Gendered Pluralism

Belinda Robnett & Katherine Tate

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University of Michigan Press
Ann Arbor

Published in the United States of America by the
University of Michigan Press
Manufactured in the United States of America
Printed on acid-free paper
First published January 2023

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data has been applied for.

ISBN 978-0-472-13336-9 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-472-22100-4 (ebook)

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Digital materials related to this title can be found on the Fulcrum platform via the following citable URL: https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12036498

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Acknowledgments

The 2012 survey analyzed in this book was funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation's Sociology Program (#1155404). We thank NSF for allowing us to look at gender and race in the politics of U.S. adults in an innovative way. Excited by the novelty of the study, we created a board of scholars for advice and feedback. We thank all who participated on the board. The research for this book began when we were both professors at the University of California, Irvine. We thank our UCI colleagues and students for providing a research-rich environment even with its heavy teaching load. Many thanks to our UCI team of graduate student research assistants who helped us with the development of the survey instrument. We thank our current colleagues and students for fostering a robust learning environment. The book benefited from its set of reviewers. We thank them for their constructive advice. Elizabeth Demers, Editorial Director, gave the book a home at the University of Michigan Press. Haley Winkle at UMP skillfully managed the book's production. Lastly, we thank our families for their support during this time. A special shout out to our children, David, Jonah, Luke, and Sophie, and Robnett's granddaughter, Alyssa!

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CHAPTER 1

Gender in U.S. Politics

Gender is a social structure that is inextricably intertwined in the "individual, interactional, and institutional dimensions of our society" (Risman 2004:429). This can also be said of sexuality, with heteronormativity sometimes seemingly invisible but dominant in every dimension of our society. We are equally concerned with race-ethnicity as a social structure and the ways in which it is embedded in the aforementioned three dimensions of our society. This book adapts this theoretical framework to understand how the U.S. social structures of gender, sexuality, and race-ethnicity influence politics and public policy in the U.S. Importantly, how do these structures intersect to influence support of or changes to hegemonic beliefs and institutional logics that operate in favor of the distribution of resources to certain groups over others? This framework is important as political science has not often treated gender as structural in U.S. politics.

Gender, sexuality, and race-ethnicity operate along three dimensions, the individual, the interactional, and the macro (Risman 2017). Accordingly, we examine the ways in which gender/sexuality/race-ethnicity as they are embodied at the individual level, and reflect the intersection of biology, bodies, and culture, influencing political and policy attitudes that are in support of equality for women, racial-ethnic minorities, and LGBTQ+ individuals. The interactional dimension allows us to move beyond individual-level analyses to focus on the ways in which ideologies, beliefs, and cultural stereotypes influence support for an equitable distribution of societal resources. As Risman (2017:214–215) notes, "Ideologies at the macro level of the gender structure are not fixed, nor are they immutable, but they do have significant impact on equality." Indeed, this is also true of the racial-ethnic and sexuality structures. Risman (2017:214) calls on us "to use empirical research to study the alternative strength of individual versus cultural expectations . . .

as explanations for particular questions . . . and the recursive relationships between" all three of the structural dimensions.

As gender is a social structure, some scholars contend that a deep political schism based on gender exists in U.S. politics; others would contradict this, claiming instead that gender and gender identities exert a modest and inconsistent effect in U.S. elections and governance. Both claims have important implications for U.S. politics. Are women organized separately from men based around their gender identity in order to participate more effectively in a democratic society? This book examines the extent to which gender identity influences U.S. political policy views and behavior. We seek to challenge claims that gender identity is not a systemic source of voting behavior and politics in the U.S. today.

We posit that

1. Gender identity persistently influences attitudes across a variety of public policy issues.
2. There is a solid fault line between women and men in U.S. politics.
3. Men will resist agendas that would help women and families, while women show greater support for them.

We seek to determine whether or not gender identity is a stable and persistent structure determining political behavior. Women's politics may be a part of identity politics in the U.S. The gender gap, defined as the difference between female opinions and male opinions, may represent privilege and unconscious bias. Group identities are formed and politicized as reactions to injustice. They are not the product of a particularized pluralist context.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Unlike the pluralist perspective,[1] which argues that group identities are not fixed but rather determined by the social and political context, we argue for

1. Pluralism, here, is not a model of group relations, representing the problematic assertion that all groups' ability to shape politics and society is widely shared and is equal or improving (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1971). That government is open and receptive to all groups is disputed here. Government can repress and immobilize groups (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 1963; McAdam 1982). Pluralists like Truman (1951), Dahl (1961), and Polsby (1971) oppose claims that a power elite controls policy outcomes. Power in politics is a mix of competing groups, not a singular, dominant one. Rather, in this book, pluralism serves as an analytic model about U.S. political behavior.

a more nuanced understanding of the centrality of gender identity as a predictor of political beliefs and behaviors. When do women share opinions regarding public policies that benefit women, the LGBTQ+ community, and disadvantaged groups? What factors are unifiers or dividers, including identity politics, stereotypes, political contexts, social class, religion, marital status, sexual orientation, ideologies, and beliefs? In some cases, for example, identity politics may serve to unite, but it can also divide.

Pluralist Theory and Intersectionality Theory Can Be Linked. Combined they create a more nuanced portrait of gender politics. We argue that gender identity is a stable and persistent determinant of public policy beliefs, although not always. In doing so, we explore the obstacles to solidarity and factors that favorably influence gender identity alignment. Although we compare women to men, the main focus of the book is on women—what brings them together on public policy issues and what divides them? In that regard, we systematically test the factors that drive the decisions. We sometimes analyze women only in subgroup models to compare women along all of the aforementioned dimensions. We are especially interested in testing ideologies as possible gender unifiers. For example, women's feelings of linked fate with other women and a feminist identity for women are tested in our interaction models.

Intersectionality Theory. Building on the work of recent scholars, we embrace an intersectionality perspective to explore the complexities of identity as determinants of public policy opinions (e.g., Brown 2014). Intersectionality theory, a term used frequently by Black feminists, contends that beliefs and behaviors are shaped by social position, as well as by intersectional systems of society including socioeconomic class, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and so on (Collins 2000b, 2015; Crenshaw 1995). Increasingly, scholars are engaging intersectionality theory, and there is a burgeoning of new publications in political sociology and political science that show how interrelated social categories shape behavior or institutions (e.g., Gershon et al. 2019; Brown and Gershon 2016a, 2016b; Brown 2014; Farris and Holman 2014; Hancock 2007; Alexander-Floyd 2018; Fraga et al. 2006; Orey et al. 2006; Philpot and Walton 2007; Roth 2008; Naples 1998; Brewer 1999; Robnett 1997). Both the concepts of structural intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991:1245) and political intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991:1241) inform our approach. The former highlights the ways in which societal structures shape one's gendered-racial lived experience, and thus one's viewpoint of the problems and how to remedy them.

Political intersectionality, or how identity-based groups align, often

lends itself to essentialist categories along racial or gender lines. Crenshaw (1991: 1242) warns that identity politics "conflates or ignores intragroup differences." Recent research aims to examine the multilayered nature of identities. Brown (2014), for example, concludes that Black women legislators' policy decisions were sometimes identity driven, that is, the result of the intersection of their race and gender, but she also emphasizes the importance of contextual factors that intervened to support or impede gender or racial solidarity. Although her work is focused on representational intersectionality, another key concept developed by Crenshaw, Brown's findings suggest that the saliency of certain identities may fluctuate. Importantly, while context may sometimes matter, this is not always the case. Further, there were intragroup differences among Black women legislators.

Focused on structural and political intersectionalities, our book takes a broader approach to understanding the constellation of factors that drive gender and racial differences on an array of public policy issues. We examine a broader set of actors absent the contextual factors that may drive them to compromise their opinions. Our study, then, examines (1) the ways in which men and women differ on public policy issues and the factors that drive these differences; (2) the ways in which Whites and racial-ethnic minorities differ on public policy issues and the factors that drive these differences; (3) the ways in which women differ on public policy issues and the factors that drive these differences; (4) the ways in which African American men and women differ on public policy issues and the factors that drive these differences; (5) the ways in which African American women differ on public policy issues and the factors that drive these differences; and (6) the ways in which LGBTQ+ individuals differ from non-LGBTQ+ individuals on public policy issues and the factors that drive these differences.

Pluralism. A pluralist framework represents an alternative to identity politics, suggesting that

1. Voters lack true allegiances to an interest group. *Women, only sometimes, show solidarity with other women.*
2. Social group identities are not automatic but politicized in a partisan or context-driven environment. *Women's political identities are not rooted in gender inequality as much as driven by a particular context.*
3. Politicized group identities typically compete directly against each other in elections. *Women lack a distinctive voice in U.S. politics, as other allegiances dilute their opinions*. In fact, when models of public

opinion are constructed, they contend, the gender effect disappears, as other cultural forces are found to be more important.

The pluralist perspective, then, argues that gender identity is not central to women's political orientations. Instead, a confluence of intersecting identities can lead women to find other aspects of their identities as more salient influences on their politics, for example, race-ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and so on. We argue that sometimes this is true, but that gender maintains political centrality. Gender identity functions as a proxy for political interests.

THE INTERACTIONAL DIMENSION

Although we recognize the relevancy of intersectional social identities in the political process, we contend that *ideologies* may intervene to serve as political unifiers across difference. Our goal is to understand what types of and in what contexts ideologies/beliefs and social identities serve either to enhance women's political solidarity or to undercut it. When do counterideologies/beliefs or intersecting identities matter?

Identity politics serves as an alternative to pluralism such that

1. Feminism and feelings of group solidarity with other women increase rates of political participation and influence public policy opinions.

Gender is more salient than other identities in determining political perspectives when women embrace a feminist/womanist perspective and/or share a heightened collective gender or gendered-racial identity.

Another factor that influences public policy perspectives, we argue, is stereotypes. We maintain that

2. Like racialized thinking (Bobo and Smith 1998), stereotypes about women including lesbians also shape U.S. politics.

Gender inequality is reproduced at the cultural level through stereotypes associated with women and nonheterosexuals (Scarborough and Risman 2017). Stereotypes may serve to divide people politically, and efforts to

empower stereotyped groups can cause a hostile response. It is important to understand how these constructs contribute to U.S. politics. There are many contrasting social representations of women. These images are used in U.S. campaigns, elections, and public policy debates. She is the housewife or the career woman. Women are statistically more likely than men to live alone and be unmarried. In the past, she was recognized as the spinster. There is also the angry Black female. There is the lesbian as well as the ardent feminist. We focus on two: Black women and lesbians (comparing gay men additionally). Opinions about Black women and lesbians are linked to one's politics.

Taking advantage of an important 2012 online panel data set called the Outlook on Life Survey (Robnett and Tate 2015) that is representative of the U.S. adult population and includes an oversample of Blacks, we find evidence for both pluralism and identity politics. The conceptual and empirical approach undertaken here is to provide an empirical portrait of women striving to move forward in the twenty-first century. This analysis strives to establish a factual understanding of how gender drives U.S. politics. Thus, the key questions this book explores are the following: First, does gender divide people politically in the U.S.? How strong is the gender divide in U.S. politics concerning partisanship, public policy beliefs, and political participation? Second, are there strong subgroup politics among Blacks, or within the LGBTQ+ community? Third, how do stereotypes about Black women and lesbians impact the policy views of Americans and, in particular, different groups of women? Finally, does political liberalism spring forth from male privilege and gender inequality, so that simply being a female serves as a unifier, or from the formation of collective identities that result in a sense of linked fate with all women, and/or an embrace of feminism?

GENDER IDENTITY AND FEMINIST IDENTITY

Scholars have advanced different views about how the lives of women shape their politics, but the notion that women are more liberal than men because of their gender identity remains dominant. While many women today are both caregivers and breadwinners, women are still socialized differently than men, and the expectation that women should take care of others remains strong. Some scholars assert that biology causes women to express more concern about others than men. Imbued with an "ethic of caring,"

women's morality spills over into their politics. Once having had a conservative effect on the voting behavior of women, being female today has a liberal effect. In the U.S., women are more likely than men to identify with and support the liberal Democratic Party (Ondercin 2017; Chaturvedi 2016).[2] Research also shows a small but persistent gap between women and men and their policy outlooks from the 1970s to the 2000s (Barnes and Cassese 2017; Sapiro and Shames 2010). For example, women are more likely than men to favor gun control measures and increases in social policy spending by the government. They also are more likely to oppose the death penalty than men. Other studies find that women show less support for wars than men (Eichenberg and Stoll 2017).

Scholars who hold that women engage in politics around their gender group, and as feminists, support identity politics claims. The liberal politics of women, these scholars assert, arise from a politicized women's consciousness (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980; Klein 1984). In earlier work based on 1985 opinion data, one scholar found that although women expressed slightly higher levels of sympathy for the disadvantaged than men, the political values of women were no more liberal than men's (Conover 1988). Instead, liberal value orientations for women were based on ideological views of being feminists. Other scholars find that the modern gender gap cannot be explained by other social and demographic factors, such as labor force participation, but reflects an attitudinal shift among all women, but chiefly among young women, who favor feminist and egalitarian values (Hayes, McAllister, and Studlar 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2000).

Feminism is not the sum of women's interests but a normative prescription for the problem of the oppression and subjugation of women. The state protects patriarchy as a system of power, and a gender identity alone is not enough of a basis to challenge inequality in the family unit, the sexual division of labor, and in private matters. The perception that gender discrimination remains a problem is strongly linked to the adoption of a feminist identity. However, the appeal of feminism has remained flat in the U.S. For example, a 2018 CBS News poll found 46 percent of American women aged 18–35 identified as feminists, with "only 34 percent of women over the age of 35 identifying the same way" (Keller 2018). The U.S. public is, at best, lukewarm about feminists. Feminists earn an average rating midway between 50

2. See also Rutgers's Center for the American Women and Politics' Factsheet on the gender gap in U.S. politics. http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/voters/gender_gap.php#Facts



Figure 1.1. Feminist Feeling Thermometer Rating by Year, 1988–2020

and 60 on a 100-point feeling thermometer scale. Ratings based on an American National Election Study survey have improved slightly, rising to 60 in 2016 (see Figure 1.1). A 2015 Washington Post–Kaiser Family Foundation poll, for example, shows that "4 in 10 Americans see the movement as angry, and a similar portion say it unfairly blames men for women's challenges" (Cai and Clement 2016).

Black women have traditionally shown stronger support for feminists than White women in public opinion surveys. According to a recent Pew Research Center study, "About four-in-ten women (41%) say feminism has helped them personally. Women most likely to say this include those with a bachelor's degree or more education (55%), Hispanic women (46%), women younger than 50 (47%) and Democratic women (50%)" (Barroso 2020a). Recent research, though, shows that feminist identification is on the rise. In 2020, 61 percent of women say that feminism describes them very well or somewhat well (Barrosso 2020b). However, feminist identification varies by age, race-ethnicity, and political party. Women between the ages of 18 and 29, those with a bachelor's degree, and Democratic women are more likely to view themselves this way. In the 2012 Outlook Survey, Black women gave

feminists the highest average rating at 57, but White women rated feminists at 48. Latina, Asian, and multiracial women also placed feminists at the midpoint and below. Modern feminist groups during their heyday of the 1970s were countered aggressively by new groups on the political right for an agenda the public considered too radical (Mansbridge 1986). Others contend that strong, negative coverage of the feminist agenda in the media has hurt the group's image (Faludi 1991). While feminism has never won strong, overwhelming support in the public, we show how it affects public opinion here. The feminist movement altered the political consciousness of both men and women. Does the gender gap disappear when support for feminism is taken into account? We find that it does not, suggesting that women take liberal positions independent of having a feminist worldview.

A women's identity might also be important in today's politics. Women, after all, are more likely than men to think about the condition of women as a group, and their identification with women is a source of political engagement (Klein 1984; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). However, a feminist consciousness does not always align with those that identify with women, or see their fate as linked to all women. Female identification may not promote social liberalism, but traditional conservatism in some instances. Scholars have found that identification with Black women influences their policy views. This type of identification increased support among Blacks for conservative welfare reform in 1996 (Tate 2010). We test separately whether the essentialism of femaleness, strong female identification, and a feminist identification drive people to support public policies that benefit women, lesbians, and disadvantaged groups.

Identity politics claims are discounted and pluralist ones sustained because women do not appear to be united around their gender alone. General surveys find that fewer than one-third to one-half of all women in the U.S. report that they have been discriminated against because of their gender (Harvard School of Public Health 2017; Sigel 1996). Social psychologists argue that women, like most, have a tendency to identify with dominant groups, while holding disadvantaged groups responsible for their problems (Sidanius and Pratto 1993; Bobo and Smith 1998; Kluegel and Smith 1986). Cassese and Barnes (2019) write that system justification beliefs brace up support for the Republican Party for White women. Others contend that a concern for discrimination against women is less forceful in democratic nations because democratic values are perceived as antithetical to social group discrimination (Jackman 1994). Furthermore, there has been a wind-

ing down of concern for the social position of women as discriminatory attitudes against women are less overt and as women's rights groups are less prominent in the political sphere. In a 2013 national telephone survey, only 17 percent felt that there was "a lot" of prejudice and discrimination against women in the U.S., and another 17 percent felt that there was "none."[3] Most felt that women were penalized "some" and only "a little" for their gender in the U.S. today. Women, however, are slightly less likely than men to believe that the problem of gender discrimination no longer exists.

Women also respond similarly to the political context. The candidacies of women in 1992, and the emergence of women's issues during Supreme Court confirmation hearings, for example, increased the political salience of gender for many women (Sapiro and Conover 1997). Campaigns and elections can also activate feelings of female solidarity. However, these events have not produced a reliable bloc of women voters. In 2016, a bloc of women voters did not organize around the candidacy of Hillary Clinton, the first female nominated for president by a major party. She won the same set of voters who had voted for the male 2012 nominee. Thus, it may not be the case that mere femaleness leads to political solidarity. The failure of women to reliably vote for female candidates sustains the claim that gender is not especially important politically.

INTERSECTIONAL GENDER IDENTITIES

Some contend that women are too diverse to unite as a group politically. Intersectionality scholars argue that different groups with shared attributes do not necessarily share policy beliefs (Collins 2005; Crenshaw 1995; Hancock 2007). According to this line of reasoning, groups cannot be defined by single attributes because other social and political factors shape their lives. Being female and a member of a minority group will create experiences that may lead to a distinctive set of policy positions. These policy positions will be different from those espoused by minority men and White women. The voting behavior of minority women remains strik-

3. Survey by Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Methodology: Conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International, February 14–19, 2013, and based on 1,209 telephone interviews. The survey results reported here were obtained from searches of the iPoll Databank and other resources provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

ingly different from White women's. In 2012, a majority of White women favored the Republican presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, over the Democrat, incumbent president Barack Obama. Some analysts in the media contend that the only reason why a gender gap emerged in 2012 was because of the strong voting preference for Obama among Black, Latina, and Asian women (see, for example, Dusenbery 2012). For certain, there is a strong diversity among women in their voting behavior. Political scientist Jane Junn (2016) points out that only twice have a majority of White women voted for the Democrat in presidential elections held since 2012 based on American National Election Study data, and that there is too often misinformed coverage of the gender gap based on a presumption that all women should be liberal and pro-Democratic. Cassese and Barnes (2019) contend that political cohesion among women is low; they find a subset of White women voted for Romney in 2012 and Trump in 2016 because they reject claims that gender inequality is rooted in sexism.

Similarly, in a 2005 opinion survey, over half or 54 percent of Black women felt that alignment with White feminist groups was not the best way to combat racism and sexism for their group.[4] A majority in the same survey also rejected a Black-only civil rights group as the best way to handle the problems of race and gender discrimination. Thus, many Black women, particularly, see their group interests as distinct (Dawson 2001; Simien 2006; Gay and Tate 1998). While some women are not strongly aligned with their gender, they are strongly aligned with their ethnic or racial group. This is the case even as Whites appear overly tolerant. With the example of White women voters voting Republican in 2016, however, Whites seek to maintain their group privilege and will not cross lines to identify with groups working against that interest.

Critics argue that a gender model for Democratic politics is not theoretically sophisticated enough to explain patterns of U.S. voting behavior. In contrast to pluralistic accounts, identities as liberal women are not constructed through campaigns and elections, as ethnic or racial privilege remains a dominant identification for Whites and White women (Jardina 2019; Weller and Junn 2018). Blacks, too, are highly aligned with the politics

4. Survey by Evelyn M. Simien, University of Connecticut. Methodology: Conducted by Center for Survey Research & Analysis, University of Connecticut, November 4–January 7, 2005, and based on 500 telephone interviews. Sample: national adult Blacks. The survey results reported here were obtained from searches of the iPoll Databank, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

of the disadvantaged through the Democratic Party (White and Laird 2020), even as some argue that there is greater political diversity among Blacks today as some have made successful political bids as moderate Democratic leaders (Tate 2010).

Blacks may organize their politics around their affinity for Black women, and less around their support of women broadly and feminists. We test which identifiers—class, race-ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, marital status, age, conservatism/liberalism, citizenship status—serve to undercut women's political solidarity along a number of public policy measures that benefit women, lesbians, and disadvantaged groups. Marriage and racial resentment are found to be important inputs in one's politics, and thus, the book's findings stop short of a full repudiation of pluralism.

THE FRAMEWORK

The analytic framework in the book is informed by assertions grounded in political and sociological theory. Gender socialization helps explain the different politics of men and women. The 2012 survey is limited as gender is measured as binary, although some may not identify as either exclusively male or female. We also examine the impact of sexual orientation, as people having no specific gender may use the terms "queer" or "other" when asked about their sexuality, whether they are heterosexual, gay, lesbian, bisexual, or other. We combine all nonheterosexual groups as members of the LGBTQ+ community. Unfortunately, our instruments were unable to capture the variety and nuances of sexual and gender identities. Sometimes we examined the specific politics of lesbians. Gender and sexuality are not just biologically constructed but shaped by social and cultural forces. This work, like previous work, finds that gender is a consistent divider of opinions in U.S. politics. Sexuality was less a consistent predictor, which may be due to the group's small sample size and the complexity of sexuality. We also delve into gender expression as we look at whether people discriminate against gays and lesbians because they appear too feminine or masculine.

The lives of women are shaped and defined by the problem of discrimination as stigma in life. As shown by numerous measures of gender inequality, discrimination and stigma continue to be problems for women, and this supports the conception of gender as a social structure that is embedded throughout society. Women encounter gender prejudice in their daily lives

that informs their politics. The personal is political. Full-time working women earn 81.6 cents for every dollar earned by their male counterparts, and that gap, regardless of occupation, increases with education, such that women with a bachelor's degree only earn 75 percent of men's annual earnings (Leisenring 2020).

The gender disparity in wealth is similar if not more substantial. *Shortchanged: Why Women Have Less Wealth and What Can Be Done about It* reports that women have only 36 percent as much wealth as men (Chang 2010). While there are few recent studies on the gender wealth gap, as of 2017, unmarried women who own or rent a home had 75.9 percent of the median wealth of their male counterparts (Hays and Sullivan 2020). Furthermore, in addition to having lower incomes on average than men, parenting is one important reason why women have less disposable income to retain and invest. For some older women, Social Security is their sole income. Furthermore, there is a large wealth disparity based on skin color. Some Black women have zero or negative wealth. The housing crisis of 2007–2008 was one important factor that deepened the racial wealth gap. Latinas and Black women, especially, were likely to receive subprime loans.

About 35 percent of adults 25 and older have a bachelor's degree (U.S. Census Bureau 2019). Educationally, while women are more likely to complete high school and college, women still earn less than do men with comparable degrees (Carnevale, Smith, and Gulish 2018). Race and gender remain important factors in determining income. Although, among African Americans, Black women are more likely to be college graduates than are Black men, earning 64 percent of bachelor's degrees (U.S. Census Bureau 2019), they earn less than do White men, White women, or Black men. Since women earn less than what men earn, on average, females remain at a disadvantage in comparison to men as heads of households. Poverty remains concentrated among parent-child family units. Nearly one-third of female-headed households are in poverty, in contrast to 10 percent of all family units. Added to this alarm concerning the rise in poverty among female-headed households is the percentage of parents who never married (England and Edin 2007). For some scholars, more than the inequality in wages and a biased employment market, the financial insolvency of independent women as parents is the key variable behind the feminization of poverty. Single parents are also more likely to have less education, less work experience, and fewer financial resources than married ones.

Considerable attention has been given to the marital status of Ameri-

cans. Since 1960, marriage rates have declined from 72 percent to 51 percent in 2010 (Cohn et al. 2011). They fell slightly further in 2016 to an all-time low of 50 percent (Parker and Stepler 2017). U.S. adults are also less optimistic about it, with 39 percent agreeing that the "institution is becoming obsolete" (Cohn et al. 2011). Latinx and Blacks have seen steeper declines than have Whites; 54 percent of Whites compared to 46 percent of Latinx and 30 percent of Blacks were married in 2015 (Parker and Stepler 2017). The significant decline in Black marriage rates has led to 58 percent of Black children living in a home with only one parent (Livingston 2018); and 69.8 percent of all Black women giving birth were unmarried (Martin et al. 2018). Marital status remains a significant determinant of the life's chances of children.

A vigorous debate over women as parents emerged during the 1960s. Some scholars sought to establish that women should not raise children outside of the traditional family. Daniel Moynihan's report on the Black family issued in 1965 criticized women as failing to raise children successfully because they were unmarried, divorced, or widowed. This report created a firestorm of protest and criticism, even as others traced it to even earlier work from the 1930s. E. Franklin Frazier (1966) in *The Negro Family* found this type of family to be dysfunctional. Later scholars also argued that public welfare was to blame for the growth in female-headed households and the rise in poverty rates among such households.

The Truly Disadvantaged outlines the economic and societal impacts of the decision to start a family without a financial safety net (Wilson 1987). The book considers some of the cultural and structural reasons for women to have families without men. Socially disadvantaged women often have children before getting married, due to structurally induced expectations. In a study of high school children, girls who expected to be an unmarried mother were more likely to become one, in contrast to those who did not. Structural factors include social class, urban environments, belonging to a female-headed household, and having five or more siblings. Higher-status women and their men choose to delay marriage because of educational or career aspirations. Low-status couples, however, will often choose not to marry but to start families. Indeed, the education gap in marital status has widened significantly over time, with a steep decline in marriage among those with a high school education or less (Parker and Stepler 2017).

The feminist movement and the sexual revolution also are forces that changed opportunities for women who felt that they could have children without spouses and no longer suffer the stigma and discrimination of being a single

parent. Surveys, nevertheless, find high levels of disapproval of the single parent. In a 2010 Pew-TIME national survey, 69 percent said that the rise in single parenting represented a serious problem for society. Only 24 percent said it was not much of a problem.[5] Furthermore, individuals seeking independent living arrangements after childbirth have been blamed by policy experts who think single parenting leads to poverty and intergenerational poverty.

Scholars continue to point to developments in household units. People more often live alone. The traditional family unit is less common. The sexual revolution also changed what women and men thought about the right to marry. Women and men find it challenging to marry today because societal norms no longer penalize those who cohabitate and seek to retain nonlegal partner and parental rights. For a variety of reasons, there may be less confidence that dating will lead to marriage for today's women and men. Because the costs of parenting are high for women, single parents may have more in common with one another, in how they think about their futures and their lives, than with married women. Along with race-ethnicity and class, marital status may be an important dividing line in U.S. politics (DeParle 2012).

THE POLITICS OF GENDERED-RACIAL AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STEREOTYPES IN THE U.S.

Racial stereotypes and stereotypes about lesbians may drive political wedges between women. They may serve to reinforce identities of difference, causing not only the affected group, but all women, to more strongly identify with their race or sexual orientation. Conversely, as women as a whole are subjected to gender stereotypes, albeit unique to each subgroup, the power of Whites and heterosexuals to control stereotype formation and persistence may serve to unify women. Gender is important in U.S. politics not only because of the politics of women's rights, but in how women are represented in society. This book turns the spotlight on how stereotypes or cultural beliefs about women also impact U.S. politics. Previous work has spent considerable time on how racial groups are represented in U.S. politics. General impressions about women based on media portrayals and government reports are called "social representations." These social representations are

5. Pew Research Center-TIME Magazine: 2011. "The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families," November 18, 2010.

not stereotypes, per se, but generalizations or heuristics conveying deductive reasoning about the interests and behavior of people who are female, Black and female, single parents, poor, lesbian, or active in church. Thus, apart from gender inequality, these social representations may be important components of U.S. politics. For example, recent studies show White women to be more sexist than non-White women, and that these beliefs were highly influential in their vote choice decision in the 2016 presidential election (Cassese and Barnes 2019; Frasure-Yokley 2018).

Social representations may or may not embody hostility toward a group. However, stereotypes are often hostile and baseless assumptions reflecting prejudice. Social representations are often considered to be facts and are not considered baseless by many members of a given society. Because social representations, however, can function like the stereotype used to shape expectations about the lives and relationships of women, a social representation may not be different from a stereotype. Stereotypes about various subgroups of women lesbians as embodying certain social characteristics inform the public about how likely it is that this group will advance. These negative stereotypes can also influence the political opinions and behavior of citizens.

Scholars in previous work find that stereotypes about Blacks reduce support for policies that assist disadvantaged families (Gilens 1999). People who feel that the welfare recipient is a "strong" woman are also less likely to support policies that give direct financial assistance to out-of-work mothers (Harris-Lacewell 2001). Do stereotypes about the strength of women and their sexual lives rooted in cultural beliefs about skin color, for example, remain important in the policy opinions of citizens, particularly women?

There are gendered-racial stereotypes about women today rooted in longstanding cultural misrepresentations of social groups (Bany, Robnett, and Feliciano 2014). Black women are often portrayed as the mammy, the prostitute, or jezebel (Craig 2002; Entman and Rojecki 2000; hooks 1992; Jewell 1993; Jerald et al. 2017; Coleman, Reynolds, and Torbati 2019). They are stereotyped as sexually deviant or vulgar, prone to unfaithfulness, having illegitimate children, and being welfare dependent (hooks 1992; Rosenthal and Lobel 2016), and as the unmarried welfare queen living alone with her children who has no desire to work but is content living off the state (Collins 1990). Black females are characterized in opposition to more feminine Whites, Asians, or Latinas (Hunt 2005). Asian women are portrayed as hyperfeminine, passive (Koshy 2004; Moran 2001), and exotic (Espiritu 1997; Prasso 2005), while Latinas are cast as "hot-blooded, tempestuous, and

hypersexual," with a recent emphasis on their curvaceous bodies and big butts (Mendible 2007).

Other studies show Black women's personalities are stereotyped as louder and more talkative, aggressive, and argumentative than White women (Weitz and Gordon 1993; Bany, Robnett, and Feliciano 2014; Neal-Jackson 2020). These stereotypes indict some women as incapable of finding mates. Black women are often depicted as "irrationally angry" (Harris-Perry 2011). The myth of the angry woman is still used to degrade women and deny them respect. There is the mammy who was beholden only to the slave master, his wife, and his children. She would cook and clean for them but not provide much care for members of her own family. Then there was the jezebel, or the promiscuous woman. These women are not likely to find a mate given their imaged sexual histories. A positively considered gendered-racial stereotype of women is that of the strong woman. Often represented as the Black woman, she survives in difficult and demeaning circumstances, which then excuses society for its harsh treatment of women and downplays her vulnerability.

Because of skin color, White women endure different stereotypes that have at times demeaned them. Often these women are depicted as weak, not strong. They quit and will not perform hard tasks. They do not quarrel if unjustly treated. These stereotypes about women based on skin color lead people to treat them differently than others and to discriminate. Moreover, Western conceptions of idealized femininity are nearly exclusively White. Women who are fat and/or Black, Shaw explains, cannot adhere to Eurocentric ideals of feminine beauty (Shaw 2005; see also Strings 2019). Women are framed very narrowly by gendered stereotypes. There is evidence that Black women are highly excluded from the dating market, and that stereotypes about them may be driving this exclusion (Feliciano, Robnett, and Komaie 2009; Robnett and Feliciano 2011). These are myths that limit their chances for equal treatment and respect by other groups. The survey analyzed in this book examined beliefs in Black female stereotypes that include the perception that they (1) lack moral values, particularly in regard to their promiscuity and dependence on welfare; (2) are less physically attractive than other women; and (3) have less "feminine" personalities than other groups of women, that is, they are loud, aggressive, talkative.

Another potentially important yet underexplored social and political cleavage in the U.S. is sexual orientation. This study distinguishes viewpoints about lesbians versus gay men. Stereotypes about gays and lesbians

are common, such that gays are often perceived as feminine and lesbians as masculine. In assessing the 2012 respondents' acceptance of stereotypes about gays and lesbians, the survey asked them to separately rate each group on a scale of perceived masculinity or femininity. Our study assesses the extent to which adults (and which groups of them) will adhere to these perceptions, and whether or not the acceptance or rejection of these stereotypes will influence their agreement or disagreement with public policies aimed at gay rights. No study, to date, assesses the role this may play in determining feelings toward lesbians and gays, or in pro-gay rights attitudes. We also examine the role of race, religiosity, and political orientation in the acceptance or rejection of such stereotypes.

An analysis of public opinion polls from 1973 to 2002 shows that Blacks are far less likely than Whites to approve of homosexuality, but are more supportive than Whites of gay/lesbian civil liberties and antidiscrimination laws (Lewis 2003). Also, Blacks (51 percent), as compared to Whites (62 percent) and Hispanics (58 percent), are the least likely to support same-sex marriage (Pew Research Center 2019). These studies, however, often fail to analyze respondent gender differences or to test differences in feelings or attitudes toward gays versus lesbians. Studies of prejudices and attitudes toward gays/lesbians often lump the groups together, but separate analyses may prove fruitful, as attitudes toward lesbians may not be the same as those toward gays (Worthen 2013). Little is known about the extent to which stereotypes about gays and lesbians impede support for gay/lesbian rights.

Furthermore, we are interested in examining the ways in which lesbians may differ from other groups of women on public policy issues. Does the experience of discrimination and stereotypes based on their sexual orientation serve to unite lesbians with or divide lesbians from other groups of women when it comes to support for public policies that benefit women and disadvantaged groups?

THE 2012 OUTLOOK ON LIFE SURVEY

These questions will be answered employing responses from the 2012 Outlook on Life Survey that were designed to study the political and social attitudes of American women. This survey is well suited for our comparative analysis. It is the first survey since the 1996 Black Election Study to sample African Americans in sufficient depth to provide detailed descriptive and sta-

tistical analyses of Black electoral and political participation. Although the General Social Surveys for 2008 and 2012 include a sample of 491 and 722 Blacks respectively, missing data reduces the sample significantly. Second, it includes White and Black people to sufficient degree to provide a meaningful comparison between the two groups' political tendencies.

The first wave of interviews was fielded over the summer and fall of 2012. A second set of interviews with the original respondents was conducted following the November 6, 2012, elections. A total of 2,294 respondents participated in this study; 1,601 were reinterviewed. A total of 1,278 interviews with Blacks were conducted in the first wave, including 757 with women. The survey's population comprised a purposeful oversample of African American men ($N = 374$) and women ($N = 472$), White men ($N = 310$) and women ($N = 280$), as well as 71 men ($N = 71$) and 55 women ($N = 55$) of other races, all noninstitutionalized and residing in the United States. The survey asked respondents a range of questions covering religious, civic, and political involvement and engagement; beliefs about race and inequality; ideas on politics; feelings and beliefs about political leaders, groups, and other prominent people; as well as demographic information. See Figures 1.2. and 1.3 for detailed descriptive statistics of the sample.

The survey used an online panel of U.S. households. Panel respondents were recruited using random-sampling techniques of listed U.S. household addresses. Households were contacted by mail and telephone. Once household members were selected using household addresses, eligible households were provided with access to the internet and hardware if necessary. Panelists then were assigned to a study sample. They took the survey online instead of by telephone, mail, or in person.

The virtues of an online survey are many. First, panel surveys may provide superior coverage of the U.S. population since they are based on listed household addresses, which represent 97 percent of all U.S. households. Second, online panel surveys avoid interviewer effects, or chiefly the race-of-interviewer effect that telephone and face-to-face surveys have. Third, online panel surveys are cost effective. Because Blacks were oversampled in this study, the sample is weighted to reflect the distribution of opinions in the general U.S. adult population.

One concern about internet panel surveys is that they overrepresent those having superior computer skills. In the preelection Outlook Survey, we asked respondents to rate the ease or difficulty of completing an online survey. Most reported that they found taking an online survey was easy to do.



Figure 1.2. Outlook Survey All Respondents (Weighted Data)

Latinos were less likely than Whites and Blacks to find online surveys "very easy" for their neighbors and for themselves. This difference was small and more likely reflected the fact that the online survey was only available in English.

Home internet access was also somewhat linked to responses to these questions. Households without the internet were provided service. Respondents who had internet and computers provided by the survey firm were less likely than those with existing internet access to find that taking the online survey was very easy for themselves or their neighbors. Thus, it is possible that nonnative English speakers and less technically experienced respondents are not fully represented in this survey. Their underrepresentation represents potential bias that will be accounted for by introducing this question as a potential control measure in all our empirical models. Finally, because of the unequal sampling design, the analysis requires weighting, which is done consistently throughout the book. There are three weights. The first weight is for the full sample, the second, for the analysis of Blacks and minorities, and the third, for a separate analysis of Black gender groups. We apply a weight to all of the statistical analyses.



Figure 1.3. Outlook Survey Black Respondents Only (Weighted Data)

OUTLINE OF BOOK

Chapter 2, "Women, Minorities, the LGBTQ+ Community, and the American Dream," examines expectations, chiefly about the American Dream, that social groups have about their lives. We begin the book with an examination of the macro dimensions of the gender, race-ethnicity, and sexuality social structures. How much do women, racial-minorities, and LGBTQ+ individuals support the current distribution of resources, adhere to institutional rules governing upward mobility, and align with these institutional logics? Do Blacks and other minority groups show as much support for the

American Dream as nonethnic Whites? The American Dream is multifaceted. For many, in an absolute sense it represents the attainment of wealth. For others, it is relative, and its achievement is having the sense of being better off than most people. Many also define the American Dream as being able to gift their children a better life than their own. Most Americans deeply believe in it, but the less well-off are less able to see it as attainable relative to those with higher incomes (Hochschild 1995). This work shows that there are also important social class interactions that predict faith in the American Dream. For women, the challenge of gender also may diminish confidence that they, too, can attain the American Dream.

Chapter 3 examines the effect of marital status on partisanship and public policy opinion. Marital status is an individual identity that can offer material rewards. Does marital status divide women? Does it influence their political perspectives? There has been considerable attention given to marital status in the U.S. Since 1960, marriage rates have declined from 72 percent to 51 percent in 2010 (Cohn et al. 2011). They fell slightly further in 2016 to an all-time low of 50 percent (Parker and Stepler 2017). U.S. adults are also less optimistic about it, with 39 percent agreeing that the "institution is becoming obsolete" (Cohn et al. 2011). Latinx and Blacks have seen steeper declines than have Whites; 54 percent of Whites compared to 46 percent of Latinx and 30 percent of Blacks were married in 2015 (Parker and Stepler 2017). The significant decline in Black marriage rates has led to 58 percent of Black children living in a home with only one parent (Livingston 2018); and 69.8 percent of all Black women giving birth were unmarried (Martin et al. 2018). Depicted in the media often as single parents, struggling financially to provide for their families, women are expected to have diminished expectations about their intimate lives, as wives and significant persons in adult relationships. We examine how marital status influences respondent policy views.

The influence of feminism and identification with women in public opinion is examined in Chapter 4. Feminists are considered as an identification with a radical ideology, as an interactional cultural construct, while identification with the fate of women can include those who harbor traditional values concerning male-female relations in the U.S. Few public opinion studies have examined the role of women's linked fate that is driven by a strong sense of one's individual gender identity (Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016). How do both types of identification shape U.S. policy views (see Sharrow et al. 2016)? Perceptions of party differences on women's issues are shown to significantly influence vote choice in the 1988–2008 U.S. presiden-

tial elections and were more influential on Whites' votes in 2008 than racial resentment, abortion, gay marriage, or the economy (Hansen 2016). Is a woman's linked fate identification consistently as liberalizing in public opinion as support for feminist values? How does it affect political and civic engagement? The 2012 Outlook Survey included a number of questions about women's civic and political involvement. This chapter compares women to men to examine the degree to which there are gender gaps in political participation. There are also different types of political participation, such as noninstitutional participation (political donations, signing of an issue petition), direct contact participation (distribution of campaign material, help with a registration drive, contact with a political official), and collective participation (attendance at a protest meeting or demonstration, participation in a neighborhood march).

Chapter 5 examines the competing and reinforcing roles of gender, racial-gender, and racial identifications among U.S. Blacks. Blacks may be more mindful of the role of race in the U.S. than are Whites, and an investigation of their politics is overdue. The variable of interest in this chapter is the role of linked fate with the lives of Black women. While 40 percent did not see a link between their lives and those of U.S. Black women, 22 percent strongly and 34 percent somewhat agreed that there was a link between their lives and the lives of Black women. Blacks also show loyalty to their racial group in the form of a linked-fate identity. Which groups in the Black community show solidarity with Blacks, Black women, and feminists? Does this identification with Blacks promote a more consistent form of liberal politics than identification with Black women and approval of feminist groups?

Chapter 6 addresses stereotypes—one interactional dimension of gender and racial-ethnic social structures—about Black women, and the extent to which they are impactful in shaping public policy viewpoints. How pervasive and deeply held are negative assumptions about Black women, such as they argue too much with others, and don't bond well with members of their own racial group? A set of scholars have argued that stereotypes about Black women persist and strongly shape public policy discourse (Hancock 2004; Harris-Perry 2011; Quadagno 1994; Gilens 1999). In this chapter, we compare the effects of stereotypes of Black women—that they are disagreeable, welfare dependent, and poor parents compared to White women, for example—on public opinion. Stereotypes in the media appear to be used more frequently in campaigns and elections, and thus their role in U.S. politics warrants new investigation.

Chapter 7, "Stereotypes, Sexual Minorities, and Community Acceptance," is a focus on the public acceptance of lesbians and gay men. In assessing the 2012 Outlook Survey respondents' agreement with stereotypes about gays and lesbians, we look at their ratings of each group on a scale of perceived masculinity or femininity. Respondents were also asked about their support for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender men and women who wished to work with or raise children, and protections against job discrimination. We also examine linkages between concern about the AIDS virus and stereotypes about Black and sexual orientation groups.

The book's conclusion in Chapter 8 summarizes the principal findings. In examining gender, race-ethnicity, and sexuality social structures in the U.S., what individual and interactional dimensions influence political and public policy opinions? Is the gender gap and political solidarity among women an exaggerated phenomenon? If so, when do men and women often express similar political opinions? Gender differences appear most consistently in the policy realm of women, children, and family issues such as family leave and pay equity laws. Democratic candidates in the 2020 presidential race greatly moved to the political left, and some promoted policies such as pay for childcare work and government-subsidized preschools and daycares for children. Feminists back such an agenda, supporting pay for parents who care for their children, as it gives women, who are more often the stay-at-home parent, greater independence over their lives. Is a gender gap on this issue and other family-focused policy mostly based on feminist politics and solidarity with women? Does gender also serve as a source of controversy in U.S. public policy debates as negative stereotypes about subgroups of women, notably Black women and lesbians, shape opinion in U.S. politics in ways that work against these groups' liberal political interests? While ample work has examined how depictions of racial groups influence public opinion, we find that stereotypes about women, Black women, and LGBTQ+ individuals limit these groups' claims to social rights and benefits.

CHAPTER 2

Women, Minorities, the LGBTQ+ Community, and the American Dream

The status disadvantage of women should be reflected in their politics as much as women's politics is rooted in biological and cultural difference. According to a recent 2020 survey, 64 percent of women feel that the U.S. hasn't gone far enough in giving women equal rights with men, and 77 percent believe that sexual harassment is a major barrier to women's equality (Barroso 2020a). Women may believe that gender discrimination is a barrier to their economic well-being and success. The rejection of sexism as a root cause of gender inequality, however, is tied to Republicanism for White women (Cassese and Barnes 2019; Cassese and Holman 2019). Notably, White women's support for Trump in 2016 was based on system justification beliefs. These female Trump supporters do not subscribe to beliefs that women are systemically disadvantaged by gender.

Women's faith in the American Dream could also explain why women are not strongly organized as a voting bloc. Critics of the Dream assail it as a basis for justifying social inequality in the U.S. (Lamont 1992, 2019; Mijs 2018). It allows people to maintain their belief that the world is fundamentally just when some are disadvantaged. Because success is believed to be rooted in personal attributes such as will, and failure in a lack of resolve, the American Dream may promote a form of politics that does not address the structural conditions for systemic inequality in the U.S. Thus, those who feel discrimination exists may have diminished expectations for achieving the American Dream. And if women are found to be critics of the American Dream, this might explain the leftward direction of their group's politics.

The pursuit of the American Dream has not been easy for some groups relative to others, and notably for those groups that have experienced labor

market, social, and political discrimination. One study found that in counties where women's earnings are a few rungs lower than men's, they are significantly less likely to believe in a meritocracy, a proxy for the belief in the American Dream, than are women located in a context where females have reached economic parity with men (Newman 2015). And, indeed, some also consider that the belief that success is based purely on hard work is a myth. This chapter investigates what people think of the American Dream comparatively. In the 2012 Outlook Survey, questions were posed to respondents pertaining to the American Dream. Do as many women as men believe it is attainable for themselves? Who are the skeptics? And does having a belief in the American Dream also define one's politics, making one more politically conservative? And does identification with women, in particular, diminish or improve expectations that one can achieve the American Dream?

MANY BELIEVE THE AMERICAN DREAM IS ACHIEVABLE

The American Dream consists of many things, but in general, it represents the attainment of life goals such as freedom of choice in how to live one's life, a good family life, homeownership, a college education, and a secure retirement (Hochschild 1995; Pew Research Center 2017a). Hard work is an important element of the Dream. The achievement of the American Dream, based on hard work in a land of opportunity, was never understood as restricted to a single group. Instead, it was a quest available to all, including emancipated men and women and newcomers. The American Dream is widely taught, and a majority of 2012 Outlook respondents had the faith that they would come close to achieving the American Dream in their lifetime. When asked how far along the road to the American Dream on a scale from 1 to 10 will they ultimately get, 80 percent said that they expected to make it to at least the halfway point or 5. The average response to this question was a 6.4 on this 10-point scale. Thus, there was a great deal of optimism in 2012 that the American Dream was both real and attainable. This optimism is in contrast to Europe, where there is greater doubt about one's ability to move up economically and pass wealth to the next generation (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso 2016).

Undermining faith in the American Dream is likely to be a concern about the problem of discrimination. Those who feel that discrimination persists in the U.S. may be less confident of their ability to achieve the American

Dream. Prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which banned employment discrimination, women and minorities were excluded from certain jobs and were discriminated against in wages (Darity and Mason 1998). The gender gap in wages has narrowed from .60 to .82, while the racial gap has worsened between Blacks and Whites (Karageorge 2017). Black men earned 80 percent of what White men earned in 1979, but by 2016, they only earned 70 percent of White men's wages (Karageorge 2017). The decrease is also true among women. In 2016, African American women earned 82 percent of what White women earned (Karageorge 2017). This was a drop from 1979, when Black women earned 95 percent of what White women earned (Karageorge 2017). This gap is largely due to unexplained factors (Karageorge 2017). Researchers find that racial and gender differences in earnings are rooted in the different skills and experiences that workers bring to the workforce and the difference in the wages attached to these skills. However, there remains a part of the gender and racial wage gap that cannot be explained, which many generally attribute to labor market discrimination.

A certain percentage of women are not in the workforce. Fewer women are in the workforce today than in 2000, and this is not entirely due to aging or retirement, as the drop is also present among those aged 25 to 54 (Fry and Stepler 2017). While down by half from the 1970s, about one-quarter of American women listed themselves unpaid homemakers in 1993. This figure is compared to 1 percent of American men in 1993 (Cohen 2004). The fact that women have, in general, less material wealth than men may shrink their expectations about future achievements. While women have less wealth than men, the gender divide in annual incomes and educational attainment is small. Furthermore, one study contends that the narrowing gender gap in the U.S. is due to as much a decline in the real wages that men make as much as it represents gains in women's earning power (Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock 1995; Lecht 2008).

Gay men, transgender or queer and bisexual men and women, and lesbians and their partners may also have dampened expectations even as public attitudes about homosexuality have improved significantly since the 1970s. However, there is some evidence of wage inequality based on sexual orientation (Badgett 2001; Badgett et al. 2007). Gay men, for example, earn up to 32 percent less than their heterosexual counterpart across all occupations (Badgett 2001; Badgett et al. 2007). Another finding attributes the earnings gap to occupation sorting and educational attainment, finding that lesbians earn more than their heterosexual counterparts (Antecol, Jong, and Stein-

berger 2008). Although sexual identities have been hidden to prevent job discrimination based on sexual orientation, it persists. A 2005 study found that employers significantly discriminated against fictitious male job seekers who listed belonging to a gay campus organization on résumés (Tilcsik 2011). To date, federal law does not specifically protect sexual minorities from job discrimination, although some states ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. As with other minorities and women, job discrimination against LGBTQ+ people limits their life chances and future economic gains (Levine 1979).

Social class is important in public opinion about the American Dream. As much as disadvantage and discrimination undercut faith in the American Dream, the current economic reality, with the decline of real wages over time, also impacts the lived experiences of workers and homeowners. These downturns have particularly hit the middle class, the bulwark of those whose sights are set on achieving and maintaining the American Dream. The housing market bubble, when housing prices fell sharply, beginning in 2006 and the economic recession impacted many U.S. families. The wealth divides between Whites, Blacks, and Latinos increased dramatically, as minorities notably lost wealth because of the home devaluations and record unemployment rates. A recent 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances administered by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System concluded that "the typical White family has eight times the wealth of the typical Black family and five times the wealth of the typical Hispanic family" (Bhutta et al. 2020).

Minority women may have different expectations about their future lives than White women. In addition, there is often a severe negative economic and social effect of incarceration on families (Arditti, Lambert-Shute, and Joest 2003). Members of households having arrest records may no longer feel as able to achieve the American Dream as members of families without arrest records. Incarceration rates are significantly higher for minorities than for Whites. One study estimated that for men born between 1965 and 1969, one in five Black men had served time in jail compared in contrast to 3 percent of White men (Pettit and Western 2004). In 2015, "10 percent of black children had an incarcerated parent . . . compared with 3.6 percent of Hispanic children and 1.7 percent of white children" (Pettit and Sykes 2017, 24).

In the 2012 Outlook Survey a majority (52 percent) of the respondents felt that discrimination against Blacks exists and remains a social problem. Only one-quarter felt that discrimination was no longer a problem. Another 25 percent took a middle-of-the-road position, neither agreeing nor dis-

agreeing with the statement that discrimination no longer remains a problem in the U.S. Most Blacks (71 percent) and other minority respondents (73 percent) felt that discrimination continued to be a problem for some groups. The belief that discrimination exists in the U.S. is expected to undermine faith in the American Dream. Optimism, in contrast to beliefs that discrimination remains a problem, is expected to strengthen one's faith that the American Dream is attainable. Based on survey data, people in the U.S. are generally much more optimistic than pessimistic. In the 2012 survey, one-half of all respondents said that they felt optimistic about the future. Only 13 percent said that they were pessimistic about their fate, while 37 percent were neither optimistic nor pessimistic.

Like discrimination and optimism, a belief in hard work is also an important correlate of faith in the American Dream. When asked if they believed that hard work in the United States means that you get ahead and achieve set goals, about one-quarter of the respondents felt it was not true. Among the minority share of respondents who felt that a belief in hard work paid off was false, 7 percent said it was extremely false. In contrast, a majority of respondents said that the belief in hard work leading to success was true. Of this majority, 12 percent felt strongly that hard work paid off.

All of aforementioned factors may drive faith in the American Dream, but to what extent will they be more significant drivers than gender, support for feminists, or lesbian identity? How will those factors similarly drive White women's, minority women's, and lesbians' belief in the American Dream? Will the same patterns emerge among African Americans?

WHAT PREDICTS FAITH IN THE AMERICAN DREAM?

All Respondents. In the model[1] for all respondents, support for feminists was unrelated to opinions about the American Dream. Neither gender nor race was a significant predictor in this analysis, as shown in Table 2.1. Sexual orientation approached statistical significance at a probability level of .10.

1. To determine what attitudes and social characteristics predict one's ability to achieve the American Dream, ordinary least square (OLS) regression models were constructed. The unstandardized regression coefficients of the analysis are reported. Two regressions were estimated, one for all respondents, and the other for female respondents only (see Table 2.1). The regression models were estimated using the data weighted by Weight 1 in the Outlook Survey.

TABLE 2.1. OLS Regression of Will Attain the American Dream for All Respondents and Women Only (Weighted Analysis)

	All Respondents		Women Only	
	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	2.496**	.491	1.690**	.725
Optimism	.138**	.031	.111*	.046
Work hard is false	–.174**	.026	–.144**	.038
Discrimination is a problem	–.038	.039	.015	.054
Feminist support	–.003	.002	–.004	.003
Feminist support X minority respondent	n/a	n/a	.012*	.005
Female	–.097	.086	n/a	n/a
Married	.376**	.101	.149	.145
Minority	.072	.102	–.455	.304
Age	.006*	.003	–.001	.004
LGBTQ+	.363#	.191	.053	.295
Income	.045**	.013	.062**	.019
Education	.087**	.026	.164**	.038
South	.007*	.089	–.032	.128
Ideology (conservative)	.066#	.040	.116*	.056
Party ID (strong Republican)	–.057*	.027	–.049	.037
Class ID (upper class)	.745**	.067	.807**	.096
Religious fundamentalist	–.090	.101	–.309*	.144
Household arrest record	–.107	.117	.087	.172
U.S. citizen	.342	.279	–.075	.410
Have stocks	.596**	.104	.283#	.148
Have children	.120	.097	.172	.144
Ease of survey (very difficult)	–.304**	.072	–.167	.107
(Total weighted N)	(1,806)		(925)	
R-square	.336		.341	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
Note: n/a denotes variable left out for model goodness-of-fit reasons.
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

LGBTQ+ respondents felt farther along the road toward achieving the American Dream than non-LGBTQ+ respondents. The failure to find these important social categories—gender, support for feminism, LGBTQ+ identity, and racial membership—to be statistically associated with the American Dream is noteworthy. It speaks to the broad appeal and convictions many people in the U.S. have about the American Dream.

Optimism, as expected, was a strong predictor in realizing the American Dream. A belief that success is based on hard work also predicted one's faith in achieving the American Dream. That the U.S. has a problem of bias and

discrimination was not relevant in one's assessment of how far along one was in achieving the American Dream. There were no statistical differences between citizens and noncitizens in opinions on how far along they were in obtaining the American Dream.

We now turn to assessing individual assessments of progress toward attaining the American Dream. Politics was important in how respondents measured their progress toward attaining it. Conservatives and Democrats felt closer toward achieving it than liberals and Republicans. Democrats believed themselves closer to achieving the American Dream than did Republicans. Alternatively, self-described conservatives felt that they were farther along in attaining the American Dream than did self-described liberals. Thus, in addition to attitudes pertaining to how optimistic respondents were about their future and whether hard work pays off, party identification and political ideology are tied to opinions about the American Dream.

In contrast to gender, feminist support, and race and citizenship, social class measures were important predictors of how far respondents perceived themselves have come toward achieving the American Dream. High-income and college-educated respondents were more likely than low-income and less well-educated respondents to express faith that they would reach the American Dream in this lifetime. Social class identification was also statistically significant in this model. Upper-middle- and upper-class respondents were also more likely to state that they were closer to achieving the American Dream than the poor and working class. Having stock investments also made respondents more likely to report that they were farther along in attaining the Dream than those without such investments. Since wealth is a big component of the American Dream, having it predicts the opinion that one is closing in on the American Dream.

Marriage was a statistically significant predictor in the analysis of the American Dream. Married respondents reported being farther along than unmarried ones. Marriage generally is associated with greater financial security, and thus this result shows that perceived beneficiaries of the American Dream are financially secure individuals. Religious beliefs and having a household arrest record did not influence respondents' responses. Having children was also not related to where respondents placed themselves on this scale of realizing the American Dream.

Women Only. Feminism as an ideology may have an empowering effect for women, giving them confidence that they can achieve their dreams despite gender disadvantage. A feminist consciousness thus might work to

push respondents farther along than others based on this scale. In this analysis, it did not. As shown in Table 2.1, support for feminists did not change the opinions all women had about the likelihood they would achieve the Dream. However, it did increase the placement of Black, Asian, Latina, and multiracial women, as shown by the interaction term with feminist support and race. However, among women the effect of favoring feminist groups and being minority is small. The coefficient for the interaction term is .012 and is statistically significant at a probability threshold of .05.

The predictors for the subgroup analysis generally mirror those shown in the first analysis of all respondents. Wealth, including having stocks, and social class identification also divide women, as they did for all respondents. Educated and affluent women in all racial groups are generally more likely than less economic and socially advantaged women to report being very far along on the road toward achieving the American Dream. One exception to the results being similar to the full sample analysis is that born-again Christians among women reported lagging behind other respondents in achieving the American Dream. Marriage was not statistically significant in the regression model for women only.

Profiles of Those Who Believe They Can Achieve the American Dream. Table 2.2 shows the projected scores of reaching the American Dream for all respondents based on the coefficients shown in the first column of Table 2.1.[2] While women had slightly lower projected scores (6.3) than men (6.4), the difference was not statistically significant. LGBTQ+ individuals are also more likely than non-LGBTQ+ persons to believe that they will achieve the American Dream. Overall, the analysis reveals that social class identifications, education, income, stock investments, belief in hard work, optimism, citizenship status, and sexual orientation were the factors most strongly associated with attitudes about the attainability of the American Dream. Respondents who identified as poor, as opposed to some other social class, generally were the least likely to have felt that they would reach the American Dream, at a score of 4.9. Upper-class respondents had the highest levels of believing that they could achieve the American Dream at 7.9 (the maximum score is 10).

2. Because the constant is calculated with the assumption of zero values for all predictor variables and may not exist in the real world, it was not used in the calculations shown in Figure 2.1. Rather the weighted mean of 6.4 for all respondents on the optimism scale was used. Statistically significant and insignificant coefficients were added or subtracted from this mean to determine the projected American Dream score.

TABLE 2.2. Projected Scores for How Far Are You on the Road to the American Dream on a Scale from 1 to 10 (10 = Very Far)?

Low optimism**	6.0
High optimism	6.8
Hard work false (extremely)	5.9
Hard work true (extremely)	6.9
Discrimination not a problem (extremely)	6.5
Discrimination a problem (extremely)	6.3
Minority	6.5
White	6.4
Female	6.3
Male	6.4
Non-LGBTQ+#	6.4
LGBTQ+	6.8
Citizen	6.8
Noncitizen	6.4
Upper social class*	7.9
Upper middle class	7.1
Middle class	6.4
Working class	5.7
Poor	4.9
$175,000 family income**	6.8
Less than $5,000 family income	6.0
Have stocks**	7.0
Don't have stocks	6.4
Graduate degree**	6.9
No formal education	5.8
Household arrest record	6.3
No household arrest record	6.4
Strong Republican*	6.6
Strong Democrat	6.2
Strong political conservative#	6.6
Strong political liberal	6.2

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

PILLARS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM

All Respondents. While many of the adult respondents, including women, in the 2012 survey said that they were at least halfway toward reaching the American Dream, many felt that the specific components that make up the Dream, such as building wealth or sending one's child to college, were not very easy to achieve. When asked how easy or hard ("somewhat" or "very") it



Figure 2.1. Percentage of "Somewhat" and "Very Easy" Responses When Asked "How Easy or Hard Is It to Reach These Goals?"

is for people like themselves to do better than their parents, own a home, build a secure retirement fund, send a child to college, and become wealthy, most said it was hard. Opinions across these questions varied a lot. Doing better than one's parents was the easiest for a plurality of respondents, but only a tiny minority said that it was easy to get rich in the U.S. Homeownership was also not as difficult as sending one's child to college. Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of respondents who said it was "very" or "somewhat" easy to accomplish these goals. The central interest is whether gender, race, gender-race, support for feminism, and sexual orientation are important predictors in the analysis of the pillars of the American Dream.

Table 2.3 shows the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis of these five pillars of the American Dream for all respondents. Gender was statistically significant in one of the five models. Thus, despite gender disadvantage, U.S. women rated these goals no more or less difficult to reach than men except in the case of sending one's children to college. Here, U.S. women rated that goal as easier to accomplish than U.S. men.

Instead of support for feminist groups, identification with women as measured by linked fate or solidarity with the lives of women was used. Women's lives are perceived as harder than men's, and thus linked fate

with women might have a negative impact on one's assessment of how easy it is to own a home and move ahead in life. More than half (55 percent) of men said that they did not identify with the lives of women, and 31 percent of men said that they identified with women's fate, but by "not very much." A minority of men said that they identified somewhat and a lot with the lives of women. A majority (63 percent) of women identified with the lives of women, while 37 percent did not. Only a minority of both gender groups identified a lot with women—6.5 percent among men and 12 percent among women.

However, women's linked fate opinions were at times important in a consistent direction. Respondents, including men, having strong women identifications were less likely to rate having a secure retirement and doing better than one's parents as easy to achieve than were respondents with weak women identifications. Similarly, women respondents who identified strongly with the lives of women felt that owning a home was a harder goal to achieve than those who did not identify strongly with women. Identification with women's fate works to bring attention to gender disadvantage. Thus, instead of empowering women, as a feminist ideology in theory does, it makes Americans aware of the economic challenges that women face. Thus, those aware of the plight of women have concerns about their ability to have a secure retirement and surpass their parents in terms of economic security. Thus, regardless of gender, identification with the plight of U.S. women causes some doubt about one's ability to do well economically and pass those advantages on to one's children. In only one of the five models was gender statistically significant. In this case, women actually felt that sending one's child or children to college was easier than did men. Similarly, LGBTQ+ respondents were less likely than heterosexual respondents to think sending their children or children of people like themselves to college would be easy to do.

Despite having a history of prejudice and discrimination, U.S. minority respondents gave mixed responses. Minority respondents were less likely than Whites to feel that homeownership was easy to achieve. At the same time, this group was more likely to feel that surpassing their parents' economic status was possible than were White respondents.

And surprisingly, in comparison to nonethnic Whites, minority respondents felt it was easier to become wealthy. This result is likely due to the end of de jure segregation laws in the 1960s and a general trend of improvement

TABLE 2.3. OLS Regression Analysis of Pillars of the American Dream (Weighted Analysis)

(Very Easy = 4)	Own a Home		Secure Retirement		Send Children to College		Become Wealthy		Do Better Than Parents	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	1.012**	.297	1.701**	.276	1.474**	.282	.963**	.252	1.849**	.300
Optimism	.075**	.018	.086**	.016	.045**	.017	.060**	.015	.045**	.018
Discrimination a U.S. problem	–.004	.024	–.031	.022	–.029	.023	.005	.020	.012	.024
Work hard belief (False)	–.058**	.016	–.110**	.014	–.073**	.015	–.037**	.013	–.107**	.016
Women's fate	–.029	.035	–.127**	.032	.017	.033	–.028	.030	–.099**	.035
Women's fate X female	–.079#	.048	.050	.044	–.012	.046	–.027	.041	.007	.048
Female	.170	.113	–.086	.104	.227*	.107	.023	.096	.095	.114
Minority	–.290**	.059	.087	.055	–.088	.056	.138**	.050	.171**	.060
Married	–.001	.059	–.065	.055	–.101#	.056	.023	.050	–.105#	.060
LGBTQ+	.165	.129	–.118	.119	–.309*	.122	–.017	.109	–.158	.130
Age	.002	.002	.003#	.002	.000	.002	–.001	.001	.005**	.002
Income	.019*	.008	–.001	.007	.014#	.007	–.015*	.007	.005	.008
Education	.022	.015	.006	.014	–.003	.014	–.015	.013	.001	.015
South	.130*	.052	–.083#	.048	.129**	.050	.029	.045	.095#	.053
Ideology (conservative)	.004	.024	–.056**	.022	.045*	.022	–.024	.020	.010	.024
Party ID (Republican)	–.015	.016	.028#	.015	–.014	.015	.058**	.014	–.004	.016
Social class ID (upper)	.232**	.040	.254**	.037	.328**	.038	.311**	.034	.200**	.040
Religious fundamentalist	–.080	.060	–.146**	.055	–.115*	.057	–.163**	.051	–.147*	.061
Household arrest record	–.100	.074	–.211**	.068	.031	.070	.057	.063	.009	.074
U.S. citizen	.221	.188	–.046	.173	–.475**	.178	–.036	.159	–.080	.189
Have stocks	.165**	.061	.205**	.056	.035	.058	.035	.052	.155*	.062
Have children	.220**	.057	.055	.053	.057	.054	.116*	.048	.077	.057
Ease of survey (very difficult)	–.147**	.045	–.111*	.043	–.115**	.043	–.118**	.038	–.104*	.046
(Total weighted N)	(936)		(929)		(935)		(932)		(929)	
R-square	.286		.305		.251		.219		.205	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

TABLE 2.4. Regression Analysis of Pillars of the American Dream, Black Respondents Only (Weighted Analysis)

(Very Easy = 4)	Own a Home		Secure Retirement		Send Children to College		Become Wealthy		Do Better Than Parents	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	1.063**	.289	1.992**	.270	.865**	.281	1.148**	.251	1.821**	.279
Optimism	.082**	.021	.054**	.019	.085**	.020	.070**	.018	.072**	.020
Discrimination a U.S. problem	–.063*	.027	–.027	.025	–.058*	.026	–.102**	.023	–.009	.026
Work hard belief (False)	–.062**	.017	–.084**	.016	–.069**	.017	–.066**	.015	–.065**	.016
Black Women's fate	–.092**	.033	–.193**	.031	–.034	.032	–.112**	.029	–.078*	.032
Black Women's fate X Female	.071#	.042	.154**	.039	.022	.041	.043	.037	.034	.041
Female	–.147	.108	–.301	.101	.018	.106	–.067	.095	–.052	.105
Married	.182**	.062	–.060	.058	.008	.061	.004	.054	–.120*	.060
LGBTQ+	.044	.111	–.039	.102	.067	.108	.155	.095	–.136	.106
Age	.002	.002	.002	.002	.001	.002	–.006**	.002	.002	.002
Income	.040**	.007	.015*	.007	.007	.007	–.003	.006	.011	.007
Education	.015	.018	.002	.016	.060**	.017	.035*	.015	.030#	.017
South	.086#	.052	–.017	.048	.088#	.050	.065	.045	.004	.050
Ideology (conservative)	–.023	.021	–.038#	.019	.009	.020	.010	.018	–.010	.020
Party ID (Republican)	.027	.022	.058**	.019	.016	.020	.013	.018	–.034#	.020
Social class ID (upper)	.126**	.035	.174**	.032	.131**	.034	.121**	.030	.117***	.033
Religious fundamentalist	.086	.052	.101*	.048	.098#	.050	.149**	.045	.122*	.050
Household arrest record	–.042	.062	–.121*	.058	–.219**	.060	–.013	.054	–.040	.060
U.S. citizen	.334#	.173	–.191	.161	–.149	.168	.253#	.150	.228	.167
Have stocks	.007	.067	–.094	.063	–.110#	.065	.009	.058	–.077	.065
Have children	–.027	.055	–.148**	.052	–.024	.054	–.089	.048	.032	.053
Ease of survey (very difficult)	.022	.041	.055	.038	.144**	.039	.108**	.035	–.087*	.039
(Total weighted N)	(1,071)		(1,071)		(1,071)		(1,070)		(1,077)	
R-square	.182		.154		.138		.165		.109	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

in race relations. Age was significant in two of the five models, with the elderly more likely than the young to think that having a secure retirement and doing better than their parents was easy to do. Older Americans, like U.S. minority groups, experienced a booming economy following World War II that enabled them to achieve higher levels of prosperity than their parents. In a period of delayed economic growth, young Americans may not be able to duplicate the economic gains of their parents.

While social class self-identification was statistically significant in all five models in the direction one would expect, where the poor and working class rated these goals as harder to reach compared to middle-class, upper-middle-class, and upper-class respondents, household income had a mixed effect. The least educated and most educated, however, rated each financial goal identically. Wealthier respondents thought it was easy to own a home and to send one's child to college, but difficult to become wealthy. Married respondents had negative opinions about two of the five financial goals. They believed it was more difficult to send children to college and surpass one's parents financially than did unmarried respondents. Those with stocks thought homeownership, retiring securely, and doing better than one's parents were easy financial goals. There is some evidence that opinions on how difficult or easy these economic aspirations are to achieve are partisan. In two of the five models, Republicans rated having a secure retirement and becoming wealthy as easier than did Democrats. Self-described political conservatives, however, believed that having enough money to retire securely was more difficult than did self-described political liberals. Conservatives rated sending one's child to college as easy compared to liberals, however.

Those in the South generally rated these goals as easy to achieve. In one instance, southern respondents, relative to nonsoutherners, rated having a secure retirement as hard. Born-again Christians or religious fundamentalists had significantly different opinions than those who don't identify themselves as such. In four of the five models, religious fundamentalists rated these financial objectives as difficult to achieve. Citizens, as opposed to noncitizens, thought it was difficult to send one's child or children to college. While the household arrest record was unrelated to how far one was on the road toward the American Dream, it negatively affected respondent opinions on how difficult it would be to achieve a secure retirement. Being a parent, however, was positively related to two of the five financial goals—homeownership and becoming wealthy. Childless respondents find these goals difficult to reach.

As in the case shown in the analysis reported in Table 2.1, optimism and the opinion that hard work pays off were both important predictors of attitudes about these financial goals (see Table 2.3). And, also, as in the case in the model predicting how far respondents were in achieving the American Dream, opinions about how prevalent discrimination against minorities is in the U.S. were unrelated. The ease-of-survey measure, introduced as a control variable, was statistically significant in all five models.

African Americans Only. Table 2.4 shows the analysis for Black respondents only in the 2012 Outlook Survey. In contrast to the analysis of all respondents, a gender gap did not emerge in this separate analysis. Black men were no different from Black women in how they viewed these financial goals. There were no significance differences of opinions on these measures between the Black LGBTQ community and the Black non-LGBTQ community.

The analyses reveal the same finding for identification with the collective fate of Black women as with women generally; identification with Black women mostly causes respondents to rate financial goals as more difficult to achieve. A plurality (44 percent) of Blacks in 2012 reject identification with the collective status of Black women. The gender gap in Black women identification is small in this instance. Almost as many (43 percent) of Black women as Black men (45 percent) said that what happens to Black women as a group does not impact their lives. However, for the 24 percent of Black women and 15.5 percent of Black men who strongly identify with the fate of U.S. Black women, goals such as earning wealth are seen as significantly more difficult than for those who don't have such identifications. In four of the five models, identification with Black women negatively impacted one's belief in one's ability to achieve these goals—homeownership, having a secure retirement, becoming wealthy, and doing better than one's parents financially. The interaction term of being female and feeling solidarity with Black women was statistically significant in two of the five models but had the opposite effect than the mainline effect. Black women having strong common fate with Black women rated owning a home and having a secure retirement as easy goals in life compared to those having weak identifications with Black women. The belief that Black women can overcome difficult situations and odds is combined with the viewpoint that Black women are doubly disadvantaged, and thus identification with Black women can have these mixed effects on the respondent's financial outlook.

Marital status had a mixed effect. Married Black respondents were more likely to rate homeownership as easy to achieve, but also to rate doing better

than one's parents as more difficult compared to unmarried Blacks. Only one age difference emerged. Younger Black Americans were no more likely to feel that homeownership, having a secure retirement, and doing better than one's parents were difficult goals to reach than older Black Americans. However, younger Blacks are more likely believe it is easy to become wealthy compared to older Blacks. As in the analysis of the American Dream scale, social class identification was an important predictor of opinion on how easy it is to reach key pillars of the American Dream. Social class identification was a consistent predictor in this analysis, while income was statistically significant in two of the five models, and education in three of the five models. Low-income respondents felt that homeownership and having a secure retirement were difficult to reach, while less educated respondents felt that sending children to college, becoming wealthy, and doing better than one's parents were more difficult than highly educated respondents. Self-described poor and working-class respondents rated all of the goals as hard to achieve relative to self-identified middle-class, upper-middle-class, and upper-class respondents. Income and education were statistically significant predictors in, respectively, two and three of the five models in the direction one would expect. High-income and highly educated Blacks were more likely to rate these financial goals as easy to achieve relative to low-income and less well-educated Blacks. Owning stocks, which was a positive correlate of the American Dream scale, was statistically significant in one of the five models. It had a negative effect for Black respondents.

Other variables, however, were generally unimportant in the opinions about these pillars of the American Dream. Sociological work has linked church beliefs historically to the quest for upward mobility, and in the analysis for Blacks, these beliefs were positively and statistically significant in four of the five models. Blacks calling themselves born-again Christians were much more likely to rate achieving these financial goals as easy relative to Blacks who didn't have these identities. Citizenship, which is an important determinant of life chances, was significant in two instances—noncitizens felt that sending one's child to college in the U.S. and becoming wealthy were difficult. Being a parent was important in one instance. In contrast to the analysis of the American Dream scale, an arrest record for the household was statistically significant in two instances. It reduces one's rating for how easy it is in the U.S. to send kids to college and to retire securely. But it did not diminish one's confidence in the other arenas. Finally, partisanship and ideology shaped opinions in some of the five models. Black Republicans were

somewhat more likely than Black Democrats to believe that having a secure retirement was easy but that doing better than one's parents financially was hard. Self-identified Black conservatives were more likely than self-identified Black liberals to describe building a secure retirement as hard.

Blacks who judged their futures optimistically were more likely to say that these goals are easy to achieve relative to those who had pessimistic outlooks. And again, as in the analysis of the American Dream, attitudes about hard work paying off were important predictors in all five regressions. A significantly higher percentage of minorities (47 percent) than Whites (38 percent) felt it extremely or moderately true that hard work can help you to get ahead and achieve your goals. In contrast to the previous analysis, perceptions that discrimination persists (which Blacks are more likely than Whites to believe) in the analysis of Blacks shown in Table 2.4 was statistically significant in three of the five regressions. Those who felt discrimination remained a problem in the U.S. felt that sending kids to college and becoming wealthy were difficult goals to achieve. In the analysis of all respondents, discrimination as a problem was unrelated to attitudes about achieving these financial goals. For Blacks, however, the perception that discrimination is a problem in the U.S. does cloud their optimism concerning how easy it is to advance financially and transfer that wealth to later generations.

Identification with Women and Black Women: Children and the American Dream. To determine if faith in the American Dream is an enduring feature of American life or not, respondents were asked if they thought that their children or the children of people like themselves would find it hard or easy to achieve it. While respondents are likely to rate how easy or hard it is to reach key pillars of the American Dream on objective indicators, such as whether they own homes or rent, have savings accounts, or live paycheck to paycheck, a question concerning prospects for the next generation is more likely to tap into political considerations. For example, when asked whether the future economy will improve or worsen, responses generally depend on which party is in control. Thus, in 2012 under a Democratic administration, Republicans and conservatives are likely to project more negative outcomes for the next generation, while Democrats and liberals will likely project more positive ones.

In general, many respondents felt that prospects for the next generation were slightly worse than their own (see Figure 2.2). Given a poor housing market, the spiraling costs of a college education, and financial market problems, most Americans think that their children or the children of people like



Figure 2.2. Histograms of Gap between Parent and Children or the Children of People Like Yourself on the Five Pillars of the American Dream (High Scores Represent More Difficulty for Children Than Parent)

themselves will be less able to obtain these life goals. Most do not believe that the next generation will find it harder than themselves to do better than their parents, own homes, send children to college, and retire well. To determine what predicts positive or negative forecasts for the next generation, a gap measure was constructed where high scores indicated that children would find it more difficult than the parents to obtain these things. Low scores indicate that children will find it easier than parents.

A regression of these scales was conducted for all respondents and for Black respondents only. The results for the variables of interest are shown in Table 2.5. In two of the models for all respondents, and four of the five models for Black respondents only, identification with women and with Black women was statistically significant. Here, however, identification with women and with Black women had positive impacts on one's confidence in one's children (or children of people like oneself) to achieve these financial goals.

For all respondents, strong female common fate identifiers felt that homeownership and becoming wealthy would be easier for their children or for children of people like themselves. Among Black respondents, strong Black female common fate identifiers expressed greater confidence that their children or children of people like themselves will find it easy to own a home, retire securely, become wealthy, and do better than themselves financially than they are able to do in comparison to their own parents.

The interaction terms, when statistically significant, had the opposite effect. Female and strong woman-identifiers rated their children's ability to send their children to college and become wealthy as less than their own opportunity to achieve these goals. Black women who were strong Black women identifiers similarly rated the likelihood of their children (or the children of people like themselves) becoming wealthy as less than their own. The contrasting effects of women identifications in the analysis of the American Dream underscore claims that disadvantaged groups like women and minorities have conflicting views about it. While women identification or Black women identification has an empowering effect for the children or hypothetical children of respondents in the survey, for women and Black women it has a disempowering effect. They don't see how their communities and their children will be easily able to attain these financial goals after all.

Gender by itself, namely being female or male, had two significant separate impacts in the full data analysis, but none in the subgroup analysis of Blacks. Women were more positive about their children's prospects than their own concerning sending their children to college and becoming

TABLE 2.5. OLS Regression Analysis of Gap for Children (or the Children of People Like You) for Pillars of the American Dream for All Respondents and Black Respondents Only (Weighted Analysis)

(Positive values mean children will find it more difficult than parents)	Own a Home Gap		Secure Retirement Gap		Send Children to College Gap		Become Wealthy Gap		Do Better Than Parents Gap	
All Respondents	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Women's fate	–.073*	.037	–.050	.034	–.033	.037	–.083*	.033	–.051	.037
Women's fate X female	.077	.050	.059	.034	.115*	.051	.112*	.046	.057	.051
Female	–.141	.118	–.098	.110	–.230#	.120	–.244*	.108	–.072	.119
Minority	.086	.062	.292**	.057	.155*	.062	.342**	.056	.216**	.062
LGBTQ+	–.118	.135	–.263*	.125	–.335*	.137	–.072	.123	–.214	.139
(weighted N)	(928)		(930)		(930)		(927)		(930)	
R-squared	.197		.199		.182		.191		.157	
Black Respondents Only	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Black Women's fate	–.068#	.035	–.126**	.034	–.041	.035	–.122**	.035	–.104**	.035
Black women's fate X female	.039	.045	.064	.043	.034	.044	.085#	.044	.050	.045
Female	.009	.116	–.093	.112	–.015	.114	–.159	.115	–.006	.116
LGBTQ+	.139	.116	.164	.112	.241*	.115	.233*	.115	–.037	.116
(weighted N)	(1,069)		(1,067)		(1,071)		(1,071)		(1,071)	
R-squared	.076		.096		.075		.118		.073	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are all predictors (Constant, arrest, age, South, workhard, citizen, survey, ideology, education, born again, children, optimism, class ID, married, discrimination, stocks, party ID, and income).

**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

wealthy. Queer respondents also expressed greater optimism that their children will have an easier time in retiring securely and sending their children to college. Minority respondents, in contrast, expressed consistently more negative views about the next generation's ability to reach goals relative to their own abilities. The race variable was statistically significant in four of the five models. These results contradict the idea that the American Dream is held widely by minorities, as they are less likely than are Whites to believe that minority children will be able to reach these important life goals. Only in the case of homeownership was the minority race variable statistically nonsignificant.

All in all, the results complicate claims that disadvantaged groups do or don't believe in the American Dream. Identification with women has a negative effect on respondents' self-assessments of how hard it will be to retire and do better than their parents financially; identification with Black women also has this effect in the Black community. Yet, when it comes to rating their children's or children of people like themselves, these identifications have a positive effect. The survey respondents think in general when identifying with the fate of women and Black women that children will have an easier time obtaining these life goals.

DOES THE AMERICAN DREAM FUNCTION AS AN IDEOLOGY?

Some argue that at its best the American Dream should represent an ideal, and not an ideology. Still for many it represents a creed. There are those in the U.S. who feel that if they can move up and attain a good and secure financial life, others ought to be able to accomplish the same. In this way, the American Dream is a heuristic, or a viewpoint about how the world works, that also influences their policy views. The position that the American Dream is strongly attainable for people like oneself may reduce support for liberal spending and government assistance programs.

To test whether positioning oneself near the attainment of the American Dream contributes to the policy views of Americans, three OLS regression models were estimated (see Table 2.6). The regression analysis, again, is weighted. Social policy measures served as the model's dependent measures. These are three seven-point scales where respondents are asked whether the government (1) "should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living" or "just let each person get ahead on his/her own"; (2) "should

TABLE 2.6. OLS Regression Analysis of Policy Positions Based on American Dream Placements (Weighted Analysis)

	Guaranteed Jobs		Minority Government Aid		Government Aid to Poor	
(opposed)	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	2.169**	.391	3.767**	.369	.830*	.384
American Dream placement scale (nearly there)	.108**	.020	.064**	.019	.064**	.020
Ideology (conservative)	.262**	.035	.232**	.033	.282**	.035
Party ID (Republican)	.154**	.024	.173**	.023	.148**	.024
Income	–.006	.012	.021#	.011	.009	.011
Education	–.006	.022	–.072**	.021	–.019	.022
Social class ID	.163**	.061	.024	.058	.306**	.060
Minority	–.142	.091	–.434**	.086	–.052	.089
Female	–.047	.077	–.226**	.073	.015	.076
LGBTQ+	–.257	.192	.419*	.182	.572**	.188
Married	.144	.088	.245**	.083	.182*	.087
Age	.002	.002	.000	.002	–.005*	.002
South	–.182*	.080	–.178*	.075	–.263**	.078
Religious fundamentalist	.046	.090	–.099	.085	.009	.088
Citizen	.112	.281	–.221	.265	.206	.276
Ease of survey (very difficult)	–.253**	.068	–.252**	.064	.086	.067
(Weighted N)	(1,405)		(1,399)		(1,400)	
R-squared	.249		.267		.250	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks . . . or not make any special effort to help Blacks because they should help themselves"; and (3) "is largely responsible for many of the economic and social problems the poor experience today" or "should not make any special effort to help the poor because they should help themselves." On the scale, 7 represents the most conservative policy view, while 1 is the most liberal. The average weighted score was above the midpoint, indicating mildly conservative views for many respondents.

Party affiliation and ideology are important components of U.S. policy opinions and were included as necessary controls in the regression analysis. In addition, social class identification along with education and income

were added, along with a set of other control measures. Even with a good set of alternative explanations for policy positions, respondents who felt that they were close to achieving the American Dream gave conservative positions on all three measures. Those far along on the road to the American Dream were less supportive of a policy to help Americans obtain jobs and have a minimum standard of living and more opposed to government assistance to minorities and the poor than those who felt that they were not far along. Thus, the American Dream does function as an ideology based on this analysis.

A gender gap emerged in this analysis of social policy. Women expressed somewhat more liberal opinions on one of the three policy measures. Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and multiracial respondents were more likely to hold liberal policy positions on one measure. Unexpectedly as a disadvantaged group, LGBTQ respondents held conservative positions on two of the three measures (see Table 2.6).

That a belief in the American Dream is associated with conservative viewpoints concerning the role of government, that government should be a limited one, is quite possible. Instead, the U.S. government should not create jobs for people seeking them but let the free market create jobs alone. Republicans and conservatives were both opposed to an activist pro-jobs-growth government and sympathetic assistance to the disadvantaged. Thus, there is some evidence that those who feel that they have benefited from the American Dream will reject an agenda in support of employment opportunities for jobless workers in the U.S and programs that are designed to financially assist disadvantaged communities.

CONCLUSION

Overall, while the American Dream is not gendered, in other words, perceived as more attainable by men than women, it appears that the disadvantaged social position of women is considered when U.S. people think about the core elements of the Dream, such as achieving financial success. Identification with women in some instances made respondents more negative about how easy it is to reach economic goals in the U.S. Self-identification with the collective status of women in two instances made respondents less optimistic that they can achieve goals such as retiring securely or doing better than one's parents financially. Self-identification with Black women

among Blacks made respondents more negative in four out of five instances, specifically owning a home, retiring securely, becoming wealthy, and doing better than one's parents. The American Dream is not for the few it seems, yet when respondents stand with women's groups, they are less positive about the core elements of the American Dream.

Identification with women made respondents more likely to have a positive outlook for the next generation. This optimism may be rooted in a feeling that respondents transfer the empowerment of women to the next generation; their children and the children of people like themselves will have an easier time achieving life goals than past generations as women held back make gains. Identification with Black women had a similar effect—Black women identifiers expressed more optimism about their children and children of people like themselves to achieve these life goals. Still, identification with women, including Black women, can have a mixed effect. In some models, women who were strong identifiers with women were also negative about their children's chances of obtaining these life goals. The analysis found Black women who identified strongly with the fate of Black women were also negative about their children's opportunities for financial success.

What is the most striking, however, about our findings was the pervasive class divide that transcended racial and gender boundaries. For every pillar of the American Dream, owning a home, securing a stable retirement, sending children to college, becoming wealthy, and believing one's children will do better, lower socioeconomic respondents perceived these goals as significantly harder to obtain than did the more affluent. Class differences emerge in that poor and working-class women across all racial groups are far less likely to believe that they are attainable and felt that they were farther away from achieving them than more affluent respondents. This is a significant finding, as it contradicts much of the work in the 1990s showing that despite economic success, Blacks were less likely than Whites sharing the same success to feel that the American Dream was attainable. Now there is evidence that middle-class and affluent racial minorities share the same faith as middle-class and affluent nonethnic Whites in how easy it is to advance socially and economically in the United States.

Thus, it is plausible that the election of Barack Obama has had a more powerful impact on affluent college-educated Blacks, raising their hopes for reaching the American Dream. Politicians of both major political parties preaching that their economic agenda will enrich the well-off will appeal to racial minorities as much as to Whites if that agenda is incorporated as a part

of the American Dream. The progressive/moderate split among Democrats will also divide voters, as moderate ones will back policies favoring the American Dream that promise to enrich them, whereas poor and working-class voters will be more skeptical and reach for more radical agendas. The gender effects shown here will also be politically important, as politicians will seek to reach out to voters through a commitment to the next generation's pledge to have the American Dream fulfilled. Those who are strong women identifiers will be especially receptive to those campaign promises concerning future generations.

CHAPTER 3

Marriage and U.S. Politics

Marital status is one of the sources of division among women, as married people vote very differently than unmarried individuals. For example, about half (52 percent) of married voters in the 2016 election cast ballots for Trump in 2016, while 55 percent of unmarried voters supported Clinton (Pew Research Center 2018a). Previous research showed that marriage can change one's politics. Married people in the U.S. tend to be somewhat more Republican in their voting behavior than single, cohabitating, separated, widowed, or divorced people (Weisberg 1987; Kingston and Finkel 1987; Newport 2009). Even controlling for race and age, Republicans enjoy greater support from those who are married. This trend persists among Whites and among non-Whites (Newport 2009).

Married individuals lean toward the political right presumably because they rely less on government. Other accounts emphasize the social conservatism of married people, leading toward opposition to liberal abortion laws or affirmative action policies. Over the last three decades, many women have become increasingly more likely to favor the Democratic Party, and there is a strong positive correlation between prevalence of divorce and the political gender gap across the 50 states. Stark differences exist between divorced men and women, with the former being richer and less supportive of Democrats and the latter being poorer and more supportive of them (Edlund and Pande 2002). More recently, researchers show that marriage lowers White and Latina women's self-perceptions of linked fate with other women, but this is not the case for African American women (Stout, Kretschmer, and Ruppanner 2017). Taken together, a model of U.S. politics emphasizing marital status might be more important than one emphasizing gender.

This chapter examines the partisanship and policy views of single and married adults, as well as the politics of those who expect to marry. We

explore variation between married women and single women in our interaction models. As increasing numbers of U.S. adults divorce and remain single, some believe that marriage is unattainable. For these individuals who think that they will never find a suitable marriage partner, does this alter their politics? Are unmarried people in the U.S. more likely to seek a government that provides policies for the things unmarried people have less of, such as unemployment insurance, health plans, and investment portfolios? To what extent will support for feminism militate against the marital status effect? Unfortunately, we are unable to analyze whether or not marital status has an effect on the politics of LGBTQ+ individuals, as at the time the data was collected, gay marriage in the U.S. was not uniformly legal.

In the 2012 survey, 51.5 percent of the Outlook respondents were married. A higher percentage of male respondents were married. This percentage is weighted, and the eight-percentage point difference between men and women is statistically significant.[1] When asked about their relationship status, more men, about 62 percent, than women, about 55 percent, said that they were either married or in a permanent relationship. Roughly 28 percent of women said that they were not looking to date or find someone, compared to 18 percent of men. Because some single or divorced people are striving to find someone, and because about half of those interviewed were married, a majority of respondents might be considered the "married" type. In this 2012 survey, the "married type" represented 70 percent. Nevertheless, women are more likely than men to be outside of the marriage market, uninterested in pursuing a relationship, or dating very casually, without commitment intentions—36 percent versus 31.5 percent.

Table 3.1 also shows the differences for women and men as well. For men and women, age was statistically significant, indicating an interaction effect for age and gender. Men out of the relationship market were younger than those in a relationship. Men not pursuing a relationship in a serious way or uninterested were on average about 40 years old, as compared to those in a relationship, who on average were 47 years of age. Women no longer seeking a relationship, in contrast to men, were significantly older than those married or seeking a serious relationship—48 versus 44. On the other measures, men and women in relationships were significantly better off than those not in relationships, except for men who reported no difference between those in relationships and not in one based on family social class.

1. Weight 3 is used to examine gender differences.

These numbers, however, vary across the racial-ethnic groups. Similar to the observations of previous scholars (Marsh et al. 2007; Banks 2011) we find that Blacks and Latinos are less likely to be married than are Whites and others (most often Asians). Among females, twice as many White respondents are married (63 percent) as compared to Blacks (31 percent) and Latinas (30.5 percent). Roughly 65 percent of White men are married, with only 42 percent of Black men and 39 percent of Latinos in this category. Nearly three times as many Black women (32 percent) and Latinas (29 percent) have never been married, as compared to 12 percent of White women. About 18 percent of White men had never been married, as compared to 33 percent of Black men and 25 percent of Latinos. The pro–Democratic Party politics of women of color might be due to the overprevalence of their single status.

When asked to characterize their relationship status at the time of the survey, 80 percent of White men, 70 percent of Black men, 63 percent of Latinos, 76 percent of White women, 61 percent of Black women, and 55 percent of Latinas were either married or looking for a marital partner. Those seeking to casually date, find a friend with benefits, engage in one-night stands, or not date included 20 percent of White men, 30 percent of Black men, 37 percent of Latinos, 24 percent of White women, 39 percent of Black women, and 45 percent of Latinas. Latinas (34 percent) and Black women (30 percent) were about twice as likely as their racial-ethnic counterparts to be uninterested in dating (14 percent and 15 percent, respectively).

Social status differences exist between those in or pursuing relationships and those unable or unwilling to pursue one (Carlson and England 2011; Fry 2010). Table 3.1 shows a comparison of means on socioeconomic measures between those in relationships and those out of relationships. The group differences are all statistically significant, except for age. Thus, those out of relationships tend to have lower income, less education, lower social class position, and less privileged family background than those in relationships. A binary logistic regression analysis, not shown, indicates that racial minorities, Blacks and Latinos, are significantly less likely to be married or living with someone than are Whites.

The Effect of Marital Status, Gender, LGBTQ+ Identity, and Feminist Support on Political Party Affiliation. Does relationship status affect one's political party affiliation? In an analysis not shown, relationship status—whether one reported seeking a relationship or being in one—had no effect on the direction and strength of one's partisanship. In contrast, marital status was an important predictor of women's partisanship. Table 3.2 reports an

TABLE 3.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents Married or in a Relationship (Weighted Data)

Group	Married	Not Married	In a Relationship or Seeking One	Not in a Relationship or Seeking One
All respondents	52.5	47.5	79	21
Men	50.5	49.5	76.5	23.5
Women	52.5	47.5	82.5	17.5
Whites	59.5	40.5	81	19
Blacks	32	68	74	26
Latinos/other race	36	63	76	24
Income-median	$60,000–$74,999	$35,00–$39,999	$50,000–$59,999	$35,000–$39,999
Age-Average	50	43	46	49
Social class ID-Median	Middle class	Working class	Middle class	Working Class

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

ordinary least squares analysis of partisanship for all respondents and by gender groups.

Marriage in the model for all respondents does not impact partisanship. However, it does for women. Married female respondents tended to favor the Republican Party over the Democratic Party compared to divorced, single or widowed women. Thus, marriage interacts with gender such that marriage serves as a politically conservative force for women, but not for men. The effect of marriage for women is small, pushing married women 0.337 points closer toward the Republican Party on a seven-point scale, compared to having no effect for all respondents. Thus, marriage for women encourages Republicanism, while marriage does not necessarily change the political membership of men. The failure to find a statistically significant result for relationship status (in an analysis not shown) means that it is the experience of marriage for women and not the absence of a partner that promotes Republicanism.

Gender was not statistically significant in the OLS model. Women were not more likely than men to identify with the Democratic Party, despite the occurrence of the pro-Democratic gender gap in voting. This finding supports pluralists claims that the gender gap is not based purely on gender difference, cultural or biological, but is contextual. The 2016 election saw a slim

TABLE 3.2. Analysis of Party Identification by Gender Groups Including Marital Status (Weighted Analysis)

Strong Republican	B	SE
(Constant)	1.646**	.387
Married	.014	.112
Married*female	.337*	.146
Feminist group rating	–.011**	.002
Feminist rating*female	–.002	.003
Female	.104	.177
Minority	–.754**	.083
Age	–.010**	.002
Education	.028	.022
Income	.031**	.011
Social class ID	.056	.055
Ideology (conservative)	.678**	.030
Racial resentment	.267**	.037
LGBTQ+	.084	.160
Church fundamentalist	.181*	.085
South	.086	.075
Citizen	.279	.237
Survey difficult	.001	.062
(Weighted N)	(1,852)	
R-squared	.478	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

majority of White women vote Republican. And race is a significantly stronger political force than that of gender. The estimated regression coefficient was –.754. Minorities or non-Whites are more likely than Whites to describe themselves as aligned with the Democratic Party.

LGBTQ identity had no effect on partisanship. Our findings are not consonant with the results of a 2013 survey showing that 56 percent of LGBTQ+ adults identify as Democrats, with 67 percent of gay men and 64 percent of lesbians doing so. In this case researchers found a gender gap, with 80 percent of lesbians and 68 percent of gay men holding a positive view of the Democratic Party (Pew Research Center 2013). The results of a 2013 survey show that only 4 percent of lesbians and 8 percent of gays identify as Republican. In results not shown, an analysis of lesbian, bisexual, trans, and queer women found their partisanship to be not significantly different from men who are gay, bisexual, trans, or queer.

Feminist group ratings were important statistical predictors of partisan-

ship. Claims that feminist ideology more than gender explains the gender gap in elections are sustained here since those who favor feminist groups are more likely to claim Democratic Party identification. An interaction term was estimated to determine if feminism had even stronger political effects among women, but it was not statistically significant.

Self-declared political conservatives and those with resentment toward disadvantaged groups were also more likely to identify with the Republican Party over the Democratic Party. Racial resentment has been shown to have a strong effect in U.S. politics (Tesler and Sears 2010). Income and age also had statistically significant effects, as low income and the old were more likely to claim membership with the Democratic Party than the Republican Party. Born-again Christians are also more likely to call themselves Republicans, as opposed to those who don't identify themselves as such.

The Effects of Marital Status, Gender, LGBTQ+ Identity, and Feminist Support on Political Ideology. Table 3.3 shows the results of an OLS regression of political ideology with marital status as the variable of interest. Marriage has a statistically significant effect. Married respondents, as shown in Table 3.3, were more likely to identify themselves as political conservatives than single, divorced, or widowed individuals. There was not an interaction of marital status with gender. Married women were no more conservative than unmarried women. Thus, the legal status of being married promotes conservative identifications for both men and women. As with partisanship, in analysis not shown, relationship status also had no statistical effect on ideological identifications. The findings reported for marital status suggest that marriage changes the political identities of women, but relationship status does not. It may be that the transformation of one's social status causes conservatism.

Gender was a statistically significant predictor for ideological identification. Here, women were more likely than men to call themselves ideologically liberal. Another predictor that emerged as statistically significant was race-ethnicity, as minority respondents were more likely to identify themselves as conservatives than Whites. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and other sexuality respondents were more likely to be liberal than heterosexuals. Age, income, party identification, and racial resentment had statistically significant effects, as shown in Table 3.3. Citizens were more likely to call themselves political conservatives than noncitizens. Finally, church fundamentalists or those who consider themselves born-again Christians were more likely to self-identify as political conservatives.

The Effects of Marital Status, Gender, LGBTQ+ Identity, and Femi-

TABLE 3.3. Analysis of Political Ideology by Gender Groups Including Marital Status (Weighted Analysis)

	All Respondents	
Strong Conservative	B	SE
(Constant)	2.869**	.261
Married	.168*	.077
Married*female	.115	.101
Feminist group rating	–.010**	.002
Feminist rating*female	.002	.002
Female	–.242*	.122
Minority	.102#	.058
Age	.006**	.002
Education	.038*	.015
Income	–.029**	.008
Social class ID	–.053	.038
Party ID (Republican)	.325**	.014
Racial resentment	.166**	.025
LGBTQ+	–.478**	.110
Church fundamentalist	.516**	.058
South	–.049	.052
Citizen	.651**	.163
Survey	.014	.043
(Total weighted cases)	(1,852)	
R-squared	.482	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

nist Support on Public Policy Views. To pursue further the question whether marriage causes conservatism, a set of OLS regressions of policy positions was performed. In this case, relationship status had few statistically significant effects, and thus, the results of this analysis are not shown. However, for 11 of the 18 policy model regressions, marital status was a statistically significant predictor. While the effect of marriage was in one instance inconsistent, it generally pushed respondents in a conservative direction. These results are shown in Tables 3.4 through 3.7. (Partial results from these tables are also shown again in Chapter 4.)

Guaranteed Jobs, Aid to Blacks, Aid to the Poor. In the first set of analyses, as Table 3.4 displays, marital status was statistically significant in all three models. Married respondents were more likely than unmarried respondents to be opposed to a government jobs program using government funds that would provide employment for all those seeking work. Married respon-

TABLE 3.4. Regression Analysis of Government Policies for Jobs, Blacks, and the Poor Based on Marital Status (Weighted Analysis)

	Guaranteed Jobs (Oppose)		Aid to Blacks (Oppose)		Aid to Poor (Oppose)	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	2.775**	.424	5.617**	.382	1.458**	.426
Married	.159#	.091	.256**	.081	.188*	.091
Feminist group rating	–.006**	.002	–.013**	.002	–.005*	.002
Feminist rating*female	.008*	.003	.007*	.003	.005	.003
Female	–.372*	.159	–.342*	.143	–.117	.160
Minority	–.068	.093	–.373**	.084	.042	.093
LGBTQ+	–.200	.203	.769**	.182	.755**	.204
Age	.003	.002	.002	.002	–.002	.002
Education	.030	.023	–.040#	.021	.005	.023
Income	.012	.012	.028**	.011	.012	.012
Social class ID	.223**	.060	.087	.054	.381**	.061
Party ID (Republican)	.133**	.026	.101**	.023	.121**	.026
Ideology (conservative)	.247**	.037	.104**	.034	.222**	.038
Racial resentment	.211**	.041	.466**	.037	.270**	.041
South	–.244**	.082	–.225**	.074	–.240**	.082
Citizen	.291	.289	.121	.259	.536#	.290
Church fundamentalist	.084	.092	.005	.083	.077	.093
Survey (difficult)	–.211**	.070	–.209**	.063	.124#	.070
(Weighted Total cases)	(1,272)		(1,267)		(1,268)	
R-squared	.288		.379		.283	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

dents were more opposed than unmarried ones to government assistance to Blacks or minority groups and the poor. In an analysis not shown, an interaction for married and female was tested, and it turned out to be significant in two of the three models. Married women were decidedly more conservative on these federal spending programs than unmarried people. Marriage, thus far, appears to be an important source of division among women.

A gender gap emerged in two of the three models. Women were less opposed to spending on a jobs program and minority assistance than men. Feminist ratings had a statistically significant effect all three models. Those rating feminists highly were more liberal on the three government spending programs. The interaction term, however, was positive and significant, revealing that the effect of feminism on the policy opinions of women was

TABLE 3.5. Regression Analysis of Support for Women and Family Policies Based on Marital Status (Weighted Analysis)

	Paid Leave		Tougher Sexual Harassment Penalties		Children's Health Insurance		Gender Quotas		Year-Round Public Schools		Welfare Eligibility Permanent		Free or Subsidized Preschools	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	9.170**	.739	5.738**	.672	9.631**	.740	5.139**	.665	3.014**	.775	6.428**	.713	7.139	.673
Married	.630**	.157	−.155	.143	−.236	.157	−.415**	.141	−.083	.165	−.132	.152	−.043	.143
Feminist group rating	.018**	.004	.021**	.004	.026**	.004	.026**	.004	.007	.004	.020**	.004	.018**	.004
Feminist rating*female	−.009	.006	−.008#	.005	−.024**	.006	−.010*	.005	.000	.006	−.015**	.005	−.006	.005
Female	.606**	.285	.916**	.260	.864**	.285	1.360**	.257	−.048	.299	.529#	.275	.131	.260
Minority	.824**	.161	.645**	.147	.395*	.162	.616**	.146	.633**	.170	.669**	.156	.328*	.147
LGBTQ+	−.859**	.305	−1.078**	.277	−1.440**	.307	−1.247**	.278	−.220	.321	−1.254**	.294	−1.134**	.280
Age	−.039**	.004	.004	.004	−.005	.004	.014**	.004	.032**	.004	−.017**	.004	.003	.004
Education	−.052	.042	−.086*	.038	−.004	.042	−.149**	.038	.087*	.044	−.070#	.040	.034	.038
Income	−.093**	.021	.006	.019	−.019	.021	−.040*	.019	−.009	.022	−.092**	.020	−.066**	.019
Social class ID (upper)	−.142	.105	.005	.095	−.448**	.105	−.120	.095	.171	.110	−.311**	.101	−.398**	.095
Party ID (Republican)	−.216**	.044	.008	.041	−.217**	.045	−.071#	.040	−.077	.047	−.120**	.043	−.300**	.040
Ideology (conservative)	−.034	.064	−.078	.058	−.555**	.065	−.286**	.058	−.126#	.068	−.300**	.062	−.390**	.059
Racial resentment	−.531**	.071	−.197**	.064	−.464**	.071	−.384**	.064	.044	.074	−.592**	.068	−.570**	.064
South	−.416**	.143	−.133	.131	−.053	.144	.123	.129	−.313*	.151	.038	.139	−.117	.131
Citizen	−1.128**	.452	−.119	.411	.020	.452	−.038	.407	.126	.474	−.224	.436	.778#	.413
Church fundamentalist	−.045	.163	.120	.149	−.052	.164	−.167	.147	−.545**	.171	.177	.158	−.160	.149
Survey	−.396**	.118	.020	.107	−.558**	.118	−.056	.106	−.349	.123	.246*	.114	−.432**	.107
(Weighted total cases)	(1,841)		(1,838)		(1,839)		(1,839)		(1,846)		(1,846)		(1,846)	
R-squared	.255		.083		.275		.247		.075		.237		.316	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

less than that for men. Sexual minority respondents were more opposed to two of the three government spending programs than were heterosexual respondents. Ideology and racial resentment had strong conservative effects. Respondents from the South were more liberal in this policy domain than those residing outside of the South.

Support for Women-Focused and Family Policies. In most instances, marital status was not a statistically significant predictor of support for policies designed to assist children and families. In Table 3.5, marriage exerts a mixed effect on two of the seven measures. Married respondents were more likely to favor paid leave for workers for family reasons and oppose gender quotas in the workplace than unmarried respondents. On other gender and family policies such as sexual harassment, making welfare eligibility a lifetime benefit, children's health insurance, or year-round public schools, marital status was statistically insignificant. The liberal and conservative effect of marriage on women and family policy attitudes in the U.S., however, was not as consistently strong as feminism and racial resentment.

Warm ratings of feminists as a group on the feeling thermometer scale of 0 to 100 increased support for six of the seven women and family policies. Feminists ratings had the strongest effect on gender quotas, with a b coefficient of .026, and the weakest on paid leave and free or subsidized preschools (b = .018). Feminist support did not affect opinions on year-round public schools, but few variables were statistically significant in this model. Feminist support among women was statistically significant in several instances. Here it shows that, once again, the effect of feminist support for women was less than that for men. A statistically significant gender gap also emerged in five of the seven models. Women were more likely than men to favor paid leave, tougher penalties for sexual harassment in the workplace, children's health insurance, gender quotas in top professions where women are numerically underrepresented, and making welfare eligibility permanent (see also Scarborough, Lambouths, and Holbrook 2019).

Racial resentment had a strong conservative effect on six of the seven measures. Respondents regardless of race who consider minorities to be undeserving of government assistance because they don't work hard enough were opposed to all of the women and family proposals, except for year-round public schools. A racial gap emerged in all seven regression models. Minorities were more likely than Whites to favor these types of workplace and government assistance for children. Surprisingly, LGBTQ+ respondents placed themselves as opposed to these proposals in six of the seven cases.

LGBTQ+ respondents represent about 7 percent of the weighted sample. Why they emerged as hostile to women and family proposals is unclear. Only on year-round schools was LGBTQ status not statistically significant.

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer respondents were more likely to oppose these women and family policies than heterosexual respondents. Minorities were in every instance more likely to favor these proposals than Whites. Age had mixed effects, as older respondents more than the young favored paid family leave and establishing a lifetime eligibility for welfare assistance. However, the old were more opposed to gender quotas in top jobs and year-round public schools than the young. Party identification and racial resentment had expected conservative effects. The South in this policy domain turned out to be more conservative than other regions.

LGBTQ+ Antidiscrimination Laws, Police Bias, and Sentencing Policies. Table 3.6 shows the effect of marriage on crime and punishment. Marital status was statistically significant in two of the four models. Married respondents are more likely than unmarried ones to support three-strike laws, which mandate life sentences for those convicted of a third felony. Married respondents were also more likely to favor the death penalty over life imprisonment. On whether police bias against Blacks is a problem, marital status has no statistically significant effect. Nor did marital status, as shown in Table 3.6, have effects on opinions concerning whether gays, lesbians, and queers should receive legal protection from job discrimination. In results not shown, married females were significantly closer to the political right than other individuals on three-strikes laws.

On LGBTQ+ rights and criminal justice questions, feminist ratings were significant in three of the four models. Respondents who rated feminist groups warmly were more likely to favor equal rights protection for lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender individuals, and queers than those who rated such groups coldly. High ratings for feminists also translated into opposition to three-strikes sentencing laws and the death penalty. However, feminist ratings did not have the across-the-board impact they had for women and family policies shown in the previous analysis. As in the previous analysis, the interaction term between feminist support and female in one model indicated that the effect of feminist support was smaller for women than for men. A gender gap emerged in two of the four models shown in Table 3.6. Here women were more likely than men to oppose mandatory sentencing laws but favor the death penalty.

An unexpected and difficult-to-explain statistic emerged concerning job

TABLE 3.6. Regression Analysis of Antidiscrimination Laws, Police Bias, and Sentencing Policies Based on Marital Status (Weighted Analysis)

	Opposed to Anti-discrimination for LGBTQ+ Jobs		Favor Three-Strikes Sentencing Laws		Police Bias Not a Problem		Pro-Death Penalty over Life Sentence	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	2.499**	.344	4.401**	.342	2.251**	.213	4.990**	.549
Married	.034	.074	.233*	.073	.020	.046	.219#	.117
Feminist rating (0–100)	–.009**	.002	-.004#	.002	.002	.001	–.009**	.003
Feminist rating*female	.001	.003	.002	.002	–.002	.002	.009*	.004
Female	–.471**	.129	.111	.128	.086	.080	–.594**	.205
Minority	.016	.075	.103	.075	–.297**	.047	.032	.122
LGBTQ+	.379*	.165	.005	.163	–.168	.104	.207	.263
Age	.005**	.002	.003	.002	–.001	.001	.009**	.003
Education	–.015	.019	–.031	.019	.011	.012	–.032	.030
Income	–.003	.010	.002	.010	.007	.006	.039*	.015
Social class	–.115*	.049	–.089#	.048	.027	.031	–.233**	.078
ID								
Party ID (Republican)	–.019	.021	.034	.021	.061**	.013	.119**	.034
Ideology (conservative)	.108**	.030	.058#	.030	.021	.019	.036	.049
Racial resentment	.100**	.033	.132**	.033	.223**	.021	.435**	.054
South	.092	.066	–.116#	.066	–.026	.041	–.223*	.107
Citizen	.182	.234	–.091	.232	.009	.143	.180	.368
Church fundamentalist	.263**	.075	–.188*	.074	.006	.047	.043	.120
Survey (difficult)	.006	.056	–.036	.056	.119**	.035	–.257**	.093
(Weighted total cases)	(1,270)		(1,266)		(1,261)		(1,262)	
R-squared	.191		.082		.242		.159	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; $p < .10$

protection for homosexuals; LGBTQ+ respondents were less likely to favor it than heterosexuals. This result could be the result of poor wording of the question, since "homosexual" often is understood to refer to gay men only. However, there was significant support for these protections by women more than men, feminist supporters more than nonsupporters, and higher-class versus lower-class respondents. As expected, older, conservative, and reli-

TABLE 3.7. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Lifestyle Choices as Bad for Society and Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage Based on Marital Status (Weighted Analysis)

	People Marrying Interracially (Bad)		Women Electing to Have No Children (Bad)		Women Choosing to Single-Parent (Bad)		Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Unions	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	–3.343*	1.607	–.533	.659	–.235	.738	–1.058	.787
Married	.647**	.217	.277#	.149	.261#	.148	.493**	.141
Feminist rating (0–100)	–.017**	.005	–.008*	.004	–.010*	.004	–.017**	.004
Feminist rating*female	.009	.007	.010*	.005	–.002	.006	.001	.005
Female	–.358	.315	–.528*	.251	.191	.303	–.326	.235
Minority	–.603*	.248	.337*	.152	.149	.153	.534**	.147
LGBTQ+	.135	.529	–.469	.377	–1.088**	.327	–.165	.315
Age	.036**	.006	.009*	.004	.012**	.014	.010**	.004
Education	–.111	.052	.035	.037	.043	.039	–.178**	.037
Income	.013	.028	–.015	.019	.057**	.020	–.041*	.018
Social class	–.135	.138	–.078	.099	–.047	.100	–.126	.093
ID								
Party ID (Republican)	.115*	.057	.086*	.042	.026	.043	.024	.039
Ideology (conservative)	–.089	.087	.016	.061	.232**	.062	.266**	.057
Racial resentment (high)	.285**	.098	.099	.068	.287**	.067	.264**	.066
South	–.492**	.189	–.004	.132	.235#	.140	.228#	.125
Church fundamentalist	.129	.197	.293*	.146	.379*	.162	1.013**	.130
Citizen	2.145	1.466	–.990*	.420	–.765	.522	1.518*	.610
Survey (difficult)	.013	.153	.069	.112	–.034	.118	.003	.102
(Total weighted cases)	(1,330)		(1,324)		(1,324)		(1,835)	
Cox & Snell R square	.112		.045		.155		.216	
Nagelkerke R square	.200		.064		.215		.314	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

gious fundamentalist respondents were far less likely to support LGBTQ+ job protections.

Married respondents were more likely to support three-strikes sentencing laws. Minority respondents were, by a significant degree, more likely than non-LGBTQ+ and White respondents to disagree with the view that police bias against Blacks is not a problem. Minorities in general were not distinct from Whites on the other LGBTQ+ rights and criminal justice questions.

Regarding support for the death penalty, supporters of feminists, particularly women, as well as women in general were significantly less likely to agree with this policy. The higher the social class status, the less likely such respondents were to agree with the death penalty. In contrast, those respondents who held racial resentment, were self-identified Republicans, older, and of higher income supported the application of the death penalty.

Lifestyle Choices: Interracial Marriages, Childlessness, Single Parents, Same-Sex Marriage. In a binary logistic analysis of whether interracial marriage, women having no children or single parenting, and gay marriage and civil unions are "good" or "bad," married respondents showed greater disapproval of these social patterns than unmarried respondents. Overall, married women and men were more likely than single, divorced, or widowed respondents to consider interracial marriage, not reproducing, same-sex marriage or civil unions, and single parenting by women as "bad." In general, women are no more liberal than men on these social trend measures, except for their support of women electing to have no children. However, feminist ratings predicted opinions in all four models shown in Table 3.7 concerning social trends. Those who favor feminist groups strongly were more likely to approve of interracial marriage, having no children, single parenting, and same-sex marriage than those opposed to feminist groups. The interaction term of feminist support and female was significant in one model, indicating that its effect was less for women than for men.

Racial resentment was also important in the analysis of policy and social trend opinions, and this book compares hostility toward minorities in the form of stereotypes about Black women and the LGBTQ+ community in later chapters. Race had a mixed effect. Minorities were significantly more approving of interracial marriage than Whites, but more disapproving of women electing to have no children and same-sex marriage/civil unions. In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that states must recognize the right of

LGBTQ+ people to marry. Minorities have shown cooler opinions toward same-sex marriage laws.

The divide between LGBTQ+ and non-LGBTQ+ respondents was fairly nonexistent. LGBT and queer+ respondents were no more likely to support the right to marry than heterosexual respondents. However, sexual minority respondents were less likely to label single parenting by women as "bad" than heterosexual respondents. Older respondents gave socially conservative responses on all four questions. They were more likely to oppose interracial marriage, women choosing not to reproduce, single parenting, and same-sex unions or marriage than young respondents. Racial resentment was a conservative force, as were church beliefs. Here, with the exception of interracial marriage, those who consider themselves born-again Christians were more likely to label women having no children, single parenting by women, and same-sex unions or marriage bad than those who don't have those identities.

THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE

While married respondents, and in several instances, married women, were more likely to identify as Republicans and hold conservative policy positions, did marital status affect the presidential vote in 2008? A binary logistic regression was created where 1 is vote for John McCain, the Republican presidential candidate, and 0 is vote for Barack Obama or some other candidate. Marital status did not turn out to be statistically significant. Thus, while married individuals tend, all things being equal, to be Republican and conservative, they were as likely to vote for Obama in 2008 as unmarried individuals. Gender was statistically significant in the model (see Table 3.8). There was evidence of a gender gap in this election. Women were less likely than men to vote for McCain. Feminist support, however, did not have a statistical effect. Furthermore, the interaction term was significant and positive, indicating that women who favor feminists were more likely than men who favor feminists to support John McCain. In this instance, feminism for these women is symbolic, representing an ideal, but not acted upon. And of course, McCain's running mate, Sarah Palin, was female.

Minority respondents were more likely to have voted against McCain and for Obama than Whites. Older respondents voted for McCain, as did

TABLE 3.8. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of 2008 Vote for John McCain

	B	SE
(Constant)	–6.717**	1.024
Married	–.048	.245
Feminist group rating	–.010	.007
Feminist rating*female	.023*	.009
Female	–1.001*	.464
Minority	–1.380**	.263
Age	.023**	.007
Education	–.211**	.070
Income	.110**	.036
Social class ID	–.414*	.170
Party ID (Republican)	1.281**	.089
Ideology (conservative)	.597**	.110
Racial resentment	.231*	.117
LGBTQ+	1.788**	.481
Church fundamentalist	.613*	.263
South	.127	.218
Survey	.177	.191
(Total weighted cases)	(1,511)	
R-squared		
Cox & Snell R square	.595	
Nagelkerke R square	.797	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

high-income, less educated respondents. Social class had an unexpected finding, as those who identified as upper middle class or upper class were more likely to vote against McCain. Party identification and ideology had expected effects on the 2008 vote. Racially resentful respondents favored Romney. Evangelicals were also more likely to vote for McCain in 2008.

LGBTQ+ respondents were more likely to vote for McCain in 2008. The sample of LGBTQ+ individuals in this survey are significantly more conservative than what other studies have revealed. Other than declaring themselves more likely to be liberal, LGBTQ+ Outlook respondents are not more liberal than heterosexual respondents, and in some instances, are markedly more conservative. A vote decision question concerning the 2012 presidential election was not included in the survey.

CONCLUSION

The chapter finds evidence that marriage is a source of division for women. Marriage can change one's politics in meaningful ways. Married respondents of all racial-ethnic groups are more likely to have higher incomes than unmarried respondents, but even in an analysis controlling for income, marriage is strongly associated with Republicanism for women, and political conservatism for all respondents, most likely because of the economic and social security marriage brings. Married respondents have expectations to be taken care of in the long run and may be less reliant on government as a source of financial and social security. Relationship status was unimportant in how partisan and ideological identities are forged. And in this case individuals who were in relationships or pursuing one were no more likely to consider themselves Republicans or political conservatives than those not in a relationship or not wanting one. The wedding ring is definitive.

Married respondents were more conservative on government assistance programs than the unmarried, and they were more likely to be social conservatives and opposed to interracial and same-sex marriage than single, divorced, and widowed respondents. However, they did not hold more conservative positions on family and children policy matters, including whether government should provide health insurance for all children or not. In fact, married respondents were statistically more liberal in one instance than unmarried respondents, favoring paid leaves for family reasons.

All in all, however, claims that marital status is as critical as gender in U.S. politics found some support in this chapter. Marriage is especially important in the politics of women. Married women were among the most Republican and conservative in some instances. Married women will likely pursue different types of politics than unmarried women. Marriage may serve to divide women from other women. Minority women were additionally more liberal on policies and social trends than White women. Thus, there is some support for pluralist claims that women are not very unified. Married, White women belong to a different political tribe.

Still, gender was an important determinant of the 2008 presidential vote, controlling for marital status and race. Furthermore, gender remains critical, as attitudes about women's groups, such as feminists, were important sources of public policy opinion. Feminist political solidarity was not as strong among women as it is among men, suggesting that feminist support is in part symbolic. Nevertheless, a gender gap was found in many instances.

There is something to be said about the enduring positioning of women on the left of men in public policy debates that makes their allegiances more profound than implied under pluralist theory. This political divide between men and women in the political world appears permanent, not manufactured by the nature of the times. Women, more than men, notably want paid leave, tougher penalties for sexual harassment, children's health insurance, gender quotas for top jobs, and welfare eligibility made permanent. This divide is found if we cull out support for such proposals among feminists. Thus, while there are important divisions among women, including marital status, the women's vote appears to be real, based on having a political agenda that is distinct from men.

CHAPTER 4

Ties That Bind

Feminists versus Women's Group Fate in U.S. Politics

Feminists and women's groups were important in opening the door to the American Dream for women. The roots of women's political organizing in the U.S. are long. Widows were allowed to vote as landowners, and the latter along with age were the main qualifications for the franchise in some New England colonies. American states, however, ultimately ratified constitutions that restricted voting rights and excluded women (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994). By the end of the Civil War, national organizations for women's suffrage were formed to extend voting rights to women. In 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted, granting women the right to vote in all elections. Thus, having secured the ballot, a group of women calling themselves "feminists" organized for social change, principally seeking to ban job segregation and wage discrimination (MacLean 2009).

Feminism, however, has wavering support in the U.S. Women, especially young women, pressed for more radical social change including women's liberation from sexual oppression, violence, and homophobia. The call for a united front for women led to the splintering of alternative groups of women who also wanted to call attention to class oppression and racial-ethnic discrimination. The feminist movement caused a conservative backlash as well (MacLean 2009). Opponents of the 1970s' Equal Rights Amendment argued that it undermined the rights of nonworking spouses and traditional women. Religious leaders and social conservatives opposed the abortion rights activism of feminists. By the 1980s, the feminist movement had lost much of its momentum. Historians credit the feminist movement as influential since surveys establish that almost

all respondents support the principle of gender equality (Taylor 1989). Yet there are those who contend that feminism is obsolete in the United States as women have won federal protection against discrimination.

Clearly, within the last 40 years, gender attitudes have changed significantly in the U.S., with a greater acceptance of gender egalitarianism and a corresponding decline in traditional gender beliefs. Analyses of such attitudes between 1977 and 2016, show that while more Americans support gender equality, the feminist revolution has stalled (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011; England 2010; Goldscheider and Lappegard 2015). Ambivalence about gender rights and equality has been partially supplanted with beliefs that simultaneously support gender equity in the public sphere. The picture is one where traditional ideas regarding gender roles in the private sphere appear to have support (Scarborough, Sin, and Risman 2018).

White women's ratings of feminists increased from 51 in 1988 to 58 in 2004 based on data from the American National Election Study. According to a recent Pew Research Center study, "About four-in-ten women (41%) say feminism has helped them personally. Women most likely to say this include those with a bachelor's degree or more education (55%), Hispanic women (46%), women younger than 50 (47%) and Democratic women (50%)" (Barroso 2020a). Recent research, though, shows that feminist identification is on the rise. In 2020, 61 percent of women said that feminism describes them very well or somewhat well (Barrosso 2020b), but this identification may be symbolic and not be reflected in policy beliefs. Feminist identification varies by age, race-ethnicity, and political party. Women between the ages of 18 and 29, those with a bachelor's degree, and Democratic women are more likely to view themselves this way.

This chapter examines whether politics is shaped by feminist support or by feelings of solidarity with women as a whole. As noted in Chapter 1, the public has generally a subdued opinion of feminists. Feminists as a group earn an average rating just at about the midpoint of 55 in standard surveys. In the 2012 Outlook Survey, respondents gave feminists an average rating of 45. Who, then, supports feminism today? Is feminist support influential, shaping the policy views and directing the political behavior of its adherents? Indeed, recent research shows that, within the general public, having a feminist identity is associated with progressive policy views not only on gender issues but on other social justice issues as well. Specifically, studies show that a feminist identity is significantly associated with support for abortion rights, gay/lesbian civil unions, policy changes in favor of immigrants, the expansion of government services, universal

health care, and a negative view of the Iraq War (Kelly and Gauchat 2016). Beyond the self-identification as a feminist, this research points to the strong relationship between feminist attitudes about women's issues and liberal views on a host of other policy concerns (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Harnois 2005; Reingold and Foust 1998; Rhodebeck 1996; Simien and Clawson 2004). For the Outlook Survey, respondents are asked to rate feminists on a scale from 0 to 100, where zero is very cold or unfavorable and 100 is very warm or favorable.

The chapter also examines the effect of gender identification in U.S. politics. Is identification with women broadly as important as support for feminist groups? Distinctions have been made between gender group consciousness and gender-linked fate (Gay and Tate 1998; Sanchez and Vargas 2016) with the former referring to an internal sense of one's group identity and positionality within the political context (Miller et al. 1981; McClain et al. 2009). A belief that one's life chances are tied to others that share similar characteristics constitutes a sense of linked fate. Feelings of linked fate include both a sense of group identification and a collective positionality with group members. Both group consciousness and linked fate are predictors of political participation (Simon and Klandersmans 2001; Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Born out of historical and contemporary experiences of racism, understandings of Black political behavior and beliefs rest on shared group consciousness (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Chong and Rogers 2005; Dawson 1994; McClain et al. 2009). Moreover, a study shows that racial consciousness inspires gender consciousness (Wilcox 1990), and in the case of African American women, both types of consciousness work simultaneously to influence political behavior and attitudes (Gay and Tate 1998). However, much of the literature focuses only on gender consciousness as it manifests through support for feminism, but conservative women are also shown to hold strong sense of gender consciousness that also promotes political participation and public policy advocacy (Schreiber 2002). Thus, presumably, conservative women may also possess a strong sense of women's group fate.

WHO SUPPORTS FEMINISTS, AND WHO IDENTIFIES WITH WOMEN'S GROUP FATE?

When asked to rate feminist as a group on a scale from 0 to 100, the typical respondent gave feminists a rating of 45, or just below the midpoint of the

scale. Feminists as a political group lost ground as social conservatives organized against women's liberation politics and policies that included abortion rights. Others also contend that the feminist movement triggered a political backlash, as their political agenda was too radical and elitist. Still feminism is embraced by those who support claims that traditional norms and values oppress those seeking acceptance and independence.

When asked if what happens to women in this country will have something to do with what happens in the respondent's life, nearly one-half of the respondents (46 percent) said no. A small minority (9 percent), however, said that women's group fate impacted their lives "a lot," while 37.5 percent said "some" and 8 percent said "not very much." Those who identify strongly with women's group fate may feel that gender disadvantage exists, but in contrast to many feminists, they do not necessarily reject mainstream values and norms, including legal marriage and traditional gender roles. Thus, those who think their individual fate is influenced by what happens to women in the U.S. may include both feminist and traditional types (Tolleson-Rinehart and Josephson 2005).

The Pearson R correlation between the feminist group rating and the women's group fate measures is modest at .18, indicating that they represent two different constructs. A women's group fate identification measure still is expected to be a politicized one, having, in general, a liberal impact on one's political views. And furthermore, the identification with women as a group reflects a recognition of shared values and interests (Gurin 1985; Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980). For liberals, women's group fate identification embodies discontent about gender disadvantage. These values and interests tend to be expressed in support for liberal social welfare policies and humanitarian ones, including opposition to the death penalty.

Table 4.1 displays the results of a regression analysis of both measures for all respondents and also for women only. For both measures, women were significantly more likely than men to rate feminists favorably and identify strongly with women. Women gave feminists a score about six points higher than men, all things being equal, while women were more than one-third of one point higher on the four-point measure of women's group fate identification. Blacks were more likely than other minorities and Whites to identify with feminists, but not with women as a group. The effect was less than that of being female, but nonetheless Blacks are more supportive of feminists. Sexual minorities were no more likely to rate feminists highly and identify with women more than heterosexual people.

Both feminism and women's linked fate appear to be politicized (see

TABLE 4.1. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis of Feeling Thermometer Rating of Feminists and Identification with Women's Group Fate (Weighted Analysis)

	Feeling Thermometer Rating of Feminists (0–100)				Identification with Women's Group Fate (None-Strong)			
	All Respondents		Women Only		All Respondents		Women Only	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	58.819**	4.948	68.621**	7.204	1.809**	.341	2.225**	.514
Female	6.016**	1.023	n/a	n/a	.357**	.069	n/a	n/a
Black	3.553#	1.826	4.334*	1.991	.134	.122	.099	.132
LGBTQ+	2.534	2.249	8.458*	3.302	.264	.172	.215	.215
Age	.106**	.032	.116*	.047	–.004*	.002	–.007*	.003
Education	.689*	.303	.361	.468	.053**	.019	.026	.031
Income	.159	.154	.151	.208	–.010	.010	.037**	.014
Social class ID (upper)	–.663	.774	–.331	1.013	.011	.052	–.172**	.065
Party ID (Republican)	–2.548**	.327	–2.177**	.520	–.050*	.022	–.106**	.035
Ideology (conservative)	–4.330**	.461	–3.639**	.633	–.068*	.030	.008	.043
Married	–1.501	1.156	–.179	1.734	–.010	.074	–.101	.111
Church fundamentalist	–3.562**	1.217	–3.704*	1.626	.258**	.080	–.058	.109
Citizen	3.258	3.350	–.993	4.406	.444#	.256	.713*	.338
South	.704	1.072	1.869	1.524	–.035	.071	.140	.103
Survey (very difficult)	–1.654#	.866	–3.815**	1.238	–.114#	.060	–.097	.085
(Total weighted cases)	(1,870)		(965)		(973)		(489)	
R-squared	.241		.169		.099		.094	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
Note: n/a denotes variable left out for model goodness-of-fit reasons.
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

Table 4.1). Democrats and especially strongly aligned Democrats were more supportive of feminists and of women than were Republicans. Self-described political conservatives were more likely to rate feminists negatively than self-described liberals and less likely to identify with women. Thus, traditional types are not equally likely to identify with women as a group. Republicans and political conservatives support traditional values and norms that feminists and women's groups have challenged as discriminatory to women.

Highly educated respondents favored feminists and identified with the fate of women more than less educated respondents. Group equality as a social and political goal tends to win support from educated classes. The old were more likely to embrace feminists than the young but reject an identification with women. Scarborough, Sin, and Risman (2018) find that successive generations of Americans have become more egalitarian, especially Generation Xers and millennials. In the 2016 election, millennials were far more supportive of Hillary Clinton than of Donald Trump, yet one-third of the young voted for Donald Trump (Galston and Hendrickson 2016).

Citizens were more likely than noncitizens to identify with women, perhaps because the U.S. has had a long history of women's rights politics. Finally, church fundamentalists were also more likely to reject feminists than those who do not consider themselves "born-again believers." Church leaders have objected to feminists and their policy agendas. At the same time, like the old, church fundamentalists were more likely than non-church fundamentalists to identify with the fate of women.[1] Women's fate does not necessarily imply the radicalism that identification with feminists does.

The analysis of women finds that lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer women are more likely than straight women to support feminists. Here, Weight 2 was applied to the analysis. The LBTQ+ measure resulted in an eight-degree warmer rating for feminist groups among women. Race was statistically significant, as Black women gave higher ratings for feminist groups than non-Black women. LBTQ+ and Black women were no more likely than other women to identify strongly with women, however. Republican, conservative, and born-again Christian women were less supportive of feminist groups than Democratic, liberal, and those who don't consider themselves born-again Christians. Age had the same contrasting effects among women. Younger women are less supportive of feminists than older women. Young women, however, are more likely to see their fates aligned with that of women as a group. Finally, women who thought the online survey was difficult were less supportive of feminists. Noncitizens were less likely to identify with women as a group than citizens.

1. These results contrast with the findings of Cassese and Holman (2016). The authors found that biblical literalism led to a weakening of gender consciousness, ties to women as a group, and political participation among women. However, it supports the findings of Bany and Robnett (2011). Controlling for the type of church, more or less political, they concluded that church participation reduced women's political participation but not that of men.

WHICH HAS A STRONGER EFFECT IN STRUCTURING ATTITUDES? FEMINISM OR IDENTIFICATION WITH WOMEN?

To determine if feminist support as measured by this feeling thermometer question and identification with women's collective fate shapes the policy views of respondents beyond their political orientations and social backgrounds, a set of regression models was developed. Overall, the results establish that feminist support had a more consistent effect than identification with women, as it strongly and consistently pushed people toward the liberal end for most of the public policy matters, notably women and family policies. Identification with women was statistically significant in eight of the 18 models. Gender, also, had effects on policy views once an identification measure and controls were added. The interaction term of support or identification with women, when statistically significant, was negative. This indicated that feminist support and identification has symbolic appeal to women, whereas for men it has a stronger substantive effect on their politics.

The first set pertains to three seven-point scales indicating opposition to a government-backed guaranteed jobs program, federal assistance to minorities, and federal assistance to the poor. Here feminist ratings affected all three programs. In contrast, identification with women's group fate significantly affected levels of support for one of the three federal programs. Thus, strong favoritism toward feminists and identification with women reduced opposition to these federal programs (see Table 4.2). When the interaction effect of being female and having strong feminist support or believing in women's linked fate was estimated, it had a positive effect on opposition to these federal programs. Thus, women who are strongly aligned with feminists or women's linked fate are less likely than are men with these identifications to support social spending programs. Women, as shown in Table 4.1, are more likely to be strongly supportive of feminists and women than are men, but the effect of this support and identification is less than that among men. Solidarity with feminists and with women among women is also symbolic, having less impact on their politics than these same alignments for men.

Finally, even controlling for these forms of female solidarity, gender had a separate effect. In some of the models, women were more liberal than men. On guaranteed jobs, women were more likely than men to support a government-run program to guarantee individuals a job and a basic standard of living. In one of the models, but not both, women were to the left of

TABLE 4.2. Regression Analysis of Government Policies for Jobs, Blacks, and the Poor Based on Group Identification Measures and Gender (Weighted Analysis)

	Guaranteed Jobs (Oppose)		Aid to Blacks (Oppose)		Aid to Poor (Oppose)	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(1) Feminist support	–.006**	.002	–.013**	.002	–.005*	.002
Feminist support*female	.008*	.003	.007*	.003	.005	.003
Female	–.372*	.159	–.342*	.143	–.117	.160
(2) Women's linked fate	–.255**	.066	–.040	.059	–.120#	.063
Women's linked fate*female	.224*	.090	.014	.080	–.025	.086
Female	–.512*	.212	–.143	.188	.175	.202

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Also not shown are other predictors in the two models: Constant, LGBTQ+, minority, age, education, income, social class, party ID, ideology, married, racial resentment, South, church fundamentalist, citizen, and survey difficulty.

**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

men on government assistance to minority groups. Apart from a self-declared alignment with women, women tend to be more liberal than men.

Women's group interests are often defined as including the family and children. In the 2012 survey, respondents were asked to rate as "good" or "bad" on a scale from 1 to 10 a battery of proposals, some of which have been adopted in Europe, pertaining to women, parents, and children. On the whole, most in the U.S. have mixed opinions about these types of policies. In 1993, the U.S. government passed legislation granting workers up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for family health emergencies. In contrast to other advanced democracies, the U.S. does not require paid family leave for employers. In 2019, however, the government passed a law granting paid family leave to federal workers. Flexible work time and free or subsidized preschool are other policies favored by women and family advocates. Welfare used to be available to anyone living under the poverty line with dependents under the age of eighteen. In 1996, the federal government changed it to a five-year lifetime limit. One question on the survey asks whether eligibility should be made permanent (again).

Table 4.3 displays the results from a set of regressions on gender and children's policy matters. In contrast to the previous analysis, the women's identification measure performed poorly across the battery of gender and family policies. All respondents who rated feminists highly favored six of the seven

women and family policies, including paid leaves for family reasons, tough sexual harassment policies, child health insurance, quotas for women in top jobs, permanent welfare benefits for poor families, and free or subsidized preschools. Strong women identifiers only favored paid family leave and making welfare eligibility permanent compared to weak women identifiers. As we have shown, gender sometimes predicts liberal support for government policies. In Table 4.3, gender is statistically significant in most of the feminist support models. Thus, a gender gap apart from identification with feminists and women exists in the U.S. The interaction of feminist support/identity and being female, when statistically significant, is negative. The effect of favoring feminists and identifying with the lives of women is less for women than it is for men.

The next tables show regression and binary regression results assessing the effect of feminism and women's identification on antidiscrimination laws, police bias, crime and punishment, and social trends. Here, both forms of solidarity had equal effects. U.S. opinion favors the death penalty, although women and minorities have tended to be less supportive of capital punishment than men and Whites (Oliphant 2018). Feminist support importantly influenced opinion in three of the four policy areas. Those rating feminists highly were very supportive of antidiscrimination protection for LGBTQ+ individuals and strongly opposed to three-strikes sentencing laws and the death penalty (see Table 4.4). Identification with women had similar effects. It significantly pushed respondents toward the liberal perspective on support for antidiscrimination job protection for gay, lesbian, transgender, bisexual, and queer individuals; on police bias against Blacks; and on life imprisonment over the death penalty (see Table 4.4). The interactions showed a moderating effect on the liberal politics from female solidarity for women except in one instance. Women with strong women identities were significantly more likely than men to oppose three-strikes sentencing laws. Finally, women were generally on the political left but in one instance were on the political right: women were more likely than men to favor three-strikes laws.

Finally, Table 4.5 displays the results of binary logistic regressions of a set of questions probing opinion on social issues related to racial groups, women, and the LGBTQ+ community, including single parenting by women and same-sex marriage or civil union laws. Here the results were fairly robust. Those who favored feminists strongly were less opposed to interracial marriage, women electing not to reproduce, single parenting by women, and

TABLE 4.3. Regression Analysis of Gender and Family Policies Based on Group Identification Measures and Gender (Weighted Analysis)

	Paid Leave		Tougher Sexual Harassment Penalties		Children's Insurance		Gender Quotas		Year-Round Public Schools		Welfare Eligibility Permanent		Free or Subsidized Preschools	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
1) Feminist group rating	.018**	.004	.021**	.004	.026**	.004	.026**	.004	.007	.004	.020**	.004	.018**	.004
Feminist rating*female	–.009	.006	–.008#	.005	–.024**	.006	–.010*	.005	.000	.006	–.015**	.005	–.006	.005
Female	.606**	.285	.916**	.260	.864**	.285	1.360**	.257	–.048	.299	.529#	.275	.131	.260
2) Women's linked fate ID	.381**	.138	.170	.122	.056	.130	–.036	.127	.059	.141	.314*	.125	.087	.120
Women's linked fate*female	–.037	.187	.084	.166	.194	.178	.019	.172	.060	.192	–.171	.172	.207	.164
Female	.331	.330	.248	.393	–.720#	.419	.554	.403	–.076	.452	.292	.403	–.577	.386

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are other predictors in the two models: Constant, LGBTQ+Q, minority, age, education, income, social class, party ID, ideology, married, racial resentment, South, church fundamentalist, citizen and survey difficulty.

**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

TABLE 4.4. Regression Analysis of Antidiscrimination Laws, Police Bias, and Sentencing Policies Based on Group Identification Measures and Gender (Weighted Analysis)

	Opposed to Antidiscrimination for LGBTQ+ Jobs		Favor Three-Strikes Sentencing Laws		Police Bias Not a Problem		Pro-Death Penalty over Life Sentence	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
1) Feminist rating	–.009**	.002	–.004#	.002	.002	.001	–.009**	.003
Feminist rating*female	.001	.003	.002	.002	–.002	.002	.009*	.004
Female	–.471**	.129	.111	.128	.086	.080	–.594**	.205
2) Women's linked fate	–.191**	.052	–.028	.050	–.068*	.031	–.139#	.082
Women's linked fate*female	.197**	.071	–.120#	.068	.047	.043	.222*	.112
Female	–.716**	.167	.469**	.160	–.096	.101	–.606*	.265

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are other *p*redictors in the two models: Constant, LGBTQ+, minority, age, education, income, social class, *p*arty ID, ideology, married, racial resentment, South, church fundamentalist, citizen, and survey difficulty.

**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

same-sex marriages or unions than those who disliked feminists. Identification with women in contrast had few direct statistical effects. Those identifying with women strongly were more likely to approve of interracial marriages. The interaction, however, revealed that women with strong solidarity with women are more likely than men to condemn women who don't reproduce or who single-parent. The performance of women-linked fate compared to support for feminist groups suggests that those identifying with women include traditional female types who support societal lines of division between men and women. Female independence, in fact, is discouraged among women who show solidarity with other women. For feminists, the transformation of the family unit has been liberating.

As in the previous models, gender was sometimes statistically significant. Women were less likely than men to condemn interracial marriage, women not reproducing, and women as single parents. In all, this analysis of social trends establishes that feminist support and women's solidarity represent different constructs. Overall, however, both feminist support and identification with women's group fate significantly push U.S. policy views toward the political left, but women's linked fate had a less consistent effect,

TABLE 4.5. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Lifestyle Choices as Bad for Society and Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage Based on Group Identification Measures and Gender (Weighted Analysis)

	People Marrying Interracially (Bad)		Women Electing to Have No Children (Bad)		Women Choosing to Single-Parent (Bad)		Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Unions	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
1) Feminist rating (0–100)	–.017**	.005	–.008*	.004	–.010*	.004	–.017**	.004
Feminist rating*female	.009	.007	.010*	.005	–.002	.006	.001	.005
Female	–.358	.315	–.528*	.251	.191	.303	–.326	.235
2) Women's linked fate	–.139#	.082	.177	.102	–.054	.108	–.160	.112
Women's linked fate*female	.222*	.112	.259#	.147	.289*	.142	.023	.159
Female	–.606*	.265	–1.006**	.364	–.805*	.335	–.309	.355

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are other *p*redictors in the two models: Constant, LGBTQ+, minority, age, education, income, social class, *p*arty ID, ideology, married, racial resentment, South, church fundamentalist, citizen and survey difficulty.

**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

and in two instances pushed women toward the political right. In contrast to individuals who favor feminists, those who identify strongly with the collective fate of women did not necessarily favor government programs that assist working families and their children.

Solidarity with feminists, in contrast, was consistently linked to support for a set of family and gender policies including paid leaves for family reasons, anti-sexual harassment policies, and permanent welfare benefits for poor families. Feminism is linked to a vision where government assists women, children, and families. Feminism is associated with female independence. Queer rights and single parenting are supported as ways to free women from unfair sex roles. At the same time, those identifying strongly with women were also more liberal than those without women identities. Women identification notably was not linked strongly to women, children, and family policies. Furthermore, among women, strong linked-fate identifiers were more likely to consider women who don't reproduce and who single-parent as "bad." Nevertheless, women's linked fate still leads people to

support some government assistance programs (e.g., guaranteed jobs and making welfare permanent). More than a programmatic vision of what government should be obligated to support, women's linked fate is associated with a general humanitarian outlook concerning politics. Like feminist supporters, strong women identifiers were more likely to oppose the death penalty.

While linkages with feminists were found to more consistently and strongly shape U.S. policy and social views, gender in many instances was also a statistically significant predictor at times, depending on the policy domain. Thus, beyond support for feminists and identification with women, women more than men had liberal views on family and gender policies, such as gender quotas for women in top career tracks, and crime policy views including favoring life sentences over the death penalty. Women also had distinctive views about women's life choices, including electing to marry outside one's race or not to have children. Women more than men favored freedom of choice in these matters. Thus, gender linkages and gender have persistent influences in U.S. public policy debates. In the end, they are not episodic forces in public opinion. Rather, gender through feminist ideology and through identification with women is an important political fault line. It is not only found among women, but among all individuals who support feminist ideologies and identify with women. Solidarity with feminists and women, however, is also symbolic for women, having less impact for women in their politics than for men.

WOMEN'S IDENTITIES AND THE 2008 VOTE

While identification with feminists and women strongly shapes public policy opinions, does it affect the vote? In Table 4.6 we show that the answer is no. Neither feminist group ratings nor women's linked fate was a statistically significant predictor of the 2008 presidential vote. In this model, voting for John McCain, the Republican nominee, is coded 1, while votes for the incumbent president Barack Obama or some other candidate were coded 0. Indeed, in Model 1, women who strongly favored feminists were more likely to vote for McCain. This underscores our claim that for some women, especially educated women, who are more likely to favor feminism, as shown in Table 4.1, a feminist label is symbolic, while for men, feminism is more impactful. There was a gender gap in Model 1, however, as women overall were less likely

TABLE 4.6. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of 2012 Vote for Republican John McCain for President

	B	SE
1) Feminist group rating	–.010	.007
Feminist rating*female	.023*	.009
Female	–1.001*	.464
2) Women's linked fate	.056	.207
Women's linked fate*female	–.401	.312
Female	.256	.760

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are other *p*redictors in the two models: Constant, LGBTQ+, minority, age, education, income, social class, *p*arty ID, ideology, married, racial resentment, South, church fundamentalist, and survey difficulty.

$^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$; $\#p < .10$

to vote for McCain than men. The linked-fate model did not have statistically significant measures, shown here in Model 2 (see Table 4.6). We contend that the gender gap in the vote is the product of the liberal policy profile of women, and not necessarily an extension of their identifications with women or with feminists.

The failure to find identification with women and support for feminists as predictors of the vote supports pluralist claims that group allegiances wash out when competing forces are present. It may be as well that politicized group identities are deeply contextual. Although McCain picked a woman, Sarah Palin, as his vice presidential running mate, women's issues were not strongly present in the 2008 presidential race. A women's empowerment agenda favors a government that provides for paid leave laws, promotes the hiring of women, and improves economic opportunities for low-income families through health care and education agendas. Direct appeals to women voters are less prominent than calling out to racially conservative individuals and churchgoers. Racial resentment, as shown in Table 3.8, was a significant predictor. Since Richard Nixon's southern strategy campaign, Republicans are advantaged when politicians focus on race-related issues. Church fundamentalism was also an important factor in the 2008 presidential vote. Born-again Christians are an important base of the Republican Party, and candidates routinely make campaign appearances at churches. To make an effective campaign for women voters and activate identifications with women and feminists, politicians would have to campaign directly on

the issue of gender inequality and offer a progressive agenda for government services aimed at female empowerment. A group empowerment platform might be more important in the recruitment of feminists and women-identified voters than picking a female as a vice presidential running mate.

ARE FEMINIST SUPPORTERS AND WOMEN'S FATE IDENTIFIERS MORE POLITICALLY ACTIVE?

Does the policy liberalism of pro-feminist and pro-women's fate identifiers translate into political activism? While the politics of feminists and women-identified voters are in line with the Democratic Party, were they also more likely to turn out and vote? Are they also more likely to be organizers and protesters than those who oppose feminism and do not see their lives as connected significantly to the lives of women?

The 2012 Outlook Survey contained a number of questions pertaining to the respondent's interest and involvement in politics, campaigns, and elections. About 14 percent of the respondents stated that they were extremely interested in government and politics. Many of the respondents (31 percent) said that they were only slightly or not at all interested in political matters. Similarly, when asked if they felt that people like themselves were influential actors in government, many felt that they were not. Roughly 39 percent said that people like themselves had only "a little" effect on government, while 18 percent said that they had no effect at all. In contrast, 5 percent felt that their impact on government was "a great deal."

Political participation in campaigns and elections varied by activity. A large majority (70 percent) of respondents voted in the 2008 presidential election. About 79 percent said that they had voted in the 2012 presidential election. Over the last two years, 20 percent signed a petition, while 15 percent contributed money to a candidate's campaign. Very small percentages of people, about 4 percent, participated in a registration drive, helped drive people to the polls, or handed out campaign materials during this two-year period. And about 7 percent attended a fundraiser event for a candidate in the past two years. A campaign activism scale was created by counting the six types of activities respondents engaged in, from participating in a registration drive to signing petitions. The average number of activities respondents in 2012 participated in was 0.56. All of the percentages and means were calculated using Weight 1 to compensate for the unequal selection of respondents.

To determine if support for feminism and identification with women's group fate increased rates of political interest, efficacy, and participation, a set of OLS regression models was estimated along with a logistic regression to determine who likely voted in 2008 and 2012. Overall, feminist supporters, as shown in Table 4.7, were more likely to show higher levels of political interest and engage in campaign activism than those opposed to feminists. However, feminist supporters were no more likely to have voted in 2008 and 2012 than those against feminists. In the 2008 vote model, women who rated feminists highly were more likely to report having voted. The interactions were not significant in the other models. Women as compared to men were also significantly less interested in politics, and were less likely to believe that their efforts could affect government change. Women were less involved than men in campaign activism.

Women's group fate identification had a wider effect on political participation than feminist support. Strong women identifiers were more likely to report having voted in 2008 and 2012 than weak women identifiers. Women's common fate also positively affected political interest, political efficacy, and electoral activism, as displayed in Table 4.8. In a few instances, the interaction between being female and having a strong woman's identity had a significant negative effect, indicating that the participation rates of women who believed in a common women's fate were less than those of common-fate-identified men. In these models, gender had contrasting effects. Women were more likely to have voted in 2008 and 2012 but were also less likely to show strong feelings of political effectiveness.

The models shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 also show that age, education, and church attendance are strong determinants of voting and political engagement, and feelings of political effectiveness. Older respondents tended to express more interest, felt more efficacious, and were more involved in political matters than younger respondents. Well-educated respondents likewise were more engaged in politics than less educated respondents. Those who attended houses of worship regularly were also more active in politics than those who did not.

Despite the uncommon context of a viable Black candidate running for president in 2008, and as the political incumbent in 2012, minority respondents did not report higher levels of voter turnout than White respondents. Minorities did report higher levels of political effectiveness or efficacy, as shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, and Table 4.7 indicates their higher levels of campaign activism as compared to Whites. LGBTQ+ respondents in both

TABLE 4.7. Binary Logistic and OLS Regression Analysis of Voting in 2008, Interest, Efficacy, and Electoral Politics Type Based on Feminist Group Rating (Weighted Analysis)

	Voted 2008 (Binary Logistic)		Voted 2012 (Binary Logistic)		Political Interest (1–5)		Efficacy/Can Affect Government (1–5)		Campaign Activist (0–6)	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	–7.429**	.606	–4.196**	.665	1.128**	.208	1.956**	.207	–1.282**	.217
Feminist rating	–.001	.004	.003	.004	.004*	.001	.001	.001	.003#	.002
Feminist*female	.011*	.005	.285	.326	.000	.002	.003	.002	.001	.002
Female	–.380	.264	.285	.326	–.366**	.100	–.291**	.100	–.170	.104
Minority	.004	.148	.120	.183	-.017	.058	.326**	.057	.100#	.060
LGBTQ+	.491#	.286	.873*	.430	-.030	.107	-.137	.106	.317#	.110
Age	.071**	.005	.029**	.005	.022**	.002	.004**	.002	.013**	.002
Education	.400**	.040	.195**	.044	.077**	.014	-.001	.014	.078**	.015
Income	.027	.018	.058**	.022	-.007	.007	-.004	.007	-.010	.008
Class ID (upper class)	.190*	.093	.256*	.114	.112**	.037	.126**	.037	.146**	.038
Party ID (Republican)	–.071#	.040	.075	.050	.002	.015	–.034*	.015	–.063**	.016
Ideology (conservative)	.177**	.057	.040	.072	.096**	.022	.055*	.002	.056*	.023
Married	–.050	.146	–.083	.179	–.020	.055	–.138*	.055	.039	.057
Church attendance	.211**	.042	.194**	.052	.031*	.016	.077**	.016	.042*	.016
South	–.098	.133	–.226	.163	.087#	.050	–.108*	.050	.069	.052
Survey	–.258*	.110	–.154	.135	–.268**	.041	–.142**	.041	–.049	.043
(Weighted total cases)	(1,875)		(1,346)		(1,852)		(1,846)		(1,811)	
R-squared					.194		.076		.104	
Cox & Snell R Squared	.262		.113							
Nagelkerke R Squared	.386		.185							

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

TABLE 4.8. Binary Logistic and OLS Regression Analysis of Voting in 2008, Interest, Efficacy, and Electoral Politics Type Based on Women's Fate Identification (Weighted Analysis)

	Voted 2008 (Binary Logistic)		Voted 2012 (Binary Logistic)		Political Interest (1–5)		Efficacy/Can Affect Government (1–5)		Campaign Activist (0–6)	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	–7.223**	.896	–5.099**	.846	1.227**	.296	.948**	.286	–1.495**	.312
Women fate ID	.666**	.155	.381**	.133	.133**	.047	.243**	.046	.197**	.049
Fate*female	–.659**	.194	–.299	.185	–.053	.064	–.207**	.063	–.086	.068
Female	1.000*	.417	.858*	.416	–.235	.152	.321*	.148	.110	.160
Minority	–.021	.206	.303	.211	–.050	.078	.367**	.076	.067	.082
LGBTQ+	1.131*	.485	.852	.543	.121	.175	–.200	.168	.221	.180
Age	.074**	.007	.031**	.006	.023**	.002	.001	.002	.012**	.002
Education	.321**	.054	.261**	.052	.077**	.020	.018	.019	.054**	.021
Income	–.015	.027	.048#	.027	–.033**	.010	.001	.010	.006	.011
Class ID (upper class)	.274*	.137	.275*	.136	.188**	.052	.182**	.051	.110*	.055
Party ID (Republican)	–.027	.056	.136*	.055	.057**	.021	–.031	.021	–.058**	.022
Ideology	–.027	.082	–.116	.081	.006	.031	.110**	.030	.068*	.033
Married	.535**	.200	.230	.202	.114	.076	–.204**	.074	.167*	.079
Church attendance	.202**	.062	.181**	.061	.025	.022	.063**	.022	.040#	.023
South	.140	.193	–.062	.192	.225**	.070	–.068	.068	.028	.074
Survey	–.290#	.167	–.167	.164	–.344**	.061	–.090	.059	–.076	.064
(Weighted total cases)	(1,046)		(1,047)		(959)		(960)		(940)	
R-squared					.235		.118		.108	
Cox & Snell R Squared	.281		.140							
Nagelkerke R Squared	.419		.229							

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

tables reported higher levels of turnout and participation in campaign activities (see Table 4.7) than non-LGBTQ+ respondents. Thus, there are some signs that the candidacy of Barack Obama as the country's first Black president had some impact on minority communities.

To identify community activist types, respondents were asked if over the last 12 months they had worked with others or joined an organization in their community to do something about some community problem. About 15 percent said that they had joined a community group, while the vast majority (85 percent) had not. The survey also asked respondents if over the past two years they had participated in any activities to address problems such as neighborhood crime, quality of education, drug trafficking, and child safety concerns, contacted a public official or agency, attended a protest meeting or demonstration, taken part in a neighborhood march, or signed a petition in support or against some matter. Thirty-eight percent said that they had signed a petition over the last two years. About one-quarter of the respondents said that they had contacted a government official over a neighborhood concern, but few had engaged in protest. Roughly 6 to 2 percent had engaged in attending a protest meeting or having marched. Using these four questions, a scale labeled "protest type" was created to measure how active respondents were in the community. The scale ranges from 0 to 4 and has a weighted average of 0.70. About 55 percent of the 2012 Outlook sample had engaged in none of these types of social and political acts.

To determine if support for feminism and women's group fate identification increased rates of community activism and protest, binary logistic and OLS regression models were estimated. The results are shown in Table 4.9. Both the feminist support and women's group fate identification measures were positively and significantly linked to engagement in community activism. Feminist supporters and women's group fate identifiers were more likely than nonsupporters/nonidentifiers to organize on behalf of their communities and to contact public officials, sign petitions, march, and protest. The interaction variables were not statistically significant.

Women were no more active on behalf of their communities than men. As in the case for electoral activism, education and church attendance were strongly linked to both forms of community activism. Similar to electoral participation, the gay and lesbian community reported higher levels of involvement than the heterosexual community. LGBTQ+ respondents across the board were more likely to report both organizing around some community problem and protesting than non-LGBTQ+ respondents. Race

TABLE 4.9. Binary Logistic and OLS Regression Analysis of Voting in Community Activism and Protesting on Feminist Rating and Women's Group Fate Identification (Weighted Analysis)

	Community Activist Type (Logistic Model)		Protester Type (OLS Model)		Community Activist Type (Logistic Model)		Protester Type (OLS Model)	
	Feminist Rating				Women's Group Fate Identification			
Variable	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	−6.200**	.638	−.449*	.181	−6.746**	.895	−.688**	.243
Rating/group ID	.009*	.004	.003*	.001	.327**	.125	.154**	.039
Group*female	−.003	.005	.000	.002	−.037	.169	−.036	.053
Female	−.004	.286	.001	.087	.172	.434	.079	.125
Minority	−.266	.166	.000	.050	−.402#	.214	−.078	.064
LGBTQ+	1.033**	.251	.234*	.094	.748#	.403	.296*	.147
Age	.018**	.004	.006**	.001	.008	.006	.006**	.002
Education	.195**	.043	.054*	.013	.276**	.059	.047**	.016
Income	.004	.021	−.004	.006	−.015	.029	.003	.009
Class ID (upper)	.131	.104	.069*	.032	.125	.144	.094*	.043
Party ID	−.106*	.045	−.014	.013	−.156*	.060	−.027	.018
Ideology	.086	.066	.017	.020	.120	.087	.053*	.026
Married	−.120	.155	.073	.048	.173	.205	.064	.062
Church attendance	.301**	.045	.044**	.014	.304**	.061	.041*	.018
South	.109	.137	−.061	.044	−.230	.188	−.133*	.058
Survey	−.064	.118	−.062#	.037	.050	.165	−.115*	.050
(Total cases)	(1,862)		(1,827)		(1,041)		(950)	
R-squared			.059				.105	
Cox & Snell R Square	.076				.105			
Nagelkerke R Square	.131				.172			

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; $p < .10$

was significant in only one of the four models, and the coefficient was negative. Minority respondents reported being less likely than Whites to be involved in community organizations. Age was also an important determinant, as older respondents more often than younger respondents reported being active politically in community affairs over the past two years.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis of the 2012 Outlook on Life Survey, this chapter finds that feminism is not obsolete in the U.S., but strongly connected to one's policy opinions. Although only half choose to identify with the fate of U.S. women, this identification, too, promotes a liberal social policy agenda. Feminism had the broadest impact, statistically linked to gender and family policies such as government-backed health insurance for children and permanent financial assistance for families with dependent children below the poverty line. Thus, those who favor a feminist agenda are significantly more likely to favor government assistance for jobs for disadvantaged groups, and pro-family and gender policies. Women's linked fate may include people having different political beliefs concerning the roles and lives of women versus men in the U.S., and their politics may be more internally divided than the politics of feminists. Regarding social trends, women who embraced a linked-fate identity with other women were more likely to hold a negative view of women who did not reproduce or who were single parents. Those identifying with women may have mixed or negative opinions about the sexual revolution. Feminists, in contrast, want a radical societal transformation, whereas women identifiers sometimes position themselves on the right of the existing left-right political divide.

Gender had almost the same consistent effect on policy views as support for feminists. While women were no more liberal than men on government assistance programs in this analysis, they still tended to more often support pro-family and gender policies than men. This gender gap in the policy arena suggests that biology and socialization still play a role in the politics of women even as liberal policy agendas spring mostly from the politics that involve activism and actions of U.S. women's groups and the identifications that they forge.

In an analysis of the 2008 vote, feminist support and gender identification did not predict casting ballots for Obama. There was a statistically sig-

nificant gender gap, however. It is argued that without a programmatic appeal to women voters on the basis of female empowerment, these identifications may not impact their vote. While increasing numbers of women are running for elective office, their candidacies are not often cast as group empowerment vehicles in the way that Black candidates originally presented themselves in the 1980s and 1990s. In a 2020 American National Election Studies survey, only one-quarter of women felt it was "extremely important" that women win elections to public office. The gender gap in elections, therefore, originates from the ideological divisions between men and women. Women are significantly more likely to be on the left end of policy debates and, consequently, liberal Democratic candidates do better among female voters. Thus, pluralist claims about political behavior remain relevant. Their identifications with feminists and women in the voting booth are undercut by racial, ethnic, and religious strife and wedge issues like abortion. Without women candidates making stronger claims for how their elections can empower women, there is insufficient evidence that a form of identity politics currently exists for women in the U.S.

Women have a history of less engagement in politics than men in the U.S., and researchers contend it is because women have typically less free time and resources to engage in politics. The analysis of the 2012 Outlook data reported in this chapter suggests that a gap between men and women in campaign activism may still exist. However, those favoring feminist groups and those identifying with women's group fate are significantly more interested and active in politics than those who oppose feminist groups and who do not identify with women's group fate. That both identifications promote political participation suggests that both types of women activists are present and vocal in U.S. politics. Women can be readily mobilized on the basis of a gender appeal. Feminist groups, however, remain controversial. Public opinion is mixed. However, their role in U.S. society is influential, as those who favor feminism favor liberal policies and have liberal social outlooks in support of single parenting and same-sex marriage. Thus, the legacy of the women's movement continues in U.S. politics in the form of an alliance with feminists and, to a lesser extent, with a general concern for the collective fate of women.

CHAPTER 5

Black Women Identities and Intersectionality Theory for U.S. Blacks

This chapter contributes to past research and current debates by examining how feminism along with identifications with Black women shape the policy and social views of Blacks. Do they promote unique or identical forms of politics within the Black community? To facilitate this investigation and determine whether Black men are as united behind gender policy matters as Black women, the 2012 Outlook Survey contains a battery of family and gender policy questions to investigate, along with the standard government assistance questions.

Of all racial-gender groups, Black women enjoyed the highest voter turnout rate in both the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections (Taylor 2012), although White women (66.8 percent) had a higher turnout rate than did Black women (64.1 percent), and Hispanic women (50 percent) in the 2016 presidential election (Krogstad and Lopez 2017). Just as African American women are thought of as the backbone of the U.S. civil rights movement (Robnett 1996, 1997), they are also thought of as the backbone of the Democratic Party (Junn 2016), as they have the highest percentage of Democratic Party affiliation of any racial-ethnic gender group. Yet, just as in the civil rights movement, they are often overlooked and underrepresented as formal leaders (Robnett 1996, 1997). This position within the political landscape, along with the high levels of community leadership, may lend itself to a stronger sense of Black women consciousness and solidarity. Eighty-seven percent of African American women identify as a Democrat (Pew Research Center 2020). This is driven in large part because of their strong desire to gain full equality and improve the lives of Black Americans (e.g., Shingles 1981; Giddings 1985; Tate 1991; Robnett 1996, 1997; Simien 2006). Compared

to Black men, Black women demonstrate higher rates of identification with the Democratic Party. For example, in the 2012 Outlook Survey, 55 percent of Black women considered themselves "strong Democrats," as opposed to 47.5 percent of Black men. This difference was statistically significant. Furthermore, Black opinion studies from the 1980s reveal that gender is an important determinant of partisanship, as Black women identify more strongly with the Democratic Party than men (Tate 1994).

Moreover, in 2017, 87 percent of Black women, as compared to 79 percent of Black men, self-identified as a Democrat or leaning toward the Democrats (Pew Research Center 2018b). Black women, more than any other racial-ethnic and gender combination, were far more likely to have voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election. Among validated voters, 98 percent of Black women, compared to 81 percent of Black men, reported voting for Hillary Clinton. In one survey, no Black women voted for Donald Trump, as compared to 14 percent of Black men who did so (Pew Research Center 2018b). Thus, clearly, the positionality of African American women lends itself to stronger and more solid support for the Democratic Party. Are support for feminism and linked fate with Black women important determinants of their party memberships and vote?

Is feminism central in the politics of Blacks, and especially Black women? Feminists are criticized for addressing only White women's concerns. Critics contend that feminism is an extension of White supremacy where the problems of economically and socially marginalized members of society are ignored. The goals and strategies of White women and women of color are often different. Breaking the glass ceiling to elevate women into important positions is not a priority for Blacks. Because Black women cannot escape their race, in the 1970s a form of Black feminism emerged. It was articulated by the Combahee River Collective, a political group and is an intersectional understanding of feminism, as it brings in subjects' position as Black women (Harris 2019). Their policy positions include the rights of Black lesbians. Black feminism today is expressed in the Black Lives Matter movement, which was organized by three Black feminists in 2013 to stop state-sanctioned violence against Blacks in the aftermath of the shooting death of a Black teenager by a neighborhood watch person (Harris 2019). Is an identification with Black women a more powerful determinant of Black politics than mainstream feminism? Or are they one and the same?

Intersectionality theory, a term used frequently by Black feminists, contends that beliefs and behaviors are shaped by social position as well as

by intersectional systems of society including socioeconomic class, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and so on (Collins 2000b; Crenshaw 1995). Even as intersectionality theory has won new intellectual acceptability, its application in political sociology and political science research remains limited (Hancock 2007; Alexander-Floyd 2018). While political scientists and political sociologists focus on how race and gender shape politics, they have only recently begun to examine how interrelated social categories shape behavior or institutions (Fraga et al. 2006; Orey et al. 2006; Philpot and Walton 2007; Roth 2008; Naples 1998; Brewer 1999; Robnett 1997). We examine the politics of U.S. Blacks using standpoint, or intersectionality, theory, as U.S. Whites might be less likely than Blacks to consider their race or ethnicity (Collins 2000b). Based on standpoint theory, it may be that Black women have political interests that are distinct from Black men, and thus both groups require separate investigations of their group politics. Intersectionality theory differs from pluralism insofar as the overlapping memberships do not weaken their effects but rather combine to produce their own unique effect.

In one study using a 1996 survey of U.S. Blacks, gender as well as racial identifications promoted liberalism, suggesting that the influence of an identification with minorities and with women does not create a special type of group politics in the Black community. It creates an overlapping rather than competing form of politics (Gay and Tate 1998). Race identities sharpen the effect of gender identities, and vice versa, in Black politics, contradicting claims of pluralists that they might weaken them. Women who hold strong beliefs about the prevalence of sexism, racism, and homophobia in society are more likely to have high levels of gender consciousness (Harnois 2015). Other work argues that Black women have a unique type of identification that importantly contributes to a uniquely gendered form of liberal group politics (Simien 2006). Here Black women are positioned quite differently than Black men, and their politics reflects that position. However, Catherine Harnois (2010) finds that Black men are as likely to support Black feminist politics. There is some evidence for this claim in this chapter as well. Nevertheless, while Black men support the goal of fighting both sexism and racism and identify with Black women, do they support specific women and children's policies as much as Black women? Like partisanship, is there a Black gender gap in the policy positions of Black women and men?

PARTISANSHIP, FEMINISM, AND BLACK WOMEN SOLIDARITY FOR BLACKS

To determine if intersectionality, or overlapping group membership, is important in opinions about feminist groups and identifications among Black women and Black men as well, separate regressions for Black women and men and interaction models were formed. The full sample of Blacks is shown in the first two columns (B and SE) of Table 5.1 as a baseline model. In the baseline model, Black women are more likely to favor feminist groups than Black men. They rate such groups about five points higher than men on a scale from 0 to 100 (see Table 5.1).

The subgroup analysis indicates that intersectionality is important. In this case, LBTQ+ Black women were significantly more likely to favor feminists than heterosexual Black women. Gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer Black men were significantly more likely to disfavor feminists than heterosexual Black men. The estimated coefficients are large. Lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer women gave feminists ratings about 15 points higher than non-LBTQ+ Black women; nonstraight Black men gave feminists ratings 12 degrees cooler on average than straight Black men. The models were different for Black men in general. Black male Republicans and southerners gave feminists groups low ratings. This was not the case among Black women. Of particular note, married Black men, as in the case for the baseline model, were less favorable toward feminists than single ones. Marital status was unimportant in the ratings Black women gave to feminist groups.

Ideology was important for all gender groups and for women, as conservative Blacks and conservative Black women rated feminists negatively. Finally, church beliefs were not important in any of the models. This finding is contrary to the one shown in Table 4.1, where born-again Christians in the full sample analysis rated feminists negatively. This label of being born again in the Black community is not seen as incompatible with being a feminist, while in the community at large it is. Blacks are more likely than Whites to be born-again Christians, measured by denomination or by self-report (Wilcox and Robinson 2010:66). Evangelicals or born-again Christians are associated with the Republican Party. Yet Black born-again Christians take more liberal positions on government spending programs than White born-again Christians. They are also more likely to support government assistance to Blacks (Wilcox and Robinson 2010:70).

TABLE 5.1. Analysis of Feminist Group Rating for Blacks Only by Gender Groups (Weighted Analysis)

	Blacks		Black Women		Black Men	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	63.062**	7.907	68.909**	9.084	56.102**	14.942
Female	4.874**	1.684	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
LGBTQ+	7.105*	3.585	14.865**	4.117	–11.723#	6.574
Age	.129*	.054	.174**	.066	.130	.091
Education	.450	.543	.141	.662	1.143	.904
Income	.414#	.219	.124	.272	1.101**	.353
Social class ID (upper)	–.382	1.077	.487	1.265	–1.627	1.937
Party ID (Republican)	–1.869**	.693	.580	.975	–3.673**	.998
Ideology (conservative)	–2.431**	.648	–2.967**	.829	–1.400	.1020
Married	–5.028**	1.877	.587	2.427	–11.943**	3.023
Church fundamentalist	.359	1.639	–2.162	2.052	3.393	2.626
Citizen	–7.739	5.031	–7.883	5.525	–10.997	10.415
South	–2.708#	1.621	2.203	2.207	–8.322**	2.604
Survey	–.731	1.249	–3.888*	1.626	2.057	1.966
(Total cases)	(964)		(560)		(392)	
R-squared	.078		.073		.155	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

A second set of regressions is shown in Table 5.2. Black women are more likely to have a stronger identification with women as a group than Black men. The effect, while statistically significant, is modest. On a scale from 0 to 4, Black women's identification with their social group is one-half of one point higher than that of Black men. One intersectionality effect was present. Church beliefs weaken identification with women among Black women but strengthen identifications with women among Black men. Outside of social class identification and citizenship, no other variables emerged as statistically significant predictors of feelings of linked fate with women. Upper-class and upper-middle-class respondents were less identified with women, as were noncitizens. In contrast, both young and old, strong Democrats and strong Republicans, southerners and nonsoutherners had equal belief that what happens to women impacts their lives. The failure to find many factors that predict individual identification with the fate of all women makes this variable unlike the feminist rating identity measure, where several variables, including age, were important.

TABLE 5.2. Analysis of Women Identification for Blacks Only by Gender Groups (Weighted Analysis)

	Blacks		Black Women		Black Men	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	1.206*	.562	1.711*	.726	1.273	.907
Female	.516**	.109	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
LGBTQ+	–.212	.249	.006	.290	–.757	.475
Age	.004	.004	.001	.005	.008	.006
Education	.043	.035	.037	.047	.030	.055
Income	.021	.014	.042*	.019	.008	.024
Social class ID (upper)	–.224**	.069	–.217**	.081	–.276*	.132
Party ID (Republican)	–.035	.045	–.042	.064	.010	.067
Ideology (conservative)	–.011	.042	.036	.058	–.064	.062
Married	–.047	.120	–.016	.160	–.124	.202
Church fundamentalist	–.011	.108	–.387**	.145	.360*	.168
Citizen	.882*	.358	.797#	.433	1.201#	.636
South	.023	.109	.216	.142	–.120	.171
Survey	–.068	.080	–.121	.108	–.131	.124
(Total cases)	(482)		(278)		(192)	
R-squared	.092		.080		.095	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
Note: n/a denotes variable left out for model goodness-of-fit reasons.
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

A final table shows the analysis of predictors measuring feelings of common fate with Black women (see Table 5.3). First, gender is not statistically significant. Black men are just as likely as Black women to link their lives to the fate of Black women. Second, in both the models of feminist support and Black women's common fate, ideology is a statistically significant predictor. Self-identified conservative Blacks are less likely than are liberals to rate feminists highly and to identify strongly with the fate of Black women. Older Blacks expressed stronger affinity with Black women than young Blacks; this was the case for feminists as well. Older Blacks rated feminist groups more favorably than younger Blacks. Social class identification, as in the case of identification with women broadly, is important. Working-class and poor Blacks are more likely to identify with women and with Black women than middle-class, upper-middle-class, and upper-class respondents.

Intersectionality effects emerged. Married Black women were more likely than unmarried Black women to identify with the situation of Black women; the opposite was true for Black men. Married Black men were less likely than

TABLE 5.3. Analysis of Black Women Identification for Blacks Only by Gender Groups (Weighted Analysis)

	Blacks		Black Women		Black Men	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	1.367**	.368	2.043**	.454	1.123#	.646
Female	.115	.075	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
LGBTQ+	–.226	.156	–.275	.191	–.127	.269
Age	.005#	.002	–.002	.003	.016**	.004
Education	.096**	.023	.098**	.031	.099	.035
Income	.012	.010	.004	.013	.028#	.015
Social class ID (Upper)	–.243**	.047	–.175**	.059	–.333**	.077
Party ID (Republican)	.026	.029	–.042	.041	.114**	.040
Ideology (conservative)	–.098**	.029	–.108**	.040	–.124**	.042
Married	.052	.085	.195#	.114	–.279*	.131
Church fundamentalist	.007	.073	–.055	.097	.155	.110
Citizen	.548#	.241	.653*	.281	.057	.470
South	–.001	.073	.002	.097	–.053	.109
Survey	–.023	.056	–.231**	.078	.149#	.082
(Total cases)	(1,130)		(660)		(457)	
R-squared	.064		.079		.119	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

unmarried Black men to feel a common fate with Black women. Education was unrelated to the other forms of gender identification except in the case of Black women. Highly educated Blacks and highly educated Black women were more likely to identify with Black women than less well-educated Blacks and less well-educated Black women. Education had no effect among Black men. Citizenship functioned similarly. Blacks who are also citizens were more likely to be strong Black women identifiers than noncitizens. Black women who are citizens also were more likely to be strong Black women identifiers. Citizenship had a similar effect for identification with women in general. The lives of noncitizens may be very different from the lives of U.S. citizens. Oddly, Republican Black men were more likely to identify with Black women than Black men affiliated with the Democratic Party. This may be a reflection of traditional Christian values that men are economically responsible for supporting women and children, while men depend on women for nurturing and homemaking skills. Thus, they share a gender-driven common fate. High-income Black men, also, were more likely

to be strong Black women identifiers. Thus, the capacity to function as a breadwinner may drive these findings. Or, of course, the reasons that Black male Republicans share feelings of common fate with Black women may differ from those of higher-income Black men. Further research is required. Age, as in the baseline model, was significant in the regression model of Black men only. Older Black men were more likely to be strong Black women identifiers.

Few factors among Blacks outside of social class and church beliefs explain identification with women and their lives. However, the portrait of which Black women and Black men support feminists and feel common fate with Black women contrasts in several ways. While for Black men and Black women, a conservative ideology significantly predicts a lack of support for feminists, conservatism alone is one of the significant predictors for both groups. Among Black men, it is older Black men versus younger ones who most support feminists and feel a kinship with Black women. Although beyond the scope of this book, the finding is important and suggests a cleavage between older and younger Black men in regard to their perceptions of the rights of women, and their identification with the plight of Black women. There are no significant differences by age among Black women in regard to their support for feminists and their feelings of group fate with other Black women. Instead, in contrast to Black men as a whole, there is a sexual orientation divide among Black women, with LGBTQ+ Black women far more supportive of feminists than their non-LGBTQ+ counterparts. There are also differences among Black men by political party, income, and marital status, with Republican, higher-income, unmarried men in greater support of Black women than Democratic, lower-income, and married men. In contrast, in explaining support for Black women, married Black women and more educated Black women had stronger feelings of common fate with Black women than their counterparts.

To determine how politicized these feminist support and group identities are, interaction models were developed between the feminist rating or group identification and being female for Blacks only. Table 5.4 shows the results of a regression analysis of Black partisanship measured as a seven-point scale from strong Republican (7) to strong Democrat (1). The results are mixed. Blacks who rated feminists very strongly had significantly stronger identities with the Democratic Party. At the same time, the effect of being strongly supportive of feminists was weaker for Black women than for men. This finding supports earlier findings that feminism for men has more potent

political effects than for women. A feminist Black man is likely to be a very strong Democrat. The effect of identifying with women for Blacks is statistically insignificant. The effect of identifying with Black women is counterintuitive. Those who feel that their fates are intertwined with those of Black women are more likely to be independent or Republicans. This is not the case for Black women, where the effect is smaller. The effect of identifying with Blacks as a group was statistically insignificant. Gender is significant in one of the four models, showing that Black women are more likely than Black men to be strong Democrats. Black LGBTQ respondents in two of the four models were more likely than heterosexual Blacks to be strong Democrats.

New work finds that Black support for the Democratic Party is in part engineered by social forces within the Black community, corralling conservative as well as liberal Blacks to identify as Democrats (White and Laird 2020). However, Republicans have been trying to recruit Black voters, and this may explain the poor performance of these group identification measures. This period may reflect more internal ideological tensions than group allegiances. Tate (2010) contends that Black voters have become less liberal over time, and socioeconomic divisions among Blacks may have finally weakened the role of group allegiances. At the same time, Democrats are seen as more receptive to the demands of feminist groups. Feminist types are still trying to overcome negative public perceptions and win elections where abortion politics and other social trends still are matters of public concern. The surprising finding concerning Black women-linked fate may be rooted in perceptions that they are strong and independent of government assistance needs. It is also possible that those who identify with Black women are disaffected Democrats.

Findings for four models are shown in Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. The first model tests the significance of feminist ratings, the second model tests the importance of a sense of shared fate with all, the third model tests the importance of a sense of shared fate with Black women, and the fourth model tests the importance of a sense of shared fate with Black people as a group. Comparing the four models, we find that positive feelings toward feminists and a strong belief that one's fate is tied to Black women significantly strengthen one's identity as a Democrat. Feelings of common fate with all women or Blacks as a whole do not have a significant influence on one's identity as a Democrat. Age and ideology have similarly strong effects on the partisanship of African Americans. So, too, does education influence partisanship, except in the Black group fate model. Sexual orientation also emerges as statistically

TABLE 5.4. Effect of Gender and Race Identifications on Partisanship (Republican) for Interaction Model, Blacks Only (Weighted Analysis)

	Feminist Rating		Women Fate		Black Women Fate		Black Group Fate	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	1.946**	.317	1.072*	.452	1.631**	.312	1.887**	.322
Feminist rating or fate ID	–.010**	.002	.023	.070	.114*	.048	–.014	.049
Rating/ID*Black women interaction	.012**	.003	–.035	.093	–.136*	.062	.016	.064
Female	–.965**	.180	–.308	.245	.064	.160	–.259	.168
LGBTQ+	–.224	.171	–.104	.258	–.308#	.164	–.307#	.167
Age	–.014**	.003	–.014**	.004	–.014**	.003	–.014**	.003
Education	.080**	.025	.138**	.036	.048*	.025	.041	.025
Income	.004	.010	.009	.015	–.017#	.010	–.014	.010
Class ID (upper class)	–.010	.051	–.016	.071	.011	.049	–.004	.051
Married	.134	.088	.374**	.120	.226**	.088	.214*	.090
South	–.121	.076	–.080	.111	–.047	.076	–.083	.078
Ideology (conservative)	.209**	.030	.193**	.042	.206**	.030	.214**	.031
Racial resentment	.073#	.038	.160**	.053	.081*	.038	.056	.039
Church fundamentalist	–.072	.076	.036	.111	–.065	.076	–.067	.079
Survey	.003	.058	–.052	.081	.010	.058	–.005	.059
(Total cases)	(942)		(476)		(1,109)		(1,074)	
R-squared	.163		.205		.104		.095	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

TABLE 5.5. Effect of Gender and Race Identifications on Barack Obama Rating, Blacks Only (Weighted Analysis)

	Feminist Rating		Women Fate		Black Women Fate		Black Group Fate	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	94.845**	4.326	89.406**	6.840	103.023**	4.178	102.246**	4.317
Feminist rating or fate ID	.176**	.021	−.039	.738	.894*	.425	.837#	.445
Female	−2.106*	1.071	−1.881	1.759	−1.056	1.054	−.872	1.090
LGBTQ+	−4.867*	2.334	−1.040	3.991	−5.786**	2.233	−6.058*	2.261
Age	.050	.035	.126*	.060	.040	.035	.053	.036
Education	−.139	.349	−.040	.567	−.758*	.336	−.698*	.343
Income	−.206	.140	−.000	.233	−.087	.137	−.086	.140
Class ID	−1.191#	.710	.216	1.128	−.741	.687	−1.003	.705
Married	1.588	1.206	2.691	1.913	.138	1.202	.330	1.233
South	1.236	1.041	3.764*	1.720	1.770#	1.026	1.738	1.054
Party ID	−5.616**	.445	−7.126**	.713	−4.862**	.407	−4.725**	.413
Ideology	−.645	.419	−.387	.666	−1.009*	.414	−.957*	.423
Racial resentment	−.863#	.522	−1.403#	.828	−1.354**	.518	−1.298*	.529
Church fundamentalist	.267	1.051	−.837	1.722	.975	1.036	.644	1.068
Survey	−2.542**	.793	−1.709	1.299	−1.282	.785	−1.170	.798
(Total weighted cases)	(933)		(461)		(1,077)		(1,034)	
R-squared	.278		.251		.177		.171	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

TABLE 5.6. Effect of Gender and Race Identifications on Mitt Romney Rating, Blacks Only (Weighted Analysis)

	Feminist Rating		Women Fate		Black Women Fate		Black Group Fate	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	19.033**	6.441	13.292	8.333	8.348	5.905	11.818#	6.127
Feminist rating or fate ID	.058#	.031	−1.486#	.901	.334	.602	−.532	.623
Female	−4.560**	1.587	.467	2.139	−4.424**	1.477	−4.773**	1.523
LGBTQ+	−5.650	3.483	−1.465	4.835	−5.805#	3.097	−5.763#	3.147
Age	.092#	.052	.101	.073	.148**	.048	.136**	.050
Education	−.441	.523	−.105	.685	.437	.487	.524	.499
Income	−.099	.209	−.164	.276	−.133	.193	−.153	.197
Class ID	1.577	1.046	1.186	1.350	1.819#	.972	1.531	1.000
Married	1.022	1.773	6.177**	2.298	.283	1.657	.890	1.704
South	3.018#	1.544	3.356	2.088	2.105	1.452	1.726	1.501
Party ID	5.636**	.676	5.296**	.873	4.993**	.608	4.864**	.622
Ideology	.279	.626	.839	.809	.669	.595	.460	.612
Racial resentment	4.040**	.765	2.975**	1.007	3.809**	.727	3.562**	.744
Church fundamentalist	.176	1.560	−1.900	2.088	−1.230	1.456	−.634	1.506
Survey	.331	1.196	.384	1.531	.594	1.132	.203	1.139
(Total weighted cases)	(889)		(464)		(1,001)		(969)	
R-squared	.154		.189		.136		.125	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

significant, having opposite effects for the two gender groups. An LGBTQ+ identity strengthens identification with the Democratic Party, as the coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Respondents were also asked if anyone in their house was serving or had served in the military, including the National Guard. However, being in a military household (analyses not shown) had no statistically significant effect on the partisanship of Blacks and Black gender subgroups. Married Blacks, like all respondents in the 2012 survey, reported weaker Democratic identities than single ones.

Although Black members of Congress elected in the South traditionally tend to be less liberal than their northern counterparts, region was not a significant predictor of Black partisanship. Region also lacked a statistical effect on Blacks in the 1980s; and other demographic variables were statistically insignificant (Tate 1994). Interestingly, however, Black church fundamentalists appear to be significantly more identified with Democrats, and for Black men only. This result may appear counterintuitive but supports the findings of a Pew Research paper that showed 95 percent of Black Protestants/other Christians voted for Barack Obama in the 2012 election (Pew Forum 2012). Education among Blacks is also related to their partisanship. College-educated Blacks have weaker identities as Black Democrats than less well-educated Blacks. It is not clear whether this effect of education is rooted in social class and privilege or some disaffection with the leadership of the Democratic Party. Income, in contrast, was not statistically linked to Black partisanship.

Overall, ideology as measured by support for feminism, liberal-conservative ideology, and racial conservatism or resentment is a very important predictor of Black partisan identities. The political implications are clear, then. Blacks are divided ideologically, and these divisions drive their partisanship more than group allegiances. Racial and gender solidarity is found among both Black Democrats and Republicans. Black women's linked fate is a source of disaffection from the Democratic Party. The Republican Party's campaign efforts to attract voters often serve to denigrate Black empowerment demands by characterizing the latter as government handouts to the unmotivated and lazy. Their appeals appear to be working in the Black community as well. Ideological differences and cultural positions today may overwhelm feelings of political solidarity with Blacks and women.

The results suggest that rather than reflecting race alone, partisanship is assembled on the basis of the ideological positions that Blacks take, in addition to important demographic characteristics, notably gender, education, and age. Today, feminism is an important component of Black partisanship.

Conservative beliefs about minority groups are important. The intersectionality analysis indicates that feminism is not an important additional component of partisan ties for Black women, while it is for Black men. In addition to ideological stances, support for feminists strengthens allegiances to the Democratic Party for Black men. Opposition to feminists supports the Republican identifications of Black men. For Black women, but not men, racial resentment views are important components of partisanship. Black women who think minority demands are not in line with U.S. values tend to favor the Republican Party. Thus, a form of bigotry in the Black community exists and is salient in the party memberships of Black women. The analysis suggests that antiabortion and antiwelfare beliefs drive the agendas of the new wave of Black Republican men and women.

Table 5.5 shows the full results for the regression models for Obama ratings. The results from the interaction models are not shown for goodness-of-fit reasons. Three of the group ratings/group identifications are statistically significant. Feminists and those who identify with Black women and with Blacks as a group were more likely to give Barack Obama higher ratings in 2012. In the model that tests the importance of a positive or negative assessment of feminists in predicting ratings of Barack Obama, Black women rate Obama less positively than Black men by about two points. A scale of support for resentment measures was formed called "racial resentment." Expressions of racial resentment (i.e., minorities don't try hard enough to advance) were also a significant force in Black voting behavior. An important but understudied component of Black political conservatism is, in fact, social resentment of Blacks (Orey 2004). The political conservatism of Blacks may not only be based on faith in American values and self-help philosophies, but also on resentment stemming from beliefs that Blacks "don't try hard enough" and that Blacks don't deserve "special favors." About one-quarter to one-third of Blacks harbor these social resentment views of Blacks in the 2012 survey. High-level Black resentment types were less likely to favor Obama than low-level Black resentment types. As compared to those that self-identified as heterosexuals, across three of the four models, LGBTQ+ individuals were significantly less likely to rate Barack Obama favorably. This is likely the result of his administrations' track record on support for LGBTQ+ rights that some within the community believed did not go far enough in support of their civil rights. As expected across all four of the models, identification as a Democrat predicted stronger positive views of Barack Obama than identification as a Republican.

To establish the role that feminism and group identifications play in the opinions of Blacks about Mitt Romney, the 2012 Republican nominee for president, a set of OLS regression models was constructed. Table 5.6 displays the results of a regression analysis. The results of the interaction model are not shown. Despite their role in the Obama ratings, two of the group identities failed to emerge as statistically significant. Although marginally significant, feminist ratings influenced Romney ratings in a surprising way. Black feminist supporters were more likely to rate Romney favorably than those hostile to feminists. It may be that stronger feminists were more positive about Romney because antifeminists were extremely negative toward him. Romney has identified as a Republican moderate, and his Mormon faith has arisen as an issue among some within the Republican Party. This may also explain why strong women identifiers, often conservatives, gave Romney lower evaluations than weak women identifiers. Solidarity with feminists has symbolic importance in the Black community as well. A gender gap emerged, however, among Blacks; Black women had less favorable ratings of Romney than Black men. In fact, a gender gap emerged in three of the four models. Black women gave Romney ratings about four to five points lower than Black men, all things being equal (analysis not shown). Sexual orientation was significant in two instances where Black LGBTQ+ respondents were cooler toward Romney than Black heterosexual respondents. This may also reflect Romney's Mormon faith, as only recently has the Mormon leadership began to address its strong hostility toward and rejection of LGBTQ+ persons.

Party identification was important. Black Republicans rated Romney more favorably than Black Democrats. Furthermore, as shown in Table 5.6, those who were resentful about special favors for Blacks and other social groups were more supportive of Romney. Age was statistically significant in three of the four models. Older Blacks gave Romney higher evaluations than young Blacks. Church fundamentalism was unrelated to Obama or Romney ratings for Blacks, even though it is an important predictor in models of White political behavior. The role of group identities in Blacks' candidate evaluations, but not party memberships, suggests that they, too, might be context driven. Ideological and social forces strongly shape Blacks' partisan identities today. Linked fate, once a critical part of a Black politics, might be more symbolic, as Black Republicans and Democrats both claim affinity with their race and gender groups.

POLICY VIEWS AND FEMINIST AND BLACK WOMEN IDENTIFICATIONS

Black women's identities with feminists and with Black women are expected to promote liberal policy views. However, identification with Black women should exert a greater, more consistent effect given the compound effects of discrimination against them. Black womanist thinking, it is argued, encompasses critiques of racism, sexism, and classism that, critics argue, traditional feminists lack (Brewer 1989; Collins 1986; Dill and Zambrana 2009:1–21). The problems of discrimination that Black women experience can be different from those encountered by White women. Thus, an agenda just focused on women cannot fully address the experiences of Black women. These problems include rates of incarceration, forced sterilizations as well as pregnancies, and biased medical treatment, in addition to a host of social class problems. Yet there are scholars who have characterized the ideologies of Blacks as reflecting multiple complex views rooted in the Black experience, and Black women identifications might also promote conservatism as well as liberalism (Dawson 2001; Harris-Lacewell 2004; Philpot and White 2010; Simien 2006; Spence 2011).

Early empirical work based on data from the 1970s found that Black men have significantly more traditional views about women's roles than other race and gender groups, and that Black women are not more significantly feminist in their outlooks than White women (Ransford and Miller 1983). In this 2012 survey, however, Black women gave feminists statistically significant higher scores, at 58 on a 100-point scale, compared to Black men, with a rating of 52, White women at 48, and White men at 40 (the means are weighted). The empirical work has been slow to catch up with the claims advanced by the new scholarship on Black public opinion even as research has found that Whites' racial resentment of Blacks remains an important and consistent component of their politics (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tesler and Sears 2010). Yet racial resentment in the Black community also has effects on positions they take on welfare policy and the legalization of marijuana for recreational use (Tate 2010, 2014).

Turning to Table 5.7, we estimate the effects on feminist ratings and group identities on 18 policy matters. Their main effects are shown. We see that all shape public policy opinions, with feminist support ratings having the most consistent effect, followed by Black women identifications. As

TABLE 5.7. Comparison of Effect of Feminist Support and Group Identities on the Policy Opinions of U.S. Blacks (OLS and Binary Logistic Coefficients; Weighted Analysis)

	Feminist Rating		Women Identity		Black Women Identity		Blacks as a Group Identity	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Oppose guaranteed jobs program	–.005	.004	–.469**	.097	–.146#	.079	–.097	.077
Oppose government aid to Blacks and minorities	–.006#	.004	–.244**	.087	–.195**	.072	–.194**	.071
Oppose government aid to the poor	–.006#	.003	–.313**	.088	–.316**	.069	–.202**	.069
Paid leave	.021**	.006	–.277	.198	.087	.125	–.395**	.124
Sexual harassment	.007	.005	.372*	.155	.297**	.100	–.083	.101
Children's health insurance	.010*	.005	.601**	.156	.377**	.107	.036	.109
Gender quotas	.016**	.005	–.031	.162	.097	.101	–.058	.102
Year-round public schools	.032**	.006	.006	.206	.173	.126	–.097	.126
Welfare eligibility permanent	.014*	.006	.609**	.192	.701**	.117	.153	.119
Free or subsidized preschools	.022**	.005	.422**	.144	.322**	.102	–.049	.104
Opposed to Antidiscrimination for LGBTQ+	–.011**	.003	–.049	.076	.122*	.056	–.067	.056
Favor three-strikes sentencing laws	–.004	.003	–.044	.066	–.145**	.053	–.179**	.051
Police bias not a problem	–.001	.002	–.109**	.038	–.053	.033	–.076*	.032
Pro-death penalty over life sentence	–.013**	.004	.060	.116	.132	.092	.159#	.091
Interracial marriage (bad)	–.018#	.010	1.185**	.412	–.312	.228	.400#	.220
Women electing to have no children (bad)	–.008	.005	–.220	.131	.246*	.108	–.056	.105
Women single parenting (bad)	.000	.005	–.092	.141	–.155	.108	–.039	.105
Opposition to same-sex marriage or civil unions	–.026**	.005	–.419*	.162	.008	.090	–.102	.089

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are other *p*redictors in the models: Constant, interaction for rating/ID*female, female, LGBTQ+Q, age, education, income, *p*arty ID, ideology, married, racial resentment, citizen, South, church fundamentalist, survey difficulty. Citizen dro*pp*ed from interracial marriage models for goodness-of-fit reasons.

**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

shown in Chapter 4, the effect of feminist support is liberal. Feminist support had its most consistent effect on the battery of questions pertaining to women and children policies compared to the other group identity measures. Identification with women for Blacks failed to affect the partisan identities and voting behavior of Blacks, but it does structure their policy attitudes. It has a liberal effect, but there was one inconsistent finding. Among Blacks, those who share a strong sense of fate with women were more likely to condemn interracial marriages as bad. While identification with Black women also is associated with liberal policy positions, there, too, one effect was inconsistent. Those who strongly identified with Black women were more likely to label women that did not bear children as bad. Feelings of common fate with all Blacks had statistically significant effects, but only on one of the women and children policy measures. Here, strong Black common-fate identifiers were more opposed to paid parental leave than weak common-fate identifiers. Thus, this Black identification measure does not seem to embody a concern for gender equality. Unlike the feminist support rating and the women's fate identification measure, feelings of common fate with all Blacks were not linked to support for gay and lesbian rights. This is not surprising, as strong common-fate identifiers were more likely to support the death penalty as well.

The interaction models revealed interesting patterns concerning group identification and gender. Black women who strongly identify with Black women were more traditional than Black women who don't identify with Black women. Table 5.8 shows the full results for the social trend items. As noted earlier, the effect of identifying with Black women is to increase disapproval of women not reproducing. Black women who strongly identify with Black women were also more likely to disapprove of interracial marriages and single parenting. Black women identifications had no effect on attitudes toward same-sex marriage, although Black LGBTQ+ respondents were more likely to support it. Less educated Blacks were also less likely to support same-sex marriage. Party identification was sometimes important in Black opinions on these questions, as were church fundamentalism and marriage. Here Republican, evangelical, and married Blacks were more disapproving of these societal trends than other Blacks. Being southern, surprisingly, was not important in these opinions. Nor did racial resentment matter. Thus, a picture of social conservatism emerges here when one looks at how Black women identities affect Black public opinion. Rather than a reinforcing lib-

TABLE 5.8. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Lifestyle Choices as Bad for Society and Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage Based on Black Women Linked Fate for Blacks Only (Weighted Analysis)

	People Marrying Interracially (Bad)		Women Electing to Have No Children (Bad)		Women Choosing to Single-Parent (Bad)		Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Unions	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	.017	1.472	–.824	.847	.967	.972	.991	.726
Black women linked fate	–.312	.228	.246*	.106	–.155	.108	.008	.090
Black women fate* female	.704*	.299	.015	.141	.374**	.141	.025	.117
Female	–1.680*	.779	–.265	.381	–1.241**	.366	–.135	.302
LGBTQ+	–.780	1.003	–.139	.410	–.056	.379	–.920*	.404
Age	.003	.011	.003	.006	.017**	.006	.002	.005
Education	–.152	.104	.046	.056	.078	.057	–.118*	.046
Income	–.030	.044	.013	.023	.030	.023	–.026	.019
Social class ID	–.324	.239	.061	.118	–.179	.115	–.025	.092
Party ID (Republican)	–.002	.148	.189**	.072	.236**	.075	–.063	.056
Ideology (conservative)	–.392**	.143	–.046	.070	–.109	.069	.104#	.057
Married	.618	.403	–.088	.202	1.017**	.204	.529**	.163
Ethnic Resentment	.037	.179	.022	.086	.045	.085	–.053	.071
South	–.241	.353	–.182	.173	.070	.172	.089	.143
Church fundamentalist	.359	.353	.197	.176	.372*	.176	.741**	.141
Citizen	n/a	n/a	–1.075**	.471	–1.382*	.664	–1.373**	.437
Survey (difficult)	.883**	.222	–.183	.138	–.404	.135	–.091	.108
(Total cases)	(773)		(770)		(768)		(1,112)	
Cox & Snell R square	.055		.049		.147		.080	
Nagelkerke R square	.150		.069		.197		.114	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
Note: n/a denotes variable left out for model goodness-of-fit reasons.
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

eral force, this analysis provides support for the intersectional claim that this type of identification is unique.

Interesting patterns between gender- and race-linked fate emerged in the analysis of the women and family policies (see Table 5.9). While Black-linked fate was negatively associated with support for paid leave family policies, it had no direct effect on any of the other measures. However, strongly race-identified Black women were significantly more liberal on these types of policies than other groups. Strongly linked-fate Black women identifiers were more likely to favor paid leave, tougher sexual harassment penalties, children's health insurance, gender quotas, year-round schools, and free or

TABLE 5.9. Regression Analysis of Support for Women and Family Policies Based on Blacks' Linked Fate (Weighted Analysis)

	Paid Leave		Tougher Sexual Harassment Penalties		Children's Health Insurance		Gender Quotas		Year-Round Public Schools		Welfare Eligibility Permanent		Free or Subsidized Preschools	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	8.401**	1.040	8.412**	.849	7.770**	.907	7.438**	.847	3.060**	1.054	9.991**	.999	10.474**	.866
Black linked fate	–.395**	.124	–.083	.101	.036	.109	–.058	.102	–.097	.126	.153	.119	–.049	.104
Black linked fate* female	.786**	.164	.320*	.134	.245#	.143	.376**	.134	.383*	.166	.157	.157	.339*	.137
Female	–.906*	.427	–.211	.349	–.266	.373	.666#	.349	–.361	.433	–.180	.411	–.187	.356
LGBTQ+	.320	.426	–.368	.349	–.474	.375	–.228	.344	.235	.433	.106	.410	–.459	.355
Age	–.039**	.007	.010	.005	–.007	.006	–.011*	.005	.011	.007	–.028**	.006	–.002	.006
Education	.044	.064	–.013	.052	.030	.056	–.126*	.052	.178**	.065	–.042	.062	–.031	.054
Income	.056*	.026	.007	.021	.052*	.023	.013	.021	–.005	.026	–.079**	.025	.016	.021
Married	.177	.229	.049**	.188	.007	.201	.122	.188	.095	.233	.203	.221	.087	.191
Social class ID (upper)	–.357**	.129	–.187	.106	–.261*	.112	–.130	.105	–.454**	.131	–.366**	.124	–.436**	.107
Party ID (Republican)	–.293**	.077	–.303**	.063	–.185**	.067	–.370**	.063	.058	.078	–.271**	.074	–.389**	.064
Ideology (conservative)	–.096	.080	.010	.065	–.040	.070	.017	.065	–.138#	.081	–.197**	.077	–.171**	.066
Racial resentment	–.085	.099	.148	.081	–.279**	.087	–.122	.081	.089	.101	–.008	.096	–.069	.083
South	–.468*	.198	–.146	.162	–.393*	.174	.012	.161	.095	.201	.178	.191	–.230	.165
Citizen	–.947	.665	.067	.543	–.559	.580	–.952#	.541	1.145#	.675	–.888	.640	–.714	.554
Church fundamentalist	.593**	.200	.216	.163	.205	.175	.458*	.163	.608**	.203	.726**	.192	–.086	.167
Survey (Weighted total cases)	.488** (1,062)	.148	–.191 (1,063)	.121	–.102 (1,052)	.130	.384** (1,058)	.121	.204 (1,063)	.150	.121 (1,058)	.143	–.217# (1,061)	.123
R-squared	.112		.063		.063		.152		.050		.104		.100	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

subsidized preschools. While for Black men race solidarity does not affect opinions on women and family issues, it has a liberalizing effect for Black women.

Another noteworthy finding is that born-again Black Christians were consistently more liberal in their responses to this battery of questions than other Blacks. The role of the Black church is important in Black politics. Rather than promoting only conservatism, the Black church appears to proffer a mix of liberal and conservative politics. This is unsurprising in that studies show that Black political churches often inspire progressive politics (Brown and Brown 2003; McClerking and McDaniel 2005), although this effect is stronger for men than for women (Bany and Robnett 2011). Social class identification was also important. Upper-status Blacks were more opposed to these women and family policies than lower-status Blacks. Southern Blacks tended to give conservative responses in this battery of questions. Racial resentment was significant in only one of the seven models; racially conservative Blacks were less likely to support a government-backed children's health insurance program than Black racial liberals.

DIVISIONS AMONG BLACK WOMEN

To identify factors that divide Black women internally, we present an analysis of the standard government assistance questions for Black women only in Table 5.10. Weight 3 was applied. The analysis found few demographic variables, such as age and education, as sources of division among Black women. Instead, social class identification was consistently linked to opinions about government programs to guarantee employment and to assist minorities and the poor. Black women who identified as poor and working class were more liberal in their opinions on these questions than Black women who identified as upper middle class or upper class. Black women's linked fate was statistically significant in one of the three models, having a liberal effect. Party identification and political ideology had consistent effects in the direction expected. Black women Republicans and self-declared political conservatives were more likely to oppose a government program to provide jobs and a minimum standard of living as well as government assistance programs for minority groups and the poor than were Black women Democrats and self-identified liberals.

Beyond a partisan and ideological divide, the act of identifying with dis-

TABLE 5.10. Regression Analysis of Government Policies for Jobs, Blacks, and the Poor for Black Women Only (Weighted Analysis)

	Guaranteed Jobs (Oppose)		Aid to Blacks (Oppose)		Aid to Poor (Oppose)	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	1.293	.859	2.330	.805	2.697**	.728
Black women linked fate	.003	.068	–.122#	.064	–.072	.058
LBTQ+	.110	.361	.502	.338	.668*	.306
Age	.005	.006	.002	.006	–.010*	.005
Education	.079	.056	.021	.053	.031	.047
Income	–.017	.023	–.020	.022	.005	.019
Social class ID	.405**	.107	.328**	.100	.181*	.090
Party ID (Republican)	.221**	.078	.253**	.073	.106	.066
Ideology (conservative)	.163*	.071	.083	.067	.133*	.060
Married	–1.050**	.199	.099	.187	.000	.168
Racial resentment	–.093	.085	.090	.079	.100	.072
South	–.032	.172	–.106	.161	–.018	.145
Citizen	–.464	.484	–.456	.453	–.660	.410
Church fundamentalist	.277	.176	–.010	.166	.293#	.150
Survey (difficult)	–.153	.132	.226	.123	.209#	.112
(Weighted total cases)	370		371		372	
R-squared	.132		.109		.121	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**p < .01; *p < .05; #p < .10

advantaged groups seems to have an important effect on the politics of Black women. Politicians who speak to the needs of poor and working-class families will find a segment of Black women who don't empathize with such groups. A class divide among Black women may be new. Based on 1980s survey data, a large majority of Blacks identified with the problems Blacks encountered and were found to be disproportionately liberal independent of economic class (Tate 1994). Now Black women who identify as middle class to upper class are more conservative than Black women who consider themselves working class or poor.

Class politics has become more apparent in an era of expanding income inequality. Furthermore, the role of government in providing income security is currently debated. The provision of extra cash benefits to the unemployed as part of COVID-19 relief, caused debate to center around whether its extension would cause a disincentive for people to return to work. Democrats argue that the extra benefits are necessary for families to pay bills,

including rent, and put food on the table. Efforts to raise the minimum wage have also provoked criticism from small businesses who claim minimum wage increases hurt their long-term viability. Others contest this, contending that increases in wages will boost the economy. These issues will see some Black women identifying as upper middle class and upper class, favoring the positions of Republicans and small business.

Interestingly, more than racial resentment, a social class division divides Black women. Racial resentment for Blacks is correlated with support for the Republican Party. Messages that minorities are threating the American way of life not only do not seem to bother some Blacks but may resonate. For Black women, racial politics does not appear to influence their politics especially. Divisions among Black women appears to be a more purely ideological, based on class conflict as opposed to wedge cultural issues. The analysis supports intersectionality theory, as Black women are divided internally. Their group is splintered by economic class.

CONCLUSION

Given the decades of high levels of support for the Democratic Party among Blacks, it is now very easy to stereotype this group. While we found gender to be statistically significant in only one of the four models of partisanship, Black women were more likely to claim strong Democratic ties. Black women express stronger loyalties to the Democratic Party because being female increases their stake in social policies even as they also have stakes in economic policies favoring the expansion of wealth. Black men rated Barack Obama, the Black Democratic president in 2012, slightly more favorably than Black women, but also rated Obama's rival, White Republican Mitt Romney, more favorably as well. The partisanship gender cleavage is important. In the 2020 presidential election, there was a national spotlight on Black women leaders in the Democratic Party as part of a campaign to get the nominee, Vice President Joe Biden, to select a Black woman running mate. Republicans have found more consistent support from Black men than women, and this might not change in the immediate future. Finally, the Republican Party appeals to Blacks who view Blacks and other minority groups as illegitimately seeking governmental support, but not necessarily to born-again Black Christians.

In contrast to the analysis of the full sample, a consistent gender gap did

not emerge in Blacks' policy positions once feminist support and group identifications were taken into account. Black women were more likely to support feminists and identify with women as a group, but Black men were as likely as Black women to express solidarity with Black women. The picture that emerged is that in public opinion, in contrast to voting behavior, gender is not especially significant. Black men espouse policy opinions that are similar to that of Black women. Race solidarity works differently for Black women than for Black men. In the battery of questions pertaining to women and family policies, an interaction between being female and strongly race identified emerged as statistically significant. While race identification did not directly affect Black opinions on women and family policies, Table 5.9 shows that strongly race-identified Black women were the most liberal on women and family policies, including paid family leave, children's health insurance, gender quotas, year-round school, and free or subsidized preschools for children. Black women's strongly liberal politics emanates from a concern about race as much as gender. This is not the case for Black men, whose race identities are more narrowly prescribed. The implications are important. Black women's race consciousness promotes support for gender empowerment policies, whereas for Black men it does not. It may be that male Black civil rights leaders may not be as aggressive in promoting women and family policies as female Black civil rights leaders.

Identifying with Black women as opposed to feminist women in theory should promote different politics. There was mixed evidence concerning this. In terms of policy views, both feminist support and identification with Black women promoted left-of-center policy views. Their effects were both broad and consistent. Feminist support and identification with Black women increased support for gender and family policies such as making welfare eligibility permanent, health insurance for children, and combating sexual harassment. The effect (about one-half of one point on a 10-point scale) was small but statistically significant. Identification with Black women also fueled opposition to harsh sentencing laws and support for LGBTQ+ rights. Feminist support had slightly broader effects, and Blacks who favored feminists strongly were more likely to be opposed to the death penalty and support same-sex marriage rights.

There was evidence that a Black woman identity also has a conservative component to it. On social trends, in contrast to feminist support, Black women who were strong Black women identifiers were more likely to label interracial marriages and single parenting bad. Black women identifiers

regardless of gender disapproved of women electing to have no children. Feminism includes a call for sexual liberation or the freedom to choose lives outside of the traditional heterosexual marriage unit. Living together outside of marriage is a legacy of feminism. Having reproductive rights is the foundation of female independence. There are some who claim that Blacks have been hurt by the decline in marriage rates (see Wilson 1987), as single parenting is associated with poverty. Black women who identify strongly with other Black women may oppose alternative lifestyles as hurting Blacks socially and economically. At the same time, Black women's fate was not associated with conservative welfare reform, as it was in 1996 (Tate 2010), but rather strong Black women identifiers favored removing time limits to welfare eligibility and making such benefits permanent for those in need.

Identification with women in the Black community also promoted liberal politics for Blacks. Its effect was not as wide-ranging as feminist support. In one instance, Black women who were strong Black women identifiers were more opposed to interracial marriages than other Blacks. This broad form of gender identification in the Black community was associated with support for same-sex marriage, however, feminist support and gender identifications had more effects on public policy positions than racial group identification for Blacks. Black common fate promoted liberal policies mostly, but like women's common fate, strong race identifiers were more likely to label interracial marriages as bad. Strong Black identifiers were also more likely to oppose paid family leave policies than weak race identifiers. While there is some evidence for intersectionality and that an identification with Black women produces different politics, there is also evidence that for Black women having a race and gender identity is mutually reinforcing. Feminism and these identifications help explain why Black women are strongly progressive, perhaps more so than any other social grouping. Other than partisanship, Black men also have policy views built around their support of feminism and gender identities. Ideology, racial resentment, and social class are forces that divide Blacks politically.

CHAPTER 6

Stereotypes about Black Women and Policy Views

This chapter investigates the claim that women are stereotyped as a group in U.S. politics, and thus, U.S. politics is gendered. Much more empirical work exists on how society is divided racially. This chapter also investigates an extension of this thesis, that Black women's representation in the U.S. also structures U.S. policy debates. Because there have been significant gains for U.S. women and Black women since the modern women's and civil rights movements, the chapter begins with an assessment of whether stereotypes of Black women persist and are still commonplace. Next, the chapter examines whether those who hold stereotypes about Black women have more conservative policy positions or not. Previous research has shown that racial stereotypes bring about a conservative brand of politics, but how gendered-racial stereotypes influence U.S. politics is a relatively new topic today.

NEGATIVE STEREOTYPING AND PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH

Stereotypes about minority women persist and strongly shape public policy discourse (Hancock 2004; Harris-Perry 2011; Roberts 1997; Alexander-Floyd 2021; Collins 2000a; Thomas, Witherspoon, and Speight 2004). Racially specific myths persist concerning the subservient, the highly sexual, or the angry woman. Single women have been portrayed as unfit parents (Rosenthal and Lobel 2016). Since the values and motivations that breed successful lives are thought to be lacking in certain types of women, it is sometimes argued that social policies to support disadvantaged parents will not change negative economic and social outcomes for some groups of women and their children.

A significant amount of work exists showing that the public continues to view minorities negatively and that these negative opinions shape the social policy opinions of citizens (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2008, 2011). This chapter investigates the impact of group stereotypes. A group stereotype is defined as a set of overgeneralized beliefs and expectations about a particular group that is believed to share similar defining characteristics (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997). Group stereotypes can be positive or negative. They are rooted in culture and are not based on personal experiences with groups. Although liking or disliking individuals from a particular group can lead to stereotyping.

Negative beliefs about U.S. Blacks, that they are lazy, violence prone, unintelligent, or welfare dependent, continue to exist. However, research based on student surveys conducted from 1933 to 1967 finds that negative stereotyping about Blacks has subsided over the years (Gilens 1999:157). African Americans also believe that particular groups exhibit certain traits (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Nunnally 2009). The measurement of stereotypes has varied. In a 2004 study, college students were asked to rate groups on a Likert or strongly agree / strongly disagree scale for traits such as bossiness, trustworthiness, and willingness to lie. Other work shows, also, that while negative stereotyping of minorities has declined, one-half to three-quarters of Whites hold negative views about Blacks and Latinos (Bobo and Charles 2009).

Recent studies support that gender and racial stereotyping continue to influence hiring practices (Eaton et al. 2019). Intersecting stereotypes about gender and race influence faculty perceptions of post\doctoral candidates in STEM fields in the United States.

Examining identical curriculum vitae, except for the name, which suggested either a male or a female candidate and manipulated to provide names that appeared to be Asian, Black, White, or Latinx, the researchers found that an interaction between candidate gender and race emerged for those in physics. Black women and Latinx women and men candidates were rated the lowest in hireability.

Similarly, Quillian, et al. (2017) conducted a meta-analysis of job callback rates when only the ethnically identifiable names were manipulated. All existing field experiments showed evidence of discrimination against both Black and Latinx applicants. The rates of discrimination had not changed from 1990 to 2015, with Whites receiving 36 percent more callbacks than Blacks and 24 percent more callbacks than Latinx applicants with identical résumés.

There are gendered-racial stereotypes about women today rooted in long-standing cultural misrepresentations of social groups. Black women are often portrayed as the mammy, the prostitute, or jezebel (Craig 2002; Entman and Rojecki 2000; hooks 1992; Jewell 1993; Jerald et al. 2017; Coleman, Reynolds, and Torbati 2019). They are stereotyped as sexually deviant or vulgar, as prone to unfaithfulness, illegitimate children, and welfare dependency (hooks 1992; Rosenthal and Lobel 2016), and as the unmarried welfare queen living alone with her children who has no desire to work and is content to live off the state (Collins 1990). Black females are characterized in opposition to more feminine Whites, Asians, or Latinas (Hunt 2005).

These negative stereotypes are found to increase opposition to social welfare support (Gilens 1999). Beliefs based on an adherence to a stereotype creates impressions that Blacks don't work hard and are unwilling to support themselves. Opposition to programs for needy families may not be based on hostility toward minority groups, but on beliefs that such groups lack a committed work ethic. For example, research finds that these negative beliefs about racial groups undermine support for antipoverty programs (Gilens 1999; Quadagno 1994; Kinder and Kam 2009).

Negative stereotypes about Blacks also increase White support for punitive crime policies (Peffley and Hurwitz 2002). Some contend that crime policy opinion is influenced by the stereotyping of groups by the media. This stereotyping is rooted in the media's coverage of suspects in violent crime news stories. Politically knowledgeable people, those likely to follow the media closely, in fact, are more likely to form opinions about government spending programs based on negative group stereotypes (Goren 2003). Stereotypes, therefore, are important components in opinion formation for the educated and politically aware. Through the media, stereotypes remain prominent sources of public opinion.

Some work finds that stereotypes of Black females are linked to policy attitudes. In a welfare mother experiment, researchers noted that negative judgments about welfare recipients were reduced when in an experimental design respondents were presented with positive, "counterfactual" information about welfare recipients (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997). In fact, favorably described welfare mothers, those "who want to work themselves out of problems," elicited more support for antipoverty programs from respondents generally opposed to social programs. Other research finds the same pattern among Black respondents (Harris-Lacewell 2001).

A recent experimental study of stereotypes about Black versus White

women concludes that respondents viewed Black women as having more sexual partners; as less likely to use birth control regularly; as more likely to have been pregnant before; as more likely to be receiving public assistance; and, as more likely to have a lower education level and yearly salary. They were also more often viewed as more likely to be single parents (Rosenthal and Lobel 2016). Racial resentment among Whites remains a powerful predictor of depressed support for gender pay equity policies. In an experimental study, when the women referenced in the survey question were Black, White liberals and White moderates who rated high in racial resentment were less likely to support the policy (Cassese, Barnes, and Branton 2015). Thus, there is more support for pay equity policies for White women who are viewed as more worthy of such support.

In the 2012 Outlook Survey, respondents were asked to rate social-gender groups, including Black and White women, on eight traits. These dimensions assess beliefs about promiscuity, that is, views that particular groups of women are either oversexed or undersexed. For Blacks, there is the myth of the Black mammy, a woman so disloyal to her race or ethnicity that she puts the children of others above her own. The survey asked if Black women were generally loyal or disloyal to their community. We also asked if women liked women more than men or men more than women to determine if she was unfit for heterosexual relationships or just unkind to men. The survey investigated the angry woman charge, asking in the survey if women were agreeable or disagreeable. The angry Black woman myth is referred to as "Sapphire" or the "Matriarch" (Harris-Perry 2011). The survey asked if women were likely to be poor parents, dependent on welfare, and unfeminine or masculine. The survey work also explored an important stereotype about women—that they are often strong, capable human beings, or, in other words, not weak.

In all eight stereotypes about Black women and men were investigated in this study, namely that Black women and men "like women more than men" and are "masculine," "strong," "disloyal," "oversexed," "welfare dependent," "disagreeable," and a "bad parent." Respondents rated each group on these scales ranging from 1 to 7. To see if Black women were rated more negatively than White women, scores were subtracted to create scales ranging from –6 to 6. A score of zero means that both types, minorities and Whites, were rated equally by the individual respondent. A negative score represented negative opinions about Black women, and a positive score represented negative opinions about White women. The average scores for the scale are

shown as histograms in Figure 6.1. Overall, the typical or modal respondent rated both groups mostly equal on all scales. Thus, for most, Black and White women were identical on these eight traits. Nevertheless, the distribution pattern indicates that some respondents rated Black women more negatively than White women on five of the stereotype measures. Specifically, respondents were more likely to consider Black women to be welfare dependent, bad parents, disagreeable, disloyal, and masculine. Notably, as well, White women were viewed as more likely to be promiscuous, to be pro-female, and to lack strength as compared to Black women. The group differences were small to middling. The difference score for masculinity was near zero at –0.03, while the largest group difference was for welfare dependency at –1.02 (see Figure 6.1). Thus, there was only a small to middling propensity to stereotype women by their race for these eight traits in the U.S.

In results not shown, the stereotype types were analyzed, and the results establish that education is not consistently linked to which female group is stereotyped, and thus, these stereotypes may not form through education or a lack of one. Instead, once income and education are included in the regression model, minorities, compared to Whites, more consistently stereotype Black women as bad parents or welfare prone, but not less loyal, or more promiscuous, masculine, pro-female, and weak than White women.

To determine what traits were associated with which gender-race groups, there was a factor analysis of these eight measures. The eight traits conceptually overlap, but barely. A varimax rotation method was used. Other rotation methods, specifically oblique rotation, were tested. Because minorities and Whites and men and women can have different opinions of minority women, a factor analysis was performed separately for each of the four racial-gender groups. In determining which traits are commonly linked with one another, we can assess whether these broad stereotypical images of minority women persist. Not surprisingly, only two dimensions emerged for the stereotypes about Black and White women. While scholars have identified a variety of negative stereotypes about minority group women, only two dimensions emerged. The first for all groups was that of the "welfare queen." The welfare queen is a disagreeable, poor parent who is dependent on welfare. The second dimension for women we label the "strong woman." This second dimension was of another type of woman, one who was strong and had masculine qualities.

Table 6.1 shows the factor loadings for the four racial-gender groups. Weight 3 associated with the uneven sampling of gender groups was used to



Figure 6.1. Histograms of Eight Stereotypes about Black and White Women (Weighted Data; Negative scores represent negative opinions about Black women; positive scores represent negative opinions about White women)

weight the data in this analysis. Three dimensions emerged. Highlighted coefficients show those representing loading onto the dimension of the welfare queen. The first dimension accounts for 20 to 27 percent of variability in the eight measures. Here, Black women diverged from the other groups. The first portrait, which emerged from Black men, White women, and White men respondents, is one of Black women who are disagreeable and welfare dependent, hence a welfare queen. The first dimension for Black women was one of a masculine, strong woman who was also a poor parent. For White respondents, bad parenting is associated with welfare dependency and forms their portrait of Black women. For White men, the view that Black women are promiscuous or oversexed also loaded onto the first dimension.

Black women's second dimension paired welfare dependency with race disloyalty and disagreeability. The second dimension for Black men, however, was identical to that for White men. Black and White men associated Black women liking women more than men with masculinity and being strong. The second dimension for White women was liking men more than women and being oversexed. The final dimension for Blacks paired promiscuity with either liking men more (for Black women) and being race disloyal (Black men). White women saw race disloyalty as associated with being a strong woman and masculine. White men did not pair race disloyalty with the other stereotypes.

The group differences in how stereotypes are combined into depictions of Black women may be important. For Black women respondents, bad parenting is not associated with welfare dependency, while White men associate promiscuity with it. Among the Black women respondents, the strong Black woman stereotype is associated with disagreeability—a negative trait. Thus, while the strong Black woman stereotype may be both positive and negative, among Black women it appears to be a negative belief about Black women.

Group stereotypes are simple constructs, and an alternative thesis is that opinion is based on heuristics or judgments that are more complicated (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1997). Racial resentment, symbolic racism, or prejudice scales have been shown to affect policy attitudes. Citizens who judge minorities as violating American values are more opposed to increased spending on social welfare programs (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Table 6.2 shows the correlation coefficients between the racial-gender stereotype measures and the resentment and White ethnocentrism scales. The White ethnocentrism scale was constructed by subtracting feeling thermometer rat-

TABLE 6.1. Component Analysis of Stereotypes about Black Women by Race and Gender (Varimax Rotation; Weighted by Weight 3)

First Dimension	Black Women	Black Men	White Women	White Men
Disloyal	–.074	–.089	–.248	–.097
Oversexed	.191	.172	.376	**.634**
Likes women more	.156	–.006	–.032	–.209
Welfare dependent	.209	**.804**	**.786**	**.761**
Strong woman	**.734**	.037	.091	–.109
Bad parent	**.599**	**.627**	**.792**	**.811**
Disagreeable	–.181	**.851**	**.740**	**.529**
Masculine	**.772**	.114	.417	.305
Total variance explained	20%	23%	27%	26%

Second Dimension	Black Women	Black Men	White Women	White Men
Disloyal	**.575**	–.042	–.103	.055
Oversexed	.143	.181	**.584**	–.020
Likes women more	.250	**.862**	**–.873**	**.737**
Welfare dependent	**.654**	.102	.188	–.056
Strong woman	–.114	**.450**	.361	**.617**
Bad parent	.414	.173	.086	–.042
Disagreeable	**.720**	–.064	.119	.342
Masculine	–.065	**.723**	–.225	**.582**
Total variance explained	19%	19%	17%	17%

Third Dimension	Black Women	Black Men	White Women	White Men
Disloyal	.337	**.868**	**.635**	**.823**
Oversexed	**.795**	**.613**	.036	.345
Likes women more	**–.662**	–.153	.018	–.230
Welfare dependent	–.219	.052	–.149	–.269
Strong woman	.020	.331	**.723**	.390
Bad parent	–.184	.420	.080	–.087
Disagreeable	–.062	–.094	.015	–.357
Masculine	.075	.198	**.542**	.087
Total variance explained	16%	19%	16%	15%

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

TABLE 6.2. Correlation Coefficients between Black Women Stereotypes Measures, Racial Resentment, and White Ethnocentrism (Weighted Analysis)

Rejects Stereotype	Group Resentment Scale	White Ethnocentrism
Disloyal	.16	–.02
Oversexed	–.18	–.22
Likes women more	.095	.04
Welfare dependent	–.34	–.41
Strong woman	–.09	–.15
Bad parent	–.365	–.28
Disagreeable	–.19	–.21
Masculine	–.16	–.22

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

ings of Black people from Whites. High scores represent more favorable ratings of Whites as a whole than Blacks. Ethnocentrism, defined as a positive feeling about one's own group over other groups, has been shown to have a wide impact across a number of policy opinions (Kinder and Kam 2009). The correlation between racial resentment and White ethnocentrism is .25, suggesting a modest overlap between them.

The correlations between stereotypes about Black women, racial resentment, and White ethnocentrism range from –.41 to .16 (see Table 6.2). White ethnocentrism in comparison to resentment against those who violate U.S. hard work ethics is equally linked to gendered group stereotypes. Those rating Whites as a group very favorably over Blacks and resenting Blacks and minorities are more likely to embrace negative stereotypes about Black women as well. Black women, however, were not considered notably disloyal to their race and pro-female, and these stereotypes exhibited the weakest links to resentment and ethnocentrism, while the welfare dependent stereotype has the strongest association with both scales followed by bad parenting.

To determine whether simple stereotypes about women also shape the policy attitudes of people, a regression analysis of 18 policy matters was performed. The battery of government assistance questions was included in the analysis. Should the U.S. provide a guaranteed job to anyone needing work? Should the government provide financial assistance to Blacks and to the poor? Table 6.3 displays the results of how the Black women stereotypes scale performed compared to racial resentment and White ethnocentrism on the government jobs and assistance questions. Overall, the stereotype that Black

TABLE 6.3. Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Gender-Racial Stereotypes, Racial Resentment, and White Ethnocentrism in Policy Scores Models for Jobs, Government Aid to Blacks, and Aid to the Poor (Weighted Analysis)

		Guaranteed Jobs (Oppose)	Aid to Blacks (Oppose)	Aid to Poor (Oppose)
Model 1	Black women are welfare dependent, bad parents, and disagreeable scale (disagree)	–.150** (.036)	–.315** (.032)	–.071* (.036)
Model 2	Racial resentment (high)	.336** (.048)	.587** (.042)	.379** (.048)
Model 3	White ethnocentrism (–100 to 100)	.000 (.002)	.012** (.002)	.005** (.002)

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are control variables consisting of rating of feminists as a group, female, minority, LGBTQ+, party ID, ideology, marital status, age, education, income, class ID, church fundamentalist, South, citizen, survey difficulty.

**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

women relative to White women are welfare dependent, poor parents, and disagreeable was statistically significant and predicted opposition to government expenditure programs. Racial resentment also was statistically significant in all three models, while White ethnocentrism was statistically significant in only two of the three models.

Additional questions pertained to policy proposals that represent policy goods that a number of European nations provide for their citizens. Thus, should the U.S. guarantee paid parental leave? Should legal penalties for sexual harassment be increased? Should children have free health insurance? Should there be gender quotas for top government positions? Since the 1978 *Bakke* and other Supreme Court rulings, quotas favoring any social group by law in public education and employment are illegal in the U.S. Should public schools run year-round? This policy would mean that parents would not need to find childcare for the summer months and would add to the government's cost of providing for free public education. Should welfare eligibility be permanent for a parent or custodian in need as long as that parent or custodian is caring for a child under the age of 18? In 1996, federal law was changed so that welfare eligibility was limited to a lifetime limit of five years.

Should preschool be made free or means-tested and subsidized by the government? Because these are policy proposals foreign to U.S. culture and law as well as big expenditure items, support for them represents a liberal policy perspective.

Table 6.4 shows the results of this policy analysis. Racial resentment performed the best. Racial resentment was a statistically significant predictor in six of the seven models. Racial resentment was statistically unrelated only to the year-round public schooling proposal, which no negative opinion measure of Blacks and Black women predicted. The stereotype scale performed second best, emerging as statistically significant in four of the seven models. Respondents who felt that Black women compared to White women were welfare dependent, poor parents, and disagreeable were also opposed to free children's health insurance, gender quotas for top government positions, lifetime welfare eligibility, and free or subsidized preschools. White ethnocentrism performed the least well. It was a statistically significant predictor in three of the seven models.

To determine how the three measures perform across LGBTQ+ social rights, criminal justice laws, and social lifestyle trends, another set of models was constructed and analyzed. These results are shown in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. Overall, the racial resentment and White ethnocentrism scales work best, emerging as statistically significant in four of the four models. The Black woman stereotype measure came close as a predictor; it was statistically significant in three of the four models. Those respondents who harbored negative stereotypes about Black women were no more likely than their counterparts who rejected stereotypes about Black women to support or reject legal protections for gays, lesbians, and queers against job discrimination. However, respondents who embraced stereotypes about Black women were more likely to support harsher sentencing laws, such as the death penalty, and to believe that police bias against Blacks is not a problem (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.6 compares racial group measures against the gendered-racial measures for the survey's battery of lifestyle choices. Pro-parent policies and gender-friendly policies elicit opposition from those who harbor discriminatory beliefs because they want a society that promotes conservative values. Conservatives don't want to subsidize certain lifestyles, such as single parenting. In an earlier analysis, party identification and ideology also shaped opinion, so that Republicans and self-described conservatives were opposed to these policies in general. But people who also harbor resentment, negative affect toward Blacks as compared to Whites, and stereotypical beliefs about

TABLE 6.4. Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Gender-Racial Stereotypes, Racial Resentment, and White Ethnocentrism in Policy Scores Models for Women and Family Policies (Weighted Analysis)

		Paid Parental Leave	Tougher Penalties for Sexual Harassment	Children's Health Insurance	Gender Quotas	Year-Round Public Schools	Welfare Eligibility Permanent	Free or Subsidized Preschools
Model 1	Black Women are welfare dependent, bad parents, and disagreeable scale (disagree)	.025 (.077)	.007 (.068)	.133# (.074)	.137* (.067)	–.104 (.077)	.352** (.073)	.289** (.069)
Model 2	Racial resentment (high)	–.656** (.083)	–.196** (.075)	–.576** (.083)	–.471** (.075)	.002 (.087)	–.809** (.080)	–.741** (.075)
Model 3	White ethnocentrism (–100 to 100)	–.008** (.003)	.001 (.003)	–.004 (.003)	.001 (.003)	–.001 (.003)	–.010** (.003)	–.008** (.003)

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are control variables consisting of rating of feminists as a group, female, minority, LGBTQ+, party ID, ideology, marital status, age, education, income, class ID, church fundamentalist, South, citizen, survey difficulty.

**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

TABLE 6.5. Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Gender-Racial Stereotypes, Racial Resentment, and White Ethnocentrism in Policy Scores Models for LGBTQ+ Antibias and U.S. Sentencing Policies

		Opposed to Antidiscrimination for LGBTQ+ Jobs	Favor Three-Strikes Sentencing Laws	Police Bias Not a Problem	Pro-Death Penalty over Life Sentence
Model 1	Black women are welfare dependent, bad parents and disagreeable scale (disagree)	–.015 (.029)	–.104** (.028)	–.073** (.019)	–.330** (.046)
Model 2	Racial resentment (high)	.146** (.039)	.156** (.039)	.312** (.024)	.581** (.061)
Model 3	White ethnocentrism (–100 to 100)	.006** (.001)	.005** (.001)	.005** (.001)	.013** (.002)

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are control variables consisting of rating of feminists as a grou*p*, female, minority, LGBTQ+, *p*arty ID, ideology, marital status, age, education, income, class ID, church fundamentalist, South, citizen, survey difficulty.

$^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$; $\#p < .10$

Black women should also be more opposed than those who reject such beliefs.

As shown in Table 6.6, the Black woman stereotype scale and racial resentment performed better than White ethnocentrism, which was statistically significant in three of the four models. In comparison, the Black women stereotype scale and racial resentment were statistically significant in all four of the models. Those harboring negative attitudes about Black women were more likely to oppose interracial marriage and single parenting. Racially resentful and ethnocentric respondents were also opposed to interracial marriage, and racially resentful respondents to single parenting. While not surprising, racial resentment and White ethnocentrism were also related to opinions about same-sex marriage or civil unions. In Table 6.6, racial resentment and White ethnocentrism predicted opposition to same-sex marriage.

TABLE 6.6. Binary Logistic Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Gender-Racial Stereotypes, Racial Resentment, and White Ethnocentrism in Policy Scores Models for Societal Trends (Weighted Analysis)

		People Marrying Interracially (Bad)	Women Electing to Have No Children (Bad)	Women Choosing to Single-Parent (Bad)	Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Unions
Model 1	Black women are welfare dependent, bad parents, and disagreeable Scale (disagree)	–.562** (.076)	–.195** (.056)	–.224** (.064)	.112# (.066)
Model 2	Racial resentment (high)	.435** (.112)	.061 (.078)	.313** (.079)	.303** (.076)
Model 3	White ethnocentrism (–100 to 100)	.027** (.004)	.005# (.003)	.007* (.003)	.010** (.003)

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are control variables consisting of rating of feminists as a grou*p*, female, minority, LGBTQ+, *p*arty ID, ideology, marital status, age, education, income, class ID, church fundamentalist, South, citizen, survey difficulty.

***p* < .01; **p* < .05; #*p* < .10

Unexpectedly, though, stereotypes about Black women were associated with support for it. This suggests that stereotypes about Black women might have a mixed effect on the rights of other social groups, while White ethnocentrism and racial resentment have broader, more consistently negative effects.

All in all, the results show that policy debates reflect gender considerations as well as racial ones. Stereotypical beliefs about Black women negatively shape liberal policy discourse nearly as much as beliefs that minorities don't work hard enough. These stereotypes perform as well as the belief that Whites are liked better than Blacks. When petitions on government are made, the position of women, and in this case, minority women, is relevant. Thus, this work supports theoretical claims that gender inequality and difference profoundly influence public policy debates.

CONCLUSION

Opposition to paid family leave and the restoration of welfare benefits as a lifetime entitlement is not only a partisan and ideological position but is rooted in judgments about social groups and specific beliefs that such groups do not work hard and strive to get ahead. Dislike of certain groups has always been shown to have a statistically significant public opinion effect. In this chapter, we show that simple stereotypes about Black women increased conservative social policy opinions.

Stereotypes about Black women influence U.S. policy debates almost as consistently as does racial resentment. Since stereotypes are easily held and remain useful in opinion formation, it is unlikely that their role in public opinion will wither away. The position of Black women economically and socially has been stereotyped as profoundly different from that of White women. Establishing that stereotypes about Black women can be as important as stereotypes about racial groups more broadly indicates a new complexity in the way stereotypes impact opinion. Thus, the portrayal of women is important in restructuring beliefs and reducing the impact of stereotypes about women in U.S. politics. There are additional stereotypes that could be explored as having impacts on U.S. politics, including bigoted perceptions of U.S. female immigrants. Immigration policy, too, might be based on more than partisan and ideological concerns. We discuss this further in the book's conclusion.

CHAPTER 7

Stereotypes, Sexual Minorities, and Community Acceptance

There is consistent coverage of the women's vote and the gender gap in U.S. elections. Sexual orientation is also present in U.S. politics as groups and individuals have pressed for civil rights protection and social policy benefits for sexual minority groups, specifically lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) people. Groups have successfully contested discriminatory laws against the LGBTQ+ community and have lobbied for the adoption of hate crime laws. States have been responsive to both liberal and conservative opinion on gay rights (Lax and Phillips 2009). Research reveals that opinions about sexual minority groups influence social policy positions (Brewer 2003; Kinder and Kam 2009) and that racialized stereotypes persist about gays and lesbians even within the LGBTQ+ community (Rafalow, Feliciano, and Robnett 2017). Hostility toward gay men and lesbians reduces support for their civil and social rights.

Using the 2012 Outlook data, this chapter investigates opinion on LGBTQ+ legal and social rights. How do gender and sexual identities shape attitudes about LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination laws? Do stereotypes about lesbian women and gay men persist? How do stereotypes about gays and lesbians impact policy attitudes? And finally, is the spread of AIDS still a negating component in the politics concerning LGBTQ+ rights and antidiscrimination laws?

PUBLIC OPINION ON CIVIL UNIONS AND MARRIAGE

Until June 15, 2020, sexual orientation was not a category that had civil rights protection under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans racial and gen-

der discrimination. Prior to this ruling, it was legal to fire workers simply because they were LGBTQ+ identified. However, the Supreme Court ruling was limited in that it only applied to employment discrimination. Just as individuals may not be discriminated against by sex, so too, the section of the act that outlaws employment discrimination based on sex also applies to LGBTQ+ people. The ruling, however, does not extend to federal protections against discrimination in housing, at stores, restaurants, colleges, adoption agencies, or hospitals, for example. As the *New York Times* reported, just prior to the Supreme Court ruling, "The Department of Health and Human Services issued a regulation . . . that undid protections for transgender patients against discrimination by doctors, hospitals and health insurance companies" (Liptak 2020). These rights are protected on a state-by-state basis. A number of states have laws banning these forms of discrimination against LGBTQ+ people, and civil rights advocates have also pressed states for additional workplace protection and for Congress to enact a federal law banning discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Still, discrimination against LGBTQ+ people remains. Until 2010, the federal government prohibited gays and lesbians from serving openly in the U.S. military, and the Supreme Court has allowed the recent military ban on transgender people to remain, pending the outcome of litigation. In a recent survey, 59 percent of lesbian and gays who are serving in the military were reluctant to reveal their sexual orientation for fear of negative career outcomes or of standing out as the in-house gay person who is largely responsible for educating their peers (McNamara et al. 2020). In 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in a five-to-four decision that a federal law banning marriage-based benefits for gay and lesbian couples was unconstitutional. Then in 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that marriage could not be restricted to heterosexual couples only. The Court's decision in 2015 was split since the debate over civil rights for LGBTQ+ individuals is considered something for state governments to resolve. At the same time, the federal government favored the court ruling against the federal law banning marriage benefits for same-sex couples. Although since 2016, all states now ban discrimination against LGBTQ+ persons who wish to adopt a child, the Supreme Court is poised to decide a ruling that would allow religious-based adoption agencies to deny adoptions to nonheterosexual couples. In 2021, the Supreme Court sided with a Catholic adoption agency over LGBTQ+ rights. Thus, the battle for equal LGBTQ+ rights remains.

Although legal today, same-sex marriage remains somewhat controver-

sial. Recent 2020 polling suggests a rapid ascension toward acceptance of LGBTQ+ rights, with 67 percent agreeing that "marriages between same-sex couples should be recognized as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages" (Gallup 2020). Yet 49 percent of those same respondents feel that most Americans are opposed to same-sex marriage. As with polling results regarding Whites' acceptance of interracial dating, or feelings toward African Americans, there may be a gap between what respondents support in theory as compared to what they personally feel and do. Since the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, White support for Black equality has climbed in the polls, but Whites have also consistently opposed policies in support of equal rights when such policies had direct effects on them personally.

In the 2012 Outlook Survey, only 40 percent supported allowing people of the same sex to marry, while 32 percent preferred letting states adopt civil union contracts. This 2012 statistic is less than but relatively consistent with the Pew Research Center findings for that year showing 48 percent in support of gay marriage. A minority, or 28 percent, felt that states should disallow both same-sex marriages and unions (Pew Forum 2019). In 2003, in *Lawrence v. Texas*, the Supreme Court ruled that state laws criminalizing sodomy, which was used to arrest and harass gay men, was unconstitutional. Discriminatory attitudes, however, are still evident in the U.S. In the 2012 Outlook Survey, 53 percent agreed, some strongly, that homosexuality should be denounced. At the same time, a majority (65 percent) opposed policies that would ban members of sexual minority groups from working with children. A majority (54 percent) said that churches should not ban LGBTQ+ people from becoming religious leaders. Similarly, most (57 percent) favored laws that do not discriminate against sexual minorities who want to adopt, and 56 percent support civil rights protection for sexual minority groups.

DO STEREOTYPES IMPACT POLICY OPINIONS?

In the 2012 Outlook Survey, respondents were asked to rate lesbians and gay men on only one social trait, namely that of being masculine or feminine. Respondents were also asked to rate White women and men on this trait. Respondents rated each group on these scales ranging from 1 to 7. To determine if lesbians and gay men were rated differently than White women and men, scores were subtracted to create scales ranging from –6 to 6. A score of zero means that both groups were rated similarly. A negative score repre-

TABLE 7.1. Public Opinion on Civil Unions and Marriage

	Percent
Allow legal marriage	40
Allow civil unions	32
Disallow civil unions and marriages	28

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

TABLE 7.2. Public Opinion on Gay Rights Social Policies

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Denouncing homosexuality	29	24	n/a	17	30
Allow sexual minorities to work with children	33	32	n/a	19	17
Allow sexual minorities to become religious leaders	28	25	n/a	17	31
Allow sexual minorities to have and raise children	32	25	n/a	20	23
Favor antidiscrimination laws for sexual minorities	35	21	30	4	9

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

sented stereotyped opinions about lesbians being the masculine type, and a positive score represented stereotyped opinions about White women being the masculine type. The average scores for the scale are shown as histograms in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. Respondents were more likely to hold stereotypical opinions about gay men than lesbian women. The mean was –0.77 for lesbian women, indicating that some respondents rated lesbian women as more masculine than White women. More respondents felt that gay men were more feminine than White men, as the mean on this scale for gay men versus White (presumably heterosexual) men was –1.94. Studies show mixed results in that some find more negative attitudes about gay men than lesbians, while others show more hostility toward lesbians (Herek 2007; Asbrook 2010). A recent study, however, of 23 countries, shows that "gay men are disliked more than lesbian women across all countries" (Bettinsoli, Suppes, and Napier 2019).

To determine if stereotypes reduced support for antidiscrimination poli-



Figure 7.1. Histogram of Masculine Type Stereotype about Lesbians and White Women (Weighted Data; Negative scores represent stereotyped opinions about lesbian women; positive scores represent stereotyped opinions about White women)

cies and laws for LGBTQ+ communities, a regression analysis of opinion on four policy items was performed. A number of variables were statistically significant. Shown in Table 7.1, stereotypes about lesbian women were statistically significant predictors of opinion. Those who held the stereotypical belief that lesbian women are the masculine type were more likely to hold traditional opinions that LGBTQ+ people should not work with children, hold religious leadership positions, and raise children. The stereotype about lesbians was not related to attitudes that homosexuality is immoral. The effect of the stereotype on opinion was modest. It pushed opinion some.

The same effect was found for stereotyping queer men, as shown in Table 7.2. In fact, the stereotyping of gay and queer men as feminine types had effects across the board. Those who stereotyped were more likely to oppose LGBTQ+ individuals working with children, having religious leadership positions, and having and raising children. They were more likely to condemn homosexuality as immoral.



Figure 7.2. Histogram of Feminine Type Stereotype about Gay Men and White Men (Weighted Data; Negative scores represent stereotyped opinions about gay men; positive scores represent stereotyped opinions about White men)

Both Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 show how group memberships, political orientations, social class, and region also impact opinion. In all cases, feminists and women were more likely to support nondiscriminatory policies for sexual minority groups. LGBTQ+ membership was not as consistently significant in these models as having LGBTQ+ friendships. Here, either being LGBTQ+ or having LGBTQ+ friends significantly predicted opposition to discriminatory policies. Race, however, had the opposite effect. Members of minority groups were more likely to support discriminatory employment policies and state laws, including those affecting working with children, than nonethnic Whites. Traditional values are sometimes more evident in minority communities than in White ones. Men were only slightly more likely to hold traditional opinions than women, and those with gay and lesbian friends were one-third of a point apart in the liberal direction from those without LGBTQ+ friends on these policy questions. Having queer friends, therefore, had a larger effect than being female and being White.

TABLE 7.3. Regression Analysis of LGBTQ+ Social Policy Opinions with Masculine Stereotype for Lesbian Women (Weighted Analysis)

	Oppose Working with Children		Oppose Religious Leadership Positions		Oppose Having and Raising Children		Homosexuality Immoral	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	1.203**	.281	1.765**	.320	.995**	.296	2.947**	.309
Lesbians are masculine stereotype	.084**	.015	.088**	.017	.064**	.016	.018	.016
Feminist rating (high)	−.006**	.001	−.007**	.001	−.008**	.001	−.180**	.054
Female	−.222**	.050	−.137*	.057	−.237**	.053	−.180**	.054
LGBTQ+	−.029	.129	−.172	.145	.059	.135	−.130	.136
LGBTQ+ friends	−.389**	.053	−.298**	.061	−.325**	.056	−.345**	.058
Minority	.214**	.059	.234**	.066	.086	.061	.075	.063
Party ID (Republican)	.030#	.016	.035#	.018	.030#	.017	.023	.017
Ideology (conservative)	.138**	.023	.160**	.027	.183**	.025	.222**	.025
Married	.166**	.056	.256**	.063	.174**	.059	.259**	.060
Age	.010**	.002	.004*	.002	.009**	.002	.006**	.002
Education	.005	.015	−.019	.016	.019	.015	−.015	.016
Income	−.004	.007	−.003	.008	.000	.008	−.016*	.008
Class ID (upper)	−.142**	.037	−.173**	.042	−.132**	.039	−.156**	.040
South	.109*	.050	.196**	.057	.077	.053	.077	.055
Church fundamentalist	.312**	.057	.507**	.064	.386**	.060	.692**	.062
Citizen	.081	.176	.279	.199	−.023	.185	.292	.203
Survey (difficult)	.082#	.043	.092#	.049	.109*	.045	−.037	.046
(Total cases)	(1,230)		(1,232)		(1,234)		(1,213)	
R-squared	.399		.384		.432		.459	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

TABLE 7.4. Regression Analysis of LGBTQ+ Social Policy Opinions with Feminine Stereotype for Gay Men (Weighted Analysis)

	Oppose Working with Children		Oppose Religious Leadership Positions		Oppose Having and Raising Children		Homosexuality Immoral	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	1.254**	.279	1.833**	.319	1.087**	.295	2.993**	.311
Gay men are feminine stereotype	.127**	.016	.126**	.019	.117**	.017	.046*	.018
Feminist rating	−.006**	.001	−.007**	.001	−.008**	.001	−.007**	.001
Female	−.218**	.050	−.131*	.057	−.242**	.052	−.185**	.055
LGBTQ+	.029	.131	−.135	.148	.093	.137	−.128	.140
LGBTQ+ friends	−.378**	.053	−.282**	.061	−.301**	.056	−.328**	.059
Minority	.180**	.058	.193**	.066	.043	.061	.035	.063
Party ID (Republican)	.030#	.016	.036*	.018	.030#	.017	.025	.017
Ideology (conservative)	.131**	.023	.149**	.026	.176**	.024	.212**	.025
Married	.165**	.055	.249**	.063	.164**	.058	.233**	.061
Age	.010**	.001	.005**	.002	.009**	.002	.006**	.002
Education	.002	.014	−.023	.016	.016	.015	−.017	.016
Income	−.004	.007	−.003	.008	.000	.008	−.016*	.008
Class ID (upper)	−.136**	.037	−.171**	.042	−.126**	.039	−.152**	.040
South	.098*	.050	.182**	.057	.062	.053	.069	.055
Church fundamentalist	.282**	.056	.492**	.064	.374**	.059	.703**	.062
Citizen	.060	.174	.260	.199	−.055	.184	.276	.204
Survey (difficult)	.077#	.042	.093#	.048	.103*	.045	−.038	.047
(Total cases)	(1,227)		(1,229)		(1,231)		(1,209)	
R-squared	.407		.386		.438		.453	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

Ideology and party membership were also statistically significant in these regression models. Strongly identified conservatives and Republicans are more likely to hold traditional opinions than strongly identified liberals and Democrats. In the 2000s, Democrats began to oppose discriminatory laws, including the policy of discharging openly gay and lesbian members of the military given their sexual orientation. Age, social class identification, marital status, church beliefs, and region were statistically significant predictors of opinion. Older Americans favored the preservation of discriminatory policies, while younger individuals favor equal social rights. Upper- and upper-middle-class people were less likely to oppose liberal social policies for LGBTQ+ people than middle-class, working, and poor respondents. Married respondents calling themselves born-again Christians or church fundamentalists were more hostile to equal rights for members of the LGBTQ+ community, as were people living in the South. Finally, those who thought that the internet survey was a difficult task were more likely to oppose antidiscrimination laws for LGBTQ+ people. Overall, feminists, liberals, women, and friends of members of the LGBTQ+ community were more likely to support antidiscrimination policies and laws for sexual minority groups. Traditionalists representing those who do not see a need for civil rights protection for LGBTQ+ people also tended to be self-declared conservatives, working class, church fundamentalists, and those from the South.

Table 7.5 shows a comparison of the stereotype scale about lesbians, gays, racial resentment, and White ethnocentrism on opposition to same-sex marriage or civil unions in 2012. In this instance, only stereotypes about lesbians were not statistically linked to opposition to equal marriage or union rights. Overall, gay male stereotypes and racial beliefs are important, however, and are involved in these policy debates. Hostility about perceived lifestyles of gay men may structure opinions concerning gay rights, prolonging what might be considered emerging, settled legal matters. Racial resentment and ethnocentrism have been found to have broad effects on social policies, and this finding supports that racial opinions structure attitudes about other minority groups.

IS THE CONCERN OF AIDS STILL A NEGATIVE FORCE IN SEXUAL ORIENTATION POLITICS?

In the 2012 survey, respondents were asked how concerned they were about the spread of HIV/AIDS in their communities. A plurality or 43 percent said

TABLE 7.5. Logistic Regression Analysis of Support for Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Unions with Lesbian and Gay Male Stereotypes, Racial Resentment, and White Ethnocentrism (Weighted Analysis)

	Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Unions	
	B	S.E.
Lesbian stereotype (favor)	.005	.007
Gay male stereotype (favor)	.037**	.008
Racial resentment (low to high)	.039**	.011
White ethnocentrism (–100 to 100)	.002**	.000

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey

Note: Not shown are control variables in the model, specifically, Constant, feminist rating, female, LGBTQ+, LGBTQ+ friends, minority, party ID, ideology, married, age, education, income, social class ID, South, church fundamentalist, citizen, survey difficulty.

**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

that they were somewhat concerned. One-third said that they were not concerned at all. Only a minority felt either extremely concerned (9 percent) or very concerned (15 percent). The media first reported on AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) in the early 1980s. It was considered to be a form of cancer that also attacked the immune system. The HIV virus was later identified as the cause of AIDS. The first set of publicly identified victims in the U.S. were gay men, and then drug users and prostitutes in the Black community, as the virus is spread through sexual intercourse or needles. Later, the origins of the HIV virus were found in sub-Saharan Africa, where a large percentage of HIV deaths and infections exist today. The HIV virus spread globally and has caused the death of millions, while tens of millions live with the HIV virus. In 2014, scientists reported having found a possible cure for two HIV-infected newborn infants (Fox 2014). Today, HIV antiviral medications make it possible for many to live with HIV and to not pass it on to their partners.

The HIV virus created a climate of fear and generated new hostility against LGBTQ+ individuals, Black women, and sub-Saharan Africans. In the 1980s and 1990s, the disease increased rates of violence against individuals because of their race, gender, and sexual orientation (e.g., Johnson 1987). To determine whether concern about the spread of AIDS is linked to hostility toward Blacks, gays, and lesbians, a regression analysis of these group's ratings by survey respondents was performed. In addition, the masculine/feminine stereotype measures were combined to form a scale and added to the regression models to determine if they, as well as concern about AIDS, are statistically linked to opinions about Blacks, lesbian women, and gay men.

TABLE 7.6. Regression Analysis of People with HIV/AIDS, Black People, Lesbians, and Gays (Feeling Thermometer Group Ratings) with AIDS Concern and Stereotype of Lesbians and Gay Men Scale (Weighted Analysis)

	Favorable Ratings									
	People with HIV/AIDS		Lesbian Women		Gay Men		Lesbians/Gays		Blacks	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
(Constant)	50.077**	6.692	46.385**	7.283	52.020**	7.339	55.821**	7.719	40.006**	6.541
AIDS Concern (low-high)	–.623	.713	–1.768*	.772	–2.294**	.783	–1.721*	.797	–.726	.698
Stereotype scale (favor)	–3.042**	.465	–4.344**	.503	–4.524**	.508	–2.811**	.514	–1.951**	.451
Feminist rating	.179**	.029	.227**	.031	.176**	.032	.264**	.032	.164**	.028
Female	3.119*	1.308	4.406**	1.413	7.787**	1.423	5.179**	1.456	3.237*	1.272
LGBTQ+	3.516	3.353	10.883**	3.639	12.224**	3.670	15.570**	3.894	–5.015	3.178
LGBTQ+ friends	2.242	1.388	12.755**	1.504	10.866**	1.519	8.627**	1.572	–.621	1.348
Minority	–1.890	1.532	4.036*	1.659	3.501*	1.684	2.030	1.704	7.147**	1.486
Party ID	–.225	.411	–.551	.445	–.501	.446	.319	.455	–.324	.396
Ideology	–1.857**	.594	–1.641*	.644	–2.794**	.646	–4.661**	.661	–.023	.573
Married	–.058	1.450	2.740#	1.569	–1.020	1.433	–1.490	1.611	1.117	1.409
Age	.023	.039	–.149**	.042	–.108*	.043	–.130**	.044	.011	.038
Education	.549	.372	.098	.402	.379	.403	.514	.412	1.543**	.357
Income	–.345#	.190	–.209	.205	–.023	.208	–.010	.211	–.591**	.184
Social class	–1.562	.970	1.356	1.043	1.842	1.050	.241	1.076	–1.773#	.938
South	.813	1.309	.102	1.413	–1.020	1,433	.797	1.452	4.210**	1.267
Church fundamentalist	2.947*	1.479	–7.181**	1.595	–5.893**	1.608	–7.007**	1.636	7.392**	1.427
Citizen	3.709	4.553	–1.518	4.940	–5.139	4.977	2.747	5.285	6.797	4.408
Survey	–2.065#	1.118	–1.404	1.198	–1.796	1.209	–2.991*	1.232	–.169	1.072
(Total cases)	(1,224)		(1,233)		(1,227)		(1,211)		(1,224)	
R-Squared	.156		.316		.331		.349		.143	

Source: 2012 Outlook Survey
**$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; #$p < .10$

For comparison purposes, the results from a fifth OLS regression model estimating the effect of AIDS concern on a feeling thermometer rating for people with AIDS are also provided. The computations are shown in Table 7.6.

Concern about AIDS was statistically significant in three of the five models, indicating that, today, hostility toward these groups is found to be based on this disease. The three statistically significant predictor is for lesbians, gays, and gays and lesbians as a group. Those who expressed a high level of concern about AIDS gave significantly lower evaluations for lesbians and gays than those who expressed little or no concern about the illness. The effect was modest. Moving from one unit of concern increased the rating of lesbians by nearly one and one-half points to two points on a scale from 0 to 100. Thus, fears about contracting AIDS in general appear to still be linked to opinions about groups believed to be at high risk for contracting the disease, but the results are not conclusive. Finally, concern about AIDS also had no effect on the group rating for "people with HIV/AIDS" and Blacks. Thus, public concern about the disease is not directly transferred to stigmatize victims of other groups believed to be at higher risk than the general population.

A scale was created combining the stereotype of lesbians as masculine and gay men as feminine. Stereotypes about the femininity or masculinity of lesbians and the femininity of gays were statistically significant predictors in all five models, including the models concerning people with HIV/AIDS and Blacks. Those who felt that lesbian women were more masculine and gay men were more feminine than White women and men, respectively, gave these groups lower ratings than individuals who did not stereotype. The magnitude of the stereotype effect on group ratings varied. Those who held these stereotypes were on average four degrees per unit change colder in their assessments of lesbians and of gays than those who rejected the stereotypes about lesbians and gays. Ideally, the survey should have contained a separate group rating for *Black gay men* and Black lesbian women, apart from Blacks, gay men, and lesbian women since these stereotype measures of masculinity and femininity are also understood in racial and ethnic terms.

Being LGBTQ+ or having LGBTQ+ friends had the largest effects on the group ratings, except for the ratings of people with HIV and of Blacks. Being LGBTQ+, for example, increased the group feeling thermometer rating for lesbian/gays by 16 degrees on average. Having LGBTQ+ friends increased the ratings for lesbian women by 13 degrees (see Table 7.6). Minority group members gave Blacks on average ratings about eight points higher than Whites.

Ideology, but not party affiliation, was linked to negative evaluations of LGBTQ+ individuals. Older respondents also gave colder evaluations of LGBTQ+ individuals than younger people. Findings reported in Table 7.3 show that the young are more likely to oppose discriminatory policies against LGBTQ+ people than the old.

Education, income, and social class had few consistent effects (see Table 7.6). Education was linked to positive evaluation of Blacks, while income and social class were tied to negative evaluations about this group. Respondents in the South and non-South respondents rated LGBTQ+ groups similarly, but southerners also gave higher ratings to Blacks as a group than nonsoutherners. Church fundamentalists, or born-again Christians, were consistently negative about lesbian women, gay men, and lesbians/gays than those who don't consider themselves born again; the effect of being a born-again Christian was statistically significant. Church fundamentalism, however, was statistically associated with favorable feelings about people with HIV/AIDS and Blacks. Those having difficulty taking the survey in two instances gave lower ratings on average than those able to take the survey with ease.

The results here show that, in general, concern about the spread of AIDS was present in respondents' attitudes about sexual minority groups. At the same time, attitudes about people living with HIV/AIDS and Blacks were not directly relevant. It emerged as statistically significant in three of the five models and, thus, cannot be ruled out as irrelevant as a basis for bias against the LGBTQ+ community. In addition to concern about AIDS, simple stereotypes about lesbians and gays were associated with negative opinions about sexual minority groups, people with HIV/AIDS, and Blacks. Difference promotes stereotypes, and these stereotypes were found to be more importantly linked to opposition to same-sex marriage rights than racial resentment and White ethnocentrism. Being LGBTQ+ or having LGBTQ+ friends was an important predictor of favorable attitudes toward the LGBTQ+ community.

CONCLUSION

Stereotypes about lesbian women and gay men impact U.S. politics. Controlling for political affiliations, education, and other demographic measures, the study showed that respondents who deemed lesbian women as masculine types and gay men as feminine types were less likely to support antidiscrimination laws and policies for sexual minority groups. These antidiscrim-

ination policies include equal adoption rights for gays and lesbians and allowing LGBTQ+ people to work with children and have equal marriage rights. Stereotypes about the perceived masculinity or femininity of lesbians and gays are impressions that members of these groups do not conform to standard views about how men and women are supposed to appear and act. Stereotypes that gays and lesbians violate ideals about defined gender roles have been used to deny social rights to members of sexual minority groups.

Thus, as in the case of racial-gendered stereotypes about different groups of women, the increased visibility of members of the LGBTQ+ community in media should help combat these stereotypes of lesbian women and gay men as nontraditional people who should not be accorded equal opportunities as jobseekers and equal treatment as employees. Having a variety of prominent people, including government officials, television characters, journalists, and church leaders who disconfirm stereotypes might reduce their significance. However, difference in the lifestyles of LGBTQ+ individuals as shown on television and other media might also promote hostility.

The 2012 Outlook Survey did find evidence that concern about the spread of AIDS or the HIV virus is used to form negative opinions about people with HIV/AIDS, Blacks, lesbians, and gays. There was a linkage of concern about AIDS in the group rating for lesbians/gays that was statistically significant. Thus, the politics of the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals appears to still be impacted by this disease.

CHAPTER 8

Gendered Pluralism

Gender, race-ethnicity, and sexuality operate as social structures within U.S. society. Each structure is multidimensional. Empirically, we have shown that these structures are embodied at the individual level and reflect the intersection of biology, bodies, and culture to influence political and policy attitudes in support of equality for women, racial-ethnic minorities, and LGBTQ+ persons. Gender identities, ideology, and gender memberships all contribute to the politics of U.S. individuals. Beyond the individual level, we find the interactional dimension to be similarly significant, as stereotypes, beliefs, and ideologies influence public opinion regarding societal policies. That said, concerning gender, the empirical analysis finds support for both identity and pluralist models of public opinion. While gender, gender identities, and feminist support were consistent predictors, there were notable areas in politics where women were not very different from men. Thus, we fall short of a claim that gender is a strong political fault line and fosters identity politics. Women are internally divided in ideologies and voting behavior, even as gender, group loyalties, and feminist thinking contribute to U.S. politics. The book's findings may disappoint those seeking to define this era as containing robust women's politics. Women's politics in the U.S. is weak to moderate. The organic basis of the women's vote is present, but political elites will have to campaign harder to highlight the plight of women and gender inequality. Although abortion politics is intensifying, the urgency in U.S. women's politics is lacking. Feminists will have to counter conservative beliefs that gender does not limit one's opportunities to advance. Political leaders need to be more attune to the problems of U.S. women, beyond making symbolic gestures; if women's empowerment were made a national political goal, based on the survey evidence, a favorable response from the electorate would emerge.

THE AMERICAN DREAM

In key instances, men and women were similar, notably with respect to their hopes for the American Dream and in their partisan and ideological identifications. The American Dream serves as a proxy for the extent to which individuals adhere to institutional rules governing upward mobility and align with these institutional logics. We explored whether women, minorities, and LGBTQ+ people think they are less able to achieve the American Dream than men, Whites, and heterosexual people. Women and minorities earn less than men and Whites, and they have significantly less wealth than men and Whites. All three groups face barriers to wealth and equal life chances comparatively. The American Dream is often seen as owning a home, sending children to college, doing better than one's parents, becoming wealthy, and having a secure retirement. Gender, race-ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ membership, as it turned out, were relatively unimportant in determining attitudes and perceptions about the likelihood of attaining these life goals.

That U.S. men and women had similar expectations about their futures is important in understanding why women are expected to vote like men concerning the role of government in facilitating the achievement of the American Dream. Different expectations about the attainability of the American Dream were rooted in social class, levels of optimism, and concern about whether hard work is rewarded in the U.S. Respondents who considered themselves poor and working class were not as sure that they would achieve the American Dream as those who identified with the upper classes. While optimism was a source of positivity about the American Dream, skepticism about the rewards of hard work generated negativity. Finally, those who felt less certain about their ability to send their child to college or to become wealthy were the same individuals who showed concern about race discrimination. Thus, concerning beliefs about the attainment of the American Dream, social tensions rooted in social class as well as differences in social outlooks are more prominent forces in U.S. politics than are gender, race-ethnicity, and sexual orientation differences alone.

These 2012 findings also contradict statistical work in the 1990s showing that despite economic success (Hochschild 1995), Blacks were less likely than Whites sharing the same financial success to feel that the American Dream was attainable. However, this finding, especially for Blacks and other minority groups, could be temporary. One study found that Barack Obama's election as the first Black president made Blacks more optimistic (Stout and Le 2012).

Optimism strongly predicts faith in the American Dream, and that optimism might fade. The story in the U.S. may not be that it is the country that has elected its first Black president but one where hate crimes and police bias against Black people are on the rise. COVID-19 has had a large effect on minorities in the U.S. along with the economic crisis wrought by the pandemic. Nevertheless, our finding appears to be consistent with a Pew Research Center report (2017b) showing that while fewer African Americans and Hispanics than Whites reported achieving the American Dream, most Blacks (62 percent), about half of Hispanics (51 percent), and a plurality Whites (42 percent) reported being on their way to achieving it. The three groups did not vary considerably in believing that achieving the American Dream was out of reach (Whites, 15 percent; Blacks, 19 percent, and Hispanics, 17 percent).

In considering the interactional dimension of the gender structure, we note that feminism had no effect on belief in the American Dream except on minority women. Here intersectionality mattered. Feminist minority group women were more likely than their nonfeminist counterparts to feel that they were farther along the road to achieving the American Dream. The effect was small but statistically significant. In contrast, identification with the lives of U.S. women, if statistically significant, had a negative effect. Those who strongly believed that their fate is linked to all women were less likely than weak identifiers to think that it was easy to achieve a secure retirement and do better than their parents. Similarly, among Black respondents, identification with the lives of U.S. Black women also had a negative effect. Those who felt that what happens to Black women in the U.S. impacts their lives felt that homeownership, retiring securely, and becoming wealthy were not easy, but hard to achieve. Thus, while gender was unimportant in this analysis of the American Dream, feminism and gender identifications were shown to have effects on perceptions of the American Dream. These gender identifications establish the potentiality of gender to be salient in U.S. elections. As women and especially women of color make bids for political office, they can speak to the hardships in women's lives in their quest to fulfill the American Dream. As it stands, belief in the American Dream is foundational in conservative U.S. politics.

MARITAL STATUS

As an individual dimension of the gender social structure, marital status significantly divided women. Marriage had a powerful conservatizing influence

on women's public policy beliefs. As discussed in Chapter 3, married women were more likely than single women to identify with the Republican Party. Importantly, the data did not find a partisan gap among men and women. In fact, women were no more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than men. Since 2012, Republicans have had more women running for Congress, and a few conservative congresswomen have emerged as national leaders. Thus far, there is nothing to suggest that women will reject the GOP. The failure to find a partisan divide as deep as the one that exists between minorities and Whites is a reason why some express skepticism about a politics of women. Nevertheless, gender remains an important cleavage in U.S. politics.

There was a consistent gender gap in the policy opinions of women and men, with women more liberal. To summarize, marriage, like social class, was very important in defining one's political identity for women, but not especially for men. Thus, married U.S. women are more likely to favor the Republican Party over the Democratic Party, and married individuals were more likely to identify as politically conservative than single, divorced, and widowed individuals. Marriage typically increases one's social class standing, which can lead women to reconsider their political interests as more economic than social. Men tend to be socialized as fully focused on their economic interests, and, thus, marriage may not lead them to think about their policy interests as different. That a marriage gap more than a gender gap explains partisanship and ideology is important, as this means married U.S. women may not have interests identical to those of unmarried U.S. women. Marriage appears to be an important source of division in the politics of women. The decision by women to have children without a second financial provider was most criticized by married people.

Marital status had a consistent, mostly conservative effect on policy views. Married respondents held socially conservative views, including disapproval of interracial and same-sex marriages. In one instance, however, married respondents were more likely than unmarried ones to support paid family leave policies. In this policy domain, a gender gap emerged as well. Women were more likely than men to favor paid family leaves, antisexual harassment policies, gender quotas to combat gender discrimination, and making welfare eligibility permanent. A gender gap existed in opinions on antidiscrimination protection for gays, lesbians, and queers as well as on sentencing laws. Women were significantly more likely than men to favor antidiscrimination job protection for the LGBTQ+ and life imprisonment over the death penalty. Yet marital status was among many important determinants of partisanship and ideological identifications.

Family income was important, as high-income respondents were both more likely to support the Republican Party and identify with liberals than low-income respondents.

Interactional dimensions of gender, race-ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ structures were also significant. Racial resentment had a strong effect as well, fueling support for the Republican Party as well as conservative identifications. Republican president Donald Trump issued divisive racial messages in both the 2016 and 2020 elections. Furthermore, while gender was unimportant as a determinant of partisanship, support for feminism had a strong and consistent effect. The strength of feminist support in the analysis contradicts claims that feminism is irrelevant. Those who favor feminists were more likely to be Democrats. Thus, while Democrats may not be able to count on the women's vote in every election, they have the share of the population who support feminists fighting for gender equality. We conclude that a gender gap is a persistent feature of policy opinions but less so in terms of partisan and ideological identities. Feminist group ratings performed most consistently over gender. Thus, more than being female, when people have politicized gender identities as feminists seeking gender equality, these identities have strong and persistent effects on public opinion. Women's politics can be strengthened if feminists enter into politics and make direct appeals to their supporters.

FEMINISTS VERSUS WOMEN'S GROUP FATE

Chapter 4 establishes that identification with feminist causes and an identification with women promote a liberal social policy agenda. Identification with women was measured as linked fate. The survey question reads, "Do you think what happens generally to women in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" If respondents answer yes, they are asked whether it will affect them "a lot," "some," or "not very much." About one-third of the women respondents said no, while a majority or 66 percent said yes. Gender identification for women is slightly more widespread than race identification among Blacks. In 2012, about 55 percent of Blacks believe that what happens to Blacks in this country will affect their lives; the rest do not. Women identifiers might also have divergent politics. While significant inequality exists between men and women, some feel that this inequality is natural because women are essentially different from men.

The women-linked fate measure, however, did not perform as well as the feminist rating in predicting policy attitudes. When it was statistically significant, however, its effect was generally a liberal one. Those who identified with the lives of women in this country were more likely to support government assistance programs, some women and family policies, and job protection from bias for gays, lesbians, and queers. On social trends, however, we see that women identities have a conservative effect. Women who are strong women identifiers were more likely to label women bad for electing to have no children or to single-parent than weak women identifiers. The feminist rating measure, by comparison to the women common fate indicator, was a more consistent predictor of liberal opinions. It may be that feminists, despite the splintering and multiplicity of groups and individuals calling themselves feminist, have a more cohesive political agenda than women as a group. The agenda of feminists, therefore, is more consistently linked to liberal politics.

The interaction models, however, show that feminism at times has a symbolic effect on women's politics. The effect of being a woman who favors feminists was less liberal than the effect of being a man who favors feminists. A similar pattern was found at times for women's group identifications. Women express solidarity with feminists and women but do not embrace strong left-of-center positions. Support for feminism and an identification with women have more dramatic effects on men's politics. Feminist and women-centered women are no more radical than feminist and women-centered men. Feminist and women's politics are more contained than radical, as women enjoy expressing solidarity with women's groups but are not extremely liberal in their politics.

BLACK WOMEN IDENTITIES AND INTERSECTIONALITY THEORY

The book examined the politics of Blacks separately in Chapter 5. Black men identify equally strongly with Black women and tend to hold views as liberal as those of Black women. However, there is still evidence that Black women more strongly identify with the Democratic Party than Black men. The coolness of Black men toward the Democratic Party is not based on a policy gap. We suspect that Black men, as sometimes more privileged members of society than Black women, dislike identifying with disadvantaged, underprivileged members of society. The Democratic Party's appeal to the "underdog"

may not appeal to them. Democrats might have to recruit men of color voters based on their masculinity and highlight their role as progressive "change agents."

The intersectionality analysis sheds light on the presence of moderate to Republican viewpoints among Blacks. Younger Black males who don't favor feminists are less attached to the Democratic Party, while Blacks holding racial resentment perspectives were also less identified with the Democratic Party. As progressives in the Democratic Party debate whether the U.S. should adopt universal health care plans and cradle-to-grave social policies, including subsidized daycare and paid family leaves, they will find segments in the Black community hostile to these policies. These are Blacks—roughly 44 percent of Blacks in 2012—who generally don't identify with the lives and problems of Black women.

Is feminism as central to Black politics, as is an identification with the lives of Black women? As compared to Black men, African American women are significantly more likely to support feminists and to feel a sense of linked fate with Black women. A significant class divide emerged for all Blacks, as well as among Black women and among Black men separately. Upper-class Blacks are less likely to feel a sense of common fate with all Black women than are those holding different class statuses. This divide did not emerge with respect to positive feelings toward feminists. Black LGBTQ+ individuals were far more likely than Black heterosexuals to feel positively toward feminists.

To examine interaction dimensions of the gender social structure as it intersects with the race-ethnicity structure, we examined the effects of both feminist support and identification with Black women on public policy opinions. Both feminist support and an identification with Black women promoted left-of-center policy views among Blacks. The liberalizing effects of feminist support and Black women's linked fate on policy opinion were both strong and consistent. Feminist support and identification with Black women increased support for gender and family policies such as paid leaves, health insurance for children, and legal bans on sexual harassment. With group identification measures included in the models, gender was not often a significant influence on the policy opinions of Blacks. Furthermore, the findings challenge claims that feminism, because of its White middle-class bias, is second to a politics organized around the interests of Black women alone. Rather, feminism is important in Black politics too. Racial resentment beliefs also impact Black politics; they were statistically linked to Blacks' par-

tisan identities and ratings of Democrat Barack Obama and Republican Mitt Romney. Black men share the politics of Black women, except for political party. Black men may feel frustrated with the Democratic Party, and that may make conservative Republican candidates attractive. That said, Black women and men are more united politically than divided. Racial resentment and social class are more important than gender as sources of division in Black politics today.

STEREOTYPES ABOUT BLACK WOMEN AND POLICY VIEWS

We now turn exclusively to an examination of the effect of interactional dimensions on public policy. While many respondents rejected stereotypes about minority women, they nevertheless still influence public opinion. In Chapter 6, the notion that Black women are disagreeable, bad parents, and public welfare recipients, relative to White women, reduced support for making welfare eligible for life to poor families and creating government-sponsored preschools and daycares for children. Other measures of resentment toward disadvantaged social groups that included both men and women, and affective feeling thermometer ratings of White ethnocentrism, also had consistent effects on policy opinions. However, the empirical fact that such simple stereotypes continue to structure opinion means that attitudes about Black women are potent symbols in national policy debates. Stereotypes about Black women hamper efforts to increase support for free preschools, restoring the lifetime entitlement to welfare assistance for families with dependent children, and funding for other programs to assist and empower working-class and poor families.

Subgroups of women are stereotyped, and these stereotypes contribute to U.S. politics. Black women are stereotyped, and these stereotypes exert significantly conservative influence in the politics of Americans across a variety of public policy matters. The fact that gendered-racial stereotypes still structure public policy debates in the U.S. represents an important finding in the book. Beliefs about women as a dimension of a broader gender social structure, and about Black women, as they represent the intersection of the gender social structure with the racial-ethnic structure, partially explain why social policy in the U.S. is limited compared to other Western democracies. Examining eight stereotypes, three consistently linked together, we find that Black women were rated as more disagreeable, poorer parents, and more

likely to be welfare dependent than White women. Constructing a scale, belief in these grouped stereotypes reduced support for government spending programs and women and family policies; and the stereotype increased support for harsher sentencing policies, including the death penalty, and disapproval of interracial marriage and single parenting by women. Furthermore, the stereotype scale about Black women performed as well as the racial resentment and White ethnocentrism attitudes.

STEREOTYPES, SEXUAL MINORITIES, AND COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE

Chapter 7 examined whether stereotypes about lesbians and gays served to increase opposition to policies that would equalize them with other members of society. The results were strongly conclusive as well. As was the case for stereotypes about Black women, beliefs that lesbian women were more masculine than White women and that gay men were more feminine than White men were statistically linked to opposition to LGBTQ+ people working with children, holding religious positions, and having and raising children. Those with stereotypical beliefs about lesbians and gays were also more likely to believe that homosexuality was immoral. These findings emerged holding a large set of other factors constant, including being LGBTQ+ and having LGBTQ+ friends, which strongly and positively in the models predicted support for LGBTQ+ people having equal social rights in society and viewing homosexuality as moral. In this case, racial resentment and White ethnocentrism, when included separately, were not statistically linked to equality of social roles for gays, lesbians, and queers. Thus, again, even as the LGBTQ+ community makes strides in winning equality of rights in the U.S., stereotypes will cloud their political and social outcomes.

Chapter 7 establishes that stereotypes about lesbians and gays also impact U.S. politics. In 2016, according to CNN exit polls, LGBTQ+ people represented 5 percent of the 2016 national vote. Roughly 77 percent voted for the Democratic candidate in the 2016 presidential election according to the *Washington Post* exit polls. Being LGBTQ+, however, had less consistent effects than gender. In the few instances that it was statistically significant, LGBTQ+ identity had mixed to conservative effects. While hostile to feminists, for example, gay, bisexual, and queer Black men were more likely to strongly affiliate with the Democratic Party than heterosexual Black men. It may be that the number of LGBTQ respondents in the 2012 outlook Survey

was too small to do a subgroup analysis and investigate further. We find clear evidence that being friends with or having family within this group may be more important politically than belonging to it. Friends and family of LGBTQ+ individuals were significantly more likely to support gay rights and liberal social policies than those without such connections. In some cases, these friends and relatives were more supportive of progressive agendas than LGBTQ+ persons as a whole. We also lacked a LGBTQ+ common fate measure. It may be that strong common fate identification with the LGBTQ+ community may have a consistent liberal effect. Overall, our findings support the claim that the LGBTQ+ community is ideologically diverse.

Thus, as shown in Chapter 3, LGBTQ+ identity has no effect on party identification. Although the group's 2016 presidential vote was strongly Democratic, LGBTQ+ people are no more likely to claim Democratic identities than non-LGBTQ people, in contrast to minority individuals, who are significantly more likely to favor the Democratic Party than Whites. At the same time, LGBTQ+ respondents were more likely than heterosexual ones to self-identify as political liberals. Like women, there may be important political divisions within the LGBTQ+ community. Yet, like women, there is solidarity behind symbolic efforts in electing LGBTQ+ candidates and celebrating group identity. As the nation's first openly gay candidate for president, Pete Buttigieg's campaign in 2020 did not emphasize gay rights, as the candidate claimed to be a president for "everyone." Barack Obama also campaigned on behalf of "everyone," not just Blacks. Candidates may do just as well emphasizing the symbolism of the candidacies today than having specific policy platforms aimed at empowering the group. One innovative study found that Blacks value descriptive representation more than substantive representation (Hayes and Hibbing 2017). Other social groups, including the LGBTQ+, may also want greater descriptive representation in government even without substantive representation. Candidates may also rationally avoid strong identity politics for fear of a political backlash. Pluralist theory fails to account for the strong reaction against group empowerment politics for marginalized groups. There are limits to how far groups can push through routine electoral politics, even in established democracies, without terrible political costs.

THE GENDER GAP IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS

The analysis did not find overwhelming evidence for women's identity politics, namely that women, based on their collective experiences of marginal-

ization and oppression, center their politics around their identities. There are several reasons against a claim of identity politics for women. First, women don't necessarily see themselves locked out of the American Dream, although identification with women causes some to doubt how easy it is to build wealth. Second, some of the statistical evidence even indicated that solidarity with feminists and women is symbolic for women. Women's expressed affinity for feminists and women does not push them toward extreme left politics even as it is associated with increased rates of political participation. Surveys reveal that most women don't see elections of women as empowerment vehicles. In a 2020 ANES survey, only 14 percent of women said that electing women was extremely important. Identity politics broadly is not strongly supported by women. Figure 8.1 shows the percentages of group members who felt electing Hispanics, Blacks, Asians, LGBTQ+ people, and women was "extremely important." Over one-third of Blacks thought electing Blacks to government was extremely important. About 29 percent of Latinos and 30.5 percent of LGBTQ+ people thought it was extremely important to elect members of their groups to government. Only 17 percent of Asians thought electing Asian Americans to government was extremely important. Blacks, Latinos, and members of the LGBTQ+ community express greater political solidarity for their group than women, based on this measure. Women are less likely to view themselves as oppressed as a group than these other groups. There is less urgency to their politics as a result.

Third, a gender gap in party membership was not found in the 2012 Outlook Survey. As pluralists argue, other overlapping group memberships, such as race and ethnicity, might best predict party membership. Women are not solid Democrats in the way that Blacks are. In their theory of racialized social constraint, White and Laird (2020) argue that Blacks are socially pressured by other Blacks to support the Democratic Party. Blacks can be strongly disapproving of Black Republicans in their social networks. There was evidence of a small gender gap in partisanship, however, among Blacks in the Outlook Survey. Black women vote heavily Democratic in elections, and they are more likely than Black men to identify as strong Democrats. Compared to Black women, some Black men, despite societal racism, may not wish to identify with the oppressed and seek policies that advance already privileged members of society. Democrats might seek to develop policies that target minority men for empowerment.

While women's linked fate identities were generally consistent predictors of public opinion, women's identifications were not directly associated



Figure 8.1. Percentage of Those Who Said Electing Their Group Members Was Extremely Important in 2020

with the 2008 presidential vote and 2012 ratings of Barack Obama and Mitt Romney (analysis not shown). There was some statistical evidence shown in Table 3.8 that feminist types were more likely to vote for Republican John McCain in 2008. McCain had picked a female, Alaska governor Sarah Palin, as his vice-presidential running mate. The appeal of descriptive representation for feminist backers underscores the symbolic importance of a feminist identity. As a presidential campaign strategy, picking a female running mate may win some women's votes. But the failure to find group identities and feminist solidarity strongly aligned with the Democratic vote in 2008 and 2012 also leaves women's politics still less defined as a political group.

Their support for the cause of gender equality through left-wing politics should logically be centered in Democratic Party politics, but there is little evidence of this to date. Much is made of the fact that women are economically and socially divided, but there are commonalities between them, particularly as women also continue to serve disproportionately as caregivers. If the Democratic Party organized a strong female empowerment agenda

alongside Medicare for all and the Green New Deal, which the Republican Party opposes, based on their liberal and group-centered profile, it is possible that women would move decisively to the Democratic Party. Thus, there is the potential for women to form a political bloc if candidates made stronger appeals for their votes on the basis of a women's empowerment agenda. However, as noted previously, voters can react against candidates who engage in group politics. Candidates may rationally avoid making pro-women appeals, even though this book finds that many voters align themselves with the politics of women. Social norms, power, and inequality cause elected representatives to avoid divisive issues such as reproductive rights. In the end, the gender gap might be greater if Democratic candidates fearlessly talked about empowering women, ending gender inequality, and protecting reproductive rights.

A CASE FOR GENDERED PLURALISM

As pluralist theory would predict, the political context is important, thus undercutting claims of an identity politics for women. In general, women are not that concerned about the problem of gender discrimination. In a 2013 national telephone survey, only 17 percent felt that there was "a lot" of prejudice and discrimination against women in the U.S., and another 17 percent felt that there was "none."[1] Most felt that women were penalized "some" and only "a little" for their gender in the U.S. today. Women, however, are slightly less likely than men to believe that the problem of gender discrimination no longer exists. A minority of women, however, still insist that society penalizes women for their gender. In 2020, in an ANES survey, 26 percent said that women were discriminated against "a lot" or "a great deal."

Women also respond to the political context. The candidacies of women in 1992, and the emergence of women's issues during Supreme Court confirmation hearings, for example, increased the political salience of gender for many women (Sapiro and Conover 1997). Campaigns and elections can also activate feelings of female solidarity. However, these events have not pro-

1. Survey by Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Methodology: conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International, February 14–19, 2013, and based on 1,209 telephone interviews. The survey results reported here were obtained from searches of the iPoll Databank and other resources provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

duced a reliable bloc of women voters. In 2016, a bloc of women voters did not organize around the candidacy of Hillary Clinton, the first female nominated for president by a major party. Thus, it may not be the case that mere femaleness leads to political solidarity. The failure of women to reliably vote for female candidates sustains the claim that gender is not especially important politically. Triggering events can make women distressed about gender inequality in the U.S. Under a context where injustices against women become prominent and when gender inequality is understood as illegitimate, ambivalence can change into concern. Thus, instead of gender inequality automatically building strong gender consciousness, identification with women becomes politicized under certain conditions.

Moreover, gender solidarity does not play as significant a role as does race in U.S. politics because women, unlike racial groups, have a tendency to identify with dominant groups, while holding disadvantaged groups responsible for their problems (Sidanius and Pratto 1993; Bobo and Smith 1998; Kluegel and Smith 1986). As noted in Chapter 1, some researchers contend that a concern for discrimination against women is less forceful in democratic nations because democratic values are perceived of as antithetical to social group discrimination (Jackman 1994). Feminism challenges beliefs that favor the status quo and men serving as the dominant group in society. A feminist consciousness involves a commitment to changing the status quo to improve the position of women. While we lacked an identification-as-feminist measure, our measure of support for feminists, calculated as a feeling thermometer, revealed that feminist ideology is not irrelevant in public opinion. Feminists achieved a lot during the 1970s, but many feel that their role in society is much less significant today. In contrast, a gender identification as measured here is a perceived commonality with the lives of women. It does not specifically challenge the status quo. A feminist commitment to social change may bind individuals more tightly than having shared political interests with women. Nevertheless, the low levels of attachment to feminist causes reduces the role of gender in U.S. politics.

Feminism is criticized as having a White, upper-middle-class bias. Thus, while a Black woman's identity might prove to be more salient to Blacks than a feminist one, Blacks did not decisively favor a politics of Black women over solidarity with feminists. That group politics is cooperative and overlaps rather than competes contradicts a pluralistic framework for U.S. politics, where group politics is varied and not especially passionate. And, indeed, as shown in Chapter 5, ratings of feminist support function as well as identifi-

cations with Black women. Feminist ratings had a more consistent impact on social trends than identification with Black women, in fact. The politics of Black women as a subgroup is not often in the public view. These groups, based on one study, don't have the direct impact that large women's groups have on state politics (Weldon 2011). However, Black women's social networks promote political efficacy, social capital, and leadership (Isoke 2013). For example, Chicago has a group of parents of color who organized to combat gang violence in their community. There are also women-of-color groups working on education policy and domestic violence in their communities. Finally, feminism had a bigger impact on the politics of Black men than Black women. Black men with feminist identities were more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than Black men lacking a feminist orientation. While Black men did rate feminists less favorably than Black women, the opinion gap between Black men and Black women was smaller than found nationally.

Feminism and women's identities along with Black women's identities did not push women to the far political left and toward radicalism. In a number of the interaction models, the effect of favoring feminists or having a gender identity was less for women than it was among men. We interpret these findings to indicate that gender identities have symbolic importance to women. They take pleasure in expressing affinity for feminists and for women without participating in the politics of these groups. It is noteworthy that feminism in its multiple forms has radical roots, including an emphasis on sexual liberation. Radical feminists have a deep distrust of a patriarchal system to protect women's rights. Sexual liberation includes society's acceptance of lesbianism and homosexuality, sexual relationships outside of heterosexual marriage, single parenting, and freedom from sexual oppression. U.S. women don't fully embrace these elements of feminism.

Furthermore, solidarity with women and, for Blacks, solidarity with Black women were linked with hostility toward social trends that are part of sexual liberation. Women who strongly express common fate with women expressed hostility toward women who don't reproduce and women as single parents. Black women who strongly identified with the lives of Black women were also more likely to denounce single parenting as bad. Both types expressed hostility toward interracial couples. Women who are strong women and Black women identifiers were not necessarily hostile to same-sex couples, however, while feminist supporters favored the extension of

marriage rights to LGBTQ+ people. Efforts to move society from a male-dominated patriarchal system through a rearrangement of family units are likely to be resisted. The radical imagination of women-identified U.S. women remains limited. They will favor the state's maintenance of the nuclear family, which privileges men in heterosexual relationships.

The book's findings also concern intersectionality theory. The finding that there are Black young men and women who hold conservative beliefs contradicts the claim that the combined harms of disadvantage (age and race, gender and race, etc.) promote liberalism (Mann 2010; Collins 1998). Thus, the individual dimension of the gendered-racial social structures as they intersect may not challenge the existing status quo that supports individual rights over empathy with others within their racial-ethnic and gender group. That said, identification with Black women had a consistent and broad impact on public opinion in the Black community. Black men were not as divided politically from Black women in their opinions. Black men were as likely as Black women to express solidarity with Black women. Black women are said to have triple disadvantages (race, gender, and social class), and those who identify with the lives of Black women were more likely than those lacking those identities to express some doubts about their ability to do well financially in the U.S.; they were more likely to hold liberal opinions concerning government spending programs and women and family policies than those who don't identify with Black women. These findings contradict the finding that a Black woman linked-fate identity favors conservative welfare reform (Tate 2010). However, a shared identity with Black women is not as consistently liberal as feminist support in the Black community; it also contains illiberal tendencies concerning social trends in sexual relations.

Accounts that place women's politics purely within a pluralist framework or identity politics model tend to focus only on the individual dimensions of the gender and racial-ethnic social structures, and are not supported by the book's analysis. Women approach politics differently than men, as gender was significant in many models, and this gender divide contradicts pluralist accounts where political divisions are short-lived and not deep. But interactional dimensions matter. Solidarity as measured by support for feminist groups and identification with the lives of women were consistent predictors in models of public opinion here. Thus, ideologies and beliefs are important. Both measures predicted greater political activism as well. In addition, women's solidarity did not appear to emerge only under special

conditions but was a broad and consistent predictor across a variety of topics. Women also are not only more liberal than men regarding support for basic government programs and women and family policies, but are also more likely to favor humanitarian policies in crime and punishment.

In summary, the findings taken together support a claim that gender in political attitudes functions under *gendered pluralism*. Gender represents more than just one of the many interests expressed in the normal operations of politics. Gender inequality remains deeply embedded in U.S. society and creates a sense of shared fate and solidarity. In *gendered pluralism*, women represent a permanent group, in group processes, that predict political outcomes. Feminism is a prominent force in U.S. politics. Furthermore, while women are not tightly bound together politically, and especially united by political party, a majority still identify with the lives and, presumably, the political interests of women. This identification affects the politics of women in weak to strong ways. Gendered pluralism explains the gender gap. Based on their liberal profile, women vote Democratic when gender concerns, substantive or symbolic, are especially salient. The gender gap is expected to be prominent when the policy gap between Republicans and Democrats is large. Rhetoric that the Republican Party is anti-woman is not enough. While we found only in the Black community a clear gendered partisan divide, with Black women being more likely strong Democrats and Black men being weaker Democrats or Republicans, women are more likely than men to call themselves political liberals than men. Their identities and liberalism make women's politics distinctive. The context is important under gendered pluralism, but women are quick to respond to gender inequality when politicized or when the two parties' presidential candidates noticeably diverge on women policy issues.

This country might see politics become more gendered if identifications with women and their lives grow. They could grow if activists and politicians focus on the barriers to gender equality in the U.S. Women's groups and feminists need to raise consciousness and boost ratings to have a larger impact in U.S. politics. At present, however, a large plurality of respondents do not identify with women. In the 2012 Outlook Survey, of the half that do, only a small minority (9 percent) said what happens to women will affect me "a lot." Similarly, public ratings of feminists are lukewarm, not reaching quite the midpoint at 45 degrees on a feeling thermometer scale of 0 for very cold to 100 for very warm in our 2012 survey. Nationally, it stands at 60 degrees in other surveys. Few women in the U.S., just one-fifth, identify as feminists

(Huffington Post 2013; Keller 2018). In a 2020 ANES survey, about 27 percent of women said that they were feminists, while 3 percent said that they were antifeminists. Most, about 70 percent, said that they were neither feminists nor antifeminists. Working-class women may not value feminism, and this is a real problem.

Other work shows it is an ideological, not class, problem. U.S. women still support sexual divides in society. Cassese and Barnes (2019) argue that there is considerable heterogeneity in the politics of women as a consequence. Sexist beliefs guide their vote choice in favor of Republican candidates. The ANES includes two forms of sexism in surveys. Modern sexism consists of three items: (1) how much attention should the media give to the problem of gender discrimination; (2) whether women seeking equal treatment are seeking special favors; and (3) whether women who complain about discrimination only cause problems. Traditional sexism is surveyed via two questions, namely (1) the extent to which women working outside the home can bond with a child; (2) whether it is better for women to stay at home and men to work. These beliefs are as potent in the politics of voters as is Whiteness as measured as racial resentment (Knuckey 2019). Cassese and Barnes contend that an attack on the Republican Party as antiwoman will not push women out of the GOP camp. Indeed, feminists need to engage in campaigns that highlight how feminism will improve conditions for working-class people, not only the upper class. That said, sexist beliefs are not often organized as a counter to feminism but may exist among voters sympathetic to feminism. Traditional values may exist among women who work outside of the home. Modern work and family dynamics may have created an ambiguity toward feminism. Republicans can reach for women who want a middle path. The statistics in this book showed that feminist beliefs do not promote far-left views, even as they push voters toward the liberal end of politics. Activists will need to be more aggressive to turn women voters against the GOP. Democrats will have to find a way to recruit women who are in the middle on expanding government to meet the needs of disadvantaged women and their families. Democrats are fearful given societal norms in favor of individualism and against group challenges.

That said, gender exerts a role in U.S. politics that will persist as long as gender inequality in society shapes the lives of women, and that inequality remains contested. Black female and LGBTQ+ social representations are negatively stereotyped, and conflict will arise as these groups advance in society. Their politics might transform social policies to better serve working and poor

families. Women's politics will not necessarily grow as the number of women leaders and activist groups multiply; they need to speak more urgently on policy matters such as gender inequality and reproduction rights. Thus, the potential for identity politics challenging the status of women exists if strong leadership emerges. Even still, there will be women whose identification with women and support of feminism is largely symbolic.

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