical in nature, but, above all, moral and cultural; in the military milieu, moreover, being an uncle offered the same possibilities for offering professional support as the direct father-son relationship or the relationship between an older and a younger brother.³⁶ In Adrien de Riedmatten's plea, it is interesting to note arguments susceptible of influencing the colonel that are similar to those invoked by Madame Gard and Madame Chapelet: He highlights his nephew's "entirely conservative political principles", as well as his "faith able to move mountains".³⁷ Madame de Roten's strategy provides further confirmation of the importance accorded to kinship ties in a request. It seemed more effective to the Fribourg native to use her late husband's network of relatives in Valais to secure her son's future. It was only after her brother-in-law's successful intervention that Madame Roten "dared" to recommend her son directly to the colonel:

Monsieur le Colonel. Monsieur de Riedmatten your dear uncle having informed me of your honoured and gracious response to the letter he had the honour of writing to you to recommend my eldest son. I want to express my gratitude to you, as well as for all the kind things with which you honour me and likewise my family. ... I thus dare, Monsieur le Colonel, to ask you please to take an interest in his appointment and to look after him when he will have left me. I recommend him to the entirely fatherly concern with which you honour all those who are around you. I have reason to believe that you will never have to regret it and that you will find in my son the gratefulness that is so rightly your due.³⁸

34 AEV, Fonds Augustin de Riedmatten II, 2/1/20, Lettre d'Adrien de Riedmatten à Augustin de Riedmatten, Sion, 8 September 1849.

35 AEV, Fonds Augustin de Riedmatten II, 7/1/21, Lettre d'Adrien de Riedmatten à Augustin de Riedmatten, Sion, 25 March 1851.

36 Cornut, "Parenté dans l'élite valaisanne des Lumières", pp. 291, 302.

37 AEV, Fonds Augustin de Riedmatten II, 7/1/21, Lettre d'Adrien de Riedmatten à Augustin de Riedmatten, Sion, 25 March 1851.

38 AEV, Fonds Augustin de Riedmatten II, 2/1/22, Lettre de Joséphine de Roten à Augustin de Riedmatten, Sion, 29 April 1851: "Monsieur le Colonel. Monsieur de Riedmatten votre cher oncle m'ayant fait part de votre honorée et bienveillante réponse à la lettre qu'il

Via this letter, Joséphine de Roten seemed to want to ensure the promotion, but also and above all the protection of her son, about whom, as the correspondence attests, she worried a great deal. She is not unique in attributing a paternal function to the colonel; many fathers who recommended their sons to Augustin de Riedmatten mentioned this as well.

It was thus rare for women to address a colonel or a captain to whom they were not closely related directly – at least in writing – in order to ask for a place. The same observation can be made in the sphere of political relations, where the “form of action ... based on influence was all the more suspect if it was practised by a woman”.³⁹ Women thus tend to act face-to-face, rather than by writing: It is during a secret meeting with the French ambassador, Michel Amelot Marquis de Gournay, that Catherine Perregaux née de Watteville (1645–1714), daughter of a Bernese patrician family and spy for King Louis XIV, justified her services by the desire to secure a military career for her son Théophile:

As for the aim I had set myself, it was to recommend my only son to the graces of the king, to whose service he would be as devoted as two of my brothers, who died in His Majesty's troops; one being a lieutenant-colonel in his Swiss guards, and the other a captain in the same unit, and my son, as well as myself, we were no less brave and had no less desire to serve so great a king usefully.⁴⁰

a eu l'honneur de vous écrire pour vous recommander mon fils ainé. Je viens vous en témoigner ma reconnaissance, ainsi que pour toutes les choses obligeantes dont vous m'honorez et ma famille de même. [...] J'ose donc, Monsieur le Colonel vous prier de bien vouloir vous intéresser à sa nomination et veiller sur lui lorsqu'il m'aura quitté. Je le recommande à votre sollicitude toute paternelle dont vous honorez tous ceux qui vous entourent. J'ai lieu de croire que vous n'aurez jamais à vous repentir et que vous trouverez dans mon fils la reconnaissance qui vous est due à si juste titre.”

39 Anne-Lise Head-König, “Introduction: Les femmes dans la société urbaine: Culture, politique, économie,” in *Frauen in der Stadt: Les femmes dans la ville*, eds. Anne-Lise Head-König, Albert Tanner (Zurich, 1993), 7–22, p. 12.

40 [Catherine Perregaux née de Watteville], “Mémoire de Madame Perregaux née de Watteville, présenté en 1714 à Monsieur le Comte du Luc, ambassadeur de France en Suisse,” *Archiv des Historischen Vereins des Kantons Bern* 6 (1867), 71–129, p. 93: “Que quant au but que je m'étais proposé, c'était celui de recommander mon fils unique aux bontés du roi au service duquel il serait dévoué comme l'avaient été deux de mes frères, morts dans les troupes de Sa Majesté; l'un étant lieutenant-colonel dans ses gardes suisses, et l'autre capitaine dans le même corps, et que mon fils, ainsi que moi, nous n'avions pas moins de courage et d'envie de servir utilement un aussi grand roi.”

Such female manoeuvres were common at the French court, moreover, even if they have not been the subject of in-depth historical analysis.⁴¹ In his journal covering the period from 1780 to 1784, the officer Marc-Marie, Marquis de Bombelles (1744–1822), writes:

It is not likely that the general promotion will appear before the fall, since if it is published too early, a large number of regiments will be deprived of their heads, who will be made generals, during the period of manoeuvres and reviews. Nonetheless, mothers, women, and sisters are already mobilised to ask for posts, and the ministries are seeing sixty people a day.⁴²

The role played by the women of the elites in the careers of their male relatives rarely appeared directly and frontally in Swiss territories: It formed part of a broader family support network, as shown by the example of Joséphine de Roten, as well as the cases from Valais and Vaud to follow.

2 Networks of Family Support for Military Careers

Born into a patrician family from St-Maurice, Louis d'Odet (1743–1836) had been a lieutenant in the Courten regiment in the French service since 1769. Nonetheless, his status as a native of the *Lower Valais* was detrimental to his possibilities for advancement. Starting in the 1760s, in effect, the Diet, the supreme decision-making instance in Valais, adopted a series of measures that aimed to favour the Patriots, residents of the sovereign country (the Upper Valais), thus penalising officers from the subject country (the Lower Valais) who wanted

41 Mathieu Marraud speaks of them, however: "Apart from the affirmation of persistent clientelistic relationships, apart from broad family cohesiveness, the examination of these practices makes clear the increased role of women. More than intermediaries, the latter in fact constituted active links around which the men's careers developed. It is very often thanks to them that higher ranks were obtained. In the absence of the spouses, who are required to join their regiment from June to September, it was up to the wives to intercede and intervene on their behalf with the competent ministers," in Marraud, *La noblesse*, pp. 233–234.

42 Marc-Marie de Bombelles, *Journal*, 1 (Geneva, 1978), p. 231, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 234: "Il n'est pas vraisemblable que la promotion générale paraisse avant l'automne, parce qu'en la publiant trop tôt, on priverait dans le temps des manœuvres et des revues un grand nombre de régiments dont les chefs seront faits officiers généraux. Cependant les mères, les femmes, les sœurs sont déjà en mouvement pour solliciter, et les ministères voient soixante personnes par jour".

to have a career in France.⁴³ Moreover, the very competitive situation in the Courten regiment was reducing the opportunities for promotion of men who, nonetheless, had the advantage of high birth. The regiment had not taken part in any military action since the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763: Being kept at a distance from combat deprived officers of the possibility of distinguishing themselves other than by their seniority and, as a consequence of the fall in mortality, the highly coveted captain positions were only becoming free far too slowly.⁴⁴ Hence, when, in 1777, there was finally an opportunity to obtain a captain's commission – a first step towards having one's own company – Louis d'Odet's mother Julienne (1707–83) and his wife Julie (1749–1820) did not hesitate to act at once, as the latter tells her husband who is stationed in Valenciennes in France at the time:

I have been extremely tormented ... for the last eight days, I am going to tell you the story: Mme Ignace wrote to cousin du Fay that we were working on getting the [struck out: compag] pension for M. de la Pierre,⁴⁵ right away, without telling me anything, cousin worked on his uncle to try to get you the commission, he spoke about it to mother [Julienne d'Odet] who told him that she would give a hundred *pistoles* to get it for you. Cousin went up to Sion and spoke about it to his uncle who did not want any money at all and who replied [struck out: to him] that he was quite annoyed that we did not speak about it to him earlier, that his sister had asked for this place for her son but that he had not yet promised it to her and that he would like to be able to arrange things to give it to you but that he would like to see the capitulation before deciding. Cousin promised to send it to him and upon his return, he advised mother to write to him and that I would make a duplicate of the letter but that she would write it in her own hand, after cousin du Fay's departures.⁴⁶

43 See Gally-de Riedmatten, *Du sang contre de l'or*, pp. 578–579.

44 See Gally-de Riedmatten, *Du sang contre de l'or*, p. 581.

45 Perhaps Antoine Hyacinthe Macognin de la Pierre (1735–84), captain of the Lavallaz company.

46 AEV, Fonds d'Odet 16/6/1, Lettre de Julie d'Odet à son époux Louis, St-Maurice, 7 July 1777: "J'ai été bien tourmentée [...] depuis 8 jours, je vais te conter cette histoire: Mme Ignace a écrit au cousin du Fay que l'on travaillait à faire avoir la [barré: compag] retraite à M. de la Pierre, aussitôt, le cousin sans m'en rien dire a travaillé auprès de son oncle pour te faire avoir cette commission, il en a parlé à la maman [Julienne d'Odet] qui lui a dit qu'elle donnerait bien cent pistoles pour te la faire avoir. Le cousin montait à Sion et en a parlé à son oncle qui n'a point voulu d'argent et qui [barré: lui] a répondu qu'il était bien fâché qu'on ne lui en eu pas parlé plus tôt, que sa sœur lui avait demandé cette place pour son fils mais qu'il ne lui avait pas encore promise et qu'il voudrait pouvoir arranger les

This extract reveals the extent of intrafamily support that mobilised relatives outside the inner circle of the nuclear family. Within this network, the women – “Madame Ignace”, the sister of the uncle whose help was being asked for, Julie and Julienne – were involved in manoeuvring to advance the careers of relatives in the military, the same as the men. Just as in the example of Madame Roten discussed above, it was only after their cousin intervened that Julienne and Julie “dared” to write the commander of the company directly. This provides further support for our postulate concerning the often indirect character of female contacts with higher-ranking officers. The women of the d’Odet family were prepared to transgress certain limits to get Louis the rank of captain. Julienne d’Odet offered money to her cousin’s uncle,⁴⁷ who was in possession of the company and was in a position to promote her son’s career, whereas “trembling and unsure”, Julie manoeuvred behind her husband’s back. If she admits, further on in the letter, to having had doubts about begging for a company in his name, it is because she knows that he “does not like the service” and that her manoeuvres are helping to “bind” him to a profession that he would like to abandon. Nonetheless, her mother-in-law Julienne convinced her that if her son “was a commissioned captain he would be able to save some money for raising his family which could become large”. In the 18th century, in effect, the financial interest for patrician captains “consisted of an unsurprising but in principle secure profit”.⁴⁸ The meagre pay of lieutenant d’Odet did not allow the family to have a lifestyle consistent with their status, nor even to live decently. For Julienne d’Odet, the widow of a notary of a subject country who had appointed her as guardian of his children,⁴⁹ these economic motives were perhaps coupled with a desire for social advancement: a successful military career and the opportunity to obtain a noble title by way of combat could have raised her family to the rank of a few powerful families in the military oligarchy of the sovereign country.⁵⁰ But these efforts would never come to fruition, and

choses pour te la donner mais qu’il voudrait voir la capitulation avant que de se décider. Le cousin lui a promis de la lui envoyer et à son retour, il a conseillé à la maman de lui écrire et que je ferais le double de la lettre mais qu’elle écrirait de sa main, après le départ du cousin du Fay.”

- 47 It is difficult to know whether Madame d’Odet is referring to a sort of bribe or to the 1,000 écus that all captains of the contingent are supposed to possess: an old requirement that the Valais Tithings reestablish in 1767 according to Gally-de Riedmatten, *Du sang contre de l’or*, p. 579.
- 48 Jean Steinauer, *Patriciens, fromagers, mercenaires: Histoire de l’émigration fribourgeoise, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle* (Neuchâtel, 2017), p. 169.
- 49 AEV, Fonds d’Odet 2, P 153, Testament de Jean Gaspard d’Odet, 22 January 1750.
- 50 It should be noted that Julienne d’Odet had been “mortally afflicted” by the resignation from the foreign service of her eldest son Hyacinthe in the same year, 1777, which explains

even if Louis d'Odet, who was admitted as a "free patriot" (franc-patriote) in the Upper Valais three years later, finally obtained his captain's commission in 1784,⁵¹ he would never obtain a company. In our view, d'Odet lacked direct support in his regiment, where his network mostly consisted of people from the Lower Valais.⁵² Moreover, he was not the only native of the Lower Valais to be discriminated against in the Courten regiment because of his origin. His case illustrates the limits of the family support network when confronted by the political logic of the Republic of the Seven Tithings (Upper Valais).⁵³

The career of the cadet Jacob Deloës reveals further obstacles. Deloës came from a bourgeois family from the Pays de Vaud (which was under Bernese rule at the time). At the start of the 18th century, "the functions of colonel were still reserved in principle for Bernese" in fact, and only one third of the captain posts could be held by subjects from Vaud.⁵⁴ According to Marianne Stubenvoll, however, "if being from Vaud was not an insurmountable handicap for someone choosing a military career, coming from a bourgeois family, on the other hand, was not advantageous".⁵⁵ Without any source of support in the foreign service and in a period of peace when "promotions were rare", the young Deloës could have run into numerous barriers in his professional rise. Nonetheless, when he tried to obtain an ensign post in the company of lieutenant-colonel Monnin of Neuchâtel, both the male and female relatives of his father Abraham helped him to get ahead in the milieu, as the latter wrote to his son around 1730:

why she was now counting so much on her son Louis. See AEV, Fonds d'Odet 1 6/6/1, Lettre de Julie d'Odet à son époux Louis, St-Maurice, 7 July 1777.

- 51 AEV, Fonds d'Odet 2, P 233, Copies de lettres patentes datée de Versailles le 9 mai 1784, in Pierre Alain Putallaz, *Eugénie de Treytorrens et Charles d'Odet: Etude de leur correspondance inédite (1812-1817)* (Lausanne, 1985), p. 35.
- 52 His brother Hyacinthe left the service in that same year, 1777, and his cousins Dufay, Devantéry and de Nucé had either subordinate ranks or captain positions, mostly by commission.
- 53 Louiselle Gally-de Riedmatten has provided a fine-grained analysis of the difficulties faced by officers from the Lower Valais in making a career in the regiment vis-à-vis officers from the Upper Valais oligarchy who wanted to preserve their hold on the higher-ranking officer positions and who were largely supported by the Diet in the last third of the 18th century, in Gally-de Riedmatten, *Du sang contre de l'or*, pp. 578-587.
- 54 Danièle Tosato-Rigo, "Vaud. 3.2. Le régime bernois (1536-1798)," 2017, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/007395/2017-05-30/>. Accessed 6 March 2020.
- 55 Marianne Stubenvoll, "Patron bernois, client vaudois au service étranger," in *Gente ferocissima: Mercenariat et société en Suisse (xve-xixe siècle)*, eds. Norbert Furrer et al. (Zurich/Lausanne 1997), 61-73, p. 66.

Your cousin the assessor Deloës wrote to mad[ame] his sister in Neuchâtel to have you recommended to mons[ieur] Monnin she who has spoken to persons of distinction on this subject ... She pays you a lot of compliments and says that she would like to have the opportunity to be able to please you.⁵⁶

Thanks to these relatives who effectively mobilised several Bernese patricians in his favour, his progress through the ranks – seven years instead of, on average, ten years to obtain a lieutenant's commission in 1736 – turned out, finally, to be rapid for the time.⁵⁷ Here, the efforts of the young Deloës' family network proved to be more productive than in the case of d'Odet; it should be noted, however, that what was being asked for was a post as subordinate officer, which was easier to obtain.

David-Louis Constant d'Hermenches (1722–85), a captain with the rank of colonel in the regiment of the Swiss Guards of the Prince of Orange-Nassau, also repeatedly called on his network of relatives, both by blood and by marriage, when he had to fill certain subordinate positions. But when it was a matter of securing the future of his son Guillaume (1750–1838), he turned first to his wife Louise, née de Seigneux (1715–72), who lived in Lausanne, Pays de Vaud, in Switzerland most of the time. In 1762, one of the commanders of one of the eight companies of the Swiss Guards resigned in exchange for a financial agreement with the other captains.⁵⁸ The company of the resigning officer was held by David-Louis Constant d'Hermenches, who saw an opportunity to place his son, who is just twelve years old, in second lieutenant position with the rank of captain. Writing to his wife from the Dutch Republic, he carefully summarised his plans, which required a complex exchange of men:

It occurred to me my dear friend that I had not explained to you the arrangement of my company clearly enough and as much perhaps for

56 ACV, Fonds P. de Loës 55, n.p., n.d., partly quoted in Stubenvoll, "Patron bernois," p. 72: "votre cousin l'assesseur Deloës à écrit à mad[ame] sa sœur à Neuchâtel pour vous faire recommander à mons[ieur] Monnin laquelle s'étant adressée à des personnes de distinction à ce sujet [...]. Elle vous fait bien des compliments et marque qu'elle souhaiteroit avoir occasion à vous pouvoir faire plaisir".

57 Stubenvoll, "Patron bernois," pp. 71–72.

58 Guy Le Comte, "La guerre dans les Flandres vue par Guillaume de Willermin: Officier aux Gardes suisses – 1793–1795," in *De Nimègue à Java: les soldats suisses au service de la Hollande, xvii^e–xx^e siècles*, ed. Sébastien Rial (Morges-Pully, 2014), 127–140, p. 128.

the edification of our friend d'Aubonne and for your own satisfaction, you need to have this; after the requested resignations, here is how the officers should follow:

1. Count de Golowkin⁵⁹ c[aptai]ⁿ c[omman]^{der}
2. Mestral de Pampigny, first l[ieute]^{nant}
 Wilhelm [Guillaume] Constant, second lieutenant, without number until he is old enough but with wages.
3. La Pottrie, sub-lieutenant
4. Wettstein the elder, an ensign's wages
5. An ensign to do without wages until Wilhelm [Guillaume] serves, so M. May⁶⁰ is committed to give 375 fl[orains] per year and a man's pay is altogether 515 fl[orains].⁶¹

By placing his 20-year-old nephew (the son of his wife's sister) Louis de La Pottrie in post number 3 of sub-lieutenant, Constant made sure that, despite his seniority, the latter would not claim the place of his son when the time come. But the plan was threatened. The young prince William v of Orange Nassau wanted to place one of his friends as an ensign at number 5 with a second lieutenant's commission. By virtue of his seniority as a page and with the prince's support, the young man could have taken the rank of la Pottrie and thus that of Constant's son Guillaume. Furthermore, Captain d'Aubonne,⁶² one of his former comrades in the regiment, wanted to hire La Pottrie for his own company. David-Louis thus entrusted his wife Louise with the following mission: convince d'Aubonne, who is in Switzerland at the time, to take the prince's friend into his company instead of La Pottrie:

59 Gabriel de Golowkin (1731–1800).

60 Friedrich May von Kiesen (1695–1776), major-general.

61 BCU, Fonds CO 11/16/11/C, Lettre de David-Louis Constant d'Hermenches à son épouse, Hellevoetsluis, 16 July [1762]: "J'ai pensé ma chère amie que je ne vous ai pas expliqué assez clairement l'arrangement de ma compagnie et que tant pour l'édification peut-être de notre ami d'Aubonne et pour votre propre satisfaction, il faut que vous ayez cela; après les démissions priées voici comme les officiers doivent se suivre:

1. Le Comte de Golowkin c[apitai]^{ne} c[omman]^{dant}
2. Mestral de Pampigny, premier l[ieute]^{nant}

Wilhelm [Guillaume] Constant, second lieutenant, sans numéro jusqu'à ce qu'il ait l'âge mais avec les gages.

3. La Pottrie, sous-lieutenant
4. Wettstein l'ainé, les gages d'enseigne

Un enseigne à faire sans gages jusqu' a ce que Wilhelm [Guillaume] serve, alors M. May est engagé à donner 375 fl[orains] par an et la paie d'un homme fait ensemble 515 fl[orains]".

62 David Louis (or Louis David) d'Aubonne (1711–86).

Understand this well and discuss it with d'Aubonne once you see that his intentions are good; if you see that he is fully one of our friends, tell him everything, even the matter of not taking la Pottrie into his company since if I do not have la Pottrie I think that I would renounce everything for my son.⁶³

On the shores of Lake Geneva, Louise succeeded in convincing Captain d'Aubonne, probably during a soirée organised by his sisters, Marie and Elisabeth d'Aubonne: social events picked up in fact when their officer brothers are on leave in Switzerland.⁶⁴ Per her husband's wishes, Louise only still had to look for an ensign at no. 5 who would not pose a threat to their son's career. "The point now my dear friend", d'Hermenches wrote her in September 1762, "is to find a young man who would like to be a supernumerary for two years for next spring ... Chance may perhaps present him to you without appearing to look for him, on the contrary, the thing is good enough to be asked for".⁶⁵ David-Louis also recommended that his wife ask his father-in-law, the mayor Jean-Samuel de Seigneux, her mother Rose or her relative M. de Bercher⁶⁶ to suggest someone to her.⁶⁷ Louise Constant d'Hermenches' mission was a success: Young Guillaume's military career was henceforth assured.

Numerous analyses in the modern history of the family, both in Europe and in Switzerland, highlight a phenomenon of intensified collaboration between relatives: at the level of consanguineous marriages and of the choice of godparents, as well as within the system of power or production in the 18th and 19th centuries.⁶⁸ Similarly, David Sabeau and Simon Teuscher reveal

63 BCU, Fonds CO 11/16/11/B, Lettre de David-Louis Constant d'Hermenches à son épouse Louise, The Hague, 16 July [1762]: "Comprenez bien ceci et parlez-en avec d'Aubonne suivant que vous le verrez bien intentionné; si vous voyez qu'il soit pleinement de nos amis, dites-lui tout, même le cas de ne pas prendre la Pottrie dans sa compagnie parce que si je n'ai pas la Pottrie je crois bien que je renoncerais à tout pour mon fils."

64 Marie and Elisabeth d'Aubonne lived in a property at Faublanc in Pully during the summer and at Rue du Bourg no. 29 in Lausanne in winter, according to Pierre Morren, *La vie lausannoise au XVIIIe siècle d'après Jean Henri Polier de Vernand, lieutenant baillival* (Geneva, 1970), p. 558.

65 BCU, Fonds CO 11/16/11/B, Lettre de David-Louis Constant d'Hermenches à son épouse Louise, Middachten, 7 September [1762].

66 David de Saussure, Baron de Bercher (1697–1765), officer in the French service, member of the *Petit Conseil* (Small Council) and treasurer of Lausanne, uncle of David-Louis Constant d'Hermenches or his son Philippe de Saussure (1727–1804), last Baron de Bercher, cousin of Constant.

67 BCU, Fonds CO 11/16/11/A, Lettre de David-Louis Constant d'Hermenches à son épouse Louise, [n.p.], 16 November [1762].

68 Among others: David Warren Sabeau, *Kinship in Neckarhausen, 1700–1870* (Cambridge/New York, 1998); Sandro Guzzi-Heeb, *Donne, uomini, parentela: Casati alpini nell'Europa*

the transformations undergone by kinship dynamics from the second half of the 18th century on: A system based on lineage, inheritance and patrilineal logics would gradually give way to a system revolving around “alliance, sentiment, interlocking networks of kindred, and social and familial endogamy”.⁶⁹ Women were increasingly becoming the key to new marital alliances within these family networks. Their strategic importance for the social advancement of their family implied a greater “investment” by the latter in its daughters: both in terms of inheritance and of education, as well as in terms of a socialisation “meant to ensure behaviour consistent with the rules of the social milieu or, if possible, of a more distinguished milieu”.⁷⁰ Women were far from being mere bargaining chips in matrimonial logics. They were also expected to play an active role: notably, within networks of informal relationships that offered “important opportunities for the assertion of group interests and [were] an excellent tool to further individual careers”.⁷¹ In the 18th century, in the context of a reevaluation of the role of women during the Enlightenment, aristocratic sociability (salons, social calls, soirées) was now mixed (whereas it had still been largely segmented by gender in the 17th century).⁷² Mediation among women had an important place in these feminised spaces.

3 Women's Networks

Relatives, frequently the wives of the captain or the colonel, became “transmission belts”⁷³ that were given priority by other women (and sometimes men) who were trying to promote the career advancement of a family member or an acquaintance.

preindustriale (1650–1850) (Torino, 2007).

69 David Warren Sabean, Simon Teuscher, “Kinship in Europe: A new Approach to Long-Term Development,” in *Kinship in Europe: Approaches to Long-Term Development (1300–1900)*, eds. David Warren Sabean, Jon Mathieu, and Simon Teuscher (New York/Oxford, 2007), 1–32, p. 16.

70 Guzzi-Heeb, “Mère aimée, mère domestiquée? Mères valaisannes,” p. 446.

71 Elisabeth Joris, “Kinship and Gender: Property, Enterprise, and Politics,” in *Kinship in Europe: Approaches to Long-Term Development (1300–1900)*, eds. David Warren Sabean, Jon Mathieu, and Simon Teuscher (New York/Oxford, 2007), 231–257, p. 242.

72 Brigitte Schnegg, “Soireen, Salons, Sozietäten. Geschlechtsspezifische Aspekte des Wandels städtischer Öffentlichkeit im Ancien Regime am Beispiel Berns,” in *Frauen in der Stadt: Les femmes dans la ville*, eds. Anne-Lise Head-König, Albert Tanner (Zurich, 1993), 163–183, pp. 167–169.

73 The expression (“courroie de transmission” in French) is used by Head-König, “Introduction: Les femmes,” note 16, p. 21.

There are numerous examples among the Chandieu, a noble family from the Pays du Vaud and an important military lineage in the service of the French crown. Thus, in October 1702, Catherine de Chandieu, née Gaudicher d'Aversé (1670–1761), wrote from their château de L'Isle, at the foot of the Jura mountains, to her husband Charles (1659–1728), colonel of a Swiss regiment and brigadier of the armies of the King of France, who was in Flanders at the time:

Mme de Lily and M. and Mme de Chamergis visited me for two days a short time ago and asked me to tell you about a young de Lily whom Mme his mother would very much like you to take into your company, he is in that of M. de la Pierre, he is a good-natured youngster whom you would only have to recommend to one of your officers and give him full power over his conduct.⁷⁴

On the occasion of another social call, moreover, Madame de Lautigny asked her to recommend “a certain Duval from the region of Gex”, who was an ensign in her husband’s regiment, “to promote him when the opportunity shall arise”.⁷⁵

In 1744, at the request of her relative, Mlle de Grancy, Françoise de Chandieu, née de Montrond (1722–77) – Catherine’s daughter-in-law – asked her husband Benjamin (1701–84), captain of a company in the French service, for a standard bearer position for Grancy’s nephew. Not having a position to fill, Benjamin de Chandieu urged her to ask his brother Esaïe (1700–75), captain of a half-company in the Swiss Guards.⁷⁶ Finally, faced with the latter’s silence, Benjamin replied to his wife: “I have written to Mlle de Grancy to offer her a standard bearer place for her nephew, in the company of one of my friends”.⁷⁷

In Geneva, Benjamin’s sister-in-law, Esaïe’s wife, Angélique Henriette de Chandieu-Villars, née Pelissari (1695–1765?), received via Mlle Ducret a request from Mme de Wattenville for her to write Monsieur de Chandieu, namely her

74 ACV, Fonds P Charrière de Sévery Ba 1469, Lettre de Catherine de Chandieu, à son époux Charles, [L'Isle], 3 October 1702: “Mme de Lily et M. et Mme de Chamergis m'ont rendu depuis peu une visite de deux jours et m'ont prié de vous parler d'un petit de Lily que Mme sa mère voudroit fort que vous prissiez dans votre compagnie, il est dans celle de M. de la Pierre, c'est un jeune garçon d'un bon naturel que vous n'auriez qu'à recommander à l'un de vos officiers et lui donner tout pouvoir sur sa conduite”.

75 ACV, Fonds P Charrière de Sévery Ba 1471, Lettre de Catherine de Chandieu, à son époux Charles, [L'Isle], 14 May 1705.

76 ACV, Fonds P Loys 4352/7 Lettre de Benjamin de Chandieu à son épouse Françoise, Aire, 8 May 1744.

77 ACV, Fonds P Loys 4352/7, Lettre de Benjamin de Chandieu à son épouse Françoise, Au Camps sous Courtray, 27 June 1744.

brother-in-law Benjamin, in order to ask him to give her nephew command of his company. She was not able to agree to this request, however; there appeared to be a conflict of interest. So, Angélique wrote to her sister-in-law, Angletine de Chandieu-Villars, who was working on the recruitment of her brothers Esaïe and Benjamin in the Pays de Vaud,⁷⁸ and asked her to discuss it with the latter “without involving any recommendation” on her part.⁷⁹ This request for the promotion of Mme de Wattenville’s nephew thus involved no less than three female intermediaries.

Thus by way of social calls – which were an integral part of the social life of the aristocratic elites of Vaud – women’s discussion groups and other gatherings, as well as by way of correspondence, “women created a semi-public arena in which the supposedly private linked into and overlapped with the public. It was the women who drew all the information together and were thus able to shape the relationship networks to their own and their families’ benefit”.⁸⁰ In the case of the Chandieu family, we should underscore the nepotistic character of the female requests, which apart from one exception concerned subordinate positions.

4 Genderless Economic Support

A career in the foreign service often depended heavily on the financial support of one’s family.⁸¹ The officers needed cash when acquiring a company, but also to run the business (expenses related to recruitment, transport, and provisions, which increased, moreover, in periods of war). These men of the elites also had to be able to fit in when frequenting the high society of the garrison towns or the European courts where they did their service.

The military entrepreneurs’ significant need for capital, as well as the indebtedness into which many of them fell, had concrete implications for the women of the family. In 1776, the aforementioned Élisabeth d’Aubonne and her brother Paul Rudolphe had to advance the large sum of 37,731 livres to erase the debts of their youngest brother David Louis, even though he was a major-general in the Dutch service. The latter, “having been so imprudent as

78 See Cornut, “Implications”.

79 ACV, Fonds P Charrière de Sévery Ba 2497, Lettre d’Angélique Henriette de Chandieu-Villars à sa belle-sœur Angletine de Chandieu-Villars, Geneva, 2 March 1748.

80 Joris, “Kinship and Gender,” p. 242.

81 Marc Höchner, “Au service de Sa Majesté: La famille Castella sous les ordres de princes étrangers,” in *Une famille fribourgeoise étoilée: les Castella*, eds. Romain Jurot et al. (Fribourg, 2012), 41–54, p. 45.

to stand security for an officer ... for considerable sums”, was obliged to sell several family properties in the Vallée de Joux (in the central part of the Jura mountains in the current canton of Vaud) and to ask for financial assistance from his family.⁸² These expenditures seem to have had an effect on the social life of Mademoiselle d'Aubonne, who had to adopt a less lavish lifestyle.⁸³ Nonetheless, they allowed her brother David Louis d'Aubonne to pursue a brilliant military career.

The officers' financial problems did not only affect their sisters, but frequently also their wives. Between 1783 and 1785, several letters from Charles de Preux, captain in the French service, to the colonel of his regiment highlight the economic difficulties he had in trying to support his family. He complains about the slowness of his progress through the ranks and asks, one after another, for the rank of major in the regiment and then a company, pleading that he has limited wealth and “too many” children. In response to Colonel de Courten, who is concerned about the disorder in his affairs, de Preux replies: “All the debts I have contracted are backed by mortgages given by my legally authorized wife”.⁸⁴ Since their marriage in 1770, the revenues from the significant landed holdings of captain de Preux's wife had in fact allowed the captain to erase his debts and keep their household afloat.⁸⁵

Significant debts were also the wedding present given by Christophe de Diesbach (1742–1819), captain in the Swiss d'Erlach regiment in the French service, to his new wife Esther de Joffrey (1752–89) in 1779. When his mother-in-law, Louise de Joffrey, née de Mestral de St-Saphorin (1728–1800), granted her daughter Esther's hand in marriage to the Bernese patrician, a member of the Sovereign Council of the city and Republic of Bern, the noblewoman from Vaud thought that she was in fact concluding an advantageous marriage. Blinded by the refinement, amiability, “politeness”,⁸⁶ and “worldly manners”⁸⁷ of Christophe de Diesbach and filled with “admiration for his very noble

82 Morren, *La vie lausannoise au XVIIIe siècle*, pp. 559–561.

83 Morren, *La vie lausannoise au XVIIIe siècle*, pp. 561–562.

84 AEV, Fonds de Courten, B 10/5/17, Lettre de Charles de Preux au colonel Ignace Antoine Pancrace de Courten, Saintes, 1 November 1785.

85 Cornut, *Femmes d'officiers militaires en Suisse romande*, see chapter 4 “Administrer le patrimoine”.

86 ACV, Fonds P Joffrey 83, Brouillon de lettre de Louise de Joffrey née Mestral à un “Monsieur,” non nommé, [n.p.], [n.d.].

87 ACV, Fonds P Joffrey 83, Lettre de Louise de Joffrey née Mestral à un parent, Vevey, 24 May 1782.

house”,⁸⁸ Madame de Joffrey did not even bother to check on the background and reputation of her future son-in-law. Now, it so happens that Christophe de Diesbach had gone heavily into debt, on the order of 12,000 livres, to purchase his company for the price of 15,000 livres. By turning to a rich heiress from the Pays de Vaud (which is under Bernese rule at the time), he attempted to resolve his major financial problems. Although the captain did not hide the debt connected to the purchase of his company and his lack of wealth during the marriage negotiations, he was careful not to let the Joffrey family know about numerous other debts, as well as his reputation for not repaying. As stipulated in the marriage contract, 12,000 livres were provided immediately to pay off the purchase debt of Christophe de Diesbach’s company; the rest was promised in the form of an annuity.⁸⁹ But Esther and Louise de Joffrey quickly discovered the extent of the captain’s debts, both in the regiment and in Bern,⁹⁰ which they were forced to pay off, in order not to lose face. The two women also had to take on the costs of Christophe de Diesbach’s recruitment, since the Vaud Riviera in fact constituted a new pool of potential recruits for the company of the Bernese captain. Many studies show in fact how important political, patronage or matrimonial ties to subject countries turned out to be for recruitment.⁹¹ Following his marriage, Diesbach dispatched his sergeants to the shores of Lake Geneva to recruit and sends the bills for their expenses to his in-laws.⁹² Her son-in-law would put such a strain on her fortune that Madame de Joffrey would be forced herself to borrow money from a cousin.⁹³

88 ACV, Fonds P Joffrey 83, Quittance passée entre Christophe de Diesbach et Madame de Joffrey, Vevey, 2 July 1789.

89 ACV, Fonds P Joffrey 83, Traité de mariage entre Christophe Théophile de Diesbach et Elisabeth Sigismonde Henriette de Joffrey, Vevey, 29 July 1779.

90 ACV, Fonds P Joffrey 83, État des dettes du capitaine Christophe de Diesbach à Berne, [n.p.], [n.d.], and Attestation de dette de Christophe de Diesbach, capitaine au régiment suisse d’Ernest envers Monsieur de Montet, capitaine audit régiment, Vevey, 6 November 1783.

91 Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum,” p. 79; Anne-Lise Head-König, “Réseaux familiaux, clientélisme, patronage et confession en pays de montagne: Le pays de Glaris, xvii^e–xviii^e siècles,” in *Famille, parenté, réseaux en Occident (xvii^e–xx^e siècles)*, eds. Anne-Lise Head-König et al. (Geneva, 2001), 181–194, pp. 186–187.

92 ACV, Fonds P Joffrey 83, Compte de Louise de Joffrey, [n.p.], [n.d.] and *ibid.*, “Compte fourni à Madame de Diesbach de la Cour au Chantre par le Major Cuenod de Martignier de l’employ des argents qu’il a avancé à sa requisition p^r faire une recrue p^r la compagnie de son epoux suivant le compte qu’il s’en est fait rendre,” Corsier, 22 March 1783.

93 ACV, Fonds P Joffrey 83, Attestation d’une dette de 1600 frs de Louise de Joffrey envers son cousin Monsieur de Denez, Vevey, April 1790.

According to Nathalie Büsser, women often co-financed the activities of the business with their own funds, which could form part of their inheritance.⁹⁴ Hermann Suter thus mentions the case of women guaranteeing loans for the creation of regiments.⁹⁵ Hence, it was not unusual for both male and female members of the family, as well as the political authorities, churches or monasteries, to act as lenders to officers.⁹⁶

The involvement of women in recruiting soldiers on behalf of a relative, which we have observed among numerous members of our study panel, could contribute to the financial prosperity of the company (since an incomplete company was frequently synonymous with financial loss).⁹⁷ However, some subordinate officers also asked for their family's assistance in recruiting men for their captain or colonel in the hope of making themselves look good and obtaining a promotion.⁹⁸ In this sense, recruitment conducted by women back home could also contribute indirectly to the career advancement of subordinate officers.

If women made careers, they could also hinder them, like in the case of Élisabeth Castella, née de Boccard de Grangettes (1676–1760), a widow from Fribourg. In 1730, Castella's accounts make clear that she managed the money (pension from France, land rents, interest on the town house, etc.) of her son Nicolas-Albert, an unmarried lieutenant in the Castella de Delley company in the French service.⁹⁹ Madame Castella held the rights of administration and usufruct of the family property. Starting in the 17th and 18th centuries, widows in fact benefited from a soft guardianship that tended to take the form of tutelage, some legislation in French-speaking Switzerland allowing a husband to designate his wife as tutor of their children in a will.¹⁰⁰ According to the historian Rita Binz-Wohlhauser, this maternal control over the family estate

94 Nathalie Büsser, "Klare Linien und komplexe Geflechte, Verwandtschaftsorganisation und Soldgeschäft in der Eidgenossenschaft (17–18. Jahrhundert)," in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018), 185–210, p. 200.

95 Hermann Suter, *Innerschweizerisches Militär-Unternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 1971), quoted in idem.

96 Rogger, "Kompaniewirtschaft," p. 228.

97 Cornut, "Implications".

98 Stubenvoll, "Patron bernois," p. 69.

99 BCUF, Fonds Castella A-651, Livre de raison d'Élisabeth Castella de Delley et de son fils Nicolas-Albert, [n.p.], 1730–1735.

100 Anne-Lise Head-König, Liliane Mottu-Weber, *Femmes et discriminations en Suisse: Le poids de l'histoire, XVIIe-début XXe siècle (droit, éducation, économie, justice)* (Geneva, 1999), p. 8.

would have prevented Madame Castella's sons from investing everything in the military sector.¹⁰¹ Usually, leaving for the army did not serve to emancipate young subordinate officers, since their meagre pay¹⁰² made them financially dependent on their parents. Furthermore, "the deterioration of the financial situation of the military entrepreneur" since the end of the 17th century,¹⁰³ as well as the significant economic risks involved in the possession of a company, perhaps convinced Élisabeth de Castella to steer her children away from a professional milieu that she regarded as too uncertain. The widow gave priority to sustainable investments via a policy of land acquisitions in the canton of Fribourg that her spouse had already initiated.¹⁰⁴ This strategy of investing the profits from the service into rents and real estate, which is clear, for example, among officers from the Canton of Schwyz,¹⁰⁵ would get reinforced in the second half of the 18th century, as can be seen in the example of other families from the military milieu.¹⁰⁶

5 Conclusion

The feminised sociability of the 18th century, the close connections between kinship groups and clientele, and the informal character of nepotistic manoeuvres provided women a legitimate scope of action for intervening in the careers of their male relatives, as was the case, moreover, in other professional and political fields in the Switzerland of the *Ancien Régime*.¹⁰⁷ Social alliance networks, clientelism and patronage could thus be part of the daily lives of women in the Swiss territories. Although they are not able to hold public office until the 20th century, they were able to play a key role as "transmission

101 Rita Binz-Wohlhauser, "La famille Castella: Points communs et différences," in *Une famille fribourgeoise étoilée: Les Castella*, eds. Romain Jurot et al. (Fribourg, 2012), 10–27, p. 19.

102 Walter Bühler, *Der Zürcher Solddienst des 18. Jahrhunderts: Sozial- und wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Aspekte* (Bern, 1977), p. 125, quoted in Höchner, *Selbstzeugnisse von Schweizer Söldneroffizieren*, p. 60.

103 Henry, "Service étranger," p. 9.

104 Pierre de Castella de Delley, *Temps révolus 1300–2006: Généalogie de la famille Castella* (Fribourg, 2013), p. 108.

105 Suter, *Innerschweizerisches Militär-Unternehmertum*, p. 88, quoted in Höchner, *Selbstzeugnisse von Schweizer Söldneroffizieren*, p. 158.

106 Head-König, "L'ascension des entrepreneurs militaires," p. 80.

107 See, in particular, Sandro Guzzi-Heeb, "Marie Julienne de Nuccé, die Politik und die Religion: Elemente einer weiblichen Machtstrategie," *Traverse: Revue d'histoire* 3 (2001), 132–140.

belt between the parties concerned": notably in the field of politics.¹⁰⁸ For men, moreover, the significant investment that a company represented in the increasingly competitive context of the 18th century often required the patronage and financial support of their family. Subordinate officers who could barely live on their pay and only got an inheritance when their parents died thus found themselves dependent on the help of their family like *Élisabeth Castella's* sons. The prestige of a military career – a springboard to the highest political offices – the opportunities for obtaining honours or noble titles (in a republican Swiss confederation) and the fact that only the higher-ranking officer positions could sometimes prove lucrative led the whole family, including the women, to get involved in the career advancement of their male relatives.

But analysis of female intercession in military careers reveals several tendencies: Requests for places were rarely made 'directly'. Several of our examples, like *Madame Roten* and *Madame d'Odet*, show in fact that it was hardly appropriate for a woman to ask directly for a favour from a man she did not know and hence women had to use an intermediary: a relative or another woman, for example. Similarly, women went into action especially when close male relatives who could provide support – a father, brother or uncle in the military profession – were lacking. Finally, it is logical that in our sources, female intercession on Swiss territory is most often apparent for subordinate officer positions. The higher-ranking positions were in fact governed by political and clientelistic logics and conditions connected to seniority that were applied more consistently in the second half of the 18th century. Women, who were excluded from the spheres of political and military power, thus had a more limited capacity for exerting influence at the top of the military hierarchy. In line with the work of the historian *Nathalie Büsser*, who pioneered the analysis of women's involvement in family military entrepreneurship, we have today to relativise the idea of 'fields of action' or tasks that are specific to one or the other sex in the families of officers in the foreign service.¹⁰⁹ *Nathalie Büsser* made her observation with respect to women's involvement in military recruitment, but it also applies to female interventions in the military careers of their relatives.

108 Head-König, "Introduction: Les femmes," note 16, p. 21.

109 Büsser, "Die Frau Hauptmannin," p. 150.

SECTION

*Public-Private Partnership, Feudal Patterns, and the
Relativity of 'State' and 'Private'*



Military Enterprise and Civil War: Private Armies and Warfare in France around the *Fronde*, 1641–52

David Parrott

This article considers the paradoxical relationship of the French state to the privatized management of warfare. Having experienced the disastrous consequences of private military initiatives during the Wars of Religion, the French monarchy and its ministers were hostile to any explicit adoption of military enterprise in the first half of the 17th century. Yet extensive noble revolts through the 1640s and culminating in the *Fronde* of 1648–52 were fuelled by the military nobility's extensive experience of recruiting and managing troops raised as forces notionally under the authority of the crown, but largely sustained by their own family networks, financial resources, and administrative skills.

1 The Crown, the Army, and Its Officers in France

Hostility to the use of mercenaries on both moral and practical grounds is an enduring topos of historical writing. In the case of early modern Europe, the 'retrograde' employment of mercenaries by rulers is typically contrasted with a progressive narrative concerning the creation of centralized systems of military control and the direct recruitment and support of national armies commanded by officers who were state employees. This familiar narrative has managed to obscure reality: the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe were the great age of the mercenary and the outsourcing of military capabilities to private contractors. Cutting-edge transformations in warfare were developed and largely monopolized by specialized mercenaries; substantial mercenary markets in the Holy Roman Empire, Switzerland, the Italian states, and Eastern Europe allowed rulers to acquire experienced, veteran troops 'off the shelf'; mercenaries provided much-needed administrative and financial flexibility in periods where wars were intensive, large-scale, but mostly of short duration.

The great transformation of this international mercenary market – arguably the true 'military revolution' of the period 1560–1660 – was the emergence and elaboration of systems of military enterprise. Regimental and corps

commanders would hitherto have raised troops under typical mercenary contracts, in which substantial advance payments were stipulated before the troops were levied and delivered to the hiring power. Longer wars from the 1550s offered the prospect of lengthier terms of service and a different business model for both contracting parties. Military entrepreneurs would bring units raised at their own expense or on their credit into the service of a ruler, and might even continue to operate them largely out of their own pockets. These personal costs and the units' wages, subsistence, and expenses would subsequently be reimbursed through the direct allocation of tax revenues or the licensed collection of new war-taxes – 'contributions' – imposed on occupied or home territory. Rulers thus outsourced the very considerable immediate expenses of raising, equipping, and maintaining troops in return for the longer-term alienation of their revenues directly into the hands of entrepreneur-commanders. These entrepreneurs carried the larger part of the financial – and personal – risk of the operations, but anticipated recovering their initial costs and potentially making a profit on their investment over five, ten or more years of active campaigning.¹

In this shift to military enterprise, France in the early 17th-century was an outlier. Up to, and indeed long after, the mid-16th century the French crown was the pre-eminent consumer of foreign mercenaries in Europe.² But the transition made elsewhere from 'hiring and firing' mercenaries to the more extensive organizational autonomy and 'shareholder' status implied by military enterprise was charged with political implications in France. In the decades after 1560 the French monarchy was exposed to an altogether less welcome unfolding of privately organized military activity – not under its own aegis, but in the hands of the warring factions in the civil wars that engulfed France from 1562 to 1598. Emerging from these decades into the uneasy peace of Henri IV's reign, the crown and its ministers recognized that the civil wars had been fuelled by the private military activities of great aristocrats and provincial nobles. Subsequent noble and Protestant revolts emphasized the continued, dangerous potential for subjects to behave as independent military entrepreneurs.

The rejection of military enterprise on these political grounds implied that all native military forces should be hired, equipped, and maintained as

1 For an account of this process and an overview of the existing historiography see David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012).

2 David Potter, *Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480–1560* (Woodbridge, 2008); Ferdinand Lot, *Recherches sur les effectifs des armées françaises des Guerres d'Italie aux Guerres de Religion, 1494–1562* (Paris, 1962).

the funded employees of the crown. Theoretically every French colonel was in paid royal service, placed in command of a military unit which had been raised through the administrative initiatives and efforts of the crown's agents, and was funded through the crown's coffers. Pay would be received in regular instalments (*montres*) from the agents of the crown; under no circumstances was money to be requisitioned by the troops through local war-taxes or confiscations. Such a system was a fiction.³ But the fiction could nonetheless have teeth: when Richelieu wished to destroy the Marillac family, aligned with the Queen Mother in the struggle for the king's support which culminated in Richelieu's triumph on the 'Day of Dupes' (1630), Louis de Marillac, *maréchal de France* and commander of the French troops on the Eastern frontier, was arraigned on charges of using his military command to misappropriate tax revenues, to levy illegal 'contributions' and to undertake a range of other fund-raising expedients. Though no one doubted the real reason for Marillac's summary trial and execution, it was a reminder that behaving as a typical European military entrepreneur carried potentially high costs in France.⁴

Marillac's defence in his trial draws attention to the essential paradox: his various local financial initiatives were not aimed at personal enrichment, but were simply a bid to gain the necessary funds and credit to keep his army in bread, munitions, and basic pay, given the inadequacy or total absence of promised funding from the centre. Well before France's full commitment to the Thirty Years' War after 1635, the mechanisms for state funding of the military were unfit for purpose. Warfare, rather than building bureaucracy and a more effective allocation of fiscal burdens, had simply generated indebtedness. And the servicing of an ever larger burden of short and longer term crown debt became the main priority of the fiscal system. An unbridgeable gap existed between the ideal of a directly-funded, state-controlled army and the reality of a dysfunctional fiscal system whose essential priority was satisfying its creditors rather than ensuring an adequate flow of funding to the armies.⁵

One response to this challenge was to try to avoid lengthy, large-scale conflict that would place intolerable pressure on the crown's ability to fund its military commitments. Short wars focused in one or two campaign theatres would facilitate what became the key element in the French crown's management of

3 David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–42* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 313–365.

4 Pierre de Vaissière, *L'affaire du maréchal de Marillac, 1630–32* (Paris, 1924).

5 Richard Bonney, *The King's Debts: Finance and Politics in France, 1589–1661* (Oxford, 1981); James B. Collins, *The Fiscal Limits of Absolutism: Direct Taxation in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley, 1988).

its war-effort. For serving and fighting in war was still central to the social and cultural expectations of the French elites: military service defined and established noble status. The social aspiration to hold military command allowed the crown to create a distinctive and hybrid system of maintaining the military establishment via a range of informal conventions by which those who sought officerships would contribute some of their own financial resources to the raising and upkeep of their units. The crown could operate in a buyer's market in which the desire of large numbers of the elite to serve in senior military office could be leveraged into financial assistance in meeting the costs of raising and operating their units. This assistance was provided without granting any reciprocal, proprietary rights to the officers, who were still treated as if they were the crown's salaried employees.⁶

These calculations were overturned by engagement in the twenty-five year war against the Habsburg monarchies of Spain and Austria into which France was reluctantly drawn from 1635. By the later 1630s the crown was struggling to maintain some 70,000–80,000 troops operating in five to six separate campaign theatres – twice the scale of any previous military effort. This expansion of the war-effort was to place the French military system based on limited and irregular state funding and considerable private cash and credit contributed by the senior and regimental commanders under immense strain. As the military situation deteriorated the ministerial regime asserted itself more aggressively. In particular the ministers and their agents stepped up pressure on the corps commanders and the regimental officers to make heavier, more regular – but still informal and unrecognized – personal commitments of cash and credit to the upkeep of military operations. Failure to do so would bring the risk of ministerial displeasure or disgrace for the high command, and for the unit officers the threat that their units would be disbanded, the officers cashiered without compensation, and the soldiers redistributed into other units.

This intensified financial pressure was not willingly accepted by the officers. Corps commanders refused to risk their own and their colonels' bankruptcy to pursue extensive operational demands from the centre, instead undertaking the bare minimum of campaign objectives. Colonel and captains were placed under pressure to keep their units up to strength, and to use their own money to make up for shortfalls of pay and supplies. If they failed to do so, they ran the risk of seeing their units disbanded, the soldiers redistributed and the officers

6 Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 313–328.

themselves cashiered. In a bid to resist this, the officers first of all turned to widespread fraud to inflate muster-rolls and conceal losses of sick and deserted troops. Meanwhile, their shared military culture shifted further towards the view that command was a short-term *rite de passage* whose main purpose was to provide lasting social prestige after the regiment had been disbanded. The crown and its ministers initially colluded in this: it was cheaper to get an aspiring officer to invest in a newly recruited unit than to pay to re-establish the regiment of an existing colonel who might be reluctant to throw further money into a military career. But there was a heavy price to be paid for this process, which effectively de-skilled much of the army beyond a core of elite, permanent units. Reluctant to create an officer-corps with an established proprietary interest in maintaining their units and who saw medium/long term service as the means to profit from their initial 'investment', the French crown had established instead an officer corps most of whom had no long-term or careerist interest in service. In the early years of the war these proved no match for the experienced, long-serving armies and officers of France's enemies.⁷

If the typical European model of military proprietorship was not to be adopted, some other means was required to direct more money from crown-sanctioned sources into the hands of commanders and unit officers. A partial response was the 1638 *taxe des subsistances*. This added an additional 8.5 million livres to the overall burden of direct taxation, and was justified by the need to support the troops during the 'winter quarter', the months following the end of formal military campaigning.⁸ By 1638 it had become clear that the crown's demands for higher taxes were a largely futile exercise in diminishing returns. The *subsistances* however was different in that it was demanded during the winter months and in places where troops were physically present – billeted and garrisoned in the French provinces. The presence of the troops created a real threat of military enforcement and ensured much higher yields, while the money collected was directly allocated to the officers of the billeted units in return for which they agreed to make good and 'refresh' their units.

The establishment of these substantial winter-quarter payments from the 1640s went some way to placating an officer-corps who previously had little incentive to maintain the operational effectiveness of their units. The sums collected were enough both to maintain the troops in food and basic wages and to channel large sums into the pockets of the unit officers who had agreed

⁷ Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 349–362.

⁸ Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp. 273–274.

to make up the strength of their units, and to replace horses, weapons, and equipment.⁹ In addition the payment of the winter quarter became a means by which the crown tacitly reimbursed the officers for the expenses that they had sustained on campaign and gave them some incentive to deploy their funds and credit in future.

The *subsistances* gave the officers – whether regimental colonels or the high command – direct access to the money that was collected and disbursed during the winter quarters. Having conceded this principle to the military, it proved impractical to rein in the larger consequences, blurring issues that the crown and its ministers wished to keep distinct. In particular it opened up possibilities for commanders to raise additional financial support through military pressure and coercion. When French armies operated across the frontiers, whether in neutral or allied territory, extracting informal and local contributions to support costs of campaigning or quartering now seemed an acceptable response. The treatment of allied Piedmont as territory placed under military contributions had produced a diplomatic crisis by the end of the 1640s, and reluctant agreement by the French authorities to the demand of the duchess-regent that all French troops would be withdrawn from Piedmont every winter and quartered in France.¹⁰ Similar practices prevailed elsewhere across the frontiers: the French troops operating in Catalonia after the revolt of 1640 treated the populations with little regard for their status as allies, and both Catalonia and Roussillon were subjected to heavy military taxes by the French commanders. Governors of frontier garrisons, well aware that they were at the bottom of the ministerial order of priorities for direct funding, habitually set up neutrality and protection treaties with border territories on their own initiative. These were regarded with suspicion by central government, both because they suspected that governors and garrison commanders used the revenues for personal enrichment and because they could limit operational flexibility. Yet in contrast to the period before 1635 the ministry was rarely prepared to act against its frontier garrison commanders who were acting independently, and arguably illegally.¹¹

9 Sums officially received by unit commanders are elusive, but the maréchal de La Mothe-Houdancourt refers to the sum of five *montres* (i.e. over half a year's pay) being provided through the winter quarter in past years: Paris, Archives des Affaires Etrangères [AAE], Correspondence Politique [CP] Espagne 32, fol. 53, February 1652.

10 David Parrott, "Interests, Corruption and Military Effectiveness: The French Army of Italy and the Campaign of 1657," *Storia Economica* 19 (2016), 51–75, pp. 57–58.

11 Martial Gantelet, *L'Absolutisme au miroir de la guerre: Le Roi et Metz (1552–1661)* (Rennes, 2012), pp. 201–245.

It proved predictably difficult tacitly to condone military initiatives taken outside France's borders to fund armies and garrisons, but to block similar initiatives at home. As the war continued the controls on the *subsistances* payments during the winter quartering in France, grew slacker. By 1650–51 – admittedly a year during the *Fronde*, but between the two periods of open civil war – the ministry ordered that *subsistance* charges should be levied across the country up to a total of 7–8 million livres. It was later revealed that the officers and their troops had demanded total financial support from the provinces of some 24 million livres.¹² The line between legitimate exactions and wholesale extortion from the local populations was regularly being crossed by the forces quartered in situ, and this would continue to be the case throughout the 1650s.

This all amounted, in defiance of the crown's and ministers' wishes, to much greater private control over the funding and maintenance of the army corps. Habituated to making local decisions about the best means to keep their units operational, to sustaining military operations, and to reimbursing themselves, the officers were also gaining unmediated control of their troops, often with the complicity of the embedded administrators. An extended period of unprecedented warfare was creating perverse incentives for an officer-corps that remained insecure in the proprietorship of their regiments and companies, but had come to recognize the far greater scope to pursue independent initiatives to fund their military activities.

Another, initially separate consequence of the extended period of war was to draw the military commanders and their troops into much tighter networks of clientage and dependency. The great aristocratic families who dominated the high command stood at the head of networks of provincial patronage through which they exercised political influence and control either on behalf of central government or, not infrequently in the tangled politics of the period 1560–1660, in order to obstruct or negotiate over initiatives emanating from the centre.¹³ One aspect of this patronage was the raising of multiple 'house' regiments and companies of troops by leading aristocratic families. The lesser officerships in these units were filled with clients of the family, and it was likely that the ordinary soldiers would be recruited from the territorial holdings, or the provinces where the family held governorships or other influence. Since a large part of the costs of these units – both recruitment and subsequent upkeep – were met as part of the family's patronage, the crown had an incentive to encourage their proliferation as a means to sustain the expanded war-effort.

¹² Bonney, *King's Debts*, p. 225.

¹³ Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 68–97.

This direct clientage was compounded by the general awareness amongst all the officers in an army corps that it was the high command and the colonels who took the primary initiatives to acquire and distribute financial resources that kept the army operational and to reimburse the lesser officers for their own costs. In a direct clash of authority between the crown and its ministers and the commanders in the field, it was not clear where the loyalty of these officers would lie. Moreover the length and scale of war after 1635 ensured that extensive informal networks of personal ties and obligations were forged through warfare and the reciprocal bonds with commanders that this created. As numerous military memoirs of the period indicate, loyalty to the high command was not purely a consequence of material self-interest, but reflected a powerful sense of being comrades in arms over successive campaigns. This was a link especially reinforced for a generation of commanders in the 1640s – the Count of Harcourt, Turenne, Louis II de Condé – whose reputation for military ability and success stood greatly above their mediocre predecessors.¹⁴ All of which meant that when, for example, the first minister, Cardinal Mazarin, congratulated maréchal Turenne in late 1648 on the fact that the upkeep of the army that Turenne commanded in Germany “had not cost the crown a shilling” in the previous campaign, this might be as much a cause for apprehension as for ministerial satisfaction.¹⁵

2 Civil War in 17th-Century France

An essential distinction between civil war and popular rebellion or revolt is the possession of organized military force in the hands of those challenging, and indeed defending, a regime. The distinction was already recognized in the 16th and 17th centuries, when the notion of *guerre civile* was common historical currency. The point of reference was classical Roman history, and the shared familiarity of the educated with Caesar’s *Bellum Civile* – the “Commentary on the Civil Wars” between Caesar and Pompey between 52 and 48 BC. Civil war implied a military struggle between commanders and their factions for control of government – and in the case of France in the later 16th century, the monarchy.

14 Jean-Marie Constant, “L’amitié, moteur de la mobilisation politique au XVII^e siècle,” in *La noblesse en liberté, XVI^e–XVII^e siècles* (Rennes, 2004), pp. 173–187.

15 *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère*, 2, ed. M.A. Chéruel (Paris, 1879), p. 234, 6 November 1648.

The ability to raise troops in a private capacity had been an essential factor in the Roman civil wars: Marcus Crassus had declared that “nobody could be called rich who was not able to maintain an army on his income”.¹⁶ And despite traditional assertions by historians of early-modern Europe that war had become too expensive for great subjects to wage in their own right, their capacity to raise and maintain troops remained the basic fact of early-modern warfare. In France, as we have seen, the networks of clienteles, the finance and credit, the recruitment and management skills of the military elites were all deeply embedded in the organization and operations of the army. The *Fronde* of 1648–53 was to be the key demonstration of the continued capacity of a party of aristocratic military commanders and their clients and allies to wage a civil war on the basis of their own control of military force. But the *Fronde* was preceded by the crisis of 1640–41, which already offered a clear demonstration that the open rejection of military enterprise after the experience of the Wars of Religion had not ensured that the crown and its agents now held outright control over the armed forces.

Cardinal Richelieu’s monopoly of influence and control over his master, Louis XIII, had been actively opposed since his assumption of power in 1624. Contemporaries noted the tight-knit network of political control that he had built, his creation of a clientele of ministerial appointees, and his reliance on the support of carefully cultivated and extravagantly rewarded aristocratic allies. Amongst these aristocratic allies, Richelieu’s key support was Henri de Bourbon, prince de Condé, the king’s cousin and prince of the royal blood.¹⁷ In contrast, the cardinal’s relations with the king’s brother, Gaston d’Orléans, had been for the most part poisonous since the late 1620s, and relations with the third prince of the blood, Louis de Bourbon, comte de Soissons, deteriorated rapidly and definitively after 1636. As governor of Champagne, Soissons had been publically blamed by Richelieu for the failure to resist the Spanish invasion of north-east France in summer 1636 which had brought Habsburg cavalry to the gates of Paris. Soissons had retaliated by his involvement in a poorly-conceived assassination plot against the cardinal, and by disdainfully refusing to buy himself out of suspicions of conspiracy by accepting the proposal to marry Richelieu’s niece. Instead he slipped across the border to join two other malcontents, Henri II de Lorraine, duc de Guise, and Charles-Maurice de La Tour d’Auvergne, duc de Bouillon. Bouillon’s sovereign possession, the border-fortress of Sedan, became a centre of conspiracy, and in 1640–41 the

16 Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939; repr. 2002), p. 12.

17 Caroline Bitsch, *Vie et carrière d’Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé (1588–1646)* (Paris, 2008), pp. 271–341.

base from which the conspirators raised an army and began a civil war to topple Richelieu's power in France.¹⁸

Asserting a right – indeed a duty – to challenge Richelieu's tyranny and to rescue the king and the people of France from his clutches, the triumvirate entered into negotiations with the Spanish monarchy through its representatives in the Spanish Netherlands.¹⁹ The step into an active alliance with France's open enemy was a grave one: much was made of Soissons' status as a prince of the royal blood with the legitimate authority to oppose the usurpation of Richelieu by whatever means. Yet sceptical of half-baked conspiracies, the Spanish crown and its ministers wanted to see evidence of real military preparations and readiness to launch a civil war before they made any solid military or financial commitments.²⁰

So the test for Soissons, Bouillon and Guise was showing that they were capable of mustering, financing, and leading an army corps. In pursuing this task they demonstrated how far the mechanisms for raising and maintaining troops could be appropriated, and the extent to which the three of them, above all Soissons, possessed networks of allegiances and clients extending deep into the 'royal' army.²¹ As a wealthy prince of the blood, Soissons already possessed his 'house' regiments and companies, whose officer-clients and men followed him without question into military opposition. Bouillon also possessed an infantry regiment in his name, and the substantial garrisons he maintained both in the fortresses of Sedan and his neighbouring sovereign duchy of Bouillon. Their extended networks of clients produced further recruits: a number of those who were either members of Soissons' household, or who had served him in the military campaigns of 1635–36 willingly joined his cause and brought their troops with them.²²

The triumvirate also had firm expectations of attracting officers and their troops from the royal armies who were not explicitly from their households or their clients. Bouillon hoped to be able to enlist his younger brother, Turenne,

18 Jean-Marie Constant, *Les Conjurateurs: Le premier libéralisme politique sous Richelieu* (Paris, 1987), pp. 172–220.

19 Arlette Jouanna, *Le Devoir de révolte: La noblesse française et la gestion de l'État moderne, 1559–1661* (Paris, 1989), pp. 241–242.

20 Charles T. Gregory, *The End of Richelieu: Noble conspiracy and Spanish treason in Louis XIII's France, 1636–42* (unpublished PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2012), pp. 94–110, 145–148.

21 Alexandre de Campion, *Lettres* (Rouen, 1657), 39, Campion to Soissons, 14 November 1636; de Campion, *Lettres*, 68, Campion to Soissons, 1 July 1639.

22 Gregory, *Richelieu*, pp. 170–171; Jouanna, *Révolte*, pp. 388–390.

who would be followed by his own regiment and others from his army.²³ Another potential affiliate was the distinguished commander, the comte d'Harcourt, kinsman of the duc de Guise. Soissons had even more extensive leverage over officers in the royal army: it was claimed in 1637 that a third of the king's army was devoted to him, while in 1640 Bouillon claimed that both high command and regimental officers in the army would flock to their banner once Soissons had declared war on Richelieu and begun military operations. In practical terms this meant that long-standing allies like Jean de Gassion had the potential to bring 1,200 cavalry under his command across to join the conspirators.²⁴

Money and credit was raised by the conspirators to strengthen the fortifications of Sedan and build up its garrison, and to pay the forces they had raised while awaiting the arrival of Spanish financial aid. But the promised Spanish subsidies proved slow to arrive and inadequate, and much recruitment took place on the officers' own credit, a situation familiar to them from service in the king's army. This dependence on the officers' credit was essential: Spanish funds were not distributed until early July, by which time a royalist army under the command of Gaspard de Coligny, maréchal de Châtillon, had been operational since May, and was advancing on Sedan.²⁵ On 6 July the combined forces of the conspirators, around 6,000 soldiers reinforced by 5,000 Spanish and Imperial troops, encountered Châtillon's army at La Marfée, just outside Sedan. Despite comparable numbers of troops, the outcome was an overwhelming victory for Soissons, with minimal casualties in the princes' army, and around 1,000 dead and 4,000–5,000 prisoners amongst the royalist forces.²⁶

The scale of the defeat and especially the high number of prisoners excited considerable suspicion that the collapse of the army was the result of clandestine support for the princes amongst the officers in Châtillon's army. The conspirators had consistently claimed that they expected large-scale defections from the royal armies once they had begun their campaign. Claude de Letouf, baron de Sirot, recorded in his memoirs that when Soissons appeared at the head of the enemy forces all the infantry in the royalist army simply threw down their arms.²⁷ The victory at La Marfée had seemingly prepared the way

23 After news of defections to Sedan by officers from Turenne's regiment, the crown ordered the despatch of Turenne and his unit to the Italian theatre: AAE, *Mémoires et Documents* [MD] 287, fol. 37, Grémonville to de Noyers, 20 April 1641.

24 Gregory, *Richelieu*, p. 153.

25 Gregory, *Richelieu*, pp. 174–185.

26 Gregory, *Richelieu*, pp. 198–201.

27 Sirot, *Mémoires*, 2 (Paris, 1683), p. 2; J. de Chastenot de Puységur's account of the battle draws attention to this collapse of resistance, and despite his careful falsification of his

for an advance by the princes into Champagne and the beginning of a period of civil war in which the shifting loyalties of the army officers would be the decisive factor shaping a military outcome. This grim prospect for Richelieu and his party was relieved by the other remarkable outcome of the battle, the death of Soissons. The most recent and well-researched account of this episode concludes that Soissons was neither killed by his own incompetence, nor assassinated by an agent of Richelieu, but simply shot at close quarters in a rearguard action towards the end of the battle when the prince found himself tangled in a close-quarter combat between some of his own dragoons and two companies of royal gendarmes.²⁸ The impact on the rebellion was decisive: much of its legitimacy depended on the leadership of a prince of the blood, and the personalized loyalty of army officers to Soissons, based on serving with him in the campaigns of 1635–36, was far more intense and widespread than that surrounding either Bouillon or Guise. Although Soissons' death ended the prospect of a civil war waged in the heart of France, the conspirators' negotiating position remained strong: Richelieu could only turn further troops on them at a heavy opportunity cost in the other campaign theatres. The duc de Guise chose to stay in Spanish service, but Bouillon and all his clients, allies and associates from the army extracted a settlement described at the time as "a treaty that could hardly be more favourable".²⁹

The success of the princes' challenge stemmed from their ability to exert organized and sustained military pressure on Richelieu's regime. This had been facilitated by the military culture of the preceding decades which, despite its ostensible rejection of military enterprise, nonetheless focused loyalty on the corps and unit commanders as the primary source of support and patronage for troops and junior officers in the army. The practical realities of military support systems that relied on officers' willingness to act as short/medium-term financial brokers for their regiments against opportunities to gain reimbursement – tacitly legitimized by the government through the *subsistances* – had turned them into military stakeholders with the capacity to move their stake from one party to another.

own memoirs, it seems probable that he had himself transferred allegiance to the conspirators, see Gregory, *Richelieu*, p. 211 (note 75).

28 Gregory, *Richelieu*, pp. 206–208.

29 Gregory, *Richelieu*, pp. 212–216.

3 The Fronde

With the accession of the five-year old Louis XIV in 1643 and the regency government of his mother, Anne of Austria, the potential for factionalism, rivalry and another breakdown into civil war was increased. Emerging as Richelieu's ministerial successor through the favour of the Regent, Cardinal Mazarin was aware of the precariousness of his political position. One of his responses was to try to expand the net of his aristocratic alliances more widely, drawing in many of those who had been disgraced, exiled, or marginalized by his predecessor. Mazarin was prepared to use his influence with the Queen to favour military promotions and to support his favoured allies for military commands and the allocation of available troops and logistical support. The military rehabilitation of the Vendôme, Guise, and Épernon families, the willingness to grant military commands even to the young king's uncle, Gaston, all marked a break from Richelieu's attempts to exclude these from military roles. This opening-up of military opportunities was of course a lot less welcome to established ministerial allies. This was felt especially strongly by Henri de Condé, the longstanding ally of Richelieu, and his son Louis de Bourbon, duc d'Enghien and the future 'Grand Condé'. The situation was exacerbated in that Henri de Condé had been a mediocre commander and strategist, whose main virtue in Richelieu's eyes – apart from helping to legitimize the cardinal's own position – was Condé's willingness to use the family's huge resources to support large numbers of 'house' regiments and to bankroll the costs of his military operations. This changed from May 1643 when his son Enghien won his spectacular victory at the battle of Rocroi, and thereafter demonstrated qualities of military leadership which rank him amongst the outstanding generals of the 17th century. During the mid-1640s and down to his success at Lens in 1648, Enghien (prince de Condé after his father's death in 1646) was responsible for a string of victories and strategic successes that transformed France's military fortunes.

The political challenge for Mazarin in this new environment was to try to curtail the huge increase in military power and patronage that Condé's successes generated, while seeking to enhance the relative military prestige of those he regarded as his new allies. As early as 1643 Condé encountered regular rejections of his requests for favours on behalf of his loyal military subordinates.³⁰ Tension over these refusals, evasions, and the imposition of other non-Condéen officers in place of Condé's nominees steadily mounted. In

30 Katia Béguin, *Les Princes de Condé: Rebelles, courtisans et mécènes dans la France du grand siècle* (Seyssel, 1999), pp. 99–101, notes a significant percentage of rejections, especially when Condé was requesting the governorships of fortified places.

1647 Condé wrote angrily to Mazarin of the “successive petty mortifications inflicted on me during each campaign”.³¹ The refusal to acknowledge his claims was compounded by Condé’s suspicion that Mazarin was placing him in military theatres which required especially high levels of personal financial commitment if the campaign objectives were to be achieved.³²

In contrast, Mazarin made considerable efforts to win the loyalty of other commanders. At the highest level this involved advancing the careers of both the aforementioned Harcourt and Turenne, whose brother, the duc de Bouillon, had been Richelieu’s irreconcilable enemy. Although Bouillon had profited handsomely from his alliance with Soissons and the victory of La Marfée, his subsequent involvement in the failed Cinq Mars conspiracy of 1642 placed him at Richelieu’s mercy. The price of saving his own life was handing over the fortress of Sedan to the crown in return for a few empty promises about recognition of princely status. Thereafter the Tour d’Auvergne brothers had an agenda for the rehabilitation of the family which involved either regaining Sedan or acquiring massive material and status compensation for its loss. Mazarin from the outset of his ministry made it clear that he would be open to negotiate over these issues in return for a military alliance.³³ Turenne, tainted in Richelieu’s eyes by his association with Bouillon’s conspiracies and marginalized despite his military talents, was placed by Mazarin in command of the army of Germany from 1644 and held the command until 1648.³⁴

Mazarin was no less concerned to create his own clientele of senior officers whose positions were explicitly owed to his military patronage. This process was especially evident in Picardy and Champagne, where he sought so far as possible to pack governorships with his own clients or loyalists. These appointments paved the way for the extraordinary military promotion of January 1651, when five of Mazarin’s military allies were simultaneously created marshals of France.³⁵ While Mazarin certainly viewed this policy as a necessary response to the grip that Condé and his family network held over large parts of the army, in retrospect it is easy to see how this polarization of the high command and lower officers was a key element in driving the crucial years of *frondeur* civil war in 1651 and 1652.

31 Quoted in Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, p. 98.

32 Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, pp. 97–98; Madame de Montpensier, *Mémoires*, 1, ed. A. Chéruef (Paris, 1858), pp. 149–152.

33 David Parrott, *1652: The Cardinal, the Prince and the Crisis of the Fronde* (Oxford, 2020), pp. 85–86.

34 *Actes du colloque internationale sur Turenne et l’art militaire*, ed. Fernand Gambiez (Paris, 1975), pp. 161–210.

35 Parrott, *1652*, p. 102.

Resentment at the burdens of the war, dislike of the ministerial regime and suspicions that Mazarin had failed to obtain a general peace because war strengthened his influence over the king and queen mother, all erupted in the first wave of the *Fronde* in 1648. Led by administrative and judicial institutions, this resistance enjoyed substantial popular support in the cities, while grievances against the regime also stirred up large sections of the traditional country and court nobilities. Initial demands in the summer of 1648 for ministerial accountability, sweeping cuts in taxes and reform of the finances, precipitated a royal decree of bankruptcy in July and the collapse of funding for the armies. The situation had turned into open rioting and resistance in late August, and by the end of the year Mazarin had lost political control and was facing overwhelming demands for his removal from government. To Mazarin and the court, the last-ditch response was a plan to spirit the king and queen mother out of Paris, and to seek a military solution to reimpose ministerial authority and renege on the political and financial concessions that had made it impossible to continue the war with Spain. The obvious danger lay in how the military commanders would react. Their financial support from the crown had dried up, leaving the officers carrying the burden of supporting their troops as the 1648 campaign wound down and the army corps prepared to move back into France for winter quartering.

Strikingly, despite the previous friction and the growing incompatibility of interests and aspirations between Condé and Mazarin, Condé opposed the revolt, offering his military support to the crown and, by association, to Mazarin. The uneasy alliance held. Although strong support was given to the rebellious *frondeurs* by Condé's brother Armand de Bourbon, prince de Conti, and his brother-in-law, the duc de Longueville, in late 1648 Condé followed royal orders and led the army he had been commanding in the Flanders theatre down into the Île de France to blockade Paris. Despite political divisions and factionalism amongst the senior officers, Condé's leadership and their confidence that he would take the steps required to support and finance their troops persuaded them to march on the capital. Once spread out around Paris, the blockade allowed the army to impose formal demands for food, accommodation, and payment on the countryside and small towns around Paris, effectively providing the winter-quarter *subsistances* that they would otherwise have collected from Picardy and Champagne. Meanwhile, informal and illicit opportunities for extortion, plunder, and establishing local protection rackets greatly increased the officers' profit from the blockade.³⁶

36 Alphonse Feillet, *La misère au temps de la Fronde et Saint Vincent de Paul* (Paris, 1862), pp. 124–131; Jean Jacquart, *La crise rurale en Île de France* (Paris, 1974), pp. 650–657.

On the opposing side, the *frondeur* nobles in Paris initially had limited access to existing military units apart from a few 'house' companies of cavalry.³⁷ The twin concerns of the city in revolt – to keep open the supply lines to the surrounding towns which produced most of Paris's bread, and to guard against an incursion by Condé's army – required the rapid funding and recruitment of new troops. Part of the money for this was gained from the appropriation of crown revenues: 270,000 livres was taken from money owed to some of the crown's tax farmers, and handed out to Conti, La Mothe, Beaufort and other nobles to raise new infantry regiments. But it was already the case that these nobles were advancing their own funds to push forward recruitment: Conti, who received 20,000 livres from the above sum, had already spent 120,000 livres raising an infantry regiment and another 30,000 on the levy of 100 horseguards.³⁸ Once these troops had been raised they were to be supported by regular levies on the citizens of Paris, and extraordinary fines and charges imposed on those suspected of allegiance to Mazarin. However, no one had much confidence that newly-levied troops in Paris would be a match for Condé and the veteran troops blockading the capital, and the few skirmishes that took place as the *frondeur* troops sought to break the blockade or to drive Condé's troops out of their positions ended in humiliating setbacks.

Of greater significance was activity outside the capital, where the prospect of taking control of existing armies or combining veterans with new levies offered a possibility of trapping Condé's over-extended troops between the city and a relieving *frondeur* army. The most obvious and threatening challenge here was posed by Turenne. Though Mazarin had previously seemed willing to discuss the ambitions of the Tour d'Auvergne as part of his strategy to broaden his aristocratic support-base, nothing concrete had been proposed by 1648; involvement in the *Fronde* offered an opportunity for the two brothers to establish a more powerful bargaining position. Although peace had been achieved with the Emperor, the troops of the army of Germany so recently under Turenne's command had not been disbanded or reassigned. There were plenty of reasons to fear that troops, many of whom had been hired and maintained by German entrepreneur-colonels and who had served under Turenne in what had been virtually self-financed campaigns in the Empire, would follow Turenne into a campaign on behalf of the *Fronde* inside France.³⁹ The crucial factor in

37 François-Nicolas Baudot, seigneur du Buisson et d'Aubenay, *Journal des guerres civiles, 1648–1652*, 1, ed. Gustave Saige (Paris, 1883), p. 134.

38 Baudot, *Journal*, p. 134.

39 Turenne had acquired a reputation for ruthlessness in extorting supplies and finances from civilian populations while commanding in Germany: Feillet, *La misère*, p. 138, quoting Hans von Erlach.

averting this threat was Mazarin's ability to buy the loyalty of the army with hard cash. The cost of this buy-out was high – 1.65 million livres raised and distributed by a long-standing banker-client of Mazarin, Barthélemy Hervart. In the context of armies where the officers were inevitably indebted through military service and regarded such rare direct cash payments as long-overdue recognition of their extended credit, it was enough to tip the balance of loyalty against Turenne.⁴⁰

Mazarin saw off the threat from Turenne, but elsewhere the situation fell into more recognizable patterns of local power-brokers supportive of the *Fronde*, and able to use their military networks, their access to credit and their experience of raising money to support and reimburse their officers to build up significant military forces. In Normandy the duc de Longueville, a strong supporter of the *Fronde*, used his position as governor and massive landowner to begin an extensive process of troop recruitment. With the support of the *Parlement* of Rouen, he appropriated the provincial tax revenues, especially the salt-tax, and imposed new local levies to assist in the costs of raising regiments. The combination of Longueville's patronage, and the money made available to cover some recruitment costs, ensured a flow of nobles, many of them of course Longueville's own clients, prepared to lead and raise units.⁴¹ A different situation prevailed in Guienne, where the governor, the duc d'Épernon, was a tepid supporter of Mazarin, while the city of Bordeaux threw itself enthusiastically into support for the Parisian *Fronde*, linked with opposition to their hated governor. Again, local levies and subsidies advanced by the urban elite provided initial funding for military levies, with the noble officers expecting to collect further money from subsequent military operations and the opportunity to extract local *subsistances*.⁴²

In fact the tide of this first civil war turned quickly: the urban elite in Paris feared the consequences of a prolonged blockade, and the impact of high prices and food shortages on the mass of the population. They also recognized the military futility of struggle against Condé's professional troops, especially given these troops' evident capacity to support themselves by levying contributions across the Paris basin (where many of the urban elite held property) for as long as the blockade required. The result was the uneasy settlement

40 Claude Dulong, *Mazarin et l'argent, banquiers et prête-noms* (Paris, 2002), pp. 165–166 (in the chapter “Un magnat de la finance: Barthélemy Hervart”).

41 Henri de Campion, *Mémoires*, ed. Marc Fumaroli (Paris, 1990), pp. 196–199; Paul Logié, *La Fronde en Normandie*, 2 (Amiens, 1952), pp. 79–91, 129–130, and 146–148.

42 Orest Ranum, *The Fronde. A French Revolution* (New York, 1995), pp. 215–241.

agreed at Rueil on 11 March 1649, and the wider pacifications across France that followed.

Though both parties had mobilized military force on this occasion, open civil war had been avoided. But Condé's deployment of military force to reassert the crown's control had placed Mazarin in his power; through the rest of 1649 Condé asserted his political supremacy at court, pushing Mazarin into a series of humiliating concessions as the price of the prince's acquiescence in his continued ministerial position. Facing political annihilation, Mazarin recklessly gambled on arresting and imprisoning Condé, his brother and brother-in-law in January 1650. This in turn set in motion a process which led to Condé's triumphant release and return to Paris in February 1651, and Mazarin's own 'perpetual exile' to Brühl in the Electorate of Cologne a few weeks later. During the imprisonment of the princes there had been a few attempts to raise troops to force their release, most notably again on the part of Turenne, now allied with the Condéen cause in his opposition to Mazarin. Turenne had learnt the lesson of 1649 when the army of Germany had been bought out from under him. On this occasion he followed the example of his brother, Bouillon, back in 1641, deploying the 'house' regiments of the Tour d'Auvergne, and a number of officers linked to him by lines of clientage or *fidelité* based on shared service in the 1640s. Initially, and very alarmingly for the crown, Turenne entered into negotiations with the now under-employed Swedish Field Marshal Karl-Gustav Wrangel, his comrade-in-arms from the 1640s, to explore the possibility that Wrangel would bring some of his Swedish and German units from his governorship of Pomerania into the conflict.⁴³ Mazarin was able to see off this threat by diplomatic intervention with Sweden, but Turenne then turned to the Spanish, leveraging his small private army to gain a treaty for military assistance from the Spanish authorities in the Netherlands, who still saw inciting disorder within France as the most effective way to end the war on acceptable terms.

Despite a surprise defeat for Turenne and his army composed of privately-raised and Spanish troops outside Rethel on the eastern frontier in December 1650, the threat he posed did not disappear until the *renversement* of February 1651 which saw Condé in Paris and Mazarin in exile. With Condé's return, Turenne quietly slipped out of his Spanish alliance. Simultaneously, and having demonstrated their capacity to pose a lasting military threat, the Tour d'Auvergne concluded the settlement that had been under negotiation with Mazarin to provide them with massive material and status compensation

43 Jean Bérenger, *Turenne* (Paris, 1987), pp. 289–290.

for the 1642 surrender of Sedan.⁴⁴ Unfortunately for Condé, this deal was sufficiently beneficial to the interests of Turenne to keep him loyal to Mazarin after the main civil war broke out in late 1651.

Despite apparent victory over his ministerial rival, political relations between Condé and the royal court deteriorated through the spring and summer of 1651, aggravated by his suspicions that Mazarin in exile was still pulling strings to undermine his position and achieve his own reinstatement. When Condé left the court in mid-September it was explicitly to take up arms to ensure that Mazarin's exile remained permanent and that his own position as the dominant personality in the royal council could be secured.

Since the early 1640s, and especially since 1648, the logic of organizing and deploying military force rather than relying on court intrigue or conspiracy to achieve political objectives had become well-entrenched. What separated 1651–52 from previous military clashes was the scale on which Condé and his allies mobilized military force – initially against the crown, and from January 1652 against the return of Mazarin to France. Condé himself was head of the most powerful, wealthiest and well-connected family in France, and in 1651 he could draw on the support of his brother Conti, and a massive network of Bourbon-Condé clients and allies. Condé also believed that he would have the support of his brother-in-law, the duc de Longueville, and for much of 1652 Longueville adopted a studied neutrality which left both sides guessing where the potentially decisive military resources of Normandy would be deployed.⁴⁵ But even without Longueville, Condé's ability to raise forces was unprecedented. The immediate Condéen party consisted of around 200 close adherents, the majority of whom were already serving officers or major provincial nobles disposing of recruitment grounds and resources to raise troops.⁴⁶ Some of these had access to formidable resources. Jean-Ferdinand de Marsin, comte de Granville, had long been a major client of Condé, and was re-established as viceroy of Catalonia in 1651 through Condé's influence. In early 1652 Marsin recognized his *fidelité* to his patron by abandoning his command of the army in Catalonia, bringing 1,000 infantry and 300 cavalry – his best troops – to join Condé's army in Guienne. To these clients and associates could be added a number of close family alliances such as those with the La Rochefoucauld, the Coligny-Châtillon, the La Trémoille, the Nemours, the Sault-Tavannes. The

44 Jean-Pierre Labatut, *Les ducs et pairs de France au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1972), pp. 352–354; AAE, MD 889, fols. 92, 132, February 1652, letters from king establishing their status as *princes étrangers* and granting them Albret and Château-Thierry as a *duché-pairie*.

45 Paul Logié, *La Fronde en Normandie*, 3 (Amiens, 1952), pp. 94–96, 103–110.

46 Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, pp. 112–132.

Bourbon-Condé family between them maintained eight regiments of cavalry and infantry under their direct patronage.⁴⁷ Family allies brought significant additional troops: Henry-Charles de La Trémoille, prince de Tarente, brought two regiments of experienced troops and additional levies from the family's base in Poitou; other families drew their 'house' regiments out of the armies on the frontiers.⁴⁸ Louis Foucauld, comte de Dognon, secured his two governorships of La Rochelle and Brouage for Condé's party with some companies of Swiss infantry that he maintained through his control of tax revenues and local extortion.⁴⁹ But beyond these existing units, a broader base of new regiments also needed to be raised.

Thanks to an exchange of governorships enforced by Condé in 1651, the duc d'Épernon, whose position in Guienne became unsustainable after Mazarin's exile, was transferred to the Condéen province of Burgundy, while Condé became governor of Guienne. The south-west of France became a powerful base for Condéen interests, with allied families controlling governorships and territory extending northwards into the Loire valley. This was consolidated in early 1652 when the king's uncle, Gaston d'Orléans, declared for Condé. Not only did this bring the Orléans 'house' regiments into the princely army, but it added Languedoc to the network of provinces openly supporting the princes and contributing resources to the military campaign.⁵⁰ Condé's assumption of the governorship of Guienne was popular amongst the local population, who provided a ready source of recruits for the princes' army.⁵¹ During the first weeks of mobilization in Bordeaux Condé distributed 200,000–300,000 livres from his own funds to meet the costs of recruitment carried out by his clients.⁵² Over and above these private means – cash and credit – the two major sources for a longer conflict were the appropriation of the crown's tax revenues and foreign – Spanish – subsidies. Appropriated tax revenues represented the most stable basis on which to fund protracted military operations: but setting

47 Jacques de Saulx, comte de Tavannes, *Mémoires*, ed. C. Moreau (Paris, 1858) pp. 275–279, provides a full listing of the Bourbon-Condé 'house' regiments at the July 1652 battle of the Porte Saint Antoine, together with their (named) officer casualties. This calculation does not include the numerous companies of heavy cavalry (*gendarmes*) and *chevaux legers* maintained by the family.

48 Gabriel-Jules de Cosnac, *Souvenirs du règne de Louis XIV*, 1 (Paris, 1866), pp. 314–317, 345–347; Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, pp. 126–129.

49 Georges Berthomier, *Louis Foucauld de St Germain Beaupré, comte de Dognon* (Montluçon, 1890), pp. 30–34.

50 Christian Bouyer, *Gaston d'Orléans: Le frère rebelle de Louis XIII* (Paris, 2007), pp. 111–118.

51 Cosnac, *Souvenirs*, 1, pp. 313–314.

52 Pierre Lenet, *Mémoires*, in *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la France ...*, 2, eds. J. Michaud, J. Poujoulat (Paris, 1838), p. 528.

up mechanisms to gather taxes and ensuring that these revenues reached the army officers required organization and time.⁵³ The financial support from Spain negotiated in a treaty signed in Madrid in November 1651 provided an injection of immediate cash, even though the promises of regular Spanish funding proved more ephemeral.⁵⁴

In confronting this insurgency the French crown relied on loyalist commanders, Harcourt and subsequently Turenne, to take control of troops from the armies they had previously commanded. While Mazarin himself sized-up the opportunities to stage a return from exile, the acting ministers and loyalist military commanders organized the army that would engage the Condéen forces in the South-West. The primary means to build up the crown's forces was to take the troops returning into winter quarters from the campaign theatres in Italy and on the Eastern and Pyrenean frontiers, and allocate them to Harcourt's army or to other forces that were confronting princely troops in Picardy and Champagne.⁵⁵ The decision provided Harcourt with numerous good-quality veteran troops, but it left dangerously exposed the question of how these troops, deprived of their winter-quarter payments, would be sustained and the officers compensated for expenses incurred earlier in the year.

The crisis took on another dimension when Mazarin himself re-entered France in early 1652, supposedly to assist the crown against Condé. His decision revived the flagging fortunes of Condé's military resistance to Harcourt by creating a whole new wave of outraged opposition across the country. It precipitated the military alliance between Condé and Gaston d'Orleans, and Gaston's resources and network of clients and allies permitted the formation of a second princely army, heavily backed by Spanish troops, which moved down through northern France into the Loire valley. Mazarin, well aware of the dangers of entering France with only a small force of guards, doubled down on his claim to be supporting the crown's military efforts. His original plan while in exile was to use his still substantial wealth to raise a corps of 5,000 German mercenaries, crossing France with these to join the royal court, located at Poitiers since the beginning of Harcourt's military operations in the south-west. The

53 Lenet, *Mémoires*, 2, pp. 527–528 on appropriating taxes and distributing regimental commissions.

54 Chantilly, Archives du château de Chantilly, Archives Condé [AC], Lettres de Condé XII, fol. 69; Lenet had already allocated this first instalment of Spanish subsidy in anticipation of its arrival: AC, Lettres de Condé XII, fol. 118.

55 François-Nicolas Dubuisson-Aubenay, *Journal des guerres civiles*, 2, ed. Gustave Saige (Paris, 1885) p. 136, 3 December 1651, reports on move of 4,500 troops from Flanders to the South West; AAE, CP Sardaigne 45, fol. 183, 25 November 1651, redeployment of troops from Italy to Harcourt.

project foundered on a number of failures of credit, and inadequate authorization for the mercenaries' complex route to France via the United Provinces (then by ship to Boulogne).⁵⁶ Instead, Mazarin turned to his military clientele embedded in the frontier fortresses of Picardy and Champagne. Some 2,000 experienced garrison troops were to be extracted to form the core of Mazarin's army, supplemented by another 3,000–4,000 newly-recruited troops that governor-clients such as Navailles, Broglio, de Bar, Fabert and La Ferté were to raise on Mazarin's behalf.⁵⁷

Both sides had access to these clienteles and personal networks, and could tap the practical military experience of senior officers in their parties to recruit and lead their armies. Many of the troops on both sides were drawn from the existing royalist forces, and many more had been recruited through the cash and private credit made available by the senior officers. The immediate question was how these recruiting drives and subsequent military operations could be funded, and in many cases how the advances made by the officers on both sides could be reimbursed. In theory the Mazarinist forces could look to the crown and royal revenues once Mazarin was back at Court and seemingly re-established as the crown's appointed first minister. However, the crown had lost direct control of large parts of France and needed to tread with extreme care in many other provinces where the loyalty of the leaders and elites was uncertain or wafer-thin. The ability to raise credit from traditional sources on the basis of a feeble trickle of royal revenues was correspondingly limited, and the presence of administrative agents with the troops fighting for Mazarin and the crown was minimal. On the other side, the mainstay of Condé's finances was the promise of massive Spanish subsidies as a result of the treaty of November 1651. But not only was the Spanish crown's overall financial situation almost as dire as the French, it became clear to many of those around Condé that the Spanish had no interest in giving Condé sufficient funds to allow him a conclusive victory over Mazarin, and that protracting the civil war was Madrid's real objective.⁵⁸ Following a familiar pattern, the first substantial new receipts after the initial treaty payments did not arrive until August 1652.⁵⁹

In this situation the commanding officers on both sides needed to deploy autonomous military force directly to extract resources from French towns

56 *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère*, 4, ed. A. Chéruel (Paris, 1887), p. 521, Mazarin to Fabert, 29 November 1651; *Lettres*, 4, ed. Chéruel, p. 576, Mazarin to d'Estrades, 26 December 1651.

57 Dubuisson-Aubenay, *Journal*, 2, p. 142; J. Bourelly, *Maréchal de Fabert*, 1 (Paris, 1881), p. 394.

58 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France [BnF], Collections Manuscrits, Fonds français [Ffr] 6708, fol. 138, 28 July 1652, Marigny to Lenet.

59 Lenet, *Mémoires*, 2, p. 557; BnF, Ffr 6708, fols. 45, 139, 2 and 28 July 1652.

and countryside, becoming the tax collectors in the areas where they operated. The commanders would certainly prefer to requisition supplies through coordinated mechanisms rather than allow their troops to pillage piecemeal. Condé and Gaston d'Orléans gave out orders in their own governorships and in provinces under their control for the orderly appropriation and collection of established tax revenues.⁶⁰ But more typical of the military situation were demands on communities for payment of arbitrary additional sums under military duress: in March 1652, for example, Chartres was ordered to pay an immediate contribution of 30,000 livres and 70 *muids* of grain to the princes' army, and to accept a garrison of 800 infantry and 200 cavalry.⁶¹ While the general principle of European military contribution-systems was that they provided protection against subsequent pillage and destruction, such niceties were hardly observed during the civil war. Having allowed his troops to "thoroughly pillage" the town of Dreux, the duc de Nemours then levied a contribution of 20,000 livres on the inhabitants.⁶²

Drawing on their previous experience of the winter-quarter *subsistances*, the officers sought to profit from the activities of their troops. A local crown agent reported that the Mazarinist cavalry regiment of Bussy de Vere had cost the province of Champagne some 450,000 livres through systematic pillage and theft, and that the officers were directly involved.⁶³ Merchants and others who profited from buying the stolen goods stimulated a virtually commercial level of plundering organized at company and regimental level, or even higher in the command chain.⁶⁴ The duc de Beaufort had commented in March 1652 that he commanded the best infantry but also the worst robbers in France, and he was unable to restrain their pillaging. But even his princely confederates recognized that Beaufort was taking a proportion of this pillage for his own profit.⁶⁵ Other officers simply set up private mechanisms to exploit local revenues, often by levying road or river tolls on all passing goods. Both the Condéen and Mazarinist troops encamped around Paris set up river blocks and toll stations wherever they controlled routes leading into the capital, taxing goods at will.⁶⁶ Ransoming of individuals or whole communities shaded into the kind of economic terrorism practised by Louis de Dognon, who ran a series of

60 AAE, MD 881, fol. 283, 14 February 1652.

61 AAE, CP 882, fol. 62, unsigned letter to Mazarin, 16 March 1652.

62 AAE, CP 882, fol. 28, Saintot to Mazarin, 10 March 1652.

63 AAE, MD 884, fol. 21, Montbas to Mazarin, 5 August 1653.

64 Dubuisson-Aubenay, *Journal*, 2, p. 234.

65 AAE, MD 889, fol. 136, Beaufort to Chavigny, 2 March 1652; AAE, MD 889, fol. 211, Croissy to Chavigny, 3 April 1652.

66 AAE, MD 885 fol. 288, Rubent to Mazarin, [late October 1652].

piracy and protection rackets out of La Rochelle and Brouage, earning a level of hatred amongst the local populations which was remarkable even in 1652.⁶⁷

The struggle between the princely and Mazarinist/royal forces engulfed great swathes of France down to October 1652. For most of its duration the outcome was uncertain and military advantage and setback swung repeatedly between the two sides. Contemporaries believed the most likely outcome was a negotiated settlement between the two parties.⁶⁸ However, Condé's decision in October to march his army away from occupied Paris to the eastern frontier, where he waged another vigorous and destructive campaign against Mazarin's supporters in the towns and fortifications of Champagne and the Lorraine borderlands, conceded the political if not the military high ground to his rival. Though Mazarin himself was unable to return to Paris until early 1653, the young Louis XIV entered the capital and the majority of the princes' supporters accepted a royal amnesty which restored the crown's direct authority.

In the course of 1653–54 Condé and his military clients and followers moved away from being an autonomous military force inside of France to being a constituent army corps embedded in the Spanish army of Flanders. Though military operations in subsequent years frequently brought them into France's eastern provinces, Condé was mostly engaged in frustrating attempts to ensure that the Spanish crown's agents placed his troops on the Spanish military payroll. This primarily meant allocating them adequate opportunities to collect winter quarter payments from territory in the Spanish Netherlands where the corps was now based.⁶⁹ By the mid-1650s Condé's army corps was reduced to a shadow of its strength at the height of the civil war. Those who remained loyal to Condé until he – and they – gained their pardon and reinstatement as part of the final Franco-Spanish settlement of the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), saw their original French troops whittled away by death, illness, and desertion. Large numbers of the replacement soldiers in their units were freebooting German or Walloon mercenaries. By the late 1650s Condé's army corps increasingly took the form of a typical Thirty Years' War multinational contractor-force, whose shareholder-officers looked to directly-extracted contributions as their primary source of income, and whose manpower was largely composed of international career-soldiers.⁷⁰

67 Berthomier, *Dognon*, pp. 30–35.

68 Parrott, 1652, pp. 119–120 and passim.

69 James John Inglis-Jones, *The Grand Condé in Exile: Power politics in France, Spain and the Spanish Netherlands* (unpublished PhD diss., University of Oxford, 1994), pp. 91–130.

70 Parrott, 1652, pp. 256–257; Henri d'Orléans, duc d'Aumale, *Histoire des princes de Condé pendant les XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, 6 (Paris, 1892), pp. 352–353.

In contrast, Mazarin benefited from the crown's widely-welcomed resumption of authority in France, re-establishing his own ministerial position at the centre of government. His military clients and allies remained essential, firstly to reassert control over those remaining areas of France, most notably Guienne and Provence, where elements of the princely party still held out, and secondly to resume the unfinished war against the Spanish, now of course compounded by the adherence of Condé and his party to the Spanish war-effort. These military supporters, who had formed Mazarin's party during a civil war whose outcome was never a foregone conclusion, now expected substantial rewards for their loyalty. In cases they were prepared to drive hard bargains to extract what they considered their due. The comte d'Harcourt, who had led the main royalist army against Condé's forces in the South West in 1651–52, abandoned the army and crossed France to seize control of the fortress and garrison of Breisach on the Rhine, captured by France back in 1638. He held Breisach as a private military base, threatening to negotiate its sale to the Spanish, until in 1654 he considered that the price offered for his renunciation was high enough.⁷¹ Others amongst Mazarin's military supporters recognized the marketable value of their frontier fortresses and their control of troops to extract financial or status concessions, frequently presented as compensation for the financial commitments that they had made during the civil war.⁷²

In the face of these demands, Mazarin's government generally showed itself concessionary and reluctant to face down its military commanders. Promotions to senior military offices were granted so frequently and willingly that the ministry ran the risk that the resulting inflation would antagonize existing holders of senior office more than it pleased the recipients of new titles.⁷³ More significant was an acquiescence in military profiteering and extortion after the end of the civil war. Efforts to restrain excessive levying of winter quarter payments, or concern with the local exaction of taxes and dues by fortress governors or provincial commanders, were almost entirely abandoned. In contrast to typical assumptions that the 1650s saw the first stages in what became the transformative military reforms of Louis XIV's 'Personal Rule', the reality was an unprecedented acceptance of local military autonomy. Administrators with the armies proved accomplices in processes of evasion and corruption, accepting inflated muster-rolls, the distribution of excessive rations,

71 Parrott, 1652, pp. 223–225, 265–266.

72 A notable case was Mazarin's erstwhile client, Abraham Fabert: Jules Bourelly, *Maréchal de Fabert*, 2 (Paris, 1881), pp. 5–17. See also François H. Turpin, *César de Choiseul, duc de Duplessis-Praslin, marechal de France* (Amsterdam, 1768), pp. 336–349.

73 Parrott, 1652, pp. 261–263.

and local extortion and protection practised by the officers.⁷⁴ On occasions where they challenged these practices – usually on operational grounds – they received scant support from the ministers.⁷⁵

The legacy of the civil wars was to embed the ‘shareholder’ assumptions of private military organization within the royal army; the officers’ own initiatives and actions in support of their financial interests and ‘investment’ in their units were tolerated more openly than at any time in the 1630s or 1640s. An overtly transactional view of politics permeated downwards from the first minister himself, and this conditioned bargaining over military commitments, costs, and reimbursement. The tacit compromises of the earlier years of the war were replaced, after the *Fronde*, with direct negotiation and acceptance that the army and unit commanders now held a strongly contractual view of their military service. In the case of the main French army corps serving on the Flanders frontier this could be mitigated to some extent by the personal presence of the young Louis XIV in each campaign from 1654.⁷⁶ But while this affirmed something of the ethos of loyal and disinterested service to troops in that army corps, it made no difference in the other theatres where the officers grew ever more assertive in their self-interested approach to the war-effort.⁷⁷

4 Conclusion

The French crown and its ministers made a deliberate choice to reject military enterprise and the outsourcing of military authority as it was practised across the majority of states during the first half of the 17th century. The consequence was the growth of a volatile compromise in which the officers were denied outright proprietorship of their units, but acquired the capacity and incentives to raise and maintain troops independent of state control. The political tensions that provoked unrest and rebellion in these decades were generated by the factionalism of ministerial government and the fiscal and administrative pressures of its foreign policy. But the character of the civil wars that broke out in 1641 and 1651–52 owed much to the well-honed capacity of the protagonists

74 Parrott, “Interests,” pp. 58–66, 73–75.

75 AAE, CP Sardaigne 45, fols. 99–100, 187–188, 12 April/1 August 1653: allegations of high-level corruption in the army of Italy dismissed by Secretary for War and the Superintendent of Finance.

76 Turenne’s memoirs emphasize the benefits of the king’s presence, while intimating that there were nonetheless military downsides to having his – and Mazarin’s – presence on campaign: *Mémoires du maréchal de Turenne*, 2, ed. Paul Marichal (Paris, 1914), pp. 2–174.

77 Parrott, “French Army of Italy”.

to exercise high levels of military autonomy. In seeking to avoid a repetition of the Wars of Religion in the previous century, the crown and its agents failed to create an accountable and centralized military system, but established one in which the ability to raise, sustain or even appropriate military forces remained intrinsic to the role of senior officers and regimental commanders.

Emerging from the decade in which these capacities had been demonstrated to devastating effect, not just in the civil war but its aftermath down to 1659, it was significant that the much-admired military reforms of the 1660s were partly concerned with greater centralized control over the military system. Yet the keystone of these reforms lay in sanctioning the official sale of military officerships. Accepting that financial assistance by officers would continue to play its part in the military system, the officers were steered towards recovering their costs via venality – purchasable colonelcies and captaincies – which could be sold in a regulated market to other aspiring officers.⁷⁸ These incoming officers would pay an agreed sum which would vary according to the status and condition of the unit vacated by the previous office-holder. Venality of office legitimated the financial ‘investment’ of the officers in their unit, and gave them an incentive to maintain its operational effectiveness, without granting them direct proprietorship over the unit itself. This institutionalization of venality was to unleash a series of festering problems and resentments during the 18th century, but it finally provided a viable resolution to some of the tensions between state control and private finance that had beset the French army down to 1660.

78 Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661–1701* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 166–171; Hervé Drévilion, *L'impôt du sang: Le métier des armées sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 2005), pp. 179–211.

Merchant of Death: Maximilien Titon (1632–1711) and the Supply of Arms in Louis XIV’s France

Guy Rowlands

1 The Early Modern ‘Contractor State’ and the Defence Industrial Base

The emergence of the ‘new military history’, with its focus on the interrelationship between war and society, has spawned a number of different lines of enquiry into the early modern period during the last half century. At first the focus was on the way armies shaped society and societies shaped armies, with the recruitment of troops and civil-military relations as major areas of attention. The role of the contractor on land was investigated primarily for uncovering their methods in raising, deploying, and sustaining bodies of soldiers, especially in the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries. In the English-speaking world the deep structural organisation of early modern armies and navies, and their places in state and society, came under intense scrutiny from the 1970s, with an especial attempt to understand the relationship between government, high politics, and military administration. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that when military logistics began to attract more attention from the late 1960s, coincidentally with a boost to economic history more generally, far-reaching enquiries were rarely extended into the supply contractors who were essential for fuelling the war machines.¹ It is all the more surprising when one considers the prevalence of concern about ‘merchants of death’ – private arms suppliers – in the inter-war period. And even more puzzling when one recalls mounting anxieties in the 1950s and 1960s that elements within a ‘military-industrial complex’ – comprised of a nexus of senior

1 A work which unusually did try to integrate logistics with politics and army organisation was the pioneering study by Geoffrey Parker, though the contractors themselves got little attention compared to the logistical geography of the Spanish Road: Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars* (Cambridge, 1972). An overview of the state of research into state, society, and war by the early 1990s, primarily based on synthesising other scholars’ original research, was provided by Frank Tallett: *War and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1495–1715* (London, 1992).

military personnel, big business, and the legislative and executive branches of government – might exert, in the words of Dwight Eisenhower, “unwarranted influence” over government not only in the field of economics and finance but strategy and international policy too.²

It was not until the final decade of the 20th century, in the aftermath of a rejuvenation of market economics, that historians of early modern warfare on land began to devote far more effort to uncovering the role and operations of entrepreneurs.³ This ‘contractual turn’ came amidst increasing public awareness of the importance of contractors in contemporary warfare, and with a growing appreciation of the way sovereigns in the 17th century relied heavily on the cooperative mobilisation of their subjects and their resources to develop standing armed forces capable of considerable expansion during wartime. Developments in the history of war were also coming under the influence of works on state fiscality, even though much financial history relates little to the history of war. It was a significant moment when in 1988 John Brewer crystallised the symbiotic, if often dysfunctional relationship between war and money in the memorable phrase ‘the fiscal-military state’, generating a lively conversation among early modern historians that shows no signs of drying up.⁴ Over the last quarter-century logistical contractors – whether bankers, military paymasters, food suppliers, or shipbuilders, to name but a few genres – have finally been placed under a much brighter spotlight. Scholars have turned their attention to the spending and channelling of money, and the supply of material resources, up to the tip of the military and naval spears.⁵

2 Helmuth C. Engelbrecht, Frank C. Hanighen, *Merchants of Death: A Study of the International Armament Industry* (New York, 1934); Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” 1961. Available at <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/farewell-address/reading-copy.pdf>. Accessed 13 July 2021.

3 An underrated study of relevance to this essay that appeared at the turn of the 21st century was Peter Edwards, *Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638–52* (Stroud, 2000), which provided immense detail on contractors and logistics. Ian Roy’s review of this book brings home just how neglected procurement had been up to this point: see Ian Roy, review of *Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638–52*, by Peter Edwards, *English Historical Review* 117 (2002), 1341–1342.

4 John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (London, 1988). Since then, notable works on the ‘fiscal-military’ debate include: *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Honour of P.G.M. Dickson*, ed. Christopher Storrs (Farnham, 2009); *The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660–c.1783*, eds. Aaron Graham, Patrick Walsh (Abingdon, 2016); *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Fiscal-Military State: Contours and Perspectives 1648–1815*, eds. William D. Godsey, Petr Mat’á (Oxford, 2022).

5 The most prominent works expounding the ‘contractual turn’ in state history include: Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2016); Roger Knight, Martin Wilcox, *Sustaining the Fleet, 1793–1815: War, the*

While much of the attention has been on the 18th century, where records tend to be more complete, it has been possible to build up partial pictures of contractor activity in the service of war-making for the previous two centuries, and no study of the Thirty Years' War can now fail to be built on a grasp of military enterprisers and, increasingly, merchant entrepreneurs.⁶ While it is true that the notion of "increasingly centralized and directly controlled systems of procurement, manufacture and resource management has been under attack" from historians,⁷ it must be acknowledged that there was, by the 1690s, far greater direction and commissioning by governments of matériel, weaponry, and foodstuffs from civilian contractors for armies and navies than ever before in numerous polities: particularly France, Britain, the Dutch Republic, Venice, Savoy, Russia, Sweden, and the Austrian Habsburg domains. The watershed for efforts to enhance the mobilisation of domestic economic power for war was the 1670s and 1680s, and the demands of the state upon contractors would build to a peak during the great conflicts that swept Europe almost continuously from 1683 to 1714.⁸

In an era when ideas of sovereign powers and their promulgation had become so vital to government, the question then becomes one of authority: how far were the contractors, on whom the central state relied for acquiring and delivering war essentials, really under proper political and financial control? For all the uptick in interest in entrepreneurs in wartime, this is a question that has not been given nearly enough attention. Contemporaries certainly lambasted contractors, and one should of course not lazily buy into "crude contemporary caricatures" of greedy, self-interested contractors.⁹ Equally, though, states' logistical dependence on private enterprise for the waging of war in the period ca. 1660–1850 posed huge problems of control and engendered a classic set of 'principal-agent' problems. With the massive logistical demands of his war

British Navy and the Contractor State (Woodbridge, 2010); *The Contractor State and Its Implications, 1659–1815*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes (Las Palmas, 2012).

6 David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012).

7 David Parrott, review of *The Contractor State and Its Implications, 1659–1815*, ed. by Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes, *Journal of Economic History* 75 (2015), 279–281.

8 For an indication of just how enormous the logistical support of armies could become in the 1700s, the dissertation of Jean-Éric Iung is illuminating: Jean-Éric Iung, *Service des vivres et munitionnaires de l'Ancien Régime: La fourniture du pain de munition aux troupes de Flandre et d'Allemagne de 1701 à 1710* (dissertation for the *diplôme d'archiviste-paléographe*, École Nationale des Chartes, 1983).

9 Huw Bowen's warning is well taken, but, perhaps because he is a historian of the British fiscal-military system, he seems to underestimate the scope for graft in the service of many states: Huw V. Bowen, "The Contractor State, c.1650–1815," *International Journal of Maritime History* 25 (2013), 239–274, p. 241.

efforts, and the unprecedented reliance on contractors to actualise them, Louis XIV's state seems to have been unusually susceptible in this regard.¹⁰ With still low levels of officialdom, haphazard, unsystematic and unreliable statistics, and major weaknesses in communications, there was often a colossal imbalance in knowledge between the state and its contractors. The size of France, with its many particularist divisions in both a geographical and sectoral sense, militated against anything more than small, incremental steps in expanding government knowledge of the myriad activities of subjects, while commercial markets, including commercial agriculture, were underdeveloped, nubilous for royal officials and only clumsily integrated in comparison with the United Provinces or England.

The government therefore needed individuals or consortia of mobilisers – brokers of services and resource-mobilisation – who themselves came to dominate their sectors. This produced a form of 'information asymmetry' that was not only hard to overcome but was built on secrecy deemed essential for maintaining trust and confidence, and which opened the door to significant exploitation of state needs. Any system in which contractors are used to support state activity is open to 'rent-seeking', a situation in which contractors and agents manipulate and alter the frameworks and terms within which they are working, either to secure greater advantages for themselves or to protect themselves from damage. Furthermore, when the state becomes dependent on private interests for its operations, and especially when a condition of military or logistical 'overstretch' has been reached, governments can find themselves forced into providing additional support to essential contractors, who might exaggerate the risks they were running. This creates a situation of 'moral hazard', in which contractors are incentivised to underbid for contracts in the knowledge that arrangements can and usually will be unpicked: the state might bail them out, or contractors would try to obtain additional support from the state while backsliding from assuming the full risk of activities that they were technically obliged to bear.

In France in the 1690s and 1700s, there is abundant evidence that military paymasters, bankers, the big contractors supplying bread to the armies and navy, and a variety of other suppliers managed to profit, sometimes enormously, from the services and matériel they supplied to the state during the Nine Years'

10 Pepijn Brandon has shown in the Dutch case that much of the political system was, in effect, a military-industrial complex, but one in which corrupt and corrosive practices were restrained by a set of controls and systematic practices that mediated between vested interests and the common good: Pepijn Brandon, *War, Capital, and the Dutch State (1588–1795)* (Leiden, 2015), pp. 43, 48, 52, and 154.

War (1688–97) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14).¹¹ With expertise in mobilising financial backing, associates, and sub-contractors in order to deliver the king's needs, they were an essential part of French war efforts that are predominantly discussed in terms of royal control, ministerial direction, strategic considerations and operations on the ground, and tactics used in battles and sieges. These contractors were certainly carrying out their business in hazardous circumstances, with risks heightened hugely by the monetary manipulations Louis XIV authorised, notably in 1689, 1693, 1701, 1704, and 1709, but in other years too. The ongoing diminutions and punctuated augmentations in the value of gold and silver coins in relation to the unit of account, the livre, were compounded by the over-issuing of rather illiquid Mint bills, first to substitute for coins while they were being redone in the mints, then to inflate the money supply to support the efforts of bankers and military paymasters. In a circular way, all this ensured credit became more expensive while supply and banking contracts required greater guarantees, owing to uncertainty about the quality of reimbursements. Periodically major bail-outs of overextended contractors proved unavoidable.¹² With an unreliable state, which was sustaining (or failing to sustain) military and naval operations at the limits of logistical possibilities, and which was demanding far more from its contractors and agents than in the 1660s–80s, it is no wonder its servants built 'insurance premia' into their services and prices. So much can be justified.

All the same, the evidence for excessive manipulation by some of the bankers and some of the financiers, whether in the military paymaster treasury of

11 On the state revenue-raising financiers and military paymasters, see Guy Rowlands, *The Financial Decline of a Great Power: War, Influence, and Money in Louis XIV's France* (Oxford, 2012). On the international bankers so crucial for remitting funds to armies abroad, see Guy Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men: The International Bankers of Louis XIV's France* (Basingstoke, 2014). On the *munitionnaires des vivres*, see Jung, *Service*.

12 See Rowlands, *Financial Decline*, pp. 90–107 ("Manipulating the Coinage"), 108–128 ("Paper Money and Absolute Monarchy"); Joël Félix, "The Most Difficult Financial Matter That Has Ever Presented Itself": Paper Money and the Financing of Warfare under Louis XIV" *Financial History Review* 25 (2018), 43–70. Félix somewhat underplays the disastrous effect mint bills and coinage manipulation had on containing logistical costs and managing the war effort. We profoundly disagree not only on Chamillart's capabilities but also on whether the mint bills – at least in the way they were abused – were a worthwhile effort to support the projection of French power when other means such as additional direct and transaction taxes, which eventually had to be introduced, might have restrained monetary manipulation had they been brought in nearer the start of the war. It is worth bearing in mind no subsequent ancien régime war saw French governments resort to these infernal monetary methods.

the *Extraordinaire des Guerres* or in the *vivres*, has survived and is glaring.¹³ The greatest manipulator of them all, a man whose financial genius was complemented by his aggressive tactics and ability to deflect attack from rivals and suspicious officials, was the great banker, Samuel Bernard (1651–1739). He combined remitting operations for the king on an unprecedented scale in European history with fruitful investments in the slave trade in the Spanish and French empires, commodities trading, illegal coin trading and false coining, contracts for collecting money from venal office sales, and emergency tax contracts.¹⁴

Thus far, however, ideas about the problems associated with managing contractors, and the advantages and disadvantages of employing them, have not been extended to what is nowadays called the ‘defence industrial base’. In the context of Louis XIV’s ‘personal rule’, from 1661 to 1715, this base included highly decentralised activity such as refining flints for flintlock muskets (albeit on a massive scale of millions per annum), or uniform production, which might be undertaken by merchants and tailors who also catered for civilian needs. Under a small number of select contractors, with spheres of activity in different areas of the kingdom, were such matters as cannonball manufacture, primarily in wartime, and the casting of cannon, mortars, and ships’ anchors, undertaken for the most part in foundries within royal depots.¹⁵ There was also one colossal monopoly within the defence industrial base, one whose contracted output might fluctuate between wartime and peacetime: the supply of gunpowder and its component saltpetre. This monopoly emerged in the mid-1660s as part of a major drive to create autarky in powder production after France, while maintaining a draining war effort for a quarter of a century after 1635, had found itself dependent on huge quantities of imports, not only of the components of gunpowder but of refined gunpowder itself.¹⁶

13 For a partial exploration of the corrosive manipulation by those involved with the *vivres* and the *Extraordinaire des Guerres*, including several men worryingly close to the centre of power, see Rowlands, *Financial Decline*, pp. 199–227.

14 On Bernard, see Rowlands, *Dangerous*, pp. 41–44, 103–114 on his methods, and 119–165 on the rise, fall, and recovery of his labours on behalf of Louis XIV and himself.

15 On naval industrial activity, see the magnificent life’s work of Jean Peter, *Les artilleurs de la marine sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1995); idem, *Maîtres de forges et maîtres fondeurs de la marine sous Louis XIV: Samuel Daliès de la Tour et les frères René et Pierre Landouillette de Logivière* (Paris, 1996); idem, *L’artillerie et les fonderies de la marine sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1995); idem, *Les manufactures de la marine sous Louis XIV: La naissance d’une industrie de l’armement* (Paris, 1997). See also, Daniel Dessert, *La Royale: Vaisseaux et marins du Roi-Soleil* (Paris, 1996), pp. 62–74, 159–174.

16 Each of these areas, and more, will receive attention in my forthcoming book on the birth of France’s arms industries under Louis XIV. In the meantime, see the grand synthesis on mobilisation of resources by Olivier Chaline, *Les armées du Roi: Le grand chantier*

The focus of the rest of this essay, however, will be on the supply of handheld firearms, in particular muskets for the king's land forces. In this field, supply dominance, based on the holding of an office and a set of privileges, was gifted by the state to a single contractor, but in order to produce and distribute the weaponry he relied heavily on several associates, who in turn commissioned the work – often in an abusive manner – from numerous sub-contracting artisans and transport providers. This was not, however, a monopoly of provision but it was hegemonic leadership of one of the three or four most crucial sectors of the burgeoning French defence industrial base. With such preponderance came indispensability in wartime, with all the dangers of rent-seeking and cost escalation this could bring. Given the nature of the products, with the state seeking to control the circulation and sale of arms, there was only one serious large-scale customer for the guns, inducing what economists call monopsony, or perhaps a lop-sided oligopsony in which Louis XIV was the primary customer but allies such as Spain and Bavaria might be supplied as well. When a supplier had few other outlets for sales to which they could turn (unlike the gunpowder contractors, who could supply to the general public for hunting), there was even more likelihood that, in the event of the state putting the contractor under intense pressure, he would cut corners, demand additional support and protect his own interests, at the expense of the king above and his sub-contractors below.

2 The Rise of Maximilien Titon, Arms Supplier to the King

Published in 1991, a doctoral thesis by Colonel François Bonnefoy on the rise of handheld firearm production in France from the start of Louis XIV's 'personal rule' to the Revolution devoted considerable space to the system evolved by Maximilien Titon (1632–1711) under the protection of the Marquis de Louvois and his son the Marquis de Barbezieux, successive Secretaries of State for War from the early 1660s to 1701. While Bonnefoy's work was magisterial in many respects and ground-breaking in the thoroughness of its treatment of arms production in the early modern period, it was very much a product of

XVIIe–XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 2016), pp. 193–272. Also the estimable work on the powder contractors of Frédéric Naulet, *La ferme des poudres et salpêtres: Création et approvisionnement en poudre en France (1664–1765)*, 2002. Available at <https://www.institut-strategie.fr/la-ferme-des-poudres-et-salpetres-creation-et-approvisionnement-en-poudre-en-france-1664-1765/>. Accessed 20 May 2024. On French dependence on imports of powder and on a major contractor for saltpetre in the 1630s, see David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge, 2001), p. 389.

its time, somewhat uncritically buying into the traditional statist historiography of Louis XIV's reign that charted the expansion of the state's activities under the control of the great ministers. Furthermore, perhaps owing to the enormous size of his *oeuvre*, he did not step back enough from the detail to consider carefully the issues of control and manipulation, nor the limited grip of the French state over its agents.¹⁷ It is true that Titon managed to augment French armaments production prodigiously, and in the Nine Years' War the king's armies did not want for matchlock muskets; but the quality of the weaponry left a lot to be desired. Moreover, the transition to flintlocks, slow at first but then after 1702 requiring a re-equipping of up to a quarter-of-a-million men, was a huge ask for the domestic arms sector, especially in the context of deteriorating state revenues and an escalation in costs for all aspects of the war effort. Titon's operations, especially from the 1690s, were often turbulent, with hiatuses of production and financial resourcing. Yet over the course of 46 years of gun-supplying his accumulation of wealth was staggering. By no means was all of it overtly sanctioned. Much of it was based on opaque pricing and behaviour, and at times Titon neglected payments while continuing to shore up his personal finances. His grandson and principal heir, Titon de Villegenon, was little different.

Scion of a family of embroiderers on both sides, which is somewhat appropriate for his attitude to pricing and expenses, Titon's forebears also held lowly court office: his father had also been principal harbinger of Queen Marie de' Medici while his maternal grandfather had also been a *valet de chambre du Roi*. In his own youth Maximilien plied his trade as an *armurier* in Paris, during which time he became increasingly aware of how problematic and weak were arms manufacture and sale in France.¹⁸ This prompted him in 1664, around the time the gunpowder monopoly was created, to propose the establishment of manufactories and magazines "which would render the King master of arms as of powders and mints".¹⁹ At a time when notions of power were crystallised in itemising specific 'marques' of sovereignty, such an appeal to impose royal

17 Bonnefoy was too ready to assume that Titon had the same interests as the king in the production of guns for the armies: François Bonnefoy, *Les armes de guerre portatives en France: Du début du règne de Louis XIV à la veille de la Révolution (1665–1789): De l'indépendance à la primauté*, 1–2 (Paris, 1991), p. 663.

18 Report of "Séance du Conseil d'Administration," *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France* 6 (1879), p. 36; Georges Hartmann, "Ancienne Maison rue du Temple: Le Magasin d'Armes à la Bastille: La Famille Titon," *La Cité: Bulletin de la Société historique et archéologique du IV^e arrondissement* 7:4 (1908), 279–310, p. 284.

19 Service Historique de la Défense [SHD], Archives de l'Artillerie [AA], 4W467, [Mémoire] *A Son Altesse Serenissime Monseigneur le Duc*, [1723–25].

sovereignty over armaments fell on fertile ground. After some hesitant starts, in 1665–66 Louis XIV set up a series of interconnected magazines for small arms. The *Magasin Royal des Armes* in the *Petit Arsenal*, close to the Bastille, rapidly became “the depot, or even one might say the shop of the merchant with whom the King has contracted”, and that merchant, with the title of *Directeur général des Armes et Magasin Royal* from 1666, was Titon.²⁰ Other depots, such as Lyon, were to be mere collection points, but as the army expanded in size – and after successive wars then returned to a larger peacetime level than before – the original ‘hub and spoke’ idea, with the Paris *Magasin* acting as chief gathering and distribution centre, gave way to a system in which it became the personal headquarters of Titon and one important depot among several, notably Lyon and Charleville.²¹ Though all kinds of pistols, carbines, and mousquetons were made, the primary focus of Titon’s operations would be muskets, primarily matchlocks until the 1690s when flintlock production began to achieve greater prominence. From 1702 flintlocks came to dwarf all other firearms production. The weapons were distributed to the infantry through arrangements with regimental officers, and were paid for through a variety of procedures: at moments of formal recruitment drives, the king would pay, but otherwise re-equipping would be at the expense of the regimental chest.²² One might imagine this would be accompanied by a major effort at standardisation of firearms, but this only went so far: uniformity of barrel length and calibre became reasonably reliable, yet this did not extend in a tightly- and precisely-defined way to lock-plates, barrel-wall thickness, and firing mechanisms. A memorandum of the mid-1720s, almost certainly by Titon’s heirs, grossly exaggerated when it spoke of Maximilien devoting himself to standardising weapons for each arm of service.²³ In reality, it was not worth the effort to try to overcome resistance from the artisans on whom Titon relied. Not least, this was because what principally concerned Titon was less quality and more profit and personal advancement.

20 SHD Guerre [GR] A¹3779, no. 67, *Memoire sur les fonctions de Grand M^e de l’Artillerie* by duc du Maine, with quote from comments by Artillery *Contrôleur général* Camus de Beaulieu, 30 January 1701; SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 317v, Pleneuf to Villegenon, 23 August 1711; SHD AA 5w18: *Mémoire*, 1754; Archives Nationales de France [AN] G⁷1782, no. 113, *mémoire* by Titon, 20 September 1707.

21 SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 191r, Chamillart to Tressemanes, 7 January 1708.

22 SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 343v, Voysin to Duplessis, 14 December 1712; SHD GR A¹1416, fols. 190v-191r, King to Vendôme, 24 August 1697. Late in the Nine Years’ War, officers were buying a mixture of matchlocks and flintlocks from Titon, with choice left to them by the war minister, SHD GR A¹377, Barbezieux to Genlis, 6 November 1696.

23 Jean-Louis Viau, “Le fusil mle 1717,” *Tradition Magazine: Armes, uniformes, figurines* 13 (1988), p. 33; Bonnefoy, *Les armes*, pp. 126–127; Naulet, *La ferme*.

Policing the production and distribution quality of the arms was only worth so much time, effort, and money.

To produce these firearms, and to carry through his promise to endow the kingdom with what would now be considered a small-arms industry, Titon had to achieve dominance as the king's broker and commissioner for these weapons. The first place he looked to was the Principality of Arches, an enclave under the sovereignty of the Dukes of Mantua, located just within France's northern border. The core of this statelet was the recently-developed arms-making city of Charleville, then housing only some 4,000 inhabitants.²⁴ In the second half of 1667 the war ministry asked the Charleville municipal authorities to ensure not only that all arms production in the principality be reserved for the king, but that henceforth all workers should labour preferentially for Titon as the king's arms dealer, under the watchful eye of the *Cour Souverain* of the duchy (for form's sake, of course). This was sold to them as being excellent for the prosperity of the town, but it in fact also entailed a degree of proletarianization of the artisans at the same time, even if this should not be exaggerated. This apparent exclusivity of production was achieved through a series of private contracts, rather than a legislated monopsony, but central to the achievement of a ramping up of production was the creation of *sociétés* linking a merchant to a *maître armurier*. At the head of this pyramid of binding contracts in Charleville stood not Titon but his agents, the Fournier family, who belonged to the local oligarchy. As brokers for the king's own super-broker Titon, Toussaint Fournier and his son Victor set up a *Magasin Royal* in Charleville, and arranged with all kinds of specialists to take their products while supplying them with the necessary raw materials. Victor Fournier shored up his position by marrying Titon's niece, and in at least one document Titon referred to him as his *commis a la Direction des dites fabriques* of the Champagne region, in which Charleville was set. Various mills and forges just outside Charleville/Arches and in nearby areas of Champagne were also owned by the Titon-Fournier partnership, or remained private but received orders from them. By 1677 most Charleville artisans had been tied to them in contracts that could last from anything upwards of a year. All this bound together entrepreneurs and artisans, including carpenters and other ancillary skilled workers, gearing everything around the depot in Charleville. Titon would pass orders to Fournier, who would then contract with

24 Carole Rathier, François-Joseph Ruggiu, "La population de Charleville de la fin du xvii^e siècle à la fin du xix^e siècle: Une enquête d'histoire démographique," *Histoire & mesure* 28:2 (2013), 3–16, p. 11.

the workers, receive the finished materials and upon delivery pay for them with money sent by Titon.²⁵

In 1688, in line with developments in royal protection for manufacturing, and precisely to increase the attractiveness for men to work there, the entire set-up inside Charleville was endowed with the status of a *Manufacture Royale*, giving its resident artisans a string of attractive privileges and exemptions. But, while an irresistible move, this brought some inconvenience for Titon, as it meant the more men relocated their activities into Charleville, the less scope he had for cutting corners in terms and conditions, and the less he could avoid dealing through the municipal structures. Louvois, possibly anticipating a big increase in production for war, needed to corral as many workers as possible into the city under contract and he was well aware that artisans in the nearby Champagne and Arches villages had become steadily less amenable to Titon's demands. That this move did not altogether suit Titon seems clear by his near-simultaneous establishment, in association with Fournier, of a new production centre at Nouzon, a sealed village around a church and château, at one end of a large pond. Here the writ of Charleville magistrates – who policed the activity inside the city – did not run, and Titon/Fournier could operate their own terms.²⁶

The situation at the other great firearms centre 600 kilometers to the south, Saint-Étienne-en-Forez, was a bit more complicated still. Louvois, rather than Titon, seems to have been the first to take notice of the little arms workshops there, known as *molieres* (grindstones), and by the mid-1660s, if not before, there were already some 600 *armuriers* in a population of nearly thirty thousand. This was propitious for the king's service, but it turned out to be far less easy for Titon to control. Titon's point-man in Saint-Etienne, usually referred to as his *commissionnaire*, was Pierre Carrier, an *échevin* of the city, who had been given the role of overseeing operations there not by Titon but by Louvois. Like Fournier in Charleville, he signed exclusive contracts with various artisans, including musket lock-makers, carpenters, and forgemasters, though he and other Titon *commissionnaires*, like the Girard family, did not establish nearly as much of a monopsony here compared to Charleville. In particular,

25 Henri Manceau, *La Manufacture d'armes de Charleville* (Charleville, 1962), pp. 14–18; François Bonnefoy, "Maximilien Titon directeur général des magasins d'armes de Louis XIV, et le développement des armes portatives en France," *Histoire, économie et société* 5:3 (1986), 353–380, pp. 354, 365; quotation from AN G⁷1643, no. 26, petition [by Titon] to Desmaretz, 19 September 1709.

26 Manceau, *Manufacture*, p. 18; SHD GR A¹524, no. 81, engraving of Nouzon; *Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux des finances*, 1, ed. Arthur-Michel de Boislisle (Paris, 1874) [CCG], p. 54, Harouys to Desmaretz, 16 September 1708.

there seems to have been a lot more manufacturing of weapons for the cavalry, much of which was never channelled through Titon's network, and which was instead mobilised by other merchants upon orders placed by regimental officers, or those officers approached individual gun-assemblers directly. As these people had no system of inspection looming over them for cavalry orders, they tended to devote as much time as possible to churning these products out, and less to Titon's infantry-orientated orders. In the Nine Years' War merchants were forbidden to commission arms, and workers forbidden to sell to anyone but Titon; but it proved near-impossible to enforce these strictures, and they seem to have been dropped around the end of this conflict. Saint-Étienne was unusual for its size in not being walled, and so goods could quite easily be smuggled out; and there was a lot of work undertaken in the countryside, for town and country economic activity was interlocking. Moreover, there was a weak guild structure and no system of *maîtrise* that would oblige artisans to produce a masterpiece and demonstrate high levels of competence. This relative lack of formal economic organisation was reflected in the fact that there was no standard pricing of work and materials, except for the government laying down how much per musket would be paid to the *commissionaires*. It is not surprising workers opted to produce for those to whom they could sell for higher prices.²⁷ Once it became clear, by late 1702, that Titon was expected to re-equip the infantry with flintlocks on a massive scale, he – and some war ministry officials – tried to instate a proper monopsony, with stronger policing than before: Titon would sub-contract orders to various merchants, who would then get the same profit per weapon as his *commissionaires*. The contract Titon had signed earlier that year did give him the right to compel Saint-Étienne gunsmiths of whatever kind to work for him, or rather (formally) the *Magasin Royal*, but this rule seems to have remained honoured as much in the breach as in the observance. Merchants continued to interlope with orders, artisans continued with under-the-counter commissions, no monopsony was introduced for cavalry and dragoon firearms, and smuggling under the noses of Titon's agents remained endemic.²⁸

So Titon was the dominant player in supplying muskets to the army, and commissioned some other weapons on an ad hoc basis for various regiments,

27 SHD AA 4w467, *Mémoire sur la Manufacture de St Etienne, Vers 1760* and *Manufacture d'armes de St Etienne, Mémoire, Vers 1760*; Bonnefoy, "Maximilien Titon," pp. 361, 363–364; idem, *Les armes*, p. 57; SHD GR A¹1613, no. 84, Dubois to Chamillart, 25 November 1702; SHD GR A¹1613, no. 98, Dubois to Chamillart, 12 December 1702..

28 SHD GR A¹1613, no. 21, Titon to Chamillart, 5 May 1702; SHD GR A²504(III), fol. 262v, Voysin to Dubois, 8 May 1710.

but by no means was his system sealed and under his total control. All the same, in the 1670s–90s he did galvanise gunsmith centres and accelerate production considerably, a remarkable achievement considering the low base at which France started in the mid-1660s. In the words of a later memorandum for Louis XV's chief minister, the duc de Bourbon, by 1688 France had "the most considerable establishments in Europe" for firearm production, and in the War of the Spanish Succession the kingdom could produce over 100,000 portable gunpowder weapons (not just through Titon) for the state and France's allies. In June 1702 Titon claimed Saint-Étienne and Charleville together could manufacture some 60,000 flintlocks per annum. Eighteen months later Titon noted he had over 2,000 workers to whom he had to pay weekly wages, and by July 1709 he claimed this had become 10,000!²⁹ In money terms, Titon was getting some 600,000 livres per annum in around 1695,³⁰ but with the price of muskets increasing early in the next decade (perhaps in part because Vauban and others recommended more be paid in order to get better quality work and material) this doubled. The set prices of the muskets fluctuated, but it is worth noting that matchlocks cost around 7 livres in the late 17th century, while flintlocks rose from around 8 livres in the 1680s to 13 livres from 1702, in part reflecting coinage devaluations. In 1706 Titon oversaw the delivery of weapons worth 1,555,560 livres, and in the following three years handled funds for his operations still worth over 1.25 million. The money came via payment orders from the *Trésor Royal* or the military paymasters. This was a staggering industrial operation, albeit one that was scattered between different areas of the kingdom, and grounded in artisanal workshops and multi-layered contractual organisation. Titon was the lynchpin for masterminding the commissioning and delivering of around two-thirds of the weapons produced in the kingdom. In the end the scale of industrial activity was massive for its time, but, as the war minister Michel Chamillart (1652–1721) admitted, in the War of the Spanish Succession it was unfortunately still not big enough for the needs of the state, and it is far from clear that all orders were delivered.³¹

29 SHD AA 4w467: [Mémoire] 'A Son Altesse Serenissime Monseigneur le Duc', [1723–25] (quotation); SHD GR A¹613, no. 42, Titon to Chamillart, 17 June 1702; AN G⁷1775, no. 296, Titon to Chamillart, 17 November 1703; AN G⁷1785, no. 143, *placet* from Titon, July 1709.

30 AN G⁷1789, no. 164, memorandum on artillery, [ca. 1695–96]. This document implies Titon was delivering some 60,000–70,000 muskets, both matchlock and flintlock, while there were apparently a lot of (siege) tools bound up in his contracts too.

31 AN G⁷1779, no. 119, *état*, April 1707; AN G⁷1785, no. 141, *Etat*, 18 June 1709; SHD GR A¹2504(111), fol. 203v: Chamillart to Rochebonne, 10 July 1708. To put this in perspective, this was about one per cent of total land military spending at this time, but a crucial one per cent nonetheless.

3 Cutting Corners and Profiteering at the Expense of the King and Workers

It was equally unfortunate that the quality of the weapons left a lot to be desired. Around 1700 Vauban fulminated that flintlocks then in service were deficient because too little was being paid for them and not enough application was going into them: “one wants them at too cheap a price.” Seven years earlier, referring to matchlocks, the comte de Tessé, second-in-command of the army of Italy, raged to his superior, “I would like Titon to be hanged, and the barrel founders, because everything bursts.”³² The fault lay partly with poorly-trained troops, who rammed too much powder down barrels with necessarily thin walls, or maintained barrel cleanliness with corrosive materials. But this should not be used to overlook Titon’s corner-cutting and profiteering, as Bonnefoy did in his overviews and general conclusions. An artillery field commander in 1702 noted of the troops serving the British and Dutch governments in the opposing Grand Alliance, “their arms are assuredly better, and the fusil [flintlock] barrels stronger.” The Grand Master of this arm, the king’s illegitimate son the duc du Maine, himself noted of captured Allied small arms: “these arms are normally a great deal better than ours.” The price France paid was in maimed soldiers as barrels burst in their faces.³³

Some degree of corner-cutting and self-protection was necessary for any contractors working for Louis XIV in the last two wars of his reign, as argued above. At times Titon did suffer from a liquidity crisis, and in 1709 he was just as much a victim as anyone of the collapse of Samuel Bernard that brought the great crash in Lyon. In June 1709 his property was sequestered on court application by his creditors, when he found himself owing some 3 million livres: this was because the king owed him some 2.39 million, while various local authorities and regiments, who ordered weapons directly from him, owed another 730,000 livres. *Contrôleur général des finances* Desmaretz had to order the Paris *consuls* to accord Titon a suspension of proceedings against him.³⁴

32 Vauban, “Moyens d’améliorer nos troupes ...,” [mainly reflecting ca. 1700 situation], in *Les Oisivetés de Monsieur de Vauban*, ed. Michèle Virol (Seyssel, 2007), p. 1144; SHD GR A¹1223, fol. 27v, Tessé to Catinat, 5 August 1693.

33 SHD AA 3W117: *Memoire du Sr Pelletier Lieutenant d’Art^{ie}*, 1702; AN M1004/46, Maine to Chamillart, 19 November 1708; AN M1017: *Memoire sur l’irregularité abusive qui se pratique a l’égard du Grand Maistre*, 25 November 1715.

34 AN G⁷1785, no. 140, Titon to Desmaretz, 27 June 1709; AN G⁷1785, no. 141, *Etat*, 18 June 1709; AN G⁷1783, no. 330, Titon to Desmaretz, 18 August 1709.

On the other hand, Titon had already, in his 1702 contract, built in margins for the costs of commissioning, wrapping, storing, and maintaining weapons, as well as interest on any stop-gap credit he might have to offer the king, and a little something for his *peines et soins*. This provided perhaps a 25–30 per cent margin over the cost of the actual raw materials and work on the weapons.³⁵ None of this stopped Titon from clamouring for additional indemnification as problems of royal cashflow mounted during the coming years. By November 1704 he was demanding Chamillart – as both war minister and *Contrôleur général des finances* – authorise compensation for covering his advances. This came sporadically. In late 1706 he was authorised to support his operations and draw 1.6 million livres by acting as the selling agent (*traitant*) for the sale of offices in the *Eaux et Forêts* (Waterways and Forests) administration, positions that were created deliberately to pay Titon's outstanding costs for the arms he had provided in 1705 and 1706. In March 1709 Chamillart could not compensate Titon for the losses he had made when forced to discount revenue-assignment instruments he had been given, so instead he provided him with fresh, unused fund sources. As a measure of how important Titon's arms deliveries are, it is worth noting that this move damaged the budget for the *Extraordinaire des Guerres* paymasters. Titon then had to sell these new instruments for whatever he could get, which inevitably meant further discounting.³⁶ Once Chamillart, with his hopeless handling of appropriations, had ceded office to Nicolas Desmaretz (1648–1721) for finance and Daniel Voysin (1655–1717) for the army, these two ministers did attempt to keep Titon's operations going, something Voysin regarded as “extremely essential” for the war effort. By September 1710 he seems to have been the top priority recipient of payments once the armies entered winter quarters and food for the field forces was no longer the top priority. Three months later Voysin even gave him 10,000 livres that had been earmarked for troops' wages. Titon's apparently parlous situation required that he, or rather his workers through him, be prioritised over ordinary soldiers.³⁷ None of this stopped Titon's heirs claiming later to the duc de Bourbon that he had had no indemnity whatsoever for discounting of instruments he had been forced to sell on, taking all such losses on his own credit. This was stretching

35 Bonnefoy, *Les armes*, p. 468.

36 AN G⁷1776, no. 430, Titon to Chamillart, 8 November 1704; AN G⁷1779, no. 76, Titon to [Le Rebours?], 19 December 1706; Jean-Claude Waquet, *Les grands maîtres des eaux et forêts de France de 1689 à la Révolution* (Paris, 1978), pp. 21–22; SHD GR A¹2490(iv), no. 651, Chamillart to Titon, 5 March 1709.

37 AN G⁷1784, no. 36, Voysin to Desmaretz, 29 August 1709 (quotation); SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 283v, Voysin to Titon, 1 September; SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 294r, Voysin to Méliand, 27 December 1710.

the truth at best, considering all kinds of additional resources had been flung his way to compensate him.³⁸

How much of the regular and additional payments went on legitimate procurement expenses is unknown, but there are enough clues to suggest a certain amount was creamed off beyond the expectation set in the various contractual arrangements between Titon and the war ministry. It did not help that Titon's accounting arrangements were a mess. There had been no proper accounting to the government for his deliveries in the 1690s, and the totality of his orders was not turned into accounting data. In 1705 he denied there were any itemisation documents or written contracts with workers – at least, none that he could produce, given activity was embedded in a series of notarial agreements, subject to professional secrecy, that linked worker to sub-contractor and sub-contractor to Titon. Certainly he had not thus far been compelled to produce anything like these for the treasurers general of the *Extraordinaire des Guerres*. What did exist were orders from the ministers to Titon, and general contractual arrangements between Titon et al. and workers. The actual orders given by Titon's agents to workers, Bonnefoy has suggested, were often oral; and precious few documents were generated itemising payment by Titon to his agents and on to the workers.³⁹ Such accounts as Titon did submit were not verified for several years after the end of the calendar year in question, and they appear to have been really rather incomplete if not random. After his death, the *premier commis* in the war ministry, Pleneuf, came to realise that – in spite of having ordered from Titon perhaps some 1.5–2 million weapons over the previous 40 years – successive *Secrétaires d'état de la guerre* had accumulated very little by way of documentation about his business in their bureaux.⁴⁰

Accounting and accountability was not helped by poor oversight of production on the ground. There was little by way of a systematic inspection system for musket manufacture under Louis XIV, even though individuals were given the status of *Contrôleur d'armes* in both Charleville and Saint-Étienne. And those who occupied such positions down the decades were not uniformly competent. At Charleville in the War of the Spanish Succession Loche, also

38 SHD GR A¹3779, no. 67, *Memoire sur les fonctions de Grand M^e de l'Artillerie* by duc du Maine, 30 January 1701.

39 This degree of obscurity and paucity of record keeping is best compared with the world of the international bankers working for Louis XIV at this time, with opacity in their processes of commissioning and paying other sub-contracting bankers and so on. The accounting records for the senior military paymasters, seriously weak though they were, were transparent in comparison with those of the bankers or Titon.

40 AN G⁷1789, no. 164, memorandum on artillery, [ca. 1695–96]; Bonnefoy, *Les armes*, p. 513; SHD GR A¹2504(111), fol. 317v, Pleneuf to Villegenon, 23 August 1711.

contrôleur of the local military hospital, was supposed to send fortnightly statements of testing, distribution and shipping out of arms, but he was negligent in his duties, used testing techniques prohibited by the ministry, and eventually had to be fired. Chapuis, his counterpart at the same time in Saint-Étienne, was similarly negligent, and in March 1711 had to be berated for not sending reports for over two years.⁴¹ Some scrutineers were outright corrupt, and there were several instances of collusion between them and the Titon network. At Charleville, Titon and Fournier had tried to corrupt Gaillard by paying him additional monies not authorised by the king, and he seems to have taken kickbacks of 8 deniers per gun barrel while fraudulently certifying the number of muskets made. He ended up in prison at the end of 1691.⁴² In 1703 Carrier in Saint-Étienne got rid of a musketlock *contrôleur* who was trying to protect lock-makers against him and the other contractors.⁴³

If the gunsmiths themselves were also seeking to cut corners, it is not altogether surprising given the abusive nature of contracts with the Titon network. Fournier extended his oppression from the workers of Charleville to those in Sedan, another arms centre only some 18 kilometers distant, and during 1690 royal *intendant* Michel-Louis de Malézieu (d. 1717) – who watched like a hawk for corruption in his jurisdiction – had to step in to permit them to work freely for others if Fournier had no work for them. From this it is clear Fournier sought to monopolise the time of his contracted workers, and prevent them earning a living when he had no call on them. Malézieu also forced up the pay of workers in Charleville.⁴⁴ Titon himself seems to have kept his distance from the ground-level exploitation of their workers, but the terms of business he set were anything but generous. As he and his agents provided the workers with the raw materials, there was the chance for buying cheap and selling dear. Indeed, Bonnefoy estimated Titon might have made up to a 35 per cent profit on these sales in the 1700s, and if one reckons that his expenses per finished musket were more than covered by the 25–30 per cent margin built into the 1702 contract (and earlier ones), this was a route to considerable profiteering.⁴⁵ Here is a classic example of information asymmetry at the heart of the principal-agent

41 SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 292v, Voysin to Loche, 6 December 1710; SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 316v, Voysin to L'Escalopier, 8 August 1711; SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 296r, Voysin to Chapuis, 25 March 1711.

42 SHD GR A¹958, no. 284, Malézieu to Louvois, 8 November 1690; Bonnefoy, *Les armes*, p. 80.

43 Patrick Mortal, *Les armuriers de l'État: Du Grand Siècle à la globalisation, 1665–1989* (Ville-neuve d'Ascq, 2007). Available at <https://books.openedition.org/septentrion/57102?lang=en>, paragraph 65. Accessed 16 July 2021.

44 Manceau, *Manufacture*, pp. 20–21.

45 Bonnefoy, *Les armes*, p. 566.

conundrum: the state did not know the real price of raw materials, nor did the workers (except in their own immediate area), but the super-contractor knew where to get the cheapest materials and how to drive the hardest bargains in doing so; he could then achieve large hidden profits even before the manufacturing process for the guns had begun. If – as he did – he could also operate his own forges and keep workers there similarly low-paid, this too could keep down the costs of passing some of the materials to the artisans in Charleville. At Saint-Étienne, where Titon was more in the hands of his associates, he had no direct-supply operations himself, and the artisans had long-standing sourcing networks, the scope for direct profiteering was less, but it was not non-existent, especially in times of pressure. In 1693–94 in Saint-Étienne Titon used rag-and-bone women to buy up gun-barrels at below the fixed rate during the famine and major recession. But this sort of behaviour had consequences: the workers were pushed down to states of starvation, and died in their scores over the 1693–94 winter. The local *intendant* Bérulle, scion of a pious family and morally outraged by these actions, expostulated to the *Contrôleur général* that he needed to install someone in Saint-Étienne who could “prevent the Sr Titon from abusing the misery and need of the workers to get arms at whatever price he wants.”⁴⁶

Alas, things were little better in the following war. As things got tight for Titon’s cash-flow, he and his cronies used crafty means to reduce their liabilities. The king, short of ready cash, gave Titon oats in 1710 with which to pay his workers in northern France at around 18 livres per 200-pound sack, but somewhere in the process there seems to have been sharp practice, probably involving rates at which it was passed on, that caused some disgruntlement.⁴⁷ Three years later war minister Voysin chastised Titon de Villegenon for settling a 25,000-livres debt to Claude de Vien, an *armurier* at Saint-Étienne, using financial assignment bills due for maturity only in 1716!⁴⁸ Villegenon clearly preferred to rid himself of long-dated financial instruments rather than trade them at a discount to find the cash to pay larger debts to his workers.

Could much be done to stop this sort of behaviour? The short answer in war-time was no, something the experienced military *intendant* Antoine François Méliand (1670–1747) admitted to Voysin in December 1710. When the financial flow to Titon slowed down, he would seemingly take little action to prevent

46 CCG, 1, p. 352, to Pontchartrain, 26 January 1694.

47 SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 282r, Voysin to Harouys, 5 September 1710; SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 291v, to Galand, 23 November 1710, clarifying that at least the worst accusations – of a 120 per cent mark-up in passing on foodstuffs – seem not to have been true.

48 SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 360r, Voysin to Villegenon, 5 August 1713.

his bills of exchange – used to send money to Charleville and Saint-Étienne – from being protested (i.e. being returned after being refused by their nominated payers in the area). He would stop production, or threatened to do so, and by August 1709 work at Saint-Étienne had completely halted, with little prospect of immediate revival.⁴⁹ By that year, Titon was quite willing to hang his own agents out to dry to save his own position. In February the contractors at Saint-Étienne – desperate to get some cash locally – had borrowed in Titon's name and drawn bills of exchange on him to be paid in Paris (something I term 'inverse remitting'), but these were then refused by Titon himself, causing his agents enormous trouble with various commercial tribunals, including in nearby Lyon, the city crucial to their activities. Never mind the ordinary workers, Titon's contractors too were on the floor, could buy no raw materials, and in turn could not supply work to starving artisans. In September Louis Carrier informed the *Contrôleur général* that, under threat of bankruptcy, even he had had to flee Saint-Étienne.⁵⁰ Worth noting is that in Charleville, where Titon had more of a direct physical stake in work, there seems to have been much less of a deterioration in productive activity and financial solvency.

At best, then, local royal *intendants* could flag up the worst excesses of exploitative behaviour and appeal to the minister to authorise some ameliorations. But they had to contend with the ferocious and manipulative, sometimes mendacious lobbying of Titon himself, a man who fought hard to preserve position and also his order book. His correspondence betrays his nervousness that ministers might turn to other arms centres, including Liège and Namur, and exposes his willingness to ridicule the abilities and trash the reputations of even small-fry contractors not under his umbrella.⁵¹ In 1704, trying to strangle in its cradle the new arms centre of Maubeuge, Titon gleefully pointed out to minister Chamillart its troubles delivering to the prestigious *Gardes Françaises*, but he did not stop at playing the ball. Spitting a sense of entitlement and condescension, he tried to take away the legs of the Maubeuge entrepreneur, Robert Daretz, too:

It is not the business of such small contractors to dare to undertake such furnishings. They are neither strong enough nor practiced enough ever to

49 Bonnefoy, *Les armes*, pp. 667–668; SHD GR A¹613, no. 36, Titon to Chamillart, 29 May 1702; AN G⁷1776, no. 245, Titon to Chamillart, 3 December; AN G⁷1776, no. 252, Titon to Chamillart, 28 December 1704; CCG, 3, ed. Arthur-Michel de Boislisle (Paris, 1897), p. 116, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 27 August 1709.

50 AN G⁷1011, petition *A M. Le Rebours*, [February 1709]; AN G⁷1784, no. 17: *placet* from Louis Carrier, [September 1709].

51 SHD GR A¹613, no. 42, Titon to Chamillart, 17 June 1702; SHD GR A¹613, no. 65, Titon to Chamillart, 1 August 1702.

succeed, but the sole design of these types of little people, and on the bad advice given to them particularly by M. D'Artagnan, ends only in disturbing me in my service under a false pretext.⁵²

Of course, as the renowned economist-statesman Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727–81) later pointed out, “There is not one merchant who would not wish to be the sole vendor of his wares. There is no trade in which those who practice it do not seek to drive away the competition.”⁵³ All the same, Titon – like Samuel Bernard in the banking world – abused his possession of the ears of ministers to try to quash anyone not under his domination, usually insisting that any derogation from his contractual umbrella would harm the king’s service. This did not stop Titon from losing his commanding position in the last three years of his life, but he did remain the monarchy’s most favoured arms contractor by a long way. Indeed, in the painful process of sustaining and clearing the crown’s liabilities in late spring 1715, *Contrôleur général* Desmaretz listed the Titon family by name as fourth in line for support after (1) the *Caisse Legendre* (a financial consortium of tax receivers by then propping up the state), (2) the payment of the *rentes* on the Paris *Hôtel de ville* (government annuities, the mainstay of long-term debt), and (3) the land armies’ paymasters, the *Extraordinaire des Guerres*.⁵⁴

This was favour indeed, and there are strong suspicions that Titon could depend – at least until 1704 – on friends in quite high places to cover his tracks. Germain Michel Camus de Beaulieu (1635–1704), the deeply corrupt *Contrôleur général* of the artillery, seems to have tried to stymie any increase in supervision over firearms contracting early in the War of the Spanish Succession, rebutting the reasoning of his own boss, the duc du Maine as Grand Master, that suggested they might assume jurisdiction over it and subject it to the oversight of knowledgeable artillery officers.⁵⁵ Twelve years after Beaulieu’s death that is precisely what happened.⁵⁶ Others, however, took a much dimmer view of Titon’s activities. Titon himself had tried in 1701 to effect a complete venalisation of the *Extraordinaire des Guerres* treasury network, using

52 AN G⁷1790, no. 17, Titon to Chamillart, 17 February 1704.

53 Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, *Oeuvres de Turgot*, ed. Eugène Daire, 1 (Paris, 1844), p. 380, Turgot to Terray, 24 December 1773.

54 CCG, 3, p. 632, [*mémoire* by Desmaretz], 1 May 1715. There were five other classes of people to be paid off. Strikingly, among the suppliers in place four, only three others are so indispensable as to be mentioned by name.

55 SHD GR A¹3779, no. 67, *Mémoire sur les fonctions de Grand M^e de l’Artillerie* by duc du Maine, with comments by Artillery *Contrôleur général* Camus de Beaulieu, 30 January 1701.

56 SHD AA 4W467, [Memo], 12 May 1716.

Mairon, its *commis* in Charleville, as his cat's paw, in order to rake in a large cut of any sales. This was at a time when he did not need to be bailed out at all. But someone else, back in 1697, had tried to disrupt Titon's own system in a similar way: in a memorandum proposing the venalisation of artillery posts, the anonymous writer (certainly a powerful financier) argued it was important that the man in charge of arming the troops was endowed "with an office and a character of distinction, in order that he is not, as he currently is, in the status of a merchant whom one can reasonably suspect of having good and bad wares."⁵⁷ It is tempting to dismiss this as a kick-down remark by an insecure social *parvenu* against someone just below him on the status ladder, but Jean-Étienne Berthelot de Pleneuf (1663–1727), chief administrator of the artillery and himself a deeply corrupt financier who knew a rogue when he saw one, openly warned about accepting Titon's estimates of prices because he was so 'suspect' as an interested party. The hardened war minister Voysin, drawing on his experiences dealing with Titon and firearms contractors, expressed weary scepticism about an idea for creating a similar system for bayonet and tool manufacturing, "given the contractor would be more attached to gain on his contract than to make these arms and tools good quality." Finally, no less a figure than the king's personal military adviser, the sieur de Chamlay, in 1709 dispassionately added to criticism of Titon's products, comparing them unfavourably with those of Germany and Liège both on grounds of quality and cost.⁵⁸ Those in the know knew very well how sub-optimal the firearms manufacturing system was, even before the travails brought on by the War of the Spanish Succession, and even by the standards of the time. But it was the very dependence on Titon for organising the rearming of the French infantry in that war that made him, for its duration, indispensable as at least the hegemonic firearms contractor.

People could also see for themselves how well Titon had done personally, even as the state and his own workers had slid into a parlous economic condition. The *inventaire après décès* of Maximilien Titon in 1711, examined by Bonnefoy, put his net worth at over 3.24 million livres, not bad for a man whose father had died worth only some 10,000 livres.⁵⁹ To put this in perspective, the average ducal fortune at time of marriage during Louis XIV's 'personal rule' and the subsequent Regency was just under 1 million livres, while at time of death

57 AN G⁷1789, no. 130, *Proposition pour la Creation de plusieurs Charges dans l'Artillerie*, [1697]; SHD GR A¹526, no. 171, Titon to Chamillart, 6 July 1701; SHD GR A¹526, no. 258, [*mémoire* by Mairon], August 1701.

58 SHD GR A¹1990(V), no. 1188, Pleneuf to Saint-Hilaire, 28 August 1706; SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 285r, Voysin to chevalier de Maulevrier, 28 September 1710; SHD GR A¹2471, no. 27, *Considerations sur plusieurs choses ...* memorandum by Chamlay, July 1709.

59 Bonnefoy, *Les armes*, p. 569; idem, "Maximilien Titon," pp. 355–373.

it was usually less than 2 million. Titon's estate in 1711 was worth no less than about half the apanage of the king's grandson, the duc de Berry!⁶⁰ To build this up, Titon notionally would have had to have saved up – on average between 1665 and 1711 – roughly 70,000 livres per annum.⁶¹ Some of his wealth certainly came from activities as a *traitant*, involved in other state financial contracts unrelated to arms, and he was also an investor in the *Compagnie de la Mer du Sud* and the *Compagnie de Chine*. But most will have come from his arms dealing to the state.

Even if people were not privy to the family wealth secrets, they could in any case see the physical manifestations of Titon's enrichment, and in this he was not untypical of the top fisco-financiers of the kingdom, merely a more brazen version. For not only did he buy a run-down estate at Ornon near Senlis in 1676 and improve it considerably, the gardens of which are still considered a monument to 18th-century gentility; not only did he buy the estate of Le Plessis-Chamant in 1692 and another at La Selle-sur-le-Bied in 1695 for his daughter and son-in-law (incidentally, the son of the king's *premier médecin* d'Aquin); not only did he buy Villegenon near Sancerre and in 1691 Thaumiers in the Bourbonnais, both for his son Louis-Maximilien.⁶² From 1673 he also began the building of the so-called Folie Titon in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine just outside Paris (now in the 11th *arrondissement*). This immense domain took up an area of some three hectares, and its interior panelling was so splendid that some of it is still preserved in the *Musée Jacquemart-André*. From its grounds in 1783 the Mongolfier brothers took off in their balloon achieving heights the ambitious Titon might never even have dreamed of. His children also owned further properties in Paris.⁶³ This was a property portfolio rivalled only by ministerial families and royal princes. It was not acquired through rather small commissions on organising the making of muskets.

It was little wonder that in August 1711, eight months after Maximilien died, Voysin demanded of his grandson Maximilien-Louis Titon de Villegenon (1681–1758) all the details of arms production, and insisted on seeing proofs

60 Jean-Pierre Labatut, *Les ducs et pairs de France au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1972), pp. 248, 260, and 267.

61 By contrast, a stonemason of the time might bring in anywhere between 500 and 750 livres a year, and the average French subject perhaps 200 livres.

62 Bonnefoy, "Maximilien Titon," p. 374 (Bonnefoy misread the documents: it is not Du Plessis-Choiseil); [Philippe Hernandez], *Description de la généralité de Paris* (Paris, 1759), p. 166. Ognon and Le Plessis are within 3 kilometres of each other, La Selle 130 kilometres further south near Montargis in the Gâtinais.

63 Hartmann hugely underestimated the size of the Folie Titon grounds: Hartmann, "Ancienne Maison," p. 289. See also Félix de Rohegude, Maurice Dumolin, *Guide pratique à travers le vieux Paris* (Paris, 1923), pp. 66, 309.

of the family's claimed powers and rights, especially any documents from 1666 that upheld their *titre* to run arms magazines. This was nothing short of a major enquiry into the Titon family's business affairs, especially in regard to their control over depots and Saint-Étienne.⁶⁴ But it would take the death of Louis XIV, and almost certainly a political deal between the Regent Orléans, who had always suspected the Titon, and his arch-rival the duc du Maine, who wanted to bring the small arms industries under artillery control, to gain a stronger grip on the manufacture of armaments in Charleville, Saint-Étienne, and other locations.⁶⁵

4 Concluding Thoughts

The great 'organiser of victory' in the Revolutionary Terror, Lazare Carnot (1753–1823), at the heart of a regime dedicated to virtue and the rooting out of antisocial profiteers, nevertheless thought that using contractors – rather than state armaments factories – was the best way to achieve high levels of production. Be that as it may, the regimes that succeeded that of Louis XIV paid far greater attention to the ways they worked with entrepreneurs.⁶⁶ When it came to small arms production, regulations and intelligent incentives were put in place in preference to endowing a hegemonic figure with the role of mega-broker, who would then mobilise sub-contractors and artisans on the king's behalf in a mist of obscurity. The documentation from the Regency after 1715 leaves a reader in little doubt that this new government was determined to learn lessons and recast the system to use several entrepreneurs rather than permit itself to be dependent on one great mobiliser.⁶⁷ Half a century later efforts to standardise infantry muskets were also extended to other firearms,

64 SHD GR A¹2504(III), fol. 317v, Pleneuf to Villegenon, 23 August 1711.

65 AN M1017, *Memoire sur l'irregularité abusive qui se pratique a l'egard du Grand Maistre*, 25 November 1715.

66 The role of entrepreneurs in the Revolutionary Wars is massively understudied. Carnot drew distinctions between good and bad entrepreneurs, but made very clear that using a number of contractors to make arms was far better than establishing a state-owned factory under the domination of a single dubious individual. In this he was following post-1716 wisdom: Lazare Carnot, *Correspondance générale de Carnot*, ed. Étienne Charavay, 3 (Paris, 1897), p. 104, Carnot for the Comité de Salut Public to Legendre de Nièvre, 8 September 1793.

67 Notably: Bibliothèque national de France, *imprimés*, F-4746(14): *Ordonnance du Roy, portant reglement pour le bon ordre que Sa Majesté veut estre observé dans les Manufactures d'Armes, establies à Charleville et à Maubeuge*, 10 July 1722; AN M1006/91, Maine to Bouchard, Roubay fils, and du Saussay, 28 October 1716.

with a tangible sense by the Seven Years' War that there had been considerable improvements in quality (even if there were abject failures to sustain sufficient production in the 1730s–50s).⁶⁸

By that time, but only just, the account had finally been closed on the Titon family's services to Louis XIV in 1754, and the last of their matchlock muskets were only removed from depots that decade.⁶⁹ This alone gives a sense of the extent, complexity, and opacity of arrangements between 1665 and 1715. The epic of Maximilien Titon's direction of arms magazines and large chunks of industrial arms production acts as a window into the way the French state could in this period finally begin to mobilise immense resources. However, by virtue of a short-sighted view that ministers could adequately police the details of contracts, and in consequence of poor accounting and limited insistence upon it, of cronyism, and then in the 1700s of sheer administrative disintegration in the finances and desperation, this expansion of weaponry came at the expense of tight control, the lives of soldiers, and the prosperity of skilled artisans. Louis XIV's state was engaged – especially from the 1680s – in a drive for massive expansion in weaponry, and it pushed procurement of men, matériel, and money to impressive and unprecedented new heights. But in its employment of poorly-scrutinised mega-contractors it pursued this path with a near-reckless disregard for upholding quality and value-for-money. It is possible this did not matter in the great business of getting arms to the king's troops, but the evidence from Colbert's tenure in the navy ministry, and in the attempts by the Regent Orléans to close the door to abuse, indicates that to some powerful contemporaries it most certainly did.

68 SHD AA 4W467: *Memoire sur la manufacture d'armes établies dans le Royaume*, May 1759 and *Mémoire sur la Manufacture de St Etienne, Vers 1760*.

69 SHD AA 5W18, *Memoire sur le Magasin Royal des armes à Paris*, [1754]; Bonnefoy, *Les armes*, pp. 389, 399.

The Officer as Military Entrepreneur in *Miles Perpetuus*: Examples from the Armies in the Empire 1650–1800

Alexander Querengässer

The finding that military service was anything but financially lucrative for many nobles is regarded as old hat in German-language research. But up to now, research both on the nobility and on the early modern military has largely limited itself to showing that the income of lower ranks was not sufficient for leading a lavish lifestyle.¹ There would only be opportunities for officers to improve their revenues when being appointed to a captain's position and taking over their own company.²

These perspectives mainly focus on the negative aspects of so-called 'company business'. Over the course of the Enlightenment and at the time of the Prussian reformers at the latest, this military economic system fell into

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- 1 "The officer did not exercise a profession in the modern sense. His primary aim was not bread-winning. He performed rather an honorary service, which offered him particular prestige and supposed closeness to his monarch. The high social position was not reflected in the salary, however", see *Grundkurs deutsche Militärgeschichte*, 1, ed. Karl-Volker Neugebauer (Munich, 2009), p. 86. "In military service as well, it was evidently more about renown befitting one's status than profitability", see Michael Sikora, *Adel in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Darmstadt, 2009), p. 58. "Rising up the ranks in the army went very slowly, and many young officers had to take loans or go into debt to live in a way befitting their status. It was only when an officer received a company that he could count on lucrative revenues", see Rudolf Endress, *Adel in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Munich, 1993), p. 44. On the other hand, Christopher Duffy already wrote 35 years ago: "A well-endowed captain or colonel could pay for a better class of recruit, keep the soldier's uniforms and shoes in good order, and help the subalterns and other officers who might otherwise be in danger of literal starvation. Private resources served as a cushion against disasters", see Christopher Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (London, 1987), p. 62.
 - 2 Bernhard R. Kroener, *Kriegswesen, Herrschaft und Gesellschaft 1300–1800* (Munich, 2013), p. 53: "Only those who could afford it economically and hoped thus to improve their material situation felt the call to possess a company." Jutta Nowosadtko similarly suggests that "the military caste is a privileged caste with its own laws, chain of authority and system of justice", see Jutta Nowosadtko, "Die 'Verstaatlichung' stehender Heere in systemtheoretischer Perspektive," in *Herrschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit: Umriss eines dynamisch-kommunikativen Prozesses*, eds. Ralf Pröve, Markus Meumann (Münster, 2004), 121–141, pp. 132–133.

disrepute as supposedly corrupt, and these criticisms are still to be found in the research literature to this day. Those who possessed companies and regiments were accused of having enriched themselves with the money provided by the local rulers or the state and thus to have harmed the latter.³ This view is essentially based on an idea of modern statehood that did not yet exist in the 17th and early 18th centuries and hence also of state regulation of the military that at this time was not and could not have been anywhere near as developed as the critics presuppose.

In his study of the French army in the 17th century, John A. Lynn has put forth a contrary thesis,⁴ which is now also supported by the work of David Parrott.⁵ Rather than enriching themselves at the cost of local rulers or the state, the nobility served as one of the main pillars of the standing French army in its early days. In fact, rulers lacked the financial resources and the corresponding administrative apparatus for maintaining a large standing army. This gap was filled by the noble holders of regiments and companies, who used their private wealth or creditworthiness to secure the upkeep of the formations with which they were entrusted. The financial tricks that were later criticised – for instance, the retaining of pay for soldiers who had died, been dismissed or never existed – only served to offset some of these officers' losses. Lynn assumes that the money that noble officers put into the upkeep of their formations far exceeded the sums that the local ruler provided them. The motive for incurring these losses was the prestige that military service offered nobles.⁶

3 Thus, for example, John Childs, *Warfare in the Seventeenth Century* (London, 2001), p. 99.

4 John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army 1610–1715* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 236: "More than any other factor, the burdens imposed by the maintenance system dictated that officers be well-to-do. Throughout the seventeenth century, the king and his ministers recognized the imperative that colonels and captains possess the means to maintain their units."

5 Lynn already in fact draws on Parrott's doctoral thesis, which was not yet published at the time. In it, Parrot also makes clear that the financial contribution of the nobility to the military was considerably greater than to civil administration: "for while civil office might prove a poor investment, military office would almost inevitably cause considerable financial loss", in David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge, 2001), p. 320. Parrott also sees strong continuity with military entrepreneurship in the period of the Thirty Years' War, see David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 260–306.

6 Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, p. 239: "How one views the financial impact of the maintenance system determines how one deals with the phenomenon of fraud by officers. If they paid a heavy price in the normal course of their duties, then cheating on *passé volants*, clothing allowances, and so forth may not have been evidence of boundless greed but instead simply a means to stave off financial collapse."

In the meanwhile, this phenomenon has also been shown for other early modern armies, for instance, the Spanish army under Philip V.⁷ Unfortunately, research on the militaries of most of the armed German *Reichsstände* (imperial estates) has not progressed enough to allow us to transfer Lynn's and Parrott's findings to the latter. However, an important groundwork – to which both Lynn and Parrott refer – was already written almost 60 years ago by Fritz Redlich: *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*,⁸ which since then, however, has hardly been drawn upon in German-language research for the period after 1648. The example of the French kingdom is certainly not transferable to the German case without further ado, since in order to be able to rely so massively on his officers, there had to be a financially strong nobility, which certainly applied to parts of the high French nobility, but not to many families of the northern German lower nobility.

The present essay aims to examine to what extent the German nobility also used their own funds to contribute to the upkeep of standing armies in the 17th and 18th centuries. In terms of sources, the phenomenon is not easy to grasp and almost impossible to quantify, since, understandably, the financial contribution of noble officers rarely turns up in official accounts. Instead, such practices mostly become evident in allusions in letters or entreaties of over-indebted officers. Unfortunately, due to the context in which the essay came into being – archives and libraries were repeatedly closed for extended periods during the Corona pandemic – it was not possible to consult all the collections and archives that the author had originally planned to visit.

The chronological focus of the essay is mainly the period 1650–1763, i.e. from the emergence of standing armies after the Thirty Years' War to the end of the Seven Years' War. But the phenomenon can already be observed earlier in the German territories. Thus, Otto Christoph von Sparr (1605–68), who was at the time a general in the service of Brandenburg, complained to his former comrade in the imperial army, Octavio Piccolomini (1599–1656), that in the later years of the Thirty Years' War he “always, apart from a few recruits, restored and maintained” his regiment “from my own resources.”⁹ It was not until 1653 that the Emperor settled his debts to Sparr, which came to a stately

7 Christopher Storrs, *The Spanish Resurgence 1713–1748* (New Haven/London, 2016), pp. 29–31.

8 Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 1–2 (Wiesbaden, 1964–65). On ‘company business’, see vol. 2, pp. 77–88.

9 Quoted in Frank Göse, *Der erste brandenburg-preußische Generalfeldmarschall Otto Christoph Freiherr von Sparr 1605–1668* (Berlin, 2006), p. 84.

24,000 reichstalers. In this respect, there is a large continuity between the military entrepreneur of the 16th and early 17th centuries and the – mostly but not exclusively – noble officer of the late 17th and early 18th centuries.

1 German Nobility and German Armies in the Early Modern Period

Before going into the practice of noble officers in princely service ‘subsidising’ early modern armies, we have first to show the differences in the landscape of the nobility in the Empire as compared, say, to France or Spain. During the early modern period, both of the latter countries developed into centralised monarchies in which the right to raise an army belonged to the crown. This clearly distinguished Spain and France from the Empire, in which the individual imperial estates appropriated the right to arm themselves and secured constitutional anchoring for it in the wake of the Peace of Westphalia as a result. The high nobility of the Empire evolved into quasi-sovereign princes.¹⁰

The leading families of the high nobility of the Empire, who were also autonomous territorial rulers, thus began to raise their own armies during the second half of the 17th century: the Hohenzollerns in Brandenburg, the Welfs in Braunschweig, the Wettins in Saxony, the Wittelsbachs in Bavaria. This brings out a difference between the latter and the leading families of the French and Spanish upper mobility, which disposed of extensive territories, but were not precisely quasi-sovereign¹¹ princes. But it was precisely this social and economic elite that contributed its resources to raising their own regiments in the service of the crown. This phenomenon could even turn into its opposite in the Empire, inasmuch as the major imperial princes gained access to the resources of smaller estates. Thus, in the 17th century, Electoral Saxony and Electoral Brandenburg repeatedly fought for the right to levy contributions from the principalities of the Harz region, on the grounds that they would assume responsibility for raising a contingent for the imperial army in return.¹² Another means of reducing costs consisted of ‘leasing’ the troops, once recruited, to a subsidising power in the event of a conflict. England and

10 See Reinhard Steiger, “Die Träger des ius belli ac pacis, 1648–1806,” in *Staat und Krieg. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Moderne*, ed. Werner Rösener (Göttingen, 2000), 115–135.

11 The imperial princes were likewise not sovereign or ‘absolute’, per Jean Bodin’s definition, since they still had the Emperor above them, see Utz Schliesky, *Souveränität und Legitimität von Herrschaftsgewalt: Die Weiterentwicklung von Begriffen der Staatslehre und des Staatsrechts im europäischen Mehrebenensystem* (Tübingen, 2004), pp. 74–76.

12 Alexander Querengässer, *The Saxon Mars and his Force: The Saxon Army during the Reign of John George III 1680–1691* (Warwick, 2020).

the Netherlands in particular, as well as Venice, had recourse to this means of enlarging their armies, which finally led smaller princelings also to establish standing troops,¹³ since they hoped to obtain economic gains from leasing them, which did not, however, work out in practice. Although often a losing proposition for the subsidy recipients, this practice does not figure among the phenomena we are looking at here, since economic gain, not social prestige, was the fundamental motive for it.

2 On the Role of Patronage – and Clientelistic Relationships

Apart from the hereditary Habsburg lands, the larger German territorial states lacked a high nobility. Nonetheless, service in the armies of Prussia, Saxony, Hannover, or Bavaria became attractive to many princes, who lacked the territorial basis for building up larger troop contingents of their own. A well-known example is the Principality of Anhalt-Dessau: an autonomous imperial estate that figured among the client states of Brandenburg-Prussia since the 17th century. The princes were the holders of a Prussian regiment (Anhalt-Dessau) and individual representatives rose to the rank of field marshal general (Leopold, 1676–1747; Leopold II Maximilian, 1700–51; Moritz, 1712–60). The Anhalt-Dessau Regiment enjoyed an elite status within the Prussian army. Nonetheless, its upkeep was subsidised by the princes time and again. When Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg reduced the regiment to four companies in the course of a downsizing of the army in the 1690s, Prince Leopold objected and concluded a new capitulation.¹⁴ In it, he agreed to assume the costs for bringing the regiment back up to the strength of ten companies.¹⁵

The relations between Electoral Saxony and the secundogeniture duchies of Saxony-Weissenfels, Saxony-Merseburg and Saxony-Zeitz, which had been established on the territory of the Electorate since 1656, proved to be somewhat

13 The significance of subsidy deals needs to be fundamentally reconsidered. For an older treatment, cf. Max Braubach, *Die Bedeutung der Subsidien für die Politik im spanischen Erbfolgekriege* (Bonn/Leipzig, 1923). On the current state of research, see *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020).

14 On the subject of capitulations, see Peter Wilson's chapter in this volume.

15 Uwe-Peter Böhm, "Das preußische Infanterieregiment des Fürsten Leopold I. von Anhalt-Dessau und seine Feldzüge in Europa," in *Fürst Leopold von Anhalt-Dessau 1676–1747: "Der Alte Dessauer": Ausstellung zum 250. Todestag*, eds. Museum für Naturkunde und Vorgeschichte Dessau, Museum für Stadtgeschichte Dessau, and Museum Schloß Mosigkau Dessau (Dessau, 1997), 26–37, p. 28.

more complicated. According to the testament of John George I (1585–1656) and the amicable fraternal main settlement (*Freundbrüderlichen Hauptvergleich*) concluded among his three sons in 1657, the three duchies remained part of the Electorate – and hence were also not represented in the Imperial Diet – but the three dukes could freely dispose of the domestic policy and economy of their territories.¹⁶ De facto Dresden still had only limited control over the secundogenitures, and although the *jus belli et pacis* continued to be the prerogative of the Elector, the dukes tenaciously and often successfully resisted efforts to raise recruits on their territory. Augustus the Strong (1670–1733) tried partly to get around this problem in the Great Northern War (1700–21) by concluding a capitulation with Duke Johann Georg of Saxony-Weissenfels (1677–1712) on the formation of an infantry regiment.¹⁷ The Elector-King tried in this way to integrate the secundogeniture principality, which was highly recalcitrant in military matters, more tightly into his war plans and to obtain recruits from this territory. The capitulation states in this respect that the regiment should “consist of nothing but capable people, for which purpose His Royal Majesty, in order to facilitate its raising, hereby leaves the contingent in the Thuringian area, in the upcoming selection of the men to his Highness”.¹⁸ In other words, Augustus the Strong allowed Duke Johann Georg to recruit soldiers in the Saxon areas, which were mostly part of the Electorate in any case, but also under the jurisdiction of the Duke. There is no evidence that the Duke invested his own financial resources in the formation of the regiment, but at least until he was enlisted into the service of Electoral Saxony, he had the ultimate authority over it. The contract was meant, in any event, to make Johann Georg feel that he contributed to the Electorate’s foreign policy from out of his own resources.

Many German princelings strove to possess a regiment in one of Europe’s major armies. Within the regiment, the holder disposed of the first company or *Leibkompanie*, and even if the holder was not responsible for provisioning the regiment as a whole, many of these first companies were equipped with better

16 But Saxony-Weissenfels also disposed of the territory of Querfurt, whose possession was linked to standing in the Imperial Diet. See, above all, *Barocke Fürstenresidenzen an Saale, Unstrut und Elster*, eds. Joachim Säckel, Karin Heise (Petersberg, 2007); *Sachsen und seine Sekundogenituren. Die Nebenlinien Weißenfels, Merseburg und Zeitz*, eds. Martina Schattkowsky, Manfred Wilde (Leipzig, 2010).

17 See Dresden, Sächsisches Staatsarchiv [SächsStA], 11237/23 Capitulationes, no folio number, presented as no. 1 capitulation in the records; SächsStA, 11237/897 capitulation, no folio number; SächsStA, 10026/2838/5 Capitulationes, fols. 13–71.

18 Quoted in SächsStA, 11237/23 Capitulationes, no folio number, presented as no. 1 capitulation in the records; SächsStA, 11237/897 capitulation, no folio number.

uniforms or filled with physically stronger soldiers for which larger sums of money had to be invested. This can be observed, for example, among the first companies of Ernestine dukes in the army of the Dutch States General.¹⁹

3 Company Business: Noble Income Source or Subsidy Deal?

German research continues to regard so-called company business as an established system of misappropriation of funds that allowed the noble officer – and this applies not only for the holders of a company, but also for those of regiment – to get rich at the expense of the state. This possibility is used in turn as an explanation for the purchasability of companies, which were regarded almost as a kind of ‘sinecure’ for the military caste. Thus, drawing on older studies, like that of Karl Demeter,²⁰ Bernhard Kroener noted:

The officer positions, which were simultaneously connected to the economic leadership of a unit or a formation, gave those who held them the opportunity to undertake profit-oriented activities by way of military logistics. The purchasability of the position of a company or regiment commander served here as capital invested in social advancement ... Every officer that wanted to receive the assignment of a commander position had, on the one hand, to have a certain initial capital, just as, on the other, he had to use his time in the service to “faire sa fortune”: which is to say, to achieve the required return.²¹

Was company business thus a – also albeit risky – dual profit opportunity for the noble officer, combining prestige with economic gains? There are a number of contemporary criticisms that support such findings.²²

19 See Oliver Heyn, “Militärisches Prestige und finanzielle Absicherung: Die Herzöge von Sachsen-Hildburghausen und die Vereinigten Niederlande (1680–1760)”, *Zeitschrift für Thüringische Geschichte* 71 (2017), 45–72.

20 Karl Demeter, *Das deutsche Heer und seine Offiziere* (Berlin, 1930); Karl Demeter, *Das deutsche Offizierskorps in Gesellschaft und Staat 1650–1945* (Frankfurt a. M., 1965).

21 Quoted in Bernhard R. Kroener, “‘Des Königs Rock’: Das Offizierskorps in Frankreich, Österreich und Preußen im 18. Jahrhundert: Werkzeug sozialer Militarisierung oder Symbol gesellschaftlicher Integration?”, in *Die preußische Armee zwischen Ancien Régime und Reichsgründung*, eds. Peter Baumgart, Bernhard R. Kroener, and Heinz Stübiger (Paderborn, 2008), 72–95, p. 79.

22 Thus, e.g. “Instead of the commanders and superior officers being concerned with the upkeep and pay of the soldiers under their command, many instead pinch from the latter,

But there is likewise no lack of sources that bring into play an entirely different explanation of the significance of purchasable companies and regiments. Charles Joseph de Ligne (1735–1814) claimed to have spent the exorbitant sum of 800,000 talers during his service in the Austrian army, a quarter of which on his regiment and other formations under his command. Among other things, these funds went into recruiting tall soldiers, more prestigious-looking uniforms, a large music corps, and the upkeep of soldiers' widows and orphans, as well as paying off the debts of his officers.²³

The young captain from Braunschweig, Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg, who would later become a Saxon and Venetian general, also had to learn from experience that he needed to contribute to the upkeep of his company with his own resources. Thus, he wrote to his father on 28 September 1688 that “the men are really good, but had cost him a lot of money.”²⁴ Werner XXIV von der Schulenburg, who concluded a capitulation with the Duke of Württemberg-Oels in 1701 on the formation of a dragoon company, similarly reports: “Apart from what I received (50 reichsthaler for a fully equipped cavalryman), I also used 3000 Rthlr. from my own resources.”²⁵ This brief remark clearly shows the important role played by the nobility in the standing army as military entrepreneurs. Whereas the Duke of Württemberg-Oels had obtained a capitulation with the Danish King to raise two full regiments, Werner acted as subcontractor who helped to fulfil part of this contract using considerable funds of his own. The investment quickly paid off in the form of prestige: “At the inspection, I was given the honour of my company being named the best in the regiment.”²⁶ That these examples are more than a collection of isolated cases is suggested by a grievance of Louis William of Baden-Baden vis-à-vis the Emperor that is dated 1 November 1703. In it, he complains that the recruitment of the cavalry regiments of his army has stalled due to a lack of money, “since the officers are completely impoverished: and have not yet received what they put into the campaign from their own means.”²⁷ The Margrave had

where they know they can, the poor commoners may stay where they want.”, in Johann Friedrich von Flemming, *Der Vollkommene Teutsche Soldat ...* (Leipzig, 1726), p. 427.

23 Christopher Duffy, *Maria Theresia und ihre Armee* (Stuttgart, 2010), p. 49.

24 Quoted in Friedrich Albrecht von der Schulenburg, *Leben und Denkwürdigkeiten Johann Mathias Reichsgrafen von der Schulenburg, Erbherrn auf Emden und Delitz, Feldmarschalls im Diensten der Republik Venedig*, 1 (Leipzig, 1834), p. 16.

25 Quoted in Johann Friedrich Danneil, *Das Geschlecht der von der Schulenburg*, 1 (Salzwedel, 1842), pp. 200–201.

26 Quoted in Danneil, *Geschlecht*, p. 201.

27 Quoted in *Kriegs- und Staatsschriften. Des Markgrafen Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden Ueber den Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg. Aus den Jahren 1700 bis 1707*, 1, ed. Philipp Freiherr Röder von

already decried the poor financing of the army in the summer: “in short, everything has gotten extreme in matters of money, so much so that I have given all that I could from my own means.”²⁸

Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg learned that his position as general in the army of Electoral Saxony with an agreed monthly salary or *Tractament* of 500 talers was by no means linked to personal economic security. Although his agreed income rose rapidly – in 1705 he received 1,000 talers per month for his position as general and another 750 as commander of a regiment – it was only paid irregularly.²⁹ Between 1709 and 1710 he repeatedly demanded outstanding pay like, incidentally, a number of other generals in the army. Even after he had already been issued a so-called *Steuerschuldschein* or promissory note entitling him to 10,000 talers of future tax income, the arrears still came to 4,733 talers, 15 groschen, and 9 33/35 pfennigs in 1710.

Johann Mathias also, on the one hand, had to wait a long time for his pay and, on the other, himself entered into financial commitments to supporting his troops. In 1706, he took on a bill of credit in his name in the city of Leipzig, in order to pay and equip the regiments of his army, which were decimated after the Battle of Fraustadt.³⁰

Ample evidence for the participation of officers in the financing of the formations under their command can be found in the army of Electoral Saxony. In 1718, a certain Major von Bomsdorf, who had served in the Röbel infantry regiment during the first phase of the Great Northern War (1700–06), complained about various arrears in money for clothing and muskets, which he had paid out of his own pocket for his soldiers at the time, but also arrears in his own pay. His claims came to 3,866 talers 16 groschen altogether. The war treasury offered him 1,500 talers.

To which, nearly with tears in his eyes, he explained that he had borrowed the preceding post from others and issued a bill of exchange, while not being able to earn anything anymore or save himself from his debts on account of his well-known miserable condition, and requested, in light of his long service during which he had lost his health, that he be mercifully accorded at least 2500 thalers, since this is what his debts came to, and this is also the level of what his wife had committed with her fortune.³¹

Diersburg (Karlsruhe, 1850), p. 256.

28 Quoted in *Kriegs- und Staatsschriften*, 1, ed. Röder von Diersburg, p. 169–170.

29 See Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser*, p. 36.

30 See Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser*, p. 20.

31 Quoted in Alexander Querengässer, *Das kursächsische Militär im Großen Nordischen* (Paderborn, 2019), pp. 333–334: “Wogegen er fast mit Thränen vorgestellt, daß er vorangesetzte Post von andern erborget und Wechsel ausgestellt, darbey seines bekandten miserablen

After much wrangling, his request was finally granted on 14 June 1718. Bomsdorf's example is revealing in that he did not even ask to be reimbursed all the money he had advanced, but only for repayment of the debts that he had incurred for the company's upkeep. Johann Günther Müller, an officer of bourgeois origin, met a similar fate a half century later. Looking back at the loss of his company in the Prince Clemens regiment in the Seven Years' War, he complained:

This evil war has made me particularly unhappy in an extraordinary way, since I namely already served 25 years and was a captain for 6 years, before it became fashionable to sell a company, came to an agreement with a retiree, the Major Stettner v. Grabenhoff with the supreme royal concession, and thus had to pay for the company Sub Titulo oneroso with 4000 thalers, which my wife contributed from her resources and after 3 years upon the outbreak of the wars put another 1000 rt into the royal supreme service to put the company back into good condition, and thus after the death of my wife, my daughter who was begat from this marriage was cheated out of assets worth 5000 rthl. through no fault of her own.³²

More extensive research is needed to substantiate the thesis that these are more than a series of isolated findings. The sense of such a 'system' seems entirely comprehensible. If the previous criticism of company business as a means of self-enrichment and of the purchasability of positions served, above all, to show the weakness created by the pervasiveness of the feudal principle in early modern states, it is entirely conceivable that precisely this weakness

Zustandes halber, nichts mehr verdienen, noch sich aus seinen Schulden retten könne, mit Bitte, ihm, in regard seiner langen Dienste wobey er Gesundheit verlohren, wenigstens 2500 Thlr., als soviel seine Schulden austrügen, und auch so hoch auch seine Frau sich mit ihrem Vermögen verschrieben, aus Gnaden zu accordiren".

32 Quoted in Andreas Dethloff, *Das kursächsische Offizierskorps 1682–1806: Sozial-, Bildungs- und Karriereprofil einer militärischen Elite* (Hamburg, 2019), pp. 288–289: "Dieser böße Krieg hat mich besonders auf eine extraordinaire Weise unglücklich gemacht, da ich nehmlich, als schon 25. Jahr gedienet, und 6. Jahr Capitaine war, noch da das Compagnie verkaufen mode geworden, einen Pensionair, den Major Stettner v. Grabenhoff mit aller höchster königl. Concession abfinden, und also die Compagnie Sub Titulo oneroso mit 4000 Thalern bezahlen mußte, welches Geld meine Frau von den Ihrigen darzu hergeschossen und nach 3. Jahren bey den eingebrochenen Kriege, da noch über 1000 rt. zu den königl. allerhöchsten Dienst die Compagnie in Stand zu setzen, hineingestecket habe, und also nach den erfolgten seel. Ableben meiner Frau, die aus dieser Ehe gezeugte Tochter, um ein Vermögen von 5000 rthl. auf eine unverschuldete Art gebracht worden". Unfortunately, Detleff focuses only on the significance of the remarks with respect to the sale of the company post and not on Müller's contribution of 1,000 talers.

was meant to be offset by the willingness of wealthy officers to invest in their own units. The centralised state with a unified military administration, such as emerged in the 19th century, cannot and must not be the standard for the 17th and 18th centuries.

This phenomenon can also be observed in the smaller German armies. Thus the lieutenant colonel from Ansbach Adam von Heydebrecht, who was commander of the Jahnus infantry regiment, complained to the reigning Margrave William Frederick during the War of the Spanish Succession: "I beseech your Highness to think of my etablissement, so that I do not work all the time for nothing for someone else [the reference is to the possessor of the regiment, Lebrecht Gottfried Jahnus von Eberstädt whom Heydebrecht wanted to replace – AQ], since every year I have to put in 2000 florins of mine."³³ Ansbach-Bayreuth was one of the many principalities that had financially overstretched themselves around 1700 by forming a small standing army and that tried to finance its upkeep by leasing the regiments successively to the States General and Electoral Saxony. Heydebrecht made aggressive use of his financial contribution to advance his career by openly pointing out to his sovereign that he was doing more to support the regiment than its holder.

In this respect as well, the patronage relationships and networks of noble officers³⁴ take on entirely new significance, for a colonel who had himself to pay for the provisioning of his regiment had greater interest in important positions, like that of company commander, being filled not by needy relatives, but rather by financially strong subcontractors.³⁵ If albeit mostly with reference to civil administration, research has already pointed to the importance of noble networks and patronage for early modern processes of state formation and consolidation of power.³⁶ Especially for the territories of the Holy Roman Empire, military history still has catching up to do, in order to demonstrate

33 Quoted in Frank Willax, *Das Fürstentum Brandenburg-Ansbach und der Fränkische Kreis im Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg: Die Karriere des Generals Lebrecht Gottfried Jahnus von Eberstädt vom ansbachischen Offizier zum General Zar Peters des Großen* (Ansbach, 2003), p. 102.

34 On this subject in general, see also *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018).

35 On the topic in general, see Carmen Winkel, *Im Netz des Königs: Netzwerke und Patronage in der preußischen Armee 1713–1786* (Paderborn, 2013).

36 Heiko Droste, "Patronage in der Frühen Neuzeit: Institution und Kulturform," *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 30 (2003), 555–590. It is not entirely obvious why Droste paints such a bleak picture of the current state of research despite the wide range of literature cited. Thus, for a contrary perspective, see Birgit Emich et al., "Stand und Perspektiven der

the significance of the nobility in the upkeep of armies as probably the most important and cost-intensive instrument of rule in the early modern period.³⁷

The capital requirements of military formations grew precisely in the field, even if this additional expenditure was often not planned for. Thus equipment, especially uniforms and footgear, was subject to far greater wear and tear than in peacetime, and if the health and fighting capacity of the soldiers was to be maintained, replacements had to be procured. Since capital had to be provided for this purpose on very short notice, it was not uncommon for officers to step in with their own private wealth. This can be shown for the contingents of the Saxon dukes in Flanders during the War of the Spanish Succession.³⁸ During the siege of the fortress of Tönning in 1713, the Saxon regimental commanders submitted a memorandum to their commander-in-chief Field Marshal General Jakob Heinrich von Flemming (1667–1728), which stated:

Both among officers and commoners in this campaign that has been going on for so long completely deprived of all clothing items and even the indispensable pants, shirts and shoes can be made and procured in Saxony without any possible wait and doing a service, the captains are no longer in a position to continue making such advances, as even the guns, particularly the stocks have gotten very rotted in the rainy weather that has been going on for so long and they are badly in need of repair.³⁹

Patronageforschung: Zugleich eine Antwort auf Heiko Droste,” *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 32 (2006), 233–266.

- 37 Although Bernhard R. Kroener alludes to the differences between the Prussian and French systems in an essay, see Kroener, “Des Königs Rock”, the Prussian system is now regarded as atypical and to what extent the French conditions are not rather reflected in the troops of the other armed Imperial estates needs to be examined. A first hint is provided by the above-cited example of the Saxon Major von Bomsdorf.
- 38 I would like to thank Dr. Oliver Heyn, who has done extensive work on the military of the Saxon dukes in this period, for pointing this out, see Oliver Heyn, “Die Ernestiner und die Reichsdefension (1654–1796),” in *Die Ernestiner. Politik, Kultur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel*, eds. Werner Greiling et al. (Cologne, 2016), 185–204; idem, “Alles nur ‘Soldatenspielererei’? Das Militär in den Ernestinischen Staaten (1648–1806),” in *Die Welt der Ernestiner: Ein Lesebuch*, eds. Hans-Werner Hahn, Georg Schmidt, and Siegrid Westphal (Cologne, 2016), 235–241.
- 39 Quoted in Querengässer, *Das kursächsische Militär*, p. 476: “sowohl Unter Officiers alß Gemeine, bey dieser so lange anhaltendten Campagne von allen beymundirungs Stücken gänzlich entblöset und können biß die unentbährlichen Hosen, Hemdten und Schue in Sachßen gemachet und heraus geschaffet werden, ohnmöglich wartten und dienste thun, auch sind die Capitains nicht mehr im Stande, solchen Vorschuß länger zu continuiren, wie dann auch das Gewehr, absonderlich die Schäfte bey so lange anhaltenden Regen Wetter sehr verdorben und der reparatur höchst benöthiget sind”.

Here too, it became clear that the captains, i.e. the company holders, paid for much of the additional costs in the field out of their own pocket.

Many of the larger continental European armies tried to restrict such practices in the second half of the 18th century: among other reasons, in order to ensure that the state had better control over the military. But precisely in the many smaller armies of the Empire, these sorts of practices can still be observed in the first Coalition Wars against revolutionary France. Thus First Lieutenant Johann Eduard von Maiern (circa 1768–1817) was head of a company in a cuirassier regiment in the Swabian Imperial Circle; on 26 April 1793, after the regiment had been mobilised for the impending conflict with France, he asked his recruitment officer Count von Wolfsegg:

Since I had to make an expenditure of 500 florins, without the provision before we left camp, the Chief War Commissary Mister von Theobald believed that a most subservient request to the high estates on account of the money that was advanced by me on deployment would be received all the less ungraciously since the other high estates also deign to take gracious account of the money for equipment expended by their officers without the worthy circle.⁴⁰

In this sense, the Ancien Régime seems more like a period of transition from a mercenary army to a state army in which many officers were precisely not only subordinate service members, but also at least in part military entrepreneurs.

Social prestige was undoubtedly not the sole driving force behind officers' willingness to incur such losses, for in the best case climbing the military career ladder was also connected to further ennobling of the officers and the granting of fiefs, which gave rise to both income opportunities and influence (for instance, by way of a seat in the Imperial Diet). Thus, John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, received the Bavarian dominion of Mindelsheim from the Emperor in 1706.

⁴⁰ Quoted in *Schwere Kavallerie der Schwäbischen Reichskreistruppen: Gesammelte Briefwechsel des Obristwachtmeisters M. Kapf sowie des Oberleutnants J. von Maiern*, ed. Wolfgang Heiss (Kehl, 2018), p. 128: "Da ich wegen völliger Equipierung eine Auslage von 500 fl. zu machen hatte, ohne die Abgabe bei dem Abmarsche vom Haus, so glaubten Herr Ober-Kriegs-Commissaire v. Theobald, das mir eine unterthänigste Bitte an die hohen Stände, wegen dem mir vorgelehnten Gelde bei dem Ausmarsch umso weniger ungnädig aufnehmen werden würde, da auch die übrigen hohen Stände auf Ihre Herrn Offiziers ohne das vom löblichen Kreis ausgesetzte Equipierungs-Geld gnädigste Rücksicht zu nehmen geruhen".

In 1713, thanks to his military service in the War of the Spanish Succession, Alexander von der Schulenburg obtained confirmation of the rank of imperial baron acquired via his grandfather, whereas, two years later, his brothers Matthias Johann and Daniel Bodo, were likewise admitted into the ranks of the hereditary imperial earldom thanks to their service. But they were as little able to overcome the boundary between lower and higher nobility thanks to this raised rank⁴¹ as the Pomeranian Flemming family, many of whose members were able to rise to the highest ranks of the armies of Electoral Brandenburg and Saxony at the end of the 17th century. In 1700, Heino Heinrich von Flemming (1632–1706) was admitted to the imperial earldom by the Emperor.⁴² Although the titles of imperial earl or imperial baron suggest *reichsunmittelbar* power – i.e. submission only to the Emperor – the von der Schulenburgs and Flemmings remained subjects of various central and northern German princes like the Hohenzollerns in Brandenburg. If the awarding of a title to family members thus represented social upgrading on the personal level, it led, on the other hand, to a devaluation of the title itself in the long run.

4 The Self-Subsidising of the Nobility

Whereas, on the one hand, well-off nobles employed their own wealth for the upkeep of standing armies in order to increase their social prestige, on the other hand, there were a great number of impoverished nobles for whom military service represented the only possibility for conserving any prestige at all. The pay ensured regular income and, thanks to the allocation of supplementary portions and rations, the army even helped to support the upkeep of labourers and servants.

But even poor nobles needed to have some initial capital to enter into military service at all, since, for instance, expensive uniforms or appropriate field equipment, including horses, had to be purchased out of one's own pocket. Many poor nobles were thus dependent on the support either of wealthy patrons or of the family association of the extended noble family. Thus, the later general Carl Anton von Jasmund, who was born in Rügen, recalls how,

41 Alexander Querengässer, "Zwischen Rittergut und Feldlager: Die Reichsgrafen von der Schulenburg im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert", in *Niederadel im mitteldeutschen Raum (um 1700–1806)*, eds. Paul Beckus, Thomas Grunewald, and Michael Rocher (Halle, 2019), 115–131.

42 *Sieben Jahrhunderte Flemmingscher Chronik: Personen und Gütergeschichte des burg- und schlossgesessenen Geschlechtes derer von Flemming*, 1, ed. Familie von Flemming (Görlitz, 1909), pp. 187–191.

in the early 1690s, he had at first been a page in the service of Margrave Louis William of Baden-Baden, the celebrated *Türkenlouis* (1655–1707), who did not only provide him a post as ensign in the Baden regiment at the age of 19, but also the equipment befitting it: “Anno 1697 I was dismissed as page, my lord had my equipage and uniform prepared for me, and I received 100 species ducats, was made fit for military service, and was placed in the Baden regiment as ensign”.⁴³ This type of patronage was widespread and secured a network of loyal officers for the patrons.

If a candidate could not find a patron, there was the possibility of obtaining the needed initial endowment from the family association. Thus, between November 1779 and October 1780, Rudolf von Büнау (1723–87) addressed several solicitation letters to his larger family. He described his difficult situation in the letters. First employed in the service of Weimar, he joined a Prussian free battalion during the Seven Years’ War, rising to the rank of major, but was discharged without pension after peace was concluded. He then tried having a go as a military author, writing two volumes on fortifications and artillery, which likewise did not earn him any money. Now he was asking the association for financial support, since he wanted to acquire officer’s gear and propose his services to the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel as major for one of the regiments going to be sent to America. At the same time, he made it clear that without this support he might be forced to pursue an occupation unbecoming his status, which he had thus far avoided in order to preserve the family’s honour. The request was examined in detail by the family association and, after careful investigation of the family archives, was granted on the grounds that, apart from the usual scholarships for university studies, “needy and poor members [had] been provided, upon consideration, a subsidy of, 10, 20, 30 and 50 reichsthalers for their gear and advancement”.⁴⁴ Rudolf von Büнау was therefore by no means the only member of the family – most of whom pursued career paths in the army of Electoral Saxony – to be granted one-time support for initial equipment.

Service in even the smallest German armies was apparently still prestigious enough for noble officers to be willing to bear the costs of their equipment themselves or even to serve without pay. Thus, since 1719, a monthly salary or *Tractament* of 19 florins was stipulated for the ensigns of the guards of the

43 SächsStA, 11338 Generalfeldmarschallamt, Loc. 163, Tagebuch des Kurhessischen Generals von Jasmund, besonders Kriegereignisse und Erlebnisse 1741/42 betreffend, p. 2.

44 Quoted in Friedricke von Gadow, “Haus und Geschlecht bei den Bünaus: Soziale Strategien einer sächsischen Niederadelsfamilie im 18. Jahrhundert”, in *Familie von Büнау: Adelherrschaften in Sachsen und Böhmen vom Mittelalter bis zur Neuzeit*, ed. Martina Schattkowsky (Leipzig, 2008), 215–245, p. 243.

Duchy of Saxony-Hildburghausen, but the holder of the post usually served without pay during the reign of Duke Ernest Frederick I (1681–1724), which led some nobles who aspired to an officer position to decide to enter military service as commoners – though paid – in the hope of being quickly promoted. Thus, in 1722, the young Guard member Ernst Christian von Dettesberg complained that he had “served the unit day and night as a common cavalryman, in the apparent and most humble hope of achieving if not promotion, at least a more substantial Tractament and thus did nothing improper or dishonourable”.⁴⁵ Over the course of his two years of service, however, this hope was disappointed and instead “my father paid in cash most of the debts that I incurred out of need up to now from this meagre poverty.”⁴⁶ The usefulness of costly guard formations in the late 17th and early 18th centuries appears in a new light against this background, if made up of noble recruits. Thus a reduction in the budget of the Chevalier Guard of Electoral Saxony from 10,000 to 5,000 talers in 1717 provoked vehement protests from the commander. The latter explained to the Collegium of the War Privy Council that his Chevaliers could by no means live on 25 talers per month, since they had, after all, to spend 10 talers on their two horses, 5 on a servant and 5 on quarters, which would leave only 5 to live on. The men had to take care of their mounts themselves. A good horse cost 200 talers at the time. But it was only after a complaint to Elector Frederick Augustus I that it was decided to reduce the budget instead to 6,000 talers, such that 30 talers per month were provided to the cavalymen.⁴⁷ The fact that the costs for horses, servants and accommodation were included in the calculation of the pay could indicate that the creation of these prestigious formations also served to create an opportunity for supporting poor nobles. Although the present study does not focus on this aspect, it certainly deserves greater attention in its own right.

5 Conclusion

For many noble officers – whether poor or not – military service undoubtedly also represented an opportunity for personal enrichment, as contemporary criticism already emphasised. Nonetheless, this study showed that noble officers also frequently contributed to the upkeep of their troops with private

45 Quoted in Oliver Heyn, *Das Militär des Fürstentums Sachsen-Hildburghausen 1680–1806* (Cologne, 2015), p. 201.

46 Quoted in Heyn, *Militär*, p. 201.

47 Querengässer, *Das kursächsische Militär*, p. 551.

resources. The reasons for this lay in the social prestige associated with both military service and possession of a powerful or even just well-equipped unit. These motives led Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, for instance, to prevent the reduction of his regiment in the Prussian service by using his own resources. It was possible, moreover, that officers, whether company or regiment holders, were seeking to obtain a promotion and, to this end, wanted to appear as highly capable commanders, who could keep their troops well-equipped and complete in the field. This motive is apparent, say, in the case of the young Mathias Johann von der Schulenburg, who proudly told his relatives that the company that had cost him so much money had been named the best in the regiment at inspection. The impoverished nobles who were dependent on the financial support of a patron or of their families, in order to be able to purchase gear at all and thus enlist in the military, had similar motives.

It is difficult to determine the quantitative significance that this funding by the unit's own officers had for the upkeep of early modern armies, since such cases were mostly only documented by accident. It can be assumed that there were considerable variations, since the more prestigious an army was, the more powerful officer candidates it could attract into its service. The Austrian army was the most prestigious in the area under consideration. A number of dukes from Saxony, Braunschweig and Württemberg, margraves from Baden-Baden, Baden-Durlach, Brandenburg-Ansbach and Brandenburg-Bayreuth, and princes from Anhalt-Köthen or Anhalt-Zerbst served in it, with most of them rising to the rank of general and maintaining their own regiments. In this study, we were able, however, to show that this was a widespread phenomenon from which even the smallest armed estates benefited. These results are also in line with the current findings of research on princely courts, for civil service at the court was also co-financed by the noble officeholder for reasons of prestige.⁴⁸

If we assume that the system portrayed was widespread, as some sources clearly suggest, a new picture of the early modern European military on the territory of the Old Empire emerges. The century and a half between the Peace of Westphalia and the outbreak of the French Revolution is subsumed by historians under the concept of the Ancien Régime.⁴⁹ From the perspective of military history, however, it seems questionable to attribute the character of

48 See Andreas Pečar, *Die Ökonomie der Ehre: Der höfische Adel am Kaiserhof Karls VI.* (Darmstadt, 2003).

49 E.g. in, among others, the two standard works on German military history: Gerhard Papke, *Von der Miliz zum stehenden Heer: Wehrwesen im Absolutismus* (Munich, 1979); *Grundkurs*, 1, ed. Neugebauer, in which 1789 serves as the caesura of the first chapter.

a major caesura to 1648. The continuities in the organisation of armies are more significant than the supposed ruptures. German military historians like to refer to supposedly ‘standing’ armies after the Thirty Years’ War. Instead of recruiting mercenaries only once war had broken out, the princes are said to have recognised the usefulness of permanent troops and kept some of their regiments in service even after the conclusion of peace. John Lynn’s classification of “aggregate contract armies” for the period before around 1650 and “state commission armies” for the period after seems somewhat more pertinent, even if the boundaries are more fluid than a conceptual separation between the two systems suggests.⁵⁰ The fact that it was necessary, from the point of view of the pre-modern state, to curtail the officers’ control over their regiments has already been alluded to in the research literature.⁵¹ This view was based, however, on the teleological perspective of the ‘process of state formation’, which constantly refers to the weak penetration of state institutions and the state’s limited organisational possibilities in the 17th and 18th centuries. The voluntary or involuntary participation of noble officers in the upkeep of the formations under their command, in the form of unreimbursed advances, can be interpreted as both a result and a way of offsetting this weakness. But it also explains why the extensive administrative prerogatives of regiment and company officers were tolerated for a long time. The inability of the pre-modern state to provide sufficient financial resources for the upkeep of the army, and the resulting need for willing noble officers to compensate with their own resources or creditworthiness, made this control necessary. In the larger European armies in, say, the last third of the 18th century – roughly after the end of the Seven Years’ War – increased efforts can be noted to withdraw these prerogatives from the officers and to subject at least the regiments more strongly to a central administration controlled and organised by the state,⁵² thus eliminating the need for officers to contribute their own capital. Nonetheless, precisely where this centralisation did not work – for instance, at the level of the Imperial Circles – the phenomenon can still be observed until the end of the 18th century. This is not unusual when compared to the rest of Europe. Although reformers in Austria, France and Prussia tried, starting in the middle of the century, to secure better funding by the state, also in order to

50 John A. Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800–2000,” *International History Review* 18/3 (1996), 505–545.

51 Peter-Michael Hahn, “Aristokratisierung und Professionalisierung: Der Aufstieg der Obristen zu einer militärischen und höfischen Elite in Brandenburg-Preußen von 1650–1725,” *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte*, n.s., 1 (1991), 161–208.

52 Jeremy Black, *European Warfare in a Global Context, 1660–1815* (London/New York, 2007), pp. 109–112. And especially also Parrott, *The Business of War*, pp. 317–327.

increase its control over the military, in Great Britain, where the purchasability of officers' patents was retained until the Cardwell Reforms, officers continued to invest in their units in the 19th century, especially at the regimental level. The best-known example is certainly James Thomas Brudenell, 7th Earl of Cardigan (1797–1868), who took over command of the 11th Light Dragoons in 1836 and had 10,000 pounds sterling worth of better horses and nicer uniforms purchased for them.⁵³ And even in Prussia officers were required to pay for their own uniforms until World War 1.

German-language military history would, in any case, do well to broaden its perspective in the future. Misappropriation of company funds was certainly a real problem that resulted from the emerging opportunities. But the military and 'the' noble officer corps within it were also not a homogeneous group, and thus there were both officers seeking self-enrichment and others seeking social prestige who instead contributed their own capital.

53 Donald Thomas, *Charge! Hurrah! Hurrah! A Life of Cardigan of Balaclava* (London, 2015), p. 77.

PART 2

Transnational Fields of Action



SECTION

Networks, Hubs, Markets



A Polity Full of Contractors: The Swiss Cantons and Their Business of War (15th to 19th Centuries)

André Holenstein and Philippe Rogger

1 Introduction

The inhabitants of the Old Swiss Confederacy had a poor reputation in other countries, where they were mainly perceived as mercenaries. In his *Utopia* in 1516, the English humanist Thomas More described them as ugly, barbaric, a wild mountain people born solely for war. For a little pay, he claimed, these “Zapoletes” would offer their services to any master; indeed, they exploited any opportunity for war, because military service was their only trade. They had no scruples about changing employer for more pay, according to More, and it was rare for a war to break out without numerous Zapoletes in both armies, facing each other as enemies.¹ The omnipresence of Swiss mercenaries on the battle-grounds of Europe is a well-known fact, and demonstrates the high degree of integration of the *Corpus helveticum* into the ‘fiscal-military system’ of Europe.²

How do researchers explain the strong presence of the Swiss in the mercenary service of European powers? The historiography began in the 18th century with the extensive and systematic treatises written by two former high-ranking Swiss mercenary officers, who emphasized the various advantages that the *Corpus helveticum* derived from its alliances with France and other powers.³ In the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, this ‘entangled

1 Thomas Morus, *Thomas Morus und sein berühmtes Werk Utopia, aus dem Englischen übersetzt mit bio- und bibliographischer Einleitung*, ed. Eduard M. Oettinger (Leipzig, 1846), pp. 161–162.

2 Peter H. Wilson, Marianne B. Klerk, “The Business of War Untangled: Cities as Fiscal-Military Hubs in Europe, 1530s–1860s,” *War in History* 29 (2020), 80–103; Peter H. Wilson, “Competition through Cooperation: The European Fiscal-Military System, 1560–1850 (Inaugural lecture at the University of Oxford, 30 January 2017),” 2017. Available at <https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/article/peter-h-wilson-inaugural-lecture>. Accessed 17 August 2020.

3 Beat F. Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire des Suisses au service de la France*, 1–8 (Paris, 1751–53); Emmanuel May de Romainmôtier, *Histoire militaire de la Suisse et celle des Suisses dans les différens services de l’Europe*, 1–8 (Lausanne, 1788). See also Beat F. Zurlauben, “Avantages mutuels que la France & les Suisses trouvent dans leurs Alliances,” in *Code militaire des Suisses*, 1 (Paris, 1758), pp. 12–26.

history' perspective gave way to a narrower focus on national history.⁴ This was linked with the militaristic connotations of the topic and its implications for the politics of history in the time around the two world wars (*Treue und Ehre*, "loyalty and honour"),⁵ and also with the conceptual and thematic reduction of the research focus to military and war history in a narrower sense.⁶ This, in combination with the critique of nationalism and militarism, which spread rapidly after 1945, explains why mercenary service then remained a peripheral object of Swiss historical studies for many years. It was only in the 1970s that it attracted new interest, thanks to innovative approaches in social and economic history.⁷ Research now began to focus not on the masculinity and military virtues of the 'Old Confederates', their superior infantry tactics, or the role of oppressive poverty as a push factor for military migration, but on entrepreneurship and the formation of elites.⁸ Since then, multidisciplinary studies have added further concepts and nuances to the work carried out in social

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- 4 Wilhelm Oechslis, "Zur Zwinglfeier 1484–1884: Der Pensionenbrief von 1503," in *Bausteine zur Schweizergeschichte*, ed. Wilhelm Oechslis (Zurich, 1890), 93–117; Georg Gerig, *Reisläufer und Pensionenherren in Zürich 1519–1532: Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Kräfte, welche der Reformation widerstrebten* (Zurich, 1947); Johann J. Aellig, *Die Aufhebung der schweizerischen Söldnerdienste im Meinungskampf des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Basel/Stuttgart, 1954).
- 5 The ideologically motivated romanticization of Swiss mercenary services is manifested particularly vividly in Paul de Vallière, *Treue und Ehre: Geschichte der Schweizer in Fremden Diensten* (Neuchâtel, 1913), which was reissued in 1940, during the Second World War, in a situation that posed a great threat to Switzerland's security.
- 6 For example August von Gonzenbach, *Der General Hans Ludwig von Erlach von Castelen: Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild aus den Zeiten des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, 1–3 (Bern, 1880–82); Albert Maag, *Die Schicksale der Schweizerregimenter in Napoleons 1. Feldzug nach Russland 1812* (Biel, 1900); *Schweizer Kriegsgeschichte: Im Auftrage des Chefs des Generalstabes, Oberstkorpskommandant Sprecher von Bernegg, bearb. von Schweizer Historikern unter Leitung von M. Feldmann und H. G. Wirz*, 1–4 (Bern, 1915–35).
- 7 Hans Conrad Peyer, "Die Anfänge der schweizerischen Aristokratien," in *Könige, Stadt und Kapital: Aufsätze zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Mittelalters*, eds. Ludwig Schmutz, Roger Sablonier, and Karl Wanner (Zurich, 1982), 219–231; idem, "Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der fremden Dienste für die Schweiz vom 15. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert," in *Könige, Stadt und Kapital: Aufsätze zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Mittelalters*, eds. Ludwig Schmutz, Roger Sablonier, and Karl Wanner (Zurich, 1982), 219–231; idem, "Wollgewerbe, Viehzucht, Solddienst und Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Stadt und Landschaft Freiburg i.Ü. vom 14. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert," in *Könige, Stadt und Kapital: Aufsätze zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Mittelalters*, eds. Ludwig Schmutz, Roger Sablonier, and Karl Wanner (Zurich, 1982), 163–182.
- 8 Hermann Suter, *Innerschweizerisches Militär-Unternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 1971); Hans Steffen, *Die Kompanien Kaspar Jodok Stockalperts: Beispiel eines Soldunternehmens im 17. Jahrhundert* (Brig, 1975); Kurt Messmer, Peter Hoppe, *Luzerner Patriziat: Sozial- und wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Studien zur Entstehung und Entwicklung im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Lucerne, 1976); Walter Bühler, *Der Zürcher Solddienst des 18. Jahrhunderts: Sozial- und wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Aspekte* (Bern, 1977).

and economic history in the 1970s. The current questions about social mobility or about the cross-border entanglement of the military entrepreneurs derive much of their inspiration from ‘new military history’⁹ and from the methodological reflections of an actor-centred history of diplomacy. For some time, furthermore, studies inspired by migration history and gender history have relativized and re-evaluated the image of military affairs and warfare as activities carried out by rulers and an exclusively male domain.¹⁰

- 9 Ralf Pröve, “Vom Schmuttelkind zur anerkannten Subdisziplin? Die ‘neue Militärgeschichte’ der Frühen Neuzeit: Perspektiven, Entwicklungen, Probleme,” in *Lebenswelten: Militärische Milieus in der Neuzeit: Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, eds. Bernhard R. Kroener, Angela Strauß (Berlin, 2010), 105–123.
- 10 Anne-Lise Head, “Intégration ou exclusion: Le dilemme des soldats suisses au service de France,” *Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte* 8 (1990), 37–55; Urs Kälin, *Die Urner Magistratenfamilien: Herrschaft, ökonomische Lage und Lebensstil einer ländlichen Oberschicht, 1700–1850* (Zurich, 1991); Viktor Ruckstuhl, *Aufbruch wider die Türken: Ein ungewöhnlicher Solddienst am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Obwaldens und der Kompanie Schönenbüel* (Zurich, 1991); Urs Kälin, “Salz, Sold und Pensionen: Zum Einfluss Frankreichs auf die politische Struktur der innerschweizerischen Landsgemeindedemokratien im 18. Jahrhundert,” *Der Geschichtsfreund* 149 (1996), 105–124; idem, “Die fremden Dienste in gesellschaftsgeschichtlicher Perspektive: Das Innerschweizer Militärunternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert,” in *Gente ferocissima: Solddienst und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz (15.–19. Jahrhundert): Festschrift für Alain Dubois*, eds. Norbert Furrer et al. (Zurich, 1997), 279–287; Jean Steinauer, *Patriciens, fromagers, mercenaires: L’émigration fribourgeoise sous l’Ancien Régime* (Lausanne, 2000); Christian Windler, “Ohne Geld keine Schweizer’: Pensionen und Söldnerrekrutierung auf den eidgenössischen Patronagemärkten,” in *Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Aussenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Hillard von Thiesen, Christian Windler (Berlin, 2005), 105–133; Nathalie Büsser, “Die ‘Frau Hauptmannin’ als Schaltstelle für Rekrutenwerbungen, Geldtransfer und Informationsaustausch,” in *Dienstleistungen: Expansion und Transformation des ‘dritten Sektors’ (15.–20. Jahrhundert)*, eds. Hans-Jörg Gilomen, Margrit Müller, and Laurent Tissot (Zurich, 2007), 143–153; idem, “Drängende Geschäfte: Die Söldnerwerbungen Maria Jakobea Zurlaubens um 1700 und ihr verwandtschaftliches Beziehungsnetz,” *Der Geschichtsfreund* 161 (2008), 189–224; idem, “Salpeter, Kupfer, Spitzeldienste und Stimmenkauf: Die kriegswirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten des Zuger Militärunternehmers und Magistraten Beat Jakob II. Zurlauben um 1700 für Frankreich,” in *Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftskriege*, eds. Valentin Groebner, Sebastian Guex, and Jakob Tanner (Zurich, 2008), 71–84; *Schweizer Solddienst: Neue Arbeiten, neue Aspekte*, eds. Rudolf Jaun, Pierre Streit (Birmensdorf, 2010); Nathalie Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum, Aussenbeziehungen und fremdes Geld,” in *Geschichte des Kantons Schwyz*, 3, ed. Historischer Verein des Kantons Schwyz (Zurich, 2012), 69–127; Nicolas Disch, *Hausen im wilden Tal: Alpine Lebenswelt am Beispiel der Herrschaft Engelberg* (Vienna, 2012); Louiselle Gally-de Riedmatten, *Du sang contre de l’or: Le service étranger en Valais sous l’Ancien Régime* (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Bern, 2014); Benjamin Hitz, “Wer ging überhaupt und weshalb? Die Eidgenossenschaft als Söldnerlandschaft: Das Beispiel von Luzern im späten 16. Jahrhundert,” in *Söldnerlandschaften: Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Benjamin Hitz (Berlin, 2014), 203–222; idem, *Kämpfen um Sold: Eine Alltags- und Sozialgeschichte schweizerischer Söldner in der Frühen Neuzeit*

The present paper provides a synthesis of current research, particularly from the perspective of ‘entangled history’ or *‘histoire croisée’*.¹¹ Cultural history of ‘the political’ (*Kulturgeschichte des Politischen*),¹² the new history of diplomacy,¹³ and the history of migration¹⁴ will serve as framework to examine the military and entrepreneurial practices of Swiss ‘contractors’, first in the context of the political power constellations within the *Corpus helveticum* and then in terms of their relationships with European powers. We can only begin to understand the phenomenon of the Swiss contractors when we have understood how wars were financed in the early modern period, how armies were equipped, in logistical terms, and who led them. Such investigations cast new light on the significance of neutral territories in the European wars of

(Cologne, 2015); Marc Höchner, *Selbstzeugnisse von Schweizer Söldnern im 18. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2015); Philippe Rogger, *Geld, Krieg und Macht: Pensionsherren, Söldner und eidgenössische Politik in den Mailänderkriegen 1494–1516* (Baden, 2015); idem, “Familiale Machtpolitik und Militärunternehmertum im katholischen Vorort – Die Pfyffer von Luzern im Umfeld des Dreissigjährigen Krieges,” in *Im Auge des Hurrikans: Eidgenössische Machteliten und der Dreissigjährige Krieg*, eds. André Holenstein, Georg von Erlach, and Sarah Rindlisbacher (Baden, 2015), 122–138; Regula Schmid, “The Swiss Confederation Before the Reformation,” in *A Companion to the Swiss Reformation*, eds. Amy Nelson Burnett, Emidio Campi (Leiden/Boston, 2016), 14–58; Nathalie Büsser, “Klare Linien und komplexe Geflechte: Verwandtschaftsorganisation und Soldgeschäft in der Eidgenossenschaft (17–18. Jahrhundert),” in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018), 185–210; *Après Marignan: La paix perpétuelle entre la France et la Suisse*, eds. Alexandre Dafflon, Lionel Dorthé, and Claire Gantet (Lausanne, 2018); Katrin Keller, “Ein Schweizer Gardehauptmann als französischer Unterhändler: Johann Peter Stuppas Werbeverhandlungen in der Eidgenossenschaft 1671,” in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 92–115; Philippe Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft, Verflechtungszusammenhänge, familiäre Unternehmensorganisation: Die Zurlauben als Militärunternehmer auf den eidgenössischen Söldnermärkten um 1700,” in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018), 211–237; Benjamin Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten: Berner Militärunternehmer im Dienst des Sonnenkönigs Ludwig XIV.* (Zurich, 2021).

- 11 André Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa: Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der Schweizer Geschichte* (Baden, 2014).
- 12 *Was heisst Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?*, ed. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger (Berlin, 2005).
- 13 *Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Aussenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Hillard von Thiessen, Christian Windler (Berlin, 2005); *Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, eds. Hillard von Thiessen, Christian Windler (Cologne, 2010).
- 14 André Holenstein, Patrick Kury, and Kristina Schulz, *Schweizer Migrationsgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Baden, 2018).

the modern period in general, and on the functionality of the ossified myth of Swiss neutrality in particular.

The *Corpus helveticum* – this conglomerate of small states and microstates – took a very different path from the major European powers. After the first phase of the Italian Wars (1494–1516), it was only indirectly involved in European wars via its alliances and ‘capitulations’ (*Kapitulationen*, i.e. military contracts or agreements). It kept out of the dynamics of the ‘military revolution’ and followed its own nation-building path as an ‘island of peace’ in the middle of Europe. In the 17th and 18th centuries, it did not maintain a standing army in the traditional sense. Instead, it had access to its permanent mercenary troops abroad, which could, according to the terms of the military alliances, be summoned back if they were needed for defence purposes. The training and maintenance of these troops were financed by the foreign powers. By externalizing the costs of a standing army and accepting pensions as payment for recruiting rights on their mercenary markets, the cantons were able to keep their taxes low. No ‘extraction-coercion cycle’¹⁵ was set in motion here; nor did the *Corpus helveticum* become a ‘fiscal-military state’,¹⁶ which as a ‘contractor state’¹⁷ would have commissioned various actors to supply the Swiss armies with mercenaries, goods, and capital.¹⁸ Instead, the *Corpus helveticum* itself acted as a supplier of mercenaries, and as an international financial centre serving the belligerent powers. In the service, capital and goods markets of the Swiss area, politicians, officers, military entrepreneurs, *marchands-banquiers*, and other actors catered to various war-related needs in the broadest sense. In the following discussion, we use the terms ‘contractor’ and ‘military entrepreneur’ as synonyms.¹⁹ By way of alliance contracts and capitulations, many elite Swiss families were involved in transnational military transactions: as service providers, entrepreneurs and proprietors of military units, as traders on the

15 Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Oxford, 1990).

16 John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688–1783* (London, 1989); *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Honour of P.G.M. Dickson*, ed. Christopher Storrs (Farnham, 2009).

17 Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2016); Rafael Torres Sánchez, Pepijn Brandon, and Marjolein't Hart, “War and Economy: Rediscovering the Eighteenth-Century Military Entrepreneur,” *Business History* 60:1 (2018), 1–19.

18 David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 196–259.

19 Jeff Fynn-Paul, Marjolein 't Hart, and Griet Vermeesch, “Introduction: Entrepreneurs, Military Supply, and State Formation in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods: New Directions,” in *War, Entrepreneurs and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden, 2014), 1–12, pp. 8–9; Torres Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart, “War and Economy,” p. 7.

European goods and financial markets, as clients and agents of princely patrons, and as the recipients of clientelist resources.²⁰ Integrated as service market into the European fiscal-military system the *Corpus helveticum* was itself not a fiscal-military state. It rather was a polity full of contractors.

One fact that benefited the Swiss military entrepreneurs was that the *Corpus helveticum* was made up of numerous independent small states, each with its own particular interests with regard to political alliances. In the first section of this paper, an outline of the political system of the *Corpus helveticum* presents the political context for Swiss military entrepreneurship. The second part explains the significance of the country's geopolitical position and the strategy of *Stillesitzen* (sitting still) or neutrality with its effects on power politics and security policies. The third part describes the changing nature of mercenary service over the centuries. The fourth part deals with the actors involved in military entrepreneurship and their practices, addressing financial, commercial, and technical aspects, as well as the economic, political, social, and confessional conditions.

2 The *Corpus helveticum*: A Composite Polity

To designate the totality of the 13 cantons (*Orte*), allied cantons (*Zugewandte Orte*), and subject territories (*Untertanengebiete*), we use the expression found in historical sources, *Corpus helveticum*.²¹ It underlines the composite structure of this conglomeration of very unequal elements, and the complexity of the alliances connecting them. This allows us to avoid the teleological and ahistorical simplifications inherent in the terms 'Switzerland' and 'Swiss Confederacy', which are strongly influenced by the experience of the Swiss federal and national state in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Relations within the *Corpus helveticum* were structurally complex and shaped by conflicting interests and rivalries between the cantons, exacerbated by the Reformation and the conflict between the denominations. The internal integration of the *Corpus helveticum* was weak. However, the small states of the *Corpus helveticum* did not perceive the heterogeneity and non-uniformity of the relationships and their lack of integration as a problem. They had never entered into their unequal alliances with the intention of forming a joint state

20 Kälin, "Dienste," pp. 283–284.

21 André Holenstein, "Corpus helveticum," 2005, in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* [HLS]. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/009824/2005-03-01/>. Accessed 6 September 2020.

called 'Switzerland'. Instead, the cantons viewed their alliances as political and diplomatic instruments to reinforce their independence. Tom Scott rightly emphasizes the composite nature of the Confederacy, a feature that characterizes many states in the early modern era. Rather than 'state', it makes more sense to speak of a 'polity', that is, a "system of government or political organization which does not presuppose an articulated 'statehood'. The Swiss Confederation was a functioning composite polity, but it was not a state – and of course it was not a monarchy."²²

Until the end of the Ancien Régime in 1798, the *Corpus helveticum* formed a complex structure made up of several systems of alliances.²³ These systems emerged in the period from the 13th to the 15th century, establishing loose connections between numerous communal, noble and ecclesiastical dominions. Over time, certain (urban and rural) communes asserted themselves as dominant powers in these systems. Thanks to successful territorial policies and power politics, they came to have sovereignty over subject territories of various sizes. These communes formed the core of the so-called Confederacy (*Eidgenossenschaft*), which, by 1513, had expanded to include 13 small, communal states, which all belonged to the Holy Roman Empire. These were the cantons (*Kantone, Orte*). The allied cantons (*Zugewandte Orte*) formed a second category of territories within the *Corpus helveticum*. These autonomous or sovereign dominions (Valais, the Three Leagues, the Principality of Neuchâtel, the Princely Abbey of Saint Gall, the cities of St. Gallen, Biel, Mulhouse in Alsace, Rottweil, Geneva, and others) maintained closer, asymmetrical alliances with some of the 13 cantons, but they were integrated much more loosely into the *Corpus helveticum* than these cantons. Lastly, large parts of the *Corpus helveticum* consisted of subject territories (*Untertanengebiete*), which were governed by individual cantons or collectives of several cantons. In the latter case they were known as condominiums (*Gemeine Herrschaften*).

22 Tom Scott, *The Swiss and Their Neighbours 1460–1560: Between Accommodation and Aggression* (Oxford, 2017), p. 175.

23 For a general treatment, see Hans Conrad Peyer, *Verfassungsgeschichte der alten Schweiz* (Zurich, 1978); Bernhard Stettler, *Die Eidgenossenschaft im 15. Jahrhundert: Die Suche nach einem gemeinsamen Nenner* (Zurich, 2004); André Holenstein, "Gemeine Herrschaften," 2005, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/009817/2005-08-19/>. Accessed 7 September 2020; Andreas Würzler, "Eidgenossenschaft," 2008, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/026413/2012-02-08/>. Accessed 7 September 2020; Clive H. Church, Randolph C. Head, *A Concise History of Switzerland* (Cambridge, 2013); *Die Geschichte der Schweiz*, ed. Georg Kreis (Basel, 2014); Andreas Würzler, "Zugewandte Orte," 2014, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/009815/2014-02-26/>. Accessed 7 September 2020; Thomas Maissen, *Geschichte der Schweiz*, 6th ed. (Baden, 2019).

The *Corpus helveticum* of the early modern period lacked certain essential attributes of statehood. Its borders were unclear, because only a small minority of the allied cantons were allied with all 13 cantons, and the cantons had differing views on the status of certain members, especially the Republic of Geneva, the Principality of Neuchâtel, and the Prince-Bishopric of Basel. The *Corpus helveticum* had no political centre, let alone a capital. Instead there were three rival centres of power: the city of Zurich as the dominant power in eastern Switzerland and the main canton (*Vorort*) of the Protestant Confederacy; the city of Bern as the predominant power in the western Swiss Plateau; and the five cantons of central Switzerland (Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Lucerne and Zug), where the city of Lucerne as the Catholic main canton and the canton Schwyz as the most powerful rural canton occupied a preeminent position. The cantons in the *Corpus helveticum* had no common state bodies or institutions: they possessed neither a joint government nor joint public authorities, neither a joint army nor a state treasury. Since they also had no common coat of arms or seal, the cantons could only represent their common identity symbolically by arranging their coats of arms in a circle, referred to as *Wappenkranz*. The only collective institution of the Confederacy was the Diet (*Tagsatzung*), which can best be characterized as a congress of diplomatic envoys from the individual cantons. It served mainly to ensure continuous political and diplomatic communication between the power elites of the individual cantons, but also to maintain diplomatic relations with external powers.

There were substantial social and economic differences between the 13 communal states of the Confederacy. The population size can be taken as an indicator, since it reflects the military power and the economic and financial clout of a polity. In 1798 there were 1.023 million people living in the territory of the 13 cantons, distributed very unevenly across the individual cantons: on the one hand the urban cantons with their large, heavily populated subject territories, on the other hand the small rural cantons. 59 per cent of the total population of the 13 cantons lived in the two large Reformed urban cantons of Bern and Zurich. The urban cantons were also more economically developed and diversified, and had access to greater financial and economic power resources than the rural cantons. Nor was the *Corpus helveticum* unified in ethnic, linguistic, or cultural terms. German was spoken in the 13 cantons making up the core territories of the Confederacy, which saw themselves culturally as part of the German nation. French and Italian were spoken in the subject territories and allied cantons in modern-day western Switzerland and Tessin, Rhaeto-Romanic in the Three Leagues.

3 The Usefulness of the *Corpus helveticum* in the Fiscal-Military System of Europe

Remarkably, the *Corpus helveticum* – except for the involvement of the Three Leagues in the Thirty Years' War – was not involved in the wars of the European powers for the whole early modern period until the War of the Second Coalition in 1799. Contrary to the narrative of traditional national history, the existence of the *Corpus helveticum* as an island of peace in the middle of a warlike Europe was not based on the country's fundamental aversion to war and its affinity with neutrality. Instead it was based – seemingly paradoxically – on the web of political alliances with the great European powers and entanglement in their wars, and on the strategic management of the country's favourable geopolitical position.²⁴

As a result of the Burgundian Wars (1474–77) and the Italian Wars (1494–1559), the *Corpus helveticum* was incorporated into the sphere of influence of the Spanish Habsburg Empire. Inevitably, this meant that it also became a strategic factor for the king of France, the great rival of the Habsburgs. Both powers wanted to gain the allegiance of the *Corpus helveticum* and achieve as close and exclusive a relationship as possible, in order to secure the advantages of its location, or at least to neutralize this area in view of its potential threat. The *Ewige Richtung* and the *Erbeinung* with Habsburg-Austria (signed in 1474/77 and 1511 respectively) and the peace and alliance treaties with France in 1516 and 1521 governed the relations of the cantons with these two powers. At the end of the 16th century, in 1587, an alliance between the Catholic cantons (with the exception of Solothurn) and Spain-Milan was added.

These alliances granted the cantons security in a dynamic and warlike environment. Both sides pledged to be peaceful neighbours and to give military help in the case of an attack by third parties. The cantons subsequently dispensed with any costly expansion of their defence structures or modernization of their militia troops, and trusted that they would be permitted to recall their mercenary troops from abroad if they needed to defend themselves. To all intents and purposes, the Swiss regiments in foreign service acquired the character of externally financed standing armies abroad. This enabled the cantons to externalize the high costs of modernizing their defences, at the expense of their allies (or the taxpayers in those countries). They were therefore able to

24 Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa*.

keep their military and security spending very low, compared to other European countries, for a long period of time. This outsourcing of military spending gave the cantons a kind of 'peace dividend' in the 17th and 18th centuries: they paid off their debts, invested part of their state funds in the debt policies of the European powers, and could afford not to tax their subjects.²⁵

The feature that made the *Corpus helveticum* such an attractive partner for alliances was its favourable location. This was the result of conflicts over power and dominion in the 15th and the early 16th century in what is now Switzerland. In this period, the communes of the Confederacy were able to assert themselves against the rival Habsburg, Burgundy, and Savoy dynasties, and affirm their longterm position as the preeminent power in the central section of the Alpine region.²⁶ This was partly due to the Swiss infantry tactics, which retained their supremacy until the early 16th century. Its sovereign control of strategically important alpine passes and its immediate proximity to important battlegrounds of the wars between Habsburg and France and their allies gave the *Corpus helveticum* a geostrategically central position in the middle of Europe.²⁷ It thus became an attractive and indispensable ally for the rival powers. This attractiveness was intensified by the fact that, after the defeat against the king of France at the Battle of Marignano in 1515, and the conquest of the Vaud in 1536, the *Corpus helveticum* ceased to engage in any power politics of its own. Instead it remained passive and made itself politically neutral (the policy of *Stillesitzen*).²⁸ The existence of a *Corpus helveticum* that was weak in terms of power politics, but useful for military purposes, security and commerce, was very much in the interest of the European powers. The country served as a security buffer between the rival crowns and as military flank protection; as an intact mercenary market and a safe transit area for moving troops between Italy and the war zones in north-western Europe; as a credit provider and a hub

25 Martin Körner, "Der Einfluss der europäischen Kriege auf die Struktur der schweizerischen Finanzen im 16. Jahrhundert," in *Proceedings of the Seventh International Economic History Congress*, ed. Michael Flinn (Edinburgh, 1978), 274–281; idem, "The Swiss Confederation," in *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815*, ed. Richard Bonney (Oxford, 1999), 327–357; Stefan Altorfer-Ong, *Staatsbildung ohne Steuern: Politische Ökonomie und Staatsfinanzen im Bern des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Baden, 2010).

26 Stettler, *Eidgenossenschaft*; Scott, *Swiss*.

27 Guy P. Marchal, "Ein Staat werden: Die Eidgenossen im 15. Jahrhundert," in *Karl der Kühne von Burgund*, eds. Klaus Oschema, Rainer C. Schwinges (Zurich, 2010), 41–51; Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa*.

28 André Holenstein, "Die wirklich entscheidenden Folgen von Marignano: Das Corps helvétique auf dem Weg zur Einigung mit Frankreich (1515–1521)," in *Après Marignan: La paix perpétuelle entre la France et la Suisse*, eds. Alexandre Dafflon, Lionel Dorthe, and Claire Gantet (Lausanne, 2018), 181–207.

for trading in war materials and provisioning the armies of the warring powers; and as a platform for diplomatic intelligence services.

As an area close to the wars but unscathed by them, the *Corpus helveticum* was an integral part of the transnational European fiscal-military system.²⁹ It benefited from wars in Europe and from the fact that the warring powers had to mobilize the resources for their wars in a competitive environment.³⁰ In particular, it exploited the fact that the European powers (as ‘contractor states’)³¹ outsourced war-related activities to private individuals. This business model was the basis for the existence of the numerous military entrepreneurs and mercenaries from the *Corpus helveticum*. From the 15th to the 19th century, they catered to a wide range of war-related needs, developing a unique tradition of labour and career migration for purposes of military entrepreneurship.³² The bellicosity of Europe and the *Stillesitzen* of the *Corpus helveticum* were two sides of the same coin.³³

4 Phases of Swiss Mercenary Service (13th-19th Century)

The centuries-long history of the *Corpus helveticum* as a supplier of mercenaries for the wars in Europe can be divided into four phases.³⁴ The different phases were defined partly by the developments in military technology and tactics that made up the military revolution, and partly by internal social, economic, and political factors, which brought structural change in mercenary services over the centuries.

The first phase, from the 13th to the mid-16th century, encompassed the emergence of the mercenary phenomenon and the first attempts at contractual regulation. In this early phase of mostly unregulated mercenary soldiering, the wars were characterized by short, in some cases seemingly chaotic

29 Wilson, “Competition”.

30 Parrott, *Business*, pp. 313–314.

31 *War, Entrepreneurs and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden, 2014); Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri, *The Contractor State and Its Implications, 1659–1815* (Gran Canaria, 2012); Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs*; Torres Sánchez, Brandon, and ‘t Hart, “War and Economy”.

32 Holenstein, Kury, and Schulz, *Migrationsgeschichte*, pp. 47–59.

33 Peyer, *Verfassungsgeschichte*, p. 128.

34 Hans Conrad Peyer, “Schweizer in fremden Diensten: Ein Überblick,” *Schweizer Soldat und MFD* 67:6 (1992), 4–8; cf. also Philippe Henry, “Fremde Dienste,” 2017, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/008608/2017-12-08/>. Accessed 5 September 2020; and Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa*.

campaigns, and spectacular victories of the Swiss infantry pike squares, armed with pikes and halberds, against aristocratic cavalry forces. In particular, the Burgundian Wars (1474–77) and the Italian Wars (1494–1559) greatly increased the demand. The men would join the service of any wealthy powers, regardless of the political and diplomatic consequences. This made it clear that the authorities in their own home cantons had only a very weak monopoly on the use of force. From the last quarter of the 15th century, both the cantonal authorities and the Swiss Diet introduced increasingly harsh regulations in response to this ‘running off to war’. Their aim was to control the flow of mercenaries and to channel them in a way that would further their own interests, in terms of alliances and power politics.³⁵ They wanted to position themselves as intermediaries between their warriors and the foreign rulers, arranging the provision of mercenary services.³⁶

The ongoing high demand for Swiss mercenaries did not diminish despite their failure to keep up with the advances in weapons technology (firearms) that took place around 1500. In the second phase (mid-16th to mid-17th century), the cantons began to provide contractually regulated and consolidated mercenary services to the warring powers. Alliances and capitulations guided the export of mercenaries into the politically desired direction. They also helped to ensure that the profits from mercenary trading were monopolized by those families within the Swiss power elite who were increasingly focusing their activities on military entrepreneurship. The third phase, from the mid-17th to the mid-18th century, was characterized by the emergence of standing armies. The mercenaries, now in the uniform of their employer and generally committed to serving for several years, were expected to show new skills in weapon handling, drills, and discipline. At the same time, the princely employers reduced the entrepreneurial freedoms of the captains and restricted their prospects of making a profit, by expanding bureaucratic control over their foreign mercenaries. Another problem was that the military entrepreneurs from the Protestant cantons had increasing difficulties replenishing their troops with new recruits. Phase four (mid-18th century to the revolutionary period around 1800) saw a gradual decline in the importance of military labour migration due to attractive employment opportunities in domestic

35 Rogger, *Geld*; Hostenstein, *Mitten in Europa*, pp. 32–40.

36 Peyer, “Schweizer,” p. 4; for the content and form of military capitulations, see Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 5–17; Robert-Peter Eyer, *Die Schweizer Regimenter in Neapel im 18. Jahrhundert (1734–1789)* (Bern, 2008), pp. 78–81, 207–269, and 539–606.

protoindustries, the political upheavals of the revolutionary period, and the emergence of national armies with universal conscription. Foreign military service then came to a definitive halt in the mid-19th century. The dismissal of the Swiss troops after the storming of the Tuileries in 1792 meant the provisional end of Swiss mercenary service in France.³⁷ Many individuals, however, immediately entered the service of the revolutionary armies, and recruitment resumed under Napoleon.³⁸ Finally, mercenary service experienced something of a renaissance during the Bourbon Restoration. This was, however, no longer within the framework of the alliance policies customary in the Ancien Régime, but was based on 'private capitulations' (*Partikularkapitulationen*). This late resurgence of mercenary services in the 19th century varied in duration: it lasted until 1815 in Sardinia-Piedmont (the Swiss guard unit, the *Hundert-schweizer* or *Cent-Suisses*, until 1832), until 1816 in Great Britain, 1823 in Spain, 1829 in the Netherlands, 1830 in France, 1859 in Naples, and 1914 in the Dutch colonial army. It continues into the present in the French Foreign Legion.³⁹ These services were unable to stop the general decline of military career and labour migration in the modern era. Only the papal Swiss Guard has managed

37 Alain-Jacques Tornare, *Le 10 août 1792: Les Tuileries: L'été tragique des relations franco-suisses* (Lausanne, 2012); for the provisional end of mercenary services in Naples, see Robert-Peter Eyer, "Die Auflösung der Schweizer Regimenter in Neapel 1789," in *Schweizer Solddienst: Neue Arbeiten, neue Aspekte*, ed. Rudolf Jaun, Pierre Streit (Birmensdorf, 2010), 199–214.

38 Alain-Jacques Tornare, *Vaudois et Confédérés au service de France 1789–1798* (Yens-sur-Morges, 1998); idem, *Les Vaudois de Napoléon: Des Pyramides à Waterloo* (Yens-sur-Morges, 2003).

39 Henry, "Fremde Dienste"; cf. also Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force* (New York, 1991); Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, Robert-Peter Eyer, "Söldner: Ein europäisches Phänomen," in *Schweizer in "Fremden Diensten"*, eds. Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, Robert-Peter Eyer (Zurich, 2006), 27–48; Hubert Foerster, "Anhang: Übersicht der Schweizer Truppenaufstellungen für den fremden Dienst vor 1797 und nach 1814/15," in *Schweizer Solddienst: Neue Arbeiten, neue Aspekte*, eds. Rudolf Jaun, Pierre Streit (Birmensdorf, 2010), 247–252; Christian Koller, *Die Fremdenlegion: Kolonialismus, Söldnertum, Gewalt 1831–1962* (Paderborn, 2013); Herman Amersfoort, "The End of an Enterprise: Swiss Regiments in the Royal Dutch Army, 1814–1829," in *De Nimègue à Java: Les soldats suisses au service de la Hollande XVIIe–XXe siècles*, ed. Sébastien Rial (Morges, 2014), 189–202; Peter Huber, *Fluchtpunkt Fremdenlegion: Schweizer im Indochina- und im Algerienkrieg, 1945–1962* (Zurich, 2017); Philipp Krauer, "Welcome to Hotel Helvetia! Friedrich Wüthrich's Illicit Mercenary Trade Network for the Dutch East Indies, 1858–1890," *BMGN: Low Countries Historical Review* 134:3 (2019), 122–147; idem, "Colonial Mercenaries: Swiss Military Labour and the Dutch East Indies, 1848–1914," 2020. Available at <https://gmw.ethz.ch/forschung/projekte/philipp-krauer.html>. Accessed 12 November 2020.

to survive into modern times, as a picturesque relict of paid military service. However, this living national monument is far removed from the bloody essence of foreign service: killing for money.

The suspension of foreign mercenary service can only partly be attributed to radical changes on the political map of Europe. Another crucial factor was the changed political balance of power within the *Corpus helveticum*, which eventually brought about the demise of paid military service in the mid-19th century. The fact was that the age-old practice of labour and career migration from the *Corpus helveticum* had been accompanied throughout its existence by a more or less fundamental criticism of this practice, with its problematic effects on the political, social, economic, and cultural conditions within the country. The breakdown of families and of the domestic labour market, the incursion of foreign habits of consumption, the venality of the mercenary leaders and political elites, and the political conflicts of interest between the cantons were the main focus of criticism in the late 15th and the early 16th century. The large numbers of men departing for distant wars and their contact with foreign cultures were perceived as a threat to their identity as Confederates.⁴⁰ In the 16th century, the Reformers condemned the practice of killing for money in the service of foreign rulers, citing religious and moral reasons, and therefore rejected alliances with the European powers.⁴¹ The enlightened reformers of the 18th century complained that mercenary service led to population losses. They rebuked the authorities for their poor governance, which was unable to prevent the emigration of valuable workers.⁴² 19th-century liberals, finally, rejected mercenary service for national and ideological reasons. They thought it was unworthy of a republic that young Swiss men should be risking their lives to defend monarchies against national unification movements in Italy.⁴³ It was these liberal circles with their critical attitude towards mercenary service who emerged victorious from the Sonderbund War between the liberal and Catholic cantons in 1847. As the dominant political force, they went on to enshrine a ban on new capitulations in the federal constitution of 1848. The existing capitulations, however, and the possibility of recruiting individuals as

40 Guy P. Marchal, *Schweizer Gebrauchsgeschichte: Geschichtsbilder, Mythenbildung und nationale Identität*, 2nd ed. (Basel, 2007).

41 *Der lange Schatten Zwinglis: Zürich, das französische Soldbündnis und eidgenössische Bündnispolitik, 1500–1650*, eds. Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, Christian Moser (Zurich, 2009).

42 Hans Dubler, *Der Kampf um den Solddienst der Schweiz im 18. Jahrhundert* (Frauenfeld, 1939).

43 Aellig, *Aufhebung*.

mercenaries, were not abolished until 1859, when paid military service abroad without the explicit permission of the *Bundesrat* (Federal Council) was forbidden by law. It is worth noting, however, that this law did not constitute a complete ban. The federal government kept the back door open so that it could at least continue to send officers to foreign armies for training purposes.⁴⁴ Even in the 19th century, the transfer of military knowledge clearly remained vital for the security policy of this neutral ‘island of peace’.⁴⁵

5 Swiss Contractors in Action

The *Corpus helveticum* was an important market for the cross-border trade in war-making resources, which involved various actors in different roles. Officers, entrepreneurs, career migrants,⁴⁶ diplomats, politicians, and specialists from the *Corpus helveticum* featured as contractors on the markets of violence, supplying the warring powers of Europe with mercenaries, loans, equipment and food, information, intelligence, and expertise. They also provided other services such as granting rights of passage to foreign troops.⁴⁷ The mercenary officers and their soldiers constituted the core of the Swiss contractors.

5.1 *Military Labour Migrants: Mercenary Officers and Their Soldiers*

The integration of the cantons into the European fiscal-military system, as reliable suppliers of mercenaries, turned migration into a mass phenomenon for

44 “Bundesgesetz betreffend die Werbung und den Eintritt in den fremden Kriegsdienst (Vom 30. Heumonats 1859),” in *Amtliche Sammlung der Bundesgesetze und Verordnungen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, 6 (Bern, 1860), pp. 312–314; Aellig, *Aufhebung*, p. 165.

45 Cf. Philippe Rogger, “Söldneroffiziere als gefragte Militärexperten: Zum Transfer militärischer Kultur in die frühneuzeitliche Eidgenossenschaft,” in *Miliz oder Söldner? Wehrpflicht und Solddienst in Stadt, Republik und Fürstenstaat (13.–18. Jahrhundert)*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Regula Schmid (Paderborn, 2019), 141–172.

46 For the phenomenon of career migration, see André Holenstein, *Transnationale Schweizer Nationalgeschichte: Widerspruch in sich oder Erweiterung der Perspektiven?* (Bern, 2018), pp. 30–31; idem, “Militärunternehmer, gelehrte Geistliche und Fürstendiener: Karrieremigranten als Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen im Corpus Helveticum der frühen Neuzeit,” in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 154–165.

47 For the concept of ‘war-making resources’ cf. Wilson, “Competition”.

the first time in Swiss history.⁴⁸ The foundations for this development were laid by the spectacular military successes of the Swiss pikemen and halberdiers against aristocratic cavalry forces in the late Middle Ages. Politicians and military entrepreneurs, mostly petty nobles or citizens from the towns of the *Corpus helveticum*, were already finding ways and means of transforming this military capital into financial profits during the Burgundian Wars. Shortly after, they brought mercenaries to the theatres of the Italian Wars. From then on, the military migrant workers from the *Corpus helveticum* – like their rivals from southern Germany, Ireland, and Scotland – were a regular feature of early modern wars.⁴⁹ While the Swiss infantry would lose their special military value in the early 16th century, partly because of the mass use of firearms, this small window of time between the Burgundian and Italian Wars gave the Swiss sufficient opportunity to enter into and consolidate mercenary relations with various powers.

Of particular importance in military but also economic and cultural terms was the alliance with France (1521), which was renewed regularly until the 18th century (the last renewal was in 1777).⁵⁰ Besides France, several other states intermittently recruited troops in the *Corpus helveticum* during the modern era: Spain (or Spain-Milan),⁵¹ Savoy (or Sardinia-Piedmont),⁵² the Netherlands,⁵³

48 Holenstein, Kury, and Schulz, *Migrationsgeschichte*, pp. 47–59. For a general consideration of push- and pull-factors, see Philippe Rogger, Benjamin Hitz, “Söldnerlandschaften: Räumliche Logiken und Gewaltmärkte in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive: Eine Einführung,” in *Söldnerlandschaften: Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Benjamin Hitz (Berlin, 2018), 9–46.

49 For the genesis of the Swiss markets of violence, see Peyer, “Schweizer”; Rogger, *Geld*.

50 Alain-Jacques Czouz-Tornare, *Les troupes suisses capitulées et les relations franco-helvétiques à la fin du XVIIIe siècle 2* (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes Paris, 1996); Andreas Würzler, “Symbiose ungleicher Partner: Die französisch-eidgenössische Allianz 1516–1798/1815,” *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte* 12 (2011), 53–75; Rogger, *Geld*; *Après Marignan*, eds. Dafflon, Dorthé, and Gantet; Holenstein, “Folgen”.

51 Rudolf Bolzern, *Spanien, Mailand und die katholische Eidgenossenschaft: Militärische, wirtschaftliche und politische Beziehungen zur Zeit des Gesandten Alfonso Casati (1594–1621)* (Luzern, 1982); Andreas Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft: Die Casati als spanisch-mailändische Gesandte in Luzern und Chur (1660–1700)* (Zurich, 2015); Javier Bragado Echevarría, *Los regimientos suizos al servicio de España en el siglo XVIII (1700–1755): guerra, diplomacia y sociedad militar* (Madrid, 2019).

52 N. Gysin, “Les troupes suisses dans le royaume de Sardaigne 1577–1815,” *Revue Militaire Suisse* 59:7 (1914), 529–552; Arnold Biel, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Savoyen und der Eidgenossenschaft zur Zeit Emanuel Philiberts (1559–1580)* (Basel, 1967); Willy Pfister, *Aargauer in fremden Kriegsdiensten*, 1–2 (Aarau, 1980–84).

53 Martin Bundi, *Bündner Kriegsdienste in Holland um 1700: Eine Studie zu den Beziehungen zwischen Holland und Graubünden von 1693 bis 1730* (Chur, 1972); Pfister, *Aargauer*, 2; Jürg A. Meier, *Vivat Hollandia: Zur Geschichte der Schweizer in holländischen Diensten 1740–1795*.

Prussia,⁵⁴ Naples,⁵⁵ Austria,⁵⁶ England,⁵⁷ Venice,⁵⁸ and the Holy See.⁵⁹ Their aim was to strengthen their armies or to establish elite units to protect their rulers.⁶⁰ Numerous other (princely) employers, some less powerful, also made use of the services of Swiss mercenaries, both those with official authorization and those without it (*avouierte und nicht avouierte Dienste*): Brandenburg, Saxony, Tuscany;⁶¹ Bavaria, Genoa, Lucca, Modena, Russia, Sweden;⁶² the papal cities of Ancona, Avignon, Bologna, Ferrara, Perugia, Ravenna, Rimini, and Urbino;⁶³ and the Dutch and English East India Companies.⁶⁴ Swiss

Griffwaffen und Uniformen (Wettingen, 2008); *De Nimègue à Java: Les soldats suisses au service de la Hollande XVIIe–XXe siècles*, ed. Sébastien Rial (Morges, 2014).

- 54 Rudolf Gugger, *Preussische Werbungen in der Eidgenossenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1997).
- 55 Eyer, *Regimenter*.
- 56 F. von Schramm-Schießl, "Die Schweizer und Bündner Regimenter in kaiserlich-österreichischen Diensten von 1691–1750," *Bündnerisches Monatsblatt* (1937), 22–27; Christoph Tepperberg, "Die Schweizergarde," in *700 Jahre Schweiz: Helvetia-Austria. Archivalische Kostbarkeiten des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, ed. Generaldirektion des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs (Wien, 1991), 59–67.
- 57 Adolf Bürkli, *Das Schweizerregiment von Roll in englischem Dienste 1795–1816* (Zurich, 1893).
- 58 Martin Bundi, *Frühe Beziehungen zwischen Graubünden und Venedig (15./16. Jahrhundert)* (Chur, 1988); Ruckstuhl, *Aufbruch*.
- 59 Paul M. Krieg, *Die Schweizergarde in Rom* (Lucerne, 1960); Robert Walpen, *Die Päpstliche Schweizergarde: Acriter et fideliter – tapfer und treu* (Zurich, 2005); *Hirtenstab und Hellebarde: Die Päpstliche Schweizergarde in Rom 1506–2006*, eds. Urban Fink, Hervé de Weck, and Christian Schweizer (Zurich, 2006).
- 60 Henry, "Fremde Dienste".
- 61 Philippe Henry, "Schweizergarden," 2007, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/008623/2007-06-29/>. Accessed 17 August 2020.
- 62 Elisabeth Salvi, "Survie, lucre ou exploit? Le service non avoué dans quelques Etats italiens au XVIIIe siècle," in *Gente ferocissima: Solddienst und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz (15.–19. Jahrhundert)*, eds. Norbert Furrer et al. (Zurich, 1997), 75–88.
- 63 Oliver Landolt, "Die Urschweiz und die Päpstliche Schweizergarde," in *Hirtenstab und Hellebarde: Die Päpstliche Schweizergarde in Rom 1506–2006*, eds. Urban Fink, Hervé de Weck, and Christian Schweizer (Zurich, 2006), 207–237, pp. 223–226; Krieg, *Schweizergarde*, pp. 297–298 lists not only Rimini and Ancona but also Pesaro, Loreto, Foligno, Spoleto, and Terni as papal cities with Swiss guards, but does not give sources.
- 64 Johann E. Kilchenmann, *Schweizersöldner im Dienste der englisch-ostindischen Kompanie um die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der englischen Unternehmungen in Vorderindien* (Grüningen, 1911); Guy de Meuron, *Le régiment Meuron, 1781–1816* (Lausanne, 1982). Another early example of the use of Swiss mercenaries outside Europe is the deployment of Franz Adam Karrer's (1672–1741) regiment in North America in the service of France. See Adrian Baschung, "Schweizer Söldner in Nordamerika." Available at <https://blog.nationalmuseum.ch/2022/08/schweizer-soeldner-in-nordamerika/>. Accessed 25 August 2022.

mercenary officers can also be found in the service of Anhalt, Baden(-Durlach), Brunswick(-Wolfenbüttel), Denmark, Hesse, Lorraine, (Electoral) Palatinate, Saxe-Weimar, and Württemberg.⁶⁵

Mercenary officers from the *Corpus helveticum* experienced rapid career progression while abroad, with some reaching the top of foreign armies as commanders. One particularly impressive military career migrant was Hans Ludwig von Erlach (1595–1650), descendant of a powerful patrician family in Bern. After serving various employers in the Thirty Years' War (Anhalt, Brandenburg, Brunswick, Sweden, Saxe-Weimar), the talented officer accomplished an astonishing ascent while serving France. As the governor of the fortress of Breisach (the conquest of which he himself had organized in 1638, while under the command of Bernard of Saxe-Weimar), he was appointed lieutenant general in 1647 and then, in 1649, commander of the French army in the empire.⁶⁶ As commanders of guard units, Swiss officers enjoyed the trust of powerful princes, and commanded small groups of hand-picked elite soldiers who were responsible for the personal safety of the rulers and their families.⁶⁷ Another remarkable career was that of Johann Peter Stuppa (1621–1701), originally from Chiavenna, a town in the subject territory of the Three Leagues. Stuppa entered the service of France in his youth and tenaciously worked his way up to the highest military ranks. Seven years after Stuppa's promotion to lieutenant general in 1678, Louis XIV appointed him colonel of the Swiss guards regiment in 1685. Between 1674 and 1688, Stuppa also acted as colonel general of all the Swiss soldiers and those from the Three Leagues. He occupied this role on behalf of Prince Louis Auguste de Bourbon, Duc du Maine (1670–1736), who had not yet come of age. In this function he acted as a direct advisor to the French king and his Secretary of War. Responsible for the organization of the Swiss troops in the French army, he played a crucial role in the allocating

65 For these often poorly documented military services, see the entries on Hans Heinrich Bürkli (1647–1730), Abraham Philibert Clavel (1669–1748), Johann Ludwig von Erlach (1595–1650), Johann Ludwig von Erlach (1661– after 1691), Sigmund von Erlach (1614–99), Friedrich Ludwig von Hallwyl (1644–84), Johann Konrad Hotz (1739–99), Hans Ludwig Krug (1611–87), Johann Rudolf May von Rued (1619–72), Franz Ludwig Pfyffer von Altshofen (1699–1771), Rudolf Pfyffer von Altshofen (1545–1630), Paul Philippe Polier (1711–59), Hans Jakob Steiner (1576–1625), Albert Treytorrens (1594–1633), François Treytorrens (1590–1660), Conrad Werdmüller (1606–74), and Hans Ludwig Zollikofer (1595–1633) in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/>. Accessed 25 July 2020.

66 August von Gonzenbach, *Der General Hans Ludwig von Erlach von Castelen: Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild aus den Zeiten des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, 1–3 (Bern, 1880–82).

67 Henry, "Schweizergarden"; Philippe Rogger, "Leibwächter der Mächtigen Europas. Die Schweizergarden in der Frühen Neuzeit," *Der Geschichtsfreund* 176 (2023), 45–67.

of officer ranks to Swiss military entrepreneurs.⁶⁸ Louis XIV supported Stuppa's career because, coming from the subject territory of the Three Leagues, he was far less integrated into family and clientelist loyalties than the members of patrician families from the Swiss cantons, and therefore upheld his employer's interests more ruthlessly than they did. One of the ways Stuppa earned the king's favour was by recruiting so-called *Freikompanien* ('free' companies without official authorization) in the Confederacy. These not only served the king for a lower rate of pay than the regular mercenary troops (i.e. those hired on the basis of the capitulations), but could also be used for offensives which these regular troops were not permitted to engage in.⁶⁹

It is impossible to determine exactly how many men from the *Corpus helveticum* went to fight in foreign service. With regard to the mercenary officers, more precise data is at least known for Glarus. It is reported that 975 mercenary officers from this small canton (with a population of around 10,550 in 1700) served in foreign armies between the 15th and 19th centuries: 475 Catholics, 488 members of the Reformed Church, 12 unspecified.⁷⁰ Other than that, exact figures are only available for individual cantons and for specific years in the 18th century. For the year 1762, for example, there is evidence of 47 officers in foreign service from Lucerne and 14 from Zug. For 1763, 45 are documented from Protestant Glarus, 35 from Catholic Glarus, 73 from Schwyz, 73 from Uri, and 59 from Valais. In 1780, when mercenary service was well past its peak, there were still 232 officers from the Three Leagues in the pay of foreign powers.⁷¹ By the 19th century, it is likely that several thousand officers from the *Corpus helveticum* had served in foreign armies.⁷² Attempts to at least count the number of military units in foreign military service are very valuable, but are either limited to certain countries or suffer from the fact that they do not include individual companies, but only entire regiments.⁷³ A rough idea of the

68 Keller, "Gardehauptmann".

69 For the *Freikompanien*, see Keller, "Gardehauptmann," pp. 95–99; and Gustav Allemann, "Söldnerwerbungen im Kanton Solothurn von 1600–1723," *Jahrbuch für solothurnische Geschichte* 18 (1945), 1–122, pp. 90–98.

70 Hans Thürer, "Glarus und die fremden Dienste," in *Glarus und die Schweiz: Streiflichter auf wechselseitige Beziehungen*, ed. Jürg Davatz (Glarus, 1991), 96–104, p. 98; idem, *Glerner Offiziere in fremden Kriegsdiensten* (typoscript, 1984).

71 Kälin, "Dienste," p. 281 (table).

72 For an impression of the number of Swiss mercenary officers, see the biographical entries in *HLS* and its predecessor, the *Historisch-biographisches Lexikon der Schweiz* [HBLs]. Available at <https://www.digibern.ch/katalog/historisch-biographisches-lexikon-der-schweiz>.

73 Victor Louis Jean François Belhomme, *Histoire de l'infanterie en France*, 1–5 (Paris, 1893–1902); Georg Tessin, *Die Regimenter der europäischen Staaten im Ancien Régime des XVI.*

number of people involved in the business of war can be obtained from the 1745 inventory of companies in the rural Catholic cantons, which were very small in both area and population. With a combined population of around 52,000 inhabitants, Uri (25.5 companies), Schwyz (18.5 companies), Obwalden (five companies) and Nidwalden (two companies) provided a total of 51 companies.⁷⁴ The following synthesis compiles the most important estimates of the total military labour migration from the *Corpus helveticum*, based on research in population history (see Table 9.1).

5.2 *Mercenary Service and Elite Formation in the Swiss Cantons*

The canton-regulated export of mercenaries was organized by military entrepreneurs, most of whom belonged to families from the political elite of their cantons. The economic and political interests of the Swiss power elites were in fact closely interwoven with the mercenary services.⁷⁵ Officers in foreign service not only collected pay and pensions, they also gained important military experience of leadership and war, improved their language skills, and developed personal connections with the power centres of Europe. Their close contacts with France, Spain, and Savoy familiarized these career migrants with the customs of European princely society. Holding high military ranks and decorated with patents of nobility and the insignia of exclusive orders of knighthood, they knew how to operate in aristocratic and courtly circles. While many mercenary officers dedicated themselves to a military career and did not return to their home country for the rest of their lives, for others mercenary service was simply a stage in their biography, part of an intergenerational

bis xviii. Jahrhunderts, 1 (Osnabrück, 1986), pp. 685–694.

74 Kälín, “Dienste,” p. 281 (note 5). In 1743 Uri (not including the Ursern) had 9,828 inhabitants, Schwyz (including Gersau and Reichenburg) had 25,815, Obwalden had 8,885, and Nidwalden 7,814. For these population figures, see the entries on Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden, and Nidwalden in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/>. Accessed 14 July 2020.

75 For the connection between military entrepreneurship and the formation of elites, see Messmer, Hoppe, *Luzerner Patriziat*, pp. 77–93; Kälín, *Magistratenfamilien*, pp. 104–138; idem, “Dienste”; Steinauer, *Patriciens*; Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum”; Rogger, *Geld*, pp. 323–343; Rogger, “Machtpolitik”; Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würgler, “Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Sold-Unternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext,” in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würgler (Göttingen, 2018), 9–33, pp. 13–17.

TABLE 9.1 Estimates of military labour migration from the Corpus helveticum

Estimates in absolute numbers					
	15th century	16th century	17th century	18th century	Total
<i>Wylser, pp. 58–59.</i>					
Emigrated:					
Population loss:		500,000	400,000	500,000	1.4 million
<i>Bickel, p. 91.</i>					
Emigrated:					
Population loss:	50,000–100,000	250,000–300,000	250,000–300,000	300,000–350,000	850,000–1.05 million
<i>Peyer, pp. 220–222.</i>					
Emigrated:					
Population loss:	50,000–100,000	Max. 400,000	350,000–500,000 [?]	350,000–500,000	1.15–1.5 million
<i>Mattmüller, pp. 320, 329.</i>					
Emigrated:					
Population loss:	30,000–60,000	Max. 270,000	200,000–340,000 [?]	200,000–340,000	700,000–1.01 million
		100,000	100,000		200,000

Estimates as percentages

	15th century	16th century	17th century	18th century
<i>Head-König, p. 233.</i>				
Percentage of adult men migrating to other countries as mercenaries:			10–30	5–20

SOURCE: JULIUS WYLER, "DAS ÜBERVÖLKERUNGSPROBLEM DER SCHWEIZ," *ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHE STATISTIK UND VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT* 59 (1923), 56–67; WILHELM BICKEL, *BEVÖLKERUNGSGESCHICHTE UND BEVÖLKERUNGSPOLITIK DER SCHWEIZ SEIT DEM AUSGANG DES MITTELALTERS* (ZÜRICH, 1947); PEYER, "BEDEUTUNG"; MARKUS MATTMÜLLER, *BEVÖLKERUNGSGESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZ, TEIL I: DIE FRÜHE NEUZEIT, 1500–1700*, 1 (BASEL, 1987); ANNE-LISE HEAD-KÖNIG, "HOMMES ET FEMMES DANS LA MIGRATION: LA MOBILITÉ DES SUISSES DANS LEUR PAYS ET EN EUROPE (1600–1900)," IN *LES MIGRATIONS INTERNES ET À MOYENNE DISTANCE EN EUROPE, 1500–1900*, 1, ED. OFELIA REY CASTELAO (SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA, 1994), 225–245.

Note: For 19th-century mercenary migration, Bickel, *Bevölkerungsgeschichte*, p. 160, estimates that a total of 50,000 men from Switzerland died in the Napoleonic campaigns, and that in 1816, according to the capitulations, 23,000 Swiss soldiers served in France, Holland, and Prussia. Later Naples and the Papal States also featured as employers.

strategy to preserve the status of the wider family unit in the long term. The accumulation of economic, social, cultural, and symbolic resources meant that the mercenary officers were well-qualified for a political office in their homeland, or for higher functions in the domestic militia.⁷⁶ A few of them did not leave the business completely after their return, and continued to manage a company of soldiers in parallel to their political career, handing over the operative leadership in the field to a deputy commander.⁷⁷ Sometimes the military entrepreneurs never actually commanded their companies themselves, or only did so for a very short time. Kaspar Stockalper (1609–91) from Valais is a prominent example of a military entrepreneur who had no (major) experience of military command with his units. As an influential politician, and as a trader and entrepreneur with wide-ranging interests (including the salt trade, the transit trade, mining, and lending), he diversified his portfolio with companies of mercenaries, which he managed remotely from Valais.⁷⁸ In some cases, he left the leadership of his companies to deputy commanders, in others he hired his units out to subcontractors for a fixed price.⁷⁹ Military entrepreneurship and political strategies for getting to the top and staying there were interdependent, since the officers could use the resources acquired abroad to develop and maintain their clientele at home, thereby expanding and securing their family's position of power.⁸⁰

However, military entrepreneurship as a factor in the formation of elites played a substantially larger role in the rural cantons of central Switzerland and in Glarus, in the patrician towns of Bern, Lucerne, Solothurn, and

76 For the close interweaving of the mercenary service and the militia system (in terms of personnel), see Rogger, "Söldneroffiziere".

77 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, p. 35; Eyer, *Regimenter*, pp. 288–290.

78 Steffen, *Kompanien*, 159–202. Steffen, however, suggests on p. 160 that Stockalper could possibly have commanded his own troops during a stay in Paris in 1644. For Stockalper, see also Marie-Claude Schöpfer Pfaffen, "Kaspar Stockalper vom Thurm," 2012, in: *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/021488/2012-05-29/>. Accessed 17 August 2020; Gally-de Riedmatten, *sang*, pp. 357–411.

79 Steffen, *Kompanien*, pp. 162, 202–205, and 273–275.

80 Kälin, "Salz"; Daniel Schläppi, "In allem Übrigen werden sich die Gesandten zu verhalten wissen: Akteure in der eidgenössischen Aussenpolitik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Strukturen, Ziele, Strategien am Beispiel der Familie Zurlauben von Zug," *Der Geschichtsfreund* 151 (1998), 5–90; Büsser, "Militärunternehmertum," pp. 85–103; Cécile Huber, Katrin Keller, "Französische Pensionen in der Eidgenossenschaft und ihre Verteilung in Stadt und Amt Zug durch die Familie Zurlauben," in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würgeler (Göttingen, 2018), 153–182.

Fribourg, and in the alpine republics of Valais and the Three Leagues than in Basel, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen or Zurich, the centres of trade, financial services, and proto-industrial commercial manufacturing. Essentially, mercenary service was more important for the Catholic elites than for those in the Reformed territories – with the exception of Bern. In the Catholic main canton of Lucerne, for example, the business of managing military companies grew in just a century into a domain of the members of the executive council, the Small Council, and their closest relatives among the Grand Council.⁸¹ Around 1500 just 12 of the 100 councillors in Lucerne had been officers in foreign service, but 100 years later that number had risen to nearly one in two (44 out of 100 councillors).⁸² One family alone, the influential Pfyffer family of military entrepreneurs and magistrates, records (in an incomplete 18th-century genealogy) 49 family members in the pay of foreign powers in the period from the 15th to the 18th century.⁸³ Nonetheless, there is also evidence of considerable interest in military entrepreneurship among the elites in those cantons where social mobility was determined primarily by civil forms of economic activity, and not so much by mercenary service. The Calvinist metropolis of Geneva, dominated by industry, trade, and finance, has not been strongly linked with military entrepreneurship in historical accounts. Yet even here we find substantial involvement in military entrepreneurship among influential families – often in the service of the Catholic king of France.⁸⁴

In the ‘confessional age’, a pragmatic approach to religious denomination was part of the repertoire of career strategies for successful military entrepreneurs. Converting to Catholicism was often the prerequisite for promotion to top positions in the French army or integration into courtly and aristocratic society via marriage with a French noblewoman.⁸⁵ There is less evidence of Catholic officers entering the service of Reformed foreign rulers.⁸⁶ Sometimes the pragmatism of the contractors extended to the princely employers

81 Messmer, Hoppe, *Luzerner Patriziat*, p. 87.

82 Messmer, Hoppe, *Luzerner Patriziat*, p. 87 (table 10).

83 Philippe Rogger, “Transnationale und transregionale Elitefamilien: Grenzüberschreitende Biographien, Beziehungen und Loyalitäten des Luzerner Patriziats am Beispiel der Pfyffer in der frühen Neuzeit,” *Der Geschichtsfreund* 170 (2017), 63–77, p. 70.

84 For examples, see the articles on the Budé, Buisson, Gallatin, Grenus, Le Fort, Micheli or Pictet families in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/>.

85 See for example the conversions of the military entrepreneurs Johann Jakob von Erlach (1628–94): Ryser, *Fronten*, pp. 118–119; and Johann Peter Stuppa (1621–1701): Keller, “Gardhauptmann,” pp. 95–96.

86 For the example of a Catholic Pfyffer in the service of Brandenburg, see Rogger, “Elitefamilien,” p. 70; Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 69–70.

themselves: while Louis XIV persecuted the Huguenots inside his kingdom, he not only employed numerous troops from Reformed cantons, but also lent whole regiments to men from Huguenot backgrounds, as a way to secure the loyalty of the Reformed cantons.⁸⁷

The mercenary markets in the territory of the *Corpus helveticum* were not free trade areas with unrestricted market access.⁸⁸ Rather, the cross-border market logic of the fiscal-military system was confronted with complex local constellations of power and interests. The leading families used political measures to protect their monopoly on the positions of command. The capitulations restricted access to officer ranks, excluding subjects, non-citizens, or families who did not belong to the political elite. In many cases, the only option available to those in less privileged circles was to try to make a living in economically and politically precarious conditions as a captain in a *Freikompanie*, raised in contravention of alliances, or to be satisfied with the rank of a subordinate officer (*Unteroffizier*) or deputy captain (captain by commission, also referred to as a *Manimanist*).⁸⁹ Therefore, a career as a military entrepreneur was determined not so much by military expertise and entrepreneurial talent, but by the family one was born into. With its claim to exclusivity, the patriciate secured not only the profitable officer posts, but also consolidated its position as the sole negotiating partner if a European ruler wanted to recruit mercenaries or propose an alliance.⁹⁰ Thus, the rulers' success in recruiting mercenaries on the highly competitive markets of violence depended very much on good relations with the influential politicians and military entrepreneurs, whose support they attempted to secure with the resources of patronage

87 François Cojonnex, *Un Vaudois à la tête d'un régiment bernois: Charles de Chandieu (1658–1728)* (Pully, 2006).

88 For the functioning of early modern markets of violence, see Rogger, Hitz, "Söldnerlandschaften".

89 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 119–124; Bühler, *Solddienst*, pp. 101–164, esp. p. 159; Pfister, *Aargauer*, 1, pp. 96–107, 2, pp. 117–131; Steinauer, *Patriciens*, p. 179; Höchner, *Selbstzeugnisse*, pp. 33–34. For the *Freikompanien*, see Allemann, "Söldnerwerbungen," pp. 90–98; Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 8–9; Keller, "Gardehauptmann," pp. 95–99.

90 In this respect, the Swiss political and military entrepreneurs can be described as power elites, as defined by Wolfgang Reinhard: for purely personal interest, they supported the expansion of state power in the military field, as a foundation on which to build up their own special political status: Wolfgang Reinhard, "Introduction: Power Elites, State Servants, Ruling Classes, and the Growth of State Power," in *Power Elites and State Building*, ed. Wolfgang Reinhard (Oxford, 1996), 1–18, p. 6.

(e.g. pensions, military ranks, titles of nobility, salt concessions).⁹¹ Since the cantons (with the exception of Geneva in the 18th century) maintained no permanent envoys in the courts of Europe, the *Corpus helveticum* evolved into a hive of activity for foreign diplomats over the course of the early modern period.⁹² These diplomats did all they could to negotiate the best possible terms for their masters on the Swiss mercenary markets.⁹³ Their aim was to obtain licences to recruit from this attractive reservoir of mercenaries, and not to leave these important recruiting grounds to their opponents. The complex web of alliances between cantons of different sizes, structures, and denominations forced the envoys to develop and maintain networks of patronage with military entrepreneurs in all 13 cantons and in the allied cantons. The political negotiations over proposed alliances or recruitment licences required consultation with various actors: influential politicians, parties within the cantonal councils, assemblies of citizens (*Landsgemeinden*), mercenary clienteles, and broad sections of the population (by means of *Ämteranfragen*, surveys of popular opinion by the authorities).⁹⁴ For the political elites, this military interdependence developed into an important site of power brokering, with pro-French, pro-Spanish, or pro-Dutch factions fighting to secure market shares for their princely employers and patrons. The foreign policies of the cantons revolved around the needs of the military entrepreneurs and their associates. Therefore, while the mercenary officers and their troops were fighting on the battlegrounds of Europe, at home their family members and close relatives worked within the decision-making bodies and among the population to achieve the best possible political conditions for their business of war (see Table 9.2).

91 Windler, "Ohne Geld"; Rogger, Geld.

92 *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018); Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa*, pp. 133–141.

93 Behr, *Diplomatie*; Andreas Affolter, *Verhandeln mit Republiken: Die französisch-eidgenössischen Beziehungen im frühen 18. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2017).

94 Kälin, "Salz"; Schläppi, "In allem Übrigen"; Carlo Steiner, "Informelle Netzwerke in der Aussenpolitik der eidgenössischen Orte: Das labile Kräfteverhältnis in der Beziehung zwischen dem Zuger Solddienstunternehmer Beat H. Zurlauben und dem französischen Ambassador Jean de la Barde," *Argovia* 22 (2010), 45–65; Sarah Rindlisbacher, "Zwischen Evangelium und Realpolitik: Der Entscheidungsprozess um die Annahme der französischen Soldallianz in Bern 1564/65 und 1582," *Berner Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 75 (2013), 3–39; Rogger, *Geld*; idem, "Ein Friedensschluss unter schwierigen Bedingungen: Die französisch-eidgenössischen Friedensverhandlungen zwischen Widerstand und Konsens," in *Après Marignan: La paix perpétuelle entre la France et la Suisse*, eds. Alexandre Dafflon, Lionel Dorthe, and Claire Gantet (Lausanne, 2018), 319–335.

5.3 *Company Management as an Entrepreneurial Challenge*

Mercenary companies were the main source of income for military entrepreneurs from the *Corpus helveticum*.⁹⁵ The basic mechanism of company management (*Kompaniewirtschaft*) was that the princely employer paid a lump sum to the military entrepreneur to cover soldiers' pay and other expenses. Unlike major military entrepreneurs in the empire, such as Wallenstein, Mansfeld, Saxe-Weimar, or Tilly, who provided their princely employers with whole regiments and armies – for a fee – during the Thirty Years' War,⁹⁶ the business of the Swiss military entrepreneurs operated on a much more modest level. In the 17th and 18th centuries, they generally captained companies of about 200 men, and no Swiss military entrepreneur managed more than four

TABLE 9.2 Important military entrepreneur families from Swiss cantons and allied cantons (selection)

Zurich	Hirzel, Lochmann, Werdmüller
Bern	von Erlach, Jenner, von May, Stürler, von Wattenwyl
Lucerne	Amrhyn, Fleckenstein, Pfyffer, Rüttimann, Sonnenberg
Uri	Bessler, von Beroldingen, Jauch, Püntener, von Schmid
Schwyz	Auf der Maur, Betschart, Nideröst, Reding, Weber
Obwalden	von Flüe, Imfeld, Wirz
Nidwalden	Achermann, Leuw, Lussi, Stulz, Zelger
Glarus	Bachmann, Brändle, Freuler, Gallati, Hässi, Tschudi
Zug	Andermatt, Brandenburg, Knopfli, Kreuel, Zurlauben
Freiburg/Fribourg	d'Affry, Castella, de Diesbach, de Gottrau, de Reynold
Solothurn	Arregger, Besenval, Greder, von Roll, Stäffis-Molondin, von Sury, Vigier
Three Leagues	Buol, Capol, Enderlin, von Planta, von Salis, Schorsch, Sprecher
Valais	de Courten, von Kalbermatten, de Riedmatten, Stockalper
Neuenburg/Neuchâtel	Chambrier, Guy, de Tribolet, de Marval, de Montmollin, de Pury
Geneva	de Budé, Buisson, Gallatin, de Grenus, Le Fort, Pictet

SOURCE: *HLS*, ARTICLES ON FAMILIES.

95 Steffen, *Kompanien*; Hitz, *Kämpfen*, pp. 171–184; Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft”; Ruckstuhl, *Aufbruch*, pp. 64–71; Ryser, *Fronten*, pp. 91–112.

96 Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 1–2 (Wiesbaden, 1964–65); Parrott, *Business*; idem, “The Military Enterpriser in the Thirty Years' War,” in *War, Entrepreneurs and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden, 2014), 63–86.

companies at once.⁹⁷ Successful families spread their contracting activities over different foreign rulers. Around 1745, for example, members of the Reding family from Schwyz commanded no fewer than four companies in France, six in Spain, and two in Naples.⁹⁸ The company remained the basic unit for the activity of the Swiss military entrepreneurs even when (as was frequently the case) mercenary officers from the *Corpus helveticum* became colonels, brigadiers or *maréchaux de camp*, commanding larger formations of troops. Even for colonels, the activities that were genuinely part of military entrepreneurship (recruitment, equipment etc.) were usually limited to the *compagnie colonelle*, which was led by a lieutenant (*Kapitänleutnant*) on their behalf.⁹⁹ However, the combination of company management with a well-paid higher-ranking post in the larger troop unit was extremely lucrative. It not only provided the military entrepreneurs with higher pay, but also gave them an information edge over the other company commanders (e.g. insight into the regimental accounts), which could potentially be advantageous for the economic interests of the company.¹⁰⁰

There are two main reasons for the predominance of the company, rather than the regiment, as an administrative and economic unit. These reasons simultaneously offer insights into the underlying structures of Swiss military entrepreneurship. Firstly, the company commanders, who had established their companies in accordance with alliances and capitulations, were not the owners of their units. Military entrepreneur families did in many cases attempt to make their units hereditary, and sought to support their claims with normative provisions, especially in the 18th century.¹⁰¹ But the terms *Eigentumskompanie* (privately owned company, company under a captain-proprietor) and

97 Hermann Romer, "Militärunternehmer," 2009, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/024643/2009-11-10/>. Accessed 17 August 2020.

98 Kälin, "Dienste," p. 281 (note 5).

99 Ryser, *Fronten*, p. 201.

100 Kälin, *Magistratenfamilien*, p. 125.

101 For more on the supposedly inheritable *Eigentumskompanien*, see for example Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 10, 15–17 ("*capitaines propriétaires*" as a term found in historical sources on p. 17, though *propriétaire* in French means both possessor and owner), and 87; Kälin, *Magistratenfamilien*, pp. 117–118, 127–130, and 228; idem, "Salz," pp. 119–120, 122 (esp. note 52); Eyer, *Regimenter*, pp. 70–77, 111–112, and 515; Höchner, *Selbstzeugnisse*, p. 34; Büsser, "Linien," p. 200. Although Kaspar Stockalper is alleged to have gifted his *Freikompanie* (which was serving France) to a son (see Steffen, *Kompanien*, p. 162), the rights of disposal were probably even more precarious for *Freikompanien* than they were for regular, officially authorized (*avouierte*) troops, since the commanders of *Freikompanien* could not count on the advocacy of the cantons if they had a disagreement with their princely employers.

Kompanieeigentümer (company owner), though frequently encountered in the literature, are misleading. Rather, the possession of a company gave temporary rights of disposal over military resources of foreign armies, which the rulers could grant and withdraw at any time.¹⁰² Companies were patronage resources *par excellence* and were awarded according to the criteria of princely patronage. The captains could assert no legal claim to them, simply by virtue of the huge power asymmetry between themselves as clients and their princely patrons.¹⁰³ In order to reinforce their political influence in the cantons, it was in the interest of the foreign rulers to award captaincies (*Hauptmannschaften*) or shares in companies to as many influential clients as possible, thus integrating them into their patronage networks. The second factor favouring the predominance of the company was the political economy in the small Swiss states and the specific market conditions associated with it. Unlike their counterparts in the monarchically structured European neighbours, Swiss military entrepreneurs could not fall back on extensive land holdings, whose population, tax revenue, and agricultural yields were sufficient to allow them to recruit, finance and equip larger contingents of troops. In the polyarchic territories of the *Corpus helveticum*, where numerous families competed for power and resources, access to these resources was not the exclusive monopoly of a single family but the object of political negotiation processes between the politically dominant families.¹⁰⁴ From the 17th century onwards, these limited resources triggered conflicts, sometimes fierce ones, over the distribution of recruitment patents and the like.¹⁰⁵

In this competitive context, the greatest challenge for military entrepreneurs was the procurement of scarce goods. These included immaterial resources such as expertise, information, political support, and protection, but above all mercenaries and money.¹⁰⁶ Competition for the resources necessary for war was a structural obstacle to the development of large-scale military entrepreneurship and made it impossible for individual contractors to provide a foreign ruler with entire regiments. The structural conditions of the Swiss mercenary markets brought specific entrepreneurial challenges. The crucial elements for

102 Rogger, "Kompaniewirtschaft", pp. 235–237; see also Hitz, *Kämpfen*, p. 183.

103 Clear examples of the clientelist awarding of companies are provided by Keller, "Gardhauptmann"; Ryser, *Fronten*, pp. 71–82.

104 Daniel Schläppi, "Das Staatswesen als kollektives Gut: Gemeinbesitz als Grundlage der politischen Kultur in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft," *Historical Social Research* 32 (2007), 169–202.

105 Bühler, *Solddienst*, pp. 18–19; Kälin, *Magistratenfamilien*, p. 126; Büsler, "Militärunternehmertum," p. 116.

106 Kälin, "Dienste," p. 282.

the success of the business were organizational and entrepreneurial skill, support from the wider family, a broad social network, and the associated credit.

The mercenary soldiers were the most important resource of the company commanders. Over the centuries, the social profile of this group changed considerably. The relatively short military campaigns of the 15th and 16th centuries offered an attractive, accessible, and temporary earning opportunity (pay and booty) for unmarried farmers' sons and farmhands, and urban workmen, but also for impecunious men with wives and children, from various social strata and occupational groups. Among those going off to war there were probably also men who mainly saw mercenary service as a chance for a change, an adventure, or an escape from the threat of criminal prosecution. They risked their physical integrity for money and other advantages, accepting the danger of dying in battle or from epidemics and illnesses.¹⁰⁷ At the time, the campaigns lasted only days or weeks, and for many they were a form of military labour migration, offering an opportunity to bridge the seasonal fluctuations in the agricultural workload. The underlying motives for the decision to accept a bounty and enter mercenary service varied by region and by class, but in many cases, the decision to leave home was probably based on a family economy that relied on additional income earned by the male family members in mercenary service.¹⁰⁸ In the course of the early modern period, mercenaries became an increasingly scarce commodity. This was partly due to changes in warfare, the structure of armies and military technology, and partly due to alternative employment opportunities in the rapidly developing, predominantly Reformed proto-industrial regions. Service in the standing armies of the 17th and 18th centuries now lasted considerably longer, often several years; for many it lasted a lifetime. Deployments in the protracted wars alternated with periods of monotonous garrison life, with drills and exercises. The new

107 Peyer, "Anfänge," p. 221.

108 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 124–127; Steffen, *Kompanien*, p. 238; Bühler, *Solddienst*, pp. 14–54; Arnold Esch, "Lebensverhältnisse von Reisläufern im spätmittelalterlichen Thun: Ein Beschlagnahme-Inventar von 1495," in: *Alltag der Entscheidungen: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Schweiz an der Wende vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit*, ed. Arnold Esch (Bern, 1998), 161–172; idem, "Mit Schweizer Söldnern auf dem Marsch nach Italien: Das Erlebnis der Mailänderkriege 1510–1515 nach bernischen Akten," in: *Alltag der Entscheidungen: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Schweiz an der Wende vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit*, ed. Arnold Esch (Bern, 1998), 249–328; Disch, *Hausen im wilden Tal*, pp. 199–226; Hitz, "Wer ging überhaupt"; Greyerz, Holenstein, and Würzler, "Soldgeschäfte," pp. 23–26; for the classification of Swiss mercenary service as military labour migration, see Holenstein, Kury, and Schulz, *Migrationsgeschichte*, pp. 48–59; and for a diachronic, comparative, and global perspective, see Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative History of Military Labour, 1500–2000* (Amsterdam, 2014).

opportunities to earn money in lines of business that did not require men to risk their lives far from home for an uncertain wage, combined with the negative development of a soldier's pay in relation to wages in Switzerland, caused a steady decline in the supply of mercenaries.¹⁰⁹ This led to difficulties recruiting new soldiers on the one hand and a growing number of desertions on the other. For the company commanders, however, the number of soldiers they commanded was a key factor for their business, since it determined the amount of money paid out by the princely employer. The military entrepreneurs responded to the shortage of recruits with questionable recruitment methods: boisterous festivities with drinking and dancing, or the brutal press-ganging of beggars and marginals (*Zwangsrekrutierungen*). Recruits on the way to the place of deployment were not only well guarded but also sometimes even shackled to prevent them from escaping.¹¹⁰ Some cantons, especially those with smaller populations, resorted increasingly to foreigners to top up their 'Swiss' troops.¹¹¹ They tried to prevent desertions with the threat of harsh punishments, and meticulously recorded the physical appearance of each soldier in the form of a personal description (*Signalement*) to facilitate the search for deserters.¹¹² The crucial factors for a steady supply of fresh recruits were money and a functioning network of recruitment agents, integrating different areas. Recruitment took place not only in the confederate cantons themselves, but also in the military entrepreneurs' manorial lands and areas of jurisdiction, in the subject territories of the individual cantons, and in those jointly governed by several cantons, the condominiums (Aargau, Thurgau, Rheintal, and Tessin).¹¹³ The condominiums were especially important as recruiting

109 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 111–118; Bühler, *Solddienst*, pp. 14–24; Kälin, "Dienste," pp. 281–282; Holenstein, Kury, and Schulz, *Migrationsgeschichte*, pp. 51–53; Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa*, p. 37. For the negative development of soldiers' pay relative to wages, see Peyer, "Anfänge," p. 223; idem, "Schweizer," p. 7.

110 Büsser, "Militärunternehmertum," pp. 120–121.

111 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 28, 41–49, and 129; Pfister, *Aargauer*, 1, pp. 33–43, 52–55; Gugger, *Werbungen*, pp. 76–79; Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa*, p. 37.

112 For the problem of desertion, see Allemann, "Söldnerwerbungen," pp. 96–103; Bühler, *Solddienst*, pp. 81–89; Pfister, *Aargauer*, 1, pp. 55–66; Hitz, *Kämpfen*, pp. 146–156. For the meticulous recording of personal descriptions of company members, see, e.g. Staatsarchiv Luzern, Cod 1795, *Signalement de tous les hommes, qui composoient le dit regiment suisse de Pfyffer le 11 octobre 1763, l'époque de sa nouvelle formation* [...]; or Staatsarchiv Graubünden, D VI Z 4, extracts from the company ledger of the Hauser company of guards, *Die Garde Compangie Hauser, den Antheil Herrn Graffen von Salis betreffend (Johann Heinrich Anton v. Salis-Zizers, 1711–1770)*, 1749–50.

113 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 32–41; Pfister, *Aargauer*, 1, pp. 33–43; Gugger, *Werbungen*, pp. 47–68, 84–127; Rogger, *Geld*, p. 226; Holenstein, Kury, and Schulz, *Migrationsgeschichte*, p. 58.

areas for the military entrepreneurs from small cantons, because their own population was not sufficient to fill the companies.¹¹⁴ The Zurlauben family of Zug acted strategically, for example: over several generations, family members occupied the position of *Landschreiber* (clerk in a condominium) in the subject territory of *Freie Ämter*, using their tightly woven network of relationships on the ground and their superior local knowledge to secure more or less exclusive access to the pool of mercenaries in that area.¹¹⁵ Similar tactics were presumably also deployed by other military entrepreneur families in central Switzerland, such as the Redings (Schwyz) or the Beroldingens (Uri), who controlled the offices of the *Landschreiber* in Thurgau and in Mendrisio (Tessin) for several generations.¹¹⁶ Ecclesiastic members of the Zurlauben family, such as abbots, monks, or secular priests, were also engaged to recruit mercenaries.¹¹⁷ The strands of these extremely complex logistics of recruitment came together in the small town of Zug. Here, in the 18th century, the business of military entrepreneurship also involved female family members: they coordinated recruitment operations for their relatives in foreign service, organized the transport of troops, kept accounts, and ensured the flow of information in matters of company management and politics.¹¹⁸

The early modern period saw not only a gradual decline in the appeal of a mercenary career, but also a steady reduction in the financial leeway available to military entrepreneurs. From the mid-17th century onwards, the foreign rulers and their military bureaucracy interfered more and more in the organization, arming, and equipment of the troops.¹¹⁹ By issuing so-called

114 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 32–37.

115 Schläppi, “In allem Übrigen,” p. 54; Büsser, “Drängende Geschäfte,” pp. 202–203; Greyerz, Holenstein, and Würgler, “Soldgeschäfte,” pp. 20–21.

116 Kälin, *Magistratenfamilien*, pp. 108, 115–116, and 131–133; Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum,” pp. 119–120; Franz Auf der Maur, Josef Wiget, “Reding,” 2011, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/022904/2014-12-11/>. Accessed 12 October 2020.

117 Dominik Sieber, “In der kirchlichen Etappe: Eigene Geistliche, fromme Geschenke und das Soldgeschäft der Zurlauben im 18. Jahrhundert,” in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würgler (Göttingen, 2018), 239–258.

118 Büsser, “Frau Hauptmannin”; idem, “Drängende Geschäfte”; Jasmina Cornut, *Femmes d’officiers militaires en Suisse romande: Implications, enjeux et stratégies de l’absence, xvii^e–xix^e siècles* (unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Lausanne, 2023); idem, “Implications féminines dans l’entrepreneuriat militaire familial en Suisse romande (xvii^e–xviii^e siècles),” *Genre & Histoire* 19 (2017). Available at <http://journals.openedition.org/genrehistoire/2670>. Accessed 8 July 2020.

119 Peyer, “Schweizer,” pp. 7–8; Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum,” p. 114; Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft,” pp. 214–215; Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa*, p. 36; for the topic of military

ordonnances, the French king changed troop numbers, *Gratifikationsplätze* (i.e. the additional payments made depending on the number of soldiers at the monthly troop review), or the soldiers' pay, and disregarded the existing provisions of alliances and capitulations whenever it suited him.¹²⁰ In view of the protracted wars and their depleted resources, the princely employers now wanted to know exactly what they were getting for their money. They tightened their bureaucratic control over their mercenary troops, allowing the military contractors less room to manoeuvre.¹²¹ At the same time, the high costs of recruitment were putting pressure on the profit margins. Moreover, the military entrepreneurs were operating in what was, in economic terms, an extremely unstable market environment. This made business planning even more difficult. Depending on whether war was being waged or garrison service was the order of the day, there were considerable fluctuations in the profits and losses arising from the difference between income (the *Soldpauschale*, i.e. the lump sum intended to cover the soldiers' pay; advance payments for recruitment etc.) and expenditure (soldiers' pay, costs of recruitment, price rises etc.).¹²² Periods of war were not only likely to mean higher recruitment costs, due to possible casualties; they also usually entailed a slight increase in pay and the prospect of victory bonuses if the battle was won.¹²³ The military entrepreneurs attempted to offset the rising costs partly by financially exploiting their soldiers. For example, they would reduce the pay (which varied according to rank or function in the company) or pass on various costs to the troops themselves: bread rations (*Kommissbrot*), clothing and uniform, weapons, or medical costs. One consequence of this transferral of costs was that

entrepreneurship and standing armies at European level, see David Parrott, "From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies: War, State, and Society in Western Europe, 1600–1700," in *European Warfare, 1350–1750*, eds. Frank Tallett, David J.B. Trim (Cambridge, 2010), 74–95; idem, *Business*, pp. 260–306.

120 Zurlauben, *Code militaire*; Ryser, *Fronten*, pp. 175–206, esp. p. 200.

121 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 13–16, 29–30, and 144–148; Kälin, *Magistratenfamilien*, pp. 129–130; Peyer, "Schweizer," pp. 7–8. The elaborate and intensified administrative penetration of the Swiss mercenary regiments is shown very clearly by the source materials in Naples: Eyer, *Regimenter*, pp. 24–26, 521–524; or the records of the *contrôles de troupes* in France: André Corvisier, "Une armée dans l'armée. Les Suisses au service de la France," in *Cinq siècles de relations franco-suisse. Hommage à Louis-Edouard Roulet* (Neuchâtel, 1984), 87–98, pp. 90–91.

122 Ruckstuhl, *Aufbruch*, p. 67; Büsser, "Militärunternehmertum," p. 115; see also Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 50–77; Hitz, *Kämpfen*, pp. 171–184.

123 Büsser, "Militärunternehmertum," p. 116.

the mercenaries accumulated debts to their captain.¹²⁴ The company owners even charged the soldiers for the expenses arising from recruitment in public houses (bounty, clothing, meals, and tobacco). Many recruits would therefore have owed money to their captain even before they joined their company.¹²⁵ After peace agreements, on the other hand, there was every chance that the troops would be dismissed from one day to the next, often without pay.¹²⁶ To be able to realistically assess the options, precise accounting and archiving of business records were essential.¹²⁷ Fundamentally, however, despite shrinking margins, colonels and captains could still make substantial profits in the 18th century – unlike their soldiers.¹²⁸ The biggest challenge for the military entrepreneurs was probably the fact that the money to finance the companies often only arrived at irregular intervals from France, Spain, or Savoy, and the entrepreneurs had to cover the running costs of their companies with their private capital or by taking out loans.¹²⁹ In other words, the company commanders borrowed money to help finance the wars of their princely employers. These loans were effectively the price for a prestigious career as an officer in France or Spain, and recall the phenomenon of venal offices in France.¹³⁰ But while French or Spanish nobles could see the incurring of debt for the sake of their ruler as part of their feudal and/or clientelistic duties, and as an honourable service to their prince, such borrowing drove many a military entrepreneur from the *Corpus helveticum* into financial hardship.¹³¹ If the pay did not arrive, the captains would take various steps – even during the campaign – to make sure that they were paid. They appealed directly to the tardy employers or their

124 Steffen, *Kompanien*, pp. 195–200, 244–245, and 248–256; Ruckstuhl, *Aufbruch*, pp. 67–68, 239–246; Büsser, “Drängende Geschäfte,” pp. 205–210, 211; Hitz, *Kämpfen*; Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft,” pp. 228–230.

125 Steffen, *Kompanien*, p. 239; Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum,” pp. 110–111.

126 Marco Frigerio, “Das Vorgehen des französischen Ambassadors Jean de la Barde im Zusammenhang mit der Bündniserneuerung zwischen der alten Eidgenossenschaft und Frankreich (1653–1658),” *Jahrbuch für solothurnische Geschichte* 69 (1996), 63–121, p. 80; Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft,” p. 220.

127 Steffen, *Kompanien*, pp. 159–226; Büsser, “Drängende Geschäfte”; Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft.”

128 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, pp. 14, 85–104; Kälin, *Magistratenfamilien*, pp. 123–126; Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum,” p. 114.

129 For example Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft,” p. 220.

130 Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661–1701* (Cambridge, 2002); Hervé Drévilion, *L'impôt du sang: Le métier des armes sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 2005); Parrott, “Military Enterprise,” pp. 89–91.

131 Kälin, *Magistratenfamilien*, p. 116; Erich Meyer, “Balthasar von Grissach (†1602): Glanz und Ruin eines Diplomaten und Söldnerführers,” *Jahrbuch für solothurnische Geschichte* 67 (1994), 5–66; Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum,” pp. 114–116.

representatives in the field and informed the authorities at home, hoping for diplomatic support in collecting the outstanding funds.¹³² The mercenary soldiers, for their part, used legal channels or violent demonstrations after their return home to demand the outstanding pay from their captains.¹³³ Demands for pay arrears, loan repayments, and outstanding pensions from the foreign rulers repeatedly defined the diplomatic agenda of the cantons and were a regular item of business at meetings of the Swiss Diet, where the foreign ambassadors were inundated with complaints and desperate petitions were sent to the rulers. The debts of the foreign rulers led to serious discussions whenever their envoys negotiated the renewal of the alliance with the cantons or requested new troops.¹³⁴ If their annoyance at the defaulting debtors was particularly great and if the foreign envoys could not prevent it, then the cantons might send one of their rare delegations to the courts of their allies to lend emphasis to their demands.¹³⁵ In parallel to these efforts, the military entrepreneur families probably took their own steps to ensure payment of the debts by soliciting the intervention of higher-ranking mercenary officers at the courts.¹³⁶ Often, however, the debts for the soldiers' pay remained unpaid for years.¹³⁷ The princes, in contrast, probably saw these calculating, bourgeois demands for payment from the *Corpus helveticum* as the expression of a strange and vexatious shopkeeper mentality. At the same time, the ceaseless complaints proved to them that the tactic behind their empty-coffer policy was actually working. Debts bound the mercenary entrepreneurs to their princely employers: unless

132 Hitz, *Kämpfen*, pp. 266–269.

133 Hitz, *Kämpfen*, pp. 247–259, 271–290.

134 Philippe Gern, *Aspects des relations franco-suissees au temps de Louis XVI: Diplomatie, économie, finances* (Neuchâtel, 1970), pp. 174–178; Martin Körner, *Solidarités financières suisses au XVII^e siècle* (Lausanne, 1980), pp. 409–430; Bolzern, *Spanien*, pp. 136–142, 173–188; Frigerio, “Vorgehen”; Simon Rageth, *Sold und Soldrückstände der Schweizer Truppen in französischen Diensten im 16. Jahrhundert* (Bern, 2008); Würgler, “Symbiose,” p. 61; Hitz, *Kämpfen*, pp. 269–271. A glance at the indices for the different volumes of the *Amtliche Sammlung der älteren eidgenössischen Abschiede* shows how much the problem of outstanding soldiers' pay and pensions occupied the Swiss Diet. See *Amtliche Sammlung der älteren eidgenössischen Abschiede [1245–1798]*, 8 volumes in 22 parts, eds. Jakob Kaiser and others (various places of publication, 1856–1886). Available at <https://digital.ub.uni-duesseldorf.de/periodical/structure/207967>. Accessed 13 October 2020.

135 Frigerio, “Vorgehen,” p. 80; Andreas Würgler, *Die Tagsatzung der Eidgenossen: Politik, Kommunikation und Symbolik einer repräsentativen Institution im europäischen Kontext (1470–1798)* (Epfendorf, 2013), p. 222; Rogger, “Machtpolitik,” pp. 131–134.

136 So far there has been only rudimentary research into the role of Swiss mercenary officers as actors in diplomacy: Affolter, *Verhandeln*, pp. 215–243, 366–376; Holenstein, “Militärunternehmer”; Ryser, *Fronten*, pp. 176–184.

137 Hitz, *Kämpfen*, pp. 199–201, 294–296.

they remained in business with them, they might miss out on the chance to have their demands met. Good connections with financiers who could quickly supply urgently needed cash were therefore crucial for military entrepreneurs, enabling them to bridge periods of financial difficulty and manage running costs. The cash-strapped company commanders secured loans not only from private individuals in their personal or family circle, but above all from monasteries, churches, and the authorities (*Obrigkeiten*).¹³⁸ To structurally minimize the financial risks of managing a company, the commanders followed several strategies. For example, they served more than one employer at once; they limited their entrepreneurial commitment to a half-company, quarter-company, or eighth-company; or they worked more closely with other military entrepreneurs when recruiting soldiers and lobbying for their interests at the Swiss Diet (campaigning for a ban on *Freikompanien*, demanding pay arrears etc.).¹³⁹ The most important factor for profitable company management, however, was the military entrepreneur's family and kinship network.¹⁴⁰

5.4 *The Family as a Sociocultural and Economic Foundation*

For military entrepreneurs from the *Corpus helveticum*, the family was the decisive sociocultural and economic foundation for their business model. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the mutual trust and codependence between family members reduced the transaction costs of military entrepreneurship. This is apparent from the frequent loans between family members, or the use of shared recruitment infrastructure. Secondly, debt claims and profit targets could be transferred to subsequent generations, thanks to the intergenerational solidarity within the family.¹⁴¹ Since the high investments of company commanders often required accounts to be kept beyond their own lifetime, the management of a mercenary company was of necessity an intergenerational practice. Entrepreneurs could not pass on their companies to the

138 Kälín, *Magistratenfamilien*, p. 123 (table 11); Hitz, *Kämpfen*, pp. 180–181 (for a detailed account of cash flows and debts in 16th-century company management, see pp. 171–304).

139 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, p. viii; Kälín, “Dienste,” pp. 282–283; Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum,” pp. 116–118; Hitz, *Kämpfen*, p. 182.

140 Suter, *Militär-Unternehmertum*, p. 87; Kälín, “Dienste,” pp. 283–284; Büsser, “Drängende Geschäfte”; idem, “Militärunternehmertum,” pp. 118–121; idem, “Linien”; Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft”.

141 Hartmut Berghoff, “Die Zähmung des entfesselten Prometheus? Die Generierung von Vertrauenskapital und die Konstruktion des Marktes im Industrialisierungs- und Globalisierungsprozess,” in *Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte: Dimensionen eines Perspektivenwechsels*, eds. Hartmut Berghoff, Jakob Vogel (Frankfurt a.M., 2004), 143–168, pp. 149–150; Rogger, “Kompaniewirtschaft,” p. 236. For intergenerationality in mercenary entrepreneurship, see also Büsser, “Linien”; Ryser, *Fronten*, pp. 112–114.

next generation, but they could pass on the debts owing to them. To ensure that the postponed settlement of accounts would actually happen, the military entrepreneur families made every effort to secure the favour of the employer in the long term, and to keep their companies in the family over as many generations as possible. The most important prerequisite for this intergenerational business model was that the family could ensure biological reproduction and that their offspring did not prove completely unsuited to the business of war. The military training of the younger generation was therefore a high priority.¹⁴² Children from military entrepreneur families began their officer careers very early by joining the company of their father, brother, or uncle.¹⁴³ Peter Viktor Besenval von Brunnstadt (1721–91) and Franz Ludwig Pfyffer von Wyher (1716–1802) were just ten years old when they began their service as cadets. In 1733, at the age of 12, Besenval was serving as a *Fähnrich* (ensign) in the Swiss guard regiment in France, and in 1738, at the age of 17, he took command of the family's company of guards.¹⁴⁴ The division of labour within the family (in the recruitment of soldiers) and the intergenerational planning and solidarity plainly show the social foundation of Swiss military entrepreneurship.¹⁴⁵ As the princely employers began to intervene more and more in the organization of the troops, the management of mercenary companies gradually lost its attractiveness for entrepreneurs. From 1750 its significance as a factor in the formation of elites also declined, though the business model remained important for some families, especially in Catholic central Switzerland, for want of economic alternatives.¹⁴⁶

5.5 *Doing War Business as Suppliers, Financial Service Providers, and Military Technicians*

Around the core business of exporting mercenaries – regulated by international law and organized within kinship structures – other, less bloody business opportunities arose for the military entrepreneurs. As well as recruiting and commanding units of soldiers, it was not unusual for company commanders to add additional services to their war business portfolio. They might, for

142 Rogger, "Söldneroffiziere," pp. 153–154.

143 See for example the military careers of the members of the Zurlauben family: Kurt-Werner Meier, *Die Zurlaubiana: Werden – Besitzer – Analysen*, 1–2 (Aarau, 1981), pp. 871–1007.

144 Markus Lischer, "Franz Ludwig Pfyffer von Wyher," 2010, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/014464/2010-09-28/>. Accessed 13 October 2020; Andreas Fankhauser, "Peter Viktor Besenval von Brunnstatt," 2002, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/017570/2002-11-06/>. Accessed 13 October 2020.

145 Büsser, "Militärunternehmertum," p. 118.

146 Kälin, *Magistratenfamilien*, pp. 127–130.

example, supply foreign armies and states with commodities needed for war (saltpetre, gunpowder, cattle, horses, cloth etc.) or with political information.¹⁴⁷ The continuous demand for loans and equipment attracted a number of military entrepreneurs or contractors from the *Corpus helveticum* who specialized in financial and commercial transactions. Integrated into cross-border European financial networks and supply chains for armaments and foodstuffs, various trading companies and banks took an active role in international arms dealing and financial transactions.¹⁴⁸ Because this intermediate trade via neutral terrain contravened embargos imposed by the warring powers, substantial risk surcharges made this business even more attractive.¹⁴⁹ In the Thirty Years' War, for example, the Zieglers, a merchant family in Schaffhausen, supplied the Weimarian and later French fortress of Breisach (or rather its Bernese commander, Major General Hans Ludwig von Erlach) with gunpowder, salt, and loans.¹⁵⁰ The city of Basel served as an important hub for arms exports and for cross-border payments in connection with the Weimarian and French armies operating on the High and Upper Rhine. The beneficiaries were, on the one hand, the Basel-based merchants and bankers involved in the European business of war, and on the other hand, the local transport industry, which shipped the goods back and forth between Basel and Breisach on the Rhine, and also transported them over larger distances if required.¹⁵¹ Basel was not

147 Büsser, "Salpeter".

148 For the logistics and provisioning of armies by private entrepreneurs and financiers, see for example Julia Zunckel, *Rüstungsgeschäfte im Dreissigjährigen Krieg: Unternehmerkräfte, Militärgüter und Marktstrategien im Handel zwischen Genua, Amsterdam und Hamburg* (Berlin, 1997); Parrott, *Business*, pp. 196–259; Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs*; Olivier Chaline, *Les armées du roi: Le grand chantier, xii^e–xviii^e siècle* (Paris, 2016), pp. 173–272.

149 Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa*, p. 105.

150 The correspondence of Hans Ludwig von Erlach with Alexander Ziegler (1596–1673) and other members of the Ziegler family is mainly located in the Burgerbibliothek Bern, *Korrespondenz des Generals Hans Ludwig von Erlach von Kastelen (1595–1650)*, Manuscripta historica helvetica xxvii.48 and xxvii.50.

151 See for example the business activity of the Basel-based merchant Marx Conrad Rehlingen (1575–1642, originally from Augsburg), in the service of the army of Saxe-Weimar, described in *Quellen und Regesten zu den Augsburger Handelshäusern Paler und Rehlinger 1539–1642: Wirtschaft und Politik im 16./17. Jahrhundert, Teil 2: 1624–1642*, ed. Reinhard Hildebrandt (Stuttgart, 2004). For other Basel merchants and bankers such as Theobald Scheppelin, Hans Jacob and Emanuel Schönauer, Daniel Iselin, Jacques and Pierre Battier, Daniel Zollikofer, Barthélemy and Jean-Henri Herwart, and for Basel wagoners such as Hans Georg Sauter and Hans Jakob Wagner, who maintained business relationships with the commander Hans Ludwig von Erlach, see the index of letters in the Burgerbibliothek Bern under Hans Ludwig von Erlach.

the only major hub for arms deals and financial transactions within the *Corpus helveticum*.¹⁵² In the west, the city of Geneva was a centre for war-related financial services, offering foreign rulers ideal conditions for transnational war finance transactions. The banks of Geneva utilized the city's status as a 'neutral' financial centre to provide large loans for foreign armies.¹⁵³ Jacques Buisson, for example, was a partner in the Geneva company Saladin & fils & Buisson, and had excellent contacts with financial actors in Paris. In 1703, he invested heavily in the war of the French army of Louis XIV in northern Italy.¹⁵⁴ Cash was not only needed to pay the expensive mercenaries; keeping up with the technological developments of the military revolution also required substantial investment in weapons technology and production, and in the modernization of military infrastructure (fortifications).¹⁵⁵ This brings us to a final group of contractors from the *Corpus helveticum*, whose core business was military technology or engineering. As highly qualified experts, they sold their know-how to foreign armies, producing and developing cannons and small arms as entrepreneurs, or seeking employment as fortification engineers (see Table 9.3).

Two examples serve to illustrate how far some of these highly qualified career migrants advanced. The Zurich cannon-maker Johann Balthasar Keller (1638–1702), with his brother Johann Jakob ('*Les Kellers*'), directed the arsenal in Paris and established foundries in Douai, Besançon, Pignerol and Breisach. After the successful casting of an equestrian statue of Louis XIV, the king appointed him *Commissaire général des fontes de l'artillerie de France*.¹⁵⁶ The fortification engineer Giovan Giacomo Paleari (1520/30–86), from Morcote in

152 Wilson, "Competition".

153 André Holenstein, "Fruits de la paix et effets géopolitiques: Les échanges économiques entre la France et le Corps helvétique à l'époque moderne," in *Après Marignan: La paix perpétuelle entre la France et la Suisse*, eds. Alexandre Dafflon, Lionel Dorthe, and Claire Gantet (Lausanne, 2018), 573–588, pp. 582–584.

154 Herbert Lüthy, *La banque protestante en France de la Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes à la Révolution*, 1 (Paris, 1959), pp. 139–143. Another example of a family involved in war-financing business with France is the Högger family, originally from St. Gallen: Lüthy, *banque protestante*, pp. 169–187; idem, *Die Tätigkeit der Schweizer Kaufleute und Gewerbetreibenden in Frankreich unter Ludwig XIV. und der Regentschaft* (Aarau, 1943).

155 Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659* (Cambridge, 1972); Regula Schmid, "The Military City," in: *Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Urban Societies between Order and Disorder*, eds. Gábor Sonkoly, Christina G. Williamson (Cambridge, forthcoming).

156 Friedrich O. Pestalozzi, "Zwei Zürcher im Dienste des 'Roi Soleil' (Joh. Jakob und Joh. Balthasar Keller)," *Zürcher Taschenbuch N.F.* 28 (1905), 1–69; Agnès Étienne-Magnien, "Une fonderie de Canons au XVII^e siècle: Les frères Keller à Douai (1669–1696)," *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 149 (1991), 91–105.

Ticino, even achieved literary fame: Cervantes mentioned Spain's leading engineer in *Don Quijote de la Mancha* (1605) and again in the comedy *El gallardo español* (1615) ten years later.¹⁵⁷

6 Conclusion

For many countries in Europe in the modern period, war became the 'the fly-wheel in the machinery of state', as the historian Otto Hintze once put it.¹⁵⁸ The arms race and the costly wars forced the states to build up military and bureaucratic systems intended to provide them with the necessary resources for war. War made the state, and the state made war. This well-known thesis does not apply to the Old Swiss Confederacy, however. Instead, it kept out of the European wars. It did not take part in the arms race itself, and it allowed the European rulers or rather their taxpayers to pay for the modernization of its troops in foreign service. Subsequently the Swiss militia troops at home fell further and further behind developments in military technology and became structurally incapable of warfare.¹⁵⁹

The *Corpus helveticum*, however, was an integral component not only of the European market for mercenaries and arms, but also of war operations on the continent. It served as a transit area for troop movements, a mercenary market, a financial centre, and hub for the trade in war materials, and as a site for innovations in military technology. Civil and military service providers, whether mercenaries, merchants, fortification engineers, weapon manufacturers, officers, or politicians, were directly or indirectly integrated into cross-border and often cross-denominational business networks, providing the armies of Europe with mercenaries, money and credit, technical expertise, information, and other services. Many families from the political elite linked their activities in the cross-border business of war with their power politics, monopolizing the profits for themselves and using their diverse social contacts with the European centres of power to expand and secure their domestic position of

157 Marino Viganò, "Giovan Giacomo Paleari," 2009, in *HLS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/048411/2009-11-26/>. Accessed 17 August 2020.

158 Otto Hintze, *Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung* (Dresden, 1906).

159 *Miliz oder Söldner? Wehrpflicht und Solddienst in Stadt, Republik und Fürstentum: 13–18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Regula Schmid (Paderborn, 2019); André Holenstein, "Wenig Krieg, schwache Herrschaft und begrenzte Ressourcen: Wirkungszusammenhänge im Militärwesen der Republik Bern in der frühen Neuzeit," in *Schwerter, Säbel, Seitenwehren: Bernische Griffwaffen 1500–1850*, eds. Jürg A. Meier, Marc Höchner (Bern, 2021), 15–32.

TABLE 9.3 Gunsmiths, cannon-makers and engineers from the *Corpus helveticum* (selection)

Name, date of birth and death, place of origin	Activity	Career abroad
Jean-Etienne Amand de Courten (1695–1745, Siders)	Engineer	Spain, Italy
Nicolas Doxat (1682–1738, Yverdon)	Engineer	Holland, Austria, Serbia
Urs Christian Egg (1748–1831, Oberbuchsiten)	Gunsmith	London
Joseph Egg (1775–1837, Oberbuchsiten [?])	Gunsmith	London
Johann Jakob Keller (1635–1700, Zurich)	Cannon-maker	France, Piedmont, Breisach
Johann Balthasar Keller (1638–1702, Zurich)	Cannon-maker, statue-maker	France, Piedmont, Breisach
Filiberto Lucchesi (1606–66, Melide)	Architect, plasterer, engineer	Austria, Poland, Slovakia
Johannes Maritz (1680–1743, Burgdorf)	Turner and cannon-maker	Lyon
Johann Maritz (1711–90, Burgdorf)	Cannon-maker	Lyon; France
Pietro Morettini (1660–1737, Cerentino)	Building contractor, engineer	Besançon; Landau (Palatinate); Namur; Netherlands; Savoy; Papal States; Genoa
Bernardino Paleari (1520/30–95, Morcote)	Engineer	Spain; Franche-Comté
Giorgio Paleari (1520/30–89, Morcote)	Engineer	Milan; Tunis; Monferrato; Domodossola, Liguria; Sardinia; Balearic Islands; Pamplona
Giovan Giacomo Paleari (1520/30–86, Morcote)	Fortification engineer	France and Spain; Tortona; Milan; Corsica; Sardinia; Pamplona; Ciudadela de Menorca, Mahon and Palma de Mallorca; North Africa; Gibraltar; São Julião da Barra and Setúbal; Roses

TABLE 9.3 Gunsmiths, cannon-makers and engineers from the *Corpus helveticum* (selection) (Cont.)

Name, date of birth and death, place of origin	Activity	Career abroad
Pietro Paleari (1601–98, Morcote)	Engineer, architect	Malaga; Fuenterrabía; Santa Isabel; San Sebastián; Navarre
Domenico Pelli (1657–1728, Aranno)	Engineer	Strasbourg; Denmark (Schleswig; Odesloo, Kronborg, Rendsburg); Germany (Gottorf, Glückstadt)
Giacomo Soldati (d. before 17 October 1600, Neggio)	Hydraulic and fortification engineer	Milan; Savoy; Turin; Vercelli; Perosa, Monmorone and Rocco di Molaro in Gravère in the Val di Susa, Torre in the Val Luserna; San Giovanni Evangelista in Pragelato
Isaak Steiger (1698–1755, Bern)	Engineer	Breisach; Belgrade; Vienna; Salzkammergut and Upper Austria; Peterwardein
François Treytorrens (1590–1660, Yverdon)	Fortification engineer	Denmark; Sweden; Augsburg; States General

SOURCE: *HLS*, ARTICLES ON FAMILIES.

power. Here the power elite benefited from a market logic, which organized the flows of war-related goods and money in the most economically efficient (i.e. decentralized) manner,¹⁶⁰ and thus integrated the *Corpus helveticum* into the European fiscal-military system as a ‘neutral’ market participant. However, in making clever strategic use of the structural features that set their country apart from its geopolitical surroundings, the Swiss contractors also served the interests of the warring powers. The extreme bellicosity of the European powers corresponded with the interests of the Swiss cantons, cultivating their geostrategically crucial position and keeping the *Corpus helveticum* out of the wars in Europe as a ‘neutral actor’ while turning its neutrality into a business model. The interdependence between them makes it very clear that neutral parties are highly relevant to war, especially in wartime.

160 Zunckel, *Rüstungsgeschäfte*; Parrott, *Business*; Wilson, “Competition”.

The Republic of Geneva as a Fiscal-Military Hub, 1685–1709: Finance, Information, and Espionage

John Condren

1 Introduction

On 31 January 1691, Thomas Coxe, British envoy to the Swiss cantons, had occasion to complain to the secretary of state at Whitehall, the Earl of Nottingham, of the relative poverty he was compelled to endure as the diplomatic representative of their Majesties King William and Queen Mary.¹ Coxe informed Nottingham of the fact that his French counterpart, Michel-Jean Amelot, Marquis de Gournay, had distributed “above 140 thousand crowns” to the canton of Bern, and some 200,000 to Zurich and the lesser Protestant cantons.² Coxe lamented that “an abler man than I will never make bricks without straw in this Egypt”. He further claimed that even had he been trusted with no more than 30,000 pounds sterling, he too might have been able to achieve greater success for the Grand Alliance (grouping together the enemies of France) among a people (the Swiss) almost universally condemned for their avarice.³ Part of Coxe’s difficulty lay in the transmitting of money from London to Switzerland: Bills of exchange drawn on Frankfurt were the most frequently employed, but British diplomats to the cantons, both then and later, often complained of the plodding pace at which money arrived.

Complaints of the Swiss fondness for money were frequent among the dispatches of British, Dutch, Austrian, Sabaudian, French and Spanish ambassadors and envoys to the Swiss Confederacy and its allies. Over a decade after Coxe’s complaint, the recently-appointed French ambassador to the

1 This research was part of the ‘European Fiscal-Military System c.1530–1870’ project which is funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. 787504).

2 For Amelot’s career as the French ambassador in Switzerland, and his rôle in secret negotiations to end the War of the League of Augsburg, see Edouard Rott, “Le secret de l’empereur (1692–1694),” *Revue historique* 147:1 (1924), 1–21; and instructions to Amelot in 1688, in *Suisse*, 1, ed. Georges Livet (Recueil des instructions aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France 30) (Paris, 1983).

3 Kew, The National Archives [TNA], State Papers [SP], 96, vol. 9, Coxe to Nottingham, 31 January 1691.

Confederacy, Roger Brûlart de Sillery, Marquis de Puitsieux, signalled his own irritation in July 1701 at how necessary hard currency was to the oiling of the wheels of negotiation in Switzerland:

The timidity of the Catholic cantons prevents them from declaring their support for the alliance with the governor of Milan. I have no doubt that if Count Casati [Philip v's ambassador to the Swiss federal Diet and the Catholic cantons] had had the promised pensions and the necessary orders for even a mediocre levy, he would have received complete satisfaction from this assembly; but ... the more one delays in satisfying these people, the more difficult and demanding they become.⁴

Throughout the War of the League of Augsburg (1688–97) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14), Switzerland assumed an almost unprecedented importance in the eyes of European statesmen and diplomats.⁵ Its reputation as a source of top-class soldiers ensured that competition for the levying of regiments was fierce. For example, when the Grand Alliance began negotiations early in 1703 for the recruiting of two regiments of 6,000 men from the Protestant cantons, the British envoy of the time, Dr William Aglionby, emphasised the need to sabotage the French 'system' in the cantons, which yielded recruits on a regular basis for the armies of Louis XIV.⁶ This competition for soldiers was inevitable, at a time when monarchs were in desperate need of men for armies campaigning in as many as five different theatres of war at once.⁷ Money talked in early 18th-century Switzerland: Louis XIV's willingness to spend lavishly in pensions and other sweeteners to leading families of

4 "La timidité des catholiques de ne se point déclarer au sujet de l'alliance du Milanez je ne puis néanmoins douter que si le comte Casati avoit eu les trois pension promises et les ordres pour une médiocre levée, il n'eust remporté de cette assemblée une satisfaction presque'entière ... plus on tardera à entrer à donner satisfaction à ces gens-cy, plus ils se rendront difficiles et augmenteront leurs pretentions", Paris, Archives des Affaires étrangères [AAE], Correspondance politique [CP], Suisse, vol. 128, fol. 379, the Marquis de Puitsieux to Louis XIV, 30 July 1701.

5 Andreas Würigler, "'The League of Discordant Members' or How the Old Swiss Confederation Operated and How it Managed to Survive for so Long," in *The Republican Alternative: The Netherlands and Switzerland Compared*, eds. André Holenstein, Thomas Maissen, and Maarten Prak (Amsterdam, 2008), 29–50.

6 TNA, SP, 96/10, dispatches of Aglionby for February and March 1703.

7 See the various essays in *The War of Spanish Succession: New Perspectives*, eds. Matthias Pohlig, Michael Schaich (Oxford, 2018). The classic text on Swiss importance to both sides is Sven Stelling-Michaud, *Saint Saphorin et la politique de la Suisse pendant la guerre de succession d'Espagne 1700–1710* (Villette-les-Cully, 1935), which examines the career of an enigmatic military officer and diplomat in the service of the Grand Alliance.

various cantons gave him – and his grandson, Philip v of Spain – an advantage over the Austrians, Dutch, and British, who were all seeking to tap into the reserves of manpower available in the Confederacy.⁸

It requires no great insight to emphasise the importance of reliable finance in the successful conduct of war. The early modern period witnessed an acceleration in the ways and means by which money could be raised quickly, cheaply, and efficiently, whether it be by domestic taxation or by borrowing on international money markets.⁹ In 18th-century Europe, an increasingly large number of cities boasted the trade volume necessary to supporting the demands of military enterprise and the moving of money. One such was Geneva, described here in 1714 by yet another British diplomat to Switzerland, Abraham Stanyan:

Besides their manufactures, they have several bankers of note, who have dealings in most of the trading towns of Europe; and during the last war, negotiated great sums of money, both for France and the Allies. Some of them suffered indeed considerably by their loans to France; but others, that had the good luck to get themselves repaid, made prodigious gains by the great interest they received for their money. To these advantages, if you add that of their situation, which makes them a convenient mart for merchandizes to be interchanged between France and Italy, it will not appear strange, if that city thrive by trade.¹⁰

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- 8 For examples of relevant scholarship, see Andreas Affolter, *Verhandeln mit Republiken: Die französisch-eidgenössischen Beziehungen im frühen 18. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2017); Andreas Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft: Die Casati als spanisch-mailändische Gesandte in Luzern und Chur 1660–1700* (Zurich, 2015); Christian Windler, “Ohne Geld keine Schweizer: Pensionen und Söldnerrekrutierung auf den eidgenössischen Patronagemärkten,” in *Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Aussenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Hillard von Thiessen, Christian Windler (Berlin, 2005), 105–133; and Andreas Würigler, “Symbiose ungleicher Partner: Die französisch-eidgenössische Allianz 1516–1798/1815,” *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte* 12 (2011), 53–75.
- 9 Dwyryd W. Jones, *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough* (Oxford, 1988); Aaron Graham, “Military Contractors and the Money Markets 1700–1715,” in *The British Fiscal-Military States 1660–c.1783*, eds. Aaron Graham, Patrick Walsh (London, 2016), 83–112.
- 10 Abraham Stanyan, *An Account of Switzerland* (Edinburgh, 1714), p. 163. Stanyan served as the British resident ambassador to the Swiss cantons between 1705 and 1713, and was partly responsible for the Grand Alliance’s tentative efforts to infiltrate the financial networks of the most significant banking families in Geneva. Stanyan also managed the raising of funds in Bern for the Allied forces in northern Italy after 1707. For his diplomatic career, see Philip Woodfine, Claire Gapper, “Stanyan, Abraham,” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* [ODNB]; and Albert Zeerleder, “Die politische und literarische Mission des englischen Gesandten Abraham Stanyan in der Schweiz von 1705 bis 1713,” *Berner Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Heimatkunde* 4 (1942), 87–102.

The small city-republic of Geneva, situated in a strategically valuable location at the foot of Lake Geneva, has been variously described by historians as a bulwark of the reformed (Calvinist) faith in the face of Catholic rulers' efforts across Europe to eradicate and eliminate the spectre of heresy.¹¹ But as the above quotation suggests, Geneva also acquired a renewed significance as a centre of banking and finance in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This reflected developments in the realm of banking throughout Switzerland (especially in St Gallen, Zurich, Bern, Basel, and Fribourg) in the previous two hundred years, as the important work of Martin Körner has made abundantly clear.¹² However, Geneva enjoyed several distinguishing features which contributed to its emergence as a financial centre of note. This essay is a preliminary explanation of the manifestation of these features from the perspective of analysing the city-republic's role as a hub of fiscal-military activity from the 1690s onwards.¹³ The essay will introduce the reader to the importance of Geneva as the centre of transnational commercial networks, which in turn stimulated the desire of important merchant-bankers to involve themselves in the business of war. Geneva's importance as a centre of information and espionage will also be discussed.

2 Trade and Finance

In geopolitical terms, the Republic's right to exist was recognised, with its independent status respected. The tiny state was not a member of the Swiss Confederacy and was not included in the Swiss federal Diet's declarations of neutrality. Nonetheless its treaties with Bern and Zurich offered it a degree of security, largely because neither France or Savoy wished to anger these two powerful Protestant cantons, or indeed the Confederacy as a whole.¹⁴ At no point before the 1790s was there any serious possibility that Geneva would be

11 Gillian Lewis, "Calvinism in Geneva in the Time of Calvin and of Beza (1541–1605)," in *International Calvinism 1541–1715*, ed. Menna Prestwich (Oxford, 1985), 39–70.

12 Körner has pointed out that the development of merchant banking in 16th-century Geneva owed much to the example of shifts elsewhere in reformed Switzerland – most particularly in the Zurich of Ulrich Zwingli in the 1520s: Martin Körner, "Genève et la Suisse réformée en 1584," *Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Genève* 18 (1984), 3–22, p. 12. See also idem, *Solidarités financières suisses au XVIIe siècle* (Lausanne, 1980), pp. 227–264.

13 For an explanation as to the defining features of a hub in this regard, see Peter H. Wilson, Marianne Klerk, "The Business of War Untangled: Cities as Fiscal-Military Hubs in Europe (1530s–1860s)," *War in History* 29:1 (2020), 80–103.

14 Catherine Santschi, "Genève et les Suisses: Mariage arrangé ou mariage d'amour?" in *Eidgenössische "Grenzfälle": Mülhausen und Genf*, ed. Wolfgang Kaiser (Basel, 2001), 25–57.

absorbed into its most powerful neighbour, France. The House of Savoy also coveted its former fiefdom of Geneva, but after the disastrous failure of the Escalade of 1602 – a surprise attack on the city which was easily repulsed – the Savoyard dukes reluctantly accepted that Geneva would not return to Savoyard domination.¹⁵ Nonetheless, until the 1750s the House of Savoy remained watchful for opportunities to reassert control. The Genevan government's paranoia over Savoyard intentions was a permanent fixture, which contributed to the enormous expenditure on the city's fortifications in the early to mid-18th century.¹⁶

The transnational element of warfare in this period has traditionally been sidelined by historians, who have tended to concentrate upon how states channelled their own resources (financial and logistical) for the waging of war.¹⁷ More recently, the importance of networks which spanned frontiers has been emphasised, as certain European cities became renowned for the facilities they offered to belligerent states. Insofar as Geneva's capabilities in this regard were comparable to those of London, Amsterdam, Danzig, Genoa or Vienna, the sheer quantity of financial transactions conducted through the medium of Genevan bankers suggests that the city was indispensable to the war effort of the French monarchy between 1690 and 1709.¹⁸ Contemporaries opposed to France wrote of the necessity to "lance the source of evil" by ruining the international credit of the foremost Genevan bankers and sequestering their possessions in allied states.¹⁹ Such threats and suggestions were intended to prevent the Genevans from continuing to supply, for instance, the French army in northern Italy in the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession.²⁰

15 Olivier Fatio, Béatrice Nicollier, *Comprendre l'Escalade: Essai de géopolitique genevoise* (Geneva, 2002).

16 Salomon Rizzo, "Un petit État désire de se bien limiter avec ses voisins, surtout quand ce sont des grands princes ..." *Contexte et acteurs du traité de limites de Paris de 1749: Les travaux d'approche genevois (1719–1725)* (unpublished MA thesis, University of Geneva, 2003).

17 Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York, 1975), 178–215.

18 André-Emile Sayous, "Les principales phases de l'histoire de la banque à Genève: Pendant le XVIII^e siècle," *Annales d'histoire sociale* 1:2 (1939), 133–140, pp. 133–135.

19 *Calendar of State Papers Domestic (Anne)*, 1, ed. Robert P. Mahaffy (London, 1916), p. 552, Dobourdieu to the Earl of Nottingham, 25 January 1703.

20 But in truth, many of these financiers would partly be the authors of their own downfall, as their connections to Samuel Bernard, the most powerful of all international bankers, would prove in 1709. The crash of April that year, when Bernard's correspondents in Lyon refused to honour the bills of exchange he had drawn on that place, brought France temporarily to its knees – Bernard himself was eventually bailed out by the crown, but many

Any historian of Geneva's financial clout must begin their research with Herbert Lüthy's magnum opus: an enormously wide-ranging two-volume deconstruction of what has come to be known as the 'Huguenot international', and first published in 1959. Lüthy had already conducted pioneering research on Geneva's importance in this context in his 1943 doctoral thesis, which focused on the period 1688–1714.²¹ This short essay will draw on much of Lüthy's work for the period specified in the title. However, it will also indicate avenues of research to be explored more fully if Geneva's value as a hub is to be demonstrated. In many regards, Lüthy was a pathfinder for a new generation of economic and financial historians who sought to chart the developments in the realm of banking and state finance since the 17th century. The recent work of Guy Rowlands on the international financiers upon whom Louis XIV relied has amplified our comprehension of the importance of the 'Geneva bankers' to the efficient management and organisation of military conflict.²² The rewards to be gleaned were manifold: increase in personal reputation and trustworthiness; significant financial profits if the right investments and choices were made; the gratitude of a thankful monarch or government.²³

As the crucial work of Lüthy demonstrated, these bankers constituted what has been termed a 'Huguenot international': a vast network of Protestant families, many linked by marriage or other blood ties, and with branches in numerous European centres of commerce and finance.²⁴ More recently, Aaron Graham has underlined the importance of these 'personal linkages' in fostering commercial connections, insofar as they were necessary to ensure trust

'lesser' financiers went under, suffering losses which forced them into bankruptcy. Bernard had overreached himself and had suffocated the money markets with paper instruments for which the crown's promises – born out of desperation for cash – were the only security. In so doing, he had dragged down many bankers from Geneva to Amsterdam who were willing to speculate on this next-to-worthless commodity.

- 21 Herbert Lüthy, *Die Tätigkeit der Schweizer Kaufleute und Gewerbetreibenden in Frankreich unter Ludwig XIV. und der Regentschaft* (Aarau, 1943).
- 22 Guy Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men: The International Bankers of Louis XIV's France* (London, 2015); see also idem, *The Financial Decline of a Great Power: War, Influence, and Money in Louis XIV's France* (Oxford, 2012).
- 23 Corinne Walker, "Les pratiques de la richesse: Riches Genevois au XVIII^e siècle," in *Être riche au siècle de Voltaire: Actes du colloque de Genève (18–19 juin 1994)*, eds. Jacques Berchtold, Michel Porret (Geneva, 1996), 135–160, pp. 138–140.
- 24 Herbert Lüthy, *La banque protestante en France de la Révocation de l'Edit de Nantes à la Révolution*, 1–2 (Paris, 1959–61). For a brief assessment of the enduring popularity of the term, see John F. Boshier, "Huguenot Merchants and the Protestant International in the Seventeenth Century," *The William & Mary Quarterly* 52:1 (1995), 77–102.

among merchants, who tended to rely upon closely-knit family networks.²⁵ This was certainly the case as regards Geneva, where merchant families such as the Fatio, the Turrettini, the Calandrini, the Lullin, the De La Rüe and many others subscribed to the principle of keeping their business within the family as far as was reasonably possible.²⁶ Many of these families had migrated to Geneva from i.a. northern Italy, from France, or from the Catholic cantons of the Swiss Confederacy – regions where their Protestantism was not tolerated, but where they still retained commercial links stretching back decades.²⁷

Paradoxically, Geneva had endured something of an economic decline from the late 15th century to the 1640s.²⁸ Prior to the reign of Louis XI in neighbouring France, Geneva had been one of the most important centres in Europe for the clearing of bills of exchange: Raymond de Roover described it as “having played a cardinal role as a redistribution center of gold and silver” in the late medieval period.²⁹ In March 1463, Louis XI (who was keen to retain specie in France after the economic catastrophe of the Hundred Years War) issued a royal charter which established four fairs in Lyon – a city which, in de Roover’s words, had waged a “cold war” with Geneva for years in matters of commerce.³⁰ From this point on, Lyon began to assume Geneva’s previous significance as the economic and financial powerhouse of the region, especially since its fairs were generally held on the same dates as those of Geneva.³¹

25 Aaron Graham, *Corruption, Party and Government in Britain, 1702–13* (Oxford, 2015).

26 See also Geneva, Archives d’État de Genève [AEG], Fonds Saladin, 12, for a useful outline of Antoine Saladin’s business undertakings and his links to banks in Lyon, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Turin, and Madrid in the years 1707–10.

27 The various social, political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and religious consequences of the Edict of Fontainebleau in October 1685 are the subject of a highly impressive and detailed collection of essays which were published for the 300th anniversary: *Genève au temps de la révocation de l’Édit de Nantes (1680–1705)*, ed. Olivier Reverdin (Paris/Geneva, 1985). For the migration of Protestant refugees from the Three Leagues of the Grisons to Geneva during and after the ‘Valtellina crisis’, see Alessandro Pastore, “The Shaping of a Religious Migration: The Sacro Macello of 1620 and the Refugees from Valtellina,” in *Exile and Religious Identity, 1500–1800*, ed. Gary K. Waite (London, 2016).

28 Jean-François Bergier, *Genève et l’économie européenne de la Renaissance* (Paris, 1963). The exhaustive synopsis offered in Anne-Marie Piuze, Liliane Mottu-Weber, *L’Économie genevoise, de la Réforme à la fin de l’Ancien Régime: XVIIe–XVIIIe siècles* (Geneva, 1990) is no less valuable.

29 For an interesting snapshot of the financial markets in Geneva’s heyday in the mid-15th century, see Michele Cassandro, *Il libro giallo di Ginevra della compagnia fiorentina di Antonio Della Casa e Simone Guadagni 1453–1454* (Prato, 1976).

30 Raymond de Roover, *The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397–1494* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), pp. 289–290.

31 Richard Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine à Lyon au XVIe siècle: Lyon et ses marchands (environs de 1520 - environs de 1580)* (Paris, 1971); Estelle Leutrat, *Les débuts de la gravure sur cuivre en France: Lyon 1520–1565* (Geneva, 2007), p. 23.

Efforts by the Genevan authorities to reclaim the ground lost to Lyon from the 1460s until around 1510 – with the (self-interested) help of the House of Savoy and Swiss cantons such as Bern and Fribourg – were generally unsuccessful, even though many German traders continued to patronise the Geneva fairs.³² By the mid-16th century, Lyon attracted large communities of Swiss and Italian merchants, many of whom settled in the city and established or consolidated trading networks throughout Europe.³³ By the late 1600s, however, Geneva had clawed back some of the lost ground, as the trading rivalry between the two commercial entrepôts continued to simmer. Nonetheless, in many ways it was a mutually profitable symbiotic relationship, especially as Geneva commanded important trading routes from south-eastern France into Switzerland.³⁴ The exile of many Huguenots from many French commercial cities to Geneva, especially after 1685, strengthened these commercial networks, established in previous generations.³⁵

Geneva's importance as an entrepôt of trade is especially noticeable with regard to the distribution of grain throughout central Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. Shipments of Mediterranean grain which were landed at Marseille were transported north across the French provinces of Languedoc and the Dauphiné, entering Switzerland via 'la porte des Alpes' at Geneva.³⁶ From here, the grain made its way to markets in the Low Countries, Germany,

32 Jean-François Bergier, "La politique commerciale de Genève devant la crise des foires de Lyon, 1484–1494," in *Lyon et l'Europe: Hommes et société: Mélanges d'histoire offerts à Richard Gascon*, 1, ed. Université Lyon II (Lyon, 1980), 33–46.

33 Françoise Bayard, "Les Bonvisi, marchands banquiers à Lyon, 1575–1629," *Annales. Histoire, sciences sociales* 26:6 (1971), 1234–1269; Marco Schnyder, "Argument juridique, artifice rhétorique ou mythe? La paix perpétuelle de 1516 dans les pratiques et les discours des marchands suisses en France (1516–1792)," in *Après Marignan: La paix perpétuelle entre la France et la Suisse*, eds. Alexandre Dafflon, Lionel Dorthe, and Claire Gantet (Lausanne, 2018); Monica Martinat, "Famiglie tra le Alpi. Itinerari di alcune famiglie mercantili tra Svizzera e Francia (xvii–xviii secolo)," *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Italie et Méditerranée modernes et contemporaines* 125:1 (2013), 2–15; idem, "Genevois à Lyon, Lyonnais à Genève: Itinéraires de migrants et de convertis (xvii^e siècle)," *Revue de l'histoire des religions: Genève, refuge et migrations (xvi^e–xviii siècles)* 232:1 (2015), 37–51.

34 Piuz, Motu-Weber, *L'économie genevoise*, p. 502; André Holenstein, "Les fruits de la paix et les effets du géopolitique: Échanges économiques entre la France et le corps helvétique à l'époque moderne," in *Après Marignan: La paix perpétuelle entre la France et la Suisse*, eds. Alexandre Dafflon, Lionel Dorthe, and Claire Gantet (Lausanne, 2018), 573–588.

35 Yves Krumenacker, "Choosing the Path to Exile: Networks, Destinations and Determinants," in *Huguenot Networks, 1560–1780: The Interactions and Impact of a Protestant Minority in Europe*, ed. Vivienne Larminie (New York/London, 2017), 109–122, pp. 114–116.

36 As Greg Monahan has pointed out, the Lyonnais merchants dealt more in luxury goods than in grain and disdained to invest heavily in the cereals trade: W. Gregory Monahan, "Lyon in the Crisis of 1709: Royal Absolutism, Administrative Innovation and Regional Politics," *French Historical Studies* 16:4 (1990), 833–848, p. 835.

Poland, and as far as Russia.³⁷ The opportunities for speculation were enormous, and many Genevan merchant-financiers – with family branches in Marseille, Amsterdam, Genoa, Livorno, and Naples – made considerable fortunes through investing in the grain market, particularly in times of dearth. In the 1730s, Genevan bankers established at Paris (most notably Isaac Thellusson) were frequently entrusted with royal commissions to supply Paris with grain during various subsistence crises. Showing the value of commercial networks established over generations, Thellusson obtained his grain supplies from the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and North America. Unlike other entrepreneurs, Thellusson appeared to forgo his potential profits through a sense of civic duty.³⁸

Geneva's own dependence upon external sources of grain has been analysed in impressive detail by Hermann Blanc and more recently Anne-Marie Piuz and Liliane Mottu-Weber.³⁹ In wartime, the city frequently requested permission to move grain from its stockpiles in France or Savoy to its depots in the city itself.⁴⁰ This dependence had political undertones: The councils complained when intendants in neighbouring provinces (such as the Franche-Comté) forbade the exportation of grain from the Pays de Gex.⁴¹ This application of economic pressure was a frequent tactic deployed both by Louis XIV and Leopold I, in order to intimidate and coerce the republic into cooperating with their aims.

Goods of a more luxurious and cosmopolitan nature – such as silk, tapestries, and spices – were also traded by Genevan entrepreneurs, many of whom benefitted from close connections to Marseille and Lyon, and who could therefore take advantage of the benevolent situation as regards royal taxation on luxury items.⁴² Geneva's location on a north-south axis gave it an exalted importance as a depot or entrepot for the buying and selling of luxury goods, and Genevan merchants frequented all the major trading fairs of Europe.

37 Piuz, Mottu-Weber, *L'Economie genevoise*, pp. 377–381; Laurent Burrus, *La communauté suisse à Marseille au XVIII^e siècle: Les logiques spatiales, sociales, économiques et familiales d'un collectif étranger* (unpublished MA thesis, University of Lausanne, 2018), p. 6.

38 Steven Laurence Kaplan, "Provisioning Paris: The Crisis of 1738–1741," in *Edo and Paris: Urban Life and the State in the Early Modern Era*, eds. James L. McClain, John M. Merriam, and Ugawa Kaoru (Ithaca/London, 1997), 175–210, pp. 191–195.

39 Hermann Blanc, *La Chambre des blés de Genève, 1628–1798* (Geneva, 1941).

40 AAE, CP Genève, 24, fols. 12–13, La Closure to Torcy, 15 June 1703.

41 E.g., AEG, Registres du Conseil [RC] 207, fol. 450, 11 September 1707.

42 Junko Thérèse Takeda, *Between Crown and Commerce: Marseille and the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore, 2011), p. 48.

Geneva's interests hinged on the protection of its international commerce. French remonstrations over how prejudicial Geneva's commerce was to that of France were frequently ignored.⁴³ The imperial court at Vienna knew the right levers to press in 1702, when Genevan commerce with the Holy Roman Empire was suspended, much to the shock and disbelief of the city's ruling councils.⁴⁴ Acting out of a desire to punish the city's merchant-bankers for their support of France's armies in Italy, the Count of Trauttmandorff (Austrian ambassador to the Swiss Confederacy) wrote angrily to the Small Council, warning of his intention to seize goods of Genevan merchants on the Swiss frontier with the Holy Roman Empire. A Genevan delegation to Trauttmandorff, headed by Pierre Gautier, was instructed to emphasise that "from our town we have sent money from France to Germany, and we have furnished from here and elsewhere bills of exchange for the imperial army in Italy".⁴⁵

Geneva had always had a strong trade in precious metals and was also a renowned centre for the manufacture of timepieces. The ruling councils of Geneva carefully monitored the economic activity of the Swiss cantons and were particularly jealous of any efforts from their neighbours (especially the Republic of Bern) to aggregate industries for which Geneva itself was renowned. For example, the syndic Isaac Pictet exhorted the Small Council to examine ways to circumvent the potential consequences of the establishment of a *draperie* in Bern, which he claimed would result in "a true interruption of commerce" between the two states.⁴⁶

3 Remittances and False Coining

Geneva was not as vibrant a trading centre as, for instance, Lyon.⁴⁷ But there was a disproportionate concentration of Protestant bankers in this tiny state,

43 AAE, CP Genève, 22, fols. 17–18, La Closure to Torcy, 25 September 1701, informing the French minister that he has warned the Genevan magistrates that they should not abuse their privileges in France by smuggling or by facilitating the trade of members of the Grand Alliance.

44 AEG, RC 202, fol. 212, 29 April 1702.

45 AEG, RC 202, 2 May 1702, fol. 219; also cited in Lüthy, *La banque protestante*, 1, p. 47.

46 AEG, RC 198, 14 September 1698, fol. 296. In January 1700, one Jean Rodolphe Bulet was barred from serving on the Grand Council (to which he had recently been elected) unless he returned from the Pays de Vaud (a territory ruled by Bern) to take up residence once again in Geneva: AEG, RC 201, 20 January 1701, fols. 11–12.

47 In April 1701, word came to the *chambre des négoçes* at Geneva to the effect that the *prevôt des marchands* at Lyon was using all possible means to interrupt commerce between Geneva and Marseille: AEG, RC 201, fols. 148, 160, 12 April and 27 April 1701.

enjoying extensive commercial connections to many cities in France, Italy, the Low Countries, and the Holy Roman Empire. Genevan merchants settled in a number of European cities throughout this period, and among Italian urban centres, Geneva was particularly well connected to Turin and Genoa – Catholic cities with minority Protestant populations – in social, cultural, religious, commercial, and financial contexts⁴⁸. The involvement of Geneva's merchants in war business did have unsettling effects for the city's political life, with opposition manifesting itself in 1703 through the medium of anonymous printed posters and broadsheets which denounced various of the city's bankers for their apparent willingness to sacrifice the city's manufacturing and artisanal industries on the altar of their own ambition.⁴⁹

The first significant instances of Genevan involvement in remitting money on behalf of Louis XIV date from the 1690s, when the wealthy merchant François Fatio transmitted cash to the Marquis de Crenan, French commander of the fortress of Casale, in Monferrato, via a correspondent at Turin, Theophile Thellusson. Fatio, a resourceful and opportunistic man, was also involved in consortia to supply gunpowder to the French army in the War of the League of Augsburg, and money to French commanders in Savoy.⁵⁰ Iberville, and his successor as resident Pierre Cadiot de La Closure (in post from 1698 to 1739) served as interlocutors and observers, apprising the French government of Genevan interest in loans to the Sun King. Geneva's importance to France escalated when it proved a valuable base for the emerging banker Samuel Bernard in the 1690s. Bernard entered into various partnerships with Genevan and Lyonnais merchants to buy up stocks of coin and have them smuggled to Geneva to be reformed. Among the various Genevan merchant-banking families who were lured into this profitable trade were the Lullin, who were among the wealthiest in Europe in the late 1690s and early 1700s, having built a fortune

48 Charles Aubert, *Les De La Rüe: Marchands, magistrats et banquiers: Genève et Gênes, 1556–1905* (Geneva, 1984); Luca Codignola, Maria E. Tonizzi, "The Swiss Community in Genoa from the Old Regime to the Late Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 13:2 (2008), 152–170; Dino Carpanetto, *Divisi dalla fede: Frontiere religiose, modelli politici: Identità storiche nelle relazioni tra Torino e Ginevra (xvii–xviii secolo)* (Turin, 2009); and Gian Paolo Romagnani, "I mestieri del danaro fra norma e trasgressione. Negozianti, banchieri, e ginevrini nella Torino del settecento," in *Le regole dei mestieri e delle professioni: Secoli xv–xix*, eds. Marco Meriggi, Alessandro Pastore (Milan, 2000), 152–175.

49 Olivier Fatio, Nicole Fatio, *Pierre Fatio et la crise de 1707* (Geneva, 2007), pp. 29–30.

50 Charles François d'Iberville, *resident de France à Genève. Correspondance, 1688–1690*, 2, ed. Laurence Vial-Bergon (Geneva, 2003), pp. 1157–1160, d'Iberville to Louvois, 5 December 1690.

through trading in silk and other luxury products.⁵¹ They had a monopoly on transporting these goods between Geneva and Turin via the passes of Grand Saint-Bernard, and were perfectly prepared to utilise these trading routes in the service of France – or of the highest bidder. Their connections in Italy meant that they could help in getting money to Italian bankers such as the Sacerdoti and the Castelli, in Genoa, Milan, and (before autumn 1703) Turin.⁵²

With branches and partners at Geneva, Turin, and Lyon, the Lullin were in a prime position to take a full share in the opportunities which wartime remitting to theatres of conflict could offer, and were also perfectly willing to offer their services to both the French and the Grand Alliance. At Turin, the Lullin were associated with the firm of Charrier & Grenouilleau, which was particularly active in supplying the British and imperial forces in northern Italy after 1707.⁵³ Having abandoned the firm of Lullin & Nicolas (one of Samuel Bernard's most important partners), Charrier returned to the service of France in 1711.⁵⁴ Describing the operations of Jean-Antoine Lullin and his partners in December 1703, the French resident-agent, La Closure, painted a vivid picture of a man attuned to his own advantage:

These merchants have trading houses open in Lyon, in Turin and here. They also do business for Messrs. Bernard and de Meuve to do with payments from Italy. They are now doing it too for the same reason for the duke of Savoy in Switzerland. It is banking business in the manner permitted in all free towns, which is impossible to prevent.⁵⁵

The last point is crucial: Geneva's independence and neutrality – which the Small Council emphasised constantly in its correspondence with other states – meant that banking operations could be carried on by Genevans for the benefit of the great powers in spite of efforts to undermine their execution. Moreover,

51 Anne-Marie Piuz, "À Genève à la fin du XVII^e siècle: Un groupe de pression," *Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations* 25:2 (1970), 452–462.

52 Lüthy, *La banque protestante*, 1, p. 177.

53 Michael P. Martocchio, "'The Place for such Business': The Business of War in the City of Genoa, 1701–1714," *War in History* 29:2 (2022), 302–322.

54 Romagnani, "I mestieri del danaro," pp. 161–162; Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men*, p. 69.

55 "Ces negociants ... ont une maison de negoce ouverte à Lion, à Turin, et icy. Ils font egalement des affaires pour Messieurs Bernard et de Meuve pour les remises d'Italie. Ils en font aussi pour la meme raison actuellement pour M. le Duc de Savoye en Suisse. C'est un commerce de banque, qui est d'un usage permis dans toutes les villes qui sont libres, qu'il est impossible d'empêcher", AAÉ, CP Genève, 24, fols. 197–198, La Closure to Torcy, 7 December 1703.

Geneva's trade throughout Europe was targeted by the major powers in order to cut off flows of capital, even though its role as a crossroad between north and south meant that such punishment also affected Dutch and British merchants who traded in cloth on the continent. This in turn stimulated widespread contraband, in which Genevan and Swiss merchants played a prominent part.⁵⁶

In the context of Geneva's role in the War of the Spanish Succession, the city's merchant-bankers – most prominently Lullin – found themselves in an ambiguous situation. The Duke of Savoy had broken with France in the autumn of 1703 in order to join the Grand Alliance. Victor Amadeus II was recruiting men and purchasing horses in Switzerland with a degree of urgency, using Genevan bankers such as the opportunistic Lullin for the purposes of moving the necessary funds by bill of exchange.⁵⁷ Using his own network of informants, La Closure was attuned to the clandestine efforts of Piedmontese military officers to liaise with the merchants and bankers so essential to France's own campaigns in the Italian peninsula. While keeping the French court informed of Savoyard activity, in 1703 La Closure also had to persuade the Genevan authorities to allow one of France's own principal bankers and remitters, Jean-Henri Huguétan, to remain in the city.⁵⁸ This was so that Huguétan could continue his remitting operations, despite pressure from the British and imperial diplomats in the Swiss Confederacy for him to be evicted from Geneva. Huguétan had settled in Geneva in order to continue his banking activities for Louis XIV, given that the emperor had already complained about his remitting on behalf of the French (in order to pay their troops in Flanders) when Huguétan was based in the United Provinces earlier in the war.⁵⁹

Huguétan was also implicated in contraband between Geneva and France, along with various of his associates, such as the Saladin family (originally from

56 Piuz, Mottu-Weber, *L'économie genevoise*, p. 531.

57 Christopher Storrs, *War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy, 1690–1720* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 82. Victor Amadeus II appears to have bought the majority of remounts for his cavalry in Switzerland, using the Reding family of Schwyz as his intermediaries at a point when he was still an ally of France: AAE, CP Genève, 21, fols. 279, 285, La Closure to Louis XIV, 7 June and 22 June 1701; and AAE, CP Genève, 22, fol. 9, same to same, 10 August 1701. In the Nine Years War, the Duke had commissioned Pierre Le Maître and Henry Grossinger "from Geneva" to buy horses for him in the Holy Roman Empire, according to passports granted to these buyers in May 1690 by the secretary of the British envoy to the Confederacy, Thomas Coxe, see *The diary (1689–1719) and accounts (1704–1717) of Élie Bouhéreau*, eds. Marie Léoutre et al. (Dublin, 2019). I am grateful to Dr Marie Léoutre for this reference.

58 Huguétan was finally compelled to leave in 1704: AEG, RC 204, fol. 297, 24 May 1704.

59 AAE, CP Genève, 24, fol. 32, La Closure to Torcy, 27 July 1703; see also Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men*, pp. 139–140.

Lyon, and with contacts in London and Amsterdam) and the Guiguer family, originally of St Gallen. The Lullin, too, were heavily involved in the smuggling of specie from Lyon to Geneva. The small city-republic had, by the early 1700s, a thoroughly deserved reputation as a centre for the production of false coinage and for smuggling. Throughout the Ancien Régime, the *Registres du Conseil* are replete with references to complaints from successive French resident-agents and from royal intendants at Lyon, and to subsequent and consequential tribunals which usually failed to permanently curtail the illegal activities of the culprits.⁶⁰ As Guy Rowlands points out, much of this was inevitable in light of the fact that “French monetary manipulation” was rife in the south-eastern provinces: Many bankers at Lyon and elsewhere, anticipating a augmentation in coin values, would send stocks of older coin to Geneva to be reformed, before bringing these stocks of specie back into the country to be circulated at a higher value than they were actually worth.⁶¹ Swiss bankers at Lyon, such as Antoine Locher, were deeply implicated in this fraudulent activity in the 1690s, and moved money in and out of France with impunity.⁶² Throughout the War of the Spanish Succession, contraband of coin en route to Geneva for reforming was endemic, despite the vigorous policing of the frontier to prevent the illicit export of valuable specie which was draining the French state of the sinews of war. Again, the neutral status of the Genevan state was important in ensuring its role as a valuable entrepot for such activity.

Geneva’s place in the international remitting system can be gauged from the following extract from a letter written by the Scots merchant John Drummond, residing at Amsterdam, in 1704:

... the French will make their remittances by Antwerp, Geneva, Genoa and Venice, and consequently divert the Exchange trade from Holland to these places, and if the Dutch cannot make use of their money at home they will remit it to the abovesaid towns to lay out at the best interest, there being many rich and substantial merchants in all these places who will always have credit for large sums, and the interest of money in Italy especially at Genoa is as cheap and rather cheaper than in Holland ... the credit of Amsterdam may be of use of the French king in the paying

60 For example, AEG, 201, fols. 120–121, 14 March 1701, report on negotiations between the sieur Turretini and the French resident La Closure, acting on behalf of the French controller-general of finances, Chamillart, and dealing in part with the question of French specie being reformed in Geneva.

61 Rowlands, *Financial Decline*, pp. 102–105.

62 Claude-Frédéric Lévy, *Capitalistes et pouvoir au siècle des lumières: Des origines à 1715* (Paris, 1969), pp. 42–47.

of his armies viz. the Paris banquier draws at 2 months on Amsterdam, the Amsterdamer at the 2 months end draws on London, the Londoner on Italy, and the Italian on Geneva, and the Geneva banquier back upon Paris, this trade is not impossible but at the same time by the difference of exchanges will cost a very dear interest, and may be done indirectly by way of Geneva, though the correspondence directly to Holland from Paris were stopped.⁶³

This succinct analysis helps us to comprehend the logistical minefield in which wartime remittances were ensnared. Crucially, it was possible for financiers to take a significant cut because of varying exchange rates. Throughout the War of the Spanish Succession, the increased reliance of the French state upon paper money (such as assignations and Mint bills) meant that foreign bankers could extract every last advantage when agreeing to take part in the geographically complicated remitting operations upon which the military machine depended. It was not uncommon for them to insist upon being reimbursed in coin, as opposed to the increasingly valueless paper currency which abounded as Chamillart tried to find every means possible to fund the armies of France.⁶⁴ As the British envoy at Turin, Richard Hill, commented in January 1705:

I am well persuaded that Mons. de Chamillard does give 12 per cent for all the money which he sends to Italy, for which he gives assignments to the bankers of Lyons, Genoa, Milan, or Geneva, upon which assignments he allows one per cent interest per month until they are paid. Besides this, the King loses 20 per cent upon all his expenses made in Italy, because he pays the louis d'or there on the foot of 12 livres, which goes in France for 15.⁶⁵

63 London, British Library [BL], Add. MS 70193, fol. 70/2lr, John Drummond to Robert Harley, 22 September 1704. I am grateful to Dr Aaron Graham for this reference. Drummond was a Scots merchant who resided in Amsterdam and frequently provided the British government with information on the French efforts to remit money to multiple war theatres. See Ragnhild Hatton, "John Drummond in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Merchant Turned Diplomatic Agent," in *Studies in Diplomatic History: Essays in Memory of David Bayne Horn*, eds. Ragnhild Hatton, Matthew S. Anderson (Hamden, Connecticut, 1970), 69–96.

64 Joël Félix, "The Most Difficult Financial Matter That Has Ever Presented Itself: Paper Money and the Financing of Warfare under Louis XIV," *Financial History Review* 25:1 (2018), 43–70; Rowlands, *Financial Decline*.

65 *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the Right Hon. Richard Hill*, ed. William L. Blackley (London, 1845), p. 482, Hill to Hedges, 3/14 January 1705.

This is not the place to retrace the various reasons why the French state's reliance on an international banking network co-ordinated by Samuel Bernard proved so catastrophic: that task has been admirably completed by Guy Rowlands. But it must be emphasised that Louis XIV's inability to do other but accept the injurious terms of Geneva's bankers – and his inability to prevent them from carrying on business for France's enemies at the same time – contributed in large part to the crown's failure to get enough money across the Alps to the armies in Italy, despite the enormous remitting operations of Bernard, Huguetan, and the Hogguer brothers of St Gallen. All of these were complicit in that failure, and the crash of Easter 1709 was merely the logical conclusion for a system which had been creaking ever since the war began in 1701.

4 Supplies and Manpower

As Geneva was obviously not a major port, unlike London, Amsterdam, Danzig, or Genoa, it could not offer the facilities of a port to military commanders wishing to move troops quickly by sea, or to embark grain, horses, and other essential army supplies for transport to the theatres in which these commodities might be required. Nor was Geneva particularly important for the recruitment of troops from its hinterland for the service of foreign powers, although – as Sebastien Dupuis points out – many members of the Genevan elite received commissions as officers in foreign armies, particularly France and the United Provinces. There were plenty of isolated incidences of Genevans taking service in France. At the AEG, the catalogue of the *archives privées* of the de Bon family mention that one of its members served as a captain in the *gardes suisses*, while a Benjamin de Bons was ranked ensign in the Diesbach regiment in 1736.⁶⁶ By the terms of its *combourgeoisie* and other agreements with Bern and Zurich, the city authorities sent forces to its allies in times of need, particularly during the first and second Wars of Villmergen.⁶⁷ Reciprocally, troops were also sent to Geneva when the Protestant cantons believed the city to be in danger, such as during the autumn of 1690, when French soldiers

66 See also the entry for Amy Buisson, son of a Genevan syndic, Jean Buisson, in *Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse* (DHS). Buisson entered French service in 1673 and was colonel-proprietor of the regiment de May (1715–21).

67 The muster lists and details of supplies for these expeditions are in AEG, Fonds militaire, I, no. 36, *Rôles et comptes du secours de Genève à Berne et à Zurich, 1653, 1657, et 1712*.

conquered the neighbouring Haute-Savoie.⁶⁸ These forces were, of course, for the city's own use in case of need. Because of its independent status, French and Savoyard deserters often tried to enter the city to escape capture. However, these deserters were regularly rounded up by the city authorities and handed over to military intendants.⁶⁹ La Closure also reclaimed the accoutrements of deserters – the property of the French state – such as in March 1704, when a horse sold by a French deserter to a peasant from Geneva's hinterland was confiscated by the Small Council and handed over to the resident-agent.⁷⁰

Geneva's isolation from the Swiss Confederacy meant that it did not habitually partake in the various Franco-Swiss capitulations which governed the recruiting of *troupes étrangères* in Switzerland, although it did agree separate treaties with France (such as the treaty of guarantee of 1584). These agreements gave Genevans in France the same rights as those of the Swiss, particularly in matters of commerce: Nonetheless, when Louis XIV and the Swiss Confederacy renewed their alliance in spectacular fashion in 1663, Geneva sent deputies to the federal Diet to agitate for the city's inclusion in the alliance.⁷¹

In times of war, recruiting agents from several belligerents frequently converged upon the region. France was not the only customer for the small pool of Genevan military talent: In 1701, La Closure complained bitterly at the presence of Dutch recruiters in the lands of Saint-Victor et Chapitre, and the Conseil des Soixante recorded its opposition to foreign recruiting as a result.⁷² The Genevan authorities themselves complained of the Duke of Savoy's recruiting in these same lands, possession of which they disputed with the House of Savoy. Louis XIV was unwilling to support Geneva's contentions against the military needs of his then-ally, Victor Amadeus II, who needed troops urgently.⁷³ But in late 1703 – when Victor Amadeus II had turned his coat and joined France's enemies – La Closure complained in his turn of how the Small Council was

68 AEG, Fonds militaire, I, no. 37, Rôle des troupes suisses en garnison à Genève, 1692; AEG, Fonds militaire, I, no. 38, Logement des soldats suisses, 1693; Comptes de la garnison suisse à Genève, 1742–44.

69 AEG, RC 203, fol. 602, 25 November 1703. For a detailed analysis of Geneva's role in extradition treaties and the return of deserters to French military authorities, see Marco Cicchini, "La désertion: Mobilité, territoire, contrôles: Enjeux sociaux et politiques au siècle des Lumières," *Dix-huitième siècle* 37 (2005), 101–115.

70 AEG, RC 204, fols. 158, 164, 18 March and 21 March 1704.

71 Tony Borel, *Une ambassade suisse à Paris, 1663: Ses aventures et ses expériences* (Paris, 1910), pp. 33–34; see also Peter Sahllins, *Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After* (Ithaca, 2004), pp. 168–169.

72 AEG, RC 201, fol. 274, 14 June 1701; AAE, CP Genève, vol. 21, La Closure's correspondence to Versailles between 1699 and 1701.

73 AAE, CP Genève, 21, fol. 282, Louis XIV to La Closure, 14 June 1701.

doing little to prevent Savoyard recruiting in its territories. The offender on this occasion was Pietro Mellarède de Bettonet, Victor Amadeus II's plenipotentiary to Bern, who was charged with the raising of troops and the purchasing of horses for the Duke of Savoy's army.⁷⁴ La Closure was also furious that a sieur Regis, "burgher of this town", took cash from Geneva to Thonon, where his brother, a captain in the Sabaudian army, was recruiting for Victor Amadeus II.⁷⁵

In this regard, La Closure was merely continuing the work of his predecessor as resident, Charles François de La Bonde d'Iberville (in post from 1688 to 1698). In July 1690, d'Iberville wrote to Versailles, reassuring Louis XIV that "I forget nothing to ensure that the enemies of the king do not take from this city any succour that they may find there: that is to say that they neither levy recruits nor buy arms in Geneva."⁷⁶ D'Iberville's correspondence from Geneva for the years 1689 and 1690 are filled with references to the Vaudois efforts to return to their valleys, and he frequently reported on their contacts with the city's populace. This was in the context of the Grand Alliance's efforts to assist and arm the Vaudois refugees who were returning to Piedmont via the Val d'Aosta – large numbers of whom were camped at Thonon, on Lake Geneva.⁷⁷ The Genevan merchant Jean-Louis Calandrini (originally of Geneva, now at Amsterdam) was approached to supply 30,000 écus to the Vaudois, but refused: less because of potential difficulties of the operation, but because of his unwillingness to involve himself "in such affairs in any way".⁷⁸

Moreover, Geneva and its hinterland often saw military activity, as detachments of troops manoeuvred in the Pays de Gex and Savoy, or – depending on geopolitical affairs in a broader context – levies from the Swiss cantons marched south to Italy during wartime, if alternate routes were blocked or

74 Turin, Archivio di Stato di Torino [ASTO], *Negoziazioni con i Svizzeri*, mazzo 7, no. 19, instructions to Mellarède, 4 October 1703. Mellarède was ordered to obtain support from Bern and Zurich for the neutrality of Savoy, now under direct threat of annexation by Louis XIV. In return, Victor Amadeus II promised to renounce his dynasty's claims to Geneva and the Pays de Vaud: this was something of a hollow promise.

75 AEG, RC 203, fol. 583, 16 November 1703. Regis's behaviour – acting without conciliar authorisation – earned him a rebuke from the Small Council.

76 *Correspondance*, 2, ed. Laurence Vial-Bergon, p. 837, d'Iberville to Croissy, 21 July 1690, in:

77 Christopher Storrs, "Thomas Coxe and the Lindau Project," in *Dall'Europa alle Valli valdesi: Atti del XXIX Convegno storico internazionale: Il Glorioso Rimpatrio (1686–1989)*, ed. Albert de Lange (Turin, 1990), 199–213, pp. 212–213. In the same volume, see Olivier Fatio, "Genève et les Vaudois entre 1686 et 1689," 97–113.

78 *Correspondance* 1, ed. Laurence Vial-Bergon, p. 583, d'Iberville to Croissy, 1 November 1689.

otherwise unavailable.⁷⁹ The purchase of horses by French and Savoyard agents and army intendants in the Genevan hinterland and the Pays de Gex is a further aspect of the region's significance that could usefully be explored in more detail. These horses were often grazed at étapes not far from the city walls, and – at times like the *Glorieuse rentrée* of the Vaudois in 1689 – they became a target for these Protestant militants who defied the ultra-Catholic French monarch. In October 1706, after the catastrophic French defeat in the Battle of Turin, La Closure wrote in confusion to Torcy, stating that this crisis for the French army in Italy had thrown everything into chaos. With the French government desperately short of money, Genevan merchants previously well-disposed – and “who owed their whole fortune to France” – were now not lifting a finger to comply with the military needs of Louis XIV's government. The Duke of Orléans, Louis XIV's nephew and commander-in-chief in Italy, had asked at the start of October for 300–400 horses to be gathered at Geneva from various parts of Switzerland, to be sent into Italy. With chagrin, La Closure claimed that his hands were tied by Chamillart's orders: the secretary for war did not want the money for this transaction – 10,000 louis d'or, which La Closure had taken pains to accumulate – to leave Geneva without express orders from himself.⁸⁰

Another example concerning war matériel comes from August 1709. The sieur de Lozilière, French *chargé d'affaires* in Geneva in lieu of his absent uncle, La Closure, informed the *conseil ordinaire* of a letter he had received from Marshal Berwick, the French commander in the Dauphiné. According to Berwick, the Allies were planning to requisition grain and munitions from the city (as well as other parts of Switzerland) and transmit them to the imperial force under Marshal Daun which had recently invaded Savoy.⁸¹ After debating Lozilière's request to refuse cooperation with the Allies, the Genevan councillors stated emphatically (and tellingly) that “we know our own interests.”⁸² That said, although the city authorities could plead devotion to Louis XIV and a determination to act solely in his best interest, networks of Genevans beyond

79 The French ambassador to Switzerland in the 1650s, Jean de La Barde, had proposed during the first War of Villmergen that French troops should join those of the Duke of Savoy in Bresse and the Pays de Gex, using the region as a launchpad from which to intervene between the warring cantons: Borel, *Ambassade suisse à Paris*, p. 19.

80 AAE, CP Genève, 28, fols. 226–227, La Closure to Torcy, 15 October 1706.

81 For a short description of the imperial invasion of Savoy and the Dauphiné in 1709, see Phil McCluskey, *Absolute Monarchy on the Frontiers: Louis XIV's Military Occupations of Lorraine and Savoy* (Manchester, 2013), p. 54.

82 AEG, RC 209, fols. 304–305, 5 August 1709; AAE, CP Genève, vol. 30, Lozilière's correspondence for 1709–11.

the frontiers of the city-republic could, at any given time, be working hand-in-glove with the Grand Alliance.

5 Information and Espionage

But in many other ways Geneva functioned as a hub, especially since – as already mentioned – it was a *porte* into Switzerland from the south-eastern French provinces.⁸³ Information was exchanged: diplomats and other *étrangers* assiduously employed their contacts among the political élites in order to gauge the progress of a particular conflict, and merchants eager to protect their loans and investments circulated rumours which were often taken as fact. It is also clear that both the French and the Allies had networks of secret agents – not just in Geneva but throughout the Swiss Confederation, and extending into the Dauphiné, Languedoc, Savoy-Piedmont, the Milanese, and southern Germany. Geneva served as a collecting-point of news from Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, and successive residents sent every newspaper and broadsheet to Versailles that they could get their hands on. La Closure used his networks among the merchants and bourgeoisie of Geneva – as well as at Nyon, Versoix, and Lausanne – to acquire copies of anti-French pamphlets.⁸⁴

There are a great deal of examples as regards information exchange, incidents of spying, and so forth. D'Iberville possessed a considerable network of informants in Geneva itself, throughout the neighbouring cantons (especially Fribourg and Bern, but also as far away as Zurich), and in Piedmont and the Milanese. D'Iberville's letters mention these spies, whose information was usually reliable up to a point, but who demanded high prices for the information they supplied. La Closure maintained similar networks and was conscious of Geneva's importance as a hub for the acquisition of news and intelligence

83 The principality of Neuchâtel, further to the north, was another 'Swiss' territory on the frontier which could offer a relatively easy potential route into Switzerland in case of need. In the early years of the 18th century, it was separated from France by a recently-conquered province (the Franche-Comté), in a rather analogous situation to that of Geneva, where Savoy (overrun after 1703) and the Pays de Gex acted as partial buffers. For a more general discussion of the challenges the French state encountered in channelling resources for war and moving them to their required destination, see Guy Rowlands, "Moving Mars: The Logistical Geography of Louis XIV's France," *French History* 25:4 (2011), 492–514. The succession to Neuchâtel in 1707–08 was a pressing issue in part because of the principality's strategic value, and its proximity to Bern, the strongest canton in military and political terms.

84 John C. Rule, Ben S. Trotter, *A World of Paper: Louis XIV, Colbert de Torcy, and the Rise of the Information State* (Montréal, 2014), pp. 334–335.

from Switzerland, Germany, and Italy. Some examples serve to illustrate the point. In the summer of 1703, with the Camisard rebellion in the Cevennes in full swing, La Closure sent an agent into the Pays de Vaud to pick up information on recruiting for the Protestant rebels against the French monarchy. He also informed Torcy of the imminent arrival at Geneva of English and Dutch (possibly exiled Huguenot) officers, who would be travelling onwards to the Cevennes to assist in the revolt. La Closure warned Torcy of the need for adequate patrolling of the frontier to prevent the infiltration of these dangerous fomenters of discord.⁸⁵

La Suisse romande – the region around Geneva and the Pays de Vaud – was also of importance to the Allies in terms of the trans-frontier exchange of money, manpower, and other resources. In July 1704, Mellarède wrote from Rolle to the Duke of Marlborough to inform him of the arrival of a number of Camisards at Geneva. The Sabaudian diplomat also warned of the precarity of communications between Switzerland and Piedmont, and stated that the only safe route lay through the Pays de Vaud.⁸⁶ If the Allies truly intended to assist the Camisards in their revolt against Louis XIV, then a reliable individual – such as the enigmatic François-Louis de Pesmes, Marquis de Saint-Saphorin – should be entrusted with the task of managing the details.⁸⁷ At Turin, the British envoy to the Sabaudian court, Richard Hill, was engaged in channelling funds from Geneva (drawn on Lullin & Nicolas) to the Cevennes – just one example of double-dealing from one of the major international bankers handling remittances for Louis XIV.⁸⁸ Hill also coordinated the relief missions and the arrival of officers through the Alps from Geneva, Lausanne, and Bern, as the Grand Alliance sought to capitalise on the internal weaknesses of France and to create a ‘fifth column’ of Protestant fighters within the kingdom of France itself.⁸⁹ Genevan printers came to Turin to get pro-Camisard literature printed, and there was a regular flow of anti-French traffic. The British crown maintained an agent at Geneva, Gaspard Perrinet, Marquis d’Arzéliers, who was charged with observing political developments and liaising with the Camisards as well

85 AAE, CP Genève, 24, fols. 20–21, 24–27, La Closure to Torcy, 16 July and 18 July 1703.

86 BL, Add. MS 61256.

87 For Saint-Saphorin’s fascinating career, see the classic work by Stelling-Michaud, *Saint-Saphorin*.

88 *Diplomatic Correspondence*, ed. Blackley, p. 491, letter of 19/30 January 1704/5.

89 This echoed efforts to do the same in the early stages of the Nine Years War, again using Geneva as a hub for the purposes of organising, because of its sympathetic populace and its proximity to the French frontier: see Matthew Glozier, “Schomberg, Miremont, and Huguenot invasions of France,” in *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713*, ed. David Onnekink (London/New York, 2016), 121–154.

as the Protestant officers sent to assist them. D'Arzéliers was occasionally given more mundane tasks, such as the purchase of 40 mules in the Genevan hinterland in 1702 for the imperial packtrains in Italy.

Geneva could also serve as a meeting-point for clandestine summits. In the spring of 1709 Abraham Stanyan, British ambassador in Switzerland, came to the shores of Lake Geneva to meet Count Venzati, a disreputable adventurer dishonourably discharged from the imperial army. Venzati demanded 50,000 pounds sterling from the British and Dutch, and the rank of lieutenant-general in the imperial forces. He claimed to have uncovered crucial information concerning the inability of the French to continue the war. Venzati negotiated with Stanyan, via the medium of the Marquis de Saint-Maurice, formerly a minister of the Duke of Savoy who lived in exile at Geneva. Venzati also provided letters concerning French troop movements in the Dauphiné, Savoy, and along the Rhône. This channel of espionage ultimately came to nothing, as the Earl of Sunderland, British Secretary of State, refused to meet the exorbitant demands of this amateur spy.⁹⁰ Before ever even approaching Stanyan, Venzati had already offered his services to La Closure, the French resident-agent, who viewed him with immense suspicion and kept him at arms' length.⁹¹

6 Conclusion

This short essay merely sheds a pinprick of light on Geneva's stature as a hub of various kinds of financial and military activity in the early years of the 18th century. The city-republic's neutrality – and its crucial location between France, Italy, and Switzerland – contributed to this scenario. The city's role as a trading crossroads, an information hub, and an independent republic, home to Protestant banking families with far-flung networks across Europe, meant that it fulfilled an important part in a system of international transactions and exchanges for the purposes of war-making. Research which I am continuing to carry out will demonstrate that status more fully over the course of the 18th century, until the French annexation of 1798 destroyed the city's independent and neutral status. Geneva's liberation by the Austrians in 1813–14, and its adherence to the recrafted Swiss Confederation in 1815, stimulated a new era in which the rise of public banking augmented the city's fortunes.

90 BL, Add MS 16537.

91 AAE, CP Genève, La Closure's letters of early 1707.

At the Crossroads of Population and Capital: Recruiting in Geneva for the French Service under the *Ancien Régime*

Sébastien Dupuis

1 Introduction

I know that they are complaining at the court that the Republic has shown too much snobbery and had issues concerning the arrangement to make for the Officers and Companies it has in our service.¹

These few lines about Geneva, which a captain of the Micheli du Crest family wrote down, in a 1763 memorandum, attributed to a “lord even greater by his birth than by the military rank that he holds”,² illustrate quite clearly the difficult relationship that the city of Geneva had with Versailles as regards military recruitment for the French service.

Research on the various foreign services of the Swiss confederation has never focused specifically on the Genevan experience up to now. Geneva was not considered a particularly flourishing market for mercenaries. Perhaps on account of its small territory and the many alternative opportunities for employment in its nascent industry? As an allied – and Protestant – territory of the Confederation, Geneva did not benefit from the same situation as its neighbours either. When, for example, the Treaty of Vervins was concluded in 1598, thus bringing the war between Spain and France to an end, unlike the confederated cantons, Geneva was deliberately absent from the treaty. It would only be added retroactively in 1603, after the failure of a famous Savoyard invasion

1 Geneva, Archives de l'Etat de Genève [AEG], archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 81: “Je sais qu'on se plaint à la cour, que la République a montré trop de hauteur et de difficultés dans les arrangements à prendre pour les Officiers, et les Compagnies quelle a à notre service.”

2 Although he is not mentioned, in reading the letter as a whole, it would seem that the reference is to the Duke of Choiseul.

attempt.³ As concerns military entrepreneurship as well, the treaties would either exclude the republic or give it a special status.

The very lucrative pension system, which was extensively used by France to secure what it hoped would be the exclusive service of Swiss troops, would never represent a revenue source for Genevan families comparable to that obtained by families like the Zurlauben of Zug or the Reding of Schwyz.⁴ In fact, the Republic of Geneva did not really recognise any official regiments – *régiments avoués* or *capitulés* – until 1783.⁵ Nonetheless, this did not in any way prevent the city from participating in the various foreign services, albeit often with fewer troops. And, like the other cantons of the confederation, it would not fail to make this a factor in its foreign relations, as well as an opportunity for professional migration for its elites.⁶ Several Genevan families, such as the Buissons or the Grenus, would thus raise free companies: notably, for the French service. These free companies (*compagnies franches*) were distinguished from the *compagnies capitulées* or *avouées*, which were officially recognised (*avouées*) by the authorities per the terms of an agreement or capitulation. At the same time, some Genevan families, such as the Pictet, were going to send several generations of their sons to serve in the Swiss regiments: in particular, in the regiments of those cantons with which Geneva had treaties of *combourgeoisie* (co-citizenship) (Berne and Fribourg in 1477 and then Zurich in 1584). The functions and command positions that these officers may have held thus did not imply any presence of troops from Geneva itself.

For a significant number of residents, and notably those from the French Protestant exile community, the military profession would also represent a way of facilitating acquisition of Genevan citizenship.⁷ It should be recalled that Geneva was far from being self-sufficient in terms of food – especially wheat – and hence it was important for it to have a good food supply and advantageous trade conditions. The service of Genevan troops and officers would thus be

3 Rudolf Bolzern, “Vervins, traité de,” 2011, in *Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse* [DHS]. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/026463/2011-09-29/>. Accessed 16 February 2022.

4 Valentin Groebner, “Pensions,” 2011, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/010241/2011-11-03/>. Accessed 2 August 2021.

5 Annika Gil, *Officiers genevois au service de France au XVIII^e siècle: François, Jean, Gaspard-Gabriel Gallatin et les autres* (unpublished BA thesis, University of Geneva, 1994).

6 André Holenstein, Patrick Kury, and Kristina Schulz, *Schweizer Migrationsgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Baden, 2018), pp. 47–59; André Holenstein, *Au coeur de l'Europe: Une histoire de la Suisse entre ouverture et repli* (Lausanne, 2018).

7 Corinne Walker, *Histoire de Genève: De la cité de Calvin à la ville française (1530–1813)*, 2 (Neuchâtel, 2014), p. 29.

appreciated by France and would certainly facilitate the conclusion of agreements linked to it.

Herbert Lüthy⁸ showed Geneva's role as a hub of communication, as well as of economic and diplomatic exchange, but also a crossroads of population movements. In addition, the presence of a permanent representative or *résident* of France also shows Geneva's importance for the French crown.

The latter puts Geneva in a favourable position for the activity of military recruiters. In a 1773 memorandum, the syndic François Micheli du Crest recalled the constant activity of these recruiters for all the armies of neighbouring states:

The fortunate location of Geneva in the middle of three states, forming an outcrop of Switzerland and a large area of communication between Italy and Germany, which gives rise, especially in times of war, to a constant passage of prowlers and deserters, and in times of peace of workers of all kinds who are looking for employment and who enlist because they do not find any.⁹

He cited, in particular, the example of a war in 1742, when Savoy managed to recruit more than 3,000 men in the city,¹⁰ which, according to the 1710 census, had around 20,000 inhabitants!¹¹ So, the city of Geneva had the capacity to provide troops. Which is not to say that it approved of it – far from it. Let us recall that the armed forces had very bad press in the civil society of the time. The soldiers had bad morals, they were violent and blasphemous, and they were libertines. For civil society, they were “the dregs of the population.”¹² In Geneva specifically, the authorities issued a number of strict ordinances for regulating the soldiers' daily lives. Thus, in 1603, they forbade all violence,

8 Herbert Lüthy, *La Banque protestante de la Révocation de l'édit de Nantes à la Révolution*, 1–2 (Paris, 1959–61).

9 AEG, Papiers de Jean-Louis Micheli-Thellusson, *Mémoire divers (1772–1783)*, Archives privées 198.706, document 705: “L'heureux emplacement de Genève au milieu de trois Etats, formant un débouché de la Suisse et une grande communication entre l'Italie et l'Allemagne, ce qui fait surtout en temps de guerre un passage continu de rodeurs et de deserteurs, et en temps de paix d'ouvriers de toute espee qui cherche de l'ouvrage et qui s'enrollent parse qu'ils n'en trouvent pas.”

10 Geneva, Fondations des archives de la famille Pictet [FAP], Fonds de famille, notes diverses.

11 Martine Piguet et al., “Genève (commune),” 2018, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/002903/2018-02-07/>. Accessed 16 February 2022.

12 Thomas Hippler, *Soldats et citoyens: Naissance du service militaire en France et en Prusse* (Paris, 2006), pp. 40–41.

blasphemy, swearing and bawdiness, introduced the death penalty for adultery and required public prayer twice a day.¹³ And, as elsewhere, the movements of foreign troops were always a source of tension in Geneva. At the end of the 16th century, when Spanish troops passed near the city on their way to the United Provinces, Pope Pius v wrote to their commander, the Duke of Alba. But the latter rejected his request to lay siege to Geneva: “the cursed city of Calvin and Calvinism, the infested source that spews its poison on to all the Catholic nations of Europe”.¹⁴ The Protestants in fact made the Spanish armies pay an exorbitant price for crossing the Rhône, which did not help to improve their reputation.¹⁵

How and why then was this recruitment of companies organised, whether free companies or not? Did the Genevan families have an interest in getting involved in military entrepreneurship, particularly before 1783? This subject, which so far has been hardly addressed apart from a few chapters in family histories, will be discussed here drawing mainly on the city’s archival resources.

2 The City of Geneva’s Attitude to Recruitment

As shown in the publications of Michel Porret¹⁶ and Marco Cicchini¹⁷ on conscription and the organisation of the city’s garrison, the establishment of a system of military recruitment in Geneva was an undertaking that appeared unpopular, to say the least, during the Ancien Régime. Moreover, even if recruitment among the city’s people was, in general, absolutely forbidden, it continued, nonetheless, to take place illegally. Beginning in 1666, however, six free companies were raised in Geneva by families that were mostly well known:

13 Bernard Lescage, “Une ville sous les armes,” in *Vivre à Genève autour de 1600: Ordre et désordres*, 2, eds. Liliane Mottu-Weber, Anne-Marie Piuze, and Bernard Lescage (Geneva, 2006), p. 290.

14 Henriette L.T. De Beaufort, *Guillaume d’Orange le Taciturne* (Geneva, 1950), p. 85.

15 Jean Chagniot, *Guerre et société à l’époque moderne* (Paris, 2001), p. 39.

16 Michel Porret, “On l’a fait marcher par force’: Enrôleurs et enrôlés à Genève au XVIII^{ème} siècle ou les circonstances d’un délit ‘conséquent pour l’Etat et les particuliers,” in *Gente ferocissima: Mercenariat et société en Suisse (XV^e–XIX^e siècle)*, eds. Norbert Furrer et al. (Zurich/Lausanne, 1997), 89–100.

17 Marco Cicchini, “La désertion: Mobilité, territoire, contrôles: Enjeux sociaux et politiques au siècle des Lumières,” in *Dix-huitième Siècle: Politiques et cultures des Lumières* 37 (2005), 101–115. See also idem, *La police de la République: L’ordre public à Genève au XVIII^e siècle* (Rennes, 2012).

namely, the Buissons, Grenuses, Fabris, and Michelis.¹⁸ This first levy was followed by the recruitment of two additional companies in 1733–34, then three more in 1744.¹⁹ In 1727, the Small Council and the *Conseil des Soixante* (Council of Sixty) were in favour of a French proposal to give official recognition to the existing Genevan companies and thus to authorise them to recruit soldiers from among the city's population. Nonetheless, after several years of dithering, the proposal would remain a dead letter. The project failed because the two parties could not come to agreement on the number of units to be formed.²⁰

As we will see further on, the families that got involved in military entrepreneurship did so under sometimes perilous conditions. The business was very expensive, and support from local authorities was sporadic at best. Moreover, it is important not to neglect the denominational aspect, which, depending on the families and officers, was far from being a secondary matter. It is true that the Swiss and their allies enjoyed freedom of worship and the promise that they would not be deployed against other members of the Protestant faith, but, nonetheless, the influence of Calvinist thought on the city's morals should never be forgotten.²¹

A fairly well-documented example of Genevan military entrepreneurship is the action undertaken by François Gallatin during the 1734 levy. As soon as an impending levy of troops to support the Swiss regiments was announced, Gallatin wrote to the Duke of Maine to propose his services for one of these companies. The future captain seemed very determined to see his initiative through to successful completion. If he expressed some concerns that his potential unit might then be rapidly dismissed, even the cursory response of the Duke did not discourage him from giving it a try: "Nothing ventured, nothing gained."²² Nonetheless, his fears seemed to be well-founded, to say the least, since this scenario had already come to pass several times and it is easy to imagine how difficult it would have been to assume the colossal financial loss that this could represent for a family. Companies and command of them

18 AEG, Papiers de Jean-Louis Micheli-Thellusson, Mémoire divers (1772–1783), Archives privées 198.706, document 704.

19 AEG, Papiers de Jean-Louis Micheli-Thellusson, Mémoire divers (1772–1783), Archives privées 198.706, document 703.

20 AEG, Papiers de Jean-Louis Micheli-Thellusson, Mémoire divers (1772–1783), Archives privées 198.706, Mémoire fait sur la demande faite par Monsieur le Comte d'Affri aux officiers genevois d'obtenir de leurs supérieurs la permissions de recruter sur les terres de la République, document 705.

21 Lüthy, *La Banque*.

22 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre de Madame Gallatin à son fils, n.d., p. 19.

were sometimes indeed a kind of property that had to be sold at the right time. Drévuillon has given some examples in his studies: like the case of the Chevalier de Saint-Maime, captain in the Noailles infantry regiment, who, in 1709, bitterly regretted having not sold his company before new ‘reforms’ made it lose a large part of its value: “If I had been really sure about it, I would have gotten more than 4000 livres out of my company”.²³

On 10 June 1734, François Gallatin officially received a certificate signed by the King’s ambassador in Switzerland, granting him the right to raise a half-company in the “laudable city of Geneva”²⁴ as reinforcements for the Betsens regiment. He obtained the authority to choose his officers and a promise that he would be provided the passports necessary for their movements on French territory in groups of at least 20 people. Once the authorisations had been obtained, the recruitment of these troops was said to have cost “more than fifty thousand livres”, according to François Gallatin’s wife.²⁵ If this first company did not last long – it was ‘reformed’ once peace had been concluded – the enterprise seemed to be appreciated by the colonel general of the Swiss, Louis-Auguste de Bourbon, Prince of Dombes, who wrote to him in 1738 to propose that he “accommodate” the half-company of Lord Micheli “for money”, the latter wanting to be rid of it. So that the holder of the company did not “part with it at a pure loss”,²⁶ the prince wanted a substantial sum of money to be paid to him, but, on the other hand, he wanted absolutely to avoid a pension. The undertaking was a delicate one, as the following lines demonstrate:

This agreement, of which I will surely not multiply the copies, should be done by you and me, and not with anyone else, not even with Lord Michely, so indicate to me exactly, supposing you are determined to make this acquisition, how far you can go.²⁷

23 Hervé Drevillon, *L'impôt du sang, le métier des armes sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 2005), p. 187.

24 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 1.

25 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre de Madame Gallatin à son fils, n.d., p. 19.

26 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre du Prince de Dombes adressée à Monsieur Gallatin, 8 November 1738, p. 13.

27 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre du Prince de Dombes adressée à Monsieur Gallatin, 8 November 1738, p. 14: “Ce traité, dont je ne multiplieray assurément pas les exemples doit se faire vous à moy, et non avec aucun autre, pas même avec le sieur Michely, marqués moy donc bien au juste, supposé que vous vous déterminiez à cette acquisition, jusqu’ou vous pouvés aller”.

After several months of back-and-forth, the sale of the Micheli company was fixed at the sum of 25,000 livres. In exchange for this very substantial expenditure, François Gallatin received the assurance that “everything that the soldiers owe back to Lord Micheli will be turned to his benefit” and that if, on the other hand, expenses still had to be paid, they would be taken from the sum of 25,000 livres, so that he received “this company free and clear of all debts”.²⁸ In just a few years, the captain thus invested around 75,000 livres to form and acquire two half-companies. In a letter to their son following François Gallatin’s death, his wife added that this sum is “not including the expenses that the upkeep of his companies cost him, his equipment and his travel during 21 to 22 years of service. All of that together with his extreme generosity completely absorbed all his wealth”.²⁹ A letter that he sent to his wife shortly before his death appears to confirm this. In it, he confides to her: “You will not be at all surprised that I have not done a will at all, since once you have taken your property and all your rights, there will be nothing left for me to dispose of”.³⁰ But we have to introduce a bit of nuance into this miserable picture, which makes no mention of the pensions and revenues to which Madame Gallatin may lay claim. This does not, however, minimise the very great expense and loss of wealth suffered by the family over the last twenty years.

François Gallatin died in service in 1745. Hence, the question arose of who would take over possession and command of his company, and all the more so as his son and heir Jean Gallatin was still far too young to lay claim to a commander’s position. In the days to follow, numerous letters were addressed to his widow. His two nephews, a captain and a lieutenant in the service of France and hence well positioned to obtain a commander’s post, were among the first to pay their respects and to recall that François Gallatin had been “an uncle whom I adored, and who deserved this, an uncle who never ceased for a moment to lavish me with his kindness, to overwhelm me with his good deeds, and to prove to me on every occasion that he regarded me not so much like his nephew as like his own son”.³¹

A few days later, Gallatin’s widow also received a letter from Monsieur de la Courauchantre, the late captain’s superior in his regiment. After expressing his

28 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre du Prince de Dombes adressée à Monsieur Gallatin, 3 January 1739, p. 15.

29 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre de Madame Gallatin à son fils, n.d., p. 20.

30 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre de François Gallatin à son épouse, 10 March 1745, p. 62.

31 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre de mon cousin Pictet de Sergy adressé à ma mère, 7 July 1745, p. 21.

grief, the latter laid out his project for permitting the younger Gallatin to take over the company of his late father. To accomplish this, he explained that he had asked the Prince of Dombes to agree to transfer possession of the company to the young boy. As far as command over the company was concerned, he proposed that the company continue to be under the command of the deceased captain until the young heir was old enough to assume this function.³² This would be granted to him. In his later letters, the younger Gallatin would refer to his cousin as the “acting captain of my Company”. When he received the post, as specified in the commission received at the time of the raising or transfer of the company, the captain was “the officially established deputy ... under our authority”.³³ If the position was not hereditary then, the intrafamily transferral experienced by the Gallatin was not, however, unique. There is often allusion made to this practice for the Genevan companies in the various memoranda consulted. This is easy to understand given the amount of money that might have had to be invested to raise a company.

Finally, it is interesting to follow the family correspondence, in order to note the importance of Madame Gallatin’s involvement in the family military business. Apart from letters in which she describes her husband’s career and past activities in great detail to her sons, she did not fail to describe the financial details of the business at length as well, including the substantial costs it entailed. Moreover, she is also the author of a substantial correspondence addressed to the higher-ranking officers whom François Gallatin knew, which she started as soon as their son was old enough to join the French service. The undertaking would be crowned by success, and the family’s military activity would thus be secured for another generation, to Madame Gallatin’s great satisfaction.³⁴

It is important to underscore that these levies and activities similar to that of François Gallatin on behalf of the King of France were made more arduous at the time by the city of Geneva’s long-standing ban on recruitment within its walls. As was the case for other Swiss cities, like Basel for example, enlistment could be viewed as equivalent to a potential loss of skilled labour, a chaotic

32 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre de M. de la Courauchantre à Madame Gallatin, 9 July 1745, p. 30.

33 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Commission de la Compagnie levée et incorporée dans le Régiment Suisse de Bettens, 20 Octobre 1734, p. 1.

34 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Protocoles de brevets, commissions, lettres de la Cour, correspondance militaire, mémoires et autres pièces relatives au service pour mon père et moy, 1ère partie: François et Jean de Gallatin.

departure of young men whose return was by no means guaranteed or even a wild soliciting that was particularly unwelcome by the established 'bourgeois' families, i.e. those who had the status of Genevan citizens. Clandestine enlistment centres, like those of Carouge or Versoix, which long served mainly to recruit for the Sardinian service, were certainly known to and more or less tolerated by the city's authorities, but they remained, nonetheless, a source of great tension.

Choiseul's reforms would represent a very significant challenge for the city. He wanted, notably, to retain in the service only companies of cities and cantons allowing recruitment of troops on their territory. In the 1760s, Geneva, which still forbade it, was thus specifically targeted by this reform. The news prompted the Genevan military entrepreneurs and officers to petition the Small Council, the city's executive organ. For Geneva not to align itself with these measures would have meant, in effect, the dissolution of its companies and a major reduction in the number of officers who were able advantageously to serve the French crown. On 13 August 1763, a group of eighteen officers – including lords Turrettini, Pictet, Lullin, Gallatin, Perdriau, Lullin de Chateauvieux, Mallet, Micheli, and Micheli du Crest – co-signed a memorandum in which they set out their arguments in favour of local recruitment and hence continued foreign service on behalf of the King of France. It is worth reproducing some of their arguments here.

The reform, they maintain, should principally aim at improving the conditions of service. For them:

We need to decide, I say, if the individuals who did these levies with the consent of the lords, who transferred them to their descendants, to their families as a patrimony, if the citizens who, putting their faith in this usage have served and are serving for a long time with a view to obtaining these companies, if all the citizens finally who have a right to these troops should be deprived of them, and the government take this position at the moment when the service is becoming better paid, when a company will be worth 6000 livres per year, when the salary of a subaltern is increasing in such a way that he can live honourably on his pay and when finally the formation of the regiment of the Swiss Guards that is not assigned to any canton gives all the officers serving in the different Swiss regiments the chance to obtain companies in this corps.³⁵

35 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 83: "Il faut décider, dis-je, si les Particuliers qui par le consentement de la seigneurie ont fait ces levées, qui les ont transmis à leur descendans, à leur famille comme un patrimoine,

It is interesting to note the use of the term “patrimony” to refer to these companies, which reveals and confirms how these businesses were regarded by the families that signed the memorandum. In fact, as discussed above, many families, having raised companies, retained them, transferring them from one generation to another. Cases of voluntarily ceding a company, like that of the Micheli du Crest company touched upon previously, were relatively uncommon and were the object of special negotiations normally involving the colonel-general of the Swiss. What we find far more often is companies rather being handed over to officers in the service following the death of a captain-entrepreneur without an ‘heir’ (in the broad sense of the term). The fact that new Genevan companies were rarely raised also helps to explain the desire to keep these posts within the family circle.

The families that signed the memorandum could hope for a better income from this reform, whether in the form of a pension for themselves or for their subordinates – whose ranks not infrequently included members of their own families, like the Pictets, who would sometimes be four or even five in the same regiment. Apart from this, the point of the Swiss Guards regiment is also discussed. This prestigious regiment was known both for its particularly rigorous and selective recruitment and for its privileges and high pay.³⁶ And, contrary, for example, to the Principality of Neuchâtel, which had had two companies reserved for it in the regiment since 1657, Geneva had none.³⁷ Captain Micheli du Crest specifically addresses this issue in another letter: “the effect of the recognition [of the company] should also remove all barriers to our advancement either in the corps of the nation or that of the Swiss Guards”.³⁸ This argument was far from being negligible: neither for the officers directly involved nor for their families. Families that, as we know, had a significant presence in the city’s various councils. Captain François Gallatin, moreover, would spend some time

si les citoyens que sur la foy de cet usage ont servi et servent des long tems dans la vue d’obtenir ces compagnies, si tous les citoyens enfin qui ont droit à ces troupes doivent en être privées, et que le gouvernement prenne ce parti dans le moment ou le traitement du service devient meilleur, ou une compagnie vaudra 6000 Livres par an, ou un subalterne augmente en appointemens de manière qu’il peut vivre honorablement de sa paye et ou enfin la composition du régiment des gardes suisses ne l’affectant à aucun canton, laisse à tous les officiers servans dans les differens régiments suisses la chance de parvenir aux compagnies de ce corps”.

36 Philippe Henry, “Gardes suisses,” 2007, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/008623/2007-06-29/>. Accessed 2 June 2021.

37 Marcel Burin des Rozies, *Les capitulations Militaires entre la Suisse et la France* (London, 1902), p. 194–195.

38 AEG, Papiers de Jean-Louis Micheli-Thellusson, *Mémoire divers (1772–1783)*, Archives privées 198.706, document 702.

in the Swiss Guards before forming his company: a period that he would say was particularly beneficial for his career.

Regarding the recruitment of people from the city and its vicinity as an argument for refusing Choiseul's reform, the officers point out "that the harm caused by Genevans no longer having officers and Companies in France will be far greater; because there will not be one less Genevan soldier going into the service, the French border will always be within reach for lodging recruiters".³⁹

But maintaining this involvement in the French service was also supposed to help to preserve the advantages of merchants and entrepreneurs. This argument is developed at length and led the city's councils to wonder about the place Geneva would have in future renewals of the alliance if the city no longer joined the Swiss confederation in its military commitments.⁴⁰ There is also a long discussion of the fact that if Geneva abstains or refuses Choiseul's terms, it would be going it alone, which, according to the signatories, would jeopardise its continued independence.

In the preparatory letters that the officers exchanged on the famous memorandum, emphasis is also placed on the fact that establishing a permanent service would also allow for the creation of an incubator (*une pépinière*; literally, a plant nursery) of officers for the city's garrison. This argument was not specific to Geneva and was also found in other, especially Protestant, cantons where the foreign service was being debated, like Berne and Zurich. In his letters, Micheli du Crest adds that the experience gained would also benefit the corporals and sergeants of the garrison.⁴¹ Furthermore, they believe that:

Genevans wishing to serve will have the pleasure of being commanded by their compatriots, and their relatives will be able to come to an understanding with their captains much more easily than if they were from another Canton.⁴²

39 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Mémoire présenté au Petit Conseil, 13 August 1763, p. 84.

40 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Mémoire présenté au Petit Conseil, 13 August 1763, p. 86.

41 AEG, Papiers de Jean-Louis Micheli-Thellusson, Mémoire divers (1772–1783), Archives privées 198.706, document 705. It is interesting to note that Captain Micheli de Crest also employs the term *pépinère*, and that he frequently uses the different arguments in favour of the undertaking in the same order and in the same terms, which leaves little doubt that the various Genevan officers had significant exchange on the subject.

42 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 78: "Les genevois qui voudront servir auront l'agrement d'être commandés par leurs compatriotes, et leurs parens pourront bien plus aisément s'accomoder avec leurs capitaines, que s'ils étoient d'un autre Canton".

The force of this last argument is attenuated, however, when one is aware of the small proportion of Genevans filling the ranks of ‘their’ company during this period, as we will see further on.

3 What Are the Motives for Enlisting in the French Service as an Officer?

The Genevan officers enlisting in the service on behalf of the French crown at least for a time were not as uncommon as one might think. Even if we leave aside the periods of the regiments bearing the names of the city (namely that of Ami Buisson from 1715 to 1721 and that of the Marquis Lullin de Châteauvieux from 1783 to the Revolution), certain families from Geneva were going to be hardly less diligent about serving in subordinate positions than families from other cantons. A telling example, although not one of the best known from a military point of view, is that of the Pictet family.

A family of French origin from Haute-Savoie, the Pictet family obtained citizenship of Geneva in 1474. A century later, it was a firmly established part of the city’s political landscape, furnishing no less than twelve syndics during the old Republic.⁴³ In his discussion of the interconnections among the city’s councils, Herbert Lüthy cites the Pictet family, among others, as an example of one of the best-established families in the different councils, alongside the Lullins, Trembleys, Buissons, and the Gallatins as well. According to his figures, in 1738, 75 close relatives were members of the *Conseil des Deux-Cents* (Council of Two Hundred). The share even surpassed the majority of seats in the *Conseil des Vingt-Cinq* (Council of Twenty-Five), with 15 close relatives this time.⁴⁴ This closeness among the Genevan families, which Herbert Lüthy rightly notes is particularly important in the Calvinist city, is widely found in the foreign service. Unsurprisingly, we find its members in the French service married or engaged to Lects, Michelis, or Gallatins. 13 of the 26 male members of the family having reached adulthood between 1685 and 1745 would enter the military profession at least for a time. Eight in the French service, and five in Piedmont and the Netherlands.⁴⁵ Three members of the family, moreover, would serve together in the Micheli de Crest company in the Surbeck Regiment.

43 Barbara Roth, “Pictet,” 2010, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/025551/2010-02-08/>. Accessed 7 August 2021.

44 Lüthy, *La Banque*, p. 40.

45 Jean-Daniel Candaux, *Histoire de la famille Pictet 1474–1974* (Geneva, 2006).

It is a legitimate question why these families, who had so many members in their ranks who could boast of experience in the foreign service, did not exert greater pressure on the different councils to authorise recruitment or to promote the foreign service more. One aspect of the answer is undoubtedly found in the nature of service, which was usually relatively brief and did not constitute a career as such, but rather a stage in a career. In general, they had much greater interest in the development of nascent industry and in the landed economy than in military entrepreneurship. This is notably the case for the Pictets, apart from two exceptions: Jacques Pictet de Pregny, who would reach the rank of general in his service for Sardinia, and Pierre Pictet de Sergy, a colonel in the French armies. On the other hand, when we look at the governmental functions subsequently held by these former officers, we see that they accumulated posts, in particular, in the municipal guard and in the artillery chamber, although not exclusively.

Jacques Pictet (1643–1721), for example, held the position of “general of the artillery corps” of Geneva from 10 May 1686 until his death 35 years later.⁴⁶ Then, from 1691 on, he was a quasi-permanent member of the Chamber of Accounts for nearly 20 years. Jean-Louis Pictet-Gallatin (1685–1739) joined the Surbeck regiment as an ensign at the age of 19. After eight years of service, he left behind the military life with the rank of captain-lieutenant and returned to Geneva. On the strength of his experience, the city entrusted him with one of the three Genevan companies involved in the Second Villmergen War. He would sum up this frustrating experience – the troop only arriving in Bern to learn that peace had been concluded – with a terse formula: *veni, nihil vidi, redii*.⁴⁷ In the following years, his political career was especially and undeniably shaped by his brief military experience (see Table 11.1).

Among all these functions, we should briefly examine that of Syndic of the Guard. At the time, four syndics elected by the *Conseil général* (General Council) held office for one year. The Syndic of the Guard, who was no less than the military chief of the city and commander of the city’s garrison, was appointed from among them, without any specific rule or criterion to codify how this appointment took place.⁴⁸ Hence, it is not surprising to find that the Pictets, who obtained the high office of syndic and could boast of military experience, were regularly assigned responsibility for the guard. Jacques Pictet would be

46 Candaux, *Histoire*, p. 75.

47 Candaux, *Histoire*, p. 144.

48 Marco Cicchini, “Milices bourgeoises et garde soldée à Genève au XVIII^e siècle: Le républicanisme classique à l’épreuve du maintien de l’ordre,” *Revue d’histoire moderne & contemporaine* 61:2 (2014), 120–149.

TABLE 11.1 The career of Jean-Louis Pictet-Gallatin (1685–1739)

Year	Position	Duration
1714	Named to the <i>Conseil des Deux-Cents</i>	unlimited
1715	Clerk in the Chamber of Fortifications	Until 1739
1716	Auditor	35 months
1719	Lieutenant in the artillery corps	-
1721	Member of the Small Council	lifetime appointment
1721	Clerk in the Artillery Chamber	Until 1735
1724	Tax Clerk	Until 1727
1727	Major of the Guard	2 years
1728	Clerk in the Appeal Chamber	3 years
1729	Captain of a company in the St-Gervais regiment ^a	-
1732	Tax Clerk	2 years
1735	General in the Artillery Corps	2 years
1737	Syndic of the Guard	1 year

SOURCE: CANDAU, *HISTOIRE*, PP. 144–145.

a AEG, Registres du Conseil 228, p. 212, he took over the company previously held by Jean Fatio.

syndic in 1687 and 1690, Jean-Jacques Pictet in 1700, and Jean-Louis, according to the above table, in 1737. It was, moreover, Jean-Louis Pictet who was in office at the time of the troubles opposing part of the city's 'bourgeois' citizenry and the government, which would culminate in a bloody confrontation between the Guard and militia members on 21 August 1737.⁴⁹ Military experience in fact helped to open certain doors to higher political functions.

Consultation of the above-cited accounts of Pierre Pictet VII (1724–1813) shows that he cost his mother, on average, 227 livres and 8 sols per year for the first 15 years of his military career. It was only thereafter that he began to be able to support himself, after receiving command over a company.⁵⁰ Along with his uncle Pierre IV Pictet (1685–1727), he was one of the few to be put in charge of his own company during a period of service. It seems that this would prove to be profitable in his case, since the improvement in his financial situation coincided with the acquisition of his company. Moreover, when he left

49 Fabrice Brandli, *Le nain et le Géant: La République de Genève et la France au XVIII^e siècle: Cultures politiques et diplomatie* (Rennes, 2012), p. 41.

50 FAP, fonds de famille correspondance Pierre Pictet.

after forty years of serving under the French flag, he would be rewarded with a colonel's commission and an annual pension of 1,800 livres. It should also be noted that his military activity did not prevent him from being a member of the city's councils. Hence, this activity did not cut him off from the life of the city.

On the other hand, the information available to us on the company of Pierre IV is quite sparse and is almost entirely limited to a few lines in his will (he died of an illness while in service and in possession of his regiment), which indicate that he bequeaths "to his godson and nephew Pierre Pictet the entire proceeds that will result from the sale of his company, as well as that of his effects, crockery and equipment".⁵¹ From a purely financial point of view, service often represented a significant investment – in personal equipment, for example – and requests for financial support from the family back home were not uncommon. In 1744, Jacques-François Pictet, an officer in the Swiss Guibert de Sissach regiment in Piedmont, had to ask his mother, Madame Pictet the Syndic, to pay the sum of 400 florins for him as the cost of five months of food. The receipt for the sum notes, "It's I Susette [sister of Jacques-François] who sold a diamond to pay this sergeant".⁵²

Let us cite one final representative of the Pictet family: namely, Marc Pictet-Micheli (1693–1768). The sixth son of Jean-Jacques Pictet, he only spent a very brief time serving under the French flag – barely five years – with the express aim of allowing his family to retain its presence in his father's company. Hence, he would serve in the Surbeck regiment, evidently without finding great happiness there.⁵³ Back in Geneva, he would have a long political career of some forty years, during which his only posts related to the military would be as a Major of the Guard in 1741, 1744, and 1747. In 1747, finally, he would take over command of another company: that of Théodore de Saussure.⁵⁴ The case is an interesting one, because it illustrates the interest the Pictet family had in conserving a minimum amount of expertise in the military domain, despite the absence of officially contracted troops (*troupes capitulées*) and without there being any mention of a sense of duty toward the French crown. On the contrary, a reading of the family correspondence is more characterised by a highly utilitarian approach to the military experience. And the fact is that for this family, even if it was far from having the prestige and presence in the military of some families like the Grenuses, Gallatins or Buissons, the success

51 FAP, Testaments, pièce B6.

52 FAP, pièce G8.

53 FAP, correspondance Marc II.

54 FAP, correspondance Marc II.

is undeniable. Moreover, the case of Colonel Pictet, whose main career was in the military profession, was viewed as a curiosity by his family.

From their first years in the service, certain of the Pictet children, such as Marc, were reminded not to lose sight of the political offices awaiting them. In the correspondence of Jean-Louis Micheli du Crest, moreover, we also find this quite revealing remark on the possibility of recruiting young unemployed Genevans for the service: “those who gain wisdom from their own experience quickly learn that diligent and sedentary work is the only way for them to support themselves honestly”.⁵⁵ This point of view was not representative of all professions, however. For example, François Gallatin, the previously cited owner of a free company in the French service, wrote a letter to his wife that is dated 10 March 1745, shortly before his death at the siege of Ostend. In the letter, which reads like a last will and testament, he tells her how highly he thinks of the French service:

I flatter myself to think that if your son continues to have a taste for the service, you will not inhibit this inclination, above all for the service of France where I think it is better for him to go than any other, having never approved of the inconstancy of those who serve without any affection and change service solely out of self-interest: this is the greatest sign that you can give me of your friendship and of your approval of my way of thinking that one can be an honest man by god and men in all sorts of professions.⁵⁶

A few years earlier, in 1737, Captain Gallatin, moreover, received a very favourable financial proposition in the form of a capitulation to raise this time an entire Swiss regiment to enter the service of the King of Sardinia. The proposition was made via his wife's uncle, who was himself in the service of this sovereign. Gallatin explains his refusal to his wife as follows:

55 AEG, Papiers de Jean-Louis Micheli-Thellusson, *Mémoire divers (1772–1783)*, Archives privées 198.706, document 705.

56 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, *Compagnie de Gallatin, Lettre de François Gallatin à son épouse, 10 March 1745*, p. 62; AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, *Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1*, p. 18: “Je me flatte que si ton fils continue a avoir du gout pour le service, tu ne generas pas son inclination, surtout pour le service de France ou je crois qu'il lui convient mieux d'aller que tout autre, n'ayant jamais approuvé l'inconstance de ceux qui servent sans aucune affection, changent de service uniquement par interet: c'est la plus grande marque que tu puisses me donner de ton amitié et de ton approbation a ma façon de penser que l'on peut être honnête homme selon dieu et selon les hommes dans toutes sortes de profession”.

If I did not tell you anything about the proposal that had been made to me to join the Guibert Regiment, it is because I had been asked for secrecy, and moreover, having no intention of accepting it, it was pointless to consult you about it. I will never serve anyone but you and the King of France, you can count on that.⁵⁷

François Gallatin's wishes for his offspring would be fulfilled: Their son would also enter the service of the Most Christian King and have a long and profitable career in it.

Finally, let us add a further important aspect of the benefits that the Geneva officers may have derived from foreign service: namely, the advantages obtained from the service in the professional domain – in particular, the commercial domain – and in the resulting family connections. They would owe this above all to the personal relationships built up by them and their families during their periods of service and even more so when said service spanned several generations. In 1751, for example, when Madame Gallatin was managing the affairs of her son Jean's company, before he was old enough to do so himself, she received a request from Monsieur Ryhiner, a patrician of the city of Bern and major in the Baltasar regiment. The latter wanted to obtain a place for his nephew in Jean Gallatin's company, which, to his great satisfaction, he would obtain. He then writes to Madame Gallatin:

I owe you Madame all imaginable thanks, and a good deed of this nature and done so fittingly will never be forgotten neither by Monsieur Ryhiner, the Councillor, in Bern, nor by me, I will never even be at peace until I have found the means to convince you of my sincere gratitude, by blind obedience to your orders and a very deep respect with which I have the honour of being.⁵⁸

57 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, article extrait d'une lettre de mon père à ma mère, 23 August 1737, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 20: "Si je ne t'ai rien mandé de la proposition qu'on m'avoit faite pour entrer dans le Régiment de Guibert, c'est que l'on m'avait demandé le secret, et que d'ailleurs n'étant pas intentionné de l'accepter il était inutile que je te consultasse la dessus. Je ne servirai jamais que toy et le Roy de France, tu peux table la dessus".

58 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Lettre de M. Ryhyner à Madame Gallatin, 19 May 1751, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 38: "Je vous en dois Madame tous les remerciemens imaginable, et un bienfait de cette nature et appliqué si à propos ne sera jamais oublié ni par M. le Conseiller Ryhiner à Berne, ni par moy, je ne serai même jamais tranquile que je naye trouvé les moyens de vous convaincre de ma sincere reconaissance, par une aveugle obéissance à vos ordres et un très profond respect avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être".

The late husband of Madame Gallatin provides yet another example, when the latter found himself at Paris for a time without any particular assignment. His commander, Colonel de Bettens, wrote to him at the time “you will apparently be leaving soon to go to Paris, where you will find Monsieur de la Cour au Chantre, who will certainly be very pleased to meet you, I beg you to send him many regards from me, and if during your stay in Paris you learn something interesting, I hope you will let me know about it.”⁵⁹ It goes without saying that for military administrators, who sometimes engaged in a form of speculation, having an ear close to power was far from being without interest.

On the subject of recruitment, there remains one aspect of great importance to discuss, without which all the rest could neither exist nor have any sense: namely, the men who make up the Genevan units in the French service.

4 The Composition of the Genevan Companies

Beyond the procrastination of the city authorities on the rules governing recruitment, the question of the geographical origin of the conscripts has also to be posed. This concern was not at all unique to the units from Geneva and is regularly mentioned both in diplomatic correspondence and in royal regulations and ordinances. Pierre-Victor de Besenval (1721–91), who was the Inspector General of the Swiss under the Duke of Choiseul at the time, wrote the following on the subject:

As for the way in which the Genevan companies are maintained, I ask you in good faith my dear Chevalier, if in a state that absolutely does not want to consent to any of its captains recruiting in its territory, we can count on something and affirm that these companies will be of good quality. The King would like to increase spending on the Swiss, but he wants to have people form this nation.⁶⁰

59 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Lettre de Monsieur de Bettens à François Gallatin, 1 February 1739, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 15.

60 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, extrait d’une lettre de Monsieur de Besenval cité dans un mémoire d’officiers genevois à destination du Petit Conseil, 13 August 1763, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 81: “Quand à la façon dont les compagnies genevoises sont entretenues, je vous demande en bonne foy mon cher chevalier, si dans un état qui ne veut pas absolument consentir qu’aucun de ses capitaines, recrute dans son territoire, on peut compter sur quelque chose, et mettre en avant que ces compagnies seront de bon aloi. Le Roy veut bien faire une augmentation de dépense pour les Suisses, mais il entend d’avoir des nationaux”.

This concern is in fact already found in articles 2 and 3 of the 1764 general capitulation concluded between Louis XV and the cantons, which clearly expresses the King's desire that at least two thirds of the troops should come from the Swiss cantons.⁶¹ During the reign of his great-grandfather, a decree of 5 April 1674 already ordered Swiss captains to send soldiers from nations other than the Swiss or German back to their units.⁶² An even more precise ordinance on the subject followed on 1 December 1696: with the "King's Ordinance on removing from the Swiss companies all men who are not Swiss, Grisons, Germans, Poles, Swedes or Danes".⁶³

It should be noted that in Geneva, efforts were made to ensure that this particularity outlived the Ancien Régime. In a May 1816 report to the Ministry of War, the Duke of Richelieu mentions a request from the city of Calvin, which would like a secret convention on recruitment in Savoy. Arguing that ancient agreements allowed it to recruit on the territory of the Bishopric of Geneva, the city asks to be able to benefit from this ancient 'secret' advantage once again. The request would be rejected this time on the grounds that Swiss regiments already had permission to recruit one quarter foreigners.⁶⁴

The share of foreigners to serve within the companies appears to be even higher than elsewhere for the Genevan troops specifically and above all for the free companies. There is a particularly revealing passage on this subject in the above-mentioned memorandum by Jean-Louis Micheli du Crest, written in the 1770s:

In times of peace, the Court of France requires the Captains to have two thirds of the Companies comprised of real Swiss, or of people reputed to be so; the Savoyards of the Bishopric of Geneva have the advantage of being recognised as Swiss by the Genevan Captains; But in time of war, the court closes its eyes to the transgression of this ordinance; This goes so far that the current Genevan Captains can show by the examination of their general ledger, or the little monthly rolls, that there were times when they did not have a single one during the preceding wars: four, five,

61 Burin des Rozies, *Les capitulations*, p. 207.

62 Vincennes, Service historique de la défense [SHD], sous-série YB, règlements militaires. The province of Montbéliard, which was the one cited most regularly as being the target of significant recruitment efforts, should be mentioned in particular in this connection.

63 SHD, sous-série YB, règlements militaires.

64 SHD, sous-série YB, correspondance diplomatique, Rapport fait au Ministre, 8 May 1816, GR XG 6.

six, I never saw ten at a time in any company; I served for 14 years, I do not believe I saw ten or twelve altogether in the company where I was.⁶⁵

Several hypotheses can be put forward to explain this fact. In the first place, it should not be forgotten that the number of companies (or more often half-companies) was still modest compared to the number of them formed by other territories of the Confederation. In 1711, during one of the most important periods for Geneva's troops, their estimated numbers, in terms of the normal numbers of troops at the time, was as presented in Table 11.2.

In the five decades to come, following a series of levies, the number of troops would briefly rise to fourteen half-companies, before falling again to five units in the 1760s. It should be noted, moreover, that starting in 1716, the number of men in Swiss companies rose to 160 (thus 80 in the half-companies) and that it was far from easy for their captains to maintain this number.

TABLE 11.2 Geneva's troops in France, 1711

Unit	Number of troops
Buisson company, May regiment	160–200
Grenus company, Surbeck regiment	160–200
Grenus half-company, Surbeck regiment	60–80
Micheli Du Crest half-company, ^a Surbeck regiment	60–80
Lect half-company, Hussy regiment	60–80
Baltazar half-company, Hussy regiment	60–80
Fatio half-company, May regiment	60–80

a This is the unit in which Jean-Louis, Pierre and Marc Pictet served.

65 AEG, Papiers de Jean-Louis Micheli-Thellusson, Mémoire divers (1772–1783), Archives privées 198.706., document 705: "En tems de paix la Cour de France oblige les Capitaines d'avoir les deux tiers des Compagnies formées de véritables Suisses, ou de gens reputer tels; les Savoyards de l'Eveché de Genève ont l'avantage d'être reconnus Suisses par les Capitaines Genevois; Mais en tems de guerre, la cour ferme les yeux a la transgression de cette ordonnance; Cela va au point que les Capitaines Genevois actuels peuvent demontrer par l'examen de leur Grand Livre, ou les petits rolles de chaque mois, que pendant les guerres precedantes, il y a eu des momens ou ils n'en ont pas eu un seul: quatre, cinq, six, je n'en ai jamais vu dix a la fois dans aucune compagnie; j'ai servi pendant 14 ans, je ne crois pas d'en avoir vu dix ou douze en tout dans la compagnie ou j'étais".

In 1726, Captain Micheli Du Crest's unit lost 15 men "from death or desertion", which led his regiment to ask for a special benefit to offset this expense, which had "crushed and greatly indebted" its captain.⁶⁶ We are thus far from recruitment on the scale of that undertaken in Bern or Solothurn, which had well-established regimental traditions. Of course, despite its special status, the city of Geneva benefited from many of the advantages granted to the Swiss nation thanks to the agreements linking it to France. In a memorandum addressed to the First Syndic and the Small Council in 1774, Jean Gallatin reminds us of this, for example, albeit with a bit of well-measured exaggeration:

A consideration that I regard to be of the greatest importance and to which I beg your lordships to please give the most serious attention, is that we are only regarded as Swiss in France by virtue of service; if we let this link fall, we insensibly lose all of our privileges: a merchant, a worker will be facing trial, have a difficulty, a favour to request, the minister of his country will not be able to be of any use to him, the name Genevan will have no substance, no weight, whereas by the official recognition [*l'aveu*] of the Companies, he will acquire the same consideration and almost the same influence as those of the Swiss Cantons.⁶⁷

But, not having its own regiment until the end of the 18th century and by virtue of its status as an allied territory, it was also far from receiving the same amount of benefit as its neighbours. The organisation of an internal recruitment regime thus responded neither to the same needs nor the same requirements. And let us not forget that the image of soldiers during the Enlightenment period was that of men who are "stupid and violent, but also unhappy, rootless and incapable of being integrated into civil society".⁶⁸ It is thus not surprising that it

66 SHD, 1993/028.2, Colour photo of the map of Philipsbourg made by Micheli du Crest in December 1730, with the accompanying Memorandum, A2339, fol. 4.

67 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Copie d'un mémoire envoyé à M. le Premier Syndic et adressé au Petit Conseil par le Comte de Gallatin, 1774, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 172: "Une considération que je regarde come de la plus grande importance et à la quelle je supplie vos seigneuries de vouloir bien faire la plus serieuse attention, c'est que nous ne sommes regardés en France come Suisses que par le Service, si nous laissons échapper ce lien, nous perdons insensiblement tous nos privilèges: un négociant, un ouvrier aura un procès, une difficulté une grace à solliciter, le ministre de son pays ne pourra lui être d'aucune utilité, le nom de genevois n'aura aucune consistance, aucun poids, au lieu que par l'aveu des Compagnies il acquera la même considération et presque la même influence que ceux des Cantons Suisses".

68 Hippler, *Soldats*, p. 41.

was considered preferable to recruit men from outside the city as rank-and-file soldiers.

Moreover, we regularly find reflections on the people to target for recruitment among the officers themselves. This issue is directly addressed in a 1763 joint letter by a group of Genevan officers serving in the Jenner/Erlach regiments, who were corresponding with Captain Turretini. For this group of officers who were involved in recruitment, it was sure that preference should be given to recruiting Savoyards and foreigners.⁶⁹ Some went even further and said that it is worthwhile to target fairs and markets specifically for their recruitment efforts, where these two populations are even far more numerous depending on the location. Nonetheless, these officers were far from being opposed to the recruitment of people from Geneva, but they were, above all, very conscience that it was not viewed favourably by the Small Council and the *Conseil des Deux-Cents*. They prudently suggest even adding a clause to a possible authorisation of recruitment in the city that “does not allow them to enlist any son of a citizen without his father’s consent, any minor without that of his guardian, any worker or servant without the consent of his master”.⁷⁰ The latter should not be turned away from their just paths by making them soldiers and thus people who lead bad lives. The question is obviously not at all the same when it is a matter of officers.

Finally, a last aspect that should not be overlooked are the motives of the conscripts themselves. The advantageous pay, which was greater than that of French regiments or those of other nations, was already one of the strongest and most obvious arguments. The appeal of a favourable border regime was not something new, especially when, as is the case here, it was ‘legally’ accepted, and thus explains one of the most important motives prompting Savoyards to enlist in the Genevan companies. As far as foreigners and transient populations – refugees in particular – in unfavourable personal and economic situations were concerned, it is not surprising or new either to find that they represent an important reservoir for recruitment. It is logical that the various letters, regulations and ordinances frequently come back to the need especially to monitor the way in which recruitment was conducted in the border regions, where the strongest population movements were concentrated. This is a problem that is also known in the other border regions of the Confederation.

Starting in the second half of the 18th century, another no less important aspect, which we find repeatedly emphasized in the motives of the Savoyards in particular, was the pension regime for disabled soldiers, of which the

69 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 78.

70 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 78.

Savoyards observed “several examples in their own villages”.⁷¹ This pension was an innovation introduced by the ministry of Choiseul. From 1762 on, it granted full pay and a suit of clothes every six years after 24 years of service and half-pay after 16 years.⁷² The ordinance is supplemented by a second one in 1764, which granted an additional disability pension to people who are wounded or disabled and whose injuries could have earned them a place at the Hôtel Royal, but who preferred to end their days at home. This ‘retirement’ or disability pension system was not unique to the free companies or the foreign service, but, combined with the attraction of higher pay, it is easy to see how it could have made the service even more appealing in difficult times. And the fact that the derogation that had been ‘secretly’ accorded to Geneva to recruit on the territory of the bishopric was well known to both the recruiters and the bishopric residents themselves surely explains the very significant share of the latter in the Genevan companies and half-companies.

5 Conclusion

Genevan military entrepreneurship in the service of France existed during the Ancien Régime. But due to the city’s special situation and the marginality of military entrepreneurship, even for a large part of the families that had recourse to it, it is not easy to study. The sources are still extremely scarce today, and the writings to which they refer are often difficult to find. Accordingly, scholarship has so far paid little attention to the subject. And yet, as we have seen in the preceding pages, there was no lack of contemporaries arguing in favour of the activity. In the famous 1763 memorandum cited in the introduction, the officers do not hesitate to link their own self-interest to the interest of the Republic as a whole in their continuing their military activity: “The public interested is connected to the interest of particular individuals in this affair ... if we are supposed to allow citizens [of Geneva] who today possess companies in France to lose this patrimony which they risked their lives to acquire or which was bequeathed to them by their fathers, but also if we are supposed to let citizens in general lose the ability to possess such companies.”⁷³ The same

71 AEG, Papiers de Jean-Louis Micheli-Thellusson, *Mémoire divers (1772–1783)*, Archives privées 198.706., document 705.

72 Jean-Pierre Bois, “Une politique de la vieillesse: La retraite des vieux soldats, 1762–1790,” *Annales de démographie historique* (1985), 7–20.

73 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, pp. 79–80.

officers were even convinced that they could rely on the support of the French Resident,⁷⁴ which certainly suggests that they were not the only ones to benefit from these arrangements. Nonetheless, the captains' argument would not be sufficient for the city's councils, who still refused to sanction strict recruitment on the territory of Geneva. In response, as had been feared, four Genevan companies would be withdrawn from their captains. The former syndic Grenus, brother of one of the captains concerned, summed up the situation in a 1773 letter:⁷⁵ The Grenus company was entrusted to a Graffenried from the Erlach Regiment, the Banquet and Trembley companies – which they had raised themselves in 1743 – were transferred to two Valaisan officers from the Courten Regiment, and the Senebier company – formerly Pictet-Lect, which he had gotten from his father-in-law Mallet – was dissolved. Nonetheless, this temporary situation would not stop Genevans from continuing to engage in military entrepreneurship, as the experience of the Colonel and owner of the Châteauevieux regiment between 1873 and 1792, Jacques André Lullin de Châteauevieux, would demonstrate.⁷⁶

The question of troop recruitment deserves to be studied more: both for the French service and for the other services to which the city of Calvin contributed. In this respect, it becomes quite clear that for the majority of the families studied, the geographic origin of the recruit was, finally, a very secondary matter as compared to the conditions of enlistment. The argument of wanting to introduce centralised and controlled recruitment to block illicit 'wild' recruitment was frequently put forward, which bears witness to the significance of the phenomenon.

As we have already noted, Geneva was a veritable hub of communication and exchange. And this transnational aspect, which is echoed in the following lines of Captain Michely de Crest from 1773, deserves to be studied more than it is at present:

Should not our government view our military establishment as being part of the system of having one in all states? And cupidity for cupidity is ours a greater burden than that of Commerce? It is at the expense of our lives that we reach a condition of subsistence that does not provoke envy, and a businessman often acquires an immense subsistence despite

74 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, p. 80.

75 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre de Monsieur l'ancien Syndic Grenus à Monsieur Gallatin, n.d., p. 144.

76 Hervé de Weck, "Lullin de Châteauevieux, Jacques André," 2011, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/023985/2011-05-12/>. Accessed 9 September 2022.

the money which is entrusted to him, and whose loss does not at all entail his own. If we are like a beehive that is perpetually ejecting swarms, is it within or without that we must ensure all our kinds of existence, will it be against the moral and physical principles of nature that we inculcate in the generations to come that of suffocating themselves, for lack of emigration?⁷⁷

77 AEG, archives de famille Gallatin, Compagnie de Gallatin, Archives privées 44.3.1, Lettre de M. Michely de Crest, Capitaine aide major au Régiment Suisse de Diesbach à M. Gallatin, 27 July 1773, p. 133: "Nôtre gouvernement ne doit il pas voir notre établissement militaire comme rentrant dans le système d'en avoir dans tous les états? Et cupidité pour cupidité la nôtre lui est elle plus à charge que celle du Commerce? C'est au dépend de nos vies que nous arrivons a un état de subsistance que ne reveille pas l'envie, et un negociant en acquiert souvent une immense aux depens de l'argent qui lui est confié, et dont la perte nentraîne point la sienne. Si nous sommes comme une ruche d'abeille qui jette perpétuellement des essains, est ce au dedant ou au dehors qu'il faut assurer tous nos genres d'existence, sera ce contre les principes moraux et phisiques de la nature qu'on inculquera aux générations à venir celui de s'étouffer, faute d'émigrations?"

Foreign Military Labour in Early Modern Europe

Peter H. Wilson

The total size of European armies increased ten-fold across 1500–1800, or more than three times the growth in overall population. Meanwhile, the shift to permanent ‘standing armies’ greatly added to manpower demands and made these a phenomenon of peace as well as war. No government managed to sustain its forces entirely from its own inhabitants, while recruitment beyond state frontiers was attractive for political, military, and socioeconomic reasons. Reliance on foreign military labour thus became a structural feature of European warfare and remained so into the mid to later 19th century.¹

This chapter presents preliminary findings from the “European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870” project which investigates how the transfer of military labour, along with other war-making assets, was an important factor in the emergence of a European order based on territorially bounded sovereign states. It will show that the extensive literature on foreign soldiers largely suffers from the same anachronistic national focus that constrains research on early modern European states, and that to understand the interaction between military labour and political development, we need to unravel how such transfers were made. One distinctive element of the project is to shift the focus away from royal courts and governments, and instead examine Europe’s ‘fiscal military hubs’, or cities where the transfer of resources were arranged, as well as investigating the myriad of actors involved in these processes.² This chapter employs another of our approaches by examining the different contractual forms which

1 This paper draws on research conducted for the project “The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870”, which is funded by the European Research Council [ERC] under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 787504). Further details available at <https://fiscalmilitary.history.ox.ac.uk/home/>. I would like to thank John Condren, Michael Depreter, Aaron Graham, Michael Martocchio, Katalin Pataki, and Cathleen Sarti for their comments and suggestions.

2 Peter H. Wilson, Marianne B. Klerk, “The Business of War Untangled: Cities as Fiscal-Military Hubs in Europe, 1530s–1860s,” *War in History* 29:1 (2020), 80–103; Michael P. Martocchio, “The Place for Such Business’: The Business of War in the City of Genoa, 1701–1714,” *War in History* 29:2 (2022), 302–322; idem, “A Man of Particular Ability’: A Jewish-Genoese Military Contractor in the Fiscal-Military System,” *Business History* (2021). For the term ‘military labour’, see *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative History of Military Labour 1500–2000*, ed. Erik-Jan Zürcher (Amsterdam, 2013).

underpinned the exchange of military labour as a way of identifying who was involved in employing and supplying foreign soldiers and how their interrelationships changed in the three and a half centuries after the 1520s.

1 Foreign Soldiers in the Historical Literature

The presence of soldiers from one country in the army of another has long attracted attention, but coverage varies considerably across time and space. It is best for the Swiss and Irish, the two groups which have come to exemplify the phenomenon more generally. The literature on the Swiss is perhaps the most advanced in terms of analytical rather than descriptive studies.³ There are good studies of the Swiss in French, Spanish, and Dutch service for all or part of the timespan.⁴ While less rich overall, there are also fine works on the

3 Recent important general collections include: *Gente ferocissima: Mercenariat et société en Suisse (XVe–XIXe siècle)*, eds. Norbert Furrer et al. (Zurich, 1997); *Schweizer in fremden Diensten: Verherrlicht und verurteilt*, eds. Hans R. Fuhrer, Robert-Peter Eyer (Zurich, 2006); *Schweizer Solddienst: Neue Arbeiten, neue Aspekte*, eds. Rudolf Jaun, Pierre Streit, and Hervé de Weck (Birmensdorf, 2010); Philippe Rogger, *Geld, Krieg und Macht: Pensionsherren, Söldner und eidgenössische Politik in den Mailänderkriegen 1495–1516* (Baden, 2015); Benjamin Hitz, *Kämpfen um Sold: Eine Alltags- und Sozialgeschichte schweizerischer Söldner in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Cologne, 2015); Marc Höchner, *Selbstzeugnisse von Schweizer Söldneroffizieren im 18. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2015); Jean Steinauer, *Patriciens, fromagers, mercenaires: L'émigration fribourgeoise sous l'Ancien Régime* (Lausanne, 2000); *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018). For Anglophone readers, John McCormack, *One Million Mercenaries: Swiss Soldiers in the Armies of the World* (London, 1993) provides a reasonable digest of the older literature.

4 For France, see Simon Rageth, *Sold und Soldrückstände der Schweizer Truppen in französischen Diensten im 16. Jahrhundert* (Bern, 2008); Jérôme Bodin, *Les Suisses au service de la France, de Louis XI à la Légion étrangère* (Paris, 1988); Benjamin Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten: Berner Militärunternehmer im Dienst des Sonnenkönigs Ludwig XIV.* (Zurich, 2021); Alain-Jacques Tornare, *Les Vaudois au service du roi de France: Révolution française 1789–1798* (Morges, 1998); idem, *Les Vaudois de Napoléon: Des Pyramides à Waterloo 1798–1815* (Morges, 2003). For those serving Spain, see Javier Bragado Echevarria, *Los regimientos suizos al servicio de España en el siglo XVIII (1700–1755): Guerra, diplomacia y sociedad military* (unpublished PhD diss., University of Granada, 2017); *Presencia suiza en la milicia Española*, ed. Guillermo Calleja Leal (Madrid, 2017). For Dutch service, see Robert Murray Bakker Albach, “Die Schweizer Regimenter in holländischen Diensten 1693–1797,” *Jahrbuch Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Familienforschung* (1989), 57–104; Martin Bundi, *Bündner Kriegsdienste in Holland um 1700* (Chur, 1972); Sébastien Rial, *De Nimegue a Java: Les soldats suisses au service de la Hollande XVIIe–XXe siècles* (Morges, 2014); H. Amersfoort, *Koning en Kanton: De Nederlandse staat en het einde van de Zwitserse krijgsdienst hier te lande 1814–1829* (The Hague, 1988);

Swiss serving Naples, Britain, and other powers.⁵ There are good overviews of the Irish,⁶ as well as excellent studies of their service in the Spanish and French armies.⁷ Far fewer fought for the Austrian Habsburgs or German princes, though these have also received attention.⁸

The Scots come a close third in terms of coverage, especially thanks to a long-running project coordinated by Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean at the University of St Andrews which concentrated on connections to the Baltic and parts of Northern Europe 1580–1707.⁹ The presence of Scottish Jacobites in the

Philipp Krauer, "Zwischen Geld, Gewalt und Rassismus: Neue Perspektiven auf die koloniale Schweizer Söldnernmigration nach Südostasien, 1848–1914," *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 71:2 (2021), 229–250.

- 5 Robert-Peter Eyer, *Die Schweizer Regimenter in Neapel im 18. Jahrhundert (1734–1789)* (Bern, 2009); Alistair Nichols, *Wellington's Switzers: The Watteville Regiment (1801–1816): A Swiss Regiment of the British Army in Egypt, the Mediterranean, Spain, and Canada* (London, 2014); Rudolf Gugger, *Preussische Werbungen in der Eidgenossenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1997).
- 6 Harman Murtagh, "Irish soldiers abroad, 1600–1800," in *A Military History of Ireland*, eds. Thomas Bartlett, Keith Jeffrey (Cambridge, 1996), 294–314; David Murphy, *The Irish Brigades, 1685–2006: A Gazetteer of Irish Military Service, Past and Present* (Dublin, 2007).
- 7 For the former, see *Presencia irlandesa en la milicia Española*, ed. Hugo O'Donnell (Madrid, 2014); Robert A. Stradling, *The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries: The Wild Geese in Spain 1618–68* (Blackrock, 1994); Moisés E. Rodríguez, "The Spanish Habsburgs and their Irish soldiers (1567–1700)," *Irish Migration Studies in Latin America* 5 (2007), 125–131; Eduardo de Mesa Gallego, *The Irish in the Spanish Armies in the Seventeenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2014); idem, "Glimpses of Irishmen in Spanish armies, 1621–1644," *The Irish Sword* 29 (2014), 268–309. For the latter, see *Franco-Irish Military Connections, 1590–1945*, eds. Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac, David Murphy (Dublin, 2009); Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac, "The Irish Regiments and the French Army: A Way to Integration," in *Loyalty and Identity: The Jacobites at Home and Abroad*, eds. Paul Monod, Murray Pittock, and Daniel Szechi (Basingstoke, 2010), 206–228; Sam Scott, "The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France," in *Ireland and the French Revolution*, eds. Hugh Gough, David Dickson (Dublin, 1990), 14–27.
- 8 András Oross, "Ír ezredek Magyarországon: Adalékok az állandó hadsereg téli beszállásolásának gyakorlatához az 1690-es években [Irish Regiments in Hungary: A Contribution to the Practice of Winter Billeting of the Standing Army in the 1690s]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 124 (2011), 117–144; Andrea Penz, "Irische Netwerke in der Habsburgermonarchie 1750–1918," in *Krieg und Wirtschaft*, eds. Wolfram Dornik et al. (Innsbruck, 2010), 343–361; John L. Garland, "Irish Officers in the Bavarian Service in the War of Spanish Succession," *Irish Sword* 14 (1981), 240–255.
- 9 Steve Murdoch, Alexia Grosjean, "The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database (SSNE)," 2004. Available at <https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/>. See also *Scotland and the Thirty Years War, 1618–1648*, ed. Steve Murdoch (Leiden, 2001); idem, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603–1660* (East Linton, 2003). More descriptive, though nonetheless useful is James Miller, *Swords for Hire: The Scottish Mercenary* (Edinburgh, 2010).

French and other armies is another well-researched topic.¹⁰ The English and Welsh collectively served in equivalent numbers, but their story has attracted less attention, though that situation is improving for the 16th and early 17th centuries.¹¹

Germans comprised the largest single group, but there are no overviews and coverage across time and place is patchy. Literature on the 16th century is dominated by the presence of the *Landsknechte*, or heavy infantry who appeared in the 1480s and who are examined primarily as a cultural and military phenomenon rather than from the perspective of whom they were serving.¹² There are now several good studies of German troops serving in Hungary during the later 16th century.¹³ There is an extensive older literature on the provision of auxil-

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- 10 Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac, *Le grand exil: Les Jacobites en France, 1688–1715* (Vincennes, 2007); Matthew Glozier, *Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King: Nursery for Men of Honour* (Leiden, 2004); David Worthington, *Scots in the Habsburg service 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2003); Stephen Conway, “Scots, Britons and Europeans: Scottish Military Service c. 1739–1783,” *Historical Research* 82 (2009), 114–130; Andrew Mackillop, “Military Scotland in the Age of Proto-Globalisation, c. 1690 to c. 1815,” in *A Global Force: War, Identities and Scotland’s Diaspora*, eds. David Forsyth, Wendy Ugolini (Edinburgh, 2016), 13–31.
- 11 Adam Marks, *England, the English and the Thirty Years War* (Leiden, 2022); David J.B. Trim, “Fighting Jacob’s Wars”: *The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands, 1562–1610* (unpublished PhD diss., University of London, 2002); idem, “Calvinist Internationalism and the English Officer Corps 1562–1642,” *History Compass* 4 (2006), 1024–1048; Josef Polišínský, “Gallants to Bohemia,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 25 (1947), 391–404. Useful summary of the literature in Steve Murdoch, “Nicrina ad Heroas Anglos: An Overview of the British and the Thirty Years War,” in *Britain Turned Germany: The Thirty Years War and Its Impact on the British Isles*, ed. Serena Jones (Solihull, 2020), 15–36. Those in Spanish service are now covered by the contributions to *The British Presence in the Spanish Military*, ed. Benito Tauler Cid (Madrid, 2021).
- 12 Reinhard Baumann, *Landsknechte* (Munich, 1994); Peter Burschel, *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: Sozialgeschichtliche Studien* (Göttingen, 1994); J.W. Hunterbrinker, ‘Fromme Knechte’ und ‘Gartenteufel’: *Söldner als soziale Gruppe im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Konstanz, 2010). For a survey of Germans in French service, see Michael Harsgor, “Die Spieße unter der Lilienblume: Deutsche Söldner im Dienste Frankreichs (14.–16.Jh.),” *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte* 16 (1987), 48–81. See also David Potter, “The International Mercenary Market in the Sixteenth Century: Anglo-French Competition in Germany 1543–50,” *English Historical Review* 111 (1996), 24–58.
- 13 For instance, see Béla Sarusi, “Deutsche Soldaten in den ungarischen Grenzfestungen des 16. Jahrhunderts,” in *Geteilt – Vereinigt: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Königreichs Ungarn in der Frühneuzeit (16.–18. Jahrhundert)*, eds. István Fazekas, Krisztián Csaplár Degovics (Berlin, 2011), 157–180; Zoltán Bagi, “Das deutsche Fußvolk in den ungarischen Feldzügen zur Zeit des langen Türkenkrieges,” in *Geteilt – Vereinigt: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Königreichs Ungarn in der Frühneuzeit (16.–18. Jahrhundert)*, eds. István Fazekas, Krisztián Csaplár Degovics (Berlin, 2011), 130–156; idem, “Westeuropäische Reitertruppen auf

aries to foreign powers from the later 17th century onwards which continues to attract attention.¹⁴ However, this remains dwarfed by the coverage of Germans in British service, particularly during the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745–46 and especially the controversial service of the ‘Hessians’ during the American Revolutionary War (1775–83) and, more recently, that of the Hanoverians in India.¹⁵

Coverage of soldiers from other parts of Europe largely reflects the periods and places where they were most prominent. Thus, for Italians and Walloons, more information is available for soldiers in Spanish service where they formed a significant minority until 1820, rather than those in the French or

ungarischen Kriegsschauplätzen: Truppengattungen, Organisation und Rekrutierung in der Zeit des langen Türkenkriegs,” *Militär und Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit* 19 (2015), 47–70; idem, “The Life of Soldiers During the Long Turkish War (1593–1606),” *Hungarian Historical Review* 4 (2015), 384–417.

- 14 For example, Wolfgang Handrick, “Der bayerische Löwe im Dienste des österreichischen Adlers: Das kurfürstliche Auxiliärkorps in den Niederlanden 1746–1749,” *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen* 50 (1991), 25–60; Stephan K. Sander-Faes, “Die Soldaten der Serenissima: Militär und Mobilität im frühneuzeitlichen Stato da mar,” in *Militärische Migration vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Christoph Rass (Paderborn, 2016), 111–126; *Presencia germánica en la milicia Española*, ed. Enrique García Hernán (Madrid, 2015).
- 15 Mark Wishon, *German Forces and the British Army: Interactions and Perceptions, 1742–1815* (Basingstoke, 2013); Paul Demet, *‘We are Accustomed to Do Our Duty’: German Auxiliaries with the British Army, 1793–95* (Warwick, 2018); Christopher Duffy, *The Best of Enemies: Germans against Jacobites, 1746* (London, 2013); idem, “Hidden Sympathies: The Hessians in Scotland 1746,” in *Loyalty and Identity*, ed. Paul Monod, Murray Pittock, and Daniel Szechi (London, 2010), 120–31; Jonathan Oates, “Hessian Forces Employed in Scotland in 1746,” *Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research* 83 (2005), 205–214. Rodney Atwood, *The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American Revolution* (Cambridge, 1980) concentrates on the military aspects of the involvement in the American Revolutionary War, while Charles Ingrao, *The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions and Reform under Frederick II, 1760–1785* (Cambridge, 1987) and Peter K. Taylor, *Indentured to Liberty: Peasant Life and the Hessian Military State, 1688–1815* (Ithaca, 1994) offer contrasting interpretations of the wider impact on Hesse-Kassel. *Die Hessians’ im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (1776–1783)*, eds. Holger T. Gräf et al. (Marburg, 2014) draws together more recent research. For contingents from other principalities, see Stephan Huck, *Soldaten gegen Nordamerika: Lebenswelten Braunschwieger Subsidientruppen im amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg* (Munich, 2011); Benno Freiherr von Canstein, *Der Waldeckisch-Englische Subsidienvertrag von 1776: Zustandekommen, Ausgestaltung und Erfüllung* (Arolsen, 1989). The Hanoverians are covered by Chen Tzoref-Ashkenazi, *German Soldiers in Colonial India* (London, 2017); idem, “German Voices from India: Officers of the Hanoverian Regiments in East India Company Service,” *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 2 (2009), 189–211. There are also older studies of the Württembergers in Dutch colonial service.

imperial Habsburg armies.¹⁶ The Huguenot diaspora dominates the study of French in foreign service, meaning that there is little coverage either side of the period 1685–1720.¹⁷ Likewise, East Central European soldiers feature primarily in isolated snapshots. Bohemians appear as the soldiers who were widely employed around 1500 in the aftermath of the Hussite Revolt.¹⁸ Poles and Ukrainians ride in as the ‘Lisowczycy Cossacks’ employed by the imperial army during the Thirty Years’ War, though there is also strong interest in the Polish troops serving Napoleonic France.¹⁹ France also frames investigations of those Hungarians and Croats who did not fight for the Habsburgs, although they were also found in other armies, notably that of Bavaria.²⁰

Lastly, given the numbers of men involved and the geographical range of their activities, the recruitment of foreign soldiers is increasingly studied by historians of migration.²¹ In addition to the longstanding interest in the use of

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- 16 *Presencia italiana en la milicia Española*, ed. José M. Blanco Núñez (Madrid, 2016); Jose M. Bueno, *Italiani al servizio di Spagna 1700/1820* (Milan, 1989); *Presencia de flamencos y valones en la milicia Española*, ed. Enrique Martínez Ruiz (Madrid, 2018). Greg Hanlon, *The Twilight of a Military Tradition: Italian Aristocrats and European Conflicts 1560–1800* (London, 1998) provides a valuable survey which does include France and especially the Empire.
- 17 *War, Religion and Service: Huguenot Soldiering, 1685–1713*, eds. Matthew Glozier, David Onnekink (Aldershot, 2007); Matthew Glozier, *The Huguenot Soldiers of William of Orange and the Glorious Revolution of 1688: The Lions of Judah* (Brighton, 2002).
- 18 Uwe Tresp, *Söldner aus Böhmen im Dienst deutscher Fürsten: Kriegsgeschäft und Heeresorganisation im 15. Jahrhundert* (Paderborn, 2004).
- 19 Henryk Wisner, *Lisowczycy* (Warsaw, 1995); George Gajecy, Alexander Baran, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War*, 1–2 (Rome, 1969–83); Ruth Leiserowitz, “Polish volunteers in the Napoleonic Wars,” in *War Volunteering in Modern Times*, eds. Christine G. Krüger, Sonja Levsen (Basingstoke, 2011), 59–77.
- 20 The Hungarian diaspora in French service has been studied extensively by Ferenc Tóth whose work is most accessible through his summary article: Ferenc Tóth “Carrières de nobles hongrois à la cour de France sous l’Ancien Régime: Réseaux et intermédiaires dans une intégration sociale,” *Bulletin du Centre de recherche du château de Versailles* (2016), 1–26. More detail in: Idem, *Ascension sociale et identité nationale: Intégration de l’immigration hongroise dans la société française au cours de XVIIIe siècle (1692–1815)* (Budapest, 2000), pp. 34–38, 45–82, and 89–106. See also André Corvisier, “Military Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe to France in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in *War and Society in East Central Europe*, 2, eds. Gunther Rothenberg et al. (Boulder, 1982), 513–545.
- 21 In addition to two important collections, *Krieg, Militär und Migration in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Matthias Asche et al. (Berlin, 2008) and *Militärische Migration vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Christoph Rass (Paderborn, 2016) there are several important case studies, including Mary E. Ailes, *Military Migration and State Formation. The British Military Community in Seventeenth-Century Sweden* (Lincoln, 2002); *British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603–1688*, ed. David Worthington (Leiden, 2010); *Irish*

non-European military labour, such as the Sepoys employed in India, scholars are also examining European soldiers and sailors as global migrants, though this is better studied for the 19th century than during the early modern period.²²

Taken as a whole, current scholarship displays great strengths in overarching studies for long sections of the timeframe, as well as detailed examinations of separate cases. However, the underlying organising principle is primarily national, either looking at how soldiers from one location served one or more powers, or how individual armies employed men from different regions, with coverage of Britain and France being better than that for other powers.²³ Studies of individual soldiers offer a useful alternative, since many of these served several different masters across their careers. However, the evidence is invariably richer for specialists, like theorists or engineers, or men who achieved high rank, rather than for their humbler comrades.²⁴ Singular examples such as these demonstrate that the use of foreign military labour was a transnational

Migrants in Europe after Kinsale 1602–1820, ed. Mary A. Lyons (Dublin, 2003); Marc Höchner, “Das Söldnerwesen in der Zentralschweiz 1500–1800 als Migrationsbewegung,” *Der Geschichtsfreund* 167 (2014), 11–29; Antonio J. Rodríguez Hernández, “La presencia militar irlandesa en el ejército de Extremadura (1640–1668),” in *Irlanda y el Atlántico Ibérico: Movilidad, participación e intercambio cultural (1580–1823)*, eds. Igor Pérez Tostado, Enrique García Hernán (Valencia, 2010), 27–153.

- 22 Roelof van Gelder, *Das ostindische Abenteuer: Deutsche in Diensten der Vereinigten Ostindischen Kompagnie der Niederlande (VOC) 1600–1800* (Hamburg, 2004); Pius Malekan-dathil, *The Germans, the Portuguese and India* (Hamburg, 1999); Ulbe Bosma, “European Colonial Soldiers in the Nineteenth Century: Their Role in White Global Migration and Patterns of Colonial Settlement,” *Journal of Global History* 4 (2009), 317–336.
- 23 For Britain, see Stephen Conway, “Continental European Soldiers in British Imperial Service c. 1756–1792,” *English Historical Review* 129 (2014), 79–106; and more generally foreigners in Britain’s empire: Idem, *Britannia’s Auxiliaries: Continental Europeans and the British Empire, 1740–1800* (Oxford, 2017). For France, see Guy Rowlands, “Foreign Service in the Age of Absolute Monarchy: Louis XIV and his Forces Étrangères,” *War in History* 17 (2010), 141–165; Christopher J. Tozzi, *Nationalizing France’s Army: Foreign, Black and Jewish Troops in the French Military, 1715–1831* (Charlottesville, VA, 2016); Guy C. Dempsey, *Napoleon’s Mercenaries: Foreign Units in the French Army under the Consulate and Empire 1799 to 1814* (London, 2002); and more generally Robert W. Gould, *Mercenaries of the Napoleonic Wars* (Brighton, 1995).
- 24 Examples include ‘Een oorlogsmans van dezen tijd en beminnaar der sexe.’ *De autobiografie van Casimir graaf von Schlippenbach (1682–1755)*, eds. Hans Vogel, Marjan Smits (Amsterdam, 2007); Matthew Glozier, *Marshal Schomberg, 1615–1690: The Ablest Soldier of his Age. International Soldiering and the Formation of State Armies in Seventeenth-Century Europe* (Brighton, 2005); Alexia Grosjean, Steve Murdoch, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years War 1618–1648* (London, 2014); Eduardo de Mesa Gallego, “Gerat Barry: Swordsman, Military Theorist, Entrepreneur and Servitor of the Spanish Monarchy,” *The Irish Sword* 30 (2015), 151–156; David J.B. Trim, “Sir Horace Vere in Holland and the Rhineland, 1610–12,” *Historical Research* 72 (1999), 334–351.

phenomenon involving actors in multiple locations, but does not provide a viable way in which to study systemic change across several centuries, or to relate it to other historical developments. Consequently, attempts to do this, while very valuable, have remained at the stage of providing additional case studies rather than a new synthesis.²⁵

2 State-Centred Perspectives and Their Implications

The other conventional vantage points are those of the state and the ‘military entrepreneur’, with the development, expansion and, ultimately, virtual disappearance of foreign military labour all related to the emergence of the sovereign national state and its supposed domestication of military contractors. The model of the ‘Fiscal Military State’ identifies revenue raising and institution-building as keys to military and political success. It was first applied to Britain and subsequently modified to take greater account of maritime power.²⁶ A core argument is that the superior capacity of the British state enabled it to augment its forces by paying foreigners when needed. The model has been applied widely to other European states, though with less consideration of their employment of foreign forces.²⁷ The alternative model is that of the

25 *Söldnerlandschaften: Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Benjamin Hitz (Berlin, 2014); *Rückkehr der Condottieri? Krieg und Militär zwischen staatlichem Monopol und Privatisierung: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, eds. Stig Förster et al. (Paderborn, 2010).

26 John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State 1688–1783* (New York, 1989) with constructive engagement by the contributors to *The British Fiscal Military States 1660–c. 1783*, eds. Aaron Graham, Patrick Walsh (Farnham, 2016). See also Nicholas A.M. Rodger, “From the ‘Military Revolution’ to the ‘Fiscal-Naval State,’” *Journal of Maritime Research* 13 (2011), 119–128.

27 *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe*, ed. Christopher C. Storrs (Farnham, 2009); Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500–1660* (London, 2002); *War, State, and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Rafael Torres Sánchez (Pamplona, 2007). Further examples in Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Constructing a Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Spain* (Farnham, 2015); William D. Godsey, *The Sinews of Habsburg Power: Lower Austria as a Fiscal-Military State* (Oxford, 2018); *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Fiscal-Military State c. 1648–1815*, eds. William Godsey, Petr Mat’ a (Oxford, 2022); Chester Dunning, Norman S. Smith, “Moving beyond absolutism: Was Early Modern Russia a ‘Fiscal-Military State’?” *Russian History* 33 (2006), 19–43; Erol Özvar, “Transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a Military-Fiscal State: Reconsidering the Financing of War from a Global Perspective,” in *The Battle for Central Europe*, ed. Pál Fodor (Leiden, 2019), 21–63.

'Contractor State' which concentrates more on how revenue was spent to procure personnel and other military assets.²⁸ It is closely related to the study of contractors and entrepreneurs as individual actors, as well as their 'business' practices.²⁹

These models have been helpful in expanding our understanding of early modern states and those they employed, but two problems remain. The focus on the nation(al) state obscures the fact that states were neither the exclusive employers of foreign soldiers, nor were all military entrepreneurs purely 'private' individuals. Numerous semi-sovereign powers, like the German and Italian princes or civic republics such as Genoa, employed foreigners, supplied soldiers to other powers, or were engaged in both activities. The Swiss cantons also acted as mercenary suppliers through alliances (with France, for example) and the conclusion of capitulations (*Standeskapitulationen*), which allowed warlords to recruit in their respective territories. Exiled rulers provided their forces to others, or hired foreigners to assist in their recovery of their lost lands, like Duke Ulrich of Württemberg who employed Swiss mercenaries in the early 16th century.³⁰ Occasionally, major powers made agreements with actors whose political legitimacy they questioned, such as those between France and Prince Ferenc II Rákóczi of Transylvania who was in rebellion against the Austrian Habsburgs.³¹ The hire of Swiss infantry by the Schmalkaldic League in 1546 demonstrates that troops could also be employed collectively.³² Later, the English and Dutch East India companies also employed German regiments, in addition to recruiting thousands of soldiers and sailors individually.³³ Given

28 Roger Knight, Martin Wilcox, *Sustaining the Fleet, 1793–1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State* (Woodbridge, 2010), with discussion in: Huw v. Bowen, "The Contractor State, c. 1650–1815," *International Journal of Maritime History* 25:1 (2013), 239–274. Further detailed studies in *The Spending of States: Military Expenditure during the Long Eighteenth Century. Patterns, Organization and Consequences, 1650–1815*, eds. Stephen Conway, Rafael Torres Sánchez (Saarbrücken, 2011); *The Contractor States and its Implications (1659–1815)*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012); *War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Rafael Torres Sánchez (Pamplona, 2007).

29 David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and the Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012); Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2016); Jeff Fynn-Paul, *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800* (Leiden, 2014). See also the special issue of *Business History* 60:1 (2018), on the "Business of War".

30 René Hauswirth, *Landgraf Philipp von Hessen und Zwingli* (Tübingen, 1968).

31 Béla Köpeczi, *La France et la Hongrie au début du XVIIIe siècle* (Budapest, 1971).

32 *Politische Correspondenz der Stadt Strassbourg*, 4, eds. J. Bernays, Harry Gerber (Strasbourg, 1931), nos. 171, 240.

33 See sources in fn. 15 and 24 above.

this diversity, it is helpful to distinguish between ‘contractee’ (benefitting from the troops) and ‘contractor’ (providing the troops) with both roles open to a variety of actors, depending on the circumstances.

The second issue concerns the narrow understanding of efficiency that often results from a state-centred perspective. There has been a widespread assumption that ‘outsourcing’ betrayed a lack of capacity and was employed only as a stopgap until the state could provide defence itself through a monopoly of violence. For example, much of the literature on Gustavus Adolphus as ‘father of modern war’ attributes his victories to his use of native Swedes who are regarded as inherently superior to ‘foreign mercenaries.’³⁴ This has been reinforced by the historiographical convention regarding the French *levee en masse* of 1792 as creating an army of motivated patriots which unleashed the nation’s potential and ushered in a wholly new era of warfare.³⁵

Behind these two issues lurks a more fundamental problem bedevilling any discussion of foreign military labour: the uncritical use of ‘mercenary’ as a supposedly timeless phenomenon ‘as old as war itself’. Mercenaries, in turn, are generally perceived as ‘foreign’ and are contrasted unfavourably with ‘native’ soldiers, regardless of whether the latter are conscripts or volunteers.³⁶ Recent developments, such as the abolition or suspension of conscription, casualty aversion amongst Western societies and the global presence of private military and security companies [PMSCs] all suggest that the era of nationalised war-making is historically transient, rather than a teleological endpoint of European military development.

We need to divest ourselves of modern concepts of nationality based on language, culture, and citizenship which are fixed in a territorially bounded

34 Further discussion of this in Peter H. Wilson, *Lützen* (Oxford, 2018), pp. 105–114.

35 Alan Forrest, *The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory* (Cambridge, 2009); *The People in Arms: Military Myth and the National Mobilization since the French Revolution*, eds. Daniel Moran, Arthur Waldron (Cambridge, 2005).

36 Malte Riemann, “As Old as War Itself? Historicizing the Universal Mercenary,” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6:1 (2021); Aaron Ettinger, “The Mercenary Moniker: Condemnations, Contradictions and the Problem of Definition,” *Security Dialogue*, 45:2 (2014), 174–191; Elke Krahnmann, “From ‘Mercenaries’ to ‘Private Security Contractors’: The (Re) Construction of Armed Security Providers in International Legal Discourses,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 40:2 (2012), 343–363; Hin-Yan Liu, Christopher Kinsey, “Challenging the Strength of the Antimercenary Norm,” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 3 (2018), 93–110; Michael Sikora, “Söldner: Historische Annäherung an einen Kriegerotypus,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29 (2003), 210–238; Sarah V. Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (Oxford, 2007); *Miliz oder Söldner? Wehrpflicht und Solddienst in Stadt, Republik und Fürstenstaat 13.-18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Regula Schmid (Paderborn, 2019).

state. Identity was certainly important but its definition in anachronistic national terms is unhelpful. The following defines 'foreign' politically rather than culturally as lying beyond the contractee's jurisdiction, in the sense that a prospective employer lacked direct, legally enforceable claims to service from those performing military labour. Soldiers from different parts of a 'composite' state were not 'foreign' to their common sovereign. Thus, while the British army retained separate English and Scottish establishments until 1707, with that of Ireland continuing until 1802, all were 'native' under this definition. Likewise, Walloons, other Burgundians, and many Italians were not 'foreign' to the Spanish army until 1714 when these territories were definitively lost. Conversely, Irish, English, Swiss, and German troops were 'foreign', as Spain's king had no jurisdiction over their homelands.

3 Motives

The questions why foreigners were employed and why men served are too complex to be covered here, but some general remarks are necessary to delineate the dynamic tensions inherent in this phenomenon. There are three parties to consider when assessing the motives behind foreign service. In addition to the contractor and contractee, there are the soldiers themselves who have been the primary focus since the vogue for 'war and society' from the 1960s. Initially, 'economic' factors were emphasised, partly because of the 'mercenary moniker' and the fashion for materialist explanations.³⁷ More recent work acknowledges significance of money and other material factors for all three parties, but offers a more nuanced interpretation of the 'business of war'.³⁸ A similar trend is discernible in the research on larger scale contractors who are no longer perceived as pursuing a 'soldier trade'.³⁹ Money generally remained a means to an end rather than the overall goal, while receipts rarely covered the true costs which were accepted as the price for political benefits. It should

37 This is pronounced in Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterprizer and His Workforce*, 1–2 (Wiesbaden, 1964–65). In similar vein, but otherwise equally useful is John Casparis, "The Swiss Mercenary System: Labor Emigration from the Semi-Periphery," *Review* 5:4 (1982), 593–642.

38 David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and the Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012); Christian Koller, Peter Huber, "Armut, Arbeit, Abenteuer: Sozialprofil und Motivationsstruktur von Schweizer Söldnern in der Moderne," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 102 (2015), 30–51.

39 Further discussion in Peter H. Wilson, "The German 'Soldier Trade' of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment," *The International History Review* 18 (1996), 757–792.

also be remembered that not all contractors were entirely willing but could feel compelled to supply troops to please powerful neighbours. Religion was another important factor, particularly during the later 16th and 17th centuries, though it was usually more important for men recruited directly into another army, than in agreements involving the temporary hire of entire units.⁴⁰

Contractees' motives were equally complex. Foreign soldiers could be just 'cannon fodder', hired to make up the numbers or to spare native troops from especially dangerous service, as was the case with Britain's use of French émigrés and others who were deployed to the Caribbean during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. More usually, foreigners were valued both qualitatively and quantitatively, even where doubts were expressed about their reliability.⁴¹ There is also something in the old argument that foreigners provided a valuable alternative source of manpower beyond the influence of traditional elites who might oppose the crown; something that grew more significant with the deepening of the religious schism by the 1530s which often added confessional grievances to existing political differences within states.⁴² Moreover, military developments periodically encouraged the view that troops raised by traditional methods were ineffective. This view grew particularly pronounced across much of Europe during the decades around 1500.

A further appeal of foreigners was the belief that they could be used as needed. This suited the 'minimal' character of most European states in the early 16th century, as well as the seasonal character of warfare which saw armies disbanded or at least reduced in winter, only to be reassembled as the grass grew and large-scale operations again became possible with the spring. Native troops, especially those provided by influential nobles, often could not be simply dismissed when no longer needed. As governments are discovering with PMSCs, it was often not easy to remove contractors once they became embedded in military provision, but that did little to diminish the faith in 'hire

40 For good discussions of religious motivations, see Michael Kaiser, "Cuius exercitus, eius religio? Konfession und Heerwesen im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 91 (2000), 316–353; *Militär und Religiosität in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Michael Kaiser, Stefan Kroll (Münster, 2004); William S. Brockington, "Robert Monro: Professional Soldier, Military Historian and Scotsman," in *Scotland and the Thirty Years War*, ed. Steve Murdoch (Leiden, 2001), 215–243; Glozier, *Scottish Soldiers*; idem, *The Huguenot Soldiers*.

41 For example, Magnus Linnarsson, "Unfaithful and Expensive – but Absolutely Necessary: Perceptions of Mercenaries in Swedish War Policy, 1621–1636," *Revue d'histoire nordique* 18 (2014), 51–73.

42 Classic, if doctrinaire statement of this view by Victor G. Kiernan, "Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy," *Past and Present* 11 (1957), 66–86.

and fire'. Finally, use of foreign soldiers denied these to potential enemies, cultivated clients amongst those who organised them, and could prove strategically expedient, since they could often be sourced closer to where they were needed, removing the need to mount long-distance expeditions.

4 Contractual Forms

A variety of contracts emerged to manage the tensions arising from these asymmetrical relations. These were known by a variety of terms which were not always employed consistently. For ease of analysis, our project identifies three types.⁴³ The most common were 'capitulations', which can be further classified in two types: the fixed-term service contracts made by individuals enlisting in a military unit, and the agreements whereby a contractor supplied a unit which became an integral part of the contractee's army. Given its social-historical orientation, most research on foreign soldiers has concentrated on the former. Our project focuses on the latter and classifies the units provided as 'foreign regiments'. These were not expected to be returned to their contractor, but nonetheless retained a distinct identity associated with their place of origin from which they usually continued to draw recruits to maintain strength. Most Swiss, Scottish, and Irish units fall into this category, and the arrangements could grant contractors considerable autonomy, such as control over internal administration and the appointment of junior officers, as was the case with Swiss capitulations. There were, however, significant differences between the capitulations agreed with cantonal authorities (*Standeskapitulationen*), and those made with individual without cantonal permission (*Partikularkapitulationen*) in which the contractor's terms were much less favourable.

Contracts for the temporary hire of foreign auxiliaries are classed as 'conventions' defined as the time-limited transfer of troops provided by the contractor into the contractee's service. Contractors generally retained control over the internal management of their units, including the appointment and promotion of officers and the administration of justice, while the soldiers were (supposed to be) paid and fed entirely at the contractee's expense. 'Subsidy treaties' represent a third category, where the contractee secured the call on, or service of the contractor's troops, but did not pay their full cost. As will be

43 Further discussion in Peter H. Wilson, "Mercenary Contracts as Fiscal-Military Instruments," in *Subsidies, Diplomacy and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Manchester, 2020), 68–92.

shown, various combinations and hybrid forms developed, but these categories nonetheless are invaluable analytical tools.

The terms 'entrepreneur' and 'enterpriser' are often used interchangeably, with the former increasingly predominating in the literature. However, presence of two terms has potential, as we can distinguish between contractors who raised companies or regiments which they subsequently commanded in return for salaries and other benefits, and individuals who organised the recruitment but had no role in command. The following uses the term 'enterpriser' for the individual contractor-commander, and 'entrepreneur' for those whose role was limited to recruitment, whilst recognising that the boundaries could be blurred, for instance when relatives of the entrepreneur subsequently led the unit. In both cases, these individuals were involved predominantly in capitulations, rather than conventions or subsidy treaties where the contractor was a semi-sovereign or sovereign who delegated command to an officer.

All three contractual forms were often cloaked in the language of alliances, especially subsidy treaties and those conventions which included secret articles promising political benefits. The project distinguishes between arrangements between contractors and contractees which were always transactional, and 'alliances', the study of which has long formed part of the history of diplomacy and international relations. Alliances were fundamental to the coalition warfare which dominated early modern European relations, as well as to the gradual demarcation of the continent into sovereign states. Alliances were often combined with one or more of the three contractual forms used to supply foreign troops. Nonetheless, they were a distinct type of agreement based more clearly on mutuality and generally less asymmetrical than contractor-contractee relations. Allies might promise each other assistance if attacked, or plan to divide up enemy territory, but their agreements only fit our analytical categories if that aid had to be recompensed directly by its beneficiary. Likewise, the presence of clauses in capitulations, conventions or subsidy treaties promising mutual aid does not negate their fundamentally transactional character. Instead, it alerts us to the importance of the political aspects already discussed under motivation.⁴⁴

Capitulations were the most numerous. An incomplete compilation of Swiss regiments in foreign service identifies 204 raised between 1551 and 1802. This omits those serving Spain, the Dutch, and powers other than France and

44 For the Swiss experience, see André Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa: Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der Schweizer Geschichte*, 3rd ed. (Baden, 2021); Andreas Würigler, "Symbiose ungleicher Partner: Die französisch-eidgenössische Allianz 1516–1798/1815," *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte* 12 (2011), 53–75.

Venice prior to 1660, with the 92 units raised after that date offering a more representative sample. As these figures indicate, many regiments had only a brief existence, usually lasting no more than a single campaign prior to the 1580s when they began to be retained for two or three consecutive years. Other than the *Gardes Suisses*, raised in 1616, no regiment remained in French service longer than ten years until the new ones organised in 1671. Such impermanence was typical. Sweden raised 537 regiments during its involvement in the Thirty Years' War between 1630 and 1648. Of these, 343 were formed in the first six years alone. The vast majority survived no more than two years and only five were still in existence in the 18th century.⁴⁵

Given their considerable numbers, our project has not attempted to record all capitulations, but instead to track general trends and identify representative examples. It is also recording some agreements over the exchange of other war materials and the use of facilities such as fortresses by one power in the territory of another, as well as deserter and prisoner exchange agreements. Nonetheless, auxiliary conventions and subsidy treaties remain the primary focus since these facilitated the service of most foreign soldiers. Currently, there are over 1,200 agreements recorded, of which 899 are conventions and subsidy treaties which we believe is very close to the probably overall number actually signed. Preliminary analysis reveals some important trends which correlate with what is already known about broader changes in warfare, state development and diplomacy, but in some cases challenges the conventional chronology whilst subtly altering our understanding of the processes behind this.

5 The Emergence and Development of Early Modern Military Labour to 1660

Capitulations were the principal way of obtaining foreign troops as Europe's 'Fiscal Military System' emerged and developed between about 1530 and 1660. The predominantly seasonal character of warfare resulted in numerous, short-term agreements for contingents raised as individual companies by captains

45 Calculated from data in Georg Tessin, *Die Regimenter der europäischen Staaten im Ancien Régime des XVI. bis XVIII. Jahrhunderts*, 1 (Osnabrück, 1986), pp. 650–668, 685–694. For the new Swiss regiments raised in 1671–72, see Katrin Keller, "Ein Schweizer Gardehauptmann als französischer Unterhändler: Johann Peter Stuppas Werbeverhandlungen in der Eidgenossenschaft 1671," in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 92–115; Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten*, pp. 69–70.

acting as subcontractors to military enterprisers who, in turn, generally acted with the blessing of the authorities in whose lands they raised their men. The emergence of more durable regimental structures in the 1550s led to capitulations for one or more regiments, though the individual companies were often still subcontracted to company-enterprisers or entrepreneurs.

The numbers recruited in the first half of the 16th century have not yet been computed with any accuracy but were certainly considerable. Information is more reliable for the period after the 1550s. Around 25,000 Germans served the rival Scandinavian kingdoms in the opening phase of the Northern War of 1563–70.⁴⁶ Spain issued contracts for 94,000 Germans 1564–78, and though it is unlikely all were recruited, Germans formed a third of the Army of Flanders' infantry until the early 17th century, always outnumbering the Spaniards and Italians and sometimes even exceeding the locally recruited Walloons.⁴⁷ Germans and Swiss formed around a third of French royal armies in the early phases of France's Wars of Religion, while 107,600 Swiss had served on both sides by 1598.⁴⁸ German Protestant princes supplied over 80,000 men to support the Huguenots 1562–92, while England sent a further 13,000.⁴⁹ On average, 3,000 English and Welsh soldiers could be found in the Protestant French and Dutch armies in any year between 1572 and 1610, while 20,000 Irish served Spain across 1586–1611 with 4,000 still in the ranks in 1623.⁵⁰

Another 50,000–60,000 English served the 'Protestant Cause' in the Thirty Years' War, together with a similar number of Scots and Protestant Irish. Around a quarter served Sweden directly, with over 18,000 fighting for Denmark 1625–29, 25,000 with the French 1624–44, 14,000 in the Anglo-Scottish

46 Jason Lavery, *Germany's Northern Challenge: The Holy Roman Empire and the Scandinavian Struggle for the Baltic, 1563–1576* (Boston, 2002), pp. 22–25.

47 Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659* (Cambridge, 1972), p. 271; Friedrich Edelmeyer, *Söldner und Pensionäre: Das Netzwerk Philipps II. im Heiligen Römischen Reich* (Cologne, 2002), pp. 235–258.

48 James B. Wood, *The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1582–1576* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 18–27, 64, and 72–73; Emmanuel May de Romainmôtier, *Histoire militaire de la Suisse et de Suisses dans les différents services de l'Europe* (Lausanne, 1788), p. 59.

49 Jonas A.M. van Tol, *Germany and the French Wars of Religion, 1560–1572* (Leiden, 2018), pp. 197–222; Oskar Bezzel, *Geschichte des Kurpfälzischen Heeres*, 1 (Munich, 1925), pp. 30–40; Paul de Vallière, *Treue und Ehre: Geschichte der Schweizer in Fremden Diensten*, 2nd ed. (Lausanne, 1940), pp. 186–188, 210–211; William A. Heap, *Elizabeth's French Wars: English Intervention in the French Wars of Religion, 1562–1598* (London, 2019), pp. 73–77, 80; L. Eppenstein, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des auswärtigen Kriegsdienstes der Deutschen in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts," *FBPG* 32 (1920), 283–367.

50 Trim, 'Fighting Jacob's Wars', pp. 340–350; Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585–1702* (Oxford, 2006), pp. 62–93, esp. p. 66.

brigade and other units in the Dutch army, and the rest in the various futile expeditions to aid the Palatinate and Bohemians. Only 16,000 of these served the Stuart monarchy directly on official campaigns, while the other 110,000 fought as auxiliaries or in foreign regiments within their host armies. Meanwhile, over 37,500 Catholic Irish served Spain across 1621–53.⁵¹

Despite the prominence accorded to Scots in some accounts, most of Sweden's foreign soldiers were Germans. On the eve of Sweden's intervention in the Thirty Years' War in 1630 half of its 72,000 troops were foreigners, mainly Germans. Only 15 of the 537 regiments raised between 1630 and 1648 were Swedish or Finnish. Scots composed nine regiments, with English forming five and two being nominally French, while Germans manned the remainder. These statistics include only the units raised directly through capitulations between the Swedish crown with contractors, and those provided by German princes who were tied tightly to the Swedish cause, such as the dukes of Mecklenburg and those of Sachsen-Weimar. They exclude forces provided by Sweden's German allies, notably Saxony (1632–35), Brandenburg (1631–35) and Hessen-Kassel (1631–48). The number of Swedes and Finns never rose much above 45,000, yet the army in Germany peaked at 130,000 in August 1632.⁵²

By contrast, the project has only identified 82 conventions and treaties for the period prior to 1660, though this is probably an underestimate. Their relative scarcity reflects contemporaries' reluctance to formalise matters with partners who were not direct allies, partly because many of the loose coalitions involved cooperation with actors like the Huguenots, Dutch, or German princes who were widely considered rebels or lacking full legitimacy at the time of the arrangements. France appears at the forefront of formalising agreements through a string of subsidy treaties with the Dutch and Sweden after 1624. It is characteristic of this stage that contractors' obligations were generally left vague. The 1631 Franco-Swedish treaty is an early example of imposing specific requirements on the number of men Sweden was obliged to maintain against the emperor. France continued this practice in its arrangements with Hesse-Kassel (1636, 1637) and Bernhard of Weimar (1635, 1639). The latter two agreements represent early examples of conventions specifying detailed arrangements for paying the troops, rather than simply providing a subsidy.

51 See the summary table in Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: The Thirty Years War* (London, 2009), p. 322 and the sources cited there.

52 Calculated from Theodor Lorentzen, *Die schwedische Armee im Dreißigjährigen Kriege und ihre Abdankung* (Leipzig, 1894); Tessin, *Regimenter*, pp. 650–668.

6 Transition during the 1660s

France was unable to replicate in Germany its arrangements in Switzerland where a 'perpetual' peace treaty (1516) as well as a renewable alliance (1521) had provided a general framework for repeated capitulations. The Rhenish Alliance of 1658 secured the temporary cooperation of those princes who were disgruntled with the Austrian Habsburgs' management of the Empire. In addition to the common arrangements for mutual assistance, which were activated in 1664 against the Ottomans, France made separate bilateral subsidy agreements with many of the members requiring them to hold troops on retainer. However, these arrangements broke down after 1667 as most princes grew alarmed at growing French aggression.⁵³

The impetus for new conventions instead came from the Dutch Republic which not only faced growing tensions with its former French ally but was engaged in 20-year struggle for maritime supremacy with England. England's inability to strike at the Dutch directly led it to contract Christoph Bernhard von Galen, the belligerent prince-bishop of Münster, to invade the Republic across its eastern, landward frontier in 1665. The Dutch responded by hiring 24,000 auxiliaries from north German princes whose mobilisation prompted Galen to abort his invasion. The Dutch conventions formed basis for future agreements between the Republic and German princes in terms of form and content. They also included the first multilateral agreements, as the Dutch signed a collective contract with the Guelph dukes in Hanover, Celle, and Osnabrück (1665), followed by another with the latter two (1668). That agreement was intended to protect the Republic during the volatile aftermath of the Franco-Spanish War of Devolution 1667 as both former belligerents sought to buy up German support not only for auxiliaries, but also access rights across strategic territory. In all, at least 28 conventions and subsidy treaties were signed during 1661–71, a decade which emerges as crucial in consolidating the mechanisms by which foreign troops were obtained.

These years also saw Venice emerge as a major 'consumer' as its long war with the Ottomans over the possession of Crete reached its climax. Between 1645 and 1668, Venice recruited 32 Corsican and Italian regiments, mostly from beyond its own lands, and a similar number from Germans, Swiss, French and Walloons. The papacy and other Italian states provided 11 auxiliary regiments, while a further 10 were hired from German princes, mainly in the 1660s. Around half of the 50 new units added to the Venetian army during the 1684–99 war

53 Joachim Brüser, *Reichsständische Libertät zwischen kaiserlichem Machtstreben und französischer Hegemonie: Der Rheinbund von 1658* (Münster, 2020).

over Morea were foreign, while another 12 German and Swiss auxiliary regiments were hired during the second, disastrous conflict in 1714–18.⁵⁴ With its associations of Christian duty against the Turks, Venetian service was initially attractive to German princes, but the high casualties rapidly deterred many and it became a secondary option for those who were unable to place forces in imperial or Dutch service.

7 Consolidation 1672–1714

The shift towards conventions and subsidy treaties was confirmed by the Dutch War (1672–79) which saw 69 such agreements, including 18 in the first year alone. The political alliance between the emperor and the Dutch in April 1672 provided the basis for the more famous Grand Alliance of 1689 at the start of the Nine Years War (1688–97) through the accession of England to the group, and the agreement was renewed during the War of Spanish Succession (1701–14). This anti-French coalition only fragmented in the 1720s and was rebuilt in the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), persisting until the Franco-Austrian alliance of 1756 wrecked what had become known as the ‘Old System’ by restructuring European relations more clearly as an unstable balance between five great powers and rather more medium and minor states.⁵⁵

This durable framework spread multilateralism amongst contractees. Each major contractor was encouraged to join the Alliance to bind it politically to the goals of the anti-French coalition, but the three major powers continued to sign separate military conventions and subsidy treaties. This also applied to those made by England and the Dutch Republic, linked as the Maritime Powers through William III’s dual roles as king and stadholder after 1688. Though the direct connection ended with William’s death in 1702, the Maritime Powers continued to sign joint agreements with individual contractors until their 1751 subsidy treaty with Saxony. The two powers became adept at managing

54 Bruno Mugnai, *The Cretan War, 1645–1671: The Venetian-Ottoman Struggle in the Mediterranean* (Warwick, 2018), pp. 245–247; Wilhelm Kohlhaas, *Candia: Die Tragödie einer abendländischen Verteidigung und ihr Nachspiel in Morea 1645–1714* (Osnabrück, 1978); Georg Tessin, “Die deutschen Regimenter der Republik Venedig bis 1718,” *Zeitschrift für Heereskunde* 299 (1982), 22–26; Viktor Ruckstuhl, *Aufbruch wider die Türken: Ein ungewöhnlicher Solddienst am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Obwaldens und der Kompanie Schönenbüel* (Zurich, 1991).

55 Heinz Duchhardt, *Balance of Power und Pentarchie: Internationale Beziehungen 1700–1785* (Paderborn, 1997); Hamish M. Scott, *The Birth of a Great Power System, 1740–1815* (London, 2015).

their foreign troop contractors, particularly through the duke of Marlborough's diplomacy in the War of Spanish Succession when they ensured that any additional troops from the same supplier were covered by separate arrangements. They also defeated repeated efforts by contractors to concentrate their units in brigades under their own generals in a single theatre, instead ensuring that large contingents were split and deployed in several areas simultaneously to prevent the provider threatening to withdraw them to extract better terms. Multilateralism extended through bundles of related treaties as the major partners in the anti-French coalition signed separate but related agreements with the same German prince. They also exchanged information to improve their negotiating positions and ensure they were not hoodwinked into granting better terms to potential contractors.

Contractors had limited scope to resist this management. They were usually competitors, especially those from the German princes who provided the bulk of foreign troops. Princes sought elevation within the Empire's internal hierarchy to enhance their influence and safeguard their status relative to other European monarchs. They had no desire to leave the Empire's protective shell, nor did they want their peers to obtain the titles they sought themselves, since a wholesale upgrade amongst the princes would negate the purpose of their own elevation. These considerations limited consortia to those within the same dynasty, primarily the Ernestine Saxons and the Guelph dukes. The former signed with the emperor (1676, 1702), Saxony (1689, 1692), and the Franconian Kreis (1692), because collective action was the only way the weaker branches could achieve the capacity required to field a full regiment. The Guelphs continued to sign collective agreements with the anti-French coalition (1674, 1688, 1701, and 1704), emperor (1684, 1692), and France (1679). However, internal disagreements ultimately prevented all three branches cooperating and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel went its own way, generally siding with France once the emperor granted an electoral title to Hanover in 1692.

The junior Hohenzollern lines in Ansbach and Bayreuth signed joint conventions with Venice (1686) and Saxony (1709), while there were several agreements involving pairs of ecclesiastical principalities when these were held in common by the same bishop. However, bishops were usually compelled by their cathedral chapters to make separate arrangements for each of their sees. The only consortium without prior political ties was that of Saxe-Gotha, Würzburg and Ansbach whose territories were at least proximate. They collaborated for mutual defence and to hire troops to the emperor (1693) and Saxony (1698), but their partnership collapsed as France briefly detached Gotha from its cooperation with the emperor in 1701. Ansbach joined Hesse-Kassel and Mecklenburg-Schwerin to persuade the emperor to hire their auxiliaries

as these were being discharged by the Maritime Powers in 1713, but he refused to make a collective agreement.⁵⁶

Though arrangements were asymmetrical, signing with a consortium of contractees could benefit a contractor by bringing connections to multiple major powers, each offering something different.⁵⁷ Spain was the weakest member of the initial anti-French coalition and soon notorious for its inability to pay in full. Contractors appreciated the expansion of agreements during the 1670s and 1690s to include the Dutch and later English who either guaranteed the money promised by Spain or assumed at least part of its financial obligations. The emperor also generally lacked funds but was the overlord of all German and some Italian princes exploited his commanding position within the Empire to manipulate them through offering important concessions in return for troops. The reform of the Empire's collective defence structure in 1681–82 changed the rules governing these practices but did nothing to reduce the emperor's ability to use the constitution to his advantage. Typically, he promised prospective contractors relief from billeting other German or imperial troops on their lands, or agreed to waive demands for war taxes in return for additional troops. Above all, the princes knew that the elevations in status and other political goals they sought required the emperor's approval. Placing troops with the Maritime Powers was often a means to acquire leverage in Vienna to push the emperor into confirming promised concessions, since he was frequently dependent on Anglo-Dutch financial aid himself. The anti-French coalition proved highly effective in securing German, Italian and Scandinavian troops. The contracted total topped 60,000 during the 1670s, peaked at 133,640 in 1695 during the Nine Years War and reached roughly that level for most of the War of Spanish Succession.

France was far less successful. The collapse of the Rhenish Alliance by 1668 left it without a framework to coordinate German contractors, while it remained without significant allies until the establishment of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain after 1700. Few princes were willing to defy the constitutional prohibition on assisting the enemies of the emperor and Empire, despite Louis XIV's frequent claims his actions were to uphold 'German liberty'. French efforts centred on sponsoring princes to remain neutral and achieved some

56 Hans Philippi, *Landgraf Karl von Hessen-Kassel* (Marburg, 1976), pp. 411–424; Georg Tessin, *Mecklenburgisches Militär in Türken- und Franzosenkriegen 1648–1718* (Cologne, 1966), pp. 45–46; Bernhard Sicken, "Truppenstärke und Militäretat des Fürstentums Ansbach um 1703," *Jahrbuch des Historischen Vereins für Mittelfranken* 84 (1967/68), 60–82, pp. 64–65.

57 For more detail on this and the following, see Peter H. Wilson, *German Armies: War and German Politics 1648–1806* (London, 1998).

success with agreements with Bavaria (1678), Brandenburg (1673, 1679, 1682, and 1683), Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel (1701), Cologne (1673, 1682, 1683, and 1687), Gotha (1691, 1701), Hanover (1672, 1675, 1677, and 1687), Mainz (1681), and Münster (1691). Offensive arrangements were limited to contracts with Bavaria, Cologne, and Münster in 1672, and again with the first two in 1701 which led to their defeat and the temporary imperial sequestration of their lands during the War of Spanish Succession.

France cooperated with Britain in treaties with Denmark and Sweden during the brief reversal of alliances in 1727, and with Spain in an agreement with Bavaria in 1741. Austria formally became a party to France's long-standing arrangements with Sweden in 1757 and the two made a joint convention with Saxony in 1758, but otherwise both powers continued to make separate conventions with German princes, though they informed each other of their terms. Thereafter, multilateralism faded. Britain and Dutch were partners in the First Coalition against Revolutionary France, but signed only one joint agreement, the problematic subsidy treaty with Prussia in April 1793. Britain then made separate arrangements with each partner until the closing stages of the Napoleonic Wars when it signed combined subsidy treaties with its principal allies in the final two coalitions.

Britain's membership of the Grand Alliance of 1689 was accompanied by its switch from being a major supplier of foreign military labour to one of its principal consumers. Initially, this included foreign regiments recruited from Huguenot and Waldensian refugees. These were disbanded with the peace in 1697 as their presence was unacceptable to Parliament which remained suspicious of a permanent army. William III's victory over his rival James II by 1691 also led to the 'Flight of the Wild Geese', or transfer of the Irish regiments loyal to the Jacobite cause into French service where they remained until 1792.

The coincidence of the Nine Years War with the ongoing Great Turkish War (1683–99) resulted in 162 conventions and treaties. Another 20 were made before commencement of hostilities in May 1701 in the War of Spanish Succession which saw 156 more. Collectively, these consolidated the system. Agreements during the Spanish Succession frequently simply renewed or adapted those from the previous conflict. In turn, they provided models for future arrangements, notably those between Britain and Hesse-Kassel into the 1790s which referred to that of 1702 as their basis.

The intensification of activity encouraged the emergence of medium German princes as contractees, beginning with Saxony during the 1690s, followed by Brandenburg-Prussia and Hanover after 1701. They hired units from smaller neighbours to make up the numbers required by their own contracts with the Maritime Powers, or as substitutes for their contingents owed under the

Empire's collective security, thereby keeping their own men free to be hired to major states. The Franconian and Swabian *Kreise* (Circles) acted collectively to hire troops to augment their forces after 1692 to increase their weight within the Empire and the Grand Alliance.

8 Contingent Sizes

Consolidation of the system stabilised the size of contingents, making the arrangements more predictable. Münster's promise of 30,000 men to England in 1665 had been wholly unrealistic, as had the bishop's belief that Charles II could pay for such a force. Bavaria and Cologne also pledged too many troops in 1672 and had to revise their commitments downwards in fresh conventions once hostilities began. Brandenburg-Prussia promised 20,000 in its agreements with Spain (1690) and separately with the Maritime Powers (1693) who assumed Spain's responsibilities. Otherwise, 6,000 to 12,000 was the norm for a single agreement with a medium-sized contractor like Bavaria, Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Naples, the Palatinate, Portugal, Savoy, Saxony, and the two Scandinavian kingdoms. Cologne occasionally contracted for up to around 10,000 during the 18th century, not least as it was often held in common with Münster and other bishoprics. Württemberg briefly joined this group in the 1730s and again during the Seven Years' War (1756–63). Otherwise, 4,000 was the upper ceiling for the smaller German principalities and those Italian states like Modena and Parma which occasionally supplied auxiliaries.

Most German princes contracted for a single regiment which, if provided for the emperor, ranged up to 2,300 men, but was often half that when supplied to other powers. The Scandinavian kingdoms switched their arrangements between France and its enemies but did not sign more than one agreement at a time. The larger German principalities made parallel agreements with different members of the anti-French coalitions which could increase their overall commitments above the normal ceiling of around 10,000 men. A few smaller principalities signed multiple agreements in the hope of consolidating these into a single, large contract which might bring more substantial political benefits. However, as Mecklenburg-Schwerin discovered during the War of Spanish Succession, contractees preferred to spread the risk amongst multiple providers.

Much larger numbers only featured in agreements involving major powers as contractors, such as the Maritime Powers' arrangements with Austria during the War of Austrian Succession and with Prussia in 1793, the Anglo-Savoyard treaty of 1793 and those with Russia 1747, 1755, 1797, and 1805. Sweden briefly

increased its commitments to 30,000 during the Seven Years' War, but Prussia avoided any precise numbers in its agreement with Britain in 1758.

Hesse-Kassel's simultaneous agreements with both sides during the War of Austrian Succession were highly unusual and the contracts contained clauses that the two contingents were not to be employed against each other. Some princes received subsidies from rival great powers simultaneously in peacetime, notably Bavaria and Cologne in the early 1750s, but these had to be concealed from the contractees and there are several instances of major powers terminating or refusing agreements with princes suspected of duplicity.

Both parties normally made great efforts to fulfil their agreements, not least because non-compliance risked reputational damage and harmed their chances of securing arrangements in the future. It was rare for an agreement to collapse immediately because the contractor failed to raise sufficient manpower. More commonly, contractors struggled to maintain their forces at the required strength, while contractees fell into arrears, with these two problems generally compounding each other. Sovereign states acting as contractors generally had sufficient forces to meet their commitments and saw subsidies and payments for auxiliaries as valuable ways of reducing military expenditure in conflicts which they would probably have joined anyway. A good example is Sweden which was in almost continual receipt of French subsidies from the later 17th century. France gained valuable leverage over Swedish domestic politics and pushed the country into war in 1675, 1741, and 1757, but each conflict also suited powerful groups and the country would have had to have maintained a defence establishment to protect its Baltic empire in any case.⁵⁸

By contrast, access to external money encouraged the German princes to raise far more men than they could maintain unaided and whose numbers considerably exceeded what they were obliged to provide under imperial collective security. The imminent end to a conflict prompted a scramble to place troops with other employers to avoid the loss of reputation and influence that would follow their disbandment. The almost seamless sequence of wars after 1665 provided opportunities, not least thanks to the emergence of the second tier of contractees like Venice and Saxony which pursued their own conflicts. Nonetheless, auxiliaries were often discharged with considerable arrears owing, while even the few months it might take to conclude a replacement agreement could prove too expensive for some principalities to maintain their forces.

58 Svante Norrhem, *Mercenary Swedes: French Subsidies to Sweden 1631–1796* (Lund, 2019).

Thus, the conclusion of hostilities was usually accompanied by new agreements either converting the temporary hire of auxiliaries into permanent foreign regiments or transferring units completely into another army. The Habsburgs soaked up much of the German manpower this way, as did Prussia until 1755. Respected contractors such as Hesse-Kassel increasingly bargained additional demobilisation benefits to cushion them against such volatility. Keen to retain opportunities to have first call on German manpower, Britain and France developed flexible arrangements whereby the contractor received a subsidy in peacetime to hold men (at least nominally) in readiness, which could be converted into a full auxiliary convention if the men were required. From the mid-18th century, Britain generally allowed one or more additional years of subsidy payments to continue once the units had been discharged.

9 18th-Century Patterns

In contrast to the innovations and expansion witnessed after 1660, the period after 1714 was characterised by the continuation of established practices amidst an overall, gradual decline in activity. Spain's loss of its Italian and Burgundian possessions transformed its remaining units from these locations into foreign regiments alongside those recruited, nominally at least, from Irish, Swiss, and Germans. Retention of Italian and Walloon regiments was determined not only by a desire to maintain strength, but also to demonstrate pretensions to recovering these regions and to continue connections with families with long-standing traditions of service. Austria retained several 'Spanish' units into the 1730s reflecting Charles VI's reluctance to abandon ties to Spain which he had been compelled to renounce in 1714. The long wars left other legacies as well, notably the presence of Hungarian exiles serving in the French hussars, as well as numerous Huguenot officers in British, Dutch, and German service.

Around 70 agreements were made across 1714–40, including many peacetime subsidy agreements by the major powers to secure German and Scandinavian support. The subsequent War of Austrian Succession saw another 58 conventions and treaties, chiefly made by the Dutch following the crisis of 1745 as French armies overran much of the Austrian Netherlands. These arrangements evolved into lasting connections with German princes as several of the temporary auxiliary regiments transformed into permanent foreign units, while others (Waldeck, Saxe-Gotha, and later Münster also) were renewed regularly. After the Patriot Revolt (1787), the Orange dynasty felt foreigners were more reliable than native Dutch and signed agreements with

Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Ansbach-Bayreuth and Mecklenburg-Schwerin for 5,345 men in 1788.⁵⁹

At least 30 new agreements were made immediately after 1748 as France and Britain competed to buy up German and Scandinavian support. Most of these subsidy treaties were modified as conventions to provide auxiliaries after 1756 with the outbreak of the Seven Years' War which saw nearly 60 additional agreements. There were no major wars outside eastern Europe in the three decades after 1763, and most powers scaled back their military commitments. Around 48 agreements were made during this time, mainly by the French and Dutch keeping Germans and Scandinavians on retainer. The main exception was the clutch of agreements made by Britain securing around 30,000 German auxiliaries during the American War of Independence (1775–83), which represented the first substantial 'export' of foreign troops beyond Europe.

Beneath the surface of the relatively tranquil inter-state relations, there were also deeper, structural changes reducing the demand for foreign military labour. One was the shift from the grand anti-French coalition to a European pentarchy as Prussia and Russia emerged fully as great powers alongside Austria, France, and Britain by the 1750s. Both newcomers were too poor to hire foreign troops, which Russia did not require thanks to its large population. Prussia supplemented its own system of limited conscription by recruiting individuals from the minor German states rather than tying itself through conventions.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, several important contractees no longer hired auxiliaries: Spain and Denmark had stopped doing this by the end of the 17th century, followed by Venice and Saxony by 1718. Both Scandinavian powers retained German regiments into the early Napoleonic era, but these were now long-established units recruiting individually to maintain strength rather than new ones formed through capitulations with princes or enterprisers. Meanwhile, whilst augmenting the number of German troops in the 1740s and 1780s, the Dutch no longer hired on the scale they had done before 1713. Austria refrained from new conventions after 1761 (with Anhalt-Zerbst) until agreements for 3,552 men from Würzburg, Bamberg and Anhalt-Zerbst in 1790 during the twin crises of another Turkish war and the revolt in the Southern Netherlands. Like

59 Oskar Bezzel, *Haustruppen des letzten Markgrafen von Ansbach-Bayreuth unter preußischen Herrschaft* (Munich, 1939), pp. 25–44; Klaus-Ulrich Keubke, Hubertus Köbke, *Mecklenburg-Schweriner Truppen in den Niederlanden 1788–1795* (Schwerin, 2003).

60 Peter H. Wilson, "The Politics of Military Recruitment in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *English Historical Review* 117 (2002), 536–568.

Prussia, it recruited heavily from the minor German principalities and imperial cities, which provided around a third of its infantry, without the need for conventions.

10 Demise and Transformation

French control over Italy, combined with the Empire's destruction by 1806, undermined the Fiscal Military System which was already strained by the collapse of the Dutch Republic 1795. France shifted to extraction through imperial hegemony, imposing asymmetrical alliances on satellite states to send troops at their own expense. By 1809, the Rheinbund was obliged to provide 122,000 for France, far exceeding whatever the Bourbons had been able to muster at any one point through foreign regiments and auxiliaries. The sharp growth in German numbers contrasted with the relative stability of those of the Swiss who were obliged to provide 18,000 infantry after 1798 (reduced to 16,000 from 1803), a significant burden relative to population, but roughly equivalent to the numbers which had served France regularly during the 18th century.

Germany's reorganisation into fewer, sovereign states signalled the end to foreign regiments in the Danish and Swedish armies, as well as depriving Austria and Prussia of a significant proportion of their manpower. The Hanoverians and Brunswickers transferred as exiled armies into British service until 1815, while Russia also formed a German Legion. In the absence of available auxiliaries, Britain returned to practice of recruiting foreign regiments, primarily from Germans, Dutch and Swiss, often commanded by former French royalist officers. Outside Britain, the profound political changes sweeping Europe after 1789 transformed state-society relations, greatly increasing the authorities' capacity to mobilise manpower and resources from their own populations, as exemplified by new forms of conscription adopted by virtually every major and minor state.⁶¹

As in other spheres, the Restoration era did not fully revive previous practice. Subsidies almost completely disappeared. Britain briefly re-emerged as an 'exporter' of manpower as thousands of demobilised soldiers and other men

61 Alan Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire* (Oxford, 1990), Thomas Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany, 1789–1830* (New York, 2008); *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era*, eds. Donald Stoker et al. (London, 2014); *Der Bürger als Soldat: Die Militarisierung europäischer Gesellschaften im langen 19. Jahrhundert: Ein internationaler Vergleich*, ed. Christian Jansen (Essen, 2004).

joined the Latin American armies fighting for independence from Spain.⁶² France, Spain, the Netherlands, Naples, and the Papacy all employed significant numbers of foreign troops through formal capitulations, but numbers declined significantly after the 1830 Revolution, and they disappeared with Italian unification which removed the last employers by 1870. That conflict saw surge in ‘foreign fighters’ at least nominally organised around ideology and exemplified by the Garibaldini. Important politically and sometimes militarily, foreign fighters were never as numerous as their allegedly ‘mercenary’ forebears.⁶³

11 Conclusions

All conclusions are necessarily provisional, as there are still gaps in the data and further analysis to complete. Nonetheless, departing from the conventional vantage point of the sovereign state reveals the transnational character of early modern Europe’s use of foreign military labour. Dispensing with the ahistorical figure of the mercenary and identifying ‘foreign’ politically rather than culturally sharpens our ability to investigate long-lasting and complex practices. Distinguishing between the different contractual forms enables macro-level analysis across time and space, as well as to contextualise micro studies of individual agreements, including those between ordinary soldiers and their employers.

The preceding exposes the cliché of the universal soldier serving the highest bidder. This was not a free market for force. Men were rarely able or willing to serve any power, while prospective employers were also discerning in whom they recruited. Access to manpower was mediated through contractors upon whom contractees depended to organise and supply the bulk of foreign troops. Geography, strategy, dynastic, and religious considerations all further

62 Matthew Brown, *Adventuring through Spanish Colonies: Simon Bolívar, Foreign Mercenaries and the Birth of New Nations* (Liverpool, 2006); Ben Hughes, *Conquer or Die! Wellington’s Veterans and the Liberation of the New World* (Oxford, 2010); Moises E. Rodriguez, *Under the Flags of Freedom: British Mercenaries in the War of the Two Brothers, the First Carlist War and the Greek War of Independence* (Lanham, MD, 2009).

63 Fuller discussion in Peter H. Wilson, “Foreign Military Labour in Europe’s Transition to Modernity,” *European Review of History* 27 (2020), 12–32; Nir Airelli, *From Byron to Bin Laden: A History of Foreign War Volunteers* (Cambridge, MA, 2018). For the Garibaldini, see the special issue on “Foreign Volunteers and the Risorgimento,” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 14:4 (2009).

influenced choices, as did perceptions of martial reputation, creditworthiness, and the likelihood of achieving ambitions.

There was a pronounced tendency for clustering of contractees and contractors along established patterns whereby men from certain areas predominately served in the same armies. However, these patterns were not universal across all contractual forms. For example, France employed Irish, Swiss and, to a lesser extent, Scots, and English in foreign regiments, but generally did not employ them through conventions or subsidy treaties. It had German and some Italian foreign regiments but obtained far larger numbers through conventions and treaties with princes from these regions. These patterns were not replicated in the service of foreign fighters as it emerged from the 1820s and reflected the progressive restructuring of states and war-making along national lines.

Civilian Trade and War Business in the Early Modern Mediterranean: The Case of Genoese Military Transporters in the War of Spanish Succession

Michael Paul Martoccio

Scholars¹ have long recognized the importance of military recruitment, supply and financing – the so-called business of war – for the economic development of early modern Europe.² While the majority of this research has centred on how states either collected revenues for war-making or paid this money out to private military contractors, new strands in business history have turned towards the role of war in the development of early modern business practices.³ Rather than facile attempts to evaluate the positive or destructive role of war on the economy, this research has shown how war provided “an inexhaustible source of business opportunities, comparable only to consumer-driven trade expansion”, propelling changes in employment, logistics, investment, entrepreneurship, and firm organization.⁴ Instead of a class of entrepreneurs specializing only in war, military contractors acted as “the quintessential eighteenth-century capitalists”, adding war-work to their existing business portfolios and taking on military contracts for a range of financial,

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- 1 I would like to thank the editors of the volume, André Hohenstein and Philippe Rogger, for the invitation to contribute as well as Peter Wilson for kindly reading an earlier draft of this essay. All translations and transcriptions are my own unless otherwise noted. All dates are given in the ‘new style’ or Gregorian calendar.
 - 2 Recent examples include Roger Knight, Martin Wilcox, *Sustaining the Fleet, 1793–1815: War, the British Navy, and the Contractor State* (Woodbridge, 2010); *The Contractor State and its Implications (1659–1815)*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012); *The Spending of States: Military Expenditure During the Long Eighteenth Century: Patterns, Organization and Consequences, 1650–1815*, eds. Stephen Conway, Rafael Torres-Sánchez (Saarbrücken, 2011); *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden, 2014); Rafael Torres-Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2016).
 - 3 See especially the articles in the 2018 special issue of *Business History*: “The Business of War,” *Business History* 60:1 (2018), 4–125. A notable example from the late medieval period is William P. Caferro, “Warfare and Economy in Renaissance Italy, 1350–1450,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 39:2 (2008), 167–209.
 - 4 Pepijn Brandon, Marjolein ‘t Hart, and Rafael Torres-Sánchez, “War and Economy: Rediscovering the Eighteenth-Century Military Entrepreneur,” *Business History* 60:1 (2018), 4–22, p. 4.

legal, social, honorific and moral reasons.⁵ The relationship between business and war was especially entangled during the 18th century when Europe's armies and navies attempted to secure their necessary war supplies through a combination of state production and international markets only to discover that neither proved satisfactory during times of peak demand. At the same time, "the rollercoaster ride of demand peaks and troughs" affected individuals and companies working in military supply forcing them to expand, contract, or diversify their war business accordingly.⁶

This essay is about precisely one such demand peak; how such military actions blurred straightforward distinctions between state, semi-state and private operatives; and, conversely, how such military-demand requirements changed or left unaffected broader patterns of business development. Specifically, it examines the role of short-term Genoese military transporters during the second half of the War of Spanish Succession (1701–14), the dispute over the Spanish throne between Louis XIV's France and his Spanish allies and their opponents from the Grand Alliance of Great Britain, the Dutch United Provinces, Imperial Austria, and the Duchy of Savoy.⁷ While a number of excellent studies have examined Genoa's state-run navy as well as more permanent, private naval contractors (*asientistas de galeras*), much less attention has been paid to small-scale, temporary naval transport-for-hire, people who made up what Gordan Bannerman has called in a different context the "sub-contractor state".⁸ While it is not possible to calculate precisely what percentage of

5 Brandon, 't Hart, Torres-Sánchez, "War and Economy," p. 11.

6 David Plouviez, "The French Navy and War Entrepreneurs: Identity, Business Relations, Conflicts, and Cooperation in the Eighteenth Century," *Business History* 60:1 (2018), 41–56, p. 43.

7 On the city's role during the war see: Riccardo Dellepiane, Paolo Giacomone Piana, "Le leve corse della Repubblica di Genova: Dalla pace di Ryswick al Trattato di Utrecht (1697–1713)," *Atti della società ligure di storia patria*, n.s., 36 (1996), 427–446; Giovanni Assereto, "La guerra di Successione spagnola dal punto di vista genovese," *Atti della società ligure di storia patria*, n.s., 51 (2011), 539–584; Christopher Storrs, "Negotiating the Transition from Spanish to Austrian Habsburg Italy: Non-Spanish Italy and the War of the Spanish Succession (c. 1700–1713/14)," in *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives*, eds. Matthias Pohlig, Michael Schaich (Oxford, 2017), 131–157; Michael P. Martocchio, "'The Place for such Business': The Business of War in the City of Genoa, 1701–1714," *War in History* 29:2 (2022), 302–322.

8 Vilma Borghesi, "Il magistrato delle galee (1559–1607)," *Miscellanea storica ligure*, n.s., 3:1 (1971), 189–223; Thomas Kirk, *Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic* (Baltimore, 2005); Luca Lo Basso "Una difficile esistenza: Il duca di Tursi, gli asientos di galee e la squadra di Genova tra guerra navale, finanza e intrighi politici (1635–1643)," *Atti della società ligure di storia patria*, n.s., 51 (2011), 819–846; idem, "Gli asientisti del re: L'esercizio private della guerra nelle strategie economiche dei Genovesi (1528–1716)," in *Mediterraneo in armi (secc. xv–xviii)*, ed. Rossella Cancila, 2 (Palermo, 2007), 397–428; Benoît Maréchaux, "Los asientistas de galeras genoveses y la articulación naval de un imperio

Mediterranean military transport fell to smaller-scale contractors, these captains played a critical role in moving men around the region. At the same time, military transport shaped the business patterns of merchants in the region. Merchant correspondence makes clear that London firms, for example, fit Mediterranean military transport-for-hire into their business plans especially along stable transport routes such as that between the Spanish coast and the Habsburg enclave of Finale in Liguria.⁹ A close look, then, at the role of Genoese shipping merchants in military transport allows us to view both the needs of belligerent states for small-scale contractors as well as how these captains fit this type of war-work into their existing business operations.

1 Genoese Military Transport: An Overview

Ever since 1528, when Andrea Doria and Emperor Charles v signed a far-reaching contract (*asiento*) for the management of 12 galleys for the Spanish crown, Genoese aristocratic families such as the Doria, Centurione, Lomellini, Spinola, and De Mari had played a vital role in shipbuilding, financing and naval supply alongside the recruitment of maritime personnel.¹⁰ Due to its strategic position along the ‘Spanish Road’ to the Low Countries, Genoa served as a centre for military transport, and Genoese shipping merchants, either on their own initiative or as sub-contractors of the larger *asientistas de galeras*, shipped Spanish soldiers around the region.¹¹ This business widened substan-

policéntrico (siglos XVI–XVII),” *Hispania* 80 (2020), 47–76; idem, “Business Organisation in the Mediterranean Sea: Genoese Galley Entrepreneurs in the Service of the Spanish Empire (Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries),” *Business History* 65 (2023), 56–87. See more generally I.A.A. Thompson, *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560–1620* (London, 1976), pp. 163–205; Carla Rahn Phillips, *Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Baltimore, 1986); Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies, and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860*, 1–2 (Stockholm, 1993); Louis Sicking, “Selling and Buying Protection: Dutch War Fleets at the Service of Venice (1617–1667),” *Studi veneziani*, n.s., 67 (2013), 89–106; Christopher Storrs, “Fleets and States in a Composite Catholic Monarchy: Spain c. 1500–1700,” in *Ideologies of Western Naval Power, c. 1500–1815*, eds. J.D. Davies, Alan James, & Gijss Rommelse (New York, 2016), 85–105; Gordan Bannerman, “The Impact of War: New Business Networks and Small-Scale Contracts in Britain, 1739–1770,” *Business History* 60:1 (2018), 23–40, p. 24.

9 Giada Pizzoni, *British Catholic Merchants in the Commercial Age, 1670–1714* (Woodbridge, 2020), p. 62.

10 Maréchaux, “Business Organisation in the Mediterranean Sea”.

11 Antonio José Rodríguez Hernández, “Al servicio del rey: Reclutamiento y transporte de soldados italianos a España para luchar en la Guerra contra Portugal (1640–1668),” *Guerra e pace in età moderna: Annali di storia militare europea* 4 (2012), 229–275; Manuel Herrero

tially after 1650 as Spanish military decline opened up new opportunities for Genoese naval transport, a process that further accelerated when the French forced the maritime republic to declare neutrality following their brutal bombardment of the city in May 1684.¹² Consequently, Genoese transporters played a vital role during the first half of the War of Spanish Succession (1701–06) as close to 100,000 Bourbon military personnel from Toulon, Marseille, Naples and other friendly ports either disembarked in Genoese territory or transited through the city to the Duchy of Milan, Sardinia, Sicily, the State of the *Presidi*, or elsewhere in the Western Mediterranean.¹³

The precise terms of Genoese employment in the Bourbon armed forces remain unclear, however. Staunchly neutral throughout the conflict, the government of Genoa refused to provide galleys to the Franco-Spanish armies. Indeed, to strengthen their non-interventionist claims, Genoa's rulers instead offered vital transportation to diplomats, grandees, and their families under neutral banner including, among many, the wife of the Duke of Savoy, Anne Marie d'Orléans; the Spanish Viceroy to Sicily, Felipe Antonio Spinola, 4th Marquis of Los Balbases; the English ambassador Henry Newton; and the French commander Philippe de Bourbon, Duke of Vendôme.¹⁴ Surviving French naval records show that Genoese shipping merchants did not take on seasonal military transport directly from the French state. For example, no Genoese-registered vessels appear among the 31 ships that ferried 8,774 soldiers, 113 officers, and 245 horses from Provence to Alassio from 26 February to 15 March 1703 nor among the dozen ships moored in the port of Genoa that same year awaiting the transportation of over 2,000 French and Piedmontese infantry, although this does not preclude the possibility of Genoese captains working under false identity such as a certain "Captain Calcagno", who transported 230 soldiers and 30 horses for the French around this time.¹⁵ Rather,

Sánchez, "Génova y el sistema imperial hispánico," in *La Monarquía de las naciones: Patria, Nación y Naturaleza en la Monarquía de España*, eds. Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio, Bernardo J. García García (Madrid, 2004), 529–562.

12 *Il bombardamento di Genova nel 1684: Atti della Giornata di Studio nel Terzo Centenario* (Genoa, 1988).

13 Martoccio, "The Place for such Business," table 1.

14 London, British Library [BL], Add MS 61521, fols. 59r–60r, 66r, 71r, 74r–75r, 76r, 90r–v, 111r–112r, and 186r–187r; Kew, The National Archives, Kew [TNA], State Papers [SP], 79/3, fols. 716r, 732r, and 817r–818r.

15 Genoa, Archivio di Stato di Genova [ASG], Archivio Secreto [AS], 2928, unfoliated, 26 February 1703, 5 March 1703, 8 March 1703, and 15 March 1703; Vincennes, Service Historique de la Défense [SHD], Fonds de l'armée de Terre, Série – A, 1693, *Etat des Bastimens qui sont dans le Port de Gennes*. ...

contemporary reports suggest that before 1706 the bulk of Genoese skippers involved in the military transport trade took up employment as sub-contractors of the Genoese-Neapolitan *asientista de galeras* Giovanni Andrea Mariano Doria Del Carretto, Duke of Tursis, whose seven galleys made up the second largest squadron in the Spanish galley fleet.¹⁶ In fact, the Genoese presence in the Duke of Tursis fleet was not lost on France's enemies. In 1703, the English Admiral Cloudesley Shovell threatened the republic with reprisals because crews of Genoese manned and commanded three of the duke's galleys.¹⁷ Two years later the British envoy to Savoy, Richard Hill, ordered the *HMS Mary Galley* and *Lyme* to attack a 40-gun Genoese ship transporting 500 Italian soldiers from Finale to Barcelona because he could not "bear the sending of forces from the Milanese to Spain".¹⁸

2 The Allied Convoy System and Transport-for-Hire (1707–12)

Regardless of how they were employed, the combination of relatively short transportation distances, an absence of significant enemy ships in the region, and pre-existing personal and business ties meant that private, short-term transporters in the Western Mediterranean before 1707 worked alone or in small numbers. This regional pattern of naval transport changed dramatically due to the Bourbon defeat at Turin in September 1706 and the subsequent shift of the Mediterranean theatre from Italy to Iberia. Beginning in December 1707 the Allies set up a complex transportation system whereby its wealthy members (the maritime powers of Great Britain and the United Provinces) promised to transport Austrian-Imperial soldiers as well as subsidized Prussian, Palatinate, Hessian and Grison troops to Catalonia, choosing to do so from Genoese Liguria because, as one British official remarked, "the expense of the transport [would] be much less and easier from the coast of Genoa than from any other place whatsoever."¹⁹ Importantly, due to naval shortages, long travel distances, French privateers, underdeveloped maritime networks, and the

16 Christopher Storrs, *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy, 1665–1700* (Oxford, 2006), p. 71. The remaining parts of the Spanish galley fleet, which totaled 29 in 1677, drew from the squadrons of Naples (eight galleys), Spain (six), Sicily (five), and Sardinia (two). Also, David Goodman, *Spanish Naval Power, 1589–1665* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 13, 62–63, 134, and 218.

17 Storrs, "Negotiating the Transition," p. 141.

18 *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the Right Hon. Richard Hill*, ed. William L. Blackley (London, 1845), p. 479.

19 BL, Add MS 61526, fols. 169r–170v.

sheer complexity of naval combined operations, the British and Dutch shipped these soldiers in highly organized convoys of auxiliary vessels and transports. 49 ships ferried about 7,500 troops from Vado to Barcelona in December 1707 (see below) while the shipment of 2,200 Palatinate and Austrian-Imperial cavalry and 3,600 infantry in July 1708 required 32 British and Dutch men-of-war and between 80 and 90 transports.²⁰ Similar large-scale embarkations from Vado, Savona, and Finale set off in July 1708, November 1708, January 1709, June 1710, May 1711, November 1711, and June-August 1712, taking a total of approximately 40,000 Allied soldiers to Catalonia from 1707 to 1712.²¹

Yet the safety of such huge convoys came with steep downsides as Anglo-Dutch warships frequently arrived to the seaside late, under-manned and short of sufficient cargo room for their (also often tardy, miscounted, and ill) human and animal freight, forcing Allied agents to turn to Genoese trading vessels to fill the supply gaps on the fly. Most often, these agents began their frantic searches for transporters at the *Loggia della Mercanzia/dei Mercanti* (Loggia of Commerce/Merchants), the city's merchant exchange. To find Genoese vessels in December 1707, John Chetwynd, envoy to the Duke of Savoy in Turin, hired an unnamed merchant conjointly with a naval officer who searched the city for available captains.²² The recruitment of troop transports was done on an ad-hoc basis, fitting the immediate needs of the moment such as when British admiral John Leake, having arrived at Vado with insufficient space to transport Austrian-Imperial cavalry in 1709, sent his attaché, James Croft, to rent as many ships as he could and deliver them to Vado for service to Barcelona.²³ Beyond the exchange, Allied agents further used less formal commercial settings such as banquets and the city's two theatres, the Teatro Falcone and Teatro Sant'Agostino, to solicit shipping merchants to take up military transport. State-sponsored *avvisi* from Vienna, for example, report the common sight of German and British officers at performances such as the handful of Austrian-Imperial cavalymen who watched a performance of *La caduta dei decemviri* in late 1701; a group of Hessian officers awaiting embarkation to Iberia who took in one of the first performances of *Turno Aricino* in October 1707; or the British Admiral John Jennings, who visited the city's opera while preparing to escort 2,444 men and 720 horses from Vado in November 1711.²⁴

20 BL, Add MS 61522, fol. 6r.

21 Martoccio, "The Place for such Business," table 1.

22 BL, Add MS 61526, fols. 54r–57r.

23 TNA, SP, 79/6, fols. 66r–67v.

24 BL, Add MS 61521, fols. 107r–108r; TNA, SP, 79/6, fols. 152r–153v; *Il Corriere ordinario: Av[v]isi italiani straordinarii* [CO], ed. Giovanni van Ghelen, 1–38 (Vienna 1701–14), Genoa, 19

Wherever they solicited Genoese captains, Allied diplomats, soldiers and naval officers actively competed with each other for the employment of Genoese shipping merchants, an unfortunate outcome of the broad, coalition warfare of the era. Exactly such a supply shortage plagued the July 1708 convoy mentioned above. Problems began when John Chetwynd and his Genoa-based brother, William, learned that Admiral Leake had failed to bring sufficient ships to transit the 5,800 Italian and German troops assembling at Vado. “The transports I brought with me are of several burthens, which I have computed will be sufficient to carry 1560 horses, more than which I could not procure, unless I had stayed a fortnight longer for the unloading of some merchant ships”, Leake wrote to Chetwynd from Vado in late May.²⁵ Worse still, agents of Albert van der Meer, the Dutch *commissaris* at Turin, had been renting out Genoese trading vessels all summer in anticipation of shipping his own part of the Palatinate cavalry. Austrian-Imperial diplomats had also been renting vessels in the city for a variety of other military purposes.²⁶ Thus, after Leake had sent his attaché J. Wardlaw to Genoa to recruit captains in early June, he was disappointed to learn that the Genoese at the exchange had “very unkindly refused to let their vessels, though otherwise unemployed” while others “demand double the freight that [had] been usually paid.”²⁷ Unable to find available transports in Genoa, Leake and the Chetwynds had to look further afield, employing merchants from Livorno, loading them up with supplies, and sending them over to Vado, an unexpected delay to the whole operation.²⁸ “We have no news yet of our transports from Livorno or yours from Genoa”, William Chetwynd wrote to his Dutch counterpart Van der Meer in early July, “so I am beginning to worry ... but I do not command the winds.”²⁹

Complicating matters further, the Chetwynds, van der Meer, and other Allied agents had to compete for the same Genoese ships with their Bourbon opponents, Bourbon-aligned *asientistas*, the Genoese state and, of course, private commercial firms. Despite the collapse of the Bourbon position in Italy,

November 1707, 26 October 1711, and 21 November 1711; Fausto Nicolini, *L'Europa durante la guerra di successione di spagna*, 3 (Naples, 1937), Doc. 819.

25 This letter is reprinted in Stephen Martin-Leake, *The Life of Sir John Leake, Rear-Admiral of Great Britain*, 2 (London, 1920), p. 225.

26 Stafford, UK, Staffordshire Record Office [SRO], Chetwynd of Ingestre MS [Chetwynd MS], D649.15, unfoliated, John Chetwynd to Leake, n.d. (May 1708); BL, Add MS 61526, fols. 190r–191r; BL, Add MS 61527, fols. 51r–52v.

27 Martin-Leake, *The Life of Sir John Leake*, 2, pp. 224–225, 232.

28 BL, Add MS 61519, fols. 65r, 70r, 71v.

29 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief [HANA], 1.02.03 (Van der Meer, 1690–1713), Reg. 54, unfoliated. I want to thank Jeannette Kamp and Loek Luiten for pointing out this source to me.

agents working directly for the French crown continued to hire Genoese merchant skippers to move troops alongside war supplies such as guns, gunpowder, and food for the Duke of Tursis. Most famously, in March 1710, Tursis, the Duke of Uceda (Juan Francisco Pacheco y Téllez-Girón), and the Marques de Lacoli (leader of the pro-Bourbon Sardis) hired a number of unnamed Genoese ships to assist in a covert invasion of the Allied-controlled island of Sardinia, a scheme made all the worse because a significant portion of the soldiers were in fact Corsican, Swiss and German soldiers only just demobilized from the Genoese army.³⁰ And while the invasion ended in disaster, the duke and his men returning to Genoa infirmed and distraught, the British pressed the Genoese to arrest the injured *asientista* and prevent him from hiring transporters in their city.³¹ “This government has pretensions to Her Majesties’ Favour as well as by the assistance we have given to the German Troops towards their embarkation on board the fleet and the readiness with which we complied with whatever was desired by the Commanders thereof”, the Genoese secretary of state replied angrily, reminding the Allies of the vital role his city played in military transportation and adding how, although the duke was their “fellow citizen”, “you know very well that he and his family have for so long a time been in the service of another Prince and that his employment has nothing to do with their being inhabitants of this city.”³²

Indeed, the sheer quantity of Genoese ships transporting soldiers for the various combatants around the *Riviera di Ponente* in these years threatened to breach the city’s neutrality and bring its merchants into open war with each other. In 1708, for example, four papal galleys accompanying Genoese transports from Avignon to support the papal campaign against Joseph I narrowly averted firing on two English men-of-war escorting a further four rented Genoese ships with 1,000 recruits for Barcelona only “because of the tranquillity (of the sea)” prevented them from catching up to their quarry.³³ An even more precarious moment occurred the following year when the Allies failed to find Genoese transports for Barcelona and nearly declared war on the republic. The conflict arose in spring 1709 when the Genoese government, fearing famine, hired the bulk of their trading vessels and sent them to Greece and the Levant in order to secure vital grain supplies. This order had serious consequences for

30 BL, Add MS 61522, fols. 171r–172r, 175r–v, 177r–178r, and 183r–184r; BL, Add MS 61523, fols. 208r–209r, 212r–213r, 214r–215r, 222r–223v, and 225r–v; TNA, SP, 79/3, fols. 38r–39v; TNA, SP, 79/5, fols. 54r–55v, 60r–v, and 70r–71v. See also Dellepiane, Piana, “Le leve corse,” p. 443.

31 TNA, SP, 79/5, fols. 54r–55v, 60r–v.

32 TNA, SP, 79/5, fols. 75r–76v.

33 BL, Add MS 61527, fols. 51r–52v.

TABLE 13.1 Ports of destination for Genoese *Navi di Guerra*, 1708–11

	Year			
	1708	1709	1710	1711
Atlantic Ports	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3,600 (3%)	0 (0%)
Adriatic Ports	1,300 (4%)	3,200 (3%)	3,225 (3%)	0 (0%)
Greece	11,850 (37%)	62,310 (66%)	28,675 (28%)	800 (3%)
Iberia & Balearics	8,400 (26%)	18,130 (19%)	42,930 (41%)	25,750 (88%)
France/Provence	0 (0%)	1,125 (1%)	1,700 (2%)	0 (0%)
Levant	0 (0%)	2,650 (3%)	3,350 (3%)	0 (0%)
North Africa	3,650 (12%)	2,425 (3%)	10,350 (10%)	1,850 (6%)
Tyrrhenian Ports	6,600 (21%)	4,450 (5%)	10,225 (10%)	1,000 (3%)
Totals Tonnage	31,800 (100%)	94,290 (100%)	104,055 (100%)	29,400 (100%)

SOURCE: ASG, CM, 406 (*VISITE DELLE NAVI DI GUERRA*).

Note: Ports of Destination included Atlantic Ports (Africa [Ambiguous], Amsterdam, Canary Islands, London), Adriatic Ports (Ancona, Ragusa, Venice), Greece (The Archipelago, Morea, Nafplion), Iberia & Balearics (Alicante, Barcelona, Cartagena, Lisbon, Malaga, Majorca, Port Mahon, Spanish Coast [Ambiguous]), France/Provence (Marseille, Nice), Levant (Gallipoli, Levant [Ambiguous], Smyrna/Izmir), North Africa (Bizerte, Tabarka, Tripoli, Tunis), Tyrrhenian Ports (Civitavecchia, Livorno, Naples, Sicily). Voyages for 1708 and 1711 do not record the entire year, but July-December 1708 and January-April 1711. Many ships occur multiple times in the records with some ships visiting multiple ports, which has been accounted for in the table. The records show 29 voyages for 1708, 70 in 1709, 104 in 1710, and 35 in 1711.

Allied military transportation. First, it drained the pool of available shipping merchants who worked routes to Iberia and other places needed for Allied military supply and transport. As shown in detail in the records of the *Magistrato dei Conservatori del Mare*, the Genoese office governing the registration and administration of its merchant fleet, 66 per cent of all Genoese state-funded trading vessels (*navi di guerra*) travelled to Greece in 1709, a dramatic increase compared to the previous year (see Table 13.1).

Second, the importation of vital foodstuffs to the city opened up opportunities for French intermediaries to smuggle grain, much of it on Genoese ships, to feed famine-ravaged Marseille and other places in Provence.³⁴ “The French did begin to buy up corn at this place and I find that they let none slip, a ship

34 Marcel Lachiver, *Les années misère: La famine au temps du grand roi, 1680–1720* (Paris, 1991); W. Gregory Monahan, *The Year of Sorrows: The Great Famine of 1709 in Lyon* (Columbus, Ohio, 1993).

being no sooner come into port, [then] they have her loading secured”, William Chetwynd observed, the diplomat offering up a variety of schemes to stop the smuggling from a blockade to withholding passports to Genoese ships in the Aegean to capital punishment for smugglers to even suggesting that the British employ an improvised fleet of Genoese felucca to attack other Genoese ships.³⁵ “When the Genoese see this ... they will be cautious how they proceed afterwards”, Chetwynd wrote to his superiors in November 1709, adding in a later letter that he had approached “some particular people here” about “their arming out upon their own account a good vessel or two to intercept the convoys as they go out ... provided I can procure them an authority from the admiralty to arm under English colours.”³⁶ While Chetwynd never provided the identity of these “particular people”, the very proposition that some Genoese would, for a price, take up arms against their countrymen in illicit French employ speaks to just how integrated the neutral city’s merchant shippers were into the war effort. Regardless of such schemes, French suppliers continued to “dispatch barks away every day” escorted by the Duke of Tursis’ galleys so that Chetwynd, exhausted, in December first implied that “force must be employed, not arguments” against the Genoese, only to abandon such strategies a few days later out of economic pragmatism: “if the war lasts, we shall be obliged to employ these people upon other occasions such as embarkations.”³⁷

Although little came of Chetwynd’s complaints in the end, the circumstances of the whole episode are worth reflection. A British agent had threatened war when he had been unable to employ Genoese merchants to ship out German-speaking troops to Spain because the neutral republic’s government had already employed these captains to bring grain to the city, some of whom then had taken up smuggling for the French supported by a Genoese *asientista*. The inherent complexity of the military transport-for-hire market made Allied agents at times try to avoid foreign hired help altogether and move troops on state-owned vessels. William Chetwynd, for instance, noted in October 1708 how British men-of-war would “save the Queen the expense of hiring transports”, even suggesting that a regiment of Grison foot soldiers bound for Barcelona later that year could serve makeshift marines providing “good service for the defence of her Majesties Ships.”³⁸ “My former orders from Lord Sunderland in relation to sending away recruits for Spain were to put them aboard the men-of-war at least so many as they will carry to save the expense of transports

35 BL, Add MS 61523, fols. 123r–124v, 125r–126v, 156r–158r, and 162r–164r.

36 BL, Add MS 61523, fols. 117r–120r, and 162r–164r.

37 BL, Add MS 61523, fols. 171r–172v, and 173r–174r.

38 BL, Add MS 61527, fols. 142r–143r, and 144r–145r.

as to avoid the danger of falling into the enemies hands”, John Chetwynd wrote Captain Byng later the following spring in preparation for the next round of troop transport, a proposal Byng sharply rejected because it would “be a prejudice to the service to take any recruits or small parcels of corn into the men-of-war.”³⁹

Further proposals for the use of state transports met with similar refusals, and as a consequence, the Chetwynds and other Allied agents hired a number of Genoese captains on short-term contracts. While to date I have been unable to discover one of these arrangements (such is the difficulty of examining what was admittedly a transitory, often one-time business), diplomatic correspondences reveal a good deal about their contents. We know, for instance, that transport-for-hire contracts specified the price of each soldier per-head; that they detailed how captains were to be compensated either through cash, bills of exchange, or other credit devices; and that they included routes and delivery times of troops, a necessity given that captains almost always returned from Catalonia with commercial freight. We know furthermore that this entire process became substantially more complicated when shipping cavalry. Horses required not only fodder, but purpose-built stables to hold them. A British government report made in 1707–08 calculated that, including food (oats, hay, biscuit, wine, pork, rice, beans, oil, and cheese) and stables, shipping a unit of 100 cavalymen from Genoa to Barcelona would cost 19 Genoese lire per man, but 165 lire per horse.⁴⁰ Moreover, building stables took time and energy, making the precise timing of convoys even more difficult while the extra time it took to load thousands of horses aboard could prove deadly to the animals, 42 dying in one ship in August 1712 as it lay off Vado.⁴¹ Faced with such stark propositions, John Chetwynd suggested in January 1708 that the British should simply hire Genoese cavalry transports on a permanent footing because he was unsure if he could “find vessels enough in these seas for the transport of all the horse at one time”, going on to explain that “making use of the same transports” would “save the expense of the stables.”⁴² Chetwynd’s advice was ignored, however, and for the remainder of the conflict the Allies only occasionally recruited cavalry transports, drawing on state-owned vessels out of British-controlled

39 SRO, Chetwynd MS, D649.15, unpaginated foils, John Chetwynd to Byng, 5 March 1709; John Chetwynd to Byng, 17 April 1709. Also, BL, Add MS 61523, fols. 89r–90r.

40 BL, Add. MS 6144, fol. 147r.

41 TNA, SP, 79/5, fols. 567r–v; TNA, SP, 79/6, fols. 258r–259r.

42 BL, Add MS 61526, fols. 171r–173r.

Port Mahon in 1711 and 1712 to move the bulk of their horses, an inefficient and costly policy.⁴³

Whether transiting people or animals, transport contracts contained specific dates for the duration of service in order to prevent “the masters of the transports cheating both the Queen and soldiers.”⁴⁴ “What is proper to be done about punishing the Masters of Transports for breach of Contract by not being ready to sail on the 12th inst. as stipulated?” John Chetwynd asked a certain Captain Butler when Genoese transports hired to transport a regiment of Grisons arrived past their November 1708 start date.⁴⁵ Anglo-Dutch contractors moreover had to be careful not to hire too many ships at Genoa nor contract transports too early in a campaign. “The admiral promised to let me have the convoy which I wait for with great impatience, having found the necessary transports for their embarkation, for which we must pay so much a day should not the Men-of-War arrive before the 17th of this month”, William Chetwynd worried in May 1709 in preparation for sending 2,278 Austrian-Imperial and Italian troops, adding three weeks later how, in the absence of a British convoy, his situation had turned even worse. “The transports I have hired are so much a day till [the convoy] arrives”, Chetwynd grumbled, “this does not a little vex me thou there is no avoiding it being obliged to fix a time if we will take up transports.”⁴⁶ Furthermore, it is clear that these agreements circulated around the broader information economy of Genoa, and deliberately contained falsehoods meant to hamper enemy intelligence. When Tursis, Uceda and Lacoli hired numerous Genoese barks for their failed Sardinian revolt in 1710, for example, the contracts (according to William Chetwynd who read them personally) specified that the ships were not to pass near Naples, Sicily or Sardinia, a ruse meant to “blind the designs they are doubtless on against the latter place [e.g., Sardinia].”⁴⁷ Finally, it is important to note that troop transportation did not necessarily imply employment as all the war’s belligerents at times forced Genoese shipping merchants to transport soldiers against their will. In March 1710, for instance, the Bourbon authorities in Sicily coerced two Genoese and two Venetian ships bound for the Levant to transport 600 soldiers, provisions and artillery to Porto Longone instead.⁴⁸

43 For an exception, see TNA, SP, 79/6, fols. 254r–v, 258r–259r, and 262r–v.

44 SRO, Chetwynd MS, SRO D649.15, unfoliated, John Chetwynd to James Brydges, 24 July 1708.

45 SRO, Chetwynd MS, SRO D649.15, unfoliated, John Chetwynd to Butler, 14 November 1708.

46 BL, Add MS 61523, fols. 97r–98r, 105r–106r.

47 BL, Add MS 61522, fols. 177r–178r. Also, BL, Add MS 61523, fols. 214r–215r.

48 BL, Add MS 61522, fols. 169r–170r.

We can better understand how this exchange between Allied agents and Genoese skippers might have worked in practice by looking closely at two remarkable documents. The first is a report issued by the British government concerning Mediterranean military contractors near the war's end. Following the crushing Tory parliamentary victory in the 1710 general election, the new government aimed to shine a light on the malfeasance of the previous Whig government by appointing three commissioners on 24 October 1711 – Sir Henry Belasyse (1648–1717), Edward Stawell (1685–1755), and Andrew Archer (1659–1741) – to “enquire into the number and quality of Her Majesty’s forces in Spain & Portugal and to examine the accounts relating to the said Forces and of the Garrisons of Gibraltar and Port Mahon.”⁴⁹ The report was pure partisan politics, with the commissioners discovering all manner of financial improprieties. German troops in the pay of Savoy had disappeared following their payment. Exchange rates paid by the British government had vastly undervalued government-issued bills of exchange. Undertakers for the fortifications of Port Mahon had failed to properly make lime, ditches, doors, windows, and casements. And doctors at Gibraltar had received sub-standard medical supplies. Yet in spite of its manifest biases, the commission offers an excellent depiction of a war effort sustained by contractors (and, for that matter, sub-contractors). Even the commissioners themselves relied on local intermediaries; the trio deposed Majorcan hospital workers through hired translators and asked brokers in Genoa for staple commodity prices to determine if their government had been overcharged.

Among those investigated were the Chetwynd brothers, John in Turin and William in Genoa, who the commissioners ordered to produce all “original contracts & vouchers” in order to determine “whether the stores, mules, oxen, carriages, corn etc. [had] been actually provided pursuant the contracts and at the prices usually allowed in that country in the summer season.” The resultant report tells us a number of things about the inner workings of the brothers’ military transport-for-hire operations at Genoa. For one, it makes clear that the Chetwynds relied on an intermediary, Joseph Boüer, “a person whom Mr. Chetwynd [had] employed” who charged “4 percent for his commission, upon almost all the expenses for these several imbarcations, except for the provisions put on board the ships.” Boüer was a well-known Allied contractor. A merchant, Huguenot, and former British consul at Nice, Boüer had

49 Two identical versions exist of this document. TNA, SP, 109/1, fols. 41r–47r and TNA, T, 1/148, fols. 4r–9v. A further printed copy of parts of the commissioners’ report was published in 1728 following the siege of Gibraltar the previous year, although the report of the Genoese transports was omitted. *The Report of the Commissioners sent into Spain ...* (London, 1728).

been employed by William Chetwynd for victualling and hiring Allied troop transports to Spain back in 1707 including the procurement of “transports with what corn and provisions [we] shall want.”⁵⁰ Despite nearly a half-decade of work for the Allies, the picture the commissioners painted of Boüer in 1711 was unflattering. Belasyse, Stawell, and Archer deposed anyone they could find in an effort to demonstrate the former consul’s supposed incompetence. “The bread was not worth eating being black & rotten ... the beef was very bad ... the wine was part good and part bad mixed ... the rice was tolerably good” noted a certain Robert Sanders, a sailor on a recently arrived British transport supplied by Boüer. Finding a number of stables that had been purpose-built onboard ships from previous embarkations, the commissioners hired local carpenters to assess their quality, determining Boüer had overcharged the British government as “they might be very well bought for 12 lyres per stable whereas he charges 24 lyres each.” Yet reading between the lines, the commission suggests how Genoese captains fit military transport-for-hire into their general business networks. In writing up their partisan screed against Boüer, the commissioners noted that, while before 1709 transporters had to provide food and supplies for the troops aboard on their own accounts, now Boüer put these costs onto Chetwynd’s account and “charged the Queen with 726 livres for barrells and other necessaries, for which there is no receipt” and further raised the price per man for freighting them from 18 to 19 livres per man. Most importantly, the commissioners noted how Boüer had finagled into the terms of his contract the right to transport 250 *mine* of corn in addition to “as much other merchandise as Mr. Boüer should put on board and the shippes could carry *gratis*” demonstrating clearly just how Genoese captains could merge military transport into their normal business networks.

3 The Convoy of December 1707: A Case Study

Unfortunately, the commissioners interviewed none of the captains Chetwynd and Boüer hired, so we cannot know what “other merchandise”, *gratis* or otherwise, these ships carried. To get some sense of how military transport fit into existing business networks, we have to turn instead to our second text of note: one of the few surviving embarkation rolls of an Allied convoy from Vado to Barcelona in late 1707. Patterned on a troop muster and replicated in its original form in Tables 13.2 and 13.3, two copies of this three-page document survive owing to the complex political economy of the Grand Alliance whereby British

50 BL, Add MS 61526, fols. 183r–185v.

TABLE 13.2 British & Dutch ships and captains for December 1707 embarkation

Commander's Name	The Ship's Names	Numbers of the heads appointed to be carried as given in by their general	Souldiers put on board of each ship with their officers included	Number of the women put on board of each ship	Number of the children put on board each ship
John Hubbard	<i>Elizabeth</i>	100	104	1	----
Robert Wyne	<i>Norfolke</i>	100	106	----	----
Francis Dove	<i>Starling Castle</i>	100	102	1	----
Thomas Bucklar	<i>Warspight</i>	80	103	2	----
... Hughes	<i>Winchester</i>	80	64	5	1
Joseph Taylor	<i>Tryton</i>	50	38	----	----
... Jackson	<i>Surloings</i>	50	----	----	----
Philip Stanhope	<i>Milford</i>	40	43	----	----
Henry Hammond	<i>Antelope</i>	300	289	44	29
Jacob Sanders	<i>Smyrna Factor Hosp.</i>	240	261	37	17
Joseph Bumsted	<i>Mathews Hospital</i>	250	235	30	15
Thomas Robertson	<i>Jeffreys Hospital</i>	300	298	38	11
Ambrose Laurence	<i>Yarmouth Fregat</i>	270	233	30	16
William Long	<i>Charity</i>	110	54	10	1
Ralph Robinson	<i>Priscilla</i>	180	150	20	12
John Ayres	<i>Hopewell</i>	100	79	11	8
John Thomas	<i>Ann Galley</i>	100	84	19	9

William Dunkean	<i>Friends Goodwill</i>	110	93	15	12
Samuel Ingram	<i>Lisbon Factor</i>	40	40	----	----
John Alkins	<i>Samuel & Anne</i>	150	139	22	8
Richard Hammond	<i>Blessing</i>	70	29	9	6
Samuel Brookes	<i>Samuel</i>	180	119	24	7
William Erle	<i>Phoenix</i>	180	150	22	4
Richard Daniel	<i>Amiable</i>	160	127	26	11
James Gillery	<i>William & Barbary</i>	160	138	24	14
Edward Constant	<i>Constant True Love</i>	90	85	16	8
William Abbet	<i>Providence</i>	120	69	9	----
Robert Taylor	<i>Prosperous</i>	80	70	11	4
John Burford	<i>Queen</i>	80	69	11	7
Robert Spilman	<i>Delight</i>	38	38	----	----
James Gother	<i>Maidstone</i>	100	89	14	11
John Buckler	<i>Swan Frigate</i>	140	84	16	8
Thomas Wales	<i>Mary & Margaret</i>	70	40	----	----
Thomas Childistone	<i>Barcelona</i>	140	70	13	4
Thomas Bandinel	<i>Anna</i>	100	79	13	7
Dutch Men of War Viz	<i>Wasemaer</i>	100	100	----	----
	<i>Veer</i>	80	80	----	----
<i>Summa Totalis of each Column</i>		4640	3911	493	230

TABLE 13.3 Short-term transport ships and captains for December 1707 embarkation

Commander's Names	The Transport Ship's as they are named	The Number of the heads were fraughted for carrie by the undertakers	The Number of the heads they were judged only able to carrie by the Commander
G. Lorenzo Bigheri	<i>Grand Madre di Dio</i>	380	340
Giuseppe Clausel	<i>Barca S. Pietro (or Il S. Christo)</i>	160	140
Francesco Decotto	<i>N. S. del Carminé e S. Niccolò</i>	350	320
Fran. Maria Rapallo	<i>S. Chiara</i>	350	320
Christian Dopft	<i>Il Ré Giulelmo</i>	150	150
Valentino Mingotti	<i>Gli Due Fratelli</i>	200	200
Gio. Battista Merizano	<i>Trionfo di Gloria</i>	200	200
Fran. Maria Grecco	<i>Nostra Signora Rosario</i>	115	115
G. Battista Calcagno	<i>S. Maria Maddalena</i>	400	370
G. Antonio Ferro	<i>S. Antonio di Padova e S. Bonaventura</i>	350	330
Damiano Tixe	<i>S. Orsola</i>	210	210
P. Battista Amerigo	<i>Gallera S. Pietro</i>	140	106
Summ Totall of the Columns		3305	3051

SOURCE: BL, ADD MS 61526, FOLS. 154R, 158R, AND 160R; HANA, 1.02.03, REG. 54, UNFOLIATED.

Note: Two versions of this document exist with minor numerical and spelling differences. I have tried to provide the more accurate spelling of each name and maintain the format of the original document.

The number of the heads on board according to the signed list of the Collonel

The number of Persons as reviewed on board of each ship by her Majet's envoy according to their quality

	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Souldiers</i>	<i>Servants</i>	<i>Wives</i>	<i>Children</i>	<i>Totals</i>
340	8	300	10	8	3	329
140	6	115	12	6	1	140
320	10	260	15	10	7	302
307	9	260	12	6	4	291
150	5	135	5	3	2	150
200	10	160	12	7	5	194
196	7	160	7	6	1	181
115	6	90	6	8	—	110
370	15	289	8	7	5	324
330	19	300	4	16	6	345
210	15	200	5	10	6	236
95	—	80	—	—	—	80
3023	125	2544	85	103	50	2927

and Dutch officials back in London/Amsterdam, in order to prevent cost overruns for the Austrian-Imperial and German subsidized troops they shipped to Catalonia, required either John or William Chetwynd (or one of their subordinates) to account for each person (soldier, officer, dependent) in each convoy as they left the care of Austrian-Imperial paymasters and stepped aboard ship into the pay of the British and Dutch.⁵¹ As such, the embarkation roll provides not so much an accurate picture of all the transporters Allied agents hired at Genoa, but those who actually departed on time from Vado. In fact, the flotilla left behind at least two ships of a certain captain Bollino and Levanto, who the Austrian-Imperial ambassador Carlo Bartolomeo Molinari had contracted to ferry French prisoners to Spain only for six of the captured men to overpower Bollino, hijack his vessel, set ashore in Monaco and force the two ships to miss the convoy entirely, leaving Molinari with the bill for services not rendered.⁵² Nor does the record include cavalry transports because, as John Chetwynd noted, “there are no vessells to be had here, or at Leghorn fit for our service”, meaning these troops had to be sent at a later date.⁵³

Nevertheless, this flotilla offers a microcosm of the recruitment, contracting, and politics of short-term military transport.⁵⁴ What is immediately obvious is the stark difference between state transports and hired ones. John Chetwynd, who did the accounting, divided the document between state and contracted vessels, with 35 English and two Dutch ships – some men-of-war like the Dutch vessels *Wasenaer* and *Veer*, others hastily-refitted frigates (*Yarmouth*, *Norffolke*, *Winchester*, *Milford*) or hospitals (*Jeffreys*, *Mathews*, *Smyrna Factor*) – carrying 4,634 Palatinate infantry, while twelve contractors carried the 2,927 Austrian and Italian infantry of the regiments of Raventelau and Bomezana, respectively. A close look at these dozen contracted ships suggests their captains had a range of motivations for taking on military transport-for-hire. Seven were Genoese, their ships registered with the Magistracy of the *Conservatori del Mare*, the office with jurisdiction over maritime issues. These

51 See generally Caleb Karges, “The Logistics of the Allied War Effort in the Mediterranean,” in *Der Spanische Erbfolgekrieg (1701–1714) und seine Auswirkungen*, eds. Katharina Arnegger et al. (Vienna, 2019), 95–118; and idem, “Britain, Austria, and the ‘Burden of War’ in the Western Mediterranean, 1703–1708,” *International Journal of Military History and Historiography* 39 (2019), 8–32.

52 BL, Add MS 61521, fols. 140r–141r. Vienna, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv [ÖStA], Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv [HHStA], Staatenabteilungen [StAbt], Italienische Staaten, Genua, Reg. 1, Berichte des Gesandten Comte Karl Molinari v. Genua v. König Karl III. (1707–1710), fols. 75r–78v. I would like to thank Katalin Pataki for drawing my attention to this source.

53 BL, Add MS 61526, fols. 122r–124r.

54 BL, Add MS 61526, fols. 154r, 156r, 158r, and 160r.

records show that most of the merchant shippers operated as representatives of larger commercial firms and joint partnerships. While Giovanni Antonio Ferro owned the *San Antonio di Padova e San Bonaventura* outright, the *Gallera San Pietro* listed one co-owner, the *Trionfo di Gloria* two, the *Santa Chiara* four, and the *Nostra Signora del Carmine e S. Niccolò* ten including relatives of its captain Francesco Decotto in addition to Frà Nicolò Bonaventura Lomellino, a scion of the powerful Lomellini family and *ammiraglio* of the Knights of Malta.⁵⁵ Investors also came from outside Genoa; just months before transiting the troops, Giovanni Antonio Ferro (*San Antonio di Padova e San Bonaventura*) had been involved in a series of legal disputes with Tuscan investors adjudicated by the Pisan *Magistrato Consolare* (Sea Consulate).⁵⁶ Other records furthermore point towards these captains' broader commercial and social world. Damiano Tixe (*Santa Orsola*) and Giovanni Battista Calcagno (*Santa Maria Maddalena*) both hailed from the Ligurian town of Arenzano and had been among a handful of grandees who donated a new roof to the town's parish church in 1703.⁵⁷ Surviving maritime insurance claims in addition show that the *Santa Chiara*, *Nostra Signora del Carmine*, and *San Antonio di Padova e San Bonaventura* worked the routes to Catalonia earlier in the decade. In fact, just four years before taking employment with the British, Giovanni Antonio Ferro had lost his entire cargo (and thus filed an insurance claim) when two British ships seized the *San Antonio di Padova e San Bonaventura* enroute from Marseille to Amsterdam (by way of Barcelona) and imprisoned Ferro briefly.⁵⁸ The remaining ships are more difficult to track. I have found no records for captains Grecco (*Nostra Signora Rosario*) and Bigheri (*Grand Madre di Dio*), while the two extant copies of the muster roll cannot even agree on the ship Giuseppe Clausel sailed, listing it as either the *Barca San Pietro* or *Il Santo Christo*. Among the remaining contractors, the picture is of a motley mix. The Dutch captain Christian Dopf (*Ré Giulelmo/Guglielmo*) was a privateer based out of Livorno

55 ASG, *Giunta di Marina*, filze 15, 16; ASG, *Conservatori del mare* [CM], filza 434. See also Luciana Gatti, *Navi e cantieri della Repubblica di Genova (secoli XVI–XVIII)* (Genoa, 1999), pp. 387, 388, and 391. On Lomellini see Cesare Cattaneo Mallone di Novi, *Gli hospitalieri di San Giovanni a Genova* (Genoa, 1994), pp. 175–177.

56 *Delle assicurazioni marittime trattato del Cavaliere Ascanio Baldasseroni* (Florence, 1803), p. 217.

57 *Catalogo dell'esposizione in occasione della Marcia Internazionale* (n.p., 2008), p. 13. Available at https://www.arenzanotracioloemare.it/IMMAGINI/2008_09_13_MOSTRA_SEC-OLO_DEI_RE/SecoloRe.pdf.

58 ASG, CM, Atti Civili, 125, Case # 282 & 302; ASG, CM, Atti Civili, 135, Case # 223. I want to thank the *Average-Transaction Costs and Risk Management* group at the University of Exeter as well as Andrea Zappia for bringing these sources to my attention.

who had seized a French tartan loaded with grain in May 1705 and another French ship later that August with cargo valued at 80,000 reales.⁵⁹ Conversely, Valentino Mingotti (*Gli Due Fratelli*) worked in the bulk freight business having arrived in Genoa just a few weeks before December 1707 carrying a cargo of high-quality molluscs from Venice, and, upon his return from Spain, leaving for Smirna and coming back in late January with a large cargo of fish.⁶⁰

Whether Mingotti felt that transporting soldiers differed little from seafood is not clear, but what is obvious is that all these captains took on military transport duty only temporarily and in full expectation of returning from Catalonia or elsewhere with commercial goods. We know Catalonia was to be the convoy's first (and, as it related to the transporters, only) destination precisely because the ships did not follow that course. Rather, on the insistence of Archduke Charles (the Allied candidate for the Spanish throne), the fleet detoured in an ultimately worthless attempt to drum up support for an anti-Bourbon revolt on Sardinia, thus violating the terms of the transporters' contracts. "Their contracts being made to go straight for Barcelona ... I hope your lordship will be pleased to send the Queen's orders to authorize my joining with my Dutch friend in the necessary expense for the satisfying of those people", William Chetwynd wrote Lord Sunderland in March 1708.⁶¹ Evidently, his request was granted, and a number of the captains continued to contribute to the Allied war effort for years to come. After transporting troops to Spain that December, Francesco Decotto (*Nostra Signora del Carmine e S. Niccolò*) journeyed to Sicily and the Morea repeatedly over the next two years (presumably to buy the aforementioned grain during the famine year of 1709) before heading back to British-controlled Port Mahon in January 1711, a pattern Francesco Maria Rapallo (*Santa Chiara*) and Damiano Tixe (*Santa Orsola*) followed as well, returning to Spain in 1710–11 after a year of working the route to Greece.⁶² So, too, did Giovanni Battista Merizano (*Trionfo di Gloria*) first return to Spain eight months after shipping troops there, then move grain from Greece and Naples after that in 1709 before travelling to London in April 1710, presumably due to connections he made two-and-a-half years earlier.⁶³ Again, the larger aggregate picture of Genoese state-sponsored trade revealed in the records of

59 CO, Genoa, 13 May 1705, 2 August 1705; CO, Livorno, 7 August 1705.

60 ASG, *Giunta della Marina*, 34, unfoliated, *Reperitur in libro orientali*. ...

61 BL, Add MS 61526, fols. 225r–226v.

62 ASG, CM, filza 406, unfoliated, 17 October 1708, 29 November 1708, 28 June 1709, 14 July 1709, 21 August 1709, 14 November 1709, 21 January 1710, 4 June 1710, 19 August 1710, 14 January 1711, and 27 February 1711.

63 ASG, CM, filza 406, unfoliated, 27 August 1708, 3 April 1709, 9 August 1709, 31 August 1709, and 16 April 1710.

the *Magistrato dei Conservatori del Mare* (Table 13.1) points towards the intense integration of Genoese merchant shipping into the Allied war-machine, with 88 per cent of Genoese *navi di guerra* travelling to Iberia in the first quarter of 1711.

In the end, the degree to which Merizano, Rapallo, Decotto and others considered military transport an essential part of their business is not yet clear. What is obvious, however, is that by 1712 the Chetwynds had built a long list of contacts in Genoa and gained significant knowledge about the transportation of soldiers to Catalonia. Their built-up expertise and networks were laid bare in March 1712 when the British ceased providing funds for the transport of further Austrian-Imperial troops to Spain and forced the Austrians to hire transports on their own. Perplexed at the whole process, the Duke of Uceda (who had defected to the Austrian-Imperial camp two years earlier and now was tasked with fighting a losing effort in Catalonia) sought William Chetwynd's advice on how to coordinate the embarkation of 6,000 Austrian-Imperial troops from Vado. "[The duke] made to get information both of the persons I employed and myself of the methods taken to subsist the soldiers and made me fancy he may have direction to provide the necessaries in case I refused to take it upon me", Chetwynd wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth, adding how he feared that the duke, "being unacquainted with the usual methods", lacked the skill needed to synchronize Anglo-Dutch warships, Genoese transports, and German-speaking troops.⁶⁴ Chetwynd was right; the duke botched the whole operation, ordering a dozen smaller ships at Genoa and a pair of *navi di guerra* to ferry the soldiers, missing his Anglo-Dutch escort multiple times, and nearly sparking a mutiny among the soldiers stranded at Vado, all of which contributed to the deteriorating situation in Catalonia and hastened the end of the war the next year.⁶⁵

Yet even peace – and the inevitable movement around the Mediterranean of soldiers and sailors that followed – offered Genoese captains ample military transport opportunities. On the Allied side, within days of the signing of the Peace of Utrecht (April 1713), William Chetwynd sought to "rent all the ships that he could to be able to send them to Catalonia" to evacuate the remaining German troops, hiring dozens of Genoese ships to ferry over 15,500 soldiers from Spain over the next few months, 11,000 of which landed at Sampierdarena just outside Genoa.⁶⁶ On the Bourbon side in 1713, the victorious Philip V signed an *asiento* with the Genoese nobleman Stefano de Mari, who would replace the Duke of Tursis after the latter's fall from favour in 1715 and

64 TNA, SP, 79/5, fols. 513r–514r, 529r.

65 TNA, SP, 79/5, fols. 544r–545v; TNA, SP, 79/6, fols. 217r–218v.

66 TNA, SP, 79/7, fols. 44r–45r; Martoccio, "The Place for such Business," table 1.

remain in Spanish service until the 1730s.⁶⁷ Following closely the policies of his soon-to-be-predecessor, in late 1713 de Mari sub-contracted a trio of Genoese captains (Paolo Luigetti, Pietro Maria Boero, and either Niccolò or Giovanni Battista Burlando) to join with French men-of-war out of Toulon and escort Bourbon soldiers from Sicily to Barcelona only for these captains to be delayed at Genoa after their crews, manned by “English and other nations”, deserted “after having received their pay.”⁶⁸ As Genoese ships sailed Bourbon troops out of Sicily (handed over to Victor Amadeus II at the Peace of Utrecht), others sailed Allied ones in. Gian Giacomo Fontana, a Savoyard official, contracted transports at Genoa to ferry the duke, his soldiers and his baggage to his coronation in Palermo in late 1713.⁶⁹ Throughout, Genoese merchant ships moved smaller groups of soldiers on short-term contracts like an unnamed Genoese ship that carried 700 Bourbon soldiers from Alicante to Porto Longone in April 1713, or that which was blown off course while transporting 150 Spanish troops from Sicily on their way to Barcelona in December of that year, or another three Genoese ships hired to ship out an Austrian-Imperial regiment (including 339 women and children) from Milan to Sardinia the following spring.⁷⁰

Indeed, for the rest of the century, Genoese shipping merchants continued to serve a vital role in military transport both voluntarily and involuntarily, taking part in the Spanish expedition to Oran (1732) as well as the Second Moroccan War (1714–18) and the wars of the Quadruple Alliance (1718–20), Polish

67 Guido Candiani, “Navi per la nuova marina della Spagna borbónica: L’assiento di Stefano de Mari (1713–1716),” *Mediterranea: Ricerche storiche* 12 (2015), 107–146; Christopher Storrs, *The Spanish Resurgence, 1713–1748* (New Haven, 2012), p. 85.

68 TNA, SP, 79/7, fols. 93r–v, 94r, 117r–v, 119r, and 129r–v; CO, Genoa, 2 December 1713, 20 January 1714, 27 January 1714, and 3 February 1714. The *avviso* lists these men as “Luigetti, Buiro, and Bursando”, unfortunately omitting their given names and ship names. Yet there is strong evidence to believe that these captains were in fact Paolo Luigetti, Pietro Maria Boero and either Niccolò or Giovanni Battista Burlando as all four sailed in 1708–11 as Genoese *navi di guerra*. ASG, CM, 406, unfoliated, 27 August 1708, 16 November 1708, 21 January 1709, 28 February 1709, 5 March 1709, 31 May 1709, 7 August 1709, 9 August 1709, 6 February 1710, 12 March 1710, 4 June 1710, 12 November 1710, 22 December 1710, and 10 April 1711. Within a year, both Boero and Burlando took employment with the Knights of Malta to fight the Ottomans. Paolo Giacomone Piana, “La squadra del commendatore de Langon: Cavalieri di Malta su vascelli genovesi nella Guerra di Corfu (1716),” in *Riviera di Levante tra Emilia e Toscana: Un crocevia per l’Ordine di San Giovanni*, ed. Josepha Costa Restagno (Genoa, 2001), 231–278, pp. 247–248. On the delay see CO, Genoa, 20 January 1714. Also TNA, SP, 79/7, fol. 119r.

69 TNA, SP, 79/7, fols. 80r, 85r–v, and 87r–v; TNA, SP, 92/27, fol. 619r; CO, Genoa, 5 August 1713, 30 September 1713.

70 TNA, SP, 79/7, fols. 134r, 135r; CO, Genoa, 15 April 1713, 16 December 1713, 17 March 1714, 23 March 1714, 24 March 1714, and 28 April 1714.

Succession (1733–35) and Austrian Succession (1740–48).⁷¹ 35 Genoese ships joined a flotilla of 462 vessels carrying over 30,000 men for Philip V's invasion of Sicily in 1718, while the Spanish hired a number of Genoese trading vessels to assist in the evacuation from Tuscany to Barcelona of the bulk of the Spanish army in 1737.⁷² Remarking on how the Spanish planned to pay these captains in 1737, the British consul in Barcelona William Winder noted the government wished to entangle the Genoese skippers into longer forms of employment by offering them remunerations of “one third in money, or good Bills on Madrid, and, the other two thirds in *Cartas de pago* [letters of payment] on the *Cadastre* of the country [the Spanish single tax], which won't be recoverable for some months”, while his counterpart in Madrid, Benjamin Keene, added a bit more bluntly how the merchants ships would perhaps be “detained in this service [e.g. coerced] ... in order to change the garrisons in Africa, and disperse the supernumerary troops in Catalonia” despite their contracts lapsing.⁷³ Again, even the ends of wars brought opportunities for military transportation.

4 Conclusions

Scholars have argued that the 18th century was when the state – either directly through bureaucratic forms or indirectly through state-funded, private military contractors – finally took over military employment, finance, supply and transportation, while a rich body of scholarship over the last two decades has made clear the various ways individual entrepreneurs entangled themselves into the business of war despite swings in state demand. This study shifts our attention away from permanent/semi-permanent contractors towards more temporary forms of war-work exemplified through Genoese military transporters. As consuls Winder and Keene hinted at, military transports-for-hire fell along a continuum between the purely coercive and the purely commercial as captains like Francesco Decotto, Giovanni Battista Merizano, Valentino Mingotti, Paolo Luigetti and others moved soldiers with varying degrees of ease along (and occasional outside of) existing commercial routes. Along the way, these men entangled themselves into a strikingly wide variety of employment relationships: as Genoese subjects feeding their nearly-starved city; as French-employed smugglers working (at least on paper) against the republic's wishes; as temporary, private employees moving German-speaking troops

71 Storrs, *The Spanish Resurgence*, p. 71.

72 TNA, SP, 89/26, fol. 49.

73 TNA, SP, 94/127, fols. 24v, 32v.

alongside of and escorted by Dutch and English vessels; and as sub-contractors working at the behest of more permanent Genoese *asientisti* like the duke of Tursis and the marquis de Mari.

It is an unfortunate fact that short of finding the records of one of these firms, we are left with seeing transporters through the eyes of the states that employed them: through Anglo-Dutch muster rolls, Genoese reimbursement schemes, Austrian-Imperial state-approved *avvisi*, French navy contracts, British parliamentary investigations, and other state sources. For this reason, this essay's findings for now remain more suggestive than definitive. Nevertheless, they open up provocative questions about patterns of socialization and business organization of military enterprise. If, as many have argued, early modern maritime business relied first and foremost on intimate social ties, did military transporters-for-hire build trust and rapport with employers without long-term bonds or were the men Chetwynd hired in 1707 already enmeshed in existing networks yet to be discovered?⁷⁴ If, rather than individuals, Genoa's captains worked as representatives of established merchant houses and large partnerships, could such diffuse networks anticipate and price-in military transport to their expected profits, and, if so, what can this tell us about the larger history of the relationship between war and pre-modern capitalism?⁷⁵

Whatever the answers to these questions, the labour fluidity of Genoa's military transporters is an important reminder that when it comes to pre-modern employment, "the notion of occupation was understood differently than it is today, a distinction often lost in long-termism."⁷⁶ In their military-transport work, Genoese captains defy stable, modern categories like 'state employee', 'privateer', 'smuggler', 'contractor', '*asientista*' or, indeed, 'military entrepreneur'.⁷⁷

74 Francesco Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period* (New Haven, 2009).

75 Oscar Gelderblom, Francesca Trivellato, "The Business History of the Preindustrial World: Towards a Comparative Historical Analysis," *Business History* 61:2 (2019), 225–259; Maria Fusaro, "The Burden of Risk: Early Modern Maritime Enterprise and Varieties of Capitalism," *Business History Review* 94:1 (2020), pp. 179–200.

76 William Caferro, *Petrarch's War: Florence and the Black Death in Context* (Cambridge, 2018), p. 180.

77 This paper draws on research conducted for the project "The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870," which is funded by the European Research Council [ERC] under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 787504). Further details available at <https://fiscalmilitary.history.ox.ac.uk/home#/>.

Military Money Men: The Toils of Entanglement and the Business Model of Harley & Drummond, Remittance Contractors

Tim Neu

During the long 18th century, preparing for and making war was probably the single most challenging activity European states were engaged in: In order to defend and expand empires in a rapidly globalizing world, it was not only necessary to continuously increase land and naval power, but also to be able to project this power simultaneously to more and ever more remote places around the globe.¹ Shipping forces to theatres of war abroad was difficult enough, but every such deployment also meant establishing and maintaining flows of men, money, and military goods. As recent research has shown, one important response to this enormous logistical problem was the ‘contractor state’, in which military entrepreneurs played a vital part in the creation of these military entanglements via different “systems of contracting, through which the state mobilized the resources of the private sector to achieve strategic ends”.²

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- 1 See Linda Colley, *The Gun, the Ship, and the Pen: Warfare, Constitutions, and the Making of the Modern World* (New York, 2021), pp. 25–35, especially pp. 33–34: “Engaging in and sustaining the business of large-scale hybrid warfare – not just *more* wars, but *changing qualities* of wars – indulging in this mode of conflict repeatedly, and making provision for the large numbers of men and machines that very necessarily involved, put those Western powers most deeply invested in these modes of warfare under extreme levels of stress.” See also the classic argument in Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), and the evidence for the English/British case in John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (London, 1989), pp. 23–63.
 - 2 Roger Knight, Martin Wilcox, “War, Government and the Market: The Direction of the Debate on the British Contractor State, c. 1740–1815,” in *The Contractor State and Its Implications, 1659–1815*, eds. Richard Harding, Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012), 175–198, p. 175. See also Roger Knight, Martin Wilcox, *Sustaining the Fleet, 1793–1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State* (Woodbridge, 2010); *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden, 2014); *Söldnerlandschaften: Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Benjamin Hitz (Berlin, 2014); Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 2016); *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen*

Some of these military entrepreneurs specialized in transferring money from the imperial centres to remote frontiers. Holding such ‘remittance contracts’ turned out to be extremely profitable. This appears quite puzzling, because looking at the practice of military supply contractors, it is easy to imagine the problems involved in purchasing, storing, assembling, shipping, and distributing huge amounts of sometimes perishable goods like food, clothing, and ammunition on a global scale.³ The transfer of money, one might assume, did not pose comparable challenges to the transport of people and goods. Or as Georg Simmel put it in his seminal *Philosophy of Money*: “[O]wing to the abstractness of its form, money has no definite relationship to space; it can exercise its effects upon the most remote areas.”⁴

This view, however, is far too modernistic and therefore, as I will argue in this study, not helpful for understanding the business model of early modern remittance contractors. If anything, purchasing power was typically very concrete in early modern times: bound up in situated bodies and things.⁵ Therefore, to establish fiscal-military entanglements on an imperial scale, which in most cases meant across oceans, money had to be *made* abstract and mobile in the first place – and that is what remittance contractors were actually paid for. Having pointed to this conceptual problem regarding money, I will then focus on the ‘toils of entanglement’: on the problem-ridden and laborious enactment of money flows within the British Empire. This is done by looking beyond the bureaucratic framework of contracts and declared accounts to the everyday social practice of remittance contractors. On this basis, I then turn finally to the underlying business model and to the question of what opportunities remittance contracts offered for generating additional profit. As an example, I use the firm of Harley & Drummond, which supplied the British troops in North America with money from 1769 to 1783.

Kontext, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018); Rafael Torres Sánchez, Pepijn Brandon, and Marjolein ‘t Hart, “War and Economy: Rediscovering the Eighteenth-Century Military Entrepreneur,” *Business History* 60:1 (2018), 4–22 (introducing a special issue on the “Business of War”); Pepijn Brandon, Sergio Solbes Ferri, and Iván Valdez-Bubnov, “Introduction,” *War & Society* 40 (2021), 1–8 (introducing a special issue on “Mobilising Resources for the Army and Navy in the Eighteenth-Century Spanish Empire: Comparative, Trans-national and Imperial Dimensions”).

3 See, e.g., the case studies in Gordon E. Bannerman, “A Domestic Contractor: John Willan,” in *Merchants and the Military in Eighteenth-Century Britain: British Army Contracts and Domestic Supply, 1739–1763* (London, 2008), pp. 89–102; Knight, Wilcox, “Basil Cochrane and the Victualling of the Fleet in the East Indies, 1792–1806,” in *Sustaining the Fleet*, pp. 155–176.

4 Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money* (Abingdon, 2011), p. 547.

5 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Spang, *Stuff and Money in the Time of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 2015), p. 274; Tim Neu, “Geld gebrauchen: Frühneuzeitliche Finanz-, Kredit- und Geldgeschichte in praxeologischer Perspektive,” *Historische Anthropologie* 27:1 (2019), 75–103.

1 Moving Money

It is by no means unusual to analyse early modern state formation, including war and imperial expansion, in terms of the intertwining of military and fiscal aspects: On the contrary, the very term ‘fiscal-military state’ was coined by John Brewer more than 25 years ago.⁶ While research initially concentrated on the revenue side, i.e. on the question of how the funds needed for military purposes were raised through the expansion of taxation and public debt,⁷ the focus then increasingly shifted to the expenditure side, and it became clear that private entrepreneurs operating in transnational markets were of decisive importance here. Enter the contractor state.⁸

Amidst this increased interest in the *Spending of States*,⁹ research on the providers of financial services also intensified: among them brokers, military solicitors, and remittance contractors.¹⁰ But why bother with these (semi-)

6 See Brewer, *Sinews of Power*; see also idem, “Revisiting “The Sinews of Power,” in *The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660-c.1783*, eds. Aaron Graham, Patrick Walsh (Oxford, 2016), 27–34; *War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Rafael Torres Sánchez (Pamplona, 2007); *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Honour of P.G.M. Dickson*, ed. Christopher Storrs (Farnham, Surrey, 2009); and the website of the research project “The European Fiscal-Military System 1530–1870”, led by Peter Wilson, which, among other things, offers an invaluable bibliography on the topic (<https://fiscalmilitary.history.ox.ac.uk/home>).

7 See, in addition to Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, the seminal works of Peter G.M. Dickson, *The Financial Revolution in England: A Study of the Development of Public Credit, 1688–1756* (London, 1967); D.W. Jones, *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough* (Oxford, 1988); Patrick K. O’Brien, “The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660–1815,” *Economic History Review* 41 (1988), 1–32; see also *Money, Power, and Print: Interdisciplinary Studies on the Financial Revolution in the British Isles*, eds. Charles I. McGrath, Chris Fauske (Newark, 2008); *The Empire of Credit: The Financial Revolution in the British Atlantic World, 1688–1815*, eds. Daniel Carey, Christopher J. Finlay (Dublin, 2011); *The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 1500–1914*, eds. Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, Patrick K. O’Brien (Cambridge, 2012); *Questioning Credible Commitment: Perspectives on the Rise of Financial Capitalism*, eds. D’Maris Coffman, Adrian Leonard, and Larry Neal (Cambridge, 2013); *A World of Public Debts: A Political History*, eds. Nicolas Barreyre, Nicolas Delalande (Basingstoke, 2020).

8 For the decisively transnational character of military procurement, see David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 260; Peter H. Wilson, “Foreign Military Labour in Europe’s Transition to Modernity,” *European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire*, 27 (2020), 12–32, p. 24.

9 *The Spending of States: Military Expenditure during the Long Eighteenth Century: Patterns, Organisation, and Consequences, 1650–1815*, eds. Stephen Conway, Rafael Torres Sánchez (Saarbrücken, 2011).

10 See, in alphabetical order, Pepijn Brandon, “Finding Solid Ground for Soldier’s Payment: ‘Military Soliciting’ as Brokerage Practice in the Dutch Republic (c. 1600–1795),” in *The Spending of States: Military Expenditure during the Long Eighteenth Century: Patterns,*

private financial intermediaries in the first place? Why should military remittances pose a “challenge”, as Aaron Graham, one of the leading researchers in this field, puts it?¹¹ After all, none other than Niall Ferguson began his book on the Rothschilds with the following remark:

‘Banking,’ the 3rd Lord Rothschild once remarked, ‘consists essentially of facilitating the movement of money from Point A, where it is, to Point B, where it is needed.’ There is a certain elementary truth in this aperçu. ... But if the history of the firm ... consisted of nothing more than getting money from A to B, it would make dull reading.¹²

But what makes Ferguson think that a history of the transfer of money must necessarily be dull, which would also imply then that it is not really worthwhile to do research on the business activities of remittance contractors? In my opinion, what makes him think this is the prevailing assumption that it is in the nature of money to be abstract.¹³

Organisation, and Consequences, 1650–1815, eds. Stephen Conway, Rafael Torres Sánchez (Saarbrücken, 2011), 51–82; idem, *War, Capital, and the Dutch State (1588–1795)* (Leiden, 2015); idem, “‘The Whole Art of War Is Reduced to Money’: Remittances, Short-Term Credit and Financial Intermediation in Anglo-Dutch Military Finance, 1688–1713,” *Financial History Review* 25 (2018), 19–41; Aaron Graham, *Corruption, Party, and Government in Britain, 1702–1713* (Oxford, 2015); idem, “Corruption and Contractors in the Atlantic World, 1754–1763,” *English Historical Review* 133 (2018), 1093–1119; idem, “The British Financial Revolution and the Empire of Credit in St. Kitts and Nevis, 1706–21,” *Historical Research* 91 (2018), 685–704; idem, “Public Service and Private Profit: British Fiscal-Military Entrepreneurship Overseas, 1707–1712,” in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden, 2014), 87–110; idem, “Huguenots, Jacobites, Prisoners and the Challenge of Military Remittances in Early Modern Warfare,” *War & Society* 40 (2021), 171–187; Marianne Klerk, “The ‘Fiscal-Military Hub’ of Amsterdam: Intermediating the French Subsidies to Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War,” in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 213–233; Tim Neu, “Accounting Things Together: Die Globalisierung von Kaufkraft im British Empire um 1700,” in *Techniken der Globalisierung: Globalgeschichte meets Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie*, eds. Debora Gerstenberger, Joël Glasman (Bielefeld, 2016), 41–66; idem, “Glocal Credit: Die britische Finanzlogistik als fraktales Phänomen am Beispiel des Siebenjährigen Krieges,” in *Der Siebenjährige Krieg 1756–1763: Mikro- und Makroperspektiven*, ed. Marian Füssel (Berlin, 2021), 75–93; Guy Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men: The International Bankers of Louis XIV’s France* (Basingstoke, 2015).

11 Graham, “Huguenots,” p. 1.

12 Niall Ferguson, *The House of Rothschild: Money’s Prophets 1798–1848* (New York, 1999), p. 1.

13 See Niall Ferguson, *The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World*, 2nd ed. (London, 2018), p. 21–23; and, in general, Viviana A. Zelizer, *The Social Meaning of Money* (New

Georg Simmel, whose *Philosophy of Money* (1900) is probably the most influential text advancing this interpretation, states very clearly that money is “abstract value” or, more precisely, “the distilled exchangeability of objects”.¹⁴ In this view, money embodies value in itself; it is emphatically *not* situated, *not* bound up in particular contexts. This abstractness, of course, makes it possible for money to function, first and foremost, as a medium of exchange. At the same time, however, it makes money exceedingly mobile and transferable. For Simmel, “owing to the abstractness of its form, money has no definite relationship to space”.¹⁵ If this is true, then Ferguson would be right: Because the transferability of money is self-evident anyway due to its – here again, in Simmel’s words – “space-transcending power”,¹⁶ a history of military remittance contractors would be quite dull and only deal with technicalities.

This conception of money, however, is misleading for a variety of reasons.¹⁷ In the first place, it is in part the result of a misinterpretation of the archaeological and archival record concerning money, because the collections of museums and archives consist almost entirely of only one type of object regarded as money: coins. And Simmel’s assumption actually applies with respect to coins, especially those made of precious metals, because cash *is* exceedingly abstract and mobile. It is detached from social relations; it can be spent and accepted by anyone, which is why it is so popular among criminals and warlords (the latter category including states, of course).¹⁸ Coins come without a history and are mobile, they can be transported without much effort and can still be traded according to their precious metal content if necessary. But inferring the characteristics of money in general from the characteristics of coins (and also bullion) is to fall for availability bias, because the archival record of money is most definitely not representative of historical monetary systems.¹⁹ On the contrary:

York, 1994), pp. 6–12; and, for the field of history in particular, Spang, *Stuff and Money*, p. 103.

14 Simmel, *Philosophy of Money*, pp. 127, 132; see also Nigel Dodd, *The Social Life of Money* (Princeton, 2016), pp. 27–30, which identifies Simmel’s work as one of the six most influential “accounts of the origins of money” (p. 46).

15 Simmel, *Philosophy of Money*, p. 547.

16 Georg Simmel, *Philosophie des Geldes*, eds. David P. Frisby, Klaus C. Köhnke, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt a.M., 1994), p. 289: “raumüberspringende Macht”; Simmel, *Philosophy of Money*, p. 442, has “all-embracing power”, which does not convey the spatial connotations.

17 See, e.g., Felix Martin, *Money: The Unauthorised Biography* (London, 2014), pp. 14–20. The following paragraph follows Martin’s first argument.

18 See David Graeber, *Debt: The First 5,000 Years* (New York, 2011), pp. 212–214; Aaron Sahr, *Die monetäre Maschine: Eine Kritik der finanziellen Vernunft* (Munich, 2022), pp. 235–240.

19 See Peter Spufford, *Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 1–4.

Pre-modern polities were not structured by a generalized 'cash nexus' for the most part and even where cash was important, it was chronically scarce.²⁰

In the case of the early modern British Empire, this means that at least four other forms of money played a significant role in the context of war finance.²¹ In order of seniority, these were: the *tally*, which was a piece of notched hazelnut, the basic instrument of public debt since the Middle Ages;²² the *bill of exchange*, a written payment order with which the issuer instructs a third party elsewhere to settle a debt in his place and which was also medieval in origin, but underwent drastic changes in the 17th century;²³ the *notes* of the Bank of England, which was founded in 1694;²⁴ and finally, starting in 1696, *exchequer bills*, a hybrid combining aspects of government bond and means of payment.²⁵ All these forms of money were less abstract and/or mobile than cash: Tallies were inscribed with the name of their first owner; bills of exchange could only be 'presented', i.e. redeemed, after a certain period of time; and exchequer bills circulated in and around London for the most part. Nevertheless, all of these objects functioned as money insofar as that they could be used to make payments.²⁶

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- 20 See Craig Muldrew, "Hard Food for Midas': Cash and Its Social Value in Early Modern England," *Past & Present* 170 (2001), 78–120; Deborah Valenze, *The Social Life of Money in the English Past* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 31–50; Graeber, *Debt*, pp. 211–305; Laurence Fontaine, *The Moral Economy: Poverty, Credit and Trust in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 2014), p. 147; Mischa Suter, "Jenseits des 'Cash Nexus': Sozialgeschichte des Kredits zwischen kulturanthropologischen und informationsökonomischen Zugängen," *WerkstattGeschichte* 53 (2009), 89–99.
- 21 See, in general, Peter G.M. Dickson, John Sperling, "War Finance, 1689–1714," in *The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688–1715/25*, ed. John S. Bromley (Cambridge, 1970), 284–315; Jones, *War and Economy*, pp. 66–94; Graham, *Corruption, Party, and Government*, pp. 53–58.
- 22 See William T. Baxter, "Early Accounting: The Tally and Checkerboard," *Accounting Historians Journal* 16 (1989), 43–82; Glyn Davies, *A History of Money: From Ancient Times to the Present Day*, 3rd ed. (Cardiff, 2002), pp. 147–153.
- 23 See Markus A. Denzel, "The European Bill of Exchange: Its Development from the Middle Ages to 1914," in *Cashless Payments and Transactions from the Antiquity to 1914*, eds. Sushil Chaudhuri, Markus A. Denzel (Stuttgart, 2008), 153–194; Matthew Dylag, "The Negotiability of Promissory Notes and Bills of Exchange in the Time of Chief Justice Holt," *Journal of Legal History* 31 (2010), 149–175.
- 24 See Christine Desan, *Making Money: Coin, Currency, and the Coming of Capitalism* (Oxford, 2014), pp. 295–329; James Steven Rogers, "Early English Law on Bank Notes," in *Money in the Western Legal Tradition: Middle Ages to Bretton Woods*, eds. David Fox, Wolfgang Ernst (Oxford, 2016), 535–555.
- 25 See Richard A. Kleer, *Money, Politics and Power: Banking and Public Finance in Wartime England, 1694–96* (London, 2017), pp. 15–28, 203–213; Neu, "Geld gebrauchen", pp. 90–96.
- 26 See Sahr, *Die monetäre Maschine*, p. 141.

But the situation was even more complex: The fact that all these objects functioned as money in the context of military remittances presupposed a complex setting, which included *actors* such as government officials or contractors, *techniques* such as the accounting practiced in the Exchequer, *institutions* such as Parliament, *norms* such as the Bank of England Act of 1694, *objects* such as ships, and, last but not least, *infrastructures* such as that of the English postal service.²⁷ And this is also true for coins, because their status as money also depends, among other things, on the public institution of coinage and the networks of international foreign exchange markets.²⁸

Therefore, abstractness and hence mobility are not ‘natural’ characteristics of monetary objects. To begin with, these objects are merely spatially and temporally situated sticks of wood, pieces of paper, and metal discs. It is only in the context of certain settings that they *become* money, that they are *made* abstract and mobile in and through monetary practices.²⁹ Once we undertake this change of perspective from abstractness as a ‘natural’ property to an enacted effect, it follows that an investigation of imperial money flows in general and military remittances in particular will by no means be a “dull read”, as Ferguson suggests. On the contrary: Precisely because early modern states were increasingly dependent, due to their imperial expansion, on the space-transcending power of ever more money and because both the quantity and mobility of money had to be enacted in complex political-economic settings, money flows and remittances are phenomena that can be used to show precisely how imperial power was constituted by the interplay of political and economic factors.³⁰

27 In the following, ‘setting’ is used as a technical term and refers to “assemblies of humans and nonhuman actants where the competences and performances are distributed”, see Madeleine Akrich, Bruno Latour, “A Summary of a Convenient Vocabulary for the Semiotics of Human and Nonhuman Assemblies,” in *Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change*, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, John Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 259–264, p. 259. This is a way of undermining the action-structure dichotomy.

28 See Christine Desan, “Coin Reconsidered: The Political Alchemy of Commodity Money,” *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 11 (2010), 361–409, p. 371: “Innovated by a constitutional act, money persisted as a matter created by relating people to a larger community. The early English ‘made money’ through arrangements that distributed the claims and obligations of individuals relative to the political world in which they lived. Coin became established as ‘money’ when it gained critical capacities through those arrangements.”

29 See Geoffrey Ingham, *The Nature of Money* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 74–80.

30 See Neu, “Glocal Credit,” pp. 83–86; Graham, “British Financial Revolution,” p. 687; idem, “Huguenots,” p. 174; Brandon, “‘The Whole Art of War Is Reduced to Money,’” p. 33; Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men*, p. 56.

Therefore, following Geoffrey Ingham, Felix Martin, and Aaron Sahr, the term ‘money’ should be used primarily to refer to the monetary setting or system as a whole. What is commonly called money, i.e. coins and banknotes for the most part, are *means of payment* within the framework of a given monetary system, representing a quantified and mobile, because transferable, amount of abstract purchasing power.³¹ But since the space-transcending power of means of payment cannot be presupposed, it has to be conceived of as the effect of monetary practices in which heterogeneous elements (humans and things at least) are associated with each other.³² Therefore, money flows in general and remittances in particular are the effects of those monetary practices in which means of payment are produced or handled specifically with regard to their spatial and temporal distribution.³³

2 The Toils of Entanglement

Money is therefore by no means always already mobile and abstract, but must be *made* so. However, this still does not adequately define the task of the remittance contractors, because depending on the situation, very different forms of monetary mobility were necessary. For example, while the transfer of funds mainly required the use of bills of exchange, the troops on the front needed coins, because the combat power of early modern armies depended to a considerable extent on a steady supply of cash.³⁴ From the private soldier who needed to supplement his rations to the commander-in-chief who commissioned the construction of entire fortifications, all of them were dependent on cash, as local credit was usually only available to a very limited extent.³⁵ If the influx of cash dried up, this immediately reduced the forces’ ability to act and ultimately created the risk of desertion and mutiny.³⁶ Supplying the forces

31 See Ingham, *Nature of Money*, pp. 69–85; Martin, *Money*, p. 26; Sahr, *Die monetäre Maschine*, p. 41.

32 See Neu, “Geld gebrauchen,” pp. 89–90.

33 For case studies following this approach, see Neu, “Accounting Things Together”; Neu, “Glocal Credit”.

34 See Graham, “Corruption and Contractors,” p. 1098. Graham speaks, very appropriately, of “military officials, who demanded a smooth flow of cash at whatever cost”.

35 See Brandon, *War, Capital, and the Dutch State*, p. 68; Graham, “Corruption and Contractors,” pp. 1095–1096; and, more generally, Graeber, *Debt*, pp. 213–214.

36 For a case study of a military crisis caused by insufficient remittances and its resolution by means of the system of public credit, see Brandon, “The Whole Art of War Is Reduced to Money,” p. 21; Neu, “Glocal Credit”.

abroad with cash was therefore a key logistical task that became more difficult to manage as the distances between the armies and the London headquarters grew.

Analytically speaking, we can distinguish between two ‘models’ that were used for this purpose in the context of British financial logistics.³⁷ I will explain them by way of two examples from 1755. Neither case is of major significance in itself, but their timing is very much so. For they happened at the very beginning of the Seven Years’ War, which is repeatedly referred to as the first real ‘world war’³⁸ and has to be regarded as a turning point in matters of military remittances, at least for Great Britain, because this was the first time since the beginning of imperial expansion, about a century and a half earlier, that regular forces were sent to the colonies in significant numbers.³⁹

The main protagonist of the first example is Christopher Kilby (1705–71). In 1755, the Boston-native and merchant was living in London and was, among other things, employed as the agent of Nova Scotia: i.e. he worked as an authorized representative acting on behalf of the colony.⁴⁰ Over the course of the year, Kilby sent several petitions in this capacity to the Treasury: the governmental

37 The two models were not unique features of British war finance, but were also used in other European empires of the time, see, e.g., Brandon, *War, Capital and the Dutch State*, pp. 210–263; Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men*, pp. 54–60 (France).

38 See, notably, Winston Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, 3 (London, 1957), which treats the war under the heading “The First World War”; see also *Der Siebenjährige Krieg (1756–1763): Ein europäischer Weltkrieg im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, ed. Sven Externbrink (Berlin, 2011); Marian Füssel, *Der Siebenjährige Krieg: Ein Weltkrieg im 18. Jahrhundert*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 2012); William Burns, “The Great War for Empire: The French and Indian War as a World War,” in *The Routledge Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History: The Colonial Period to 1877*, eds. Antonio S. Thompson, Christos G. Frentzos (New York, 2015), 78–85. See also, more generally, Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York, 2001); *The Seven Years’ War: Global Views*, eds. Mark H. Danley, Patrick J. Speelman (Leiden, 2012); Marian Füssel, *Der Preis des Ruhms: Eine Weltgeschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges 1756–1763*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 2020); *Der Siebenjährige Krieg 1765–1766: Mikro- und Makroperspektiven*, ed. Marian Füssel (Berlin, 2021); for the fiscal-military aspect, see Graham, “Corruption and Contractors”; Neu, “Glocal Credit”; Reed Browning, “The Duke of Newcastle and the Financing of the Seven Years’ War,” *Journal of Economic History* 31 (1971), 344–377.

39 See Stephen Conway, *The British Army, 1714–1783: An Institutional History* (Barnsley, 2021), p. 32.

40 See Charles W. Tuttle, “Christopher Kilby, of Boston,” *The New-England Historical and Genealogical Register and Antiquarian Journal* 26 (1872), 43–48; William T. Baxter, *The House of Hancock: Business in Boston 1724–1775* (Cambridge, Mass., 1945), pp. 95–97, and passim; Michael G. Kammen, *A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution* (New York, 1974).

body ultimately responsible for the fiscal-military flows of money. Some of these petitions had to do with the funding of the “expedition into the Bay of Fundy”,⁴¹ which served to deport the French-born and Catholic Acadians who settled in Nova Scotia.⁴² One of these petitions begins as follows:

The Memorial of Christopher Kilby, Agent to His Majesty’s Colony of Nova Scotia
Humbly Sheweth

That Bills of Exchange are drawn upon your Memorialist by Lt. Gov. Lawrence

viz.	Feb. 1.	A in favour of Cha[rles] Apthorp Esq.	3000 [pounds sterling]
		B in favour of Tho[mas] Hancock Esq.	3000 [pounds sterling]
	April 1	C in favour of Cha[rles] Apthorp Esq.	3000 [pounds sterling]
		D in favour of Tho[mas] Hancock Esq.	3000 [pounds sterling]
			<hr/> 12000 [pounds sterling] ^a

a TNA, T 1/360/40, Memorial of Christopher Kilby for 12,000 pounds sterling in respect of four bills of exchange drawn on him by Lieutenant Governor Lawrence of Nova Scotia. Underwritten: Certified for the Commissioners for the Plantations by John Pownall, 18 June 1755.

Now, the Lords of the Treasury did not have to rely solely on Kilby’s information, for at the same time Lieutenant Governor Charles Lawrence of Nova Scotia had also sent corresponding certificates to the Board of Trade and Plantations, which were forwarded to the Treasury. One of these certificates reads:

My Lords,

This waits on your Lordships to advise of my having drawn upon Christopher Kilby Esq., an Agent for this province for the sum of Three Thousand pounds Sterl. in fav[our] of Charles Apthorp Esq., bearing equal Date herewith and marked (A), being for Value received, and to be received, from Apthorp and Hancock in money and other supplies for His Majesty’s special service in this province,. ...

Cha[rles] Lawrence⁴³

41 Kew, The National Archives [TNA], T 1/360/57, List of the Bills of Exchange drawn by Colonel Lawrence.

42 See Anderson, *Crucible of War*, pp. 112–114.

43 TNA, T 1/360/42, part of T 1/360/41–44, Four certificates from Lawrence to the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations that he has drawn the bills on Kilby, 1 February 1755 to 1 April 1755.

The overall effect of this money flow can be described quite simply: As part of the campaign, British troops in Nova Scotia had received £12,000 worth of money, goods, and services and this sum was now reclaimed in London for reimbursement. In practice, however, it was a little bit more complicated, as can be seen from the documents. The troops in Nova Scotia received cash and other supplies from Colonel Charles Lawrence (1709–60), the deputy governor of the colony. Lawrence in turn had obtained them from the Boston-based trading firm Apthorp & Hancock for a set of four bills of exchange which he in Halifax ‘drew’ on Christopher Kilby in London.⁴⁴ Two bills of exchange were drawn ‘in favour of’ Charles Apthorp and Thomas Hancock each, making them the ‘payees’ and giving them two options on how to proceed further: They could either sell the bills right away in Boston to other merchants or send them to a correspondent in London.⁴⁵

Either way, in the end all four bills would be presented to Kilby (the ‘drawee’), who would be bound to redeem them after a certain period of time, but did so in most cases only after he had petitioned the Treasury and been reimbursed by the Exchequer.⁴⁶ It should also be noted that any of these transactions could involve any of the different types of money mentioned above: For instance, sometimes Kilby would only receive tallies from the Exchequer instead of cash.⁴⁷ From a typological point of view, the direction of movement of the bills of exchange is crucial here: In this first model, purchasing power was created in the periphery, here in Nova Scotia, by the issuing of bills of exchange, which were then moved to London.⁴⁸

44 See Baxter, *House of Hancock*, pp. 129–161 for the relationship between Hancock and Kilby.

45 But sending the bills of exchange to London entailed its own risks, as the bills could be lost when crossing the Atlantic: for example, due to shipwreck or capture by enemy ships or pirates. This risk could be minimized relatively easily, however, by issuing the same bill of exchange several times and sending the consecutively numbered versions by different ships. See, on the topic in general, Joseph Chitty, *A Treatise on the Law of Bills of Exchange, Checks on Bankers, Promissory Notes, Banker's Cash Notes, and Bank-Notes* (London, 1799), pp. 45–46, and 37 for a typical wording: “pay this my first Bill of Exchange (second and third of the same tenor and date not paid) to”.

46 For further explanation of how remittances by bills of exchange worked, see Jones, *War and Economy*, pp. 79–82; Brandon, “The Whole Art of War Is Reduced to Money;” pp. 25–26; Neu, “Glocal Credit,” pp. 83–86; Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men*, pp. 54–60. See also Jacob M. Price, “What Did Merchants Do? Reflections on British Overseas Trade, 1660–1790,” *Journal of Economic History* 49 (1989), 267–284; John Sperling, “The International Payments Mechanism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *Economic History Review* 14 (1962), 446–468.

47 See Baxter, *House of Hancock*, p. 150.

48 See Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men*, p. 55, who calls this model “inverse remitting”, because he sees remitting from the metropole to the fronts as the norm.

The second case, which also took place in 1755, shows that remittances could also be handled according to a different model. In order to send as few regular British forces to the continent as possible or even none, Hessian subsidiary troops were again contracted in 1755.⁴⁹ The question of how to transfer the subsidies from London to the continent was considered by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury in Whitehall on 23 July:

Read a proposal of Sir Josuha Van Neck and Company and John Gore Esq. and Company proposing to give their Bills on Amsterdam for such Sums as may be required for the payment of the Levy Money and Subsidy to the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel upon their receiving the value thereof at the rate of eleven Guilders and an half Stiver current Money of Amsterdam for Pound Sterling such Bills to be made payable viz.

2/3 at eight days sight

1/3 at one Month date.⁵⁰

Here again, the transfer of purchasing power sounds quite simple at first: two companies, Van Neck & Co. and Gore & Co. offer to 'give' bills of exchange on Amsterdam to the Treasury, and thus, in effect, to the government, for payment of the levy money and the subsidy proper.⁵¹ But, yet again, the practice referred to is a little bit more complex: The two trading companies drew bills of exchange in London on their business partners in Amsterdam, who remained unnamed. These bills of exchange were then handed over to the Treasury, which had them transported by post or courier to Amsterdam, where either a British or Hessian agent would have received them. The agent would then go on to present the bills of exchange to the business partners of Van Neck and

49 See Carl W. Eldon, *England's Subsidy Policy Towards the Continent During the Seven Years' War* (Philadelphia, 1938), pp. 29–31; for the wider context, Daniel Baugh, *The Global Seven Years War: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest*, 2nd ed. (Abingdon, 2021), pp. 122–146.

50 TNA, T1/363/45, Minute of the Commissioners of the Treasury on the proposal of Van Neck and Gore to give their bills on Amsterdam for the payment of the levy and subsidy to the Landgrave of Hesse Cassell, 23 July 1755.

51 For Josua Van Neck, see François Crouzet, "The Huguenots and the English Financial Revolution," in *Favorites of Fortune: Technology, Growth, and Economic Development since the Industrial Revolution*, eds. Patrice Higonnet, David S. Landes, and Henry Rosovsky (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 221–266, pp. 254–255; for John Gore, see Romney R. Sedgwick, "Gore, John (c.1689–1763), of Bush Hill, Mdx.," in *The History of Parliament Online*. Available at <https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1715-1754/member/gore-john-1689-1763>. Accessed 13 April 2022.

Gore and receive cash or other means of payment in return, depending on the agreement.

At first glance, this network of monetary practices resembles that of the first model: In both cases, the problem of transferring purchasing power was solved primarily by bills of exchange handled by merchants.⁵² This underlines the fact that British war finance was a phenomenon of political economy in the truest sense of the word, since merchants appear to have had a key role in organizing the money flows of the fiscal-military state. Therefore, the crisis-ridden remittance problem raised by imperial expansion was not solved primarily by Weberian rules-and-regulations-based bureaucratisation and modernisation, but by linking economic and political actors and their trust-based networks.⁵³

But there is also a crucial difference between the two models with respect to the direction of movement of the bills. While in the first case, they were drawn in the periphery and sent to London, in the second case, it was the other way round: The purchasing power was created in the imperial centre and transported afterwards to the fronts in the periphery via bills of exchange. Both models had specific advantages and disadvantages: Drawing on actors in London was much more flexible, since in principle any British official or military officer could issue such bills. Without this flexible form of creating purchasing power through bills of exchange, British warfare abroad would simply not have

52 See Graham, "Corruption and Contractors," p. 1099. Although in the first example, the bills of exchange were drawn on Kilby in his 'public' capacity as the agent of Nova Scotia, the financial dimension of the agency clearly involved a mercantile endeavour; see, on the subject in general, Kammen, *A Rope of Sand*, pp. 43–48; and, for Kilby in particular, Baxter, *House of Hancock*, pp. 129–161, especially p. 134: "On the other hand, the Treasury did not honor some of the bills until a couple of years or so had gone by and petition after petition had been sent in by Kilby, during which time the latter made Thomas pay 6 per cent interest on his large overdraft."

53 See, on the subject in general, Parrott, *The Business of War*, pp. 310–317; Brandon, Solbes Ferri, and Valdez-Bubnov, "Introduction," p. 7; Torres Sánchez, Brandon, and 't Hart, "War and Economy," p. 7; see also Graham, *Corruption, Party, and Government*, pp. 238–249, which speaks of a "partisan-political state": "Although fiscal-military bureaucracies continued to expand [after 1756, T.N.], they were also still interwoven with parliamentary politics and the wider commercial and civil society, which no doubt helped them to mobilize and manage the networks of local elites and private contractors who shouldered ... a very large amount of these demands" (p. 248). For the importance of trust, see Natasha Glaisyer, *The Culture of Commerce in England, 1660–1720* (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 38–42; Francesca Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period* (New Haven, 2009), pp. 153–176; Nuala Zahedieh, *The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660–1700* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 90–103.

been possible.⁵⁴ On the other hand, there were also manifest disadvantages, at least from the point of view of the imperial centre: Since bills of exchange could be drawn anywhere in the periphery at any time, the Treasury in London had no overview of impending payment obligations.⁵⁵

The second model, on the other hand, was quite different: Here, the Treasury could negotiate with the major financiers in the City of London, which meant that they could determine the timing and amount of all payments in advance. In addition, economies of scale and market competition could be used in this way to obtain more favourable conditions.⁵⁶ Unsurprisingly, the British government favoured the second model: As early as June 1755, the Treasury received a letter from the Lords Justices which expressly stipulated that only the Commander-in-Chief in North America, Major General Edward Braddock, was entitled to draw bills of exchange on the Treasury.⁵⁷ In fact, neither governors nor military commanders had ever been entitled *ex officio* to create purchasing power this way, but had to be authorized to do so on a case-by-case basis. In an emergency, however, bills of exchange could be drawn without prior authorisation. But, in that case, the authorities in London reserved the right to decide whether or not to accept the bills.⁵⁸ This restriction created new business opportunities.

3 Harley & Drummond, Remittance Contractors

In order to ensure the supply of the regular forces in the American colonies with all-important cash, the British government in 1754 came up with a solution typical for the 'contractor state': handling the remittances was outsourced to the firm of Hanbury & Thomlinson within the framework of, as we would say

54 For a case study, see Neu, "Accounting Things Together".

55 See Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men*, p. 55.

56 See Roy A. Sundstrom, *Sidney Godolphin: Servant of the State* (Newark, 1992), pp. 113–124; Graham, *Corruption, Party, and Government*, p. 55.

57 TNA, T 1/360/37; C[laudius] Amyand that the Lords Justices have directed that the Treasury should only allow either General Braddock or the Commander-in-Chief in North America to draw money for the current expedition there, and that specie should be sent to North America to maintain the rate of exchange, 17 June 1755; the French government also preferred "to have a steady stream of planned foreign remittances exiting France", see Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men*, p. 56.

58 See Curtis Nettels, "British Payments in the American Colonies, 1685–1715", *English Historical Review* 48 (1933), 229–249, p. 238.

today, a private-public partnership.⁵⁹ The contract stipulated that the contractors were to receive the money destined for America in London, buy Spanish and Portuguese coins with it and ship these coins to North America, in order to hand them over to the paymasters there.⁶⁰ However, since the early 18th century, it had become clear that such an all-cash approach was not practicable.⁶¹

Therefore, when the contract was transferred to Harley & Drummond in 1769, they took over a much more complex operation serving to supply the main military bases established after the Seven Years' War in New York, Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Montreal.⁶² It can be visualized as follows (see Figure 14.1).




FIGURE 14.1 Remittance network of Harley & Drummond

59 See Neu, “Glocal Credit,” pp. 78–80; Graham, “Corruption and Contractors,” p. 1100; see also Bannerman, *Merchants and the Military*, p. 49, according to which Hanbury and Thomlinson were already occasionally acting as remittance contractors since 1745.

60 TNA, AO 1/190/592, Roll 592 J. Thomlinson, J. Hanbury, and others, Contractors for remitting money for the Forces in North America, 24 December 1754 to 27 May 1757: “investing the same in the purchasing Spanish Milled Dollars and other Spanish Coined Silver, and Spanish and Portugal Coined Gold either in England or in the Colonies and Shipping the same to North America”.

61 See Jones, *War and Economy*, p. 77; Brandon, “The Whole Art of War Is Reduced to Money,” p. 25.

62 At first, the partnership consisted of Thomas Harley, see Roland Thorne, “Harley, Thomas (1730–1804), politician and banker,” 2004, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* [ODNB]. Available at <https://doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.1093/ref:odnb/12345>. Accessed 12 April 2022; and John Drummond, see Edith Lady Haden-Guest,

Under the terms of the contract, the Treasury regularly paid certain sums of money to Harley & Drummond in London, who then drew bills on their agents in the colonies (*Bill of Exchange 1*): here Gordon & Crowder in New York as an example. These bills were transported across the Atlantic by the Pay Office and passed on to the army command, which presented them to Gordon & Crowder in return for specie. But how were Gordon & Crowder able to provide such enormous amounts of cash? They drew bills on their London principals (*Bill of Exchange 2*), which were sold for cash to New York merchants. These bills crossed the Atlantic in the opposite direction and, after having been received by merchants in London, they were finally presented to and paid by Harley & Drummond.⁶³

Analytically speaking, an imperial entanglement linking centre and periphery was established in this way by forming a transatlantic monetary circuit that coupled two local and very different monetary settings with each other:⁶⁴ While in England, but especially in London, various types of money circulated (mainly coins, tallies, bank notes, and exchequer bills), the military settings to be found in the colonies or in occupied territories were primarily based on coins.⁶⁵ The purchase and transport of Spanish and Portuguese coins, which had played a key role at the beginning, continued to play an important but

“Drummond, John (1723–74), of Stanmore, Mdx.,” in *The History of Parliament Online*. Available at <https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1754-1790/member/drummond-john-1723-74>. Accessed 12 April 2022. Soon after, the latter was replaced by his cousin, Henry Drummond, see Philip Winterbottom, “Drummond, Henry (c. 1730–1795), banker,” 2004, in *ODNB*. Available at <https://doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.1093/ref:odnb/48025>. Accessed 12 April 2022; according to Norman Baker, *Government and Contractors: The British Treasury and War Supplies, 1775–1783* (London, 1971), p. 175, Henry was the nephew of John.

63 See Baker, *Government and Contractors*, pp. 175–183; “The Seventh Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Examine, Take, and State, the Public Accounts of the Kingdom”, in *The Reports of the Commissioners Appointed to Examine, Take, and State the Public Accounts of the Kingdom*, ed. William Molleson, 1 (London, 1783), pp. 119–145, 427–502 (Appendix).

64 See Ann L. Stoler, Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper, Ann L. Stoler (Berkeley, 1997), 1–56; Steve Pincus, “Reconfiguring the British Empire,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 69 (2012), 63–70, p. 63: “My operating hypothesis ... is that the empire involved a dialectical and fruitful relationship between what was going on in the colonies and dependent states (including Scotland and Ireland) on the one hand and what was going on in England on the other”.

65 To be clear: The military settings in the colonies were primarily coin-based, not the colonial economy as a whole; see Walter S. Dunn Jr., *The New Imperial Economy: The British Army and the American Frontier, 1764–1768* (Westport, Conn., 2001), p. 61: “Money [in the colonial economy, T.N.] was in the form of bills of exchange, paper money, and specie

ultimately subsidiary role in this imperial remittance system, insofar as specie shipments were no longer made to directly supply the troops, but only to support the exchange rate between the American outposts and London.⁶⁶ The British government was thus able to transfer purchasing power from London to North America in a cashless and relatively secure manner, thereby ensuring its ability to project military power in a rapidly globalizing world. It has to be stressed, however, that this “space-transcending power” was not simply due to the use of money, but was provided by the sophisticated monetary apparatus organized primarily by Harley & Drummond. But what did Thomas Harley (1730–1804) and John Drummond (1723–74), who was later replaced by his cousin Henry Drummond (1730–95), gain from engaging in this business?

4 The Business Model of Harley & Drummond

In light of recent research on military entrepreneurs, the most likely answer to the question of the business model of Harley & Drummond would be: We do not know. Or rather: We cannot know, because we lack the sources to find out. As Peter Wilson and Marianne Klerk put it recently: “The glaring absence is the lack of business records which are, indeed, sadly hard to find for this period.”⁶⁷ And if records do exist, they usually come from government archives, which does not make the search for business models any easier, since contracts and declared accounts for the most part do not document the actual business ventures, but rather create a justifiable representation of them directed at the state officials tasked with inspecting the accounts.⁶⁸ Fortunately, in the case of Harley & Drummond, the situation is different, because the remittance

(silver and gold coins)”, p. 64: “The paper money could not be used to pay for the merchandise and obtaining sterling bills of exchange with the paper was difficult.”

66 See Kleer, *Money, Politics, and Power*, p. 73; Edinburgh, The NatWest Group Archives [NGA], GB 1502, DR/464/1/32, Drummond & Jordan to Harley & Drummond, Quebec, 24 October 1777. Until 2020, these archives were known as the “Royal Bank of Scotland Group Archives”.

67 Peter H. Wilson, Marianne Klerk, “The Business of War Untangled: Cities as Fiscal-Military Hubs in Europe (1530s–1860s),” *War in History* 29 (2022), 80–103, p. 86; see also Klerk, “The ‘Fiscal-Military Hub’ of Amsterdam,” p. 222; Erik Thomson, “Jean Houfft, French Subsidies, and the Thirty Years’ War,” in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 234–258, p. 252.

68 See Aaron Graham, “Auditing Leviathan: Corruption and State Formation in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain,” *English Historical Review* 128 (2013), 806–838, pp. 808–816; on the topic in general, see Bruce C. Carruthers, Wendy Nelson Espeland, “Accounting

contractors' business records have been largely preserved and today form the collection "Records of John and Henry Drummond, contractors to the Treasury as paymaster to His Majesty's forces in North America" in the NatWest Group Archives in Edinburgh.⁶⁹

4.1 *Commissions: The Official Business Model*

First of all, there was an official business model: Harley & Drummond, as was stipulated in all four contracts concluded between 1769 and 1783, were entitled to a commission of 1.5 per cent; the firm thus received a remuneration of 1 pound sterling and 10 shilling for every hundred pounds sterling transferred. It did not matter for the profitability of the contract in which way the purchasing power was transported to North America, because all operating costs could be charged to the government: Transport and insurance costs in the case of cash shipments, as well as the commissions of the agents in the colonies when bills of exchange were used.⁷⁰ Even the salary of Thomas Neale, who worked locally in London as an agent for the two partners, was paid by the government. In short, the remittance business was virtually risk-free and the commission of 1.5 per cent more or less represented Harley & Drummond's net profit.⁷¹

At first glance, this does not seem to be a lucrative contract, as Gordan Banerman has pointed out that supply contracts could generate profits of up to

for Rationality: Double-Entry Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic Rationality," *American Journal of Sociology* 97 (1991), 31–69.

69 NGA, GB 1502, DR/464.

70 According to Baker, *Government and Contractors*, p. 177, the agents' commissions and some other minor charges were not allowed any more under the last contract, but had to be met out of the contractors' commission. However, this does not change the overall picture.

71 See the declared accounts in TNA, AO 1/191/595, Roll 595 T. Harley and J. Drummond, Contractors for remitting money for the Forces in North America, 15 March 1769 to 20 December 1770; TNA, AO 1/191/597, Roll 597 T. Harley and H. Drummond, Contractors for remitting money for the Forces in North America, 20 December 1770 to 30 July 1778; TNA, AO 1/200/644, Roll 644 T. Harley and H. Drummond, Contractors for remitting money for the Forces in North America, also expenses of the Forces in the West Indies and in Gibraltar and Minorca, 15 July 1778 to 31 December 1781; TNA AO 1/204/661, Roll 661 T. Harley and H. Drummond, Contractors for remitting money for the Forces in North America, 1 January 1782 to 17 June 1783. However, the business of financial intermediaries had not always been so risk-free: this was a comparatively late development. See, e.g., Christopher Clay, *Public Finance and Private Wealth: The Career of Sir Stephen Fox, 1627–1716* (Oxford, 1978), p. 38: "Fox made a fortune as a risk-taking financier. ... He raised money for which he had to pledge his own credit as collateral security".

TABLE 14.1 The contractors' commission

Period	Contractors	Money Received (pounds sterling)	Commission (pounds sterling)	Commission p.a. (pounds sterling)
15 March 1769 - 20 December 1770	Thomas Harley & John Drummond	212,522	3,187	ca. 1,800
20 December 1770 - 30 July 1778	Thomas Harley & Henry Drummond	4,301,289	64,519	ca. 8,500
15 July 1778 - 31 December 1781	Thomas Harley & Henry Drummond	8,069,423	121,041	ca. 35,000
1 January 1782 - 17 June 1783	Thomas Harley & Henry Drummond	3,893,307	57,844	ca. 39,600
		16,476,541	246,591	

SOURCE: TNA, AO 1/191/595; TNA, AO 1/191/597; TNA, AO 1/200/644; TNA, AO 1/204/661.

11 to 15 per cent.⁷² In absolute numbers, however, things look quite different: While the contracts examined by Bannerman were all for less than 5,000 pounds sterling, Harley & Drummond received a total of about 16.5 million pounds sterling in 14 years for remittances and commissions totalling a staggering quarter of a million pounds sterling (see Table 14.1).⁷³

Since the four contracts listed in the table had very different terms, I have added the average annual commission for purposes of comparison. It

72 Bannerman, *Merchants and the Military*, p. 127; see also Stephen Conway, "Checking and Controlling British Military Expenditure, 1739–1783," in *War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Rafael Torres Sánchez (Pamplona, 2007), 45–67, p. 62: "Profits for contractors appear to have diminished accordingly from around fifteen–twenty per cent before 1780, to about ten per cent thereafter," referring to Baker, *Government and Contractors*, p. 247. However, contemporaries suspected that contractors made profits of up to 60 per cent during the American War of Independence, see Conway, "Checking and Controlling," p. 51.

73 Baker, *Government and Contractors*, p. 176, claims that under the three contracts held by Thomas Harley and Henry Drummond "£17,002,598 4s 2d was supplied to the armies in North America" and a commission of "£128,150 4s 4d paid to the contractors". Even after reviewing the declared accounts several times, I cannot understand how Baker calculated these totals. See also Earl A. Reitan, *Politics, Finance, and the People: Economical Reform in England in the Age of the American Revolution, 1770–92* (Basingstoke, 2007), p. 23, who cites Baker's figures.

immediately becomes clear that the remitters profited considerably from the American War of Independence, which intensified from 1775 onwards and gave rise to astronomical costs.⁷⁴ Over a period of five years, Thomas Harley and Henry Drummond together made a net profit of well over £30,000 a year. Some comparative figures help to provide context: Henry Drummond was not only a remittance contractor, but also, from 1772 on, one of three partners of Drummonds Bank together with his brother Robert and his cousin John.⁷⁵ In 1769, this important London bank managed over 1,500 customer accounts and made an annual profit of £10,000.⁷⁶ Similar evidence can be found for a perhaps even more significant institution in the London financial market: around 1750, Hoare's Bank also made an annual profit of just over £10,000 on total assets of around £500,000.⁷⁷ Even if the profits would have increased by the end of the 1770s, it is still possible that Harley & Drummond made as much or even more annual profit through their remittance contract alone than two of the largest private banks in London put together. It is not only the fact that both contractors were also active as merchant bankers that suggests making such a comparison with the banks, by the way, but also the fact that the opportunities for additional profit were to be found here.

4.2 *Exchange Rates, Cash, and Banking: Additional Profit Opportunities*

An 1890 article on Thomas Harley in the *Dictionary of National Biography* reports that contemporaries assumed that the remittance contract, which had been extended several times, had brought in up to £600,000 in profit, which would have been two and a half times the profit officially declared.⁷⁸ And though remittance contracts are considered particularly lucrative in the literature, it is not usually explained where this particular profitability is supposed to have come from.⁷⁹ In the case of Harley & Drummond, however,

74 During the war, annual military expenditure reached an unprecedented 30 million pounds sterling, see Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, p. 38; and the public debt doubled to an equally unprecedented 245 million pounds sterling, see Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, p. 114.

75 See Winterbottom, "Drummond".

76 "Messrs. Drummond". Available at <https://www.natwestgroup.com/heritage/companies/messrs-drummond.html>.

77 Peter Temin, Hans-Joachim Voth, *Prometheus Shackled: Goldsmith Banks and England's Financial Revolution after 1700* (Oxford, 2013), p. 132.

78 "Harley, Thomas (1730–1804)," in *Dictionary of National Biography*, 24, eds. Leslie Stephen, Sidney Lee (New York, 1890), 406–407.

79 See Bannerman, *Merchants and the Military*, p. 42; Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, p. 208: "The most lucrative contracts were for the supply and remittance of money either to garrisons

it is possible to discover sources of additional profit, since – as mentioned above – not only the declared accounts but also the internal business records have largely survived. And among these, for example, there is to be found a very significant “Memorandum relative to the Contract”, which was probably written by Thomas Harley himself shortly before the first contract was concluded, i.e. in 1769. Harley identifies three ways to make extra profit besides the commissions:

- (1) “that our Agents may be the only public drawers of bills and consequently sole Masters of the Exchange which we may then govern as we see most convenient to ourselves, and by augmenting the credit given on private Account, charge Government the Exchange we think proper ...;”
- (2) “charge government for the whole £20,000, advanced to us, as if we had remitted it in specie – ... for if we are to exhibit neither bills of Lading nor Policies of insurance, this last Article may be carried to account as here mentioned”
- (3) “And whereas Abraham Mortier Esq. deputy paymaster at New York has overdrawn his account with the pay Office, which occasioned the giving no Subsistence bills in December last for the payment of the troops in that district ... , whereby we not only lose the Commission and the use of the money for the space of 6 Months ...”.⁸⁰

The first point is certainly the most spectacular, not least because of its frank language: Under the contract, Harley & Drummond’s agents would be the only public drawers of bills of exchange in the North American colonies and supposedly be able to control the rate of exchange as a consequence. Thus, they could charge the government exactly the exchange rate they thought appropriate. But how did Harley come up with this idea? The American colonies had a notorious trade deficit with England. A constant demand for bills of exchange on London followed from this: a demand for the transfer of purchasing power to the metropolis to cancel debts from importing merchandise.⁸¹ Since the contract was to transfer purchasing power in the opposite direction,

such as Gibraltar or to pay troops in Europe or America, services that the big merchant and banking houses which underwrote government loans were best equipped to provide.”

80 NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/19/3, Memorandum relative to the Contract.

81 See Julian Gwyn, “British Government Spending and the North American Colonies 1740–1775,” in *The British Atlantic Empire before the American Revolution*, ed. Peter Marshall, Glyn Williams (London, 1980), 75–86, p. 82; John J. McCusker, Russel R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607–1789* (Chapel Hill, 1991), pp. 71–88.

Harley could reasonably assume that his and Drummond's agents could largely monopolize the supply of bills of exchange on London and thus gain significant influence over their colonial market price: i.e. the exchange rate.⁸² Since bills of exchange have a specific face value, their price is determined by a ratio, the exchange rate between the local currency and pound sterling. Bills of exchange become cheaper/more expensive when you get more/less face value in pounds sterling for a certain amount of New York currency.

As compared to this prospect of total economic control, the second opportunity for additional profit seems almost a little petty: Harley wondered whether the firm could tell the government that they had transferred purchasing power by cash, when in fact they would have used bills of exchange. That would be possible, he reasoned, if they did not have to present bills of lading or insurance policies. The additional profit would then result from the fact that the costs of sending cash, i.e. freight and insurance, were higher than for transfer by bill of exchange, which only added the commission of the local agents.⁸³ Even by the standards of the time, that would have constituted fraud.⁸⁴

The third opportunity for additional profit is only alluded to by Harley by way of a negative example: The deputy paymaster in New York had overdrawn his account with the Army Pay Office, which is why the contractors were told not to draw bills in December for the upkeep of the troops stationed there. But this meant not only losing the commission, but also, as Harley mused, losing "the use of the money for the space of 6 Months".⁸⁵ What did he mean by that? To answer this question, the temporal structure of the remittance system must be taken into account: Whenever Harley & Drummond drew bills of exchange on their agents in the colonies, they were in most cases instantly reimbursed in London: bills of exchange for money. The money was thus immediately available to the remitters, but due to the use of bills of exchange, it only had to be paid out by them much later for the actual purpose of financing the forces abroad. This is because the bills first had to cross the Atlantic. Having arrived in the colonies, they were redeemed for cash by the agents, as was shown above, and the agents in turn drew new bills for the same amount on their principals. And these new bills too had then to make the voyage across the Atlantic before they were finally settled in London after falling due. To accommodate for these periods of time necessary for the physical transportation of the bills

82 See Dunn Jr., *New Imperial Economy*, p. 61: "When the army reduced its expenditures, the supply of bills dried up."

83 See Baxter, *House of Hancock*, p. 207; Gwyn, "British Government Spending," p. 81.

84 For other forms of fraud, see Graham, "Auditing Leviathan," pp. 808–816.

85 NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/19/3, Memorandum relative to the Contract.

back and forth, the bills issued in London were made payable at three months after they were drawn and the colonial bills came due only 30 or 40 days after they were accepted in London. Therefore, up to six months passed before Harley & Drummond had to pay out the money again.⁸⁶ The memorandum does not explicitly say at this point what the two partners did with the funds in the meantime, but since the prospect of having to forego their use was perceived as a loss, it must have been lucrative.

However, the “Memorandum” was only a theoretical assessment, which is why we now have to ask whether the imagined profit opportunities could also be realized. This question is easiest to answer for the second opportunity. It was not possible fraudulently to claim that cash was shipped, when in fact bills of exchange were used, because the bills of lading and insurance had to be annexed to every account handed in for audit.⁸⁷

That did not really matter, but the first profit opportunity Harley had envisaged could not be realized as planned either: The exchange rates eluded complete control by the remitters and their agents. Harley, the presumed author, wanted to use the quasi-monopoly conferred by the contract to keep the exchange rate in the colonies above par, which in New York at that time would have meant an exchange rate of more than 171 New York pounds for £100.⁸⁸ But the correspondence with the agents in the colonies shows very

86 NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/19/3, Memorandum relative to the Contract: “The first branch of the Contract is remitting Monies to New York Louisbourg Nova Scotia Quebec & Montreal, by bills given into the Pay Office, every two Months, which are drawn at 3 Months date and we are redrawn on at 30 or 40 days Sight”. Therefore: Three months (London bills drawn at three months after date) plus about two months for crossing the Atlantic for the colonial bills, see Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic 1675–1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York, 1986), p. 26; plus one to one-and-a-half months (colonial bills drawn at 30 or 40 days after sight). For an example of a colonial bill, see NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/8/3, Bill of exchange for £143 10s 4p at forty days sight, drawn by Gordon & Crowder (New York) on Harley & Drummond (London), payable to Richard Penn Esq. or Order, 13 May 1779; see, on the topic in general, Chitty, *A Treatise on the Law of Bills of Exchange*, pp. 136–149; Lucy S. Sutherland, J.E.D. Binney, “Henry Fox as Paymaster General of the Forces,” *English Historical Review* 70 (1955), 229–257, p. 236.

87 A document entitled “Vouchers necessary to be Delivered to the Auditors Offices with the Accounts for Remitting Money for Subsistence of His Majesty’s Forces in North America pursuant to a Contract Dated the 29th of November 1769”, see NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/7/5; states very clearly: “Invoices, and Vouchers to all costs & Charges attending the Purchasing and Remitting”; see also Graham, “Auditing Leviathan,” p. 810; J.E.D. Binney, *British Public Finance and Administration, 1774–92* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 148–149.

88 See John J. McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600–1775. A Handbook* (London, 1978), p. 158, who gives around 177 as par; NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/19/3, Memorandum relative to the Contract, where par is said to be around 171.

clearly that although the contractors could indeed exert considerable influence on the exchange rate, they did not ultimately become “sole Masters of the Exchange”.⁸⁹ A monopoly position was not enforceable. For example, a very typical letter sent to London by Gordon & Crowder in 1779 shows, firstly, that the agents were not the only suppliers, but rather other merchants also sold bills of exchange on London, so that competition did take place and influenced the rate of exchange:

We are sorry to acquaint you that it is impossible to keep up the Exchange, all Bills except ours being to be bought in Town at 168 8/9 and under; As very large Sums will be wanted in the course of a few days, We must endeavour to raise what We possibly can by drawing, at the same rate with others.⁹⁰

Moreover, the reference to the “large sums”, meaning cash for the military, which had to be raised through the sale of bills of exchange can be understood to mean that, at least after the outbreak of the war, the agents’ demand for cash was more inelastic than that of the New York merchants for bills of exchange on London. So, the merchants could try to withhold their cash and thereby force the agents to lower the exchange rate.⁹¹ Overall, it can be concluded that the remitters were not able to determine the exchange rate completely, but they were able to influence it to a considerable extent. And although all exchange rate gains from the official business in bills had to be credited in favour of government, the influence on the exchange rate brought clear advantages for the remitters’ private dealings in bills of exchange.⁹²

So, while it was not possible to deceive the state authorities with regard to the way money was sent and it was also not possible to completely control the exchange rates, the third profit opportunity considered in the memorandum was a complete success. When the remittance contract expired on 17 June 1783, a balance of about £367,000 was still in the hands of Harley &

89 NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/19/3, Memorandum relative to the Contract.

90 NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/1/23, Gordon & Crowder to Harley & Drummond, 4 May 1779, New York.

91 For more on the matter of exchange rates, see NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/1/25, Report to Commander in Chief, signed by William Smith, Brook Watson, William Deane Poyntz, Duncan Drummond, M. Morgan, New York, 30 December 1782.

92 See NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/19/3, Memorandum relative to the Contract: “the term private account being a shadow without substance, and substituted to cover the advantage we may derive from the Exchanges”. However, losses from exchange transactions could also be charged to the government.

TABLE 14.2 Lending by Harley & Drummond

28th March 1771	Sir George Colebrook Debtor to Cash £15,000 lent him at 4 per Cent	£15,000
August 9th	Messrs. Cox & Drummond Debtor to Cash for £10,000 lent them at 5 per Cent	£10,000
12th September	Henry Drummond Esq. Debtor to Cash for £9,000 lent him at 4 ½ per Cent	£9,000

SOURCE: NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/6/12.

Drummond.⁹³ Of this, about £243,000 was accrued commissions, but that still left them with £123,000 of public money. During the term of the contract and especially during the war, the sum was in all likelihood even higher due to the aforementioned fact that they were able to use any sum of public money issued to them for their own purposes for about six months. But even so, it is an enormous amount of cash.⁹⁴ By comparison, Hoare's, the famous London private bank mentioned earlier, was able to operate with cash-on-hand of 130,000 to £170,000 around the middle of the century.⁹⁵

Access to funds of such magnitude was extremely advantageous in economic terms. To start with, Harley & Drummond held some of these funds in the bank in which Henry Drummond was a partner. The government funds thus indirectly supported the Drummonds' banking business as deposits.⁹⁶ In addition, Thomas Harley and Henry Drummond entered the financial market themselves. For example, there is "An account book for the payment of fees on warrants and expenses", as it is described by the NatWest Group Archives, which begins as follows (see Table 14.2).

These entries obviously have nothing to do with the payment of fees; rather they very clearly document that Harley & Drummond lent out the public money in their hands against interest. Another type of entry is found, for

93 See NGA, GB 1502, DR/464/7/6.

94 Unlike in the military settings in the colonies, 'cash' here is not synonymous with 'coins', but also includes banknotes and bank deposits; see Malachy Postlethway, "Book-Keeping, The Cash-Book," in *The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce*, 1, 3rd ed. (London, 1766); Anne L. Murphy, "Inspection and Efficiency at the Eighteenth-Century Bank of England," *Histoire & Mesure* 30 (2015), 147–170, p. 156.

95 See Temin, Voth, *Prometheus Shackled*, p. 157.

96 See, e.g., NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/6/1, Thomas Neale's cheque on Messrs. Drummonds, 18 July 1774, London: "Pay Anthony Sawyer Esq. or Bearer, two hundred sixty four pounds 12s for fees of Office for 1772 & 1773 and place it to Account of Messrs. Harley & Drummond".

example, for 9 April 1774: “Cash Debtor to India Bonds received 6 Months Interest on £3000 India Bonds to 31st March – £45.”⁹⁷

Harley & Drummond used the public money in their hands to make loans and also invested in the bond market – as many officials did too: first and foremost, the various paymasters.⁹⁸ It should be noted that this was not corruption in a strictly legal sense, since for a long time, the use of public funds for private transactions was not explicitly prohibited. This situation was to change slowly from the 1780s onwards.⁹⁹ In general, these business activities can only be reconstructed with great difficulty from the documents, and the overall impression is that this was intentional. As consequence, it is not presently possible to tell, unfortunately, whether it is true, as according to the rumour mentioned earlier, that the contract brought in a total of £600,000: i.e. whether Harley & Drummond were able to earn an additional £350,000 through their banking business on top of their commissions of £250,000. However, in view of the fact that they were able to conduct this additional business with at least as much cash holdings as the large London private banks and had insider information due to their involvement in the military apparatus, it can be assumed, in any case, that they profited massively.¹⁰⁰

97 NGA, GB 1502, DR 464/6/12.

98 See, in general, Molleson, *Reports*; in particular, “The Fifth Report of the Commissioners appointed to examine, take, and state, the Public Accounts of the Kingdom”, in Molleson, *Reports*, pp. 55–72, p. 71: “that is, by taking away from the Paymaster General of the Forces the Custody of the Public Cash, and placing it in the Bank of England; this Treasury will then be converted into an Office of mere Account, and the Paymaster General, instead of being the Banker of the Army, will be the Instrument only, through whom the Army Services are paid, without having the Power of applying the Public Money to any other Purposes whatever.” See also Mark Knights, *Trust and Distrust: Corruption in Office in Britain and Its Empire, 1660–1850* (Oxford, 2021), pp. 184–227; for examples, Sutherland, Binney, “Henry Fox as Paymaster General of the Forces”; T.H. McGuffie, “A Deputy Paymaster’s Fortune: The Case of George Durant, Deputy Paymaster to the Havanna Expedition, 1762,” *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 32 (1954), 144–147.

99 See Jeremy Horder, “R v Bembridge (1783),” in *Landmark Cases in Criminal Law*, eds. Philip Handler, Henry Mares, and Ian Williams (Oxford, 2017), 81–101, p. 81; Philip Harling, Peter Mandler, “From ‘Fiscal-Military’ State to Laissez-Faire State, 1760–1850,” *Journal of British Studies* 32 (1993), 44–70, p. 54.

100 On officials making use of their insider knowledge, see Rowlands, *Dangerous and Dishonest Men*, p. 180; Knights, *Trust and Distrust*, p. 277; on the profitability of these transactions, see Sutherland, Binney, “Henry Fox as Paymaster General of the Forces,” p. 254; Horder, “R v Bembridge (1783),” p. 86.

5 Conclusion

The term 'fiscal-military state' refers to a connection between production and consumption: Early modern states 'produced' money by fiscal means in order to be able to 'consume' it for military purposes. However, the aspect of distribution – metaphorically speaking, the hyphen in 'fiscal-military' – has usually been neglected up to now. But how is money distributed on an imperial scale? How does it get from the metropolitan hubs, where taxes converge and public debt is incurred, to the theatres of war where it is spent?

First, however, we needed to clarify why the question of the distribution of money is usually not even asked. I argued in the first section of the article that this is because of the common assumption that money is inherently abstract and mobile, such that there is no real problem to distribute money spatially. In fact, however, it was a real challenge: The transport of purchasing power turned out to be an effect of complex socio-technical settings and monetary practices.

After these more conceptual considerations, my second aim was to sketch out, by way of introduction and using the example of the British Empire in the long 18th century, how the remittance of money worked in practice. The basic principle here was the handling of different materialisations of purchasing power, in order to be able to connect different local monetary settings in the form of an imperial fiscal-military entanglement. Bills of exchange were of central importance. They enabled a cashless and reasonably secure transport of purchasing power over long distances. There were two models: Either purchasing power was created in the periphery by drawing bills of exchange on the London metropolis or vice versa.

The remittance settings were political-economic hybrids. They were made possible in the first place by the collaboration of public officials and private-sector merchants, each pursuing their own agenda. Because military entrepreneurship is at the centre of this anthology, I focused in the third part of the essay on the firm of Harley & Drummond, which was responsible for supplying cash to the British forces in North America as a remittance contractor from 1769 to 1783. In practice, this meant maintaining and servicing a setting that can essentially be described as a constant circuit of bills of exchange between London and the outposts in North America. The advantage for the government was obvious: It could feed various forms of money into the circuit at any time in London, while the paymasters in America could withdraw cash from the circuit.

But what was the business model of Harley & Drummond, the operators of the remittance setting? Fortunately, this question can be answered, because

the company's business records have been preserved, which is very rare for military contractors in general. Basically, a distinction must be made between the official business model and additional ways of making a profit out of the position of a remittance contractor. The official business model was quite simple: A moderate commission of 1.5 per cent of the transferred sums was agreed with the government. However, as the American War was incredibly expensive, Harley & Drummond ended up obtaining around a quarter of a million pounds sterling just in commissions.

Additional profit opportunities resulted, in the first place, from the fact that the remitters could exert considerable influence on the exchange rates between London and the colonies. This was because they largely controlled the supply of bills of exchange on London, since only their agents in the colonies were allowed to draw bills for public purposes: i.e. primarily for financing the regular troops. And this influence on exchange rates allowed for a more profitable side business in bills of exchange in their own right. However, Harley & Drummond certainly benefited most from the fact that they could dispose of considerable amounts of cash in London at any time, as money paid to them only flowed out again after about six months due to the way the remittance setting worked. And they used this public money extensively to conduct private monetary transactions, to make loans and to invest and speculate in the financial market.

In the form of this systematic linking of public obligations and private business – which, on the one hand, ensured that private resources were used when public resources were insufficient, but, on the other hand, also enabled corruption and personal enrichment – Harley & Drummond did more than exemplify the behaviour of officials, contractors, and military contractors in the fiscal-military system of the long 18th century.¹⁰¹ The remittance setting they organized also demonstrates, above all, that empires and economies co-evolved.¹⁰² The imperial business of transferring purchasing power from London to the colonies depended on the private business of merchants in the colonies generating the demand for transfers in the opposite direction – and vice versa. Harley & Drummond thus ensured that imperial and mercantile money flows were intertwined, interrelated, and synchronized in such a way as to create a genuine political-economic circuit that linked the financial markets and the military institutions in London and the colonies.

But Harley & Drummond's business is not only indicative of the politico-economic character of the British Empire. It was also a factor of

101 See Graham, *Corruption, Party, and Government*.

102 See Torres Sánchez, Bandon, and 't Hart, "War and Economy".

change: especially with regard to the use of public money for private gains. For it was precisely such 'business models' that were increasingly perceived as corrupt, giving rise to reform movements throughout the long 18th century, which intensified after the end of the American War. In this way, the system of remittances in which Harley & Drummond were involved not only contributed to early modern imperial expansion as a hybrid phenomenon of warfare and economic exploitation, but also simultaneously and paradoxically fostered the normative differentiation between private and public interests: between 'the economy' and 'the state'.¹⁰³

103 See Knights, *Trust and Distrust*, p. 420.

SECTION

Diplomacy and Patronage



From Private Entrepreneurship to State Monopoly: Contracting Swiss Soldiers for Dutch Service under *Ancien Régime* Fiscal-Military Practices (1693–1829)

Michael Depreter

Since the late 15th century, the Swiss had a reputation for being particularly skilled soldiers.¹ Following their infantry's successful engagement in the Burgundian (1474–77) and Italian Wars (1494–1559), they became keen suppliers of military manpower as a means for social and financial advancement of both the soldiers and their officers.² On the other hand, from the very beginnings, the Dutch Republic became a keen employer of foreign soldiers.³ At the intersection of supply and demand, this contribution aims to give a tentative overview of Dutch contracting practices of Swiss soldiers, from the first systematic recruitment of Swiss units retaining their own identity within the Dutch army in the late 17th century up to the last upsurge of such practices in the newly

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- 1 This research is part of a broader collective project on “The European Fiscal-Military System, 1530–1870”. The project has received funding from the European Research Council [ERC] under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 787504). I would particularly like to thank my colleagues on this project, John Condren, Aaron Graham, Michael Martocchio, Katalin Pataki, Cathleen Sarti, and Peter Wilson, as well as the editors of this volume, André Holenstein and Philippe Rogger, for their useful feedback on this contribution.
 - 2 John McCormack, *One Million Mercenaries: Swiss Soldiers in the Armies of the World* (London, 1993), pp. 24–57; Michael Jucker, “Erfolgreiche Söldnerlandschaft Eidgenossenschaft? Die Innenperspektive um 1476,” in *Söldnerlandschaften: Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Benjamin Hitz (Berlin, 2014), 85–105; André Holenstein, “Die wirklich entscheidenden Folgen von Marignano: Das *Corps helvétique* auf dem Weg zur Einigung mit Frankreich (1515–1521),” in *Après Marignan: La paix perpétuelle entre la France et la Suisse*, eds. Alexandre Dafflon, Lionel Dorthe, and Claire Gantet (Fribourg, 2018), 181–207. Overview of Swiss regiments in foreign service since the 16th century in Georg Tessin, *Die Regimenter der Europäischen Staaten im Ancien Régime des XVI. bis XVII. Jahrhunderts*, 1: *Die Stammlisten* (Osnabrück, 1986), pp. 685–694.
 - 3 H.L. Zwitzer, *‘De militie van den Staat’: Het leger van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* (Amsterdam, 1991), pp. 39–61, esp. pp. 45, 61; Olaf van Nimwegen, *De veertigjarige oorlog, 1672–1712: De strijd van de Nederlanders tegen de Zonnekoning* (Amsterdam, 2020), pp. 35–36; idem, *De Nederlandse Burgeroorlog (1748–1815)* (Amsterdam, 2021), pp. 393–395.

instated Kingdom of the Netherlands as the last units, reinstated during the Restoration, were only ultimately dismissed in 1829.

As an Early Modern phenomenon, Swiss foreign service has already been extensively studied. From the employee's (supply) perspective, historians paid attention both to the military entrepreneurs, often cantonal aristocratic dynasties, and to the soldiers themselves, considering the socio-cultural, economic, religious, and political incentives drawing men into service abroad.⁴ Monographs have been devoted to specific regiments⁵ as well as to economy and politics of foreign service in specific cantons.⁶ From the employer's perspective

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- 4 John Casparis, "The Swiss Mercenary System: Labor Emigration from the Semi-Periphery," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 5 (1982), 593–642; Hans Steffen, *Die Kompanien Kaspar Jodok Stockalperts: Beispiel eines Soldunternehmens im 17. Jahrhundert* (Brig, 1975); Hans Conrad Peyer, "Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der fremden Dienste für die Schweiz vom 15. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert," in *Könige, Stadt und Kapital: Aufsätze zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Mittelalters*, eds. Ludwig Schmutge, Roger Sablonier, and Karl Wanner (Zurich, 1982), 219–231; Christian Windler, "Ohne Geld keine Schweizer: Pensionen und Söldnerrekrutierung auf den eidgenössischen Patronagemärkten," in *Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Aussenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Hillard von Thiesen, Christian Windler (*Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung Beiheft*, 36) (Berlin, 2005), 105–133; Benjamin Hitz, *Kämpfen um Sold: Eine Alltags- und Sozialgeschichte schweizerischer Söldner in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna, 2015); Philippe Rogger, *Geld, Krieg und Macht: Pensionsherren, Söldner und eidgenössische Politik in den Mailänderkriegen, 1494–1516* (Baden, 2015); Marc Höchner, *Selbstzeugnisse von Schweizer Söldneroffizieren im 18. Jahrhundert (Herrschaft und soziale Systeme in der Frühen Neuzeit, 18)* (Göttingen, 2015); André Holenstein, Patrick Kury, and Kristina Schulz, *Schweizer Migrationsgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Baden, 2018), pp. 47–59.
- 5 Robert-Peter Eyer, *Die Schweizer Regimente in Neapel im 18. Jahrhundert (1734–1789)* (Bern, 2008); Willy Pfister, *Aargauer in fremden Kriegsdiensten, 1: Die Aargauer im bernischen Regiment und in der Garde in Frankreich 1701–1792: Die Aargauer im bernischen Regiment in Sardinien 1737–1799* (Aarau, 1980); idem, *Die Aargauer in fremden Kriegsdiensten, 2: Die bernischen Regimente und Gardekompanien in den Niederlanden 1701–1796* (Aarau, 1984); Guy de Meuron, *Le régiment Meuron, 1781–1816* (Lausanne, 1982); Adolphe Linder, *The Swiss Regiment Meuron at the Cape and afterwards, 1781–1816* (Cape Town, 2000); Alistair Nichols, *Wellington's Switzers: The Watteville Regiment (1801–1816). A Swiss regiment of the British army in Egypt, the Mediterranean, Spain and Canada* (Huntingdon, 2015).
- 6 Hans Conrad Peyer, "Wollgewerbe, Viehzucht, Solddienst und Bevölkerungsentwicklung in Stadt und Landschaft Freiburg i.Ü. vom 14. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert," in *Könige, Stadt und Kapital: Aufsätze zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Mittelalters*, eds. Ludwig Schmutge, Roger Sablonier, and Karl Wanner (Zurich, 1982), 163–182; Jean Steinauer, *Patriciens, fromagers, mercenaires: L'émigration fribourgeoise sous l'Ancien Régime* (Lausanne, 2000); Nathalie Büsser, "Militärunternehmertum, Aussenbeziehungen und fremdes Geld," in *Geschichte des Kantons Schwyz*, 3, ed. Historischer Verein des Kantons Schwyz (Schwyz, 2012), 69–127; Marc Höchner, "Das Söldnerwesen in der Zentralschweiz, 1500–1800, als Migrationsbewegung," *Der Geschichtsfreund* 167 (2014), 13–29. Despite its title, Walter Bühner, *Der Zürcher Solddienst des 18. Jahrhunderts: Sozial- und wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Aspekte* (Bern, 1977), is primarily concerned with the Zurich's policy regarding foreign service.

(demand), Swiss troops are known to have been highly sought after by many Early Modern polities. Their French service, in particular, is renowned: the 1521 treaty, renewed for the last time in 1777, granted the French monarchy a right to recruit 6,000 to 16,000 soldiers in the Confederation in exchange of a right to recall, a regular subsidy irrespective of the number of troops effectively provided, and commercial privileges such as toll exemptions and access to French salt, in addition to individual pensions serving as retainers or bribes for Swiss officer families.⁷ Similarly, often more strictly aligned than France to their confessional identity when it came to geographical and political areas of recruitment, the policies of other employers such as Spain, Piedmont-Sardinia, or Naples have been examined.⁸ Although some polities were able to follow the French example and obtained an alliance to consolidate their recruitment practices through official capitulations (*Standeskapitulationen*), as Habsburg Spain did with the Catholic cantons in 1587,⁹ others resorted to private capitulations with individual military entrepreneurs (*Partikularkapitulationen*). The latter gave greater freedom to the contractor, but could also lead to difficulties to recruit on Swiss territory.¹⁰ As attested by the Dutch case-study, the terms of service of foreign soldiers could however change over time as the respective polities and military entrepreneurs renegotiated them.

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- 7 Hans Conrad Peyer, *Verfassungsgeschichte der alten Schweiz* (Zurich, 1978), pp. 80–81. On the origins and significance of the French service: Holenstein, “Die wirklich entscheidenden Folgen von Marignano,” pp. 181–207; Andreas Würzler, “Symbiose ungleicher Partner: Die französisch-eidgenössische Allianz 1516–1798/1815,” *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte* 12 (2011), 53–75. Most recently: Benjamin Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten: Berner Militärunternehmer im Dienst des Sonnenkönigs Ludwig XIV.* (Baden, 2021). See also Jérôme Bodin, *Les Suisses au service de la France: de Louis XI à la Legion étrangère* (Paris, 1988).
- 8 Hermann Suter, *Innerschweizerisches Militär-Unternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 1971); Rudolf Bolzern, *Spanien, Mailand und die katholische Eidgenossenschaft: Militärische, wirtschaftliche und politische Beziehungen zur Zeit des Gesandten Alfonso Casati (1594–1621)* (Lucerne/Stuttgart, 1982); Andreas Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft: Die Casati als spanisch-mailändische Gesandte in Luzern und Chur (1660–1700)* (Zurich, 2015); Arnold Biel, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Savoyen und der Eidgenossenschaft zur Zeit Emanuel Philiberts, 1559–1580* (Basel/Stuttgart, 1967); N. Gysin, “Les troupes suisses dans le royaume de Sardaigne,” *Revue militaire suisse* 59 (1914), 662–670; Rudolf von Steiger, *Die Schweizer Regimenter in königlich-neapolitanischen Diensten in den Jahren 1848 und 1849* (Bern, 1851); Robert-Peter Eyer, *Die Schweizer Regimenter in Neapel im 18. Jahrhundert (1734–1789)* (Bern, 2008).
- 9 Bolzern, *Spanien*, pp. 28–30.
- 10 André Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa: Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der Schweizer Geschichte* (Baden, 2014), pp. 32–40, 127. On different types of fiscal-military contracts: Peter Wilson, “‘Mercenary’ contracts as Fiscal-Military Instruments,” in *Subsidies, Diplomacy, and State Formation in Europe, 1494–1789: Economies of Allegiance*, eds. Svante Norrhem, Erik Thomson (Lund, 2020), 68–92.

Less reputed than those serving in France, Swiss soldiers in the armies of the United Provinces are not unknown. By 1792, the Dutch were indeed the second-biggest consumer of Swiss regiments in Europe, behind France but ahead of Spain and Piedmont.¹¹ Matthijs Bokhorst's 1930 unfinished study of Dutch-Swiss relations around 1700 as well as Hermanus Amersfoort's *Koning en Kanton*, in particular, have respectively focused on a turning point for Dutch recruitment of Swiss soldiers in the 1690s and on its ultimate demise at the start of the 19th century.¹² A long-term comparative overview of Dutch contracting practices towards Swiss foreign troops, however, has not yet been attempted. Such an overview reveals both a continuity and the changing nature of this service beyond similarities of formal practice of private and official capitulations during the Ancien Régime and its Restauration. This first attempt to evaluate the overall contribution of Swiss soldiers to Dutch demand places the contracts themselves, as witnesses of a specific documentary culture and its actors, at the core of a two-fold analysis. I will first examine how and where Dutch demand and Swiss offer met. The place where negotiators and their networks connected to agree on the levying of troops indeed reveals the actors' changing agency, highlighting how Swiss service evolved from private enterprise over increasing cantonal control to potentially conflicting state monopolies. In a second stage, the evolution of contractual form and content will similarly reveal how both the Dutch and the Swiss polities increasingly sought to control manpower to the detriment of independent military entrepreneurs, leading to a monopoly of the emerging nation-state.

11 McCormack, *One Million Mercenaries*, p. 147; Robert Murray Bakker Albach, "Die Schweizer Regimenter in holländischen Diensten, 1593–1797," *Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Familienforschung* (1989), 57–104, mentions a total of 26 Swiss regiments serving in Europe in 1792, among which 13 for France, 4 for Spain, 3 for Piemont, and 6 for "Holland".

12 Matthijs Bokhorst, *Nederlands-Zwitserse betrekkingen voor en na 1700: Eerste deel (1685–1697)* (Amsterdam, 1930), pp. 66–101. The second part of Bokhorst's work remained unpublished. Hermanus Amersfoort, *Koning en Kanton: De Nederlandse staat en het einde van de Zwitserse krijgsdienst hier te lande, 1814–1829* (The Hague, 1988). See also: Martin Bundi, *Bündner Kriegsdienste in Holland um 1700: Eine Studie zu den Beziehungen zwischen Holland und Graubünden von 1693 bis 1730* (Chur, 1972); *De Nimègue à Java: les soldats suisses au service de la Hollande, XVII^e–XX^e siècles*, ed. Sébastien Rial (Morges, 2014). A rather traditional approach to Swiss soldiers in Dutch service in: Jürg A. Meier, *Vivat Hollandia: Zur Geschichte der Schweizer in holländischen Diensten, 1740–1795: Griffwaffen und Uniformen* (Zurich, 2010). On Dutch-Swiss relations in the Early Modern period, see also: Christine von Hoeningen-Huene, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und Holland im XVII. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1899); *The Republican Alternative: The Netherlands and Switzerland Compared*, eds. André Holenstein, Thomas Maissen, and Maarten Prak (Amsterdam, 2008).

1 Accessing and Negotiating Swiss Soldiers: Military Entrepreneurs and Rising States

Since the late 16th century, a few captains and colonels provided Swiss soldiers to the United Provinces on the basis of private capitulations and religious (reformed) affinity. Hence, in the early stages of the Revolt already, Swiss units served William the Silent of Orange (1533–84) under Nikolaus von Hattstatt and Veyt Schoner in 1568.¹³ The Estates General, however, only started hiring Swiss in 1598, retaining four companies dismissed from French service, each company counting 250 men. In their overview, Ten Raa and De Bas do not mention any public authority partaking in these capitulations on the Swiss side.¹⁴ Captains of the units were Guillaume du Puy,¹⁵ Hans Krieg von Bellikon,¹⁶ Hans Meyer,¹⁷ and Hans von Sax.¹⁸ When known, the familial and geographical background of these men suggests that confessional likeness may have brought them into Dutch service: Bellikon and Meyer were both from Reformed Zurich, whereas Sax's family had also converted to Protestantism.

Although other companies followed their example, they all seemed hard to maintain. Indeed, besides the French origins of the companies contracted in 1598, a failed attempt to recruit another 700 to 800 men dismissed from French service in 1606 underscores that the Dutch did not yet have the necessary networks to recruit Swiss units directly and on a systematic basis in the

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- 13 F.J.G. Ten Raa, F. De Bas, *Het Staatsche leger, 1568–1795*, 2 (Breda, 1913), p. 149 (“Claes Hattstaet”, “Veyt Schoner”). On Nikolaus von Hattstatt (1510–85) and his family involved in foreign service: Veronika Feller-Vest, “Hattstatt, von,” 2007, in *Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse* [DHS]. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/019632/2007-11-29/>. Accessed 23 April 2022.
- 14 Ten Raa, De Bas, *Het Staatsche leger*, 2, pp. 149, 168–171 (“Guillaume du Puy”, “Hans Krieg van Bellikon”, “Hans Meyer van Zurich”, “Hans van Saxen van Unterwalden”).
- 15 Not identified.
- 16 Andreas Steigmeier, “Bellikon,” 2004, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/001634/2004-06-11/>. Accessed 4 April 2022.
- 17 Given his origin, unlikely the Catholic Hans Meyer (1537–1612), member of the Council of 200 of Fribourg, captain of the Lanthen-Heid regiment in France: Pierre de Castella, “Meyer, Hans,” 2008, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/015021/2008-11-13/>. Accessed 4 April 2022.
- 18 Likely related to Johann Philipp von Sax-Hohensax (1550–96), who married Adriana Franziska von Brederode in the Netherlands, is attested in Dutch service in 1577–88, and was governor of Guelders in 1578: Anna-Maria Deplazes-Haefliger, “Sax-Hohensax, Johann Philipp von,” 2011, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/048767/2011-02-21/>. Accessed 4 April 2022. His father converted to Protestantism: idem, “Sax, von,” 2011, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/019541/2011-02-18/>. Accessed 4 April 2022.

cantons. Dutch access to Swiss manpower was seemingly obtained in France,¹⁹ which, unlike the United Provinces, had gained permanent access to recruitment in both Protestant and Catholic cantons since 1521.²⁰ Whether the Dutch contacted malcontent, zealous Reformed or supernumerary Swiss captains directly or whether France, then allied with the United Provinces, mediated these contacts, remains to be investigated.

Between 1609 and 1622, the contracted companies lost their distinctive Swiss character. They were complemented with men from other geographical origins or taken over by military entrepreneurs such as Christian of Brunswick-Lüneburg. No new capitulations were signed during this period. Up to the 1660s, at least, the United Provinces found it difficult to directly recruit captains and men in Switzerland.²¹

When the Estates General sought to augment their army in 1665 as the War of Devolution led to renewed international tensions,²² they addressed the Evangelical cantons to hire two Swiss regiments.²³ Possibly hoping to take advantage of tensions between France and the Confederation as Louis XIV sought to hire free companies at lower conditions rather than officially capitulated ones according to the alliance renewed in 1663,²⁴ a Dutch delegation in Paris took the opportunity to contact a cantonal delegation as well as Swiss colonels active in French service.²⁵ As the Swiss diet had condemned and threatened to sanction those privately capitulating with France in January 1666,²⁶ it is noteworthy that a few Protestant captains such as May (Bern) and Redinger (Zurich) offered their services before February 1666, as did Bonstetten (Zurich) in 1668,²⁷ at a time when Louis XIV reduced the French army strength after the conquest of the County of Burgundy.²⁸ Besides the changing conditions for Swiss troops in French service and uncertain prospects due to their

19 Ten Raa, De Bas, *Het Staatsche leger*, 2, pp. 168–171; Pfister, *Aargauer*, 2, p. 12.

20 Holenstein, “Die wirklich entscheidenden Folgen von Marignano”.

21 F.J.G. Ten Raa, F. De Bas, *Het Staatsche leger, 1568–1795*, 3 (Breda, 1915), p. 191; F.J.G. Ten Raa, F. De Bas, *Het Staatsche leger, 1568–1795*, 4 (Breda, 1918), p. 253. Pfister, *Aargauer*, 2, p. 12. See also: Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten*, p. 224.

22 Van Nimwegen, *De veertigjarige oorlog*, pp. 109–112.

23 Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten*, p. 224.

24 On French policy and the Swiss reaction in these years, see in particular: Katrin Keller, “Ein Schweizer Gardehauptmann als französischer Unterhändler: Johann Peter Stuppas Werbeverhandlungen in der Eidgenossenschaft 1671,” in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 92–115, pp. 95–99.

25 F.J.G. Ten Raa, F. De Bas, *Het Staatsche leger, 1568–1795*, 5 (Breda, 1921), pp. 488, 553–554.

26 Keller, “Ein Schweizer Gardehauptmann”, pp. 95–99.

27 Ten Raa, De Bas, *Het Staatsche leger*, 5, pp. 560–561.

28 Keller, “Ein Schweizer Gardehauptmann”, pp. 95–99.

(temporary) dismissal, confessional community and networks may have spurred these military entrepreneurs to offer their service to the Dutch Republic. In Zurich, especially, a strong current emphasising such community of Reformed interests existed.²⁹ Nevertheless, as the Evangelical cantons did not wish to enter the triple alliance, the United Provinces had to rely on individual capitulations with separate captains rather than on any political alliance. Without political support and permission to recruit, the men promised by Bonstetten proved hard to levy in the Confederation. The project was abandoned in October 1669.³⁰

Since 1668, rising tensions between France and the United Provinces, formerly allies, indeed complicated access to Swiss manpower even more. As reliance upon the French marketplace had become hazardous, obtaining direct access became a priority. As the United Provinces still desired to recruit three regiments (3,600 men), besides a cavalry company and a company of 150 “vuurroers” (matchlock guns), negotiations were resumed in 1671. Friedrich von Dohna was now sent directly to the Evangelical cantons.³¹ A private capitulation was concluded on 29 March 1672. The operation was abandoned again in July as Holland was unwilling to pay and as the French had, by then, invaded the United Provinces (May 1672).³² It nevertheless foreshadowed Dutch efforts of the 1690s.

Stressing both a political, Republican, and religious, Reformed, community with the United Provinces,³³ Petrus Valckenier’s well-studied mission to the Evangelical Cantons was indeed destined both to convince the representative assemblies to allow levies and to establish contacts to tap networks for contracting and recruiting such troops, bypassing the former French marketplace where Dutch efforts had been largely ineffective. Valckenier was successful, concluding several capitulations in Zurich in 1693 (Capol, Lochmann,

29 Sarah Rindlisbacher, “Mit Gottes Segen und obrigkeitlichem Auftrag: Der Zürcher Gesandtschaftsreise von Johann Heinrich Hottinger zu protestantischen Reichsfürsten und in die Niederlande 1664,” in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 68–91.

30 Ten Raa, De Bas, *Het Staatsche leger*, 5, pp. 560–561.

31 Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten*, pp. 224–225.

32 Ten Raa, De Bas, *Het Staatsche leger*, 5, pp. 560–561; van Nimwegen, *De veertigjarige oorlog*, pp. 112–118.

33 See in particular: Thomas Maissen, “Petrus Valkeniers republikanische Sendung: Die niederländische Prägung des neuzeitlichen schweizerischen Staatsverständnisses,” *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 48 (1998), 149–176; idem, “‘Par un pur motif de religion et en qualité de Republicain’: Der aussenpolitische Republikanismus der Niederlande und seine Aufnahme in der Eidgenossenschaft (ca. 1670–1710),” *Historische Zeitschrift* 39 (2004), 233–282.

Goumoëns) and 1694 (Sacconay).³⁴ Zurich was Valckenier's main place of residence during his stay, which suggests that the military entrepreneurs came to him to negotiate.³⁵ Moreover, since the 16th century, the town also held the confederation's archives, including treaties and alliances with foreign powers since the 16th century.³⁶ Using French-Swiss practice as a model, for instance to assess the monetary value of foreign service – systematically calculated in French écus and livres tournois to be converted in Dutch florins as we will see –, access to capitulations made by the Swiss with French authorities may hence have been sought after.

Nevertheless, the new Swiss-Dutch capitulations were still private contracts with military entrepreneurs rather than public ones involving political authorities. Valckenier's endeavours were facilitated by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) whereby Louis XIV had estranged reformed officers, now keen to serve coreligionists.³⁷ Hence, Hercules Capol (1642–1706), contracting for a Grison regiment, was a patrician who studied medicine at Leyden (1665) before starting a military career. He had served France until 1685, before joining Spain (in Milan) and, eventually, the Dutch Republic.³⁸ Co-signatories and fellow officers in Capol's regiment were Rudolf Anton Saluz, who had served France between 1677 and 1692,³⁹ and Conradin Beeli von Belfort (1639–1712), who would serve Zurich in the Second War of Villmergen.⁴⁰ For the Zurich battalion of 800 men, Heinrich Lochmann, Hans Felix Werdmüller, and Johannes Heinrich Schneeberger⁴¹ signed as lieutenant-colonel, major, and captain, respectively. Lochmann (1658–1702), born in Zurich, had been captain of Swiss guards in French service in 1686, but had resigned by 1690 as a consequence of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.⁴² Werdmüller (1658–1725),

34 The Hague, Nationaal Archief [NA], Raad van State [RvS], 1903.

35 Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten*, p. 228.

36 Andreas Würzler, "Tagsatzung," 2014, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/010076/2014-09-25/>. Accessed 3 April 2022.

37 On these men and pro- and anti-French factional strife in the Cantons, see also Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten*, pp. 208–261.

38 Martin Bundi, "Capol, Hercules," 2003, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/023378/2003-07-24/>. Accessed 7 April 2022.

39 Daniel Saluz, "Saluz, Rudolf Anton," 2007, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/024243/2007-02-23/>. Accessed 7 April 2022.

40 Adolf Collenberg, "Beeli, Conradin," 2002, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/023304/2002-05-03/>. Accessed 7 April 2022.

41 Likely related to Hans Ludwig Schneeberger (1594–1658), quartermaster at the Zurich arsenal and member of the Council: Martin Lassner, "Schneeberger, Hans Ludwig," 2010, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/018187/2010-05-18/>. Accessed 26 April 2022.

42 Katja Hürlimann, "Lochmann, Heinrich," 2008, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/023977/2008-07-09/>. Accessed 25 April 2022.

also born in Zurich, had been lieutenant in Lochmann's French regiment (1676) and was now heading for a brilliant career in Dutch service.⁴³ Similarly, Jacques François de Goumoëns (1667–1729), had started his career in French service, became colonel-proprietor, and now signed a capitulation for a Bernese company.⁴⁴ Finally, Jean de Sacconay (1646–1729), a Bernese officer who had left French service due to the persecution of Huguenots, capitulated for a complementary Swiss company on 1 January 1694 and would henceforth serve as lieutenant-colonel of the Mülinen regiment before obtaining his own regiment.⁴⁵ Goumoëns and Sacconay capitulated individually, as they signed to levy a company rather than a larger battalion or regiment for which Lochmann and Capol negotiated collectively with their associates. This reflected a practice specific to the Bernese units: as the canton did not avow the levies, the capitulations were made for free companies which would later integrate a regiment to be avowed in the Netherlands.⁴⁶ Zurich's authorities, on the other hand, after having ineffectively fought recruitment through repression, now regularised their captains' capitulation. In exchange, the Estates General offered a vague promise to advocate Zurich's right to free commerce and, especially, grain provisions, at the Viennese imperial court (article 29). In a period of direness, potential access to grain replaced French salt as a bargaining chip.⁴⁷

After these first private capitulations, a further series of capitulations was negotiated in the Netherlands. As they could finance the serving regiments through Amsterdam's capital market⁴⁸ and complement them through already established networks of contracted military entrepreneurs, the United Provinces were now in a stronger negotiating position. Both Bern and the Grisons, each separately, sent envoys to The Hague in the early 1710s. Although Bokhorst suggests a shift in offer and demand, the Swiss becoming keener to provide soldiers than the Dutch were to taking them on,⁴⁹ Bern and the Grisons foremost sought to regularise troops de facto already serving the Dutch via particular capitulations rather than to provide more men. Especially after the turmoil

43 Bernhard Rieder, "Werdmüller, Hans Felix," 2013, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/024419/2013-10-03/>. Accessed 25 April 2022.

44 Damien Bregnard, "Goumoëns, Jacques François de," 2004, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/023730/2004-11-24/>. Accessed 7 April 2022.

45 Lucienne Hubler: "Sacconay, Jean de," 2011, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/024227/2011-02-10/>. Accessed 7 April 2022.

46 Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten*, pp. 233–239.

47 Bühler, *Der Zürcher Solddienst*, p. 30. See also Sarah Rindlisbacher, *Botschafter des Protestantismus: Aussenpolitisches Handeln von Zürcher Stadtgeistlichen im 17. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2022).

48 James C. Riley, *International government finance and the Amsterdam capital market, 1740–1815* (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 28–67.

49 Bokhorst, *Nederlands-Zwitserse betrekkingen*, pp. xxiv–xxv.

caused by the Battle of Malplaquet (11 September 1709), where Swiss soldiers, even relatives such as the Bernese May family, had fought each other as they served on both the French and the Allied side,⁵⁰ avowing the regiments would allow the cantonal authorities to regain a degree of control on both human and financial capital embodied in them. The envoys' presence in the Dutch Republic must however also be considered in the context of peace talks leading to the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). Beyond capitulations, they negotiated alliance and subsidy treaties with the Estates General. On behalf of the Grisons, Peter von Salis (1675–1749) ensured recognition of the Three Leagues' territorial sovereignty;⁵¹ general representative of the Protestant cantons in the peace negotiations, François-Louis de Pesmes de Saint-Saphorin was commissioned by Bern to conclude a defensive alliance.⁵² Both Salis and Saint-Saphorin had served as officers in Swiss regiments abroad, respectively in France (until 1702) and in the Dutch and imperial armies (1685–88, 1692–1705). However, despite family members still directly involved in military service – Salis's brother served as captain in the Capol regiment and Saint-Saphorin's brother-in-law was no less than Jacques François de Goumoëns –,⁵³ neither Salis nor Saint-Saphorin acted as military entrepreneurs. Whereas such personal networks were usually not disregarded, Salis and Saint-Saphorin acted as representatives of their cantons, securing alliance and subsidy treaties (1712, 1713) as well as a general capitulation with Bern drawn up in The Hague in 1714.⁵⁴

As the War of Spanish Succession came to an end, the Dutch withdrew from major international conflicts and substantially reduced troop strength of the existing regiments, dismissing, reorganising and redistributing companies in 1714, 1716/17, and 1737, respectively, according to the terms of this general

50 On Malplaquet: Hervé de Weck, "Malplaquet, bataille de," 2008, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/008913/2008-08-25/>. Accessed 20 April 2022; André Corvisier, *La bataille de Malplaquet, 1709: l'effondrement de la France évitée* (Paris, 1997).

51 Jean Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, 8/1 (Amsterdam, 1726), pp. 386–387. On Peter von Salis: Jürg Simonett, "Salis, Peter von (Soglio)," 2011, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/016954/2011-12-12/>. Accessed 11 June 2022. On his diplomatic mission: Bundi, *Bündner Kriegsdienste*, pp. 70–89.

52 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 423–427. On Saint-Saphorin: Rolf Stücheli, "Pesmes de Saint-Saphorin, François-Louis de," 2010, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/024135/2010-09-27/>. Accessed 22 April 2022; Sven Stelling-Michaud, *Saint-Saphorin et la politique de la Suisse pendant la guerre de Succession d'Espagne (1700–1710)* (Villette-lès-Cully, 1935). On this mission to The Hague, see especially: Stefan Altorfer-Ong, "Exporting Mercenaries, Money and Mennonites: A Swiss Diplomatic Mission to the Hague, 1710–1715," in *The Republican Alternative: The Netherlands and Switzerland Compared*, eds. André Holenstein, Thomas Maissen, and Maarten Prak (Amsterdam, 2008), 237–257.

53 Bundi, *Bündner Kriegsdienste*, p. 76; Bregnard, "Goumoëns, Jacques François de".

54 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 425–427. See also Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten*, pp. 252–257.

capitulation, as we will see.⁵⁵ The same terms allowed the existing Swiss regiments to be brought back to full strength during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48).⁵⁶ In 1748, the end of the war did not impede the recruitment of a regiment of Swiss guards, as well as four new regiments, only one of which remained in existence beyond 1749.⁵⁷ Hence, six regiments, including the guards, served up to the end of the Ancien Régime, shortly complemented by the Meuron regiment from 1781 onwards.⁵⁸

After 1714, the official capitulation with Bern negotiated by Saint-Saphorin set the framework for the private capitulations. To complement existing units and their recruitment networks, new contractors and their networks were again contracted in the confederacy. Onno Zwier van Haren, Dutch plenipotentiary and commissioner general of Swiss and Grison troops was hence sent to Zurich to contract Jacob de Budé and the captains who would serve in his regiment.⁵⁹ On 1 and 6 January 1748, Budé himself signed a capitulation for a regiment of eight companies, to be complemented with another four companies, levied and employed under the conditions existing for the Bern regiment. To raise the additional four companies, Budé entered into another agreement on 1 February 1748, in the name of five fellow military entrepreneurs, company captains who would serve in his regiment and, each individually, raise 200 men.⁶⁰ Captains Michael Sturzenegger⁶¹ and Jean Antoine Porta,⁶² on the

55 J.W. Wijn et al., *Het Staatse leger*, 8 (The Hague, 1964), pp. 277, 486–490; Pfister, *Aargauer*, 2, pp. 19–20; Tessin, *Die Regimenter*, pp. 685–694.

56 Pfister, *Aargauer*, 2, pp. 20–22.

57 H.L. Zwitzer, J. Hoffenaar, and C.W. van der Spek, *Het Staatse leger*, 9 (Amsterdam, 2012), p. 862.

58 Zwitzer, Hoffenaar, and van der Spek, *Het Staatse leger*, 9, pp. 856–857; Tessin, *Die Regimenter*, pp. 685–694; Höchner, *Selbstzeugnisse*, pp. 278–280.

59 NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.207. On O.Z. van Haren: Prinsen, “Haren (Onno Zwier van),” in *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*, 8, eds. P.C. Molhuysen, P.J. Blok (Leiden, 1930), col. 684–689.

60 NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.207. On Budé (1693–1774), who served in France between 1710 and 1745 before entering in Dutch service (1745–50) where he became colonel, then general-major in 1766, and a member of the Council of 200 from 1728 onwards: Vincent Perret, “Budé, Jacob de,” 2002, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/020242/2002-03-25/>. Accessed 22 April 2022.

61 Michael Sturzenegger was father to Ulrich (1714–81), lived in Trogen and was a member of the Council: Thomas Fuchs, “Sturzenegger, Ulrich,” 2012, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/026185/2012-07-20/>. Accessed 26 April 2022.

62 The a Porta family was installed in Chur since the mid-15th century, and at least one family member had served in a martial quality (captain of the castle of Fürstenberg in 1578): Martin Bundi, “Porta, von,” 2018, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/020152/2018-01-18/>. Accessed 26 April 2022.

other hand, negotiated their capitulations for an infantry company separately, partly on their own terms as respectively agreed upon on 9 and 22 January 1748.⁶³ These three capitulations were contracted in Geneva, Zurich, and Bern respectively.⁶⁴ At least the reference to Geneva suggests an effort made to meet Budé in his hometown. Significantly, several capitulations made with these company captains, resembling forms in which only name and signature of the contractor had to be filled out, show The Hague as intended, yet subsequently erased and amended, place of negotiation. Clearly, demand had to seek its supply to tap new recruitment networks abroad.⁶⁵

As the Batavian republic reformed its army, the Swiss units were dismissed in 1796–97.⁶⁶ Conscription became the basis of a national army as Enlightened ideas about citizenship and nationhood were applied, just like in the French revolutionary armies.⁶⁷ Whether those ideals were immediately sustainable is however questionable: in September 1803 at the latest, Napoleonic France resumed hiring Swiss units on the basis of private capitulations and a right obtained from the reinstated confederacy to recruit no less than 16,000 men.⁶⁸ Rendering foreign service less appealing, new political ideals and changing economic circumstances also lay at the heart of the army organization of the newly instated Kingdom of the Netherlands (1814). Here too, implementing these changes proved difficult: on the one hand, conscription had been strongly associated with the despised French rule; on the other hand, the dynasty of Orange was eager for compliant troops at her command.⁶⁹ Hence, when

63 NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213.

64 NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.207.

65 NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213 (capitulation Sturzenegger: The Hague replaced by Zurich); NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213 (capitulation Porta: The Hague replaced by Bern).

66 Zwitter, Hoffenaar, and van der Spek, *Het Staatsche leger*, 9, pp. 856–857, 862.

67 Hervé Dréyillon, “Une Révolution militaire, 1789–1795,” in *Histoire militaire de la France*, 1 (Paris, 2018), pp. 481–482; Philippe Catros, “‘Tout Français est soldat et se doit à la défense de la patrie’ (Retour sur la naissance de la conscription militaire),” *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 348 (2007), 7–23. Frederick C. Schneid, “Introduction,” in *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?*, eds. Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, and Harold D. Blanton (London/New York, 2009), 1–5, rightly questions the longevity of revolutionary and Napoleonic conscription before the end of the 19th century. On ideals and reception of conscription in France, see: Annie Crépin, *Défendre la France: Les Français, la guerre et le service militaire, de la guerre de Sept Ans à Verdun* (Rennes, 2005). On the Enlightenment’s increasing critique of foreign service: Rudolf Bolzern, “The Swiss foreign service and Bernese reform politics in the late eighteenth century,” *History of European Ideas* 33 (2007), 463–475.

68 McCormack, *One Million Mercenaries*, pp. 162–170, esp. p. 165.

69 Herman Amersfoort, “The Dutch Army in Transition: From All-Volunteer Force to Cadre-Militia Army, 1795–1830,” in *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour, 1500–2000*, ed. Erik-Jan Zürcher (Amsterdam, 2013), 447–477.

William of Orange (1772–1843), son to the last stadholder, became sovereign Prince of the United Provinces, then King of the Netherlands, he desired to recruit 12,000 Swiss troops.⁷⁰ Starting over from scratch, Elias van der Hoeven was sent as plenipotentiary and extraordinary envoy to the Confederacy.⁷¹ Between 23 September 1814 and 28 August 1816, he negotiated contracts for no less than 11,997 Swiss soldiers.⁷²

Despite the advent of a new national, albeit federal, political framework,⁷³ Swiss cantons still negotiated and concluded official capitulations individually or in clusters of several cantons. A general capitulation was considered but not agreed upon. Bern set the stage with a first treaty signed on 23 September 1814. Capitulations were not only contracted with the traditionally manpower-providing Protestant regions of Bern, Zurich (19 October 1814), and the Grisons (27 October 1814; 28 August 1816).⁷⁴ Schaffhausen, St Gall, Aargau, and Thurgau (20 December 1814) now officially capitulated to raise a few companies within their jurisdiction to join the Zurich regiment, as did Glarus (24 December 1814; 14 February 1816) and Appenzell (29 December), both to join the Grison regiment.⁷⁵ They hence departed from former practices of ‘laissez-faire’ recruitment on the soldiers’ market.⁷⁶ More drastically, formerly *terrae incognitae* for official capitulations with the Dutch, Catholic cantons such as Zug (15 March 1815), Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Lucerne, Solothurn, and Ticino (29 March 1815; 24 October 1815; 23 February 1816), agreed to recruitment within their jurisdiction,⁷⁷ reflecting changing attitudes towards religious ideology as well as a need for catholic officers and soldiers to find new markets beyond their traditional employers.⁷⁸

Although Lagemans’ edition of these treaties does not systematically specify Swiss negotiators, a pattern of political involvement represented by higher government officials, siding if not overruling the military entrepreneurs,

70 Amersfoort, *Koning en Kanton*, p. 111.

71 Amersfoort, *Koning en Kanton*, pp. 109–141, esp. pp. 110–112.

72 E.G. Lagemans, *Recueil des traités et conventions conclues par le royaume des Pays-Bas avec les puissances étrangères depuis 1813 à nos jours*, 1 (The Hague, 1858), treaties no. 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 24, 35, 41, 42, and 50.

73 Renato Morosoli, “Bundesvertrag,” 2010, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/009809/2010-05-07/>. Accessed 10 June 2022.

74 Lagemans, *Recueil*, 1, treaties no. 10, 12, 13, and 50.

75 Lagemans, *Recueil*, 1, treaties no. 14, 15, 16, and 41.

76 Such “laissez-faire” clearly appears in a letter by Reboulet to Heinsius on 20 August 1710: *De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius, 1702–1720*, 11, ed. Augustus J. Veenendaal Jr. (The Hague, 1990), p. 72 (letter 128).

77 Lagemans, *Recueil*, 1, treaties no. 20, 24, 35, and 42.

78 Amersfoort, *Koning en Kanton*, pp. 109–141.

emerges. Indeed, Bern's treaty was negotiated by both politicians and officers acting as members of Bern's sovereign council: whereas Niklaus Rudolph von Wattenwyl,⁷⁹ Rudolph Wurstemberger,⁸⁰ and F.A. Tschiffeli de Stabroek⁸¹ were avoyer, councillor, and member of the small city council, respectively, Rudolf von Luternau⁸² and Charles May de Buren were, respectively, an artillery colonel and a lieutenant-colonel of infantry.⁸³ Similarly, Federal Cantonal Mayor Jakob Ulrich Sprecher von Bernegg,⁸⁴ Cantonal Associate Judge T. von Castelberg,⁸⁵ Mayor Anton von Salis-Soglio⁸⁶ and Lieutenant-Colonel Jakob Sprecher

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- 79 Niklaus Rudolf von Wattenwyl (1760–1832), formerly in Dutch service (1776–84), major of a Thun regiment in 1795, high commanding officer of the Federal Swiss troops in 1805, 1809, and 1813–14. He was avoyer of Bern from 1803 to 1829, alternatively with Niklaus Friedrich von Mülinen, Christoph Friedrich von Freudenreich, and Emanuel Friedrich von Fischer: Christoph Zürcher, “Wattenwyl, Niklaus Rudolf von,” 2013, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/013317/2013-08-26/>. Accessed 27 April 2022.
- 80 Rudolf Wurstemberger (1790–1823), son of Ludwig, officer in the Austrian army until 1814, then partaking in the Swiss expedition to Franche-Comté in 1815, deputy of the Grand Council of Bern in 1821: Franziska Schönauer, “Wurstemberger, Rudolf,” 2013, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/012412/2013-11-27/>. Accessed 27 April 2022.
- 81 Member of the Bernese Tschiffeli patrician family, many of which's members served as foreign troops: Hans Braun, “Tschiffeli,” 2012, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/020918/2012-11-20/>. Accessed 27 April 2022.
- 82 Rudolf von Luternau (1769–1849), served France until 1792, colonel of Bern's artillery in 1804, general inspector of the Federal artillery in 1809, entered the Grand Council of Bern in 1814, and the Small Council from 1816 until the end of the Restauration in 1831: Hans Braun, “Luternau, Rudolf von,” 2008, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/023989/2008-07-03/>. Accessed 27 April 2022.
- 83 Lagemans, *Recueil*, 1, pp. 41–49, treaty no. 10.
- 84 Jakob Ulrich Sprecher von Bernegg (1765–1841), studied law in Wittenberg and Jena, delegate at the Grison Diet in 1790, politically active in the Grisons between 1791 and 1839, deputy at the Grand Council of the Grisons: Martin Bundi, “Sprecher von Bernegg, Jakob Ulrich,” 2013, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/005268/2013-01-10/>. Accessed 26 April 2022.
- 85 Likely Johann Theodor von Castelberg (1748–1818), studied at Pavia, secretary to the Grison in 1766, six times president of the Ligue between 1777 and 1798: Ursus Brunold, “Castelberg, Johann Theodor von,” 2005, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/016796/2005-02-01/>. Accessed 27 April 2022.
- 86 Anton von Salis (1760–1831), mayor of Bregaglia (1780), president of Chur, Zernez, and Southern Tirol during the temporary government envisaging Grison annexation by Austria (1799–1800), imperial chamberlain in 1811: Jürg Simonett, “Salis, Anton von (Soglio),” 2012, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/013586/2012-01-06/>. Accessed 27 April 2022.

von Bernegg⁸⁷ negotiated on behalf of the Grisons.⁸⁸ For Glarus, Cantonal Mayor Nicolas Heer assumed the same responsibilities in February 1816.⁸⁹ The August 1816 complementary agreement for the Grisons was negotiated by Federal Cantonal Mayor Jakob Ulrich Sprecher von Bernegg, again,⁹⁰ Federal President Gaudenz von Planta,⁹¹ and Cantonal Associate Judge Johann Placidus Caderas.⁹² This time, no active officers were involved,⁹³ confirming a shift in official agency from military to political powerholders despite the clear familial ties between both worlds as illustrated by the Berneggs. Uri and Schwyz constitute an exception to this institutionalised control embodied in politicians, as General Don Louis Auf der Maur, stadholder regent and captain general of Schwyz, signed the agreement for a complementary battalion to the Catholic infantry regiment on 24 October 1815.⁹⁴ Hence, the Schwyzer Auf der Maur

87 Jakob Sprecher von Bernegg (1756–1822), served in the United Provinces, captain at 18 and major at 28, accompanied the stadholder to England and was lieutenant-colonel of the exiled Dutch troops on the Isle of Wight. Proprietor of the Swiss Sprecher regiment (1814), he served William I of the Netherlands (1772–1843) as major-general (1816): Daniel Sprecher, “Sprecher von Bernegg, Jakob,” 2012, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/048990/2012-02-27/>. Accessed 26 April 2022.

88 Lagemans, *Recueil*, 1, p. 51, treaty no. 13.

89 Lagemans, *Recueil*, 1, p. 167, treaty no. 41. Niklaus Heer (1775–1822), former adjunct-major to Glarus troops sent to help Bern in 1798, was member of the canton’s diet in 1802, Landamman in 1803–6, 1808–11, 1813–16, and 1818–21, and delegate to the Diet from 1803 to 1820. Head commissioner of war in 1805, 1809, 1813, and 1815, he took an active role in the Swiss army reform: Veronika Feller-Vest, “Heer, Niklaus,” 2007, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/005996/2007-10-10/>. Accessed 22 April 2022.

90 Bundi, “Sprecher von Bernegg, Jakob Ulrich”.

91 Gaudenz von Planta (1757–1834), studied law in Vienna, was Landamman in 1786, member of the Grand Council of the Grisons from 1812 to 1832, of the Small Council in 1815, 1819, 1823, 1827, and 1830, and took part in drafting the Cantonal constitution in 1814: Jürg Simonett, “Planta, Gaudenz von (Samedan),” 2010, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/005278/2010-09-28/>. Accessed 26 April 2022.

92 Johann Placidus Caderas (1774–1821), was member of the Grand Council (1805–20) and its president in 1815 and 1818, also president of the Grison League in 1815, 1818, and 1820, and delegate to the Diet in 1816: Adolf Collenberg, “Caderas, Johann Placidus,” 2008, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/005279/2008-05-27/>. Accessed 26 April 2022.

93 Lagemans, *Recueil*, 1, pp. 191–192, treaty no. 50.

94 Lagemans, *Recueil*, 1, pp. 156–157, treaty no. 35. Ludwig Auf der Maur (1779–1836), officer serving Sardinia, returned to Schwyz and became aide-de-camp of Aloys von Reding in 1798, captain of Schwyz in 1803, vice-Landamman (1813–15, 1824–25), commander of the Swiss catholic regiment in the Netherlands (1816–21), and recruiting officer for the Schwyzer capitulations with the kingdom of Two-Sicilies: Franz Auf der Maur, “Auf der Maur, Ludwig,” 2013, in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/007268/2013-12-19/>. Accessed 22 April 2022.

family tried to take up a traditional military entrepreneurship which it had exercised before the Revolution.⁹⁵ Assuredly, these differences reflect the autonomy retained by each canton and its political networks and organisation.

Beyond new institutionalised politics, the place of negotiation and conclusion of the treaties reflected a persistence of old Dutch practices and ties with the Protestant cantons. Indeed, the new capitulations were almost systematically concluded in their political centres, Bern, Zurich, and Chur. These places did not only concentrate the financial and political elites who had the economic power and political authority to provide troops; they also constituted knowledge reservoirs of a fiscal-military documentary culture and practices to which one was eager to resort. Expectedly, this applied to the Bern, Zurich, and Grison capitulation. But Zurich, in particular, also served as place of negotiation for Schaffhausen, Aargau, Thurgau, and St Gall, capitulating to provide companies for the Zurich regiment (20 December 1814),⁹⁶ Glarus, capitulating for two companies joining the Grison regiment (24 December), Appenzell (3 companies to join the Grison regiment),⁹⁷ Zug (15 March, 1 company to serve in a Swiss catholic regiment), the Catholic cantons (29 March – Uri, Unterwalden, Schwyz, Lucerne, Solothurn, Ticino, and Zug),⁹⁸ and Uri and Schwyz again (3rd battalion, 24 October 1815).⁹⁹ In February 1816, Bern became a place of negotiation for Glarus (two additional companies for the Grison regiment, 14 February), Schwyz, Appenzell, and Ticino (23 February).¹⁰⁰ As the Long Federal Diet was held in Zurich from 6 April 1814 to 31 August 1815, Zurich then alternating with Bern and Lucerne as siege of the regular Federal Diets,¹⁰¹ contracting practice seems to have reflected both old traditions – Dutch demand meeting military entrepreneurs and political authorities at home – and new institutions – the Federal diet not only hosting the traditional protestant manpower-suppliers but also their catholic counterparts.

2 Fiscal-Military Contracts: Emergence, Stabilisation, and Persistence of Contractual Forms

The 1693–94 particular capitulations negotiated by Valckenier set a first framework for Swiss service in the United Provinces. Although these contracts were

95 Büsser, “Militärunternehmertum,” p. 74; Amersfoort, “Dutch Army in Transition,” p. 471.

96 Lagemans, *Recueil*, 1, pp. 41–49, no. 10; p. 50, no. 12; p. 51, no. 13; p. 52, no. 14.

97 *Ibid.*, p. 53, no. 15; pp. 53–54, no. 16.

98 *Ibid.*, pp. 63–64, no. 20; pp. 69–70, no. 24.

99 *Ibid.*, pp. 156–157, no. 35.

100 *Ibid.*, p. 167, no. 41; p. 168, no. 42.

101 Morosoli, “Bundesvertrag”.

not yet standardised, the content and sequence of their respective articles already suggest a certain degree of uniformization constraining a colonel- or captain-entrepreneur's negotiating agency in respect to the employer's specifications. Containing approximately 20 articles each, the contracts regulated the basic conditions of Swiss service.

To recruit their respective companies, the Dutch supported the Swiss captains, acting as military entrepreneurs, with an interest-free loan of 6,000 *livres*, to be deducted from the company's pay at a monthly rate of 250 *livres* (over two years).¹⁰² On top of this, two entrepreneurs benefited from an annual pension.¹⁰³ This, however, now constituted an exception rather than the rule. For each recruit, a company captain would perceive a five *écus* signing bonus, in addition to five *écus* travel money for each soldier to reach the United Provinces.¹⁰⁴ A captain's further gratifications depended on the strength of a company: nominal strength was set at 200, including staff, with a gratification of 27 additional pays to the captain.¹⁰⁵ Conceived as an incentive to maintain a company's effective strength, this gratification would be reduced by half when a company fell below 175 men, and lost entirely if it fell below 165.¹⁰⁶ Casualties would be replaced at the captain's expense. Each captain was however allowed two months to replenish his company after an engagement. During this time, he would receive pay according to the last muster before said engagement.¹⁰⁷

Soldiers' pay was set at 16 *livres* 4 *sous* (all in "French money", i.e. *livres tournois*), equivalent to 13 *florins* 10 *sous* money of Holland – a specification strongly suggesting alignment to French practices to which the Swiss were

¹⁰² NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 10; capitulation Capol, art. 7 (specified as 2,000 *écus* in this first contract, but equally amounting to 6,000 *livres*, at an equivalence rate of one to three); capitulation Goumoëns, art. 6; capitulation Sacconay, art. 1 (exception: 1,000 *écus*, only half of it, 1,500 *livres*, to be recovered at rate of 300 *livres* per month, unless the Estates General decide to grant it as a gratification "considering his losses in France").

¹⁰³ NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Capol, art. 3 (pension of 200 *écus* to Saluz); capitulation Sacconay, art. 3 (pension of 200 *écus* to Sacconay).

¹⁰⁴ NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 11, 12; capitulation Capol, art. 8, 9 (travel money, signing bonus of 15 *livres* only on arrival in the Netherlands); capitulation Goumoëns, art. 7, 8; capitulation Sacconay (exception: travel money nor signing bonus are included, which seems logical as the capitulated company would largely be recruited among already serving, supernumerary, Grison troops, as per art. 1).

¹⁰⁵ NA, RvS, 1903 and Staten Generaal, 12584.291, capitulation Lochmann, art. 5; NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Capol, art. 4; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 1; capitulation Sacconay, art. 5.

¹⁰⁶ NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 7, 8, and 9; capitulation Capol, art. 6; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 3, 4, and 5; capitulation Sacconay, art. 7, 8, and 9.

¹⁰⁷ NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 21; capitulation Capol, art. 18; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 17; capitulation Sacconay, art. 19.

more acquainted due to long-standing traditions of service.¹⁰⁸ Recruits signed up for at least three years, and dismissal was to be compensated with two months' pay for each soldier;¹⁰⁹ provisions protecting both the soldiers and the captain's investment. Clothing and weaponry had to be provided by each captain to his soldiers at company level.¹¹⁰ Ammunition, on the other hand, was provided by the Estates of the United Provinces.¹¹¹

In terms of discipline, the companies were entitled to their own jurisdiction, "as the Swiss are accustomed to enjoy everywhere", a reference to companies serving in France and elsewhere and a clear concession, considering disciplinary reforms subjecting soldiers who served the United Provinces to stricter (and direct) military justice since the late 16th century.¹¹² To maintain discipline, regular pay was essential, and ought to be provided to the company in monthly thirds, respectively paid out on the 1st, the 10th and the 20th of the each month.¹¹³ Moreover, each company was allowed its own sutler, ensuring regular provisioning on campaigns.¹¹⁴ Recruits were ensured access to all services available to other troops serving the United Provinces (accommodation, bread, hospitals).¹¹⁵ Finally, before their arrival, the recruited companies would be assigned easily reachable quarters on the frontiers, a measure destined at maintaining control over the recruits once they entered the United Provinces.¹¹⁶

Although some restrictions on recruitment of French deserters may have been related to discipline, morality, and the fear to see dishonest recruits leave

108 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 6; capitulation Capol, art. 5; capitulation Goumoëns, art 2; capitulation Sacconay, art. 6.

109 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 22, 23, capitulation Capol, art. 19, 20; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 18, 19; capitulation Sacconay, art. 20, 21.

110 NA, RvS 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 15; capitulation Capol, art. 12; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 11; capitulation Sacconay, art. 10.

111 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 16; capitulation Capol, art. 13; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 12; capitulation Sacconay, art. 14.

112 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art.17; capitulation Capol, art. 14; capitulation Goumoëns, art.13; capitulation Sacconay, art. 15. On the disciplinisation of the army: Marjolein 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence: Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands, 1570–1680* (London/New York, 2014), pp. 37–57.

113 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 19; capitulation Capol, art. 15; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 15; capitulation Sacconay, art. 17.

114 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art.18; capitulation Capol [article absent]; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 14; capitulation Sacconay, art. 16.

115 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 24; capitulation Capol, art. 21; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 20; capitulation Sacconay, art. 22.

116 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 13; capitulation Capol, art. 8; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 9; capitulation Sacconay, art. 11.

after receiving their signing bonus or pay, another restriction was clearly political: subjects of the Estates General, England, and Spain, then allies in the Nine Years' War, were excluded from the captains' recruitment pool.¹¹⁷ In January 1694, Sacconay, the last captain to contract, was imposed a complementary restriction, extending to German soldiers from the Westphalian, Lower Saxon, and Lower Rhine circles. Moreover, at least two thirds of the company now had to be recruited among the "Suisse naturels", i.e. subjects of the cantons.¹¹⁸

Two potentially contentious points regarding control of the regiments by Swiss and Dutch military elites, on the one hand, and by the cantons and the United Provinces, on the other hand, deserve further attention. Firstly, each captain retained appointment of his company's officer staff, subject to approval of the regiment's lieutenant-colonel. Where larger units were capitulated, the latter retained the appointment of the captains, subject to approval of the general. At the time of contracting, this position was held by Arnold Joost van Keppel, Lord Albemarle, colonel-general to the Swiss troops in Dutch service and a favourite of William III of Orange (1650–1702).¹¹⁹ Included in the capitulations for the Lochmann battalion and the Capol regiment as well as in those for the individual companies contracted with Goumoëns and Sacconay, the specification regarding appointment of the captains further hints upon a progressive standardisation of the contracts: both Goumoëns and Sacconay can already be considered appointed when signing their contract.¹²⁰ As these provisions concerned the most lucrative positions, with possible promotion to captaincy over time, appointments however led to recurring disputes over the following years,¹²¹ necessitating more precisely defined terms in future contracts, particularly as the Swiss elites desired to reserve officer positions to their own cantonal networks.

Secondly, the particular capitulations did barely restrict service: all captains signed a statement to serve the Estates General wherever and against whom-ever required, except against their canton ("nostre patrie"). Whether this service was defensive or could entail offensive actions was not specified.

117 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 14; capitulation Capol, art. 10; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 10; capitulation Sacconay, art. 13.

118 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Sacconay, art. 12, 13.

119 A.J. Van der Aa, *Biografisch woordenboek der Nederlanden*, 10 (Haarlem, 1862), pp. 126–128.

120 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Lochmann, art. 20; capitulation Capol, art. 17; capitulation Goumoëns, art. 16; capitulation Sacconay, art. 18.

121 The correspondence of Heinsius is overflowing with such cases involving Albemarle. See, for instance, in 1702 and without being exhaustive: *De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius, 1702–1720*, 1, ed. Augustus J. Veenendaal Jr. (The Hague, 1976), pp. 283, 289, 326, 401, 403, and 408.

From 1714 onwards, the general capitulation with Bern sharpened and consolidated the initial framework for further Swiss capitulations. Indeed, the 1713 alliance with the Grisons even explicitly stated that Grison troops would serve under the same conditions as those officially capitulated with Bern. Hence, between 1714 and 1748, the form of the capitulations, up to the content of each numbered article, is strikingly similar, almost formulaic. The standard articles already set in the 1690s, such as 6,000 *livres* interest-free loans to company captains to levy recruits, five *écus* signing bonus complemented with five *écus* travel money per recruit, as well as a captain's gratification according to his company's strength, were maintained.¹²² Individual pensions to particular officers disappeared. A soldier's monthly pay equally remained unchanged (!), and the cost of his equipment was borne by the captain. As in Sacconay's 1694 capitulation, a company now systematically had to hold at least two thirds of Swiss soldiers, and the last third was to be recruited among high Germans (Swabia, Austria, Bavaria, Franconia, Upper Rhine, and Upper Saxony).¹²³ Additional specifications and new articles, however, solved issues which had emerged with the first capitulated units. Overall, the length of these fiscal-military contracts increased to approximately 30 to 32 articles, a seemingly stable number until the Revolution, as both the Estates General and the cantonal authorities bargained to increase their respective control over Swiss units as agreed upon in principle in the alliance and subsidy treaties.

Firstly, the Estates General desired to increase efficiency of the hired troops. Although each captain was still to provide weapons and clothing to his men, calibres had to be equal to those in use by the State troops – an essential specification to use the ammunition provisioned by the Estates General, and

122 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 425–427 (general capitulation Bern), art. 1 (loan), 2 (signing bonus), 3 (travel money), 5 (weaponry), 6 (length of service), 7 (pay), 11–12 (captain's gratification), 24 (ammunition), 26 (sutler), 27 (regularity of pay), and 29 (access to accommodation and services); NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.207, capitulation Budé, art. 1 (loan), 2 (signing bonus), 3 (travel money), 5 (weaponry and clothing), 6 (pay), 8–11 (captain's gratification), 21 (ammunition), 23 (sutler), 24 (regularity of pay), and 26 (access to accommodation and services); NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Sturzenegger, art. 1 (loan), 2 (signing bonus), 3 (travel money), 5 (weaponry), 6 (pay), 8–11 (captain's gratification), 21 (ammunition), 23 (sutler), 24 (regularity of pay), and 26 (access to accommodation and services); NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Porta, art. 1 (loan), 2 (signing bonus), 3 (travel money), 5 (weaponry), 6 (pay), 8–11 (captain's gratification), 21 (ammunition), 23 (sutler), 24 (intervals of pay), and 26 (access to accommodation and services).

123 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 425–427 (capitulation Bern), art. 4; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.207, capitulation Budé, art. 4; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Sturzenegger, art. 4; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Porta, art. 4.

revealing potential previous issues.¹²⁴ Moreover, this would certainly increase a captain's reliance on the weapons' market pushed by the Estates General in the United Provinces. Disciplinary efficiency was also sought for. Companies retained their jurisdictional competence, i.e. their own martial courts, but had to apply the military law of the United Provinces, equally revealing of previously encountered issues.¹²⁵ Access to accommodation, provisions, and medical services was still guaranteed, but now complemented with access to fodder from the Estates' stores at the same rate as the one paid by national troops.¹²⁶ Officers' leave also became regulated according to the rights of the other officers in the Dutch army.¹²⁷

As the War of the Spanish Succession had crippled Dutch finances,¹²⁸ the Estates General included provisions allowing them to reduce manpower, and specified how such reductions would affect a captain's gratification.¹²⁹ In principle, reductions had already been agreed upon in the 1712 and 1713 subsidy treaties regulating Bernese and Grison service.¹³⁰ New specifications allowed the United Provinces to replenish and reduce companies as they needed them. On the other hand, military entrepreneurs were guaranteed employment beyond the end of the war, albeit with potentially reduced manpower. Some captains, such as Jean Antoine Porta, managed to juridically preserve their company's existence, albeit reduced, against full dismissal in peacetime.¹³¹ Most captains, however, could lose their company following regimental reorganisations and

124 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 425–427 (general capitulation Bern), art. 5, 23; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.207, capitulation Budé, art. 5, 20; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Sturzenegger, art. 5, 20; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Porta, art. 5, 20 (specification on calibres and quality).

125 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 425–427, art. 25; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.207, capitulation Budé, art. 22; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Sturzenegger, art. 22; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Porta, art. 22.

126 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 425–427, art. 30; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.207, capitulation Budé, art. 28; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Sturzenegger, art. 28; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Porta, art. 28.

127 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 425–427, art. 32; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.207, capitulation Budé, art. 29; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Sturzenegger, art. 29; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Porta, art. 29.

128 Maarten Prak, *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Golden Age* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 263–273.

129 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 425–427, art. 13–17, 19; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.207, capitulation Budé, art. 12–16, 18; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Sturzenegger, art. 12–16, 18; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Porta, art. 12–15, 17–18 (article 16 is a guarantee against full dismissal of the company!).

130 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 423–428 (Bern), art. 11, 386–387 (Grisons), art. 7.

131 NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Porta, art. 16.

would have to abide by the reductions as regulated in the subsidy treaties with the cantonal authorities.

The cantonal authorities themselves, indeed, had vested interests in this military enterprise. Not only were they often related to military entrepreneurs through familial and social networks, explaining their involvement in securing long-term employment for their troops.¹³² They also desired to regain political control over their manpower and its use. Hence, new specifications tried to reserve lucrative officer positions, traditionally sought-for by Swiss elites, to cantonal subjects, at least to a high degree if not entirely. The alliance with Bern already contained several specifications regarding the 16 companies then serving the United Provinces, eight of which had been avowed, and eight others still to be levied: all had to remain in the hands of citizens or subjects of Bern in order to keep the cantonal peace.¹³³ In their 1713 treaty, the Grisons similarly retained the right to appoint company officers, including captains. The Estates General only kept a limited choice regarding a regiment's staff, to be chosen among the Grison-appointed company captains and one of the three officers put forward by the Grisons.¹³⁴ Bern's 1714 capitulation restated that all appointments of captains were retained by Bern, although a time-limit to make these appointments was agreed upon in order not to hamper a company's functioning. Within each company, captains appointed their officers, provided confirmation by the colonel and colonel general. Again, a time-limit was added to avoid long haggling over positions in Switzerland.¹³⁵ Further capitulations were made on this model, but approval of the Prince of Orange was equally sought for, beyond the approval of the regiment's colonel.¹³⁶

Related to the effectiveness of a right to recall their avowed regiments, retained by both Bern (for all troops) and the Grisons (only for the officers),¹³⁷ the general capitulation with Bern restricted overseas, i.e. colonial, service or even transportation by sea, except in defence of England.¹³⁸ However, the individual capitulations signed with Budé, Sturzenegger or Porta did not repeat such a restriction. Formerly, only Goumoëns, in his company's capitulation,

132 On the entangled networks of political and military actors in the Swiss cantons, see bibliographical footnotes in the introduction.

133 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 423–428, art. 8–10, 12, 13, and 14.

134 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 386–387.

135 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 425–427, art. 21–22.

136 NA, Staten Generaal, 125927.207, capitulation Budé, art. 19; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Sturzenegger, art. 19; NA, Staten Generaal, 12597.213, capitulation Porta, art. 19.

137 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 423–428 (Bern), art. 6, 386–387 (Grisons), art. 3, 6.

138 Dumont, *Corps*, 8/1, pp. 425–427, art. 31.

had retained such a right for himself in order to aid his homeland if it were to come under threat.¹³⁹

When William I of the Netherlands restored old recruitment practices during the Restoration, fiscal-military capitulations were drawn up anew in a most detailed way to cover all aspects of future Swiss service. Once again, Bern set the standard for the other cantons' capitulations.¹⁴⁰ The new capitulations made from 1814 to 1816 with the Swiss cantons contained no less than 62 articles, reflecting three tendencies: the demise of profitable military entrepreneurship, an increased assimilation of the regiments to the Netherlands' army structures and practices, and, paradoxically, an increased control of their troops by the Swiss authorities.¹⁴¹

In terms of military entrepreneurship, although a regiment would still be named after its colonel (art. 2), companies now received a number within the Dutch army and captain-entrepreneurs lost their interest-free loans to raise a company as well as their gratifications. The higher officers of a regiment, including company captains, were now accountable for the money they received as state officials, agents of his Majesty, rather than as military entrepreneurs (art. 29). Officers could still be involved in recruitment in the Confederation, but would tap their local networks as agents of the state: indeed, while on semestrial leave, they could opt either to receive a half pay or a full pay if they served as recruiters in support of the ordinary hired recruiters (art. 39, 40). Further constraining the officers' recruitment agency and reflecting a new kind of scientificity based on numerically measurable elements inherited from the Enlightenment and the Revolution, specifications regarding age (18–36, up to 40 in wartime, art. 24), health (art. 25), and height (art. 26) of the recruits were now included, with exceptions made for a regiment's musicians (art. 27). A regiment's completeness remained the officers' responsibility: once the companies were recruited, they would have to pay recruitment agents out of their own pockets to replenish the ranks when troops were found lacking (one-third in peacetime; one-fourth in wartime, art. 36). This measure, however, seems related to discipline enforcement rather than to military entrepreneurship. Moreover, recruits would now entirely be clothed, equipped, and armed at their assigned arrival depot in the Netherlands, according to the orders of the minister of war (art. 15), a measure both diminishing the former military-entrepreneurs' role as investors in their companies, and hence their

139 NA, RvS, 1903, capitulation Goumoëns, art. 21.

140 Amersfoort, *Koning en Kanton*, p. 122.

141 For what follows: Lagemans, *Recueil*, treaties no. 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 24, 35, 41, 42, and 50.

potential gains,¹⁴² and leading to a stronger integration of the Swiss units in the army of the Netherlands.

In many ways, the Swiss units were now indeed integrated to a higher degree into the Dutch army. With the inevitable exception of regulations concerning recruitment abroad, their distinctiveness as foreign regiments gradually disappeared. Henceforth, a regiment resorted under the rules, martial law, and courts of the king's army (art. 45–47). Although it could keep its own flag, the latter was to display the arms of the Sovereign House of the United Provinces (i.e. the House of Orange), besides those of its canton (art. 48). A regiment's autonomy against dissolution into other Dutch army units was guaranteed (art. 53, 54), but it was to be treated equally to all Dutch national troops in everything (art. 60). Soldiers were entitled to the same pay (art. 38) and retirement pensions as other Dutch troops (art. 41, 42), constituting both a guarantee and a loss of former privileges. Recruits signed up for respectively four or six years, and could renew their enrolment for terms of two, four or six years (art. 20, 21). In a recruitment depot established in Bern (art. 28), a Dutch commissioner would muster and pay new recruits on arrival and enrolment (art. 30). In terms of career advancement, Swiss officers were assimilated to national officers (art. 55). As prisoners of war, their treatment would be equal to that of other officers from the national army (art. 19). The King of the Netherlands also kept a strong hold on new appointments of higher officers (colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and majors) in case of vacancies (art. 18).

Paradoxically, despite this increased integration into the Dutch army, cantonal authorities also increased their hold on the Swiss troops. Firstly, although officer appointments became a royal prerogative, they were appointed on proposal of canton or colonel (art. 7), and only the Bernese (or other cantonal) bourgeoisie could be considered for appointment, a point which they had already tried to ensure before the Revolution. More importantly, service was much more explicitly restricted than it used to be: a Swiss regiment could not serve on board (art. 50), outside Europe (art. 49), against its homeland (art. 51), or even, preferably, against other Swiss troops serving other powers (art. 52). Indeed, Bern and the other cantons now retained a right to recall the troops whenever necessary (including not only external threats but also civil war), although this would entail a refund on clothing, equipment, and weaponry provided by the Netherlands (art. 56). Such an extended right to recall also made cantonal authorities more interested in keeping their troops both national and up to strength. On the one hand, all recruits now had to be Swiss,

142 On company economy and potential profits for captains during the *Ancien Régime*, see in particular: Hitz, *Kämpfen um Sold*, pp. 180–184.

except medical staff or technicians, experts who moved more freely (art. 22). On the other hand, company reductions were limited to absolute leave and suspension of new recruitment (art. 58), implying that the cantons achieved an even higher degree of stable employment for their men than in the 1714 general capitulation. Full dismissal of a company would cost an unspecified *paye de réforme* (discharge fee) to each soldier and officer according to their respective rank and length of service (art. 59). Moreover, Bernese authorities would deliver returned deserters to the depot in Bern. (art. 32). The increased cantonal control over the Swiss troops was also reflected in the management of individual soldiers' signing bonus and travel money: formerly managed by the captains, this money now went through an institutionalised regimental treasury installed in Bern and most likely controlled by the cantonal authorities who signed the contract (art. 28). Finally, as both the Swiss troops and the newly constituted Kingdom of the Netherlands were now bi-confessional, free practice of the reformed religion was ensured wherever Bern's soldiers would serve in the Netherlands or allied countries (art. 44), an article logically amended in favour of Catholic practice in the treaties with the Catholic cantons.

3 Conclusion

During the Dutch Patriot Revolt, Swiss foreign troops remained loyal to the authorities they had sworn allegiance to, respectively the provincial Estates or the House of Orange. Recent literature hence tends to nuance the perception of Swiss troops as servants of the Dutch monarchy alone.¹⁴³ However, one cannot escape the fact that no major capitulations were concluded during stadtholderless periods. Moreover, exceptions to the rule, the 1712–14 alliances and official capitulation required by the Protestant cantons to avow (and regain control of) their regiments, were concluded under Grand Pensionary of Holland Anthony Heinsius, known to have continued the policy of his patron William III of Orange.¹⁴⁴ Desiring to consolidate his newly retrieved power with reliable troops, William I of the Netherlands, as King of the Netherlands, hence rather unsurprisingly revived Swiss foreign service during the Restauration.

143 Van Nimwegen, *De Nederlandse burgeroorlog*, pp. 358–360.

144 Augustus J. Veenendaal Jr., "Who is in Charge here? Anthonie Heinsius and his Role in Dutch Politics," in *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic 1688–1720: Politics, War, an Finance*, eds. Jan A.F. de Jongste, Augustus J. Veenendaal Jr. (The Hague, 2002), 11–24.

Nevertheless, although formal practice of contracting Swiss troops via capitulations according to the uses established in 1693 and refined in 1714 resumed, its meaning had dramatically changed, as witnessed by both the process and the result of the negotiations. Despite the persistence of Protestant recruitment networks, at least until the end of the Ancien Régime if not beyond, contractors gradually lost their independence as they were progressively sidelined as active negotiators, from the first private capitulations in 1693 over the Bernese official capitulation of 1714 to the renewed official capitulations of 1814. The place of negotiation tells a similar story, reflecting shifting power positions of offer and demand. Loss of independence is also reflected in the content of the contracts. During the 18th century, the agency of Swiss military entrepreneurs in Dutch service had progressively been restricted (as had their pensions), both by their Dutch employers who sought to increase bureaucratic and military efficiency through standardisation of contracts and units, and by cantonal authorities, desiring to control their manpower and muster its potential for their own purposes, whether financial (officer positions) or military (right to recall). Moreover, changing concepts regarding army organisation and new economic circumstances may have led Swiss foreign soldiers and military entrepreneurs to seek security of employment, giving up the high degree of autonomy they still enjoyed at the end of the 17th century. Mirroring a general tendency,¹⁴⁵ this agency was further restricted as the nation-state took shape, leading to the final demise of the military-entrepreneurs.

Indeed, the former stadtholder's attempt to revert to the old system was check-mated both by his own parliament (1829) and by the changing power dynamics within the Swiss confederation. Military entrepreneurs, who had coexisted and collaborated for centuries with their political networks, now saw the latter taking the lead, potentially to the detriment of their own commercial interests. Whether the bourgeoisie in the new kingdom of the Netherlands had by this time lost its long-lived strong financial (loans) and economic (weapons' market) interests in Swiss and other military enterprise remains open to further investigation. In any case, the revival of hired foreign troops was short-lived, the last Swiss units being dismissed by 1829 as a new era of nationalised military organisation emerged.¹⁴⁶

145 Holenstein, Kury, Schulz, *Schweizer Migrationsgeschichte*, pp. 50–53.

146 Amersfoort, "The Dutch Army in Transition," p. 476.

A Career before the Career? On the Emergence of the ‘*Créature*’ Peter Stuppa (1619–1701)

Katrin Keller

The name of an influential figure with an ambivalent reputation in the old Swiss Confederation and older Swiss historiography turns up again and again in the second half of the 17th century in connection with Swiss mercenary service in France. I am referring to Peter Stuppa (1619–1701),¹ an officer from Chiavenna, a city in what was at the time a dependent territory of the Three Leagues. Stuppa was in the French service from the mid-1630s until his death in 1701. The subject of the Grisons achieved a spectacular military and social rise in the second half of his life during the reign of Louis XIV.² Stuppa first becomes perceptible in the historiography when looking back at the 1660s. Starting in late 1665, the then captain in the Swiss Guards regiment made himself highly unpopular in the Confederation by raising *compagnies franches* for France along with other Swiss officers. These *compagnies franches* were mercenary troops, which were not recruited and deployed in keeping with the framework conditions of the French-Swiss mercenary alliance that had just been renewed in 1663 and were therefore considered illegal.³ The officers at

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- 1 Some historiographical studies (see Caviezel in note 2) and the *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* identify Stuppa with two first names as *Johann Peter Stuppa*. The name *Johann* cannot be observed in any of the sources consulted, however. Hence, only the *Peter Stuppa* version will be used in this paper. On the unclear year of birth, see note 12.
 - 2 Peter Stuppa is alternately described as a military celebrity and hero or, because of his ties to the French court, as a schemer and someone who sullied his own homeland; see, for instance, Charles-François de Vintimille, Comte Du Luc, “Mémoire sur la Suisse (1715)”, trans. in *Schweizerisches Museum* 2:4 (1816), 610–668, p. 626; Beat Fidel Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire des Suisses au service de la France*, 7 (Paris, 1752), pp. 130–139; Beat Fidel Zurlauben, *Code militaire des Suisses, pour servir de suite à l’Histoire Militaire des Suisses, au service de la France*, 1 (Paris, 1758), pp. 55–60; Hartmann Caviezel, “General-Lieutenant Johann Peter Stoppa und seine Zeit,” *Jahresbericht der historisch-antiquarischen Gesellschaft von Graubünden* 22 (1892), 1–59; Edouard Rott, *Histoire de la représentation diplomatique de la France auprès des cantons suisses, de leurs alliés et de leurs confédérés*, 7 (Bern, 1921), pp. v, 66, and 372–373; Francis Barraz, *Peter Stuppa, 1621–1701: La vie d’un commandant de régiment suisse au service de la France, sous Louis XIV* (Cully, 1990).
 - 3 On the alliance between France and the Swiss Confederation that existed since 1521, see *Après Marignan: La paix perpétuelle entre la France et la Suisse*, eds. Alexandre Dafflon, Lionel

fault got into a conflict with the cantons about this that lasted many years, and the Federal Diet identified Peter Stuppa as the driving force behind for the unwanted mercenary troops. The disputes had hardly subsided when, in late summer 1671, Louis XIV dispatched Stuppa to several of the Swiss cantons as his official plenipotentiary to recruit new contingents of mercenaries for France. The King was strengthening his army in preparation for the Dutch War (1672–78) and the Swiss troops were supposed to be increased by around 10,000 men. After Stuppa had successfully carried out this recruitment mission, Louis XIV gave him several promotions in quick succession: promoting him in February 1672 to commander of his own regiment, in April and July of the same year to brigadier and governor of Utrecht, in 1674 – due to the designated office holder still being a minor⁴ – to interim *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons*, i.e. to the position of commander in chief of all the Swiss troops in France, in 1678 to *Lieutenant général* of the French army and thus to the highest military post that a foreign officer could obtain, and finally in 1685 to Colonel of the Swiss Guards Regiment.⁵ His having achieved these

Dorthe, and Claire Gantet (Lausanne, 2018); Andreas Würigler, “Symbiose ungleicher Partner: Die französisch-eidgenössische Allianz 1516–1798/1815,” *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte* 12 (2011), 53–75.

- 4 The post of *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons* was usually held by a hereditary prince. The office holder, Louis XIV's legitimised son, Louis Auguste de Bourbon, Duc du Maine (1670–1736), assumed the post in 1688 upon reaching the age of majority, but Peter Stuppa continued to set the tone until his death in 1701, see Katrin Keller, “Ein Schweizer Gardehauptmann als französischer Unterhändler: Johann Peter Stuppas Werbeverhandlungen in der Eidgenossenschaft 1671,” in: *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 92–115, p. 93.
- 5 See François-Joseph-Guillaume Pinard, *Chronologie historique-militaire, contenant l'histoire de la création de toutes les charges, dignités et grades militaires supérieures de toutes les personnes qui les ont possédés ... des troupes de la maison du Roi: Les lieutenants généraux des armées du Roi jusqu'en 1715*, 4 (Paris, 1761), p. 305; Keller, “Gardehauptmann,” pp. 92–97. Only three other Swiss officers in the 17th century attained the post of *Lieutenant général*, the highest rank in the French army after *Maréchal de France*: Johann Ludwig von Erlach (1595–1650) from Bern in 1647, Hans Rudolf Werdmüller (1614–77) from Zurich in 1655, and Johann Jakob von Erlach (1628–94) from Bern in 1688, see Pinard, *Chronologie*, 4, pp. 36, 228, and 321. Apart from Stuppa, the function of interim *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons* was also briefly held by François de Reynold (1642–1722) from Fribourg from 1719–21; Louis-Auguste-Augustin d'Affry (1713–93) from Fribourg was administrator of the Swiss and Grisons troops from 1771 to 1792, see Georges Andrey, “François de Reynold,” 2010, in *Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse* [DHS]. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/024199/2010-08-27/>. Accessed 2 June 2021; Alain-Jacques Czouz-Tornare, “Louis-Auguste-Augustin d'Affry,” 2017, in DHS. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/023244/2017-06-15/>. Accessed 2 June 2021.

high military ranks, political-diplomatic circles viewed Stuppa as a powerful factor within the Swiss mercenary forces in France and in French-Swiss foreign relations.⁶

Although hardly any other Swiss protagonist had a comparable career in French mercenary service, up to now – presumably due to the difficult source situation – hardly any research has been done on Peter Stuppa.⁷ The fact that starting in 1671, a subject of the Grisons seemingly appeared out of nowhere to become a powerful factor in the French army and at the court of Louis XIV is in need of explanation. The pre-history of this exceptional career is entirely unknown. This contribution tries to throw light on its background and begins in the 1650s and early 1660s: with Stuppa as a protagonist in the Swiss Guards Regiment and with those of his personal relationships that can be established for this period.

1 A Relative Opens the Door to a Career in France

The time Peter Stuppa spent as an officer in the Swiss Guards in France in the 1650s and 1660s paved the way for his extraordinary career from 1672 on. He made it to the privileged position of an officer in the Guards thanks to the support of his cousin Johann Anton Stuppa (before 1597–1652), who had been in the French service since 1630 at the latest.⁸ Johann Anton served France as a mercenary officer in the Thirty Years' War; he was the leader of the pro-French

6 In early 1672, the Savoyard ambassador in Paris, Thomas-François Chabod, Marquis de Saint-Maurice (1624–82), reported to the Duke of Savoy: “Lord Stoup, who is now omnipotent here” and: “Lord Stoup has credit with Monsieur de Louvois who does everything this other person suggests to him”, cited in Rott, *Représentation*, 7, pp. 406, 407. When Stuppa died, Louis de Rouvroy, Duc de Saint-Simon (1675–1755) noted: “The King put his complete trust in Stoppa, colonel of the Swiss guards, to such an extent that so long as he lived, M. du Maine could do nothing about it”, see Louis de Rouvroy Saint-Simon, *Mémoires de Saint-Simon: Nouvelle édition collationnée sur le manuscrit autographe, augmentée des additions de Saint-Simon au Journal de Dangeau*, 8 (Paris, 1891), pp. 34–35.

7 See Keller, “Gardehauptmann,” p. 3 (note 5). In 2019, a French family researcher published a volume on the Stuppa family compiling an extensive collection of quotations from the 18th and 19th centuries, as well as data from primary sources (above all, French church records). The latter are not placed in a more general historical context, however, see Dominique G. Colliot, *Un canal de sang de Bâle à Paris: Histoire de la Famille Stuppa* (Paris, 2019).

8 Johann Anton Stuppa's family, which likewise came from Chiavenna, had settled in Lyon in 1597 and his father was a merchant-banker there. Initially, Johann Anton was also active in this field, see Colliot, *Canal*, pp. 171, 177, and 179.

faction in the Three Leagues and was used as an agent by French diplomacy.⁹ In 1638, Louis XIII rewarded him for his contributions with a patent for a captain's position in the Swiss Guards regiment. This Guards company formed the cornerstone for the Stuppa family's successful military entrepreneurship, and it would remain under the family's command without interruption up to 1722.¹⁰ By bringing his relative Peter into the company, Johann Anton allowed the latter to partake of the credit he enjoyed among relevant people around the court and gave him access to the exclusive circle of the Swiss Guards officers in Paris.¹¹

There is hardly any reliable information on Peter Stuppa's life before 1648.¹² The *Histoire militaire* by the military historian Emmanuel May (1734–1802)

9 See Alexander Pfister, *Jörg Jenatsch: Sein Leben und seine Zeit* (Chur, 1984), pp. 377, 384–386, and 392; Rott, *Représentation*, 41 (Bern, 1909), pp. 526, 649; idem, *Représentation*, 42 (Bern, 1911), p. 422. Rott mistakenly refers to Johann Anton as Joseph Anton.

10 In January 1638, Louis XIII rewarded Johann Anton Stuppa for his services with a “hereby newly created captain's post in the regiment of his Swiss guards”, see Bern, Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv [BAR], PO#1000/1463#1320*, patent dated 13 January 1638. It is unclear how things went after this show of favour: it is not until 1648 that Stuppa's company is perceptible as part of the Swiss Guards regiment, see Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 2 (Paris, 1752), p. 113. The last Stuppa to serve as commander was Jean-Alexandre Stuppa (c.1700– after 1724), see Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 1 (Paris, 1752), p. 274.

11 Since being permanently established in 1616, the Swiss Guards regiment was part of the court troops later known as the *Maison militaire du roi*. As *garde ordinaire*, the Swiss Guards served at and around the court and at the same time figured among the elite troops in the field, see Rémi Masson, *Défendre le roi: La maison militaire au XVIIe siècle* (Ceyzérieu, 2017), p. 108.

12 Neither his year of birth nor his date of birth can be verified, nor do we know where the young Peter Stuppa lived or stayed, nor at what point in time he entered into French service. The Stuppa family fled Chiavenna in 1620 in connection with the Valtellina Massacre and settled in various places (including Geneva and Lyon), see Konrad Schulthess, “Glaubensflüchtlinge aus Chiavenna und dem Veltlin in Zürcher Kirchenbüchern, 1620–1700,” *Der Schweizer Familienforscher* 36 (1969), 77–114, pp. 78–80, 106; Jacques Augustin Galiffe, *Notices généalogiques sur les familles genevoises: Depuis les premiers temps jusqu'à nos jours* (Geneva, 1836), pp. 464–465. According to his own remark to Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–83), Stuppa had already been serving in France for 32 years in 1667. This would allow us to date the start of his service to 1635–36, see Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France [BnF], Département des manuscrits, Mélanges de Colbert, 146, p. 207, letter from Peter Stuppa to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, n.p., 20 November 1667. The inscription of Stuppa's epitaph in Château-Thierry that is cited in Zurlauben gives Stuppa's age as 81 years and six months. This would mean that Stuppa was born in June 1619, see Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 1, p. 360. According to information from the Musée du Trésor de l'Hôtel-Dieu in Château-Thierry, the gravestone was damaged during the French Revolution and later restored. An epitaph no longer exists today and there is presumably no other way of verifying the text.

from Bern is the only source that mentions early stages in his military career. Thus, Stuppa is said to have joined the *compagnie franche* of his relative Johann Anton Stuppa as a cadet in 1636, to have become an ensign in 1637 and a lieutenant in 1640. According to May, he received the *commission of Lieutenant colonel* in September 1654 and that of *Colonel* in September 1658. In 1651 and 1652, May writes, Stuppa provided “various services at the court during the civil war”.¹³ The military histories of François-Joseph-Guillaume Pinard (died before 1778) and Beat Fidel Zurlauben (1720–99) mention various campaigns and sieges in which the Stuppa Guard company participated in the 1650s and early 1660s. In addition, Stuppa accompanied the King on his travels in Guyenne and to Avignon and Marseille from 1659 to 1662.¹⁴ It was around this time that Stuppa converted to Catholicism. The conversion is presumably related to his marriage to the French noblewoman Anne-Charlotte de Gondi (1627–94) and may also have been a strategic decision, in order to increase his career opportunities in the military and to facilitate his integration into French aristocratic society.¹⁵

Since the Stuppa family has not left behind any extant records, information on the Guard captain Peter Stuppa can only be gleaned from the correspondence series of the royal ministries and from sources that have been handed down to us from contemporaries. Even though no family archives are available, disparate sources with news about individual family members throw light on at least punctual aspects of Peter Stuppa’s milieu and activities. But, overall, the information of which we dispose on his early career has to be regarded as highly fragmentary.

13 See Emmanuel May, *Histoire militaire de la Suisse, et celle des Suisses dans les différens services de l’Europe*, 6 (Lausanne, 1788), pp. 97–98. May does not give any sources for this. (In general, concrete references are hardly to be found in his work, in contrast to Zurlauben, who constantly names his sources.) This information was evidently not available to Zurlauben and Pinard, who published before May. These details have to be viewed critically in principle, since May’s text exhibits a number of inaccuracies: for example, he describes Stuppa’s promotion to *Lieutenant colonel* in 1654 as an award for his services during the Battle of Arras on 25 August 1654. But according to Pinard, Stuppa was with his company in Italy with the French army from 1653 to 1655 (and, in general, repeatedly in northern Italy since 1648). Zurlauben also includes Stuppa among the five Guard companies that were deployed in Italy from 1653 to 1655, see Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 2, pp. 191–195.

14 See Pinard, *Chronologie*, 4, p. 305; Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 2, pp. 182.

15 The earliest and most specific reference to the conversion is found in the concluding record or *Abschied* of the Diet of the Swiss Confederation of 22 January 1662, when Basel announced that the Guard captain Stuppa had converted, see *Die Eidgenössischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1649 bis 1680*, 6:1 (Frauenfeld, 1867), p. 553 (Art. d).

2 Peter Stuppa as Representative of the Chandieu Family from Vaud

Peter Stuppa had a close relationship with the Chandieu family from Vaud since his early years of service in the Swiss Guards regiment and, fortunately, this relationship is also reflected in their family archives. In an otherwise extremely difficult situation as regards sources, the extensive correspondence left behind by the brothers Paul de Chandieu-Villars (1622–85) and Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle (1618–75) provides us most of the information we have on Peter Stuppa and the 1650s and early 1660s. Paul and Albert came from an aristocratic family from the Dauphiné, which had settled in Bernese Vaud in the 16th century and owned several manors there. Like Stuppa, they were officers in the French service. Paul de Chandieu had commanded a half company in the Swiss Guards regiment since 1654.¹⁶ The earliest known original letters of Peter Stuppa and of at least two other members of the Stuppa family are to be found among their papers. Moreover, Stuppa is frequently brought up in the intra-family Chandieu correspondence.¹⁷ Although the source material is attractive, it is somewhat diminished by the fact that explicitly formulated remarks on Stuppa's role in the Swiss Guards Regiment, whether possible functions or concrete missions, are lacking. Hence, it is often only possible to place the fragmentary information available into a coherent substantive context by way of interpretation. Moreover, the fact that not a single letter from the Chandieus to Stuppa could be found makes matters more difficult. But from the replies of Stuppa, who was mostly in Paris over a long period of time, and the letters between the brothers, we can conclude that a regular exchange of information took place between them.

The Chandieu brothers and Peter Stuppa were pursuing a common goal in the 1650s: the preservation of their military units in the French army and of their privileged status as (Guard) officers, which was by no means guaranteed. For the number of troops and officers even of the prestigious Guard Regiment varied depending mainly on the wars being fought and financial and political

16 See François Cojonnex, *Un Vaudois à la tête d'un régiment bernois: Charles de Chandieu (1658–1728)* (Cully, 2006), pp. 17–20.

17 The family papers are in the Archives cantonales vaudoises and form part of the P Charrière de Sévery collection. Paul de Chandieu-Villars was the father of the later Stuppa protégé Charles de Chandieu (1658–1728), whose 1701 appointment as commander of the former Bernese regiment of Erlach caused a great stir in Bern, see Cojonnex, *Vaudois*. Complementary, although considerably less ample, sources from this period are also found in the Acta Helvetica, in a sub-collection of the Zurlaubiana, the family archives of the Zurlauben magistrate family from Zug and in the family archives of the Bernese patrician family, the von Wattenwyl, in *Schloss Oberdiessbach* (Oberdiessbach Castle).

circumstances. The court could reduce or scrap a company at any time. The officers did not have claim to ownership of their military units, which consequently were not hereditary. The mercenary officers were accorded temporary control over a resource that had been lent to them, but only the King or the *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons* decided about the duration of the usufruct.¹⁸ But from the perspective of the 13 cantons of the Confederation, the participation of Stuppa and the Chandieu brothers in the Swiss Guards regiment was a source of irritation, since both families did not come from the magistracy of the ruling cantons, but rather from dependent territories. The Chandieu company was shifted from the dismissed Molondin regiment to the Guard in 1654 and the Stuppa company was upgraded from a *compagnie franche* to a Guard company in 1648.¹⁹ The families from the ruling elites of the 13 cantons regarded control over these scarce, materially and symbolically important, resources as their customary law privilege, and competitors were thus unwelcome.²⁰

The sources available for this period contain several remarks about Peter Stuppa. He first appeared as an intermediary representing the interests of (certain) Swiss officers. Starting from the end of 1656, he tried to avert the scraping of Paul de Chandieu's half-company. He did so together with Guard captain

18 See Philippe Rogger, "Kompaniewirtschaft, Verflechtungszusammenhänge, familiäre Unternehmensorganisation: Die Urlaube als Militärunternehmer auf den eidgenössischen Söldnermärkten um 1700," in *Soldgeschäfte, Klientelismus, Korruption in der Frühen Neuzeit: Zum Soldunternehmertum der Familie Zurlauben im schweizerischen und europäischen Kontext*, eds. Kaspar von Greyerz, André Holenstein, and Andreas Würzler (Göttingen, 2018), 211–238, pp. 236–237. Johann Anton Stuppa had to learn this in 1650, when his entire company was "re-formed" and combined with the Zurlauben half company. The diminution did not only mean a lowered profit outlook, but could also lead to the need for greater coordination between the two co-heads and thus harboured greater potential for conflict. In 1652, after Johann Anton's death, Peter Stuppa did not take over the command of this half company, but instead the *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons* awarded the unit to Johann Baptist Tschärner from the Grisons (1618–62), the son of the mayor of Chur, Johann Tschärner (1593–1659). After Peter Stuppa complained directly to Louis XIV, the latter authorised him to raise a new half company, which was then joined to that of Tschärner, see Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 2, pp. 113–114; La Courneuve, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères [MAE], Mémoires et Documents Suisse, 48MD/23, fol. 231r. In light of the catastrophic state of French finances at the time, the creation of this half company was not self-evident. Stuppa's continued participation in the Swiss Guards regiment was thus in great danger at the time.

19 See Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 1, p. 278; idem, *Histoire militaire*, 2, pp. 113–115.

20 See André Holenstein, *Mitten in Europa: Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der Schweizer Geschichte* (Baden, 2014), pp. 127–128.

Im Thurn from Schaffhausen,²¹ with Paul's brother Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle, who as a family member was very interested in the Guard unit's continued existence,²² and with the French embassy employee François Mouslier (died 1683).²³ The threat of dismissal occurred during a phase, which had been ongoing since 1649, in which the French Crown was reducing and "re-forming" many of the Swiss troops due to its catastrophic financial situation. Sometimes the troops were dismissed without receiving any compensation and without the officers being paid the massive outstanding pay that was due them from previous years.²⁴ In Paul de Chandieu's case, however, personal misconduct also seemed to speak for his dismissal, since he stood accused by his superiors of not being present with his troops in the field or of having been absent without permission.²⁵ Moreover, he was accused of shirking his military duties, since he had not taken part in the last campaign. He also appears not to have exhibited the requisite submissiveness vis-à-vis his immediate superior, the Colonel of the Swiss Guards Regiment.²⁶ Nonetheless, the aforementioned individuals militated for Paul to remain in the French service, whereby Peter Stuppa and Albert Chandieu in particular appealed both in personal audiences and in writing to Cardinal Mazarin, the Minister of Defence Michel Le Tellier (1603–85) and the Guard commander Laurent Estavayer-Montet (1608–86).

21 Presumably Heinrich Im Thurn (died 1659), see Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 1, p. 240.

22 How and whether Albert Chandieu L'Isle was involved in his brother's half-guard company is unknown. The correspondence only makes clear that he militated for it to be maintained.

23 Lausanne, Archives cantonales vaudoises [ACV], P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 201, letter from Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 6/16 January 1657; also ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 200 and 202, letters from Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 22 December 1656/2 January 1657 and Paris, 9 January 1657.

24 See Holenstein, *Europa*, p. 125; Guillaume Poisson, *18 novembre 1663: Louis XIV et les cantons suisses* (Lausanne, 2016), p. 39. In order to prevent the Swiss from withdrawing their troops in the precarious situation of the Crown during the Fronde, Jules Mazarin (1602–61) and other ministers gave some of the French crown jewels to the Swiss officers in February 1649 and May 1650 as security for the 600,000 livres owed them, see Yves-Marie Bercé, "Le rôle des Suisses pendant la Fronde: 'maîtres ou serviteurs?'" in *Cinq siècles de relations franco-suisses: Hommage à Louis-Edouard Roulet* (Neuchâtel, 1984), p. 77.

25 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 806, letter from Charles de Schomberg to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 17 April 1656.

26 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 200, letters from Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 22 December 1656/2 January 1657; ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 819 and 820, letters from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris 2 January 1657 and Paris 9 January 1657.

But both also called on Paul to meet the demands of his superiors.²⁷ The efforts of Stuppa and his colleagues were successful: the dismissal of the Chandieu Guard company does not appear to have been seriously considered anymore after 1657. The unit survived the major reforms of 1661 and 1668 and remained under the command of the Chandieu family without interruption until after 1748.²⁸

Apart from his militating for the preservation of the Chandieu company, Stuppa also acted as representative of the Chandieu family's interests in other ways in Paris. Between 1656 and 1660, he got in touch with relevant authorities about outstanding pay and other matters connected to the half company, as well as financial transactions and a family salt business.²⁹ In addition, Peter Stuppa tried for a long time to get the *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons* to grant Paul de Chandieu a leave of absence (*congé*).³⁰

In connection with outstanding pay, there is reference in the family papers of the Zurlauben family from Zug that Stuppa acted as a kind of plenipotentiary for the Swiss Guard officers and that he was dispatched from the field to Paris as their representative in negotiations in 1658.³¹ There is also evidence in the Zurlauben papers that Stuppa was able to obtain a *congé* for Heinrich II Zurlauben (1621–76). The Guard officer from Lucerne Franz Ludwig Pfyffer (1634–89) told Zurlauben on 18 November 1662 about Stuppa's efforts in this regard:

you have every possible obligation to [Guard captain Johann Peter] Stoppa who this morning, in the presence of just [Guard captain Georg] Keller and me, spoke for you to M. [the *Colonel général des Suisses et*

27 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 200 and 201, letters from Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 22 December 1656/2 January 1657 and 6/16 January 1657.

28 See Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 2, p. 294.

29 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 200, 231, and 232, letters from Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 22 December 1656/2 January 1657, 4 January 1658, and 17 January 1658; ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 1068, letter from Paul de Chandieu-Villars to Louise Chandieu-Villars, Bordeaux, 17 November 1659; ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 818 and 834, letters from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 28 November 1656 and n.p., 12 October 1660.

30 See ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 828, letter from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 20 December 1657; ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 230, 231, and 232, letters from Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 13 December 1657, 4 January 1658, and 17 January 1658.

31 *Regesten und Register zu den Acta Helvetica, Gallica, Germanica, Hispanica, Sabaudica etc. necnon genealogica stemmatis Zur-Laubiani* [AH], 1–186, ed. Aargauer Kantonsbibliothek (Aarau, 1976–2014), 40/131 and AH 44/136.

Grisons?, Eugène-Maurice de Savoie] the Count [de Soissons] with as much vigour as can possibly ... be employed for a friend In this meeting, we did not ... [fail], rest assured, to support your interests in such a way that you will surely [obtain] your leave. ...³²

Several accounting records prepared for colonel Albrecht von Wattenwyl (1619–71) from Bern list financial compensation that Stuppa received for his intercession in matters that are not further specified (possibly also for outstanding troop payments). Between 1656 and 1665, five payments to Stuppa of 20 to 50 livres are listed for his “sollicitations”.³³ While on his deathbed, the Guard captain from the Grisons, Johann Baptist Tschärner (1618–62), was also counting on Stuppa’s influence; Tschärner recommended that a cousin “write mister Friess and mister officer Stoppa from time to time and tend to their advice and whatever they will advise, do the same”.³⁴

The sources do not always allow us to determine whether Peter Stuppa’s efforts were successful. But the fact that he was able to act as *solliciteur* for his clientèle at all undoubtedly presupposed a certain degree of credibility.³⁵ This was apparently already the case in the 1650s.

3 Special Functions in the Swiss Guards Regiment and in the Relationship with the Swiss Confederation

In the mid-1650s, there was a change in the occupants of the two key positions in Swiss mercenary service in France: the post of Colonel of the Swiss Guards regiment was filled in January 1656 after a vacancy for more than two years and that of *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons* was filled in December 1657 after

32 AH 96/124: “vous avez tous les Obligations du monde a [capitaine de la Garde Johann Peter] stoppa qui hier matin a La presence de [capitaine de la Garde Georg] Keller Et moy seuls, a Parlé pour vous a Mr [le Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons?, Eugène-Maurice de Savoie] le Conte [de Soissons] avec autant de ... [vigueur] qu’il se peut ... Employer pour un amis En ce rencontre, nous n’avons pas ... [manqué] Comme vous pouvez ... [croire] d’Appuyer vos Interests de sorte que sur ce Asseurement vous ... [recevrez] vostre Congé ...”. Insertions and omissions per AH-Regest. The count mentioned is undoubtedly the *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons*.

33 Oberdiessbach, Schlossarchiv, Familienarchiv [FA] von Wattenwyl, drawer 38, no. 6, financial records of the Guard company of Colonel Albrecht von Wattenwyl 1652–68.

34 Chur, Staatsarchiv Graubünden [StAGR], D V-3.230, no. 150 (f. 463), letter from Johann Baptist Tschärner to an unknown cousin, Paris, 24 January 1662.

35 See Hervé Drévilion, *L’impôt du sang: Le métier des armes sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 2005), p. 91.

remaining vacant for about one and a half years.³⁶ Although no direct connection can be established based upon the sources, the Chandieu papers reveal an increase in Stuppa's activities during this time. On the one hand, Stuppa complained in various letters about being overwhelmed: "Alas, nothing but toil and business;"³⁷ "apart from the trips that I made to Compiègne, I had very little time for myself;"³⁸ "M[onsieu]r Stoupe ... is very busy on all sides and in all ways, both in love and business;"³⁹ "another mission that one has given me;"⁴⁰ "the overwhelming mass of matters in which I find myself for some time now."⁴¹ It becomes clear in other places that Stuppa appears to have had foreknowledge about the situation of the provisioning and the reform plans for the Swiss Guards regiment.⁴² He also issued instructions to Paul de Chandieu for his half company stationed in Piedmont, by putting him in touch with local contacts (for example, the major of Valenza, "who is a close friend of his")⁴³ and recommending that he use the withdrawal of the troops as a means of exerting pressure to avert the still looming threat of dismissal of the said half

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- 36 See Georges Livet, *Suisse*, 1 (Recueil des instructions aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France 30) (Paris, 1983), p. L; Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 1, pp. 141–142.
- 37 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 811, letter from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 4 May 1655.
- 38 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 817, letter from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 24 October 1656. According to Charles de Baschi's itinerary, Louis XIV stayed at the Château de Compiègne on 22 August, 5 September, and 6 October 1656, evidently accompanied by Stuppa (and his company?) on several occasions, see Charles de Baschi, *Voyage de Charles IX. en France, écrit par Abel Jouan, suivi d'un itinéraire des Rois de France, depuis & compris Louis VII. jusqu'à Louis XIV. inclusivement* (Paris, 1759), p. 136.
- 39 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 200, letter from Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 22 December 1656/2 January 1657. A romantic relationship with an unidentifiable lady of the court (possibly his later wife?) is also talked about in a few other letters during this period.
- 40 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 827, letter from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 19 October 1657.
- 41 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 828, letter from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 20 December 1657.
- 42 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 905, letter from N. Tschudi to Paul de Villars-Chandieu, Lyon, 19 May 1656; ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 817 and 831, letters from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Villars-Chandieu, Paris, 24 October 1656 and Paris, 16 April 1658; ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 234, letter from Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 4 May 1657.
- 43 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 207, letter from Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 9 March 1657. The spelling of the name is uncertain: de la Coster or something similar.

company.⁴⁴ A concrete mission of Stuppa is finally detectable in December 1657, but without anything being mentioned about the client. Within eight weeks, he was supposed to assemble the accounting for all the bread deliveries that the up to ten Swiss Guard companies in Piedmont received in 1656 and 1657. Since Stuppa was not himself in Piedmont, he passed on the mission to Paul de Chandieu, who was stationed in Valenza, and the Zurich Guard captain Heinrich Escher (1606–80). He gave Chandieu instructions about formalities and deadlines, so that the statements would arrive correctly and on time at the army administration in Paris, which was supposed then to provide compensation to the captains who had advanced the money for the provisioning.⁴⁵ In 1667, Stuppa reminded Jean-Baptiste Colbert about another mission that the minister had assigned him in 1661, when it was a matter of paying off outstanding payments to the Swiss Guards regiment: “in the same year [16]61 you sent me to try to facilitate the payments that were due to the regiment [of the Guards – κκ] that came to large sums and I acted in such a way that you did me the honour of testifying to your satisfaction”.⁴⁶ The two missions and the not further specified burdens could have something to do with the function of *Lieutenant colonel*, which Stuppa is supposed to have held since 1654 according to May’s *Histoire militaire*, but for which there is no direct evidence.⁴⁷ Such an officer position could be particularly demanding at a time when the two superior posts had just been filled. *Lieutenant colonel* was not a normal rank, but rather a staff position, whose holder performed organisational functions in the regiment for the colonel and commanded the troops in the latter’s absence.⁴⁸ However, Louis XIV did not introduce the position in the Swiss Guards regiment until 1689,⁴⁹ so it cannot but remain doubtful that Stuppa was assigned this rank. And yet other sources, a few years later, also give the impression that he had a ‘special function’. Thus, Stuppa is described in the literature as

44 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 820 and 821, letters from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Villars-Chandieu, n.p., 9 January 1657 and Paris, 12 January 1657.

45 ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 828 and 829, letter from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Villars-Chandieu, Paris, 20 December 1657 and Paris, 11 January 1658.

46 BnF, Mélanges de Colbert, 146, p. 207, letter from Peter Stuppa to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, n.p., 20 November 1667.

47 See May, *Histoire militaire*, 6, p. 98 and the critical discussion of the function above (see note 13).

48 The post, which initially only existed in the French infantry, did not acquire importance until 1661, when Louis XIV relied especially on the *Lieutenant colonels* and the majors in implementing his reforms and made these offices inalienable, see Drévilion, *Sang*, p. 46; Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661–1701* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 162–164.

49 See Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 1, p. 150; Masson, *Défendre*, p. 241.

“adjoint” of the *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons* for the period from 1665 on,⁵⁰ and the title “commissaire général des Suisses”⁵¹ or “General Commissarien der Compagnies Franches”⁵² is found in several sources by 1671 at the latest. It is also mentioned in one place that he was in command of the five Guard companies that accompanied Louis XIV in September 1667 during the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands.⁵³ That Stuppa both had influence at the court and benefited from its protection is made clear by a letter of August 1666 to the Swiss Federal Diet that was signed by 12 Guard captains.⁵⁴ Stuppa was fiercely attacked by the Diet after having recruited *compagnies franches* for France in defiance of the regular conditions. The 12 Guard officers in Paris, on the other hand, defended him, recalling “his great capacity and the great credit he has at the royal court” and that his mistreatment could have negative consequences: “it would also be ill-judged if one wanted to attack such a man in this way without any cause: a man who has served so well and already held possession of his command for so long”.⁵⁵

For its part, the French Embassy in Solothurn contributed to the consolidation of Stuppa’s position by recommending in 1658 that the Stuppa half-company be enlarged into a full Guard company and in 1659 that Stuppa

50 See Livet, *Suisses*, 1, p. 54.

51 Geneva, Archives de l’Etat de Genève [AEG], R.C. 171, fol. 115r, Geneva Council Minutes, entry of 26 May 1671: “Nob[le] Jacob Andrion in light of his request tending to allow him to raise some Swiss and Valaisans passing through this town for Lord Stoupe General Commissioner of the Swiss ...”; Fribourg, Archives de l’Etat de Fribourg [AEF], Rathserkanntnisbuch 30, oath of the Captains, 15 October 1671; Rott, *Représentation*, 7, fol. 407, letter from the Marquis de Saint Maurice to the Duke of Savoy, 19 February 1672: “Lord Stoup has credit with Monsieur de Louvois who blindly does everything this other person suggests to him and also made him the general commissioner of the Swiss. This new position reduces somehow the authority of the post of monsieur the count of Soissons, but he appears not to heed this, in order not to compromise himself and risk his reputation.” (“Le Sr Stoup a crédit auprès de Mr de Louvois, qui fait aveuglément tout ce que cet autre luy suggère et l’a aussy fait commissaire général des Suisses. Ce nouvel employ diminue en quelque sorte l’autorité de la charge de Mr le comte de Soissons, mais il tesmoigne de n’y pas prendre garde, pour ne pas se compromettre et risquer sa réputation.”).

52 AH 7/62, address from October 1671.

53 See AH 111/71.

54 Bern, Staatsarchiv des Kantons Bern [StABE], A v 67, no page number (included between pp. 817 and 819), letter from the Guard officers Erlach, Chandieu-Villars, Locher, Keller, von Waldkirch, Stricker, Werdmüller, Machet, de Reynold, Hauser, Sury, and de Molondin to the 13 cantons, Paris and Dunkirk, 10 August 1666.

55 StABE, A v 67, (included between pp. 817 and 819). The Guard officers criticised the view of the Diet, for which the selection of officers from allied territories (*Zugewandte Orte*) or those who were recently given citizenship in one of the 13 cantons violated the terms of the mercenary alliance.

be given citizenship of Basel. The enlargement of the Guard company was all the more notable since the number of troops in the Guard regiment hardly changed between 1655 and 1661, when many troops were dismissed following the Peace of the Pyrenees.⁵⁶ Why, then, was Stuppa's Guard company augmented in precisely this period? A letter of February 1658 from the ambassador to the Swiss Confederation, Jean de La Barde (1603–92), to the *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons* provides some clues:

Y[our] H[ighness] could have already heard that Lord Stopa, a Grison who has a half company in the Swiss Guards regiment and is very attached to the King's service, for whom he does not cease to provide good offices in this country, and as I sense the fruit in the matters that I deal with on the King's behalf I feel obliged to very humbly beseech Y[our] H[ighness] to show him all possible favour and, particularly, to be so kind as to augment his half company into a full company as soon as it will be possible. The favour that Y[our] H[ighness] will show him will be very well employed ...⁵⁷

De La Barde's letter provides two reasons for aiding Stuppa. Firstly, the ambassador presented Stuppa as an officer who undertook ceaseless efforts on behalf of the King's interests in the Swiss Confederation ("this country"), which in turn contributed to de La Barde's main order of business: namely, the renewal

56 See Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 2, p. 39. There is no extant overview of the composition of the Swiss Guards regiment in the 17th century in the relevant French archives. The claim is based on Zurlauben's "Enumération des Compagnies du Régiment des Gardes-Suisses qui ont été réformés en différens tems", which he established using the annual accounts of the *Extraordinaires des Guerres*. The records on the *Extraordinaires des Guerres* of the 17th century, which would make it possible to grasp the financing of Swiss troops in France, were mostly destroyed during the French Revolution, see Joël Félix, *Économie et finances sous l'Ancien Régime: Guide du chercheur, 1523–1789* (Vincennes, 1994), pp. 49–211. Available at <http://books.openedition.org/igpde/2255>. Accessed 2 June 2021.

57 BAR, Po#1000/1463#1404*Po, letter from Jean de La Barde to Eugène Maurice de Savoie-Carignan, Comte de Soissons, n.p., 8 February 1658: "V[otre] A[ltesse] pourra desja avoir appris que le S[ieu]r Stopa Grison qui a une demie Compagnie au Regiment des Gardes Suisses et tres affectionnée au Service du Roy, pour lequel il ne cesse de faire de bons offices en ce pais, et comme J'en ressens le fruit dans les affaires que J'ay à y traiter de la part du Roy Je me sens obligé de suplier tres humblement V[otre] A[ltesse] de luy faire toutes les graces possibles et particulierement de vouloir augmenter sa demie Comp[agnie] Jusques à une Compagnie entiere le plustost qu'il se pourra. La grace que V[otre] A[ltesse] luy fera sera tres bien employée ...".

of the Franco-Swiss alliance.⁵⁸ Secondly, he recommended showing Stuppa the greatest possible favour, since this investment would pay off later on. Unfortunately, it is not possible to establish in what the “good offices in this country” consisted.⁵⁹ But the requested reward for Stuppa and de La Barde’s testimony suggest that Stuppa played a useful role in cultivating Franco-Swiss relations from the mid-1650s on.⁶⁰ Conversely, the example shows that mercenary companies and commander posts were key patronage resources that decision-makers used to try to bind influential clients to the French Crown as long as possible.

Further proof that France regarded Peter Stuppa’s direct connections in the Confederation as useful and actively promoted them is to be found in the granting of Basel citizenship to him on 15 June 1659. Before the decision in question was taken by the Basel Council, the Secretary of the French ambassador, the Embassy Treasurer and other individuals appealed to the mayor of Basel and other delegates of Basel to the Federal Diet in several sessions to make Stuppa a citizen of Basel. In order to underscore the importance of the matter, the Secretary of the embassy sent a reminder to Basel, including a supplication and an official attestation of the Three Leagues.⁶¹ The embassy’s motives are

58 The negotiations being conducted by de La Barde since 1648 turned out to be particularly difficult in the anti-French Protestant cantons and were made even more difficult by English agitation, among other things. In 1654, Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) had sent John Pell (1611–85) to Zurich as envoy to the Swiss Confederation, having given him the concrete mission of foiling the renewal of the alliance and encouraging the Swiss cantons to recall their poorly treated mercenary troops in France, see Sarah Rindlisbacher, “Zur Verteidigung des ‘Protestant Cause’: Die konfessionelle Diplomatie Englands und der eidgenössischen Orte Zürich und Bern 1655/56,” *Zwingliana* 43 (2016), 193–334, pp. 213–219.

59 As the example of Albrecht von Wattenwyl (1617–71) shows, other officers also supported the ambassador in his negotiations. In return, de La Barde also militated on von Wattenwyl’s behalf here: specifically, for the preservation of his Guard company, see FA von Wattenwyl, drawer 38, no. 7, letter from the embassy secretary Claude de Brillac to Albrecht von Wattenwyl, Solothurn, 4 March 1660.

60 A similar case is found in 1665 with Sebastian Heinrich Stricker (?-1665), a Guard captain from Uri, whom François Michel Le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois (1641–91) informed: “I presented to the King the care that you take to be serviceable to him in your canton and His Majesty received what I had the honour to tell him so well that he resolved to grant you a half company to form a complete one with the company under your command”, see BAR, P0#1000/1463#1321*, letter from Marquis Louvois to Sebastian Heinrich Stricker, Paris, 13 November 1665. The formation of this half company would not come to pass, because Stricker died unexpectedly in December 1665.

61 Basel, Staatsarchiv Basel Stadt [StABS], Älteres Hauptarchiv [AHA], minutes: Kleiner Rat 42, fol. 316r. The documents mentioned in the minutes could not be found. Curiously, Peter Stuppa himself never travelled to Basel to receive his citizenship. For a long time, he let it be known that the King and the court could not do without him, so that finally, in

not explicitly mentioned in the sources. The fact that Basel was a border town and that France was interested in as favourable and uncomplicated conditions as possible for the recruitment and passage of mercenaries in it will, undoubtedly, have been chief among them.⁶² A 'Basel' officer who was well-connected in both the French military and in the Swiss (military entrepreneurial) elite would be able to exert influence and, as needed, pressure most directly in this regard.⁶³ An additional motivation for de La Barde may have been the annex to the alliance that was adopted with the Protestant cantons in 1658 and that stipulated that the captains of their companies had to be citizens of the cantons in which the companies were raised.⁶⁴ Citizenship gave Stuppa access to recruitment opportunities that would have remained unavailable to him as a mere subject of the Grisons. Furthermore, de La Barde presumably had an overriding interest in weakening the position of the influential anti-French mayor of Basel, Johann Rudolf Wettstein (1594–1666). Wettstein's anti-French attitude became obvious in January 1658 when Basel, at his instigation, was the only

mid-February 1661, Stuppa's brother, Johann Baptist Stuppa, took the oath of citizenship on his behalf, see StABS, AHA, minutes: Kleiner Rat 43, fols. 42r, 242v.

- 62 It was crucial for the military entrepreneur to dispose of the largest possible geographical sphere of influence with a great potential for mercenaries. The more companies and regiments entered into the service of foreign princes, the greater became the competition for recruits within the Federation. The acquisition of additional citizenship rights served as a measure against the increasing competition (and at the same time intensified the latter), see Anne-Lise Head-König, "Der Aufstieg der Militärunternehmer: Jost Brendle, Oberst und Generalleutnant im Dienste Frankreichs," in *Die schweizerische Wirtschaft: 1291–1991*, ed. Ronald Cicurel (St-Sulpice, 1991), 80–86, p. 80. In addition to Basel citizenship, Peter Stuppa acquired citizenship of Fribourg in 1671, see AEF, Rathserkenntnussbücher 30, fol. 76, as well as of the Catholic canton of Glarus in 1688, see Glarus, Landesarchiv Glarus, PA 23.B 1:5. Per the documents from the Three Leagues that were submitted for the naturalisation in Basel, Stuppa also seems to have been a citizen of Sent in Lower Engadine. As will be discussed further on, the citizenship of relatives in Geneva also provided Stuppa access to another recruitment area.
- 63 This was confirmed during Stuppa's major recruitment mission in 1671: In Basel, in contrast to other cantons, the recruitment negotiations went smoothly and quickly, as Stuppa glowingly emphasized to the Minister of War Louvois, see Keller, "Gardehauptmann," pp. 109–111. He also discusses the connection between citizenship and influence in this excerpt from a considerably later letter: "For the canton of Basel, I am sure that you are convinced like me that it will do everything that you will want, as I am a citizen of that city. I will not fail to write to these gentlemen, such that I will have no reason to doubt their following the advice that I will give them" BAR, PO#1000/1463#1062*, letter from Peter Stuppa to Roger Brülart, Marquis de Puysieux, Paris, 22 June 1698.
- 64 However, this clause did not apply to companies of the Swiss Guards regiment, see Paul Schweizer, *Correspondenz der französischen Gesandtschaft in der Schweiz 1664–1671* (Basel, 1880), pp. 94–95.

canton in the Confederation to oppose French recruitment of mercenaries.⁶⁵ It's also very probable that de La Barde was counting on the fact that having a reliable French client and mercenary officer like Stuppa in Basel could help to bring about a more positive outcome for future recruitment requests. From Basel's point of view, Stuppa's naturalisation increased the prospects for Basel patrician sons to serve as (sub)officers in the Stuppa Guard company and to gain access to the prestigious Swiss Guards regiment.⁶⁶

4 A Wide-Ranging Network of Contacts

In his early career, Peter Stuppa also benefited from his dense network of contacts. That he was, as a member of the Swiss Guards regiment, in contact with the Swiss mercenary elites and, via the latter, with the Swiss ruling elites has already been made clear. Stuppa's activities as mediator also show that he was trying to position himself as an active player within this network of officers: presumably with the aim of building up his own network of clients. In what follows, we want thus briefly examine the other social contexts in which Peter Stuppa was to be found in the 1650s and early 1660s.

To start with Stuppa's family, besides the aforementioned cousin Johann Anton Stuppa, Peter's younger brother Johann Baptist Stuppa (1623–92) should also be mentioned. From 1652 to 1661, he was active as a pastor at the French Protestant Church in Threadneedle Street in London. The services he rendered to the illustrious Huguenot family du Puy-Montbrun, his ties to Louis II de Bourbon, prince de Condé (1621–86), and to other leaders of the Fronde, and his theological studies made Johann Baptist a well-connected figure in international Protestantism.⁶⁷ Oliver Cromwell recruited him as an agent and sent

65 See Julia Gauss, Alfred Stoecklin, *Bürgermeister Wettstein: Der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit* (Basel, 1953), p. 317.

66 Concretely, the Basel Council tied the granting of citizenship to the expectation that Basel would be taken into account in the future when recruiting new companies or awarding command posts, see STABS, minutes: Kleiner Rat, 43, fol. 242v. Starting in 1663, the Stuppa Guard company will also then be listed in *Etat de la France* as the Basel company (from this edition on, the Guard companies are listed with the names of the officers), see Nicolas Besongne, *Estat de la France ...* (Paris, 1663), pp. 170–171. The Stuppa regiment that was formed in 1672 created additional opportunities for Basel officers to take command of a company in this regiment as captains. Apart from family members and officers from the Grisons, the commanders in Stuppa's military units in fact came mainly from Basel.

67 Some of those with whom Stuppa corresponded can be identified in the *State Papers* of John Thurloe (1616–68). These included Condé's envoys in London, Henry Taillefer, Sieur de La Barrière (died 1670) and Pierre de Caumont La Force, Marquis de Cugnac,

him on a secret mission to France in 1654 to mobilise influential Huguenot circles for an English-backed military uprising against the French Crown.⁶⁸ Although the mission was unsuccessful, Johann Baptist continued to enjoy Cromwell's trust, which is why the French ambassador in London, Antoine de Bordeaux-Neufville (1621–61?), hired him as a double agent in return for payment of 300 pounds sterling (which Stuppa had himself demanded).⁶⁹ After the restoration of the English monarchy, Charles II (1630–85) banished Johann Baptist from England in September 1661, whereupon the latter entered French service on a more permanent basis and embarked on a distinguished career as an officer starting in the 1670s.⁷⁰ The dominant view in the literature is that Johann Baptist Stuppa profited from his already successful brother Peter and was able to enter French military services thanks to the latter's protection. But on closer inspection, the accomplishments of Johann Baptist in the mid-1650s may, on the contrary, have promoted Peter's rise. In any case, the fact that the hyperactive and well-connected brothers came as a pair probably made them particularly appealing for the French government.

The city of Geneva was also evidently counting on Peter and Johann Baptist Stuppa becoming influential figures when, on 22 June 1655, it granted citizenship to one of their brothers, Nicolas Stuppa (1611–68), and his son for free. In

the Frondeists and Condé followers Jacques Carpentier de Marigny (1615–70) and Henri Charles de La Trémoille, Prince de Tarente (1620–72), and the Geneva theologian Antoine Léger (1596–1661), who kept him informed about what was happening politically and militarily in the different European countries, see John Thurloe, *State Papers*, ed. Fletcher Gyles (London, 1742). Available at <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/series/thurloe-state-papers>. Accessed 2 June 2021. Johann Baptist Stuppa was also in touch with the Zurich antistes Johann Jakob Ulrich (1602–68), see Zurich, Staatsarchiv Zürich, E II 457 f, Stuppa's letters to Ulrich in the dossier *Anglicana, teils Duraeana*; as well as with the Basel antistes Theodor Zwinger (1597–1654), Basel, Universitätsbibliothek Basel, Frey-Gryn Mscr II, 11, no.14.

68 See Stefano Villani, "A Man of Intrigue but of No Virtue": Jean-Baptiste Stoupe (1623–1692), a Libertine between Raison d'État and Religion," *Church History and Religious Culture* 101 (2021), 306–323; Grigorio Vola, "The Revd. J. B. Stoupe's Travels in France in 1654 as Cromwell's Secret Agent," *Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 27 (2001), 509–526; Arnold Lätt, "Schweizer in England im 17. Jahrhundert," *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte* 11:3 (1931), 316–353, pp. 337–348; Fernand de Schickler, *Les églises du refuge en Angleterre*, 2 (Paris, 1892), pp. 153–154, 170–172.

69 See Lätt, "Schweizer," p. 340.

70 See Schickler, *Eglises*, pp. 231–234; ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 850, letter from Johann Baptist Stuppa to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 30 November 1661. During the Dutch War, Johann Baptist published the anti-Dutch tract *La religion des Hollandois*. In 1677 he was promoted to colonel with his own regiment and in 1689 to brigadier, see Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 3 (Paris, 1752), p. 32.

return, the Geneva Council expected Peter and Johann Baptist's support for the city. It explicitly made them citizens "in exchange for the service that one expects from these gentlemen, his brothers, for the benefit of the public".⁷¹ It is clear that the brothers were already perceived as potentially influential figures by the mid-1650s. The Geneva Council wanted to secure their services by giving preferential treatment to their relatives in Geneva. Here as well, concrete military entrepreneurial interests were at stake, as shown by the fact that in October 1655, just four months after the naturalisation of his relatives, Peter Stuppa was authorized by the Geneva Council to recruit 25 men for his Guard company in the territory of the Republic.⁷² The correspondence with the Chandieu brothers also shows that his network of relatives in Geneva played a role for Peter Stuppa's military enterprise.⁷³

Peter Stuppa's relationships with relevant actors at the court and in the army were key for his social and military rise. His marriage to Anne Charlotte de Gondi (1627–94) in January 1661 was surely crucial. The Gondis were an aristocratic family from Florence who, under the protection of Catherine de Medici (1519–89), were able to position themselves as influential financiers, clergy and court officials in France from the 1560s on. Anne Charlotte's father and grandfather served as, among other things, *gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi* and *introducateur des ambassadeurs*. A very distant relative was the influential leader of the Fronde, Jean François Paul de Gondi, Cardinal de Retz (1613–79).⁷⁴ Before her first marriage to Louis François Colbert,⁷⁵ Anne Charlotte may have been *fille d'honneur* to Marie de Bourbon (1606–92), the mother of Eugène-Maurice de Savoie-Carignan, Comte de Soissons (1635–73) and *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons*.⁷⁶ Yet another family and official

71 AEG, R.C. 155, fol. 195, Geneva Council Minutes, entry of 22 June 1655.

72 See AEG, R.C. 155, fol. 305.

73 See, e.g. ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 818, letter from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, Paris, 28 November 1656: "If you or monsieur deslisle [Albert de Chandieu-L'Isle] could address all soldiers to my brother in Geneva or to monsieur George Michely, I will be much obliged".

74 See Joanna Milstein, *The Gondi family: Strategy and Survival in Early Modern France* (Farnham, 2013), pp. 26–27, 64–65, and 76 (genealogical table after p. x1).

75 See Jean-Baptiste-Pierre Jullien Courcelles, *Histoire généalogique et héraldique des Pairs de France, des grands dignitaires de la Couronne, des principales familles nobles du royaume, et des maisons princières de l'Europe: Précédée de la généalogie de la maison de France*, 10 (Paris, 1829), p. 7. Louis-François Colbert was *Contrôleur des finances en la généralité de Paris* and a second cousin of Jean Baptiste Colbert. His dates of birth and death and the date of the marriage are unknown.

76 See Marie-Catherine-Hortense de Villedieu, *Mémoires de la vie de Henriette-Sylvie de Molière* (Tours, 1977), p. 208. Apart from its being mentioned in the memoirs of the

relationship tied the Stuppas to the Bourbon-Soissons, for Madeleine Stuppa, a daughter of Johann Anton Stuppa from his second marriage, was a *fille d'honneur* to Olympia Mancini (1639–1708), the wife of the *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons*.⁷⁷

As already suggested, in his dealings as Guard captain, Peter Stuppa had personal access to some of the most important decision-makers at the court: Cardinal Mazarin and the Minister of War Le Tellier. The Chandieu correspondence makes clear that Stuppa was also acquainted with other prominent army officers like Marshal Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, Viscount of Turenne (1611–75), and the Count of Soissons. The latter accompanied Stuppa in autumn 1660 on a one-month trip to England, which did not, however, have any military purpose. Louis XIV had given Soissons the mission of paying respects to the restored monarchy and King Charles II on his behalf and of seeking a bride at the English court for Louis' younger brother Philippe I, Duke of Orléans (1640–1701).⁷⁸ Furthermore, Stuppa was also in contact with important financial actors like Baron Jean Hérault de Gourville (1625–1703), the brothers Georges Pelissari (c.1628–76) and Claude Pelissari (died 1662), and Barthélémy Herwarth (1607–76).⁷⁹

The connection to the French ambassador in the Swiss Confederation, Jean de La Barde, and the role played by the latter's patronage in the enlargement of Stuppa's company and his acquisition of citizenship in Basel has already been mentioned. It is clear, moreover, that a close relationship existed with de La Bardes' long-time collaborator, the secretary of the embassy François Mouslier (died 1683).⁸⁰ Mouslier was very active in Paris in supporting the Swiss officers, often together with Stuppa, as becomes apparent from the Chandieu correspondence. Interestingly, Mouslier also turns up as a 'friend' in connection with Peter Stuppa's marriage to Anne Charlotte de Gondi. The marriage contract

writer Marie-Catherine de Villedieu (c.1640–1683), no evidence of this function could be found.

77 See Colliot, *Canal*, pp. 183–184. When exactly the cousin was in the service of the Comtesse is not clear. It has been shown that she was given this title in 1675.

78 See Max Braubach, *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen: Eine Biographie* (Vienna, 1963), p. 27; Pinard, *Chronologie*, 3 (Paris, 1761), p. 573; ACV, P Charrière de Sévery, Ba 834, letter from Peter Stuppa to Paul de Chandieu-Villars, n.p., 12 October 1660.

79 The relationship with the financial actors appears in an event in 1657, when the aforementioned people gathered to discuss the support of Nicolas Fouquet (1615–80), who had fallen into disrepute with Mazarin. Stuppa was present and is described as belonging to the "faction de M. d'Herval [Herwarth]", see Jean Hérault de Gourville, *Mémoires de Gourville*, 1 (Paris, 1694), pp. 317–318.

80 Rott, *Représentation*, 6 (Bern, 1917), p. 960 refers to Mouslier as "secretary and confidant of De La Barde".

was signed on 9 January 1661 in Mouslier's house in the Cloître Notre-Dame quarter of Paris. He is described in the contract as a witness for Peter Stuppa as follows: "on the part of the said Lord Stuppa, Monsieur François Mouslier, counsellor of the King and his councils, Controller General of the Chancellery of France his friend".⁸¹

The problematic situation of the sources does not allow for a more exact reconstruction of when and how Peter Stuppa's connections in the various milieus came into being. In light of the documents considered, it would appear permissible to conclude that the Guard officer disposed of a far-flung and effective network of relationships, consisting, in part, of illustrious actors from different social contexts, already in the 1650s.

5 Peter Stuppa as Protagonist and Profiteer in France's Reshaping of its Relations with the Swiss Confederation: Outlook and Conclusion

The reshaping and enlargement of the French army were among the first tasks that Louis XIV tackled upon assuming personal rule in 1661 and pursued more intensively in connection with his expansionist foreign policy starting in 1665.⁸² The monarch did not only want to reshape his army, but also relations with the Swiss Confederation. The 15 years of tough negotiations to renew the alliance between France and the Swiss Confederation culminated in the celebration of the alliance in Paris in November 1663: a lavish display of power by Louis XIV vis-à-vis his Swiss allies. Just a short time thereafter, it would become apparent that the Crown was not allowing itself to be limited by this treaty in its efforts to achieve its political goals.⁸³ A first change in French-Swiss relations was evident in the staffing of the embassy in Solothurn. The term of office of the ambassador Jean de La Barde (1603–92), who had negotiated the alliance with the Swiss Confederation, had come to an end in October 1663. Louis XIV did not name a high-ranking aristocratic diplomat as his successor, as the cantons, needless to say, expected, but instead left the post under the

81 BnF, P.O. 2729 Stoppa ou Stoupe (1). The relationship between Stuppa and Mouslier deteriorated starting in the mid-1660s at the latest and definitively in 1671, when the Minister of War, bypassing the *résident* Mouslier, entrusted Stuppa with the recruitment of mercenaries: a task that traditionally belonged to the embassy's competencies, see Schweizer, *Correspondenz*, S. 158.

82 See Masson, *Défendre*, pp. 116–120; Olivier Chaline, *Les armées du roi: Le grand chantier, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 2018), pp. 23–30.

83 See Poisson, 1663, pp. 63–80, 109–111; Holenstein, *Europa*, p. 127.

interim direction of the *chargé d'affaires* between October 1663 and April 1665. It was not until 1665 that he appointed the aforementioned François Mouslier, who was of lower social status than his predecessors, as France's official representative in Solothurn with the rank of a *résident*.⁸⁴ Mouslier had been a close collaborator of de La Barde since 1651 and his being appointed at least on an interim basis would not have been unusual from the point of view of having a smooth transition and maintaining continuity in the embassy's business. But the fact that Mouslier stayed in office until 1671 and, above all, that he was suspected of being involved in the shadowy affairs of the former finance minister Nicolas Fouquet and was, as consequence, imprisoned in the Bastille between January and August 1663, made his appointment suspicious, if not indeed an outright affront to the cantons.⁸⁵ As permanent envoy, Mouslier was equipped with all the required powers, but he was not as distinguished as prior (and future) ambassadors. Paul Schweizer correctly sees "a completely provisional character" in Mouslier's appointment and an attempt by the King "shortly after his assumption of personal rule ... , to come to terms with the Swiss in a simpler and less costly way."⁸⁶ In fact, the conditions for Swiss mercenary service in France also changed dramatically starting in the 1660s. At the beginning of October 1665, just a few months after being dispatched to the Swiss Confederation, the *résident* Mouslier was given the mission of increasing the Swiss troops.⁸⁷ The Crown wanted the new companies to be recruited

84 In 1665, Mouslier even only had the rank of a *deputé-résident*; he did not become *résident* until 1667, see Livet, *Suisse*, 1, p. 54; Andreas Affolter, *Verhandeln mit Republiken: Die französisch-eidgenössischen Beziehungen im frühen 18. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2017), p. 48; Schweizer, *Correspondenz*.

85 See Livet, *Suisse*, 1, p. 53; Rott, *Représentation*, 6, p. 960; Schweizer, *Correspondenz*, pp. 26–27.

86 Schweizer, *Correspondenz*, p. 29.

87 See BAR, Po#1000/1463#1392*, letter from François Mouslier to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Solothurn, 16 October 1665. The enlargement of the army served to prepare for armed aggression against Spain, which was foreseeable after the death of the Spanish King Philip IV on 17 September 1665, because Louis XIV laid claim to parts of Philip's inheritance. In May 1667, Louis XIV had his troops invade the Spanish Netherlands; in February 1668, he occupied the Spanish Franche-Comté. Swiss troops took part in the conquests. The Federal Diet condemned the French military actions as offensive actions against non-French territories and hence as troop deployments that violated the alliance, see Klaus Malettke, *Hegemonie, multipolares System, Gleichgewicht, internationale Beziehungen 1648/1659–1713/1714* (Paderborn, 2021), pp. 316–317; Rudolf Maag, *Die Freigrafschaft Burgund und ihre Beziehungen zu der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom Tode Karls des Kühnen bis zum Frieden von Nymwegen (1477–1678)* (Zurich, 1891), pp. 193–215; Benjamin Ryser, *Zwischen den Fronten. Berner Militärunternehmer im Dienst des Sönnenkönigs Ludwig XIV.* (Zurich, 2021), pp. 49, 321 (note 318).

at a lower pay rate of six or even just five écus per man, instead of the seven écus that was hitherto paid, and the recruitment contracts to be concluded not with the cantons, but rather directly with the individual captains.⁸⁸ The bypassing of the cantons in the recruitment of these so-called *compagnies franches* clearly violated the terms of the 1663 alliance. France then went one step further in the troop reform that followed the 1668 Peace of Aachen. Since the troops were no longer all needed, the Swiss Guards regiment was reduced after the conclusion of the peace treaty – in and of itself a normal procedure. As of 16 June 1668, Louis XIV dismissed almost 40 Guard officers, a majority of whom belonged to the ruling elites of the 13 cantons. The dismissed troops were not sent home, however. Instead, France used the mercenary potential that had been released to form new *compagnies franches* at lower pay rates. The majority of the captains who were subsequently hired as new commanders no longer came from the ruling elites of the cantons, but mainly from allied territories (*Zugewandte Orte*) and subject territories.⁸⁹ It is clear that Louis XIV was shifting certain parameters of the relationship with the 13 cantons⁹⁰ and trying to circumvent restrictive terms of the mercenary alliance (like pay level, origin of officers, areas of troop deployment, and guarantee of religious freedom for Protestants), in order to achieve the greatest possible authority over the Swiss mercenaries.⁹¹ The later offensive use of Swiss troops during the 1668 occupation of Franche-Comté or in the Dutch War starting in 1672, which was regarded, above all, by the Protestant cantons as a violation of the treaty and severely criticised, appears to confirm this hypothesis.

Peter Stuppa was one of the protagonists and profiteers of these changes. For contemporaries and 18th century military historians, he shared responsibility for the negative development of Louis XIV's mercenary policy. Thus, he is said to have encouraged the transformation of former Guard companies into cheap *compagnies franches* that were mostly led by officers from allied

88 See inter alia BAR, Po#1000/1463#1392*, letter from François Mouslier to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Solothurn, 13 November 1665; BAR, Po#1000/1463#1321*, letter from Marquis de Louvois to François Mouslier, Paris, 8 December 1665; STABE, A VI 57, p. 10, concluding record (*Abschied*) of the Diet of 11 January 1666 in Baden.

89 See Keller, "Gardehauptmann," p. 98; STABE, A IV 57, pp. 671–678, list for the Diet of 1 July 1668; Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 2, p. 39; Nicolas Besongne, *Estat de la France ...* (Paris, 1665), pp. 215–129; idem, *Estat de la France ...* (Paris, 1669), pp. 231–233.

90 Not only by way of novel *compagnies franches*, but also by France delaying debt repayment, paying pensions partly in the form of salt instead of money, and obstructing or abolishing Swiss trade privileges that were provided for in the alliance, see Livet, *Suisse*, 1, p. 53; Maag, *Freigrafschaft*, pp. 247–252.

91 See Schweizer, *Correspondenz*, pp. 95–96; Holenstein, *Europa*, pp. 127–129.

territories and hence could be deployed without restriction.⁹² It is difficult to prove or disprove the veracity of this claim, since the sources that have been found thus far do not say anything about Stuppa's role in the matter of the *compagnies franches*. What is clear, however, is that the proven and lucrative business model of the mercenary aristocracies of the 13 cantons was jeopardised by the reduction of the pay rate and the competition of 'foreign' or naturalised officers. The possibilities for controlling and sanctioning 'non-Swiss' who, it was feared, were more beholden to their royal employer than to the Swiss Federal Diet and the interests of the Swiss authorities were thus made more difficult. Peter Stuppa and his brothers were themselves among those who profited from this change in system: the subjects of the Grisons seized their opportunity and, starting in 1665, raised three and a half cheap *compagnies franches*, which they kept in the service for a long time.⁹³

Thanks to the change in system, in the 1660s, the French Crown benefited from cost savings with more or less unchanged troop numbers and was able to achieve a persistently lower pay rate for the Swiss line regiments thanks to Stuppa's 1671 recruitment mission.⁹⁴ The 1671 mission provides the first clearly documented evidence in the sources of Peter Stuppa's official collaboration with the French Minister of War. It would appear that starting in the mid-1650s, thanks to the missions that he successfully discharged and his loyal services, the subject of the Grisons rose continually from an 'ordinary' captain in the Guards to a royal '*créature*', who was a good candidate for assuming his later function of interim *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons*. The sources examined thus

92 On the 1668 transformation of the troops, in particular, Zurlauben notes: "[Stuppa] had recommended the plan of this reform, persuaded the Marquis de Louvois, the Minister of War, to form out of the debris of the dismissed companies a large number of *compagnies franches*, of which the pay was six écus per man.... Several officers of the [Guard] regiment and others, who because of their low birth or the mediocrity of their fortune, did not have anything to venture or to hope for in Switzerland, formed these companies and, despite the repeated objections of the cantons, preserved them." ("[Stuppa] avoit conseillé le plan de cette réforme, persuada au Marquis de Louvois, Ministre de la Guerre, de composer des débris des Compagnies licenciées un grand nombre de Compagnies-Franches, dont la solde étoit de six écus par homme.... Plusieurs Officiers du Régiment [des Gardes] & d'autres, qui par leur basse naissance, ou la médiocrité de leur fortune, n'avoient rien à risquer ni à prétendre en Suisse, formerent ces Compagnies, & malgré les défenses réitérées des Cantons, ils les conserverent", see Zurlauben, *Code militaire*, 1, pp. 55–56; Keller, "Gardehauptmann," pp. 98–99.

93 See StABE, A IV 57, p. 716, *Abschied der Tagsatzung* of 4 November 1668; StABS, AHA, Protokolle: C 1.1, 18 March 1669; Vincennes, Service historique de la défense, Ya 373, list of the *compagnies franches* in the "Estat de toutes les troupes Suisses qui sont au service du Roy", 10 February 1696.

94 See Keller, "Gardehauptmann," p. 114.

far do not allow us to determine whether he was also actively promoted by the French ministers of war on his way to becoming commander-in-chief of all the Swiss troops in France. It is clear, however, that Peter Stuppa was ready at the right time and at the right place when the *Colonel général des Suisses et Grisons* in office, the Count of Soissons, died unexpectedly in 1673: he had a suitable wealth of experience as officer and mediator, the requisite contacts and network, influence and credit at the court and in the Swiss cantons, and evidently also the required talent for exercising this key function in the French-Swiss mercenary system.

The Besenval Family: Constants and Changes in Its Military Entrepreneurial Activities (1650–1800)

Julien Grand

From the 1650s to the French Revolution, military entrepreneurship would be one of the financial and aristocratic backbones of the Besenval patrician family from Solothurn. The dawn of the 1650s allowed the family to place its first officer in the King's service: a tradition that was maintained until 1830, with a sole exception between 1661 and 1671. The longevity of this service allows us to undertake an analysis of the constants and changes inherent to foreign service under the Ancien Régime, using the example of this family, which has left behind ample archival materials.¹ Switzerland having been spared the major wreckage of history, numerous family archives have been preserved and have not been scattered. This makes it possible to have a consistent look at family trajectories in the context of military entrepreneurship. Despite these substantial primary source materials, some periods, nonetheless, remain in the dark, and the contribution of new sources helps to complete the picture that we are going to provide. In this paper we will discuss three aspects of the activity of the Besenvals: first by addressing the mode of transferral of military units, then by looking at the revenues arising from such posts, and concluding with the forms of recruitment.

At the time, the Swiss cantons and Solothurn, in particular, maintained close political, military, cultural and financial ties with France, which translated, notably, into the repeated renewal of alliances between the Kingdom of France and the Confederation of the XIII Cantons. The permanent embassy of the King of France in Solothurn played an important role in his diplomatic apparatus, moreover, and connected Solothurn, more than the other Swiss cantons, to France. The Besenvals found a favourable environment in this context for having a go at the military entrepreneurship that provided the Swiss

1 The Besenval family archives were housed at the Musée des Suisses dans le Monde (Château de Penthes), but are now stored at the States archives of Solothurn after the bankruptcy of this museum. They are currently in the process of being digitised, but are already available online, see www.besenval.anton.ch. See also Laure Eynard, "Le Fonds de Besenval: De la conservation à la diffusion du savoir," *La Lettre de Penthes* 26 (2015), pp. 53–55.

cantonal elites an important basis, both financially and politically, for asserting their authority in the different cantons. Nothing embodies this privileged link to France better than the current Swiss embassy in France. The owner of the building in the second half of the 18th century was none other than Pierre Victor Besenval. Within the Besenval family, Pierre Victor represents the ultimate accomplishment of the family's military entrepreneurial activities, since he managed to achieve almost complete integration into the French nobility.

1 Entry into French Service and Establishment of Permanent Regiments

Martin Besenval² was born in the Aosta Valley and wandered the roads of southern Germany as a Savoyard peddler before settling in Solothurn in 1628. Initially, he kept his distance from the patrician families who traditionally had been offering their services to European princes for ages within the framework of *Reisläuferei*³. Only late in life he acquired his own company of Swiss Guards, the family historiography situating this step in 1653.⁴ Thanks to his ties to the Schwaller family, however, he entered into the service of the Most Christian King before that date, since the French ambassador mentions a guard company jointly held by Schwaller and Besenval already in 1651.⁵ The Besenvals therefore began their foreign service as financial backers of their relatives in Solothurn, while remaining in the shadow of Solothurn's political office holders.⁶ The sources are mysterious about Martin's new activity, but we can detect here a change in the framework of his financial activities following the end of the Thirty Years' War and perhaps preparations being made for his youngest sons, the first of whom is 17 years old in 1650. This thus corresponds to the context highlighted by Zurfluh for Zwyer d'Evibach, in which service represented a unique opportunity to increase one's symbolic capital.⁷ In the course

2 A simplified genealogy of the de Besenval family is to be found at the end of the article, in order to facilitate reading and to be able to situate the actors in question (Fig. 17.1).

3 I.e. a commitment limited only to the duration of a campaign and without a permanent basis.

4 Gabrielle Claerr Stamm, *La saga de la famille de Besenval, seigneurs de Brunstatt, Riedisheim et Didenheim* (Riedisheim, 2015), p. 38.

5 Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque publique et universitaire [BPUN], 8 RO I/43, fol. 388.

6 See the correspondence of de la Barde at BPUN, 8 RO I/42, 43 and 44.

7 Anselm Zurfluh, "Sebastian Peregrin Zwyer von Evibach (1597–1661): Ein eidgenössischer Solddienstunternehmer," in *Gente ferocissima: Mercenariat et société en Suisse (XVe–XIXe siècle)*, eds. Norbert Furrer et al. (Zurich/Lausanne 1997), 17–30.

of the reorganisation in the 1650s, Jean de la Barde, ambassador of the King of France to the Swiss Confederation, defended the *avoyer*⁸ Schwaller's company without mentioning Besenval, but he specifies regarding the Schwaller company that "Three persons on whom I depend for it [the King's service] have an interest in these two companies".⁹

In 1654, Jean-Martin, the second son of Martin Besenval, was 20 years old and thus found himself leading a company in the field. The unit that his father had taken over from Schwaller was reduced to a half-company, joined to that of Arregger, his brother-in-law.¹⁰ The status of the companies in the service of a France that has just emerged from the Fronde was highly uncertain in this period,¹¹ since they were made and unmade depending on the intrigue.¹² With the death of Jean-Martin on the outskirts of Arras,¹³ the only Besenval to die on the field of honour,¹⁴ de la Barde's intervention would be needed to keep the company in the family and have it transferred it to Jean-Victor.¹⁵ Prior to the military reforms undertaken by the Le Telliers, the political credit that families possessed within the Confederation was key for the attribution and transferral of units – all the more so since every vacancy whetted the appetites.¹⁶ Before the court at Versailles to some extent shunted the ambassador aside in the second half of the 17th century, the ambassador's steps in distributing military posts had been guided by the current political realities in Switzerland. In 1658 he still recommended captain Besenval to the Colonel General of the Swiss and Grisons,¹⁷ but Martin's death in 1660 reduced the political capital of the family in Solothurn significantly and Jean-Victor's company suffered from the dismissals that followed the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees.¹⁸ The follow-

8 The *avoyer* was the head of the Solothurn Council and thus the highest possible political office in the canton.

9 BPUN, 8 RO I/44, fol. 237.

10 BPUN, 8 RO I/45, fol. 89.

11 Zurlauben even says: "The service of the Swiss in France was not at all reliable before 1671", in Beat F. Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire des Suisses au service de la France*, 7 (Paris, 1752). Available at <https://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-25408>. Accessed 21 April 2017.

12 BPUN, 8 RO I/45, fol. 90. On the more general context, see Edouard Rott, *Histoire de la représentation diplomatique de la France auprès des cantons suisses, de leurs alliés et de leurs confédérés*, 6 (Berne, 1917).

13 Aargauer Kantonsbibliothek, Acta Helvetica [AH] 76/147.

14 Which will, incidentally, be one of the reasons given for ennobling the family, see Prégny-Chambésy, Musée des Suisses dans le Monde [MSMA], 1/2.10.

15 BPUN, 8 RO I/45, fol. 145.

16 AH, 92/110.

17 BPUN, 8 RO I/47, fol. 89.

18 *Die Eidgenössische Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1649 bis 1680*, 6:1 (Frauenfeld, 1867), pp. 506–507.

ing period of peace thus marked a parenthesis in the military service of the Besenvals, while France was reorganising its army.¹⁹

Louis XIV's resumption of his wars would, however, provide the Besenvals a new opportunity to reconnect with the military profession. Pierre Joseph (1647–1704), newly married to Marie Sibille de Thurn et Valsassina, a family from the lands of the Prince-Abbot of St. Gallen, would take command of a company officially sanctioned (*avouée*) by this prince of the Empire,²⁰ and Charles Jacques (1649–1703) would raise a company,²¹ which was later integrated into the Salis regiment.²² These new companies were the fruit of the levy undertaken by the King's extraordinary envoy Jean-Pierre Stuppa.²³ The latter managed to rise into the entourage of Le Tellier and was given the mission of raising companies in Switzerland. He accomplished this, notably, by forming free companies (*compagnies franches*), thus short-circuiting the authority of the cantons and attracting considerable enmity within the Swiss Confederation. With the establishment of permanent regiments and the transition to what Lynn calls a "state commission army"²⁴, however, the era of committing for just a single campaign was over. In becoming an enduring feature, these levies would bring about four main developments for the Besenval family: 1) a shifting of the centre of gravity of their economic activities to Paris; 2) difficulties maintaining themselves in political power in Solothurn by playing both sides; 3) the need to secure the transferral of military appointments from one generation to another; and 4) the opening up of new career opportunities in France. We are going to try to contextualise these changes within the problematic of the transferral of military companies in the service of France.

Chargés d'affaires of the family quickly turned up to manage the Parisian affairs,²⁵ the beginning of a separation between the Swiss and French activities that would culminate in the 18th century. The need to be constantly present among the troops likewise quickly required granting of leave to travel

19 Lucien Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle: Puissance de l'état, contrôle de la société* (Paris, 2009), pp. 616–619.

20 MSMA, 1/4.4.

21 MSMA, 1/8.8.

22 MSMA, 1/8.30.

23 Zurlauben, *Histoire militaire*, 7, pp. 131–132. On his mission, see Katrin Keller, "Ein Schweizer Gardehauptmann als französischer Unterhändler: Johann Peter Stuppas Werbeerhandlungen in der Eidgenossenschaft 1671," in: *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 92–115.

24 John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610–1715* (New York, 2006), p. 7.

25 MSMA, 1/28.47.

to Switzerland, which was generally accorded by the minister of war;²⁶ this would make taking up political appointments at home considerably more complicated and would be partly responsible for the loss of political power in Solothurn. The 1720s would be particularly difficult for the Besenval family in this domain, since the family would narrowly avoid extinction following numerous deaths. Two out of the *avoyer* Besenval's three children would thus make the conscious choice to pursue a French career, thereby renouncing a political appointment in the Solothurn councils.²⁷ But, at the very same time as the King was trying to limit venality in the military,²⁸ the permanence of the Swiss regiments would encourage the patricians to find ways of keeping the companies raised within the family, mobilising all the resources of patronage required for an intra-familial transfer – this in order not to lose the initial investment made to raise troops in the service of the King. At the end of the 17th century, however, the political credit that a family possessed remains key for its survival. The two Besenval brothers in the service at the time provide us with a good example. When there were transgressions, Pierre Joseph, at the head of a company of the Abbot of St. Gallen, would receive the insistent order of this prince of the Empire to bring the company back home.²⁹ As a result, Pierre Joseph's company would be 'reformed' in 1682.³⁰ His brother Charles Jacques, on the other hand, had recourse to the services of a certain Buch from Solothurn as captain-lieutenant,³¹ before transferring the company for a sum of 1,200 livres to his nephew François Joseph, while still remaining the nominal head of the unit.³² The archives are silent as to whether this transferral was sanctioned by the royal authority, but as the Besenvals were starting to serve the King's interests in Solothurn and Switzerland as a whole better and better, it was not called into question. We have here the embryonic form of a scenario that would get repeated again and again until the fall of the Ancien Régime.

26 BPUN, 8 RO I/53, fol. 271.

27 See the correspondence of Jean-Victor II Besenval with the Marquis d'Avaray at BPUN, 8 RO I/114 and MSMA, 1/17.233.

28 Hervé Drévilion, *L'impôt du sang: Le métier des armes sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 2005), pp. 179–185.

29 BPUN, 8 RO I/55, fols. 272, 315.

30 Stamm, *La saga*, p. 83. The 'reformation' of a company means that its commander is removed from command by the king. The remaining troops are then either added to an existing company or form the embryo of a new company assigned to someone who is useful to French interests in Switzerland.

31 MSMA, 1/8.82.

32 MSMA, 1/8.72; MSMA, 1/9.3.

François Joseph would be forced later to renounce French service. A tempestuous marriage in Solothurn prevented him from joining his company, because he was not able to evade the reach of the ecclesiastical courts. His company in the Salis regiment had been supplemented by a free company³³, which was raised using the funds of his uncle, the *avoyer*.³⁴ Returning to service having become impossible for him, the *avoyer* and family patriarch had to save his investment and find a solution. The preservation of the company in the Besenval family would thus get negotiated between the *avoyer* and colonels Wagner³⁵ and Stuppa.³⁶ Whether he wanted to or not, the *avoyer* had, nonetheless, to resign himself to sending his eldest son into the service,³⁷ even though he viewed him rather as the son who would inherit his political credit in Solothurn. This agreement had to be approved, however, by Louvois,³⁸ who transferred the captain's commission to the oldest Besenval son, Jean-Victor II.³⁹ The latter thus left the orbit of Solothurn for good and would partly contribute to the Besenval faction and the French camp losing political power in Solothurn, since he was on a diplomatic mission in Poland on behalf of Louis XIV when his father died. By sending his eldest son, the *avoyer* Besenval demonstrated his loyalty to the King of France; he was then granted a half-company of Guards.⁴⁰ It would be attached to that of the Salis regiment to form a complete half-company within the Guard regiment.⁴¹ At the same time, the company held by François Joseph was kept in the Schellenberg regiment⁴² and then the Greder regiment.⁴³ During the War of the League of Augsburg, Jean-Victor II would be joined by his two younger brothers, Pierre Joseph, who would only serve a few years,⁴⁴ and Charles Jacques, who would be an ensign in the Guards

33 A free company was, as a rule, unregimented. In the context of Swiss foreign service, this also meant that it was not officially sanctioned (*avouée*) by any canton and it tied the owner of a unit to the King by way of a specific *capitulation* or convention, which could be contrary to the interests of the Helvetic Corps as a whole.

34 MSMA, 1/10.108.

35 Mauritz Wagner was at the time the lieutenant colonel of the Swiss Guards regiment. As such, he was the *Solothurner* of highest rank among the Swiss troops in France and often acted as conduit between the authorities of his canton and Colonel Stuppa.

36 MSMA, 1/6.216.

37 MSMA, 1/6.59.

38 MSMA, 1/6.219.

39 MSMA, 1/10.104.

40 BPUN, 8 ROI/64, fol. 269.

41 MSMA, 1/6.60. See also MSMA, 1/10.78.

42 Bern, Archives fédérales suisses [Bar], J4.1#1000/1259#, fols. 206–207.

43 MSMA, 1/6.63.

44 François-Alexandre Aubert de la Chesnaye-Desbois, Jacques Badier, "Besenval," in *Dictionnaire de la noblesse*, 3 (Paris, 1864), p. 61.

regiment.⁴⁵ It was thus ensured that the companies acquired starting in the 1670s would be able to remain in the family fold. This continuity would be reinforced at the time of the Peace of Ryswick, since there were plans, firstly, to distinguish between those who served effectively and the others and, secondly, to reduce two companies to one, in order to have the captains serve alternately and thus to keep as many patricians as possible in the French fold.⁴⁶ Priority was given to maintaining the companies of the sons⁴⁷ and of the nephew of the *avoyer* Besenval in this system,⁴⁸ on account of the political credit that the family had in Solothurn and in Switzerland. At the end of the 17th century and thanks to the accomplishing of the reforms put in place by the Le Tellier, we can observe an embryonic form of heredity in the transferral of military companies. Of course, there would never be an automatic transferral, since access to a company or its retention would always depend on patronage resources held by the King, the Colonel-General of the Swiss or the political authorities of the different Swiss cantons. Nonetheless, the families coped with this risk as long as they managed to unite the conditions required for taking over a company: a man who was old enough and ready to take it over if the titleholder of a company died or retired and sufficient credit with the patrons who accorded these revenues. This situation, which tended towards pseudo-venality, was more tolerated than accepted by the royal authorities, whose aim was to be able to bind the families who were able to influence Swiss politics in accordance with French interests. Although the Besenval family succeeded in getting a place in the sun, there was also a flipside to the coin. With the adoption of permanent units, numerous candidates, in effect, were pushing into the antechamber of the King's munificence. It would thus take Jean-Victor 11 32 years of service and Charles Jacques 34 to become the head of a regiment. The service came to be sclerotic, because the families in place around 1700 would become more and more difficult to remove, whereas newcomers rarely got beyond the rank of captain-lieutenant. This situation would have political consequences in Solothurn. In effect, the families who no longer had access to the Small Council since the latter had nibbled away the prerogatives of the Grand Council no longer received French favours except marginally and found themselves excluded from the most lucrative military posts. This would be one of the reasons for the citizens to overthrow the hegemony of the Small Council

45 BPUN, 8 RO I/70, fol. 208.

46 BPUN, 8 RO I/71 (vol. 2), fol. 205.

47 In 1697, Charles Jacques also received a half-company in his name from the King, see BPUN, 8 RO I/73, fol. 101.

48 BPUN, 8 RO I/71 (vol. 2), fol. 205.

in Solothurn in 1723,⁴⁹ at a time when the all-powerful Besenval family would no longer be in a position to secure its hold on political offices.

2 Making French Service Perpetual

With regiments becoming permanent, Louis XIV perhaps did not foresee that the Swiss officers were also going to settle in Versailles and create their own networks by inserting themselves into the aristocratic and ministerial clienteles; this would tend, little by little, to push the ambassador into the background. For although the ambassador still had a central place in matters in the 17th century, the centre of gravity for attributing military posts within the Swiss troops was going to shift to Paris in the nascent 18th century. To succeed, the Swiss captains would have to make their entrance into the court, forced to serve as courtiers in order to overcome the company bottleneck. If the gauge up to this point had been a family's political credit in the cantons, the network of clientele and friends at Versailles, representing one of the four criteria for advancement given by Lynn,⁵⁰ would come to rival the power of the ambassador. Having more arrows in one's quiver than simply the ambassador's support became a necessity for the officers in the service of the Most Christian King. Another development was starting to take place: continuity of service was going to become a key argument for getting ahead and the family's political capital in Switzerland would, to some extent, become secondary. The Colonel General of the Swiss could thus draw on an enormous pool in making his choice,⁵¹ with the Swiss regiment having around 1,100 officers in the 1690s.⁵² The Besenvals' Parisian network would thus be absolutely crucial for military careers and longevity would be consciously used to attain the upper ranks. But, even more importantly, in the absence of institutional heredity, it was absolutely essential to have a man ready when a titleholder⁵³ died or had to retire from service. In 1710, Franz Joseph and his eldest son Urs Joseph Michael succumbed to a fever. His second son, Pierre Antoine Joseph, was only 13 years

49 Hans Sigrist, *Solothurnische Geschichte*, 3 (Solothurn, 1981), pp. 6–9.

50 Lynn, *Giant*, p. 259.

51 MSMA, 1/10.115.

52 André Corvisier, *Louvois* (Paris, 1983), p. 517.

53 Since the term 'owner' does not reflect the legal reality of possessing a company, which is more similar to a usufruct, we have adopted the term 'titleholder', which is opposed to that of commander. It is not out of the question, however, that the titleholder would choose to command his unit himself.

old at the time and had to wait until 1714 to become a captain in Brendlé's regiment⁵⁴ and take over the family company.⁵⁵ The young Pierre Antoine Joseph had a fine career in front of him, if he had not been killed in a duel in 1723: an event that definitively puts an end to the Besenvals' political dominance in Solothurn. The family situation was not conducive to taking over a company at the time. Not only had the family suffered numerous deaths and the number of its male representatives was dwindling as a result, but, furthermore, those who could be called upon to take over the company had barely left behind their nappies or were too old: Pierre Victor, the future lieutenant-general, was only three years old; his cousin Jean Victor Pierre Joseph had just celebrated his 12th birthday and hence cannot take up service right away; finally, the uncle, Pierre Célestin Antoine, was already getting on in years, at 37, and his emerging political career in Solothurn certainly did not give him any motivation to go to France. Nonetheless, the King would grant the company to Jean Victor Pierre Joseph, thanks essentially to the credit that his uncle, Jean-Victor II, enjoyed at the court, as Cardinal Dubois told him: "Your consideration played no small part in influencing his Majesty in favour of this young gentleman."⁵⁶ In fact, however, there was no one to occupy the position physically, despite the captain's commission granted to young Jean Victor Pierre Joseph.⁵⁷ Hence, the family took precautions by signing an agreement with Monsieur de Vevey, the commander of the unit, who undertook to pay 3,600 livres per year until the young Besenval could take it over.⁵⁸ Since, however, the King remained the ultimate arbiter in the naming of his captains, there was no guarantee that the young Besenval would really be able to dispose of this company as titleholder when he was ready to join it.

If this example demonstrates the uncertainty involved in the transferral of companies, the younger branch provides us the opposite example: that in which the circumstances allow for a smooth transferral. There would, in effect, be no problem ensuring the transfer, since, when Jean-Victor II died, Pierre Victor had already been a cadet for three years in the Guards regiment and thus became the natural successor of his father as titleholder⁵⁹ of his

54 Stamm, *La saga*, p. 57.

55 AH, 26/77.

56 MSMA, 1/17.150.

57 MSMA, 1/19.2.

58 MSMA, 1/19.39.

59 The term 'titleholder' here means that Pierre Victor received from the King the patent of captain for his units, but that he was too young to be their commander and left the responsibility to a captain-lieutenant until he had the real capacity to command.

units.⁶⁰ This transferral took place even though the Besenval family no longer possessed means of influence in the political councils in Solothurn and Switzerland at the time. Pierre Victor's parents were, however, integrated into Parisian noble society: an integration that got concretised, notably, in a marriage to a representative of the de Broglië family. There is thus a stark contrast to the older branch, which would meet a very different fate. In 1731, Jean Victor Pierre Joseph had, in effect, reached the age of 18 and he asked to be given his due. Monsieur de Vevey did not hesitate to bring certain claims to bear.⁶¹ A judgement was then rendered by clerks of the Brendlé regiment; according to this judgement, Besenval was required, first of all, to pay a sum of 3,535 livres to take over his company.⁶² Ten years later, the Duke of Bourbon would not refrain from recalling that Jean Victor Pierre Joseph had only received this command "thanks to a big favour because of the name he bears", but that his services were still very modest.⁶³ Finding himself in an unenviable financial situation, he tried then to obtain a company in the Guards, which was a guarantee of a better income and a fine career. Several drafts written by Jean Victor Pierre Joseph, and intended for the Colonel General of the Swiss and Grisons, give us a glimpse into the argumentation used to achieve his aims:

I have long had from my ancestors who have had the honour of serving as captains. My great-uncle de Besenval was killed in 1654 during the lifting of the siege of Arras, my maternal great grandfather de Sury served at the same time and in the same capacity. His company has since become Viggier and Arregger today. The two half-companies of Machet and the company of de Staal changed their names and families when the two gentlemen acquired them. ... Since your Serene Highness is willing to allow me to ask his favour, I allow myself to ask his permission to try to obtain from a Captain in the Guards that he is willing to propose to me to command his company.⁶⁴

60 MSMA, 1/17.255.

61 MSMA, 1/19.57.

62 MSMA, 1/19.53.

63 MSMA, 1/28.62.

64 MSMA, 1/18.38: "Il y a long temps que j'ai eu de mes ancêtres qui y ont eu l'honneur de servir en qualité de capitaines. Mon grand-oncle de Besenval a été tué en 1654 a la levée du siège d'Arras, mon bisaïeul maternel de Sury a servi dans le même temps et dans la même qualité. Sa compagnie est depuis devenue Viggier et arregger aujourd'hui. Les deux demi-compagnies de Machet et la compagnie de Staal ont changé de nom et de famille quand les deux Mr. les ont obtenu. ... Puisque que votre A. S. [Altesse Sérénissime] veut bien me permettre que je lui demande une grâce, je prends la liberté de lui demander

In response, he received a captain's commission in the Swiss Guards,⁶⁵ without, however, possessing a company as titleholder, since he took over Karl Leonhard Bachmann's half-company for a period of eight years, before having to turn it over to Bachmann's eldest son.⁶⁶ Funnily enough, Bachmann had received command of the Besenval company in the Guards in 1725,⁶⁷ which shows the volatility of personal situations in the service and the criss-crossing that could take place from one generation to the next. In any case, it did not take long for news of this commission to spread among the interested families,⁶⁸ describing this change, in passing, as the best way of succeeding.⁶⁹ Even if the situation was only temporary, it still allowed Jean Victor Pierre Joseph to climb the ranks, becoming a knight of the order of Saint Louis⁷⁰ and a brigadier,⁷¹ both promising to obtain more important functions.⁷²

It will not be long, however, before the precariousness of his position in the service made itself felt, since the Bachmann company is given to Louis Auguste Augustin d'Affry. Besenval did not lose everything, since the King kept him as commander of d'Affry's company in the Guards.⁷³ The King, in effect, hardly took the agreements made between Swiss families into account and Besenval found himself caught in the middle. As the young Bachmann would not fail to ask for his company in due course, Besenval offered to assume the commission until the son was old enough to take command.⁷⁴ He undoubtedly hoped, when the time came, to be able to push in front of him or to obtain for himself the long-awaited company as titleholder. The price was high for such an opportunity at the time and it was not long before he would have the chance. Franz Viktor Josef Settler (1693–1788)⁷⁵ wanted to turn over his company for a sum of 40,000 livres and was willing to part with it for an annual security of

la permission de tâcher d'obtenir d'un Capt [capitaine] aux Gardes qu'il veule bien me proposer pour commander sa compg [compagnie]."

65 MSMA, 1/19.1.

66 MSMA, 1/18.304.

67 Veronika Feller-Vest, "Karl Leonhard von Bachmann," in *Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse* [DHS]. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/023296/2002-01-17/>. Accessed 1 September 2022.

68 AH, 177/68.

69 AH, 140/65.

70 MSMA, 1/18.308.

71 MSMA, 1/18.310.

72 Dréyillon, *L'impôt*, p. 44.

73 MSMA, 1/18.58.

74 MSMA, 1/18.56.

75 Urban Fink, "Franz Viktor Josef Settler," in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/017583/2011-11-23/>. Accessed 1 September 2022.

4,000 livres. Besenval was afraid to enter this deal, because there was no guarantee that the company would be given to his son and, inasmuch as it was a unit that was officially sanctioned by the canton of Solothurn, the approval of Solothurn's authorities was required.⁷⁶ Thanks to the help of his cousin Pierre Victor, the Colonel General of the Swiss gave his *carte blanche*, "despite his aversion to agreements."⁷⁷ Pierre Victor pushed his cousin to accept, because, not only would he be able to increase his earnings, but he also regarded the price as affordable, a half-company easily being worth 50,000 livres.⁷⁸ Jean Victor Pierre Joseph accepted the proposal finally, because his cousin stood surety for him,⁷⁹ even though he still had some worries about being dependent on the goodwill of the general and the colonel.⁸⁰ The two men thus concluded the contract.⁸¹ Besenval would religiously pay the amount from 1752 until 1774, years for which the archives provide us receipts for a total amount of 79,000 livres.⁸² Since Settler died in 1788, we can extrapolate to a total of 144,000 livres paid by Besenval and his descendants for this company in the Guards: a sum of money that would essentially come from the revenues of the family's Alsatian properties.

This agreement would make Jean Victor Pierre Joseph disgusted with the service and he would retire to his home "in a dark and hypochondriacal mood."⁸³ The actual revenues of the company were less than the money invested and he tried, always highlighting the longevity of the Besenval family's service, to obtain hereditary rights to it.⁸⁴ When he left the service, the company's debts came to 13,682 livres.⁸⁵ By way of a more or less convoluted agreement,⁸⁶ he relinquished his half-company to Robert Vigier⁸⁷: a transferral that was validated by the King.⁸⁸ There is no need for elaborate calculations to note the dead loss incurred by Jean Victor Pierre Joseph in this affair, even if

76 MSMA, 1/18.21.

77 MSMA, 1/20.58.

78 MSMA, 1/20.58.

79 MSMA, 1/18.22.

80 MSMA, 1/18.20. See also MSMA, 1/18.23.

81 MSMA, 1/22.155. See also MSMA, 1/22.152.

82 MSMA, 1/22.145–236.

83 MSMA, 1/18.60.

84 MSMA, 1/18.8.

85 MSMA, 1/20.29.

86 MSMA, 1/18.303.

87 Andreas Fankhauser, "Joseph Robert Wilhelm Vigier von Steinbrugg," in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/017603/2014-01-22/>. Accessed 1 September 2022.

88 MSMA, 1/18.118.

the agreement would be modified later on to try to ameliorate his situation.⁸⁹ The agreement had become a veritable imbroglio whose fate is of interest to no less than four of Solothurn's patricians and largely depended on the wishes of the King, the Colonel-General and the canton of Solothurn. Georges François Urs, Jean-Victor Pierre Joseph's youngest son, would join the Swiss Guards regiment as a cadet later on,⁹⁰ but he was quickly the target of reprimands.⁹¹ His cousin's connections would enable him to become supernumerary deputy assistant major in the Guards regiment⁹² and, despite Choiseul's reforms, he would still manage to obtain the command of a company in the Guards, since his cousin made him the head of his lieutenant-colonel's company.⁹³ The agreement with Vigier had disappeared and hence the young Besenval had to submit to the order of rank.⁹⁴ At the time of his death in 1785, he would still have not obtained anything more than this command in the Guard regiment. The sums poured into the venture by his father were thus definitively lost and it would not be long before the Revolution swept away the edifice of French service.

The 18th century thus saw the culmination of the tendencies brought about by the reforms of Louis XIV. The families in place during the War of the Spanish Succession had a head start, but the key was to be able to ensure the transferral of companies from one generation to the next. Chance played an important role here, since one had to be able to propose a suitable heir at the right moment. To obtain this transferral, it was also necessary, however, to be able to count on a solid network that went through the court and whose centre was the Colonel General of the Swiss. This made political capital in the cantons a secondary matter, since the Besenvals had a good place in the Swiss regiments despite being absent from the governing councils of Solothurn since 1736. The families entered into contracts whose execution was more or less uncertain, since they were always subject to the goodwill of the royal authorities: first and foremost, the colonel-general of the Swiss and Grisons. This development led to inflation in the price of the companies whose profitability thus became illusory, as we shall see further on. Our thesis is that this period led the patricians to start turning toward the physiocratic exploitation of their landed estates and, if still

89 MSMA, 1/18.303.

90 MSMA, 1/22.273.

91 MSMA, 1/18.174.

92 MSMA, 1/20.129.

93 MSMA, 1/22.428 and MSMA, 1/22.275.

94 MSMA, 1/22.270.

timidly, commerce,⁹⁵ given the lack of possibilities in foreign service; they left it to others to persist in the royal service. The expression of this rupture would become visible after the Revolution, when some patricians would succeed in adapting to the new political regimes, while others, like the Besenvals, would consciously reject any idea of a liberal regime. The family under consideration offers a perfect example of the disparity affecting the patricians in French service in this context. Whereas the younger branch possessed two companies of its own and was able to maintain them without a major initial investment, thus allowing it to live in opulence, the older branch had to fight tooth and nail for its place and expended a substantial part of its fortune trying to succeed. This obstructed horizon largely explains why the service lost its appeal during the century. Some patricians simply did not have or no longer had the means for giving it a go and were thus forced to turn to other sources of income. On the political level, “this development contributed significantly to the impermeability of the country’s ruling classes.”⁹⁶

3 Foreign Service: An Eldorado?

In light of the energy devoted by the Besenval family to trying to acquire military appointments in France, it is legitimate to ask about motivation. The economic question occupies an important place in the historiography of foreign service.⁹⁷ Hence, to what extent was this service profitable for the Besenval family? The family archives do not provide all the administrative records for the period in question, but they allow us to appreciate the evolution of financial practices related to the service. The sources are silent for the period before 1671. The information available for the period after Stuppa’s levies is not much more revealing, but it does allow us to conceive an income of 750 livres per month, from which, of course, the expenses inherent to managing a company have to be deducted.⁹⁸ A detailed breakdown from 1680 shows that the latter came to 5,054 livres for the period from 1677 to 1680,⁹⁹ which suggests quite substantial profit on the order of around 7,000 livres per year. The same

95 For example, by creating an economic society in Solothurn in 1761, see Jean-François Bergier, *Histoire économique de la Suisse* (Lausanne, 1984), p. 92.

96 Hermann Romer, “Entrepreneurs militaires,” in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/024643/2009-11-10/>. Accessed 1 September 2022.

97 Walter Schaufelberger, “Von der Kriegsgeschichte zur Militärgeschichte,” *Revue suisse d’histoire* 41:4 (1991), 413–451, pp. 432–434.

98 MSMA, 1/8.80.

99 MSMA, 1/8.82.

document informs us that Buch ran the company for 500 livres per year, which thus did not reduce the profitability of the investment to zero.¹⁰⁰ The subsequent handing over of the company to the nephew François Joseph¹⁰¹ allows us to obtain more details and to refine the figures for the end of the 17th century, with profits of 8,173 livres in 1681.¹⁰² These records confirm the impression left by the sparse documentation we cited previously and the total is not very far from the 750 livres per month mentioned in 1676.¹⁰³ The company's revenues were going to remain constant, since a review conducted in 1687 shows that the latter received 2,682 livres in 1687 as monthly payment¹⁰⁴: a total that is confirmed by another record from 1691 for a payment of 2,742 livres.¹⁰⁵ These sums put a company's titleholder in an enviable position at the time, since the middle nobility had an annual income of around 1,000 livres.¹⁰⁶

In 1688, the *avoyer* raised a new company for the Guards regiment, whose records have been preserved for a period of 24 months spread over four years. This provides us, then, a good basis for comparison with the company held by Charles Jacques. The financial records of this company confirm¹⁰⁷ the previous figures, since the average monthly income comes to 3,406 livres. Nonetheless, the overall result is a monthly loss of 390 livres. The difference cannot be explained by the number of troops, since this is equal in the two periods. But expenses increased by around 1,400 livres per month: a situation that can certainly be attributed to the War of the League of Augsburg, during which the Kingdom encountered financial difficulties. Rowland estimates the annual profit of a French captain to have been 500 livres at the time.¹⁰⁸ It was also in this period that the standardisation and modernisation of infantry equipment was carried out,¹⁰⁹ which surely had an influence on the charges that a

100 MSMA, 1/8.82.

101 He then entered the Rosen regiment as a cornet at the age of 16, see de la Chesnaye-Desbois, Badier, "Besenval," p. 60.

102 MSMA, 1/8.72.

103 Or a total close to that reported by Gustav Allemann, "Söldnerwerbungen im Kanton Solothurn von 1600–1723: II. Teil," *Jahrbuch für solothurnische Geschichte* 19 (1946), 1–120, pp. 16–17.

104 Bar, J4.1#1000/1259#, fols. 247–248.

105 Bar, J4.1#1000/1259#, fols. 206–207.

106 Bély, *La France*, p. 455.

107 Solothurn, Staatsarchiv Solothurn [StASO], Fond Besenval / F15,6, 1–2 Kp Besenval des Garde Rgt – 2 –.

108 Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661–1701* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 231.

109 Lynn, *Giant*, pp. 458–463.

captain had to cover and that Rowlands has estimated to be 53 livres per man annually.¹¹⁰

The end of the 17th century thus represented a lean period for officers¹¹¹ and peace was hardly going to improve matters due to the consolidation of companies. We can understand here the reluctance of the cantons to accept the lowering of wages to 16 livres following the Peace of Ryswick¹¹² and it seems like the only way to stay afloat financially was to obtain a gratification¹¹³ or a pension from the king¹¹⁴ or a post in the general staff of a regiment, like that of major for Charles-Jacques.¹¹⁵ The latter post had the advantage of completely relieving its holder of the burden of the company.¹¹⁶ The War of the Spanish Succession allowed to keep the profitability of the Swiss companies uncertain. Jean-Victor II was on a mission in Northern Europe. His brother and his *chargé d'affaires* Brochant sent him the financial records of his two companies: one in Castella's regiment and the other a half-company in the Guards regiment. There is not the same degree of precision as in the previously cited sources, but these records¹¹⁷ give us valuable information on military revenues at the end of the reign of Louis XIV. Although incomplete, they cover the period 1706–17 and only include revenues and hence the profits generated by the companies. It is interesting to note that the company in the Guards produced a profit every year: the smallest being 383 livres and the biggest 5,571 livres, with an average of 2,718 livres per year. This profit was thus a far cry from that of the 1680s, but still better than the losses suffered during the last war, although it should be remembered that the profits had to be shared with Vigier, the other commander of this joint company.¹¹⁸ For the company in the Castella regiment, it is likely that it ran deficits in the years without figures. The average of 4,073 livres profit should thus be regarded with caution, since it is likely that the company had deficits in five of the years in the period under consideration, which would bring the average profit to 2,376 livres. A note in the records informs us that the

110 Rowlands, *The Dynastic*, p. 213.

111 A debt observed at the time for all the captains of the French army, see Drévilion, *L'impôt*, p. 100.

112 See, for example: MSMA, 1/6.66 and, more generally, the ambassador's correspondence contained in BPUN, 8 RO I/73 and 74.

113 AH, 83/62.

114 BPUN, 8 RO I/74, fol. 61.

115 MSMA, 1/5.216.

116 Drévilion, *L'impôt*, p. 253.

117 Included at call-number MSMA, 1/11.

118 MSMA, 1/11.151.

company ran a deficit in 1711 due to the high price of clothing;¹¹⁹ this could serve as confirmation of our supposition about deficits in the 1690s. Here again, we must conclude that these revenues, if the titleholder only had one company, did not allow for a decent life at court and increasingly require robust financial health, in order to be able to “pull the devil by the tail”¹²⁰ in the bad years. Hence, the importance of posts superior to the level of the company, like the rank of brigadier held by Jean-Victor II, which came with a salary that brought in around 6,000 livres per year.¹²¹ In this respect, an analysis of the revenues of Jean-Victor II shows that between February 1709 and December 1719, foreign service only represented 18 per cent of his income,¹²² which allowed him to be integrated, thanks to his lifestyle, into the Parisian nobility.

When Pierre Victor took over the two companies from his father, his uncle was in a position to write that he “drew 14,000 livres from his two companies all expenses paid.”¹²³ This situation was the privilege of those who were able to succeed directly to the position of titleholder. As indicated above, the elder branch did not share this good fortune. In the 1740s, the company of Jean-Victor Pierre Joseph in the Seedorf regiment brought in 1,608 livres per month¹²⁴: a sum that is confirmed in a subsequent letter.¹²⁵ The difference was largely the result of the small size of the company. If it still produced a profit some months, the latter amounted to a few hundred livres at most. Such a total did not allow one to have an extravagant lifestyle, especially when a would-be fashionable officer had to put in appearances in high society.¹²⁶ It would be during this period that Jean-Victor Pierre Joseph tried to get into the Guards regiment. As captain-commander of Bachmann’s company, he secured an income of 200 livres per month: a better deal than when he was titleholder in the Seedorf regiment.¹²⁷ The latter still belonged to him and continued to bring in a monthly profit of 175 livres in 1749 and 1751.¹²⁸ In light of these figures, it is obvious that the condition of captains in the French service had greatly deteriorated over the course of the 18th century. Whereas a profit of 7,000 to 9,000 livres had been conceivable in 1680, profits rarely exceeded 3,000 livres in 1750. Moreover,

119 MSMA, 1/11.154.

120 MSMA, 1/11.156.

121 MSMA, 1/11.151.

122 Analysis based on documents included in MSMA, 1/11.

123 MSMA, 1/17.255.

124 MSMA, 1/29.15, 16 and 19.

125 MSMA, 1/29.20.

126 Jean Chagniot, *Guerre et société à l'époque moderne* (Paris, 2001), p. 232.

127 MSMA, 1/18.133.

128 Calculated using the figures contained in MSMA, 1/29.

the currency had depreciated.¹²⁹ Comparing these totals thanks to the tool created by Fressin, we see that the currency lost half its value between 1680 and 1760;¹³⁰ this is confirmed by Levasseur in showing an evolution of the value of the livre tournois from 7.53 grams of silver in 1675 to 4.05 grams in 1759.¹³¹ This loss of value has to be relativised, however, since it does not seem that prices necessarily followed a marked inflationary trend, as Baulant demonstrates using a *setier*¹³² of wheat, which sold for 14.19 livres at the Les Halles food market in Paris in 1680 as opposed to 19.81 livres in 1760.¹³³ Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the economic condition of Swiss officers in the service of France underwent a slow but sure erosion, which no longer guaranteed a lifestyle conducive to integration into the French nobility.

Increasing his income was indeed central to Besenval's desire to acquire Settier's company in the Guards. Pierre Victor tells him that he has seen financial records showing an annual income of 8,600 livres for the company. According to his calculation, the company should bring in 7,000 and, subtracting the 4,000 that has to be paid annually to Settier, this still leaves him 3,000 – or 600 more than in his post at the head of d'Affry's company.¹³⁴ The calculation would turn out to be wrong. The company had to undertake numerous expenditures and incurred 11,000 livres of debt to merchants in 1756.¹³⁵ But the company still generated a profit: 3,710 livres from November 1757 to April 1758¹³⁶ or 1,830 for July to December 1758.¹³⁷ However, the annual payment to Settier ate up almost everything. For the period from 1756 to 1759, the unit's debt reached 13,682 livres¹³⁸: a situation that was not unheard of at the time.¹³⁹ Despite a company in the Guard, Besenval failed to achieve a higher military rank and advance his

129 Suter also regards this as one of the reasons for the difficulties of mercenary service in the 18th century: Hermann Suter, *Innerschweizerisches Militär-Unternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 1971), p. 56.

130 Calculation made using Fressin's method and tool "Ancien Régime Currency Converter". Available at <http://convertisseur-monnaie-ancienne.fr/?Y=1750&E=0&L=1413&S=19&D=6>. Accessed 11 January 2019.

131 M.E. Levasseur, *Les prix: Aperçu de l'histoire économique de la valeur et du revenu de la terre en France* (Paris, 1893), p. 57.

132 The *setier* was a measure of grain containing around 156 litres.

133 Micheline Baulant, "Le prix des grains à Paris de 1431 à 1788," *Annales: Economies, sociétés, civilisations* 23:3 (1968), 520–540, pp. 539–540.

134 MSMA, 1/20.58.

135 MSMA, 1/20; for the cited example, see MSMA, 1/20.14.

136 MSMA, 1/20.5.

137 MSMA, 1/20.6.

138 MSMA, 1/20.29.

139 Max F. Schafroth, "Der Fremdendienst: Kurzfassung eines Vortrages vor der SVMM," *Revue suisse d'histoire* 23:1 (1973), 73–87, pp. 80–86.

career. Perhaps he lacked the talent? Settler, who always succeeded in making a good 6,000 livres per year, expresses his astonishment at the situation.¹⁴⁰ In any case, the evolution of the Besenval family in the foreign service is to be placed in the context of the slow erosion of the revenues deriving from the latter. These revenues were falling, notably, due to the consolidation of companies and the reduction of their size to 50 men. If profits were still possible¹⁴¹, the depreciation of the value of the currency helped to shape a military corps in which simple captains had trouble making ends meet.¹⁴² Only surpassing the company's grade enabled titleholders to obtain a pension and to conceive of having a decent standard of living.¹⁴³ Many patricians, including Jean-Victor Pierre Joseph, lost considerable sums of money sometimes, without ever being able to make their investment grow in what seemed like an industry on the decline.¹⁴⁴ Unfortunately, the sources do not allow us to know the main reason for the deficit run by the company of Jean Victor Pierre Joseph, but it is sure that the 4,000 livres that he had to pay annually made it impossible to achieve profitability. In light of these figures, it thus seems that the main driver of the motivation for patricians to put themselves at the service of the King of France was no longer the lure of profit, but rather the hope of gaining access, by way of service, to the closed circle of those who managed to rise to the level of a regiment or obtained the rank of general officer.

4 Swiss Troops in Name Only?

Let us now turn to the recruitment practices of the Besenval family. The historian Jean Steinauer has shown that there was a strong relationship between patronage ties established in Switzerland and recruitment.¹⁴⁵ Do we find the

¹⁴⁰ MSMA, 1/22.156.

¹⁴¹ Bucher estimates that a captain's profits varied between 15 per cent and 40 per cent of his expenditures, see Rudolf Bolzern, "In Solddiensten," in *Bauern und Patrizier: Stadt und Land Luzern im Ancien Régime*, ed. Jubiläumsstiftung 600 Jahre Schlacht bei Sempach und 600 Jahre Stadt und Land Luzern (Luzern, 1986), 30–42, p. 38. François Walter mentions the same figures for the 18th century, see François Walter, *Histoire de la Suisse*, 2 (Neuchâtel, 2010), p. 46.

¹⁴² Suter, *Innerschweizerisches*, p. 416.

¹⁴³ This thus matches in all respects the description given by Philippe Henry, "Service étranger," in *DHS*. Available at <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/008608/2017-12-08/>. Accessed 1 September 2022.

¹⁴⁴ Thomas Maissen, *Histoire de la Suisse* (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2019), p. 152.

¹⁴⁵ Jean Steinauer, *Patriciens, fromagers, mercenaires: L'émigration fribourgeoise sous l'Ancien Régime* (Lausanne, 2000), pp. 20–23.

same pattern for the Besenval family? Before 1671, recruitment seemed to happen locally. Having a political position was thus the guarantee of being able to recruit in Solothurn. De la Barde mentions this when asking Mazarin to keep the Sury and Besenval half-companies in the service.¹⁴⁶ Up to the War of the League of Augsburg, it is not possible to paint a picture of the recruitment conducted by the Besenval family. But during this conflict, the sources show the officers cooperating with one another to organise it.¹⁴⁷ The local base was no longer enough: like in 1692, when recruitment was shut down in Solothurn for political reasons.¹⁴⁸ The Besenvals paid the price, since they were given authorisation to recruit only 12 men from Solothurn out of 25 altogether.¹⁴⁹ This was undoubtedly the reason why the Besenvals no longer recruited exclusively in the region. In 1694, the city of Rapperswil had to defend itself before the Diet, because the Salis and the Besenval families had recruited locals without the authorisation of the cantons that governed the city as a protectorate.¹⁵⁰ There were multiple ways to find soldiers, but it was quite often the case that the family back home took care of it. Jean Victor II would thus use his brother to send him recruits,¹⁵¹ as well as his cousin François Joseph.¹⁵² Often, however, as we will see further on, the recruiting area would be moved to Alsace.

While Jean Victor II was away, the recruitment would be subcontracted to captain-lieutenants.¹⁵³ The same would take place for the half-company of Pierre Célestin Antoine in Brendlé's regiment, whose recruitment would be handled by M. de Vevey.¹⁵⁴ Outsourcing thus made it possible to avoid this highly cumbersome task. The officers of the companies also took part: as noted by lieutenant von Vivis, who asks for leave to go see his brother-in-law in Haguenau and plans to obtain some recruits there.¹⁵⁵ This geographical specification is not without interest, since Alsace was going to become increasingly

146 BPUN, 8 RO I/45, fol. 185.

147 AH, 97/186.

148 BPUN 8 RO I/62, fol. 538. At the start of the League of Augsburg, the Solothurn council refuses requests to provide recruits for France, arguing that the latter would be used in offensive operations. For his part, the King's ambassador, Tambonneau, writes that he assumes that Solothurn's resistance is mainly intended to get the most out of the levy: notably, by obtaining the repayment of debts held by the King.

149 Allemann, "Söldnerwerbungen," p. 20.

150 *Die Eidgenössische Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1681 bis 1712*, 6:2 (Einsiedeln, 1882), pp. 2251–2252.

151 MSMA, 1/10.108.

152 BPUN, 8 RO I/74, fol. 396.

153 MSMA, 1/11.192.

154 MSMA, 1/19.39.

155 MSMA, 1/10.50.

important for the family's recruitment. The first extant mention of the company is from 1738 and contains interesting information on where the recruits come from.¹⁵⁶ Swiss are a slight majority at 51 per cent. All in all, Solothurners only accounted for 19 per cent of the company's troops and they came from all over the canton. The share of foreigners amounts to 47 per cent and shows that a large number of Germans enlist in the regiments at the time. It is even more interesting to note that 31 per cent of the company is made up of Alsatians: a sign that Brunstatt, a barony belonging to the Besenval, was being used at the time for the purpose of the family's recruitment.

This is not an isolated tendency and is confirmed by a record of the same company dating from 1749.¹⁵⁷ The share of Alsatians was tending to increase. The relative number of Solothurners remains unchanged, but the Alsatians comprise half of the troops. The fact that the two Lorrainers included on the company's rolls come from the place where it is garrisoned also shows that recruitment could be easily accomplished without having recourse to Switzerland. This development does not seem to be confined to Swiss troops, since French recruitment was preponderantly from border towns and garrisons.¹⁵⁸ The origins of the Solothurners in the same record does not point to any particular region of recruitment. On the other hand, many of the Alsatians come from the Brunstatt and Riedisheim communes: the two fiefs of the Besenval family. Is this presence of so many Alsatians a temporary fact? In any case, their share would fall to 39 per cent a few years later. The rolls from March 1751 reveal that the Swiss are, in effect, again more numerous than foreigners.¹⁵⁹

The data allows us to show that the Besenval family was going to turn increasingly to its Alsatian fiefs to conduct its recruitment during the 18th century.¹⁶⁰ The latter would be organised at the time using personnel who administered and managed the family's affairs in Solothurn and Alsace: like a certain Dürholz, who recruited in Solothurn,¹⁶¹ but was also responsible for maintaining the connection with the Brunstatt manor.¹⁶² The holders of a variety of manorial offices in Brunstatt would also be directly involved in recruitment:

156 MSMA, 1/29.11.

157 MSMA, 1/29.82.

158 André Corvisier, *Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789* (Paris, 1976), p. 146. See also Lynn, *Giant*, p. 327.

159 MSMA, 1/29.13.

160 Suter has shown that the situation of the Besenvals is not unusual at the time, see Suter, *Innerschweizerisches*, p. 112.

161 MSMA, 1/32.79.

162 StASO, Fond Besenval / F15,4 Didenheim / Didenheim 7 (1644–1892).

like the clerk, the abbot¹⁶³ and the bailiff¹⁶⁴. Later, it would be the manor's tenant or receveur who would be responsible for transmitting the names of recruits to Georges François Urs de Besenval.¹⁶⁵ Once Jean Victor Pierre Joseph retired from the service, he would take up recruiting for his cousin Pierre Victor himself¹⁶⁶ in collaboration with his eldest son. Using Alsatians will have its limits, however, as Pierre Victor writes to his cousin:

What I like best are certainly the Solothurners, nonetheless, given how expensive and scarce they are, we need to take foreigners, nonetheless, I ask you that they are only a third, namely that when you will have two Solothurners, you can take a foreigner, as inspector, you feel that I must lead by example and that I should be sure to follow the conventions scrupulously.¹⁶⁷

The reforms undertaken by Choiseul, who notes that out of 18,000 men in the Swiss regiments, only 3,000 are in fact Swiss,¹⁶⁸ aim, in effect, to reduce the proportion of foreigners in the Swiss regiments, as Pierre Victor again makes clear: "I forgot to tell you that in general what I need are Solothurners, because M. de Choiseul absolutely wants us [to have] Swiss".¹⁶⁹

Though well documented for the reign of Louis xv, it is possible for us, nonetheless, to note that the use of Alsatian estates occurred well before 1750, since François Joseph Besenval was fined 10,000 livres in 1691 for having brought Solothurners to Brunstatt in order to enlist them, thus circumventing the requirements of the Solothurn authorities.¹⁷⁰ Alsace thus served to get around the establishment of more effective recruitment chambers (*chambres des recrues*).¹⁷¹ A Solothurner is even said to have been kidnapped in the Sundgau,

163 MSMA, 1/32.76.

164 MSMA, 1/18.154.

165 MSMA, 1/22.268.

166 MSMA, 1/32.75.

167 MSMA, 1/20.86: "Ce que j'aime le mieux certainement ce sont les Soleuriens, cependant vue la grande cherté et la rareté, il faut bien prendre des étrangers, cependant je vous demande que ce ne soit que le tiers, c'est-à-dire, que lorsque vous aurés deux Soleuriens, vous pouvez prendre un étranger, comme inspecteur, vous sentés que je dois prêcher d'exemple, et qu'il faut que je m'en tienne à suivre scrupuleusement les capitulations".

168 Fabian Brändle, *Demokratie und Charisma: Fünf Landsgemeindekonflikte im 18. Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 2005), p. 55.

169 MSMA, 1/20.77.

170 Allemann, "Söldnerwerbungen," p. 33.

171 Romer, "Entrepreneurs". A chamber of this sort was established in Solothurn in 1689, see Allemann, "Söldnerwerbungen," pp. 29–32.

in order to be made to join the Greder regiment by force.¹⁷² Two estate managers from Brunstatt who were enlisted by the Besenvals also appeared initially as officers in their companies. They are Sr. Altermatt, a bourgeois from Solothurn,¹⁷³ and Chaqué,¹⁷⁴ thus indicating that the Besenvals' recruitment practices in Alsace were institutionalised relatively quickly in the 18th century. Even though the recruitment of Alsatian soldiers into the French army was prohibited until 1727,¹⁷⁵ they, nonetheless, represented a significant contingent of recruits.¹⁷⁶ The Besenvals would have certainly taken advantage of this boon. As for seeing this as a symbol of manorial domination, as suggested by Steinauer, we cannot entirely concur. On the one hand, the Besenvals' ties to the inhabitants of their manor were very loose until about 1760; and, on the other hand, the documents in our possession tend rather to show that it was the officers of the manor who were on the lookout for men to recruit. One thing remains clear: the contribution that the Alsatian manors were compelled to make do not suggest any ties of submission or feudality in the agreements concluded on the part of the Besenvals.¹⁷⁷ As for Switzerland, the varied geographical origins of the Solothurners also allows us to rule out this hypothesis, since the men enlisted are not to be found in the other documents dealing with the Besenval family.

5 Conclusion

The Besenval family's military entrepreneurship offers us a longevity that makes it possible to study the phenomenon in the long term. Whereas access to and retention of companies in the service of France largely depended on the political capital available in the cantons in the 17th century, the reforms carried out under Louis XIV changed matters. Whereas the Sun King was trying to avoid heredity and venality in military appointments, the outcome would be the opposite, with families trying to ensure the transferral of units from one generation to the next. Swiss military entrepreneurs would try in vain to

172 Allemann, "Söldnerwerbungen," pp. 24–25.

173 MSMA, 1/17.125.

174 MSMA, 1/17.44.

175 Chagniot, *Guerre*, p. 205.

176 Anne Blanchard, Philippe Contamine, *Histoire militaire de la France* (Paris, 1992), pp. 444, 545.

177 As such, we are not able share Steinauer's conclusion that there was a system bordering on feudal submission for recruitment, since there is no evidence to support such behaviour on the part of the Besenval family.

establish a hereditary principle for the transferral of their companies, which they often considered their own property, whereas the monarchy would always aim to be able to distribute them according to a clientelistic principle. The different branches of the Besenval family allow us to analyse the different scenarios that could appear in the transferral of these units. Political capital in the cantons, as materialised via the mediation of a French ambassador with a long reach, would give way, little by little, to clientelistic networks at the court of Versailles. His networks made it possible not only to ensure the transfer of units within the family, but also to get beyond the rank of captain, which was one of the only ways for Swiss to succeed in France. The Besenval family provides us a good example here, since the younger branch would succeed, thanks to the connections of Jean-Victor II, in being completely integrated into the French nobility. This will allow his son, Pierre Victor, to have access to more lucrative appointments, which eradicated the ups and downs inherent to running a company and made owning it more of an anecdotal matter. By contrast, the elder branch would have to fight tooth and nail to try to make a place for itself in this microcosm. Even if they succeeded in obtaining the 'Holy Grail', namely, a company in the Guards regiment,¹⁷⁸ and thereby in entering into the King's *maison militaire* (military household), the economic costs would be so great as nearly to suffocate this branch financially. This fate may explain the increasing disenchantment with military entrepreneurship over the course of the 18th century: a development that involved at least two factors. The first is a devaluation of the currency in combination with inflation in the sums of money required to acquire a company; and the second is a market that was saturated by the presence of too many patricians looking to make a place for themselves in the French sun. In effect, whereas in the 17th century, the sums of money derived from military entrepreneurship had allowed for substantial profits, the last wars of Louis XIV made these profits more uncertain than before, and then, under the reign of Louis XV, they became no longer sufficient to survive in possessing only a single company in the King's service. The period of decline of the foreign service thus began in earnest,¹⁷⁹ which also helps to explain certain political modifications within the Confederation. The fall of the French camp in Solothurn in 1723 has its origins, notably, in the fact that the petty bourgeois no longer got beyond appointments as ensign and lieutenant in the service, because the higher posts were all occupied by the families in

178 André Corvisier, "Clientèles et fidélités dans l'armée française," in *Hommage à Roland Mousnier: Clientèles et fidélités en Europe à l'époque moderne*, ed. Yves Durand (Paris, 1981), 213–236, p. 223.

179 Henry, "Service étranger".




FIGURE 17.1 A simplified genealogy of the Besensval family men involved in military entrepreneurship in France

power alongside the *avoyer* Besenval at the time. As Hermann Romer writes: “The political monopoly that the patricians accorded themselves subsequently reduced the chances of a military career for other bourgeois, the companies of the officially sanctioned regiments [régiments avoués] being reserved for the ruling families”.¹⁸⁰ Rudolf Braun confirms this view in writing about the troubles that the cantons experienced during the 18th century. “The majority of the known biographies classify the conspirators in sociological terms as being among those whose ‘status is blocked in terms of their chances of mobility’ or who are ‘inconsistent personalities’ in the face of the conflicts”.¹⁸¹ The reforms carried out by Choiseul¹⁸² are to be seen in the same context. The troubles to which they gave rise, mainly in the cantons with a *Landsgemeinde*¹⁸³, reveal the tensions generated by the struggle of the families for control over state resources.¹⁸⁴ The reforms also demonstrate that it was becoming more and more difficult to find Swiss soldiers for the service. While the patricians continued to take on debt to obtain a post as officer, the recruits were lacking.¹⁸⁵ The Besenval family was able then to fall back on its Alsatian holdings for recruitment purposes; this was also a convenient way of circumventing the cantonal regulations of the recruitment chambers. When the Revolution broke out, this world, which had been put in place over almost 150 years, collapsed for the Besenvals. Though having emerged from a merchant family in the 17th century, they would not succeed in negotiating their way through this socio-political and, to a certain extent, economic transformation. They became stuck in a narrow vision of their nobility and refused all the new opportunities offered by the liberal regimes that were gradually coalescing. They served the monarchy once again under the Restoration, but would get lost in the service of Naples or become totally integrated into the French elite, before disappearing, little by little, over the course of the 19th century.

180 Romer, “Entrepreneurs”.

181 Rudolf Braun, *Le déclin de l’Ancien Régime en Suisse* (Lausanne, 1988), p. 218.

182 For context on the winds of reform blowing through the French army in the 18th century, see: David D. Bien, “La réaction aristocratique avant 1789: l’exemple de l’armée,” *Annales: Histoire, Sciences sociales* 29:1–2, 23–48, 505–534.

183 Brändle, *Demokratie*, p. 243.

184 Suter speaks of a “struggle for survival” (*Existenzkampf*) in this regard, see Suter, *Innerschweizerisches*, p. 110.

185 This development is examined in Braun, *Le déclin*, p. 104.

The Sinew of War

Regula Schmid

Men, iron, money, and bread, are the sinew of war; but of these four, the first two are more necessary; for men and iron find money and bread, but bread and money do not find men and iron.¹

Niccolò Machiavelli's famous adage lists men, weapons, money, and food as equally essential components necessary for warfare, but within these four, it assigns priority to the use of men and weapons to acquire money and food. The contributions to this volume, however, firmly invert this causality by claiming for money the role of the main mover of war, reasserting the supremely popular maxim of the early modern age: *pecunia (est) nervus belli*.² Money moved men across Europe and beyond, fed them, and fueled the weapon race of the early modern age.

Notwithstanding Machiavelli's urge to position himself as original thinker – his seemingly timeless didactic principles were outdated when he relied on his experience of the Italian Wars and his interpretation of Roman history for describing how war should be led. In fact, as he was writing, the world around him, and warfare itself was undergoing irreversible changes: In the late 15th century, when Machiavelli's insights started to take shape, armies were still mainly put together *ad hoc*, and for a finite period of time. They consisted of varying groups of typically not otherwise associated people, bound by vastly diverse kinds of legal relationship to the lord, which lived off the land and whatever booty they could find as they rode and marched into enemy dominions,

1 Niccolò Machiavelli, *Art of War*, ed. Christopher Lynch (Chicago, 2005), p. 159. Cf. Niccolò Machiavelli, *Dell'arte della guerra*, ed. Mario Manteilli (Florence, 1971), p. 179: "Gli uomini, il ferro, i danari e il pane sono il nervo della guerra; ma di questi quattro sono più necessari i primi due, perché gli uomini e il ferro trovano i danari e il pane, ma il pane e i danari non trovano gli uomini e il ferro."

2 Michael Stolleis, "Pecunia nervus rerum: Zur Diskussion um Steuerlast und Staatsverschuldung im 17. Jahrhundert," in *Zur Staatsfinanzierung in der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Michael Stolleis (Frankfurt a.M., 1983), 63–128. Machiavelli knew the sentence well and contradicted it explicitly: "... non l'oro, come grida la comune opinione essere il nervo della guerra, mai i buoni soldati, perché l'oro non è sufficienti a trovare i buoni soldati, ma i buoni soldati sono bene sufficienti a trovare l'oro", quoted in Stolleis, "Pecunia", p. 64.

from stronghold to stronghold. Combined with the need for a growing number of people available for longer periods of time, this kind of *ad hoc* recruitment reached its affordable limit in the course of the 15th century, in terms of time, efficiency, and money (in 1474–75, it took Frederick III almost a year to gather and put into action an ‘imperial’ army against Charles the Bold of Burgundy, and that he managed at all was a success in itself).³

The dominance of the infantry – coveted by Machiavelli who dreamed of a faithful urban infantry militia – eventually proved short-lived. It has also been overstated to a certain extent: It is true that the sheer number of people fighting on foot with a personal weapon by far surpassed all other armed entities for most of the following 400 years. But the main change in warfare came with the introduction of firearms, especially mobile cannons whose efficacy had been shown, for all to see (including Machiavelli) by Charles’ VII of France swift incursion into Italy in 1494–95. The interplay of artillery, infantry, and (to a more or less important extent) cavalry now constituted the core of warfare. Without guns no war, but without money no guns. The master-gunners were in such high demand and so expensive that it was preferable to employ them on a permanent basis. The foot soldiers had to orient their actions in the field towards the presence of cannons (their own and the enemy’s) and had to act in synch with them. The new warfare needed training of vast numbers of people in a short period of time instead of the lifelong education to arms of a small number of men – the ‘flowers of chivalry’ were replaced by anonymous masses that had to be controlled and whose movements had to be coordinated.

The places of war also shifted. In the Middle Ages (notwithstanding military history’s emphasis on ‘great’ battles), short, swift raids and siege warfare had been the dominant expressions of military conflict, reflecting a structure of power that relied on strategically chosen strongholds in lands where confusingly layered and checkered dominions of a multitude of rulers prevailed. After 1500, warfare took place among, within, and crossing over territorially defined boundaries. Finally, the armies themselves turned into vast, moving societies encompassing soldiers and non-combatants, men, women, and children. With them, a huge number of horses had to be fed, outfitted, and administered. Early modern armies were therefore military organizations that entailed an important ‘civil’ element, servicing the diverse needs of all the people involved, yet ultimately aimed at maintaining the army’s belligerent capability.

After a lull around 1500, siege warfare resurged with renewed vigour, but was thereafter directed at fortifications and towns increasingly surrounded

3 Patrick Leukel, *“all welt wil auf sein wider Burgundi”: Das Reichsheer im Neusser Krieg 1474/75* (Paderborn, 2019), pp. 185–199.

by geometrically constructed battlements situated at strategically important points close to the borders of territories. The concomitant military remodeling of the urban systems swallowed enormous sums of money. This became a core issue of the fiscal-military complex of the Ancien Régime especially, but by far not limited to Louis' XIV France. Nevertheless, warfare also spread out, with larger numbers of soldiers moving across wider swaths of land. Rare but even more devastating battles became the norm. Accordingly, the typical aim was to gain the opponent's heavily fortified centers and from there dominate the other's land comprehensively. Such practices required yet further investments in manpower, available for longer periods of time, to guard the territorial gains, and that in turn favored permanent armies.

This is not the place to challenge or support master stories, nor the place to discuss egg-and-chicken-problems of army and state. And, of course, precursors to all these developments can be found – on an organizational level with the *compagnies d'ordonnance* and the *mortes-payes* designated to guard fortified places created by Charles VII of France in 1445, and other 'permanent' elements,⁴ or the English garrison policy of the 100-years-war,⁵ and also on a technical level: For a military historian, the rise of the infantry in the late Middle Ages is proven by the decisive victories of infantry troops in Courtrai (1302), Sempach (1386), Agincourt (1415) or Murten (1476). However, in Murten, the foot soldiers of the confederates and their allies were supported by a thousandfold cavalry (in contrast to what had happened a few months earlier at Grandson),⁶ and Charles the Bold stubbornly refused to believe that his enemies were, in fact, attacking, until it was too late,⁷ and both factors were

4 Philippe Contamine, *Guerre, état et société à la fin du Moyen Âge: Études sur les armées des rois de France, 1337–1494* (Paris, 1972), pp. 278–301.

5 See especially the studies of Anne Curry, e.g.: Anne E. Curry, "La Normandie au xve siècle: l'occupation militaire d'Henri V et le contrôle des garnisons," in *La guerre en Normandie, XIe–XVe siècle*, ed. Anne Elizabeth Curry, Véronique Gazeau (Caen, 2018), 179–194.

6 In fact, Philippe de Commines explicitly explains the victory of the Swiss by the presence of the cavalry: "Au peu de deffence fust desconfit ledict duc et mys en fuyte : et ne luy print point comme de la bataille precedente [Grandson], ou il n'avoit perdu que sept hommes d'armes (et cela advint pour ce que lesdictz subjectz [i.e. the Swiss] n'avoient point de gens de cheval) ; mais a ceste heure cy dont j'ay parlé, qui fut pres Morat, y avoit de la part desdictes alliances [the Swiss confederates and their allies, and the league of the upper Rhine towns and bishops, plus the dukes of Lorraine and of Habsburg] quatre mil hommes a cheval, bien montéz, qui chasserent tres loing les gens dudict duc de Bourgongne; et si joignirent leur bataille a pied avecques les gens de pied dudict duc, qui en avoit largement ...", see Philippe de Commines, *Mémoires*, 1, ed. Joël Blanchard (Geneva, 2007), p. 331.

7 Johannes Dierauer, *Panigarola's Bericht über die Schlacht bei Murten* (Frauenfeld, 1892), pp. 8–10. On this most important description of Charles' behaviour during the battle of Murten by the permanent envoy of Galeazzo Maria Sforza to the duke of Burgundy, see the

instrumental of the Burgundian defeat. The victory of Francis I at the battle of Marignano (1515) was achieved by the artful and crucial interplay of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, and was also marked by the hubris of the effectively leaderless Swiss⁸ who had forgotten that their victory at Novara (1513) was won, against the general trend, against infantry only, because the French cavalry and artillery had been ineffectively deployed.⁹ And finally: by the middle of the 16th century, hand guns – the arquebus and smaller types – had become a decisive factor on the battlefield. These firearms supplemented and eventually supplanted the traditional pike, halberd, and longsword of the Swiss *Gewalthaufen* and the German *Landsknechte*. Early modern infantry thus typically consisted of pikemen and musketeers, the firearms protecting the men poised with their up to 5,5 m long spears against the attacking cavalry, but by ca. 1700 the pikes had been all but abandoned. The cavalry sported handgun and sabre.¹⁰ The biggest exporter of handguns was the Val Gardone in Italy. In 1526 an appeal to the Venetian government requested an export of 200 gun barrels a year, by 1562 estimates were of about 25,000 handguns of specific types, and ten years later, 300 arquebuses were produced for export daily, i.e. almost a hundred thousand a year!¹¹

Leaving aside chronological discussion of ‘the military Revolution(s)’, a number of changes after 1500 can be thus highlighted: First, cannons had become decisive ingredients of European warfare, used in tandem with cavalry and infantry;¹² Second, small arms became the main weapon of infantry and, with the sabre, the second weapon of the cavalry; Third, firearms proliferation necessitated a major upsurge in the production, trade, distribution, and storage of raw materials and industrially manufactured output (gunpowder; iron, bronze, and other metals; stone, lead, and cast iron for ammunition); Fourth,

introduction by Dierauer, and on Giovan Pietro Panigarola, see Gigliola Soldi-Rondinini, “Giovan Pietro Panigarola e il ‘reportage’ moderno,” *Freiburger Geschichtsblätter* 60 (1976), 135–154.

8 I follow here: Laurent Vissière, “Les Français face aux Suisses: une guerre incertaine (1512–1515),” in *Marignano 1515: La svolta*, ed. Marino Viganò (Milan, 2015), 33–73.

9 Olivier Bangert, *Novare (1513): Dernière victoire des fantassins suisses* (Paris, 2012).

10 Rainer Zenke, Mark Häberlein, “Waffen,” 2019, in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online*. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_COM_376114. Accessed 30 April 2023.

11 Catherine Fletcher, “Venice, Brescia and Gardone Val Trompia: Martial culture in a subject city and its hinterland,” in *Urban Martial Culture in Europe (1350–1650)*, *Proceedings of the Conference Bern, November 12, 2021*, eds. Regula Schmid, Daniel Jaquet (forthcoming).

12 Vissière, “Français,” p. 66: “Les succès des Français en Italie ne proviennent pas de leur fureur, ni d’ailleurs de l’emploi privilégié d’une arme – la chevalerie ou l’artillerie – sur les autres, mais de la combinaison extrêmement réfléchie de trois armes la cavalerie lourde, l’infanterie suisse et l’artillerie de campagne.”

the extensive procedures of weapon production, ore mining, and the subsequent transport and processing of raw material, semi- and finished products involved technical skills and transnational exchange. Fifth, large numbers of fighting personnel were mainly recruited on basis of longer-term military contracts; and Sixth, rulers preferred people who bound themselves for longer periods, and on clearly laid out, relatively standardized terms, to the colourful bands of constantly changing individuals that had made up the feudal armies of the Middle Ages. After 1500, armies became bigger, more intrinsically linked to technology, and in times of peace as well as war, they claimed distinct spaces within the growing state – geographical, social, and political. A constant stream of money, equipment, and commodities was thus aimed at these purposefully moving bodies of humans, machine, and beast, and on every step of the way, innumerable opportunities for acquiring the kinds of capital Bourdieu introduced – economic, social, cultural ... – presented themselves.

1 People

Overall, the contributions to this volume span four centuries, from the 15th to the 19th century. A majority of the chapters, however, emphasize the century and half covering the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), the War of Spanish Succession (1701–14), and the Seven Years' War (1756–63). These conflicts impacted all the major powers in Europe, and left no region unaffected, and at times spread to other continents as well. Abundant business opportunities thus emerged, were seized, and were perpetuated, not least by the men and women profiting from them.

One notable profiteer and active protagonist of the early modern 'arms race' was Maximilien Titon (1632–1711), the "merchant of death" described by GUY ROWLANDS. Titon's business depended on the plans of the monarch who in turn depended on the services of this powerful man. Uneasy relationships between governments and powerful (and indispensable) brokers of military clout were an unavoidable result of the state's 'outsourcing' of military services: DAVID PARROTT investigates steps taken by the French crown to rein in the activities of, and their own dependency on the military entrepreneurs. Government-military business ties also underpinned the activities of men examined and presented by MARIAN FÜSSEL. These international military capitalists juggled assets between Prussia, Denmark, France, England, Scotland, America, and Canada, profiting from war whenever they could (the German *Kriegsgewinnler* [war profiteer] conveys the disdain which often met their activities). Others successfully pursued opportunities for personal social

advancement, using familial and political networks, to such an extent that their rather obscure origins were eclipsed by the golden rays of the French sun – at least for their own lifetime. The scarcity of sources that KATRIN KELLER has to deal with when reconstructing the astonishing rise of Peter Stuppa perhaps reflects not just the vagaries of archival survival, but is also symptomatic for the life of this man from a subject territory of the Grisons: Stuppa came from the margins of power, knew how to exploit the bonds of mutual distrust which helped hold together the *Corpus Helveticum* and navigate the pitfalls of the French court. He married an heiress with a noble background (Anne-Charlotte de Gondi) and eventually rose to the highest military position available to a foreigner in France. However, without children or other male heirs, he was not able to transfer his accumulated capital to the next generation. Personal and family investments – in money, in kind, and in emotional ‘currency’ – had to be successfully balanced, over both the short and long term, as ALEXANDER QUERENGÄSSER shows in a series of biographies. Faithful service over generations generated capital that would be reinvested by families such as the Besenval or the von Erlach. The inner familial strategies of placing sons in the right position for advancement were generally difficult to manage. Even accumulated experience passed from one generation to the other could only go so far outweighing the cluster risk of such strategies. JULIEN GRAND deftly shows the rise and fall of the Besenval, whose almost exclusive reliance on French military employment eventually turned to their disadvantage. The von Erlachs at the center of BENJAMIN RYSER’s article, were more successful, however. Comparative analysis clearly indicates that their success, like that of the Besenval family, involved having many sons and placing them in advantageous marriages. But unlike the Besenvals, the von Erlachs skillfully combined local political power, French service, and business, in wartime and peacetime alike.

In spite of the risk of sudden ups and downs inherent in war, the sheer duration of wars between the 15th and 19th centuries, combined with the long-lived reign of their most important protagonist, Louis XIV (born in 1638 and king from 1643 to 1715), created relatively solid conditions permitting longer-term business strategies beyond speculation on suddenly arising, short range opportunities.

2 Places

The nerve centers of the bustling business of war were cities, rather than the courts (which were however closely connected to the urban fabric as with Louis

xiv's Versailles and Paris).¹³ In the cities, money, technology, knowledge, commodities, and manpower converged. In most regions of Europe, existing towns attracted the business of war, on basis of their infrastructure, and geographical and political position. France, under the Sun King, was different; there, the urban network itself was remodeled. Louis xiv established a new network of military service towns,¹⁴ pouring money, manpower, and ingenuity into their construction and maintenance, thus realigning the paths of commerce (and to some extent the very fabric of the country) towards war.¹⁵

It would be a challenge to find people in, say, 17th-century France that did not make their living, directly or indirectly, through war. The personnel of stables and inns and other providers of amenities catered to the infrastructure of transport and movement of troops, tailors made tents, wainwrights made wheels for wagons and gun carriages, seamstresses sewed uniforms, ropemakers were as indispensable as carpenters, ragmen and -women who collected and sold for recycling cloth, metal, and whatever they could find. This 'small business of war' is largely unexplored, but MICHAEL PAUL MARTOCCIO deftly puts Genoese bargemen, "moving men around the region", at the center of an intriguing study showing how the 'big' business of war was interlaced with regional specializations profiting from specific political and strategical constellations. That this regional economic focus was transient is inherent to the vagaries of war and its underlying politics.

The small enterprises providing the day-to-day feeding, grooming, and distribution of services within the armies, carried out, to an important degree, by women (and eternalized by Bertolt Brecht in his 1938–39 play *Mother Courage and her Children*),¹⁶ were obviously connected by a myriad of synapses to the big and smaller business of war discussed in this volume. But how these connections worked, and how they can be grasped with adequate historical methods, is another question.

The extensive infrastructure of cities obviously made them crucial to the growing and ever-shifting networks of war related business enterprise. Some

13 *La cour et la ville dans l'Europe du Moyen Age et des Temps Modernes*, eds. Léonard Courbon, Denis Menjot (Turnhout, 2015); *Ein zweigeteilter Ort? Hof und Stadt in der frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Susanne C. Pils, Jean P. Niederkorn (Innsbruck, 2005); John P. Spielman, *City and the Crown: Vienna and the Imperial Court, 1600–1740* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1993).

14 David Bitterling, *L'invention du pré carré: Construction de l'espace français sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 2009).

15 Jean Meyer, "States, Roads, War, and the Organization of Space," in *War and Competition between States*, ed. Philippe Contamine (Oxford, 2001), 99–128.

16 Markus Meumann, "Tross," 2019, in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit Online*. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0248_edn_SIM_367809. Accessed 1 May 2023.

of these cities acquired special position within Europe and beyond as hubs collecting, organizing, and redistributing men, objects, money, information, and their movements.¹⁷ JOHN CONDREN explores how Geneva functioned as a ‘fiscal-military hub’, showing how information on money flows, business opportunities, theatres of war, movement of troops and exchange of secret information – i.e. espionage – were interconnected – and who profited most from this complicated game. SÉBASTIAN DUPUIS’ take on Geneva, a town “at the crossroads of population and capital” implicitly mentions the town’s politico-geographical advantages for the French seeking to recruit men into their military service. In fact, already the Romans (and the Celts before them) had perceived the safety of a natural hill nestled between the lake and the rivers Rhone and Arve. Throughout its history, the place that was geographically easily accessible from south and north, east and west, bridged different cultures and political spheres. Geneva, however, is also a prime example showing that even places most favored by nature still need state intervention to thrive. The important commerce and banking business of the late middle ages was built upon strong privileges, and when, in 1464, Louis XI of France forbid his nation’s merchants to frequent the Geneva fairs and endowed Lyon with all amenities for a banking and commercial center, Geneva’s business got into dire straits.¹⁸ Similarly, the importance of an interventionist hand is shown by PHILIPPE ROGGER when discussing how Hans Ludwig von Erlach managed the fortress Breisach after its capture as an (almost) ‘private’ (e)state.¹⁹

It is the towns that assembled the hustlers and merchants, the opportunists, the bankers and money lenders, the arms producers and the many small businesses who made their living in the context of perennial war, supplying Europe’s belligerent centuries with their products. Here, also, rulers used visible signs to impress upon their subjects and competitors their entitlement as military leaders: They invested their gains not only into large scale fortifications and military buildings that reshaped the towns, but also into monuments and ornaments such as Louis’ XIV monumental rider statue cast by Johann

17 Peter H. Wilson, Marianne Klerk, “The Business of War Untangled: Cities as Fiscal-Military Hubs in Europe (1530s–1860s),” *War in History* 29:1 (2022), 80–103.

18 Jean François Bergier, *Les foires de Genève et l’économie internationale de la Renaissance* (Paris, 1963).

19 See also Philippe Rogger, “Erlach, Hans Ludwig von,” 2015, in *Lexikon der Heerführer und hohen Offiziere des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, ed. Markus Meumann. Available at <https://thirty-years-war-online.net/prosopographie/heerfuehrer-und-offiziere/erlach-hans-ludwig-von/>. Accessed 15 May 2023.

Balthasar Keller²⁰ and countless ‘trophy’ embellishing public buildings. (This was not a prerogative of monarchies only: in cities, communal arsenals built from the 15th century onwards expressed urban autonomy. In towns within the *Corpus Helveticum*, also appearing first in the middle of the 15th century and becoming ubiquitous a century later, fountain figures of the communal banner bearer represented the urban community at arms).²¹

Discussion of business hubs profits from insights and concepts which comparative urban history has developed on urban networks, the relationship of state and city,²² of the courts and the town, the role of groups as urban ‘stakeholders’, and on the *longue durée* of change. This close examination of the relationship of town and the military complex from the point of view of urban history has good potential for further study.²³ That might also entail considering the transformation of the town and its ‘martial culture’²⁴ since the late middle ages, in a comparative, European perspective: In the late Middle Ages, especially in the Empire, towns’ governments acted as major players as autonomous ‘military entrepreneurs’, providing money, men, and weapons in their own right.²⁵ That is a role that the communal members of the *Corpus Helveticum* continued into the modern period. However, in the course of their integration into princely territories, towns in most regions of Europe became the providers, rather than the organizers, of military power. It would be

20 See the introduction in this volume. On the ‘renaissance’ of the rider statue in early modern Europe, see Volker Hunecke, “Fürstliche Reiterstandbilder in Europa (16.-19. Jh.),” in *Die Inszenierung der heroischen Monarchie*, ed. Martin Wrede (Historische Zeitschrift Beiheft, n.s., 62) (Munich, 2014), 236–265.

21 Daniel Jaquet, “Les fontaines à statue,” 2022, in *Martial Culture in Medieval Town*. Available at <https://martcult.hypotheses.org/2407>.

22 For an overview on (German) research, see Heinz Schilling, Stefan Ehrenpreis, *Die Stadt in der Frühen Neuzeit*, 3rd ed. (Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte, 24) (Berlin/Boston, 2015), pp. 35–48, 69–75.

23 Holger T. Gräf, “Militarisierung der Stadt oder Urbanisierung des Militärs? Ein Beitrag zur Militärgeschichte der frühen Neuzeit aus stadtgeschichtlicher Perspektive,” in *Klio in Uniform? Probleme und Perspektiven einer modernen Militärgeschichte der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Ralf Pröve (Köln, 1997), 89–108.

24 *Martial Culture in Medieval Towns: An Anthology*, eds. Daniel Jaquet, Regula Schmid, and Iason Eleftherios-Tzouriadis (Basel, 2023); Regula Schmid, Daniel Jaquet, Elena Magli, and Mathijs Roelofsen, “Martial Culture in Medieval Towns: Forschungsbericht,” *Militär-geschichtliche Zeitschrift* 80:2 (2021), 348–355; Ann B. Tlusty, *The Martial Ethic in Early Modern Germany: Civic Duty and the Right to Arms* (Basingstoke, 2011).

25 Stefanie Rütter, “Reichsstädte als Kriegsunternehmer? Ratsherren, Bürger und Büchsenmeister als Profiteure der Süddeutschen Städtekriege (1376–1390),” in *Die Kapitalisierung des Krieges. Kriegsunternehmer im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Matthias Meinhardt, Markus Meumann (Berlin, 2021), 47–59.

interesting to extend ANDRÉ HOLENSTEIN's and PHILIPPE ROGGER's analysis of the *Corpus Helveticum* as a "polity full of contractors" – a mercenary market, financial center, transit area, hub of war materials, and site of innovation for military technologies – by integrating insights from urban and communal histories with well-established findings concerning towns as political, legal, economic, social, religious, and intrinsically martial spaces. Further systematizing research on the origins and development of European and global war business hubs, and investigating the causes and effects of shifts in the 'urban network of war',²⁶ could also lend new impetus to comparative discussions on the "origins of the modern state"²⁷ and the role of towns within state-building processes.

3 Movements

People and places were connected by movements. The contributions to this volume show intrinsically linked movements of people, goods, and money. The logistics and the political agility they needed are explored by ASTRID ACKERMANN who investigates how Bernard of Saxe-Weimar organized the supply of his *Armée d'Allemagne* during the Thirty Year's War. TIM NEU follows the money-trail across the Atlantic, where financial instruments and the sheer physical challenges of overseas traffic hampered smooth payments of British troops in North America, and PETER H. WILSON examines military movements as part of labor and migration history. Both add distance (and, albeit implicitly, risk management)²⁸ to the parameters affecting the early modern business of war. Military service can, obviously, be discussed in terms of labor migration.²⁹ This is neither a new perspective nor a new phenomenon; the knights setting out on the first Crusade in 1095 or the Anglo-Saxon warriors who filled the ranks of the Byzantine Varangian Guard after 1066³⁰ – to name

26 An attempt to grasp the *longue durée* of European (and transcontinental) developments up Bonaparte's reconceptualization of the military urban landscape is the article Regula Schmid, "The Military City," in the forthcoming *Cambridge Urban History of Europe vol. 2*, eds. Maarten Prak, Patrick Lantschner.

27 *War and Competition between States*, ed. Philippe Contamine (Oxford, 2001).

28 Explicitly addressed in: Hanna Sonkajärvi, "Mobility between Risk and Opportunity: The Military Profession in the Eighteenth Century," *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome* 123:1 (2011), 49–56.

29 *Krieg, Militär und Migration in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Matthias Asche, Michael Herrmann, Ulrike Ludwig, and Anton Schindling (Berlin, 2008).

30 Nicholas C.J. Pappas, "English Refugees in the Byzantine Armed Forces: The Varangian Guard and Anglo-Saxon Ethnic Consciousness," 2014. Available at <https://deremilitari.org/2014/06/english-refugees-in-the-byzantine-armed-forces-the-varangian-guard-and->

but two 11th century examples – were highly mobile ‘war professionals’. It is however important to reach beyond general statements and approach the phenomenon systematically using the insights from migration history: What kinds of migration were involved here? Did war service lead to permanent relocation, thus initiating settlement and follow-on chain-migration, or were the impacts on human relocation more ‘circular’ temporary labor (or seasonal) migration, conceptions which might raise questions about the effects returning soldiers had on their home communities? Did returnees import military skills and knowledge to a civil context?³¹ To what extent did the career-migrants discussed in this volume consciously plan their careers?³² How did investment of war profits and pursuit of new opportunities stimulate local economies and/or reinvigorate family endeavors? Which facilitating factors or impediments were created by the ‘taking’ states and the ‘giving’ regions adjusting to changing institutional circumstances – as shown, for instance, by MICHAEL DEPRETER in the case of the Dutch efforts to secure Swiss mercenaries between the 17th and 19th centuries? For Switzerland, the major cultural impact of ‘foreign’ money and customs since the late 15th century is well known. How the ‘simple Swiss’ of old were spoilt by the influx of riches is, in fact, part of the Swiss national master story since the end of the 15th century.³³ More generally, such phenomena underscore the far-reaching influence of the

anglo-saxon-ethnic-consciousness/. Accessed 15 May 2023. For the Middle Ages in general, see Philippe Contamine, “Le problème des migrations des gens de guerre en Occident durant les derniers siècles du Moyen Age,” in *Le migrazioni in Europa secc. XIII–XVIII*, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi (Florence, 1994), 459–476.

- 31 André Holenstein, “Wenig Krieg, schwache Herrschaft und begrenzte Ressourcen: Wirkungszusammenhänge im Militärwesen der Republik Bern in der frühen Neuzeit,” in *Schwerter, Säbel, Seitenwehren: Bernische Griffwaffen 1500–1850*, eds. Jürg A. Meier, Marc Höchner (Bern, 2021), 15–32, pp. 23–24, 26–28; Philippe Rogger, “Söldneroffiziere als gefragte Militärexperten: Zum Transfer militärischer Kultur in die frühneuzeitliche Eidgenossenschaft,” in *Miliz oder Söldner? Wehrpflicht und Solddienst in Stadt, Republik und Fürstenstaat, 13 – 18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Regula Schmid (Paderborn, 2019), 141–172; André Holenstein, “Militärunternehmer, gelehrte Geistliche und Fürstendiener: Karrieremigranten als Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen im *Corpus Helveticum* der frühen Neuzeit,” in *Beobachten, Vernetzen, Verhandeln: Diplomatische Akteure und politische Kulturen in der frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft*, eds. Philippe Rogger, Nadir Weber (Basel, 2018), 154–165. Telling biographies from a different cultural context are in *Along the Silk Roads in Mongol Eurasia: Generals, Merchants, Intellectuals*, eds. Michal Biran, Jonathan Brack, and Francesca Fiaschetti (Oakland, 2020).
- 32 Sonkajärvi, “Mobility”.
- 33 Guy P. Marchal, “Die ‘Alten Eidgenossen’ im Wandel der Zeiten: Das Bild der frühen Eidgenossen im Traditionsbewusstsein und in der Identitätsvorstellung der Schweizer vom 15. bis ins 20. Jahrhundert,” in *Innerschweiz und frühe Eidgenossenschaft*, 2, ed. Historischer Verein der Fünf Orte (Olten, 1990), 309–406; Katharina Simon-Muscheid, “‘Schweizergelb’ und Judasfarbe,” *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 22 (1995), 317–344.

business of war on societies.³⁴ Social and gendered approaches to military migration, and systematic examinations of the pathways between military and civic societies can add considerable insight into comparative societal change in Europe and beyond.³⁵

4 Military Service as Intergenerational Project

Time and distance are two crucial parameters for understanding the development of the early modern business of war. They underpinned battle strategies and the movements of troops and supplies, but also influenced the development of personal ties and family strategies related to military business. Louis' XIV 17th century was especially advantageous for such strategies as the relative stability of the long reign of the Sun King facilitated, or even permitted in the first place, intergenerational planning. However, strategies for "staying on top"³⁶ involved more than having enough surviving sons able to follow in their male forebears' footsteps. DAVID PARROT's study of military enterprise in France concludes that "the length and scale of war after 1635 ensured that extensive informal networks of personal ties and obligations were forged through warfare and the reciprocal bonds with commanders that this created". These bonds forged by shared dangers and challenges had a strong emotional glue, but also led to promises and obligations going beyond the individual military comrades. Women played a crucial part in upholding, fastening, and 'playing' the networks created by war and the businesses it attracted. The collaboration between the women who stayed in their places of origin and the men who pursued a military career was obviously considered temporary – the wives managed estates and the military business during the absence of the husbands until their eventual return. Male networks were greased by women's intervention and 'networking' by letter and personal intervention, as JASMINA CORNUT's analysis of 18th and 19th century family letter collections shows. While asking their male correspondents for support of sons or nephews, these women regularly invoked professional and emotional ties their male relatives

34 Holenstein, "Militärunternehmer"; André Holenstein, "Die militärische Arbeitsmigration ab dem 15. Jahrhundert," in André Holenstein, Patrick Kury, and Kristina Schulz, *Schweizer Migrationsgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Baden, 2018), pp. 47–49; Philippe Rogger, *Geld, Krieg und Macht: Pensionsherren, Söldner und eidgenössische Politik in den Mailänderkriegen 1494–1516* (Baden, 2015).

35 Mary E. Alies, *Military Migration and State Formation: The British Military Community in Seventeenth-Century Sweden* (Lincoln, Nebraska, 2002).

36 Rudolf Braun, "Staying on Top: Socio-Cultural Reproduction of European Power Elites," in *Power Elites and State-Building*, ed. Wolfgang Reinhard (Oxford, 1996), 235–260.

had established in earlier years. This analysis reveals military service as an intergenerational project, based on (gendered) division of labour,³⁷ but also as educational project when young men are urged to diligently study. The officers in charge are put, by their female correspondents, in an almost preceptor-like position. The long wars of early modern Europe meant that military businesses, and associated family strategies tied to them, extended beyond the life span of one generation. But how did 18th- and 19th-century commanders see their role as educators – a role that some mothers obviously expected extending beyond the teaching of military skills? Did new, ‘enlightened’ pedagogical ideals affect the inner workings of army education or did they open a new gulf between military and civil lives?

5 Whose Business is War?

“Il n’y comprenait rien du tout.” Not understanding anything is Fabrice, the hero of Stendahl’s 1839 novel *La Chartreuse de Parme*. In an iconic scene, Fabrice rides heedlessly and drunk across the battlefield of Waterloo, exhilarated by the deafening roar of the cannons. When a group of officers rushes past him, he does not realize that one of them is the Emperor himself, and that he just witnessed the flight of Napoleon. *La Chartreuse de Parme* is an ironic, literary take on the changing world of the early 19th century, but might also give historians who are not wont to symbolic narratives, a chance to try looking closer at their own historical perspectives. In particular, the moment the hero witnesses an event that would change the world, but without understanding it, spotlights a classic historian’s dilemma: Writing in hindsight, tasked with bringing order to a confusion of tumultuous events, and finding patterns in the course of history – in short, by ‘making history (work)’ –, historians ‘reduce complexities’. First by deciding whose story they will tell. Is it the story of nameless men, women, and children buffeted by war, struggling to find a living, enjoying the small comfort of the bottle of spirit offered by a kindly sutler? Or the story of the movers and shakers who juggle big money and big losses,

37 Nathalie Büsser, “Die ‘Frau Hauptmannin’ als Schaltstelle für Rekrutenwerbungen, Geldtransfer und Informationsaustausch: Geschäftliche Tätigkeiten von weiblichen Angehörigen der Zuger Zurlauben im familieneigenen Solddienstunternehmen um 1700,” in *Dienstleistungen, Expansion und Transformation des ‘dritten Sektors’ (15.–20. Jahrhundert)*, eds. Hans-Jörg Gilomen, Margrit Müller, and Laurent Tissot (Zurich, 2007), 143–153; Jasmina Cornut, *Femmes d’officiers militaires en Suisse romande: Implications, enjeux et stratégies de l’absence, xviiie–xixe siècles* (unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Lausanne, 2023).

driving the destiny of many? Or shall it be the story of abstract entities and structures like the 'State'? Historians have been taught, of course, that these diverse perspectives do not exclude each other, yet they also know from experience, that divergent approaches can be hard to reconcile.

Nonetheless, as the contributions in this volume amply show, it is, in fact, possible to a large extent to jointly incorporate a worm's eye and a bird's view, first, by focusing on people who lived of war, and whose actions made war work, and second, by targeting business. Business is a form of mediation. It brings together people of all walks of life. It creates and shapes mechanisms for the exchange of goods, people, and information, and connects them to places. It offers opportunities for many people, even if the chances of succeeding on a grand scale are unevenly distributed: legal obstacles, personal circumstances, acumen – both for business and for networking –, and sheer luck, are as important as geographical and topographical advantages, and the vagaries of climate, weather, and politics. By looking at the human, technical, and financial means that drove war, how they adapted to warfare, and were changed by it, this volume invites opportunities to discuss and rediscover the impetus of historical development itself.³⁸

38 I am grateful to Drew Keeling for commenting on the draft of this paper and adding his considerable linguistic support, and to Philippe Rogger and André Holenstein for many most instructive and fascinating discussions.

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“Money, money, and more money.” In the eyes of early modern warlords, these were the three essential prerequisites for waging war. The transnational studies presented here describe and explain how belligerent powers did indeed rely on thriving markets where military entrepreneurs provided mercenaries, weapons, money, credit, food, expertise, and other services. In a fresh and comprehensive examination of pre-national military entrepreneurship – its actors, structures and economic logic – this volume shows how readily business relationships for supplying armies in the 17th and 18th centuries crossed territorial and confessional boundaries.

By outlining and explicating early modern military entrepreneurial fields of action, this new transnational perspective transcends the limits of national historical approaches to the business of war.

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