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Cities of Migration

Understanding the diversity of urban diversities in Europe

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Writing this book has been a long and ambitious journey. Inspired by the works of early pioneers such as Mahnig (2004), Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2009) and Borkert and Caponio (2010), we started our quest to understand 'the diversity of urban diversities' already in 2018. Echoing the work from preceding decades in deconstructing 'national models of integration', we believed there should be a much greater appreciation of variation in local approaches to migration and diversity as well. Achieving this was, however, incredibly ambitious and challenging, due to challenges in data availability, comparability, methods and interpretation. But we got there; a typology of cities of migration that helps understand the diversity of urban diversities.

We were stimulated, helped and encouraged on this journey by great academic peers and by much-needed institutional support. The research initiative Vital Cities and Citizens from Erasmus University was indispensable in providing the funds required to freeing our research time to give our full attention (devotion) to the book. In addition, we thank the EU Knowledge Centre for Migration and Demography for giving access to the D4I dataset that provided a solution to some of the data and comparability issues that we had been facing.

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but also took away the possibility to travel to the cities that were selected for the more in-depth qualitative research. This meant we had to spend much time engaging with various persons from the selected cities through our screens. We thank all the participants from the 16 case cities for their collaboration in these difficult times.

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In spite of the huge ambition, we are aware that this is just the first step towards a deeper understanding of these urban diversities. We hope that our typology will receive lots of additions and amendments in the future; we see that as a sign of serious engagement with the typology, and hopefully also as a key step towards applying and re-examining the typology in a broader number of national and regional contexts across the globe. So, this book is not the end of our journey, but only the start of it!

Asya Pisarevskaya and Peter Scholten, Rotterdam, 17 May 2024

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Cities are the places where migration-related diversities often become the most manifest. It is where migrants usually arrive, where they make contact with others, where they find housing, jobs and schooling, and from where they sometimes also depart, often to other cities. Migration and diversity are often key parts of the historical development and economic positioning of cities. Many cities were built on migration and continue to be primary magnets for migrants from all over the world. Think about how global cities as London, New York and Shanghai evolved as key cities of migration, or how the economy of port cities as Rotterdam, Marseille, Naples and Cape Town continues to be deeply entwined with migration.

Yet we know little about how and why migration-related diversities may play out very differently in different cities. There is traditionally a lot of attention for how migration shapes the so-called 'Global Cities' (Sassen, 2001) or "gateway cities"—those, that serve as an entry point to a region or country, often due to its strategic location, transportation infrastructure, or economic significance (Price & Benton-Short, 2008). Cities like New York and London where migration is connected to the global economic positioning of these cities, where migration is a big part of urban identity and where newcomers are often faced with many economic opportunities. It is these cities that are often referred when talking about 'superdiversity' (Vertovec, 2007); cities that are so diverse that it is hard to distinguish clear groups, where people with a migration background sometimes even make up more than half of the population ('majority-minority cities'), and where being diverse is a key part of urban identity.

However, most cities are not global cities. The so-called 'non-traditional gateway cities' are understudied, they have not been much looked at in terms of their governance approaches and policies for incorporation of migrants and handling of migration-related diversity in general (Zhuang, 2023). Different cities may encounter very different migration-related diversities, and also respond very differently to these diversities. For instance, port cities as Marseille, Naples, Liverpool and Hamburg have historically met with large-scale low-paid labour migration, often

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housed in very specific parts of the city near the harbour. This spatial and economic background continues to leave its imprint on the city today. Other cities, such as Stuttgart or Mulhouse, may have specifically historically developed migrant communities that define urban diversity to a large extent, such as in these cases the history of guest labour migration for the local economies from Turkey and Algeria respectively. Other cities may be more 'transit cities' where migrants pass through for only a limited time, or new migration cities that have only recently started to develop into places of immigration. Think about how a city as Ho Chi Minh City has turned into a major immigration city (national and international) over the last decade or so.

Understanding what we will describe as the 'diversity of urban diversities' is highly relevant in terms of understanding the challenges and opportunities in different cities and the approaches that may be the best fit for specific cities. For instance, in a medium-sized city like Rouen with a diversified economy and lots of students, the challenges and opportunities are likely to be very different from a city like Rotterdam with its economy structured around its port and its long history of labour migration. This will also be reflected in different governance approaches. For instance, a city like Rotterdam has, because of its history and economy, focused much on housing, desegregation and participation, whereas in Rouen a much broader approach was followed.

A more systematic understanding of the 'diversity of urban diversities' will also contribute to our theoretical thinking on (migration-related) diversities and on the governance of diversities. Migration-related diversities are still often understood from what Ulrich Beck (1992) described as the national container view in social sciences. In his book Integration Nations, Adrian Favell (2022) convincingly shows how 'immigrant integration' is legitimized from a perspective of nation-state building, leading to specifically national ideas or models of integration. The local turn in migration studies (Zapata-Barrero et al., 2017) signals a growing interest of migration scholars to reach beyond what Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) have described as 'methodological nationalism.' This book aims to contribute to this local turn and to reaching beyond methodological nationalism, by unravelling the urban dimension of migration-related diversities.

There is no one-size-fits-all face of migration-related diversity in cities. The core ambition of this book is to develop a better empirical and theoretical understanding of how and why migration-related diversities take different shapes in different cities and how and why cities also respond differently to these diversities. By a systematic mapping of categories of cities of migration and by an in-depth study of these categories, we will contribute to a more differentiated understanding of urban diversities. This will challenge how cities of migration are conceptualized in the literature but will also provide a more differentiated perspective on how cities can respond to different migration-related diversities.

1.1 Understanding the Plurality of Urban Diversities

Migration-related diversities have been and still are often understood in the context of nations. Ways of perceiving, conceptualizing and acting up on migration-related diversities is often understood as a form of reproduction of the nation state. This 'national container view' (Beck, 1992) was itself reproduced in at least two different ways, each limiting attention to the specifically local or urban dimension of migration-related diversities. First, our perspective on and approach to migration-related diversities is constrained by specific historically developed and nationally institutionalized discourses. Bertossi (2011) defines as these as 'national models', often national models of integration. An example is the French national Republicanist model that combines aspects of universalism, colour-blindness and assimilationism in a way that goes back to the French revolution. This implies that urban diversities would need to be understood against the background of such national models, or the extent to which they conform to or give practical relevance to the national models. This has turned attention for instance to the relations between cities and national policies, and issues as multi-level governance and policy conflict in case cities did not conform to national models.

Secondly, this national container view also tended to be reproduced by social scientists operating in the context of such national models. Not only do social scientists, including migration scholars, take the national level as the focus of study, they also often tended to reproduce specific concepts from this national context. This involves for instance nationally specific categorisations of migrants (such as ethnically defined minorities in the Netherlands, racially defined communities in the UK, or colour-blind 'proxies' for migrants in France, etc.) and the 'naturalization' of these categorisations by producing all sorts of (quantitative and qualitative) data about them. As various scholars have shown (Favell, 2022; Schinkel, 2020) this also involves the use of the concept of integration that problematizes the position of these categorisations in specific national contexts and legitimizes the idea that an integration policy is required to resolve 'integration problems.'

This 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer & Schiller, 2003) has for a long time obscured the view on the urban dimension of migration-related diversities. Cities were mostly studied from the perspective of or in relation to national models. However, especially the last decade or so has witnessed a rising interest of scholars in this urban dimension. Zapata-Barrero et al. (2017) have described this as the local turn in migration studies. This has led to a growing understanding not only of contradictions and inconsistencies between national and local perspectives on and approaches to migration-related diversities (Bertossi, 2011), but also to an increasing understanding that the local and the national may in various ways be 'two worlds apart' operating in very different logics (Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008; Caponio & Jones-Correa, 2018).

Yet, without a systematic understanding of the variety urban diversities and urban approaches, the local turn risks falling prone to similar problems as methodological nationalism. A container view on urban diversities would not do justice to

the diversity of urban diversities. Borkert and Caponio (2010) refer to the 'local dimension of integration' when capturing how cities deal with diversity. Triggering attention to this local dimension has been incredibly important in breaking through the methodological nationalism of those times. Building on this important work, we develop the thesis that this local dimension contains a plurality of local diversities and local approaches (Bazurli et al., 2022, Scholten, 2020a). We will help reveal, map and understand what we will describe as the diversity of urban diversities.

Our thesis on the plurality of urban diversities is grounded in various studies that highlight specific urban diversities. Glick-Schiller and Çağlar (2009) have shown that cities with different economic structures tend to develop different mobility and diversity configurations and trigger very different governance responses. Baumgärtel and Oomen (2019) show how and why some cities may become more open than others in their reception of refugees, such as the Cities of Refuge in Europe or the Welcoming Cities in the US. Tasan-Kok et al. (2014) show that even when cities are facing diversification, or what they describe as hyperdiversity, the framing of this diversity and the local governance responses may still be very different. Also, whereas global cities are often found to embrace superdiversity (Foner et al., 2014), postindustrial cities have sometimes struggled more with diversity and mobility (Meissner & Vertovec, 2015). Furthermore, these diversified realities of urban governance can contrast with national (and international) perspectives on migration and diversity. Amongst others, Caponio and Jones-Correa (2018), Spencer (2011) and Zapata-Barrero (2015) have revealed contradictions and even conflicts between urban governance and often more rigid 'national models', thus complicating ideas on 'multi-level governance.'

There are various dimensions along which urban diversities can differ. Scholars have focused for instance on differences in size of the migrant population (Crul, 2016), but also the diversity amongst migrants (Vertovec, 2007; Sassen, 2001), urban segregation and unease with increasing diversity (Crul & Lelie, 2019; Mepschen, 2016), the social, economic and cultural position of migrants (Glick-Schiller & Çağlar, 2009) as well as differences in local integration and diversity policies (Martínez-Ariño et al., 2019; Schiller, 2016) migrants' political participation (De Graauw & Vermeulen, 2016; Uitermark, 2014) and in the power of urban level vis-à-vis national and regional levels of governance (Dekker et al., 2015; Emilsson, 2015; Zapata-Barrero et al., 2017).

1.2 Beyond the Local Turn in Migration Studies

The local turn has gone through several stages. First was the (re)discovery of the city as the focal point for studies of diversity. A number of studies have helped reveal the importance of the urban setting for understanding migration and in particular migration-related diversities. As Glick-Schiller and Çağlar mention it, the importance of 'locality' to opportunity structures for migrant incorporation. The city is for many migrants the first context in which they mobilize, participate,



Fig. 1.1 Number of publications in migration research database (www.migrationresearch.com) on geographical scope 'Urban', since 1970s. Source: Migration Research Hub www.migrationresearch.com on 30.05.2023 only Journal articles, Books and Book Chapters

interact and even identify. Also, studies showed that cities often do not simply follow national policies but also became increasingly entrepreneurial themselves in setting specific policy approaches. In various ways, such studies revealed that there was a distinct, what Borkert and Caponio (2010) call, local dimension of integration.

The second phase in the local turn, in which our study can be positioned, brought a growing appreciation of variation between cities (see also Pisarevskaya et al., 2021). This includes for instance studies of how cities differ in terms of the scale or volume of diversity. Crul (2016) focuses in his study on 'majority-minority cities', which are superdiverse in the sense that more than half of the population has a migration background. Another key topic has been segregation. For instance, numerous studies have shown that some cities may face more issues of segregation due to their historical and economic development, such as port cities and postindustrial cities where migrants tend to be housed in relatively poor neighbourhoods.

One of the most widely referred to study that fits this second phase of the local turn, is Glick-Schiller and Çağlar's (2009) comparative theory of locality. They found a relationship between "city scale", or the differential positioning of cities within broader political, cultural and economic relations at a regional, national and global level, and the incorporation paths that migrants follow. City scale is not defined in terms of geographical scale or population size, but rather the positioning of cities as outcome of postindustrial restructuration. They distinguish between top-, up-, low- and down-scale cities.

- *Top-scale cities* include the global cities that take in a top position in global economic, cultural and political exchanges, and offer a wide range of opportunities for migrant incorporation.

- *Up-scale cities* take in a relatively high position in global exchanges, for instance, because of new and emergent industries or services, and offer growing opportunities for migrant incorporation.
- *Low-scale cities* take in a weak position in global exchanges, often being dependent on specific industries or services, and offering weak and selective opportunities for migrant incorporation.
- *Down-scale cities* are often at the losing end of postindustrial reform, involving economic, social and cultural decline and urban reform, mostly offering weak opportunity structures for newcomers.

As the authors describe, the variable of neo-liberal restructuring is indicated by economic, political and cultural power of the cities, and it is clear that in top-scale cities we might observe a powerful stance in all three of these indicators. While in the opposing end of the scale, the down-scale cities, are supposed to exhibit lack of economic, political and cultural significance in globalized world, as the authors call them, these are often old industrial cities at the losing end of globalization. While the other two scales would be somewhat in between, with a difference that the low-scale cities rely on "single type of industry" and therefore there is a narrow economic opportunity for globalization. In up-scale cities the process of neo-liberal restructuring has taken a rapid pace, mainly due to new-economy industries and services, however their prominence has not (yet) achieved that of the top-scale cities.

In terms of integration pathways, top-scale cities offer a wide range of opportunities for migrant incorporation, due to prominence of both ethnic/diasporic institutions, tourist-oriented economy and cosmopolitan global talent attraction. Up-scale cities offer multiple pathways of migrant incorporation and the ethnic-based organizations (ethnic pathways) contribute to making these cities economically powerful and globally embedded. Low-scale cities have no capacity to invest in migrant transnational organizations as an up-scale city might do, hence offering weak and selective opportunities for migrant incorporation. Down-scale cities are only able to offer weak opportunity structures for newcomers, such as ethnic small business niches (Glick-Schiller & Çağlar, 2009).

Whereas Glick-Schiller and Çağlar's work has been very helpful as a conceptual approach to demonstrate the diversity of urban settings, it is difficult to apply as a typology of urban diversities. It theorises the relationship between economic opportunity structures and integration pathways for migrants in different cities, rather than offering an approach to understanding urban diversities and their various implications. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the economic approach that Glick-Schiller and Çağlar take does justice to the full complexity of how urban diversities are shaped. As we saw in 1.1, there is much literature about the importance of a broad range of factors for understanding urban diversities. This includes spatial rather than economic factors (such as the type of city, how a city is designed, how the location of a city matters to mobilities) as well as factors related to time and history (policy legacies, histories of migration, historically developed narratives on a city) as well as more social-structural, economic and political-institutional factors. It is our objective to build a more systematic approach towards understanding the

plurality of urban diversities bringing in such a broader range of factors. Another typology that deserves attention is Singer's (2015) typology of metropolitan areas. This typology is proposed on the basis of hundred largest metropolitan areas of the USA, takes mainly a demographic approach to their categorization. Singer groups these places by immigrant shares and historical trends of growth or decline throughout twentieth and twenty-first century. This leads to seven types of immigrant gateways: former, major-continuous, minor-continuous, post-World War II, re-emerging, major-emerging, and minor-emerging, and distinguishes them from 'low immigration metro areas'.

The strength of Singer's typology is that it really positions cities in relation to their spatial fixes as well as their positioning in longitudinal economic transformations. A weakeness seems to be that it is developed very specifically for the US case, and like Glick-Schiller and Caglar, seem to put priority on economic factors and history of immigration. Moreover, it does not take into account the spread of migration-diveristy (segregation) to define the city types. Therefore, in our approach we will not only take a more international comparative perspective, but we will also take an approach that includes a broader variety of factors into account, including but not limited to economics.

1.3 A Systematic Approach to the Plurality of Urban Diversities

Our approach (Fig. 1.2) seeks to build on studies of urban diversities but also reach beyond the local turn in migration studies and beyond the Comparative Theory of Locality. Our goal is to develop a typology that helps us understand the plurality of urban diversities. Under the typology we understand a theory-driven approach to categorizations, which emerges as a result of cross-tabulation of several variables, or dimensions. Each cell of such a table would form a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive category, thus grasping possibly existing manifestations of a concept also beyond the observed cases under analysis (Bailey, 1994; Collier et al., 2008, p. 158). Typologies represent either a system of ideal types (Weber, 1949) based on hypothetical extremes or a system of constructed types based on most commonly shared characteristics (McKinney, 1966 cited in Bailey, 1994).

In this book we will offer a systematic and differentiated approach to urban diversities, which will enable scholars as well as others to understand the plurality of urban diversities. Our approach to arrive to such typology will combine both the ideal type approach and the constructed typology of shared characteristics, and it consists of several steps described in subsequent chapters of this book.

First, as every typology needs to be grounded in theory, we start with a systematic exploration of literature to develop a conceptualization of urban diversities (Chap. 2). This includes a systematic review of literature on urban diversities and on the factors that according to the literature may account for the different shapes that

Fig. 1.2 Summary of methodological approach

urban diversities may take. This part of the research follows a deductive approach where we use the literature to define the factors that we need to take into account when mapping the plurality of urban diversities. Importantly, such an exploration does not yet lead to a typology; it merely provides us with a conceptual framework for which dimensions or variables need to be incorporated into such typology.

Secondly, we empirically map urban diversities. We do this by a more inductive approach in which we systematically analyse data of large number of cities, determining their extent of migration-related diversity and the way it is spread across neighbourhoods. This mapping provides a first glance at the empirical plurality of urban diversities, and allows us to determine clusters of cities that are similar to each other in terms of variety, volume and spread of diversity. Such clusters should not be considered as types yet, but they do provide a basis for the selection of cities that could vary on relevant factor-characteristics, and examine these cities more closely. In total we will examine 16 cities from four clusters of cities.

Thirdly, we examine the selected cities more in-depth in order to find out whether and how they differ in terms of other theoretically-relevant factors (Chaps. 4, 5, 6 and 7). We will study several factors that could potentially shape the configurations of urban diversity. This is a step that is crucial in typologisation; reaching beyond mapping plurality, but also understanding the plurality of urban diversities based on the factors identified from literature in the previous step. In terms of methods, this step involves the study of primary and secondary documents on cities, their diversities and their approaches to diversities. It also includes interviewing as a method for closing any gaps left in our understanding of the cities based on document analysis. This involves interviewing key experts from a city, which can be from the city itself or from a local NGO, or from a research background. Based on this in-depth qualitative research we will develop a better understanding of how the various factors shape the diversity and segregation in the selected cities.

Finally, in a fourth step we will systematically compare the patterns we found across cities and construct the typology, combining both logics of typology building mentioned above. First we will use the metho of Qualitative Comparative Analysis, in which cities will be categorized along of theoretical extremes for each theoretical dimension of analysis (ideal type logic). The results of the QCA analysis are then taken together and interpreted to construct several types of cities—in the step five—based on the logic of commonly shared characteristics (Chap. 8).

1.4 Methodological Approach

For implementing this systematic approach towards typologizing the plurality of urban diversities, we make use of a variety of methods. For each ‘step’ in the analysis, we will discuss methodological issues in more detail. In main terms, this involves the following methods:

- *A systematic literature review of academic literature on urban diversities*. Using the PRISMA methodology of systematic literature reviews, we identified the main dimensions on which urban diversities vary. These dimensions then provide the foundation for the next more empirical steps in the research. For developing an overview of the literature we have made use of the migration research hub.
- *A quantitative analysis of a harmonised dataset of cities in Europe.* To map the plurality of urban diversities, a harmonised dataset is required that provides as many cities from various countries possible. Although many datasets are available, the harmonisation of data for purposes of comparison across countries is very limited. Therefore, we work with a harmonized dataset obtained from D4I, which includes data on a total of 293 cities (or 'functional urban areas') from across four different European countries (Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands), taken in 2011. The data from this year is used to identify a more limited number of city cases for further analysis; this involves 16 cities from four different clusters.
- *A qualitative in-depth analysis of the selected cities*. Subsequently, the in-depth qualitative analysis of the 16 cities is based on analysis of documents from these cities, literature review and expert interviews (see Annex 1 for the list of experts). This analysis will focus on the factors that were identified in the literature review of the first step.
- *A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the selected city cases*. To compare the cities with each other, we use the four-value fuzzy-set QCA, where cities are assigned scores 0, 0.33, 0.67 and 1 indicating the extent each factor is present case by case. Subsequently, we analyse the relationships between diversity configurations and factors using QCA set-logic. Based on significant relationships of necessity and sufficiency, we identify multidimensional types of cities of migration at the end of the book.

1.5 Conceptualizing Migration-Related Diversity

To demarcate the focus of the project and to define its relation to the state of the art of current academic literature on migration-related diversity, a number of concepts need to be defined clearly. First of all, 'migration-related diversity' is conceptualized as any form of (etic, social, political, cultural, religious, racial) diversity related to first or second-generation migrants. We deliberately do not confine ourselves to a specific form of diversity as it is an empirical question what forms of diversity emerge as relevant and pertinent in specific urban settings. In fact, the migration literature has revealed important differences between countries in terms of defining diversity; such as the 'race relations' model in the United Kingdom and the United States versus the more ethnic and cultural conceptions of diversity in many European continental countries. We do confine ourselves to first and second generation migrants, as for taking on board more generations the 'migration' dimension to

diversity becomes less clear (and as it is very difficult to collate data on later generations).

Related to this concept of 'migration-related diversity', a definition is required as well of who is considered a 'migrant.' For this project, and taking into consideration the availability of data in different country settings, we define a migrant as anyone who is foreign-born and settles in a city for either temporary or permanent purposes. This leaves out domestic migration (which is a very relevant matter as well in many cities, but often associated with different issues than international migration) and for instance tourism or business trips that do not have any purpose of settlement. It includes settlement with very different temporalities (permanent, temporary, or anywhere in between), as this is a key empirical question for the project. A weakness of this definition (which I allow because of data availability purposes) is that this definition also includes 'natives' who are foreign born but repatriate to their home country; however, for this very specific category, it can also be considered an empirical question to what extent they are or are not defined as migrants (as for instance the Aussiedler[1] in Germany). Finally, a second-generation migrant is anyone of whom at least one of the parents is foreign-born and who remains in a country for either temporary or permanent purposes.

'Urban governance' is defined as an interactive process of problem definition, policy formulation and problem solving between government and society at the urban level. This means that urban governance includes but is not limited to government policies; in fact, the governance of diversity does often involve many different types of actors. It also can but does not necessarily involve 'diversity policies' or 'integration policies.' In fact, one of the key questions this project will focus on is whether local governments adopt specific policies targeted specifically at migrants or whether they adopt a 'mainstream' approach based on generic policies and service, or whether in fact they do nothing and adopt a laissez-faire approach.

1.6 Outline of the Book

The structure of the book follows our systematic approach from conceptualizing diversity, to mapping diversity, analysing diversity and then theorizing an ideal type of cities of migration. Each step of the approach will be taken in different chapters. In Chap. 2 we take stock of the broader literature on urban diversities and deductively develop a framework with relevant dimensions of urban diversities. This sets the contours for the inductive mapping of diversities along these factors in Chap. 3, and subsequent in-depth analysis of these cities in Chaps. 4, 5, 6 and 7. This in-depth analysis will be done per cluster of cities that appear to share similarities in terms of the factors identified in Chap. 2.

[1] Ethnic German re-settlers from post-Soviet countries.

After this combined deductive-inductive approach we should have a clear view of how the factors from Chap. 3 correlate with specific diversity configurations in cities. Therefore, in Chap. 8 we will systematically analyse the findings and try to identify ideal-types that account for specific urban diversity configurations. Finally, we will wrap up in Chap. 9 with an elaboration of the typology and a positioning of the typology in the broader literature.

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Chapter 2
Conceptualizing the Plurality of Urban Diversities

A systematic approach towards capturing and understanding the variation of urban diversities, requires a careful conceptualization of urban diversities. In migration studies there has been a growing interest for the 'local dimension' of migration-related diversities (Borkert & Caponio, 2010). In this book we develop the thesis that this local dimension brings a plurality of urban diversities. However, in order to capture this plurality, we need a proper understanding of relevant dimensions on which urban diversities can vary. Often, urban diversities are described in terms of different degrees of diversity, such as in terms of 'minority' cities with significant migrant groups or 'majority-minority' cities where the majority of a city has a migration background (Crul, 2016). Or it is described in terms of spatial unevenness of distribution of people with and without a migration background, or 'segregation'.

However, understanding the plurality of urban diversities also requires understanding the factors that account for such them. For instance, whether a city has a long migration history that has brought specific groups to the city, or whether the socio-economic makeup of a city triggers specific diversity configurations (such as port cities dependent on migrant labourers often housed in traditional working neighbourhoods).

This chapter will develop the conceptual framework that will be used for mapping and subsequently theorizing this plurality of diversities. It will provide a systematic literature review of migration studies literature to capture the key dimensions of urban diversities. Finally, we will develop these dimensions into a conceptual framework that can be used for an empirical mapping of urban diversities in a broad range of cities.

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2.1 Conceptualizing the Plurality of Urban Diversities—A Deductive Approach

A typology is always grounded in theory; it offers ideal-typical theoretical representations which can then be confronted with empirical situations in order to better understand these situations. This is why our approach commences with a systematic exploration of key theoretical perspectives on migration-related diversity in cities.

A first part of this deductive approach is to develop a clear conceptualization of urban diversities. What are the key dimensions on which urban diversities vary? These dimensions can then be taken as a starting point for typologisation. In particular, these dimensions will be taken as the basis for the empirical clustering of cities of migration, and the more in-depth analysis of these clusters. Although it will always be impossible to incorporate all dimensions addressed in the literature, this deductive approach will also help embed our approach in and contribute to the broader literature on urban migration studies.

We conducted this literature review in three steps. The first step was identifying recent debates covered in the introductory articles of the seven special issues of the two leading journals, JEMS and ERS in the last decade (G. Bolt et al., 2010; Bulmer & Solomos, 2015; Foner et al., 2017; Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore, 2018; Meissner & Vertovec, 2015; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016; Simpson & Peach, 2009). We limit our initial search to these journals for the same reasons as Yalaz and Zapata-Barrero (2019) identified earlier, namely longest publication history, European focus, research agenda setting power related to their impact factor and exclusive focus on migration research.

Based on this core literature, we deductively defined and labelled a number of key dimensions of diversity. In line with studies such as Bolt et al. (2010) and Meissner and Vertovec (2015), we conceptualized diversity not only in terms of 'volume' of the population with a migration background, but also in terms of the diversity of backgrounds and the spatial spread of diversity. In addition, we identified and labelled three groups of factors that tend to be associated with diversities in the literature. This includes what we label as 'mobilities' or historically developed patterns of migration. Secondly, we focus on what we call as 'inequalities', or structural patterns of inequality between migrants and non-migrants in terms of opportunity structures, in terms of education and income and in terms of discrimination. Finally, a last group involves political institutional factors, which refers to the institutional setting of policies, politics and governance regarding diversities. Importantly, at this stage of conceptualisation, these dimensions are merely defined and labelled; we did not make any deductive inferences about the relation between the variables, which we examine in the subsequent chapters of the book that form the basis of the typology.

Based on these five core dimensions, we conducted a *template analysis*, a combination of inductive and deductive approach. This enabled us to map how previous literature studied urban diversity: which aspects of it were examined the most and which sub-dimensions of diversity, segregation, inequalities, mobilities at urban

level worth focusing on in our further city-case studies. To do so, we did a further bibliometric analysis. We conducted a Boolean search[1] on Scopus, and coded on Citavi 5, a reference programme, the 591 abstracts of 1647 collected references that were both relevant to our search.. While we started with codes, identified in the core readings mentioned above, when necessary, we created new descriptive codes the initial template to reach the final list of sub-dimensions presented below. The abstracts were assigned a sub-dimension code, when the study clearly touched upon that specific topic. Each abstract could discuss various sub-dimensions, that is why each study could simultaneously be assigned to several codes. Below we describe the most prevalent topics of the analysed urban diversity literature, providing the foundation of the analytical aspects covered in the subsequent chapters of this book.

2.1.1 Urban Diversities

When taking stock of the literature on urban diversities at a meta-level, several dimensions emerge. The first one is the ***'level of diversity'***, defined here as migration-related diversities. At a basic level, this dimension captures the relative size or volume of the population with a migration background. Here, as our literature review will show, there is much variation in terms of the focus of different aspects of diversity. This includes a focus on ethnic, racial, religious, national and various other forms of diversity, as well as variation in terms of focus on foreign-born or first generation migrants as well as others focusing also on the descendants of migrants.

The literature review shows that the primary focus of existing studies is diversity of ethnic or racial background, which mostly overlap with consideration of diversity of countries of origin. 257 out of 569 studies mention one or more dimensions of diversity which amounts to a total of 343 categorical references. Of the 13 sub-dimensions of diversity that we identify, diversity of ethnic, racial and country of origin backgrounds is mentioned by far the most, that is, 99 out of 343 remarks that appeared in 96 studies.

An important development in the literature on urban diversity is the focus on the growing social ***complexity of diversity*** itself. Hollinger (1995) has described this as the 'diversification of diversity', and Vertovec (2007) has coined the term 'superdiversity' to capture this phenomemon. The literature review revealed 99 remarks emphasizing the complexity of ethno-racial diversity as they consider the importance of region of origin of urban population with immigrant background (Burnley, 2002; Grady & McLafferty, 2007; Wang, 2012; Susanne Wessendorf, 2017; Xue

[1] After several iterations spread over time, the total number of studies screened are based on the following Boolean word search in September 2018:

TITLE-ABS-KEY ((*migrant* AND (*city* OR *cities* OR *urban**) AND (**diversity* OR *difference*))) AND NOT SUBJAREA (*agri* OR *bioc* OR *busi* OR *ceng* OR *chem* OR *comp* OR *deci* OR *eart* OR *ener* OR *engi* OR *envi* OR *immu* OR *mate* OR *math* OR *medi* OR *neur* OR *nurs* OR *phar* OR *phys* OR *vete* OR *dent* OR *heal*).

et al., 2012), the ratio of so-called native groups to those with immigrant background (Crul, 2016; Yoder & La Perrière de Gutiérrez, 2004), mixed ethnic backgrounds and intermarriages across groups (Alba & Duyvendak, 2017; Guevarra Jr., 2012; Jun & Ha, 2015; Lamphere, 2007; Telles, 1993; van Oudenhoven & Ward, 2013; Warikoo, 2004). This means that besides simply volume or share of population with migration background it is also important to look at the variety within these population (Scholten, 2020b).

This focus on complexity is also manifested in studies that emphasize various intersectionalities of diversity. Of the 96 studies on diversity of ethnic/racial/country of origin background, other diversity categories also simultaneously discuss:

- intersectionality (Crul, 2016; Foner et al., 2017; Katz et al., 2010; Keil, 2005; Lamphere, 2007; Meissner & Vertovec, 2015; Padilla et al., 2015; Simpson & Peach, 2009);
- diversity of human capital (Crul, 2016; Kloosterman et al., 2016; Lee, 2015; Li et al., 1998; Meissner & Vertovec, 2015; Wessendorf, 2018; Xue et al., 2012);
- legal capital (Burchianti & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Burnley, 1992; Crul, 2016; Kloosterman et al., 2016; Padilla et al., 2015; Phillimore, 2015);
- religion (Alba & Duyvendak, 2017; Larguèche, 2001; Martikainen, 2009; Meissner & Vertovec, 2015);;
- gender (Biehl, 2017; Crul, 2016; Meissner & Vertovec, 2015; Phillimore, 2015);
- cultural diversity (Burchianti & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Giovanangeli, 2015; Rose, 2015; van Oudenhoven & Ward, 2013; Yeoh & Willis, 2005)
- linguistic diversity (Flynn & Kosmarskaya, 2014; Massicotte, 1999; Meissner & Vertovec, 2015; Phillimore, 2015).

These studies show that it is important not only to focus on the volume of (migration-related) diversity, such as in the percentage of a population from migration background, but also on the complexity of these diversities. This attention to superdiversity or 'diversity of diversities' may help us distinguish between more complex and more simple urban diversity configurations. Through qualitative research with special attention to variety of migration motives, religious backgrounds and legal statuses where possible, we will be able to identify the sorts of diversities, or sorts of intersectionalities, emerging in specific settings.

2.1.2 Urban Segregation

Another dimension that emerges consistently in the literature concerns the spatial dimension of diversity. The extent to which diversity either or not is concentrated in specific parts of the city says much about how diversity is experienced, what kinds of diversity may be involved and what the implications of diversity can be for migrants as well as for non-migrants. Some cities, such as port cities, for historical and structural-economic reasons tend to be characterized by a relatively high degree of segregation.

Segregation was in the centre of discussion in 241 out of 569 studies covered in this review. Almost half of those focus on residential segregation (120 studies) and a little bit more than half on interpersonal contact (141 studies), revealing its different layers, venues and manifestations, while 20 of them touch upon both key dimensions (Akay et al., 2014; Alba & Duyvendak, 2017; Barwick, 2017; Body-Gendrot, 2002; G. Bolt et al., 2010; Burnley, 1992; Caggiano & Segura, 2014; Cancellieri & Ostanel, 2015; Finney & Catney, 2012; Foner et al., 2017; Giovanangeli, 2015; Hall, 2015; Ho, 2011; Jiménez, 2007; Kojima, 2014; Kosnick, 2008; B. Ray & Preston, 2009; Rzepnikowska, 2017; Sepulveda et al., 2011; Vásquez & Dewind, 2014; Vidal, 2010). While the first approach to study segregation is mostly focused on the location of the place of residence, and the differences in concentration patterns of various ethnic and racial groups across urban areas, the second one emphasises more the research of meaningful interactions between city residents of various origins.

Among the studies on ***residential segregation***, the key focus is first and foremost on ethnic and racial segregation at the urban level (51 out of 120 studies), followed by an interest in the extent to which the boundaries of migrant neighbourhoods are porous or rigid (25 of 120), and thirdly, length of residence of migrants in a given neighbourhood (13 of the 120). These studies reveal a residential hierarchy determined by the particular conditions of the newcomer in a city, such as:

- legal status (Cort et al., 2014),
- ethnic or familial ties (Andersson, 2013; Flippen & Parrado, 2012; Jiménez, 2016; Rosenbaum & Friedman, 2001) or
- suburbanization trends (Bayona-Carrasco & Gil-Alonso, 2012),
- neighbourhood models based on the presence, diversity and segregation of foreign residents in a city (García & Moreno, 2011)
- struggles for public space (Cancellieri & Ostanel, 2015; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016)
- conviviality and intergroup contact in neighbourhoods (Padilla et al., 2015; Stolle et al., 2013).

Among the studies on ***interpersonal contact***, the key focus is on interactions in the street market or other public spaces (100 out of 141). Conditions and experiences of friendship across ethnic and/or religious groups in certain public spaces stand out as the most studied aspect of those interactions (36 out of 100). Among those looking at friendship across ethnic and/or religious groups, 4 studies focus on religious distancing, 15 studies on ethnic/linguistic distancing, 12 studies on conflict and crime, 2 studies on class-based exclusion as a result of interactions in the public space. Few studies mention alliances for labor rights among and beyond migrant communities in the urban context (Doussard, 2016; Guevarra Jr., 2012; Iskander & Lowe, 2010; D. Katz, 2012) whereas 17 of 141 studies on interpersonal contact draw attention to different aspects of workplace segregation or diversity, in different sectors (Bakens & Nijkamp, 2013; Bendick Jr. et al., 2010; Body-Gendrot, 2002; Bolt et al., 2010; Foner et al., 2017; Jaskulowski, 2018; Malkin, 2004; Vazquez, 2001), in relation to migrants' networks and business locations (Joassart-Marcelli, 2014; Li et al., 1998;

S. Park & Kim, 1998) and firms' policy on diversity (Cadier & Mar-Molinero, 2012; Chivakidakarn, 2013; Lee, 2015; Nathan & Lee, 2013; Tandé, 2017; Vašát & Bernard, 2015). One of the striking findings here is that only 7 of the 141 studies on interpersonal contact overtly take into consideration the fact that people with migration background can have multiple allegiances overtime and they take part in different activities across the urban space, in which they can have various degrees, frequency and extensiveness of contacts with non-migrant groups or with other migrants of distinct origins (Caggiano & Segura, 2014; Copeland-Carson, 2011; Hall, 2015; Kleinman, 2014; Ray & Preston, 2009; Sepulveda et al., 2011; Vidal, 2010).

This wealth of literature adopts variety of theoretical perspectives on mixing and separation of migrants and non-migrants in cities, and also, they use different terminology to refer to social and interpersonal patterns of how migration-related diversity is spread across city neighbourhoods and streets. In our book, under segregation we understand geographically bounded interactions between migrant and non-migrant urban residents, and we do not use this term in a negative connotation. We take from this literature that mixing or segregation of immigrant population give specific character to diversity configurations in cities, and that it is an important dimension to take into account to capture different manifestations of migration-related diversity. However, the literature makes clear that segregation can come in many different forms (spatial or not) as well as with many different implications, this makes the proper and uniform measurement of segregation difficult to achieve In our study, we follow the reviewed literature and aim to observe residential segregation and qualitatively also capture the extent of interpersonal interactions between migrants and non-migrants in the cities that we study.

2.2 Factors Associated with Variation in Urban Diversities

A second purpose of our deductive approach to urban diversities has been to identify factors that may account for urban diversities. These will structure our analysis of the clusters of cities of migration that we will identify, and make a systematic analysis of factors behind these clusters. This includes a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to be done in Chap. 8.

2.2.1 Mobilities

A first and relatively evident cluster of factors that can help understand why urban diversities shape in different ways in different cities, relate to the underlying ***dynamics of migration*** itself. Urban diversities will reflect urban mobilities (as well as contribute to urban mobilities, which is something we will attend to later).

Among the 569 studies on migration-related urban diversity, there are 96 studies related related to changes in mobility practices. They discuss nine different yet closely related aspects of mobility. The main emphasis, with 36 out of 96 studies on mobility is the research on new arrivals, or on current or relatively recent levels of migration. This does not only involve levels of immigration, but also 'mobilities' more in general, including emigration, secondary migration, circular migration and other forms of mobility. Studies situate these mobilities in various types of urban settings, including:

- the majority minority metropolis (Alam, 2013; Crul, 2016)
- in global cities (Baver et al., 2017; Blanc-Chaleard, 1998; Murdie & Ghosh, 2010; Sepulveda et al., 2011; Takenaka & Osirim, 2010),
- in a global city but as embedded in a transnational context (Bhattacharya, 2008),
- in transit zones (Pérouse, 2009),
- in old colonies (Higgins, 2017)
- and in relation to urban citizenship or urban integration of different groups and generations (Amrith, 2015; Antweiler, 2001; Aymard & Benko, 1998; Berger & Heller, 2001; Dirim & Hieronymus, 2003; Donahue, 2009; Erdmans, 2006; Ferraro et al., 2015; Flynn & Kosmarskaya, 2014; Frank & Akresh, 2016; Grill, 2012; de Guibert-Lantoine, 1992; Helweg, 2012; Jiménez, 2016; Joassart-Marcelli, 2014; Lalich, 2006; Lau, 2006; Mercer, 1995; Miyares, 2004; Ray, 2008; Rich, 2010; Shevitz, 2007; Sujoldžić, 2009; Tolnay & Bailey, 2006).

A second sub-dimension is closely related to current or recent levels; ***histories of migration***. At any given time, the configuration of urban diversity is likely to represent not only current migration patterns, but to represent the accumulation of migration patterns throughout history. In fact, an increasing number of studies refers to the growing variation in mobility patterns of cities; cities are often not just a city of arrival or departure, they are often both. This includes studies to new types of mobility (Higgins, 2017) and fluctuations and diversification of migration channels (Meissner & Vertovec, 2015) and types of mobilities inscribed into different groups (Higgins, 2017) and secondary movements (Le, 2008). Others see links between secondary movements and mobility types (Finney & Simpson, 2008; Poppe, 2013) or between mobility motivations and temporality of migration (Lyons, 2007) and new destinations (Di Giovanni, 2016; von Reichert, 2002).

The third key sub-dimension is the differences in the ***types of mobilities*** that are available for some and not for others, such as skilled migration or forced migration. This is identified in 21 studies (Benedicto, 2009; Brandi, 1998; Çağlar, 2016; Cook et al., 2011; Donato et al., 2006) whereas 17 studies focus on a closely related phenomenon, that is, on different migration motives. 10 studies focus on secondary movements, whereas 8 others draw attention to new destinations. 4 studies on temporality consists of temporary migration (Lyons, 2007; Ostertag, 2016), circular migration (Schrooten et al., 2016), cross-border commuters (Mora, 2006) and two others on barriers to mobility (Lulle et al., 2018; Wong & Ng, 2002).

Regarding the link between dimensions of mobility and diversity, several studies see the new arrivals on top of existing diversity related to the aspect of increasing

diversity of migration generation (Crul, 2016; Ferraro et al., 2015; Lalich, 2006; Sepulveda et al., 2011) or to the diversity of age in migration (Crul, 2016; Dirim & Hieronymus, 2003; Meissner & Vertovec, 2015). Similarly, diversity of migrants' age and fluctuations or changes in the volume of migration are seen interrelated by some (Di Giovanni, 2016; Meissner & Vertovec, 2015).

2.2.2 Inequalities

A second cluster of factors to account for urban diversities can be described as (in) equalities. Structural (in)equalities can shape diversities in various ways. One key factor is the ***economic opportunity structure*** that a city provides, which is central in the work of Glick-Schiller and Çağlar (2009). Such opportunity structures may shape diversities, for instance by attracting certain types of migrants (i.e. labour migrants for specific industries), as well segregation resulting from inequalities of the housing market.

In the literature, inequality dimension is most frequently studied by looking at structural inequalities and discrimination that migrants encounter in urban contexts (105/235). These structural aspects entail presence or lack of institutional interventions to address migrant populations' unequal access to labour market, education, housing, as well as access to healthcare and social assistance. Of 27 studies concerning inequalities in the labour market, 18 of them look at ethnic entrepreneurship. Some studies discuss it in relation to migrants' economic status (Knapp & Vojnovic, 2016) or in relation to ethno-racial inequalities and social capital (Burnley, 2002; Kloosterman et al., 2016; Knapp & Vojnovic, 2016). Others talk about opportunity structures and barriers for immigrant enterprise in various cities (Moon et al., 2014; Waldinger, 1989; Y. Zhou, 1998), business enclaves and self-employment (Jones, 2010; Kaplan, 1997; Mora, 2006; Park & Kim, 1998; Sepulveda et al., 2011; Somashekhar, 2018; Vuddamalay et al., 1991) and relate to networks and transnationalism (Willemse, 2014; Wong & Ng, 2002).

Inequality in terms of access to education were analysed in 24 studies and were mostly related to discussions on social and cultural and institutional power of majority (Alba & Duyvendak, 2017; Beech & Bravo-Moreno, 2014; Feuerverger, 1997; Goode, 1990; Kostlán, 2007; Bravo-Moreno & Beech, 2012; Crul, 2016; Gutiérrez, 2014). Some studies focus on the challenges of teaching in culturally diverse cities to culturally diverse group of students, the relationship between cultural alignments and educational persistence, achievements and success (Altschul et al., 2008; Body-Gendrot, 2002; Feuerverger, 1997; Gutiérrez, 2014; Hackett, 2012; Ma et al., 2018; Magaldi-Dopman & Park-Taylor, 2014; Shady, 2014; Tanners, 1997; Tolnay & Bailey, 2006; Zhou, 2003). Others focus on educational policies in certain cities (Beech & Bravo-Moreno, 2014) or application of the educational policies at the neighbourhood or street level (G. Bolt et al., 2010; Galenson, 1997; Goode, 1990; Ho et al., 2015; Kromidas, 2011; Mercer, 1995; Rydland et al., 2013; Wolf, 2005).

The second most frequently studied aspect of (in)equality between migrant and non-migrant urban populations is the inequality of economic status (79/235), which refers to the economic status gaps resulted from the accumulated wealth of the city over generations and available sources of income, employment and social mobility opportunities for newcomers. Employment or alternative sources of income as well as class are identified as key determinants of economic status of migrant and native populations as they are mentioned in 32 and 12 studies respectively. The employment is mostly studied focusing on urban poverty and segregation (Forrest & Johnston, 2001; Frey & Fielding, 1995; Green, 1978; Hiebert, 1995; Iceland & Scopilliti, 2008; Joassart-Marcelli, 2014; May, 2009; Österberg, 2013; A. Park & Wang, 2010), job mobility and employability of migrants (Cordero-Guzmán & Grosfoguel, 2000; Dohan, 2002; Hardy, 1978; Heikkilä, 2005; Pastor Jr. & Marcelli, 2000; Robertson, 2016; Rosvall, 2017; Shasta Pratomo, 2017; Tian & Xu, 2015; S. Wessendorf, 2018; Yeoh & Khoo, 1998). Class inequality is studied mainly in relation to gender (Collins et al., 2008; Lisiak & Nowicka, 2017; Orum et al., 2009), religion (Fields, 2010), ethnicity/race linked to institutional power of majority (Lidz, 2010) and in terms of ethnic or racials manifestations in public spaces (Grzegorczyk, 2012; Ho et al., 2015; Orum et al., 2009; van Gent & Musterd, 2016).

Housing is another very prominent aspect of analysis of inequalities and migration-related diversities in cities. Regarding access to housing, present housing situation emerge as a key indicator of inequality in 14 different studies, which dive into the analysis of house or land ownership and conflicts related to housing. Some studies observe that, on the one hand, the financial resources and related to that the market segment of housing available for a given household and, on the other hand, housing market that offers more chances in middle size cities, may lead to spatial segregation outcomes in global cities such as San Francisco (Pamuk, 2004), Montreal (Massicotte, 1999) and New York (Miyares & Gowen, 1998), in Canadian cities (Haan, 2009; Ley & Murphy, 2001; Miller et al., 2004) and in middle-size Dutch cities (Bolt & van Kempen, 1997).

The inequality dimension appears highly related to migration-related diversity as these are discussed together in around 30% of all analysed papers on diversity and inequality. Most commonly, the structural inequality and economic status are discussed in relation to ethno-racial or country of origin diversity of urban residents.

Inequalities are also closely linked to discussion of segregation, unsurprisingly the structural aspects of inequality and economic status of migrants are linked with issues of residential segregation, and to a lesser extent with interpersonal contact. For instance, several studies focus on the relationship between residential segregation and access to housing together (Alba & Duyvendak, 2017; Bahr & Gans, 1985; G. Bolt et al., 2010; G. S. Bolt & van Kempen, 1997; Bråmå & Andersson, 2010; Hiebert, 1995; Massicotte, 1999; Miyares & Gowen, 1998; Pamuk, 2004; Wolch & Li, 1997). Next to these, studies on economic status in general, and class in particular, seem to be also attuned to (ethic) residential segregation (Alba & Duyvendak, 2017; Fields, 2010; Foner et al., 2017; Grzegorczyk, 2012).

On the basis of this literature analysis, we conclude the importance of looking at socio-economic inequality patterns between migrant and non-migrant population in urban settings, and in the subsequent chapters we will analyse the economic status of these population respective of each other, and opportunities of access to various segments of labour market, education and housing markets. In addition, we will also try to capture the extent of discrimination and anti-immigrant attitudes present in the cities as a reflection of interpersonal relationships, that shape and reinforce these inequalities and power imbalances between the established residents and the newcomers.

2.2.3 Political Institutional Factors

Finally, a third group of factors captures the political-institutional setting in which urban diversities are shaped. Here it is important to observe that (like the previous factors), diversities can shape the political-institutional setting as much as the setting can influence diversities. For instance, migratory developments in a city, such as the arrival of a new group of humanitarian migrants or labour migrants, may trigger certain policy responses; but at the same time, policies can also trigger migratory developments, such as in welcoming cities or 'cities of refuge' that have been exceptionally open to humanitarian migrants.

In this group, we define a number of specific factors. First of all, ***urban governance*** can have an important impact on urban diversities. This involves migration policies as well as policies targeted at diversities, including but not limited to integration policies. There has been a broad variety of studies on different approaches or 'models' in the governance of diversity (Alexander, 2003; van Breugel, 2020, Schönwälder, 2020; Schiller, 2016). Studies often agree on the 'diverging logica of integration policy making at national and city level' (Jorgensen, 2012). One the hand, various studies argue that local policies tend to have a preference for specific models on migrant inclusion or 'integration'. For instance, Schiller (2016) argues that in contrast to the often more normative or ideological 'national models', local models tend to develop a form of pragmatic accommodationism, amongst others as local policies are much closer to the everyday realities and complexities of migration and inclusion. Zapata-Barrero shows that the local level tends to be more susceptible to what he describes as 'interculturalist' approaches to migrant inclusion.

Others have emphasized rather the diversity of policy perspectives at the local level (Schönwälder, 2020; Dekker et al., 2015, van Breugel, 2020; Ambrosini & Boccagni, 2015; Alexander, 2003). Responding to different local circumstances, which can be local politics, local policy histories, local social, cultural and economic settings, cities can also diverge in terms of approaches. Whereas some may be more multiculturalist or assimilationist, others may appear more pragmatic, or more integrationist.

A second 'political-institutional' factor that we will take into account is ***urban politics***. This includes but is not limited to the role of local political parties and local political arenas. In the broader sense, urban politics also includes interactions between various interest-driven actors trying to shape local policies. This includes for instance the role of immigrant councils or immigrant organisations more broadly, who do in some cities play a crucial role (Schönwälder, 2020; De Graauw & Vermeulen, 2016, Mahnig, 2004). But local political parties can play an important role as well (Dekker et al., 2015), in ways not always aligned with national policy models.

Finally, a relevant factor is how a city relates to the ***broader institutional environment*** in which a city operates. To a certain degree, cities will always be bound in specific ways to structures and decisions from other levels of government. For instance, whether or not immigrants have a right to vote in local elections is an important factor in shaping local policy approach but is usually defined at the national rather than the local level. In specific regards, local policymaking will thus follow a top-down logic. However, various studies also show how local governments can play an important role in shaping national policies as well. Local governments can develop entrepreneurship or 'local leadership' in defining their own approaches and creating positive conditions for their approaches at other levels (Jorgensen, 2012, Scholten, 2020a). Guiraudon (2000) has described this as 'vertical venue shopping', where governments rather than following top-down policy models, actively shape and reshape policies at other levels. This can lead to a 'bottom-up' logic in policymaking, but may also lead to a decoupling of policies where policies at different levels simply live different lives and may conflict at occasions. Cities of refuge or 'welcoming cities' are an example of this, where cities make their own choices and defy national policies (Oomen, 2019).

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter we have deductively developed a conceptual framework for understanding the plurality of urban diversities. First, we captured systematically what we define as urban diversities, by distinguishing diversities (volume and variety of diversity) and segregation. Subsequently, we have, based on an extensive literature review, identified and developed three groups of factors that, according to the literature, are related with urban diversities; mobilities, inequalities and political institutional factors. Importantly, we do not simply see these factors as 'explanatory variables' for urban diversities; rather we see them as factors that may come together (elective affinity) with specific configurations of diversity. For each group of factors, we have defined relevant subfactors by a qualitative review of literature. As a result of this deductive approach, Fig. 2.1 depicts the conceptual framework that was developed and that will be applied in subsequent chapters.



Fig. 2.1 Summary of conceptual framework

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Chapter 3
Mapping the Diversity of Urban Diversities

What variation can be identified in urban diversities? In this chapter we provide an empirical mapping of diversity characteristics in cities as outlined in Chap. 2: diversity of origins and residential segregation between people with and without a (first generation) migration background. Can we identify cities that have distinct combinations of the two main dimensions? Inductive analysis in this chapter will provide a second step towards developing a typology of cities of migration. At the end of this chapter, we will identify clusters of cities and select typical cities to be examined more in-depth in subsequent chapters.

3.1 Cross-National Dataset

Our inductive mapping of urban diversities will be done by using a large dataset of cities in France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands; the D4I dataset provided to us by the EU Knowledge Centre of Migration and Demography (KCMD) (Alessandrini et al., 2017). This dataset allows us to compare cities from four countries with very different migration histories. The data stems from 2011 but even though it is old it is uniquely valuable, because it was harmonized[1] by KCMD in order to enable urban level comparison across the countries. Usually, such analysis is complicated, because each country has a different way to define migrants, record nationalities, ethnicities and countries of origin of their populations, and register geographical settlement of their residents. Even though this dataset was the best available at the

[1] Prior to its inclusion in the D4I dataset the original census or registry-based data from national statistics agencies was harmonized by KCMD (Alessandrini et al., 2017). The data originates from 2011 and is spatially disaggregated. This harmonized dataset consisted of a uniform spatial grid of 100x100 meter with estimated number of residents per origin residing in each 'cell'. The grids can be aggregated to the level of local administrative units, and even larger ones—functional urban areas (FUAs).

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moment of research, there still were serious inconsistencies in the national datasets, which led us to a limited selection of countries that can be compared.[2] The unit of comparison are Functional Urban Areas that include the urban core with commuting areas around it. Surely, FUAs could be bigger than municipalities and smaller than metropolitan regions, however this enables us to map localities across-countries in a uniform way, disregarding the distinction of administrative divisions between nation-states.

The total number of FUAs under analysis is 293,[3] which covers 97% of all FUAs in these four countries in 2011, according to the OECD lists (OECD, 2012). The D4I dataset contains information on the number of people of each origin that live in a specific spatial unit of each city. Based on this available information we estimated the number of origins residing in each urban area, share of foreign-born (for Germany and the Netherlands) and foreign nationals (for France and Italy), total number of residents in each city and the spread of migrants and non-migrant groups of residents in the cities (segregation). The FUAs under our analysis are ranging in size, with majority below 400 thousand residents. Substantial number of cities 18% have less than 100 thousand of population, while only 7% are above one million inhabitants. It is known that in Europe cities are smaller than globally, and therefore this study provides a special insight on diversity in smaller cities (Fig. 3.1).

3.2 Diversity of Urban Diversities

Using the D4I dataset, we first mapped the 293 cities along the dimensions of diversity and segregation. On the figures below, it is shown that half of all cities have less than 9% of foreign nationals or foreign-born residents in 2011. About a quarter of cities show migrant share ranging from 12 to 25% of all population showing quite a dispersed picture on the upper end of the distribution, while the bottom quarter of cities have less than 6% of migrant residents. Less than 2% of all cities host over 20% of migrant population. In terms of diversity of the migrant population, cities also vary widely, with over 60% of cities having less than 60 origins residing there. Only about 5% of all cities are home to over 100 origins. About a quarter of functional urban areas show up to 30 origins residing there (Fig. 3.2).

[2] Even though D4I dataset originally included seven counties, we had to exclude three from the mapping, because of differences of data registration. In the original data from Spain, the United Kingdom and Ireland the number of migrant origins was artificially reduced to a limit of 20. Therefore, the levels of diversity in the cities with over 20 origins were underreported and that would not allow proper cross-country comparison with other countries where there was no artificial limit on number of origins recorded. That is why in this study we only use the data from Germany, the Netherlands, France and Italy.

[3] We excluded the functional urban areas at the border between countries, because their commuting areas were spread across both countries and because of that the estimation of migration-related diversity was not possible at the FUA level.



Fig. 3.1 Cities by population size. (Source 1 KCMD D4I 2011 data set)



Fig. 3.2 Cities by volume and variety of migration-related diversity

Taken together, these distributions point out that in empirical reality of the four European countries contradicts the tendencies of previous research. The data shows that there are rather few of the so-called 'global cities' where large volume of population comes from superdiverse backgrounds. Yet, the literature heavily focuses on precisely this kind of cities, leaving cities that are less diverse underexplored. Our PRISMA literature review shows that New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Toronto, London, Amsterdam and Sydney have been central in the studies of urban diversity (Table 3.1).

In the table above the reader can see the list of 10 most mentioned cities in the literature on urban diversity. Clearly most of them are very diverse and truly global cities. One or several of these cities are mentioned in over 40% of all abstracts from

Table 3.1 Top-10 cities mentioned in the abstracts of PRISMA literature review

Top-10 cities	Number of mentions
New York	63
London	28
Los Angeles	27
Toronto	25
Chicago	18
Amsterdam	16
Sydney	12
Antwerp	10
Berlin	10
Vancouver	10

Table 3.2 Cities mentioned in abstracts of PRISMA literature review by regions

Regions	Number of mentions
European cities	196
American cities	188
Canadian cities	53
Asian cities	29
Australian cities	23
Latin American cities	19
MENA cities	14
African cities	13
New Zealand cities	4
Total	539

our PRISMA literature review.[4] This demonstrates that such specific cities indeed attract a lot of research attention (Table 3.2).

In terms of regions, most of the literature conducted research on urban diversity in the USA, Canada and European countries. In European countries, the research interest was mainly focused on large capital cities and great trade or port cities: London, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Berlin, Barcelona, Madrid, Paris, Rotterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, Vienna, Athens, Copenhagen, Milan, Rome, Stockholm, Cologne etc.

Clearly, the numbers of migrant populations and the diversity of origins are not distributed evenly across the countries (Fig. 3.3). Countries differ in terms of migration histories, geographies, economy and policy, and it is not unexpected to observe country differences in terms of volume and variety of migration-related diversity also at the urban level. As figures below show, cities in the Netherlands host generally many more migrant origins than other countries, with the median of 100.

[4] where specific cities are mentioned in the abstract of the articles.



Fig. 3.3 Variety (top) and volume (bottom) of migration-related diversity of cities by countries

While French and Italian cities show diversity of origins with a median of 40 and 50 respectively. In terms of relative size of migrant population, Germany is an unquestionable leader. It shows the widest spread of migrant share in cities, ranging from 5 to 21%, and a highest median at 13.5%. The other three countries display lower median percent of migrant residents in urban areas: between 7 and 9%. In every country there are of cause some outliers, most noticeable on top of the distribution. Among the French cities, Paris, Creil and Mulhouse stand out, for their extremely diverse populations either by migrant share or by diversity of origins. In Italy Milan and Rome are the outliers, while in the Netherlands those are the cities of 'Randstad' area: Amsterdam, Utrecht, Delft, Rotterdam and the Hague. In Germany Berlin and Hamburg boast the most diverse population backgrounds.

The reasons for these differences may lie in the different definition of migrant in the countries. While the Netherlands and Germany record migrants on the basis of countries of birth, thus including the nationals who were born abroad into the 'migrant' category, while Italy and France record only migrants with foreign nationality, thus excluding naturalized foreign-born from the definition of a 'migrant'. These differences have implications for both the measures of number of origins and the share of migrants recorded in our dataset. However, there is no remedy for this, unless countries adopt one way of recording and measuring migration and diversity of origins.

3.3 Mapping Volume, Variety and Spread of Diversity

In order to identify which cities share similar configurations of diversity we quantitatively map the cities along volume, variety and spread of diversity. Volume and variety of diversity can be measured together by Gini-Simpson Index of Diversity.[5] This measure includes not only the share of migrant groups but also account for variety in the countries of origin of these groups. This index represents the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a community belong to different origins.

The formula is 1—D, where *D is*

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(\frac{m_i}{T}\right)^2$$

Where m_i means the number of residents of origin in a city, and T means the total number of residents in a city, n is the number of origins in a city. The squared proportions of all origins in a city are summed up and then subtracted from 1. The higher is the index the more diverse is the population of the city. As mentioned above, the LAU-based dataset was used to calculate this index.

Spread of diversity is measured by Index of Segregation (also called as index of dissimilarity). It is calculated on the D4I dataset, in which spatial units are harmonized through a universal grid[6] by KCMD (Alessandrini et al., 2017). Due to the difference in the privacy rules across the countries calculation of this index by origins would bias the cross-country comparison. That is why we compare the spread of two groups—migrants (all origins combined) and non-migrants (locals). The formula for the Index of segregation is the following:

$$IS_{xy} = \frac{1}{2}\sum_{i=1}^{k}\left|x_i - y_i\right|$$

Where X_i is a number of city residents of native origin in a grid *I,* divided by the total number of natives in the whole city. While Y_i is a number of migrant residents of all non-native origins in a grid *i* divided by the total number of migrants in a whole city. *K* is the number of grids that make up one city. The absolute values of the difference between X_i and Y_i (without signs—or +) for each grid are summed and divided by 2. The index of segregation (or index of dissimilarity) shows how the residence patterns of migrants is geographically distributed in comparison to residence of the non-migrants. The value of the index shows the share of the migrant

[5] Gini-Simpson index is the same as Gibbs–Martin index (used in sociology, psychology and management). The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the part *D* of the Gini-Simpson's index.

[6] The harmonised data consisted of a uniform spatial grid of 100x100 meters with an estimated number of residents per origin residing in each 'cell'.

population to be (hypothetically) moved to another area in order to reach full similarity of the geographical spread with non-migrant.

On the figure below you can see the 293 functional urban areas mapped by two indexes. We have split the distribution of each variable by a median: the median for diversity index is 0.174, the median for index of segregation is 0.303. Thus, we drew a distinction between high (above median) and low values (below median).

The scatter plot (Fig. 3.4) divided by the medians is the basis for cities' clustering according to the logic outline above. Each category is mutually exclusive, because one city can not be in two quadrants, and it exhaustive, even though we have only 4 counties in our analysis, the cities from other countries would plausibly find their place in other of these four categories:

- High diversity and Low segregation
- High diversity and High segregation
- Low diversity and High segregation
- Low diversity and Low segregation

Of cause, there are cities that are visibly located on the borders between the categories, this is normal, because empirical reality does not necessary neatly fit the ideal-typical categories.



Fig. 3.4 Mapping of cities by index of diversity and index of segregation. Four clusters

3.4 Selection of Typical Cities Per Cluster

For a more in-depth analysis, we made a selection of cities from each quadrant, representing, where possible, all four countries. We aimed to select the cities typical for each category because, as you see on the Fig. 3.4 above, the majority of the cities do not display the extreme values of each dimension. Therefore, selecting cities from the middle of the clusters may allow us to reveal a more representative picture of each type.

However, it was not always possible, as not all countries are evenly spread along the dimensions of segregation and diversity. In those cases, we just selected a city from required countries closest to the center of the quadrant. Moreover, given that no Dutch city in our D4I dataset was located in the quadrant "low diversity and low segregation", we decided to find a fitting Dutch city from the non-public CBS data of the year 2013. The city of Doetinchem was found to be the city with the matching indices of diversity and segregation fitting the firth quadrant.

In the table below, we show the cities chosen per each category, the size of population and the characteristics of urban diversity (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3 Summary table for data per selected cities 2011

Cluster	Name	Index of diversity	Index of segregation	Population	Number of origins	Share of migrants
(1) High diversity & low segregation	Konstanz (DE)	0.27	0.25	114,392	85	14.5%
	Paris (FR)	0.26	0.21	9,446,721	146	14.1%
	Parma (IT)	0.21	0.28	391,590	72	11.4%
	Hilversum (NL)	0.21	0.26	108,423	96	11.2%
(2) high diversity & high segregation	Ingolstadt (DE)	0.30	0.38	346,139	68	16.6%
	Nîmes (FR)	0.18	0.33	144,795	50	9.3%
	Modena (IT)	0.22	0.35	531,736	83	11.8%
	Rotterdam (NL)	0.30	0.43	1,522,083	148	16.6%
(3) low diversity & high segregation	Plauen (DE)	0.10	0.32	118,727	29	5.2%
	Vannes (FR)	0.08	0.34	52,659	26	4.1%
	Cosenza (IT)	0.05	0.40	293,545	24	2.6%
	Leeuwarden (NL)	0.10	0.47	403,857	95	5.0%
(4) low diversity & low segregation	Dessau-Roßlau (DE)	0.12	0.24	182,530	41	6.3%
	Doetinchem (2013– NL)	0.12	0.23	58,987	106	6.4%
	Rouen (FR)	0.12	0.23	294,682	63	6.2%
	Viareggio (IT)	0.12	0.24	234,192	42	6.1%

The cities in the first cluster score between 0.21 and 0.27 on diversity index and between 0.21 and 0.28 on segregation index. They are of varied sizes, with Paris being the mega-city with the population over nine million, while Konstanz and Hilversum have population of around 100 thousand inhabitants. These cities have between 11 and 15% of migrant population, of many origins, with Paris being the most diverse with 146 nationalities, while other have between 71 and 96 origins.

The second cluster of cities display diversity scores between 0.18 and 0.30, thus quite dispersed. This is due to the fact that there were not many French and Italian cities in this quadrant to choose from, and Nîmes and Modena were chosen mainly for their country representation, rather than for their position on the diversity scale. In terms of segregation the cities score between 0.33 and 0.43—meaning that more than 1/3 of the cities population would have to move in order to create an even spatial patters of residence among migrants and non-migrants. These cities are also varied sizes: with Rotterdam being the largest functional urban area of 1.5 mil inhabitants and Nîmes being the smallest city with 144 thousand of residents. Share of migrants in these cities varies between 9 and 16% and the number of nationalities from 68 to 148.

In cities in the third cluster, display diversity scores between 0.05 and 0.1 while segregation values are between 0.32 and 0.47. These cities are smaller by size, with the largest functional urban area—Leeuwarden hosting over 400 thousand inhabitants, and the smallest Vannes, with only 52 thousand residents in 2011. Between 2.6 and 5% of the cities populations are migrants, of a limited number of nationalities (24–29), the outlier here is Leeuwarden, where 94 origins reside.

Cities in the fourth cluster display diversity index values of 0.12 and segregation index values between 0.23 and 0.24. These are smaller cities between 58 and 200 thousand residents. The migrant share is those urban localities is about 6% and the number of origins ranges from 41 to 106 (the Dutch city is an outlier in that sense).

3.5 Conclusions

Before we can try to understand HOW and WHY there are different urban diversities, we first need to understand WHAT the diversity in urban diversities actually is. Following a systematic inductive approach, using a unique comparative data set, this chapter has mapped this diversity of urban diversities and identified ‘clusters’ of cities that share relatively similar scores in terms of the volume and variety of diversity as well as the level of residential segregation. Finally, we have selected four cities per cluster, one from each country represented in the dataset (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands), for the in-depth analyses in the next chapters.

Importantly, these clusters do not yet represent types; they only represent cities that share relatively similar diversity configurations. Selecting cities from different clusters is only a method for making sure sufficient diversity is represented in the



Fig. 3.5 Map with geographical location of the selected city cases

in-depth case studies. The in-depth analysis is to reveal whether the cities indeed form part of specific ideal-types that share not only diversity but also share specific factors that account for these diversity configurations. It is likely that such explanatory ideal-types do not simply overlap with the descriptive clusters of urban diversity from this chapter.

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Chapter 4
Cities Cluster I: High Diversity and Low Segregation

The cluster of diversity configurations is perhaps most often referred to in the literature as characteristic for multicultural cities or superdiverse cities. This configuration involves relatively high levels of diversity, in terms of relative share of migrants, as well as relatively low levels of segregation. As median representatives of this cluster, we have selected Konstanz (GER), Paris (FRA), Parma (ITA) and Hilversum (NL). Interestingly, this diversity configuration is not manifested only in large cities. Our analysis puts Hilversum (NL) and Konstanz (GER) with less than 100.000 inhabitants in the same category as Paris.

In this chapter we will explore this category I further by examining in-depth the four selected cities. For every city, we will first capture a more qualitative image of the urban diversity configurations that were found in our quantitative analysis. What can we say about the volume and variety of diversity in these cities, and about the nature of segregation?

Subsequently, for every city, we will delve into the three groups of factors that could account for this diversity configuration; mobilities, inequalities and political-institutional factors. For mobilities, we will briefly sketch each city's migration history and look at the levels as well as types of migration. For inequalities, we will look at urban economic opportunity structures and structures of discrimination. For political-institutional factors, we will look at urban governance, urban politics as well as the broader institutional setting in which diversity takes shape (Table 4.1).

4.1 Konstanz

Konstanz is a wealthy university city in the South-German state of Baden-Wurttemberg. It is situated on lake Constance (Bodensee), on the border between Switzerland and Germany, and attracts many tourists in summer months. Konstanz has a rather long history of both immigration and cross-border mobility, as it is located at the border with Switzerland. The main immigration flows that shaped the

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Table 4.1 Cluster 1 cities

city name	Population 2019	share of migrants (%) 2019	Nominal GDP (PPP) per capita 2019	Mean household income (PPP) 2019	Employment: Agriculture (%) 2019	Employment: Industry (%) 2019	Employment: Services (%) 2019	Unemployment rate (%) 2019
Hilversum	90,238	9,49%	na	49,600 €	na	na	na	1,29
Konstanz	84,760	15,34%	48,805 €	32,622 €	1,33	23,22	75,44	2,85
Paris	10,277,625	15,59%	15,335 €	62,656 €	0,26	14,81	84,91	7,90
Parma	198,606	15,71%	57,838 €	44,871 €	2,76	30,18	67,05	4,90

current city's diversity landscape include guest-workers from Italy and Turkey and their families, who came in the 60–70 s and 80 s. The guest-workers used to work in the textile industry, which closed in the 90 s (K1_interview 2021). Then, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, came ethnic Germans ("Aussiedler"). and Jews from the countries of the former Soviet Union. Refugees from the Balkans' as well as more recent conflict areas in the Middle East, such as Palestinians and Kurds (Cybulla, 2020) (Cybulla, 2020) were welcomed in the city. Although temporarily, as many refugees from the former Yugoslavia, were forced to return, despite being well integrated in Konstanz.

4.1.1 Diversity and Segregation

Konstanz has a high level of migration-related diversity with 14,5% first generation migrants coming from 85 different countries (2011 data). Since 2014 new immigration into the city has substantially increased and, in 2019, the share of foreign nationals is around 16% (Konstanz in Zahlen, 2020a). The population with migration background more broadly, including naturalized Germans, second generation and German repatriates, composes more than 30% of Konstanzers.

The origins of foreign population in the city are predominantly European (incl. Turkey) (74%), with almost half of foreign citizens coming from EU member states. Among the 16.9% of Asian population, the main countries of origin are Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Around 5% of the urban population is African, twice as much as in 2012. The largest groups of foreign citizens living in Konstanz are Italian, Croatian, Turkish and Romanians. Since 2010, the number of Italians, Croatians and Romanians has been rising, while the number of Turkish nationals has been falling. Among foreign citizens the largest groups are Italian (13%), Croatian (8%) and Turkish (7%) nationals ("Konstanz ist bunt", 2020c).

Konstanz is among the *less segregated* cities, as per our estimation of 2011. With around 25% of the urban population that needs to be moved to reach an even spatial distribution between foreign-born and German-born, it has certain districts with a higher concentration of migrant population than others. The Industriegebiet particularly stands out in this regard. More than half of its residents has either foreign citizenship (38%) or a migration background (19%) (Stadteilprofiele, 2018; "Konstanz ist bunt", 2020c). Other quarters with a relatively higher number of residents with a where between 34 and 40% of residents are either foreign citizens or naturalized Germans with foreign origins ("Konstanz ist bunt", 2020c). Although the areas mentioned above host more migrants than others, there is no one part of Konstanz where only Germans without a migration background reside. Even in the wealthier areas by the lake (K1_interview 2021), there is at least 20% percent of the population with an immigrant background ("Konstanz ist bunt", 2020c).

According to Hinz et al. (2014), neighbourhoods with higher share of foreign residents are also those where more economically disadvantaged population lives. This is due to discrimination in the housing market, and lower disposable income

among migrant groups. The most of 'socially precarious' migrants live in Petershausen West (38%), followed by Fürstenberg (29%), Königsbau (27%) and Wollmatingen (26%) ("Sinus-Milieus in der Stadt Konstanz 2016", 2017). Indeed, the municipality report (2020) shows that disposable income in Industriegebiet, Petershausen-West and Königsbau are lower than in the city as a whole, and unemployment rates are in Industriegebiet (5.1%) and Fürstenberg at (3.3%) than the Konstanz's average unemployment rate (2.6%).

4.1.2 Mobilities

In the current times, the city's population continues to grow, and this is mainly due to the incoming population, both from other parts of Germany and from abroad. From 2009 till 2019 there were more people settling in Konstanz than departing, although in the last years this difference between the inflows and outflows became less striking ("Konstanz in Zahlen", 2020a). Since 2014 the city has faced a rapid growth of foreign residents, whose net increase was 3066 people while the growth of German residents was much less prominent—709 (Bernard, 2020).

International mobility is the most intensive with Switzerland (Stadt Konstanz, 2021) with more people departing to Switzerland than coming back. A high percentage of German citizens lives in Kreuzlingen, just across the border (Wöhler, 2015). Other countries with which Konstanz has the most population exchanges are: Romania, Italy and Hungary (Stadt Konstanz, 2021). Also, international students contribute to the mobility patterns in the city, as they come and go every year.

The large stock of migrant population, high numbers of naturalized citizens and stably positive net migration indicate a long-term residence patters of migrants in Konstanz. Residents of Konstanz without migration history have lived in the city for an average of 26 years, while those with migration background have resided there on average for 17 years (Ackermann et al., 2012), which is rather long. Even though international students clearly constitute a more mobile part of the population, the rest of foreign residents tend to settle here for longer time.

4.1.3 Inequalities

As a whole Konstanz can be called a relatively wealthy city with high costs of living, where many well-off and highly educated people live. 42% of all population in Konstanz belongs to higher social milieus,[1] which is significantly more than in

[1] The report "Sinus-Milieus in der Stadt Konstanz 2016" (2017) distinguishes eight different milieus of migrants as defined by their socio-economic position (low, medium and high) and value orientation (traditional, modern and innovative).

Germany overall, and on the contrary, there are less people in lower status milieus compared to German average. However, residents with migration background more frequently belong to lower status milieus than the residents of Konstanz on average (34%—migrants; 30% the city as a whole) ("Sinus-Milieus in der Stadt Konstanz 2016", 2017). Besides, immigrants have a higher unemployment rate than the city residents on average. The overall unemployment rate is 3.8%, while the unemployment rate for foreigners was 7.8% (in Jan 2020) (Bundesagentur für Arbeit Konstanz—Ravenburg, 2020).

Nevertheless, in comparison to Germany as a whole, there are more migrants in Konstanz belonging to a higher social milieu (pg. 39 of "Sinus-Milieus in der Stadt Konstanz 2016", 2017), because jobs at the university, various start-up, tech company Siemens, pharmaceutical industry and hospitals attract international professionals (K1_interview; K2_interview). Moreover, expensive housing in the city is affordable for migrants with higher levels of socio-economic status, skills, and mobility, while the lower-class migrants usually settle in the neighbouring town Singen (K3_email_correspondence; K1_interview).

All in all, Konstanz offers diverse economic opportunity structures for migrants. While in the past guest-workers from Turkey and Italy used to work predominantly in the textile industry, nowadays migrants and their descendants are employed in various economic sectors and occupations, ranging from university to start-ups, established international businesses, such as pharma companies.

Various ethnic groups and generations of migrants in Konstanz have different levels of education. The groups arriving in the 90 s were generally higher educated than the guest-worker's migrants of the 60 s and 70 s. In the recent years Konstanz became a popular place for international local start-ups, which attracted more highly-educated migrants (K1_interview).

In terms of employment prestige, the difference between ethnic Germans and descendants of migrants is marginal. However, for women the gap is more pronounced. Especially female descendants of Turkish, Italian and former Yugoslav migrants are more frequently employed in jobs of a lower prestige than men, while this trend is reversed for female descendants of migrants from Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries (Fick et al., 2014).

Overall, the receiving society in Konstanz is quite used to immigrants and is rather open to living in a diverse and multicultural society. German residents of the city without a migration background largely agree that civic criteria of belonging to the German nation are more important than ethnic origin or place of birth[2] (Stadt Konstanz, 2020d). 45% of Germans and 50% of people with a migratory

[2] Answering the question "*What are important criteria to be German?*" 95% of German Konstanzers considered that respecting the German political and legal system was very important or quite important; and 95% considered knowledge of German language as either very important or quite important criteria of German identification. Less important were aspects such as being born in Germany (64% considered it not important), or having German ancestors—79% considered it not important (Stadt Konstanz—Konstanzer Bürgerbefragung, 2020d).

background living in Konstanz think that relationships between migrants and non-migrants are good. The majority of people with a migration background feel that they belong in the city, and about a quarter of them have a German partner. However, city residents with a migration background feel more often discriminated against (Ackermann et al., 2012). However, not all migrants are equally accepted. Those of European origin (Italians, and Polish and Jews) are more accepted than for instance Turks and other Muslim communities (Stadt Konstanz, 2020d)[3]—indicating some degree of islamophobia. Highly-skilled migrants are most welcome, while others are often seen as a source of criminality. For instance, the city organized a campaign against beggars from Eastern European countries, reportedly organized by criminal networks ("Eine saubere Stadt", 2019), which were making touristic areas of the city unsafe (Weiner, interview, 2021).

4.1.4 Political-Institutional Factors

The political orientation of Konstanz has been traditionally conservative— liberal. However, the founding of the university in 1966 triggered a visible social-liberal shift, which around 1990s had a green turn. In 1996, Konstanz elected the first green mayor of Germany— Horst Frank— who had been in power until 2012. Since September 10, 2012, Uli Burchardt— a Christian Democrat—took over the seat of mayor in the city. Migration, integration and diversity have been addressed by the city administration for the past 40 years. Already since the 80 s, there was an integration officer ('Ausländerkoordinator/in'), which in many ways was a pioneering approach in southern Germany. Currently, dr. David Tchakoura—originally from Togo—is the integration officer of the city ("Konstanz Internationale Stadt", 2020b).

In the past decades there were three paradigmatic changes and administrative changes in the local governance of integration and diversity. The first one took place in the 90 s, when integration became a central topic on the municipal agenda, and then again, in 2005, when Germany recognized itself as a country of immigration, migrant integration became an even more prominent policy area. In 2002, the integration office of Konstanz was given more importance and freedom of action. With the change of leadership to CDU in 2012, the position somewhat lost its independence and has fallen under controlled by the department of Culture and Social affairs. The third paradigmatic change happened recently, when the city initiated the move from the 'integration approach' to 'international approach' (Fiedler, 2020, October 6; "Konstanz Internationale Stadt", 2020b). The point of this reconceptualization was to strengthen the positioning and the image of Konstanz as an international city, which draws its strength from the diversity of its residents. This transition

[3] Answering the question "*How agreeable are various ethnic/religious minorities as neighbours?"* from 12 to 16% of respondents found Turks, Muslims and refugees as "rather unpleasant" neighbours ((Stadt Konstanz—Konstanzer Bürgerbefragung, 2020d).

was somewhat halted due to the 2015 influx of refugees, which meant that the city would still keep the focus on these rather vulnerable populations (K2_interview). In the past the city had a specialized integration officer for refugees, however, in the 2020 this role was abolished and merged with the overall integration office. This is regarded as a reasonable change in line with the 'international city Konstanz' strategy— towards a more all-encompassing, whole society approach to integration and the turn away from target-group policy (Fiedler, 2020, October 6).

Konstanz aims to support integration, participation and interaction of diverse groups that live there. Konstanz sees diversity more as an opportunity, rather than a challenge ("Konstanz Internationale Stadt", 2020b). There are many pro-migration civil society organizations[4] and the municipality collaborated with them throughout the years, providing funding and explicit institutional support. The integration office has been actively engaged in network governance with these dedicated NGOs, among others via a Forum for Integration (now called International Forum), that existed since 1999. The forum meets four times a year and provides advice to the city council on the matters of diversity. The network governance approach allows the city to coordinate the newly arriving populations to the organizations providing the most relevant and targeted support for their needs, whichever they are.

Since 2003, Konstanz governance of diversity could be described to some extent as mainstreaming. For the Konstanz integration office, it was important not only to work with the organization that specialises on migration, but make all the organizations in the city diversity-friendly, to facilitate migrants access to core city institutions and to implement integration is a two-way manner—not just expecting migrants to adjust but also adjusting the receiving environment (K2_interview). Besides, integration approach in Konstanz could be described as a "client-centric paradigm", which targeted individuals, and defined diversity not only in terms of ethnicity, but also taking into account gender, age and other factors (Reutlinger & Schwendener, 2011). Schooling, language training, healthcare and housing were the main areas of attention. Employment has been less of a focus, since Konstanz has a strong economy and low levels of unemployment. Besides, the municipality also worked on making the city administration more international and inclusive (K2_interview; Reutlinger & Schwendener, 2011). The city has been committed to improving the political participation and equal social belonging of people with a migrant background (Grundsätze zur Förderung der Integrationsarbeit durch die Stadt Konstanz, 2018), and has invested in development of various social initiatives, support project and innovative solutions, such as smart-phone app "Integreat" that provided information on city services for newly arrived migrants in Farsi, Arabic and many other languages (Door to door—Digital Factory gGmbH, 2023). Many initiatives were organized to facilitate social cohesion of diverse populations and

[4]Those organizations include labour-market oriented foundations (i.e. Arbeiterwohlfahr Kreisverband Konstanz e.V), religious charities (Caritasverband Konstanz e.V), Red Cross Konstanz, migrant social organizations, such as religious clubs, clubs for specific national/ethnic groups, clubs to create encounters between groups, those especially for refugees (i.e. Save me Konstanz) and many others Café Mondial, Forum Azilon, B-welcome.

establish a welcoming atmosphere of acceptance and anti-racism ("Konstanzer Erklärung: FÜR eine Kultur der Anerkennung und – GEGEN Rassismus", 2012). To prevent segregation, deliberate choice was made for a dispersal of housing for refugees to facilitate prone interaction with the established city residents.

4.2 Paris

Paris is one of the largest cities in the dataset and the largest one that was selected as case study in this book. It is the only city in the selection that can lay claim to being what Sassen described as a 'Global City', with almost 9,five million inhabitants in the Parisian functional urban area. The city has a long history of migration, domestically as well as internationally. Its contemporary population is a truly superdiverse mixture of different episodes of migration to and from the city. This includes migrants from all over Europe attracted to the opportunities that Paris offered and many migrants from all over the world connected to French colonial empire. According to OECD data, whereas the Parisien area (Ile de France) hosts 20% of the total French population, it hosts 40% of all migrants living in France today. Also, a third of all migrants arriving in France in the past 5 years, live in the Parisien Area (OECD, 2018).[5]

Also today the Parisien highly diversified economy and its central positioning in international economic relations, make the city into a very important city of migration.

4.2.1 Diversity and Segregation

What defines the diversity of Paris within cluster I cities is not just the volume of diversity; 14,1% of the population does not have French nationality, which is average for cluster I. This number stays relatively stable towards 2019, when 14,5% of the population has a non-French nationality. However, Paris does distinguish itself in two regards. One is the very high number of different nationalities represented in Paris: 146 (2011 data). This is a clear signal of the superdiverse nature of Paris as a global city. Secondly, many migrants (also first generation) with French nationality are not included in the 14,1%. Because of the postcolonial background of many migrants (such as from Algeria) this group is quite large in Paris.

Also, more in general, because of Paris' long history of migration, the general population with a migration background is very significant. As most of these have French citizenship and are not considered migrants in the approach we have chosen

[5] https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264305861-6-en.pdf?expires=1605781184&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=A3982C1928089CEA9710AE61583CAB9A

Table 4.2 Population of the Paris Urban Area (Ile de France), Census 2019 data (INSEE, 2020)

	By birth	By nationality
Algeria	2,7%	1,7%
Morocco	2,1%	1,2%
Portugal	1,9%	1,9%
Tunisia	1,0%	0,7%
Guadeloupe	0,7%	n.a.
Martinique	0,6%	n.a.
China	0,6%	0,6%
Turkey	0,6%	0,5%
Mali	0,5%	0,5%
Ivory Coast	0,5%	0,4%
Senegal	0,5%	0,3%

in this study (for methodological and ethical reasons stated in Chap. 1), these are not represented in our data. According to 2019 data from INSEE, 19,8% of the population of Ile de France metropolitan area was born outside France and did not have French citizenship at birth. This number has increased significantly over the past decades, from 10,2% in 1968 to 17,7% in 2010 (Census 2010) and 19,8% in 2019.

When looking at Paris metropolitan area and looking at both the foreign-born population and the population by nationality, the following groups emerge as Paris' top migrant communities: These nationalities reflect the postcolonial character of diversity in Paris, with Algeria and Morocco represented in the top-5 nationalities (Table 4.2). China, Portugal and to some extent Italy also represent that attractiveness of Paris for labour migrants. Especially with Portugal France has developed a migration connection that includes labour migration as well as family migration. Increasingly, migration from these countries also includes high-educated labour, reflecting the attractiveness of Paris as a diversified economy with a strong focus on (international) commerce.

With an index of 0.21 the Paris area also scores relatively low on segregation. At first sight, this does not echo with various studies that indicate a relatively strong segregation of the Paris area, also described as a 'mosaic' (Simon, 2000). However, what is important in this context is that (for reasons stated in Chap. 1) we focus on nationality rather than on ethnicity or descent. So, our analysis shows that the population without French nationality is distributed more equally across the city than in the other city categories. We interpret this as a sign of Paris' superdiverse character, providing a strong variation of housing opportunities across Paris' diverse neighbourhoods.

However, studies do report higher segregation levels in specific neighbourhoods, especially to the north-East of the city. This includes the 18th, 19th and 20th Arondissements of Paris, and several neighbouring municipalities such as Saint Denis, La Courneuve, Genneviliers and Bobigny (OECD, 2018: 34). Castañeda (2018) argues that there is an emphasis in academic and popular discourses on such banlieu cities, which are stigmatized as problematic.

4.2.2 Mobilities

The Paris urban area remains and has always been the central hub for migration flows to and from France. Not only its central position in international economic relations, but also the presence of significant migrant communities plays a key role. The current diversity configuration of Paris (2019 data) very much reflects an accumulation of the rich migration history of the city, with a strong presence of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians from the (former) French empire, strong presence of sub-sahara Africans and of the strong migratory connection between Portugal and France. The fact that, as table X shows, these groups are still the largest groups in terms of migrants by birth as well as nationality, signals that these communities have continue to grow of the past decades.

However, Paris is not only a city of arrival, it is also a portal for mobility onwards to other areas in France. Although the Urban area of Paris (Ile de France) has continued to grow, also due to migration, the central Parisian area has a structural negative migration balance; meaning that more people are leaving the city than settling in the city.

4.2.3 Inequalities

The Paris urban area is characterized by high levels of inequality; it hosts some of the richest as well as some of the poorest neighbourhoods in France. The Greater Paris area has the highest income inequality of any French metropolitan area; the unemployment rate in the Ile de France region for foreign-born is nearly double that of native born (OECD, 2018: 22). Lelévrier et al. (2017) speak of an increasingly dual structure in the city, with a growing discrepancy between low skilled and immigrant residents versus the increasingly knowledge intensive labour market. On the one hand this is due to the key economic function and attractiveness of the Paris central area, where most high income households of the broader Paris region is located. But also in the overall urban area (Ile de France), the level of unemployment amongst French as well as non-French inhabitants (8% average unemployment in Paris versus 9% in Rouen and 10% in Nîmes, based on 2019 data). However, unemployment amongst people with non-French nationality remained considerably higher than amongst those with French passport; 6% of French citizens in unemployment, against for instance 16% for Algerians, the largest migrant group in Paris (INSEE, 2019).

On the other hand, the average household income in Seine-St.Denis, Val De Marne and other banlieues is far lower (Lelévrier et al., 2017). These are areas where most people with a migration background live. Unemployment levels are also significantly higher in those areas than in the central Paris area.

Such inequalities are obviously related to patterns of discrimination in Paris. According to data from 2018, 59% of the population is sceptical that there is a capacity to welcome new arrivals to Paris, and only 33% of the population believes that migrants have economic and financial potential (OECD, 2018: 36). Davidson (2012) shows how discrimination in Paris, as in France more in general, tends to be directed at the growing Muslim population. This is often mixed with racialized structures, especially when Muslims from West Africa are involved, which are often considered black rather than Muslim. Castañeda (2018) argues that especially Mahgrebis are strongly discriminated on the labour market in Paris. In particular, second-generation Turkish immigrants with similar CVs to non-immigrants are less likely to be interviewed, and in a worse employment situation than in any other European country (Castañeda, 2018: 74). Castaneda (2018: 77) argues: *"it is often hard for newcomers to connect with other Parisians. French citizens believe in helping others through the welfare state more than citizen to citizen, through charitable acts or civic organization. This contributes to the social isolation of North Africans, particularly those who do not have work acquaintances.*"

4.2.4 Political-Institutional Setting

The Paris approach to migration-related diversity very much echoes the French national approach characterized by universalism. This involves a colour-blind approach that accepts diversity but does not target or acknowledge specific migrant groups (Mahnig, 2004), in the spirit of the French Republicanist model of liberty, equality and brotherhood. For the Paris administration, diversity is a social fact. However, it is has never resorted to multicultural policies targeted at specific groups or communities such as has been the case in countries like the UK and the Netherlands.

However, this does not mean that Paris has no policy at all in relation to migration-related diversity. Simon and Beaujeu (2018) describe the Paris approach as being driven by area-based proxies. This means that rather than targeting groups, the approach targets areas based on the challenges and needs faced in these areas. There is a national action plan for integration with a rapidly grown budget since 2005, which lays the foundation for the Parisien approach as well. In this context, there are various programs in Paris, focused on fostering proximity and connection between recently arrived migrants and others, such as by creating spaces of integration (Les grands voisins) or web platforms for volunteers (Je m'Engage).

Another core policy aspect concerns the broader French 'politique de la ville' (City Policy) which focuses on areas with specific challenges in terms of housing, labour, education or other social challenges. Almost half of all the priority urban zones or 'zones urbaines sensibles' are located in France (148 on a total of 349). Furthermore, since 2015 there is a new Parisian action plan 'mobilisation of the

community for refugee reception'. This was a response to the 2015 inflow of refugee migrants from in particular Syria, and involved access of refugees to services through local assistance and to adapting university services to migrant needs.

The Parisian approach to diversity has been criticized for its lack of leverage in terms of combatting discrimination. Scholars have argued that the absence of data on ethnicity, race or culture complicates a proper analysis of (direct as well as statistical) discrimination. A particular focus in this regard has been discrimination and racism by the police. In 2005, police operations against immigrant youngsters in the banlieues triggered vast riots (also beyond Paris). The riots revealed a broadly neglected sense of exclusion on behalf of the French migrant population (as stated, amongst whom many with French citizenship). These protests were repeated frequently in subsequent years. In 2020 this became visible once again with very large protests in Paris in the context of the Black Lives Matter movement.

Radicalisation and terrorist attacks also form an important part of the context in which Paris' approach to diversity has evolved. This was already the case in the 1980s and 1990s, when Paris faced Algerian Islamic terrorism, such as with a series of bombings in 1995. The year 2015 would be a tragic year in this context. First, in January, Islamic extremists killed the editors of the critical journal Charlie Hebdo. Later that same year, in November, a series of attacks took place at various locations in Paris, including the Bataclan concert venue, killing 131 persons and injuring at least 413. The terrorists were motivated by the acts of the Islamic terrorist organization ISIS. This left deep wounds in Paris' society, and also triggered many critical questions concerning how such radicalization could take place in France. Also, between 2015 and 2020, several terrorist incidents took place.

In sum, Paris can be described as a truly superdiverse city of migration. It hosts a very diverse migrant population with more than 140 different nationalities which are distributed relatively equally across the city (when look at nationality, not at race, ethnicity or culture). However, this diversity also comes with significant inequalities and friction. Migration reinforces the vast inequalities between different neighbourhoods of Paris. Furthermore, diversity has come with deep friction around discrimination as well as radicalization, both leading to critical questions about to what extent Paris has the right approach and tools for coming to terms with its superdiverse character.

4.3 Parma

Parma is a city in the region Emilia-Romagna in Northern Italy and is one of the richest cities in the country and has a consequently higher costs of living. Parma has both an agricultural and an industrial economic profile. With farmers producing food for industrial processing such as vegetables, milk and diary products, and of cause the famous Parma ham and hard cheese Parmigiano Reggiano. In terms of mechanical industry, Parma is first in Italy for the industrial transformation of

agricultural products: equipment for the canned industry, milk processing plants, slaughtering plants etc. It is also a university city with one of the oldest universities in the world (founded in 962 A.D.) and which forms an important cultural and educational centre. According to Istat, in 2019 there were 196,518 residents in the municipality of Parma. The population of the city was growing for the past 10 years.

Parma has a rather long history of both domestic and international immigration. First, in the 1970s the internal migrants from the south of Italy came to work in the city, and since they settled in the warehouses as it was the cheapest available housing—local parmigianni colloquially called them "*capanoni*". Nowadays, the same term refers to international migrants, especially those settled in economically deprived areas of the city, indicating the persisting inqualities of the labour market. In the late 70 s and 80 s, international students started enrolling to the Univeristy of Parma from several Middle Eastern countries, including Lebanon, Egypt. Many of them pursued a medical career and some of them stayed in Parma. In the 80 s and 90 s there was large scale labour migration from Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, regulated by the national government quotas (P1_interview). Since 1995 the number of immigrants rapidly increased in the whole province of Parma (Provincia di Parma, 2005). In the next 10 years their number more than tripled. Among whom the most prominent groups were Tunisians, Albanians and Filipinos, besides many migrants were from sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and Eastern Europe. More recently, as the legislation in Italy has changed, the asylum-seeking route became the most feasible legal way for immigrants to settle in Italy. Nowadays, there is a significant immigration of Eastern Europeans, Albanians, Romanians, Moldavians (P1_interview).

4.3.1 Diversity and Segregation

In 2019, Parma-city was home to 32,782 of migrants, amounting to 16% of its total population (Immigration report, E-R, 2020). Over the past 10 years number of migrants has been steadily growing. The migrants come primarily from European countries outside the EU (26,6%) and also the EU member states (20%), followed by migrants from northern (13%) and western regions of Africa (13%). These top-10 nationalities together constitute 68% of all foreign citizens residing in the city (Table 4.3). As follows from the immigration history of the city, Romanians, Moldovans are the most numerous, followed by Filipinos and Albanians.

The types of migrants that live in the city of Parma are also diverse. In recent years pathways for labour migration from outside the EU were very limited, while EU mobile citizens were must less restricted in their pursuit of jobs in the region. When in 2012 there were about 21% of non-EU migrants receiving residency on the ground of work—mainly Moldovans, Chinese, Nigerians and Ghanaians, their numbers have drastically decreased in the more recent years. In 2018 among the non-EU migrants, the majority of residence permits issued were for family reasons

Table 4.3 Share of migrants by citizenship in 2019, Parma city

Countries of migrants' origin	abs. 2019	% of total foreign citizens
Romania	4426	14%
Moldova	4242	13%
Philippines	2670	8%
Albania	2603	8%
Nigeria	1870	6%
Tunisia	1701	5%
Morocco	1290	4%
Ukraine	1282	4%
Ghana	1159	4%
China	960	3%
Total	32,782	

Source: own calculations based on open data of Parma's city resident population January 2019 (I.Stat, 2019)

(69%), then 12% for the study reasons and 10% for humanitarian reasons (I.Stat, 2020). Also, the University of Parma has a long history of attracting international students, who have been studying there the 1970s. Nowadays, there are around 6% of international students. Most of the international university students come from Albania, China, Romania, Cameroon, and Moldavia (between 9 and 4%) (Regione Emilia-Romagna, 2019).

Our calculations on D4I 2011 data indicate moderate levels of segregation in Parma (0.28), which is slightly higher than in other cities of this category. By looking at the most recent picture we can see that in all neighbourhoods—migrants constitute over 10% of population. Which indeed shows a rather dispersed settlement pattern. Four neighbourhoods that stand out by their higher share of residents with foreign citizens are city quarters Oltretorrente, Pablo, Parma Centro and San Leonardo, where over 20% of residents are non-Italians.

4.3.2 Mobilities

In the past 10 years more migrants have been settling in Parma than leaving it. The inward mobility of foreigners saw its peak in 2013, most likely due to the refugee arrivals from the North Africa. In other years arrivals of migrants fluctuated around 3000, while the migrant outflows were always below 2000. Parma is an important immigration hub where migrants are attracted directly from abroad as well as from other cities in Italy. Stably, more migrants settle here from outside the country than from other municipalities in Italy, and as a consequence Parma is rather used to welcoming 'newly' arrived migrants. In terms of departures, just over 1000 migrants annually leave the city to look for further opportunities elsewhere in the country, rather than abroad.

The mobility patterns of the foreign-born population in Parma are diverse. Some communities have been well established and facilitate further attraction and settlement of the co-ethnic newcomers. For instance, Moroccan and Senegalese communities have been settled in Parma for a long time and, especially the latter form a structured community of the city. In the mid 2000s, there was a rapid increase in numbers among Eastern European women: Moldovans and Ukrainians (Provincia di Parma, 2005), many of them found jobs in domestic care. In accordance with the national trend, there have been an increase in numbers of humanitarian migrants in Parma. These asylum seeker groups tend to remain in the city temporarily, for 2–3 years depending on their application procedure. After obtaining a permit to stay, they often attempt to reach their family members in other areas of Italy or Europe (P1_interview).

All in all, in terms of mobility, Parma can be described as an important welcoming city, where the primary adaptation of foreigners in Italy takes place, with some people settling for longer, while others moving on to other places, including the region Emilia-Romagna—as there are many job opportunities located in the rural areas surrounding Parma.

4.3.3 Inequalities

In Parma, as well as in the whole region of Emilia-Romagna, a significant occupational stratification between migrants and Italians is observed. Almost 30% of foreign workers employed in Emilia-Romagna hold unskilled functions, compared to the approximately 6% observed for Italian workers. These differences are also reflected in the monthly income difference of 23% in favour of Italians. According to the immigration report (Regione Emilia-Romagna, 2020) migrants are generally employed in service sector (54,4%), followed by industry (25%), construction (8,2%) and commerce (7.9), 5.3% are employed in agriculture. Compared to Italian nationals, migrants are overrepresented in agricultural work, construction and in services, and underrepresented in commerce and industry. In industrial sector, migrants in Parma are usually employed in lower skilled jobs (P1_interview). Domestic work, including elderly care and household help, is mainly fulfilled by foreigners (Regione Emilia-Romagna, 2020)—often middle-aged women from Eastern Europe (P1_interview). They speak Italian well, and usually have higher education, obtained in their countries of origin, which they could not or did not want to utilize there, due to low salaries, or lac k of jobs in the struggling economies. As Ambrosini (2012) pointed out, many of them start as undocumented, and gradually obtain the legal permission to stay via the families where they work. Also, many migrants own small businesses because, when they experience difficulties to find a job, they create their own.

Most of the migrants have worse opportunities of employment than Italians partly because of lack of knowledge of Italian language, and most end up in job that

require no or less use of the language. However, some groups have an easier start, either due to language knowledge, or due to established support networks. For instance, Albanian immigrants speak Italian very well, as they already learn the language in their home country via TV and radio. That is why many Albanians work as clerks in various firms and organizations, therefore occupying middle-class jobs, similar to Italians (P1_interview). Ghanaians, Moroccan, Senegalese are among the most long-standing immigrant communities in the city—they help co-national newcomers to find places to stay, manage bureaucracy, find jobs, as well as provide a social network. Also, there is a community of Africans studying medicine (from Cameroon, Senegal and Uganda), who obtained scholarships to study in Parma University and they were supported by the professional community of medical doctors from Africa in their arrival process. Some of these Africans with an Italian medical degree remain in in the county, especially in Parma it is not uncommon to see a doctor with African roots (P1_interview).

In terms of education, there is a large gap between Italian and non-Italian youth when it comes to gaining admission into university via the high school system (P3_interview). In terms of secondary education, foreign students have been overrepresented among the graduates of technical and professional institutions, while Italian youth has mainly graduated from Lyceums, high schools allowing to enter the university. In comparison, only 21,8% of foreigners and almost 50% of Italians graduated from such type of schools (Regione Emilia-Romagna, 2020).

While Parma is considered a city open for receiving migrants, for native Parmigiani, large-scale reception of migrants and asylum seekers lead to increased intolerance as they are less able to have profound interactions with the newcomers. Currently, the relationships between Italians and migrants in Parma are described as 'tentatively positive', without apparent conflict and lack of strong positive attitudes either. The situation is characterized by individualism, general apathy and indifference, due to the lack of social ties between cultures (Bottura et al., 2015). The lack of knowledge of Italian language is especially seen as a key factor that precludes intercultural interaction. This social divide between Italians and migrants seems to be fuelled by xenophobia rooted in fear of Italians to lose their access to scarce rights and privileges, which in their opinion should favour them, not migrants. Besides, Italians are concerned with the issues security, unemployment, and delinquency in the migrant populations (Bottura et al., 2015).

Italian levels of openness to migrants are related to the perceived distance between ethnic groups. There has been documented exclusion of Indian women from social life in Parma, mainly due to their dependent status from their husbands. Especially in lower-skilled, lower educated household women are found to be oppressed and isolated, they are forbidden to learn the Italian language, are not allowed to drive, or socialize with anyone outside Indian community. This creates tensions with receiving society because Italian social workers and doctors see their community as very segregated and not willing to participate in the Italian society. Widespread lack of family planning, and selective abortions demanded by Indian

men are condemned in the host society. Also Indian children experience ethnic discrimination in schools, reflected in bullying and ostracism from the Italian peers, especially in secondary school (Thapan, 2013).

Migrants note that discrimination in Parma especially apparent in their occupational aspirations being unfulfilled, with many migrants finding themselves unable to move upwards in work positions. While foreigners considered their difficulties living in Para stemming from linguistic divides, bureaucratic procedures, discrimination and other economic issues (Bottura et al., 2015). The extent of labour exploitation of migrants in this province of Parma is rather high. It is ranked 43d (of 100) on the index of agromafia's presence and intensity, a significantly higher presence than in other provinces in the region Emilia Romagna, most of which are in the ranks of 80 ("Agromafie, la provincia di Modena all'82esimo posto," 2017; EURISPES, 2017). However, this phenomenon occurs mainly in the rural areas, and therefore it could be less defining for the urban centre of Parma. The majority of irregularly employed and exploited migrant workers are male and often coming from India, Albania and Morocco (CGIL, 2020).

4.3.4 Political-Institutional Factors

Since the 1990s Parma local politics had alternating centre-left and centre right coalitions. Left-wing coalition of 1994 was followed by two right-leaning governments between 1998 and 2007 and after a period of civil list government again switched to left leaning coalitions with Federico Pizzarotti as a mayor. Migrant inclusion however was not much in the focus of the government's attention. Only since 2010 the municipality appointed an inclusion officer, whose task was to coordinate and develop activities targeting immigrants. This is when collaboration between official institutions of the municipality and civil society materialized. The city engaged into the management of the SPRAR projects (Service for protection of refugees and asylum seekers)[6] and created a "Round-table for immigration" an instrument for connecting with foreign communities and development of innovative strategies for inclusion (Prot. n. 3967, iii. 1.2, 2010). Since 2014, when the city was governed by anti-establishment 5-star movement ('Cinque Stelle') there was openness to receiving higher numbers of asylum seekers within SPRAR and collaboration with civil society actors was more intense. Until 2017–2018 the municipality strived to facilitate intercultural activities and mediate inter-religious tensions, i.e. by organizing a round-table on religion and a day of 'inter-religious dialogue' before the coronavirus pandemic (P1_interview). Also, it there was more support

[6] This project was co-financed by the ministry of interior, it is Italy-wide, and the aim of which is activate autonomy, self-sustainability of asylum seekers in the city. The municipalities decide themselves how many asylum-seekers to host and in which housing structures.

for the community centres that provided services for both Italians and migrants. Moreover, there was a policy regarding family assistance to migrants, young students and mothers were given support with learning Italian. In the 2018 the national political landscape changed to the right, and during 'Salvini government' also the local approach reverted to more restrictive towards refugees and organizations supporting them (P3_interview).

Asylum and refugee immigration has been in mainly the focus of policy action both nationally and locally in the past 10 years, while the rest of types of migrants have been supported primarily by ethnic associations and voluntary organizations. There are many civil society and voluntary organization engaged in active support of migrants in Parma (P1_interview). In the years of municipal reluctancy to deal with immigration issues, these pro-immigrant civil society actors were operating independently and formed strong network of collaboration. One of the oldest civil society organizations, Centro Asilo Immigrazione Cooperazione (CIAC), collaborated with other associations and the emergency system of refugee reception (CAS) to provide first assistance to migrants (P1_interview; P3_interview). Between 2011 and 2017 various governance actors, including the municipality, participated in a "Provincial table of asylum". It was a coordination and collaboration body which helped to ensure that all asylum seekers, both from SPRAR and CAS systems received assistance they needed. Since SPRAR housing was located in the city it was easier to facilitate intercultural encounters between newcomers and locals (P3_interview). Nowadays, provision of medical care for immigrants is a priority focus for CIAC and other organizations, such as Spazio Salute Immigrati, that offers medical services for the asylum seekers, Centro Immigrazione Asilo e Cooperazione Internazionale (CPIA) di Parma, that coordinates socio-sanitary support for migrants. Besides, several CSOs provide language courses and assist with cultural and linguistic mediation for asylum seekers: Centro Provinciale per l'istruzione degli adulti (CPIA) and World in Progress (WIP). While Centri per l'Impiego di Parma e di Fidenza and Agriform help asylum seekers to find a job, develop a CV and offer internship opportunities (Monacelli et al., 2019). Moreover, CIAC also provides legal and cultural-mediation services for all asylum seekers, also those hosted in the CAS, where such services are often absent (P3_interview).

4.4 Hilversum

Hilversum is a relatively small city (just over 90.000 inhabitants) in the center of the Netherlands, roughly in between Amsterdam and Utrecht. The city has a relatively high volume of diversity, with 14,5% of the population having foreign citizenship. According to Dutch statistical office (CBS), the number of Hilversummers with a first- or second-generation migration background is more significant; about 30%. This percentage has slightly increased over the last decade or so from 22,5% in 2010 to about 30% in 2021.

At the same time, Hilversum is relatively little segregated. This reflects the specific history of Hilversum as a middle-class city that has become known as the media-capital of the Netherlands. Although the city originally evolved in relation to carpet-industries, it developed in the twentieth century into the city where most national media institutions from the Netherland settled, together with associated business activities. Also, some international companies such as Nike installed their regional headquarters in Hilversum. This reinforced Hilversum as a middle-class city known for its 'villa-neighbourhoods' characterized by a lot of green facilities and space. It also led to a growing presence of "high-skilled migrants" in the Hilversum migrant population, besides more traditional labour migrant communities associated with its history as industrial city.

4.4.1 Diversity and Segregation

The middle-class character of Hilversum is also reflected in the diversity configuration of the city. When compared to other Dutch cities (such as Rotterdam included in this study), there are relatively more migrants in Hilversum from countries that send primarily high-educated migrants. This includes India, which even represents that largest group based on nationality. India is known for sending amongst others high-educated ICT specialists, who may find good labour market opportunities in Hilversum as a media capital. But it also includes often relatively highly educated migrants from the UK and Germany. Recent and older labour migrant groups as the Poles and the Turks respectively are also strongly represented, but relatively less than in other Dutch cities. It is this combination of migrants from a broad variation of sending countries that makes Hilversum score high in terms of diversity (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 Population of Hilversum by migration background. (Source: CBS Statline, data 2019)

	Migration background	Foreign born	Citizenship
Total	28%	17%	9%
Morocco	3,1%	1,4%	0,4%
Indonesia	2,8%	0,8%	0,1%
Turkey	2,8%	1,4%	0,6%
Germany	2,1%	0,7%	0,5%
UK	1,2%	0,8%	
Poland	1,1%	0,9%	0,8%
India	1,0%	0,9%	0,8%
Surinam	0,8%	0,3%	0,0%
Former Soviet Union	0,7%		
Dutch Antilles	0,6%		
France	0,6%	0,4%	0,3%
Syrië	0,5%		
United States of America	0,5%	0,4%	

The level of segregation is relatively low in Hilversum; about 23% of the population would need to move in order to achieve an equal distribution of nationalities across the city. That is significant but still lower than in most Dutch cities. This seems to reflect the more middle-class character of migrants in Hilversum, which are apparently very well able to keep up with the housing needs and preferences of the Dutch middle-class.

4.4.2 Mobility

The high diversity and low segregation in Hilversum are not simply of a past immigration flow that gradually shaped the city. Hilversum today still is very much a city of migration; the average level of immigration as well as the average level of emigration are above the national average. In 2019, 2,0% of the population had immigrated in that year (against 1,6 as national average) and 1,1% had emigrated in that year (against 0,93% as national average).

This means that about 3% of the population of Hilversum was internationally mobile in 2019, which is not that much less when compared to the significantly larger city of Rotterdam (4,0%). However, this 'floatingness' does seem to differ from other cities in terms of the nationalities, as it involves more middle-class migrants (amongst whom expats).

4.4.3 Inequalities

The fact that Hilversum is a middle-class city does not necessarily mean that it faces less inequalities than working class cities. The fact that Hilversum is relatively little segregated does suggest that inequalities do not take on a spatial dimension. However, it is possible that labour migrants such as those from Poland and Turkey may be in a different socio-economic position then expat migrants. This is also illustrated by the fact that, what local statistics describe as, 'non-western migrant households' make relatively most use of various income support measures when compared to other households.

The average annual household income in Hilversum is slightly above national average (source: CBS Statline), and this is also the case for both households with the Dutch main earner and foreign origin main earner. The income difference between migrant and non-migrant households are on the average level on the Netherlands (4,7 thousand euro in the year 2017[7]).

[7] Own calculations on the basis non-public CBS micro-data (reference year 2017).

In terms of education, Hilversum has larger proportion of highly educated residents than on average in other urban centres of the country (36%). The educational differences between migrants and non-migrants are minimal, especially in the higher education. The percentage of highly education people among people with migrant origin is almost 40%, which about 3% higher than among Dutch.[8]

In spite of the high level of diversity, discrimination does seem to be a problem in the Hilversum area. The Meldpunt Discriminatie Gooi en Vechtstreek even signals a trend of increasing discriminatory incidents in relation to colour, religion and ethnicity.

4.4.4 Political-Institutional Factors

In political terms, the city of Hilversum is a fragmented city, with strong parties on the left as well as the right. This usually leads to broad local coalitions in the city council, which can generally be described as located in the political center. In this context, migration-related diversity is not politicized in the city, and the Hilversum also does not have a distinct 'integration policy' targeted at migrants. In the recent past, migration-related diversity was for a short time a more central topic in local politics around the rise of Leefbaar Hilversum, a moderate local populist party that can be compared with Leefbaar Rotterdam. Tragically, Hilversum was also the city where the influential national populist leader Pim Fortuyn was killed by an animal rights activist in 2002. However, as of 2010 support for this local party has declined.

The Hilversum approach towards migration-related diversity can best be described as a universalist approach. This means that rather than defining a distinct approach, migration related diversity is 'mainstreamed' across generic policy areas as labour, housing and education. Illustrative is how the 2018–2022 government coalition agreement signals that the city encourages refugees to acquire Dutch language skills but considers this primarily an individual responsibility of the migrants concerned. Besides language, migrant incorporation is perceived primarily as an issue of participation. In this context, the city recently developed an active strategy towards supporting labour market participation of refugees (Hilversum, 19 mei 2017). Furthermore, the NGO 'Samen oplopen' is active in Hilversum in providing buddy schemes where migrants are coupled to other 'Hilversummers' in an effort to support their participation.

[8] Own calculations on the basis non-public CBS micro-data (reference year 2017).

4.5 Analysis of Cluster I Cities

Cluster I cities are characterized by a relatively high degree (volume and complexity) of diversity as well as medium-low levels of segregation. The four in-depth city case studies analysed under this cluster (Konstanz, Paris, Parma and Hilversum) have in common not only that the percentage of the immigrant population is relatively high, but also that migrants come from many different backgrounds, not only in in terms of ethnicity but also various immigration motives, diverse temporal patterns of mobility, demographics, migration generation socio-economic class. They are cities closely resembling what Vertovec (2007) has described as superdiverse cities. In none of the cities one or several specific groups stand out numerically, it is the mix of very diverse populations that defines the cities. This applies to Paris, whose population reflects the world, but to some extent also to a much smaller towns like Konstanz or Parma, where people of so many backgrounds live together.

The cities in this cluster are characterized by relatively low levels of segregation, compared to others. This does not mean that there is no segregation at all, there are neighbourhoods in every city where comparatively higher share of migrants resides. Especially for Paris, previous research shows that segregation does appear more prominent, when considering not only segregation by foreign citizenship but also the migration background, thus including second and sometimes third generation. At the same time, in these cities there are also no areas where migrants would not be residing at all. The very high variety of origins, migration types, and varied socio-economic characteristics allow for wider spread and residential mixing of the local and migrant populations. In these 'superdiverse' cities, diversity is already a structural part of the city, a 'new normality', it is less likely that new immigrants are segregated.

When trying to account for the diversity configuration of this cluster of cities, we looked at mobilities, inequalities and broader political-institutional factors (Table 4.5). In terms of mobilities, what appears to define the selected cities is diversified and often long histories of migration. During that long period of time these cities attracted migrants from various destinations and for various reasons: from guest-workers and colonial immigration, to Easter European labour immigrants and refugees fleeing conflicts at the European borders both in the 1990s and in the recent times. This brings a mixture of different types of migrants to these cities. Furthermore, we see that cities in this cluster are relatively 'mobile' or 'floating'; this means that they are not only places of immigration but also for emigration. These cities continuously attract immigrants, many of whom settle, raise children. The large share of migrant population and the diversity of the reasons they came for also means that many choose to leave the cities to return to their own countries, or move on to other destinations.

This mixture of migration types also makes sense when looking at broader inequalities of the city. All selected cities for this cluster revealed diversified economic opportunities structures and generally strong economic position of the cities.

Table 4.5 Summary table. Comparison of cluster I cities

Cities	Mobility	Mobility	Mobility	Inequality	Inequality	Inequality	Inequality	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Diversity	Diversity	Segregation 2019 recent
Cities	History	Level and temporality	Types of flows	Urban develop-ment / opportunity struc	Discrimi-nation	Income inequal	Education inequality	Targeted (towards what/who?)	Amount of support from municipality (involvement in	Integrationist / diveristy focus	Relationa-ship with regional level	Right-left orientation	Number of various origins	Volume	Current level of segreation
Hilversum (NL)	Medium	Increas-ingly mobile both inflows and outflows	Varied: labour migration (low- and high-skilled), postcolonial migration, family migration, humanitarian migration	Strong economic stance, middle-class town with diversified economy	Discrimi-nation increasing	Different for different types of migrants (expats vs labour migrants)	Moderate, no sign of strong inequality	Non targeted, some measures aimed at refugees	Active local gvt approach	Universalist approach, mainstreamed	Top-down	Centre, with fragmentation	High	High	Medium-low
Konstanz (DE)	Medium	Inflow, settlement	Old migr - labour migrants; then german repatriates, refugees, now highly skilled internationals from eu	Strong economic stance, broad sector	Some (islam-ophobia, european and highly-skilled accepted more)	Medium (migrants are observed in various social classes)	Mainly among 1st-gen school children	Cohesion, intercultural policies (non targeting)	A lot	Diversity	Bottom up / against national for inclusion	Centre-right, prev. Centre left and right	Very high	High	Medium-low

(continued)

Table 4.5 (continued)

Cities	Mobility	Mobility	Mobility	Inequality	Inequality	Inequality	Inequality	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Diversity	Diversity	Segregation 2019 recent
Paris (FR)	Long	Overal high mobility, now more outflows	Varied: postcolonial, labour, family and humanitarian-migration	Strong and diversified economy	High discrimi-nation of black and muslim populations	Different for different types of migrants (some are more unequal than others)	Not clear, seems average high	Neighbourhoods, against discrimination and radicalization	Active local gvt approach	Universalist approach	Bottom up	Centre-left with some differences between arondisseme	Very high	High	Low segregation (of foreign nationals)
Parma (IT)	Medium	Inflow, settlement; if leaving to other it cities	Varied: labour migrants, students, refugees, eu migrants	Strong economic stance, broad sector	Parallel lives, xenophobia due to rising numbers, islamophbia	Worse employment opportunities, some groups are more equal	Higher educ inequal for 2nd gen; some migr. Are well educated (i.e. Badanti)	Refugees	Some	Reception and integration of refugees	Mixed	Mostly centre-left with a period of centre-right	Very high	High	Medium

All the cities in this cluster are rather wealthy. Paris's local economy is very diverse, while Konstanz, Parma and Hilversum are middle-class cities that offering wide range of opportunities to different types of migrants: from knowledge-intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals and universities and fruitful economic soil for start-ups, and labour opportunities in traditional industries, agriculture, tourism and care. This does not mean that there are no inequalities in the city; it rather means that migrants fit more generally in the broader inequality structure of these cities, without being concentrated only in the lower class. Inequalities in terms of income are observed in these cities, which migrants occupying lower positions, which often is explained by the lack of language knowledge. However, there are also many migrants working in white-collar positions, creative industries and hospitals, thus fitting into the middle-class. This is also reflected in discrimination patterns in these cities. The four cities are generally seen as relatively open and inclusive, even though the presence of discrimination is acknowledged. Diversity seems to be more of a normality in these cities than elsewhere, also because the economic situation is favourable, and there is not perception of scarcity. However, even in these cities, we see that specific groups may be particularly ostracized; in both Paris and Konstanz the Muslim and black population emerge as the most discriminated against, while in Parma the rise of refugee numbers in the recent years soared the anxiety regarding the loss of social cohesion between the locals and the new commers.

In terms of political and institutional factors, what is striking from the four examined city cases is that they all follow a rather general or universalist policy approach to migrant integration. Rather than integration being a separate policy field or 'silo', it is part of a broader diversity approach, such as the 'international approach' in Konstanz, the general city policy in Paris. Based on the political changes both in the national and local context the cities have also been changing the focus of their diversity governance. On the example of Parma, it can be seen that local authorities changed their approach from non-interventionist and relying on civil society organizations, towards more collaboration, and targeted focus on asylum seekers in the period 2014–2017, and the subsequent withdrawal of support in light on the restrictive turn on a national level.

This reflects the earlier point that diversity is seen as a new normality in these cities, and is thus not necessarily problematized and institutionalized as a separate policy domain. In terms of political context, we did not find a very clear pattern; One city is centre-right (Konstanz), however it moved back and forth between different political orientations, Hilversum is centre, and Paris and Parma are generally centre-left with some differences between the arrondissements, and/or some period of centre-right governments in the past 20 years.

In sum, we found that cluster I cities are in general cities with continuous and diverse migration history and that offer diverse economic opportunity structures. This leads to a mixture of migration categories and different migrant communities and alignment with existing inequality structures in the city. Cluster I cities are often cities that have long accumulated histories of migration, in which they have attracted high-skilled as well as low-skilled migrants from various parts of the world.

They are cities where diversity is a new normality which is also reflected in a general approach where integration is not set apart as a policy silo but rather treated as integral to what the city can do to be inclusive.

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Chapter 5
Cities Cluster II: High Diversity and High Segregation

The second cluster of cities of migration in terms of their diversity configuration that we defined in the inductive analysis of Chap. 3, involves cities which are very diverse but are relatively segregated. For this cluster, we also selected one city from each of the four selected countries to develop a better understanding of it: Ingolstadt (GER), Modena (ITA), Nîmes (FRA) and Rotterdam (NL) (Table 5.1).

Cities in this cluster do not seem to correspond with cities of a certain size (just as for cluster 1). The cities in this cluster vary in terms of size as well as the total number of migrants in the selected urban area. The diversity index score, the share of migrants and the number of different origins are similar to cluster I. The cities do have a higher segregation index, ranging from 0.33 in Nîmes to 0.43 in Rotterdam. Furthermore, whereas differences with cluster I in terms of nominal GDP per capita and household income do not appear to be very significant, there are differences in employment. Unemployment levels seem higher in cluster II cities than in cluster I, and a larger percentage of the population is employed in industry against a lower percentage employed in services.

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Table 5.1 Cluster 2 cities

city name	population of 2019	share of migrants (%) 2019	Nominal GDP (PPP) per capita 2019	Mean household income (PPP) 2019	Employment: Agriculture (%) 2019	Employment: Industry (%) 2019	Employment: Services (%) 2019	Unemployment (%) 2019
Ingolstadt	136,981	18,69%	182,997 €	56,757 €	1,16	26,67	72,16	1,89
Modena	189,816	15,10%	56,654 €	43,953 €	3,35	32,84	63,79	5,50
Nîmes	148,561	10,39%	33,221 €	37,513 €	4,39	16,13	79,47	10,19
Rotterdam	1,232,747	8,95%	60,049 €	35,853 €	1,23	14,18	84,58	4,59

5.1 Ingolstadt

Ingolstadt is located on the riverbanks of Danube. It is an industrial city— home to the headquarters of Audi and Airbus. The city has 138.716 inhabitants ("Ingolstadt in Zahlen", 2020a[1]) and is the fifth largest city of Bavaria. It has the youngest population in comparison with the other major cities of the region. This is partly due to the presence of two universities: the Ingolstadt School of Management (the economic and business department of the Catholic University of Eichstätt Ingolstadt, est. 1472) and the Technical University of Applied Science (Hochschule Ingolstadt). Besides the sizable student population, the natural demographic changes have been showing a positive trend for over 20 years. Overall, for the past years the population of the city has been growing both due to demographic changes and immigration.

The population of Ingolstadt has risen significantly since the Second World War. The extensive arrival of migrant groups coincides with West-Germany's history of guest-worker programmes. Many labour migrants came in those years from Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and former Yugoslavia following agreements in the 50 s and 60 s. In the 80 s and 90 s of the previous century came ethnic German repatriates ('Aussiedler') from the countries of Soviet Union. In the mid 90 s, refugees following the Balkan War have arrived to Ingolstadt. The expansion of the EU brought new labour migrants from Eastern Europe, as and in the years past 2015 refugees were welcomed in the city. The long history of migration in the city resulted in a sizeable migrant population already in mid-2000s. In 2008, Ingolstadt was among the top-three of all German cities (just behind Frankfurt am Main and Augsburg), with nearly 40% of its residents with migration background (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p. 31).

5.1.1 Diversity

Ingolstadt is a very diverse city, it reveals a high heterogeneity of migrant population not only in terms of origins, but also in terms of generations, reasons for immigration, and socio-economic profiles (I1_interview). In 2019, the share of residents with migration background (including second generation) was 45%, of which 20% were foreign citizens and 25% were Germans with migration background (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020b). By the end of 2020, around 33% of the Ingolstadt population were born abroad. 14% of total population originated from the EU countries, 7% were born in the states of former Soviet Union, Romania, 3% ex. Yugoslavia, 3% Turkey 5% from Asia, America and Africa (Hauptamt—Statistik und Stadtforschung, 2021). The majority of those originating from former USSR countries, Romania and Poland are naturalized Germans. While those coming from other areas mainly have foreign citizenship (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020b, p.5). However, among Turkish

[1] https://www.ingolstadt.de/media/custom/465_1995_1.PDF?1533818349

nationals living in Ingolstadt more than a third were born in Germany (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p. 41).

Since 2013, the numbers of residents with migration background have increased by 4% which is a relatively small change, compared to other small German cities where the impact of large scale refugee arrivals since 2015 was more pronounced. Already before the refugee influx of 2015–2016, Ingolstadt was a diverse city, with 50% of its children and teenagers having a migration background (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p. 31–32).

Since, Ingolstadt as an industrial city it has attracted many labour migrants. There are many migrants from 'new' EU countries on temporary contracts working in auto-motive sector, as well as highly educated young professional from Southern European countries (I1_interview). Since 2012 the number of foreign students in the Ingolstadt higher education system has been rising and reaches 17,4% in 2018 (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020c).

5.1.2 Segregation

As the quantitative analysis with 2011 data has also shown, Ingolstadt is strongly segregated. Some parts of the city have a very high proportion of migrant residents, while others have a very low proportion. Particularly Nordwest (68.7%), Nordost (51.4%) and Südost (38.5%) are predominantly migrant, and within these the neighbourhoods Piusviertel, Konradviertel and Augustinviertel stand out (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p. 153). More recent data has shown that the segregation patterns in the city remained the same over the years, and Nordwest, Nordost and Südost areas still have particularly high proportions on non-German residents.

Segregation between rich and poor is also present and continues to increase.[2] Ingolstadt stands out in the southern-German region as one of the most segregated cities (together with Erlangen) (Helbig & Jähnen, 2018). Segregation in Ingolstadt stems from the industrial profile of the city and from the labour migration that it has experienced for decades (I1_interview). Recent labour migrants and descendants of Turkish guest-workers, employed in the factories of Audi, predominantly live in the North, as it is closer to their place of work. Other areas have a higher proportion of repatriates from ex. USSR countries residing there. Nordwest and Nordost areas where a particularly high share of migrant workforce reside (36% and 29% respectively), and the Nordwest is where the most population works— over 53 thousand employees (Bundesagentur für Arbeit Bayern, 2019).

[2] https://www.donaukurier.de/nachrichten/bayern/DKmobil-wochennl232018-Geballte-Armut-in-Ingolstadt;art155371,3802661

5.1.3 Mobilities

Generally, immigration trends to the city follow availability of jobs, which attract both workers from Germany and from abroad. Ingolstadt's history as an industrial city meant that labour migration played a significantly larger role here than in other cities in the region. The figure below shows the historical immigration and emigration waves and from Ingolstadt.

With very high positive numbers of net migration in the 1970s (recruiting of guest-workers), and 1990s with the opening of the borders with Eastern Europe and the Balkan war, and with negative net migration in the periods of economic crises (oil crises of 1973 and 1979), as well as repatriation of Balkan refugees. The increase in migrant population from 2010 is mainly a result of new Eastern European countries joining the EU (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p. 45), a steady increase in numbers of international students and arrival of refugees from 2014 onwards.

Currently, numbers of both international arrivals and departures is rather high in Ingolstadt and the majority of those mobile are foreign citizens. The total international mobility population of Ingolstadt has been increasing from 2009 till 2015, and since then it has slightly declined but remained significantly higher than 12 years ago. High mobility of foreign population partly is explained by short term contracts or seasonal work in the industry. The Integration report 2013 states that yearly, around 1500 foreigners register for an average of 3 months for this kind of work. (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p. 49).

A significant number of immigrants come from other EU countries (Schels, 2019). From 2012 till 2018, the number of EU immigrants has increased from 5,8% to 9.3% of all foreigners (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020c). This is due to temporary workers arriving from the East Europe and generally more educated young migrants from the South working as engineers or technicians for Audi for instance (I1_interview).

5.1.4 Inequalities

Even though the economic situation in the city is favourable and the unemployment is very low (2,9%), there are significant income inequalities between Germans and migrants, as well as between men and women. German employees earn 90,8% more than foreign employees, and men earn 55.3% more than women (Bundesagentur für Arbeit of 2017 as quoted in Eikmanns, 2018). This has to do with the type of economic sector and the jobs available there. The primary economic sector in Ingolstadt is a manufacturing industry, with Audi being the largest employer. This sector traditionally provided job opportunities for men, as illustrated by research on a similar Audi factory in Neckarsulm (Kolb, 2011). Ingolstadt was called "*the city of the German man*". The income disadvantage of migrants is because the majority of them work in the low wage sector, with many coming from Eastern Europe.

The demand for migrant labour has been steadily growing in the past years. However, before 2012, it was not met because the foreign qualifications of migrants

were not recognized. Consequently, many skilled migrants were engaged in minimal or marginal employment, for instance part-time work, seasonal employment, short-term contracts. And overall employment rate was significantly lower than that of the German population (43% vs 64%) (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p. 135). The adoption of National Recognition Law in 2012, had a significant impact in Ingolstadt suffering from the shortage of skilled labourers. This law enabled many migrants to get their foreign qualification recognized and obtain a steady employment. In 2018, the disparities in employment rates between German and foreign citizens in Ingolstadt were reduced substantially, with ca. 61% of foreigners employed compared to 69% of Germans (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020c). Besides, the share of unemployed among migrants reduced to 5,3% in 2019 (Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik, 2021). The share of employed migrant women has increased significantly since 2001, however they still remailed low (32%), not only because of job opportunities of the industrial sector but also because traditional family values play a role (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p. 126). While men primarily are employed in the industry, migrant women tend to find a small-scale employment, such as mini-jobs (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p.135).

Qualification inequality between German and foreign workers have been pronounced for years, with a recent tendency to slowly shrink. The most pronounced difference is in the share of low-skilled workers among Germans and migrants (10% versus 23% in 2018). The share of highly skilled foreigners has increased in Ingolstadt in the past years, and in 2018 there were 19% of employed migrants with a higher education. Although this number is still below the level of Germans (25%), the number of foreign workers with higher education has risen most significantly in the past years, with highly educated migrants arriving from Eastern and Southern Europe (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020c).

There is no clear picture regarding ethnic or racial discrimination of migrants in the city. A perceived picture on this relationship is that of parallel lives. People tolerate each other and accept other cultures but there is little interaction between groups (I1_interview). Migration and integration are not politically politicized topic in the city and there are no real conflicts between migrant and non-migrant population. A good economic situation and low unemployment seems to facilitate peaceful coexistence. Though, there are some rivalries between migrant groups. In the media, a few mentions of discriminatory and even racist behaviour towards Muslims can be found. For instance, comments on headscarves as a symbol of backwardness (Hennl, 2017) or difficult experiences of the first policemen of Turkish origin in Ingolstadt (Ratzesberger, 2020).

5.1.5 Political-Institutional Factors

Christian Social Union (CSU)– a conservative, centre-right party—has consistently been the biggest party since 1972 in the city council. The Social Democrats (SPD)—centre-left—have significantly lost support over the past decades. They were the

two main parties until recently. However, CSU also shrunk significantly in 2020 (from 44.6% to 26.8%), which resulted in a more fragmented city council: CSU -13, SPD 9; Greens– 8, Free voters of Bavaria—4, Alternative for Germany– 4, with the rest of the parties having only 2 seats (Hauptamt—Statistik und Stadtforschung, 2020). The city has been historically led by the CSU mayors until 2020, which changed to SPD member—Christian Scharpf—the first social-democratic mayor in Ingolstadt in 48 years (Osel, 2020). The far-right AFD is also popular in Ingolstadt more than anywhere in Bavaria, shown in 2017 elections.

Local governance of integration has been institutionalised in Ingolstadt since 2006, which corresponds to a shift in national policy, acknowledging Germany as the county of immigration. Since 2014 Ingrid Gumplinger holds this office. The municipality takes an evidence-based approach to integration policy making, having commissioned an extensive report on about the origins, composition and social position of Ingolstadt residents with migration background in 2013 (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p. 6). Moreover, Ingolstad's local integration policy is characterized by network governance to a certain extent. For instance, migration council, where the mattes affecting migrants and their descendants are discussed, has been active in the city since 1979. It is chaired by the integration officer and includes 16 elected citizens, 9 representatives of the municipal council, the education board, the equality board and the Job Centre. Besides, the Technical Hochschule of Ingolstadt, the National Job Agency, the Airbus company, Service for young migrants, and Caritas are among co-opted members in the council (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020b, p. 4). The Migration council has the authority to submit proposals to the city council and its committees for further policy-making process. It also funds migrant associations, clubs and projects aimed at improving coexistence of immigrants and natives (Satzung über den Migrationsrat und den Integrationsbeauftragten, 1979). The Migration council is a space for networking, connecting the representatives of the council (many of which are with migration background) with the city authorities responsible for specific matters. This connection allowed for a more intensive support for people with migration background (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020b). Despite a highly diverse population of the city, Ingolstadt municipal administration is largely German, with only 136 of the 2247 employees of the municipality having a migration background (Integrationsbericht, 2013, p. 163).

The main six areas of intervention in Ingolstadt's integration governance in the years 2014–2020 were language and mother tongue, education, employment, labour market and social security, health, religion, asylum seekers and refugees. Multiple projects, initiatives and events were conducted in the city within each intervention area (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020b, pp. 9–34). Awareness-raising campaigns on challenges and opportunities of bi-lingual upbringing of children, international Day of Mother Tongue, as well as trainings of intercultural language mediators were organized, in order to address needs of communication with migrants in various organizations. In the area of education, lob search networking opportunities for youth with migration background and information campaigns for migrant parents about educational system on Germany were provided. In the area of health, a project "With Migration for Migrants – Intercultural health in Bavaria" (Mit Migraten für

Migranten [MiMi], 2021) aimed at improving knowledge about health care and, in particular, family planning and pregnancy among migrants.

In addition to specific integration governance, Ingolstadt takes a mainstreamed approach to tackling social inequality and facilitates intercultural dialogue. There is a programme, co-funded by the regional and national governments, that tackles social inequality in deprived neighbourhoods. These areas are inhabited by both socially disadvantages Germans and migrants, due to cheaper housing (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2015). Public intercultural initiatives stimulating spaces of interaction among residents and celebrating diversity include a yearly Festival of Cultures, Intercultural week since 2017, and events around International day of the migrant (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020b). Moreover, in 2018 an intercultural training was organized for police officers of Ingolstadt.

Asylum seekers and refugees, as well as Turkish and other Muslim populations are the main target groups of Ingolstadt's integration and diversity policies. Projects targeting muslim population involve voluntary Islamic visitors service, working group on diverse Turkish streams and a group for Encounter of religions/Christian-Islamic dialogue. There were various activities conducted to stimulate interreligious tolerance, among which speeches and information events in the churches and mosques, open day at the mosques, fast-breaking event together with representatives of various Turkish communities, a training programme of the hospital for Muslim home-visiting volunteers (Stadt Ingolstadt, 2020b).

To sum up, Ingolstadt is an industrial city with long migration history. It is characterized by high levels of diversity of origins and migration types, as well as by high levels of segregation and inequality, that largely defined by the labour and salary stratification among migrants and Germans. Migrants form a lower socio-economic strata because they fill in the demands of hard labour at the factories of the city. Conservative targeted integration approach of the past years, seems to co-exist with a more mainstreamed approach to intercultural conviviality and alleviation of general social inequalities. However, focus on asylum seekers and Muslim populations, indicates a degree of problematization and othering of these groups.

5.2 Nîmes

Nîmes is a relatively small city in southern France, with just under 150,000 inhabitants. It is an ancient city dating back to pre-roman times. In contemporary times, the city is primarily known for its tourist sector. However, from the 16th up until the early 19th century the city was known widely for its industrial activities, especially involving a strong textile sector that contributed to various spin-off activities in the city (Cosson, 1985). This attracted populations from all of southern France as well as from Spain, Portugal and Italy. Like most French cities, over the 20th century significant immigration took place from North Africa, in particular from Algeria and Morocco. More recently, also around several local higher education establishments, this industrial sector has evolved into a technological sector. In 2016, Nîmes also opened an asylum seekers center.

5.2.1 Diversity and Segregation

With 10,4% of the population of foreign nationality (2019 data) and about 50 nationalities represented, Nîmes is a moderately diverse city, also given its small size. In comparison to other cities from this cluster, the level of diversity is somewhat lower, although the level has gone up from 9,3% foreign nationality in 2011. However, it is important to observe that given its historic importance as a city of migration, the population that can be considered to have a migration background 'in the broad sense' is much more significant; within the scope of this research, we focus only on those without French nationality (Table 5.2).

When looking at the top-10 nationalities represented in Nîmes, the Moroccan population stands out at the most numerous. This migrant group is connected to the colonial past of French, but due to the fact that Morocco was a protectorate, many Moroccan migrants do not have French citizenship. This differs for persons from Algeria who often did have French citizenship, as Algeria was considered part of France. Other prominent countries of migrant origin Spain, Portugal and Italy also reflect Nîmes' location in southern France. Many migrants from these European countries or former French colonies have been attracted for work in the old industries of Nîmes or in the tourist sector.

5.2.2 Mobilities

Nîmes has a long migration history, consisting of a variety of types of migration occurring over different periods (Moch & Tilly, 1985). The accumulation of these migration histories define the diversity of Nîmes today. First of all, the rise of Nîmes as a textile industry city brought migrants from other parts of Southern France, as

Table 5.2 Demographics on Nîmes, based on nationality and birth (INSEE, 2019)

	Non-french nationality	Non-french birth
Total	10,4%	14,5%
Morocco	4,0%	5,6%
Algeria	1,4%	2,4%
Other	0,9%	1,3%
Espagnols	0,9%	1,0%
Other african nationalities	0,8%	1,1%
Author EU nationalities	0,7%	0,9%
Other European nationalities	0,6%	0,7%
Portugal	0,5%	0,6%
Tunisia	0,3%	0,5%
Italy	0,2%	0,3%
Turkiye	0,1%	0,1%

well as migrants in particular from Italy, Spain and Portugal (Calvo, 1993). As the descendants of these migrants from the 16th to the nineteenth century are now French-born, they are not visible in the statistics used for this book. However, this migration has helped define the city.

In the twentieth century in particular migration from Northern Africa emerged, from formerly colonized territories (Algeria and Tunisia) or territories associated with France (Morocco). This means that whereas Nîmes scores relatively high on volume of diversity, the 'variety of diversity' is marked by a strong presence of Magrebien migrants (as in many Southern-French cities). In 2004, more than 100 families of Moroccan descent moved from Corsica to Nîmes after serious experiences with racial discrimination.

However, in the twentieth century migration to Nîmes has diversified further. Although not a major source of labour migration anymore, migration from North-Africa has continued, especially family migration. Furthermore, after the EU enlargement and the lifting of migratory restrictions for EU citizens, immigration from Romania increased as well. Furthermore, since 2016 Nîmes hosts an asylum seeker center.

5.2.3 Inequalities

For historic, geographical and economic reasons, there are significant inequalities within Nîmes between neighbourhoods. Outside the ancient city center, the city could not spread equally to the North as to the South because of the hilly environment. As a consequence, middle-class residential zones can be found in the north of the city, whereas to the south more working class residential zones developed. Those were also the areas where more industrial activities were located. Most migrants settled in such working class areas, such as Pissevin, Valdegour and Chemin Bas d'Avignon, creating a degree of overlap between class inequality and ethnic difference (Kirkness, 2013). This accounts for a 0,33 segregation index for Nîmes, which is higher than the category I cities, but one of the lowest for the category II cities.

This residential segregation connects with significant inequalities in the sphere of income, education and employment. Immigration converged with already pre-existing inequalities in the city, based on its industrial heritage. Unemployment amongst migrants is considerably higher than amongst non-migrants. Against 9% average unemployment amongst people with French nationality, 25% of those of Algerian nationality is unemployed, as well as 13% of Moroccans and 13% of Portuguese. Migrants are relatively often involved in seasonal agricultural work and seasonal construction work, where they also frequently face irregular employment and exploitation (N1_interview).

There is not much data available on discrimination in Nîmes. But interviews suggest a connection with inequalities in the city, especially the concentration of migrants in specific parts of the city, and the vulnerability of migrants in seasonal or

irregular work. These suggests a division in the city between those working in the services sector (primarily education and tourism) and those working in industries and agricultural work, with migrants represented primarily in the latter.

5.2.4 Political-Institutional Factors

Politically the Nîmes city council has changed over the past decades from a left-oriented working city to a more centre-right city. Until the 1980s, the working class population of Nîmes laid the foundation for a strong left in the council. Between 1995 and 2001 the city was also ruled by a mayor with a strong left orientation. However, since then, the city has been ruled by a mayor with a strong centre-right character; Jean Paul Fournier (UMP). About 25% of the votes went to the anti-immigrant Front National, indicating a strong presence of an anti-immigrant vote in Nîmes. In the years after 2018, Nîmes was also an important location for protests by the populist Yellow Vests Movement, or the' Gilets Jaunes'.

The current political constellation reinforces a universalist (French Republicanist) approach to migration-related diversity. Similar to most French cities, Nîmes largely follows the general French universalist approach to migration-related diversity. This means that diversity is in itself relatively little acknowledged or promoted but rather treated as a social fact. Within the universalist approach, diversity is targeted primarily via the proxy of areas. This means that (just as in the other French cities in this book) diversity policy is mostly part of the politique de la ville, and in particular the Zones Urbaines Sensibles. With Pissevin, Valdegour and Chemin Bas d'Avignon Nîmes has three of these zones. Unemployment in these areas is on average around 44%. With the universalist approach, more specific social service programs have been gradually abandoned, such has the Centre Communal d'Action Sociale which does no longer exist.

The absence of a clear government approach leaves a space that is primarily filled by NGOs. Various non-governmental organisations, including Ami Nîmes but also ANAIS and LICRA, play a key role in helping migrants, especially newly arrived asylum seekers. They do so without government support, but often with the support of social workers.

5.3 Modena

Modena is a city of nearly 187 thousand residents located in the region Emilia-Romagna. The province of Modena constituted by a highly interconnected network of towns is inhabited by over 700 thousand people (Provincia di Modena, 2022). This is one of the richest provinces in Italy in terms of GDP per capita, which in 2018 was estimated at €34,000 (Wickstrom & Alessandro, 2020). Modena is an attractive and rather open city for migrants, with a more welcoming context for

migrants compared to an average Italian city. Despite it is not a metropolitan-global city, it still provides many of economic opportunities for entrepreneurial newcomers, not only in Modena per se, but also in the towns of the larger urban area. A 'diffused urbanity of a dense network of small to medium production units' is a characteristic feature of Modena province that is called 'a Third Italy' (Semprebon, 2013, p. 583). The city itself has both industrial and cultural heritage. It is a seat of an archbishop—thus an important religious centre, and has an old university of Emilia-Romagna, founded in 12th century. Several factories and headquarters of Italian renowned sport cars, i.e. Ferrari, de Tomaso, Lamborghini, Pagani and Maserati are located in Modena. There are also many prominent meat packaging and catering companies, as well as textile and clothing industries. Both in terms of labour opportunities and welcome policies, Modena is regarded as one of the advanced economic 'ecosystems' in Italy (Centro di Ricerca Interdipartimentale su Discriminazioni e vulnerabilità (CRID)/De Vanna, interview, 2020).

Thus, immigration is not a new phenomenon in Modena. First, in the 1960s and 70 s internal migrants from Southern Italy stated arriving to the city to work in the industries. Since the early 90 s international immigrants began to settle here as well. In particular Albanians and Romanians, as well as migrants from North Africa. Overall, in the past 19 years their share has rapidly increased in the whole Modena province, as well as in the capital city, from 5.9% in 2001 to 16% in 2019 (Cantini, 2010; Regione Emilia-Romagna, 2019a). In early 2000s Modena was very diverse in terms of nationalities, with over 100 different origins. The most populous groups were Moroccans, Ghanaians, Albani ans, Filipinos, Tunisians, Romanians, Nigerians, Turkish and Ukrainians. And over the years the numbers of these nationalities have drastically increased from a few hundreds to thousands.

5.3.1 Diversity & Segregation

Modena is on the fifth place in Italy by the number of foreign residents (Regione Emilia-Romagna, 2019b). It hosts relatively large share of migrants from various countries. In 2012 there were 13,5% of migrants in Modena city, and by 2019 their share increased to 16%, counting 135 different nationality (own calculations based on Istat, 2021).

17.5% of foreign residents in Modena come from the EU-EFTA countries, while the vast majority are from third countries (Wickstrom & Alessandro, 2020). Among the most numerous groups residing in the city of Modena are North Africans (Moroccans, Tunisians), Eastern Europeans (Moldovans, Romanians, Albanians, Ukrainians), Sub-Saharan Africans (Nigerians and Ghanaians) as well as migrants from east and south-east Asian countries (Chinese and Filipinos) (see Table 5.3 below). Migrant children constitute about 20% of all foreign population and 20% of all children in the city. While until 2001, male migrants were the majority, in the recent years there are more female than male migrants (52,7%—female in 2019).

Table 5.3 Top 10 nationalities in Modena city 2012 and 2019

Nationalities in the commune	abs 2012	% of total migrants	Nationalities in the commune	abs 2019	% of total migrants
Morocco	2937	12.1%	Romania	3439	12%
Ghana	2592	10.7%	Morocco	2954	10%
Philippines	2478	10.2%	Philippines	2874	10%
Albania	2071	8.6%	Ghana	2428	8%
Romania	2028	8.4%	Albania	2158	7%
Moldova	1897	7.8%	Ukraine	1882	7%
Ukraine	1566	6.5%	Moldova	1728	6%
Tunisia	900	3.7%	Nigeria	1284	4%
Turkey	779	3.2%	China	1170	4%
China	710	2.9%	Tunisia	1096	4%
Total	24,216		Total	28,952	

Besides foreign citizens, there are also around 17% of foreign-born naturalized Italians living in Modena. Refugees and asylum seekers constitute less than 1% of the city's residents (Wickstrom & Alessandro, 2020), however it was still reported as a noticeable change in the city's population by the municipality.

The University of Modena and Emilia Romagna is a medium-size Italian university, and it does not host many international students. Most of the non-local students are southern Italians, while international students mostly come from African countries to study engineering or medicine.

According to our data (D4I, 2011), Modena is rather segregated. There are certain areas in the centre of Modena, and the neighbourhoods of the first line of periphery, where residents predominantly have migration background, either of the first or the second generation (CRID/De Vanna, interview, 2020). The municipality reports that one or two areas in the city are "dominated" by a single ethnic group (majority or minority) and that other people feel unwelcome or unsafe there (Wickstrom & Alessandro, 2020). For example, Sacca and Crochetta quarters are especially populated by migrant families. In the 1960s these were the quarters where the internal migrants from the South of Italy used to live, and now they have been replaced by international immigrants (CRID/De Vanna, interview, 2020).

5.3.2 Mobilities

Overall, migrants tend to settle in Modena, as 70% of those with regular statuses are long-term residents (Regione Emilia-Romagna, 2019b). It is an attractive city to live in, due to its relative wealth, vibrant entrepreneurial and business ecosystem, well-connected with other neighbouring towns, allowing all residents to benefit not only from the opportunities available in Modena commune, which consequently creates

a favourable economic climate—above an average Italian city (CRID/De Vanna, interview, 2020).

In the years before 2014 more people were arriving to the city than leaving. Especially steep increase was observed in the years 2001–2013, while recently the change was marginal of about +1,6%, because about the same amount of migrants are arriving to live in the city, as leaving it. Interestingly, most migrants immigrate to Modena from abroad, and lesser share comes from other Italian cities. While the situation is the opposite in terms of outward mobility: rather few migrants emigrate from Modena for abroad, and vast majority of leaving migrants move to other Italian cities (own calculations based on statistical data from Provincia di Modena, 2020).

A small number of people leave 1–2 years after arrival to Modena, if they did not manage to find a job, or experienced labour exploitation in the city, and root themselves in Modena, prefer to leave Italy. France is considered one of countries, most frequently referred to in migrant imaginaries as a potential destination of further migration for better opportunities. (CRID/De Vanna, interview, 2020).

5.3.3 Inequalities

As mentioned earlier, Modena has been welcoming migrant labour, predominantly in industrial and agricultural sectors for years. Since 2008 there has been a 25% increase in foreign employments in Modena province, compared to only 4.8% of increase for Italians. In the past 10 years, foreign population became a considerable workforce (Regione Emilia-Romagna, 2020).

However, the economic opportunities in these sectors also imply labour market stratification. Natives usually have higher qualifications and higher positions in the labour market occupational structure, such as lawyers, businessmen, doctors, university professors. On the contrary, migrants usually have lower paid jobs. Asian migrants, for instance Indians, Bangladeshi and Pakistanis often own small businesses, i.e. selling fruits and vegetables, groceries and household goods. Others are employed in the car factories or food industry. Another significant proportion of immigrants are employed in domestic cleaning services and care for children or elderly people. Such stratification results in noticeable difference in the levels of income between the 'native' Modenese and the residents with migration background (CRID/De Vanna, interview, 2020).

Migrant labour exploitation, especially in agricultural sector, is also an issues in Modena province. Even in the high-tech enterprises with good reputation there have been cases of modern slavery and abuse of migrants (CRID/De Vanna, interview, 2020). Modena holds the 82nd place among all Italian provinces according to the presence of agromafia and illegal labour employment of migrants, quite average in Emilia-Romagna (EURISPES, 2017; Vivo Modena, 2017).

In terms of education inequalities, in the past years, the refugees and asylum seekers arriving by boats seemed to have somewhat higher qualifications than before, with many having full secondary education, and even some with bachelor

degrees. Nevertheless, the majority of migrants seem to have lower levels of school education, and in some cases even without any schooling. Migrants that live in Modena already for 10–15 years, have relatively lower levels of education. However, their children very often follow general educational trajectories, with completion of the secondary level, and many also enrol to study at the universities too. A small part of local university students are either descendants of migrants from Modena or arrived to Modena as very young children and grew up here (so called 1.5-generation). A small share of international students from developing countries usually belong to middle or upper-middle class in their countries of origin. The rules of Italian universities provide a rather favourable opportunities to obtain an Italian higher education degree (CRID/De Vanna, interview, 2020).

Even though Modena sees itself as rather open city, a certain degree of discrimination and prejudice are still present there. Women of Muslim background are seen as the group most susceptible for social isolation (ICC Index, 2019), while Roma are reported to be one of the most vulnerable groups. Despite very high levels of socio-economic integration and assimilation, Albanians have been described as one of the most discriminated groups (King & Mai, 2009). Discrimination in the housing market is very pronounced for them as well as for African refugees, and in particular for single men. Often they live in small, depopulated villages of the province, where rents are cheaper, and commute long hours to the place of work (King & Mai, 2004). The 'refugisation' of public debate in Italy in the years 2014–2017, included hate-speech and negative stereotyping of boat-migrants, which incited prejudice among local Modenese. Since landlords are largely native Italians, they rarely agree to rent the house for Africans or African-looking people. However, this stereotypes did not seem to lead to violent conflicts between the locals and migrants (CRID/De Vanna, interview, 2020).

5.3.4 Political-Institutional Factors

From the 1990s the city has been governed by centre-left coalitions, and the current mayor is a member of Democratic party. The governance model in Modena is dominated by 'red political subculture' (Semprebon, 2013). It has been characterized by a stronger engagement of local authorities and local communities in political intervention and tackling of social issues, presence local welfare policies, as well as significant efforts in building local identity (Barberis, 2007). This climate has been quite stable in the 1970s and 1980s, however in the 80 s, public institutions had lost their organizational cohesiveness and had less capacity to address complicated challenges, such managing newly arriving immigrants. Around this time, other actors, such as labour unions (i.e. la Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) and catholic church-based organizations took on the role of alleviating the deficiencies of the public institutions (Barberis, 2007). They initiated migration-related events, pushed for new public initiatives and assisted immigrants. In the mid-1990s, the local administration regained its leading role, as electoral consensus was

reached. This new-found consensus on managing immigration led to the coordination of public and private interventions, which later made Modena a national model for the political handling of migration (Barberis, 2007). From the 2010's there has been a shift in the national political discussion on migration. With politics and mass media fuelling hate and stigmatization, it became a polarizing and sensitive issue also among Modena's local administration. Nevertheless, lately the pressure over immigration debate has de-escalated, given the outcome of regional election and the change of climate in the country over the past couple of years (CRID/De Vanna, interview, 2020).

Nowadays, Modena's local policies on reception and diversity are seen as progressive and experimental in Italy. The city is a member of an Italian network "Cittá del dialogo" and of the European council's network of Intercultural Cities (ICEI, 2020). This membership is valued by the municipality, which held public announcement of its participation in the ICC network in 2019 and organized several public meetings to raise awareness about immigration, reception and the methods of intercultural city's approaches to inclusion, diversity and participation. However, by the end of 2019 the city administration still did not have a clear long-term strategy of diversity and inclusion, and the demonstration of commitments towards interculturalism rarely publicly stated. The ICC report 2019 therefore, concludes that Modena is only marginally committed to interculturalism (Wickstrom & Alessandro, 2020).

The local approach to diversity and integration governance has two main features: it is strongly aligned with regional policies of Emilia Romagna, and it supports civil society initiatives and neighbourhood-level cooperation. Two regional laws (l.r. 5/2004) and (l.r. 2/2003) helped define the responsibilities of public actors and outline the new political mainstream of immigration management, also in the municipality of Modena (Barberis, 2007). Reception and intercultural policies stand in the central focus of the regional policy agenda, as well as in Modena city, which together with other larger cities of the region stands out by their pro-active and innovative governance approaches to incorporation of migrants (CRID/De Vanna, interview, 2020). Already in 2015, the city has collaborated with several third-sector volunteer organizations a project of family hospitality for non-accompanied minor migrants 'WelcHome'. It was rather experimental for that this, before the introduction of "Zampa law" in 2017, which normalized family incorporation practice for unaccompanied minors (Mercurelli et al., 2020).

Many NGOs and associations specialize on various aspects of integration in Modena: linguistic, cultural, and health care integration are among others. The municipality has been promoting immigrant consultation bodies as well as neighbourhood committees, in which both migrant and non-migrant residents are involved in welfare and safety initiatives (Semprebon, 2013). The city tries to facilitate between-neighbourhoods interaction among residents with different ethno-cultural backgrounds, by organizing thematic events, for instance the Migration Festival, some initiatives of culinary exchange, music, art and sport events. Some schools are also engaged in promoting intercultural project and parties, however, there is no unifying policy or recruitment plan for teachers for instance (Wickstrom & Alessandro, 2020). The municipality supports initiatives for Italian language

training for various groups as risk of social isolation, such as non-working mothers, unemployed or pensioners, and it supports associations and NGOs that teach language to foreigners (Wickstrom & Alessandro, 2020). There is a large variety of language course providers in the city, among which are associations, Christian organizations and NGOs (1), schools (2), employment agencies (3), reception cooperatives (for asylum seekers) (4), private paid language courses (5) and teachers training projects (6), however they still do not fully meet the demand, due to understaffing and non-professional training of the teachers, and lac of certification (de Vanna & Gentile, 2020).

There is no special policy of ethnic mixing in neighbourhoods, neither anti-segregation policy in Modena. But there is a specific Office for Legality and Security Policy, which intervenes in the segregated (even perhaps ghettoized) areas, to inform the newcomers to the city about the common rules of traffic and public behaviour in parks, by means of leaflets translated in various languages and neighbourhood consultations involving residents, social workers and the city authorities. The civil servants in the city of Modena are mainly Italians, and it does not reflect the diversity of city population, and the city does not have a special plan to encourage such inclusion of minorities in local government bodies (Wickstrom & Alessandro, 2020).

5.4 Rotterdam

Rotterdam is a historic port city of global importance and the second city in the Netherlands. Because of its status as a port city it has a very long migration history, with migration playing a central role in the emergence of the city in the 17th century. Over the past century, migration to and diversity in the city of Rotterdam has been related to its status as a major industrial power in Europe. The city has been a magnet for labour migration from Southern Europe and from specific countries as Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia. Also, the city hosts sizeable communities from former Dutch colonies, in particular from Surinam and the Antilles.

Currently, the city of Rotterdam is going through rapid postindustrial transformations (Dekker et al., 2015). As a postindustrial city, the urban economy has been diversifying significantly. This is also manifested in migratory patterns to Rotterdam, which increasingly include highly-educated labour migration in relation to Rotterdam's health sector, international businesses and the university. In this sense, Rotterdam clearly mirrors similar transitions in other postindustrial port cities of Europe, such as Hamburg and Liverpool.

However, these postindustrial transformations have also posed serious challenges to Rotterdam (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). Throughout most of its history, the labour market relied heavily on the high demand for manual labour in the port and in related industries such as ship building and oil processing. The automatization and outsourcing of these industries has come with relatively high levels of unemployment in the strongly working class city. The social and economic reforms

that the city has been going through since the 1950s and 1960s have also come with popular discontent.

The city of Rotterdam nowadays defines itself as a superdiverse city (see also Scholten et al., 2019, Van de Laar & Scholten, 2023). This has, however, not always been the case. As a working class city, there has not been so much acknowledgement of cultural diversity as there has been attention to socio-economic matters (in particular labour market participation and housing). However, since the end of the 1990s, cultural diversity has become a core theme in Rotterdam politics, bringing to the surface a bipolar relationship between the city and diversity. On the one hand, the rise of populism in the early 2020s brought to the surface a growing resentment against immigration and a desire to increase social cohesion in the city around a clear local identity. On the other hand, in the late 1990s and also since the late 2000s, the city has been more openly embracing superdiversity as a key part of Rotterdam's identity as a world port city. The coexistence of these two discourses have contributed to a high level of politicization of migration and diversity in the city.

The functional urban area of Rotterdam has grown significantly over the past decades. This is not only due to the growth of Rotterdam, but also immediately surrounding cities as Schiedam, Vlaardingen and Capelle Aan Den Ijssel. Within the larger urban area (also described as Regio Rijnmond), these cities are strongly interconnected not only in economic terms but also in terms of social structure and in terms of migratory patterns. Traditionally, migrants that originally settled in one of Rotterdam's working class neigborhoods gradually found their way into popular neighbourhoods in surrounding cities and municipalities. However, over the past decades the reverse migration pattern, from suburbs to Rotterdam, has emerged with the gentrification of Rotterdam.

5.4.1 Diversity and Segregation

The accumulation of different periods and types of migration makes Rotterdam into a highly diverse city. This is visible in the 148 different national origins represented in the urban population in 2011 (Table 5.4). Furthermore, whereas the share of migrants is already high when only accounting for the first generation (16,6% in 2011, increased to 29% in 2019), it is even higher when taking into account the direct descendants of these migrants as well, the so-called 'second generation.' Including this second generation, Rotterdam is one of the examples of a 'majority-minority' city where more than half of the population has a migration background (53% in 2019). As a traditional immigration city, the second generation of migrants is very significant (23%) when compared to the first generation of migrants (30%).

When looking at nationality, there are two groups that clearly stand out in Rotterdam: migrants with Polish or Turkish nationality. Both are groups that came to Rotterdam at first for labour migration and later increasingly in the form of family migration. Also when including migrants with Dutch citizenship (first or second

Table 5.4 Demographics of Rotterdam population, based on migration background, birth and citizenship

	Migration background	Foreign born	Citizenship
Of total population	52%	29%	12%
Surinam	8,2%	4,4%	0,1%
Turkiye	7,4%	3,4%	1,4%
Morocco	7,0%	3,0%	0,6%
Dutch Antilles	3,8%		
Capeverdes	2,4%	1,3%	
Indonesia	1,8%	0,6%	0,1%
Poland	1,6%	1,3%	1,4%
Germany	1,5%	0,6%	0,5%
Formal Yugoslav Republics	1,4%		
China	1,1%	0,8%	0,5%

generation), the Turks and Polish emerge as the largest groups in Rotterdam. However, what is clear from the figures on Rotterdam is that, apart from these two groups, there are many relatively sizeable migrant groups in the city. Several large groups are, however, not visible in figures based on nationality, as they have obtained Dutch nationality. This includes Rotterdammers of Surinamese descent, refugees from former Yugoslavia and a significant part of the Moroccan population.

This composition of Rotterdam's population is the product of several distinct periods of immigration. First, migrants who came from former Dutch colonies in the period after the Second World War are clearly present in the superdiverse city today, but not captured in the data as they often have Dutch citizenship. Secondly, the first period of labour migration in the 1950s and 1960s is still reflected amongst others in the presence of migrants from Italy, Spain and Portugal. Thirdly, the later and more substantial labour migration flows from across the Mediterranean are reflected in the presence of migrants from Turkey and Morocco. However, as the data show, these are no longer the dominant category that they are often assumed to be in public discourse. Fourthly, the main category nowadays reflects recent labour migration from within the EU, especially from Poland but also from Bulgaria. Finally, two other categories are also represented clearly in the data: Chinese and Syrians. Chinese have a very long history of migration to Rotterdam because of the port, but have recently also seen an increase in numbers in particular for expats and for study migration. Syrians reflect the most recent refugee migration in the late 2010s.

The city of Rotterdam has a much broader definition of migrants than what is used in the context of our study. It defines anyone who has at least one of her or his parents born outside of the Netherlands, as someone with a 'migration background.' This means that besides people of different nationality and born outside of the Netherlands, also those born outside of the Netherlands with Dutch nationality and those born in the Netherlands with parents born outside the Netherlands are considered 'migrants.' Here a distinction is often made between first- and

second-generation migrants. Also people with citizenship of one of the other EU member states are considered 'migrants' and included in statistics on migration.

Another characteristic of the diversity configuration in Rotterdam is a relatively high level of segregation. About 43% of the urban population would need to change location in order to achieve an equal distribution across the city in terms of national origin. The city's history as a port city offers a major explanation for this segregation. Migrants settled in particular in neighbourhoods with relatively cheap and accessible housing. These were often neighbourhoods developed specifically for harbour workers and workers in related industries. Various of such neighbourhoods can be found in the south of the city, as well as in the west of Rotterdam near Schiedam. Here Rotterdam reflects a similar pattern that is often found in port cities around the world where neighbourhoods for port workers gradually evolved into migrant neighbourhoods and to a relatively high level of segregation as compared to non-port cities.

5.4.2 Mobility

As a port city, Rotterdam has always been as much a city of arrival as a city of departure. In fact, during most of the 18th, 19th and early 20th century, Rotterdam was one of Europe's main hubs for departure of migrants from all over Europe to various destinations, such as the US, Canada, Brazil, South-Africa, Australia and of course the former Dutch East-Indies (now Indonesia). Much of the inner-city's infrastructure has for a long time been designed for this 'floatingness' of the population, providing at the same time home to short-term migrants who were just passing through Rotterdam as well as to newly arrived migrants that wanted to find work and settle in Rotterdam.

Even today, Rotterdam a city of migration rather than just a city of immigration or emigration. The level of emigration is almost just as high as the level of immigration (Scholten et al., 2019).

5.4.3 Inequality

Migration reinforced inequalities that already existed in Rotterdam's social, economic and spatial structure as a working-class city. Especially since the 19th and 20th century, most migration to Rotterdam was connected to the strong demand for low-skilled labour in local port-related industries. This also put migrants in a vulnerable position in the context of the postindustrial restructuring of the urban economy, bringing a relative decrease in demand for low-skilled labour. Rotterdam has a relatively high level of unemployment when compared to other cities in the Netherlands: 13%. However, unemployment is significantly higher in neighbourhoods with migrants and amongst specific migrant groups, such as Surinamese

(17%), Turks (20%), Moroccans (26%), Somalians (47%) and Syrians (69%). Interestingly, unemployment amongst recent migrants is lower (10%).

These inequalities are also reflected in strong differences in average household income levels. Rotterdam on average is already significantly below the average household income for the Netherlands (3 k euro less). However, within Rotterdam, the differences are very significant as well, especially for Surinamese (−2,9 k euro), Turks (−4,6 k euro), Moroccans (−6,4 k euro) and Syrians (−11,4 k euro). Also Polish migrants who are relatively often employed do earn less than average Rotterdam households (−3,4 k euro).

These inequalities also have a distinct spatial dimension in Rotterdam. The most pertinent example is the south of Rotterdam where many migrants settled in working class neighbourhoods that had been erected over the last century. The south of Rotterdam was even declared a 'problem area' of national importance, deserving a National Program Rotterdam South that was established in 2011 and is still ongoing. This program involves a strong investment from national government in a very intensive household level approach towards promoting the participation of all inhabitants of the south, migrants as well as non-migrants.

The postindustrial reform of Rotterdam's economic and social structure has put migrants in a vulnerable position. It also seems to have reinforced labour competition between the migrant working class and the 'native' working class. A clear relation can thus be found between these postindustrial transitions and the rise of populism in Rotterdam. In spite of most migrants and populist voters sharing a relatively similar socio-economic position, cultural diversity surfaced as an issue of contestation in the context of broader socio-economic competition. This is in itself not only a recent phenomenon; research suggests that racial tensions in Rotterdam in the 1970s were also manifestations of competition for affordable housing between migrants and non-migrant working class (Dekker et al., 2015).

This tension around cultural diversity is also manifested in reports and incidents of discrimination. Besides discrimination based on skin colour or appearance (racism), discrimination based on religion also plays a significant role in Rotterdam. This involves in particular discrimination of Muslims. It is, however, very difficult to identify clear trends in racism and Muslim-discrimination; some figures indicate an increase in both forms of discrimination, but increasing awareness and sensitivity concerning these forms of discrimination, and a better organization of receiving formal notification of discrimination, may also explain why more cases are revealed in data than before (RADAR, 2018). The issue of anti-Islam attitudes has been brought to the foreground in Rotterdam politics also with the rise of two parties that receive support primarily from the local migrant population (DENK and NIDA). Furthermore, in 2020 Rotterdam was one of the main sites of mobilization for the Black Lives Matter movement in Rotterdam, triggering an intensification of Rotterdam's anti-racism approach.

The economic revival of Rotterdam since the 2000s does seem to enhanced the socio-economic position of migrants. Across the entire local population, the level of unemployment has been decreasing significantly. At the same time, the diversifying local economy also provides new opportunities for migrants. This includes the rise

of large multinational companies that attract migrants amongst others from other EU countries, China, the Middle East and the US. Also, study migration is an increasing factor of importance, related to the Erasmus University Rotterdam as well as various other higher education institutions in the city. The city has also seen an increase in ethnic entrepreneurship.

5.4.4 Political Institutional Factors

Rotterdam's background as a postindustrial working-class city is also reflected in local politics. It has traditionally been conceived as a stronghold of the Social Democrat Party, ruling the City Council uninterruptedly from the Second World War up until 2002. This Social-Democrat tradition is also clearly reflected in local policies towards migration and diversity. Since the late 1970s, the city has focused primarily on socio-economic integration, emphasizing in particular the importance of housing and participation.

A major breakthrough in local politics and policies was when the local populist party Liveable Rotterdam took over power for the periods 2002–2006 and later again 2014–2018. This set a very different tone on immigration and diversity. A key policy change involved a so-called 'Rotterdam Law' that set a certain socio-economic threshold for people settling in specific neighbourhoods in order to prevent further segregation (originally the city even tried to set an ethnic threshold for specific neighbourhoods). Also, a civic code was installed, a 'Rotterdam code' that specified guidelines for social interaction in the city.

The rise of populism coincided with a rise of an ethnic factor in local politics. Two parties emerged that both drew support mainly from Rotterdam's population with a migration background; DENK and the Islamic party NIDA. This signals the bipolarity in Rotterdam's approach towards diversity, where very different discourses on diversity co-exist.

Since 2018, the local policy approach has again taken a turn towards a more superdiversity embracing direction. Under the banner of 'Relax, this is Rotterdam' superdiversity is taken as a social fact, something that is there, and that the city can best deal with in the best ways possible. In this context Rotterdam has also significantly upped its efforts to fight racism in the city, and to bring diversity more to the foreground in the operations of the city administration itself (Van de Laar & Scholten, 2023).

In relation to other levels of governance, Rotterdam has at various moments played a pioneering role in developing policy initiatives locally that would later become adopted as national policies. At the end of the 1970s, Rotterdam adopted an 'Integration Policy' before Dutch government announced its first national policy only in the early 1980s. But perhaps most importantly, Rotterdam initiated civic integration programs for newcomers already in the late 1980s (with the Project Inburgering Nieuwkomers, PIN). This civic integration approach would not only become the core of national integration policies in the Netherlands since the 1990s,

but would also become adopted in Europe more broadly. Similarly, Rotterdam managed to change national policies in the 2000s in order to enable de-segration, by triggering a national law that is commonly described as the Rotterdam Law. So, Rotterdam clearly does not fit into a pattern of cities simply implementing national policies, it has in various ways been a laboratory for new policy initiatives.

In sum, Rotterdam's position as a city within category II (high diversity, high segregation) seems to be a manifestation of its postindustrialist background. As a world port city, Rotterdam has always been a city of arrival as well as departure. Its current diversity composition reflects various different migrant episodes in recent history. Furthermore, migration has reinforced already existing inequalities in the working class city, in terms of labour as well as housing. This is still reflected amongst others in relatively high levels of segregation today, especially in the south of the city. The postindustrial transition of the city have put migrants as well as the native working class in a vulnerable position, providing a trigger of polarization and the rise of populism. With the revival of Rotterdam's economy since the 2000s, the position of migrants has improved and new opportunity structures have emerged for an increasingly diversified (low-educated as well as high-educated) group of migrants. Rotterdam is gradually coming to terms with 'super-'diversity and gentrification seems to lead to a gradual decrease of segregation; it is likely that further postindustrial transformations will push Rotterdam more closely to category I cities with high diversity and low segregation.

5.5 Analysis of Cluster II Cities

The cities that emerged in our analysis of urban data as cluster II are cities with relatively high diversity and relatively high levels of segregation. Although varying in terms of city size and the size of the migrant population, the cities in this category tend to have comparable diversity levels to cluster I cities but higher levels of segregation. As case studies, we selected four cities, one from each of the selected countries: Ingolstadt (GER), Modena (ITA), Nîmes (FRA) and Rotterdam (NL) (Table 5.5).

Our in-depth qualitative analysis of these cities revealed that the configuration of migration-related diversities as well as the governance responses to diversities reflect the mostly industrial and postindustrial character of the cities. The relatively high levels of diversity reflect various groups of labour migrants that have come to these cities to work for instance in the car and airline industries of Ingolstadt, the textile industry or tourist sector of Nîmes, the car factories of Modena or the harbour of Rotterdam. This includes amongst others workers from central and eastern European countries, from Mediterranean countries and 'guestlaborers' from Turkey or Morocco. Labour migration has been a dominant part of most of the migration history of these cities, although most cities do reveal a recent diversification of migration. This diversification can be seen as an indicator of postindustrialization and social and economic diversification.

Table 5.5 Summary table of comparison of cluster II cities

Cities	Mobility	Mobility	Mobility	Inequality	Inequality	Inequality	Inequality	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Diversity	Diversity	Segregation 2019 recent
Cities	History	Level and temorality	Types of flows	Urban development/ opportunity struc	Discrimination	Income inequal	Education inequality	Targeted (towards what/ who?)	Local leadership	Type of policy approach	Relationship with regional level	Right-left orientation	Number of various origins	Volume	Current level of segreation
Ingolstadt (DE)	Medium	Inflow settlement	Labour migrants, professionals repatriates, students, refugees recently	Strong economic stance, narrow sector (industry)	High, esp turkish and moroccan	High	Present, but evening out	Targeted to refugees and mulsims, recently more cohesion policies	A lot	Integration > diversity	Bottom up + collab	Centre-right , recent change to left	High	High	High
Modena (IT)	Medium	Inflow, settlement	Labour migrants, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, refugees, eu labour migr various skill levels	Strong economic stance , broad sector	High, esp albanians, roma and black	High	Present, but evening out	Targeting on refugees and segregated neighbourhoods; more intercultural neighbourhood governance recently	Some	Integration > interculturalism	Bottom up	Centre-left	Very high	High	High
Nimes (FR)	Medium	Inflow, settlement	Post-colonial and labour migrants	Post-industrial city in economic decline	Anti-immigrant sentiment (visible in fn votes)	High inequality linked with job and residence	High inequality	Deprived areas	Hands off	Universalist	Bottom-up	Centre-right	Medium	Moderate	High
Rotterdam (NL)	Long	Highly mobile populations, immigration keeps increasing, so does emigration	All kinds of labour migrants, increasing numbers of highly-skilled, post colonial and humanitarial migration	Diversification of economy in recent years, after a pariod of post-industrial restructuring	Discrimination of muslim and black	Moderate high	Moderate high	No targeting, but some specific measures for refugees	A lot	From integrationist >> to diveristy inclusive	Bottom up	Shifting from centre-left to right-wing populism	Very high	High	More segergated

This postindustrial character of these cities is also related to the segregation that we identified in these cities. Industrialization in these cities often brought very specific neighbourhoods with large-scale social housing, which over time became more and more inhabited by (often low-paid) labour migrants. This applies to specific working-class neighbourhoods such as Sacca and Crochetta in Modena, the southern part of Rotterdam, Pissevin in Nîmes, and the Nordwest of Ingolstadt. The cities resemble each other in a way that is very visible today and that has reinforced an intersection of class differences, residential segregation and migration-related diversities.

As a consequence of this intersection, inequalities play an important role in how migration-related diversities take shape in these cities. On the one hand, postindustrial cities bring many economic opportunities that attract labour migrants, as is still very visible in most of the city cases (especially Rotterdam, Ingolstadt and Modena). On the other hand, Nîmes as well as to some extent the other cities also reveal the social and economic vulnerabilities of labour migrants. Not only are they overrepresented in low-paid labour, they are also particularly vulnerable for shifts in economic circumstances.

A particular vulnerability concerns discrimination of migrants. We found concerns on discrimination in most of the city cases of this category, often targeted at very specific groups of labour migrants such as eastern-European laborers, Muslim and Black migrants. Also, for instance in Modena but also in Rotterdam, low-paid labour migrants have been vulnerable for exploitation.

Although postindustrial cities historically tend to be leaning to the left-side of the political spectrum, we see that in two cities (Rotterdam, Nîmes) have gradually moved to a more centre-right orientation over the last decade or so. Especially in Rotterdam and Nîmes, the issue of immigration has also played a central role in this shift. In Modena we see a consistent centre-left orientation, even despite increased securitizing discourse of national politics. Interestingly, in Ingolstadt we see a reversed trend, from a traditionally centre-right local politics towards the leftist orientation in the latest elections.

Finally, what is clear from our city analyses is that cluster II cities seem to have a combination of targeted and mainstreaming governance approach. The targeted aspect possibly stems from social and economic problematization of migrants in these cities, leading mostly to integration approaches that focus on housing, education, language training and participation. Ingolstadt, Modena and Rotterdam have been very active in integrating migrant population in a collaborative manner together with civil society. In the recent years a paradigmatic shift is emerging in these cities, in which years of integration policy are being replaced with interculturalist diversity governance, where there is more emphasis on interconnectivity between ‘natives’ and ‘migrants’ and joint community governance.

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Chapter 6
Cities Cluster III: Low Diversity and High Segregation

The third cluster of cities of migration involves cities with relatively low diversity but relatively high levels of segregation. So, cities that are segregated but not so diverse. Also for this cluster we selected, based on the quantitative analysis from Chap. 3, four cities that are median to this category: Plauen (GER), Cosenza (ITA), Leeuwarden (NL) and Vannes (FRA).

The selected cities for this cluster are relatively small in comparison to the categories 1 and 2 that were discussed in previous chapters. Vannes is the smallest city in this category, with just over 53.000 inhabitants, and Leeuwarden is the largest with just over 123.000 (Table 6.1). The diversity index is low for each of the cities; all four cities have a diversity index of 0.10 or lower. However, segregation is relatively high. Plauen and Vannes have a segregation index of 0.32 and 0.34 respectively, whereas Cosenza and Leeuwarden even have higher indexes of 0.4 and 0.47 respectively.

6.1 Plauen

Plauen is a relatively small town located in east-central Germany, in Saxony, near the border with Czech Republic, and it used to be part of former Eastern Germany. Lace production has been in the centre of urban economy since early XX century. Plauen reached its population peak in the 1910s, as a boomtown (128 thousand inhabitants). The lace-production has massively shrunk since then, and there are only about 10 companies working together under the Plauen Lace trademark, employing around 200–250 workers (DW Akademie, 2020). Since the second world war, the number of the city population has been shrinking, as has the job opportunities. Unemployment rate however has also been going down, which could be traced back to the exodus of young people. In 2008 the town lost its status of a district-free city and became the central city within the Vogtland district (Vogtlandkreis). Currently there are around 64.600 inhabitants in the city of Plauen (Stadt Plauen,

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Table 6.1 Comparative table for cluster III cities

city name	population of 2019	share of migrants (%) 2019	Nominal GDP (PPP) per capita 2019	Mean household income (PPP) 2019	Employment: Agriculture (%) 2019	Employment: Industry (%) 2019	Employment: Services (%) 2019	Unemployment rate (%) 2019
Cosenza	66,107	5,91%	23,914 €	22,859 €	12,63	14,56	72,79	21,00
Leeuwarden	123,107	4,16%	na	38,900 €	na	na	na	1,67
Plauen	64,931	na	43,073 €	41,593 €	1,19	35,81	62,98	3,89
Vannes	53,719	5,30%	na	na	na	na	na	na

2019). Besides laces, there is also a MAN factory (bus and lorry manufacturing), which for years has been under the risk of closing down ("Plauen bangt um MAN-Standort", 2020).

The history of migration in Plauen is connected with labour recruitment schemes of former Eastern Germany. From 1960s onwards, labour migrants from other socialist countries (Algeria, Mozambique and Vietnam) were coming to Plauen, and many worked in the textile industry. After the fall of the communist regime, and the reunification of Germany, most of them were forced to leave because they had to prove they could live without the support of the state. Those who stayed started their own businesses because with de-industrialisation many lost their jobs in disappearing industries. While in 1989 there were still 1500 Vietnamese migrants living in the city, only a tenth of those were still in the city in 2008. In 2011, the Vietnamese residents still form the largest group of migrants. In the early 90 s, around 3200 repatriates ('Spätaussiedlers) from Soviet countries, and in particular Kazakhstan, came to Plauen. The majority of them have settled in the city in the early 2000s, and about a third in the 90 s. Around 500 are still estimated to live in Plauen (Friedrich & Böhmer, 2011).

6.1.1 Diversity & Segregation

Nowadays, relatively few migrants live in the city of Plauen. According to the 2011 census (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2011), only 5.8% of the population had a migration background: 4.1% were naturalized German citizens and 1.7% had foreign citizenship. In the 2018, there were over 4000 foreigners living in the city ("Gemeindestatistik 2019 für Plauen, Stadt", 2019a), indicating an increase from 1.7% to around 7%.

It seems that Plauen has undergone rather striking changes in terms of migrant population in the past decade. In 2011, around 40% population with migration background was born in the former Soviet Union countries, in particular Kazakhstan. They represented the group of repatriates (Spätaussiedlers)[1] ethnic Germans that were offered special permission to resettle to their historical motherland after the fall of the Berlin wall. Vietnamese migrants, who arrived in the times of GDR, and ethnic Germans from Soviet Union constituted the largest 'migrant' groups (Pl1_ interview) in the first decade of twenty-first century. Since 2015, the ethnic composition has changed, due to the arrival of around 800 Syrian asylum seekers (Ruf, 2015). The diversity of migrant origins in Plauen is also rather small, with the largest groups being either naturalized Germans of Soviet Union or Vietnamese origin, and Syrians, who arrived more recently.

[1] Ethnic Germans which were invited to resettle back to their historical motherland, and got naturalized.

According to our own calculations, residential segregation in Plauen is moderately pronounced, indicated by a segregation index of 0.32—more than on average (D4I,2011). However, informants in the city mentioned no area that is particularly segregated. The more established groups of migrants (Vietnamese and Soviet Union re-settlers) are well distributed across the city. There is no recent information available on the segregation patterns between migrants and non-migrants in Plauen. Perhaps, it is worth mentioning that right-wing voters are particularly strong in the neighbourhoods Haselbrunn and Preißelpöhl, areas on the periphery with low rents and a history of social disadvantage. The Dritte Weg, a neonazi party, has an office here, and there are several pubs and clubs that are meeting places for neo-nazis (RomaRespekt, 2019).

6.1.2 Mobilities

Plauen is characterized by a rather low fluidity of migrant population. According to the data of 2011 census, the majority of Plauen's residents with migration background have been living in the city over 10 years (52%), about a third lived there between 5 and 9 years (27,5%) and 17% less than 5 years. In the years 2016 and 2017 the district of Vogtlandkreis (where Plauen is located) was a transit area (a place of passage) for asylum seekers arriving to Germany from the southeastern neighbours (Pl1_interview). In this period about 800 asylum seekers were hosted in the town (Ruf, 2015). In the first decade of twenty-first century, refugees only stayed in Plauen till they got their status, and left the city soon after (Friedrich & Böhmer, 2011). However, this seemed to have changed, as according to the latest information Plauen hosts 80% of all refugees in Vogtlandkreis and they seem to settle in the city (Pl1_interview). Since Plauen is the largest city in the Vogtlandkreis, migrants tend to stay and settle there. Also, refugees who were encouraged to settle in surrounding villages tend to move to Plauen, as there is a stronger community here (Pl1_interview; Pl2_interview).

Before 2011, about the same number of migrants were coming to Plauen as leaving, though net migration was negative until 2008. Since 2010, general flows of international mobility have risen as did the overall number of migrant residents. In that period there were more migrants arriving and settling in Plauen, than departing.

6.1.3 Inequalities

There is no available data about income or education differences between residents with and without a migration background in Plauen. The general income level in the Vogtlandkreis is very low for both migrants and non-migrants. The late-repatriates (Spätaussiedler) arriving in the 90 s and 2000s had difficulties having their previous degrees and qualifications recognized. A lack of knowledge of the German language

and difficulties in having pre-migration diplomas recognised has inevitably led to most of them entering lower skilled jobs. As a result, many of them were underemployed for a long time. Currently, late repatriates tend to work in the same sectors as Germans do, however their integration trajectory has been full of challenges related to language and the recognition of qualifications. In the past there were a lot of education initiatives for this group aimed at facilitating their labour-market integration. Vietnamese migrants, who stayed in Plauen after the reunification of Germany, have shifted from industry jobs into small entrepreneurship predominantly in the trade of fruit, vegetables, and clothes.

The more recent refugee migrants are also likely to experience difficulties in labour market integration, as there are not many job opportunities in the town in general. The question of qualification recognition and language knowledge are expected to be relevant obstacles still. From the side of the employers there is a general scepticism to hiring foreigners, and the municipality is trying to address this issue. Employment prospects of women are hindered also by the lack of child-care facilities, which binds them to stay and home and take care of small children (Pl1_interview).

Plauen is characterised by a strong right-wing scene (Ruf, 2015), with the supporters of neo-nazi and right-wing parties targeting refugees. From 2014, asylum seekers experienced several attacks and a there were reported a series of fires targeting foreigners.[2] According to the integration officer of the Vogtlandkreis (Pl1_interview), the popularity of right-wing parties does not dominate the overall reception climate in Plauen because there are also many people who support diversity and welcome refugees. The right-wing parties and their efforts to mobilise youth against migrants are considered an inevitable consequence of democratic society, and are tolerated. The web-site of the neo-nazi party "The third way" (der dritte weg) is actively engaged in framing migrant residents of Plauen as criminals threatening public security. However, there have not only been confrontations with the neo-nazis, but also reports of tensions between groups of migrants (Jubelt, 2018), which are also viewed by the press as undermining public safety.

6.1.4 Political-Institutional Factors

The municipal council is quite diverse and includes members of centre, right and left parties of Germany. The biggest party in the 2019 elections was the CDU (23.7%), followed by AFD (20%). 'Die Linke' and the SPD on the left gathered 14% of votes each. Besides, FPD (liberal party) with 10%, a Green party and the Dritte weg extreme right party are also represented (Statistisches Landesamt des Freistaates Sachsen, 2019b). In the 90 s until 2000, a CDU mayor Rolf Magerkord was in the lead. While from 2000 till now Ralf Oberdorfer from the pro-business

[2] https://www.mdr.de/sachsen/chemnitz/vogtland/brandstiftung-plauen-100.html

liberal party (FDP) has been in power. The right-wing scene in Plauen was present sine years and was declining until 2014, when it gained in popularity again with the surge of asylum seekers arrivals. Particularly the party The third way ("der dritte Weg") has gained supporters and even got one seat at the city council. Since 2015, Plauen has become their base for the border region between Saxony, Bavaria and Thuringia. 'Der Dritte Weg' particularly attempts to finance youth clubs to gain followers, however is not seen as a big threat in the local administration but rather a part of political pluralism of modern democracies (Pl1_interview).

Since 1991 local diversity governance has been institutionalized in the form of official position "Ausländerbeauftragte" (Foreigner's official). However, municipality's competences in this area are limited because Plauen is not an independent city (Kreisfreie Stadt). Moreover, since immigrant integration is a politically contested topic in the whole region (not just in Plauen) it is therefore easier that these issues are decided at the Landkreis level (Pl2_interview). Thus, integration and diversity policies are primarily defined at the provincial level (Landkreis). Frau Glitzner has been Vogtland's integration officer from 2007 onwards. Since, Plauen is the administrative centre of the Vogtlandkreis, the provincial integration office is located in the city too. The city-level foreigners' official is a contact point for the provincial migrant integration officer, and their task is to represent the perspective of migrants in the meetings of the city council and coordinate integration courses, that are offered on a yearly basis.

The city does not have a specific approach to integration and due to the low numbers of arrivals handles the issue on a case-to-case basis (Friedrich & Böhmer, 2011). Late-repatriates have been the primary focus of attention of integration governance until 2015, when the focus shifted to the asylum seekers from Syria and other countries (Pl1_interview). Labour market integration seems to be the primary target area of governance in Plauen. Since the city does not offer many job opportunities in general, it is rather hard for migrants to find employment. The municipality tries to work with employers to address the bias in hiring foreigners. Besides, the Vogtland administration is striving to increase employability of women, who are facing obstacles related to child-care obligations, in the context where child-care provision is limited (Pl1_interview).

In the Vogtland province and Plauen, as its main town, there are some evidence of civil society engagement in the migrant integration governance. The province receives funding for the projects in the field of migrant integration and diversity from the Free state of Saxony as well as from national funding programmes. They work closely with the local civil society organisations and education providers to distribute these funds in Plauen and other towns of Vogtland (Pl1_interview). For instance, there is a network of social and religious organisations operating in the field of integration, which has been established in the 1990s primarily to support integration of late-resetlers from Soviet Union; the focus of the network expanded to include other types of migrants in 2005. Twice a year a meeting between the relevant municipal actors and the Plauen Job Centre takes place. Provincial initiative Land.Zuhause.Zukunft of the Robert Bosch Stiftung funded integration courses

for newcomers, as well as smaller projects on integration (Vogtlandkreis, 2020). Besides, the federal state of Saxony launched an initiative to provide housing for asylum seekers by paying the owners ("Weiter Wohnraum für Flüchtlinge im Vogtland gesucht", 2015). Another relevant actor in the province is "Partnership for democracy", which receives national funds for coordination and funding of projects aimed at promoting diversity and democracy and preventing extremism (Vogtlandkreis, 2020), while some foundations, i.e. Unikat e. V. are dedicated support traditional crafts oriented to facilitate integration of women.

To conclude, Plauen is a small town in the phase of economic and demographic decline, that has recently faced a sharp increase in the relative share of immigrants. While the city as a whole struggles to providing employment opportunities for everyone, local Germans feel threatened by the newly arrived, which is expressed in the rising support of extreme-right parties, and a rather hostile environment for migrant incorporation. Local governance of diversity is largely dependent on the provincial administration. Its main focus is labour market and housing inclusion of refugees, however, it is managed mainly on individual basis due to low numbers.

6.2 Vannes

Vannes is the smallest of selected cities for this study, with around 53.000 inhabitants (although the broader agglomeration, Golfe du Morbihan—Vannes has a broader population of 173,461). Vannes itself is a small market town on the coast in Brittany, with an old historic center and a small harbour within a predominantly agricultural region. The level of immigration for Vannes has, also compared with other French cities, always been rather low. Just as most French cities, Vannes has experienced immigration from former French colonies or territories, such as Algeria. In addition, there has been some migration of Turkish guestlabourers since the 1970s, followed by family migration (Guillou & Wadbled, 2004), as well as some more recent labour migration from within the EU.

6.2.1 Diversity and Segregation

In 2017, 3453 persons out of a total population of 53,352 were foreign-born (about 6,5%). For the broader Agglomeration, this was far less, at 3,6% in 2020 (see Table 6.2). Populations from African countries and Algeria and Morocco are the largest, as in most French cities. The Turkish population is relatively large when compared to other French cities. With a segregation score of 0.34 Vannes is relatively segregated when compared to other cities, although less segregated than some of the other cities from cluster III.

Table 6.2 Demographics of Vannes, based on nationality and country of birth

	Nationality	Birth
All	2,6%	3,6%
Other African nations	0,4%	0,7%
Other nationalities	0,4%	0,8%
Other EU countries	0,3%	0,5%
Turkiye	0,3%	0,4%
Author European countries	0,3%	0,5%
Morocco	0,1%	0,2%
Portugal	0,1%	0,1%
Italy	0,1%	0,1%
Algeria	0,1%	0,2%
Tunisia	0,1%	0,1%
Spain	0,0%	0,1%

(INSEE, 2020, data from 2020; Golfe du Morbihan—Vannes Agglomeration)

6.2.2 Mobilities

Vannes, as many places in Brittany, has a history of domestic and international emigration rather than immigration (Morillon, 2006). Over the past decades, only in the 1980s and 1990s Vannes had a positive balance where more people moved to Vannes than people that left, either domestically or internationally (Vannes, 2017). Since the 2000s this 'migration' balance follows once again a negative trend. Combined with population ageing, this has important demographic consequences for Vannes (Vannes, 2017).

Looking at the main foreign-born populations in Vannes, most groups largely reflect the migration history of most French cities. This includes a strong presence of postcolonial migrants from North African and Sub-Saharan African countries, as well as more recent labour migrants from within Europe. For the former group, Vannes constructed large collective housing facilities in the 1960s and 1970s for housing repatriates from Algeria. For the latter category, the agricultural sector around Vannes has been an important source of employment.

The relatively large Turkish population in Vannes reflects a period of labour migration from Turkey in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s (Guillou & Wadbled, 2004). These arrived primarily as builders but also worked in the agricultural sector and in some local industries (including the Michelin factory).

6.2.3 Inequalities

Vannes is a relatively segregated city, which appears reflected to the urban development of the city in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when new neighbourhoods were constructed in peripherical areas of Vannes with collective buildings. This includes

neighbourhoods like Kercado, Menimur and Kerhoven. Both Kercado and Kerhoven have been priority urban zones (ZUP) in the past. Kercado was the neighbourhood where Algerian repatriates were housed in the 1960s and 1970s. It still has a relatively large immigrant population (about 25%; Contrat de Ville, 2015), and is associated with high levels of unemployment, low levels of income and relatively high levels of crime. Menimur, more to the North of the city, has about 15% immigrant population and also features mostly social housing. Kerhoven is a newer neighbourhood where the Michelin factory is currently located.

In terms of unemployment, data for the entire agglomeration show an average level of unemployment for those of French nationality; about 6% in 2020. However, unemployment is much higher for other nationalities, such as 15% for Turcs and for Portuguese, and 12% for Algerians. However, when compared to other French cases selected in this study, except from Paris these levels of unemployment are relatively low in comparison.

The Turkish population predominantly lives in Kercado and Menimur. According to Guillou and Wadbled (2004), the community in Vannes maintains strong intra-ethnic community ties, visible in support structures with in the Turkish community as well as in a broad variety of Turkish 'ethnic' businesses.

There is very little data and research available on discrimination in Vannes. However, the study of Guillou and Wadbled (2004) report that the majority of the Turkish population has experienced discrimination. Foulard wearing is reported as one of the objects of discriminations.

6.2.4 Political Institutional Factors

In general Vannes has always been a center-right city. The Republicans UMP hold a majority in the City Council (Diverse Droite/UMP), and most recent Mayors are from UMP. This includes the current mayor David Robo.

In line with the general French approach as well as with the UMP tradition in local government and politics, Vannes largely follows a universalist approach. There is no specific policy targeted at immigrants or the foreign-born population. The local approach leans on the general urban policy. There is a vice-mayor of social affairs, solidarity and urban policy (in 2020 this was Mohamad Azgag). As part of the 'Contrat de Ville' (Vannes, 2015) there are various programs that do not target immigrants but rather focus on social cohesion, including language training and social mixing in neighbourhoods to enhance cohesion and a program to prevent labour market discrimination. An example is the Communal Centre for Social Action (CCAS) that brings together a variety of generic measures for social participation and integration (or 'insertion'), including some targeted specific at refugees.

At a local and neighbourhood there is a variety of local citizens initiatives. This includes an initiative of a broad range of local NGOs to support recently arrived migrants. In addition, the local Turkish population is associated in the Turkish association ACTO Vannes.

In sum Vannes is a small and not so diverse city with relatively high levels of segregation, typical for this type of cities. This segregation reflects the urban development history of Vannes, with large scale collective buildings constructed in periods when also migrant labourers were attracted to low-paid jobs in the city (visible today in neigborhoords as Kercado and Menimur). This leads to an intersection between housing, inequalities and also reports of discrimination. Furthermore, Vannes has historically rather been a center for emigration, domestically as well as internationally.

6.3 Cosenza

The Cosenza urban area has a population of around 250 thousand inhabitants, and the city centre around 70 thousand. Between 2012 and 2019 urban population numbers have slightly declined The region of Calabria, where Cosenza is situated, was historically a region of emigration (I.Stat, 2020). Many Italians have been leaving their homes to work abroad or in the North and Centre of Italy since 50 s–60 s of the XX century. Nowadays, Cosenza and its neighbouring towns had the highest per capita incomes in the region Calabria (as per estimation of tax return in 2011). A large fraction of the Cosenza workforce is employed in public and private services. This better economic position of the province in the region attracted more international migrants in the past decades, resulting in diversification of its population. Since 2002 till 2012, the share of immigrants has increased four times. Even though the numbers in the region of Calabria are far below the national average, their presence is very noticeable and discussed in the media, due to the rapid growth of their numbers in the past couple of decades (Sarlo et al., 2014).

Consenza considers itself a 'solidarity' city open for immigration, and has a history of reception of migrants and asylum seekers from at least the 1990s. Like in the whole region of Calabria, a significant proportion of migrants have been arriving from the Mediterranean sea, crossing by boats (D'Agostino, 2017). Even though Cosenza is not a port city, where the migrants arrive at the first instance, the issue of reception has been rather prominent throughout the years (Cosenza Immigration Office, interview, 2021). Many fled falling state regimes and war, in the 1990s— from Albania when the communist regime fell there, in 2000s people have fled from the countries of North and Sub-Saharan Africa torn by revolts, armed conflicts, bad governance and poverty (D'Agostino, 2017). Kurdish people also started arriving to the reception centres in Cosenza and the rest of the Calabria province in the 1990s. Besides, the city has a long tradition of informal reception of Roma people and Romanians. (Cosenza Immigration Office, interview, 2021). Among them were some labour migrants employed in seasonal agricultural activities or in the tourism sectors and asylum seekers. Many migrants have been either staying for a short period of time, or just passing through in the years 2002–2012 (Sarlo et al., 2014).

Table 6.3 Top-10 nationalities in Cosenza

Top-10 nationalities in the municipality	abs 2019	% of total migr.
Romania	1046	25%
Philippines	738	17%
Ukraine	400	9%
China	229	5%
Morocco	201	5%
Poland	174	4%
Nigeria	142	3%
Russia	112	3%
Albania	108	3%
Iraq	97	2%
Total	4240	

Source: own calculations based on I.Stat, 2019

6.3.1 Diversity & Segregation

The volume and variety of migrant population in the city of Cosenza is rather limited. In 2019 it constitutes 6.3% in 2019—an increase on around 2% since 2012. Top-3 nationalities constitute over 50% of all foreign population: Romanians (25%), Filipinos (17%) and Ukrainians (9%). Among the top-10 we can see Chinese, Eastern Europeans and North Africans (Table 6.3). Interestingly, nationals of Philippines reside mainly in the Cosenza commune and not in the province.

The proportion of female immigrants is the highest in Cosenza province compared to other provinces of the Calabria region and exceeds the number of male immigrants.

The last few years, with some groups settling in Cosenza province, the number of foreign children enrolled in schools has increased and in the years 2015–2016 constituted about 4% in all levels of schools. In the region of Calabria, the majority of these children are of Moroccan and Romanian origins, and fewer are of Ukrainian, Chinese, Polish, Filipino background (Regione Calabria, 2018). However, specifically in the city of Cosenza, it is likely that there are more Romanian, Filipino and Ukrainian children enrolled, reflecting the distribution of the nationalities.

Our own calculations of segregation levels in the Functional Urban Area[3] of Cosenza reveal relatively strong unevenness in residential patterns of migrants and locals (0.40—index of segregation). In previous research, Piana di Sibari has been regarded as the extreme place of residential segregation, where its unsustainable levels created higher risks of social conflicts (Sarlo et al., 2014). However, this area is located in the province, where the migrant population works in agriculture, and not in the municipality itself. In the urban centre, there is no perception of severe segregation because Consenza is small and the urban centre is accessible within 10 min (C1_interview). Still, significant concentration of migrants are encountered

[3] includes the city centre and the suburban areas adjunct to the city.

in the peripheries of the city, in the historical centre and in via degli Stadi, where the immigration office is located (Cosenza Immigration Office, interview, 2021).

Work opportunities in Cosenza—particularly in the service sector and domestic assistance—are concentrated in the urban centre. Therefore, people who work in the centre are privileged in their search for employment. In the centre of the city there is a large presence of women from refugee families that would like to find work; as well as of families that have settled in the city and attend local schools. Among migrants, there is a clear preference for cheaper accommodation solutions and areas that do not require a car for moving around but where public transport is available (C1_interview). Many houses in the historical centre are rented illegally on the black market and are very cheap. The disadvantaged groups of Romanians and Roma, who are often undocumented, live in those old houses with deteriorated sanitary infrastructure. This is the only area that is considered to be ghettoised.

6.3.2 Mobilities

Cosenza is the city of high international mobility of migrants. Relative to overall migrant population, between 13 and 16% of foreigners have either came or left Cosenza every year. During the past decade there were more foreigners arriving to Cosenza city, than leaving it. Larger proportion of migrants arriving to Cosenza come from abroad, and less so come from other municipalities in Italy. On the contrary, among those migrants leaving the city, most of them depart towards other municipalities in the countries, and not to abroad.

The city also sees quite a substantial emigration of young Italians, with about 50% of youth leaving to the North of the country or larger cities in the region. They describe Cosenza as a city of emigration rather than immigration (Cosenza immigration office interview, 2021).

The length of stay in Cosenza is varied for different groups of migrants, with drastic distinction between newly arrived refugees, EU migrants and regular non-EU migrants. Among migrants with regular status, 42% had a residence permit of long stay, while 58% held a short term residency, given mainly on the basis of employment (Sarlo et al., 2014). The proportion of migrants with long term residence permits has increased to 56% in 2016 (Regione Calabria, 2018). The migrants that received schooling and education in Calabria or have work-related residence permits tend to stay in the city for longer. Many migrants are interested in a more permanent resident permit, for example migrant women. Filipina migrant women, who often have been in Cosenza for 10–15 years, tend to apply for family reunification with their husbands and children and settle in the city.

However, most newly arrived migrants wish to ask for asylum and then leave the city and the region, in order to continue their journey elsewhere. It is particularly the case for families with children. For many migrants arriving to Cosenza, the life is very precarious especially for women and for those who are illiterate. All in all, it creates a rather fluid dynamics, and an air of a temporariness. Many migrants have

the idea that they can stay for a year or two in an accommodation centre, while the project is funded, and then move on (C1_interview).

6.3.3 Inequalities

Official statistics shows that 33% of foreigners were registered in Cosenza as unemployed (Regione Calabria, 2018, p. 116). Generally, immigrants hold the lowest positions in the workforce (C1_interview). Labour market segmentation is also created by Italian national policies. For instance, nationals of Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania have difficulties of finding a stable employment, due to national policies limiting their access to the labour market. As a result, they mostly do informal work (i.e of collecting copper and selling it in the street), and many find themselves in very precarious situation (Cosenza Immigration Office, interview, 2021). Moreover, the region of Calabria has been characterized by multiple cases of labour exploitation, where migrants worked in inhumane and very hard conditions for very small pay (Sarlo et al., 2014, p. 8). A higher legal precarity of the foreign residents limits their rights and participation in all economic sectors of Cosenza (Cosenza Immigration Office, interview, 2021). Therefore, it could be inferred that there are significant differences in income between migrants and Italians, as well as between those who are employed informally and those having stable and legal job contracts.

Overall immigrants in Cosenza are employed in domestic services (household help, child and elderly care), agriculture, commerce, construction, restaurants, bars, and hospitality sector (Sarlo et al., 2014). The informality and precariousness of labour market, stimulates migrant entrepreneurship—as an alternative to employment. The establishment of ethnic enterprises heavily relies on migrant family and ethnic community ties, that support each other by accumulating resources, as well as providing training and work opportunities for co-ethnics (Saladino, 2015). In 2014 there were 4150 migrant enterprises (6.3% of all businesses) in Cosenza province, and the presence of 'immigrant' businesses is growing, while Italian entrepreneurship is declining. The majority of them are individual entrepreneurships, mainly in construction, hospitality business and restaurants. The enterprises are often owed by individuals born in Morocco (1.113 companies), China, and Pakistan—among non-European counties; and those from Germany (565) and Switzerland (273), who are regarded to be descendants of Italians, who emigrated to those countries after the WWII (Saladino, 2015). Moroccans are generally involved in the sector of wholesale and retail trade and reparation of cars, some are involved in import-export activities from Italy to Morocco, others are engaged in ethnic retail in Italy to fellow Moroccans, and yet others trade in mobile street kiosks (Saladino, 2015).

Domestic labour is performed largely by Eastern European female migrants, who are gradually substituting traditional Filipino workers. While the Filipina community is able to impose a fair price for their services, as they are organised, the eastern European female migrants are more on their own. Therefore, this substitution process has led to a phenomenon of quasi-slavery for eastern-European women

working in domestic care. These women often live in the houses that they work and must work night and day; such jobs are precarious, with low social prestige and are often paid in black (C1_interview).

The regional data about pensions, indicate that migrants from Germany, Switzerland, France Morocco, Canada, Argentina, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Albania are among those most frequently receiving some kind of pensions in Calabria (Regione Calabria, 2018). Receiving a pension is an indirect indicator of long term and legal settlement in the country. Thus, it can be concluded that in Cosenza these migrant nationalities are more socially protected then others.

In the context of general socio-economic precariousness, migrant ethnic communities provide security as well as maintain ties with tradition and culture (C1_interview). The two long-standing communities that are well organized and well represented in Cosenza are Senegalese and Filipina migrants. They are engaged in public sphere, have voluntary organizations, know how to defend their rights, and re-educate the general public about their role in the society. The active participation of Filipina migrants in the public space has helped develop structures which have supported other ethnic communities, such as female Moroccan and female Albanian migrants. These communities collaborate with the mayor and play a prominent role in public sphere. Nowadays there are also many Albanian and Romanian female migrants in Cosenza, but rather than engaging in civil society organizations their communities are tied together by a stronger role of family and religion. Senegalese and Maghreb communities also organize themselves on the basis of religion. In general, religion is a core aspect of the situation in Calabria regarding immigration (C1_interview).

In the recent years the fear of local residents towards arriving immigrants has increased, however this did not result in violence against immigrants (Cosenza immigration office, interview, 2021). Even though, it is difficult to generalize the attitudes, the municipality sees itself as welcoming rather than xenophobic. Nevertheless, there is a case of social isolation in Cosenza between immigrants and the Italians. Migrants, especially black, experience racism from the Italian population, even from young people at the universities. Even though, there are migrant associations that are very active in the field of re-education of young people about racism, there is still lot of work to do. This fundamentally stems from a lack of knowledge and lack of exposure (C1_interview).

Children and families that arrive in Cosenza have a clear difficulty with integration because they live inside their communities. This often has to do with a community strategy of co-ethnic support that serves to alleviate some hardships faced by migrants, such as supporting migrant university students who are often exhausted as they have to work alongside their studies. In the Muslim community they monitor the mosques and promote their religion and language. Thus, there is a process of *selective acculturation* as migrants try to take the best they can while remaining separated in the general community (C1_interview). Among the male temporary migrants working in agriculture, this situation largely results from the employers and corporals (*caporalato*—it.) who control the workers, organize their accommodation and labour conditions, and often prevent the inclusion of their workers in the

general social service systems, learning of the language and establishment of connection with receiving society.

6.3.4 Political-Institutional Factors

The political attitude towards migration in Cosenza has changed over time. When left-leaning mayors were in power from 1996 till 2011, the city administration had a more proactive stance towards inclusion of immigrants, collaborating with civil society organization, holding consultations on the issues of migration with involvement of migrants associations, and organizing festivals related to the topics of immigration and diversity. Since 2011 the political leadership of Cosenza moved toward centre-right, with mayor Mario Occhiuto, a member of Forza Italia partly, serving two terms till present. The members of the city council belong to the civic list with mixed representation of centre-left and centre-right members (Openpolis, 2020). Since the turn of political spectrum, policy action in the area of immigration has reduced. The regional government of Calabria is responsible for policy-making for asylum-seekers reception, and local authorities are not so involved. Up to 2000s, the regional policies were of ad-hoc and limited scope, after the increased refugee flows most of the policy-making was conducted on the basis of the actions and projects planned and financed by the EU and national funds. The implementation of such project has been, nevertheless, rather limited (Sarlo et al., 2014). However, there has been a widespread awareness in Calabria that migrants can offer revitalization of towns affected by demographic decline, where there were many vacant houses to host refugees in (D'Agostino, 2017).

Cosenza considers itself a 'solidarity', or welcoming city as it has been quite open for immigration for a long time (Cosenza Immigration Office, interview, 2021). The issue of immigration became prominent in the municipal agenda since 2011–2012 when immigrants from North Africa started arriving in coastal cities of Calabria. Nowadays, immigration governance is institutionalised in the form of a dedicated office for immigration matters. It offers a weekly presence of cultural mediator, reception of complaints and information advice, assistance in the search of job, housing and social assistance for the EU and non-EU citizens. Their intercultural mediation service (essentially translation service) is available only once a week for half a day. Over the past 5 years, the financial department of the municipality also developed a structure which offers various activities for immigrants such as, an internet centre. On the provincial level, in 2019 the health care became more accessible for foreigners legally residing in Cosenza, as they were exempt from paying a fixed contribution (Calabria Accoglie 2.0, 2021).

The municipality collaborates with voluntary organizations, migrant associations and NGOs in their efforts to tackle social and personal problems of immigrants, by directing funding streams from regional and national levels. The civil society organizations provide cultural mediation, legal, and sanitary services directly to the migrants. Besides the funding, mode of collaboration between the

officials and CSOs is rather informal in a form of dialogue regarding the free services, in which local immigration office fulfils a coordinating role (Cosenza Immigration Office, interview, 2021). The locally implemented projects include among others information desk funded by the Ministry for Labour and the Fund for Migration, Asylum and Integration (FAMI) within a project "Calabria Accoglie 2.0 (Comune di Cosenza, 2020); a project for comprehensive approach to immigrants' hospitality funded by European Fund for Refugees (Sarlo et al., 2014, p. 51); the opening of the multifunctional centre for social inclusion of regular non-EU immigrants in the restored Palazzo Gervasi in the old city centre (Sarlo et al., 2014, p. 53), this place became as example of urban development serving all residents of Cosenza, both migrants and Italians, by providing a space for intercultural dialogue (C1_interview).

Local governance has primarily focused on reception of asylum seekers. During the periods of mass refugee arrivals municipality organized a street "Via Fittizia" or "via dell'accoglienza" (welcome street) in order to assist of registering of immigrants so that they may obtain a residence status (Cosenza Immigration Office, interview, 2021). Since 2016 the municipality collaborated with several civil society organizations in the provision of first-reception services to vulnerable groups, including immigrants, who were in dare need of social welfare support (Formazione di un Elenco di Strutture Socio-assistenziali Disponibili per la Prima Accoglienza di Nuclei Familiari in Situazioni d'Emergenza Residenti a Cosenza e di Minori Stranieri non Accompagnati, 2016). The SPRAR system developed from a house named "Casa del Migrante" which received money from the province and began to host migrants and families. This house became the center of protests and after a long process of negotiations with mayors it has led to a settlement and integration project in Cosenza for migrant families (C1_interview). In 2017 the municipality of Cosenza joined the National Distribution Plan for asylum seekers, however, was reluctant to take in many asylum seekers. The municipality guaranteed reception facilities to a minimum number of migrants in order to limit their presence in the city. This resulted in opening housing for 224 persons (Comune di Cosenza, 2017). All these measures were part of national government efforts to address fears of Italian population regarding immigration. While at this moment there is no longer a continued action by the municipality, there are migration-related projects sustained by various associations (C1_interview).

To sum up, Cosenza is a southern Italian city, which as the whole region has been experiencing decades of emigration of native population, who were leaving for better economic opportunities. However, since the 1990s as a regional economic centre, the city also attracted irregular migrants and asylum seekers who arrived by boats to the coastal towns of Calabria. Due to aging population, migrants from Philippines and Romania has been working here in domestic work and care for many years. The city has been diversifying in terms of immigrant origins and overall numbers, there has been met with growing xenophobia and racism from local population, as well as clear unequal social position of immigrant population in comparison to Italians. Local governance of migration and diversity has been rather limited in scope, and relied substantially on national and EU funding. It is mainly

based on the civil society engagement into ad-hoc initiatives and projects, while municipality focused mainly on reception of refugees via SPRAR system. In general, immigrant population are welcomed in the city either on temporary or permanent basis, and some ethnic groups form self-reliance networks and organizations, in does seem that urban diversity has not become an integral part of urban life.

6.4 Leeuwarden

Leeuwarden is one of the oldest Dutch cities and the capital of the Province of Friesland. With about 124.000 inhabitants it is a medium-sized city in the most northern part of the Netherlands. Its urban area is considerably larger, about 404.000 inhabitants, and includes various surrounding municipalities. In recent history the city has obtained a more regional role and has struggled with unemployment. This is one of the reasons for migration and diversity to remain relatively low in the city. In much of the twentieth century, Leeuwarden was a lively centre of agricultural industry, such as dairy industries. These industries fell into decline in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. In order alleviate employment problems, the national governments encouraged various semi-government functions to relocate to Leeuwarden. At the same time, Leeuwarden and its surrounding area are facing considerable ageing of the population. However, this does not (or not yet) seem to translate in significant increases in the level of migration.

The province of Friesland is officially bilingual, with Frisian being a major language besides Dutch, also in schools in official services. Although there is a clear substate national belonging for Frisians, this remains largely disconnected from migration and integration. For instance, learning the Frysian language is not considered an alternative for learning Dutch as part of civic integration programs.

6.4.1 Diversity and Segregation

With a share of 4% of the population being of non-Dutch nationality (2019 data), Leeuwarden is not a very diverse city when compared to other cities selected in this study (Table 6.4). Especially not compared with the Dutch average which is significantly higher. However, for a cluster III city, Leeuwarden does have relatively many different national backgrounds; 95 (2011 data). Also due to proximity, Germans are the largest group based on citizenship (as well as in terms of foreign born and migration background). Migrants related to Dutch colonial history (Indonesia, Surinam, Dutch Antilles) are clearly represented in the population in terms of migration background, but for obvious reasons less in terms of citizenship and foreign born. Leeuwarden also hosts a sizeable population that is considered ‘non-western’ according to Dutch data (cbs.statline), which includes people with a Moroccan or Turkish migration background but also a growing population with a refugee

Table 6.4 Demographics on Leeuwarden, by migration background, birth and citizenship (2019 data, source, cbs.statline)

	Migration background	Foreign born	Citizenship
Total	17%	10%	4%
Germany	2,0%	0,8%	0,6%
Indonesia	1,8%	0,6%	0,1%
Surinam	1,2%	0,5%	0,0%
Dutch Antilles	1,1%	n.a.	n.a.
Morocco	0,9%	0,4%	0,1%
Iraq	0,8%	0,5%	0,1%
Formal Yugoslav Reps.	0,5%	n.a	n.a
Turkiye	0,4%	0,2%	0,1%
China	0,4%	0,3%	0,2%
Viet Nam	0,4%	0,2%	n.a.

background, especially Iraqis, Eritreans and Syrians. Also, recent labour migrants are relatively well represented in the city: Romanians, Bulgarians and Polish. However, the size of each of these groups is relatively small.

Segregation is relatively significant in Leeuwarden. 47% of the population would need to move in order to achieve an equal distribution of nationalities across the city. This reflects the urban planning of Leeuwarden which, besides the historic city center, has several neighbourhoods with a clear working-class character: the Vegelinbuurt, the Vrijheidswijk and Schieringen-Heechterp. These are also the neighbourhoods were relatively many migrants with a Moroccan background (but often with Dutch nationality) live, as well as labour migrants from centra land eastern Europe.

6.4.2 Mobility

Mobility levels for Leeuwarden are around the national average for the Netherlands, but much lower than Rotterdam and Hilversum that are also included in this study. For 2019, there was an immigration percentage of 1,56% and an emigration percentage of 0,90%. This means that in 2019 only 2,47% of the population was mobile, which is slightly below the 2,49% average for the Netherlands in that year. As the figures on nationalities show, Leeuwarden has received several refugee groups arrived in the period of intensified refugee inflows of 2015–2016, not only from Syria but also from Eritrea. This comes on top of earlier refugee immigration from countries as Viet Nam and the former Yugoslav republics in the 1990s and from Iraq in the 2000s. The strong presence of Germans suggests cross-border mobility as well.

The city does try to attract domestic as well as international labour migrants, as part of a program ‘Talent voor de stad’. This program does seem primarily targeted at high-skilled migrants. This does not seem well reflected in the diversity configuration of Leeuwarden yet.

6.4.3 Inequalities

As mentioned, Leeuwarden is located in a relatively poor region in the Netherlands. This is also reflected in the average household income level which is considerable below the national average. For instance, in 2017 it was around 24,6 thousand euro, while the national average around 30 thousand. The discrepancy of incomes between migrants and non-migrants is also higher than on average in the country. For instance, in 2017 households with foreign-born breadwinner earning on average 7000 euros less than households with Dutch-born main earner.[4] There are also significant inequalities in terms of education levels reflected in underrepresentation of migrants in the higher levels of educational attainment. While among Dutch 30% hold degrees of higher level, among migrants this share is 7% less. This gap is more pronounced, than on average in the country. These inequalities are also spatially expressed in the city by the segregation between the attractive inner town of Leeuwarden and the spacious outskirts of the city on the one hand, and the specific working class neighbourhoods described above.

Patterns of discrimination in Leeuwarden do not appear to stand out in comparison to other cities and regions in the Netherlands. The local discrimination point Tumba does report that anti-muslim and anti-black discrimination has manifested itself in the city, amongst others as part of the broader national debate on 'black Pete' in the Netherlands. Similarly, in 2020 also in Leewarden there were many formal complaints registered of anti-Asian discrimination, as response to an anti-Asian song at the beginning of the Covid pandemic.

6.4.4 Political-Institutional Factors

Leeuwarden is traditionally a social-democratic stronghold with a dominant position for labour parties as the Partij voor de Arbeid and a strong focus on employment, education and housing. Even when in the 2020s the position of this party was undermined throughout the Netherlands, it remained the largest party in Leeuwarden in the municipal council elections in 2022.

This is also reflected in the local approach which focuses on inclusion and participation; there is a strong socio-economic focus in the Leeuwarden approach to migrant integration and migration (L1_interview). Or, even more, there is not so much a separate integration approach (nor has there been a separate approach over the past decade or so), but integration is rather considered part of generic policies on participation, education and housing (L1_ interview). As a relatively poor city with industrial roots, Leeuwarden already had a strong policy legacy in focusing on neighborhood policies and educational support; migrant inclusion has been absorbed in those 'mainstream' policy efforts. Also in the area of discrimination, apart from

[4] Own calculation non-publicly available data of CBS, reference year 2017.

the socio-cultural incidents that Tumba reports, there is a strong focus as well on discrimination on the labour market and in schools.

This socio-economic orientation also seems to explain why the Frysian language does not play a more considerable role in the debate on migrant inclusion in Leeuwarden. The focus is not so much on culture and subnational identity and language, but on the tools migrants need to participate on the labour market. Here Leeuwarden and Frysland differ significantly from other cases of substate nationalism, such as Flanders; economic integration clearly comes first.

6.5 Analysis of Cluster III Cities

The cities that emerged in our quantitative analysis as 'cluster III' cities are cities with relatively low diversity in combination with relatively high levels of segregation. We selected four cities, one from each of the countries: Plauen (GER), Vannes (FRA), Cosenza (ITA) and Leeuwarden (NL). While similar in terms of levels of diversity and segregation, there seems much variation in terms of size (from 52,000 in Vannes to over 400,000 in Leeuwarden).

Our in-depth analyses of these cities do not have extensive migration histories. Often there are city-specific migration histories, such as the German repatriates to Plauen and the history of emigration of Cosenza. There is significant variation in terms of the categories of migration identified in the cities, although most of the experiences relate to migrants who generally find themselves in relatively weak social-economic positions (repatriates, postcolonial migrants, labour migrants).

The selected cities tend to be characterized by relatively weak social and economic opportunity structures. This is exemplified by the high levels of unemployment in Plauen (after collapse of the lace industry), but also the strong role of the informal economy in Cosenza, the prominence of the rural sector in Vannes and the general weak economic structure of Leeuwarden. The relatively high levels of segregation in the selected cities seems a consequence of these weak economic structures. Segregation reflects the general high level of inequalities in the cities.

This does seem to bring vulnerabilities in terms of discrimination as well. Especially Plauen has had experiences with extreme-right mobilisations in local politics, and in Vannes and Cosenza there have been experiences with discrimination of particularly vulnerable groups such as Black or Muslim minorities.

There does not seem to be a clear pattern in terms of urban politics and governance in these cities. Whereas Plauen and Vannes tend to be more leaning towards the political right, Cosenza is a centrist city and Leeuwarden traditional leans to the left. In terms of governance approach, some cities (Plauen, Cosenza) seem to take a very active approach towards inclusion and participation, whereas in Vannes and Leeuwarden a more universalist approach is adopted (Table 6.5).

Table 6.5 Summary table. Comparison of cluster III cities

Cities	Mobility	Mobility	Mobility	Inequality	Inequality	Inequality	Inequality	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Diversity	Diversity	Segregation 2019 recent
Cities	History	Level and temorality	Types of flows	Urban development / opportunity struc	Discrimination	Income inequal	Education inequality	Targeted (towards what/who?)	Local leadership	Type of policy approach	Relationa-ship with regional level	Right-left orientation	Number of various origins	Volume	Current level of segreation
Cosenza (it)	Short	Outflow, some temp stay, some settlement	Eu labour migrants, seasonal, domestic workers, asylum seekrs, irregular migr	In-between economic stance, moderate, regional centre	High	High	Varied, moderately high	Migrant associations	Some	Reception	Top-down	Centrist	Limited	Low	Medium
Leeuwarden (nl)	Short	Low levels of inward and outward mob	Refugees and labour migrants	Weak opportunity structure	Discrimination indications, black pete	High inequality, though the average is low	High inequality (cbs 2017)	Targ social problems, not groups	Active , focus on poor people	Universa-list approach	Top down	Leftst	Medium variation	Low	High
Plauen (de)	Short	Outflow, temp stay pass through	Late resettlers ethn-germans; refugees	Weak economy, decline, narrow sector	High	Medium (lack of data)	Medium (lack of data)	Late recetlers (past) refugees (now)	Some	Integration refugees	Top-down	Centre-right + support of extream right	Limited	Low	High
Vannes (fr)	Medium	Low inflow, continious outflow	Post-colonial migrants, labour migrants	Local industries and agriculture	Some discr of muslims	High inequality	Moderate high	No	Hands off	Universa-list approach with social and housing focus	Bottom-up	Centre-right	Limited	Low	Medium high

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Chapter 7
Cities Cluster IV: Low Diversity and Low Segregation

The final cluster of cities that we will examine is that of cities with relatively low levels of diversity and low levels of segregation. For this cluster too we have selected four cities, one from each of the four countries for which comparable data was available; Dessau-Roßlau (GER), Rouen (FRA), Doetinchem (NL) and Viareggio (ITA) (Table 7.1).

The cities in this cluster are relatively small; from just under 60.000 for Doetinchem to just under 300.000 for Rouen. All four cities have a relatively low diversity index of 0.12 and a relatively low segregation index as well (0.23 for Doetinchem and 0.24 for Dessau-Roßlau, Rouen and Viareggio).

7.1 Dessau-Roßlau

Dessau-Roßlau is a rather new municipality, which was created in 2007, as a result of administrative merging of two cities Dessau and Roßlau. Since late nineteenth century, Dessau was an industrial hub for manufacturing, and experienced a period of economic, cultural and population growth, due to establishment of Bauhaus school. This school (1925–1932) was an important aspect of the city's identity and has led to concentration of industry, arts, education and handcrafts in the first half of the twentieth century. The city also played an important role for Nazi Germany during WWII, producing the substance Cyclone B used for genocide in concentration camps, and where the Junker factories of planes and machinery were located. Most of the city was destroyed in during the war.

In the 1970s Dessau remained an industrial city, where machine-construction, wagon construction and a large brewery were functioning. The city maintained high demand for labour in the industrial sector until 1988 (Wiechmann et al., 2014). However, little is known about international immigration to the city in the period of DDR. In general DDR had several bilateral agreements with Socialist counties such as Cuba, Poland, Hungary, Mozambique, Vietnam, Angola and Algeria. Besides,

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Table 7.1 Cluster IV cities. Comparative table

city name	population of 2019	share of migrants (%) 2019	Nominal GDP (€) per capita 2019	Mean household income € 2019	Median household income (€) 2019	Employment: Agriculture (%) 2019	Employment: Industry (%) 2019	Employment: Services (%) 2019	UnemployMent (%) 2019
Dessau-Roßlau	81,237	5,5%	41,077	33,538	29,694	1,76%	27%	71%	4,6%
Rouen	329,517	7,7%	42,682	40,691	34,048	1,78%	20%	78%	10%
Viareggio	60,602	7,4%	na	20,207	na	na	13%	24%	10%
Doetinchem	57,555	7,2%	na	na	na	na	na	na	1,23%

DDR was committed to offering education to socialist 'brother-states' as a political way to distance themselves with the policy of guest workers adopted by West Germany (FRG). It seems like during those times a limited number of foreigners from socialist countries were living in Dessau-Roßlau either as students or as workers of factories (DR1_interview; (Gärtner & Kamenik, 2018; Multikulturelles Zentrum Dessau, 2013; Rabenschlag, 2016).

After reunification of Germany, the city lost most of its industry. In the 1990s, the factories closed down, and young people and labour migrants (Schrader & Joskowski, 2015) left the city in search of employment. Still now, the city suffers from depopulation, as young people and qualified workers leave for better opportunities elsewhere. This is one of the cities in Germany, where the demographic situation is particularly challenging (DR1_interview). Nowadays, Dessau-Roßlau is trying to reinvent itself as a place for pharmaceutical production, while maintaining the prominence of traditional manufacturing industries. Other dominant economic sectors in the city are retail trade, communication (call-centres) and health industry.

7.1.1 Diversity & Segregation

The migrant population has been growing in the city since the reunification of Germany. From 2011 to 2017 the share of foreign-born grew from 6 to 7.42%. Migration is a rather recent phenomenon because foreign citizens constitute the vast majority of population with migration background (75%) (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017b). In 2019 the number of foreign citizens makes up 7.7% of population (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2019).

The origins of migrants have also become more diverse. In 2011 there were 41 different countries of birth in Dessau-Roßlau. By the end of 2017 this number had tripled, amounting to 130 different origins (of which 50 had only 3 or less residents). The largest migrant groups are Syrians (28% of migrant population), followed by Chinese (6.3%) and Polish (6.0%), another large group comes from Romania (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017b). In 2019, the number of national origins decreased slightly to 120 with Syrians still being the largest group (21.7%), followed by Polish (9.2%) and Russians (5.3%) (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2019).

Many of those newly arrived migrants were asylum seekers who were assigned to Dessau-Roßlau through the national quota system (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017b). Other types of migrants include international students, which are enrolled in the Hochschule of Dessau-Roßlau, and labour migrants from Eastern Europe.

The migrant population is significantly younger than Germans, with 70% between 0 and 39 years, and 26% under 18. While 70% of Germans above 40 (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017b). In terms of gender differences, there were slightly more men than women (55%) among migrants, which is due to higher numbers of men among refugees (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2019).

Regarding segregation, 60.7% of migrants live in inner-city areas (Innerstädtisch-Mitte, -Nord, -Süd), 12.1% live in Roßlau, and the remaining 27.2% in the other 21 neighbourhoods (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017b). The reason for such settlement pattern is the urban history, and availability of cheap housing in the city centre. The bombing during WWII destroyed the inner city, which was rebuilt during the DDR (GDR) times with cheap panel houses ('Plattenbauen'). With the exodus of population and general demographic changes after 1990, those houses eventually became vacant. Newcomers started settling in the houses as it was cheap, and from 2015 asylum seekers were also housed in empty apartments owned by a housing corporation (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017a). The municipality called such an approach 'decentralized housing' because asylum seekers were housed in apartments rather than in communal centres in urban outskirts. The initial settling of the newcomers in these quarters has attracted more and more people to live here. 90% of refugees in Dessau-Roßlau live in this district. As a result, the urban center has a disproportionately high number of migrants, (approximately up to 20% of the local population), while the situation is very different in the outskirts (DR1_interview). Some areas of the city are more opposed to housing refugees than others. For instance, in Roßlau there were several protests in 2015–16 against a temporary housing facility, which was not built after all (Gesemann et al., 2018, pp. 43–47).

The majority of migrants (81%) live in the areas Nord, Süd, Mitte, Zoberberg, West, Süd and Roßlau that were classed as 'intervention areas' (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017b), where a higher number of inhabitants rely on social security. This is not surprising, given that labour market integration of refugees, who constitute a large proportion of local migrants, takes time. Especially, if job opportunities in the city are limited. The residential segregation is also reproduced in the educational system, because children are assigned to kindergartens and schools based on the districts where they live, which prevents contact between migrant and German children (DR1_Interview).

When comparing current residential patterns of migrants with the segregation index based on the data from 2011 census, it looks like Dessau-Roßlau became more segregated after the influx of refugees in 2015 since newly arrived asylum seekers were hosted in cheaper houses of the inner city. Before that, a large proportion of foreigners in the city were international students who were probably more scattered around the city. However, even in 2008 there seemed to be some disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Dessau-Roßlau with a high concentration of foreigners (Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2008). These are only tentative conclusions, as the data allowing for a more precise measurement of segregation index in recent years is not available.

7.1.2 Mobilities

Overall, Dessau-Roßlau has a history of outward migration. Since the reunification of Germany, the city has lost almost a quarter of its inhabitants, becoming one of the East German cities with the greatest emigration and the lowest rate of returns (Fuchs

& Weyh, 2016). The situation started to change in the only in the past 6 years, when the migration inflows surged. At the end of 2014, migrant share was 4,7% (Gesemann et al., 2018). At that time foreigners were mostly international students of the city's Hochschule (which explains the high number of nationalities but the low number of people per nationality). Around 600 international students a year have been coming to the city. Since 2015, the city welcomed higher numbers of refugees, international students, and Eastern European labour migrants (DR1_interview). 94% of the asylum seekers in the city have lived there since 2016 (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2019). More than half of migrants (61%) have been living in Dessau-Roßlau for less than 5 years, 10% have been living there between 10 and 19 years, and 7.7% over 19 years (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017b). These numbers show that Dessau-Roßlau began experiencing immigration rather recently, and that only a small proportion of migrants have stayed in the city since the 1990s.

Since 2013, the numbers of foreign arrivals grew and the largest peak of migrant arrivals was in 2015. However, in the following years, the inward mobility started to decrease, while the outward mobility kept increasing. In 2019, there were almost equal numbers of migrants arriving and leaving.

Even though the recent data shows that in total more people arrive to the city than leave it, the departure rates for both Germans and foreign residents are very high. The integration officer Altmann described Dessau-Roßlau as a city of passage ''Durchlaufstadt'), where newcomers stay for a relatively short time (DR1_interview). Both Germans and migrants have similar motives for leaving the city (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2019). Few labour market opportunities is one of the reasons for such outward mobility, even despite the efforts of the city to incentivise a long-term settlement of migrants to counter depopulation (DR1_interview). People do not necessarily leave for abroad but rather for larger cities with more economic opportunities or stronger and more established migrant communities (DR1_interview). This also reflects the migration dynamics in the whole region of Sachsen-Anhalt: migrants tend not to stay there for a long time, but either move back to their home countries or move further to larger German or to European cities with bigger communities of foreigners (Ketzmerick, 2015).

7.1.3 Inequalities

Like in the whole of Sachsen-Anhalt, employment opportunity structures for immigrants are rather slim in Dessau-Roßlau. However, the city administration sees the benefit of incorporating migrants in the labour market, as they fill in the labour needs emerging as a result of the changing demographics of the city and the departure of young German people.

Most migrants here have rather precarious and low-paid jobs in the sectors with low-paid positions. Much higher percentage of foreign workers than Germans are employed in the lowest level positions ('Helpers') in the region. Migrants are predominantly employed in tourism, manufacturing, construction and cleaning

services. The Eastern European migrants work a lot in the construction and service sectors, where most of job opportunities in the city are present. The integration officer of the city highlighted the tendency of migrants to aim for jobs that are below their level of qualification (DR1_interview). This tendency is often explained by non-recognition of their prior degrees, and limited knowledge of German language, and reluctancy of employers to hire migrants.

Due to the aging population on the city, the care sector is growing. The largest employers in Dessau-Roßlau are in healthcare and care for the elderly (Indrustrie- und Handelskammer Halle-Dessau, 2018). Moreover, the brain drain of German highly skilled workers from East to the West of the country, opens more opportunities for highly skilled foreigners in some economic sectors of Sachsen-Anhalt. The graph below shows that the percentage of highly skilled foreigners in the region is significantly higher than in the western regions of Germany. Highly qualified migrants (especially women) are employed in the health sector and education (Ketzmerick, 2015).

Given that many foreigners are recently arrived refugees, it is not surprising that the overall unemployment rate in Dessau-Roßlau is 10.1%, while among foreigners, unemployment is almost 36% (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017a, p. 11). Both unskilled and highly qualified migrants are overrepresented among unemployed and job seekers compared to Germans (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2019a). The municipality is actively working towards improving migrants' employment rates, and has already achieved some results. The unemployment rate among both the German and foreign population has been decreasing in the past 5 years from nearly 30% of migrant unemployment in 2015 to 21% in 2019 (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2019).

Inequalities in terms of education are also notable in Dessau-Roßlau. Whereas over half of German students go to the highest level of school education, only 36.7% of foreign students do (Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017a). Overall in the Sachsen-Anhalt region, the share of those without any professional education is higher among foreigners (45%) than among Germans (17%). Many highly qualified foreigners live particularly in the larger university towns of Sachsen-Anhalt (Ketzmerick, 2015, p. 27) The international orientation of Dessau-Roßlau's university means there are many young, highly qualified migrants, but they do not settle in the city and leave shortly after graduation (DR1_interview).

Dessau-Roßlau appears to be less accepting of diversity and presence of refugees than other cities in the region, such as Rostick, Dortmund and Lippstadt (Gesemann et al., 2018). More residents of the city perceive diversity as a threat, which is more than in other cities, and less of the population perceives it as enriching life in Germany. Refugees are also perceived less positively in Dessau-Roßlau, however, about 50% of population still have a positive view of the newly arrived populations (Gesemann et al., 2018).

The small size of the city makes it easier to feel part of society, and there is enough living space for decentralised housing for refugees. Moreover, a part of civil society and some individual actors are strongly engaged with the issues of integration. Nevertheless, there are also challenges related to the rapid increase in numbers of migrants in Dessau-Roßlau. There is a notable increase in xenophobia and racism

towards immigrants, which thrives in the context of the relatively weak urban economy. A lack of opportunities for young people and migrants fuels an increased perception of immigrants as a threat to opportunities for local people. This translates to tensions between migrants and non-migrants, and sometimes results in neighbourhood conflicts and even threats directed to those engaging in work with refugees. The city lacks structures to combat such developments (Grau, 2019). According to the city's integration officer (DR1_interview), these developments point to the lack of experience with living in diverse society and a lack of encounters with foreigners, especially among the ageing German population. The concern of the local population about increased immigration, comes from a lack of awareness.

7.1.4 Political-Institutional Factors

The City Council of Dessau-Roßlau is rather fragmented on the right-left spectrum, with no clear majority. In the 2019 elections, among the largest parties, 12 seats belong to CDU, 8—to AfD, 7– to die Linke, 5– to Greens, 5– to SPD. The centre and left parties lost a significant number of votes, while the right-wing parties made significant gains. The mayor of the city is currently Peter Kuras from the FDP—a liberal democratic party.

Diversity governance of the city has been institutionalised since 2009 in the position of integration-coordinator funded by the federal state government. And since 2012, there has been an integration advisory board, through which migrants were politically represented. However, this body has not been very active and until there was no clear policy regarding migrant incorporation. The merging of the two municipalities has not lead to a formation of common city identity between Dessau and Roßlau, and this divide has also been reflected in the disagreements on the issues of diversity and integration (Gesemann et al., 2018, pp. 44–45).

The Integration policy, which was in development since 2010, has been published only recently. The introduction to it emphasises the importance for migrants to adopt the values of the receiving society stated in German Constitution: the equal treatment and dignity of all people, both men and women. However, the policy itself is not only targeted to migrants. The integration officer has also highlighted that they aimed to conceptualise diversity as beyond ethnic or national origins, and target groups beyond the migrant population (Altmann, interview, 2020). The guiding principle of the policy to create guidelines of coexistence in a diverse society for the residents of the city as a whole, where "*one understands how to manage conflicts, opens up spaces for participation and promotes communication"* (translated from: Integrationsbüro der Stadt Dessau-Roßlau, 2017a, p. 13).

The city has a lot of independence in how to develop and implement integration policy, as it is not directly accountable to the administration of Sachsen-Anhalt. They are engaged in the regional network of the cities, where twice a year they exchange ideas with other municipal integration officers. The involvement in international city networks is rather marginal. According to the current integration officer, Dessau-Roßlau is unique in Sachsen-Anhalt and they play a leading role in their

region in governance of migration. The city aims to go beyond the expectations outlined in regional guidelines. For instance, the they worked together with many foundations (i.e. the Robert Bosch Stiftung and the Bertelsmann Stiftung) and other organisations to compile data on diversity of population from various sources. The municipality took on board the report of Bertelsmann Stiftung (Gesemann et al., 2018) revealing negative perceptions of diversity and used the insights to develop their integration approach, with the focus on cohesion and targeting not only the migrant population but residents of the city as a whole (DR1_interview).

Several diversity and social cohesion initiatives have been launched recently in the city a collaboration of municipality, foundations and other civil society organizations. Since 2018, there were projects aiming to stimulate interaction between people with diverse backgrounds. The municipality has partnered with the international office of the Hochschule, the TV channel 'Offener Kanal Dessau' as well as the regional network of migrant organizations (Landesnetzwerk Migrantenorganisationen Sachsen-Anhalt (LAMSA) e.V. Within this initiative there have been many cultural events organized, among them the Literary Peace contest 'Texts for Freedom and Diversity' (Texte für Frieden und Vielfalt), community music events, an initiative "Women meet-ups" (Frauentreffen) encouraging migrant women to cook together once a month. Also, a new project "World open commune" will be launched and for the next 5 years, that aims at attracting migrants to the city to fight demographic decline. To alleviate labour market inequality, the city also launched some initiatives to incorporate migrants in the social work sector such as childcare and elderly care, as well as through information campaigns promotes migrant employment in small and medium enterprises.

To sum up, Dessau-Roßlau is a small city in the stage of economic and demographic transition. It has been struggling to reinvent its economy after the fall of the GDR and reunification, while battling with the emigration of young and skilled people. Immigration is seen in the city as an opportunity for economic and demographic growth and since 2015, there has been a surge in the numbers of migrants, primarily refugees. This has not come without challenges, as the socio-economic inequalities and segregation became apparent. The municipality did not have a coherent integration or diversity management policy until recently due to the city's internal divide. Currently, they main policy goal is to promote social cohesion and intercultural dialogue because they want to attract more migrants and encourage long-term settlement.

7.2 Rouen

Rouen is the capital city of Normandy. It is a historic city and hosts the fourth largest port of France. The city also attracts significant numbers of international students for the University of Rouen Normandy. With a foreign-born population of about 9,5% of the city population, 7% of non-French nationality (2019 census data) and a segregation score of 0.24 it is a not-so-diverse city with a relatively low level

of segregation. In this regard is differs from various other port cities in our sample that are known to be more diverse and segregated. The diversity that characterizes the city today comes primarily from the postcolonial types of migration that can be found in all French cities, especially from the Maghreb. In addition, international students coming to the University of Rouen make up a growing percentage of Rouen's migrant population.

7.2.1 Diversity and Segregation

People from North-African and Sub-Saharan African countries make up for the largest part of the foreign-born population of Rouen (Table 7.2). This includes almost 5000 persons from Algeria, over 4000 from Morocco and 1400 from Tunisia, as well as almost 7800 from other African nationalities. These other African nationalities include various groups from West Africa such as from Senegal (R1_interview). Importantly, this data contains only the foreign-born population, for the ethical reasons stated earlier in the study. This means that the data only captures the people who were born outside France and came to France later; it does not include people of North African or Sub-Sahara African 'descent' with French citizenship.

7.2.2 Mobilities

The port has brought a long history of mobility to (and from) Rouen (Barzmann, 2008). Historically this included many persons from the United Kingdom. Since the nineteenth century it includes other European groups such as Portuguese, Spanish, Polish and Italians. This changed in the period after the Second World War, where

Table 7.2 Demographics on Rouen, based on nationality and citizenship

	Nationality	Birth
Total	7,0%	9,5%
Other African countries	2,0%	2,5%
Algeria	1,1%	1,8%
Morocco	1,0%	1,5%
Other	0,9%	1,2%
Portugal	0,4%	0,6%
Tunisia	0,4%	0,5%
Other EU countries	0,3%	0,4%
Other european countries	0,3%	0,3%
Turkiye	0,3%	0,3%
Italy	0,2%	0,2%
Spain	0,1%	0,2%

(INSEE data, 2020, Unite Urbaine de Rouen)

first the Algerians emerged as an important immigrant category, and later the Moroccans, Turkish and Sub-Saharan Africans. Besides the port, also construction work and the agricultural sector surrounding Rouen have been important sources of employment for migrants.

Besides immigration, there is also much secondary migration from Rouen to Paris in particular (interview). This involves secondary migration for economic purposes but also the attraction of broader migrant communities living in Paris.

Finally, the University of Rouen Normandy seems to be an increasingly important source of mobility to Rouen. With over 25,000 students, the university attracts students from all over Europe and beyond. In the Rouen commune (narrower city area than the urban area), already about 20% of the immigrants are students (INSEE, 2017). The presence of students means an important contribution to the diversification amongst different migrant categories, bringing people from a broader variety of countries.

7.2.3 Inequalities

When compared the broader set of European cities, the segregation score of 0.24 is relatively low. Most foreign-born residents live in relatively mixed neighbourhoods as Centre Ville Rive Gauche and Vieux Marche Cathedrale (R2_interview). There are, however, specific neighbourhoods with social housing facilities that have relatively higher percentages of foreign-born populations. That includes neighbourhoods as Hauts de Rouen, Grammont and for recent migrants in particular Chatelet Lombardie and Grand Mare. The foreign born population in Chatelet Lombardie was around 16.8% in 2009 (INSEE, 2009). Les Hauts de Rouen, situated in the north-east of the city, has been an urban priority zone in the past. It is situated relatively isolated from the rest of the city, on a plateau, and contains mostly collective building blocks constructed in the 1970s.

Inequalities in terms of migrant inclusion have largely matched those of the already existing port-city working class. This also includes unemployment levels, where Rouen has a high level of unemployment when compared to the national average and to the other French cities in this study; 8% in 2020 (INSEE, 2020). Unemployment amongst the non-French population is significantly higher even; 18% amongst Algeriens and 17% for Moroccans for instance.

A relatively new development is the increase of international students, which tend to be relatively dispersed over the city.

In terms of discrimination, Rouen very much reflects broader concerns for French cities, such as anti-black and anti-muslim discrimination. In this context a House of Associations and Solidarity (MAS) was established to bring together organisations in the struggle against racism and injustice.

7.2.4 Political-Institutional Factors

Rouen is a centre-left city. Although historically mostly in the center of the political spectrum, it has become more left-leaning since 2007. The current mayor Nicolas Mayer-Rossignol comes from the Socialist Party and leads a broad leftist coalition that received two-thirds of the votes in the 2020 elections.

According to Boukrou (2006), Rouen has moved in its local approach to diversity from a targeted to a more universalist approach. From an approach that worked with communities, Rouen moved to a regional approach to integration in 2006–2009 and since then a more universalist approach where integration is part of urban policy (Politique de la Ville). The Contrat de Ville (2015–2020) is now the most important framework for activities on diversity, focusing on specific priority neighbourhoods. In combination with this universalist approach, Rouen also has a 'terroritorial plan for the prevention of discrimination' (2015).

Similar to various other French cities, much social work at the neighbourhood level is done by NGOs. This often occurs without support from local governments, or only limited support. One active NGO involves the Association for Solidarity with Labour Migrants.

7.3 Viareggio

The town of Viareggio is located in northern Tuscany, the province of Lucca, on the coast of the Tyrrhenian Sea. In the year 2019 its population was around 62 thousand inhabitants. It is the second largest city of the province. The primary economic sectors of Viareggio are tourism, commerce and services, as well as fishing and floriculture. The city is an active industrial and manufacturing center for luxury yachts and boats. The shipyards of Viareggio are part of a value chain that starts in La Spezia and ends in Livorno, and the ship production moves from one place to the other being a trigger for migrant mobility too.

7.3.1 Diversity and Segregation

Viareggio was home to 3444 immigrants (5.6%) in 2012, however, in 2019 these numbers have significantly increased to 4974 people, constituting 8% of the whole city's population. The vast majority originate from Romania (34%), followed by 8% of Albanians. As displayed on in the table below the rest of 10 most numerous nationalities include Eastern-Europeans, east and south-east Asians, and North Africans (Table 7.3).

Viareggio is one of cities in Italy having a higher proportion of female migrants in comparison to national average. This is due to the presence of Eastern European domestic and care workers (Albani et al., 2017). In the Table 7.4 below it is

Table 7.3 Top-10 nationalities in Viareggio

Nationalities	Number of people 2019	% of total foreign citizens
Romania	1713	34.4%
Albania	411	8.3%
Morocco	327	6.6%
Ukraine	283	5.7%
Philippines	235	4.7%
China	207	4.2%
Poland	177	3.6%
Bangladesh	127	2.6%
Moldova	123	2.5%
Pakistan	101	2.0%
total	4974	100.0%

Table 7.4 Top-5 nationalities with the highest share of female migrants in Viareggio

Top-5 Nationalities with highest share of women	Men	Women	Total	Men %	Women %
Ukraine	38	245	283	13%	87%
Russia	11	72	83	13%	87%
Moldova	34	89	123	28%	72%
Polonia	55	122	177	31%	69%
Romania	725	988	1713	42%	58%

Source: own calculation based on Istat data 2019

noticeable that Russian, Ukrainian, Moldovan, Polish and Romanian female migrants significantly outnumber men of the same nationalities.

About 100 refugees were admitted to a SPRAR system in Viareggio (VG1_interview) in the course of past years. SPRAR housing facilities exist since 2013, there were asylum seekers from Nigeria, Ghana and Mali, later on, more nationals of Bangladesh and Pakistan, as well as some Eritreans started applying for asylum in Italy. In 2016 there was a peak of refugee numbers in Viareggio, most of whom are single men, however now there are only 44 refugees among beneficiaries of SPRAR system in the city (VG2_interview).

According to our previous analysis of segregation in based on 2011-D4I data, Viareggio is not particularly segregated town, which is definitely the case among live-in care workers who reside together with their employers and are scattered around the city. However, personal accounts of informants refer to two districts of the city, were migrants often reside. One is—Varignano—a poor neighbourhood, which in the past was populated by internal migrants from the south of Italy (i.e. Nalpes). Nowadays, the descendants of those southern Italians live here, as well as Moroccans. Another area with higher proportion of migrant residents is in the city centre close to the train station, where many ethnic food markets are located, a lot of immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh live there (VG2_interview). Previous literature indirectly points at the existence of migrant ghettos in the city, with inter-ethnic conflicts between groups of migrants (Melotti, 2007). This information was not possible to confirm.

7.3.2 Mobilities

Immigration to Viareggio started first from the south of Italy, and even though those were internal migrants, in the context of striking inequality between the two parts of the country, their settlement in the Northern town was met with a similar attitudes as foreign immigration. The presence of foreigners in the city started to be noticeable after the Arab Spring revolutions in several North African countries (VG1_interview).

Since 2012 Viareggio has been attracting increasingly more international migrants. Whereas in 2011–2012 net migration was 75 people a year, these numbers have substantially increased in 2013–2018, with around 200 more people arriving than leaving the city. The role of Viareggio in international migration streams seems to also change in various years during the past 10 years. In some years Viareggio attracted more foreigners from other Italian cities, and in other years, more migrants would be leaving the city in search for better opportunities elsewhere in Italy. All in all, it is clear that the growth of migrant population in Viareggio is mainly the result of immigration from abroad as well as natural population growth, rather that internal mobility (own calculation and interpretation, based on Istat data, 2020a, b).

The patterns of migrant length f settlement depend, of cause on the sectors that they are employed. Those who are employed in shipyards tend to move across the coast of Italy, following the stages of ship production, or where there is a need for labour (VG1_interview). Domestic and care workers are bound to the lives of their employers (Ambrosini, 2011). If the person they cared for passed away, they may find another elderly person to care for in Viareggio or elsewhere, or they move back to their home country. It is noted that immigrant women do not usually bring families from abroad (VG2_interview), partly because many of them do not have a legal residency as well as the nature of work precludes having time for private life (Ambrosini, 2012). Among the refugees, there is also some indications of further outmigration from Viareggio, many seem to leave the city for other Italian cities or abroad (VG2_interview). In other words, Viareggio does not seem to attract migrants for long- term settlement but rather for seasonal or short-term labour and temporary asylum.

7.3.3 Inequalities

The main sectors of migrant employment are tourism and hospitality sectors, domestic care of the elderly, shipyard industry and production of flowers (VG1_interview). Many western-Europeans from the Netherlands, France and Great Britain tend to work in more stable jobs in shipyard production or as a yacht crew, while migrants from North and Sub-Saharan Africa mainly have temporary contracts, lower wages and experience worse labour market integration in the city's economy. Foreign employment in tourism and hospitality sector, domestic care and flower cultivation is also characterized by temporariness, precariousness and low

salaries (VG1_interview). Such migrants are in the focus of the municipal social policy in times of economic crises and get some social support. And refugees within the SPRAR system are assisted in job search and usually work in hospitality, cleaning, and agriculture, once they leave the system (VG2_interview). Besides, there is also a small sector of black economy, criminal activities, in which some foreign nationals are engaged in. Such criminal economy includes trafficking of female and transgender sex workers, drug smuggling and trade. Being a small port and a tourist hub, Viareggio seems to be an attractive place for such businesses. Migrants that are believed to be in control of black economy—Moroccans, Tunisians— are especially discriminated against and ostracized by Italian population.

There is no publicly available data on income and education levels of Italians and migrants in Viareggio. Qualitative accounts of the informants in the city indicate that in this provincial town Italian population is affected by narrow and limited economic opportunities in a similar way as migrant population. Italian population is slightly more well off, as they are the ones employing the foreign workers, but the income gap may not be that large. Native population of Viareggio is rather senior, often retired, and they employ a domestic care-workers and maids. The migrant population on the other hand consists of two distinct groups: younger single men from North Africa (Morocco) and East Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan) working in yacht and flower industries, and middle-aged eastern European women working as domestic care workers (VG1_interview). Overall, Italian population does not have significantly better jobs than foreign population in the town. The seasonal economy of the city is seasonal with many more (often semi-official) jobs available during the summer months in hotels and restaurants than in winter. Both Italians and foreigners work in tourism and hospitality sectors of the city. Some Italians commute for work to bigger cities, for instance to Florence (VG2_interview).

Some vulnerable Italians in Viareggio find themselves at a disadvantage, when compares to refugees. Due to salient policy attention to the refugee crisis, national funding is directed to reception, accommodation and support of asylum seekers. Whereas there are no such funds specially allocated to help vulnerable Italians, who are also in need to (re)integration into the labour market, or struggle with personal circumstance or are in need of housing. There is a general social security policy available for citizens, however, it is not always enough (VG1_interview).

7.3.4 Political-Institutional Factors

Vareggio's city council is composed by non-party affiliated members of 'lista civica'(Italian—civic list), which were supported by the Democratic party of Italy—a longstanding centre-left party. Migration and diversity governance is not institutionalized in the form of an official or a specifically dedicated department of the city administration. However, this topic has come to the policy attention in the recent years. It was first put on the agenda (VG1_interview) by left-oriented municipal council (Comune di Viareggio, 2021) that came to power in 2015. As part of the

shift from right to the left politics, the municipality decided to focus on integration of refugees and asylum seekers in the community of Viareggio (VG1_interview).

First refugees started arriving to Viareggio in 2011 as a result of Arab Spring, but only since 2016 the municipality started taking policy action in refugee integration. Before that NGOs welcomed refugees with their own limited funds and capacity (VG1_interview; VG2_interview). The new city administration applied for national funds to establish SPRAR accommodation for refugees, which in the highest peak of arrivals was around 100 people (VG1_interview; VG3_interview). This new commitment was challenging for the local government (VG1_interview), and inclined the municipality to participation in national and international networks—"City of Dialogue" (ICEI, 2020), a part of European Council network of Intercultural Cities, and the European project EUCAN, which aimed to fight against discrimination, radicalization and xenophobia (Comune di Viareggio, 2019). Though this engagement they hoped to learn how to provide better services for the newly arrived and to train the staff of the NGOs in the reception and integration of refugees and asylum seekers. Even though these networks provided some opportunities for international knowledge exchange and funds for thematic events (i.e. 'Theatre of the oppressed' organized in Viareggio), the impact of these networks remained rather limited—with no follow up actions or significant change of integration practices (VG2_interview; VG3_interview). The self-evaluation report to evaluate Viareggio's interculturalism (ICC index) has not been yet published, indicating that the membership of this city in this international networks may be rather nominal.

The municipality Viareggio organizes reception and integration of asylum seekers and refugees in accordance with the Tuscany region guidelines. The city administration is officially in charge of budget management, selects partner organizations and coordinated their work. There are three NGOs in Viareggio Cooperativa Oddissea, national organization Arci Versallia, and a catholic organization Misericordia that provide refugees with accommodation, and facilitate labour market and social integration (VG1_interview). Spread micro-reception (so called 'accoglienza diffusa") is an approach that started in the beginning 2014–2015 as an alternative to isolated large reception facilities, which prevented social mixing of the hosted migrants and local communities. By means of this spread micro-reception, asylum seekers and refugees are supported by SPRAR/SIPRIOMI social workers on their trajectory to self-reliance, while they are hosted in subsidised accommodation in the city. This approach facilitates asylum seekers' interaction with the local community, and social workers help them with documents, learning of Italian language, and encourage refugees to participate the life neighbourhood, for instance by helping the elderly or doing some garden maintenance (VG2_interview; VG3_interview). Since 2018 SPRAR partnership with Arci cooperative and the municipality of Viareggio provides social and health assistance, such as to obtain and renew the health cards, legal assistance for the renewal of the residence permits, as well as psychological support for people with mental-health issues, provided by a team of ethno-psychologists. Additionally, there are translators, in order to be sure that communication is given to migrants in their native language (VG3_interview).

According to former head of social domain in Viareggio, there is a mainstream social policy to support vulnerable groups, young people, families with children, and the service are available for foreigners too (VG1_interview). There was a system of economic incentives (500 euro per person/per month), to encourage employers to accept asylum seekers for internships in industry, agriculture and other sectors (VG3_interview). Besides refugees, victims of trafficking have also been targeted by local policy and NGOs, since this became a salient issue in Viareggio.

In sum, migrant population in Viareggio is rather small, and consists mainly of temporary, seasonal migrant labourers, domestic workers, and some refugees. The city has seasonal economy focused on tourism and production of luxury yachts, thus having narrow economic opportunities for both locals and migrants. Only refugees seem to be in the focus of policy attention, as a result of the political shift of the local government from right to the left. Other migrants are rather invisible in the local policy, and can make use of the general social policy available for whole city population, given that they speak Italian. Viareggio joined some international networks and projects indicating its commitment to diversity and inclusion and in search of capacity building, however the level of engagement and impact of it remained limited.

7.4 Doetinchem

Doetinchem is an old and relatively small city in the eastern part of the Netherlands. It has just under 58,000 inhabitants. It is situated in a largely rural area of the Netherlands, but also has hosted various industrial activities such as a paper factory and various industries related to the food sector. The city mainly fulfils a small industrial function as a hub within the broader rural area in which it is located.

7.4.1 Diversity and Segregation

Doetinchem fits very well in the category IV cluster as a city with low diversity; only 2,7% of the population is of non-Dutch nationality, and 7,2% is foreign born, which is well below the national average (CBS, 2019). Also when encompassing the broader definition of persons with a first or second generation migration background, only 14,3% of the urban population can be classified in this category, which is well below the Dutch average of 24%.

However, when it comes to the number of different nationalities, Doetinchem still scores relatively high for cluster IV. With 106 different nationalities the city is

Table 7.5 Demographics on Doetinchem, based on migration background, birth and citizenship. (2019 data, source: Cbs.statline)

	Migration background	Foreign born	Citizenship
Total	14,3%	7,2%	2,7%
Germany	2,8%	0,7%	0,2%
Turkiye	2,7%	1,3%	0,4%
Indonesia	1,6%	0,6%	0,0%
Syria	0,8%		0,5%
Former Yugoslav Reps.	0,6%		
Iraq	0,4%	0,3%	
Poland	0,4%	0,2%	0,1%
Dutch antilles	0,3%		
Surinam	0,3%	0,1%	0,0%
Afghanistan	0,2%	0,2%	
Morocco	0,2%	0,1%	0,0%

under the Dutch average but above the average for cluster IV. The nationalities represented partially reflect the industrial character of Doetinchem, with old labour migrant categories such as Turkey and China but also more recent labour migrant categories as Polish. However, Doetinchem has also received significant persons from refugee sending countries as Syria (even the largest group in 2020) and from Iraq and Eritrea. Furthermore, also due to proximity, the city hosts quite a few persons of German nationality, which is even the largest population by migration background (2,8%) (Table 7.5).

Just as the other cluster IV cities, segregation is relatively low in Doetinchem (0.23). This segregation does relate largely to the situation of old working class neighbourhoods such as De Hoop. However, the relatively small size of segregation is rather surprising giving the small industrial character of the city. Possible explanations include the small scale of the city which facilitates desegregation, but also the dispersed location of refugees across the city may be an explanation.

7.4.2 Mobility

Mobility is relatively low in Doetinchem. In 2019, 0,45% of the population immigrated and 0,28% emigrated. This means that in total only 0,74% of the population was internationally mobile, which is relatively few for the Netherlands. This once again reflects the more regional function that Doetinchem fulfills.

7.4.3 Inequalities

The average household income in Doetinchem is relatively low when compared to the Dutch average: 24100 euros (2017[1]). The differences in income between migrants and non-migrants are like on average in other cities of the Netherlands, migrant-lead households earn about 4000 euro per year less, than those with the Dutch-born main earner. In terms of education there are also some inequalities, and they are higher than on average in the Netherlands. Even though the overall share of highly educated residents in Doetinchem was about the average of the country (around 25%), the share of highly educated among migrants is about 5% lower than among residents of Dutch origin.[2] These inequalities can be also notable in the city neighbourhoods such as more middle-class residential neighbourhoods at the outskirts of the city in comparison to working class neighbourhoods as De Hoop closer to the center.

Discrimination is, according to local figures,[3] relatively high in Doetinchem when compared to equally large or even larger cities in the same region in the Netherlands. There is no analysis available as for why these figures are higher. However, one of the reasons may be that awareness and reporting on discrimination and racism is relatively high because of local policies and a good organization of the structure for reporting cases of discrimination and racism.

7.4.4 Political Institutional Factors

The political landscape of Doetinchem has been, for decades, defined by the Christen Democrat party CDA. However, more working class parties as the labour party PvdA and the socialist party SP have also been significant in the city council.

Within this landscape, attention to integration, diversity and discrimination has been significant. Doetinchem is, especially for the relatively small volume of diversity, rather entrepreneurial on this topic. For instance, in the 2010s Doetinchem was one of the cities that was active on the national campaign against discrimination (later the program 'Doetinchem verbindt', or 'Doetinchem brings together'), and that enhanced the local Anti-Discrimination Office as a center for reporting discrimination and for coordinator local actions against discrimination. In 2014, the city also participated as one of the pilot cities for the introduction of a participation declaration; a nationally coordinated initiative to have newcomers and the city sign a declaration of commitment to do anything to make participation happen. And in

[1] Own calculations based on non-publicly available CBS data, reference year 2017.

[2] Own calculations based on non-publicly available CBS data, reference year 2017.

[3] https://www.art1gelderlandmidden.nl/uploads/Discriminatiecijfers%202014%20ADV%20Oost-Nederland.pdf

the late 2010s, Doetinchem has been in particularly active in encouraging asylum seekers and refugees to participate in society.

Such a more targeted approach is combined with a more generic socio-economic approach to participation. For istance, the Participatiecentrum Doetinchem plays a central role in encouraging the labour market participation of all Doetinchemmers, including those with a migration background.

7.5 Analysis of Cluster IV Cities

The cities identified as 'cluster IV' cities are cities with relatively low levels of diversity and relatively low levels of segregation. We selected four cities, one from each of the four countries: Dessau-Roßlau (GER), Rouen (FRA), Viareggio (ITA) and Doetinchem (NL). Besides diversity and segregation, the cities vary quite much in terms of size (in a range from 58,000 for Doetinchem to almost 300,000 in Rouen) (Table 7.6).

In our in-depth qualitative analyses of these cities, we saw that migration plays only a marginal role in these cities. There are some modest experiences with often a variety of types of migration, but never very significant. The cities often combine refugee, postcolonial and labour migrants, as well as sometimes student migration (such as Rouen and Dessau-Roßlau). This variety may be one of the factors behind the relatively low levels of segregation; the various groups live quite scattered across the cities. For instance in Rouen in some neighbourhoods there are more student migrants and in others labour migrants, or in Viareggio domestic and care workers in one and refugees in others. Viareggio and Rouen also have experiences with emigration or 'secondary migration' to other major cities. Dessau-Roßlau was even described as a 'city of passage' rather than a city of migration.

There is some variation across the cities in terms of economic opportunity structures, but (similar to the cluster III cities) the cities in this cluster seem to offer relatively weak economic circumstances. Migrants are often employed in sectors with relatively low-paid jobs, such as manufacturing (Dessau-Roßlau, Doetinchem, Viareggio), the port or surrounding rural regions (Rouen) or sometimes seasonal services such as tourism (Viareggio). In some cases there is relatively high unemployment (Dessau-Roßlau). Just as in cluster III cities, the cities in this category seem to be vulnerable to discrimination.

In terms of politics, most cities have a more centre-left tradition. Besides Rouen, which seems to follow the general French universalist approach, most cities follow an active approach towards diversity, inclusion and anti-discrimination. Cities like Viareggio and Doetinchem have even been quite entrepreneurial in their welcoming, intercultural or anti-discrimination approaches.

Table 7.6. Summary table of comparison of cluster IV cities

Cities	Mobility	Mobility	Mobility	Inequality	Inequality	Inequality	Inequality	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Political-institut factors	Diversity	Diversity	Segregation 2019 recent
Cities	History	Level and temorality	Types of flows	Urban development / opportunity struc	Discrimination	Income inequal	Education inequality	Targeted (towards what/ who?)	Local leadership	Type of policy approach	Relationship with regional level	Right-left orientation	Number of various origins	Volume	Current level of segreation
Dessau-roßlau (de)	Short	Outflow, wants to retain, pass through	Late resettlers, eu labour migrants, refugees, some students	Weak economic stance, reinventing attempts	Medium	Medium	High	Refugees	A lot	Integration	Bottom up	Centre-right, with far-right support	Medium	Low	High (since refugee arrivals in 2015-16)
Doetinchem (2013 – nl)	Medium	Low inflow levels, low mobility	Old labour migrants, agricultural workers, recent refugees	Weak economic opportunities	Above average (?)	High	Moderate high	Refugees	Active approach	Integration & diversity, anti-discrim	Mixed	Centre-left	Limited	Low	Medium
Rouen (fr)	Medium	Low inflow levels, pass-through towards paris	Colonial migrants, students	Mixed agricultural, marginal industrial(port) and student city	Discrimination of muslim and black	Moderate high	Moderate low, good university in place	Neighbourhood targeting, overall universalist	Some	Diversity	Bottom-up	Centre-left	Limited	Low	Low
Viareggio (it)	Short	Outflow, pass through	Seasonal workers in tourism, a bit of refugees, domestic workers	Tourism-based, seasonal economy, narrow opportunities	Some towards allegedly criminal groups	Medium	Moderate (lack of data)	Refugees	Some	Hands off	Top-down	Centre-left (shifted from right)	Limited	Low	Medium-low

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Chapter 8
Towards a Typology of Urban Diversities

How and why do some cities develop such different diversity configurations? And what is the relation between diversity and segregation levels and broader economic situation, migration history and political factors? After the analysis presented the previous chapters we know how 16 selected cities compare to each other in terms of mobilities, inequalities and broader political-institutional setting. However, to understand how these factors are related to diversity and segregation, requires a further step of analysis. To this aim, in this chapter we make the step towards a typology of cities of migration.

We started this book with the selection of cities based on an inductive mapping of the diversity and segregation indexes using data of 2011. We defined four clusters of cities in order to capture variation between European cities on these variables. However, such inductive groupings say nothing in terms of how and why cities have specific diversity configurations. For developing a better understanding of these clusters and for developing types, we deduced a set of key factors from the literature (Chap. 3) that may account for diversity configurations and subsequently explored (in Chaps. 4, 5, 6 and 7) how a selected number of case studies score on these variables. This involved an in-depth qualitative exploration of these cities, including a more in-depth (and more up to date) snapshot of segregation and diversity levels and a systematic study of our key factors mobilities, inequalities and political-institutional setting. Now, this provides the foundation for the next step in the analysis: the development of a cross-national typology of urban diversities. To identify and understand types of urban diversities, we systematically examine how mobilities, inequalities and political-institutional factors relate to levels of diversity and segregation. If we can find systematic relations between all analysed aspects, then we could speak of types of urban diversities.

Thus, we will build a typology by tracing the patterns of similarities and differences between the 16 cities through Qualitative Comparative Analysis. An important methodological note is this analysis does not involve testing the relationship between the factors and the clusters per se, but examining the relationship between the factors and the diversity and segregation across the 16 individual cities. We

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understand a type as a significant association found through QCA analysis between ALL theoretical aspects defined in Chap. 2. This means that the QCA analysis will lead to a systematic grouping of cities based on our QCA analysis (the 'types') which will likely differ from the explorative clustering of cities based on diversity configurations as followed in Chaps. 4, 5, 6, and 7.

In moving from our explorative clusters to a typology, we start by reviewing the positioning of the 16 case studies in terms of urban diversity and segregation. This allows us to get a more precise view on their diversity configurations based on our qualitative research (covering the time until 2019). Subsequently, we analyse (QCA) the relationship between each of our three core factors (mobilities, inequalities and political-institutional factors) and the diversity configurations we defined in the first step (see Appendix 3 for details on the conducted fsQCA in R). At the end of this chapter, we then bring all patterns of relations together, and see whether we can identify a number of coherent types of cities of migration.

8.1 Reviewing How the Cases Fit the Sets of Urban Diversity and Segregation

Our in-depth case studies in the Chaps. 4, 5, 6 and 7 allowed us to grasp a more precise and more updated (beyond the integrated dataset) understanding of how the 16 cities compare to each other along these dimensions. Reviewing the positioning of our cases in terms of their diversity configuration is important opportunity to make our QCA more precise and thus construct a more valid typology.

We assigned fuzzy-set scores to each case to indicate the degree of its belonging to each theoretical set. As mentioned earlier, we defined four possible degrees of membership: fully in the set (1), mostly in the set (0.67), mostly out of the set (0.33) and fully out of the set (0). These scores allow us a more robust and systematic comparison of the cases. The theoretical set of 'high migration-related diversity' is composed of two sub-sets: high volume of diversity and high variety of diversity, which both have to be observed to categorize a case as 'fully highly diverse city'. And, on the contrary, low volume and variety of migration-delated diversity have to be observed for a case to be regarded as fully not fitting the definition of 'highly diverse'. The theoretical set of "highly segregated city" is defined with just one dimension of residential segregation, as it observed by expert interviewees and secondary data collected during the in-depth case studies. Due to unavailability of cross-country comparable data on segregation levels, it is not possible to identify the recent levels of segregation with the same certainly as in 2011. However, for our set-theoretic analysis it is enough to determine full or partial fit of the cases using qualitatively informed evaluations.

In the table below, we show the extent the 16 cities fit the theoretical sets after qualitative research (Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 Cities fit into sets of high diversity and high segregation

Cities	DIVERSE	SEG
Cities	High variety & volume 2019	High segregation 2019
Hilversum (NL)	0,67	0
Konstanz (DE)	1	0
Paris (FR)	1	0,33
Parma (IT)	0,67	0,33
Ingolstadt (DE)	1	1
Modena (IT)	0,67	1
Nîmes (FR)	0,67	1
Rotterdam (NL)	1	1
Cosenza (IT)	0,33	0,67
Leeuwarden (NL)	0,33	1
Plauen (DE)	0	1
Vannes (FR)	0	1
Dessau-Roßlau (DE)	0	0,33
Doetinchem (NL)	0,33	0,33
Rouen (FR)	0,33	0
Viareggio (IT)	0	0

In the table above we can see that Konstanz, Paris, Ingolstadt and Rotterdam are considered as fully fitting the definition of 'highly diverse cities', while Hilversum, Parma, Modena and Nîmes fit this definition to a lesser degree, still they 'mostly in the set'. The cities Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau and Viareggio have too little variety and volume of migrants, so they are considered fully out of this theoretical set, while Rouen, Doetinchem, Leeuwarden and Cosenza display a higher level of diversity, nevertheless they are mostly out of the set 'highly diverse cities'.

With regards to theoretical set 'highly segregated', there is also some variation between the cases. Ingolstadt, Modena, Nîmes, Rotterdam, Leeuwarden, Plauen, Vannes are considered fully fitting this definition, since their levels of residential segregation between migrant and non-migrant population were high in 2011 and were also maintained in the more recent years, according to qualitative accounts of the interviewees. Cosenza is given a 0.67 score because the interviewees did not perceive the city as being highly segregated, thus there may have been change in the recent years towards less segregation. Hilversum, Konstanz, Rouen and Viareggio do not belong to the set 'highly segregated', since both quantitative and qualitative accounts of these cities indicate more residential mixing in the neighbourhoods. Paris, Parma, Dessau-Roßlau and Doetinchem are regarded as mostly out of the set 'highly segregated', however, the qualitative accounts indicate that in the recent years there have been more segregation than was captured in 2011 data, in some cases due to new arrivals such as around the refugee situation that emerged in Europe around 2015. Hence, they were given score of 0.33, to make a difference between them and those cases that are fully out (with scores 0).

8.2 Mobilities and Urban Diversities

The first group of factors we studied in our 16 city cases involves mobilities (Table 8.2). We look at three specific aspects of mobility: the history of migration, the level of migration and the types of migration flows. How do cities' history of migration, and the distinct types of migration flows and their intensity relate to diversities and segregation in the selected cities? For instance, do cities with high levels, multiple types of immigration flows and a long migration history develop a different configuration of diversity than cities with lower levels of immigration, shorter histories of migration and less variation in the types of immigration flows?

8.2.1 History of Migration

For the purposes of more systematic qualitative comparison, we categorize various lengths of migration history into short, medium and long. Long migration history is observed in the cities that have been attracting immigrants for centuries and continue doing so in contemporary times. In our selection cities Rotterdam and Paris have the longest history of intensive immigration. Medium history of immigration

Table 8.2 Membership in set of mobility conditions (fuzzy-set membership of city cases in three theoretical sets of mobility dimension)

CITIES	LONGHIS	FLOWVAR	MOB
Cities	Medium or long history	High variety of migration flows	High mobility (both Inflow and Outlow)
Cosenza	0	0,33	0,67
Dessau-Roßlau	0	0	0
Doetinchem	1	0	0
Hilversum	1	1	0,67
Ingolstadt	1	0,67	0,67
Konstanz	1	1	0,67
Leeuwarden	0	0	0
Modena	1	1	0,33
Nîmes	1	0,67	0
Paris	1	1	1
Parma	1	1	0,33
Plauen	0	0	0
Rotterdam	1	1	1
Rouen	1	0,33	0,33
Vannes	1	0	0
Viareggio	0	0	0

Fuzzy-set scores: 1—full fit; 0,67—mostly fit; 0,33—mostly out; 0—fully out.

is defined in terms of decades. In many cities the period of intensified immigration starts from the post-WWII period with guest-worker agreements and post-colonial immigration. Cities such as Konstanz, Hilversum, Ingolstadt, Modena are categorized as having medium immigration history. Other cities in which immigration is still perceived as something new, have been experiencing immigration within the past 20 years, with more intense recent influxes, often related to refugee arrivals. The immigration history in the cities Plauen, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Viareggio and Dessau- Roßlau is categorized 'short'. The difference between the cities with short migration history and the rest matters more than distinction between long history and medium, so we constructed our theoretical set to capture the greater distinction. We defined our theoretical set as 'medium or long history of migration' and assigned full membership scores (1) to cases that display either long or medium history, while those with short history are considered as not belonging (0).

Not surprisingly, we see that long and medium migration histories tend to go together with relatively high diversity. In a city like Paris, the long history of migration has accumulated into a very diversified make up of its society today. At the same time, short migration history is mainly observed in the cities with low variety and volume of migration-related diversity. However, there are some exceptions: Vannes, Rouen and Doetinchem—cities with medium migration history—mostly do not fit the set of highly diverse cities. Interestingly, even in the cities with 'short' immigration history, the variety and volume of diversity have increased in the past 5–10 years. In most cases it was due to refugee influx (i.e. Plauen, Dessau-Roßlau, Cosenza), the change, however, was not sufficient to transform these cities into 'highly diverse'.

Segregation patterns do not seem to have a particular correspondence with the length of immigration history. Both high and low levels of segregation can be found among the cities with different duration of immigration history.

8.2.2 Types of Migration Flows

The histories of immigration have been characterized by various types of migrants, which have different reasons and modes of arrival. There seems to be a pattern that highly diverse cities have mostly experienced very different types of migration flows. The cities as Rotterdam, Modena, Parma, Paris, Konstanz, Hilversum, Ingolstadt and Nîmes show an impressive mix of labour, humanitarian, educational, post-colonial and family immigration. International students, ethnic repatriates (in Germany), both high- and low-skilled workers, immigrants from within and outside of the EU, refugees and asylum seekers live side-by-side in those localities. Thus, these cities are considered to be either fully (1) or mostly fitting (0,67) the theoretical set 'high variety of migration flows'. While in the cities with lower levels of diversity—Vannes, Plauen, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Doetinchem, Dessau-Roßlau, Viareggio and Rouen—we observe a more limited variety of immigration types. There could be a mix of post-colonial and labour migrants (France), or

ethnic-German repatriates and refugees (Germany). In such cities, there are also many intra-EU labour migrants and seasonal workers. Therefore, they are considered to be mostly or fully out of the set 'high variety of migration flows'. With regards to segregation, no clear patterns have emerged.

8.2.3 Mobility Levels

Another aspect of mobilities is the intensity of migration inflows and outflows in the cities. In the previous chapters the mobility patterns of international migrants were analysed using various sources of data, where data was available, we examined trends over time. In most of the cases, it was possible to identify whether the volume of migration inflows has been growing over the past decade or declining. Moreover, we also looked at the net migration, and where possible, identified the difference between the numbers of those coming in and moving out of the cities. We also attempted to gather qualitative accounts of our informants to grasp the temporal nature of migration, distinguishing between the cities that retain immigrants—settlement cities, or those where most migrants tend to stay only temporarily—pass-through cities. It is important to remember, however, that migrants in those cities are diverse in their mobility aspirations and strategies, they may have unequal opportunities in terms of findings jobs and settlement. Therefore, these observed trends may differ per type of migrant, and it could be a stretch to speak of a single overarching and uniform trend in any city.

Whereas it is almost logical that high diverse cities are also mobile cities, this is not necessarily so. A diverse city can also be diverse as it is an 'arrival city' where migrants arrive and settle, without significant outward mobility. However, as discussed in Chap. 2, there seems to be a trend from 'arrival cities' to 'mobile cities'. Indeed, we find that most of the highly diverse cities, are also highly mobile with substantial numbers of migrants arriving and leaving. Cities like Parma, Modena, Konstanz, Rotterdam, Ingolstadt in particular have been experiencing intensification of immigration in the past decades. In Rotterdam, Hilversum and Paris the outflows have been increasing too, although outmigration still remained below the levels of immigration; these cities remain to some extent 'arrival cities', although increasingly less so. Only in Paris in the recent years more migrants were departing than arriving. All these cities are economic centres of international, national or regional level, that continuously develop, and thus, maintain and even improve their attractiveness as destinations for immigrant settlement. In these cities large groups of migrants settle for many years, due to stable and diverse economic opportunities and historical ethnic networks of support. Nîmes—a city with medium diversity levels also continuously attracts higher numbers of immigrants, who tend to settle there for longer. If this trend persists, the diversity levels of Nîmes might eventually increase in the future. However, this postindustrial city is experiencing economic decline, that sets it aside from the cities mentioned above.

On the contrary, cities with low diversity tend to experience low overall levels of mobility and stronger outflows. Vannes, Plauen, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Viareggio, Rouen, Doetinchem have few incoming migrants, among whom many stay there only temporary. These cities are characterized by higher migratory outflows, with the exception of Doetinchem and Leeuwarden. Cities like Plauen, Rouen, Cosenza and Dessau-Roßlau, have been struggling with intensified emigration of young and higher educated for years. From southern Italy to the North, from East to west Germany, from periphery to the capital, residents of these cities have been leaving in search of better economic opportunities: both established population ('natives' and migrants). Some of the cities are putting their efforts in economic integration of newly arrived refugees in the hope that that would improve their demographic balance. However, economic integration takes both financial investments and time. So, most of these cities refer to themselves as pass-through cities, highlighting the fluid and temporary residence patterns of large proportion of migrants. Of cause, there are some migrants that settle in these cities, for instance in Cosenza, we observe established communities of Filipina and Senegalese migrants, while in Dessau-Roßlau some ethnic-German repatriates represent the more settled group. For segregation, no clear patterns were found in level of mobility flows.

For the QCA we aimed to capture the distinction between highly mobile cities and those with limited international mobility. Those cities where both intensive in and outflows are observed were regarded as fully (1) or mostly fitting (0,67) the set of 'highly mobile cities'. Those cities where only outflows or only inflows were strong, or those cities with overall low numbers of international mobility have been categorized as mostly (0,33) and fully outside (0) of the set 'highly mobile'.

8.2.4 Conclusion; the Relationship Between Mobilities and Diversity Configurations

Our QCA revealed that 'Long or medium history' of immigration is indeed a necessary condition for 'highly diverse' cities. Without long or medium history of immigration cities cannot be highly diverse. While the necessary condition for the reversed set of 'non diverse cities' is a lack of high mobility, and as a more detailed look reveals that it is especially the absence of high international inflows, which is observed in the cities of moderate diversity. The sufficiency analysis showed that a combination of long or medium history with a high variety of migration flows is typical for the 'high-diversity' outcome in the cities Modena, Nîmes, Parma, Hilversum, Ingolstadt, Konstanz, Paris and Rotterdam. While the low levels of migration-related diversity in the cities Dessau-Roßlau, Plauen, Leeuwarden, Viareggio, Doetinchem, Roen and Vannes are characterized by a combination of limited international mobility and limited variety of immigration inflows. The case of Cosenza reveals a shorter migration history combined with limited variety of

immigration flows, since its levels of both inflow and outflows are considered rather high.

The analysis of connections between mobility factors and segregation provides less conclusive results. There were no necessary mobility conditions found for neither highly segregated cities, nor cities with lower segregation levels. However, the sufficiency analysis revealed that segregation in some (non-diverse) cities—Plauen, Leeuwarden and Cosenza—manifests a combination of limited migration history and limited variety of migration flows. However, that same combination also is observed in Dessau-Roßlau and Viareggio, which are mot regarded to be highly segregated. Therefore, we can not say with certainty which mobility conditions are important to differentiate between cities with high and low segregation.

In sum, the analysis revealed that there is a relationship between mobility trends and the levels of diversity, and that there is no relationship with residential segregation patterns. Longer histories of mobility seem to go together with more variety of immigration flows. Cities with high levels of migration-related diversity are in general also the cities with a continuous increase of immigration inflows over the years and a willingness of migrants to settle in the cities for longer. And on the contrary, short history of migration, limited variety of immigration flows, low intensity of inward mobility, in some cases accompanied by higher outflows of both native and migrant population tends to be typical for cities with low diversity. However, the comparative analysis of mobility trends with segregation dimension brings inconclusive and mixed results, indicating lack of connection between these two aspects.

8.3 Inequalities and Urban Diversities

Secondly, we focused on a group of factors that relate to inequalities (Table 8.3). This includes the analysis of the urban economic opportunity structures, the inequalities in terms of education levels and income, and evidence on the extent of discrimination, racism and xenophobia. How these inequalities embedded in the opportunity structures of the cities correspond with the levels of diversity and segregation? For instance, are working class cities with high inequalities more likely to be more diverse and more segregated?

8.3.1 Economic Opportunity Structures

Strong economic conditions and high levels of migration tend to go together. Our QCA observed high levels of migration diversity in the cities with strong economic stance. We saw a clear relation in the cities with high volume and variety of diversity offer relatively strong economic opportunities, in contrast to cities in the economic downturn. The cities with strong economy exhibit diverse profiles, for instance, Paris with its centuries long super-diversified postindustrial service economy,

Table 8.3 Membership in sets of inequality conditions

Cities	STRONG	DISCR	INCINEQ	EDUINEQ	INEQ
Cities	Strong and diversified economy	High awareness of discrimination & xenophobia	High income disadvantage (of migrants)	High education disadvantage	Super-condition: high inequalities in income OR education
Cosenza (IT)	0,33	1	1	0,33	1
Dessau-Roßlau (DE)	0	0,67	0,33	1	1
Doetinchem (NL)	0,33	0,67	1	0,67	1
Hilversum (NL)	1	0,33	0,33	0,33	0,33
Ingolstadt (DE)	0,67	1	1	0,33	1
Konstanz (DE)	1	0,33	0,33	0,33	0,33
Leeuwarden (NL)	0,33	0,67	1	1	1
Modena (IT)	1	1	1	0,33	1
Nîmes (FR)	0,33	1	1	0,67	1
Paris (FR)	1	1	0,67	0,67	0,67
Parma (IT)	0,67	1	1	0,67	1
Plauen (DE)	0	1	0,67	0,33	0,67
Rotterdam (NL)	1	1	1	0,67	1
Rouen (FR)	0,33	0,67	0,67	0,33	0,67
Vannes (FR)	0	1	1	0,67	1
Viareggio (IT)	0	0,67	0,33	0,33	0,33

Fuzzy-set scores: 1—full fit; 0,67—mostly fit; 0,33—mostly out; 0—fully out.

represents not only great economic power, but also cultural and political hub. Rotterdam's economy historically centred around port has diversified intensively in the past decades and now its ecosystem consists of a variety of international corporations, trade, entertainment and art and design industries. Konstanz and Hilversum represent wealthy middle-class towns with diversified economy that is attractive for both highly-skilled and labour migrants, coming from both EU and non-EU countries. In the theoretical set of 'cities with strong and diversified economy' the cities named above are assigned the full membership (1). The cities Parma, Modena and Ingolstadt represent top regional economic centres with a strong industrial background. While in Ingolstadt the profile is rather narrowly focused on machine industry, Parma and Modena seem to have a more diversified economy, that includes car manufacturing, food and agricultural technology, as well as strong cultural sector and universities. As a result, there is a variety of opportunity structures available for

migrants: from industrial labour, to knowledge-intensive industries and research, technological start-ups and ethnic enterprises, artistic and other professional careers. In fact, Modena is in many ways similar to Konstanz, and, therefore, also gets full membership in the set 'strong economy'. While Ingolstadt because of its more narrow sector gets a partial membership (0,67) in this set. Parma is economically less strong than Modena and therefore also fits the theoretical set to a lesser degree (0,67).

Lower levels of diversity are observed in the cities with weak or declining economies. Such cities usually have narrow economic opportunity structures determined by some specific sectors. Either industry that shrank or closed down in the turbulent periods of political and economic restructuring, i.e. in Nîmes, Plauen and Dessau-Roßlau, Leeuwarden, or in general the small scale character of the local economy, i.e. Viareggio, Doetinchem and Vannes have small industries and seasonal agricultural production (in Viareggio also tourism). Rouen, Cosenza and Dessau-Roßlau, in addition to industrial and agricultural profile, position themselves as student cities. Hence, all these cities are considered either mostly (0,33) or fully (0) out of the set 'strong and diversified economy'.

Overall, no conclusive patterns are observed in terms of strength of economy and segregation. We have found segregated and non-segregated cities within cities with strong or weak economic opportunity structures. This seems to be the consequence of the broad varieties in terms of opportunity structures found across the cities. For instance, we do observe a link between postindustrial cities (such as Rotterdam, Ingolstadt, Modena) and relatively higher degrees of segregation than in other cities. This may indicate that the type of economy than the strength and breadth of economic structures influence segregation. In particular, in the cities with a strong industrial component, urban housing market has also developed in such a way that leads to the large areas near the industries occupied by the workers, who in the past may have been rural-urban immigrants, or internal South-North immigrants, and who over the years were replace by guest-workers, and more recent inflows of international migrants.

8.3.2 Socio-economic Inequalities

It became clear that income and educational disadvantage of migrants is observed in all the cities to a higher or lower extent. Obviously, there are no cities in our analysis which could be regarded as completely equal. During the in-depth case studies, the income inequalities was easier to capture and compare, therefore we are more certain in our categorization of the cities in the theoretical set on income disadvantage than educational disadvantage. Due to lack of robust comparative data on educational levels there are more cities with partial membership in the 'high educational disadvantage' set. For the QCA it is better to have less variables for a systematic comparison, so we created a super-condition 'Highly unequal cities' where either income OR educational inequalities between migrants and non-migrants are considered high. This also allows us to fill in the gaps in data on educational inequalities,

which was not available in several cases. The membership of cases in super-condition based on disjunctions ('OR)' are calculated using the maximum score of the two simple conditions. Meaning, that the city-cases are assigned the highest score of membership out of the two sets: 'high income disadvantage' and 'high educational disadvantage'.

The most apparent link is observed between income inequalities and residential segregation. Even though available data on local level is rather sporadic, it seems that the cities with higher levels of segregation are also those where migrants predominantly occupy lower paid jobs in comparison to 'natives' and therefore earn on average less. Since migrants earn less, they also cannot afford to live in the accommodation accessible for higher-earning established population. They, therefore, predominantly inhabit cheaper housing stocks in the historically marginalized, or deprived urban areas. This link of high income disadvantage of migrants and high segregation is observed in the cities Rotterdam, Nîmes, Modena, Ingolstadt, Vannes, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Plauen, which have been segregated for many years (as indicated by 2011 data) and are categorized as either full or partial members of the set 'high income disadvantage'. However, our qualitative analysis revealed that since recently, Dessau-Roßlau, Parma and Doetinchem also demonstrate, even though to a lesser extent, a similar pattern of increased levels of segregation linked to migrant lower economic position. For instance, Dessau-Roßlau used to have lower segregation, but after the welcoming of relatively large group of Syrian refugees in its city centre, experienced a significant increase in segregation. The economic inequality is not so pronounced there because, according to the local authorities, established resident population also does not earn much. Nevertheless, the recently hosted refugees are still in the process of integration into the local labour market, which is not easy, as job opportunities are scarce even for the 'natives'; hence, this city is regarded as mostly out of the set 'high income disadvantage'. Parma and Doetinchem were qualitatively described somewhat segregated,[1] because these both localities have historically industrial neighbourhoods with higher concentration of migrants. In these cities, migrants were also as more disadvantaged in terms of income, than the non-migrants—and these cities are considered full members of the set 'cities with high income disadvantage'.

In terms of education, the pattern is not so clear, also due to lack of systematic data comparing the groups. Generally, the level of education for migrant adults in most of the cities is lower than that of natives. It also has to do with the kind of labour that is most in demand: industrial labour, manual occupations, agricultural workers. In some cities, even though educational inequalities are present they are evening out, for instance in Ingolstadt and Modena.

Cities that are low and medium-low in terms of segregation are Paris, Konstanz and Hilversum were characterised as high-income cities with diversified economic

[1] As explained in the beginning of Ch8, we have no way of comparing how their qualitative accounts relate to our previous estimations of segregation level based on 2011 data, and to other cities in other countries. Therefore, the observed patterns need to be interpreted with a 'pinch of salt'.

opportunity structures. This is reflected also in the variety of occupations that both migrants and non-migrants have. Migrants here are not predominantly stuck in the lower-level positions in contrast to the natives, but rather, they represent variety of income levels, with both higher earning and lower earning groups present. One interesting case to consider is Viareggio, which is a relatively small town with scarce economic opportunities for both migrants and 'natives.' Even though migrants still often find themselves in lower paid positions, it is not much different for native Italian population, who also are often employed in tourism sector, which is very seasonal and is often paid in "black" (informally). Plauen is also rather similar to Viareggio in this regard, so both of them were characterised as mostly out of the set 'high education disadvantage of migrants'.

Rouen, Modena, Cosenza and Ingolstadt were considered mostly out of the set 'high education disadvantage of migrants' (0,33), because Rouen is partly a university city thus there are many international students among migrants hose levels of education are high, in Modena and Ingolstadt the educational inequalities are present but they are evening out, according to our data, and in Cosenza, there is just like in Rouen a university with some international students, and high numbers of Eastern European domestic workers whose levels of education are actually high.

There is not much data on levels of education, however it is important to note that pre-migration education of people may not be recognized and does not necessary lead to better job prospects, since the knowledge of the host country's language is often required to enter high-paid jobs. So, even if some people, for instance, domestic workers from Eastern Europe are often highly educated women, they work in the lower paid sector, which usually does not provide them with possibilities to utilize their professional skills, and it does not provide them with a higher socio-economic status in the receiving society.

Patterns of socio-economic inequalities in relation to the levels of diversity of migrant population are less apparent. However, we found in our case studies, that in the cities with low diversity, the income inequality between natives and migrants is always high. Whereas in cities with higher levels of diversity there could be both large, moderate and small disparities. Nevertheless, this observation seems to point at the trend already noted in the previous paragraphs: low migration-related diversity is brought about by fewer or narrow opportunities for migrants. In this situation migrants predominately find themselves in the lower paid positions where there is more labour demand. Lack of broader opportunities also does not create incentives for settlement, but rather for temporary stay and or seasonal labour, which leads to fluidity, temporality, marginality of migrants, and this, in turn, does not lead to overall growth of migrant population, and growth of diversity of their origins, types and professional profiles.

8.3.3 Level of Discrimination

Our analysis shows that discrimination was observed and plays a role in all cities, across the countries and selection categories. However, we have to acknowledge that a systematic set-theoretic comparison of discrimination levels and types was methodologically challenging. First of all, although it was clear that discrimination was observed across all cases, it was very hard to comparatively assess the level of discrimination due to the lack of (comparable) data In many cities there were simply no systematically collected data on discrimination, while others had results from attitude surveys and sporadic accounts of discrimination from news. Where possible, we relied on the accounts of the expert interviewees and references in primary or secondary documents to the level of discrimination, to remedy this lack of data. Secondly, we saw a diversity of forms of discrimination being reported in the cities: sometimes discrimination and xenophobia was targeted at specific vulnerable communities (i.e. Roma), or ethnic or religious groups (Muslims), or other groups othered by their appearance (for instance asylum seekers or labour migrants from Africa). Some types of migrants, such as expats and European high-earning migrants are far less reported in relation to discrimination Therefore, the inferences on the relation between discrimination and urban diversities need to be considered with care.

Besides the fact that discrimination seems to play a role in all cities, we see that some cities seem to target anti-discrimination more explicitly. Whether this is a consequence of higher levels of discrimination, greater awareness, or a response to more manifest forms of discrimination, cannot be asserted. We see that cities with relatively higher levels of segregation seem to target discrimination more explicitly. Both in segregated cities with relatively low diversity, such as Plauen and Cosenza, as well as with high diversity, such as Ingolstadt and Modena, there is greater awareness of frequent discrimination towards immigrants, and it is reported apparently more. This is less so in the cities with low segregation, such as Viareggio, Konstanz and Hilversum. Cities as Paris and Rotterdam seem to present a more complex situation, perhaps this is due to size of the cities and the diversity of migrant populations and the established populations in these cities. These cities also see themselves as relatively diverse and inclusive, but at the same time there are also many deprived neighbourhoods, where high discrimination is a matter of everyday life.

8.3.4 Conclusions on the Relation Between Inequalities and Urban Diversities

Analysing the relationship between inequalities and urban diversity configurations, we found clearly that a strong economic position is a necessary condition for highly diverse cities. Only among cities with strong and broad economy highly diverse cities can be found. This is also confirmed by the analysis of the nondiverse cities. A

weaker economic stance is a necessary condition for low diversity cities. However, there are two cities that somewhat violate this relationship. Nîmes is considered as almost highly diverse city, however, does currently not have a strong economy; it seems that is diversity configuration has more historic reasons. While Ingolstadt is considered both a highly diverse city and having a strong economy (even though a narrow sector), its diversity is greater than could be expected based on the strength of its economy.

The QCA sufficiency analysis revealed that there are two different combinations of factors that are typical for highly-diverse cities. One combination typical for high diversity in Ingolstadt, Modena, Paris, Parma and Rotterdam includes a combination of conditions: strong economy, strong awareness of discrimination and pronounced migrant inequality (either in income or education). A second combination typical for high diversity in Hilversum and Konstanz includes just like the first path a strong and diversified economy, but we do not have very clear evidence of discrimination of migrants and drastic inequalities between migrants and natives because there are many migrants that are also highly educated or work in knowledge sector.

For the reversed set of 'cities with low diversity' one sufficient combination of conditions was found, the one that involves weaker and narrower urban economy and high awareness of discrimination.

Through QCA we have also confirmed that a combination of high awareness of discrimination and high migrant disadvantage is a necessary combination of conditions for highly segregated cities. Highly segregated cities are not observed without the presence of both these conditions. On the contrary, for cities with lower segregation levels, no necessary conditions were identified.

The results of the sufficiency analysis for highly segregated cities were not very conclusive. The three inequality conditions (and their combinations) were insufficient to explain the difference between highly segregated cities and the rest. There were several rows in out truth tables that were contradictory, meaning that the same combination of conditions was observed for both highly segregated and mixed cities. The only pattern that we can be certain about is that moderate-low segregation levels in Hilversum and Konstanz are related to the strong economic stance, absence of obvious discrimination and lower inequalities of these cities, while the city of Viareggio's lower segregation corresponds to its lower economic stance combined with lower inequalities and still present evidence of discrimination.

8.4 Political Institutional Factors and Urban Diversities

A third group of factors we examined concerns political institutional factors and their relationship with urban diversity and segregation (Table 8.4). This involves three factors: urban politics, type of local diversity governance and local leadership. For instance, does the political context (left, right, centre) influence how urban diversities are shaped, as well as the other way around? What links are there between

Table 8.4 Membership in sets of political-institutional conditions

Cities	RIGHT	LOCLEAD	BOTPOL	LOCALIST	UNIV	INTERCULT	INTEGRAT
Cities	Right-wing political orientation (currently and historically)	Strong local government leadership	Bottom-up policies	Super condition (local leadership AND bottom up policies)	Type of policy: Universalist (No migrant targeting)	Type of policy: Diversity OR interculturalism	Type of policy: integrationist / reception
Cosenza (IT)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Dessau-Roßlau (DE)	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Doetinchem (NL)	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Hilversum (NL)	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Ingolstadt (DE)	0,33	1	1	1	0	1	1
Konstanz (DE)	0,67	1	1	1	0	1	1
Leeuwarden (NL)	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Modena (IT)	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Nîmes (FR)	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
Paris (FR)	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
Parma (IT)	0,33	0	0,33	0	0	0	1
Plauen (DE)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Rotterdam (NL)	0,67	1	1	1	0	1	1
Rouen (FR)	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Vannes (FR)	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
Viareggio (IT)	0,33	0	0	0	0	0	1

Fuzzy-set scores: 1—full fit; 0,67—mostly fit; 0,33—mostly out; 0—fully out.

the policies a city follows regarding migration and diversity, and the actual diversity and segregation levels observed in a city?

8.4.1 Urban Politics

To systematically compare the cities and identify the relationship between urban politics and urban diversity configurations we have constructed a theoretical set 'right-wing political orientation'. In this set, cities where mayors and city council majority are from right-wing parties in the recent years and historically, get the full membership in this set: Dessau-Roßlau, Nîmes, Plauen, Vannes (1). The cities, where the right-wing majority is in power but historically there have been periods of both right and left-leaning city governments and mayors, are categorized as mostly fitting the set 'RIGHT': Konstanz, Rotterdam (0,67). The cities that now have left-leaning governments and previously had fluctuations along right-left political spectrum are categorized as mostly out of the set (0,33): Ingolstadt, Parma, Viareggio. The cities Cosenza, Doetinchem, Hilversum, Leeuwarden, Modena, Paris, Rouen have had left-leaning city councils and mayors recently and historically, and therefore, are categorized as fully not belonging to this set (0).

However, QCA demonstrates that local political orientation is neither necessary nor sufficient condition to explain the patterns of relation to urban diversity configurations on its own. This could be perhaps due to the political fluctuation that happened in the analysed time span. Indeed, we see that most of the cities experienced changes in local governments along left-right political spectrum. For instance, Konstanz is a centre-right city in 2019, however previously it was governed by centre-left for many years; a similar finding applies to Rotterdam that as one of the strongholds of Dutch social-democrats swung to a more populist orientation in the early 2000s, and since then has been moving back and forth between a more leftist and a more rightist orientation. On the contrary, Ingolstadt has been historically governed by centre-right party, but recently it became centre-left.

Examination of the calibrated data table shows, that among 8 highly diverse cities there are three cities with right-leaning local governments, and 5 with left leaning. And the same right-left grouping of cities is observed among the cities with lower diversity. Among the cities with higher segregation levels, there is equal number of right and left-leaning local governments, however, among the cities with lower segregation levels, majority have left-leaning local governments. Nevertheless, these observations are not conclusive enough to suggest that local politics alone has strong relation with diversity configuration.

8.4.2 Urban Governance

In terms of urban governance, we examined to what extent the cities followed one of ideal-typical governance approaches that we identified in Chap. 2: either a universalist approach, a diversity or interculturalist approach, or an integrationist or reception approach. Of cause, interculturalist and diversity approach are somewhat different from each other, but to simplify the analysis we consider cities with either of these approaches to be more similar to each other than to the other two types of approaches. Also integrationist and receptionist approaches are different but both share a very clear targeted orientation to 'integrate' or provide reception assistance to specific groups of migrants. In the receptionist approach, most focus is given to refugees and asylum seekers, while the integrationist approach also targets other types of migrants, usually seen as 'insufficiently integrated' in the labour market or ethno-cultural mainstream. Universalist approaches are characterised by colour-blindness, with no focus on specific migrant groups but it targets social problems for all residents. Also, it is important to note that some cities have several governance approaches present simultaneously, which makes the comparative analysis challenging. The cities were always assigned a full score (1), when a specific policy approach was identified, and in all other cases the cities were considered fully out of a specific policy approach set.

Although are findings over the 16 case studies are somewhat mixed, our QCA does suggest a relationship between cities with high diversity levels and a choice for an interculturalist or diversity approach rather than an integrationist approach. This suggests that rather than more diversity triggering a greater need for integration, it triggers a more accommodative approach to diversity instead. However, this is not observed in all cities that are highly diverse. For instance, Nîmes, Paris, Parma and Hilversum do not have clear interculturalist or diversity focus. Paris, Hilversum and Nîmes have a universalist approach, which does not have an emphasis of intercultural exchanges but rather aims to address inclusion of all kinds of vulnerable populations irrespectively of their origins and backgrounds. For the French cities this is (evidently) explained by the national republicanist policy approach. In Parma, for years the focus on reception and integration of asylum seekers and refugees prevailed, though with some evidence of intercultural efforts. Interestingly, in diverse cities with high levels of segregation (Rotterdam, Modena and Ingolstadt), a shift from integrationist policies towards more diversity-oriented and intercultural policies has happened in the recent years. The industrial past and very pronounced inequalities between migrants and non-migrants have led to problematization of migrants population and integrationist policies, that targeted the underprivileged groups with the aim of 'integrating' them into the mainstream. However, the increasing diversification of origins and socio-economic profiles of migrants in those cities has provoked local governments to shift this approach towards the one that suit better to accommodate and, in some ways, 'celebrate' diversity of these cities' residents. Even though Konstanz is not a highly segregated city, it also has recently shifted their approach from integration to interculturalist policy.

Among the cities with low levels of diversity, urban governance approaches are varied. Some have universalist approaches focusing on the whole population with no special attention to migrants (Vannes, Leeuwarden), others pursue more targeted policies aiming to integrate refugees into the labour market (Plauen and Dessau-Roßlau), yet others focus on first reception of (usually undocumented) migrants and asylum seekers (Cosenza, Viareggio), and two adopt a diversity approach (Rouen, Doetinchem), which is more typical for the highly-diverse cities described above. We suppose that local governance approach in the context of low migration-related diversity is varied because it stems from the combination of the local specifics of immigration flows, limited resources and relative dependency on the national or regional regulation. The East-German cities execute mainly refugee integration programs both because there is national-level policy focus on their integration, and because refugees form the most recent and the biggest group of immigrants in those localities. Consenza and Parma were also evidently dependent on national and regional priorities and funds, when it comes to diversity policies. Since years those policies in the Southern-Italian region have been focused on emergency reception of migrants and arrangement of temporary solutions for housing and health access. As it was mentioned earlier, in Cosenza, those newly arrived migrants, tend to leave after a few years to other cities and counties, while those migrants who came to Cosenza with the purpose of longer-terms settlement, usually rely on their own ethnic support networks, which municipality does not intervene much into. In French non-diverse cities, universalist approach is part of the national colour-blind policy, just like in the more diverse counterparts.

Migrant targeting in policies is mostly observed together with an integrationist or reception policy approach; in the cities with high diversity different groups of migrants could be targeted by the integration policies, while in the smaller and less diverse cities targeting mainly concerns refugees and asylum seekers. Targeting and integrationist policy can co-exist together with diversity and interculturalist policies, with some cities being in the policy transition.

8.4.3 Local Leadership and Localist Governance

Another aspect analysed in relation to levels of diversity and segregation is the extent to which local governments are actively involved in the diversity and integration governance. We looked at two factors: (1) local leadership—namely, how proactive local governments are in the field of migration and diversity governance, how much support they provide to migrant organizations, NGOs and whether they have clear stance towards migration and diversity issues; and (2) what is their relationship with other levels of governance i.e. regional and national. Existence of local innovative initiatives for integration of migrants, reception of migrants or facilitation of intercultural contact, existence of institutionalise diversity policies that even sometimes counter the national-level policy discourse—were regarded as indicators of strong bottom-up governance. Often the two dimensions were going hand in hand

with each other, so to simplify the qualitative comparative analysis we united them in a super set "Localist governance" (LOCALIST), for which both the local government proactivity AND bottom-up policies need to be observed, so that cases are assigned the full membership. In case, there is a divergence, when the bottom-up policies are present but local government is not very supportive or does not have very clear vision of migration and diversity policy—those cases get the minimum score out of the two dimensions.[2]

We see that cities with higher levels of diversity normally have stronger local leadership in issues of migration and diversity than cities with low levels of diversity. Ingolstadt, Konstanz, Modena, Paris and Rotterdam are highly diverse cities, and they also display localist approach to governance, and have pro-active stance of local administration and clear vision on migration-related diversity issues. They often have international or integration officers, who coordinate networks of organizations working in the field of integration, reception of migrants as well as migrant grass-root associations. There are migrant councils that represent interests of migrant local residents, and active efforts to enhance cohesion are taken at both neighbourhood and city level. These cities also support and encourage migrant association, other non-governmental actors of civil society. They also start bottom-up local initiatives, that may sometimes be at odds with national policies. They see themselves as 'innovators', who pro-actively search and support new solutions for integration and well-being of the marginalized groups, i.e. irregular migrants and unaccompanied minors.

However, some rather diverse cities—Hilversum, Nîmes and Parma, do not fit the ideal type of localist governance. In Parma, it is because their local government was only temporarily engaged, and with the change of national political discourse, discontinued much of their leadership and support on the NGOs. Hilversum's local government does have pro-active stance, but they do not propose any bottom-up projects, rather they are guided by the national policy level and practice a mainstreamed approach to diversity governance. Nîmes also does not fit the pattern of strong localist governance, although we see (perhaps as a reflection of a broader pattern in France) a less active local government being combined with various local NGO activities.

Among the low diversity cities, local governments rarely have strong pro-active stance or clear vision on migration and diversity issues. There are few pro-active local governments but mostly cities have a with hands-off approach. The two localities—Dessau-Roßlau and Doetinchem—considered full members of localist governance set—have a rather active and bottom-up policy to integration of refugees. While Leeuwarden municipality is very focused on tackling social problems, i.e. poverty, but does not focus on specific migrant groups, and does not have visible bottom-up initiatives in this area. Vannes has a hands-off universalist approach with some bottom-up initiatives. This could be due to the very low inflow of recent migrants in Vannes, and absence of political pressure to focus on specific (and new)

[2] This approach is based on a Boolean 'union' operation on sets.

migrant groups. In Plauen and Viareggio the involvement of municipality is far less visible than in other cities, perhaps this has to do with the fact that the cities largely follow the direction of the provinces where they are located. In Plauen a lot of policy decision are taken in the District government, while the municipality only executes what is necessary.

8.4.4 Conclusions on the Relation Between Political and Institutional Factors and Urban Diversities

Through the QCA analysis, no necessary conditions were found, indicating that no single political-institutional factor makes a crucial link with diversity and segregation levels of the cities. However, we did find specific 'sufficiency' relations between the different policy approaches (universalist, integrationist and interculturalist), localist governance and leadership, and the local policy orientation. We found that interculturalist policies together with localist governance approach is clearly associated with high diversity in the cities Ingolstadt, Modena, Konstanz and Rotterdam. In addition, we found that localist governance and non-Right (that is centre-left and left) political orientation of local governments goes together with high diversity in Paris, as well as Ingolstadt and Modena. Somewhat exceptional seems to be Doetinchem—a city with lower diversity levels—which is however also 'explained' by combination of these political-institutional factors. This case shows that the city administration followed a policy approach similar to those of highly diverse cities. Moreover, the highly diverse cities Parma and Hilversum follow neither of these two solution paths, both cities neither have interculturalist policy nor localist governance, in Hilversum the policy is universalist, and in Parma asylum-seekers reception-oriented policy have prevailed, with limited integration measures organized mainly by NGO networks.

The analysis for the highly segregated cities brought about mixed results. On the one hand, it revealed that some highly segregated cities have in common right-leaning local governments that do not pursue neither a strong locally-driven approach to governance, nor intercultural policy: Nîmes, Plauen and Vannes. On the other hand, some highly segregated cities like Ingolstadt and Modena, have an opposite combination—left-leaning local governments (after a period of right-leaning) adopt strong localist governance on migration and diversity, with intercultural policy. Interestingly, these are the same conditions that are shared by a non-segregated city—Doetinchem.

The sufficiency analysis of non-diverse cities revealed a somewhat inconsistent pattern, in which the lack of interculturalist policy and right-leaning orientations were found to be typical for cities with low diversity: Plauen, Vann and Dessau-Roßlau. Interestingly, these conditions were also found to be manifest in Nîmes—a city that is mostly in the set of highly-diverse cities. This is, just like Doetinchem, a case of city, where local governance approach, deviates for the more common

approach of other cities in their group. There were no consistent patterns revealed for low segregated cities, except for the qualitative observation that right leaning local politics is less common among them, than left-leaning local politics.

8.5 Towards a Typology of Urban Diversities

Based on the systematic analysis of the relation between mobilities, inequalities, political-institutional factors and urban diversities, can we identify clear types of urban diversities? The aim of this analysis was to move beyond the mapping and description of urban diversities towards an understanding of how and why cities may belong to specific types of urban diversities. This does not mean causal relations between the variables, but rather a better understanding of how the factors come together and make configurations. This will not only lead to a better empirical understanding but also a better theoretical understanding of what types of urban diversities there are and why.

Based on a QCA analysis, we mapped out the strongest relationships between the socio-demographic and spatial realities of the cities and the factors of mobility, inequality and political-institutional. First of all, our analysis shows a clear pattern that accounts for the differentiation between cities with high and low diversity. It was found that strong economy together with long and diverse history of immigration flows clearly distinguishes highly diverse cities from not-so-diverse cities. Diverse cities of today reflect the accumulation of persistent, diverse and intensive migration inflows that they have been experiencing for prolonged periods of time: at least since after the WWII or longer. We have also seen that these highly diverse cities are those where migrants tend to settle, rather than just pass through. Some of the highly diverse cities along with high immigration levels also have higher levels of emigration, i.e. Paris and Rotterdam, still high emigration is not always present in highly diverse cities, and therefore cannot be considered typical. The broad economic opportunity structures serve as a 'pull and retain' factor for migrants in highly diverse cities. Strong economies of the cities as Parma, Modena, Rotterdam and Ingolstadt attract a lot of labour migration, but at the same time their economies also greatly depended on it. It is important to note that some cities provide more opportunities for specific kind of migrants, while other have a more overarching profile. Whereas Konstanz and Hilversum are magnets for high-skilled and high-paid labour, this less so for cities like Parma, Modena and Ingolstadt, that have more labour-intensive, industrial economies.

Secondly, we found that highly segregated cities are only found among cities with strong inequalities between migrant and non-migrant populations. However, not all highly unequal cities are also highly segregated. That means that spatial segregation is associated to other factors beyond inequality between migrants and non-migrants. The nature of residential segregation is different in highly-diverse and not-so-diverse cities. From the qualitative analysis it stems that economic sector of cities may play a role, that is diverse cities with strong industrial past tend to be

highly segregated (Ingolstadt, Modena, Nîmes, Rotterdam). While less diverse cities like Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Plauen and Vann, are segregated because of the concentration of cheaper (and lower quality) housing in specific areas and lower often a 'pass-through' mobility of migrant population, since many migrants do not settle in the cities with struggling and narrow sector economies, and more forward to other areas of the country or to other countries. Political-institutional factors were not found to be as strongly related to diversity configurations, as they could not fully distinguish between cities with high and low diversity and neither with high versus low segregated cities. Nevertheless, it can be noted that left-leaning political orientation, strong localist governance approach and intercultural policy tend to coincide with highly-diverse cities, while right-leaning political orientation and absence of localist governance approaches and not interculturalist policy, tend to be linked to the cities with lower diversity and those that are more segregated. Still, it is important to note that there were cities that did not fit these patterns, namely Doetinchem and Nîmes.

When we bring the conditions with significant relationship together, it becomes clear, that strong economy, high diversity, long history of migration and variety of immigration flows are always observed together among our cases. In fact, we could argue that strong economy, long history and variety of immigration flows distinguish highly diverse cities from cities with lower levels of diversity.

On the other hand, there is also a clear distinction between cities with pronounced migrant disadvantages (high inequality) and those where the inequalities are moderate, either because both migrants and non-migrants are relatively prosperous (middle-class cities) or because both migrant and established population are struggling economically. In unequal cities, there is also more awareness of discrimination towards migrant groups perceived as others.

The cities with pronounced migrant disadvantage (highly unequal) may be either strongly segregated or less segregated.[3] While, in more equal cities high segregation is not observed. Which means that migrant inequality may have a spatial reflection of these inequalities (higher segregation), but there must be also other factors playing a role. For instance the segregated housing market, shaped by the industrial past of the city where some parts of the city on purpose have been designed to host working class population. First this population was coming from other parts of the same country (i.e. Brabanders in Rotterdam, and South Italians in Northern Italy), and later it was replaced by immigrating guest-labourers and other labour migrants reflecting new waves of migration from within the EU and from outside the EU.

The analysis of political-institutional factors clearly showed that none of these factors *on their own* relates to configurations of urban diversity. However, combinations of political-institutional factors with other significant factors revealed that strong economy in combination with strong local leadership and innovative bottom-up policies 'explain' high-diversity in many cities. Ingolstadt, Konstanz, Modena,

[3] *It could also be that the measures of segregation are not precise enough and the level of segregation (in recent time) in some highly unequal cities is not 'measured' precisely.*

Paris and Rotterdam fit perfectly into this pattern, while Hilversum, Parma and Nîmes only partially. Three of these cities do not seem to have strong local leadership in relation to migration-related diversity, and while Nîmes still has some bottom-up policies largely driven by civil society, Parma has even less of that. Cases of Doetinchem and Dessau-Roßlau demonstrate that strong localist governance alone does not uniquely define highly diverse cities, because even though these two cities have low diversity and weaker economy, yet we observe there strong localist governance. Perhaps, this has to do with the strong political will, which in Doetinchem comes from the leftist political orientation, pursuing interculturalist policies in their locality, while in the case of Dessau-Roßlau, the right-wing political orientation and steady demographic decline of the city translate into pursuit of integrationist approach to integration of refugees (from Syria) aiming at their labour market participation and long-term settlement.

When taking into consideration local political orientation, it becomes apparent that Parma, Ingolstadt, Paris and Modena, share the same sufficient conditions, in which strong economy, left-leaning local politics and high inequality together coinside with their higher degree of diversity. However, left-leaning local governance is also not a unique characteristic of highly diverse cities because many non-diverse cities have left-leaning governments as well. Some segregated cities, such as Nîmes, Plauen, Vannes and Rotterdam, can be interpreted in relation to the presence of high inequality and discrimination combined with right-leaning governments, however, also Dessau-Roßlau (a not highly segregated city) shares this configuration of conditions.

Specific local policy approaches do not seem to have consistent fit with levels of segregation of diversity. Among highly unequal and segregated cities we observe usually *reception and integration* policies for vulnerable (or problematised) migrant groups. Some other unequal cities on the contrary adopt *universalist* policy approaches. Interestingly, most of those universalist-cities are French, which is in line with national universalist policy. Some partially consistent patterns were found for *interculturalist or diversity* policy approach. It is true, that most of the cities that are highly diverse have such policies: Konstanz, Ingolstadt, Modena, Rotterdam, but not all highly diverse cities have them, and also there are two cities with lower diversity levels (Rouen and Doetinchem) that also adopt diversity or *intercultural* policies. *Intercultural* policy approach seems to be sufficiently linked to highly segregated, highly diverse cities with strong economy and high inequalities, such as Ingolstadt, Rotterdam and Modena. While segregated cities with less diversity and weaker economy do not usually adopt this type of policies.

As a result of our analysis, we may conclude that mobility and inequality factors tend to have a stronger relation with diversity configurations and also with each other, while the political-institutional factors disrupt those relationships, as they have less clear match with diversity configurations. Furthermore, from our analysis it stems that it does make sense to distinguish between highly diverse and non-diverse cities; as well as between cities with more and less pronounced inequalities between migrant and non-migrant population. The spread of diversity—segregation—can be seen as geographical reflection of these inequalities, which is observed

more strongly in those cities where expensive and cheaper housing distribution is geographically bounded (i.e. for instance in cities with industrial. Postindustrial economy). That means, that while segregated cities are always highly unequal cities, not all highly unequal cities are segregated. This makes another important caveat for our typology building. That said, we argue that it makes sense to distinguish among highly-diverse cities: three different types; and among less-diverse cities—two distinct types. We will now present each type one after the other in the order from higher diversity to lower diversity.

Taking together the analysed dimensions we arrive (as displayed in Fig. 8.1 below) at 5 types of cities. They provide a first theoretisation not only of THAT these cities have different diversity configurations but also WHY these are different.

8.5.1 Superdiverse Cities

The first type of cities refers to superdiverse cities, with economic circumstances and migration patterns not only triggering very high levels of migration-related diversity, but also reproducing inequalities in terms of social-economic status and discrimination in these cities. Superdiversity here not only means the volume of diversity but also the extent of variation in diversity, involving not only the size of the migrant population but also diversity in social positions, origins, legal statuses and languages. These cities inevitably come with pronounced inequalities between



Fig. 8.1 Types of cities

migrants and non-migrants, but they are not necessarily spatially segregated, and even if there are some neighbourhoods with concentration of first-generation migrants, it is less omnipresent and apparent, since the class background is not necessarily tied to migration. In our in-depth qualitative analysis, this type is only represented by two cities: Paris and Parma. However, we know from the literature, and from our quantitative analysis, that this type clearly represents a broader set of cities. It seems to come closest to Glick-Schiller and Çağlar's type of 'Top-cities' or, at least in Paris' case, to what has been described as 'global cities' (Sassen, 2001).

- Diversity configuration: highly diverse cities, superdiverse because of the high 'variety of diversity', manifested in a wide variety of groups and a complex set of intersectionalities.
- Mobilities: long histories of migration, that attracted various types of migration inflows including both highly-skilled and low-skilled, refugees and labour migrants, students and expats. Moreover, they have a substantial proportion of 'floating' or highly-mobile populations, that come and leave after a few years.
- Inequalities: often cities with strong and diversified economic opportunity structures but also vulnerable to inequalities, especially for specific intersectionalities. However, the inequalities are not necessarily reflected in spatial segregation based on migration-related diversity; the high-diversity composition of these cities and varied nature of diversities often means that (first generation) migrants are also often strongly varied in terms of background and economic position, and find their way into many different areas of the city.
- Political-institutional factors: cities where diversity is a new normality, a generic, universalist approach for the whole diverse population may be preferred as targeting specific groups is too complex in the setting of superdiversity. Such cities have enough political power and financial resources to develop own innovative policies, therefore strong localist governance is likely to be observed in such cities. Moreover, the high diversity of populations also demands policy to pursue interculturalist or diversity approach, that celebrated various cultures and ensures social cohesion.

8.5.2 Postindustrial Diverse Cities

This type represents cities where economic opportunities and migration patterns have triggered or reinforced spatial local inequalities also in terms of residential segregation. We see from our case studies that these are mostly postindustrial cities, where postindustrial transitions have triggered not only specific residential patterns (working class neighbourhoods) but also specific migratory patterns (low-paid labour migration). In our study Rotterdam, Ingolstadt, Modena perfectly fit this type. Nîmes is perhaps a less optimal fit, as it has industrial past and diversifying economy, but a less strong economic position and also a somewhat lower diversity than others in that group. The distinctness of postindustrial diverse cities really

emerges from our data, and echoes observations from a broad literature on postindustrial cities and their specific transitions in terms of demographics, sustainability, economic innovation, etc. (Carter, 2016; Kahn & McComas, 2021). The cities in this type are, just as superdiverse cities, experienced cities of migration with long migration histories but, unlike superdiverse cities, where mobilities have been specifically shaped by the industrial past of cities' economy (for instance of ports, automotive, mining industries, textiles and food production, etc.). Postindustrial cities tend to attract specific forms of labour and develop a higher level of segregation. With migrants often attracted as workers, these cities tend to reveal more striking socio-economic disparities between (working-class) migrants and middle-class non-migrants, and discrimination tends to be more on the surface. In terms of governance approaches, because of the scale of mobilities and diversities, these cities also tend to develop own pro-active approaches to diversity and inclusion; however, unlike in superdiverse cities highly diverse cities, they often have a history in more integrationist approaches, where sizable group of disadvantaged and therefore problematised migrants are clearly targeted by integration measures. Nevertheless, in the past decades of more intensified diversification these cities also adopt more interculturalist diversity policies.

- Diversity configuration: very diverse but also relatively high degree of segregation
- Mobilities: High levels of mobility, history of selective (labour) migration that has diversified over recent periods.
- Inequalities: inequalities from industrial histories still influence migrant inclusion and migration patterns today, migrants form part of the working class predominantly, also housed in traditional working-class neighbourhoods of postindustrial cities and are vulnerable to both migration related and class discrimination.
- Political institutional factors: as postindustrial cities with a strong working class, the cities may be expected to be left leaning, but some have over recent decades developed a stronger tendency towards the right. In addition, they tend to have very active local approaches to diversity and inclusion, often reflected in 'integrationist' approaches, or at least a recent history thereof.

8.5.3 Middle-Class Diverse Cities

This type represents cities where the economic circumstances and the migration history have triggered a high level of diversity but not particularly marked by striking inequalities between migrants and non-migrants, nor by residential segregation of migrants. These are often experienced cities of migration that today show the accumulation of a variety of mobilities from the past. Distinctive for this type seems that this variety reflects the middle-class structure of the urban economy (as in smaller and medium-sized cities with mobilities not biased to either low-paid or high-paid labour only). As our two cases Hilversum and Konstanz show, these tend

to be middle-class cities where due to economic opportunities the type of migrants mix seamlessly with the host society. Migratory patterns in these cities tend to reflect and reinforce the middle-class nature of these cities, such as international student migration in Konstanz and high-skilled migration in Hilversum. Because of this 'match', segregation is usually low, and socio-economic disparities and discrimination usually follow suit with broader societal patterns, not specific to migration. As migration and diversity are so much part of the mainstream of these diverse cities, they are somewhat more likely to follow an active and universalist governance approach, where the local administration does not treat migration and diversity as a stand-alone topics but rather as a topic of relevance across all sectors and domains; these are usually not the cities with a strong focus on integration of migrants (though Konstanz has some of integration. These middle-class cities are often on the political center or the political right, and have an active approach to diversity, though Hilversum does not focus on migration-related diversity much.

- Diversity configuration: relatively diverse and non-segregated cities, matching the middle-class character of the cities.
- Mobilities: long histories of migration, accumulating in high diversity, and migration patterns matching local economic circumstances.
- Inequalities: strong economy with significant but specific opportunities, inequalities exist but are balanced and migrants also form part of different economic categories.
- Political institutional factors: (universalism, interculturalism) rather than an integrationist approach.

8.5.4 Divided Cities

Another type of cities is clearly less diverse than all the types mentioned above, yet marked by pronounced inequalities between migrant and non-migrant population. Since the economies are weaker or less able to navigate to postindustrial futures, these cities can experience steady emigration of their populations, both those with and without migration background. The migrants that are attracted there, are less diversified in their origins and socio-economic statuses, and many tend to stay in these cities only temporarily. Migration is still perceived as something 'new' in these cities, of if not new, it is still considered 'odd', something out of normal. Just like postindustrial cities, divided cities are relatively segregated, but the nature of residential segregation is somewhat different. In some cases (i.e. Leeuwarden, Plauen) this has to do with the past or present of industrial neighbourhoods, which continued its legacy by shaping housing stock. Yet, others without an outspoken industrial past but with agricultural economy (Vannes, Leeuwarden, Cosenza) have some areas with more affordable and lower quality housing, that originated there in the course of urban development, or more precisely—urban decline. In either case, the lower numbers and more homogeneous composition of migrant groups tend to

concentrate in those areas, along with other less prosperous populations. It often happens thanks to their ethnic and religious networks and is a coping strategy against omnipresent othering and discrimination experienced by first generation migrants in divided cities. In terms of political-institutional factors, these cities usually do not have pro-active or innovative local governance approach to issues of migrants, nor they tend to strive for their inclusion. However, it is common that there are provisions oriented towards reception of asylum seekers (i.e. Cosenza, Plauen) and sometimes integration of refugees (Plauen, Leeuwarden). These cities follow the policies brought top-down upon them by either regional on national directives, which they are obliged to implement.

- Diversity configuration: Moderately diverse, often growing levels of diversity from specific forms of migration, often low-paid labour migration.
- Mobilities: Low levels of mobility, mostly immigration of specific groups.
- Inequalities: High levels of inequality, with income and educational disadvantages matching with spatial segregation and high vulnerability to discrimination.
- Political institutional factors: political inclination of the city often depends on the socio-economic structure of the city, the cities are also more likely to develop integrationist policy approaches.

8.5.5 Marginal Migration Cities

The final type that we distinguished is also relatively little diverse, with short histories of migration but less segregated than 'divided cities.' Such marginal cities of migration tend to be cities with often very narrow (emerging or declining) economic opportunity structures that trigger specific inequalities which are also reflected in specific migration patterns. This can be cities with specific agricultural industries, or those in struggling economic transition after postindustrial decline. For instance, Viareggio, with its tourist and yacht-building sectors, or Dessau-Roßlau, an east-German city which in fact failed to reinvent itself after the pre-war industry has gone into decline. For significant part of their history these cities were experiencing population decline and were not particularly attractive for migrants. Worse economy in those cities takes its toll also on the non-migrant populations, since it does not have much opportunities to offer for them neither. This means that there is not much inequality and diversification in the housing market, as population emigration over the years keeps the rental prices and competition for rental of the houses low. This leads to lower levels of residential segregation between migrants and locals, than in divided diversity cities (IV). In terms of political-institutional factors, no conclusive patterns have been observed, neither in terms of political orientation, pro-activeness of local governments or type of pursued policy. These cities would not necessarily be expected to have own innovative, pro-active policy approaches, first because of such cities do not have much own resources and also do not have much pressure to develop their own responses, since migrant population is small.

Still, we do observe that several such cities have rather strong localist governance in the migration and diversity issues. For instance, Doetinchem has both integration and interculturalist policies, that are actively advocated for by local government, and Dessau-Roßlau, in their strive to retain newly acquired population (as a result of refugee allocation in 2015), are proactively working towards integration of these groups into labour market and society at large. Marginal diversity cities, are perhaps, more experimental, when it comes to determining their approach to deal with emerging migration realities, that is why it is not possible to conclude on a specific political-institutional pattern in this type of cities.

- Diversity configuration: not so diverse cities, with growing or declining levels of diversity depending on economic transition, often low-paid labour migration very specific to the economic opportunity structures of the city.
- Mobilities: low levels of mobility, very specific to city's economic position.
- Inequalities: high levels of inequality, defined by the city's specific economic opportunity structure, also reflected in mobility patterns, discrimination and spatial segregation.
- Political institutional factors: political inclination of the city often depends on the socio-economic structure of the city, the cities do not always have very articulate policies on migration and diversity but when the do they are slightly more likely to develop integrationist policy approaches.

8.5.6 Conclusions

In this chapter we made the step from capturing the plurality of urban diversities (Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) towards systematically understanding how and why cities of migration differ. We did this by developing a typology of cities of migration. Each type brings together specific factors that either describe or account for urban diversities, including political institutional factors, inequalities, mobilities and diversity configurations. By a systematic QCA on the findings from previous chapters, we identified 5 types, which we defined as middle-class diverse cities, superdiverse cities, postindustrial diverse cities, divided cities, and marginal migration cities.

These types should by no means be seen as static types. We also see various cases of cities 'moving' between the types. For instance, we see postindustrial cities such as Modena, Ingolstadt and Rotterdam 'on their way' of becoming less segregated superdiverse cities. And we see divided or emerging postindustrial migration cities moving on towards becoming postindustrial diverse or superdiverse cities. Theoretically, various trends are possible, also from superdiverse to more divided cities; for instance, in case of new inequalities emerging and new mobilities and diversities fitting in these inequalities, a move towards becoming a more divided city is possible as well. With the different types of cities of migration now identified, understanding 'mobility' between the types is an important next step in our research agenda.

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Chapter 9
Conclusions

The local turn in migration studies has drawn attention to the local level for understanding migration and migration-related diversities (Zapata-Barrero et al., 2017). This book contributes to this turn by revealing a plurality of urban diversities and exploring the factors that contribute to this plurality. Cities of migration come in various types, reflecting different diversity configurations, different locally situated inequalities, and different local approaches. There is no reason for trying to understand the dynamics of migration-related diversity in Paris and Plauen or in Rotterdam and Rouen in similar terms. These cities have very different diversity configurations, migration histories, opportunity structures and political institutional settings. Rather than defining these cities in terms of one urban model our effort is to grasp and understand the complexity of urban diversities. We see this as an important step towards a more differentiated view of urban diversities, and also a insight into the challenges that form in different cities and a better understanding of how and why cities choose different approaches towards governance of migration and diversity. Where Ingolstadt may need an approach very much tailored to the legacy of industrial migration and urban segregation, Hilversum may need an approach that is focused on the whole local population and on the role of diversity across policy sectors and domains.

9.1 Types of Cities of Migration

The typology of five types of urban diversities—superdiverse cities, postindustrial diverse cities, middle-class diverse cities, divided cities, marginal migration cities—shows that there is no one-size-fits-all for urban diversities. This is shaped by their migration histories, but also their socio-economic structures. Here our findings do resonate with those of Glick-Schiller and Çağlar (2009) on the importance of economic opportunity structures to urban diversities. Their work on Top-scale, Up-Scale, Low-Scale and Down-scale cities contributed significantly to

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understanding how different (global) economic positionings of cities creates entirely different opportunity structures for the inclusion or integration of migrants. Our approach was different in that we have not taken these structures as a starting point for our research and that we do not look at their impact on integration patterns per se, but we come to similar findings that interactions between urban economic structures and diversity are strongly bounded to each other. This relation goes both ways; economic opportunity structures trigger specific patterns of mobility and inclusion, such as in postindustrial cities that see relatively many working-class labour migrants and residential segregation, but ongoing mobilities and increasing diversities are also essential in reshaping these economic opportunity structures.

Singer's (2015) typology of metropolitan areas is proposed on the basis of hundred largest metropolitan areas of the USA, takes mainly a demographic approach to their categorization. The author groups these places by immigrant shares and historical trends of growth/decline throughout twentieth and twenty-first century. There are some similarities between the Singer's typology and ours. Singer's typology proposes seven types of immigrant gateways: former, major-continuous, minor-continuous, post-World War II, re-emerging, major-emerging, and minor-emerging, and distinguishes them from 'low immigration metro areas'. In our typology, we also draw distinction between cities with high and low diversity levels. Our types 'Marginal migration cities' and 'divided cities' would likely fit the definition of either 'low immigration areas' or 'minor emerging areas' of as per Singer's typology, for those that have experienced rapid immigration growth in since 1990s. Despite the fact that Singer's typology in more detailed to account for various type of highly diverse cities, than ours (as it names five various types of cities with high immigration rates, and we name only two), their typology is only focused on the USA and overlooks several other important factors, which matter in interpreting the similarities in urban dynamics of diversity and its governance. Our typology is more internationally applicable and comprehensive, as we develop it on the basis of cities across several countries and using more dimensions such as residential segregation and variety of migrant origins as well as the state of urban economy and socio-economic disparities between migrants and non-migrants. Through this we demonstrate the interdependence of socio-economic, historical and demographic realities shaping urban diversity landscapes.

A typology does not only describe differences but also provides an understanding for how and why such differences exist, in our case differences between cities in terms of their diversity configurations. Therefore, we studied (quantitatively as well as qualitatively) a broader range of factors across cities varying in their diversity configurations. We analysed a total of 16 cities selected from all four clusters and from all four countries with comparable data up until 2019. Besides the degree of diversity, we looked at segregation (spatial diversity), histories and types of mobility, local inequalities, political-institutional factors and at economic factors. Each type does not only define a specific configuration of urban diversity and indicates how cities has developed such configuration. Each type is defined by a specific combination of mobilities, inequalities, political-institutional setting and urban diversities that are observed to a different extent across the sub-sets of cities (Fig. 9.1).



Fig. 9.1 Types of cities of migration

As outcome of our systematic approach, we labelled the five types of cities of migration as follows (Table 9.1):

- *Superdiverse cities*; This type represents cities with long and diversified migration histories, where mobilities and diversities often fit in already existing local inequalities. This will often reflect the strongly diversified economic structure of these cities, which distinguish them from postindustrial cities. Much diversity can be expected amongst migrants, who will be active in a broad variety of sectors. These cities will often develop active pro-diversity policies, mainstreamed across all areas of activity in the city.
- *Postindustrial diverse cities*. These are also experienced cities of migration with long migration histories but where mobilities often clearly reflect the industrial past (for instance of port cities, mining industries, textiles, etc.). Postindustrial cities tend to attract specific forms of labour and secondary migration, and develop a higher level of segregation. With migrants often attracted as workers, these cities tend to be more vulnerable in terms of socio-economic disparities and discrimination tends to be more on the surface. In terms of governance approaches, because of the scale of mobilities and diversities, these cities also often develop active and universalist approaches to diversity and inclusion; however, unlike other diverse cities, they often have a history in more integrationist approaches.
- *Middle-class diverse cities*. These are experienced cities of migration, where today's cities often show the accumulation of a variety of mobilities from the

Table 9.1 Summary of key characteristics of the 5 types of cities of migration

	Superdiverse cities	Postindustrial diverse cities	Middle-class diverse cities	Divided cities	Marginal migration cities
Diversity configuration	Superdiverse, low segregation	High diversity combined with segregation (such as working class neighbourhoods)	High diversity, low segregation	Moderate diversity, high segregation	Relatively little diverse, low segregation
Mobilities	Long and diverse history of migration, floating populations, diversified migrant population	Long but selective migration history (esp. labour migration).	Long history of migration, diversified migrant categories reflecting local economic circumstances	Low levels of migration, often only specific groups related to local economic circumstances	Low diversity, weak opportunities for migrants
Inequalities	Strong economic opportunity structures which also come with inequalities	Inequalities from industrial past pervade new inequalities, vulnerabilities and discrimination	Strong but often specific economic opportunities for specific migrants	High levels of inequality, reflected in and reinforced by migrant groups, vulnerabilities for discrimination	High levels of inequality, reflected in and reinforced by migrant groups, vulnerabilities for discrimination
Political-institutional factors	More universalist and sometimes interculturalist policy approaches, strong local governance approach	Pro-active local approaches, tendency towards integrationism	More universalist and interculturalist approaches.	More integrationist or receptionist approaches	No-policies, some integrationism but often not explicit.

past. This variety often reflects the structure of the urban economy, which can be described as middle-class (as in smaller and medium-sized cities with mobilities not biased to either low-paid or high-paid labour only). Because of this variety, segregation is usually low, and socio-economic disparities and discrimination usually follow suit with broader societal patterns, not specific to migration. As migration and diversity are so much part of the mainstream of these diverse cities, they are likely to follow an active and universalist governance approach, where the local administration does not treat diversity as a standalone topic but rather as a topic of relevance across all sectors and domains.

- *Divided cities.* This type represents cities that are in many ways very similar to post industrial cities, but where migration face a much weaker economic structure and where migration is often much more recent and limited. In divided cities we often see very specific migration forms or migrant communities who are housed in specific parts of the city. These cities too are more likely to develop integrationist approaches targeting the social problems that are associated with migration.
- *Marginal migration cities*. These are cities where migration is a relatively new or minor phenomenon, in the context of local economic transitions. Diversity is usually low in these cities, but so is segregation, as new economic developments tend to trigger various types of mobilities. As a consequence, socio-economic disparities in these new migration cities tend to be relatively low, and discrimination not (yet) a major concern. The approach towards diversity and inclusion is often far less developed or mainstreamed than in diverse cities; in some cases these cities will choose a more targeted and integrationist approach for specific types of mobility (or even specific groups), in other cases these cities will not see diversity and inclusion as a central governance priority and opt for a hands-off approach (leaving inclusion to civil society).

9.2 Capturing the Plurality of Urban Diversities

Our typology of cities of migration offers a differentiated approach towards conceptualizing and understanding urban diversities. This is based on an epistemological premise that we should try to understand rather than ignore or deny the (social) complexity of diversity in cities as well as beyond (see also Scholten, 2020a). We agree with Foner et al. (2014) that our goal should be to develop a more differentiated understanding of the complexity of urban diversities. This has been described by Meissner and Vertovec (2015) as a 'multidimensional reconsideration of diversity.' The nowadays broadly used concept 'superdiversity' (Vertovec, 2007) does not only signal the (social) complexity of diversity in itself, but also the complexity of how diversity can manifest itself and be approached in different settings.

Our typology helps navigate the great variation and complexity that one can find in terms of urban diversities. There is much variation between cities, both in terms of their diversity configurations, local situations and urban approaches, but this

variation can be understood from the broad set of factors that we included in our typology. Our approach shows that rather than comparing cities because they are situated in different countries, as is commonplace in comparative research of for instance French and German cities, it is important to assess what type of cities of migration are being compared. Postindustrial diverse cities as Nimes and Ingolstadt may, in spite of being in two different countries, have more in common because they are cities with similar industrial pasts and postindustrial transitions, involving similar economic structures and challenges, similar patterns of spatial dispersion or concentration of working-class and migrant populations, similar migration histories, etc. The same applies for middleclass migration cities as Konstanz and Hilversum who have much more in common than their two different national settings suggest, because these are two cities with strong economic opportunities for specific middleclass migration, and a fitting social-structural make up of the city.

While capturing the plurality of urban diversities, our approach also offers a systematic way of preventing a form of 'methodological localism' where complexity would be reduced to a specific model of the local. This tendency to reduce the complexity of urban settings has been observed in the fixation of research on so-called global cities such as London, New York and Paris (see also Glick-Schiller & Çağlar, 2009). Most cities are not global cities, at least not in way these much studied cities are. Our research demonstrates that the configuration of diversity, and the related inequalities, mobilities and political-institutional settings were very different in Viareggio or Vann than in a superdiverse global city like Paris. Our study supports a broader trend in migration studies (a. o. Kelly et al., 2023) to focus also on cities of different sizes and different backgrounds, helping us to capture migration-related urban dynamics beyond global cities.

We also did not find a clear or 'linear' relationship between size and types of city of migration. Yes, it is true that larger cities tend to be the more diverse cities. But we also found some rather small cities like Parma or Ingolstadt to be in fact superdiverse or postindustrial diverse cities, when taking into account both the volume and variety of migrant origins. Also, we saw some larger cities like Rouen and Leeuwarden figuring as divided or marginal cities of migration. Size matters, but in the end does not say much about local diversity configurations.

Understanding inequalities is, as our approach has shown, a key part of understanding urban diversity configurations. Here our approach does echo some of the observations of Glick-Schiller and Caglar, particularly regarding the importance of understanding the socio-economic conditions of a city. We see a correlation between high levels of diversity and the strength of economic opportunity structures in cities (without suggesting a specific causal relation). Migration-related diversities tend to come with economic opportunities. Especially in superdiverse cities (in our cases both Parma and Paris) this involves strongly diversified opportunity structures as well, for instance including high-paid as well as low-paid job opportunities. Here again we see that the postindustrial diverse cities type shows a different pattern; economic opportunities and mobilities to these cities have developed together with inequalities in terms of housing, often leading to significant spatial segregation. Many postindustrial cities are known for their working-class neighbourhoods that

have increasingly diversified. In these cities, diversities have tended to overlap more with class or socio-economic status, creating a basis for more open struggles with discrimination. This does not mean that discrimination is not an issue in other cities, but in postindustrial cities these are more on the surface and can involve significant friction.

Finally, we also found that it matters significantly how one defines and studies diversity. Our systematic literature review revealed that there is a broad consensus in the literature that (migration-related) diversity in cities means more than simply the number of persons with a migration-background. Therefore, we also looked at the diversity amongst persons from different backgrounds as well as the variety of different types of migration. This reflects a broader trend that is observed in the literature from focus on migrants from specific groups or communities (also criticized for 'ethnic lensing') to a focus on the variety of diversity (Hollinger, 1995) or superdiversity (Vertovec, 2007). In our typology we saw that this is precisely one of the distinctions between superdiverse cities on the one hand and postindustrial and middle-class diverse cities on the other, so important that it is even reflected in the framing of the types. Superdiverse cities are exceptional in the degree of diversity based on long and varied histories of migration; there are many migrants from many different backgrounds who intersect (in terms of ethnicity, class, status, etc) in many different ways. In postindustrial and middle-class cities we often see long but more specific migration histories, such as the history of working class labour immigration to industrializing cities, still very much reflected in the diversity configurations and in spatial diversities of such cities today.

9.3 Understanding the Plurality of Local Approaches to Diversity

Inthe context of the local turn in migration studies, our typology offers a new way of understanding the plurality of local approaches to diversity. It is well-known that migration studies have long been, and to some extent still are, haunted by a persistent 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Cities were previously often studied only in reference to specific 'national models of integration' (Bertossi, 2011), or historically developed and institutionalized national repertoires for how migration and migration-related diversities are to be understood and acted upon, in which cities were supposed to fit.

Wedid not find any evidence of cities lining up along specific national models and policy philosophies in specific countries. To the contrary, we found cities across different country settings lining up along specific factors, including mobilities, inequalities and political institutional settings of cities. For instance, we see integrationist approaches emerging more in postindustrial and divided types of cities, where inequalities are manifestly connected to mobilities and diversities. On the other hand, in more diverse and less inequal cases, we see a higher prevalence of

diversity governance approaches universalism and mainstreaming. In cases of low diversity and low mobility, we also see, not so surprisingly, a higher prevalence of non-institutionalised policies or a laissez-faire approach.

This invokes various interesting questions from a broader political scientific perspective. Not only do we see a variation in approaches that cannot be reduced or connected to national approaches, we also see that local approaches are contingent upon a variety of local situational factors, such as economic histories of a city, migration experiences, the spatial dimension of diversity and inequality, etc. This suggests that the approach to diversity is not so much politically defined, but is in fact defined by local socio-economic and demographic contexts. And once again here we see that two postindustrial cities in different countries may have more in common than two citeis from different types in one country; Rotterdam seems more similar to Ingolstadt than to Hilversum. This finding suggests that policy learning and adoption of good practices for migration and diversity governance may be more useful when done among the cities that fit in the same type, and not only if they are located in the same country.

Our analysis shows that there is need for situating the ongoing debate in migration studies on 'integrationism' (Schinkel, 2018, Favell, 2013). Rather than seeing integrationism as a universal model, we see it emerging in urban environments where diversities go together with high levels of inequality (and segregation). Places like Ingolstadt and Leeuwarden show how integrationism comes from a deeply rooted concern with limiting social economic inequalities and a strong belief in social interventionism in general. We also see that in cases where diversities and inequalities do not overlap in such a straightforward way, in cases where diversity is more fragmented and complex, more universalist or mainstreamed approaches mostly have emerged.

Also, there can be a discrepancy between the diversity configuration and a city's socio-economic makeup on the one hand and the perception of diversity and mobility among policy-makers and general public on the other. For instance, a postindustrial port city may still perceive itself as a working-class city and thus adopt integrationist approaches towards problematized groups, while it may already have moved on towards a more superdiverse type with more diversified socio-economic patterns. As part of political or social discourses, the types of cities of migration can also have a performative effect on the cities; it can define problematization or non-problematization of specific migration-related diversities. This makes the types no less relevant or powerful, but it does require us to be very precise on how we situate the types; in social practices, in policies, in discourses, in politics, in media, etc.

So, there is also no-one-size-fits-all in terms of the approaches to migration and diversity; cities with different structures and different backgrounds tend to develop very different approaches. Here our study contributes to a more differentiated understanding of models of integration or diversity governance, which are a central part of literature on interculturalism, universalism, mainstreaming, integrationism and various other policy models.

9.4 The Dynamics in Between Types of Cities of Migration

A risk of developing a typology of cities of migration could be that these types then become considered as static entities. That would be a misunderstanding; types are nothing but theoretical constructs that help to understand the complex dynamics of urban diversities. A city 'is' never a pure type; a type can only be used to understand a city. This means that a city will often be located somewhere in between types. See how we saw a city like Rotterdam being described mainly in terms of the postindustrial diverse city type, but also revealing some traits of the superdiverse type. Our Rouen combining aspects of the marginal migration city and the postindustrial diverse city.

Therefore, it is also understandable that cities move between types. It is so that due the often deep structural and historically developed nature of the types, it is unlikely that a city will swap types overnight. However, in our in-depth qualitative studies, we saw various illustrations of cities trying to move around between types. We see that various postindustrial cities are dealing with their segregations in such a way that they move towards the type of superdiverse cities (such as Modena, Ingolstadt, Rotterdam). In fact, as we look at Parma and Paris, we see clear postindustrial aspects in their urban histories as well; however, the higher diversification of economic opportunities in these cities seems to distinguish them from the postindustrial type.

There can be various triggers of cities 'moving' in between types. For instance, we have seen some cities, such as Cosenza and Leeuwarden, very active in economic reform and in policies aimed at desegregation. In Cosenza this goes together with efforts to regularize or limit the informal parts of the local economy. This could lead these cities moving towards the type of marginal migration cities, which are less segregated. Or alternatively, the rise in economic power of such cities and growing diversification of immigration flows may eventually mean that there will be less concentration of migrants in specific areas (of cause given the appropriate urban planning policies in place); and such cities may over the years move towards postindustrial type. Another trigger can be the policies that cities adopt towards inclusion and mobilities. We saw that such policies largely reflect the urban diversity configurations, but this does not mean that consistent policies over longer periods of time could not have an impact on these configurations as well. Take for instance the development towards more intercultural approaches in cities like Rotterdam and Nimes and their focus on specific neighbourhoods as the South of Rotterdam and Pissevin in Nimes, which could eventually move these cities more towards superdiverse cities characterized by lower levels of inequality.

More research with a more explicit focus is required to understand the 'moving' of cities across types. For instance, one could also expect that the arrival of new types of migrants, could affect the diversity configuration of cities as well. It would be very interesting to see whether for the selected cities the arrival of Ukrainian refugees has affected the positioning of cities in the typology. Such effects are most likely to seen in a smaller and less diverse places. While in the localities with high

levels of diversity and inflow of new refugee wave may be less defining for diversity and segregation levels but could, instead, have a stronger impact on policy priorities (i.e. increased targeting). The same goes for more longitudinal developments with impact on cities, such as economic transitions, political changes and global developments with impact on European cities.

9.5 Methodological and Ethical Reflections

In this book we tried to develop a rigorous and systematic mixed-method approach towards understanding the complexity of urban diversities. We believe that this approach is best suited for a study chartering new terrain and trying to capture and subsequently understand broader patterns, in our case that of variety in urban diversity configurations.

However, this method has come with various drawbacks. One is that there is hardly any comparable data at the local level across country settings. For the purpose of this book, we secured access to a unique dataset that was standardized across countries, the D4I dataset provided by the EU Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (Alessandrini et al., 2017). With this dataset, drawn from 2011, we found that data was comparable for four countries; France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. This provided a unique opportunity to map diversities across the two selected dimensions (diversity and segregation) from 293 cities. For the purpose of comparison (taking account of differences in demarcation of 'cities' between countries), we took data from so-called 'functional urban areas', to stay as true as possible to our unit of analysis 'cities of migration'.

We see that this limitation in terms of availability and comparability of data at city level is even more severe, because the definitions of a 'city' and well as geographical demarcations of city neighbourhoods, and the ways of registering origins of resident population differs greatly across cities in different countries and for the smaller cities much data is simply not available in national or international databases. Furthermore, however pleased we are with the comparable data from four countries, the fact that it was from 2011 is also a serious limitation. In 2018, when we started working on this book, the data was already 7 years old, and to date it was the only known harmonized dataset on the neighbourhood level available thanks to KCMD. We resolved to use this data only to map diversity dimensions and select cases for further study. However, for understanding the city cases and how the diversities there evolved over time, had to collect qualitative and quantitative data until 2019. Still, the comparability issues of such data collected through cases studies remain. It would help that more comparable data is available for the inequalities in terms of educational levels and income, as well as inter-group relationships between migrant and non-migrant population.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis has been criticized by scholars for the fact that the definition of the thresholds for inclusion and exclusion of the cases from theoretical sets is arbitrary and not transparent. Also, QCA has been criticised because

the logic of causality in small-N case analysis is very different from the statistical way of logical inferencing, and these approaches often clash with one another. We believe that it would help the validity and generalizability of this proposed typology, if a similar approach would include larger number of cases in comparison and inclusion of some additional conditions, for instance, housing market regulations. It would also be useful if such study is repeated in some years in order to add a longitudinal perspective and conduct a longitudinal QCA analysis.

Finally, in terms of ethical considerations, we made the choice in this book to only refer to those people as 'migrants' who have actually migrated. So we have (largely) discarded data on so-called second generation migrants, where only the parents have actually migrated. This is to avoid any inadvertent labelling of people as migrant who would not consider themselves as such. We understand that this comes at a cost of losing some proximity to the public, policy and political discourses on urban diversities that we find in most of the settings of our study. Hence, it may come at a cost of a more intuitive intelligibility of our types from such discourses. Yet we hope that our approach will stimulate critical reflection as to the ethical and performative effect that social classifications of migrants may have.

However, this choice also led to several very interesting insights that we hope will trigger more reflection. For instance, in our data Paris emerged as a not so much segregated city, when we disregard anything beyond the so-called first generation migrants. We see this not only as a reflection of but also as a consequence of the superdiverse nature of the city; the diversity of immigration into Paris nowadays nicely reflects the diversity of the city already, and (often different sorts of) migrants also find their way to different parts of the city. We understand that this defies some of the ethnic, religious or racial perspectives taken in policy (and sometimes research) on migrants and segregation in Paris, but it does offer a far more objective view of urban migration-related diversity, in contrast to racial diversity.

9.6 Setting a Research Agenda for Urban Diversities

The typology of urban diversities is by definition not the end point for understanding the plurality of urban diversities. It is the end point of this book, but the starting point for applications of the typology and for developing a better understanding of the background of the types.

In terms of this research agenda, globalization is one of the priorities; how much do our types apply to cities beyond Europe? Issues with data comparability have limited this study to a number of European countries with comparable data. Would a study of cities from all over the world lead to definition of similar types? A key concern here is the relevance we found of the socio-economic makeup of the cities, for understanding their diversity configurations and also their local policy responses, and also the historical economic development of cities. It would be interesting to examine, to what extent the postindustrial experience in many European cities comparable with those in other parts of the world, which may have 'skipped' the

industrial phase or who may still be in it or moving towards it. Also, while from the Euro-centric perspective European cities may differ significantly amongst each other, they may also be much more similar to each other in terms of shared social, cultural and economic pasts, in contrast to cities in other regions with other shared histories. What if the variation in terms of these pasts is increased, how much does our typology then still stand? Could it be that the economic structures stand out so much because in Europe variation in history, culture and social structure is rather limited?

Another priority in further research is understanding the dynamics between the types. We see, as argued above, some evidence of that cities may be moving from one type to another in the course of time, but we do not see the clear trajectories of that change yet. Could it be that with mobility and diversification increasing over time, all cities at the end become superdiverse cities? Is it so that economic developments 'push' cities to different types, such as from postindustrial to superdiverse, or could cities 'move' in other direction too—from superdiverse to divided?

A third priority is to strive for a uniformity in data collection on origins and their places of residence across countries. We understand that it is hardly possible to do this for the global scale, still the framework of the EU could provide a starting ground for harmonization of data collection. We of cause acknowledge that different countries may have diverging preferences on how to register their population; administratively or through censuses and which categories to use in their national demographic reports. Still it should be possible to implement a requirement of data collection at the city levels about the country of birth of people and current nationality of people and do so consistently without limiting the numbers to top 10 or 20 most popular countries of origin. That would ensure that across countries it would be possible to appropriately capture not just the shares of 'diverse' population but also the variety of such diversity. Moreover the records of the residents at the sub-local level, i.e. per neighbourhoods and districts, in a uniform way would also enable comparative analysis of spread of diversity and residential segregation patterns in cities located in different countries. During our research it became clear that such data is usually not available for research at all. Systematic collection of place of residency from the EU as a whole continuously would enable a proper cross-country analysis and lead to better understanding of the general factors that shape it.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 List of Interviews

Organization	City	Date	Reference code
Save-Me-Konstanz, Committee Member	Konstanz	7-1-2021	K1_interview
Integration Officer	Konstanz	11-3-2021	K2_interview
Academic expert	Konstanz	January, 2021	K3_email_correspondence
Civil society organization	Paris	17-7-2021	PR1_interview
Academic expert	Parma	25-1-2021	P1_interview
Academic expert	Parma	25-1-2021	P2_interview
Civil society organization	Parma	5-2-2021	P3_interview
Statistical officer	Ingolstadt	01-02-2021	I1_interview
Center of Interdepartmental research on discrimination and vulnerability	Modena	8-12-2020	CRID 2020
Integration officer	Plauen	15-12-2020	Pl1_interview
Academic expert	Plauen	7-12-2020	Pl2_interview
Cosenza Immigration Office	Cosenza	20-01-2021	Cosenza immigration Office_interview_2021
Academic Expert	Cosenza	27-11-2020	C1_interview
Integration Officer	Dessau-Rosslau	8-12-2022	DR1_interview
Former member of city council/ Academic expert	Viareggio	12-11-2020	VG1_interview
Civil society organization (ex.)	Viareggio	08-12-2020	VG2_interview
Regional official	Viareggio	24-11-2020	VG3_interview

(continued)

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-72211-0

Organization	City	Date	Reference code
Academic expert	Nimes	6-1-2021	N1_interview
Academic expert	Rouen	9-1-2021	R1_interview
Civil society organisation	Rouen	17-3-2022	R2_interview
Civil society organisation	Leeuwarden	16-5-2022	L1_interview

Appendix 2 QCA Theoretical Sets

Here are the QCA theoretical sets that we have constructed based on these variables

Set Code	Name of sets
DIVERSE	High Variety & Volume
SEG	High segregation
Mobility factors	
LONGHIS	Medium or long history of migration
FLOWVAR	High variety of migration flows
INFL	Substantial inflow
OUTFL	Substantial outflow
MOB	Superset: High mobility (both in- & outflow)
Inequality factors	
STRONG	Strong economic stance, broad sector
DISCR	High discrimination, xenophobia (prominent awareness of discrimination)
INCINEQ	High income disadvantage (of migrants)
EDUINEQ	High education disadvantage
INEQ	Superset: High inequalities in income OR education
Political-institutional factors	
UNIV	Type of policy: Universalist (no migrant targeting)
INTERCULT	Type of policy: Diversity OR interculturalism
INTEGRAT	Type of policy: Integrationist / reception
LOCLEAD	Strong local government leadership
BOTPOL	Bottom-up policies
LOCALIST	Superset (local leadership AND bottom up policies)
RIGHT	Right-wing political orientation (currently and historically)

Appendix 3 QCA Tables for Chap. 8

This annex presents the systematic analysis of set-relations between the three types of factors and the dimensions of urban diversity and segregation, as defined in Chap. 2. We first analyse each group of conditions separately: mobilities, inequalities and political-institutional factors and at the end we analyse together only those conditions that were found to have significant set-relations with diversity and segregation. We perform two crucial steps of QCA: determination of necessary and sufficient

conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012) and we do so separately for the outcomes high diversity (DIVERSE), low diversity (~DIVERSE), high segregation (SEG), low segregation (~SEG). All this analysis is done using R-software, packages QCA (Thiem & Dusa, 2013) and SetMethods (Oana & Schneider, 2018).

Mobilities & Diversity

First, we test the three main conditions of Mobilities: Long history (LONGHIS), mobility (high inflow and outflow: MOB) and variety of immigration flows (FLOWVAR).

LONHIS was found to be a necessary condition (incIN = 0,917), meaning that highly diverse cities are not possible without long history of migration. If a city is diverse, it also has long history. However, the coverage and relevance of this condition is not very high (RoN = 0,577). It means that this condition is closer to trivial (Table A.1).

Second, we checked if analysing the scale of inflow (INFL) and outflow (OUTFL) separately would change the results.

In the Table A.2, term 3 has the highest inclusion (incIN = 1,0), higher RoN and coverage scores (0,749), meaning that if a city is highly diverse, it also displays either strong inflows (INFL) OR week outflows (~OUTFL). Also, the term 4 could be interpreted as a consistent necessary condition with high consistency, relevance and the highest coverage. It means that if cities are highly diverse they either have high inflow of immigration OR varied immigration flows (Table A.2).

If a city has low diversity it also does not display high mobility (~MOB). This necessity condition is highly consistent and also has substantial coverage, and relevance (RoN = 0,68; conN = 0.742) (Table A.3).

Table A.1 Necessary conditions mobilities for high diversity

		inclN	RoN	covN
1	LONGHIS	0.917	0.577	0.667

Table A.2 Necessary conditions mobilities for high diversity (inflows and outflows separately)

		inclN	RoN	covN
1	LONGHIS	0.917	0.577	0.667
2	~LONGHIS + INFL	0.916	0.499	0.628
3	INFL + ~OUTFL	1.000	0.749	0.799
4	INFL + FLOWVAR	0.917	0.846	0.847
5	~OUTFL + FLOWVAR	0.959	0.681	0.742

Table A.3 Necessary conditions mobilities for low diversity

		inclN	RoN	covN
1	~MOB	0.958	0.680	0.742
2	~FLOWVAR + MOB	1.000	0.457	0.648

Next, we examine inflows and outflow conditions separately, it becomes clear, that the lack of substantial inflows of migrants (~INFL) is the most important necessary condition (Table A.4).

If a city has low diversity, it also has not experienced a substantial INFLOW of migrants. All three parameters of fit for this condition are high (incIN = 0,958; RoN = 0,88; conN = 0.885).

The same set of conditions is analysed for relationship of sufficiency. We aim to determine here combinations of conditions that are observed when the cities have high diversity (DIVERSE) (Table A.5).

The complex solution generates the model shown in Table A.6. This model has quite high explanatory power (CovS >0.8) and can be interpreted as follows. Having long history of immigration AND high variety of immigration flows leads to high diversity. The cases covered by this solution are Modena, Nîmes, Parma; Hilversum, Ingolstadt, Konstanz, Paris, Rotterdam.

Parsimonious solution with inclusion of logical remainders generates another model, only with one condition: high variety of immigration flows (FLOWVAR) leads to high diversity Table A.7. When we use intermediate solution formula with

Table A.4 Necessary conditions: mobilities for low diversity (inflows and outflows separately)

		inclN	RoN	covN
1	~INFL	0.958	0.880	0.885
2	~OUTFL + ~FLOWVAR	0.959	0.679	0.742
3	OUTFL + ~FLOWVAR	1.000	0.375	0.615

Table A.5 Truth table mobility conditions for high diversity

	LONGHIS	MOB	FLOWVAR	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
8	1	1	1	1	5	1.000	1.000	Hi1versum, Ingolstadt, Konstanz, Paris, Rotterdam
6	1	0	1	1	3	1.000	1.000	Modena, Nimes, Parma
3	0	1	0	0	1	0.493	0.000	Cosenza
5	1	0	0	0	3	0.396	0.141	Doetinchem, Rouen, Vannes
1	0	0	0	0	4	0.152	0.000	Dessau-Roßlau, Leeuwarden, Plauen, Viareggio

Table A.6 Complex solution. Sufficient conditions mobilities for high diversity

M1: LONGHIS*FLOWVAR -> DIVERSE					
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	LONGHIS*FLOWVAR	0.871	0.836	0.835	–
	M1	0.871	0.836	0.835	

Table A.7 Parsimonious solution. Sufficient conditions mobilities for high diversity

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	FLOWVAR	0.876	0.836	0.876	–
	M1	0.876	0.836	0.876	

directive expectations that all three variables lead to higher diversity, the result is the same as in the complex solution.

Therefore, we conclude that a combination of long history (LONGHIST) and high variety of immigration flows (FLOWVAR) are both necessary and sufficient conditions for high diversity.

The same three conditions are analysed for the outcome of low diversity (~DIVERSE) (Tables A.8) and (A.9).

Interpretation: there are two pathways leading to lower diversity in cities. The first one, cities *without* long history of immigration AND with low variety of migration inflows display lower diversity. The second one: cities with low mobility and low variety of migration inflows display lower diversity (Table A.9).

When logical remainders are included, there is only one solution: low variety of migration inflows leads to lower diversity. Intermediate solution has the same result as complex solution (Table A.10).

Table A.8 Truth table mobility conditions for low diversity

	LONGHIS	MOB	FLOWVAR	OUT	n	incl	PRI		cases
3	0	1	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	3	Cosenza
1	0	0	0	1	4	0.924	0.910	1	Dessau-Roßlau, Leeuwarden, Plauen, Viareggio
5	1	0	0	1	3	0.802	0.718	5	Doetinchem, Rouen, Vannes
6	1	0	1	0	3	0.495	0.000	6	Modena, Nimes, Parma
8	1	1	1	0	5	0.264	0.000	8	Hilversum, Ingolstadt, Konstanz, Paris, Rotterdam
2	0	0	1	?	0	–	–		
4	0	1	1	?	0	–	–		
7	1	1	0	?	0	–	–		

Table A.9 Complex solution. Sufficient conditions mobilities for low diversity

M1: ~LONGHIS*~FLOWVAR + ~MOB*~FLOWVAR -> ~DIVERSE						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	~LONGHIS*~FLOWVAR	0.929	0.918	0.542	0.042	Dessau-Roßlau, Leeuwarden, Plauen, Viareggio; Cosenza
2	~MOB*~FLOWVAR	0.871	0.835	0.834	0.334	Dessau-Roßlau, Leeuwarden, Plauen, Viareggio; Doetinchem, Rouen, Vannes
	M1	0.876	0.844	0.876		

Table A.10 Parsimonious solution. Sufficient conditions mobilities for low diversity

M1: ~FLOWVAR -> ~DIVERSE						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	~FLOWVAR	0.876	0.844	0.876	–	Dessau-Roßlau, Leeuwarden, Plauen, Viareggio; Cosenza; Doetinchem, Rouen. Vannes
	M1	0.876	0.844	0.876		

Mobilities & Segregation

Only one disjunction appeared as a potential necessary condition for high segregation: if a city is segregated it experienced either high inflow OR low outflow OR limited variety of immigration inflows (Table A.11). The relevance of this disjunction is rather low (RoN = 0.225). Moreover, disjunctions are not considered as valid necessary conditions by good practice of QCA.

No necessary Mobilities conditions were found for Low Segregation.

This truth table contains many contradictory configurations of conditions, which is shown in low consistency parameter (incI<0.7). We can see that combination of conditions in row #1 includes cases with both low segregation (Dessau-Roßlau, Viareggio) and those with high segregation (Plauen, Leeuwarden). Only the raw 3 contains consistent combination of conditions observed on only 1 case—Cosenza. This table (Table A.12) already before minimization shows that Mobility conditions are not sufficient to account for high segregation.

The truth table (Table A.13) for the outcome of Low Segregation suffers from the same lack of consistency as the Table A.12 below. Therefore, no sufficient mobility factors were found to account for low segregation.

Table A.11 Necessary conditions. Mobilities for high segregation

		inclN	RoN	covN
1	INFL + ~OUTFL + ~FLOWVAR	0.963	0.225	0.603

Table A.12 Truth table. Mobility conditions for high segregation

OUT: output value
n: number of cases in configuration
incl: sufficiency inclusion score
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency

	LONGHIS	MOB	FLOWVAR	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
3	0	1	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	Cosenza
1	0	0	0	0	4	0.614	0.545	Leeuwarden, Plauen, Dessau-Roßlau, Viareggio
6	1	0	1	0	3	0.601	0.557	Modena, Nimes, Parma
5	1	0	0	0	3	0.598	0.553	Doetinchem, Rouen, Vannes
8	1	1	1	0	5	0.532	0.461	Ingolstadt, Rotterdam, Paris, Konstanz, Hilversum
2	0	0	1	?	0	–	–	
4	0	1	1	?	0	–	–	
7	1	1	0	?	0	–	–	

Table A.13 Truth table. Mobility conditions for low segregation

OUT: output value								
n: number of cases in configuration								
incl: sufficiency inclusion score								
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency								
	LONGHIS	MOB	FLOWVAR	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
8	1	1	1	0	5	0.534	0.463	Ingolstadt, Rotterdam, Paris, Konstanz, Hilversum
6	1	0	1	0	3	0.498	0.443	Modena, Nimes, Parma
3	0	1	0	0	1	0.493	0.000	Cosenza
1	0	0	0	0	4	0.462	0. 365	Leeuwarden, Plauen, Dessau-Roßlau, Viareggi o
5	1	0	0	0	3	0.402	0.337	Doetinchem, Rouen, Vannes
2	0	0	1	?	0	–	–	
4	0	1	1	?	0	–	–	
7	1	1	0	?	0	–	–	

Table A.14 Necessary conditions. Inequalities for high diversity

		inclN	RoN	covN
1	STRONG	0.916	0.924	0.917

Table A.15 Necessary conditions: Inequalities for low diversity

		inclN	RoN	covN
1	~STRONG	0.917	0.923	0.916

Inequalities & Diversity

We analyse three theoretically relevant conditions of inequalities: strength and broadness of local economy (STRONG), the extent of migrant disadvantage compared to non-migrants (INEQ) and awareness of discrimination of migrants (DISCR).

Strong economic stance is a necessary condition for high diversity, meaning that only among cities with strong and broad economy, highly diverse cities can be found. STRONG is a superset of the DIVERSITY (Table A.14).

The analysis of necessary conditions for the outcome of low diversity (Table A.15) confirms the results of Table A.14, as it shows direct opposite relation of necessary. A weak economic stance (~STRONG) is a necessary condition for low diversity cities. It also means that, highly diverse cities are not possible with weak economic stance. However, there are two cities that violate the formal rule of necessity. Nîmes is considered as mostly highly diverse city (fs DIVERSE = 0,67), however, does not have a strong economy (STRONG = 0,33). While Ingolstadt is considered both a highly diverse city and having a strong economy (even though a narrow sector), its fuzzy score of STRONG (X) is less than that of DIVERSITY

(Y), that is why in the formal rules of QCA it does not meet the criteria for necessity (where X should be higher or equal to Y).

The minimization of the truth Table A.16 resulted to two sufficient pathways to high diversity.

Strong economy (STRONG) combined with awareness of discrimination (DISCR) AND strong migrant disadvantage (either in income or education: INEQ) is observed in highly diverse cities (sol.1) (Table A.17). However, there is also a second pathway that could explain high diversity in Hilversum and Konstanz. These cities have strong economy, but do not have strong evidence of discrimination of migrants and drastic inequalities, because there are many migrants that are also highly educated or work in knowledge sector (sol 2). Parsimonious solution of this truth table (Table A.16) reveals that STRONG is sufficient conditions for all the highly diverse cities.

Table A.18 clearly distinguishes configurations of inequality conditions that account for the cases with low diversity (rows 3 and 4). However, in the raw 4 there is one city—Nîmes, that is considered mostly diverse (fs = 0,67), but it shares the same configuration of conditions as the rest of the cities with low diversity.

The minimization procedure results in one solution path (Table A.19) of sufficient conditions for low diversity: it consists of weak economy combined with clear awareness of discrimination of migrants. All the cities with low diversity share this union of conditions (~STRONG*DISCR).

Table A.16 Truth table. Inequality conditions for high diversity

OUT: output value								
n: number of cases in configuration								
incl: sufficiency inclusion score								
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency								
	STRONG	DISCR	INEQ	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
5	1	0	0	1	2	1.000	1.000	Konstanz, Hilversum
8	1	1	1	1	5	0.948	0.910	Ingolstadt, Rotterdam, Paris, Modena, Parma
4	0	1	1	0	8	0.397	0.143	Nimes, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Doetinchem, Rouen, Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau
3	0	1	0	0	1	0.248	0.000	Viareggio

Table A.17 Sufficient conditions Inequality for high diversity

M1: STRONG*DISCR*INEQ + STRONG*~DISCR*~INEQ -> DIVERSE						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	STRONG*DISCR*INEQ	0.948	0.910	0.749	0.625	Ingolstadt, Modena, Paris, Parma, Rotterdam
2	STRONG*~DISCR*~INEQ	1.000	1.000	0.209	0.085	Hilversum, Konstanz
	M1	0.953	0.924	0.834		

Table A.18 Truth table. Inequality conditions for low diversity

OUT: output value								
n: number of cases in configuration								
incl: sufficiency inclusion score								
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency								
	STRONG	DISCR	INEQ	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
3	0	1	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	Viareggio
4	0	1	1	1	*8*	0.900	0.857	Nimes, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Doetinchem, Rouen, Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau
8	1	1	1	0	5	0.418	0.000	Ingolstadt, Rotterdam, Paris, Modena, Parma
5	1	0	0	0	2	0.395	0.000	Konstanz, Hi1versum

Table A.19 Complex solution. Inequality conditions for low diversity

M1: ~STRONG*DISCR -> ~DIVERSE						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	~STRONG*DISCR	0.909	0.875	0.835	-	Viareggio; Nimes, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Doetinchem, Rouen, Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau
	M1	0.909	0.875	0.835		

Table A.20 Necessary conditions. Inequalities for high segregation

		inclN	RoN	covN
1	DISCR	0.963	0.407	0.666
2	INEQ	0.963	0.409	0.666
3	DISCR*INEQ	0.927	0.520	0.694

Inequalities & Segregation

In this table (Table A.20) we see three conditions and their union have high inclusion scores (incIN >0.9), so they can regarded as necessary. This means that if cities have strong evidence of discrimination AND strong inequalities (migrant disadvantage) they are also highly segregated. Highly segregated cities are 'not possible' without high awareness of discrimination and high inequality (DISCR*INEQ). The relevance of this condition is, however, not very high.

There were no necessary conditions of inequality found for Low Segregation outcome.

In Table A.21 we can see several contradictory configurations. Rows 4 and 8 truth table rows include city-cases that have conflicting outcomes. For example, Paris, Parma (row 8) and Doetinchem, Dessau-Roßlau, Rouen (row 4) are not highly segregated, but they have the same conditions as other highly segregated cities. Minimization of this truth table can not lead to conclusive solution, which does not allow us to say that there are clear sufficient combination of inequality conditions that would explain cities with high segregation.

Table A.21 Truth table. Inequality conditions for high segregation

OUT: output value								
n: number of cases in configuration								
incl: sufficiency inclusion score								
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency								
	STRONG	DISCR	INEQ	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
4	0	1	1	1	8	0.749	0.687	Nimes, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Doetinchem, Rouen, Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau
8	1	1	1	1	5	0.736	0.666	Ingolstadt, Rotterdam, Paris, Modena, Parma
3	0	1	0	0	1	0.248	0.248	Viareggio
5	1	0	0	0	2	0.000	0.000	Konstanz, Hi1versum
1	0	0	0	?	0	–	–	
2	0	0	1	?	0	–	–	
6	1	0	1	?	0	–	–	
7	1	1	0	?	0	–	–	

Table A.22 Truth table. Inequality conditions for low segregation

OUT: output value								
n: number of cases in configuration								
incl: sufficiency inclusion score								
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency								
	STRONG	DISCR	INEQ	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
5	1	0	0	1	2	1.000	1.000	Konstanz, Hilversum
3	0	1	0	1	1	0.752	0.752	Viareggio
8	1	1	1	0	5	0.473	0.334	Ingolstadt, Rotterdam, Paris, Modena, Parma
4	0	1	1	0	8	0.449	0.313	Nimes, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Doetinehem, Rouen, Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau

In this truth Table A.22 we see that only three cases have high consistency (rows 5 and 3), to be included in the minimization. Even though, some rows 8 and 4 contain contradictions (for the same reasons as in Table A.21), these rows and cases won't be taken into minimization, because the consistency is too low (incl <0.7), and OUT = 0.

Minimization of the two rows allows us to conclude that there are two pathways explaining three cases with low segregation (Table A.23). Presence of strong economy AND absence of strong discrimination and high inequality between migrants and non-migrants seems to be associated with Hilversum and Konstanz being less segregated. The second path, explains only one case—Viareggio: which have lower segregation because of its weaker economy combined with less educational and income inequalities (~INEQ) between migrants and non-migrants. However, it does have also higher discrimination awareness (DISCR).

Table A.23 Complex solution. Inequality configurations for low segregation

M1: STRONG*~DISCR*~INEQ + ~STRONG*DISCR*~INEQ -> ~SEG						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	STRONG*~DISCR*~INEQ	1.000	1.000	0.238	0.191	Hilversum, Konstanz
2	~STRONG*DISCR*~INEQ	0.752	0.752	0.143	0.096	Viareggio
	M1	0.876	0.876	0.334		

Table A.24 Necessary conditions: Political-institutional for high diversity

		inclN	RoN	covN
1	INTERCULT + ~RIGHT	0.916	0.537	0.646

There are too few cases that were explained by these solutions (CovS is low = 0.33). That is why we can conclude that only inequality conditions are sufficient to explain the difference between ALL highly segregated and less segregated cities.

Political-Institutional Conditions & Diversity

In terms of political-institutional conditions we analyse types of local policy: intercultural or diversity policy (INTERCULT); universalist policy (UNIV) and integrationist or reception policy (INTEGRAT); strength of localist governance approach (LOCALIST) and presence of right-leaning political orientation (RIGHT), or left-leaning (~RIGHT).

There was a disjunction revealed as necessary for Highly diverse cities, which can be interpreted as either Interculturalist governance OR Left-leaning politics (~RIGHT) are necessary for highly diverse cities (Table A.24). However, the relevance of this condition is not very high (RoN = 0,537), and disjunctions are not regarded as consistent necessary conditions by good QCA practice.

There were no necessary political-institutional conditions found for Low Diversity.

There are some contradictions in row 15—Doetinchem is not diverse but it has a combination of conditions that is the same as in Ingolstadt and Modena. Also, Parma is considered highly diverse, but has the same combination of conditions as low diversity cities Viareggio and Cosenza (row 5, Table A.25). Having five conditions for 16 cases is considered too many for appropriate minimization procedure. Therefore, we test sufficiency of conditions for each type of policy one by one.

The truth table with only Interculturalist policy (as policy type) also has some contradictory configurations (Table A.26).

In Table A.26 it is clear that non-diverse Doetinchem has the same configuration of policy conditions as highly-diverse cities Ingolstadt and Modena (row 7), while highly diverse cities like Parma and Hilversum group together with Leeuwarden, Cosenza and Viareggio—which are less diverse (row 1, Table A.26). Consistency of

Table A.25 Truth table. All political-institutional conditions for high diversity

OUT: output value
n: number of cases in configuration
inel: sufficiency inclusion score
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency

	UNIV	INTERCULT	INTEGRAT	LOCALIST	RIGHT	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
16	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1.000	1.000	Rotterdam, Konstanz
19	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	Paris
15	0	1	1	1	0	1	3	0.700	0.625	Ingolstadt, Modena, Doetinchem
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.500	0.254	Hi1versum, Leeuwarden
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.427	0.202	Parma, Cosenza, Viareggio
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.335	0.204	Nimes, Vannes
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.330	0.000	Rouen
6	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.199	0.000	Plauen
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.000	0.000	Dessau-Roßlau

Table A.26 Truth table. Selected political-institutional conditions for High Diversity (with INTERCULT)

OUT: output value								
n: number of cases in configuration								
incl: sufficiency inclusion score								
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency								
	INTERCULT	LOCALIST	RIGHT	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
8	1	1	1	1	2	1.000	1.000	Rotterdam, Konstanz
3	0	1	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	Paris
7	1	1	0	1	3	0.700	0.625	Ingolstadt, Modena, Doetinchem
1	0	0	0	0	5	0.461	0.225	Parma, Hi1versum, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Viareggio
5	1	0	0	0	1	0.330	0.000	Rouen
2	0	0	1	0	3	0.273	0.113	Nimes, Plauen, Vannes
4	0	1	1	0	1	0.000	0.000	Dessau-Roßlau

Table A.27. Complex solution. Sufficient political-institutional conditions for high diversity (with INTERCULT)

M1: INTERCULT*LOCALIST + LOCALIST*~RIGHT -> DIVERSE						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	INTERCULT*LOCALIST	0.800	0.770	0.500	0.209	Doetinchem, Ingolstadt, Modena; Konstanz, Rotterdam
2	LOCALIST*~RIGHT	0.769	0.728	0.416	0.125	Paris; Doetinchem, Ingolstadt, Modena
	M1	0.833	0.813	0.625		

this row 1 is below the threshold of incl = 0.7, therefore we can proceed with minimization without that contradictory row.

The resulting model produces two solutions (Table A.27). Sol 1: that interculturalist policies AND localist governance approach are sufficient conditions for highly diverse cities (Ingolstadt, Modena, Konstanz and Rotterdam); and the second path (sol 2) suggests that localist governance approach AND non-Right (centre-and centre-left) political orientation of local governments are sufficient conditions for another group of highly diverse cities (Paris, Ingolstadt and Modena). The only exception from this model is Doetinchem, which is not categorised as diverse city. Yet, it does have policies similar to those of highly diverse cities.

When we test universalist policy (UNIV) or integrationist policy (INTEGRAT) in combination with LOCALIST and RIGHT, we do not get consistent results because several cities with low diversity fit in the same combination of conditions, resulting in contradictory configurations in the truth table (Table A.28).

Even though there were no necessary conditions determined for non-diverse cities, we can perform sufficiency analysis, trying to find combination of conditions that have to be present when the low diversity is observed in cities. The simplified

Table A.28 Truth table. Selected political-institutional conditions for low diversity (with INTERCULT)

OUT: output value								
n: number of cases in configuration								
incl: sufficiency inclusion score								
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency								
	INTERCULT	LOCALIST	RIGHT	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
4	0	1	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	Dessau-Roßlau
2	0	0	1	1	3	0.817	0.777	Nimes, Plauen, Vannes
5	1	0	0	0	1	0.670	0.507	Rouen
1	0	0	0	0	5	0.615	0.447	Parma, Hi1versum, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Viareggio
7	1	1	0	0	3	0.300	0.127	Ingolstadt, Modena, Doetinchem
8	1	1	1	0	2	0.000	0.000	Rotterdam, Konstanz
3	0	1	0	0	1	0.000	0.000	Paris

Table A.29 Complex solution. Sufficient Political-institutional conditions for Low Diversity

M1: ~INTERCULT*RIGHT -> ~DIVERSE						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	~INTERCULT*RIGHT	0.856	0.833	0.499	–	Nimes, Plauen, Vannes; Dessau-Roßlau
	M1	0.856	0.833	0.499		

truth table with 0.7 consistency cut-off threshold, does not have contradictory configurations in the rows with positive outcome.

Row 2 (Table A.28) contains one contradictory case—Nîmes, which is mostly in the set of highly diverse city, but not fully in it. However, the consistency of this row is above 0.7, so it can be taken for minimization.

This solution can be interpreted as follows: lack of interculturalist policy AND right-leaning local politics are sufficient conditions for the cities with low diversity: which is typical for the low diversity cases Plauen, Vannes and Dessau-Roßlau (Table A.29). These combinations of conditions are always observed when the low diversity is observed (and also in Nîmes, which is categorized as city with higher diversity).

Political-Institutional Conditions & Segregation

No conclusive necessary conditions among political-institutional factors were found for High segregation and low segregation.

Truth table including all the political-institutional conditions had too many contradictions—showing that highly segregated and less segregated cities share the

same combinations of conditions. Also, for the same reasons as for the analysis of diversity, for our 16 cases under analysis, the number of conditions for minimizations should be lower than five. Thus, we selected again only one type of policy: interculturalist policy to examine if together with political orientation and local governance approach they satisfy the criteria of sufficiency for segregation outcome.

The analysis of the single types of policy (either INTERCULT; or UNIV or INTEGAT), in combination with conditions 'LOCALIST' and 'RIGHT' produced more meaningful results (Table A.30).

The only contradiction in the rows with the outcome 'highly segregated' cities is Doetinchem—as it is not highly segregated, but it does have the same configuration of policy factors as Ingolstadt and Modena (as we saw previously).

The minimization of this TT produces the following solutions (Table A.31).

Ingolstadt and Modena manifest a combination of Interculturalist policy, proactive localist governance approach and left-wing political orientation of governments—all of which should be observed in the highly segregated cities. However, these same conditions are shared by a non-segregated city like Doetinchem (which poses an interesting case for in-depth analysis). And the other configuration is completely the opposite: absence of intercultural policies, lack of localist governance and right-leaning local political orientation also are sufficient conditions for highly

Table A.30 Truth table. Political-institutional conditions for high segregation (only INTERCULT)

DUT: output value
n: number of cases in configuration
incl: sufficiency inclusion score
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency

	INTERCULT	LOCALIST	RIGHT	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
2	0	0	1	1	3	0.910	0.901	Nimes, Plauen, Vannes
7	1	1	0	1	3	0.700	0.667	Ingolstadt, Modena, Doetinchem
8	1	1	1	0	2	0.599	0.599	Rotterdam, Konstanz
1	0	0	0	0	5	0.461	0.364	Parma, Hi1versum, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Viareggio
3	0	1	0	0	1	0.330	0.000	Paris
4	0	1	1	0	1	0.330	0.000	Dessau-Roßlau
5	1	0	0	0	1	0.000	0.000	Rouen

Table A.31 Complex solution. Sufficient political-institutional conditions for high segregation

M1: INTERCULT*LOCALIST*~RIGHT + ~INTERCULT*~LOCALIST*RIGHT -> SEG

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	INTERCULT*LOCALIST*~RIGHT	0.700	0.667	0.259	0.259	Ingolstadt, Modena, Doetinchem
2	~INTERCULT*~LOCALIST*RIGHT	0.910	0.901	0.370	0.370	Nimes, Plauen, Vannes
	M1	0.810	0.790	0.630		

segregated cities. The second solution has better consistency (0.9), that is why it is more convincing then the first one.

Due to high number contradictory configurations, we conclude that there are no clear sufficient political-institutional conditions for cities with lower segregation.

Altrnative Combinations of Conditions and Outcome Variables

In the second stage of analysis, we step away from the assumption that Diversity and Segregation must be analysed as outcomes in fsQCA. We have played around with various combinations of conditions and outcomes, identifying variables that co-occur together, distinguishing groups of cities from each other.

From the table below (Table A.32) it becomes clear that high diversity, strong economy (STRONG) and long history of migration accompanied by variety of immigration flows (LONGFLOW) are nearly always observed together (except in Nîmes). In fact, we could argue that strong economy, long history and variety of immigration flows distinguish Highly Diverse cities from those with low migration-related diversity.

On the other hand, there is also a clear distinction between cities with clear migrant disadvantage (high inequality) and those where the inequalities are moderate, either because both migrants and non-migrants are prosperous (middle-class cities) or everyone is economically struggling. In unequal cities, also the awareness of discrimination is more pronounced (Table A.33).

The cities with pronounced migrant disadvantage (highly unequal) may be also strongly segregated, or they may be less segregated. But, in less unequal cities there is LOWER segregation. It could also be that the measures of segregation are not precise enough and the level of segregation (in recent time) in some highly unequal cities is not grasped precisely. When we add sufficient political-institutional conditions into the truth table together with inequality conditions, it becomes clear that together they provide a good basis for distinction of highly-diverse cities from less diverse cities.

Table A.32 Truth table. STRONG and LONGFLOW for high diversity outcome

OUT: output value
n: number of cases in configuration
incl: sufficiency inclusion score
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency

	STRONG	LONGFLOW	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
2	0	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	Nimes
4	1	1	1	7	0.906	0.877	Hilversum, Ingolstadt, Konstanz, Modena, Paris, Parma, Rotterdam
1	0	0	0	8	0.270	0.058	Cosenza, Dessau-Roßlau, Doetinchem, Leeuwarden, Plauen, Rouen, Vannes, Viareggio
3	1	0	?	0	–	–	

Table A.33 Truth table. SEG, DIVERSE and DISCR for high inequality outcome

	SEG	DIVERSE	DISCR	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
8	1	1	1	1	4	1.000	1.000	Ingolstadt, Modena, Nimes, Rotterdam
4	0	1	1	1	2	1.000	1.000	Paris, Parma
6	1	0	1	1	4	0.934	0.929	Cosenza, Leeuwarden, Plauen, Vannes
2	0	0	1	1	4	0.907	0.873	Dessau-Roßlau, Doetinchem, Rouen, Viareggio
3	0	1	0	0	2	0.660	0.327	Hilversum, Konstanz

Table A.34 Truth table. STRONG, RIGHT, DISCRINEQ, LOCLEAD for high diversity outcome

OUT: output value
n: number of cases in configuration
incl: sufficiency inclusion score
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency

	STRONG	RIGHT	DISCRINEQ	LOCLEAD	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
10	1	0	0	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	Hilversum
11	1	0	1	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	Parma
14	1	1	0	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	Konstanz
16	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	Rotterdan
12	1	0	1	1	1	3	0. 917	0.876	Ingolstadt, Paris, Modena
4	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.593	0.327	Leeuwarden, Doetinchem
3	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.495	0.000	Cosenza, Rouen
7	0	1	1	0	0	3	0.333	0.145	Nimes, Plauen, Vannes
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.330	0.000	Viareggio
8	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.330	0.330	Dessau-Roßlau
2	0	0	0	1	?	0	–	–	
5	0	1	0	0	?	0	–	–	
6	0	1	0	1	?	0	–	–	
9	1	0	0	0	?	0	–	–	
13	1	1	0	0	?	0	–	–	
15	1	1	1	0	?	0	–	–	

DISCRINEQ is a supercondition created as a union of two simple conditions: DISCR * INEQ = DISCRINEQ (High discrimination AND high migrant disadvantage). LOCALIST is condition indicating pro-active stance of local governments in the questions of migration and diversity. As we see in the truth Table A.34, the configuration rows with positive outcome 10,11,14,16 and 12 are fully consistent.

The minimization procedure generates two paths of conditions that are sufficient for the highly-diverse cities (Table A.35).

1. Strong economy in combination with strong local leadership of migration policies

Table A.35 Complex solution. Mixed conditions for high diversity

M1: STRONG*LOCLEAD + STRONG*~RIGHT*DISCRINEQ -> DIVERSE						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	STRONG*LOCLEAD	0.896	0.868	0.709	0.251	Hilversum; Ingolstadt, Paris, Modena; Konstanz; Rotterdam
2	STRONG*~RIGHT*DISCRINEQ	0.938	0.890	0.624	0.166	Parma; Ingolstadt, Paris, Modena
	M1	0.914	0.877	0.875		

Table A.36 Truth table. Local governance and strong economy conditions for high diversity

	BOTPOL	LOCLEAD	STRONG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
2	0	0	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	Parma
8	1	1	1	1	5	0.934	0.924	Ingolstadt, Konstanz, Modena, Paris, Rotterdam
4	0	1	1	1	1	0.752	0.507	Hilversum
5	1	0	0	0	3	0.498	0.202	Nimes, Rouen, Vannes
3	0	1	0	0	1	0.493	0.000	Leeuwarden
7	1	1	0	0	2	0.330	0.198	Dessau-Roßlau, Doetinchem
1	0	0	0	0	3	0.220	0.000	Cosenza, Plauen, Viareggio
6	1	0	1	?	0	–	–	

Table A.37 Complex solution. Sufficient configurations of Local governance and strong economy for High Diversity

M1: ~BOTPOL*STRONG + LOCLEAD*STRONG -> DIVERSE						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	~BOTPOL*STRONG	0.858	0.673	0.250	0.125	Parma; Hilversum
2	LOCLEAD*STRONG	0.896	0.868	0.709	0.584	Hilversum; Ingolstadt, Konstanz, Modena, Paris, Rotterdam
	M1	0.910	0.877	0.834		

2. Strong economy in combination with high inequality between migrants and non-migrants AND left-leaning political orientation (~RIGHT).

The minimization of the truth table (Table A.36) results in two solutions (Table A.37). Sol. 1 has rather small coverage of cases—only Parma and Hilversum. But Hilversum is also included in the solution 2. Solution 2 shows that Strong local leadership in governance on migration and diversity together with strong economy is a sufficient condition for high diversity.

Tables A.38, A.39, A.40, A.41, A.42, and A.43 illustrate the analyses of the following conditions: discrimination and inequality (DISCRINEQ), interculturalism (INTERULT), strong economy (STRONG), for the outcomes of high segregation and low segregation. Below each truth table the solutions is presented.

Table A.38 Truth table. DISCRINEQ, INTERULT, STRONG for High segregation

OUT: output value								
n: number of cases in configuration								
incl: sufficiency inclusion score								
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency								
	DISCRINEQ	INTERCULT	STRONS	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
5	1	0	0	1	6	0.866	0.833	Nimes, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau
8	1	1	1	1	3	0.820	0.802	Ingolstadt, Rotterdam, Modena
6	1	0	1	0	2	0.620	0.395	Paris, Parma
1	0	0	0	0	1	0.596	0.496	Viareggio
2	0	0	1	0	1	0.496	0.330	Hilversum
7	1	1	0	0	2	0.395	0.246	Doetinchem, Rouen
4	0	1	1	0	1	0.248	0.000	Konstanz
3	0	1	0	?	0	–	–	

Table A.39 Complex solution. Mixed conditions for high segregation

M1: DISCRINEQ*INTERCULT*STRONG + DISCRINEQ*~INTERCULT*~STRONG -> SEG						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	DISCRINEQ*INTERCULT*STRONG	0.820	0.802	0.334	0.334	Ingolstadt, Rotterdam, Modena
2	DISCRINEQ*~INTERCULT*~STRONG	0.866	0.833	0.483	0.483	Nimes, Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau
	M1	0.847	0.819	0.816		

Table A.40 Truth table. DISCRINEQ, STRONG, RIGHT for high segregation

OUT: output value								
n: number of cases in configuration								
incl: sufficiency inclusion score								
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency								
	DISCRINEQ	STRONG	RIGHT	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
8	1	1	1	1	1	0.834	0.801	Rotterdam
6	1	0	1	1	4	0.833	0.799	Nimes, Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau
7	1	1	0	0	4	0.686	0.583	Ingolstadt, Paris, Modena, Parma
5	1	0	0	0	4	0.635	0.500	Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Doetinchem, Rouen
3	0	1	0	0	1	0.427	0.199	Hilversum
1	0	0	0	0	1	0.393	0.248	Viareggio
4	0	1	1	0	1	0.000	0.000	Konstanz
2	0	0	1	?	0	–	–	

Table A.41 Complex solution. DISCRINEQ and Right-leaning local politics for High Segregation

M1: DISCRINEQ*RIGHT -> SEG						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	DISCRINEQ*RIGHT	0.812	0.786	0.482	–	Nimes, Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau; Rotterdam
	M1	0.812	0.786	0.482		

Table A.42 Truth table. DISCRINEQ, DIVERSE, RIGHT for low segregation

OUT: output value								
n: number of cases in configuration								
incl: sufficiency inclusion score								
PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency								
	DISCRINEQ	DIVERSE	RIGHT	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
4	0	1	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	Konstanz
3	0	1	0	1	1	0.858	0.801	Hilversum
1	0	0	0	1	1	0.834	0.801	Viareggio
5	1	0	0	0	4	0.665	0.555	Leeuwarden, Cosenza, Doetinchem, Rouen
7	1	1	0	0	4	0.599	0.455	Ingolstadt, Paris, Modena, Parma
6	1	0	1	0	3	0.399	0.251	Plauen, Vannes, Dessau-Roßlau
8	1	1	1	0	2	0.283	0.165	Rotterdam, Nimes
2	0	0	1	?	0	–	–	

Table A.43 Complex solution. Mixed conditions for Low segregation

M1: ~DISCRINEQ*DIVERSE + ~DISCRINEQ*~RIGHT -> ~SEG						
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	~DISCRINEQ*DIVERSE	0.876	0.835	0.332	0.049	Hilversum; Konstanz
2	~DISCRINEQ*~RIGHT	0.890	0.858	0.379	0.096	Viareggio; Hilversum
	M1	0.901	0.876	0.428		

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