

# **Two-Level Role Theory and EU Migration**

Negotiations with the Visegrád Group

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## **7 EU Role Conceptions and Role Expectations towards the V4**

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# 7 EU Role Conceptions and Role Expectations towards the V4

## 7.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to identify the EU representatives' role conceptions for the EU, for the Visegrád Group, and the perceptions of these conceptions by the V4 states. Its objective is also to present the degree of congruence between the EU's role conceptions and its perceptions by the V4 as well as between diverse role conceptions formulated for the EU by both the V4 and the EU. The chapter consists of four parts. In the first one, role conceptions defined by the representatives of EU institutions for the EU as a whole and for its member states (including the V4) during the migration crisis will be identified. The primary roles of the EU identified in this analysis are Anchor of Solidarity (helping those in need), Normative Power, Humanitarian Donor, Supervisor, Global Player, and Borders' Protector. Role conceptions for the member states are aligned with those identified for the EU, i.e., Solidary State and Responsible State.

In the second part of the chapter, after analysing the statements of V4 politicians, their perceptions of role conceptions expressed by the EU will be presented. The EU's role conceptions will also be juxtaposed with role conceptions that the V4 states' leaders formulated towards the EU. In the third one, the EU's role conceptions, their perceptions by the V4 states, as well as the V4 role conceptions for the EU will be compared based on their degree of congruence. The comparison will be made by applying binary role theory assumptions and digraph models (Walker, 2017, 2022). The latter allow naming each of the roles according to specific game strategies and the ranks assigned to different outcomes. Subsequently, it will be possible to calculate a degree of congruence between two strategies that will also represent a degree of role conflict between the V4 and the EU.

The fourth part of the chapter presents a brief summary stating that the EU and the V4 states formulated completely different role conceptions for both the states and the EU as a whole. The V4 states completely disagreed with the EU's role conceptions defined for them and perceived them quite differently to what the EU wanted. This led to a conflict between the EU role conceptions and the

V4 role perceptions of them. According to the theoretical synthesis across Level I and Level II negotiations, the agreement was so difficult to reach because there was almost no overlap between role conceptions and their perceptions, in other words the degree of congruence was low.

## **7.2 Role Conceptions Expressed by EU Representatives**

The analysis of EU institutional representatives' discourse includes 57 statements in total. Statements of the President of the European Council (Donald Tusk—15 statements), the President of the European Commission (Jean-Claude Juncker—15 statements), the first Vice-President of the EC (Frans Timmermans—6 statements), the EC Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship (Dimitris Avramopoulos—10 statements), and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Federica Mogherini—11 statements) were analysed. The 57 analysed statements were made between 2015 and 2018 and concern the migration crisis; the role the EU and its member states should have played back then, as well as possible means of managing migration in the analysed period and in the future. They were selected, as all other statements, using purposive sampling.

The results of the analysis clearly showed that the role most often formulated for the EU during the crisis was the role of Normative Power (present in 37 of all analysed statements, which makes up 65% of all of them). The second most frequent role was the role of Anchor of Solidarity that was present in 28 out of 57 statements (49%). EU institutions' representatives also referred to the role of Humanitarian Donor (28%), Global Player (14%), Supervisor (12%), and Borders' Protector (12%). The above roles were distinguished based on responsibilities formulated towards the EU and its member states during the migration crisis. The most frequently identified roles for the EU and its member states are presented in Table 7.1.

The role of Normative Power was mainly identified as the role of an agent taking responsibility for the crisis and its consequences. Even though the EU representatives did not indicate whether the European states caused the crisis in any way, they did emphasise that said states should show responsibility for what was happening at EU borders and in some of its member states. This role refers to a specific set of values that the EU is built upon. This is worth noting, as the V4 states politicians used it in their statements as well (which is detailed in Chapters 5 and 6). However, they referred to different values than the EU representatives. The latter mentioned mostly pluralism, solidarity, freedom, justice, tolerance, equality, the principles of non-discrimination, respect for human rights, and rule of law, which are the values that have guided the EU from the very beginning.

In the analysed statements, these values were not linked to the heritage of Christian civilisation which seems particularly interesting given the

*Table 7.1* Roles that the EU defined for itself and the Member States (including V4) during the crisis

<i>The EU representatives' role conception of the organisation</i>	<i>% of statements</i>
Normative Power	65
Anchor of Solidarity	49
Humanitarian Donor	28
Global Player	14
Supervisor	12
Borders' Protector	12
<i>The EU's role conceptions for the member states</i>	<i>% of statements</i>
Solidary State	26
Responsible State	9

*Source:* Author's own elaboration.

topic presented herein. While the V4 politicians emphasised the need to protect Western Civilization and Christian Values, the EU representatives hardly mentioned them. For the V4 states politicians, the defence of European identity and civilisation was a priority, while the EU representatives barely noticed this need. Carrying into effect the values and moral foundations of the EU was supposed to take the form of solidarity in helping the refugees and immigrants. In 2017, the Head of EC said,

I have always fought for Europe. At times I have suffered because of Europe. And even despaired for Europe. Through thick and thin, I have never lost my love of Europe. But there is, as we know, rarely love without pain.  
(Juncker, 2017c)

Therefore, not only the values but also specific relationships and emotions that characterise them were mentioned—a theme which will be further developed in next sections of the chapter.

The second role that the EU representatives pointed out is the role of Anchor of Solidarity, as they stressed that the problem of migration “is not only the problem of Greece, of Italy, of Malta, but that this is a European problem. And this problem needs a European answer—an answer built around the principle of solidarity” (Juncker, 2017b). The EC president even stated that “solidarity must remain a living principle in Europe (...). This is part of Europe’s DNA. We are also here to help those unable to help themselves” (Juncker, 2016b) and “Solidarity is not a one-way street—every country must take its fair share of responsibility. And if there are some who refuse, the Commission must also

honour its own responsibilities” (Juncker, 2017a). He was referring, among others, to the stance of the V4 states, which, in his opinion, refused to show solidarity not only towards the refugees, but also towards other member states, such as Greece or Italy.

Additionally, the role identified by the EU’s representatives was the role of Humanitarian Donor that also refers to the set of values the EU was built on and is strongly related to the idea of solidarity. This role often appeared in the same statements as the Normative Power role. The fourth role that the EU’s representatives identified was the role of Supervisor. The migration crisis was framed as a moment of trial and a test for all member states. The trial was supposed to prove the maturity to adopt the EU principles and ideas. J.C. Juncker said, “The crisis is stark and the journey is still long. I am counting on you, in this House, and on all Member States to show European courage going forward, in line with our common values and our history” (Juncker, 2015).

In the analysed statements, the motif of a test or exam checking the level of basic EU values incorporation as well as—in case of states that joined the EU in 2004 and afterwards—the maturity and fully fledged membership of the EU member states was often present. One may even say that the EU representatives perceived accepting the EU’s policy during the crisis and taking the responsibility for its consequences as a rite of passage into adulthood. During the trial or exam, the EU representatives acknowledged that the EU has to act as a Supervisor towards the member states. Thus, they pointed out that this was the moment when the V4 states (often referred to as still new EU members) had to be shown how to behave to fully implement the EU principles and to be considered a fully fledged member of the EU.

The EU representatives expressed the need for the EU to act as a tutor, as illustrated by the statement from June 2017 of the EC president, who said, “I believe solidarity should first come from the heart—but if it is not then we have to uphold binding decisions” (Juncker, 2017a). This concerns the procedure initiated against Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary that did not want to participate in the procedures of refugees’ relocation in the EU territory. The EU presented itself as an older and more experienced actor able to discipline and punish for disobedience, which was in this case the lack of solidarity during the crisis.

Also, the role of the EU as a Global Player, i.e., an organisation which is building its position on the international stage, was clearly visible in the statements of the EU representatives. It is worth mentioning even though it was not present in the analysed statements as frequently as, for instance, the role of the EU as Normative Power or Anchor of Solidarity. Because the crisis was treated as a moment of trial, attempts were made to use it as an opportunity to improve the image and position of the organisation and its member states. It was pointed out that when particular states find it difficult to face the ongoing challenges,

We all agree that no single European country can respond effectively to any of the challenges of our times and that we, the European Union, have a responsibility to embrace our role as a global power, working together for peace, security and human development worldwide, and in some cases even filling a gap.

(Mogherini, 2018)

Thus, the joint actions of EU states were presented as an opportunity for global image creation. The key issue, however, was the need to work together despite many differences and declare a common position in the face of the migration problem.

The roles the EU representatives envisaged for its member states during the crisis were in line with the roles defined for the entire organisation (although the EU representatives referred more often to the role of the EU as a whole than to the roles of its member states). These roles included Solidary State as well as Responsible State (state sharing the responsibility). They were well portrayed by F. Mogherini, who said,

It is a moment of truth, to see if we are really Europeans and if we are really a Union. That is what it is about: our responsibility to protect the lives of human beings, and human rights and solidarity among Member States and towards those in need.

(Mogherini, 2015)

The statement suggested that the time to test solidarity and cooperation in Europe had come for real.

In order to act in solidarity (carry out the solidarity role towards the refugees and the states affected by the crisis), a consensus regarding the actions to be undertaken was necessary. It should have been reached by agreement despite differences. The EU representatives underlined the fact they were aware of possible different opinions regarding immigration *per se*. The acceptance of diverse approaches to migration crisis management was possible but only while maintaining openness and solidarity, even despite the fears. It is an important position in the context of the roles defined for the EU members, especially considering the stance of the V4 states. The latter emphasised the importance of diversity within the EU as well, but they did not always complement it with openness. What is more, they defined the role of Solidary State in a different way as well.

To summarise, the EU representatives presented the time of crisis as a moment of trial for the entire organisation and its members. Thus, they wanted that both the EU and its member states adopt and carry out on the international stage the roles of Normative Power and Anchor of Solidary. They should show solidarity both with the refugees and with the states affected by the crisis. Moreover, the

EU wanted to play the role of Supervisor of the member states so that they know how to behave and how to implement the values of the EU. Although there was no distinction between roles formulated for the V4 and the rest of its member states, the rhetoric of the EU institutions representatives showed that the countries that had joined the EU in 2004 were still in the process of adopting its core values. Thus, it was assumed that these values “originated” in the “old” member states and highlighted the differences between the East and the West and between the old and the new EU members.

Some EU representatives also indicated that the breakthrough moment of the discussed situation could be viewed not only as a crisis but also as an opportunity. On 11 November 2015, D. Tusk said, “migration creates both challenges and opportunities and it affects us all—countries of origin, transit and destination” (Tusk, 2015). Similarly, J.C. Juncker, while talking about the crisis, stated that “This is an opportunity, this is not a threat, and the sooner we accept it the better” (Juncker, 2016a).<sup>1</sup>

### **7.3 V4 Perceptions of the EU’s Role Conceptions and the V4 Role Conceptions for the EU**

The analysis of the discourse of the V4 states politicians comprises 181 statements of prime ministers, presidents, ministers of foreign affairs, and governing parties’ politicians actively participating in parliamentary debates concerning the crisis and crisis management policy.<sup>2</sup>

The rhetoric of Polish, Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak politicians painted the image of states that feel forced by the EU to undertake specific actions, punished for disobedience, socialised, parented, and sometimes blackmailed during the crisis. It affected both the processes of role definition (as shown in Chapter 4) and the perception of role conceptions formulated by the EU. The analysis of the V4 politicians’ statements has allowed determining their perception of role conceptions formulated by the EU. They are presented in Table 7.2, where they have also been juxtaposed with the above-mentioned EU’s role conceptions formulated towards the EU by the V4.

The most frequent opinion in the statements of the V4 states politicians (20% of the analysed statements) was the conviction that the EU wanted to subordinate its member states (including the V4) by requiring them to adopt specific solutions concerning the migration crisis and acting as Normative Superior. The V4 politicians said that the EU wanted to “impose” said solutions and “constrain” the member states. Moreover, they emphasised that the EU “pressured” the member states in relation to the adoption of the quota relocation mechanism. They also uttered that their states were being “attacked” and “accused”, as well as “punished for their disobedience”. V. Orbán said, “They want to dismantle the fence, they want to let in millions of immigrants, and they want to distribute

*Table 7.2* Role conceptions of the EU representatives together with their perceptions by the V4 and V4 role conceptions for the EU

<i>The EU representatives' role conception for the organisation</i>	<i>% of statements</i>	<i>Perceptions of the EU roles conception by the V4</i>	<i>% of statements</i>	<i>Role conceptions for the EU formulated by the V4</i>	<i>% of statements</i>
Normative Power	65	Normative Superior	20	Regional Hegemon	20
Anchor of Solidarity	49	Firebrand	7	Borders' Protector	17
Humanitarian Donor	28	Blackmailer	7	Defender of Western Civilization and Christian Values	15
Global Player	14				
Supervisor	12	Disciplinarian	5		
Borders' Protector	12				

*Source:* Author's own elaboration.

them on a mandatory basis. And they want to punish those who don't obey them" (Orbán, 2017a).

Polish politicians from the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Party (PiS, Law, and Justice) and Zjednoczona Prawica (United Right), as well as their Czech and Slovak counterparts, voiced similar concerns. A PiS MP said, for instance, "[My party] is opposed to all attempts of imposing the quota mechanism of refugees relocation on the member states" (Głębocki, 2016). The president of the Czech Republic, M. Zeman, pointed out that the aforementioned mechanism was "demanded by the EU" (Zeman, 2015). Even the president of Slovakia, A. Kiska who (similarly to the members of the Platforma Obywatelska Party (Civic Platform) in Poland) used essentially the same rhetoric as the EU representatives, stated, "I wish that the route of threats about the end of solidarity in connection with EU funds triggered by lack of solidarity with refugees be abandoned before we get too far" (Kiska, 2015).

This role of Normative Superior contrasts with the role of Normative Power. The EU representatives perceived the EU's role during the crisis in terms of presenting the special attitude of this organisation that showed and expressed a set of values which were subsequently put into practice, whereas the V4 politicians tried to show that these values were being imposed on them. The role that the EU wanted to play on the global international stage was somehow



transformed at the EU's level, as the V4 political leaders used it to show that not all the EU members wanted to act as the Normative Power in that sense.

In the statements of the V4 politicians, one can find opinions stating that Central-Eastern Europe is a region that coped well with migration and related problems, some of which were caused by the EU itself—hence the EU was assigned a role of Firebrand. A good example can be taken from the statements of Prime Minister V. Orbán, such as

We Central Europeans have succeeded in stopping the flow of migrants—which everyone had previously said was unstoppable. We Hungarians, in particular, have proved that the flow can be stopped. We are ready to provide assistance and know-how to Italy and Germany, and together we should go to Libya to stop the migrant flow. This is what our letter is about, and this is a serious offer.

(Orbán, 2017b)

It clearly suggests that he believed that the solution proposed by the “cumbersome relatives from the East” was the best one possible, but Western countries had to see for themselves that their propositions did not yield the expected results in order to realise it. Orbán also warned that “The main threat for the future of Europe does not come from those who want to get here, but from the Brussels fanatics of internationalism” (Orbán, 2016c).

Additionally, one of Fidesz MPs even said during a debate, “(...) Relocation quotas (...) one may say, are a suicide attack on the existence of Europe, on European economic and social security, as well as on European culture and democracy based on Jewish, Christian, Greek, and Latin traditions” (Szilárd, 2015). Also, the Polish Prime Minister stated, “Attempts at a sort of exportation of problems that some states created for themselves without participation of any other states, which now are to be burdened by them, cannot be called solidarity” (Szydło, 2015).

Thus, one gets the impression that the V4 accused the EU firstly of generating problems related to migration and secondly of exporting these problems to other member states.

Furthermore, the V4 politicians were saying that the EU acts as Blackmailer and Disciplinarian, mostly through imposition of fines for lack of participation in the processes of refugees and migrants' relocation. V. Orbán said,

This punitive proposal, according to which they want to make countries which do not want to take migrants in pay 250,000 Euro for every migrant not admitted, is like being punched—or kicked by a horse—in the chest. It is hard to find words, it is hard to express one's outrage in civilized language,

(Orbán, 2016)

B. Szydło emphasised, “Poland will not allow being blackmailed” (Szydło, 2017a).

The actions of the EU were viewed in some of the V4 states as treating other states as undeveloped, not modern enough, and not adopting Western values, as well as an attempt to teach or preach to them and thus taking the role of Disciplinarian. Actions and decisions taken at the EU level were supposed to suggest that V4 states were treated as not adapted well enough to function within the EU, immature, or even stupid—hence the opposition towards the conceptions formulated at the EU level. In this case, Poland and Hungary differ from the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the latter two countries, the aspect of being considered worse or less mature was rarely brought up, unlike in Poland and Hungary.

Nevertheless, in all V4 states, the EU’s actions and requirements were seen as attempts to educate, tutor, and parent the still new member states. Politicians often emphasised that the EU institutions are trying to “tell them what to do” and do not treat them as equal expecting unthinking obedience. This conception was perceived as a way of teaching and disciplining which was in contrast with the EU’s role conception of a Supervisor. Thus, one might suggest that the role of Supervisor was perceived as a role of Disciplinarian or even Blackmailer.

The politicians from the governing parties rather unambiguously suggested that the EU should express strength and determination when facing a threat like the migration crisis. It should show a united front, without the division into Eastern and Western or two-speed Europe. According to the V4 political leaders, the EU should be strong and act as Regional Hegemon. It would make it visible and capable of action. Regardless of political option or approach to the solutions proposed by the EU, all politicians declared the need to stay united. All possible threats stemming from divisions or disintegration of the Schengen Area were highlighted. B. Sobotka, prime minister of the Czech Republic, said, “Only united Europe, and not particular states acting alone, can deal with the migration” (Sobotka, 2016).

Similarly, A. Kiska, the president of Slovakia, emphasised,

Europe of today needs consensus and solidarity. Nobody with a heart in the right place wants to see such enormous human tragedy, suffering and dying. Neither Europe as a whole, nor Central Europe including Slovakia, will benefit from making a distinction between the old and new Member States again. A distinction between the West and the East.

(Kiska, 2015)

B. Szydło had a similar suggestion: “We want the European Union, as it was planned, to provide us, Europeans, with security, development, and prosperity. This Union can be built only if we act together” (Szydło, 2017b).

Moreover, politicians from the V4 states pointed out that the EU should defend its member states from migration. V. Orbán said, “Whatever anyone may have said, Brussels did not protect us. In fact, they sought to make us exposed” (Orbán, 2016). According to the V4 politicians, the EU did not defend its borders, as clearly pointed out by the president of the Czech Republic, “I accuse the European Union, as a Eurofederalist in this case, of the inability to serve a very basic function of external borders protection” (Zeman, 2015).

Based on the identified EU’s role conceptions and their perception by the V4, it is easy to see that there is almost no overlap between them. The EU’s role conceptions for the organisation as a whole and for individual member states (including the V4) are quite different from their perception by the Visegrád Group. The only overlap that exists is between role conception defined by the EU and the V4 states, namely the EU’s Borders Protector. It appears both in the statements of EU politicians and in those formulated towards the EU by the V4 countries. Nonetheless, one has to stress that in the statements of the V4 politicians the role appears at the second position, whereas in the statements of the EU’s representatives at the fifth.

#### **7.4 Degree of Congruence of Level I Roles and Possibility of Agreements**

The goal of this part is to present the degree of congruence between the EU role conceptions and their perceptions by the V4, as well as the degree of congruence between the EU’s and the V4’s role conceptions. The degree of congruence will be indicated on the basis of binary role theory and digraph models of game theory (Walker, 2017, 2022). Following the assumptions of binary role theory (Walker et al., 2011), one can identify each of these roles with a name of a specific game’s strategies. Based on this information, I analyse strategies and results applied by the EU and the V4 during the migration crisis.

According to the data presented earlier in Table 7.2, the most frequently referred roles by the EU representatives were the roles of Normative Power and Anchor of Solidarity. The role of Normative Power, according to the assumptions of binary role theory, is presented as a role of a strong friend with vital interests, pursuing an alignment strategy. The role of Anchor of Solidarity is identified as a role of a partner with a strong position that pursues the strategy of appeasement. This is a strategy in which a settlement (+;+) outcome of mutual cooperation ranks highest. Here, the conditional cooperation strategy is different than the unconditional strategy enacting the role of Normative Power.

After juxtaposing these two role conceptions and strategies assigned to them, one can identify the degree of congruence (overlap) between role of Normative Power and Anchor of Solidarity. It is presented in Figure 7.1. The arrows represent the rank order of preferences; the direction of the arrow connecting any two outcomes indicates which outcome is ranked higher. The degree of




Figure 7.1 Digraph analysis of role contestation between two role conceptions identified for the EU by its representatives. It shows quite low degree of congruence: 0.17. Correspondingly, one might identify high level of role contestation (RCI), that is, .83.

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Walker (2017, 2022).

congruence is identified as the fraction of arrows running in the same direction. Correspondingly, the role strain between these two role conceptions equals  $1 - DC$ . Figure 7.1 shows that there was a relatively high level of role contestation ( $RCI = .83$ ) among the EU’s representatives regarding their enactment because of their relatively low degree of congruence ( $DC = .17$ ). The lower level of congruence results from the different highest-ranked outcomes for each role.

The roles that EU formulated for its member states during the crisis were the roles of Solidary State and Responsible State. After juxtaposing with the names of appropriate strategies, show the full degree of congruence as .50 in the case of Anchor of Solidarity and Solidary State and .66 in the case of Normative Power and Responsible State. Thus, the degree of congruence between the role conceptions of the EU as a whole and the role conceptions for its member states was at the middle level. It is due to the fact that the roles of Solidary State and Responsible State are presented as games with appeasement and alignment strategy played by weaker players. This shows that the EU wanted full compliance with all its member states and expected such compliance from them. The degrees of congruence, shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, represent the cooperative will of the EU.

As mentioned in the previous parts of the chapter, all the roles that the EU identified for itself and its member states during the crisis were then interpreted by the V4 political leaders. By juxtaposing these perceptions with the EU role conceptions, it is possible to show the degree of congruence between them and then assess whether an agreement between the EU and the V4 states was possible.




Figure 7.2 Digraph Analysis of role conceptions formulated for the EU and its member states. This digraph shows that there is high congruence (DC = 0.67) between the role conception of the EU Normative Power and the role conception identified by the EU for its member states, i.e., the role of Responsible State.

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Walker (2017, 2022).




Figure 7.3 Digraph analysis of role conceptions formulated for the EU and its member states. This digraph shows that the degree of congruence is at the middle level (DC = .50) between the role conception of the EU as Anchor of Solidarity and the role conception identified by the EU for its member states, i.e., the role of Solidary State.

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Walker (2017, 2022).

Following the data presented in Table 7.2, the Normative Power role (along with the role of Responsible State) was rather interpreted by the V4 as a role of Normative Superior, i.e., an organisation which tries to impose its will on its member states or an agent trying to compel others to adhere to certain values. Thus, although the EU wanted to present itself as Normative Power and wanted its members to play the role of Responsible State, the V4 was trying to




Figure 7.4 Digraph analysis of the EU’s role conception as Normative Power and its perception by the V4 as Normative Superior. The degree of congruence is .33; thus, the Role Contestation Index equals .67.

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Walker (2017, 2022).

show that they are rather compelled to follow the EU’s obligations and values. Consequently, the V4 interpretation of the role is represented as an enemy game with a hegemonic strategy. The V4 saw the EU as an agent that did not want to cooperate, but rather to impose its will on the partner—the V4. In this game the strategy of domination ranks highest.

Thus, after comparing the roles of Normative Power and Normative Superior, a low degree of congruence ( $DC = .33$ ) is identified, which indicates a high degree of role contestation between the EU and the V4 regarding the EU’s role of Normative Power.

This digraph (Figure 7.4) shows the degree of congruence between this role dyad—Normative Power and Normative Superior. As the degree of congruence between the EU’s role conception as Normative Power and its perception by the V4 as Normative Superior is only .33, one might also expect that the agreement might be difficult to achieve; however, it is not impossible.

The digraph shows the degree of congruence between the following role dyad: Anchor of Solidarity and Firebrand. The degree of congruence is .50. The EU’s role conception of Anchor of Solidarity was interpreted by the V4 as a role of Firebrand, i.e., a player who is strong and pursues vital interests together with balancing strategy. The degree of congruence between these two roles is presented in Figure 7.5 indicating a moderate level of role contestation between them regarding the EU’s Anchor of Solidarity role conception.

The role of Humanitarian Donor was perceived by the V4 as a role of Blackmailer, when the V4 states presented themselves as being forced to help and also blackmailed. Moreover, in case of non-compliance, penalties were threatened. The role of Humanitarian Donor is showed here as a role of a friend,




Figure 7.5 Digraph analysis of the EU’s role conception as Anchor of Solidarity and its perception by the V4 as Firebrand. The degree of congruence is .50; thus, the Role Contestation Index equals .50.

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Walker (2017, 2022).




Figure 7.6 Digraph analysis of the EU’s role conception as Humanitarian Donor and its perception by the V4 as Blackmailer. The degree of congruence is .33; thus, the Role Contestation Index equals .67.

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Walker (2017, 2022).

but with strong position and secondary interests, pursuing an alignment strategy, but the role of a Blackmailer is a role of an enemy with a strong position, vital interest, and pursuing a hegemonic strategy. Thus, the role of Humanitarian Donor was perceived as a different and contested role (RCI = .67) by the V4. This is shown in Figure 7.6.




Figure 7.7 Digraph analysis of the EU’s role conception as Supervisor and its perception by the V4 as Disciplinarian. The degree of congruence is .17; thus, the Role Contestation Index equals .83.

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Walker (2017, 2022).

The digraph shows the degree of congruence between the following role dyad—Humanitarian Donor and Blackmailer. The degree of congruence is .33. The EU role of Supervisor as a partner role with weaker capability, secondary interests, and pursuing an appeasement strategy was perceived by the V4 as a role of Disciplinarian with weaker capability and vital interests pursuing a hegemonic strategy. Thus, the V4 perceived the role of the EU as an enemy. Although the EU wanted to play the role of a strong partner pursuing an appeasement strategy, the V4 saw it quite differently. The degree of congruence between the described role dyad is shown in Figure 7.7 and equals .16 which indicates a very high level of role contestation (.84). That is why, the agreement was so difficult to achieve.

Apart from the above-mentioned interpretations of the EU’s role conceptions, the V4 states also formulated some role conceptions for the EU. Firstly, they wanted the EU to play the roles of Regional Hegemon and Defender of Western Civilization and Christian Values. These dyads were created based on the frequency with which they were cited in the statements. The role of Regional Hegemon is defined as an enemy role of a strong player, with vital interest pursuing a hegemonic strategy. The role of the Defender of Western Civilization and Christian Values is described as a rival role played by a strong player with vital interest pursuing a balancing strategy. The degree of congruence between the role of Humanitarian Donor and Defender of Western Civilization equals .17. This is presented in Figure 7.8. The degree of congruence (.50) between the role of Normative Power and Regional Hegemon is also shown in Figure 7.8.






Figure 7.8 Digraph analysis of the EU's and the V4's role conception for the EU. The digraph shows the degree of congruence between two role dyads: Normative Power and Regional Hegemon as well as Humanitarian Donor and Defender of Western Civilization and Christian Values. The degrees of congruence are .50 and .17, respectively.

Source: Author's own elaboration based on Walker (2017, 2022).

There is one role that overlaps being mentioned by both the EU's representatives and the V4 political leaders—the role of Borders' Protector. However, this role is listed as seventh in the EU's representatives' statements and second in the statements of the V4 leaders. These roles are compared in Figure 7.9. Although the only overlap between EU role conceptions and V4 role expectations is the role of Borders' Protector, the degree of congruence between these conceptions does not equal 1.0, as they are perceived differently. The EU defined this role conception for itself as a role of a strong rival with vital interests, whereas the V4 wanted the EU to play it as a role of an equal enemy with vital interests. Thus, the degree of congruence between the EU's role conception and the V4 expectation towards the EU is .67 (Figure 7.9)—even if the name of the role is the same, a different strategy is assigned to the highest rank.




Figure 7.9 Digraph analysis of the EU's and the V4's role conceptions for the EU. The digraph shows the degree of congruence between two role conceptions: Borders' Protector as the EU role conception and Borders' Protector as the V4 role expectation. The degree of congruence is .64.

Source: Author's own elaboration based on Walker (2017, 2022).

### 7.5 Summary

The analysis presented in this chapter shows that the EU's representatives identified similar roles for both EU and its member states. There was also no distinction between EU members—the same roles were identified for each member. Although the roles were defined in the same way, the strategies for their implementation were defined differently; hence the level of congruence was not as high as it might have been expected. Nonetheless, it was still .50 and .67.

Both the roles and the strategies assigned to each of them were subsequently perceived by the V4 states in diverse ways. The presented analysis shows that the degree of congruence is quite low when it comes to relations: (1) between the EU's role conceptions and their perceptions in the V4 states, as well as (2) between the role conceptions formulated for the EU by both the EU and the V4. In all the analysed role dyads, the highest degree of congruence is .50, and the lowest .17. That is why the possibility of reaching an agreement was rather low.

Role conceptions formulated at the EU level suggesting the role of Normative Power and Anchor of Solidarity were perceived by the V4 states as roles of Normative Superior or Firebrand. At the same time, when the EU representatives tried to define the role of the EU as Humanitarian Donor or Supervisor, the V4 stated that the EU took the role of Blackmailer or Disciplinarian to force member states into specific actions.

The analysis of role expectations specified by the V4 for the EU shows that the V4 wanted the EU to play the role of Regional Hegemon, Defender

of Western Civilization and Christian Values, and Borders' Protector. These expectations did not correspond with the EU's role conception as Normative Power or Humanitarian Donor. Among these expectations, there is only one that overlaps with the EU's role conceptions, i.e., the role of Borders' Protector.

The patterns described above seem to confirm the assumption of the proposed theoretical synthesis that the size of the overlap (win-set) depends on the degree of congruence between diverse role conceptions. If the degree of congruence is lower, the overlap is smaller and hence the agreement is difficult to achieve.

## Notes

- 1 However, these suggestions contradicted those presented by, among others, the prime ministers of the V4 states, who saw the crisis only as a threat, not as an opportunity. More on the subject in Chapter 4.
- 2 It does not include the statements of the politicians from the opposition, as they are analysed in Chapter 4, presenting horizontal role contestation processes in the V4 states. For the most part, these statements were translated from their source languages into English for the purposes of the present monograph and then interpreted. However, existing translations published on respective government websites were used when available.

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