



Collective Memory, Marginality, and Spatial Politics in Urban Indonesia.

Edited by
Manneke Budiman · Abidin Kusno

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This edited volume is the result of a series of workshops on urban spatial politics in Indonesia organized by the Faculty of Humanities at the Universitas Indonesia (UI) in 2018 and 2019. It consists of papers by participants who worked together with their graduate students as co-authors. Each chapter offers its own unique perspective of the city as it tries to make sense of urban change in Indonesian cities from the colonial era to the current post-Reformasi time. Together they show how urban expansion and development have resulted in more complex social and economic problems and how politics and processes of urbanization have delivered significant new life to the urban population but also failed to deliver prosperity and equality to many of the city's inhabitants, especially to those living in the margin of the city.

This book acknowledges that the city is the most monumental product of modernity. It offers unlimited possibilities but at the same time creates multidimensional problems. It blurs the line between opportunities and challenges, leaving only ambiguities and contradictions in the assumption of urban modernity. Has the city become a home for more and more Indonesians? In some ways, due to rapid urbanization, the city has become a home (*rumah*) for most of its inhabitants, replacing the earlier association of hometown with rural-based environment (*kampung halaman*). For many inhabitants of Jakarta, "going back to hometown" (*mudik*) to villages in the month of Ramadan, for instance, has increasingly become an ordeal of an annual ritual; it is more and more expensive and emotionally taxing due to the dramatic rise in the price of food and goods as well

as the inevitable travel costs associated with returning to their hometowns. Coming back to Jakarta at the end of the Ramadan vacation, paradoxically, has gained more substance as it means returning home after a long and tiring *mudik*.

While city administrators never stop planning and building their cities to supposedly provide more comfort and ease for city dwellers, somehow the city seems to develop its own way of resisting regulation and control. In the midst of columns of high rises and rows of busy streets, signs of restlessness, unpredictability, and intractability reign. Living under multi-layered social inequalities, the urban multitudes play out different levels of agency and ways of responding to governmentality. They voice their concerns in their own ways, often underground as undercurrents, not so much to avoid suppression but simply because their agencies are too complex and dynamic to be effectively understood or regulated.

Major cities across the archipelago and outside the capital city of Jakarta have also rapidly developed and their populations are highly mobile. Today, Jakarta is not the sole model for city management, nor is the only center of the country. For many Indonesians, Jakarta is only one part of larger patterns of opportunities and challenges that help Indonesian cities to grow in the first place. It is always intriguing to understand how Indonesian cities develop from time to time, but can we gain an adequate understanding of how cities evolve without first understanding the historical, political, social, and economic factors in different periods that have continuously shaped those cities and charted their maps to the future.

Indonesians who grew up in different periods are still able to talk about the “old” and the “new” when they meet in a cross-generational family setting. They know that their urban life should be located in both spatial and temporal dimensions. “What is new” or “unlike before” is the unspoken framework of conversations as Indonesians make sense of the time and space within which they are embedded. They know well that the city is not a void or a passive space but is always vibrant and in motion. Writing about the city the authors are interested in is a way of recording their own time and movement in space, a process that materializes events and offers a sense of what is in the process of happening. Together they show in their essays that time (the historians’ compass) is not the only constitutive actor that gives shape to cities and that its many spaces, big and small, also play a role in giving the city its past and history. This volume invites readers to reflect on time and space but also movement in an arena that is action-packed—the city.

Finally, we would like to note that most of the studies on Indonesian urbanism are written and published by non-Indonesian scholars, which may give a false impression that urban studies is a discipline that is poorly developed in this country. This volume seeks to overcome such a perception by intentionally putting together a volume with Indonesian contributors only to offer their perspectives on Indonesian cities. This exclusivity is intended to compensate for the lack of literature on Indonesian urban studies published by Indonesian scholars, especially in the English language.

The Editors would like to thank Enago International for its editing service as well as substantive feedback on each of the chapters. We would like to express our gratitude to the Vice-Rector of Research and Innovation at the Universitas Indonesia for providing generous funds that made the research, workshop series, and this publication possible in the first place. Also playing an instrumental part in the process is the York Centre for Asian Research (YCAR) of York University, Toronto, through its Research Collaboration Fellowship and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for supporting the key research meetings prior to the volume's publication. We thank Alicia Filipowich at YCAR for her generous assistance of research and administrative support. We also thank two anonymous reviewers for comments on the earlier version of the manuscript. Lastly, we are deeply indebted to the individuals who have constantly assisted us from the beginning to the end with all of the minute details of the technical and administrative matters in Indonesia: Dr. Diah Ayu Maharani, Dr. Shury Mariasih Gietty Tambunan, and Ms. Pratidina Sekar Pembayun. Without them, this volume would not have been possible.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Collective Memory, Marginality, and Spatial Politics in Urban Indonesia

Manneke Budiman and Abidin Kusno

Urban studies in Indonesia has long been dominated by social sciences. This came as a result of the nation's significant demographic shift from rural to urban and the need for research aimed at generating new policy to address the changes in society. Since the 1960s, due to urbanization, considerable attention has been given to rural–urban migration issues, for example, how to integrate rural migrants into urban society including providing them with needed services. Informed by a worldwide trend in the postwar era, disciplines such as anthropology, economics, geography, and sociology have focused on issues of urban development, modernization,

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and the informal sector. Scholars in these fields seek to contribute to urban policy formulation and programming (for a report on urban studies in Indonesia, see Mboi and Smith (1994); see also Stren (1998) for a survey of urban research trends in developing countries).

However, although worldwide trends (in part generated by the objectives of global institutions or foreign donors) play important roles in shaping urban knowledge, the characteristics and quality of the research by Indonesian researchers are often distinctive because of the influences of local language, culture, and politics. This is particularly the case for research in the humanities field because the audience does not comprise policy makers and the research methods are often qualitative and specific rather than driven by generalization and applicability or practicality.

Historians and scholars in Cultural Studies address policy issues less directly; their work can overlap with economic or policy objectives, but they most directly engage with the making and unmaking of public culture. They bring the diverse experiences of urban life and the meanings, interests, and actions associated with them into contact, sometimes as negotiation and transaction and sometimes as confrontation and conflict. They explore these relationships often beyond a dichotomy between the other and the self or the periphery and the center.

Furthermore, they see these relationships as reciprocal and complex and not easily resolved by policy or technocratic proposition. Thus, this book reveals the contested cultures of city life. We see this focus as a contribution of the humanities field to Indonesian urban studies. We assembled a group of researchers from different humanities disciplines at Universitas Indonesia to contribute to this volume. Our main motivation is the conviction that humanities scholars offer individual approaches to the deep histories and current developments of urban areas that we often do not know well enough. We are encouraged by the responses of colleagues in the Humanities to engage with “urban studies” as an amorphous interdisciplinary field. We appreciate their motivation to work collaboratively with their graduate students from the broad domain of humanities, such as cultural studies, literature, communication and media, history, and philosophy. While the characteristic of each of their discipline is traceable in the contribution to this volume, the processes of writing and working together for this volume have produced a work that is, as a whole, intersectional and characteristically “urban.” As all the contributors are Indonesian researchers residing in Indonesia, we asked three questions at the outset of this research program: What is significant about

Indonesian researchers, and what is distinctive about their humanities background? What do they seek to contribute to the field of Indonesian urban studies, which has largely been dominated by social sciences?

The authors responded in various ways through the subjects of their choice. They are motivated by concerns and curiosities regarding subjects and issues that have been either forgotten or considered unimportant for understanding the present. A central component in their analyses, as indicated above, is culture, which implies “contestation, critique, and conflict” (Huysen, 2008, p. 3). The phenomena we call cultures are in fact political because they occur within societal spheres that interact with conflicting interests and values. No matter how specific their contribution is to the field of Indonesian urban studies, their work is part of a larger currents of thoughts that have been circulating in the academic world.

CURRENTS OF THOUGHT

With the focus on contestation, critique, and conflict, this book seeks to contribute to the field of critical urban studies in postcolonial contexts.

Postcolonial urban studies develop critical perspectives on the impacts of colonialism as represented by the uneven urbanization and social and environmental injustices that exist today in cities in the Global South. Influenced by Marxian political economy, postcolonial urban studies seek to emphasize the specificity of cities in the Global South as not merely victims of capitalism-driven economic inequality, but also how cultures and identities are formed, and societal orders are structured, in ways that are often too complex for a generalized or globalized Marxist urban political economy approach to substantively capture (for a Marxian political economy approach see, among others, Castells, 1977; Harvey, 1973, 2005; Davis 2005; and Miller 2000). In recent decades, scholars in postcolonial cultural studies have sought to enrich Marxist urban political economy by mobilizing a range of critiques that problematize the tendency to homogenize the production of capitalism’s social and urban forms and for giving scant attention to local contexts and histories.

Jennifer Robinson (2002), for instance, offers a critique of global cities literature and a call for more appreciation of “ordinary cities.” Robinson calls for understanding locality on its own individual terms have generated fields such as “Southern theory” (Watson, 2016), “subaltern urbanism” (Roy, 2011), and a less hierarchical “comparative urbanism” (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2022).

Instead of viewing postcolonial cities as products of imported urbanism, comparative urbanists show how people translated, often exceptionally, foreign terms, or concepts for their own cities (Roy & Ong, 2011; see also Huyssen (2008)). In the field of economic geography, instead of “suburbanization,” scholars have used terms such as “extended metropolis” (Ginsburg et al., 1991), “mega-urban regions” (Jones & Douglass, 2008), and “*desakota*” (McGee et al., 1991) to describe the different urban forms and social norms that emerged out of the interaction between local and global forces, which overtime have produced different urban life and constituted “messy urbanism” (Chalana & Hou, 2016).

The study of cities in Indonesia is inseparable from these recent currents of thought in urban studies, and this book seeks to contribute to the study by presenting works by Indonesian scholars.

INDONESIAN URBAN STUDIES

There is no lack of literature on Indonesian cities written in English, although it is fair to acknowledge that Jakarta and other major cities in Java have received the most attention. Overseas scholars of urban studies in Indonesia have contributed numerous ideas for scholars in Indonesia to develop their own approaches to Indonesian cities, such as, among others: Abeyasekere (1987), Barker (1998, 2018), Colombijn (1994, 2010), Colombijn et al. (2005), Dick (2003), Evers and Korff (2000), Geertz (1965), Hellman et al. (2018), McGee (1967), McGee et al. (1991), Coté et al. (2017), Jellinek (1991), Leaf (1992, 1993), Lee (2016), Lim and Padawangi (2008), Milone (1981), Mrazek (2002), Murray (1991), Nas (known as the “godfather” of Indonesian urban studies; 1986, 1993, 1995), Nas & Grijns (2000), Padawangi (2013, 2021), Peters (2013), Reid (1980), Roitman and Rukmana (with contributions mostly from scholars in Indonesia; 2023), Van Roosmalen (2008), Silver (2008), Simone (2009, 2014), Taylor (1983), and Wertheim (1958). These authors’ examinations increased scholarly sensitivity to the undercurrents that prevail in the cities of Indonesia. They contributed urban themes such as *merantau* (“migration”), *desakota*, mega-urbanization, urban involution, and urban symbolism (see a survey by Nas and Boender (2001), who sought to place Indonesian cities in the urban theory discourse).

The diverse reference lists that end each chapter in this book reflect the importance of the contributions of scholars residing outside Indonesia. What we have learned from this wide range of scholarly endeavors is that

distinctive and novel responses to urban changes in Indonesia should by no means be the preserve of indigenous scholars, although they should form an important part of their own scholarly endeavors. We remain aware of the Dutch sociologist Wertheim (1987), who highlighted two weaknesses in Peter Nas's (1986) book, *Indonesian City: Studies in Urban Development and Planning*: the absence of Indonesian contributors and the lack of attention to the city as an arena of conflicts. Wertheim hoped that efforts to investigate cityscapes through a critical perspective would continue after Indonesia's independence, and he encouraged Indonesian scholars to contribute by offering their own analyses of urban changes in postcolonial Indonesia. Wertheim himself perceived Indonesian cities as a product of continuity between the colonial and postcolonial eras. For him, the Indonesian New Order administration (1966–1998, and beyond) appeared to be largely appropriating and sustaining the practices of the Dutch colonial government.

Notably, this continuum paradigm is a reminder that today's spaces are built on a framework of colonial control. Urban spaces are shaped in the images of their rulers and reflect the prevailing authoritative structures. Yet as this book will demonstrate, the production of space in post-Suharto Jakarta is influenced by power in now-decentralized forms based on market impacts, elite control (in collaboration with national, regional and local authorities), entrepreneurial authority, the clout of mass organizations, and the supremacy of the people. Power is not always in the hand of a singular ruler or a corporatist state. The city is an arena of conflicts that involve multiple actors.

As for Wertheim's (1987) concern about the lack of indigenous scholars in urban studies literature, today, a wide range of Indonesian scholars are generating studies of urban Indonesia. Indeed, Nas's (2000, 2002) later books on Indonesian cities have included Indonesian scholars. Additionally, and also as if in response to Wertheim's call for more Indonesian scholars writing about Indonesian cities, in the early 2000s, the Dutch government collaborated with Gadjah Mada and Airlangga universities in Indonesia, through the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, to examine the role of cities in the context of "Indonesia across orders" (Colombijn et al., 2005).

This collaboration between Dutch and Indonesian scholars aimed to address Indonesia's processes of (de)colonization, and it produced important research texts particularly on urban history. Scholars such as Purwanto (2004), Basundoro (2009), Husain (2010), and Fakhri (2005) among

other described the development of cities in Indonesia in the colonial era and at the beginning of the postcolonial period, thereby continuing the tradition of city observers such as Handinoto (2015), Kuntowijoyo (2000), Soemardjan (2009), Soerjo (1983), Surjomihardjo (2008). Recently, Basundoro (2019) provided a comprehensive survey of Indonesian urban studies since colonial times including notes on their publishers. Basundoro (2019) also documented the contributions of Yogyakarta and the city's dedicated publishers (such as Ombak Press Yogyakarta) in disseminating works on urban history by young Indonesian scholars. Some of them have advanced Sartono Kartodirdjo's work on rural communities by shifting attention to the urban subaltern to account for cities as the arena of conflicts.

Most recently, Padawangi (2021) and Batubara and Handriana (2021) have emphasized the importance of linking agrarian studies with urban studies offering thus an intertwining rural–urban analysis. We also recognize the work by experts in professional disciplines such as architecture and urban planning. The works of Firman (2004, 2009), Hudalah and Woltjer (2007), Kusumawijaya (2006), Silas (1996), and Santoso (2006), among others have produced significant works in the literature that undergirded the present book's approach to comprehending the development of the Indonesian cityscape.

What we have learned from them is how the contributions of professionals who (often work “under” the state or private developers but are not dictated by them) shape urban forms and social life. The government or private business groups might appropriate their ideas for urban regeneration, but their wisdom—particularly in architecture and planning—stands, as reflected by the scholars who contributed to the present volume.

Today, the field of urban studies is not only the domain of academics. Activists, artists, journalists, community leaders, and freelance writers have expanded the field and developed their own perspectives, often in collaboration with academics (see Kusno et al. (2011) and Budianta and Hapsarani (2018)). They have given voice to critical and theoretical local perspectives on the historiography of (de)colonization. In the art world, *ruan-grupa's* breakthrough *oeuvre* of writings, such as the *Jurnal Karbon* on the city of Jakarta, has helped open up new areas of discussions on the city's culture. These works are performative and participatory in nature, and they engage readers in the study of urban spaces, especially through themes of Jakarta's art, identity, and politics. Meanwhile, urban activists such as Sri Palupi (Ecosoc Rights), the Urban Poor Consortium, Rujak,

and Forum Kota document injustice in the city and present power as an essential theme in all discourses relating to the cities of Indonesia.

Furthermore, Indonesian urban studies is essentially inseparable from the studies of the urban *kampung*s, since in all of the Indonesian cities, *kampung* primarily serves as the support system that helps cities continue to flourish and develop in terms of both social and economic aspects. Urban *kampung*s represent the resilience of the residual, that is, local community traditions, which refuses to be completely done away with despite the rapid urbanization processes that take place in the city. In addition, even though *kampung*s have always had to come to terms with uncertainty about their survival due to their ever-shrinking space caused by new high-rise developments that surround them, *kampung*s have also for a long time been providers of affordable food and rooms for the subsistence of millions of lower-middle and middle-level workers whose productivity keeps the city's business and economy going.

Some of the chapters in this volume demonstrate concrete awareness of the importance of *kampung*s for urban sustainability and discuss typical urban *kampung* issues, such as *lokalisasi* (red-light area), traditional market, and urban phenomena that are rooted in *kampung* tradition such as *orkes dangdut gerobak*. Newberry (2018) introduced the concept of “*kampung class*,” which primarily comprise “lower-class communities” whose existence in the city persists amidst the social and political change that happen to the nation. Urban *kampung*s have their own history that gives shape to their informality, sense of solidarity, and governmentality (2018, p. 193). The “rhythm of *kampung* life” in the heart of the urban setting, in Newberry's view, serves as an invisible and immaterial infrastructure that supports the life of the city as a whole. Such a distinctive role that *kampung*s play in the urban context was further underlined by Kusno, who defined *kampung* as an “intermediate space” in which both the “shared and conflicting interests of the urban dwellers”, as well as the informality of the everyday life of urban communities and the “normative urbanization” are mediated, resulting in the phenomenon of “middling urbanism” (2019, p. 76).

With the present volume, all the contributors aimed to continue the tradition of critical writing on cities by reinstituting some previously raised themes to study Indonesian cities: urban centers as conflict arenas traced through the functioning of a city as the cause and effect of the conflicts and how urban spaces become battlefields as well as grounds of resistance and conciliation. The writings collected in this book depict the intimate

associations among culture, politics, and urban spaces. In this context, politics is not limited to state dogma or activities; the term encompasses the everyday vernacular framework and the policies advocated or put forth by activists, professionals, business entities, and communities.

In this sense, the political becomes difficult to distinguish from the cultural. The book further examines how different social groups, with and without intergroup linkages and consciously or otherwise, produce urban spaces that influence state politics and social relationships whether directly or indirectly. We have discussed how Indonesia as a nation has not been the developer of all of its urban spaces, but neither individuals nor groups of experts alone conceive the transformations of cities. In the same sense, the dynamics of the city are not entirely attributable to the effects of markets, economic progress, and technology. Urban changes are also often caused by crises of power that generate vigorous defenses and criticisms of the ruling system. Nevertheless, the state machinery has always sought to exploit the interests of experts, businessmen, and society at large to confront crises and strengthen its position. Therefore, urban spaces are co-produced by varied parties, but the authorities appropriate them through development, glory, and order. Complementing previous works, our aim with this book is to elucidate how the state often interprets spaces created by diverse parties as a new stage of overcoming the crises of power.

In the following section, we summarize the chapters in each of the three themes of the book as three collections. The first, *Urban Regeneration and Collective Memory*, refers to the link between the desire to revitalize or rebrand urban sites and the accompanying requirements to displace collective memories. The four chapters that reflect this theme show the efforts of communities affected by urban regeneration to keep living by establishing their identities in arenas of conflicts of interest. They show the ability of communities to represent their collective memories to build relationships in the fight against marginalization.

The second set of chapters, titled *Marginality and the Other Archives*, discusses the places of otherness that are established through uneven power relationships with conceived or planned spaces. They show how players, materials, and circumstances that are not reflected in official planning documents produce different spaces, different activities, and different memories.

The third section of the book, *New Mood, Medium, and Media*, consists of five essays on the effects of constructing new spaces, both physical and virtual, for social change. The first two chapters consider efforts in

colonial time by elites, professionals, and community leaders to spatialize a “new age” in response to the new challenges of the times. The last two consider the contemporary activities of social media citizens (netizens) as participants in the “information age” and “network society” in practicing the new politics of identity, which has profoundly shaped the political lives of both cities and the nation.

Urban Regeneration and Collective Memory

In this book, memory is distinct from history because it is related to narratives of marginality and daily life. Memory is often invisible and tends to disappear because it blends in with diverse and contradictory activities and spaces; it survives time because it lives in daily life as a collective memory. Even so, memory—more precisely, collective memory—can become the basis of identity formation processes that often also drive communities. Such actions can oppose hegemonic spaces by standing outside them in time. Urban regeneration and collective memory are thus related. Urban regeneration can be interpreted as an alliance of interested parties to transform space and change consciousness.

Meanwhile, collective memory refers to past events (whether experienced or not, as with traditions) that are not always integrated or formal but are often strong enough to influence current actions and future ideas. Memory often influences or gives context to resistance and alternative imaginaries. The collection of writings in this section considers the working-class music *dangdut gerobak* (Chap. 2); working-class identity formation in a mining town (Chap. 3); identity formation in the context of *Arek Malang* as the intersection of music, gangsterism, and soccer fandom (Chap. 4); and the representation of ethnic Chinese identity in the film *Cek Toko Sebelah* (Chap. 5). All of these are situated in contexts of urban regeneration.

In Chap. 2, Munir and Tambunan discuss a *dangdut gerobak* orchestra’s way of claiming their right to a new urban space by reconstructing their identity and tradition. They elucidate how old tradition is revived to confront the dominant assumptions of gender, sexuality, and patriarchy that accompany (new) urban spaces. Rejecting the city government’s labeling of their community as buskers, the *dangdut gerobak* orchestra members demonstrate that they are compatible with modern urban Indonesia even if they choose to define themselves using the traditional word *gerobak* (“hand-pulled cart”). In their efforts to oppose the official

definition through a move that Munir and Tambunan call “contra-narration,” the members of the orchestra reconstructed their identities through their collective memory, which, passed down through generations, keeps alive the significance of the *gerobak* and its connections to the identity and tradition of the *dangdut* orchestra musicians.

The story of the *dangdut gerobak* orchestra shows how modernity and tradition are brought together to define a position for the marginalized in urban politics. Before becoming a counternarrative, the *dangdut* orchestra was a sustainable everyday practice that did not need recognition or assistance from the government. Munir and Tambunan ask and answer some interesting questions: How can the *dangdut gerobak* orchestra live under the government’s radar and simultaneously become a contemporary commodity? How do they redefine the correlations between gender associations and representations? How does featuring female musicians take on significance that is different from the commodity itself? How can female musicians dominate the public arena and become drivers of economic life by engaging collective memory?

In Chap. 3, Ediyen and Tambunan present a study of “chained people” (*orang rantai*) of Sawahlunto. They expose the struggle for local identity through the city’s heritage discourse. Sawahlunto was designed by the government as a tourist city because of its mining history, and the focus of this chapter is the local response to this plan. The authors highlight the descendants of the chained people, who aimed to present their own heritage, in a narrative that complicated the official presentation of a mining tourism city. They show how one story can be connected to another story and then diverted back to the first one, demonstrating that discourses on urban spaces cannot avoid the inherent contradictions that those spaces construct.

This chapter also clarifies that such incongruent spaces are built from special interests, so the narratives of urban regeneration is necessarily supplemented by counter narratives drawn from collective memory that sought accommodation. Additionally, this chapter illustrates the way in which everyday’s narratives of living go hand in hand with both the acceptance and rejection of narratives that support the discourse on mining tourism.

Chapter 4 by Maulida tells the story of rock music in Malang, showing the close ties between music, youth culture movements, and the collective memory of the city. Maulida connects gangsters, music, and Aremania and demonstrates the dynamics of *Arek Malang* in the context of Malang’s

collective memory of the experiences of colonialism, revolution, and post-independence modernization. In each of these phases, *Arek Malang* has been intimately associated with marginalization, youth, revolution, streets, gangsters, the lower socioeconomic strata, and rock music. The ways in which this collective memory is managed in a football association demonstrates the close relationship between collective memory and the disciplining of the lower classes in Malang.

This chapter evinces how movements intersect to spontaneously generate new movements and how these movements complemented each other in shaping the *Arek Malang* culture. The authors also discuss how an erstwhile street movement was “domesticated” with enticements such as football clubs that in reality served to further the city’s commitment to enforcing control over the working classes. The identity of the city of Malang is revealed through the processes of adaptation and transformation that contribute to the dynamics of the *Arek Malang* movement. Maulida illuminates how young people searching for identity can help shape a city’s personality. The author also elucidates how these bottom-up journeys from the streets to the field or from groups to associations are analogous to the revolutionary period’s “youth” memory, which includes recollections of violence and urban conflicts. Finally, Maulida exhibits how *Arek Malang* attempted to break away from the central government’s bids to control their identity.

In Chap. 5, Tambunan and Widhiasti examine the film *Cek Toko Sebelah* and demonstrate how the prototypical ethnic Chinese shophouses in Indonesia became contradictory spaces for urban development efforts that did not intend to retain these traditional spaces. This chapter shows discrete physical, traditional, and generational contradictions and underlines how incongruencies persist as adaptation and continuity. In the face of urban regeneration, ethnic Chinese have their own stories to recount. The image of the ethnic Chinese as actors in Indonesian history began emerging only in the post-Suharto era, that is, after over 30 years of this ethnic minority’s marginalization, whereby it was seen as the other (the scapegoat of the state). The ability of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese population to connect and develop their own lifestyles and livelihoods in an unsupportive political environment has been interpreted in many ways.

This chapter evokes Chinese culture, which is often associated with this community’s power, as resistance to the culture of capital. *Cek Toko Sebelah* is a film about tradition, resilience, and solidarity in a city undergoing a massive transformation that threatens the *kelontong* store culture and

family traditions of the city's Chinese population. Tambunan and Widhiasti discuss the movie's presentation of the contradictions of development from the perspective of daily life in one store. The authors describe how the ethnic Chinese population in Indonesia used the tactics of adaptation and translation to quietly adjust to the shifts in power dynamics that transformed the cities and ultimately revive the unbreakable Chinese solidarity grounded in culture and collective memory.

Marginality and the Other Archives

The second theme explores marginality in relation to planned geographies. It emphasizes resistance irrespective of whether the formation is ultimately diverted or subdued to become a functional aspect of the government in power.

This section presents examples of such dynamics in the red-light districts of Gang Dolly in Surabaya (Chap. 6), the urban social pathology of Batam industrial city (Chap. 7), and how a new town called Pondok Indah in Jakarta created new neighborhoods in an area called Pondok Pinang with which it formed an interdependent relationship (Chap. 8). The last chapter in this section documents the creation of alternative archives by music communities, which problematize the institutional locations of official archives and the institution's power to frame and record classifications through exclusion (Chap. 9).

Chapter 6 by Hayati and Mudaryanti follows sex workers who lived in Gang Dolly and subscribed to its traditions until the municipal government believed it was time to offer a new image for the city. This chapter shows how Gang Dolly became a victim of the humanitarian, justice, and morality discourse regarding the modernization and uprightness of the cityscape. The new narrative is not limited to the symbols of modernization and industrialization or representations of heritage and natural wealth, which is where lies the contradiction. The sex industry is a part of what makes the city famous and memorable, but Gang Dolly is not always discussed in official tourist guidebooks or history books. Gang Dolly is known by the city government and *arek Suroboyo* (citizens of Surabaya) as a kind of heterotopic space of the city. It is the "other" space that contributes to urban life and gives the city its meaning even though it is often ruled out. Gang Dolly is an informal lubricant for the city. Most governments have, to an extent, accepted and maintained Gang Dolly throughout its history in this area. The local community had always lived along

with the residents of the alley; thus, it became a normal part of the city's life.

This chapter demonstrates that Dolly was not the result of urban planning. It lived and grew in a location within the city and experienced various municipal government policies until it became a victim of a morality discourse in the post-Suharto era combined with Mayor Risma's agenda of fighting injustice. Mayor Risma saw Gang Dolly as the symbol of a past establishment that oppressed women and children in the city. In the context of rebranding the city, Gang Dolly was considered a disaster that threatened humanity and the future of Surabaya. Hayati and Mudaryanti provide readers the opportunity to observe the dynamics of the *kampung* (village), as well as both the formal and the informal leadership of the city government. The authors also offer food for thought about the emergence of the morality discourse pertaining to the humanitarian agenda of the leadership. Gang Dolly rose and fell from the contradictions of city branding, and only time will tell if the disappearance of Gang Dolly will remain in the collective memory of *arek Suroboyo*. The study of Gang Dolly also elucidates its existence as a contradictory or other space that the city government had to eliminate in the interests of creating a new Surabaya.

Chapter 7 by Anita and Pradjoko considers the case of Batam, where rapid urbanization produced social pathologies in the form of poverty, crime, and prostitution. Batam, built collaboratively by three countries as an example of a new strategy for how to develop a city or region, depended on mobilizing informal cheap laborers and sex workers. Anita and Pradjoko show that the industrial city of Batam exploited the lower echelons of society that were made to work to complement the shortcomings of the industrial city. For example, the factories in Batam do not provide housing for their workers, who have to rent boarding houses in the villages that have sprouted in the areas surrounding the factories. Prostitution provides the entertainment expected of an industrial city; poverty maintains the existence of a low-cost workforce; and criminality justifies efforts to safeguard and relinquish the responsibility of the industrial space.

Such an arrangement shows that "urban problems" are part of the informality expected to emerge in an industrial city. This chapter also highlights the role of the intermediaries in the relationship between capital and labor. The middlemen, mafia, and thugs evidence a setting that has no clear formal or informal boundaries. Nonetheless, this blurring complements Batam's needs as an industrial city. Furthermore, this chapter

underscores the involvement of transnational regional governance in co-producing poverty, crime, and prostitution.

In Chap. 8, Ulfiarti, Murdayanti, and Mutia describe yet another formation of “other” space (heterotopia) through the production of a new space. Pondok Indah, a wealthy residential area in South Jakarta, was a symbol of the government’s agenda of engaging private capital to create a new citizenry through elite settlements. Real estate in Pondok Indah has mushroomed in value, but there has been very little research attention on the impacts of Pondok Indah on the communities around the development. This chapter fills the gap by discussing the impact of separating an area of Pondok Pinang to build the exclusive new suburbs at Pondok Indah.

Pondok Indah emerged in the 1970s marking an era of progress in human settlement during the New Order, and Ulfiarti, Murdayanti, and Mutia examine the impact of enclosing land for elite settlements as a sign of new expansion by private developers in the capital. Pondok Indah separated itself from Pondok Pinang to establish a modern elite class identity, creating an unequal social arrangement in the community. How Pondok Pinang and Pondok Indah turned against each other, adapted to each other, and pushed each other is a theme consistent with the transformation of Jakarta through the ages. As one of the first private real estate developments in postcolonial Jakarta, Pondok Indah and its growth reflect several phenomena: The private sector can undertake urban development and become a symbol of state development, and new spaces can elevate or reduce the quality of life of the surrounding environment while spurring adaptation, competition, and creativity.

This chapter also illustrates the fact that urban space in Jakarta is formed through an informal alliance of the state and capital (between the political authorities and entrepreneurs) that produced spaces of informality that in turn must adapt to the new settlement. Pondok Pinang had to adapt to meet the interests of new settlements, for instance, by providing labor and rooming for the new town’s working class. Such formation patterns characterize the transformation of the urban spaces of Jakarta, where the process of capital, land, and building formations was informal and the impacts that occurred were also subject to informal adaptation. We learn from this chapter how new spaces are always associated with what is old, interlocking, and shifting and how they negotiate and cooperate in uneven battles. The result is the emergence of new activities and everyday infrastructure that are often unpredictable, as well as the rapid erosion of the environment that cannot be promptly handled through urban planning.

Chapter 9 presents a community-based movement to archive Indonesia's popular music. The authors, Adhiyatmaka and Kurnia, highlight the community's movements to document and archive popular music in the absence of government initiatives. They analyze the collective memory of organizations' founders and describe how these individual collections redefine the concept of "Indonesia" by integrating all that is remembered and forgotten. This chapter presents an example of informal heritage movements that began from the grassroots in the absence of state or business-sector support. It is not about resistance (because there are no formal institutions to challenge), but it does engage in the effort to define Indonesian heritage. The bottom-up initiative aims to document music that is deemed to represent Indonesia more comprehensively. A study of four institutions, the Irama Nusantara, the Indonesian Jazz Archives (private funding), the Indonesian Music Museum, and the Lokananta Project (semi-government), evidences the collective memory and history of their respective creators and supporters. The authors probe how music is defined; which assemblages qualify as "Indonesian" and which do not; how each of these organizations struggles for its local, regional, and national identity; and how such entities can be recognized as private collectives or apparatuses that accumulate community (not country) compilations.

This chapter highlights diverse selections that allow these compendia to grapple with the political and music associations identified by every administration over the course of Indonesian history. This chapter also delves into the manner in which this music collection deals with identity politics during the decentralization period.

New Mood, Medium, and Media

The third collection of chapters represents the theme of spatial technology and the new medium of social media as representations of a new time. The contributors consider the roles of professionals, developers, and entrepreneurs as well as citizens in devising a different form of city governance. The aim is to contribute to social change or influence the course of history. The context of creating the new spaces varies from modernizing the old to novel strategies, but they all pertain to confronting the challenges posed by economic, political, and cultural clashes and crises that occur in transitions from colonialism to postcolonial autonomy.

The first two chapters consist of material from the colonial past, particularly the construction of Pasar Johar in Semarang (Chap. 10) and the planning for a new seat of Dutch colonial power in Bandung (Chap. 11). Chapters 12 and 13 end the book discussing the new age of information technology such as (in particular) social media that has allowed citizens to influence political outcomes and engage in the new politics of identity. The notion of power, which is central to any reconfiguration of space and time, takes physical as well as virtual form.

There is strong and fairly consistent continuity between the colonial histories of cities in Indonesia and their journeys into the postcolonial period, although much of the constructed colonial heritage has been destroyed or no longer remains. However, phenomena other than the lost buildings remain in memories, archives, and postcolonial relations. These remnants make the past feel intimately connected to the present. This section opens with Chap. 10 by Srendro and Kanumoyoso's article on Pasar Johar (Johar Market) in Semarang which was design by Dutch architect, Thomas Karsten. Karsten's much-lauded market design is viewed not just from the lens of modernization but also as an effort to solidify the authority of the city government. Pasar Johar's existence recalls an "exemplary center" where authorities display their power to control street vendors and regulate space and time through the activities of urban traders and buyers. The disciplining of people through space contains the element of education in becoming a "citizen of the city."

Those assigned spaces in Pasar Johar were distinguishable from those who are still forced to sell outside the walls of the new-age market. Pasar Johar represented a series of classifications and identities that can be read through urban space and local security efforts and that distinguish the old from the new and outside from within. Srendro and Kanumoyoso hint that Pasar Johar signifies a part of the politics of reform, modernization, pacification, reconciliation, and also class formation by a regime that wanted to maintain its power through new conceptions of spaces presented by professionals such as Thomas Karsten.

In Chap. 11, Lestari, Mudaryanti, and Mutia consider Bandung, located at a higher altitude than Batavia and marked by the authorities and businessmen (from East Java) as a future utopia, a city of dreams. Bandung became a subject of research because of the rising awareness of the West Javanese social and political contexts and the crisis of legitimacy of the colonial government. The sense of anxiety that permeates literature about tourism in Bandung in colonial times relates to the context of securing

economic resources for the plantations of West Java, the dynamics of Islam, and political awareness among the Indonesian people. Bandung started to become a government center only after the Priangan area became a production center for large plantations. The study of *Bandoeng Vooruit*, an association that introduced the tourism to Bandung, shows a link between politics and culture. The scholarly discussion of urban tourism can be understood through several perspectives, one related to domesticating the so-called dangerous or wild environment. This taming process is well-known through the *Mooi Indies* painting style that emerged in the early twentieth century to imagine a peaceful colony in the time of “zaman pergerakan”—the era when colonial order was increasingly threatened by anti-colonial movements. The Indies where there was rebellion and the violence of war and forced labor was portrayed as exotic, scenic, and peaceful.

The *Bandoeng Vooruit* movement can be seen as the process of a city’s branding effort to attract European residents to the colony and simultaneously display the presence of a new age in the colonial rule of Indonesia. Meanwhile, the physical revolution in the form of the *Bandung Lautan Api* and DI/TII events in West Java exhibited the conflict over the new age and demonstrated that Bandung was inseparable from the political history of West Java. Through the *Bandoeng Vooruit* movement, this chapter illuminates the relationships between state bureaucracy, businessmen, professionals, and the elite (European) middle-class leaders as they developed Bandung, normalized the colony, and birthed a utopian space for consumption through the tourism discourse.

In the decentralization era today, the world of Indonesian cities moved beyond the gaze of the state. The capital city loosened, and there was no longer a center against which to contest. As Indonesia decentralized, local or city politics became arenas of disputes over power, policies, and priorities. As Indonesia decentralized its authority, it also entered the new world of digital technology and its associated new media. Social media today has become a medium for societal interactions and a conduit for new politics of identity.

In Chap. 12, Acikgenc and Pratama examine the political implications of social media. They evince the emergence of the polarization of Indonesian democracy through the transformation of the tradition of *musyawarah* (deliberation). Social media facilitates polarization and at the same time obscures history and memory, both official and informal. This chapter looks at “post-truth” information mobilization on social media,

where objective and subjective lines overlap. Acikgenc and Pratama cite the example of the 2017 local election with Governor Ahok's case to demonstrate how the post-truth mobilization against Ahok became united. The 212 (refers to December 2, 2017) protest movement that saw mass demonstrations in central public spaces such as the National Monument Plaza and on protocol roads represented the climax of a journey that began in a virtual space. The resistance toward Ahok is first the virtual and subsequently urban spaces created an imagined community of the urban Islamic middle class.

Because collective memory is local and often does not experience centralization, the emergence of digital social media has accorded people a space that can accommodate different expressions of memories. As discussed in Chap. 12, collective memory emerges in social media at the surface of a democracy that influences identity formation through polarity politics.

In Chap. 13, Rumata, Salim, and Sastrosubroto show the intersection of identity regulation and social media politics. The authors show how a so-called democratic movement is contained and influenced by social media technology; how polarity is formed from impulses embedded in social media mechanisms that shape community (friending) through the search for opponents (unfriending); how the conflict-avoiding traditions of *musyawarah* (deliberation), *paguyuban* (community), and *silaturahmi* (friendship) are amended by the democracy of the polarity of pros and cons and friends and opponents; how traditions of ambiguity are mitigated by followers (through social media) who are encouraged to take polar positions because of peer and adversarial pressure; how repeated representations produce mass "truths"; how one witness and testimony can turn into thousands and millions of witnesses (and testimonies) because of repeated mass presentations; and how ideology can become populist.

This chapter extends into Chap. 12 in scrutinizing the behavior of Indonesians as they consumed and produced social media during Ahok's fall: how social media presented Ahok and how this depiction encouraged the articulation of polarity. It also details the actors and communities that inspired the polarity: the pro- and anti-Ahok movements and their building of collective memories pertaining to Ahok, Jakarta, and Indonesia. An important contribution of this chapter is the impact of the polarities on the government's efforts to regulate identity politics and social media content.

Under the three themes of “Urban Regeneration and Collective Memory,” “Marginality and Other Archives,” and “New Mood, Medium, and Media,” contributors of this book discuss the roles of culture and politics in defining spaces and how built environments in turn shape culture and politics.

As a whole, this book invites readers to reflect on time, space, and their movements in the action-packed urban arenas. As an intentional and strategic decision, the volume only presents discussions on Indonesian cities by Indonesian contributors from the broad field of humanities. We also seek to acknowledge the limitation that the chapters collected in this volume pertain only to the cities of Java. The authors of this volume do not intend to disseminate a Java-centric hegemony. As such, this book could be an incentive to propagate more Indonesian urban studies conducted in English, especially by Indonesian researchers. Expanding these efforts could develop an Indonesia-specific discourse on urban studies.

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PART I

Urban Regeneration and Collective
Memory



CHAPTER 2

The Mobility of *Orkes Dangdut Gerobak* in the Urban Space: Commodification of Female Sexuality and Patriarchal Capitalism

Muhammad Syabrul Munir
and *Shuri Mariasih Gietty Tambunan*

INTRODUCTION

The media produces and disseminates various meanings of *orkes* (“orchestra”) *dangdut*. For example, mainstream media associates it with low-class entertainment or singers selling sexuality. *Orkes dangdut gerobak* (cart-wheeled *dangdut* orchestra) is often portrayed as a negative phenomenon in urban spaces and is associated with sexual harassment, drunkenness, and even murder. According to some scholars (Yampolski, 1991; Weintraub, 2010; Wallach, 2008), *dangdut* refers to shaky dance movements or

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goyangan, which can be interpreted as an activity that encourages sensuality; it can also be seen as a form of entertainment that releases stress.

As Wallach (2002) discussed, the patriarchal capitalism that has influenced Jakarta has constructed a paradigm that understands *goyangan* in *dangdut* as an activity that contributes to male dominance over women; female *dangdut* singers who perform *goyangan* are seen as objects to satisfy the desires of male audiences. Moreover, the *goyangan* phenomenon in *orkes dangdut* is linked to the objectification of the female body. Several narratives of online media that discuss female body objectification and the commodification of female sexuality are explored in this chapter.

Previous research on *dangdut* mostly focused on its historical trajectory and cultural positioning, particularly in comparison with other music genres in Indonesia. For example, Weintraub (2010), a scholar who conducted significant research on *dangdut* in Indonesia, examined *dangdut* music in relation to the historical and political culture in Indonesia. He explained that media can be used to interpret the themes of *dangdut* music, such as class and power relations (Weintraub, 2006, 2010, 2013). Other researchers highlight the problematization of sexuality in *dangdut* (Bader, 2011; Van Wichelen, 2005; Bader & Richter, 2014).

During the initial stages of this research, it became evident that mainstream and online media constructed images of *orkes dangdut gerobak* that led the public to form particular perceptions regarding these musicians, such as the abovementioned view that the female singers are merely sex objects for their male audiences. The dancers are even harassed by male audience members, who grope with impunity and without their consent. The media narrative is that these singers' erotic dance movements cause their assaults.

However, from 2016 to 2017, based on our fieldwork in the Jatinegara area, one of the *orkes dangdut gerobak* sites in Jakarta, we argue that the everyday lives of *orkes dangdut gerobak* is a space for actors, female singers, and musicians to negotiate with urban authorities. These groups challenge the negative misrepresentations of their existence in the urban scene by performing in the streets and constructing counternarratives to the criminality and sexuality pushed by the media that highlighted morality. This chapter investigates how the mainstream media constructed the cultural practice of *orkes dangdut gerobak* in comparison with the findings of our ethnographic research. Furthermore, it discusses the dynamics of *dangdut* as a popular culture in the urban space by examining the power relations between *orkes dangdut gerobak* members, represented by Orkes Selvina,

and city officials. The processes and forces at stake in the dynamics of these power relations contributed to the different moral imaginings of *dangdut* as well as to how popular music imaginaries shape questions of urbanism.

ORKES DANGDUT GEROBAK IN ONLINE MEDIA:
COMMODIFICATION OF SEXUALITY
AND PATRIARCHAL CAPITALISM

We identified multiple online media narratives regarding *orkes dangdut gerobak* that consistently featured keywords in the articles' titles related to eroticism and the commodification of female sexuality. *Goyang atau Joget* is identical to *dangdut* music, but in one article, Silalahi (2013) describes the dances in *orkes dangdut gerobak* as erotic (all sources based on our translations). In an article from merdeka.com, Arnengsih, a female *dangdut* singer in an *orkes dangdut gerobak*, comments that she must also embody eroticism: "That is common, if I don't *shake*, I will not receive money."

Dance by male *dangdut* dancers in an *orkes* is seen as an expression of masculinity. The term "*goyang*" has no specific meaning, but when *goyangan* is practiced by men in a public sphere in the form of a *dangdut* concert, together with female singers, the implied meaning is that the male audiences are patrons of the female singers (Weintraub, 2013, p. 22). They patronize the women by dancing with them in an *orkes dangdut*, and masculinity again becomes distinct because it is men in the audience who give money to the female singers. This defining of masculinity in public spaces renders them gendered spaces in which women are exploited by masculine powers (state power, economic power in a competition-based market economy, power of technology, and power of male sexual desires; Kristianto, 2009).

Goyang and *saweran*, money audiences give to performers, are interrelated in every *orkes dangdut gerobak* concert. *Saweran* itself has various meanings: first, as an expression of male sensuality over that of women, which could lead to male domination in public spaces; second, as an expression of male wealth in public spaces; and third, simply as an expression of pleasure. Silalahi's (2013) article tends to situate *saweran* in *orkes dangdut gerobak* as the expression of male sensuality over female *dangdut* singers:

These two women expressed that they do not feel uncomfortable when they dance surrounded by strange, drunk men at night. “I am with a friend named Lina. Sometimes we sing together, or sometimes when we are tired, like right now, we alternate singing. Aggressive advances definitely happen, for example, touching or groping our waists. Yet, I am not afraid, since I have some male friends here. Teasing is common here,” she said casually while rubbing her forehead several times. Nengsih admitted the erotic dance movements that she performs are solely to get money from masher guys. She added that if someone starts to be aggressive, her trick is to avoid him and move on to another man with small change in his hand. “If [one is] being annoying and starting to grope, of course I will move to another. But not everyone is aggressive. Usually, one becomes annoying if they are already heavily drunk,” she said. (*Silalahi, 2013, translated by the researchers*)

The eroticism of the singers’ *goyangan* is still the most significant element in the journalistic narrative of this article. Quotations that contain the phrase “erotic movements” posit female singers as objects that allow audiences to indulge in their sexuality, but the women quoted above shared some agency to confront men, moving on if one became difficult. In Silalahi’s narrative, Arnengsih’s eroticism is given more emphasis than her bravery in singing in the middle of an all-male crowd and confronting men who sexually harassed her.

In another article entitled “The Fun in Dancing with *Gerobak Dangdut*” (*news.detik.com, 2010*), the author marginalized the singer’s abilities and portrayed her as an object for men.

The night is getting late as four men push a cart down the Lenteng Agung road. In the cart are a set of loudspeakers, guitars, drums, flutes, and a keyboard. They are accompanied by a woman who sways while she walks.

While smoking her cigarette, Leni told me that she has been singing *dangdut* for six years, moving from one neighborhood to another. Yet, she claimed not to feel uncomfortable. Indeed, as she sings on the streets, there are men teasing her. “But I am not afraid. I have male friends here. The teasing is such a common thing. It’s seldom to encounter rude guys,” she said. Her statement is seconded by Anto, a 35-year-old man from Sragen, Central Java. It has been 10 years since he started working as an *orkestr dangdut keliling* member. So far, he has not experienced an offensive audience or one that is rude to his vocalist. (*news.detik.com—translated by the researchers*)

The statement “They are accompanied by a woman who sways while she walks” is powerful in constructing the readers’ perception that the female singers are at fault in the case of sexual assault; “swaying” implies erotic behavior. In this context, Leni and some male members of *orkes dangdut gerobak* walk together, but the article emphasizes the way Leni walks. The article also blurs Leni’s opinion of her career choices: “But I am not afraid, I have male friends here.” She demonstrates her bravery, even though the impact is limited because she is protected by the male group members. This indicates in fact that Leni is not completely commodified.

Next, Wallach (2002) explains how Indonesians have been influenced by two ideological systems: patriarchal capitalism and commodified female sexuality (pp. 1–2). The discourse still perceives men as superior to women, especially in the practice of *orkes dangdut gerobak* in urban spaces, but this narrative also ignores women’s own work. The female singers of *orkes dangdut gerobak* seem to be entirely sexually commodified when in fact they still have agency to confront sexual assailants.

Bartky (1990) proposes that female sexual commodification is closely related to female sexual objectification. He spells out a separation of the female body from its existence as a [fully] human being to its presentation as merely an object to satisfy men’s sexual desires. Women’s sexual commodification can take the form of sexy female *dangdut* singers or song lyrics containing pornographic references; these offer male viewers pleasure, but viewing them cannot transcend to satisfaction.

Exploiting the female body by shrinking it to a mere commodity for men is an embodiment of patriarchal capitalism. Coined by Eisenstein (1999), the concept emphasizes an interdependent relationship between the capitalist class structure and male supremacy (p. 196). With the term, Eisenstein highlighted the role of capitalism in reinforcing male dominance over women by commodifying them in sexualized and pornographic manners that economically entrench the patriarchy. Patriarchal capitalism also fuels the dominant association of *dangdut* with female sexuality and its exploitation. Bader (2011) argues,

This prominence of female sexuality is one reason why *dangdut* and *tarling dangdut* music are often considered to be *musik kampung* and erotic entertainment. As a discursive practice performed by the emerging Indonesian middle class and elite, this narrative has served as an indicator for defining what is inappropriate and unsuitable in Indonesia. (p. 338)

Even though Bader focuses on *tarling dangdut*, a specific type of *dangdut* from the coastal area in West Java, her findings resonate with the findings of this chapter. She argues that the elites were the ones with the social power to position *dangdut* as low-class music (*musik kampung*) because they are the ones with the authority to decide what is appropriate.

Erotic content in the media is also the result of patriarchal capitalism. In one article entitled “Sexy ‘Dangdut’ Outfits Banned in Tangerang,” published on jakartapost.com, Anya (2017) explains how sexiness in *orkes dangdut gerobak* is narrated. Attaching the word “sexy” to “*dangdut*” automatically sexualizes the women who engage in *dangdut*. That is, if a woman is involved, anything related to *dangdut* is sexy *dangdut*.

Anya (2017) reported that hosts could order (“request”) female singers to wear what the hosts desired. Toing, the boss of the group, *dangdut* RGJ, explained that he followed the hosts’ requests in terms of clothing and the concept of the events, and Anya highlighted the prevalence of sexuality in hosts’ requests: “Most hosts requested that the singers wear clothes that exposed parts of their body, such as the thighs and chest.” Yet again reflecting patriarchal capitalism, women become products their hosts can custom order. Emphasizing the sexualized nature of transactions entices men to read articles such as Anya’s, but these narratives negate the actual talents of the singers. Women are indeed commodified, but that is not the sole aspect of their existence and work.

We consistently found this tone of criminalizing the members of *orkes dangdut gerobak*, for instance, in the article “Rebutan Joget dengan Biduan, sekuriti di Senen Tewas Dianiaya” or “Not Wanting to Take Turns to Dance with the Female Singer, a Security Guard Was Killed in Senen,” which was published on merdeka.com (Ronald, 2016). The article’s author, Ronald (2016), chose words and narratives that presented the *orkes dangdut gerobak* as responsible for what happened; he particularly blamed the female singer for triggering the incident. He ended his article with sympathy for the intent behind the policy that banned performances by *orkes dangdut gerobak* in the area: that they were “*hanya membuat keributan*,” or a “source of trouble.” Moreover, in addition to constructing a discourse that criminalized *orkes dangdut gerobak*, Ronald managed to sexualize the female singers as the ones responsible for men’s desires.

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF *ORKES DANGDUT GEROBAK*
 SELVINA: THE MOBILITY OF *ORKES DANGDUT GEROBAK*
 IN JAKARTA'S CITY SPACE

Orkes dangdut gerobak is always accompanied by two symbols: a cart and *dangdut* music. Several terms referring to *orkes* are *orkes dangdut keliling* (“moving-around *orkes dangdut*”), *orkes dorong* (“*orkes* that is pushed”), and *dangdut gerobakan* (“*dangdut* in a cart”). In this chapter, we use *orkes dangdut gerobak* because it encompasses three key characteristics: first, *orkes* as a group of a singer and musicians; second, *dangdut* as a signifier of pop culture; and third, *gerobak*, signifying the apparatus that makes them different from other street musicians.

To run a *dangdut* concert on the streets, *orkes dangdut gerobak* use the following: a *gerobak* (a cart), a set of generators, a sound system, an amplifier, and a keyboard; this equipment is common to *orkes dangdut gerobak* in the Baladewa area of Central Jakarta and its surrounding area. In other areas, for example, in Ciganjur and Depok, the *orkes dangdut gerobak* use only a *gerobak*, a set of generators, a sound system, and a CD player. Orkes Selvina is an *orkes dangdut gerobak* that uses a keyboard, which is a sign of modernity and sophistication (Jensen, 2011); ironically, the modernity fades when the means of transporting Orkes Selvina in Jakarta is a cart. *Orkes dangdut gerobak* is therefore an anomaly: Its modernity represented by a keyboard and a sound system relies on the old-fashioned *gerobak*.

Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, is perceived to manifest modernity; therefore, Orkes Selvina's use of the *gerobak* is anachronistic. Based on *orkes dangdut gerobak*'s lack of modernity, the city banned *gerobak* as violating public order under Local Regulation of DKI Jakarta Article 40, 8/2007, which prohibits their existence in much of the city space. In an interview, Uca (the leader of Orkes Selvina) said, “[We are] frequently warned by the police, wherever we go, we are warned by the police... very frequent, by social services too.”

Article 40 has become city officials' legal tool for controlling the existence of *orkes dangdut gerobak* in the city space. Officials define *dangdut gerobak* as buskers even though they identify as musicians. The officials use their labels as a form of “governmentality,” according to Jensen (2011), to identify themselves as the dominant parties in the city and shape *orkes dangdut gerobak* as a dangerous presence in the city.

Meanwhile, the power relations between *dangdut gerobak* and city officials (the police department and social services), despite being imbalanced,

are very dynamic. As the leader of the *orkes*, Uca had attempted to negotiate their existence in the city with the police department, insisting that he was a musician and rejecting that he should be “forbidden to exist” in the city. The effort to be identified as a street musician is depicted by the work of his own *dangdut* song “Amarahmu,” composed by Uca and written by Keling (an Orkes Selvina member), and the group has performed the song multiple times in street concerts.

“Amarahmu” is a well-crafted arrangement, not just monotonous tones that are played randomly and continuously or a modification of another song. This not only indicates that Uca understands music and rhythm but also negates the official city discourse that Uca and his friends are buskers. In an interview, Uca told me his songs are often accidental: “[I just make it] without any intention, who knows somebody might want to buy.” Uca’s unintentional compositions mark him as a skilled musician, well beyond a mere busker.

The power relations between Orkes Selvina and city officials are not rigid; the *orkes* have some room for negotiations. For example, Uca recounted several events during our 2016 interview related to the police department that were the result of the group’s diplomacy. The police often explain that they are not making the laws but are just following their orders from above, suggesting that they do not always enforce or agree with the strict governance. Rather, the police appear to attempt to disengage from the repressive authority that orders them to remove *orkes gerubak dangdut* from the city spaces.

The fact is that the police, as they report it, are mere subordinates who must do the work assigned to them. Rather than possessing absolute power, they appear to be located in the lowest stratum of the political hierarchy. Similarly, Suaeni, the singer for Orkes Selvina, recounts a moment when social services interrupted her *orkes dangdut gerobak*. The officer was taking pictures to report back to the subdistrict that the group needed to stop performing, but they did not actually do anything to stop the musicians from performing. In other words, the police department and social services agency are deployed to practice a repressive action, but their actual practices are contextual and fluid. In fact, Uca and Suaeni told me that some officials support their activities in the city space:

The ones who support... *Alhamdulillah* there are many who support, for example, Mr. Joko, the Regional Chief of Police [imitating Mr. Joko]: “The thing is that if there is anyone [arresting you], you report to *Aa* [‘Brother’

in Sundanese], just call me.” But now [we are] no longer [prohibited] by Mr. Bimo. Mr. Bimo supports us because he likes *dangdut* and so does Mr. Hasyim. Just go along with it.” (interview, translated by the researcher)

These city officials, who are supposed to be enforcing strict governance, do not in fact have negative feelings toward *orkes dangdut gerobak* playing in the city spaces. For instance, Mr. Joko’s instruction that Uca call him “*Aa*” suggests a close relationship between them, and the fact that Pak Bimo and Mr. Hasyim, authorities in the police department, appreciated the music and no longer prohibited the group’s performances demonstrate the flexibility in enforcing the regulation. It appears that not every city official practices the same level of repressive action in everyday situations. The dynamic interaction of the police and social service officials with the members of the *orkes dangdut gerobak* is not as rigid as depicted in mainstream narratives. The regulation that is usually repressive and strict turns out to be flexible when enforced upon Orkes Selvina by the city officials.

MORAL DISCOURSE IN *ORKES SELVINA*

Orkes Selvina challenges the notion of eroticism and the commodification of sexuality as fashioned in the media in the context of moral discourse. Uca opens every concert with the phrase, “Excuse me, *assalamu’alaikum*.” “Excuse me” speaks to an ethical tradition in Indonesian society, and “*assalamu’alaikum*” is a phrase representing moral values. He renounced the association of his music with sexuality in this statement in our interview: “Although [we are just] *dangdut gerobak*, [we are] best quality. If possible, good *akhlak* [good behavior] too ... I want entertainment, the music is to entertain people, not for that [negative] stuff.” Here, Uca uses the term *akhlak* to indicate that he does not wish to be associated with eroticism and sexual assaults, “that [negative] stuff.” The *orkes dangdut gerobak* led by Uca is also currently making an effort to confront another discourse, that of criminality, which has long been attributed to *orkes dangdut gerobak*, by showing *akhlak*.

In our ethnographic study, everyday practices in the *orkes dangdut gerobak* community include rejections of the negativity, both criminal and sexual. Suani told me that she once got mad at her singer friends when they wore short pants to the concert on the streets: “*Astaghfirullah!* They do not think of selling their voices; instead, they give an impression of

being easily taken. It's so embarrassing" (interview conducted and translated by the researcher). She rejects eroticism in her work as a singer in Orkes Selvina and prioritizes vocal quality over exposing body parts just for money. This is not to say that eroticism is not practiced in the phenomenon. This suggests that the *orkes* led by Uca's *orkes* rejects the media-constructed notion of female objectification, eroticism, and criminality.

This finding is parallel to Bader's (2011) conclusions in her research on *nyawer* culture in *dangdut* performances in West Java. Bader's research contributes to the existing scholarship on creativity and female agency, particularly in *dangdut*, which has always been associated with female objectification:

Although the singer dancers I worked with in Jakarta and Indramayu performed in sensual, erotic ways and sometimes engaged in brief physical contact with dancing audience members, they did not cross the line to overt physical indecency. Instead, they creatively improvise during these *nyawer* encounters, whereby different meanings have been ascribed to their lived experiences. These lived experiences point to the manifold nature of their subjectivities, which are shaped by their creative, embodied actions and intercorporeal relationships with the dancing audience on stage. (Bader, 2011, p. 340)

In Orkes Selvina, Uca and Suaeni reject the commodification and objectification of the female singer's sexuality as well as their criminality through their creative and embodied actions. For example, Uca and the other male members physically restrain any attempts by the audience to harass the female members during performances. This implies agency, which challenges the dominant narrative of *orkes dangdut gerobak* by the mainstream media.

Uca also protects female members from harm from the audience: "Even Emi is harassed, [she is] dragged all over the space. I don't like it, so I stop [playing music] at once." "I don't like it" suggests an attempt to resist the discourse of criminality that has long been associated with *orkes dangdut gerobak*. Next, "I stop at once" shows that Uca, as the leader of Orkes Selvina, is against the sexual harassment experienced by one of his members.

Additionally, Orkes Selvina resists the sexualization of the female singers by the clothes they wear. Uca said, "Here [in this group] I run... we don't want to wear this kind of skirt (pointing at her tight skirt). I want

Levi's long pants" (interview conducted and translated by the researcher). The limitation affiliated with wearing short skirts provides a counter discourse to the notion that associates *orkes dangdut gerobak* with sexual harassment and eroticism. Additionally, it strengthens Orkes Selvina's cultural practices that reject the objectification of *dangdut* female singers.

We argue that the collective effort to resist the mainstream media's stigmatization of *orkes dangdut gerobak* is a form of authority contestation. Furthermore, the very essence of the group is temporary, which could be interpreted as a strategy for defying the authorities while navigating the city, literally and figuratively. Police surveillance becomes difficult if the groups perform in moving locations around the city. This "collective creativity" (Giuffre, 2016) conveys how the members have become creative individuals who "... are embedded within specific network contexts so that creativity itself, rather than being an individual personality characteristic is, instead, a collective phenomenon" (p. 1). Collective creativity "is a subversive weapon for actors in the field. And the use of art is a strategy for actors in the field of power. Creativity happens as a result of this social contest. It is a social strategy" (Giuffre, 2016, p. 126). As a creative collective, *orkes dangdut gerobak* continues to move (mobility) and change (temporality), which challenges the city's established social order.

CONCLUSION

This chapter on *orkes dangdut gerobak* aims to contribute to the research on *dangdut* as a daily cultural practice in urban society. The depiction of *orkes dangdut gerobak* in online media is often demeaning, and based on our ethnographic study, there are complex everyday practices that need to be re-evaluated especially in connection with the dynamic urban practices. The main findings of this research demonstrate the anomalies in the meanings of modernity that are practiced by *orkes dangdut gerobak*. For instance, the *gerobak* does not embody technological advances, but the instruments these musicians play are technologically sophisticated.

Another aspect we highlight here is that the connection between group members based on their income earning does not impact their social relations. We found that the social relationships of the *orkes dangdut gerobak*'s group members with the group owners do not show evidence of power relations. It quite contradicts the modern economic concept in which money determines social relations between people.

Although governance is often rigidly and repressively conducted in practice, the *orkes dangdut gerobak* members we interviewed and observed in this case study reported that more flexible relations with individual city officials that lessened some of the repressive practices. Formally, the local regulations ban *orkes dangdut gerobak* performances in public city spaces, and authorities call these performers buskers rather than acknowledging them as musicians. However, Orkes Selvina confronts city officials diplomatically to preserve their existence and ability to keep making a living in the city spaces of Jakarta; they also demonstrate skill and identify as musicians, not buskers. Uca and his group challenge the narratives the mainstream media has constructed about *orkes dangdut gerobak*.

The discussion of *orkes dangdut gerobak* in this chapter conveys how *dangdut*, as a genre of Indonesian popular music, can shape understandings of urbanism. The mainstream understanding of *dangdut* as music for the lower class is challenged in this chapter. Furthermore, *orkes dangdut gerobak* as a mobile cultural practice navigates its way through the aisles of urban spaces in Jakarta and illustrates the dynamic understanding of urbanism. Urbanism in Jakarta is constantly changing and filled with contesting narratives from all types of actors, in this case, the authoritative voice of the mainstream media and the seemingly subjacent voices of the members of *orkes dangdut gerobak*.

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Orang Rantai in Sawahlunto: A State-Sponsored Heritage City and the Politics of Collective Memory

Agseora Ediyen and Shuri Mariasih Gietty Tambunan

INTRODUCTION

Sawahlunto, a city in West Sumatra province, located 90 km from Padang, the capital city of West Sumatra, was the only Indonesian city to be nominated to UNESCO as a World Heritage (Syafri & Fernandes, 2018), an unusual achievement for a city that had been an abandoned mine and considered a “dead city.” Sawahlunto was transformed socially and economically by embracing the city’s past as a mining city. In reconstructing

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Sawahlunto as a heritage city, the government's main strategy was to reconstruct the collective memory of the city's past, particularly the memory of chained convicts whom the colonial government had sentenced to hard labor and sent to the Sawahlunto mines. The government intended to reconstruct the manner in which the people of Sawahlunto and tourists should understand the meaning of chained convicts to create opportunities for local life, tourism, and investment.

Based on numerous documents about the development of the city, Asoka (2005, p. 162) determined that Sawahlunto's existence was diminishing. For over 100 years, the city's main income had come from the coal mines, but the income had declined rapidly with the decreasing coal supply. The people of Sawahlunto left the city and *merantau* (a specific term used in Indonesia referring to the act of migrating to the big cities or even the capital). As the city continued to lose its inhabitants and mining yielded little return, the government decided to transform the city with cities such as Batusangkaras' inspiration.

Many researchers have investigated how a city develops, particularly those intended for tourism, highlighting issues such as how space is constructed, economics, collective memory, and the social and cultural structure of societies (Conlin & Jolliffe, 2010; Ballesteros & Ramirez, 2007; Wanhill, 2000). Other researchers have already examined Sawahlunto in the context of city planning and how it relates to the social and cultural conditions of societies (Arifman & Teguh, 2014; Nawansir, 2003; Suprayoga, 2008; Hendry, 2011). Researchers have even specifically studied the *orang rantai* in Sawahlunto (Alexander & Wisdiarti, 2017; Fahmi, 2016; Kurniawati & Achnes, 2015). However, researchers have yet to explore how collective memory has been used to construct the image of the city in relation to its transformation, particularly in the context of the memory of the *orang rantai*.

Given this lack, with this chapter, we examine the role of a museum tourism site in Sawahlunto and discuss its role in the government's reconstruction of the city's image. We also address how reconstructing the city's image was immersed in the politics of collective memory and cultural heritage. This chapter also fills a research gap regarding reconstructing the meaning of chained convicts. The Sawahlunto city government recalled a legendary foreman from the history of chained convicts, Soerono, when naming the tourism site: Lubang Mbah Soero. The government constructed Soerono's heroic imagery in contravention of the people's collective memory and the historical writings.

With this chapter, we aim to analyze how the dominant authority constructed the meaning of Sawahlunto's transformation, and we highlight the naming of Lubang Tambang Mbah Soero. Recent literature on heritage and power (Schramm, 2015) discussed the process of legitimizing particular narratives about the past in reference to the relationships between the state, international bodies (such as UNESCO), and locals such that the discussion should consider the role of every actor within the discourse on heritage, power, and ideology. Therefore, we aim to unveil the complexity of the meaning-making process in constructing the identity of Sawahlunto as a mining tourism city through a cultural studies perspective. We conducted our study from January 2016 to February 2017, and our reflective research methods consisted of observations at the tourism sites, textual analysis of articles in the tabloid *Mak Itam*, and of a book that claims to present a historical reading of Sawahlunto (Erman, 2005), and interviews with locals. Some of the main findings show how making meaning from *orang rantai* differed for different people as well as how the meaning was reconstructed to refer to both a hero and a criminal. This chapter conveys what is at stake in this top-down approach to reconstructing this state-sponsored heritage project.

ORANG RANTAI AS HEROES

To counter the popular meaning of *orang rantai*, which refers to criminals, the government of Indonesia has reconstructed the term to instead refer to heroes, primarily by naming the tourism site Lubang Tambang Mbah Soero in reference to a famous *orang rantai*. *Peraturan Daerah Kota Sawahlunto* No 22001 is the policy that authorized this change. According to this policy, "Sawahlunto, in 2020, will be *Kota Wisata Tambang yang Berbudaya* (A Cultured Mining and Tourism City)." Under this policy, the government developed a number of tourism sites and arts and cultural events.

For the purposes of this research, the focus will be on one tourism site in particular that used to be a mining area. Sawahlunto's past was closely correlated with *orang rantai*, prisoners from all over Indonesia who were sentenced to work as miners. During the early development of the city, the main discourse focused on how Sawahlunto originated as a colony for criminals given that the mine workers were mostly *orang rantai*. To counter this, the city government reconstructed the idea of the city as a penal colony, which had been the main historical narrative from the Dutch

colonization period. Each aspect of society has reacted differently to this change based on their memories of this part of Sawahlunto's past. We argue that this is a part of the "tourism-driven heritage authorization model" (Su, 2018, p. 5) in which the authority, in this case the city government, controls the narrative that constructs the image of the city for the sake of tourism.

Sawahlunto became a city in 1858 following the discovery of coal in the Ombilin area by De Groot after De Greve's expedition in 1868. In the beginning, Sawahlunto was a large forest, and the people of Sawahlunto had only begun to develop the land in the form of small farms, but this changed when the Dutch discovered a large seam of coal in the Ombilin hills. Once the coal expedition began, the mining city was built in the 1890s. The government began sentencing convicted prisoners to work in the mines because the locals were not used to working underground (Erman, 2005, p. 74). In the main area of the city, there was *Lubang Sugar*, which had been the main mining area during the colonial era. It is this site, following the local government's rebranding, that became one of the main tourist attractions: Lubang Tambang Mbah Soero.

The government constructed the image of Mbah Soero as a hero using *Mak Itam*, a tabloid published by the city's newspaper. The articles in the city's newspaper portrayed Mbah Soero as a hero who was well respected by both the Dutch and fellow *orang rantai*. According to the tabloid, he also spread the teachings of Saminism, a traditional Javanese peasant' cult, in Blora before he was transported to Sawahlunto in 1902; he was convicted for opposing the Dutch tax policy.

In our analysis of stories in *Mak Itam*, Samin Surosentiko, whose childhood name was Raden Kohar, was presented as a prince or nobleman from a kingdom in Blora who was actually in disguise among the village people. He was to be understood as someone who wanted to organize the people to fight the colonizers, a protector of the people with courage and mysticism (*Mak Itam*, 2014, p. 33). Among the younger generation who cared about the *Samin Suro Santiko* community, Mbah Soero was also depicted as determined to protect the people and fight the colonizers (*Mak Itam*, 2013, pp. 13–14). By choosing the name "Mbah Soero" for the main tourism site in the city, the government used his heroic story to redefine *orang rantai* in general.

The tabloid also explains how these heroic characteristics are depicted in cultural seminars at the local universities and in other venues. One way

to do this is to borrow the “authoritative voice” from scholars and researchers to justify this dominant image:

Dr. Syafri Sairin, a professor of anthropology at Universitas Gajah Mada and UKM in Malaysia. He explained that not all *orang rantai*, or forced workers during colonial times, were criminals. *Orang rantai* and mine workers were fellow Indonesians who fought the colonizers. Mbah Soero was a clear example of an *orang rantai* who was not a criminal. (*Mak Itam*, 2013, p. 14, translated by the researcher)

The government followed the authoritative voice of scholars and researchers who were quoted in *Mak Itam* to justify presenting *orang rantai* as heroes.

In doing so, the city government did not intend to erase the idea of *orang rantai* as criminals, which many had assumed throughout history; rather, the government built stronger representations of Mbah Soero. As argued by Kotler and Gertner (2002), who analyzed the reconstruction of Turkey’s image as a tourism destination, the government tried to repair the denigrating news coverage of the country without addressing the roots of why the country was depicted in such a way, which only worsened the country’s image. Kotler and Garner demonstrated that Turkey shifted the focus to positive elements because “... to improve a country’s image, it may be easier to create new positive associations than try to refuse old ones” (p. 255).

Kotler and Gertner (2002) argued that these new associations eventually take over and eliminate historical meanings and associations, and in Sawahlunto, the government applied similar strategies by creating associations between the city and the new image of *orang rantai* as heroes. Through the character of Mbah Soero as a well-known nobleman with a strong character, a new understanding of *orang rantai* would trump the previously negative connotations associated with the word. The government seems to have succeeded in implementing this dominant image of *orang rantai*. For example, Pak De Sukadi, one of our interviewees, believed the narrative that Mbah Soero was actually a nobleman from Java:

Mbah Soero was actually a political prisoner. He came from Blora, Jepara. He was a prince.” (Sukadi, January 2017)

Sukadi believed in the government's dominant image, but some members of society contended that Mbah Soero was never a real person:

Mbah Soero did not actually exist. He was actually a woman, and his job was to give messages to children. Our friends told us the story. Oh, that's not true, he just sold *tumbang getuk* (traditional food). (Saridan, interview, February 2017)

The memory of Mbah Soero indeed differs according to different individuals; as Kusno argued, "*memori kolektif sangatlah tidak stabil karena terus dibentuk, dirajut dan dipertaruhkan oleh masyarakat dan negara seturut kepentingan tertentu*" (2009, p. 10) ("collective memory is unstable because it is constantly molded, knitted and put at stake by the society and the state based on their vested interest"). In the case of Sawahlunto, collective memory can also be unstable, particularly in the face of a dominant government meaning-making process, as we showed above.

The complexity with which people in Sawahlunto perceive *orang rantai* extends beyond the memory of Mbah Soero. Society itself has also emphasized heroic images of *orang rantai* because many fought against the Dutch colonizers. One respondent, Mbah Adjoem, the son of an *orang rantai* foreman, stated that *orang rantai* were prisoners who were forced into working but who fought the Dutch colonizers. Another respondent was Sukadi, another descendant of an *orang rantai*, explains his family's connection to the term, particularly his grandfather:

My grandfather, from my mother's side, was from the Pekalongan area. Whenever money (taxes) was taken from the people, he would take the money back and return it to the people. He would stop the carriage taking the tax money owned by the Dutch colonizers. The carriage was actually managed by the palace and taken care of by wedana (palace worker). One time he killed a Chinese businessman who made salted fish in Pekalongan, which made him a fugitive. My grandfather from my father's side whose name is Mbah Lakik ... his land in Wonogiri was taken by the Dutch. (Sukadi, personal communication, January 2017, translated by the researcher)

The quotation depicts how members of society reveal the same stories of the heroic role of *orang rantai* that is actually in line with the dominant discourse imposed by the government. Their memories reflect society's memory of *orang rantai* as people who were "hunted" by the Dutch or

who had their lands forcefully taken by the Dutch. Sukadi considered his grandfather heroic even though his grandfather's crime had been killing a Chinese businessman.

Analyzing the interview responses revealed that the Sawahlunto residents we spoke with believed that most *orang rantai* were not actually criminals but were falsely imprisoned by the Dutch to provide cheap labor: "They were actually taken away from their original jobs. They were criminalized. They did nothing wrong but were transformed into *orang rantai*" (interview with Pak De Mujiono, January 2017). Given that the Dutch government promised the prisoners better lives if they worked in the coal mines, we could argue that the respondents' memories of *orang rantai* are dominated by the Dutch government's exploitation of the men. We also could argue, however, that the respondents rejected the association of *orang rantai* with criminal activity because they did not want to be considered the descendants of criminals.

Individuals in Sawahlunto make meaning out of *orang rantai* through their family histories and stories that are passed down through the generations. Evans (2012) discusses how families that migrated from the United Kingdom to Australia used memories and historical materials to learn about their family histories, arguing that people can understand their economic, social, and cultural histories from these materials as well as from oral history; the author observed, for example, "Sewing skills were central to the production of other key items made, owned, and passed on by women to other women in colonial Australia and used to construct and record family history" (p. 217). In the case of Sawahlunto, oral history passed down from one generation to another and historical materials such as archives were used to justify the family line of *orang rantai* as heroes.

In this subsection, we revealed how first the local government of Sawahlunto deconstructed the dominant depiction of *orang rantai* as criminals, followed by the people of Sawahlunto themselves. We argue that the government was attempting to erase the legacy of its role in bringing the *orang rantai* to Sawahlunto by, for example, naming the main mining site after Mbah Soero: Instead, the government declared that *orang rantai* were heroes. According to Yananda (2014), the image of a particular space is constructed with easy-to-understand references, in this case, a nobleman from the past who fought the colonizers. Building this kind of collective understanding of *orang rantai* was substantial in transforming Sawahlunto, particularly for investors and potential tourists:

... critical heritage debates stress the aspect of counter memories as well as the valorization of dissident voices. Thus, heritage is not important in and of itself, but, rather, in relation to the politics of recognition that are at play in popular memory. (Schramm, 2015, p. 446)

Our findings show that Sawahlunto exemplifies the characteristics of a state-sponsored heritage city in which the state, represented by the city government, becomes the dominant actor and controls the process of making meaning of the past. However, as Schramm (2015) argued, the debate on the issue of cultural heritage is necessary for exploring counter-memories and the multiplicity of voices in the meaning-making process. At the same time that the city is constantly reconstructing the popular memory of Sawahlunto as part of its branding process, which we elaborate in the next section, local counter-memories can contest the dominant narrative and require negotiating new meanings.

ORANG RANTAI AS CRIMINALS

As argued earlier, the paradigm of *orang rantai* or chained convicts as criminals has existed since colonial times, and some members of society in Sawahlunto consider their descendance from *orang rantai* a disgrace. Saridan said that his family refused to be acknowledged as such and considered this “*pencemaran nama baik keluarga*,” “ruining the family name”:

We are courageous when referred to as children of *orang rantai*. I will confront this person. We are not descendants of *orang rantai*. Do not insult us. I have the courage to say this because my father came to this place with my mother and they brought one child. It would have been impossible for him to be a prisoner, because the ship carried 40 people. There were a lot of people and a lot of passengers, so would be impossible for a prisoner to come with a wife and a child. The Dutch would not transport non-prisoners in the ship. (Saridan, personal communication, February 2017)

Kusno (2009) explains that even though collective memory is often preserved, it is unavoidable that individuals will forget difficult moments or moments that do not fit with their preferred memories. Individuals tell themselves different stories, such as Saridan’s story that his father could not have been a prisoner if he had come over on the ship with his wife and child, thereby justifying that he cannot be descended from *orang rantai*.

In addition to being remembered as criminals, *orang rantai* have been considered “*orang buangan*,” which literally means “people who are thrown away.” Sukadi said, “railway workers for the coal mines came in stages and they came in ships ... people in the past called them ‘*orang buangan*’ ... well, there were more than seven thousands of them.” Mujiono described that, “*orang rantai* are unworthy slaves (*budak tidak berharga*). They were lucky that they were not killed. They are different from ‘*orang kontrak*’ (workers with contracts). *Orang kontrak* were paid if they worked. *Orang rantai* were not paid until they had paid their due.” These understandings of *orang rantai* as *buangan* or as slaves are embedded in the collective memory of the people of Sawahlunto.

In addition to the residents’ collective memory, another source supports the negative connotations associated with *orang rantai*: Erman describes the harrowing trip the men were forced to take to Sawahlunto, during which they were tortured, beaten, and treated like animals by the Dutch guards (pp. 29–30). Apart from their treatment by the Dutch, *orang rantai* were also treated badly by society. Mujiono explained that the Dutch government instilled in the population the fear that many of the *orang rantai* were murderers from Java; the government’s strategy was that if a prisoner escaped, local people would report him immediately out of fear. Locals living in fear of *orang rantai* would also remain obedient to the colonial government. Mujiono did tell us that this approach was not always successful and that many in Sawahlunto remained unafraid of *orang rantai*.

Historical writings support this understanding *orang rantai*’s lower position in society. For instance, Erman (2005) explains that people from Nias and Minangkabau who worked as laborers did not want to be considered on the same level as *orang rantai* (77); those workers refused to wear their uniforms because they were nearly the same color as those worn by *orang rantai*, which they called “*buruh paksa*” (“those doing forced labor”).

Erman’s (2005) findings were mostly derived from colonial documents and do not address the everyday realities of Sawahlunto society. Most of the documents are in Dutch and are thus framed from the Dutch colonizers’ perspective and agenda. Our research findings include interviews with members of society and show that local Sawahlunto society did not share the government’s perception or presentation of *orang rantai* as criminals. However, differences in how respondents perceive the meaning of *orang rantai* occurred because they share different memories about these men

that have of course been influenced by dominant discourses that have been constructed within society.

We also found that interactions between local people and *orang rantai* were extremely limited. The prisons were built near the mines so the prisoners could be easily transported, and security around the mines was taken very seriously to avoid escapes. Adjoem, a respondent, also shared that the Dutch government restricted the mine workers from having a social life. Isolating the prisoners ensured that *orang rantai* would not be a threat to society, which actually made the miners more independent and courageous (Erman, 2005, p. 87). Limiting the prisoners' social interactions, according to Erman, was also a way for the Dutch colonial government to control the *orang rantai* population and ensure the continuation of cheap labor. The total of the government's efforts at isolation and control of the *orang rantai* population are arguably at the root of how the representation of *orang rantai* as criminals was cultivated.

Today, members of society in Sawahlunto are affirming or contesting the dominant understanding of *orang rantai*. Individual and even community actions are beginning to construct alternative discourses and even to challenge existing discourses, for example, by representing *orang rantai* differently in theater performances. Mujiono is a member of a theatre group that is producing a story of an *orang rantai* man and a Minangkabau woman whose love was not blessed by the other villagers because they were from different social strata; in the performance, the concepts of self and other are used to differentiate *orang rantai* from the local Minangkabau people. Mujiono had also proposed making a feature-length film, but the process was only just beginning during the time of this research.

Sukadi has also written a book about the history of mining in Sawahlunto, mostly from stories his mother told him. Sukadi and Mujiono are examples of members of Sawahlunto's society who have rejected the government's dominant depiction of *orang rantai*. Other works that contest the dominant discourse surrounding *orang rantai* also exist, but these materials were not widely available at the time of this research. We therefore cannot determine the impacts of any of these newer materials on the ways the people of Sawahlunto understand *orang rantai*.

The dynamic whereby *orang rantai* reconstructed as either heroes by the government or as criminals by other actors reflects the complexity of heritage, power, and ideology. Schramm (2015) analyzed the process of establishing the African Burial Ground National Monument in New York as an official heritage site that had been long awaited by the African

American community and finally received support by the government. The land carries great significance regarding the early African American presence in the northern part of the United States, but actors such as activist Sonny Carson insist on “the repatriation of the remains of one of his own ancestors to African soil” (Schramm, 2015, p. 448). This notion of repatriation does not apparently fit into the official narrative of African American triumph, which has been constructed by African American stakeholders and state officials, just as in the existing dominant narrative of *orang rantai*. The conflicting sides in this case study, as in Schramm’s analysis, show that making sense of the past will always entail power plays. Indeed, the claiming of heritage spaces is in itself an ideological battleground.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the research findings here show how the Dutch Sawahlunto city government controlled the narrative regarding *orang rantai* in Sawahlunto as part of shaping the city’s identity. When necessary, the men were criminals, and now they are heroes, but it has been the people in Sawahlunto who either affirm or contest this depiction. The government depicted *orang rantai* as heroes by naming the old mining site Lubang Tambang Mbah Soero after Mbah Soero, a penal laborer who fought for the poor and challenged the Dutch colonizers. The government also extrapolated Mbah Soero’s heroics to represent the general population of *orang rantai*. Though most residents affirm this depiction of heroism, our interviews with locals from Sawahlunto and reported in the tabloid *Mak Itam* revealed several opposing ways of understanding *orang rantai*. The respondents argued that there is a significant difference between the government narrative and what they believed or had heard.

Complicating matters is that the current construction of *orang rantai*’s actions as heroic does not align with how Dutch historical archives and documents portray *orang rantai*: In creating a penal colony, the Dutch colonial government played an important role in constructing *orang rantai* as criminals. More recent depictions by the government and locals alike reveal no similarities in understanding what *orang rantai* mean in transforming Sawahlunto from a mining city to a tourism city. Discussions regarding how the government, the people’s memory, and historical writings interpret the term *orang rantai* are complicated, in that they sometimes overlap and contrast. Such conflicting understandings reveal how

the meaning-making process is heavily embedded within imbalanced power relationships. The most authoritative player, in this case the government, has it seems become the more trustworthy source.

In contrast, the memory of the people, which official authorities often disregard as a reliable source, has not played a significant role in the meaning-making. Reconstructing cities' images in Indonesia has not been exclusive to Sawahlunto. But we limited this research to discussing Lumbang Tambang Mbah Soero as an example of Sawahlunto's transformation, but researchers on other tourism sites and other aspects of the city could offer additional enlightenment narratives and meaning-making in reconstructing images or memories.

This research contributes to the literature related to the evolution of tourism in Sawahlunto and opens a door to future studies. Future researchers could explore the cultural functions of the government in relation to its dominant role in meaning-making while re-evaluating its historical aspects. Larger samples from areas surrounding Sawahlunto and from diverse ethnic backgrounds would offer other perspectives on the memory of *orang rantai*.

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Gangsters, Music, and Aremania: Modernity and the Dynamics of Arek Malang to Defend their Existence (1970–2000)

Faishal Hilmy Maulida

INTRODUCTION

Fundamentally, no history can be separated from the area where it happens, whether locally, regionally, across a country, or worldwide, and these geospatial categories have different definitions and applications. Local history is the study of an event, theme, or structure that occurred in a society in a given spatial scope and can be as broad as the influence of the event and the historical process that took place. Local history is a science (historiology), whereas regional history is an administrative, district, and provincial concept. Local and regional histories can be distinguished conceptually but are difficult to separate while assessing the geographical and spatial dimensions of history (Zuhdi, 2016, p. 3). Malang Raya (Malang City,

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Malang Regency, and Batu City) is located in the highlands and is surrounded by mountain ranges. The coastal areas of southern Malang contribute to the diversity of the region. Malang City, also known as Tribina Cita, supports students, industries, and tourism. The three pillars were determined in the Plenary Session of Gotong Royong Malang Municipality in 1962 (Pemerintah Kotamadya Malang, 1978, pp. 27–30).

Culturally, in addition to the ideals of Malang evident in Tribina Cita, Malang was known as a barometer of music and boxing in Indonesia between the 1960s and mid-1980s. This is evidenced by the existence of national musicians from Malang, such as Ian Antono, Abadi Soesman, Ucok Harahap, Teddy Sudjaya, Totok Tewel, Noldiek, Wiwie Gang Voice, and Silvia Sartje, as well as various boxing arenas in the city that produced national boxing athletes, such as Wongso Suseno, Nur Hasyim, Monod, and Thomas Americo. Furthermore, Malang is known as the football barometer of Indonesia, evidenced by the number of clubs, such as PS Arema, Persema Malang, Persekam Metro FC Kabupaten Malang, and Persikoba Batu, that performed regionally and nationally between the mid-1990s and 2000s.

The emergence of the acronym “Arema,” which combines *arek* (“child” or “youth”) with the adjective Malang (as an administrative area), signifies identity for individuals and groups. As the acronym developed, its use was not limited to *arek-arek* (*anak*), meaning native to or domiciled in the Malang area, but was more broadly used to describe a cultural identity not limited by spatial and temporal boundaries. Although the name *Arek Malang* was initially limited to inter-territorial relations among the youth in Malang, it was then legitimized by Persatuan Sepakbola (PS) Arema, which was established on August 11, 1987. The next development was “Aremania,” a descriptor for PS Arema supporters and a label that was capable of bridging the divisions among gangs who often fought with each other depending on which village or group they belonged to from Malang and its surrounding area.

ROCK MUSIC AND THE BATTLES BETWEEN VILLAGES

“Music reflects people’s thoughts and ways of life,” reads the opening sentence of a book on modern music (Howard & Lyons, 1962). This statement implies that music will always change across space and time given that our thoughts and ways of life are in flux. Nature, personal talent, awareness of beauty, and the influence of environmental and cultural

concerns affect people's attitudes and responses to music (Hardjana, 2003, p. 37).

The music industry as part of popular culture can reach large numbers using mass production and distribution, making messages easily accessible to the wider community (Heryanto, 2012, p. 9). As evidenced in Malang, music develops dynamically, constantly changing and influencing its audience, especially youth. The development of rock music in Malang from the 1960s until the early 1990s is not much different from how this music developed in other big cities. The fundamental difference is that there is a much greater appreciation of the creativity of urban rock artists in Malang City than in other cities.

In the 1960s, the Sukarno regime forbade Western music, especially British and American music, as not reflecting the nation and character building of the capitalist state. However, as the government was encouraging its citizens to stay away from rock music, that era in Malang was characterized by the appearance of new musicians, who usually gathered in what is now Sarinah Plaza, located in the square of Malang City. The first band to appear in Malang after the events of G30S 1965 was Eka Dasa Taruna, founded by Lieutenant Colonel Sudarji (Fandoli, 2011).

In the 1970s, several new music groups emerged, but these could only practice and perform if they were funded by large companies. For example, Bentoel and Oepet were sponsored by the biggest cigarette factory in Malang, and bands such as Zodiak, Panca Nada, Arulan, and Swita Rama were also sponsored. With that corporate support, Bentoel became one of the most popular rock groups in the city of Malang. The vocalist, Micky Jaguar, and drummer, Ian Antono, were famous for being eccentric and always surprising their fans (Apokalip 2010a, b).

In the 1970s, GOR (Sport Center) Pulosari, located on Kawi Street in Malang, was a venue often used for rock concerts. It was built on deep ground and bounded by a wooden tribune that enclosed a large stage beneath it, a design that ensured that the stadium was soundproof and had brilliant acoustics. A number of artists, ranging from Panbers, Trencem, Bentoel, Cockpit, Sylvia Saartje, to Godbless, have played at GOR Pulosari, a once-prestigious rock concert venue that remains an important artifact in the local rock and roll saga of the 1980s and early 1990s. Musicians such as I Kang Fawzi, Power Metal, Gito Rolies, Deddy Stanzah, Iwan Fals, Nicky Astria, Ita Purnamasari, Slank, and Dewa 19 played at this sacred venue (Apokalip, 2010a, 2010b).

By the early 2000s, rock music had suffered losses in Indonesia, both in numbers of musicians and fans and in the intensity of concerts, largely because Malang youth had developed other cultural interests, but the music in Malang continued to change and adapt. Whereas in the 1970s, the musicians mostly played Western hard rock; in the 1980s, they were able to create and sing their own songs under the art-rock genre. In the 1990s, the number of local music festivals increased, and this period became known for the emergence of heavy metal (Ardivitiyanto, 2015, pp. 55–67).

Rock music developed in Malang from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, a period that can be considered its golden age. Rock music characters tended to be masculine, strict, and forthright, and they made strong impressions on the teenage gangs that emerged during that era. Young people developed strong primordial ties to their *kampung*, villages, and were fiercely territorial about them. *Kompas* (2011) reported that young people of Malang City joined gangs such as Argomz (Armada Gombal), Prem (Persatuan Residivis Malang), Saga (Sumbersari Anak Ganas), Van Halen (Vederasi Anak Nakal Halangan Enteng), Arpanja (Arek Panjaitan), Arnak (Armada Nakal), Anker (Anak Keras), Aregrek (Arek-arek Gang Gereja), and Ermera.

However, there is a difference between the teen gangs that existed in Malang in the 1970s and those in the 1990s. Whereas the 1970s gangs displayed their masculinity, according to Hudijono (2012), their 1990s counterparts had shifted their focus to lifestyle and fashion. Sometimes the lifestyle reflected the distance and differentiation between *anak gedongan* (“rich boys”) and *anak kampung* (“kampung boys”). Other gangs such as the River A Complex, D’Jongen, Sexy Jongen, Rameco, NICO, OXI12, and PK17 used Western terminology in their names (Hudijono et al. 2012, p. 37).

The popularity of gangs in Malang was strengthened by the two local languages, which to Malang youth are symbols of identity: “*Boso Walikan*,” “a language that is flipped,” and “*Boso Malangan*,” “the language of Malang people.” *Boso Walikan* was used during the Indonesian National Revolution era as a cryptic language to identify intruders among Indonesian soldiers. In *Boso Walikan*, words in words are reversed; for instance, “*saya*” (“I”) and “*kamu*” (“you”) are the reverse of “*ayas*” and “*umak*.” Some Javanese words are reversed as well, such as “*wedok*” (“women”) and “*lanang*” (“men”) into “*kodew*” and “*nganal*.”

Boso Malangan is a street language derived from slang words commonly used in Malang. For instance, the Indonesian word “*bohong*” (“lying”) is flipped into “*ngobob*” in *Boso Walikan*, but since the early 1970s, the youth around the Kayutangan area in Malang have used “*pesi*” to mean lying, and youth from Sawahan area say “*awad*.” Now, the youth use both “*pesi*” and “*awad*,” so that to accuse someone of lying, they no longer say “*Umak ngobob*,” the reverse of “*Kamu bohong*,” which actually means “You are lying.” Instead, they say “*Umak awad*” or “*Umak pesi*” (Rachmawati, 2012, p. 100).

During the period of *Arek Malang*, the youth of Malang actively used *Boso Walikan*, and the dialect easily signified those originally from Malang and newcomers. Indeed, youth who can communicate in *Boso Walikan* feel a sense of pride and solidarity, and *Boso Malangan* varies in the different regions around Malang, and young people feel pride and solidarity in being able to communicate with each other and use these languages to signify their gang involvement.

Meanwhile, teenage gangs are a pressing issue in some countries, including in Indonesia and especially in Malang. However, owing to the secretive nature of their organizations, obtaining reliable information about gangs is challenging. Even countries such as the United States have presented little research on gangs (White et al., 2008, p. 6), although gang theorists have identified that members of lower classes who have been ostracized by society make ripe targets for juvenile gangs (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). However, in a local newspaper, the *Malang Post*, a former gang member shared the following insight:

In the 1970s–1980s, young people in Malang were fond of making gangs. They joined in these gangs to have an identity. The purpose of the gangs at that time was not to do evil, but to be a group in order to survive by foraging. That’s all, really! HM Mochtar (a former gangster). (translated by the author)

The gang member from the story, HM Mochtar, added that in the early 1980s, some mysterious hitmen called Petrus were targeting people with criminal backgrounds and gang members, including members of Argomz. Argomz was considered to be a group of thugs, but in the article, Mochtar rejected the public’s assumption. He told Zaeni (2008) that Argomz was just a group of young amateur radio hobbyists, which was the trend at the time; there were many other amateur radio groups such as Mopret, Renco,

and Black Embek. The assumption appeared to have arisen because Argomz did not seem to have a clear purpose, even though Mochtar said the group owned an amateur radio station as the center of its activities. Argomz existed for a considerable time until the government hired Petrus to kill off the gang members. Many, including from Argomz, left town.

Lais Purwandi, another former gang member, told me during an interview that from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, Malang, especially Malang City, was fertile with rowdy youth gangs:

Gangsters Malang when it's a lot, Bareng area has a gang, Summersari have gangs, Galunggung have gangs, all western (west Malang) first if the night of the weekend especially Children in Gading, Mbebekan, Mergan, Bandulan, Summersari, which is obviously the term ijen (Ijen Boulevard) to the west, if the night does not dare to watch the cinema night in Kelud (cinema on the street Kelud, Malang), Lais Purwandi (Interview, January 21, 2015). (translated by the author)

He reported that the Bareng area was dubbed the lion cage. Every night of the week, there was always a “*tukang palak/tukang target*” (someone who takes money by force), and every night, the police would enter the village and arrest the thugs. There were famous gangs, such as the English gangs in the Kasin area and the German and Nazi gangs in the Bareng area who wore costumes and jackets with the Swastika insignia. The most dangerous gangs were Ancor from the Jodipan region, Texas from the Oro-oro Dowo region, Segal (Setan Galunggung), SAS (Combined Oro-oro Dowo and Kauman), and Aregrek (Arek-arek Gang Gereja), the oldest and most frightening, from the Galunggung region. There was also a gang called Lindungan Nuklir from Linu, in the area of Bareng, Malang.

The success of rock music and the emergence of gangster communities in Malang cannot be entirely separated from the culture attached to the city, which is the culture of the people, *Arek*. The *Arek* are characterized as being strong-willed, loyal, egalitarian, aggressive, open to changes, and easy to adapt. Their stereotypical personality can be summarized in an idiom, “*njaba njero padha*” (“it is the same inside or out”), meaning we are all the same whether you are from the area or outside the area.

The open and egalitarian culture of *Arek* made Malang open to the influence of rock music and gang culture when they were introduced through Western movies and radio and music concerts. *Njaba njero padha* indicates a sense of openness to newcomers, a concept specifically present

in East Java province; another Indonesian city with this culture is Surabaya (Sutarto, 2004, pp. 1–13). Malang’s youth accepted new culture in the form of rock music and gangster culture, and the area’s openness is critical to the rise of both in Malang.

The existence of gang culture cannot be separated from the collective memory of Malang City during the colonial and post-revolutionary era, which was characterized by violence and conflict. According to Tjamboek Berdoeri (alias of Kwee Thiam Tjing), regarding the tragic riot in the Chinese community in Malang, Jawa Timur, on July 21, 1964, fields were destroyed and looted, and Chinese women were raped. The riots started when the Dutch colonizers returned after the independence of Indonesia, and the Chinese community was suspected of supporting the colonizers (Berdoeri, 2004). The revolutionary era brought back memories of violence and conflict that were still being felt during modernization attempts after independence.

The emergence of gangsters and the hype of rock music in Malang fueled the desire to identify as *Arek Malang*. “Malang people,” particularly the youth, created a movement based on a unique culture that comprised elements from rock music and gangs and that ultimately represented a form of solidarity for the Arema football club. Later, this phase transformed into a tight-knit community bonded under the umbrella Aremania.

AREMANIA AND THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL FOOTBALL

To explain the dynamics of Malang’s social structure, particularly Arek Malang, here, I explore the emergence of Aremania as a counterweight to the masculinity of rock music and the emergence of teen gangs from the 1970s until the mid-1990s. Aremania emerged as a group of PS Arema football supporters who were able to provide a more complex expression of Arek Malang. The emergence of PS Arema in Indonesian football changed the typical lifestyle of young people in Malang, who preferred to express themselves through football as opposed to gang activity. Rock music at the time had also begun to lose its prestige after there were no longer venues for performing. GOR (Sport Center) Pulosari became a shopping center, and rock music audiences slowly started to attend games at Stadium Gajayana instead.

The MC (host) of music in Malang, Ovan Tobing, the founder of Aremania, invited music lovers to attend PS Arema matches. Persema Malang, a prestigious club founded in 1953, had been the idol of Malang

people before the emergence of PS Arema, but the people of Malang gradually came to call themselves Arema from Arek Malang because it was more relatable and better connected to their growing community identity. At that time, music lovers became Arema supporters, and so did Persema supporters, and even gangs in villages in Malang unified themselves under Arema. Discreetly and gradually, Arema erased its association with the identities and habits of Malang youth gang and replaced it with Aremania, representing rabid fandom for the team, the sport, and the local identity.

The shift in Malang football community culture began in the early 1990s, from Ngalamania, support for Persema football club, to Aremania, support for PS Arema, and continued until the late 2000s. Several circumstances enforced this shift, including how easily the name Arema was derived from “Arek Malang.” The term made the notion of solidarity easy to grasp and elicited a sense of attachment to Malang culture, which in turn elicited a sense of belonging among the people.

The other factor that affected the shift in allegiance from Persema Malang to PS Arema was that even though it was a new team established only in 1987, Arema consistently won more matches than Persema Malang. In fact, Arema won the Football Association of Indonesia’s (PSSI) Galatama (the main league) in 1992–1993, an accomplishment that certainly played a role in citizens of Malang enthusiastically attending matches. A third factor that drew youth support in the 1980s and 1990s for a shift in the Malang area from a focus on rock music and gangs to football was the fact that Ovan Tobing and Lucky Acub Zaenal, important figures in the rock music community in Malang, were co-founders of Arema.

Arema was well-loved as a privately owned football club and later a symbol of resistance against Persema Malang, a local government-owned “red-plated” club. The fact that Arema was privately owned meant that the club needed Aremania to buy tickets to help sustain the team rather than barging through the stadium gates without paying, which was common practice at the time. The team also encouraged supporters from out of town to attend matches and support the team. Over time PS Arema became the pride of the city, instilling in its citizens a sense of unity, belonging, and responsibility that had not previously existed.

PS Arema’s long journey to Galatama cannot be separated from its founding as a football club. Muntholib (2009, pp. 17–24) offers a comprehensive understanding of this club’s history. It started with a discussion between Ovan Tobing and Lucky Acub Zainal, who were then invited to meet Dirk Sutrisno, the owner of Armada 86. Following a long discussion

between Lucky, Ovan, and Dirk, the three agreed to establish the Galatama club, and Dirk agreed that to register his club with PSSI. The club's name, however, would be changed from Armada 86 to Arema 86.

In May 1987, following the team's formation, Arema 86 immediately started work on promotion; it was a new team that was to compete at the national level, but it was not widely known by the people of Malang. As I noted earlier, football fans in Malang were still generally supporting Persema Malang, which played in Perserikatan. On August 11, 1987, Malang Mayor Tom Uripan formally changed the name Arema 86 to PS Football Club Arema, and Lucky Acub Zaenal, Dirk Sutrisno, and Yusuf attended the ceremony. PS Arema was the name it would play under to compete in Galatama.

During the Galatama era, Arema supporters tended to be violent fans, the same as English hooligans, and some Malang youth gangs supported Arema. At the stadium, gangs would compete to be the loudest, and during that time, a rivalry took shape between Surabaya and Malang supporters; vehicles with N plates (for Malang) were regularly damaged in Surabaya, as were Surabaya vehicles with L plates in Malang. In 1992, the police conducted a *razia* (raid) on the people of Surabaya in Malang to prevent violence (Psilopatis, 2002, p. 3). Even in the early days of Arema, as Alyverdana (2012, pp. 82–83) observed, some people considered the original PS Arema fans “terrible.” In the early 1990s, they were called “*Pasukan Bodrex*” (“young people who like to make riot”). The early Arema fans were still teenagers, and this young fan group has always been the scapegoat for chaotic events that occurred in the PS Arema matches.

In 1988, the Arema Fans Club (AFC) was established, and the first chairman was Ir. Lucky Zaenal (Psilopatis, 2002, p. 18). Initially, there were 13 *korwil* (area coordinators), who were stewards of Arema supporters in villages or areas of Malang. According to the article entitled “*Aremania Junjung Sportivitas*,” published by *Bestari* magazine (2001a, 156), Arema supporters perceived AFC as being set off from other supporters; in response, AFC, which had once been regarded as too exclusive to accept most Arema supporters, began to encourage harmony between supporters. AFC was disbanded sometime in 1994, according to Lucky Acub Zaenal because of time constraints and issues about regeneration.

After the dissolution of AFC, the term *Aremania* began to be used to refer to Arema supporters, and at the same time, the gang members who had been young in the late 1980s had matured by the mid-1990s and had moved away from gang activity. Meanwhile, sociological changes in

Indonesia and prevention efforts by some Aremania figures kept new gangs from emerging in Malang. In another article in Bestari (2001a, b, p. 156), Gusnul Yakin, a former Arema coach, noted that although it was unclear how exactly the term Aremania had appeared, it united Arema supporters. Ovan Tobing and some of his colleagues started using the name in mid-1994 at the same time that Ovan started wearing the first jacket bearing the term Aremania, permanently attaching the name to Arema supporters.

Possibly the height of the violence of Malang football fans during the 1990s was the 1991 tragedy at Galatama XI between Petrokimia and PS Arema. During games, Arema fans were aggressive and forced authorities to evacuate the stadium in a riot that resulted in four people being injured and damage to homes and cars (*Jawa Pos*, 1991, p. 15). Throughout the League Indonesia Perserikatan XXIV 1990/1992 competition between Persema Malang and Persegres Gresik, Arek-arek Malang terrorized the Persegres players who were practicing at the Gajayana stadium. They not only cursed from the stands but also spat on Persegres players when they were leaving the stadium. Even on the day of the match, they threw stones onto the pitch that caused significant interruptions, and the chaos continued after the whistle; some Persegres players were locked in the locker room for several hours.

As dynamics in the world of national football changed and *gang-gengan* culture in Malang dissipated around the mid-1990s, Malang supporters too began to change. Negative images of Malang's supporters, especially Aremania, remain, but in 2000, Aremania was recognized as having the best supporters in Indonesia. When thousands of supporters came to Jakarta for the Big Eight of the Ligin VI round, PSSI Chairman Agum Gumelar was impressed by the creative and sporting conduct of the Arema supporters at Gelora Bung Karno Main Stadium, Senayan, Jakarta.

Aremania as a community of football supporters offered a sense of identity that youth at the time of its inception found very attractive. Owing to its geographically remote location, Malang was mostly isolated from other cities in East Java, specifically, Surabaya, and the youth in Malang were labeled as troubled. Aremania emerged in Malang out of the community's desire to create a unifying identity; in the same way that the young people had accepted rock music and gang culture, Aremania offered an attractive sense of belonging.

CONCLUSION

When analyzing the emergence of gangs in different villages and the love of rock music among the youth of Malang, there emerges an expression of modernity from the structure of middle-class society. Young people consumed modern commodities and lifestyles brought with global currents. In Malang, the love of rock music in the 1970s was heavily influenced by Western music. The 1970s brought the rock music of the United States and England to Malang, and cinema from the early 1970s to mid-1990s was dominated by Western films. Many of the gang-themed movies at the time targeted young people, especially the middle class, leading young people to mimic the celebrities in the films.

From the 1970s to the beginning of 2000, the emerging transformation of culture and modernity that was controlled by the middle class began to affect the structure of other social classes in Malang society. Over time, rock music and gang culture were no longer monopolized by the middle class but became more widespread. The *Arek Malang* identity was strict, straightforward, and uncompromising on the surface, and although this identity was not entirely the product of rock music and gang culture, they were considered factors. Anwar Hudijono classified gang culture at the time as “*gedongan*” and “*anak kampung*.” In part of the cultural shifts at the time, the emergence of Aremania culture interrupted the passion of Arek Malang for rock music and gang life to emphasize unity between people even as it represented the same hard, straightforward, and uncompromising character that identified Arek Malang character.

In addition to the inherent character of Arek Malang, the cultural characteristic of Malang as being open to change and easy to adapt also played a role in forming Aremania as a new urban culture. This characteristic emerged in Malang out of political disruptions such as the time during the colonial period when Malang was named a *gemeente*, a municipality, on April 1, 1914. Political events exert a significant impact on the openness of a city’s residents to newcomers, and rock music resonated with the youth because it fit their firm, straightforward, and uncompromising personalities. The intersection of social, political, and cultural values in Aremania as a new urban culture in Malang became the unifying element of Arek Malang, transforming Aremania into a unifying identity free of gang culture.

According to Benny Hoedoro Hoed, cultural transformation is based on the wishes of communities, but desires based in the past cannot be

fulfilled; change will not manifest if the attitude is not based on modernity. Modernity, however, is endogenous and tends to discard things in a culture that are associated with tradition (Hoed, 2014, p. 230). In Malang, there was a shift from music and gang culture to Aremania, but there has been no cultural shift from the strict, straightforward, and uncompromising character of Arek Malang over time. Even if things change on the surface, what is important is that the identity of Arek Malang is maintained from the Aremanian era.

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CHAPTER 5

Urban Regeneration and Images of the “Other” in *Cek Toko Sebelah* (2016)

*Shuri Mariasih Gietty Tambunan
and Maria Regina Widhiasti*

INTRODUCTION

Discussions about the idea of cities allow us to understand how social change occurs in everyday reality. Urban spaces have always been important aspect of cities in many films that carry with it particular narratives about cities. Consequently, the portrayal of urban problems in films has become a means to understand how power and the struggle for power operate in urban settings. As argued by Mennel (2008), “power relations are organized by social differences in class, gender, age, race, and ethnicity, which produce urban patterns and processes” (p. 15).

The representation of urban life in films reflects the types of power relations that affect the social and cultural problems of cities. In Indonesia, Paramaditha (2011) argued that post-New Order filmmakers “portray characters who acknowledge their problems in the modern city but choose

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to keep their desires alive by redefining their relation to space. In the end, they are not victims but rather people with agency to negotiate in the city” (p. 510). Indonesian films, particularly those produced since the New Order era, have not only problematized urban issues but, most importantly, also portrayed how agency works in contesting or negotiating with imbalanced power relations in the urban context, including in the case study chosen for this research.

Cek Toko Sebelah (CTS) is an Indonesian comedy film released in December 2016 and directed by Ernest Prakasa, who also co-wrote the script. Ernest Prakasa is a Chinese Indonesian comedian who often uses his ethnic background as material for his stand-up comedy and some of the films he has produced and directed, such as *Ngenes* released in 2015 and *CTS* (2016). The representation of Chinese Indonesians in Indonesian popular culture has always been problematic, particularly because of systematic discrimination against the Chinese. They face ongoing attempts to eradicate their ethnic identity from the political and social discourse of Indonesian public culture, as elaborated by Heryanto (1998), especially under the Assimilation Law during the New Order era.

The meaning of “Chineseness” in Indonesia has evolved throughout history and will always be in a state of flux: “In what appears to be a response to the violence, a new recognition of Chinese Indonesians and their long history of civil predicaments has become one of the most popular features in contemporary literature, fine arts, and films” (Heryanto, 2008, p. 71). Therefore, any cultural texts representing Chinese Indonesians, particularly after *Reformasi*, convey an ideological battleground in which the relationship of power between minorities and majorities needs to be constantly challenged.

In an interview with kompas.com, the director, Ernest Prakasa, who also plays the main character in the film, explains that he did not intentionally address the subject of Chinese Indonesians in the film; even the issue of pluralism was an accidental theme of the film because, according to Ernest, the film attempts to derive humor from the theme of family. However, he also admits that by choosing a mixed-ethnic marriage between the characters of Yohan (Chinese Indonesian) and Ayu (Javanese), the conflict that arises between the father and Yohan is actually multiculturalism. The film also invokes the 1998 riot, which becomes a background story providing a reason for the father’s decision to rebuild the family store. CTS covers issues such as the generation gap, family (kinship), and the restructuring of urban space. Most importantly, these

challenges are articulated within the context of the identity of Chinese Indonesians.

The film tells the story of a father, Afuk (Chew Kin Wah), who intends to bequeath his store to one of his two sons, Yohan (Dion Wiyoko) and Erwin (Ernest Prakasa). However, the son he has chosen, Erwin, is already a successful young executive and is soon to be promoted to branch manager in Singapore; he does not want the store. The older son, Yohan, who works as a photographer, does want to take over the store, but he has a difficult relationship with his father because of an arrest for drug possession. Afuk also does not approve of Yohan’s marriage to Ayu.

Previous research on the film has argued that *CTS* depicts social norms and issues of diversity (Nathania & Sukendro, 2018; Radika, 2019; Anton, 2018; Hartanti, 2018) or the audience’s meaning-making process of how multiculturalism is represented in the film (Kalangi, 2018). Even though the discussion about Chinese Indonesians in the context of multiculturalism and tolerance is a significant aspect of the film, the film problematizes how urban spaces have always been catalysts for change. Progress and modernity represented by the skyscrapers of the city have put to one side or even eradicated the “other” spaces in the city.

This research aims to explore how urban dwellers negotiate these constant changes or urban regeneration. The film tries to salvage fragments of what is left of the urban space through the representation of a *toko kelontong* and reconstructs this other space as a substantial part of the multiplicity and dynamic transformation of urban life. The textual analysis of the film is conducted from a cultural studies perspective by examining how narratives and cinematographic elements, such as the use of lighting, *mise-en-scene*, and continuity in editing, are used to convey particular issues. These issues are related to how urban regeneration in Jakarta should be problematized, including the threat it poses to the continuation of *toko kelontong*.

IMAGES OF THE “OTHER” URBAN SPACE

CTS (2016) portrays the dynamics of everyday life in an urban setting, contrasting the images of Toko Jaya Baru, the small business owned by Afuk around which the storyline revolves, against the rest of the city. The first five minutes of the film establish the context: A series of images represent different parts of the city. In the first shot of the main character, Erwin is walking hastily along the clean, well-designed pavement of the

urban center, representing a young, successful executive. His sophisticated clothes, the smartphone in his hand, and his upmarket briefcase depict his social class and position in the city. The skyscrapers in the background further emphasize this characterization. Erwin becomes a signifier of the modern urban part of the city that is conveyed at the beginning of the film.

In the scenes that follow, the audience is introduced to Toko Jaya Baru and Afuk, Erwin's father. The images here are quite different from the beginning shots, as they portray an "other" space in the city. Another shop, Toko Makmur Abadi, owned by Nandar, is Afuk's competition. Previously, there had been only one *toko kelontong* in that area, Toko Makmur Abadi, but Afuk's original store was destroyed during the 1998 riot in which the angry mob destroyed businesses owned by Chinese Indonesians. After that, Afuk relocated his store next to Nandar's store, creating competition between the two. The two stores are depicted as typical *toko kelontong* in an urban area in Indonesia. Located in a lower- to middle-class housing complex, the fenced-in land next to the shops is abandoned. This reflects the fact that the area is still being developed and is therefore part of the urban regeneration process.

People in Jakarta need to navigate their everyday lives in this disarray of displacement due to commercial expansion, for example, new shopping malls and high-rise buildings. Spaces such as *toko kelontong* have become classified as other in contrast with these commercial expansions.

Editing is also used in the film to depict the idea of everyday reality outside the two stores. A bread seller with his bicycle cart is used to reflect spatial continuity in the editing (Bordwell & Thompson, 2005). Spanning from a high to middle angle shot, in the opening scene (00:00:17), the camera follows the movement of the bread seller as he greeted the owners of the two stores, which becomes the scene that introduces the audience to the *toko kelontong* spaces. Spatial continuity in this scene is emphasized by the bread seller's movement from one shot to another. The audience follows his movements between the two stores, and as our eyes move with his, we also witness the day-to-day routines in this other part of the city, which is quite different from the area where Erwin works. The gap between this part of the city and the modern urban representation is also shown in the scenes when Erwin first comes to the store after Afuk has asked him to take it over.

Erwin has taken a month's leave from his upscale office, and when he visits, the *mise-en-scène* portrays the contrast between Erwin surrounded by high-rise buildings and his father's shabby-looking store. The choice of

images in the sequence is used to emphasize the urban–other contrast between Erwin’s urban apartment and the store with a mouse roaming around the dirty floor. His look of disgust when he sees the store reflects the disgust and reluctance that he feels toward being present in this other space.

Another editing technique is utilized in the film to emphasize the narration. In one particular scene (00:28:38), there are overlapping shots of (1) a portrayal of Erwin’s anxious expression while sitting in his apartment among the skyscrapers of Jakarta and (2) the view from his apartment. This accentuates the different spatial imagery of Erwin’s upper middle-class environment from his father’s *toko kelontong*. Furthermore, the choice to present a bird’s-eye view of the store’s environment could be interpreted as Erwin’s perspective on the store, looking down at it from his skyscraper apartment. Through the use of visual imagery, the film heightens the hierarchy between the *toko kelontong* and Erwin’s modern urban environment. This notion will be further discussed in the following subsection.

“CLEANING UP” THE CITY

As mentioned earlier, the dynamic transformation of the city is represented in the film through contrasting images of the modern, urban spaces represented by Erwin, and the “other” space represented by Toko Jaya Baru. The premise of the film is that Afuk does not want to sell his store to Johan, a developer. Johan and his oversexualized secretary epitomize the power of the city’s authorities in refining the city and justifying purchasing Afuk’s shop as part of a modernization program for economic progress. In the scene when Johan is introduced as a potential buyer, his Mercedes Benz sports car confirms his social class as he drives slowly past both stores. The car is obviously out of place, but Johan’s scenes reflect the removal of the other spaces of the city as authority such as his stakes its claim over public spaces. Johan’s desire to purchase the shop can be read as an attempt to cleanse the city of spaces that do not fit into its development program.

This drive to “cleaning up” the city has been centrally constructed around class-based discourses; the drive to clean up the city, in effect, becomes inextricably linked with an attempt to purge the city of the poor. (Fernandes, 2004, p. 2421)

In many cases, owners who are considered unfit are evicted for the sake of progress, and in this film, the *toko kelontong* is the undesirable space. Although it is not clearly explained in the film what the developer will do with the stores, the inference is that the buildings will be demolished for new buildings.

It is important to contextualize this discussion within the social and political conditions of Jakarta, particularly those after the riot in 1998. Superblocks were built to attract people to live in city centers and expunge the traumatic image of the city after the riot. Budiman (2011, 2017) argues that the combination of private housing, shopping centers, entertainment, and business spaces gave the inhabitants a sense of security, and the commercialization of public spaces increased rapidly: “Other mega projects such as the new town, shopping malls and the recent superblocks have the quality of fleeing from the distress of the urban environment” (Kusno et al., 2011, p. 473). These megaprojects did not, in reality, solve urban problems but instead created new problems. For example, spaces that did not fit the blueprint of these mega projects were undesirable and automatically removed. In other words, urban regeneration, which developers claim improves the esthetic of city spaces, actually generated class-based discrimination.

Spaces in the urban setting are fragmented. Winarso (2011), commenting on urban dualism in Jakarta, explains:

There are “villages” close to sophisticated residential estates; informal commercial areas adjacent to modern malls and shopping centers; and *kampung*s (an Indonesian word for an informal and incrementally developed settlement in an urban area) surrounded by modern office buildings, apartments, and condominiums. (p. 164)

Jakarta, just as other large cities do worldwide, contains areas that are considered modern, such as the sophisticated residential areas and high-rise buildings depicted in this film. These parts of the city reaffirm Erwin’s characterization as a modern, urban *flâneur* who belongs to the sophisticated part of Jakarta, whereas his father, Afuk, belongs to the other part. Urban regeneration affirms urban dualism, in which the sophisticated and unsophisticated sections of the urban landscape become more distinctive.

Urban regeneration has also intruded into the everyday lives of urban inhabitants, particularly small business owners.

As a city becomes denser with people and activities, space becomes a precious commodity. Thus, a city consciously commodifies and regulates the spaces. In time, proximity attracts growth of population, economic activities, and diverse functions. (Nasution, 2015, p. 4)

In his research, Nasution (2015) argues that the city constantly commodifies and uses any available space. The marginalized populations in Hong Kong and Jakarta, for example, appropriate and configure their urban spaces, while the elitists of the city dominate the production of urban space, value these spaces, and work with private sector actors such as developers to profit from these marginalized unprofitable spaces, such as *toko kelontong*.

Raco and Tunney (2010) conducted research on the small businesses evicted from the Olympic Village site in East London in 2007 under the justification of redevelopment. Developers and the city authorities regulated what an ideal urban area should look like: “Urban development becomes converted into the production of commodified urban spaces that radically restructure the quotidian, day-to-day lives of individuals, businesses and communities” (Raco & Tunney, 2010, p. 4). One of the most significant consequences was the radical restructuring of the everyday lives of the individuals in the cleared spaces, which is also represented in CTS.

The day-to-day lives of the people connected to the store, particularly Afuk’s employees, are disturbed. Near the end of the film, when Erwin tells his father that he has decided to take the job in Singapore and will not take over the store, Afuk decides to sell the store. The sequence of shots in this particular scene shows Erwin celebrating his job promotion in Singapore with his colleagues and girlfriend while Afuk distributes severance money to his employees. After receiving his severance money, an employee asks his friend, “What kind of job should we do now?,” demonstrating the hopelessness and disruption caused by the sale. The store’s symbolism will be explained in the next section of this chapter.

TOKO KELONTONG: A VEHICLE OF TANGIBLE MEMORY AND A COMMUNAL SPACE

For the characters in the film, the store is more than just a physical space in the urban setting; it carries tangible memories of family values and acts as a communal space. In an earlier scene, as Erwin explains to his girlfriend

about the developer who wants to buy the store, he talks about the sentimental value of the store for his father:

Erwin: He doesn't want to sell it ...

Nad: Why?

Erwin: Well, he has built that store with mom for years. It has sentimental value.

Nad: If the price is okay, why not?

Erwin: Well, money can't always buy everything, I guess.

(Servia et al., 2016, 00:46:45)

Even though Erwin eventually decides not to take over the store, he understands why his father does not want to sell it. Moreover, the film posits that despite the class-based conflict, Afuk does not consider money a significant factor in his decision to keep the store. For Afuk (Servia et al., 2016, 01:00:05), the store is something he and his wife built from nothing. This is emphasized when Yohan, the older son, explains to Erwin why he wants to take over the store.

When dad opened the store, it was a difficult time for him. You were very young at that time. We were in a lot of debt and when dad is stressed out, he lashes out at me. Fortunately, Mom always convinced me that it happened because of the difficult situation. She was always really nice to me. I want to take over the store not because I envy you. It's because it's the last memory of mom that I can still hold on to. (Servia et al., 2016, 01:22:10)

For Afuk, Erwin, and Yohan, the store is a vehicle of memory, particularly related to the late mother's important role in each of their lives. As Kusno (2010) observed, "Buildings serve as a reminder of the practices of the past" (p. 3), and Afuk's *toko kelontong* in its physical form has become a reminder of Afuk's past, particularly his late wife's memory. This reflects how nostalgia toward the tradition of *toko kelontong* manifests in the building itself. It also exemplifies the anxiety of Chinese Indonesians over fading traditions.

Other scenes visually depict how the store becomes a space that helps Afuk in particular to remember his late wife. In the scene in which Afuk is alone in his empty store, saying goodbye for the last time, the minimal lighting accentuates the sad and gloomy ambiance of the soundtrack, and he experiences flashbacks to when his wife was still alive and his children were playing inside the store. Bordwell and Thompson (2005) suggest

that flashbacks are used to contrast present day and past relationships, even if they momentarily disrupt the continuity of the story. Using flashbacks, CTS compares two different shots to make a point, specifically to highlight the correlation between the store and the memory of the late mother: “But the past is not only recalled; it is incarnate in the things we build and the landscapes we create. We make our environment comfortable by incorporating or fabricating memorabilia” (Lowenthal, 1975, p. 7). Memories are incarnate or embodied in the physical space of the store, making it a meaningful space for the main characters even as it is being threatened with demolition.

As mentioned above, the soundtrack in this scene also signifies the store as a tangible memory for Afuk: As Afuk begins to cry in his empty store, the song “*Berlari Tanpa Kaki*,” or “Running Without One’s Feet,” reaches its climax. The refrain speaks about being tough (“*tegar*” in Indonesian) upon losing a loved one. The audience is invited to make sense of the memory of the mother, which is embodied in the store visualized by the flashback:

From moment to moment, the audience member extracts information from non-diegetic sources to generate the emotional information he or she needs to make a coherent story in the diegesis ... Music significantly occurred with other cinematic sources of support, such as montage and *mise-en-scène*, which were found to influence inference processes. (Cohen, 2001, p. 254)

The music assists the audience in understanding what is going on in the scene. Visual and audio elements help construct the store (*toko kelontong*) as a vehicle of tangible memory.

Furthermore, Lefebvre, in his book *The Production of Space*, constructs stores as communal spaces; he argues that space is produced socially and that knowledge is produced in that particular space. The word “production” entails the social interactions that eventually construct a space. As individuals come together and start to interact with one another in a location, for example, in a *toko kelontong*, these interactions create a new space: “Space is practiced place, and space is produced by the creativity of the people using the resources of the other” (Giles & Middleton, 1999, p. 111). As a physical building, a store cannot yet be considered a space; it only becomes a space, particularly a communal space, when individuals interact there and engage with each other and the space. For example, Kuncoro, an employee who speaks slowly and is the newest addition to the

Toko Jaya Baru family, is portrayed in contrast with, for example, the feminine Naryo, who often teases Kuncoro. Their interaction reflects the everydayness of the store as a communal space.

In CTS (2016), the store is portrayed as a communal space not only for the employees and the owner but also for the inhabitants of the surrounding neighborhood. In a scene after Afuk has decided to sell the store, he asks Nandar, who used to be his competitor, to take care of his customers:

Nandar: How about our clients, the small stores?
 They have to go to *Pasar Induk*, which is very far from here.
 Afuk : Please take care of my customers.
 (Servia et al., 2016, 01:03:38)

Even though they were once competitors, in this scene the two characters express camaraderie in their reasons for running their businesses. It also is not merely a source of income for Nandar; he also cares about his customers, who need a place to buy the products they re-sell in their *warung* (small stores). Afuk's request for Nandar to take care of his customers also reflects the store owner–customer relationship, which is not only based on economic relations but also on social interactions and creating a communal space.

As Nasution (2015) argued, the marginal spaces in the urban context, for example, *kampung* areas, or in this case study, *toko kelontong*, share the characteristics “negotiation, flexibility & adaptability, collaboration, and collectivity” (p. 4). As the inhabitants of the marginalized spaces navigate through their everyday lives, they often creatively negotiate and work with what they have to survive:

Marginal space intelligence narrates how space can be collectively produced, embedded with meaning, as well as, motivates its inhabitants to move forward with certain goals. Spaces are a place for social struggle as well as celebration of the collective goals. The lack of resources is overcome by the formation of collective goals, dialog, and negotiation, and the complex multi-layer of space. The absence of resources becomes the main resources. (Nasution, 2015, p. 11)

We interpret the film's construction of *toko kelontong* as a communal space as a collective product of all of its inhabitants. Furthermore, even though Afuk and Nandar are business rivals, within the marginalized space, they

share a common goal, which creates a sense of community within their *toko kelontong*.

The social relationship and collectiveness manufactured in these small businesses is contrasted with the developing retail system of the mini-market in Jakarta. In the last scene, the former employees of Toko Jaya Baru are hired by Yohan and Ayu’s new businesses (a photography studio and a bakery) located in the space of Afuk’s *toko kelontong*. During this scene, one of the employees explains what kind of job that he had to do during his last employment:

I worked in a mini-market. It was really boring because I did not have to do anything. I didn’t need to add up what people needed to pay because there was already a computer, right? Customers can just grab the stuff they want. My only entertainment was to listen to the sound of the printing machine. (Servia et al., 2016, 01:35:42)

His description of working a boring job in the mini-market indicates the lack of communal ambiance. As a self-service store, a mini-market does not provide opportunities for employees to interact with customers the way they usually do in Toko Jaya Baru.

The *toko kelontong* in CTS (2016) is constructed as a space in which social interactions occur daily; it is a place where employees even associate with employees from other stores. The budding relationship between Kuncoro, the latest addition to Toko Jaya Baru, and Tini, the female employee from Toko Makmur Abadi, is one of the many social interactions portrayed in the film that emphasizes the role of stores as communal spaces. Furthermore, the residents of the surrounding neighborhood also play a significant role in making these spaces communal.

The bread seller, the female customer who puts her purchases on her tab, and Pak Ali and his granddaughter, who pass by the store and interact with Afuk, all actively construct the communal space. In his interaction with Pak Ali, Afuk asks him when they will go fishing, implying a close relationship between the two. From a multicultural perspective, Pak Ali’s white *kopiah* is the signifier used to symbolize tolerance between a Chinese Indonesian and a Moslem man of the neighborhood. As argued earlier in this chapter, the urban regeneration of the city demolishes not only the physical space of the store but more importantly the communal function of the store. It radically restructures and sometimes obliterates the day-to-day lives of individuals and communities.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, CTS's (2016) representation of urban problematizes the notion of urban regeneration as potentially eradicating urban spaces for "others." In this film, *toko kelontong* signifies what is deemed undesirable and destroyed for the sake of development. *Toko kelontong* is also portrayed as a vehicle of tangible memory for the characters while being constructed as a communal space for the employees and the inhabitants of the surrounding neighborhood. The findings of this research demonstrate that films, as argued by Turner (1999), can represent and convey particular beliefs: "The ideology of a film does not take the form of direct statements or reflections on the culture. It lies in the narrative structure and in the discourses employed—the images, myths, conventions, and visual styles" (p. 173). The conflicts among the characters and the film's cinematography create an ideological battleground between plans for progress that embodies the notion of modernity and the values of family and social relationships. In exploring the film's narrative and visual imagery, researchers have problematized not only the findings in the text but also the ideological meanings conveyed by the film.

In an era in which urban regeneration has become an unstoppable force exterminating or marginalizing communal spaces in cities, CTS re-evaluates how transforming some spaces can actually save them. As the store is transformed into a photography studio and a bakery, which align with Johan and Ayu's dreams, one might interpret that the *toko kelontong* surrendered to the city's plans for progress. However, the ending also depicts how the two new spaces still maintain their function as communal spaces for the employees and inhabitants of the city.

Collectivism in this case study also reflects how Chinese Indonesians, as minorities, build collectivity out of their constant exclusion from the mainstream, particularly during the New Order era. Moreover, the fact that the couple maintained the space that carried the late mother's memory is in itself an ideological portrayal of how urban regeneration does not always destroy memory and the past. Family values and social kinship can prevail in the midst of progress and through the active agency of the inhabitants of the "other" spaces of cities. The inhabitants are the most important factors in ensuring the continuing existence of these spaces.

We argue that the film conveys a conventional generation gap, between a father and his two sons. However, although on the surface, urban

regeneration is causing the disappearance of *toko kelontong*, the film’s ending illustrates that the younger generation in Chinese Indonesians (in the form of Ernest Prakasa as the writer and director) has merely renegotiated the space. Without the physical store to evoke the memory of the late wife, the characters create two new stores as new spaces to make new meaning out of their family’s memory.

In total, the research presented in this chapter has problematized not only how urban issues and their politics are represented in popular culture literature but also how urban regeneration in Jakarta marginalizes “other” spaces, such as *toko kelontong*. The commodification and commercialization of urban space have segregated urban settings. However, social bonding and collectivism within these marginalized spaces have also produced a degree of social capital that fosters social responsibility and promotes resilience. Furthermore, these residents can evolve and negotiate strategically with the vigorous impacts of urban regeneration.

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PART II

Marginality and the Other Archives



CHAPTER 6

Prostitution and Its Social Impact in Gang Dolly, Surabaya (1967–1999)

Mala Hayati and Tri Wahyuning Mudaryanti

INTRODUCTION

Kuntowijoyo, in his book *Pengantar Ilmu Sejarah*, states that sex is a historical force (1995, pp. 132–133) as its meaning changes from one historical period to another in the history of modern Indonesia. The study of sex has been abandoned and replaced with a gender concept that emphasizes the differences between men and women more from a sociocultural understanding. The feminist movement in the Western world transformed into a radical movement that resulted in the field of women's studies, and feminist criticism emerged in literature as well. Sex has become the driving force behind the service industry; outside of the rural areas is an entire sex industry of publishers, shops, theaters, and other types of businesses. In Indonesia, sex as a business is both clandestine and out in the open. Even *priyayis* (respected middle-class gentlemen) are customers of the packaged sex business (Kuntowijoyo, 1995, p. 133).

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Prostitution cannot be seen as a cultural or moral problem because it cannot be separated from social responsibility or economic and political conditions. Prostitution in Indonesia is usually seen as the behavior of women who either openly or secretly commit extra-marital sex in return for money or other valuables (Soedjono, 1977, p. 14). Prostitution has existed all throughout history and across geographies in Indonesia, such as in plantation areas, coastal cities, and ports on the north coast of Java, as well as in trade centers and military bases (Boomgard, 1989, p. 161).

Prostitution in Indonesia developed in accordance with the views of the colonial Dutch government, which considered sexual services for its troops a form of entertainment. This presumption led to the presence of prostitutes in military barracks and in prisons to serve sexual needs and mitigate tensions during the war (Truong, 1992, p. xxvii). However, the prevalence of venereal diseases became a countrywide challenge: On July 15, 1852, the Dutch East Indies government issued a regulation on prostitution known as *Reglement tot wering van de schadelijke gevolgen, welke uit de prostitutie voortvloegen* (Rules for fighting the adverse effects of prostitution) (*Lembaran Sejarah*, 2002, p. 26). Under rule 1852, female sex workers had to register with the police, with the intent of suppressing illegal prostitution. The rule then required registered prostitutes to see a doctor every week, and any who tested positive for a venereal disease would be admitted to the hospital until they were healthy again.

This chapter discusses the development of prostitution in the middle of a residential area in the region of Putat Jaya, Surabaya. The existence of prostitution in Indonesia, especially in Surabaya, can be documented to the era of the Mataram Kingdom. The enormous power of the king was considered to be infinite and *agung binatara* (divinely glorious) (Moedjanto, 1986, p. 15). According to Hull et al. (1997, p. 2), the king acquired concubines from, among other sources, noblemen who presented their daughters to kings as a sign of loyalty. Other concubines were presented as gifts from other kingdoms, and some originated from lower-class families and were sold or surrendered to kings. The practice of having royal concubines at the time did not completely represent the commercialization of sex, but the practice demonstrated that women occupied a lower societal position than men.

A more organized form of prostitution in Surabaya was instituted during the Dutch occupation represented by practices including concubinage (Regiee Bay, 2010, p. 1), which at that time became a solution to the few women in the area. As a port city, Surabaya was a natural location for

prostitution. The port was considered strategic both as a base for the Dutch Navy and as a transit post for regional traders. The practice of prostitution around the port of Tanjung Perak was described in a *parikan*, or poem, that circulated in society in Surabaya: *Tanjung Perak mas kapale kobong, monggo pinarak mas kamare kosong* (“the ship is on fire in Tanjung Perak sir, please stop by, sir, the room is empty”). According to the head of the Dutch Navy, the prostitution in Surabaya could be likened to that in Yokohama, Japan.

During the Japanese occupation, the area of Kembang Jepun, north of Surabaya and close to the port of Tanjung Perak, was the center for prostitution. Prostitutes came not only from Surabaya but also from Kediri, Malang, Banyuwangi, and Sulawesi (Agustiningasih, 2011, p. 10). The women who worked in this district were *jukun ianfu* (comfort women) and women who became prostitutes of their own accord.

After Indonesian independence, prostitution in Surabaya grew in the area surrounding the port and spread to other areas, such as cemeteries (e.g., Kembang Kuning and the Cina Putat Jaya cemeteries). In 1967, a procurer named Advonso Dollira Khavit used the Cina Putat Jaya cemetery as a place of prostitution. It would later be known as “Dolly” and become increasingly crowded and a magnet for new businesses in the surrounding area. This resulted in a close relationship between the local area and conditions of the surrounding community.

SURABAYA AND ITS PEOPLE

The name “Surabaya” was first mentioned in the Trowulan I inscription dated 1358 CE. The inscription describes Surabaya as a village on the banks of the Brantas River that functioned as a crossing place. The word “Surabaya” was listed in the *Negara Kertagama* tome written by Mpu Prapanca, which documented the voyage made by King Hayam Wuruk in 1365, specifically in Canto XVII (Pramudito, 2006, p. 54). The area borders the Madura Strait to the north and the villages of Jojoran, Ivory, and Kedung Cowek as well as the Kenjeran Beach to the east. To the west, it borders the villages of Getting, Kali Greges, Petemon, and Gresik, and to the south, it borders Kali Wonokromo, Panjangjiwo, and Sidoarjo (Lamijo, 2006, p. 28). In 1830, Surabaya Residency was reorganized into several districts: Bangkalan, Bawean, Madura, Pamekasan, Surabaya, and Sumenep. In 1838 another reorganization took place to include Gresik and Mojokerto (Indonesian National Archive, *Staatsblad* 30/1838).

During the Dutch occupation, Surabaya played an important role as the place of the *Gezaghebber in den Oosthoek* (Policymaker of the East) (Basundoro, 2013, p. 28). This situation affected Surabaya's status, which officially became a *gemeente* (municipality) under State Regulation No. 479 dated April 1, 1906 (Lamijo, 2006, p. 28). At the lowest structure of the *Gemeente* was the *Wijk*, which was equivalent to a "quarter" or a "neighborhood" (Basundoro, 2009). The status resulted in Surabaya becoming an autonomous region that managed and funded its own city affairs (Surdamawan & Basundoro, 2013). From that point on, Surabaya grew rapidly and continued being influenced by the sugar import and export activities carried out in the port of Tanjung Perak. Surabaya would later become a city with one of the busiest ports in the Dutch East Indies.

The city's increasingly rapid development attracted migrants to the region. These immigrants came from the Netherlands, Britain, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Portugal (Basundoro, 2013, p. 3). In addition to Europe, immigrants came from other Asian countries, such as China, Japan, and Arab states. The *bumiputera* (natives) also migrated to Surabaya from the area surrounding the *gementee* of Surabaya.

The community during the Dutch occupation was divided into different social classes: The Europeans comprised the upper class followed by the foreign Asians, and the lowest group was the indigenous people. This community division not only influenced residential areas but also significantly affected education, government, and available employment. Nearly all government administration employees were Dutch, and a few low-level administrative posts were sometimes held by indigenous people. In terms of settlements, the Dutch and other Europeans lived in the more well-off urban areas, whereas the Chinese, Arabs, and other eastern nationals were concentrated in the eastern side of the Kali Mas (Lamijo, 2002, pp. 31–32).

The *bumiputera* and the foreign Asian community lived in poverty. Purnawan Basundoro (2013) documents at least three causes of poverty in Surabaya. The first was the ecological change following the physical development and European settlements that took over the existing sugar plantations; peasant laborers were evicted from their land and lost their sources of living, thus creating unemployment (Basundoro, 2013, p. 102). The second factor was the high rate of migration from different regions to Surabaya; as soon as it became a municipality, it attracted people from the region in search of better jobs. However, new arrivals did not come with adequate skills to earn decent wages, and as a result, many of them also ended up unemployed (Basundoro, 2013, p. 102). Finally, the third cause

was the low wages offered in Surabaya because wages correlated directly with education level (Basundoro, 2013, p. 102). The people of Surabaya who lived in poverty continued to survive until the Japanese occupation, but most new immigrants were still uneducated and unskilled and thus remained unemployed, which continued to support prostitution as alternative employment for *bumiputera* women in Surabaya. The practice of prostitution continued even after independence.

PUTAT JAYA: BETWEEN ECONOMICS, MORALITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION

Prostitution in Surabaya seemed to have entered a new phase when on March 11, 1958, the government of Surabaya passed a law to close seven Chinese cemeteries in Surabaya, ending their burial activities. Homeless people started using the cemeteries for shelter (Basundoro, 2013, p. 240) including the one in Putat Jaya. The prostitution activities in the former cemetery had started in 1966. In 1967, a procurer named Advonso Dollira Khavid, or “Dolly,” went to the former Chinese cemetery in Putat Jaya to establish a place for prostitution and would then set up four brothels, called Tentrem, Double Queen, Mama Mia, and Mama Rosa (Liberty, July 16–31, 1991); three of the four brothels were rented to other people. At first, Dolly’s brothels only served Dutch soldiers, but with time, the number of customers increased enormously. Eventually, “Gang Dolly” became well-known among the indigenous people and foreigners and an economic center for the region (Firdaus, 2013).

The area known as Dolly was located in Kelurahan Putat Jaya, Kecamatan Sawahan, Surabaya. There were two suburbs in this region, Dolly, located on the Jalan Kupang Gunung Timur I and some parts of Jalan Jarak, and the Jarak suburbs, which covered the rest of Jalan Jarak. Both suburbs covered three RW (neighborhoods). Jarak suburbs covered RW III, X, and XI, and Dolly covered RW VI, X, XIII. In addition to brothels, there were cafés and massage parlors; every night, sex workers, underage girls, pimps, and masseurs offered their services to visitors. The business in Gang Dolly also supported street vendors, parking boys, bar and karaoke workers, laundries, bouncers, cleaners, *becak* drivers, taxi drivers, and food stall owners. Each was connected to the others in a symbiosis that brought mutual profit to all of the actors.

Dolly developed rapidly between 1968 and 1969 (Purnomo & Siregar, 1985, p. 54), related to the raids on brothels in Surabaya such as in Kembang Kuning, Wonokromo, and Tambak Rejo; owners of brothels closed by the city of Surabaya began to move their businesses to Dolly. Dolly's development can be analyzed from two aspects: population growth and the physical development of buildings in local businesses. Prostitution grew in Dolly, attracting migrants to seek the local low-skilled jobs.

Dolly attracted sex workers to a thriving industry, which led to conflicts among businesses, but this did not prevent Dolly from becoming more vibrant and expanding. However, the sex workers operating in Dolly were also aware that they were being trafficked; many could not leave until they had repaid for all their rent, food, and daily necessities, and they were never told the amounts or when their debt would be repaid. They were not allowed to leave their boarding rooms without bodyguards so they would not run away.

Frequent conflict did not deter Dolly residents from actively expanding their sex businesses because Dolly had its own internal system created by the actors; the city administrator and council were not entirely formal themselves: The local police, military personnel, and district administrators who were supposed to enforce the law were among the players who helped Dolly survive as a prostitution center. Separately, because Dolly was a common area for criminal activities such as gambling, drinking, and fighting, heavy security was necessary, and services were provided by local thugs, Civil Defense personnel, and soldiers (Purnomo & Siregar, 1985, p. 49).

The existence of cottage owners, managers, waiters, commercial sex workers, and trafficking could only be sustained by the mutual dependency between parties. Day by day, prostitution in Dolly grew and attracted more people until there were dozens of brothels, 48 by 1981. The brothels, prostitutes, and procurers all had to expand to support the increasing flows of customers from Surabaya and other cities in East Java.

The developments in Dolly also affected other businesses in the area that provided nonsex services such as restaurants, cigarette stands, cellars, tailors, laundry services, radio repair shops, karaoke places, shops for daily needs, parking lots, and salons. In addition to being a place for prostitution, Dolly was also a place for community activities, such as mosques, schools, and other education facilities such as the Qur'an Learning Park.

Although the government had never officially issued a permit for the establishment of Dolly, it had no option but to accept the new community

because doing so confined prostitution to that area. The alternative would have been thousands of prostitutes and pimps scattered throughout the city. Nevertheless, the government helped maintain the well-being of the region by providing health services up until the 1980s, with a paramedic on duty for treatments along with administering weekly injections.

The government's concern over health in Dolly intensified when in 1991, a prostitute tested positive for AIDS (*Kompas*, November 24, 1991). The city government cooperated with Surabaya's Social Service Department to conduct additional health screening in the Dolly area. In addition, the Surabaya City Government, assisted by the Department of Health and religious leaders, offered counseling services about HIV and AIDS.

Many efforts were made to relocate Dolly, but these efforts often failed because during the period 1967–1998, people who had certain interests in the Dolly region disrupted the plans for change; plans would leak, and the residents would really renounce the efforts. Finally, however, the Surabaya City Government issued Regional Regulation No. 7 of 1999, prohibiting the use of buildings within the city of Surabaya for immoral activities. The regulation was issued because of the government's concern that the religious and moral norms had been declining in the Surabaya region. The government intended the regulation as a formal statement that prostitution was not condoned in Surabaya.

The existence of Dolly in the middle of the Putat Jaya residential area also had some positive impacts on the surrounding community, such as the development of a micro-economy in the region surrounding the suburb. The first prostitution business pioneered by Dolly Khavit in Kelurahan Putat Jaya, initially only benefited pimps and prostitutes. However, the increasing number of brothels and visiting guests benefited residents relying on different types of livelihoods, which ultimately improved the levels of education, welfare, and prosperity.

The increase in economic activity that Dolly had supported was evidenced by the increased population in Sawahan; residents from around East Java traveled to this community looking for opportunities. According to Surabaya's Center for City Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Surabaya), the population of the Sawahan urban village was 149,400 inhabitants in 1970, 220,008 in 1984, and 199,780 in 1995.

The population of the Sawahan region declined again in the 1990s triggered by several reasons, such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic suffered by some prostitutes. Guests began to feel afraid to come to Dolly, the area

became deserted, and the economy grew sluggish. The plan proclaimed by the E Commission of the City Council of Surabaya in 1992 also had a major impact on the declining number of residents who came to Sawahan Village.

THE LASTING IMPACTS OF DOLLY

As noted earlier, although Dolly was a location of prostitution and the crimes accompanying it, such as fighting and theft, the industry ended up supporting a thriving community of service workers. In addition to the restaurants, bars, and small stores the workers and customers needed, jobs were created, such as parking attendants, food vendors, cigarette sellers, barbers, grocery store owners, medicinal herb shop owners, tailors, carpenters, mobile photographers, electronic technicians, laundry business owners, mobile nail technicians, and coffee shop owners. One resident from outside Putat Jaya reported moving to the Dolly specifically to build a grocery store because he believed he would prosper, and restaurants did well because prices were higher there than in other regions.

The Putat Jaya prostitution complex contained a mosque as well, and the localization committee invited clerics to serve for the mosque's first activity. One of the routine activities was the Qur'an recitations for all of the prostitutes in Putat Jaya. The activities took place every Thursday from Ashr to Maghrib and ended with the Maghrib prayer together, at which hour the sex services paused until the activity was completed (*ba'da maghrib*). This shows that the people of Dolly still respected their religion and associated values. The city has always struggled to move Dolly. Plans to relocate since the 1980s have always been rejected by the public and have thus failed.

Although Dolly had certain positive economic benefits, there were negative impacts on the community as well, particularly in terms of social well-being and community health. However, despite the adverse effects on children's psychological development, parents feared becoming unemployed if they left the area; some parents reported believing that their children would be safe from the adverse impacts from the area if they were properly educated about the dangers of the area.

Notably, not all parents thought the same. One of the pimps who opened a brothel in Dolly admitted that he preferred for his child to live in his hometown in Malang because the environment in Dolly made children grow up too quickly. He revealed that many teenagers around the

brothel were caught peering at the prostitutes and clients, and he believed children should not grow accustomed to seeing certain things. What he saw made him feel sad, and he decided he did not want to bring his child to live in a house with prostitutes. Finally, also as noted above, the advent of the first AIDS case reported in Dolly in 1991, and subsequent cases, chased visitors from the suburb out of fear, which ultimately reduced the economic fortunes in the Putat Jaya region.

CONCLUSION

Prostitution in Java had been widespread long before the government began regulating it in 1852. Prostitution in Surabaya flourished in the middle of the nineteenth century, along with the expansion of Surabaya as an important port city, a center of commerce and industry, a navy base, and the site of the eastern terminus of the railway in Java. “Gang Dolly” emerged and became quickly well-known as a center of economic activities in Surabaya. This development had long-lasting moral, economic, psychological, sociocultural, and economic impacts on residents, some positive and some negative.

In addition, the existence of a prostitution area in the middle of settlements was deemed to be destructive to children’s psychological growth. Young children living near the location were exposed to practices considered indecent, and there was fear that the children would be negatively influenced by prostitution.

However, the impacts of prostitution in Dolly were not always negative, as evident from informal economic activities, such as the emergence of various alternative career opportunities: parking attendants, grocery store owners, laundry service owners, food vendors, and so on. This resulted in an improvement in the level of well-being, prosperity, and standard of living around Dolly.

Dolly was eventually closed by the Surabaya City Government in 2014. However, doing so did not eradicate prostitution in Surabaya. The prostitutes moved to other parts of the city and opened new businesses for their prostitution practices. A law clearly prohibiting prostitution in Indonesia has never existed. However, in the case of prostitution in Putat Jaya, moral messages were taught. In an attempt to be moral, Surabaya City’s government planned to end Dolly’s prostitution, as the municipal government deemed that prostitution must be immediately resolved.

Regulations implemented by the Surabaya municipal government have been in accordance with their authority. Judicially and sociologically, the existence of prostitution has created a negative reputation regarding the region. Ongoing bureaucratic reformation is necessary to provide residents with the principles of good governance. However, the end of prostitution in Dolly Alley only created a new space of covert prostitution elsewhere.

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Poverty, Criminality, and Prostitution: Impacts of the Development of Batam as an Industrial City (1971–1998)

Anita Ahmad and Didik Pradjoko

INTRODUCTION

Batam Island's strategic location should have prompted a focus on maximizing its economic interests, as it is susceptible to being annexed by other countries. However, at the beginning of his time in office, President Soeharto focused on recovering the domestic (macro) economy and preparing for reelection (Wulandari et al., 2009). Eventually, President Soeharto realized how crucial Batam Island was for economically strengthening Indonesia's sovereignty. In 1971, in a presidential decree, Batam was declared an industrial area expected to compete with Singapore. The decree was then reaffirmed in the Second Five-Year Development Plan between 1974–1975 and 1978–1979, which declared that Batam would be developed into a center of economic activity in an industrial area.

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Implementing the development plan resulted in Batam becoming an industrial city in the early 1980s.

Industrial cities in developing countries only began emerging in the early to mid-twentieth century with the invention of technologies that enabled the mass production of manufacturing goods (Nas, 1986). The emergence of the industrial world was followed by a demand for workers, which triggered high rates of urbanization (Hariyono, 2007). Most parts of society are concentrated in the industrial and service sectors, as opposed to the agricultural sector.

Batam, which has developed into an industrial city, continues to attract migrant workers. With the population explosion in the early 1980s, Batam City faced multiple labor issues and symptoms of social pathology, namely, poverty, illegal settlements and slums, crime, and prostitution. In this chapter, we are particularly interested in analyzing the sociology of Batam City from a historical perspective. This research is deemed necessary because most research on Batam has focused on the city's macroeconomic development. Few studies offer a comprehensive examination of the impact of the city's economic progress on its social structures during the peak of its development. In addition, a case study on urban problems in Batam would contribute to urban sociological research in Southeast Asia, mainly in the form of the city's historiography.

Cities should be viewed not only according to their morphological or physical characteristics, as expressed by Amos Rapoport, but also according to their specific functions, such as centers of economic activity, government, and so on (qtd in Zahnd, 1999). Moreover, a city cannot be separated from its residents' interactions and behaviors (urban sociology). Mere observation of the city's current situation is insufficient in conducting urban research. One must understand that a city is not formed overnight; its development is a process that needs to be fully understood so that urban problems can be seen as a part of that process (Hariyono, 2007). Therefore, the history of a city can be considered a worthy topic on its own.

Based on historical research, the borders of a city are not bound by administrative provisions but evolve with the city itself (Kuntowijoyo, 1994). Administratively speaking, Batam is separated from Singapore and situated in another territory. However, from an economic perspective, it is part of Singaporean territory. The fast-growing development of Batam in the economic sector is driven by the advancement of Singapore, which is famous for having one of the busiest seaports in the world. Singapore's economy advanced with the rapid growth of its industrial sector in the

1960s (Asian Development Bank, 1971), and the Port of Singapore has been a center for container shipping in Southeast Asia since 1972 (Turnbull, 1977). The economy of Singapore then began to play a big role in the service sector (tourism) in the 1980s (Brown, 1997). The country's economic progress, particularly with regard to industry, has influenced Batam's development into an industrial city.

Studying the economic development in Batam requires understanding the correlation between the economic development and the ecological and sociological changes in the region. Therefore, a case study of the sociological development in Batam from a historical perspective can be presented comprehensively given that these aspects together form a dependent system (Kartodirdjo, 1993). According to Lindquist (2010), during the course of Indonesia's financial crisis between 1997 and 1999, when the exchange rate from IDR to USD and SGD dropped drastically, the economy in Batam was booming. The dynamics of Batam's economy, which was based on illegal drug dealing and prostitution, became the determining factor of its economic development. The city's success was an anomaly during Indonesia's worst monetary crisis (Lindquist, 2010, p. 280).

Studies show that poverty, criminality, and prostitution increased as a result of Batam's development, and law enforcement did not attempt to address the new challenges. According to Wertheim (1987), the New Order regime's city development plan was only good on paper but provided no actual mechanisms for supporting marginalized urban residents, especially those living below the poverty line, whether with education, housing, employment, or public safety; the government even failed to intervene when they became victims of police raids. Batam's attempts to use migrants to expand the population had the opposite effects of the government's expectations. The migrants were not fully absorbed into any of the city's formal sectors. Instead, they were trapped in crime and prostitution (Wertheim, 1987, p. 542).

IMPACTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF BATAM AS AN INDUSTRIAL CITY FROM 1971 TO 1998: ILLEGAL SETTLEMENTS AND SLUMS

Batam City's urbanization was not offset by the provision of education and skills training for work-seeking migrants, which created a problem known as social disease or urban social pathology (Simanjuntak, 1981). These symptoms of social imbalance (Daldjoeni, 1992) drove the

relentless urban social pathology of poverty that took forms such as homelessness, criminality, and prostitution (Kartono, 2001). The result was the development of slum areas.

Illegal housing construction and slums were widespread in Indonesian cities, not just in Batam, because of the high price of land in cities and the growing emergence of land speculators (*Tempo*, 1993, January 2). In Batam, it was difficult to buy land without the permission of the Batam Authority, especially when the land was to be developed into an industrial area. The growing population of Batam City also increased the demand for housing.

The *si Ruli* in Batam (“wild house”) emerged in 1990, and by 1995, dozens of illegal settlements had increased to tens of thousands. Building an illegal settlement became a shortcut to owning a home: M. S. Simbolon from Batu Aji told a reporter that it cost much less to build an illegal settlement, whereas a typical home would cost a fortune. From a quite different perspective, Safaruddin told the reporter that he had built his illegal settlement in Baloi Center because it was close to where he worked (*Kompas*, 1997, February 15).

However, illegal settlements have serious negative impacts on the ecological balance in the city and on city residents. In addition to being built in areas prone to flooding and landslide, these areas feature no facilities for maintaining hygiene, and disease spreads easily (*Kompas*, 1993, May 15). The Health Office of Batam Municipality reported in 1998 that the number of malaria patient visits to hospitals had increased to 2812 from 2657 in 1990, coinciding with the proliferation of slum areas in the city.

By 1994, there were around 12,000 houses in 59 slum areas around Batam City that had begun to threaten the flow of freshwater into the reservoir, the city’s source of drinking water. In addition to polluting the water, the slum areas also raised the sedimentation levels, which caused flooding and damage to the surrounding environment. In addition, slums were being built in protected forests, which violated the Basic Framework of City Spatial Planning Batam Island industrial area (*Kompas*, 1994, March 31). These issues were considered destructive to city development planning and stretched urban services beyond the control of the government (Marbun, 1979).

In 1994, the population of Batam Island was recorded as over 121,000 people, 40% of whom lived in illegal settlements and slums. According to the Head of Executive Officials of Batam Authority, Surjohadi Djatmiko, the inhabitants of the slums and illegal settlements were of various

backgrounds and employment profiles. Though many were unemployed, many worked in informal sectors or as civil servants and members of ABRI/Indonesian National Force (*Kompas*, 1994, March 31). The Batam Authority and the regional government made multiple efforts to overcome the destructive impacts of the illegal settlements and slums.

First, the Batam Authority has been curbing illegal settlements by demolishing them for the last two decades. They demolished the first 40 settlements in Bengkong Mahkota (Batu Ampar) on January 8, 1994. The action prompted unrest during the demolition when a political activist and a community leader resisted the officers and encouraged those around them to do the same.

Second, Batam Authority attempted to entice the slumdweller to the government's low-cost housing, locally known as *Rumah Sangat Sederhana* (RSS). Batam Authority had allocated a residential land area of 3480 hectares, 80% of which had been handed over to developers who were members of Real-Estate Indonesia, and offered settlement residents a 50% discount to help them afford an RSS home. However, by 1994, only 8904 houses (118 ha) had been built, whereas the projected count for 1993 was 25,941 units. Third, the local government transported migrants back to their hometowns if they could not afford RSS (*Kompas*, 1997, February 15).

These efforts by the government and Batam Authority did not, however, decrease the number of illegal settlements and slums. For instance, the Deputy Chairman of Riau Local Government, Dr. Roedi Ilyas, and Mayor Ir. H. Raja Usman Draman reported, "Since 1980, 3,000 heads of family have been resettled, and 300 migrants have been returned to their hometowns, but this was not a significant result since it was just a temporary problem-solving measure" (*Kompas*, 1988, November 2). Specifically, Surjohadi, the Head of Executive Officials of Batam Authority, told a reporter, "The developers did not build enough *low-cost houses* affordable to the low-income society. A simple house (type-21), which costs IDR 7 million in Jakarta, is sold for IDR 15–20 million" (*Suara Karya*, 1995, January 21).

That is, the developers built homes that were too expensive even for middle-income employees. Those who had to buy were forced to buy on credit by borrowing money from their employer to pay the down payment. Residents of the illegal settlements also saw this RSS ownership program as an unlikely solution because there were too few houses to

accommodate everyone and those houses that had been built were too far from their places of work (*Kompas*, 1995, November 24).

CRIME

The next element of social pathology that manifested in the city of Batam was crime. Crimes such as theft, murder, robbery, smuggling, mugging, and rape marred the successful development of the industrial city. As of 1986, Batam's statistical data showed that around 90% of the city's crimes were categorized as theft or assault.

In the first high-profile crime in Batam City since its evolution into an industrial city, a Singaporean tourist was violently mugged in July 1987, and his injuries resulted in his death after he had returned to Singapore. In response to this incident, in September 1987, Batam security officials engaged the Military District Command to conduct raids and round up any thugs and any individuals with no ID cards. Under instructions from the government, the local military garrison conducted a mass arrest of supposed thugs who were suspected of crime. They arrested some 300 Batam residents, shaved their heads, and deported them to Galang Island.

Then, in July 1991, a robbery and murder were committed at Bank Dagang Negara, Nagoya (*Kompas*, 1992, November 5), and in January 1995, a Taiwanese tourist named Lim Siu Lung was found dead in a hotel room where he had gone after several armed robbers had entered his shophouse and beaten him. In between those two crimes, a Singaporean citizen named Shua Seow Sam who had opened a money exchange business in Batam was also murdered (*Suara Karya*, 1995, January 21). Many of the violent crimes that took place in Batam had robbery as the motive and targeted victims who were seen as both wealthy and easy targets.

In addition to murder and robbery, piracy and smuggling became a common crime in the Strait of Philips and Singapore. During an operation in August 1991, 75% of captured perpetrators were migrants from the island of Mat, behind Padang, Sambu Island, and Tanjung Uban around Batam (*Kompas*, 1992, November 5). These crimes were caused by the slow development of infrastructure, such as security apparatuses, especially the Riau water police force. Batam City only owns 15 patrol boats, 13 of which are wooden patrol boats that max out at 8 miles per hour.

Therefore, it can be argued that this growing crime is the result of dysfunctional societal structure. The progress of Batam impacted the criminal activity in the area around Batam, especially Riau. For instance, Batam's

geographic position and the high costs of goods associated with its rapid economic development stimulated the smuggling of goods into Riau from Singapore for transport to North Sumatra, West Sumatra, and Java (*Kompas*, 1991, September 14).

B. J. Habibie developed the concept of the balloon theory in March 1979, when he was the chairman of the Batam Authority Board, during a meeting with Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. The theory refers to Batam's development as a string of balloons connected with valves such that if pressure on one balloon threatens its explosion, the pressure is channeled to the next balloon in the chain until the pressure reduces. The expectation was that Batam would develop by accommodating the overflow of economic activity from Singapore, and the government efforts succeeded so well that much investment, trade, and tourism activity moved from Singapore to Batam.

However, in addition to booming economic activity, Singapore sent a wave of crime to Batam, reflected in the Bank Dagang Negara robbery of July 1991 in Nagoya and in cases of narcotics smuggling in 1992. In the first case of narcotics smuggling, a gang of criminals led by Singaporean citizen Peter Ong killed a bank guard assisted by a former cashier of Bank Dagang Negara (*Kompas*, 1991, September 14). The second case of narcotics smuggling involved a shop in Taman Indah area, Nagoya. The police managed to capture the owners, Kolant Ko Chuon Kwang, Goh Juan Kwang, and Tong Sen Kim, and all were citizens of Singapore. In other cases, smugglers swallowed condoms filled with heroin to cross the border undetected (*Suara Karya*, 1995, January 21).

The rise in criminal activity in Batam was triggered by a number of factors. First, as we noted earlier, the rapid urbanization caused by migration was not accompanied with any support services for the new migrants, and they were ultimately marginalized from any of the city's formal service, employment, or other sectors. Although there are no accurate official data on unemployment and homelessness in Batam, it is assumed that they increased each year (*Suara Karya*, 1995, January 21). Even high-school graduates such as Soekanto of Pariaman from West Sumatra found themselves without work:

Soekanto (35) ... admitted that before coming to Batam, what he had in mind was there had to be so many job opportunities in this city for people like him who graduated from high school ... Once he arrived in Batam, it turned out that he did not see what he had imagined before. "I was even

unemployed for almost one and a half years and I almost starved to death.” ... In that critical moment, he unexpectedly met an old friend whom he met when travelling in Pekanbaru ... Thanks to his friend’s help, Iskandar, he trained to drive a taxi; then he became a taxi driver... (*Suara Karya*, 1995, January 21, authors’ translation).

Second, industries in Batam imposed a strict contractual system, and when workers’ contracts expired, they were immediately unemployed until they received new contracts; this cycle drove crime in between contracts (*Kompas*, 1992, November 5). The third factor in the high crime rates in Batam was the high cost of living. Even civil servants found it difficult to live in a city so close to Singapore, let alone those who had even lower incomes or were unemployed. Residents told reporters,

people outside Batam would not believe it if they were told how much money they spent every month... This high cost of living is because the price of groceries sold in Batam is much more expensive than that of other areas... Saragih (40), a teacher at a junior high school in Batam, said that he earned a monthly salary of IDR 250 thousand; it would be difficult for him to fulfill his family’s basic needs... forced to be able to find additional income by working elsewhere outside of teaching hours. After teaching, he worked as a taxi driver until late at night. (*Suara Karya*, 1995, January 21)

PROSTITUTION AND DRUGS

In addition to Pontianak, Mataram (Lombok), Medan, and Denpasar, Batam became a main destination for child trafficking, specifically young girls destined for sex work. Batam became a primary destination in particular for those coming from Sumatera Utara; it was considered a strategic location because it was near Singapore and Johor, Malaysia (Perangin-Rangin, 2009), and Batam was also strategic because of its small ports (Utami, 2017).

Sex workers from outside Indonesia were also transported to Batam, mainly from Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Thailand. The wide prevalence of prostitution in Batam was driven by the high demand from Singaporean tourists: Batam prostitutes were known to be much cheaper than those in Singapore, and Singapore imposed stringent restrictions on prostitution (Hull et al., 1997, p. 93).

Meanwhile, prostitution in Batam City had mushroomed in the first place as one impact of the expansion of the tourism industry. Travel from

Singapore was inexpensive, and as we noted above, prostitution was inexpensive as well (e.g., 50 SGD in Batam versus 200 SGD in Singapore). The prostitutes were between 16 and 25 years old and worked on three-month contracts managed by a pimp known locally as “Mommy.” They operated from 11 AM to 4 PM and continuing from 7 PM until past midnight (*Tempo*, 1993, January 2). After they completed their three-month contract, they could return to their hometowns with their earnings, which amounted to about IDR 3–5 million (*Kompas*, 1992, November 5).

Prostitution in Batam operated rather differently from the practices in other cities in Indonesia. For instance, their contracts did not prohibit the prostitutes to travel in groups to Singapore (*Tempo*, 1993, November 13). Ela, who had been working for four years, spent SGD 35 to travel to Singapore during the low season to find new customers, although she was arrested twice and deported to Batam along with 25 other prostitutes. Singapore was a promising city to meet low-income customers such as taxi drivers, satay sellers, and construction workers (*Tempo*, 1993, November 13).

Prostitutes interested in relocating to Batam could apply through local brokers in their areas. Many women had been promised work as factory workers or housemaids but had found that they had been lied to; instead, of those jobs, the women had been forced into prostitution. However, some had been explicitly told that they would be working as prostitutes in Batam. Brokers could earn IDR 300,000 per recruit (*Tempo*, 1993, November 13). Several women had been prostitutes in their hometowns and had come to Batam for higher pay, such as prostitutes from Medan and of Chinese descent from West Kalimantan (*Tempo*, 1993, November 13). The prostitutes from Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand were considered high class (*Kompas*, 1986, March 14).

Lindquist (2010) conducted an extensive field study between 1998 and 1999 of the economic pillars of Batam and found that the economy mainly relied on the money circulating around nightclubs, pubs, karaoke bars, hotels, and gambling establishments, all of which attracted increasing numbers of tourists from Singapore: from 60,000 in 1985 to 580,000 in the 1990s. Most were male weekend visitors looking for prostitutes and drugs such as ecstasy and marijuana, which could be easily obtained in the nightclubs, and Lindquist referred to Batam drug trading as “the Economy of the Night.” Lindquist also found that law enforcement tended to tolerate drug dealing at nightclubs and, interestingly, that tourists and sex

workers were customers; female sex workers in Batam could earn USD 30 per day from their customers (Lindquist, 2010, pp. 281–282, 286), and in addition to the entertainment industry, prostitution became a lucrative profession following the Indonesian financial crisis of 1997.

With the surge in prostitution, however, the prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases became a risk to the city. Based on data from the Health Office of Batam Municipality, the number of visits from patients with sexually transmitted diseases to Batam Hospital increased from 546 in 1990 to 1059 in 1995, which aligned with the numbers of prostitutes in the city. For example, some 73 prostitutes were recorded working in Batam in 1983, and 1107 prostitutes were working in 1995. B.J. Habibie observed this to be a consequence of economic development in Batam, (*Suara Pembaharuan*, 1998, September 1).

The spread of nightlife in Batam as part of its rapid economic progress supported ample adult entertainment such as massage parlors and nightclubs (*Tempo*, 1993, November 13), and many owners granted prostitutes permission to operate in their businesses. Other venues openly provided their customers with prostitutes. For instance, the nightclubs Golden Million and Golden Star had 300 women available, and there were 40 at Maxim Bar (*Tempo*, 1993, November 13). Nightclub owners offered erotic dancers in addition to female escorts in efforts to be competitive. The dancers were mostly from Singapore and Malaysia (*Suara Karya*, 1995, January 21). Despite awareness of the problem and its impacts, authorities in Batam struggled to prosecute owners of these establishments because local security officers protected the clubs (*Suara Karya*, 1995, January 21). Such conditions perpetuated prostitution in the city of Batam.

Besides operating at night clubs, prostitutes in Batam operated in a red-light district in Bukit called “Samyong,” better known as Bukit Girang, which literally means Happy Hill (*Tempo*, 1993, November 13). Prostitution in Bukit Girang was classified as registered because it was monitored by authorities such as the police and assisted by social and health institutions (Kartono, 2001). Bukit Girang was a complex of slums. In 1988, 243 prostitutes were recorded as working in Bukit Girang, which did not include those working in the 13 massage parlors (*Kompas*, 1988, November 2). In 1993, the number of prostitutes in Bukit Girang increased to 348 (*Tempo*, 1993, November 13).

Additionally, apart from jeopardizing the health of the population, the increasing prostitution in Batam deteriorated societal morals (Kartono, 2001) and contributed to a negative image of the city. Young people in the city became accustomed to hanging out at nightclubs in the evening and were introduced to the world of prostitution at early ages (*Suara Karya*, 1995, January 21).

CONCLUSION

Batam's development as an industrial city and the associated advances had negative impacts on the city. The city's rapid urbanization—fueled by rural, unskilled, uneducated migrants—introduced illegal settlements and slums; high poverty, unemployment, and crime; poor public health; and physical and environmental damage. Industrial and commercial activities mushroomed around the city, but an underworld ballooned in growth as well.

The areas of marginalized migrants contained massage parlors and nightclubs where drugs were sold and women danced erotically. Prostitution thrived, and violent robberies for money became common. The Batam Authority attempted to mitigate the harms this population was causing by razing illegal settlements and transporting migrants back to their home villages but also by attempting to lure them to stable government-built homes that were unaffordable even with the assistance. Apart from the citywide impacts of the communities of marginalized residents building their own slums, Batam is located at the borders with Riau, Johor, and Singapore, and it has become a hub of child sex trafficking. The many unintended negative consequences of Batam's rapid urbanization make the city a highly effective case study of the challenges of attempting to modernize cities, and this study highlights areas for effective city management and urban planning to address *before* launching pushes to expand a city through migration.

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CHAPTER 8

Pondok Indah and Pondok Pinang from 1973 to 1997: Developing Through Interdependency

*Isti Sri Ulfiarti, Tri Wahyuning Mudaryanti,
and R. Tuty Nur Mutia Enoch Muas*

INTRODUCTION

In 1977, Australian historian Lea Jellinek published a study on residences in Jakarta known as *pondok* (“cottage”). *Pondok* were temporary residences rented out by *tauke*, their owners; they were rented to migrant traders, and the *tauke* also owned the tools the traders used when they lodge there. The *pondok* is typically six square meters and usually accommodates 10–40 people, albeit quite tightly. When Jakarta adopted the policy of being a closed city, initiated by Ali Sadikin, *pondoks* were widely built to accommodate the rapid urbanization of the city.

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In 1973, in South Jakarta, more than 460 hectares of new housing was built to address the shortage of homes. These suburbs were known as Pondok Indah (“beautiful”), and they were beautiful in design and in the public facilities available to their residents. However, given that the development of this suburb was targeted at the upper middle class, the quality of materials, building area, and land area was much better than what the government had used to build homes for the lower middle class. That is, *pondok* can be simple or luxurious (*Tempo*, 1976, March 13, p. 51).

The residential area of Pondok Indah is in the subdistrict of Pondok Pinang, Kebayoran Lama District, South Jakarta. Pondok Pinang was at one time a *kampung* with people who worked as farmers, carpenters, or furniture traders, and access to the area was limited. The closest main road was Jalan Raya Ciputat, and in 1975, the area had still not been equipped with electricity; lighting at the time depended on kerosene lamps or the insignificant amounts of electricity the locals could generate. Projected to be an elite area in Jakarta, Pondok Indah brought social and economic influences on the local community.

Here, we discuss the impacts on the urban spaces in Pondok Pinang of the Pondok Indah suburbs, which were constructed over agricultural lands, in terms of the environment and the surrounding communities. Discussions on developing Pondok Indah began in 1973 in cooperation between real estate companies and the local government, and 1997 marked the end of the agreement between the Jakarta city government and the developer of Pondok Indah, PT Metropolitan Kencana.

Many scholars have discussed the construction of Pondok Indah, including Blackburn (2011), Sutedi (2007), Soerjani (1981), and Budihardjo (1998), and these studies were similar to Warnamaker’s (2008) on settling the elite in Beverly Hills, California, USA. However, these researchers only addressed the issue of the land acquisition for the construction, with little mention of the impact of the built settlement. In this essay, we offer more comprehensive research on the subject. We focus on when changes occurred to the region and their impacts on both the spaces and the socioeconomic conditions of local communities, particularly the people of Pondok Pinang.

We reviewed literature from a range of sources, including books, magazines, newspapers, journals, and other printed sources such as maps, and we also interviewed residents of the Pondok Pinang and Pondok Indah communities who had been living in the area at the beginning of the area’s construction. We conducted these interviews in 2017 with the following

subjects: Haji Abu Bakar, Idris, Revianti, Machruf, and Joannesa; Abu Bakar, Idris, and Machruf used to live in the area now called Pondok Indah, and Revianti and Joannesa were among the first to move into the new development.

MASTER PLANNING OF PONDOK INDAH

The government developed Pondok Indah according to Jakarta Master Plan 1965–1985. In the Master Plan, the city was divided into areas designated as settlements, and one of the planned areas for settlements was South Jakarta, divided into the Central Development Area (Wilayah Pengembangan-Pusat/WP-P), the Southern Development Area (WP-Selatan/WP-S), and the Western Development Area (WP-Barat/WP-B).

First, WP-P covered the Tebet, Setiabudi, Mampang Prapatan, and Kebayoran Baru subdistricts and some of Cilandak and Pasar Minggu, covering a total area of approximately 5.711 hectares. The population density in this region was 167 persons/ha, which drove the government to restrict every type of construction (industry, trade, services, and offices). Second, WP-S covered part of the Pasar Minggu and Cilandak subdistricts, encompassing 12 urban villages with an area of 5.233 hectares and an average population density of 45 persons/ha; WP-S was in a water catchment area and was planned as a green open space. Third, WP-B covered the Kebayoran Lama subdistrict, with 10 urban villages covering 3.676 hectares and an average population density of 76 persons/ha. This area in the medium- to long-term plan was to be developed as a city, as its soil conditions, water, and altitude were suitable for development. However, until the 1980s, the infrastructure and public facilities in this area were insufficient (BPS Jakarta Selatan, 1986).

In South Jakarta, settlements such as Kebayoran Baru (built in 1948) had been planned during the administration of President Soekarno. Developing Kebayoran Baru was intended to overcome the housing shortage for civil servants who had moved from Yogyakarta to Jakarta as a result of the unification of RIS and RI in 1950 (Dinas Museum dan Pemugaran Prov. DKI Jakarta, 2000). High levels of urbanization drove economic and sociocultural challenges such as housing shortages.

Jakarta's Governor Ali Sadikin proposed overcoming the issue by building national housing (*Perumnas*) for lower- to middle-class residents and encouraging the private real estate sector to build for the upper middle class, although even before real estate had come to flourish in Jakarta, the

government had already deployed authoritative bodies to explore rejuvenating urban activity centers and developing new areas. One such agency was the Executing Agency of the Authority of Pondok Pinang, approved by the Decree of Governor No. Da 11/19/6/1972 dated June 14, 1972, on Pembentukan Badan Pelaksana Otorita Pondok Pinang (BPOPP).

BPOPP worked with real estate businesses to build Pondok Indah, located in the Pondok Pinang area. The intention was for upper middle-class residents and foreigners living in Singapore to move their families to these new luxurious suburbs in Jakarta (Nicholas & Wu, 2011). Here, we discuss the many social and economic impacts of the development on the community around Pondok Pinang.

Pondok Pinang was developed in an agreement between the Jakarta regional government and PT Metropolitan Kentjana, the developer. The agreement was promulgated on September 17, 1973, and was valid until February 13, 1997, with Commissioner Liem Soei Liong and Soedwikatmono as Managing Director (Sutedi, 2007, p. 301). Under the agreement, the government provided permits and land clearing, the real estate firms provided funds for the project (Dieleman, 2011), and Jakarta was to be transformed into a metropolis with modern, world-class facilities.

FROM PONDOK PINANG TO PONDOK INDAH

There are several historical versions of the naming of Pondok Pinang. Prior to Jellinek (1977), Mr. R. M. Soemanang in 1940 had coined an approximately similar meaning of the word “*Pondok*.” In the stories passed down by elders, betel nut (*pinang*) gatherers usually brought their goods to the center of Batavia, but sometimes, rains badly damaged the road. When they could not pass, the betel nut gatherers built temporary lodges that were later referred to as *pondok*, and because most people who stayed there were *pinang* gatherers, the area became Pondok Pinang, a village for traders traveling inland (Soemanang, 1940, p. 6).

Pondok Pinang is in an area occupied by a community of Betawi people whose livelihoods rely on agriculture and wood crafts. The original area was a lowland plain with fruit trees, rubber plantations, rice fields, and swamps, and several factors contributed to its choice for the new elite suburb including primarily its strategic location not far from Jakarta’s city center; the area was also 12 meters above sea level and thus protected from flooding (Soemanang, 1940). The areas selected for Pondok Pinang was also beautiful, and because it was a suburb of Jakarta, the land was

reasonably priced, for instance, ranging from IDR 1000 to IDR 4000 for land in 1976 compared with IDR 27,000 to IDR 90,000 around downtown Jakarta (*Tempo*, 1976, March 13, p. 51).

In 1974, the agrarian subdirector of Jakarta granted compensation to the people of Pondok Pinang who would be displaced by the construction of the Pondok Indah suburb, although only for their buildings and land (*Kompas*, 1977, 12 September, p. 4.) and not their bulldozed crops (trees; *Prisma*, March 1977, p. 49). Compensation for permanent buildings with brick walls (*rumah tembok*), floor tiles/flooring, and roof tiles was set at IDR 12,000/m². A semi-permanent building received compensation of IDR 9000/m², and a bamboo wall house (*rumah bilik*) received compensation of IDR 3500/m², as well as the land, which was compensated at IDR 2400/m².

Only a few villages were co-opted so Pondok Indah could be constructed: Kampung Pondok Pinang Timur, Gebruk Tengah, Gebruk Timur, Kampung Terogong Besar, and Terogong Belakang (Soerjani, 1981, p. 25). Some 1250 families were displaced, approximately 6250 people (*Kompas*, 1977, June 25, p. 9). Land was acquired in one of two ways: buying and selling (*geblok*) or by trading (*tukar guling*).

(a) Buying and selling land

Under the *geblok* system, the BPOPP bought individuals' land. The government did not relocate them; rather, many bought land in the village of Pondok Pinang or nearby such as in Parung, Tanah Ara, or the Ciputat area (Soerjani, 1981, pp. 25–26).

(b) Trading land

Under *tukar guling*, the government exchanged land for land, with the amount of replacement land adjusted according to the amount of land being traded; if the owner's property was larger than the plot for trade, the government paid the difference. The payment for each plot of land was calculated based on a per-meter cost for building a new home. Nearly all Pondok Pinang communities affected by the acquisition accepted land from the authorities in the Haji Muhi area, located in Pondok Pinang Barat. There, the government provided about 40 hectares and some shelters for the new residents who were building houses (*Kompas*, 1977, March 22, p. 3).

In 1977, Pondok Indah covered almost 448 hectares of Pondok Pinang urban village, which was 660 hectares, that is, 68%. The new development's boundaries were nearly the same as those of Pondok Pinang village: the north was bordered by Sodetan, the east was bordered by Grogol, and the west was bordered by Pesanggrahan, but the south was bordered by the planned toll road to Cengkareng. Of the 448 hectares of the project, 239 were allocated to 3500 plots for housing, with lots ranging from 200 m² to 1000 m². The suburb was planned to accommodate 15,000–20,000 people (*Kompas*, 1977, September 12, p. 4). Until 1991, the area built for the Pondok Indah suburbs was limited to the eastern region of the Ciputat highway.

It is estimated that 30,000 people resided in Pondok Indah by 1997 (*Eksekutif*, 1997, November 21, p. 65) in populations that changed the community composition of Pondok Pinang. Initially, there were only Indonesians, but the elite housing development attracted foreign investment in the area, including from the United States, Argentina, Germany, and Japan. The composition of Indonesian citizens also changed: rather than being mostly Betawi, the new population included a variety of upper middle-class Indonesians in addition to the foreigners.

The Pondok Indah suburbs were inhabited by businessmen, artists, athletes, and state officials, including the head of the Center for Data and Mapping Management, the Director of Education and Culture (Alda, 1995), and the former Siliwangi Commander, Ibrahim Adjie (*Tempo*, 1987, p. 78). Among the businessmen were Ir. Ciputra, Soedwikatmono group leader of Pondok Indah; artists included Lidya Kandau and Venna Melinda (*Kompas*, 1994, May 15, p. 18); and one athlete was Christian Hadinata, a badminton player (*Tempo*, 1984, May 26, p. 68).

Most foreigners lived in the Tarogong area because there was a Joint Embassy School, renting large houses along the main road of Metro Pondok Indah because the 1960 Agrarian Basic Law prohibited foreigners from buying land. Diplomats and foreign embassy staff also lived in the area. Prospective residents of the Bukit Golf plot required at least IDR 2.5 billion to purchase land, as 2000 m² cost between IDR 850,000 and IDR 1.2 million (*Tempo*, 1991, June 22, p. 32).

Homeowners in Pondok Indah built their houses according to their own individual designs. For instance, Ir. Ciputra had his home on a Bukit Golf plot built in an American country style, whereas others built Mediterranean-style houses with high pillars to the second floor; some chose minimalist homes with fences. The houses were built observing

Marcus Vitruvius Pollio's three architectural elements: convenience, strength, and beauty (Soekiman, 2000, p. 241). The presence of middle-to upper-class and wealthy residents and the variety of foreign-style houses made Pondok Indah a symbol of modernity of the upper middle class (Nas, 2005, p. 74). Members of the Pondok Indah community were looking for a quieter and more comfortable environment away from the noise of the metropolis, and the suburb of Pondok Indah became one of the most prestigious in the Jakarta area.

The Pondok Indah suburb was inspired by the city of Beverly Hills in the United States and was very well organized and maintained. For instance, those who bought land and had not yet built their houses were required to pay PT Metropolitan Kentjana to take care of the land, and the company also managed the parks in the residential areas including watering gardens every day. In fact, any damage to crops in the Pondok Indah area was not taken care of directly by the Pondok Indah community but were reported to and maintained by the company. Residents were forbidden to change buildings or any of the plants without the developer's permission. Expensive social facilities were constructed in the residential areas, such as schools and malls (Sorensen & Okata, 2011, p. 178). This can be seen in the elite structure of Pondok Indah, whose houses were built in accordance with Mediterranean and country styles and with wide, paved streets decorated with palm trees. In subsequent developments, the settlements were supplemented with school infrastructures, such as Don Bosco, Joint Embassy School, Tirta Marta, and Ora Et Labora, and the construction of modern economic facilities, such as malls like the Pondok Indah Mall (PIM), and sports facilities.

NEW SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE

Pondok Indah consisted of not only luxurious housing but also infrastructure, including transportation, markets, health care facilities, and educational institutions. The Metro Pondok Indah highway was constructed to connect the settlement to the rest of the area. The main road was completed in mid-1977 and mimicked the broad main street of Beverly Hills, palm trees and all, although rather than California's *Phoenix sylvestris*, the less expensive *Hyophorbe lagenicaulis* were used in Pondok Indah (Damayanti, 2013). In addition, the sides of some roads were decorated with flower gardens.

Metro Pondok Indah was intended to ease the pressures from the usual traffic jams at the Kebayoran Lama railway and Blok A, Kebayoran Baru; additionally, a new road was built with a direct link to Kebayoran Baru so that all transportation access would not depend on the Ciputat highway. The roads connecting Jumat Market, Marga Guna, Haji Nawis Street, and Radio Dalam Street with a width of 50 m and a length of 3.5 km (*Kompas*, 1977, March 7, p. 3) were expected to accommodate three vehicles on the right side and three on the left. With the new road, vehicles were able to reach Kebayoran Baru within five minutes (*Tempo*, 1977, June 11, p. 35).

The new road network introduced options for other forms of transportation such as taxis, *bajaj*, and Metromini S79 along the Blok M-Cinere route, although residents of Pondok Indah itself rarely used these services and instead traveled in their private vehicles. However, the additional forms of transportation were intended to support not only the Pondok Indah community itself but also surrounding communities. The roads and infrastructure made it easy to visit from the surrounding communities in the region, and the PIM became a prime shopping destination according to Revianti, one of the first inhabitants of Pondok Indah.

In addition to the stores, the mall offered restaurants, entertainment, and even a water park. Before the mall, there was a Dwima store located near the Metropolitan Kentjana office, and Revianti said that one Pondok Indah resident had sold goods out of his garage that ranged from daily necessities such as rice, mineral water, sugar, gas, and snacks to school and laundry supplies. Residents themselves rarely shopped for groceries in the Pondok Indah, however, delegating such tasks to their servants. Joannesa reported that before the mall, residents had had to shop outside of the areas at places such as Hero in Barito, Golden Truly in Fatmawati, Ratu Plaza, Gajah Mada, Aldiron, and Melawai (*Tempo*, 1985, June 6, p. 66).

Developing the area also included health infrastructure. Construction began in 1984 on a private hospital in the suburb to fulfill one of the government's requirements regarding supporting infrastructure for the new development. Pondok Indah Hospital was built on an area of 5500 m² in Metro Duta. People who sought treatment at the hospital came from various backgrounds. For example, Indra Lesmana was an artist who was treated for liver problems, and victims of a fire at the PIM were treated at the hospital (*Kompas*, 1992, March 30, p. 10). Before the existence of this hospital, Pondok Indah residents preferred to go to the Fatmawati Hospital or other hospitals far away. Moreover, there was only one pharmacy in Asihan.

To provide sports activities to the residents of the Pondok Indah settlement community, an international fitness club was opened, the Clark Hatch. In the Pondok Indah community, there were gymnastics and jogging groups organized in the park. Meanwhile, the settlement built its first golf course on 538,584 m² of land located on the border with the Grogol River. The golf course was the fifth one to be built in Jakarta. Players were required to be members of the Pondok Indah community. The Pondok Indah golf course and the sports facility tended to focus more on international golf matches and business activities (*Eksekutif*, 1997, November 21, p. 65).

Meanwhile, the educational infrastructure up until 1991 included facilities to support students from kindergarten to high school. Some schools, such as Don Bosco, Joint Embassy School, Bhakti Mulya, Ora Et Labora, and Tirta Marta, were run by foundations with facilities that sometimes contrasted starkly with those of the government-run public schools (*inpres*). For example, Bhakti Mulya Kindergarten, a private school, provided swimming facilities, equipment for games, a space for free activities, a library of books, and a library of toys; there was also a complete car park, with signs and a miniature of the Semanggi Interchange in Jakarta (*Tempo*, 1985, July 20, p. 70). Despite their busy lives, residents of Pondok Indah wanted their children to be comfortable and safe and have access to a quality education. Similarly, parents could carry out their daily activities knowing that their children would be under the school's supervision.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES

The construction of the Pondok Indah settlements affected the surrounding communities. For example, social changes were observed. The indigenous people (Betawi) initially lived together as one big family. Several families, with couples who were already married, lived under one roof. This was possible given the amount of land and number of houses owned by parents who were able to accommodate their extended families. However, with Pondok Indah, this familial pattern changed. With the money they acquired from selling their land to the developer of Pondok Indah at a low price, they could only afford to buy smaller houses outside the area, and extended families could no longer live together under one roof.

According to Haji Abu Bakar, the purchase of land for the Pondok Indah settlement resulted in a division of inheritance among the

community, which caused some family members to choose to buy cheaper land but in a different location. Idris' parents, for example, sold all their land to the Pondok Indah settlement project and shared the profits with their children. However, Idris kept the land that had not been sold through the project until 1982, when the selling price was higher. Idris and his brothers then moved to different locations. His brothers moved to Parung and Kedawang in 1977, and Idris and his parents moved to the Haji Muhi area. Removals and changes in the life patterns of the surrounding community whose land was used to build settlements led to the marginalization of indigenous communities in the eastern region of Pondok Indah.

Another social change that occurred in the community was an increase in the number of people who performed the *hajj* after they sold their land; generally, the former landowners who went on pilgrimage had owned large land holdings for which they had received significant financial compensation rather than receiving different land plots. However, according to Abu Bakar, there were allegations that some people who were performing the *hajj* were doing so because they had been offered incentives, so they would leave their land. The suburb also altered the lifestyles of the community around Pondok Indah. For instance, the mall became a place for schoolchildren, and Revianti said that they would usually go to school with a change of clothes so they could go to the mall after school. Mahruf said the mall became a new playground, and Timezone, the arcade, even attracted children outside Pondok Indah. Children who had participated in free group activities outdoors now wanted to play indoor arcade games.

Meanwhile, the Pondok Indah development had immense economic impacts on the residents of the area who had been working in agriculture and woodcraft. Farmers were evicted so their land could be developed, and agricultural land cover decreased from 473,442 hectares in 1970 to 100 hectares by 1981 (Soerjani, 1981). By 1984, there were only 56 heads of farming households around Pondok Pinang (BPS Jakarta Selatan, 1984), whereas there had been 684 only a decade before (Soerjani, 1981). The farmers moved into orchid farming, opened stalls, became furniture merchants, worked in woodwork, rented out rooms to immigrants, and found other types of work.

Wood craftsmen, meanwhile, had negotiated a policy agreement with the local government not to be evicted and could continue their work uninterrupted. Concerned by threats to their livelihoods, the wood craftsmen demanded land acquisition from the local government in 1975. They were represented by Mohammad Sardjan, who had been the Minister of

Agriculture in 1952 and was now the joint chairman of the wood craftsmen in Pondok Pinang (*Kompas*, 1977, September 12, p. 4). In October 1976, the woodworkers' wish was granted. Decree No. D/IV/9223/e/6/76 dated October 22, 1976, on the formation and use of land in an area of 60 hectares located in Kelurahan Pondok Pinang, Kebayoran Lama subdistrict, South Jakarta area for the area of household carving and furniture crafting business was approved, and the woodworkers started a cooperative called *Koperasi Kerajinan Kayu Ukiran dan Rumah Tangga (Koperta)*.

Sales of wooden handicraft products increased with the entry of foreigners to the settlement of Pondok Indah as reported by local wood craftsmen in interviews. The carvers traveled to the foreigners' homes, and the foreigners appreciated that the local motifs featured flowers, which carvings from other areas did not, and that carvers would produce pieces tailored to the wishes of the buyer. This state of affairs then attracted woodworkers from regions outside Pondok Pinang, such as Jepara, which is famous for its carpentry and woodwork. In 1976, as many as 1500 people migrated from Jepara to work in the woodwork industry (*Kompas*, 1978, March 27, p. 13).

In addition, some foreign customers appreciated their pieces so much that they told relatives abroad and even their embassies about their art. Their support made several local woodworkers successful businesspeople. Haji Abu Bakar was able to send one of his children to university in Pondok Indah, and he participated in the *hajj* pilgrimage twice and bought land in other regions.

Other jobs that were created with the development of Pondok Indah were service jobs such as caddy at the golf course and worker at the mall. When there was an international golf match in 1983, most of the workers were recruited from the communities around Pondok Indah, and when the mall opened in 1991, the restaurant workers and shopkeepers were from the surrounding community; many had lived on the land that had been turned into the Pondok Indah suburb, and others who had once lived on those lands worked for the new suburban homeowners as housemaids. These job vacancies were usually only transmitted by word of mouth.

Furthermore, the Pondok Indah development affected the *bajaj* drivers around Pondok Indah. When Pondok Indah was completed, it attracted new passengers, including those who did not live far from the Ciputat highway, such as around houses in Pinang Mas and Pinang Perak. Their

basecamp at that time was still around the Ciputat highway. According to Revianti, bajaj passengers increased with the opening of the PIM. This increase was expected to increase the revenue of the bajaj drivers, as they began to stop in front of the mall.

CONCLUSION

In the era of Ali Sadikin, Southern Jakarta experienced a change in spatial layout because of the need for urban settlements in Jakarta. As the capital city, Jakarta had become home to many migrants. The city offered employment opportunities and the chance to build a better life, but development required settlements with modern facilities.

The land chosen for the construction of an elite settlement in Pondok Pinang was close to the central government and much cheaper than land in Jakarta, and residence there was pitched to elites in Singapore and elsewhere in Indonesia; foreign residents were even solicited to invest in the economic development in Indonesia. Building Pondok Indah greatly influenced the spatial layout of Pondok Pinang, transforming it from agriculture/plantation use to an elite settlement equipped with modern facilities and an infrastructure that implied the exclusivity of its inhabitants. The elite residential area also brought social and economic impacts to the lives of surrounding communities.

With the disappearance of their agricultural holdings, the farmers of Pondok Pinang lost their livelihoods and had to change occupations. Many became woodworkers or sold food, and some rented their properties to migrants to the city. However, long-term woodworkers benefited from Pondok Indah. In addition to receiving 60 hectares of land from the regional government to support their woodworking businesses, they had a built-in customer base in the residents of the new suburbs, and some woodworkers saw great economic success. Service industry jobs also emerged in Pondok Indah such as caddy, mobile trader, shopkeeper, household assistant, gardener, security officers, and drivers.

The establishment of Pondok Indah pressured the people of Pondok Pinang socially, economically, and culturally. Because farming was no longer a viable career option, the people of Pondok Pinang managed to survive by becoming woodworkers. Meanwhile, the fact that some of these people chose to become workers in Pondok Indah could be interpreted as their part in supporting the existence of Pondok Indah as an elite area in Jakarta. Such an established interdependence is inevitable. In the

Indonesian context, satisfaction is often gained through othering and constructing others as lesser parties. Seemingly persisting in the coexistence of Pondok Pinang and Pondok Indah, such an approach has sustained their existence, development, and interdependence.

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Community-Based Practices of Archiving Indonesian Popular Music: Redefining the Notion of Indonesia

Ignatius Aditya Adhiyatmaka and Lilawati Kurnia

INTRODUCTION

From the era of Dutch colonialization to the present day, Indonesian popular music has been influenced by external and internal factors that have contributed to its uniqueness. It involves various processes ranging from appropriation to hybridization (Toynbee & Dueck, 2011). Musicians frequently mix musical elements from outside of Indonesia with traditional music, which has resulted in a genre that exhibits modern and Indonesian characteristics (Wallach, 2002). The development of Indonesian popular music started with *keroncong*, a significant cultural contribution from the nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. Indonesian freedom fighters used this music to disseminate the spirit of anticolonialism among the Indonesian people at large. According to Lockard (1998), “Popular music has become

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in recent decades a central feature of culture and daily life in Indonesia” (p. 54). Therefore, Indonesian popular music as a cultural product can be regarded as contributing to national identity. With its widely varied forms, Indonesian popular music has become part of the discourse on being a member of the national community and contributed to opinions on what it means to be a citizen (Weintraub, 2010).

However, despite the significant role that Indonesian popular music plays in daily public life, there have been no serious national efforts to date to preserve or archive these materials. There is no equivalent in Indonesia to the National Film and Sound Archive in Australia, the British Library Sound Archive, or MusicSG in Singapore. Indonesia’s only institution for archiving popular culture with any government support is Sinematek Indonesia. This archive was initiated by Misbach Yusa Biran and other Indonesian film workers and was realized under the administration of the Governor of the Special District of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin, in 1975. Sinematek Indonesia grew over time to become the official national film archive and was financed by the state budget under the Ministry of Information. Regular financial assistance, however, was stopped in 2001, placing Sinematek Indonesia in the precarious position of trying to preserve film archives with very limited and irregular funds from Yayasan Pusat Perfilman Haji Usmar Ismail [Haji Usmar Ismail Film Center Foundation] (Elyda, 2014).

Studio Lokananta, one of the country’s largest and only state-owned music recording companies, found itself in a similar situation (Theodore, 2013). When it was still under the Indonesian Ministry of Information, Studio Lokananta’s role was to record and duplicate music to be played by the 49 stations of Radio Republik Indonesia across the country. Today, there is little doubt that Studio Lokananta launched old-time Indonesian popular musicians such as Titeik Puspa, Waljinah, Bing Slamet, and Buby Chen to nationwide popularity.

However, the studio also undertook a serious and well-managed attempt to archive all the master recordings it had ever produced; it is no exaggeration to say that Studio Lokananta’s archive of Indonesian popular music is the most comprehensive to date. However, the studio could only archive the master recordings it had produced and had no access to the popular music produced across the country. Furthermore, the archive owned by Studio Lokananta has been on the brink of disappearance since it declared bankruptcy in 1977 and since the dissolution of the Indonesian Ministry of Information in the late 1990s. The acute shortage of funding

has resulted in “the deterioration of the condition of the archive that totals no less than 40,000 master recordings” (Theodore, 2013, p. 30).

These alarming conditions regarding the preservation and archiving of cultural artifacts, in particular, popular culture, triggered some individuals and communities to document Indonesian popular music independently. Coming from varied backgrounds, they are motivated to undertake this activity because of difficulties they have experienced in accessing recordings, data, and information on old-time Indonesian popular music. Between 2009 and 2016, at least four initiatives emerged with similar intentions: namely, Irama Nusantara, Arsip Jazz Indonesia, Lokananta Project, and Museum Musik Indonesia. Their founders worked collectively in what Bennet (2009) described as do-it-yourself (DIY) preservationism to collect, archive, and preserve recordings and other materials related to Indonesian popular music, eventually organizing them in a manner that was accessible by the public.

Neither the Old nor the New Order governments considered archiving popular music important because music was seen as a mere object of power during these periods. However, in the post-Reformation era (particularly during the presidency of Jokowi), archiving music became profitable. Here, we analyze two impacts of the attempts to archive Indonesian popular music. First, archiving Indonesian popular music can be understood as an attempt to save cultural heritage closely related to the collective memories of the urban sphere. Second, positioning archiving within the framework of popular culture brings about condensed issues of historical context, as mentioned above. In assessing these impacts, it is necessary to describe how archiving transitioned from being an initiative of different individuals to one of volunteer-based communities. Afterward, we discuss in detail the main research problem of this chapter: memory and movement.

In this essay, we discuss how popular music is related to the concept of Indonesia as a nation. Although there is no formal definition of popular music, Weintraub (2010) defines it as being based on the masses. Storey (2003) complements this definition by arguing that popular culture is also the people’s dynamic culture and operates beyond mainstream or official cultures. Centralization during the periods of the Old and New Orders allowed the central government to determine all regulations, whereas the decentralization that occurred after the Reformation encouraged a range of individual and nongovernmental institutional initiatives. We will elaborate on this later in the chapter.

For this study, we focused on four initiatives to archive popular music in Indonesia: namely, Irama Nusantara, Arsip Jazz Indonesia, Lokananta Project, and Museum Musik Indonesia. We discuss how the founders of these initiatives are attempting to preserve the material past of popular music in Indonesia and change notions of the country's cultural heritage. To achieve this, we conducted semi-structured ethnographic interviews with the founders of each initiative and direct observations of some of their activities to better understanding of the challenges as well as benefits of archiving. Flinn (2007) put forward the concept of a community archive that subsequent researchers came to use (see Baker, 2015; Baker & Huber, 2013; Collins & Carter, 2015; Brandellero et al., 2015) and that served as the basis for this research.

It is important to mention that the aims and objectives, subject matter, and approaches of the Indonesian popular music archiving initiatives are at times different from those of the community archives. For this reason, we also explored DIY heritage preservation (Baker, 2015) and activist archivism (Collins & Carter, 2015). Of the four initiatives we observed, only Museum Musik Indonesia owns physical archives that the public can easily access. Arsip Jazz Indonesia is working on completing its collection, and Irama Nusantara has uploaded its archived files for public dissemination. Lokananta Project also assisted Lokananta Studio in uploading record archives to the studio's official website for ease of access to the public as well as in publishing books from their archives. First, we describe the historical contexts of the four initiatives to archive Indonesian popular music. Then, we explore how each community uses popular music heritage practices and strategies to create publicly accessible popular music archives without violating HAKI regulations.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF POPULAR MUSIC INDONESIA

Because of regulations imposed on popular music in Indonesia, this discussion must be preceded by a description of the historical contexts in which popular music was related to the affirmation of power in the past. Ibrahim (2017) explain how factors such as power in the ideology of the Guided Democracy during the Old Order, in concert with the power of Lekra and the incarceration of Koes Plus, can be understood as attempts to sustain power. During that time, Soekarno propagated anti-Western discourses in order to ban Western culture (such as popular music) in Indonesia. This propaganda affected Koes Plus, Lilis Suryani, and Titik Puspa, who, according to Soekarno, were influenced by the West.

Considered to be mimicking Western culture, their music was believed to potentially ignite revolution in Indonesian youth. Long hair (*gondrong*) was even prohibited in schools because it was deemed Western.

Soeharto's New Order regime applied the opposite form of power. Maintaining close ties with America, the regime encouraged all things American. Cinemas showed Hollywood movies, and Western investments facilitated the development of Indonesian popular culture; local film and music were heavily influenced by their Western counterparts. In examining the Westernization of Indonesia, it is necessary to take into account Pasaribu (2005), who posited that Western music had actually arrived in Indonesia earlier than the twentieth century with the arrival of the Dutch. Pasaribu (2005) found that before the Dutch, the Portuguese and Spaniards had also brought Western music to Indonesia, ranging from church hymns to dance music. However, during the New Order, popular music was a medium for propagating the new ideology. Long hair mimicking American celebrities was allowed, and Koes Plus even released three Nusantara albums at the request of President Soeharto.

Dangdut was not allowed to be broadcasted on televisions until the 1970s, when the music of Oma Irama was played on TVRI, the government's official TV channel; this was a turning point for *dangdut*, which began to enter the mainstream culture. However, it is also important to note that, as Weintraub (2010) explained, Oma Irama was originally a member of a rock band that believed *dangdut* to be overly sentimental and similar to Malay music, and therefore, he modified it by adding Western instruments. It was no surprise when Oma Irama became famous for his Elvis-like rock star costumes and sideburns. His appearance on TVRI demonstrated the significant power of the genre.

In the 1980s, music shows such as *Aneka Ria Safari* were broadcasted by the Ministry of Communication under Ali Moertopo. Originally established by the government in 1962 to welcome the Asian Games, TVRI served as an entertainment channel and the government's tool for disseminating propaganda. The Ministry of Communication directly managed TVRI's content (Al-Rasyid, 2010; Rachma, 2018). Originating from a concern over the development of Indonesian music, Eddy Sud's "Artis Safari," which gathered notable celebrities, transformed into a propaganda tool for the Golkar Party. Celebrities who appeared on the program, such as Ari Wibowo, Chicha Koeswojo, and Meriem Bellina, were obliged to take part in the Golkar Party's campaign safari. The New Order government filtered celebrities not by their genre or singing capability but by

their support for the regime's ideology and philosophy. In brief, Soekarno's and Soeharto's governments utilized Indonesian popular music to spread their political ideologies.

During the Reform Era, regulations on certain types of music were loosened. Jokowi had declared that, in general, popular culture was good for Indonesia's economy, and under the banner of creative industry, various popular culture products such as movies, comics, and music became lucrative investments. To manage and support this creative industry, Bekraf (the Creative Economy Agency) was established.

Led by Triawan Munaf, Bekraf was not only mandated to develop the creative industry in terms of media but also encouraged different art exhibitions such as Inacraft, the creation of regional souvenirs, and the development of Indonesian coffee as profitable commodities. Bekraf aimed to create a cultural repository to support various archiving activities. The founders of two initiatives, Irama Nusantara and Lokananta Project, cooperated with Bekraf to open the archives of RRI (the government's radio station, established in 1945) and those of Lokananta (publisher of the vinyl records played in RRI's broadcasts). The studio was established in 1950, and Bekraf later became the largest producer of vinyl records in the country.

Numerous events have reminded Jokowi's government of the importance of archiving Indonesian popular music. For instance, when Malaysia claimed the song "Rasa Sayange" as its cultural heritage, Jero Wacik of the Ministry of Tourism issued an official statement to the government of Malaysia to desist, and the feud would have lingered had the government of Indonesia not found a compilation of Indonesian songs composed for the 1962 Asian Games in Studio Lokananta's collection of vinyl recordings. Among the recordings was "Rasa Sayange." Such incidents encouraged the government to create a repository of cultural artifacts including Indonesian popular culture. Although Jokowi's government does not exactly limit or manipulate music as the Old and New Order governments did, the development of the creative industry has transformed music into a commodity.

CONCEPTS OF POPULAR MUSIC HERITAGE PRACTICE

Analyzing popular music archiving initiatives in Indonesia revealed that their activities were related to concepts put forward by researchers outside Indonesia. However, the earlier researchers also presented the various

obstacles that usually confront such initiatives, which gave us a much better understanding of the function and role of the popular music archiving initiatives that we researched, as well as the challenges they face.

Flinn (2007) described community archiving as “the grassroots activities of documenting, recording, and exploring community heritage in which community participation, control and ownership of the project is essential” (p. 153). The word “community” itself has a broad meaning, but Flinn describes a community as “a group who define *themselves* on the basis of locality, culture, faith, background or other shared identity or interest” (p. 153; emphasis in original). The community of archivists Flinn identified focused on documenting minority or marginalized communities in response to the failure of mainstream heritage narratives and collections to feature and actively represent their histories, stories, and knowledge (Flinn et al., 2009).

Baker (2015) referred to DIY archiving activities as “a group of popular music archives, museums and halls of fame that were founded by enthusiasts run largely by volunteers and which exist outside the frame of authorized projects of national collecting and display” (p. 4). With activities and functions running parallel to those of formal archiving institutions, these initiatives created physical spaces for volunteers to learn skills “along the way as they work to collect, preserve and make public artifacts related to popular music culture” (Baker & Huber, 2013, p. 513).

Collins and Carter (2015) introduced the term “activist archivism” to describe carrying out archiving activities as “an intended political response to the limitations of formal archives maintained by media institutions and traditional gatekeepers of cultural heritage where specific content is often ignored or excluded for a variety of cultural and economic reasons” (p. 126). Admittedly, there are many differences between community archives and the concept of activist archivism. However, they share two fundamental similarities.

First, “there is an underlying distrust of official fan archives and a desire by creators of community archives to maintain autonomy” (Collins & Carter, 2015, p. 129). Second, both are “motivated by the failure of mainstream heritage narratives and collections to reflect and actively represent their histories, stories and knowledge” (Collins & Carter, 2015, p. 130). Concerning the difference between activist archivism and DIY institutions, Collins and Carter (2015) emphasized the understanding of fan as a collector, as used by Baker (2015) to represent private versus public activities. They aptly described the fundamental activity “as a community

activity, one that relies on the collective efforts of a group of like-minded people, who strive to make available the material objects of popular culture for consumption” (Collins & Carter, 2015, p. 128). Another fundamental difference is the preference of those involved in activist archivism to upload their collected data for convenient online access by the public.

MAKING HISTORY ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC

As we have introduced, within the context of archiving cultural artifacts, four grassroots initiatives have emerged to preserve Indonesia’s popular music. Despite some significant differences in their individual activities, processes, and outputs, the founders of these archiving initiatives, Arsip Jazz Indonesia, Irama Nusantara, Lokananta Project, and Museum Musik Indonesia, share an understanding of the importance of their content to society.

None of the individuals involved in these initiatives has formal skills in heritage practices. However, all share a strong curatorial influence driven by founders acting as gatekeepers with clearly stated aims based on their personal backgrounds (Brandellero et al., 2015) to make their history accessible “on their own terms” (Flinn et al., 2009, p. 73). That is, these DIY archives are heavily influenced by their founders.

Chrisyaura Qotrunadha, who sparked Lokananta Project in November 2014, was very much concerned with the condition of Studio Lokananta’s archive. She considers it necessary to document the studio’s history to ensure that it is not forgotten by Indonesian society. In an attempt to remind the public of the importance of Studio Lokananta in maintaining the history of Indonesian popular music, Qotrunadha gathered her friends from various backgrounds to jointly conduct a study on the archives of Studio Lokananta from the 1950s to 1970s.

From its establishment to the present, Lokananta Project has been an open community that anyone can join to attend discussions and participate in activities. The project has published a compendium on the history of Indonesian popular music from Studio Lokananta’s materials. Lokananta Project also helps promote the studio on social media and meets regularly with Studio Lokana’s public relations department to discuss strategies to raise awareness among young people.

Irama Nusantara was officially established in 2012 with the purpose of widely disseminating information on Indonesian popular music after its founders had grown frustrated with being unable to find popular

recordings or information. That shared experience inspired them to create a way to ensure easy public access to these files. The founders were also aware that the lack of archiving culture in Indonesia meant that physical evidence and documentation of Indonesian music was at risk of disappearing before future generations could know about it.

Irama Nusantara created a website to host archived data as the most effective way to raise “the awareness of the public of the fact that it is of high importance that the public know and is familiar with the Indonesian modern music being a part of the nation’s identity” (Irama Nusantara, n.d.). To date, the group has uploaded more than 1500 Indonesian popular music recordings from the 1950s to the 1970s. Irama Nusantara chose this period deliberately because music recordings from that time have already become more difficult to find and therefore are at risk of being forgotten.

Arsip Jazz Indonesia was established in 2010 as an attempt to fill the gap in the documentation of history of jazz music in Indonesia. In 1999, two Indonesian jazz music collectors, Alfred D. Ticoalu and Roullandi N. Siregar, were the first to propose establishing an Indonesian jazz music archive, and they began collecting recordings and any items related to Indonesian jazz music. They made the materials accessible to the public in 2010 in an archive of materials related to jazz music in the Dutch East Indies and Indonesia beginning in 1900. However, although the materials are publicly accessible, Arsip Jazz Indonesia does not have a permanent physical location. Instead, the materials are held at the founders’ private home and are available on email request to them.

Museum Musik Indonesia has a very different aim. Located in Malang, East Java, Museum Musik Indonesia’s archive consists of recordings and memorabilia donated by the public, and anyone who donates a collection automatically becomes an archive proprietor. The museum is preserving the musical memory of its donors.

The archive established by Museum Musik Indonesia not only includes artifacts related to Indonesian popular music but also includes music recordings, books, and memorabilia from outside Indonesia. Hengki Herwanto, a museum founder and a former music journalist, explains that “Museum Musik Indonesia is aspiring to become a central footprint of all Indonesian music activities as well as all kinds of music that are in existence in Indonesia” (interview, October 15, 2016). The statement clearly indicates that Museum Musik Indonesia aims not only to establish an

Indonesian popular music archive but also to document the entire history of music in Indonesia.

PLACE-MAKING WHILE ARCHIVING

Heritage plays a crucial role in the construction of place, as it connects past experiences to present-day localities (Moore & Pell, 2010). Although popular music heritage in Indonesia remains relatively undefined, the founders of these four archiving initiatives attribute value and meanings to the materials they have memorialized. Thus, the practice of music heritage in Indonesia can be understood according to a context in which personal and collective musical memories are shaped and fixed in time and place.

The expression of unique localities that translate into the promotion of identity through conservation is the manifestation of heritage practice. Museum Musik Indonesia, for example, curated and displayed their archives based on musicians' place of origin. This type of curation is a form of cultural adaptivity, "the selective socially meaningful adjustments and alterations necessary to make something suit a new purpose under changed conditions" (Darvill, 2014, p. 464). Cultural adaptivity humanizes, celebrates, and memorializes music and musicians, thus enabling Museum Musik Indonesia to celebrate Indonesian popular music culture, in general, and Malang's music scene, in particular.

THE PROBLEMS OF CONTINUITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

Although the missions of the initiatives are clear, the members have faced challenges in opening their archives to the public. For instance, the initial objectives of Lokananta Project were to create a digital music library, publish a book on the history and development of Studio Lokananta, and produce compilations of music from the archive, but the project later decided to only publish books after conflicts related to copyrights and royalty sharing.

Arsip Jazz Indonesia and Museum Musik Indonesia also digitized their archives but could not upload them to their websites because of copyright issues. This indicates that "copyright has implications not only for creative choices but also for the kinds of stories documentarians choose to tell" (Larsen & Nærland, 2010, p. 54). Copyright regulations also dictate which stories initiative members can tell in their archives.

Irama Nusantara is the only initiative that grants access to its digitized music files on its website, and in addition to music files, the group plans to upload magazine articles, posters, and other materials. Maintaining this open-access archive of the history of Indonesian music is an act of activist archivism. It is noteworthy, however, that Irama Nusantara has thus far eluded the copyright challenges that other initiative leaders have faced. David Tarigan, a founder, believes that as long as their archive serves educational and not commercial purposes, they will not trigger any copyright challenges.

These DIY archivists operate with very small outside donations, in many cases using their own funds, and their greatest challenge is maintaining the continuity and sustainability of their archives (Baker & Huber, 2013; Flinn et al., 2009). Our own observation also reveals that the founders of the archives play the most important roles in their management, which also makes them vulnerable.

The founders of Museum Musik Indonesia admitted that they had not yet thought about succession planning, and in the event of something happening to the founders, the sustainability and continuity of the museum archive would be seriously threatened because “DIY projects are vulnerable due to their reliance on the efforts of a few key individuals and their appeal to restricted communities of interest” (Baker & Huber, 2013). Arsip Jazz Indonesia is also working through the challenge of continuity planning. Since its establishment, the archive has relied on the founders’ personal funds and has never received assistance from the government or other donors, and the founders perform all archive activities: collecting, documenting, and conducting public relations.

Moreover, the founders of Arsip Jazz Indonesia observed that many Indonesian music collectors are reluctant to share access to their own collections, largely because of a widely known sense of self-importance among Indonesian popular music collectors. The founders of Arsip Jazz Indonesia admit that they are somewhat “crippled” in attempting to add holdings from Indonesian jazz music collectors to their archive. Lokananta Project faces the similar challenge that only the founder has been conducting the management activities, which naturally threatens that project’s continuity as well.

Despite their similar missions of preserving Indonesia’s popular music history and increasing public awareness by sharing the music and making it freely available, the founders of the four initiatives we examined here pursue their missions in different ways. For instance, Irama Nusantara digitizes music recordings and uploads them to its website, whereas

Museum Musik Indonesia is building a physical archive of all things related to popular music with the goal of establishing a museum. The differences between the initiatives highlight the distinct challenges and opportunities in the process of collecting, archiving, preserving, and eventually granting access to the public.

CONCLUSION

This chapter presented four Indonesian community archives of popular music that have contributed to creating and maintaining a better understanding of Indonesian popular music. The communities are demonstrating the desire to preserve, digitize, and exhibit the material culture of Indonesian popular music in response to the lack of reliable references regarding its history.

Centralization during the Old and New Orders caused the archiving of Indonesian popular music to be subjugated under the responsibilities of governmental institutions, such as the National Archives, but the government at the time was unmotivated to preserve popular music outside of the mainstream culture. Under decentralization, current attempts to archive Indonesian popular music can be understood as negotiating popular music's position, which was objectified, manipulated, and utilized by existing authorities according to the ideologies of the time. The existence of Bekraf and its support for the aforementioned negotiation confirms the commodification of popular music by the state. However, we believe that this coexistence has the potential to bring about other initiatives. Parties outside the existing network of power can take advantage of the opportunity to cooperate with Bekraf.

The absence of a formal institution to archive Indonesian popular music meant that communities played a crucial role in archiving these materials through collective memory. Initiatives to archive Indonesian popular music were established because of the founders' personal experiences, thus creating various ways of seeing the past and constructing the history of Indonesian popular music. The result is a variety of meanings, expressions, and media that together influence the collective archive and how it is presented to the public. Moreover, although the relationship between place-making and the historical practice of popular music is complicated and dynamic, it can define the heritage process at a local level brought to life through archives in the context of urban spaces.

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PART III

New Mood, Medium, and Media



Traditional Market as a Public Space: Thomas Karsten's Design for Johar Market in Semarang (1906–1939)

Annisa Maghfira Surendro and Bondan Kanumoyoso

INTRODUCTION

Thomas Karsten, a Dutch architect and urban planner, has been widely discussed in Indonesia's urban history from multiple perspectives: the influence of his designs on the lives of colonial cities and their consistency in calculations and style. He began his career as an architect in Semarang but was later recognized as an urban planner who had significant impacts on the Dutch East Indies urban environment. Karsten envisioned cultural unity between European communities, indigenous people, and other ethnic communities in one colonial society. However, his vision rarely came to fruition in colonial societies, which remained ethnically divided physically and socially.

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In “Ir. Thomas Karsten and Indonesian Town Planning, 1915–1940,” Bogaers and de Ruijter (1986) examined Karsten’s thoughts and contributions to Indonesian colonial urban planning assuming that urban planning, a discipline that was actually developed in the Netherlands, had been discussed very little in the Indies. They presented Karsten as an architect and urban planner who deserved recognition and based their paper on M. J. Granpré Molière’s review of Karsten’s essay entitled “Indiese Stedebouw” (“The Urban Planning of the Indies”). Bogaers and de Ruijter essentially defined Karsten: who he was, his ideas, and how he contributed to the development of urban planning in the Indies.

In addition, Joost Coté began studying Thomas Karsten in 2004. His 2014 article, “Thomas Karsten’s Indonesia,” inspired the research for this chapter. In his article, Coté explains Karsten’s belief in racial integration to create what he expressed in his personal diary as *de eenheid der wereld* (“the united world”), a postcolonial state in which every social class could live harmoniously without racial segregation. Together with Hugh O’Neill, P. K. M. Van Roosmalen, and Helen I. Jessup, Joost Coté also wrote a book titled *The Life and Work of Thomas Karsten* (2017) that became a main reference for the study of Karsten. Coté had obtained authorization from Karsten’s family to analyze his personal diary, which had survived Japanese World War II internment at Camp Baros in Cimahi near Bandung. Karsten died in the camp in 1945.

Karsten’s complex thinking can also be discussed from other perspectives. First, although multiple researchers have examined his vision of a new colonial society without racial segregation, most studied his design for small public housing, which was unavoidable given that he did suggest separating economic classes as a solution to racial segregation in colonial society. With the same purpose in mind, however, he also designed markets.

Architecturally, Karsten’s market design has been widely discussed, but no scholars have examined the relationship between market buildings and his antipathy to racial segregation. Therefore, with this chapter, we attempt to unify these ideas: not only how Karsten’s market design complied with his duties as an architect but also how he attempted to transform markets as urban public spaces. Karsten’s idea was revolutionary at a time when town squares and city parks were regarded as the only public spaces.

The spatial scope of this research was the city of Semarang. Karsten designed three markets in Semarang: Pasar Randusari, Pasar Jatingaleh, and Pasar Johar, which was the central market and the largest of the three.

These markets were part of Karsten's gradual effort to establish markets as public spaces in colonial society. For this study, we analyzed the time period from 1906 to 1939. The market restorations began in 1906 when Semarang became a municipality, and Pasar Johar was completed in 1939.

KARSTEN'S VISION OF COLONIAL ARCHITECTURE

Born in Amsterdam, Thomas Karsten graduated with a degree in architecture engineering from the University of Delft. He soon became well-known for his interests in urban planning; contemporary Dutch policy at the time greatly impacted urban planning in the Netherlands, thus influencing his work. The 1901 Housing Regulations became the first framework for cities in the Netherlands to consider during urban planning. At the time, urban planning as a field of study was part of architectural studies, and as a profession, it was only just emerging. In 1904, Karsten commenced one of his first architectural projects, designing a people's housing project in Amsterdam (Bogaers & de Ruijter, 1986, pp. 72–73). Four years later, he joined the housing division in the *Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging van Democratische Ingenieurs en Architecten* (The Socio-Engineering Association of Democratic Engineers and Architects).

In 1914, he traveled to the Indies to work in his friend Maclaine Pont's architectural firm in Semarang. At that time, European intellectuals were quite concerned about the social conditions in cities in the Indies, such as Semarang. A year later, Pont's health worsened, and he returned to the Netherlands; Karsten then opened his own firm. As an architect, Karsten designed office buildings that still exist today, including *Nederlandsch-Indische Levensverzekerings en Lijfrente Maatschappij* (NILLMIJ; now the office of Jiwasraya), *Stoomvaart Maatschappij Nederland* (now the office of Djakarta Llyod), and *Joanna Stroomtraam Maatschappij* (now the office of PT. KAI Daerah Operasi IV) (Sumalyo, 1993, p. 43).

Karsten's career peaked as he became the urban planning adviser for Semarang upon his return to the city. In 1916, the government appointed Karsten to design Semarang's expansion to the southern hills into the Candi Baru region. During the 1920s and 1930s, Karsten worked as an urban planning adviser for municipalities in Java (Semarang, Bandung, Batavia, Magelang, Malang, Bogor, Madiun, Cirebon, Meester Cornelis (Jatinegara), Yogyakarta, and Surakarta), three municipalities in Sumatra (Palembang, Padang, and Medan) and one in Kalimantan (Banjarmasin). He also contributed ideas for the order of economic space, especially for

market improvement and development, and his ideas were implemented in three markets in Semarang, namely, Pasar Djatingaleh (1930), Pasar Randusari (1932), and Pasar Johar (1933). From an architectural design perspective, these markets were similar.

In the 1920s, Karsten and two other famous architects in the Dutch East Indies, Maclaine Pont and Wolff-Schoemaker, shared their thoughts on defining “Indies architecture.” Karsten and Pont believed that traditional architecture could become the foundation for Indies architecture, but Wolff-Schoemaker held the opposite view, and the differences stemmed from the architects’ different backgrounds. Karsten was born and raised in the Netherlands but migrated to Java and declared the Dutch East Indies his homeland. Pont was born in Batavia into a family who had been in the Dutch East Indies for five generations, and similar to Karsten, he spent his childhood and early education in the Netherlands. Wolff-Schoemaker, however, had been born in Java and educated at a military academy in the Netherlands and had returned to the Dutch East Indies as an architect with the Department of General Affairs.

The discussion began with Karsten’s agreement with P. A. J. Moojen, who stated that the quality of architecture in the Dutch East Indies improved with the arrival of architects from Europe. Despite his agreement, Karsten also criticized the idea; he did not believe all European architects produced better work. In fact, Karsten believed that the Dutch East Indies had already been demonstrating independent architecture, and Karsten’s use of the word “independent” was indeed progressive: Karsten was declaring that the architecture of the Dutch East Indies had already developed in a radically different direction from what was happening in the Netherlands, and the arrival of European architects had no significant impact on Indies architecture.

Karsten believed that the key element of achieving good Indies architecture was unifying souls, particularly the souls of the East and the West. Domination of one over the other would jeopardize this unity, and in a colonial society, domination is reflected in race-based segregation. Karsten believed that colonial domination would weaken because the colonial society was gradually heading toward unity. Karsten stated that “to achieve the best solution based on wider perspective for issues related to domestic housing, educated Indonesian architects would be required” (de Vletter, 2009, p. 148).

Karsten’s views on Indies architecture were different from those of Pont and Wolff-Schoemaker. According to Pont, traditional architectural

style could be a panacea in the search for Indies architectural style, a conclusion he arrived at after studying the architecture of native houses and buildings, which utilized local materials; the buildings Pont designed followed the standards of hygiene and architectural taste of Europeans living in the Dutch East Indies. Wolff-Schoemaker, in contrast, based his views on technical approaches. He had little interest in incorporating traditional architecture into his works because he believed traditional architecture could not serve as a foundation for modern architecture. Wolff-Schoemaker also contended that traditional architecture had not significantly contributed to the general development of architecture in the Dutch East Indies.

These three perspectives were embodied in different architectural styles. Holding on to modern views, Wolff-Schoemaker designed in the style of Art Deco, which he believed would create an atmosphere of a modern city (Hadinoto, 2012, pp. 68–74). Meanwhile, Pont saw potential in traditional architecture; even though it was grounded in local wisdom and materials, Pont believed that the wisdom of Western architecture could enrich traditional architecture to satisfy high standards. Meanwhile, Karsten dreamed of a “united world” and sought to achieve a balance between traditional architecture’s spirituality and Western architecture’s technicality. Motivated to combine and balance Eastern and Western architectural styles, Karsten developed a unique approach to his work.

Karsten’s idea of a united world and its relation to Indies architecture was reflected in his desire to create an architectural style that could be accepted by all people in the Dutch East Indies. This notion mirrored his political support for collectivism (Nas, 2007, p. 151). Architecture should be placed in the context of city planning, and Karsten understood cities as organic unities in which all differences and unrelated aspects must be unified and harmonized; this meant that every tendency to interrupt harmony should be repressed.

Therefore, Karsten highly recommended integrating traditional Dutch architecture into Indies architecture. Here Karsten’s views on a united world become questionable: Either his views are revolutionary, or he merely aims to achieve harmony by repressing differences. Karsten’s emphasis on the unity between traditional aspects and the modern, Western world was apparently the reason he did not garner more than lukewarm acceptance during Indonesia’s national movement.

BECOMING AN URBAN PLANNER

Karsten conveyed his ideas in professional organizations such as *Vereeniging voor Lokale Belangen* (Association of Local Areas) and *Planatologische Studiegroep* (Planology Study Group). From 1919 to 1925, Karsten refrained from engaging in professional topics because he had a broader cultural agenda. For one, he published a weekly journal titled *De Taak* (*Task*) in 1917. *De Taak* contributors were intellectuals of various ethnicities who wrote about important elements of indigenous traditions, especially in Java, that were to be maintained and modernized. *De Taak* was dedicated to analyzing various aspects of Javanese culture: architecture, music, arts and crafts, and lifestyle in general. The word “task” was emphasized not specifically to incorporate Western ideas but rather to prepare Javanese society to develop a modern way of thinking.

Although *De Taak* paid great attention to Javanese culture, its editorial group declared, “There has not been the slightest chance at this time that the Javanese can determine such development, not even their intellectuals.” However, Karsten believed that the Javanese could eventually lead their own society, and he positioned himself as a European who would help the Javanese modernize. Karsten considered that the Europeans’ task was to provide the leadership the Javanese needed in the modern world (Coté, 2014, pp. 70–71).

Based on Karsten’s many works in architecture, urban planning, and social critique, the government recognized him as an architectural and urban planning expert. In 1930, he was appointed a member of the *Bouwbeperkingscommissie* (Commission on Urban Reform). This commission then generated *Stadsvormingsordonnantie* (Urban Planning Ordinance), a national urban planning regulation implemented in 1938 (Rahardjo, 2013, p. 7).

However, Karsten was still considered too radical and critical; his criticisms were appearing in discussions, papers, and essays, and he had always opposed the colonial rule of separation by race. He thought that if housing were divided by economic strata, based on his vision of one colonial society, unifying Eastern and Western cultures could form a new colonial society such as that in America (Coté, 2014, p. 80). One result of his views was that his appointment as professor at the *Technische Hoogeschool* Bandung was postponed until the early 1940s.

Karsten’s principles made a great mark in design for urban planning. His focus was always providing housing and public spaces to support

establishing the *stedelijke middenstand*, the urban middle-class population of Java (Coté, 2014, p. 74). To unite colonial society, Karsten realized that the Javanese community had to grow intellectually but without removing its cultural roots, and as an urban planner, he had the means to support this objective. For Karsten, designing public spaces and neighborhoods together was similar to providing a physical framework for modern living in urban communities. At the 1925 *Volkhuusvestingcongress* (Congress of Housing), he encouraged his fellow architects and urban planners to learn the rhythm of Javanese people's daily lives in order to create a modern Javanese community.

To establish the structure of the city's economic sector, Karsten recognized the importance of the marketplace, believing it important to society's welfare. However, he saw that markets could appear slum-like, and therefore, some rules for the city's aesthetics were needed (Karsten, 1938, p. 77). Karsten's awareness of buildings' appearance and function encouraged him to design efficient markets with a unique character, but he also believed that from a social perspective, a building's design should mesh with its surrounding environment and that development should not eliminate its people's historical elements. Further, he believed that an urban planner should observe a society's character rather than considering only technical issues related to economics and cleanliness, and an example of this was his desire to create a market for the indigenous community (Karsten, 1919, p. 299).

Karsten's personal life was well established in Indonesia. He married an indigenous woman named Soembinah in 1921, a woman who had European blood from her father. Specifically, Karsten's wife's grandfather was Heinrich Wieland, a retired Swiss soldier who settled in Wonosobo, and her father was Mangoenredjo, a village head in the Dieng Mountain area. Karsten has a great appreciation for Indonesian women. A common practice during that time was for Dutch men to have concubines or *nyai*, but very few Dutch men married indigenous women, but Karsten had a different understanding with local indigenous women.

Karsten married Soembinah and encouraged her to learn Dutch and socialize with European women. She played a significant role in Karsten's life, such as accompanying him on a trip to Europe in 1930. Together, Karsten and Soembinah had four children, one of whom followed in Karsten's footsteps as an architect. According to their son Simon, it was necessary to understand two main things in order to understand Karsten's

ideas: his love for the homeland and his high appreciation of Soeaminah (Rahardjo, 2013, p. 7).

Ironically, radical nationalist groups considered Karsten too cooperative with the government; his concept of colonial society's unification contradicted the groups' concept of independence. According to Karsten, Indonesia's independence did not need to be achieved by revolution but could be achieved through education. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Indonesia occupied a very special place in his heart. Shortly before he died in the Japanese detention camp in Cimahi, Karsten asked his doctor to record the following in his diary as his last words: "*Indonesia bermoelialah, Indonesia bersatoelah*" ("Indonesia be noble, Indonesia be united") (Rahardjo, 2013, p. 7).

MARKETS IN SEMARANG IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was a request for self-governance from people outside Batavia who felt neglected by the central government. After much consideration and discussion, in 1905, the central government officially imposed *Decentralisatie Wet*, or the Decentralization Act. This law granted autonomy to regions that met the requirements of municipal status, and Semarang was one of them. On April 1, 1906, Semarang received municipal status from the central government of the Dutch Netherlands Indies.

However, this change was implemented in stages. It took about 4 years for the city to establish a treasury and about 10 years for it to establish such governmental apparatus as a mayor. However, this did not prevent Semarang's municipal council from conducting its duties. Indeed, the council's main intention was urban planning, and its earliest policy was to expand the city to the southern hills.

The municipal council also took over the markets to improve the economy of the city's spatial structure; the council realized that the market was the key factor in regulating economic space. Good market planning could concentrate the urban community's "buying and selling activities so it would not disrupt other life sectors" (Wertheim, 1958, p. 31). In fact, the municipality had attempted to implement urban market planning long before Karsten arrived in Semarang.

On November 9, 1885, *Staatsblad* No. 72 stated that under local leaders' supervision, residents, or users, should keep their markets clean. Following this, the resident (mayor) of Semarang issued stricter market regulations, so a cleaning system was established by collecting one cent per day from each seller (Regulation of sanitation and market order in Semarang Residence, 1899). However, the government failed to collect enough money to build an effective market sanitation system.

After becoming a municipality, Semarang took over markets as part of its efforts to manage the city's health, especially its sewage and waste disposal, but at that time, the city was still experiencing financial constraints, and many markets were still built on private lands. In 1907, the municipal government officially included market management in its budget, allocating 14,400 gulden annually to this priority. In 1910, the government replaced the one-cent collection system with official taxes that did not burden sellers and that clarified how funds would be allocated. The water and electricity company, which provided the most revenue for Semarang City, could cover budget shortfall (*Gedenkboek der Gemeente Semarang 1906–1931*, 1931, p. 35).

Until 1910, the municipal government did not have the right to gain benefit from markets. Municipal revenues were derived from merchants' rents on the venues and were incorporated into budgets for the markets' maintenance. The municipal government also implemented a system to support sellers' welfare. The rental rates ranged from 1 cent/m² per day to 10 cents/m² per day, among the cheapest compared with other municipalities, and Semarang also provided *Pasar-creditwezen* (market loans), a special loan program that prevented sellers from becoming indebted to moneylenders. This market loan carried 6% interest, with a weekly installment payment plan (Baldinger, 1938, pp. 48–53).

By 1910, Semarang had taken over eight markets: Pasar Pedamaran Lor, Pasar Pedamaran Tengah, Pasar Pedamaran Kidul, Pasar Ambengan, Pasar Beteng, Pasar Djurnatan, Pasar Karang Bidara, and Pasar Peterongan. The municipality quickly took over other markets after Stbl. No. 379, 1914, which regulated economic activities as part of the local municipality's responsibility, including markets as a key economic activity. In 1917, the city government of Semarang officially took over Pasar Johar. Following this takeover, Semarang's government established system improvements. Approximately 25 years later, the number of markets taken over had increased to 16.

The concept of the central market first emerged at that time. The municipality developed an ideal concept for a clean, neat market comprising five parts: (1) air and light flow; (2) ease of clearance after markets close; (3) protection of sellers and buyers from rain and direct sunlight; (4) good organization; and (5) easy access with distinct divisions. Thus, market design had begun, and this ideal market was eventually built on the site of a former prison.

KARSTEN'S DESIGN FOR PASAR JOHAR

Before building Pasar Johar, Semarang owned a city prison located in front of the old square in the northern part. *Johar* (mahogany) trees surrounded the prison, providing a shady area for visitors, and then, some peddlers began selling commodities in the area. By 1865, increasing numbers of traders had turned parts of the square into a market that residents called Pasar Johar, after the *johar* trees.

One factor that influenced Pasar Johar's rapid development was the density of Pasar Pedamaran; this market was 7000 m² and could not be expanded any farther because of the surrounding settlements, but the growing number of sellers raised the need for new land. By 1890, the Pasar Johar area greatly resembled Pasar Pedamaran, and by the time of an 1898 government inspection of Pasar Johar, some 240 sellers owned permanent places for selling their commodities (Liem, 2004, p. 176).

In response to this crowding, Pasar Johar was rebuilt and merged with Pasar Pedamaran, and it was expanded more when the prison was moved to another location to incorporate new lands that had been purchased from Chinese residents. The market area also expanded into some parts of the square and the city park. The government aimed to merge other small markets, such as Pasar Benteng, Pasar Jurnatan, and Pasar Pekojan, into one centralized market, the central market. Until 1930, Semarang had 13 markets, and its total market area increased from only 13,000 m² to 56,000 m² (Gedenkboek der Gemeente Semarang 1906–1931, 1931, p. 291).

In 1931, as the first step in expanding Pasar Johar, the government destroyed the old prison building and developed Pasar Jatingaleh in the south in the same year while Pasar Randusari was still under construction. These two markets were the first concrete markets that Karsten designed, and they incorporated the five market elements listed above. In addition, commodities in these two markets were arranged in a particular order.

After obtaining the government's trust, Karsten was appointed to design the central market, which the city government hoped would centralize urban economic activity. The government selected Pasar Johar, a combination of five old markets, to be the central market because of its strategic location. Conversely, the old markets—Pasar Johar, Pasar Pedamaran, Pasar Beteng, Pasar Jurnatan, and Pasar Pekojan—had been seedy and located downtown, Pasar Johar was designed with four blocks of buildings and eight-meter-wide hallways as connectors.

Karsten completed his first design in 1933. It was similar to Pasar Jatingaleh but much larger, and the design itself was intended to accelerate construction. Even so, in the following years, the design was revised. In the early 1930s, the Great Depression had delayed work because of unstable prices for building materials, but in mid-1937, private investors tendered an offer to continue the market's development with some adjustments in design. However, the adjustment was using about 2.8 tons more teak as column buffers; although it would cost less, it risked termite attack. Therefore, Karsten refined his design, and his final design in mid-1937 used more steel even though it was more expensive.

Among the prominent changes at Pasar Johar from the design of Pasar Jatingaleh were that the columns were taller and slimmer and that there was now a second floor on the Pasar Johar building's side. Unfortunately, Karsten's design for Pasar Randusari could not be located, but field observations lead to the conclusion that Pasar Randusari was Karsten's initial design, prior to Pasar Jatingaleh and Pasar Johar. Evidence is the absence of a design for shops on Pasar Randusari's outermost areas, which Pasar Johar has. Multilevel roofs support air and light circulation in both Pasar Jatingaleh and Pasar Randusari, but Pasar Johar does not have a multilevel roof. However, all three markets have terraced floors to facilitate traders' sales of their commodities.

Karsten remarked that because of spatial limitations, the land should be used to its maximum; because there was no available open land near Pasar Johar, market space needed to be maximized with multilevel development. However, the second floor should not fully cover the ground floor, and Karsten ensured that it would not block the light or hinder air circulation; rather, the second floor would only cover the market's outermost shops. In fact, the market's outer shops maximized space and served as dividers so that traders would not sell their commodities outside the market. For Pasar Johar, we can imagine a two-story building with a large open space resembling an atrium and making a grand impression.

The design characteristic that made Pasar Johar unique was its octagonal columns with a mushroom shape, that is, widening at the top. The mushroom design had been incorporated at Pasar Randusari and Pasar Jatingaleh, but the columns of Pasar Johar were higher and thinner; they seemed to enlarge the space because they did not require large blocks to support the roof. A person who looked up would see that the ceiling alternated between the mushroom columns and also-octagonal air and light circulation holes. The columns and holes stretched from end to end, so that without partitions, the entire surface beneath the roof received full light and air. There were no dark, musty rooms, and good lighting prevented rat and cockroach infestation. However, some feared that as a result of hundreds of years of sediment, the texture of Semarang's soil could not support those columns. To prevent soil erosion, Karsten used drains to strengthen each column and covered the floor with andesite stone, which looked clean and could be easily cleaned.

Compared with other markets in the same era, inter-ethnic interactions were fairly tense inside Pasar Johar, partly because Karsten maintained the floors' terraced design. Until that time, most traditional markets maintained the strong local character of traders sitting on the floor while buyers, who had higher status, stood, but Karsten encouraged a united colonial society inside the market without racial segregation; he designed the booths so that traders sitting on the floor were higher than the aisles of standing buyers. After overcoming various obstacles, the market opened in 1939 and was fairly successful. For the first decade after its completion, Pasar Johar was considered the grandest market in Southeast Asia.

CONCLUSION

Through Thomas Karsten's design talents, which were ahead of his time, Semarang succeeded in improving its markets' physical facilities and management. He offered the market as an urban public space, that is, a place where people of different races and ethnicities could participate in economic activities. He lived in an era when urban planning issues were greatly discussed in Europe. After being involved in various projects and organizations, Karsten decided to work in Semarang, where he developed his career as a prominent architect and urban planning expert in the Dutch Netherlands Indies. He designed buildings, worked in urban planning, and was often involved in discussions on housing issues.

Karsten had a vision that he called a united world, which became the basis of all his concepts and designs for urban planning and architecture. Joost Coté published a comprehensive paper on how Karsten was inspired by various other scientific fields, such as psychology. When Karsten visited America, he witnessed an example of the unification he wanted to establish in the Dutch Netherlands Indies. Whether Karsten was aware of the ethnic issues in America remains unclear; most likely, he perceived ethnic unity in America only from a housing perspective.

In addition, Karsten wrote his thoughts in the weekly journal *De Taak*, which published the writings of many intellectuals of various ethnicities. He believed that the European community had a duty to scientifically promote Javanese society's way of thinking without quashing traditional values, and he considered this a step toward modernization. However, that he did not consider the Javanese people's level of education seems likely; surely local wisdom for urban planning exists, but so far, we have not identified it. Meanwhile, Karsten maintained important traditional elements in his architecture that are less visible in Pasar Johar's design but can be observed in the Sobokarti Theater in Semarang.

Karsten's career peaked when he was appointed a member of the Urban Planning Ordinance in 1938. He played a major role in the organization, drafting the concept and rules of Indonesian national urban planning. Although Karsten worked hand in hand with the government, he was able to express his antisegregation vision; he envisioned a housing system based on economic class division. Unfortunately, however, economic class division still manifested according to ethnic categories; most of the middle and upper classes were European or Chinese. Even so, his efforts were not in vain: Karsten's work introduced sanitation and health in markets and several lower-class settlements.

Before Karsten arrived, the Semarang municipal government had issued various policies on sanitation and market-space management that had come to fruition earlier and were more advanced than in other municipalities. Under those circumstances, Karsten had ample room to realize his vision because the government's rules for markets supported his designs. Semarang provided the technical support Karsten needed, not only financial but also by opening the city square and park for the purpose of a new market. With this support, Karsten designed three markets for Semarang: Pasar Randusari, Pasar Jatingaleh, and Pasar Johar.

It is likely that Karsten designed Pasar Randusari earlier than Pasar Jatingaleh, even though Pasar Jatingaleh was completed one year earlier.

This is evidenced by an absence of shop designs on Pasar Randusari's outer sides and the fact that its pillars were shorter and wider than those of Jatingaleh. In contrast, Pasar Johar's mushroom-shaped pillars looked slim and towering, becoming one of its trademarks. Another development was the roof shape; Pasar Randusari and Pasar Jatingaleh had multilevel roofs to support air circulation but Pasar Johar did not. Instead, the market's height allowed good air circulation because ventilation holes had been refined based on a newer design. Another one of Pasar Johar's key characteristics was the outer side's second floor, which provided a grand impression of the open space in the middle of the building.

At this point, the principle of unification had been realized, as Karsten used Western architecture for a traditional Javanese market. The manifestation of his desire to eliminate racial segregation began with Pasar Randusari, where Karsten elevated sellers; trading became easier because sellers sitting on high floors could interact face to face with buyers. However, Karsten did not eliminate traditional elements when designing a modern store in which the seller sat in a chair or stood behind a counter. Thus, he successfully designed a space of equality without changing existing cultural structures.

Unfortunately, by 1990, only 50 years after this clean, forward-looking design was completed, the Adipura team named Pasar Johar the dirtiest market in Indonesia. Moreover, in 2015, the market caught fire, and its revitalization remains unclear. However, Pasar Johar is worthy of being designated a cultural heritage site, at least partially because the history of its development process demonstrates that history is not black and white. Karsten's market design illustrates that some Dutch colonials were truly concerned about indigenous people's welfare. Indeed, his concept of unification contradicted the concept of independence. However, with his last words, he expressed the inevitability of Indonesian independence: "*Indonesia bermoelialah, Indonesia bersatoelah.*"

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CHAPTER 11

Representation of *Mooi Indie* in Nature-Based Tourism: Development of Tourism in Bandung from 1925 to 1941

*Esti Indah Puji Lestari, Tri Wahyuning Mudaryanti,
and R. Tuty Nur Mutia Enoch Muas*

INTRODUCTION

The history of tourism in Indonesia has yet to be studied extensively. According to Sunjayadi (2007), this is because of the assumption that tourism in Indonesia has only grown since the 1970s, which neglects the history of colonial tourism (p. xv). Yet, when examined more deeply, the activities that led to the development of tourism were found in colonial society.

In his book *Vereeniging Toeristen Verkeer Batavia (1908–1942): Awal Turisme Modern di Hindia Belanda*, Sunjayadi (2007) explains that the term “tourism” began to be used and became popular in the Western world in the nineteenth century (pp. xv–xvi). Tourism is understood as a

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journey away from home over a relatively short time, and the money spent on tourism destinations emanates from home, not from the visiting location. The concept of tourism is divided into two categories, namely, pre-modern (colonial) and modern. Forms of premodern tourism can be seen in the journey patterns in Java pre-twentieth century by priests, merchants, clerks, and explorers, such as Junghuhn, a Dutch botanist who traveled to explore unspoiled places. Modern tourism, however, involves guidebooks, attractions, accommodation facilities, transportation, and the presence of tourist groups with prearranged activities.

James Spillane, in his book entitled *Indonesian Tourism: Economic Strategy and Engineering Culture (1994)*, states that it is critical to consider five important elements when planning and developing a tourist destination: (1) attractions because usually tourists are attracted to a destination because of a particular characteristic; (2) facilities such as restaurants, hotels, parks, theaters, and cinemas because these tend to support the growth of destinations; (3) infrastructure, namely, all construction both under and above ground; (4) transportation, including complete information about facilities, terminal locations, local transportation services at the destination, etc., all of which must be available before travelers arrive; and (5) hospitality, which should guarantee the safety and comfort of the tourists.

Images of tourism in Indonesia during the colonial period depicted mountains, paddy fields, beaches, or its exoticized inhabitants conducting their daily activities; this genre of images became known as *Mooi Indie* (“the beautiful Dutch East Indies”). Distributed through postcards, information about Indonesia spoke to its natural beauty, villages, and indigenous people’s lives, and paintings of *Mooi Indie* featured three basic elements (*Trimurti*) that are commonly found: paddy fields, mountains, and trees (Burhan, 2008). *Mooi Indie*’s depiction of Indonesia’s natural beauty at the time served as a tool for promoting tourism that later informed the colonial government’s attempts at constructing the Dutch East Indies as an exotic as well as profitable territory (Lombard, 2000).

Unconsciously, *Mooi Indie* became important for Dutch colonialism. As the dynamic enter of society, villages became significant political bases at the time. In fact, the Dutch understood sociopolitical landscapes in Java through the framework of villages (*desa*) (Ongkhokham, 2009, p. 164).

It is interesting to note that *Mooi Indie* illustrates village dynamics, along with their conflicts and restlessness, in romantic, quiet, peaceful

frameworks. These beautiful depictions of a colonized country are the foundational trope of *Mooi Indie*. The genre is rooted in romanticism, a school of thought that predominated in Europe during the Dutch colonial era in the Indies. Through *Mooi Indie*, European scholars desired to create an exotic and imaginable East. According to Onghokham (2009), the *Mooi Indie* art school preserved and froze these conditions, comprehensively converging with projects of colonialism.

Raden Saleh, famous for his painting of animals locked in combat, created some of the early visual manifestations of *Mooi Indie*; his renowned painting *The Arrest of Prince Dipanegara*, in which the prince is depicted wearing a Middle Eastern outfit, is characteristic. The outfit is a signifier that *Mooi Indie* is a form of orientalism with a dimension of internationality. The Middle/Near East is the part of Asia that first came into contact with the Western world, and Indians and Indonesians are often depicted wearing Middle Eastern clothes (Onghokham, 2009, p. 165).

Along with the development of Bandung came *Bandoeng Vooruit*, an organization that aimed to take care of social interests and matters related to the development of the city of Bandung; originating as a social organization, *Bandoeng Vooruit* transformed into a self-sufficient tourism development organization for Bandung. In this chapter, we discuss the role of *Bandoeng Vooruit* in how modern tourism developed in Bandung in the early twentieth century. In the process, we will demonstrate that tourism has been active in Indonesia since the colonial period and was especially so in the early twentieth century. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the role of *Bandoeng Vooruit* in the development of tourism in Bandung, especially modern tourism from 1925 to 1941, as well as to provide an overview of the history of tourism in Bandung and Indonesia in general.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN TOURISM IN BANDUNG

This research is not the only study of the history of *Bandoeng Vooruit* in Indonesia. Anton Solihin wrote a thesis entitled *Bandung Vooruit: Lahir dan Peranannya dalam Pengembangan Kepariwisata di Bandung dan Sekitarnya (1925–1942)* in which he discusses the history of *Bandoeng Vooruit*. What our research adds is that we discuss the transition of tourism activities in Bandung and the influence of *Bandoeng Vooruit* in that transition; we also discuss the promotion of *Bandoeng Vooruit* through various media channels. We discuss not only the dynamics of *Bandoeng Vooruit*

from its formation but also its eventual role in developing tourism in Bandung, and we also examine how previous researchers have generally represented *Mooi Indie* in tourism (Hardjasaputra, 2002; Reitsma, 1892; Solihin, 1994; Sunjayadi, 2007).

For this study, our primary sources were the monthly magazine *Mooi Bandoeng*, published by *Bandoeng Vooruit*, and guidebooks (*wandelgids*); secondary sources included books, theses, dissertations, and papers discussing the history of tourism. The books include Reitsma's *Bandoeng: The Mountain City of Netherlands India*, in which she discusses the development of Bandung as a mountain city since the nineteenth century; Hardjasaputra's *Perubahan Sosial di Bandung 1810–1906*, which discusses the social dynamics of the city of Bandung from the nineteenth to the early twentieth century; and Sunjayadi's *Vereeniging Toeristen Verkeer Batavia (1908–1942): Awal Turisme Modern di Hindia Belanda* deals with *Vereeniging Toeristenverkeer*, a tourism association and semi-government organization that became a tool for monitoring and organizing tourism in the Dutch East Indies.

On April 1, 1906, Bandung was accorded status as a municipality, or *gemeente*. The rice fields and plantations that initially surrounded the city began to change in appearance with the expansion of the region to the north. In the nineteenth century, Bandung was still a small town with a population of 20,000–50,000 people (Daldjoeni, 1987, p. 41), but the new designation brought increased economic activity to Bandung, and the population increased in turn. Additionally, the Dutch East Indies government moved the capital from Batavia to Bandung, with its beautiful natural scenery, which entailed moving government and military institutions to the new municipality (Kunto, 2008, pp. 68–70), furthering the rapid development.

Bandung was also chosen to be the new capital city because of its geographical location: the city is located in the highlands and surrounded by mountains and was therefore deemed to be perfect for defense. As the outbreak of World War II approached, the authorities were anxious about Japanese military maneuvers, and Batavia as a coastal city was much more vulnerable to attacks. Bandung was also simply considered a healthier place to live than Batavia.

Bandung, with its beautiful natural scenery, underwent a rapid physical development that earned it several new epithets such as *het Parijs van Java* (Paris of Java), *de tuin van Allah* (Garden of God), *Europa in de Troupen*, and *de meest Europese stad van Indie* (the most European city in the Indies)

(Leushuis, 2014, pp. 114–115). For Europeans, the tropical atmosphere of Bandung was more comfortable than that in Batavia, and it was then planned that Bandung would be the ideal residential city for colonial, primarily Dutch, society (Leushuis, 2014, p. 117). *Europa in de Troupen* is a nickname given by Europeans because of the natural beauty of tropical Priangan, which is shrouded in the cool air of Europe. Parijs van Java, Geneve van Java, Montpeiller of Java, and Switzerland van Java are nicknames for cities in the Priangan Residency region due to their similarity to the coolness, peace, and beauty of cities in Europe. One of the first travelers to visit the Priangan Residency was Charles Walter Kinloch, who visited the area around 1852 and was very impressed with his journey through Jalan Raya Pos.

Kinloch reported that traveling by horse-drawn carriage from Batavia to Buitenzorg (Bogor) was very fast and that at every 5–7 miles (8–11 km), horse posts and lodgings were provided as places of rest. When he entered the Priangan plateau, he had to use buffalo, horses, and *gethek* because of the difficult, winding roads, and at one point he had to cross the Citarum River, but during his journey he greatly admired the natural beauty of the region. He was met along the way with beautiful rural life, cool and clean air, a pleasant atmosphere, and natural and enchanting scenery (Kinloch, 1853).

In 1898, an association was formed in Bandung called *De Vereeniging tot Nut van Bandoeng en Omstreken* that consisted of European elites. Its goal was to develop and construct a beautiful city environment, but the association was also a venue for discussing the aspirations of Bandung residents (Leushuis, 2014, p. 119). In the midst of Bandung's development as a municipality, the emergence of organizations such as *De Vereeniging tot Nut van Bandoeng en Omstreken*, which later became *Bandoeng Vooruit*, were striking features of civic life.

By the early twentieth century, the city of Bandung could be accessed by vehicles such as *pedati*, *delman*, and cars. In 1900, the first asphalt was laid in Bandung at Residenweg (now Jl. Stasiun Timur) and Kerklaan (now Jl. Perintis Kemerdekaan). The streets within the city were equipped with lights, and trees were planted by the roadside for shade (Kunto, 2008, p. 71).

In addition to transportation facilities, local accommodations supported the development of tourism activities in Bandung. In 1933, there were already 41 hotels and *pension* in Bandung, with classy hotels such as the Grand Hotel Homann and the Grand Hotel Preanger located in

strategic areas such as *Bragaweg*, *Groote Postweg*, *Naripanweg*, and *Dago* (Reitsma, 1892, p. 15). In the vicinity of the *Oranje Plein*, there was a complex of *Lux Vincet* retirement houses run by L. W. Huisman (Kunto, 2008, pp. 59–60). There was also accommodation in the areas adjoining Bandung, such as Pangalengan, where there were five hotels; in Lembang, where there were two; and in Cimahi, where there were three (*Mooi Bandoeng*, December 1933, pp. 95–96). The high demand for tourist accommodations drove the rapid growth in the hospitality industry in Bandung in the 1930s.

In 1896, Bandung became the venue for a congress of the *suikerplanters* from East and Central Java. At that time, Bandung was still a small town, with a population of only 29,382 in 1896 according to *Gids voor Bandoeng Met Teekeningen van W. O. J. Nieuwenkamp*; ethnically, the population breakdown was Europeans 1134, Chinese 1958, Arab 43, and indigenous 26,247. To improve services in the new city, Pieter Sijthoff, an assistant resident of Priangan, took the initiative to establish an association that would provide facilities for the community and build and improve the social, educational, and cultural welfare of Bandung and its surrounding communities.

The idea was realized with the establishment of *Vereeniging tot Nut van Bandoeng en Omstreken* (Association for the Welfare of Bandung and Surrounding People) in 1898 (Kunto, 2008, pp. 70–71). The association served as a forum to channel the aspirations of Bandung residents and surrounding areas; members of the society included European elites such as government officials, hotel owners, *kweekschool* teachers, botanists, businessmen, and *preangerplanters*. In detail, the members were the Soesman family (landlords in Braga and Kebonjati); the Reeman family (landlord Sukajadi); v.d Bruinkops (landlord Pamayonanan-Cibarengkok); v.d Wijk (landlord of Kiaracandong); R. A. Kerkhoven (Priangan plantation entrepreneur); K. A. R. Bosscha (Priangan Plantation entrepreneur); Schenk (Pasirmalang plantation entrepreneur); Homann (owner of Homann Hotel); Bogerijen (owner of Maison Bogerijeau), and C. A. Hellerman (shop owner in Braga) (Kunto, 2008).

Pieter Sijthoff, the founder of the association, is believed to have been the day-to-day administrator, and chairmanship of the association was entrusted to a Priangan resident, Mr. C. W. Kist. *Vereeniging tot Nut van Bandoeng en Omstreken* aimed not only to improve the community's welfare but also to highlight the problems of infrastructure development and the physical arrangement of Bandung. From its establishment in 1898

until Bandung was designated a *gemeente*, the association was responsible for significant infrastructure development and improvements such as repairing roads, installing lights, planting trees by the road, and making gullies. To support the image of the beauty of Bandung, settlements made of bamboo cubicles located on the edge of the road were renovated with permanent walls and guardrails were fitted between the road and yards of the houses (Kunto, 2008, pp. 74–75).

Regarding education, schools were established ranging from kindergarten (*froebel*) to Lagere School (elementary school) to a carpentry school (*ambachtscholen*). In another initiative, *Vereeniging tot Nut van Bandoeng en Omstreken* established an association that was equipped with hearses to assist with deaths in the community. And in terms of transportation, buffalo carts were gradually replaced with horse carriages that were called *sado* (*dos a dos*) (Kunto, 2008, pp. 74–75). Although *Vereeniging tot Nut van Bandoeng en Omstreken* was an independent, nongovernmental organization, it had a genuine interest in helping the government develop Bandung. Specifically, the organization promoted tourism in Bandung, in cooperation with the government, using pamphlets and postcards with panoramic images of the area.

During its development, *Vereeniging tot Nut van Bandoeng en Omstreken* changed its name twice. First, around 1906, it was renamed to *Comite tot Behartiging van Bandoeng's Belangen* (Committee for the Care of the Interests of Bandung City). Then, on February 17, 1925, its name was officially changed to *Bandoeng Vooruit* (Bandung Maju—Bandung Prospers), chaired by S. A. Reitsma (Mooi Bandoeng, November 1936, p. 65). One of the members of *Bandoeng Vooruit* was the mayoral of Bandung, and one of the requirements of membership was that one had to be an entrepreneur, and therefore, there were regular negotiations between the two sides in the building lobbies.

Bandoeng Vooruit, with the status of a private organization, focused on developing and promoting tourism in Bandung. It was established for the benefit of Bandung and surrounding areas, including its tourism. In carrying out its activities, this organization cooperated with the government of Bandung (Gemeente Bandung) and promoted tourism to the area through pamphlets and postcards with panoramic images of Bandung.

Bandoeng Vooruit opened its first office in 1933 at *Oude Hospitaalweg* 16, and the editorial and administrative sections were on *Landraadweg* 3. In later years, the office of *Bandoeng Vooruit* moved several times before finally settling on *Jalan Naripan* from April 1938 to 1941. All office

activities were moved to Jl. Naripan (*Mooi Bandoeng*, January 1936, pp. 85–86). Initially, the administrative and advertising departments were in different locations, and the office was moved to Jl. Naripan partly to unite administrative and advertising affairs and partly because increasing numbers of members needed tourism information. Throughout its development, the members of *Bandoeng Vooruit* were not Europeans only; in 1939, there were Chinese members and 22 members who were indigenous (Jaarverslag, 1939, p. 13).

The *Bandoeng Vooruit* annual membership system was divided into two categories: individual and institutional, NLG 6 for individual members and NLG 10 for institutions or associations. Members received the *Mooi Bandoeng* magazine and an annual entrance ticket to the highways to Tangkuban Prahū and Papandayan, which were managed using a toll system. In addition to membership funds, *Bandoeng Vooruit* earned money from regular donors (*Mooi Bandoeng*, No.12, *Jaargang* 9, December 1941). *Bandoeng Vooruit*'s had three important mandates as a tourism development organization in Bandung: first, to explore and develop the potential of tourism in Bandung and surrounding areas; second, to organize and beautify Bandung as a tourist destination city; and third, to attract and promote Bandung as *Parijs van Java* and promote its neighboring cities (Kunto, 1986, pp. 234–235).

This organization's activities can be understood in two parts. First, it conducted social activities focused on the development and physical arrangement of Bandung. Second, along with the change in its direction and objectives to develop tourism in Bandung, its activities evolved to emphasize the promotion of Bandung and the development of facilities to support tourism.

BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT TOURISM ACTIVITIES

To facilitate the flow of tourist traffic, *Bandoeng Vooruit* built roads to Tangkuban Prahū (1928), to Papandayan volcano (1935), and from Paseh to Kawah Kamojan (Kunto, 1986, pp. 254, 258–259). In 1935, the *gemeente* government provided a subsidy of NLG 1500 for road construction to Papandayan. Commentaries on the *gemeente* Bandung subsidy to *Bandoeng Vooruit* were published in various newspapers such as *De Indische Courant*, *De Sumatra Post*, *Algemeen Handelsblad*, and *De Tijd*.

Bandoeng Vooruit's road construction and repair projects did not rely solely on member contributions. In addition to donations from the *gemeente* government, *Bandoeng Vooruit* also received donations from private entrepreneurs, such as Hotel Homann and Hotel Preanger (Hardjasaputra, 2002, p. 19). As a partner of the *gemeente* in city planning, *Bandoeng Vooruit* also carried out projects such as arranging the appearance of shops to appeal to European tourists (Kunto, 1986, p. 240). The organization also built or repaired city facilities such as parks, swimming pools (Cihampelas and Centrum baths), zoos, and lounges. Bandung Zoo (*Bandoengsche Zoological Park*) was completed in 1933 as an initiative of *Bandoeng Vooruit*, which also contributed to the renovation of the *Societeit Concordia* building (1927–1929) and its facilities, such as dance halls and theater (Hardjasaputra, 2002, pp. 14–15).

Infrastructure development supports tourism activities. Bandung is located in a basin surrounded by mountains, and the tourist attractions were dominated by natural attractions in the mountainous areas around the city, such as Dago, Cisarua, Jompong, and Halimun *watervaal* (waterfall); Arcamanik pesanggrahan; *waterkrachtwerk* Lamadjang; Dago, Cihampelas, Empang Cipaganti, Situ Cileunca Pangalengan, and Situ Patenggang Ciwidey baths; Maribaya hot spring, the modern bath at Centrum, and so on. There are also the *Bandoengsch Zoologisch Park*, *het Jubileumpark*, *van den dienst van den mijnbouw museum*, and *museum van den post-telegraaf-en telefoondienst*.

Frequent tourist sites included Ciwidey and Rancabali in the south of the city, which required a vehicle rental and a full day's provision of food and water (Reitsma, 1892, p. 48). While in the village of Sindanglaya, on the road to Sumedang, tourists could visit Pesanggrahan Arcamanik and take in the plains of Bandung. In the village of Sasak, before reaching the guesthouse, tourists could rent a horse for NLG 2 per person, including a tip for the horse handler (Reitsma & Hoogland, 1921, p. 38). There was also the Maribaya tourist park in Lembang, famous for its hot springs, which became a favorite tourist destination of the Dutch in the 1920s and 1930s (Brahmantyo & Bachtiar, 2009, p. 109).

Bandung also featured entertainment venues such as *Societeit Concordia* and *Societeit Ons Genoegen* and cinemas such as Majestic, Oriental, and Elita. In *Societeit Concordia*. There were frequent musical performances, theater productions, and dance parties. Tourists could watch theatrical performances, plays, and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer American Western movies (Hutagalung & Nugraha, 2008, p. 65).

City tours conducted with *delman*, *sado*, or horse-drawn carriages were popular with visitors; places of interest included residency buildings in Cicendo, temples in Chinatown, Kininefabriek, and several city parks. In addition to the city tour, there was also a Rijsttafel (full meal consisting of appetizer, main course, and dessert) culinary tour, the first culinary tourism concept in Indonesia, introduced in the early twentieth century (Rahman, 2016). It was held every Sunday at the Homann Hotel; Preanger planters were usually customers at this.

Mooi Indie's colonial romanticism is also manifested in *rijstaffel* (colonial feast). During the colonial period, the Dutch enjoyed food extravagantly. In fact, they went to hotels to enjoy the feasts that were served every Sunday. About 30 waiters would serve dozens of dishes from all cuisines, most of which were Javanese (Onghokham, 2009, p. 170). Such a culinary ritual could be understood as an expression of power and status.

TOWARD ORGANIZED TOURISM

In its function as a tourism development organization, *Bandoeng Vooruit* coordinated well-planned tours and regularly published travel plans and excursions around Bandung in *Mooi Bandoeng* magazine. For example, on Sunday February 19, 1939, the organization held an excursion to the mountains of Tangkuban Prah and Situ Lembang. The publication of excursion activities in *Mooi Bandoeng* included activity information, entry fees, registration deadlines, and group departure points.

Excursion activities were usually conducted every Sunday. A sample tour to Conggeang held on Sunday, November 5, 1939, was followed by an excursion to Galunggung, and on Sunday, December 10, 1939, an excursion was organized to Manuk Crater. Members of *Bandoeng Vooruit* were charged NLG 4.25. Each excursion usually had a different starting point; stewards coordinated transportation needs, a car was organized if the destination was outside or around Bandung, and each excursion activity was assigned a travel leader.

During the first half of the twentieth century in Bandung, tourism activities were coordinated through a travel group and displayed characteristics of modern tourism such as tour guides, guidebooks, and organized transportation, premodern tourism, prevalent in the nineteenth century, was loose, informal, and carried out on an individual basis. For instance, a late nineteenth-century annual horse-racing event in Tegalega once attracted visitors to Bandung, and visitors were not only Europeans

but also indigenous and other groups; notably, however, visitors came using various means of personal transportation because there were no coordinated accommodations or transportation, and there were no tourist guidebooks (Kunto, 1986, p. 285). According to Robert Cribb in *International Tourism in Java 1900–1930* (1995, p. 193), the use of guidebooks and the presence of tourist groups marked modern tourism in the Indies, which began around the early twentieth century, and we also cite this period as the beginning of modern tourism in Bandung. In line with Robert Cribb’s terminology, it can be argued that premodern tourism in the nineteenth century was characterized by the absence of an organization that managed various travel needs; travel was still random, tourists were not organized into groups, and there was no central provider of information for the tourists. In terms of nature, tourism was neither promoted nor was information contained in tourist guidebooks.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, increasing numbers of tourists began visiting Bandung for recreation and nature; although the appeal of horse racing did not fade, nature tourism became the activity of choice among tourists in Bandung. A previous mayor of Apeldoorn, Mr. Dr. W. Roosmale Nepveu, who visited Bandung in 1936, expressed his eagerness to see Bandung’s impressive natural beauty, particularly its beautiful urban parks and wide city streets (*Mooi Bandoeng*, November 1936, pp. 65–66). Mr. Roosmale’s interest in Bandung shows the appeal of Bandung as a tourist attraction for those interested in nature. The above highlights how the pattern of tourism activities in Bandung shifted from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries to bring about modern Bandung tourism with the efforts of *Bandoeng Vooruit*.

BANDOENG VOORUIT: FROM TOURISM PROMOTION TO CITY ARRANGEMENT

Once the modern era of tourism in Bandung began, local and regional attractions were promoted using printing posters, flyers, brochures, and travel guidebooks as well as via presentations at the annual exhibition (*Jaarbeurs*), and *Bandoeng Vooruit* had a booth at the exhibition. They also published a *maanblad* (monthly magazine) called *Mooi Bandoeng* in 1933 that contained key information for both domestic and foreign tourists, and the magazine became a highly effective means of disseminating information and promoting the region.

The year 1933 was also important for *Bandoeng Vooruit* because it was the year of a merger between *Bandoeng Vooruit* and *Vereeniging tot Bevordering van het Vreemdelingen Verkeer* (Society for the Promotion of the Tourist Office). The merger substantially increased *Bandoeng Vooruit*'s membership and fees from the previous year.

Bandoeng Vooruit used *Mooi Bandoeng* to encourage locals to become members and actively participate in developing Bandung into a metropolis (*Mooi Bandoeng*, November 1936, pp. 65–66). As noted earlier, membership included toll tickets on private roads, special discounts for various excursions, and discounts on *Bandoeng Vooruit* guidebooks. By the end of September 1936, the organization had 931 members (Kunto, 1986, pp. 234–235).

To provide more convenient access to tourism information, *Bandoeng Vooruit* built a tourist information center in the city center that provided visitors with tourist information and trained tour guides (*Mooi Bandoeng*, February 1934, pp. 114–116). However, *Bandoeng Vooruit* promoted the city through mass and certain promotional media. Members of the board also personally accompanied the visits of important people such as Sri Mangkunegoro VII from Surakarta in 1935 (Kunto, 1986, p. 247). In addition, Sunan Paku Buwono X from Surakarta visited Tangkuban Prahur Crater (Kunto, 2008, p. 289); the great king of Thailand, Rama V, visited Curug Dago in 1902; and his grandson, Rama VII, visited Bandung in 1929 (Brahmantyo & Bachtiar, 2009, p. 114).

Bandoeng Vooruit also prepared an annual tourist calendar of regular *Jaarbeurs* (exhibitions/exchanges) and horse racing in the Tegalega field, and both programs were strong in attracting visitors to Bandung (Kunto, 1986, pp. 248–249). In addition, *Bandoeng Vooruit* organized recreational tours in Bandung. The key attractions in Bandung and its surroundings were: (1) large hotels with a wide choice of restaurants; (2) first-class cinemas; (3) a Malabar radio station; (4) a geological museum and a postal museum; (5) *Technische Hoogeschool te Bandoeng* and luxury gardens; (6) Tangkuban Prahur and Papandayan; (7) airports; (8) waterfalls and mountain lakes; (9) zoos and hydroelectric stations; and (10) six swimming pools and markets (Kunto, 1986, p. 236). From the above division, it appears that *Bandoeng Vooruit* tried to classify recreation destinations in Bandung according to type of tourist activity. Some tours involved outdoor activities. Considering the geographical advantage, climate, and natural panorama of Bandung and its surroundings, activities involving nature became the mainstay of tourism in Bandung.

Bandoeng Vooruit's efforts to boost tourism played a significant role in developing the city and the surrounding region. First, the association improved the physical arrangement of Bandung City, and second, the group was instrumental in disseminating information about Bandung and its tourism potential. The role of the organization in facilitating tourist traffic flow was indicated by road development activities, such as traveling by car to Tangkuban Prahū (1928) and Papandayan (1935).

In line with this phenomenon, the development of tourism in Bandung cannot be separated from the development of Bandung itself as a city in the early twentieth century following its designation as a *gemeente* in 1906. As the population increased, especially the Europeans who had been in Bandung since the late nineteenth century, the Bandung municipal government wanted to take care of the Europeans' various interests, and efforts to meet those needs ultimately contributed greatly to the development of urban tourism in Bandung.

CONCLUSION

In the course of its history, tourism activities in Bandung experienced a shift from premodern to modern times that began with the emergence of *Bandoeng Vooruit*, an organization that introduced and promoted the natural beauty of Bandung through pamphlets and brochures as well as through organized tourism activities in Bandung. According to Robert Cribb, modern tourism in the Indies began around the early twentieth century, and we present the history of tourism in Bandung, Indonesia as an example, using early twentieth-century inventions such as guidebooks and tourist groups to demarcate modern from premodern tourism.

Premodern tourism in Bandung involved tourists from foreign countries and the archipelago for the annual horse race, but people arrived independently and arranged their own travel, lodgings, and entertainment for their stays. *Bandoeng Vooruit* brought the advent of modern tourism, with organized travel, tourist attractions, and accommodations; indeed, horse-racing events became parts of organized tourism.

Bandoeng Vooruit also supported the greater development of Bandung beyond tourism by supporting the local infrastructure for tourism activities. *Bandoeng Vooruit* built roads to Tangkuban Prahū and Papandayan and then from Pasoh to Kamojan Crater and even took the initiative to build Bandung Zoo.

The emergence of tourism development organizations such as *Bandoeng Vooruit* led to changes in the pattern of tourism activities in Bandung that advanced local tourism activities from premodern to modern, and *Bandoeng Vooruit's* early promotional efforts highlight the pristine natural beauty of Bandung. Coming full circle, we can say *Mooi Indie's* contribution to tourism in the form of celebrating the beauties of Indonesia is equally undeniable in the form of the *Mooi Indie* advertisement “Wonderful Indonesia—Feeling Is Believing” (2011).

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The 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election: The Production of Post-Truth and the Islamic, Urban, Middle-Class Identity

Gigay Citta Acikgenc and Herdito Sandi Pratama

INTRODUCTION

In years of political turmoil, the face of a city undergoes changes. With a battle of discourses that brought forth changes to the city's aspiration and image, Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election is an object worthy of research. At the time, the incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) endured fierce political battles in his race for reelection, faced accusations of religious blasphemy, and ended up serving a two-year prison sentence. In a forum in 2016, Ahok spoke about issue of SARA (ethnic, religious, race, and intergroup sentiments) that had occurred during his time running as a candidate in the Bangka Belitung gubernatorial election; he also asked his supporters to remain calm and not get carried away by

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the discourses of hatred hiding under the guise of religion. In his statement, Ahok asked the people to remain critical and refuse to be provoked by certain interpretations of Surah Al-Maidah, verse 51, which prohibits Muslims from befriending Jews and Christians. In addition to research-worthy issues pertaining to law, it is interesting to observe the massive movement that emerged right after Ahok's speech went viral in the social media and how the movement polarized Indonesian society.

The unyielding waves of movements against Ahok framed him as an enemy who blasphemed Islam, and these movements, which remained influential until the 2019 general and presidential elections, highlighted the new form of politics based on the ambiguity between rationality and testimonies and intuition. This highlighting is made most effective through social media, utilizing the infrastructures of information technology to achieve a strong persuasive effect in constructing the public's discourse and attitude.

Social media and information technology have unleashed a proliferation of opinions and testimonies that have devalued objectivity and rationality, which previously were respected as the pillars of knowledge. Knowledge transmitted via social media rejects the mainstream epistemological tradition of senses and reason as far superior sources of knowledge to testimonies and intuition. Information technology has allowed for testimonies to proliferate and indeed to transcend the objectivity of senses and the validity of reason. People now produce and process knowledge based on testimonies that spread like wildfire in digital spaces, manifesting a post-truth era in which objectivity is less relevant than persuasiveness.

In the field of epistemology, or the philosophical study of knowledge, the term "testimony" refers to others' formal or informal written or verbal statements, but modern epistemology does not consider testimony a primary source of information, as it does memory, reasoning, and perception (Goldman, 1999). Moreover, modern epistemology uses an individual approach to examine humans' sources of knowledge, which, in turn, isolates individuals from external factors such as other "knowers" and social institutions. Thus, in response to the inadequacy of theoretical tools in modern epistemology, contemporary thinkers have developed "social epistemology" as an extension of epistemology (Goldman & Whitcomb, 2011).

The rapid and ongoing developments in ICTs in the twenty-first century, such as smartphones and digital applications, have made it easier than ever to acquire information and knowledge. According to Floridi (2014),

electronic devices not only mediate communication with one another but help us shop, work, find entertainment, and so on. These devices and the expansion of ICTs have also transformed the way we source our knowledge: we now consider that we *know* what we learn from search engines, social media feeds, and chat rooms.

Knowledge acquisition that involves more than one knower is not a central part of the modern epistemology discourse. Instead, modern epistemology focuses more on memories, intuitions, reasoning, and sensory perception as the primary sources of knowledge (Goldman, 1999) and considers testimony a secondary source. Meanwhile, under the social epistemology discipline, research focuses on the social aspect of knowledge. According to the contemporary epistemological approach, knowledge is no longer viewed from an individualistic perspective; the relationship between knowledge and social aspects is now the object of study: knowledge gained from other people, how gained knowledge is justified, the reliability of testimonies, and so on. The infrastructure of ICTs ensures that our sources of knowledge are not limited to our individual sensory perceptions or reasoning faculties. The virtual connectivity between individuals facilitated by the IT infrastructure grants us knowledge based on what others knew first.

Regarding the latter point, this reliability is still in question. In today's digital age, search engine and social media algorithms have directed what information we receive and, in turn, disseminate on a daily basis, and our dependence on the testimonies of others through the internet has fostered the dissemination of what has been called fake news, which has particularly affected the political arena. For example, the article by Lim (2017) titled "Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia" focused on the 2017 regional head election (*pilkada*) in the DKI Jakarta area with the aim of showing how political activities in social media produced binary polarization between the supporters of each candidate and ultimately influenced the quality of information received by grassroots voters. In this context, we discuss the role of testimony as a source of knowledge by analyzing the post-truth politics of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. In this chapter, we discuss the role of testimony in our knowledge acquisition and determine its unintended consequences. To this end, we use an analytical approach to sketch the theoretical description of knowledge and testimony and to contextualize the problem using a case study.

TESTIMONY AND KNOWLEDGE AND POST-TRUTH ERA

In an everyday sense, we see the term “testimony” used in the realm of law to describe witness testimony in a court. The word “testimony” is also commonly used in the context of journalism when referring to the presence of verbal evidence in a news report, and we use “testimony” to refer to a personal assessment of a product someone has tried before. For this study, however, we define “testimony” as an epistemic source in which “hearers” acquire information from either the spoken or written words of others (Lackey, 2008).

Gelfert (2014) divided testimony into three categories: (1) mundane; (2) factual; and (3) aesthetic. Mundane testimony consists of personal information such as names, occupations, ages, and addresses; such descriptions can usually be learned without having to experience them. For example, to verify someone’s identify, we simply ask for identification such as a birth certificate or driver’s license. In general, this type of testimony does not create a significant epistemological problem because it only requires common sense and trust.

Factual testimony, however, refers to information received from someone with particular knowledge about a topic that we want to learn, for instance, a meteorologist delivering tomorrow’s weather forecast or a customer service representative discussing one’s electric bill. In general, we tend to accept this type of testimony “as is” because we have no reason not to believe it. Finally, aesthetic testimony refers to the information in, for example, film or book reviews that express an individual’s personal tastes, and expertise can factor into the value of such testimony, such as reviews from historians who appreciate a work of art and discuss its style, technique, and composition, all of which might be unfamiliar to laymen.

It is important to note that Gelfert’s (2014) division of testimony is fairly wide in scope and assumes that each type of testimony is distinct, when in reality, the three types can overlap and intersect. The division is nevertheless still useful as an overview of testimony, which is missing from the popular definition, and it emphasizes the importance of the role of testimony in our daily lives.

Scholars have often questioned the validity of aesthetic testimony as a source of knowledge, and therefore, we need to clarify the meaning of knowledge in order to unravel this misconception. In this case, it is easier to focus on what is *not* knowledge. For instance, knowledge is not merely an opinion. According to Gelfert (2014), knowledge should be more

stable than opinion, which tends to be more volatile; furthermore, opinions are often tied to individuals' psychological states, as seen in political commentaries on social issues. These findings suggest that opinion cannot be equated with knowledge, whereas "opinion" and "testimony" can be used interchangeably because both aspects are distributed by at least two people who depend on one another for information.

The knowledge/belief distinction, which is related to objectivity, is also a popular assumption that is not entirely accurate. Based on epistemology, knowledge is defined as a justified true belief, where a belief is an opinion, assertion, or proposition based on specific reasons or justifications. In contrast to beliefs, truth is based on reality, although this does not preclude beliefs from being true.

This explanation, however, does not align with the popular understanding of knowledge, which includes objective facts. The explanation above is a theoretical means of clarifying the common misinterpretations of the terms "testimony" and "knowledge." Based on the definition of knowledge as a belief, which is something true that can be justified, we can conclude that truth becomes an important element in a philosophical investigation of knowledge. The true-or-false value of a belief is determined through claims that serve to justify whether someone truly has reliable knowledge. The next explanation will cover how information technology blurs the justification process and value of truth from an assertion, proposition, or opinion and leads to unwanted consequences.

In 2016, Oxford Dictionary's word of the year was "post-truth," which the dictionary defined as when objective truth is less influential in shaping public opinion than emotive-persuasion and personal beliefs (Wang, 2016). The prefix "post-" is not interpreted as "after" but rather states that the word that follows (truth) is now irrelevant. The term was selected because searches for it had increased by 2000% compared with the previous year (Wang, 2016).

Although it extends to the context of political constellation and public opinion, which are widely developed and mediated by information technology, post-truth has long been understood as a condition whereby "alternative facts" change "actual facts." According to McIntyre (2015), post-truth is practiced as ideological supremacy to persuade others to believe something by giving up actual evidence. Along with this understanding, according to McIntyre, post-truth did not begin in 2016 but simply became a much larger phenomenon more recently. Post-truth also

encompasses the cognitive bias whereby individuals believe that their conclusions are based on adequate reasoning even when they are not.

With the mediation and power of information technology, especially social media, post-truth truths are more real. Anyone can find someone online who agrees with them no matter their opinion, and by only reading, engaging with, and sharing these opinions with like-minded others, people can create a bubble of content within which they never hear anything they do not want to hear whether it is objectively true or not. As a result, people are not forced to question their own beliefs, and armed with preferences, social media provides such a large space to serve this type of information exchange that it becomes difficult to change people's positions. Polarization occurs easily because it is not based on actual evidence, and social conflicts arise that can scour trust from society (Rothstein, 2005). The culture that developed in the post-truth era was driven by social media. A. C. Grayling contended that strong opinions can quell evidence, and in this era, what is believed is more valuable than fact. Post-truth culture is narcissistic and values our opinions as though we all are celebrities (in Coughlan, 2017).

The diametric position in opinions that develop on the internet is easily transformed into an interpersonal feud among groups. According to Grayling, online culture is unable to distinguish between fact and fiction. The process that occurs in cyberspace has the potential to damage public conversation and democracy (Coughlan, 2017).

In the post-truth era, fact and fiction can be neglected and discarded. If previously it was relatively easy to fight truth with lies, it is now no longer even possible to identify a lie: Simona Modreanu illustrates how we now use euphemisms such as "challenged ethically" and "truth is temporarily unavailable" that blur truth and lies, honesty and dishonesty, fiction and nonfiction, and reality and hoax (Modreanu, 2017).

Modreanu (2017) suggests that the motive of post-truth phenomena derives from the post-modern trend that rejects a single truth narrative in the face of the influence of many public figures, relativism, community setbacks, and narcissism. Furthermore, the nature of the post-truth era combined with cultural indifference resulted in a fragile society full of suspicion (Modreanu, 2017). Individuals' today struggle to understand the breadth of useless knowledge accumulating at an incredible rate, and the future is increasingly unpredictable (Modreanu, 2017). Such conditions produce cognitive dissonance, which, to overcome, requires society to reinstate belief and intuition (Modreanu, 2017). Confidence and

intuition become the preferential basis of society in dealing with a world situation that cannot be controlled because of the nature of uncertainty. It is precisely in this matter of belief and intuition that epistemic and social problems arise and are accentuated.

Miller and Record (2013) explained that internet search engines such as Google create significant challenges for epistemic research on knowledge acquisition because the search engine algorithms tend to present incomplete or biased results based on one's search history. Findings based on what one has already searched for have a significant impact on one's impression that a particular belief is the "truth," after which believers become resistant to any contradictory information.

The formation of belief based on search engine algorithms has made the justification process more difficult than what epistemology experts could have imagined. Miller and Record (2013) noted that this phenomenon is not unique, especially in terms of its epistemic characteristics. The filter bubble is equivalent to socializing with people who possess the same mindset, including those who consume information from sources that present a particular political agenda or narrow-minded perspective. However, Pariser (cited in Miller and Record (2013)) stated that people who access search engine technology do not choose to be in a particular social group. For example, when I read/share liberal-oriented political sources, the news that my conservative friends share is no longer visible on the homepage of my Facebook account.

According to Miller and Record (2013), search engine algorithms aim to drive users' attention to material they should find engaging, an innovation in the field of information technology. However, the algorithms have the potential of channeling very different material to two people who in theory should be similar and potentially driving them further apart with each online engagement.

Information exposure managed by search engine algorithms can indirectly isolate social media users from diverse viewpoints about a particular topic. In this case, similar algorithms are also used by social media platforms, such as Facebook. According to Lim (2017), information received by Facebook users in Indonesia is isolated by the algorithm and consciously filtered based on the preferences of their Facebook "friends." In Indonesia, Facebook users tend to have an extensive network of friends and having more than 1000 "friends" is the norm. In the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, Facebook users (ranging from those in the pro-Ahok party to those in the anti-Ahok party) were extremely active. For

example, some users “unfollowed” friends who did not share their political views. Such information isolation was intensified through private instant messenger services, such as WhatsApp, LINE, and Blackberry Messenger.

The dynamics that shape a group of individuals facilitated by the existence of information filtering algorithms attempt to create an online identity that supports the existing belief. The existence of an algorithm is not a factor allowing the formation to exist. Social media and algorithms work together to choose, sort, and establish a hierarchy over someone else, information shared by them, as well as their political preferences (Lim, 2017). In these groups, interactions are an exchange of opinions preceded by sentiment and positively correlated with the perspective that becomes the beginning of the formation of these online groups. This kind of formation on social media that produces fake news is no longer known as news whose validity needs to be investigated.

Lim (2017) noted that branding has become an important element of political campaign strategies, as seen in the social media campaigns of the candidates in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. In this case, branding refers to building an emotional connection between the products (the gubernatorial candidates) and voters. For example, in the first round, Ahok’s social media team focused on spreading positive images of Ahok as clean, honest, and free of corruption. Meanwhile, Yudhoyono’s social media team promoted his youthful and religious side, whereas Baswedan’s social media team promoted their candidate as polite and friendly.

Each social media team worked to promote the respective programs that they offered. However, the “branding” of each candidate was the main priority, not their programs and public policies. Moreover, although it was not openly admitted, the social media team of each candidate used “buzzers” and “netizens” on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, all of whom influenced a significant number of followers. Consequently, the discourse on social media among the voters was insubstantial due to the existence of people who were paid to keep targeting the psychological level of voters using “branding.”

This type of social media strategy also impacted the topics discussed via private instant messaging services, which, in turn, were carried into the public sphere. In some cases, the “information” that was perceived, forwarded, and discussed by the voters included little to no objective facts about public policies on health, education, and the environment.

DISCUSSION

Electoral politics in Indonesia is a prime example of when the value of truth is questionable; instead, the influence of information from people on social media continues to increase. Truth has been appreciated as a value throughout philosophical discourse. Lee (2015) posits that in the dialog written by Plato, Socrates asked “What is *righteousness*?” In his writing, Socrates asked Euthypro why punishing his father for murder was the right thing to do. Socrates expressed that Euthypro could not actually explained convincingly why punishing his own father was the right thing to do. For Socrates, the pursuit of truth of what we believe is something that is true. Furthermore, finding truth through proven evidence is one of the many missions of science.

According to Socrates, the greatest enemy of truth is false knowledge or, as McIntyre (2015) stated, when we claim that we know something based on contradictive evidence (or no evidence at all). This is when the pursuit of truth ends. However, if we remain skeptical, it is possible to determine if such a claim is true. If we do not know something, we can try to learn more. If we do not believe in a fact, others may try to convince us to believe in it. However, if we are willfully ignorant of the truth of an opinion, event, or belief because we are unwilling to change our existing belief, we no longer appreciate truth as a value that needs to be upheld to acquire knowledge.

The value of truth is not in the obsession to discover the absolute truth but in the process of justifying the belief and transforming it into reliable knowledge. In the context of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, this process was destroyed by the campaign strategies that only focused on “packaging” the candidates, instead of highlighting their respective policies. Therefore, grassroots voters were unable to receive accurate information about the competency of each candidate. Such a scenario is not beneficial to a healthy democratic system. Moreover, the internet’s information flow system indirectly gives space to biased information acquired by voters. Voters who do not receive and exchange verified information are prone to becoming irrational voters. This means that their decisions are not based on reasonable considerations, such as voting for a political candidate based on religious and ethnic similarities rather than their background, which more clearly articulates their capacity as a political leader and their ability to positively impact the people.

As shown in the case of Ahok, Indonesia provides a context where there is a thin line between rationality and intuition. In fact, the contrary position between the two is Western thinkers' constructed form of artificial separation. In behavioral economics, Kahneman (2011) discovered that an individual's real decisions are often motivated by systematic biases. Moreover, the proliferation of opinions, information, and testimonies in digital spaces prompts knowledge production through ways that are neither reason-based nor entirely intuition-based. The dynamics between rationality and intuition result in a synthetical basis of knowledge and movements. Such a proposition can be clearly identified in the case of a viral, edited video of Ahok's speech. On the one hand, people's reaction was triggered by the rising intuition of primordial religiosity, which resulted in antipathy toward the speech. On the other hand, there was a rational basis underlying such a reaction, which can be discovered from judgments on the facts surrounding the video clip. Rationality and intuition fuse together and result in what could be deemed as essentialization, particularly the essentialization of Islamic identity.

Interestingly, such essentialization undergoes a method of "resistance," a mechanism of creating a mutual enemy that eventually leads to the creation of an ideological position. The video of Ahok's speech prompted the emergence of a form of resistance, which positioned Ahok and his every attribute (ethnic, religion, and political choices) as "the enemy." Such resistance was reinforced by the social media, which subsequently amplified the discourse and formed the polarization of "*Us versus Them*." Ahok and all of his attributes are "them," and such construction simultaneously produces the narrative of "us." The method of resistance then resulted in an essence of Islamic identity that mobilized numerous movements, such as 212. Fixing one's identity amid such artificial polarization is also strengthened through other narratives, such as the term "pribumi" conveyed by Anies Baswedan as Ahok's rival in the election.

As a capital city and destination for urban citizens, Jakarta embodies a dynamic, heterogeneous society. Occurrences in the city signify the space-consuming coexistence between progress and the primordial roots that migrants bring from their hometowns. In the middle of such an urban wave, Jakarta's "original" group of people (Betawi) is a reflection of a society that was never conceived before. Therefore, Jakarta as either a city or an idea is an undefined project. Urban slums and real estate are conjoined and coexist in a fluid structure assembled by the rise of the middle class. Whichever (most commonly economic) definition that one attaches

to the middle class, Jakarta has become a silent battlefield between primordial-conservative ideas from the past and their modern-progressive counterpart and its orientation to the future. In this temporarily undefined situation, Jakarta is an active reflection of the country's politics. Government and business centers merge together within an active coexistence and form images of a nation-state.

The rise of the middle class is frequently caused by wider access to the economy and education. In major cities, such emergence never has a single facade. The middle class has the agency to transform the image and memory of a nation-state, but they also depend on the political direction of the nation-state itself. Referring to Goenawan Mohamad, Budiman (2011) argued that the middle class has the desire to generate progress and coherently comply with the desired changes. In other words, the class knows no tension between hopes of progress and the romanticism of the past.

The multiple façades of the middle class can be commonly found in major cities, such as Jakarta. During the authoritarian New Order regime, politics and SARA (ethnic, religion, race, and intergroup) sentiments were not allowed. Therefore, the middle class could not articulate identity related to SARA. Intriguingly, after the fall of the New Order, as the society marched toward political openness, religious identity politics were articulated. The face of Jakarta has changed through expressions of religious aspiration. The regulations of satellite cities are more open to these religious aspirations. In public streets of Jakarta, religious activities emerge, religious mass organizations strengthen, and religious preaching penetrates city spaces, universities, schools, government institutions, and private institutions. It seems that reformation leaves the city with a strong urgency of religious aspiration that is barely limited by the awareness of modernity.

Occurrences during Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election, particularly what happened in the case of Ahok, constitute a culmination point that successfully allows the city's collective religious aspiration to penetrate the aforementioned bare limit of modernity. If previously there was a vision of modernity that prevented political and massive expressions of religious aspirations, the case of Ahok brought the urban middle class beyond modernity's limit, and this articulates the politics of a city that is sectarian, religious, and oppositional to modernity's idea of progress.

Fusing together the development of social media and its characteristics, these discourses resulted in a compound with a high potential for

explosion. Reducing relationships to binary logic such as friend/unfriend and like/dislike is common on social media platforms but is polarizing, and once people choose sides, they primordially and religiously essentialize their others through a method of resistance, and this constructed Ahok as a target. Through rejecting Ahok and labeling him a blasphemer (in some cases, *the* blasphemer) of religion, a self-other wave of separation emerged. With the existence of Ahok as the other, the idea of a religious “us” was formed.

Waves of rejection, hashtag wars, and digital mobilization then allowed the rise of on-the-street movements, united groups, and produced an urban middle class that articulated Islamic identity, and this articulation was then quickly absorbed as a political modality that was used to support a candidate who later emerged as the victor of the gubernatorial election, and this process of essentialization was rapid, massive, and long-standing. At the time of the 2019 presidential election, this middle-class expression and articulation of Islamic identity was then transformed into electoral benefits. Although the identity of the urban middle class is never a singular aspect, this chapter has shown how the production of an Islamic, urban, upper-middle-class identity was constructed through the facilitating aspects of post-truth and social media in the context of Ahok’s speech. In this context, the line between knowledge and testimony or rationality and intuition faded away. The opposing sides of the spectrum became intertwined, and this resulted in particular symptoms of identity.

Apart from the research findings that indicate that humans are not as rational as ancient Greek philosophers had imagined, rationality is still a distinctive feature of humans in general. However, this feature ceases to function if we are unable to identify the differences between truth and falsehood. Frankfurt (2006) wrote that appreciation of the value of truth can be seen from how far rationality is practiced. Rationality, in this case, is also related to the factuality of one’s opinion or a proposition that “sculpts” one’s belief. Thus, factuality is an important aspect whereby truth becomes an instrument for constructing a conducive and harmonious society.

Finally, the role of testimony as a source of knowledge shows how truth can become a value that is believed by every member of a community. This is especially important given that truth can also influence social interactions among like-minded individuals. However, there is also the devaluation of truth or “post-truth” to consider, when the justification process is no longer reliable. Even mass media institutions cannot avoid the

production and dissemination of false information that is ultimately consumed by the public. As a result, the gap between truth and falsehood continues to widen, especially in terms of the information relayed through mass media and social media platforms. In the era of information technology, mass media has played a role in creating the post-truth world, partly making rationality and factuality, supposedly the main principles of mass media, nearly universally obsolete. The lack of processes for verifying news also contributes to mass media's dysfunction as one of the important elements for realizing a democratic society.

CONCLUSION

Advancements in ICT have changed how we acquire information and knowledge. More specifically, the dependence on other people to acquire knowledge has become the norm. Such dependence is not directly noticed by the public because communication between two or more people is not considered a method of acquiring knowledge. In these situations, distinctions between facts and opinions and between belief and knowledge can lead to misconceptions about the role of testimony as a source of knowledge. Such misconceptions are also fueled by search engine algorithms that focus on users' previous search histories.

Therefore, the present study discussed the role of testimony in knowledge acquisition by analyzing the post-truth politics in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election in the context of search engine and social media algorithms and the "truths" they drive us to. The validity of testimonies on social media is now facing a justification process that cannot be relied upon because of personalized algorithms that filter information based on search results and internet activity. The validity of testimonies as a source of knowledge also faces the devaluation of truth as a common value in a society. This makes the truth of a testimony no longer a common priority and concern because speed and identity bias precede the values of rationality and factuality.

This chapter has emphasized that the reliability of testimony as a source of knowledge is doubtful. In this case, through branding strategies and the promotion of fake news, the public simply chose a candidate based on irrational considerations (e.g., outward appearance, religion, and race), without contemplating the candidate's policies that would ultimately affect society. In general, in the phenomenon of Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election, information technology and social media facilitated the

arrival of the post-truth era. In particular, this resulted in the awakening of the middle-class consciousness, which articulates Islamic identity through the framework of essentialism and ushers in religion as a force in one city's politics along with its urban society.

Finally, it is important to mention the key limitation of this study, which is the lack of data on how the role of testimony can directly influence the political process. Thus, future studies on social epistemology should complement this study by obtaining data through interviews, questionnaires, and surveys.

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Religion in Urban Politics: Social Media and Its Regulatory Debates in the Aftermath of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial Election

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INTRODUCTION

Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, is a modern city that is also still developing in terms of infrastructure. The city is the center of economy, business, politics, and governance in the nation and is home to the most diverse cultures in Indonesia. Regarding politics, the 2017 Jakarta

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gubernatorial election can be argued as a battle for the sustainability of democracy in the nation.

The national General Elections Commission announced simultaneous regional elections in 101 regions across the country in February 2016, including Jakarta. The two candidates in the final stage of the election were contradictory figures: Anies Baswedan, former education minister, and former Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, called Ahok. This election was a fierce political battle between performance and capacity and a popular personality figure.

During the election, public participation in social media polarized supporters of Ahok and those of Anies Baswedan, where Ahok criticized his political opponents for misusing an Al-Quran verse for political purposes during his visit to *Kepulauan Seribu*, Jakarta's district, on September 2016. He stated that voters were being deceived by those who used verse 51 of Al-Maida, and his video on YouTube went viral after Buni Yani posted the edited version as well as the transcript, from which he allegedly removed the word "*pakai*" or in English "used" (Detikmetro.com, 2016).

Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia) considered Ahok's speech blasphemous to the Qur'an and a humiliation of Ulama and Muslims (MUI, 2017). The MUI Fatwa received support from the National Movement of Fatwa Controller led by Bachtiar Nasir and Habib Rizieq Syihab, and the movement initiated a series of actions (known as "Aksi Bela Islam") on October 14, 2016, November 4, 2016, and December 2, 2016. Ahok apologized to the public and clarified his statement to the national police. Nevertheless, he was sentenced to two years in prison (after 17 trials) on April 20, 2017, a day after he was defeated in the gubernatorial election (Rachelea, 2017).

Freedom of expression is a right guaranteed by Indonesia's 1945 Constitution (Chapter 28). However, the practice of this freedom has encountered great debate with regard to hate speech. Campaigns of intolerance, a religion-based state establishment, the disowning of Pancasila, hate speech toward minorities, and other divisive movements grew and polarized discussions on social media during the Jakarta gubernatorial election. Social media facilitates diverse information exchange, and

ideological polarization is inevitable in the context of political discussions (Lee et al., 2014). Instead of fostering advancement, freedom of expression in cyber media wrecks the state, for instance, in the form of the emerging hoax and hate speech manufacturing group Saracen (Mediani, 2017) or the finding of thousands of radical and terrorist propaganda contents on *Telegram* (Hasyim, 2017). However, Indonesians have demonstrated sufficient awareness of hoax contents (Mastel, 2017).

The focus of this chapter is on the role of religion in urban political morality, such as on social media, and to what extent it could pose challenges for internet governance in the future. The backdrop of this study is the second round of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election from March 7 to April 15, 2017. We conducted a literature review to present a comprehensive overview of polarization, and we have divided this chapter into three parts: (1) value construction on social media; (2) political morality in Jakarta gubernatorial election; and (3) regulatory implications. Media plays a significant role in ideological polarization in Indonesia, historically and politically. Social media poses new challenges for existing internet governance, specifically whether regulations can prevent the escalation of threats against the values of Pancasila and the unity of the nation.

VALUE CONSTRUCTION ON SOCIAL MEDIA

Social media has penetrated Indonesian society in a significant way; it has served not only for individual social interactions but also for social mobilization and change. There are at least 143.26 million internet users in Indonesia, most of whom use the service for chatting and social media (APJII, 2017), including to speak out against issues that harm the society or community. The “*Koin Peduli Prita*” Facebook fan page and Twitter hashtags “#FreePrita” and “#KoinKeadilan” were symbols of public support during a defamation case between a homemaker, Prita Mulyasari, and a private hospital between 2008 and 2009 (kompas.com, 2009), and “#saveKPK” was an expression of public support on social media for the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) following the controversial “*Cicak vs Buaya*” (“gecko vs. crocodile”) public statement made by head of National Police Comr. Gen. Susno Duadji in 2010 (Suryakusuma, 2015); “#saveKPK” was even trending on Twitter on January 23, 2015 (Deliusno, 2015).

Social media transcends collaborative creation. It is a place for value creation and consumption, and value creation on social media involves

strong themes and potential actors' contributions to disseminate them. Bechmann and Lomborg (2012) argue that there are two approaches that determine the value creation on social media: (1) the industry-centric perspective (creating economic and social value in terms of power exploitation) and (2) the user-centric perspective (creating value in terms of self-creative exploration). These dichotomous value creation patterns raise concerns about "theoretical collapse of production and usage" (Bechmann & Lomborg, 2012, p. 774). Hence, in the analysis, they consider how these two distinct perspectives would complement or contextualize each other. In taking a user-centric perspective to understand value creation on social media, we should acknowledge that self-values are not only created but also shared in the network. Social media enables the distribution and the expansion of these shared values. Accordingly, Oh et al. (2015) argue that social media is a vital aspect of collective behavior and social movements.

They consider social media values keynoting processes that result in unified and strong themes that stand out among "milling voices and chaotic interactions" (Oh et al., 2015, p. 212). The authors also criticize the perspective that separates the online from the offline world. Lim (2018) argues that the use of social media is so immense that it penetrates the social and cultural aspects of urban society. Thus, the dichotomy between the real and virtual is no longer relevant, which has created a sphere she calls "cyber-urban space." On another note, Rodriguez (2013) argues that collective sense-making comprises relationships between actors and their coordinative actions. These actions include daily engagement in the network, their contributions to diffusing the shared meaning, and the characteristics of sense-making process in networked cultures.

The next question refers to how people incorporate these themes into their belief systems and construct certain behaviors on social media. In a very open-ended environment such as social media, individuals are able to connect in diverse, vast, and heterogeneous networks. Consequently, it is likely that individuals become exposed to diverse information that can challenge their predispositions. However, the question is whether these diverse networks lead to freer and more deliberate choices for engagement or to like-minded and not like-minded divisions.

Social media creates an echo chamber effect whereby people tend to engage with like-minded groups rather than opposing groups, no matter how diverse the network is. Lee et al. (2014, p. 713) found that the more people engage in political discussions on social media, the more likely is

partisan and ideological polarization even amid a diverse network. For instance, polarization happens very easily on Twitter (Barberá, 2015; Conover et al., 2011; Lorentzen, 2014), particularly regarding political matters, whereas the echo chamber effect is not as captured on news Twitter (Colleoni et al., 2014). Polarization is also seen on high emotional engagement Facebook group (Vicario et al., 2016). This echo chamber effect may also foster “social extremism and political polarization” (Barberá, 2015). Hashtags on Twitter may exhibit initial information about content that users may or may not engage in (Conover et al., 2011). According to the need of orientation concept, a person will not seek personally irrelevant information. Therefore, if the relevance is low, people will show less of an interest (McCombs & Stroud, 2014).

When an individual faces two different opinions, they may decide a particular opinion that is contrary to their personal belief. For example, one might believe that “*forgiving is good*” but decide not to forgive someone else’s mistake. Cognitive dissonance may explain this condition. Initially proposed by Leon Festinger (1957), cognitive dissonance refers to the idea that a person may not tolerate inconsistencies between two cognitions represented by belief and behavior (Cooper, 2007). The more disagreement between the two cognitions, the more people are inclined to reduce the dissonance (p. 7). A person in this situation would likely change their beliefs, actions, or perception of action (Festinger, 1957 in Teng et al., 2015, p. 44). Nonetheless, criticism regarding this theory emerged due to its inability to predict behavior and measure the dissonance (p. 52). This theory acknowledges self-autonomy to justify chosen behaviors or Brehm’s (1956) “free choice paradigm.” Cognitive dissonance occurs in daily human decision-making processes. Humans tend to reduce any possible conflict between choices (Cooper, 2007, p. 14).

POLITICS OF MORALITY IN JAKARTA GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

In the first round of the election, there were three gubernatorial candidates: (1) Agus Yudhoyono, son of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; (2) incumbent governor Basuki Tjahja Purnama, alias Ahok; and (3) former Education Minister Anies Baswedan. Agus and his partner Sylvi lost by 16.71%, and the other two received similar numbers under 50% (*Tempo*, 2017). In March 2017, the Jakarta election commission

announced a second round of voting for April 19, 2017 (KPU DKI Jakarta, 2017). The two competing candidates were Ahok and Djarot Saiful Hidayat and Anies and Sandiaga Uno.

The competition in the second round was fierce. Primordial issues, religion, and ethnicity were drawn into political campaign tensions. The second-round candidates were primordially very different. Ahok represented minority groups, specifically the Chinese and Christian, and Anies represented the Moslem majority, and polarization was inevitable because some campaigns encouraged Jakarta voters to choose the Moslem candidate no matter who he was. This polarization was induced by controversial remarks Ahok made that were framed in a negative way and that went viral on social media. In November 2016, the police accused Ahok of blasphemy (Rahadian, 2017; Rochmi, 2017; Rohamna, 2017).

Jakarta is a diverse, heterogeneous, and multicultural city, and researchers have found associations between high ethnic diversity and social conflict (Wasterly & Levine, 1997). However, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue that degree of ethnic heterogeneity has no significant impact on conflict but rather that the issue is ethnic polarization. The Ethnic Polarization Index (EPOI) and the Ethnic Fractionalization Index (EFI) are common methods used to mitigate potential conflict within society. In the 2010 population census, the National Statistics Bureau found that Indonesia's EFI was 0.81 and EPOI was 0.5, meaning that Indonesia was a highly heterogeneous society, yet not polarized, so that conflict was unlikely (BPS, 2013). Using the same census database, Arifin et al. (2015) found that Jakarta's EPOI was 0.66 and EFI was 0.76. Jakarta's EFI scale was slightly more than the threshold (0.6), which means that it is unlikely that any potential ethnic conflict would occur in a more ethnical heterogeneous society. Contrarily, an increase in ethnic heterogeneity in a homogeneous society would lead to ethnic hostility (p. 252).

Even so, the growing ideological polarization during the Jakarta gubernatorial election created clashes in Jakarta and around Indonesia. People involved in mass rallies led by Rizieq Shihab, popularly known as "Aksi 212" or "aksi 411" (named after the dates of the rally: December 2 and November 4), came from regions such as Java and Sumatera to defend him (Fahmi, 2017). In particular, they were defending Islam after feeling they had been insulted by a Christian-Chinese public figure. They defended not only Islam but also their *Ulama*, Rizieq Shihab.

On the other side, the Ahokers accused the Rizieq loyalists of being racist and unfit to live in Indonesia. Moreover, to Ahokers, who were

mostly rationalist, liberalist, moderate Moslems or minorities in Indonesia, Ahok was a martyr and victim of the politicization of religion. They labeled the opponents Arabized, or un-Indonesian, radical, fundamentalist, intolerant, and even terrorists (Lim, 2017, p. 9). In responding to the several mass rallies, Ahokers used a thousand “thank you” flower boards (Harvey, 2017) to send their messages. According to Indonesia Indicator, a digital research institution, the negative sentiment toward Rizieq increased after Ahok’s detention, with calls for Rizeq, who was in exile, to face charges including pornography. Rizieq’s loyalists, meanwhile, accused Ahokers of attempting to criminalize their *Ulama* (Franciska, 2017).

The polarization between those loyal to Rizieq and those who were not was tested by social media, instant messaging groups, and weblogs, and the brewing conflict between the two candidates’ sympathizers grew uncontrollable. The Islam Defenders Front carried out several assaults and intimidations against people who were suspected of insulting Rizieq Shihab that went viral on social media (Puspitasari, 2017; Faruqi et al., 2017). Not only that, some hashtags went viral to express both sides: #aksibelaIslam, #aksibelaQuran, #aksidamai, #tangkapAhok, #penjara-kanAhok, #DamaiBukanMakar (pro-Rizieq Shihab); #temanAhok, #kami-Ahok, #Perjuanganbelumselesai (Ahokers).

In addition, both sides’ supporters used websites to express their voices and interests, such as pkspuyengan.com, arrahmahnews.com, voaislam-news.com (pro-Ahok) voa-islam.co.id, and arrahmah.com (anti-Ahok) (Lim, 2017, p. 8). Campaigns to provoke fear over communism and Chinese rule were brought back to the table to sharpen the polarization between the pro- and anti-Ahok factions, and this was not the first time that similar campaigns happened. In fact, Rizieq and his radical allies had been accumulating power to bring down populist figures, including President Joko Widodo (Budiasa, 2017). There was even at one point a call for the President to take a DNA test to prove that he was not communist (Gema Rakyat, 2017). These secretive yet obvious fear campaigns had the potential to threaten the fundamental values of Pancasila, especially by polarizing indigenous versus and nonindigenous (*Pribumi* and *non-Pribumi*). We find here that religion entered the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and changed political morality in ways that could have affected the political climate in other cities around Indonesia.

It shows that religious factors become the precondition of political morality. The source of morality in the context of this research is based on religious morality. Political behavior (voters) is related to the theological

beliefs of voters toward transcendental entities (including God, the End Times).

The function of political morality based on religion has a “sticking power” for social integration among the religious community. This demarcates “us” and “them.” Religious morality influences how citizens (voters) behave in the context of voting. Their behavior is determined by religious beliefs. Morality in this political context is not determined by public morality, which protects all societies and has an orientation toward public interest; it changes according to religious morality.

Political actors, especially those in the gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta, should pay attention to the ethical dimensions of society. Sutor identified three political ethical dimensions: policy, politics, and polity (Sutor, 1997). Policy reinforces traditional, Indonesian values in *Pancasila* as *grondslaaag* (foundation), such as faith, humanity, unity, justice, civility, and wisdom. The political dimension strengthens the value of humanity and morality, or deontology, based on Kantian philosophy. In polity, ethics are implemented through a set of social political structures, including law and order and political institutions. This set of social political structures translates to a political aim that can only be achieved by strengthening the culture and structure of Indonesia. In the context of new technology, the use of social media in politics by individuals is rationalized for a higher purpose (Sutor, 1997). Social media users’ moral politics should not contradict the nation’s traditional values and aims, such as in terms of justice, civility, and unity. The ethics of social politics should also depart from the willingness to reach for traditional values as the main point of ethics.

Ideology is a basic framework of social cognition shared by members of social groups, constituted by certain selections of sociocultural values, and organized by an ideological schema that represents the self-definition of a group (van Dijk, 1995, p. 248). Hall (1986) understood ideology as a mental representation, mental framework, and presentation system that guides behavior, attitudes, norms, and values. Certain groups use ideology to legitimize and promote their interests (Halbwachs, 1992).

Ideological polarization has occurred throughout Indonesian history. After Indonesian independence in 1945, President Soekarno’s Old Order regime unified state ideology by creating a common enemy: neoliberalism and neocolonialism. President Soeharto’s New Order regime preserved the unified ideology by making the left (communism) and the right (radical Moslem) common enemies. The New Order conducted ideologization, depoliticization, and *Pancasila* indoctrination on all people.

During the Reformation, Indonesia became a democratic country that guaranteed freedom of expression. Meanwhile, communication technology developed from face-to-face to computer-mediated communication, printed to e-news, mass media to personal one (e.g., social media, messaging groups). Hence, ideology became personal, uncontrollable, and polarized.

Power over media played a significant role in constructing these polarizations in Indonesia. Under the Old and New Orders, commandeering the mass media was common for disseminating the governments' messages including the "common enemy" campaign. In 1959, Soekarno forced the press to support the government (Ghazali, 2004) by imposing tight regulations on publication permits (p. 60). After the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, Indonesia's media industry changed significantly (Armando, 2014; Nugroho et al., 2012). Freedom of the press was guaranteed by Law Number 40/1999, and government control diminished after the closure of the Department of Information. Civil and political rights were also guaranteed when the Indonesian government ratified Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in February 2006 (Nugroho et al., 2012, p. 40).

Internet penetration in Indonesia had a great influence, particularly among political elites, NGOs, and student activists, on public opinion formation (Winters, 2002). In addition to being a source of information, the internet was a tool for coordinating young activists who endeavored to end three decades of dictatorship (Winters, 2002, p. 118). Freedom of expression and technology enabled the augmentation of ideological polarization in the form of "ideologies."

Ideological polarization occurs in states with immature and mature democracies. According to Haidt (2012), between 1976 and 2008, the proportion of Americans living in highly partisan counties increased from 27% to 48%. He concluded that people are fundamentally intuitive, not rational. Others can only be persuaded by appealing to their sentiments. Even in countries with mature democratic systems (e.g., America), religion influences voters. The difference is that religion-based morality departs from humanism principles and orients toward human interests (e.g., political discourse on the issue of abortion and euthanasia).

REGULATORY DEBATES

The Indonesian government issued Law Number 19/2016 on Electronic Information and Transaction (amending Law Number 11 of 2008), also known as UU ITE (*Undang-Undang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik*), Indonesia's most comprehensive law on internet governance. Along with this, Government Decree Number 82 of 2012 on the electronic system and transaction management offers the technical basis of the law. These two laws comprise the legal reference for regulating digital issues such as e-commerce and even social media. As the number of social media users in Indonesia increased, a quasi-intergovernmental body called the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (*Badan Siber dan Sandi Negara*) formed under Presidential Decree Number 53/2017. The aim of this agency was to enhance national cyber security (Kementerian Sekretariat Negara, 2017) and to supervise social media accounts (Sutrisno, 2017).

Social media content is considered objects of law under the UU ITE, but the limitation of content regulation tends to be a "gray area" in terms of justice. In fact, the Minister of Communication and Informatics will not hesitate to block social media accounts that are proven to have violated the law. Debates on the "catchall articles" were inevitable because laws under these articles were often used to criminalize people by nit-picking their flaws on social media and bringing them to court in an attempt to punish them.

In 2015, the Chief of Indonesian National Police released circular No. SE/06/X/2015 on hate speech in which hate speech is defined as any criminal offense outside the constitution, such as defamation, slander, libel, provocation, circulation of hoax (2(f)) or speech that is intended to provoke hatred toward individuals or a group of people based on ethnicity, religion, religious beliefs, faith, race, skin color, gender, disability, or sexual orientation (2(g)). This letter provides instruction for law enforcement to be fair while handling hate speech cases (Mangantibe, 2016).

The National Commission on Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia/Komnasham) objected and asked that defamation not be categorized as hate speech in the letter (*Tempo*, 2015). The Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (Safenet) argued that UU ITE tended to threaten freedom of speech and silence criticism. For instance, Safenet found 381 people who were victims of Articles 27(3) and 28(2) from 2008 to 2018 (Berita Satu, 2018).

In addition to defamation, blasphemy has also provoked debate in the public space. The case of Ahok, who was framed for blaspheming Islam, heated up the political climate and brought a new challenge to the regulation makers. Regulations should be based on rationality, and throughout history, the relationship between religion and politics, which is regulated in Indonesia, has involved debates between Islamic and secular nationalists. This resulted in compromise in the form of Pancasila, commonly understood as the core values of the nation. This debate on Islamic versus secularist nationalism also happened in Indonesia in the context of political contestation in the context of the function of religion in practical politics, specifically to raise political awareness, including determining how religion and politics should correlate in a nation.

President Joko Widodo argued that politics and religion should be separated, which provoked debate. Rais Am from PBNU and chief of MUI K. H. Ma'ruf Amin, posited that religion and politics influence one another. State politics should also gain approval from religion (Artharini, 2017). Yudi Latif, a lecturer from Universitas Paramadina, contended that there is no problem between religion and politics and that the problem is rather with the political elites. The Religious Affairs Minister at that time, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, also agreed that religion and politics cannot be separated (Itsman, 2017). However, he reminded people not to politicize religion, which to him entailed using, manipulating, and exploiting religion for merely pragmatic political interest.

According to Ridwan Lubis, a professor at State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah, religion is the responsibility of the state. Articles on religion in Indonesia's Constitution provide a climate for law creation (Elnizar, 2018). General Secretary of PP Abdul Mu'ti Muhammadiyah put forth that religion was an important matter with ample opportunity and that there was absolutely no room for politics to be separated from religion and society (Hidayatullah.com, 2018). These discussions show that religion and politics in Indonesia can never be separated; religion is the source of politics and laws in Indonesia. Debates on how religion and politics should intertwine are not new. For example, the debate between BPUPKI (The Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence) and the constituent assembly, a state organization in Indonesia meant to formulate new constitutions.

At present, the Indonesian government has only been persuasive toward social media platform providers. For instance, the Minister of CIT asked global websites to block its AdSense to prevent the spread of falsehoods

on social media (Jefriando, 2017). In addition, the government must adopt firm action in reinforcing the UU ITE, especially for global digital companies operating in Indonesia. For example, Government Decree No. 82/2012 stipulates that global companies have to acquire the statues of Permanent Establishment (*Badan Usaha Tetap*). Consequently, they become Indonesia's legal entities similar to Indonesian companies and are obligated to pay Indonesian taxes. However, some companies are reluctant to obtain this status but continue to operate in the country (Rumata & Sastrosubroto, 2017). The government has urged Facebook to renew its "consulting management" principal company status since it was classified as a "digital platform provider," according to Indonesian Standard Industrial Classification. Without this status, the government is authorized to block access and social media providers' services in Indonesia (according the Article 2 of the UU ITE amendment).

The government should be able to mobilize society against fake news or negative content. To do so, the government should increase societal awareness of the existing internet content regulations, for instance through moot court. The MCIT, working together with ITU, held the Asia-Pacific Regional Mock Court Exercise on Fighting Cybercrime on September 18–19, 2012. This moot court was effective in demonstrating to the public the possible issues for law enforcement, as well as some bilateral and multilateral issues related to solving some cases that may emerge (the MCIT press release Number 78/2012). Lastly, the government actively urged international forums to formulize feasible global "cyber ethics" (IGF, 2014; ITU, 2012, 2013). These ethics formulations accommodate urban society's activity in cyber space and similarly promote including local values in formulating global cyber regulations. The United Nations General Assembly should follow with creating a binding multilateral agreement.

CONCLUSION

The 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election was a fierce political battle between two candidates: a Christian Chinese candidate named Basuki Tjahja Purnama, alias Ahok, and an Arab-Indonesian candidate named Anies Baswedan. The election became a contest of ideologies between majority and minority, and the polarization between pro- and anti-Ahok was inevitable after Ahok's controversial remarks regarding Al-Maida 51 in 2016. Both voices used social media and other online media to channel their interests and expressions, and supporters of each side grew stronger

in both digital and public spaces. This polarization amplified bigger issues such Pancasila versus anti-Pancasila and indigenous versus nonindigenous that could potentially threaten Indonesian unity and democracy.

Social media plays a role as a value creator and an amplifier of ideology polarization. Although social media facilitates the formation of diverse networks of information, political polarization remains inevitable, and social media can become an echo chamber. Throughout history, media has played a significant role in polarizing citizens in Indonesia. The Old Order regime harnessed mass media to create a common enemy: anti-Western anti-neocolonialism. Similarly, the New Order regime used mass media for anti-communist (left extremist) and anti-radicalism (right extremist) campaigns. Mass media became the government's tool for building a unified ideology. In contrast, in the era of Reformation, unified ideology was challenged by democracy with regard to freedom of expression, faith, and civic and political rights. In addition to facilitating the need for information, social media became a tool for socializing and political movements.

This political polarization brought challenge for the regulator and existing regulations. Regulations regarding social media mainly exist in Article 27 Sections (1), (2), and (3) as well as Article 28 Sections (1) and (2) of Law No. 19 of 2016 on Electronic Information and Transaction (amendment of the Law No. 11 of 2008). The law has not been thoroughly implemented in UU ITE. Regulations for social media content on UU ITE still fall within a "gray area." After the 2017 gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta, debates regarding "catchall articles" on UU ITE, especially on defamation and libel, continued to appear as threatening the freedom of expression. Nevertheless, this shows how religion can be the center of all political constellations, which can tremendously impact the national order.

Indonesia is not the only country to experience challenges in terms of regulations. The Indonesian government has tried to be more active in supporting international forums to formulate global cyber ethics that accommodate local values, including city politics. This chapter proposes that future research should address the ideological fractionalization index to measure polarization in terms of mental state, value, and belief. This index, apart from the existing EFI and EPOI, would offer an alternative view for broadly understanding polarization and how to overcome the problems.

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