Kyungwon Choi

The Formation of Japan-ROK Security Relations

Meeting the Evolving Cold War Challenge

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Preface to the English Edition

In 2014, when the Japanese-language edition of this book was published, political friction between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was soaring due to the two countries' different views of historic events. It was also a time when the debate over how to respond to structural change in East Asia resulting from China's emergence as a major power was at a fever pitch in both countries. During the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, Japan and the ROK had cooperated; now, their strategies on China diverged markedly.

It seemed clear to me that this was the moment to ask what the ROK meant to Japan and what Japan meant to the ROK. I sought the answers in the period of Cold War transformation from the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, and that led to the publication of the original version of this book.

As I revisited my text during the process of having the book translated into English, my attention was drawn time and again to the words of Ōhira Masayoshi, the late prime minister who earlier in his political career played a major role in the normalization of Japan-ROK diplomatic relations and the subsequent development of the two countries' bilateral relationship. At a Japan−US summit meeting that he attended as Japan's foreign minister, Ōhira pointed out that Japan had two military divisions on the Korean Peninsula before World War II (WWII) for security. He added that Japan's postwar constitution forbade such direct military assistance, but that Japan was providing economic assistance to the ROK equivalent to what it had cost to maintain those two prewar divisions (Chap. 5, p. 123).

Ōhira's comment highlights the Japanese government's consistent view of Korea's importance to Japan's security, both pre- and post-WWII, and that the only change was to Japan's means of demonstrating that importance. Prewar, Japan exerted military force to annex the Korean Peninsula for the sake of ensuring Japan's security. Stripped of its military capabilities and constrained by its anti-war constitution after the war, Japan instead provided the ROK with economic assistance to insulate itself, and the ROK, from potential hostilities in Asia. This, it seemed, was Tokyo's answer to the question of what significance the ROK held for Japan and was what undoubtedly underpinned the joint initiatives that it launched with the ROK postwar. It was

also Japan's response to pressure from the USA to shoulder a greater share of the security burden in Asia.

While conducting the research that formed the basis of this book, I was asked why I would focus on Japan-ROK initiatives when their bilateral relations were determined by the US's East Asia strategy. The US's role is intrinsic to any discussion of Japan-ROK security relations. But the USA did not dictate Japan-ROK security cooperation, even during the Cold War. Japan and the ROK developed joint initiatives through a process that saw them coordinate their respective perceptions and strategies. So, notwithstanding the US's critical role, past or future, I highlight in this book the efforts of Japan and the ROK in developing their relationship.

This approach is important to an understanding of how, in the present day, Tokyo and Seoul are aligning their respective positions and strategies with Washington's Indo-Pacific Strategy. The gap between the security policies of the ROK and Japan, ranging from their perceptions of history to their policies on China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), makes this the perfect time to ponder again what Japan and the ROK mean to each other. This is a difficult task, but it is critical for identifying further areas of cooperation. I hope that this book contributes in some way to this task.

I was fortunate to receive a Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR) Incentive Award for the research papers that were the genesis of this book. I was similarly blessed for the recognition the Japanese edition of my book garnered from the Association for Contemporary Korean Studies in Japan. These acknowledgments validated for me the importance of Japan-ROK security relations for stability in East Asia and made me feel that my research was indeed worthwhile.

I received assistance from many quarters throughout the process leading to the English edition's publication. In particular, I am grateful to Dr. Sakai Kazunari at Kreab for his exhaustive support. I would also like to thank a former Japanese ambassador, Shimanouchi Ken, for his meaningful comments based on his experience in the diplomatic field.

The final translation was handled by Mr. Keith Krulak, who is deeply knowledgeable about East Asia and has translated many outstanding Japanese works. He has carefully read the Japanese text and complemented it to the extent of fixing errors in my original and has produced an English edition that I think makes the information readily accessible to international readers. I would like to thank him from my heart.

Lastly, I would like to thank and dedicate this book to my wife, Naomi, who is the closest person to me and has always encouraged and supported me in my academic career.

Shizuoka, Japan
January, 2025

Kyungwon Choi

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About the Author

Kyungwon Choi is a professor in the Faculty of Foreign Studies of Tokoha University in Japan. His areas of specialty are East Asian international relations, Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations, and ROK politics and diplomacy.

Choi earned his undergraduate degree from the Department of North Korean Studies of Dongguk University in the ROK and his master's degree in North Korean security policy from that department's graduate school. He went on to earn a doctorate in Japan-ROK security relations in Japan from Keio University's Graduate School of Law. Subsequently, he was a research fellow at the Keio Institute of East Asian Studies and became an associate professor at the Center for Asia-Pacific Future Studies and at the Research Center for Korean Studies at Kyushu University, before joining the Tokoha faculty in 2020.

Choi's key publications include *Reisen-ki Nikkan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei* [The formation of Japan-ROK security relations in the Cold War period] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2014), which received an Association for Contemporary Korean Studies in Japan award; *Nikkan ga kyōyū suru kinmirai e* [Toward a near future shared by Japan and the ROK] (Tokyo: Honnoizumi-sha, 2015), on which Choi was a coeditor; "Window of Opportunity for a New Détente: 'Tight Link Strategy' of Moon Jae-in Administration and ROK-DPRK-US Triangle," *Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies*, Vol. 9, 2020; "Nikkan kankei no hen'yō: Rekishi mondai to keizai anzen hoshō no ishu- linke-ji" [Transformation of Japan-ROK relations: Linkage of the history issue and economic and security issues], *Gendai Kankoku Chōsen kenkyū* [The journal of contemporary Korean studies], Vol. 19, 2019; "Japan's Foreign Policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the Détente Era: An Attempt at Multilayered Policy," *The North Korea International Documentation Project Working Paper Series*, Wilson Center, 2017; and "Nikkan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei: Bundan taiseika no 'anpo kiki' e no taiō, 1968" [Japan and Korea seek national security cooperation: The "security crisis" of 1968 under the divided system], *Kokusai seiji* [International politics], No. 170, 2012, which garnered a Japan Association of International Relations Incentive Award.

Chapter 1
Japan and a Divided Korea

Abstract This chapter provides a detailed introduction and overview of the contents and structure of the book, which aims to elucidate how Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) approached security cooperation over the period from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, when a new order was emerging. The focal point of the volume is the Japan-ROK security relationship that came into being through a complex process in which the two countries managed and adjusted their differing perceptions of how changes in both the regional and international order affected the Korean Peninsula. It highlights their conflicting policies with respect to these developments, as well as to specific threats. The author discusses previous literature on this aspect of bilateral relations and reveals how Japan and the ROK, in seeking common ground for security cooperation, ultimately settled on economic assistance.

1.1 Japan and the Republic of Korea in a Changing East Asian Order

On March 6, 2023, the administration of President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea (ROK; South Korea) put forward a solution to the long-standing conscripted labor issue between the ROK and Japan. Both countries worked to soothe the political and diplomatic friction over historical issues that had been ongoing since the 2010s and set a course to strengthen relations. Shuttle diplomacy with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio was also resumed. At the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting held on March 16, the two leaders confirmed that Japan and South Korea share fundamental values such as democracy, market economy, freedom, and respect for human rights. They then "confirmed the importance of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific at this turning point in history, and shared the view that like-minded countries should work together to uphold a free and open international order based on the rule of law." Given the changing international order, the two countries chose the path of working together on their diplomatic strategies and responding jointly. In addition, they agreed to launch a bilateral consultation on economic security to

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resolve the issues both countries faced, such as "making supply chains more robust and tackling leaks of sensitive technology."[1]

Building on this improvement in Japan-ROK relations, the two leaders joined US President Joseph R. Biden at a meeting at Camp David in August of that year, where they clearly indicated their intention to cooperate in addressing major issues in the Indo-Pacific region.[2] The joint statement emphasized maintaining order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the rule of law, economic security, and regular joint training exercises among the three countries, and declared the institutionalization of Japan-ROK-US consultations. Furthermore, they agreed to build a stable and sustainable cooperative relationship, pledging to hold regular summit and ministerial meetings (foreign affairs, defense, finance, and commerce and industry). Thus, a Japan-ROK-US cooperation framework to address issues in the Indo-Pacific region and maintain regional order has emerged. It was the rapid improvement in Japan-ROK ties that made this further strengthening of Japan-ROK-US security cooperation possible. Recalling that friction over historical issues in the early 2010s spread to economics and security, areas that were said to have supported bilateral relations until that point,[3] the improvement in relations in 2023 should be called a sea change.[4]

What made this sea change possible is that the East Asian regional order was also in flux amid the changes in the international order caused by a more intense Sino-US strategic competition and by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Following Beijing's stronger hegemonic moves in the East and South China Seas—and after the 2019 Hanoi Summit between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK; North Korea) concluded with nothing to show for it[5]—Pyongyang formulated a "five-year plan for the development of defense science and weapon systems"[6] and embarked on the development of tactical nuclear weapons for a war against the South even as it continued with the production of "super-sized" nuclear warheads in preparation for a war against the US. The situation called for a coordinated response from Japan and the ROK. Improving ties with Tokyo became essential for Seoul, which was also working to strengthen its relationship with Washington. Concerned about the possibility of a serious situation like the Ukraine war occurring in East Asia, Japan advanced cooperation with the ROK.

Japan and the ROK have each reinterpreted the other within their own diplomatic strategy, positioning each other as partners. President Yoon described Japan as "our partner as we face common threats that challenge the freedom of global citizens,"[7] and posited that the two countries, based on mutual respect, must contribute to peace and prosperity in the international community through wide-ranging cooperation in the areas of the economy, security, society, and culture. He further stated that when the ROK and Japan "move towards a common future and when the mission of our times align, based on our shared universal values, it will also help us solve the historical problems that exist between our two countries." He expressed the perspective that the resolution of historical issues, rather than a prerequisite for strengthening relations, could be achieved by both sides cooperating and confronting the challenges they each face together. Yoon's "Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region,"[8] which clearly outlines the values and direction of South Korean diplomacy, emphasizes cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region with the US, Japan,

India, Australia, and European countries that share values such as freedom, the rule of law, and human rights. The ROK has set a goal of becoming a "global central state," unveiled a policy of expanding security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, and made clear its intention to actively participate in building regional order. The progressives in the previous ROK administration, inclined to undervalue the role of Japan and the Japan-US alliance in regional security, were reluctant to cooperate on security with Tokyo. The conservative Yoon administration, in contrast, has set a goal of strengthening cooperation with liberal democracies, placing emphasis on strengthening deterrence against North Korea, and considering ways to keep China in check. The Yoon administration has been actively working to promote security cooperation with Japan, assessing that the balance of power in East Asia is maintained through the roles played by Japan and the Japan-US alliance, and that the ROK also benefits from this. This was evident when the leaders of the ROK, Japan, and the US agreed at the Phnom Penh Summit in November 2022 to share information on DPRK missile launches in real time and to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific region.[9]

For his part, Prime Minister Kishida named the ROK, along with the US, Australia, Canada, Europe, and India as partners with which Japan will work together in his "New Plan for a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific'."[10] A cooperative relationship with the ROK had been missing from Japan's strategic thinking until this point, owing to a sense of distrust over the ROK's response to historical issues. However, with the ROK's diplomatic efforts to improve relations, Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa in his 2023 foreign policy speech to the Diet reassessed the ROK as "an important neighboring country with which Japan should cooperate in dealing with various issues of the international community" and also mentioned the importance of "enhancing Japan-ROK and Japan-US-ROK strategic coordination, including in the area of security."[11] Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its April 2024 "Outline of a New Plan for a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific,'" indicated Japan would strengthen cooperation with various countries and partners.[12] The first is to "strengthen mutually complementary efforts with the US, Australia, India, South Korea, Canada, Europe" and others; the second is by "utilizing frameworks such as the G7, Japan-US-Australia-India, and Japan-US-Korea, promote cooperation for rulemaking and enhancement of autonomy of each country"; and the third is to "promote cooperation with emerging and developing countries more extensively than before." The ROK has at last been included among the friendly countries with which the Kishida administration is pushing to strengthen cooperation.

Amid the transformation of the East Asian order, Japan and the ROK, while maintaining their respective alliances with the US as fundamental, began to seek out the potential for bilateral cooperation and to identify areas where they needed to cooperate. Of special note, it was concern over the DPRK situation and emergent China's hardline approach that drove home the need for security cooperation at the diplomatic and defense levels in both Japan and the ROK. It might be said that East Asia needs Japan-ROK cooperation precisely because it is in a period of a change in the order, fraught with uncertainty. Japan, the ROK, and the US have sought stronger security ties since 2022. The question going forward is how they can map out a common strategy for China and the DPRK on the basis of the enhanced deterrence

they achieved through stronger trilateral cooperation. For in responding to the change in regional order, Japan and the ROK face the challenge of having to balance security considerations (deterrence) with the demand for easing of tensions (diplomacy).

Looking back over the 2018–2019 period, the ROK engaged in intermediary diplomacy between the US and the DPRK so they could reach agreement at their bilateral summits in Singapore and Hanoi. In contrast, Japan sought to avoid the US making concessions to North Korea and resulting in an agreement of any kind, an approach that stemmed from Japanese concerns about changes in the security framework. Seoul needed to make assiduous diplomatic efforts toward Tokyo to avoid roiling Japan-ROK relations as it attempted to create a new system combining a Sino-US balance of power with the coexistence of North and South Korea. The ROK's efforts were too little, too late.[13]

The balancing of deterrence and diplomacy is important in policies toward China and Russia, as well. South Korean progressives criticize the move to strengthen cooperation between Japan, the ROK, and the US, saying it would, instead, bring about regional instability by creating a Cold War-era structure of confrontation between these three countries, on the one hand, and China, Russia, and the DPRK, on the other. Though it has deep ties to the US and Japan in terms of its security, economically the ROK is largely dependent on China. Moreover, when the DPRK nuclear issue and future unification of the Korean Peninsula enter into the equation, the ROK has no choice but to emphasize cooperation with China. China is, after all, a signatory to the ceasefire agreement that ended the Korean War and, as an ally of the DPRK, deeply involved in issues pertaining to the Korean Peninsula. In addition, Sino-DPRK relations have grown closer since Pyongyang made clear its support for Moscow during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This is amplifying East Asian regional instability, a situation that demands careful attention. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the DPRK in June 2024, for the first time in 24 years. The two leaders concluded a "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership," which stipulates that if either side suffers armed aggression, "the other party shall immediately provide military and other assistance by all means available."[14] We might say that the mutual deterrence system on the Korean Peninsula that collapsed with the end of the Cold War has been reconstituted.

This situation is a remarkable illustration of the security vulnerabilities of the East Asian region surrounding the Korean Peninsula. It demonstrates the need to discuss East Asian regional stability from a broader framework of building a peaceful order in the region and not just from the perspective of obtaining the power to deter the DPRK's military provocations. It calls for a strategy shared by Japan and the ROK, encompassing the whole of East Asia, that balances deterrence and diplomacy.

The change in the contemporary East Asian order wrought by China's new major power status gives even greater significance to the analysis of Japanese and ROK diplomacy and the construction of their cooperative relationship given the changes in the regional order that occurred around the time of US-China rapprochement in the early 1970s. As part of that altered East Asian landscape, Japan and the ROK faced various common challenges.

Although in this book I emphasize the process by which Japan-ROK security relations formed and evolved during the Cold War, changing power politics between the US and China also played a part. I suggest that Japan-ROK security relations were not so much the result of cooperation that arose structurally through the two countries' alliances with the US, as the product of their respective analyses of the situation and policy maneuvering and coordination. Put another way, their security relationship emerged from the ROK government asking for the cooperation of the Japanese government and the Japanese government responding accordingly.

I examine the elements of that relationship and the political dynamics underpinning its evolution. What I would like to emphasize here is the international politics related to the construction of the regional order. The joint statement emerging from the Six-Party Talks on September 19, 2005, affirmed that the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula would be pursued in line with the framework forged at talks among the DPRK and the ROK, the US, and China as the directly related parties.[15] The full application of that framework as a policy construct began in the mid-1970s, which is the period on which this book focuses. The late 1960s through the mid-1970s—the wider temporal scope of the book—represents the period in which the template for exploring the nature of Japan-ROK security cooperation and its contribution to the construction of the regional order was developed.

This book aims to elucidate how Japan and the ROK approached security cooperation over the period from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, when a new order was emerging. This was a transformative period in the Cold War order in East Asia, ranging from the security crisis engendered by DPRK military provocations, which peaked with the armed guerrilla attack on the Blue House (the ROK president's official residence) and the attempted assassination of President Park Chung-hee in January 1968, to US-China rapprochement in 1971–72, and the fall of Saigon in April 1975. At the time of the 1968 security crisis, Japan and the ROK sought to identify areas where they could cooperate on the basis of their separate alliances with the US, given the security considerations. At the same time, they were also able to enlarge their diplomatic reach through the use of "détente diplomacy," such as aiming to improve ties with China, thereby modifying their existing diplomatic relations. This led Japan and the ROK to view the subsequent 1975 security crisis—destabilization of the Korean Peninsula triggered by the fall of Saigon—in a different light and to tailor their responses accordingly.

As the two countries looked to reconcile the differing political positions of these security and détente requirements, they explored and began to show new developments in bilateral security cooperation. Conventional analyses using a "cooperation or conflict" dichotomy are too limited to capture the complex coordination of interests that this entailed.[16] Therefore, this book examines how, given the transformation in the regional order, Japan and the ROK developed cooperative relations in the area of security despite conflicts in their political interests, with a particular focus on the political processes driving subsequent changes in that security relationship.

1.2 Previous Literature

Much of the literature to date has analyzed the Japan-ROK security relationship in the context of the trilateral relationship among Japan, the ROK, and the US as mediated by the US. This is perhaps because within the hub-and-spoke system of the US military commitment in Asia (the "hub"), the US-ROK alliance and the Japan-US alliance (the "spokes") have each become institutionalized, yet there existed no direct security cooperation between Japan and the ROK.[17] The previous literature can be broadly divided into three categories.

The first group of research analyzes the dynamism of the post-World War II Japan-ROK relationship from a theoretical perspective. It uses a model to explain the conditions under which Japan-ROK cooperation and friction emerge. Academic and former US national security policy advisor Victor D. Cha puts a twist on alliance theory with his quasi-alliance model, arguing that changes in Japan-ROK relations were shaped by policy shifts instituted by the US, the two countries' common ally, rather than the threats posed by hostile countries. In other words, mutual cooperation increased when Japan and the ROK both felt that US commitment was weak and they developed symmetrical or balanced fears of abandonment. Conversely, friction occurred when this fear of abandonment was asymmetrical between the two.[18] Given that previous literature on Japan-ROK relations comprised case studies focused on certain topics, Cha's study is considered groundbreaking in offering an analysis of the postwar bilateral relationship grounded in a theoretical framework.

However, Cha's explanation that reduced US commitment was the sole driver of Japan-ROK cooperation has been criticized for ignoring the way that the bilateral relationship took a turn for the better in the midst of a US policy of proactive intervention, and for manipulating dependent variables to make them consistent with his model.[19] In fact, one analysis refutes Cha's conclusions by demonstrating that Japan-ROK relations did indeed improve under the US proactive intervention policy.[20]

Political scientist Yoon Tae-ryong points out that Cha's quasi-alliance model, which attributes everything in the Japan-ROK relationship to changes in US commitment, is nothing more than public goods logic. He notes that, given both nations rely on the US for their security, in a sense it is quite natural that they should respond to changes in US commitment. What is more important, he asserts, is that changes in US policy exert a variety of impacts on Japan-ROK relations, some of which, on occasion, contradict each other. Yoon analyzes the two countries' alliance behavior using his "net threat theory" that simultaneously considers fluctuations in shared threats and the relative strength of US commitment. A net threat is what remains once US commitment has been subtracted from a shared threat. Even if, for instance, a shared threat intensifies, a commensurate strengthening of US commitment will diminish the net threat and lower the incentive for Japan-ROK cooperation. Yoon argues that fluctuations in the net threat are what give rise to bilateral cooperation or friction.[21] In the case of the responses to the security crises examined in this book, Yoon finds that it was the rise in joint threats that gave rise to cooperation between the two countries.

Cha's work, however, also assumes threat fluctuations, albeit not explicitly, so Yoon's idea of net threat is not so different from Cha's quasi-alliance model.[22] Both theories explain the repeated pattern of cooperation and friction between Japan and the ROK, but they only elucidate the regularity of this pattern and fail to explore changes in security relations arising from the international setting of the time and domestic political conditions. The net threat approach sees increased threat levels as presenting opportunities for cooperation in responding to security threats. Yet it overlooks the fact that Japan and the ROK have different threat perceptions and foreign policy orientations that result in friction over the means and method of such responses.

We must take particular note of how, in the early 1970s, Japan and the ROK, responding to US-China rapprochement, pursued new possibilities on the diplomatic front that were consistent and in balance with their existing security relations, and adjusted their relationship within the context of the new world order. This reflects a complex conflict of interests that cannot be captured with the conventional "cooperation or conflict" analysis. Again, such an analysis only explains the regularity of the repeating pattern. What we need is to go further and shine light on the process of change apparent in the adjustment process.[23]

A second grouping of literature focuses on the division of roles between Japan and the US in relation to ROK security. Political scientist Kurata Hideya analyzes the issue of the reduction in US forces in the ROK in 1970 and Japan's cooperation in developing the ROK's defense industry from the perspective of ROK defense and the formalization of the division of labor between Japan and the US. He notes that as a reduced US military presence in the ROK became official after the Nixon Doctrine, a kind of division of roles developed between the US and Japan whereby the US would provide military support to the ROK during wartime and Japan would provide assistance to the ROK to defend itself during peacetime.[24]

There are also studies of diplomatic history that focus on US policy cooperation to develop a framework for Japan-ROK security cooperation. Political scientist Yu Sun-hee analyzes how the US reinforced its Asia strategy by developing Japan-ROK security cooperation arrangements, tracing the process from the issue of Okinawa's reversion to Japan through to US force reductions in the ROK.[25] She also defines the trilateral relationship as a "triangular alliance of security relations" with common security interests, and she finds there to have been a growing interaction among the security commitments and defense roles that each party must undertake.[26]

Such studies, having painted an overall picture of the regional commitments of the US and other countries, provide new insight into the relationships among Japan, ROK, and the US. A division of labor emerged whereby the US, a Cold War empire,[27] dealt with any external aggression against Japan and the ROK and in exchange, they, as states within the empire, paid for their safety. In that sense, the formalization of the division of labor between the US and Japan in relation to the ROK's security is critical to understanding the trilateral relationship. But there is little evidence of the positions taken or policies adopted by each country with respect to this matter of divvying up roles. It requires analysis of the ways Japan and the ROK defined and configured that division-of-labor construct, not just those aspects stipulated by the

US.[28] That is, beyond the pressure and advice provided by the US to Japan and the ROK, what we need is to examine how Japan and the ROK pursued cooperation and made adjustments to conflict in the context of bilateral interaction and reference this closely to their actual exchanges.

The third set of literature discusses the impact that the changes in power politics among major powers had on the region's international relations, Japan-ROK relations included. Academic and former journalist Lee Dong-jun reveals that the change in US-China relations served as a dynamic in solidifying the division of the Korean Peninsula.[29] Historian Hong Seuk-ryule, too, finds that détente on the Korean Peninsula following US-China rapprochement internalized that division, and he widens the scope of analysis to encompass changes in ROK society.[30]

Their studies provide important clues for examining the changing East Asian order and the Korean Peninsula from the 1960s to the 1970s. But neither analyzes how Japan and the ROK reacted to the change in the East Asian order and adjusted their relationship accordingly. This is possibly because they focus on the DPRK/ROK issue paired with US-China rapprochement. Hong, though, does cite the need for research that focuses on the policies of Japan and the Soviet Union for the Korean Peninsula rather than just those of the US and China.[31]

1.3 Japan-ROK Security Interaction

This book expands on the previous literature to focus on three issues.

The first is the domestic political and foreign policy positions on the requirements for security and détente—in other words, the "Korea clause" as being a product of coordinating conflicting interests across different dimensions. The Korea clause, put forward in the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué, is notable as the first time that Japan expressed an interest in security of the ROK. Japan, however, sought to revise that clause in reaction to the change in the Cold War order at the beginning of the 1970s. This is thought to have infuriated the ROK and caused friction between the two countries.[32] So it is seen that whereas Japan revised the Korea clause to give itself a free hand in advancing its own détente diplomacy, the result was in fact a deterioration in its relationship with the ROK.

The revision of the Korea clause features prominently in analyses of the pattern of cooperation and friction in the Japan-ROK relationship. The narrative is that following the July 1971 Nixon Shock, the Japanese government shifted to a more autonomous foreign policy and set out to improve Japan's relations with China and the DPRK by revising the Korea clause. Subsequently, it is believed, the 1975 security crisis caused Japan to again reevaluate the Korea clause, occasioning a return of the Japan-ROK security relationship to its pre-détente state.[33]

What these analyses fail to explore is how the US and ROK governments perceived and responded to Japan's attempts to revise the Korea clause. Further investigation is needed into whether the Japanese government's revision efforts succeeded in the end and what sort of changes they wrought on Japan's relations with the ROK.

In this book, I identify the Japanese government's efforts seeking to revise the Korea clause as a political impulse to pursue an autonomous diplomacy, an indication of its sense of panic at falling behind the US in diplomacy with China.[34] That impulse, though, failed to translate into concrete policy action out of concern over the possible fallout on the military and security aspects of the asymmetric Japan-US alliance. Ultimately, the efforts amounted to little more than political rhetoric directed at the Japanese public. The assertion that Japan-ROK security relations changed as a result of the Korea clause revisions of the time is, therefore, superficial analysis.

Recent research reveals that the Korea clause was a continuation of the 1951 Yoshida-Acheson Exchange of Notes (the product of US forces based in Japan being sent to the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War) and of the "Korean Minute," a secret agreement from the time the Japan-US Security Treaty was revised in 1960. As such, the clause was a pivotal agreement in the Japan-US security framework guaranteeing the safety of Japan and the Far East.[35]

The three countries may not have shared the same degree of understanding of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Yet the various consultations among them must have generated a stronger shared sense that the Japan-US-ROK security arrangements mediated by the US were the foundation of Japanese and ROK security. Consequently, it means that when examining the Japanese government's attempts at revising the Korea clause, less attention should be given to pronouncements by Japanese politicians and more to the exchanges in diplomatic and security consultations between the US and Japan, the US and the ROK, and Japan and the ROK.

In this book I examine the three countries' responses to revising the Korea clause in the early 1970s, from the perspective that the clause was largely the product of the coordination of their respective interests in relation to the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. The literature to date has treated revision of the Korean clause in the same context as the Taiwan clause's becoming a dead letter with the normalization of Japan-China relations, as discussed in Chap. 4. In contrast, I focus on how these two clauses were intentionally differentiated.

The second issue examined in this book is the change in Japan-ROK security relations, which gradually became more about each other amid the changes in the regional order. With the North-South relationship essentially transitioning into a legitimacy contest between political and economic systems, the Japanese government pursued economic cooperation with the ROK under the strategic consideration of contributing to a Southern victory in that competition. And yet, in response to the ROK's calls to suspend trade with Pyongyang, Japan took the position that it could not obstruct private-sector trade with the DPRK if it was to cooperate in bolstering Seoul's military strength. This slight change to policy also altered the nature of the Japanese and ROK responses to the security crisis spurred by the fall of Saigon in April 1975. The ROK focused on countering the DPRK threat, whereas Japan was keenly aware of the need to avoid the risk of chaos in the event that the ROK suffered the same kind of internal collapse as South Vietnam.

The different responses can be attributed to the two countries' varying perceptions of China. Japan took the position that China was constraining DPRK military action and that there was no danger of a DPRK invasion. In contrast, the ROK felt that the

DPRK might engage in a unilateral surprise attack, with China's tacit consent, to occupy central ROK. Only at that point, the ROK deemed, would China call for a ceasefire because, as a signatory to the Korean armistice agreement, China would be called on to stabilize the situation in any Korean contingencies. The significant gap between the two countries' threat perceptions and resultant security policies stemmed largely from their differing relationships with China amid changes in the Cold War structure in East Asia following the US-China rapprochement. Japan was able to normalize its diplomatic relations with China; the ROK, on the other hand, had failed to improve relations with China in spite of its diplomatic efforts.

Japan and the ROK also perceived the end of the Vietnam War differently. The ROK was focused on the possibility that the successful Communist revolution in Vietnam might set off DPRK leader Chairman Kim Il Sung. Japan, conversely, read that success as primarily the result of the collapse of the South Vietnamese government and saw little likelihood of it sparking conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Even when Japan-DPRK economic exchanges became a point of contention with the ROK, Japan held back from making the political decision to suspend such exchanges. Japan's plan was to maintain channels of communication with the DPRK with an eye to ultimately normalizing diplomatic relations and, thereby, peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.

The third issue I tackle here is international relations amid the construction of a regional order. Among the US, China, Japan, and the ROK there appeared to be a shared belief with regard to the construction of a stable order on the Korean Peninsula. Ensuring the ROK's security while finding a political consensus among these countries was far from easy. The DPRK proposed that it negotiate with the US to build a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula, and as though backing that idea, China encouraged contact between the US and the DPRK. The US and the ROK, however, made it clear that any talks must include the ROK, and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger proposed that the US and China join the DPRK and the ROK at the table ("Kissinger concept"; see Chap. 6).

This book will examine such proposals, including the largely unknown 1975 Japanese suggestion for direct negotiations between the US and the DPRK. This was a two-part proposition to prevent the DPRK's isolation at a time when US-China cooperation regarding the Korean Peninsula had stalled and South-North talks had broken down. A two-stage concept, it called for dialogue initially between the US and the DPRK that the ROK would join later. This is a fascinating indication of how Japan sought to become involved with the construction of the Cold War structure and the regional order, aiming to build a new order in East Asia. I will examine the circumstances behind the Japanese proposal, the impact of the proposal on Japan's response to the security crisis, and the new challenges all of this presented for Japan-ROK security relations.

1.4 Angle of Analysis: Security Crises Amid the Division of the Korean Peninsula

The time frame addressed in this book—the late 1960s through the mid-1970s—is a period of transformation in the Cold War system in East Asia. That period began with the security crisis precipitated by the DPRK's military provocations (culminating with the January 1968 attack on the presidential residence and assassination attempt on the ROK president) and continued through the US-China rapprochement of 1971–72 to the security crisis that followed the fall of Saigon in April 1975.

The focal point of this book is Japan-ROK security relations that formed through the process of the two countries managing the gap in their perceptions of, and conflicting policies with respect to, the transformation of the regional order *vis-à-vis* the Korean Peninsula as well as the nature of discrete, specific threats. In emphasizing the interaction whereby Japan and ROK created common ground for cooperation, I reveal how they explored various possibilities for cooperating on security and how they ultimately settled on security cooperation in the form of economic assistance. I further aim to show how their security relations developed in response to the changing international order.

The two countries' search for security cooperation presupposed the division of the Korean Peninsula. The division between the North and South that had been fluid until then became institutionalized as a system through the formation of alliances following the Korean War that formed a system of mutual deterrence in the region.[36] During the early years of the Cold War, conflict was more likely in Asia than in Europe and chiefly as civil war. Unlike Germany, the nations of East Asia were far enough away from the center stage of the Cold War that localized conflict was possible, and that wars of unification did not necessarily lead to world war. A series of agreements concluded in the wake of the Korean War created a system that rendered further regional conflict impracticable. These include the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROK (October 1, 1953); the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the DPRK (July 6, 1961); and the Sino-DPRK Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty (July 11, 1961).

But the impracticability of waging war did not equate to the possibility of making peace. The DPRK saw to that by engaging in indirect aggression, hostility qualitatively different from all-out war.[37] This gave rise to the "paradox of division,"[38] where the enforced division of two "sides" had consequences opposite to those intended by making possible localized, low-intensity military provocation and destruction just short of war. The US and the ROK tried retaliating against DPRK military provocations, but the prospect of an escalation into total war prevented effective action. The division of the peninsula had unintended consequences, by constraining US and ROK actions and rendering retaliation impracticable.

The reason why this book focuses on these security crises is because I believe that it is this very "paradox of division" that informed the nature of responses to the crisis by, and the security cooperation between, Japan and the ROK. In the late 1960s,

Japan and the ROK decided to explore potential areas for cooperation, for though they presumed that the US-ROK alliance and the US forces stationed in the ROK were sufficient to deter a full-blown war, they had identified low-intensity aggression as a new threat.

The divided peninsula entered into a new phase with US-China rapprochement in the early 1970s. The cooperative framework between the US and China became linked to the mutual deterrence mechanisms. Carefully watching US-China joint action, Japan and the ROK explored additional possibilities for security cooperation based on their alliances with the US while also seeking to improve their relations with China and otherwise expand their diplomatic reach. The requirements for security and those for détente, contradictory political and diplomatic positions, became clearly manifest. I elucidate the formation of and the qualitative change in Japan-ROK security relations that occurred through the change in the regional order around the division of the Korean Peninsula and through the process of the coordination of these two political and diplomatic positions.

1.5 Structure and Data

The main content and questions posed in each chapter are as follows.

Chapter 2 analyzes responses to the 1968 security crisis, focusing on Japan's perception of the ROK's security crisis and the kind of security relationship that the ROK sought to build in requesting Japanese cooperation. The ROK asked Japan for help augmenting the equipment of the ROK police so that it could deal with DPRK indirect aggression. The two countries clearly explored a range of security cooperation possibilities before ultimately settling on providing that cooperation in the form of economic assistance.

Chapter 3 frames the Korea clause as the product reconciling security and détente requirements in the course of the 1969 Okinawa reversion negotiations. Much of the previous literature has depicted the Korea clause as the product of Cold War-style cooperation between Japan and the ROK. However, no easy convergence has been found between the two countries' respective positions: the ROK was working to maintain a Cold War-style order in East Asia while aligning with the Cold War strategy of the US, and Japan was pursuing Okinawa reversion negotiations from the position of a transformed Cold War structure. I revisit the Okinawa reversion negotiation process from the perspective of East Asian regional security, arguing that the Korea clause was more the product of a complex reconciliation of security policy interests than of cooperation.

Chapter 4 looks at the impact on bilateral security cooperation through economic assistance of the ROK's request that Japan assist with its "Four Projects" heavy and chemical industry (HCI) development policy, instituted in response to the US withdrawal of troops from the ROK. I focus on how the ROK's initial plan changed in the course of implementation in consultation with Japan.

Chapter 5 examines how Japan and the ROK began to review their respective security policies as US-China rapprochement transformed the East Asian Cold War order. I also look at the logic that Japan used to persuade the US and the ROK that it should continue its exchanges with the DPRK despite their opposition and show how Japan adjusted its relationship with the ROK at the same time. Previous literature has argued that Japan-ROK cooperation regressed as a result of the change in the regional order wrought by US-China rapprochement. I show, however, that Japan's diminishing concern over being caught up in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula deepened aspects of its cooperation with the ROK as the latter channeled its energies into a competition with the DPRK for political and economic legitimacy.

Chapter 6 takes as its theme the search for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and examines how Japan and the ROK worked to establish a regional order amid the security crisis that followed the fall of Saigon in April 1975. I focus on Japan's 1975 proposal for direct negotiations between the US and the DPRK, a two-stage concept beginning with talks between the US and the DPRK and later bringing the ROK into the dialogue, which Japan thought would prevent the DPRK from becoming isolated amid a breakdown in South-North dialogue.

As a historical study on Japan-ROK security relations, this book draws primarily on those two countries' diplomatic records, as well as US foreign policy documents from the same period. In 2014, the ROK made public its diplomatic records through 1983. Among those, I utilized documents concerning the Japan-ROK relationship and the ROK's relations with the US and China held in the Diplomatic Archives within the ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. I also used official documents from the Economic Planning Board and other government departments preserved in the Presidential Archives and the National Archives of Korea to portray the consultations that took place between Japan and the ROK on economic cooperation issues.

The Japanese diplomatic records that I used comprise official documents released to me through an information disclosure request to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They also include official documents on Japan-ROK relations disclosed since June 2010, primarily comprising documents from the Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference.

My sources for US foreign policy documents were the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, and the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. I also drew on the official documents held by the National Archives II. In addition, my sources for published documents were the Department of State's *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*), publisher Kashiwa Shobō's *Documents on United States Policy toward Japan*, and the National Security Archive's microfiche and other electronic data media.

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Chapter 2
Responding to the 1968 Security Crisis on a Divided Korean Peninsula

Abstract Armed infiltrations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) against the Republic of Korea (ROK) increased in frequency from the mid-1960s, reaching a peak in January 1968 with a raid on the presidential residence, the Blue House. This chapter examines how Japan, the ROK and the United States explored various possibilities for security cooperation, but specifically how the Japan-ROK security relationship took shape in response to this crisis. The ROK asked Japan for help augmenting the equipment of the South Korean police, and the two countries clearly explored a range of security possibilities. The chapter shows how what resulted from their responses became the template for their bilateral security cooperation in the form of economic assistance from Japan.

Armed infiltrations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) against the Republic of Korea (ROK) increased in frequency as of the mid-1960s, reaching their peak on January 21, 1968 with a raid on the presidential residence, the Blue House. This low-intensity aggression represented a departure from the traditional threat of all-out war.[1] Japan, the ROK, and the United States explored possibilities for security cooperation that would ensure the ROK's security; that process and its results shaped the subsequent Japan-ROK security relationship.

The US and the ROK had consultations regarding whether their Mutual Defense Treaty could be used against low-intensity DPRK aggression. The US also suggested to Japan that its economic cooperation with the ROK alone was insufficient, urging it to make more direct and significant efforts on ROK security issues. It was in this context, consequently, that Japan and the ROK began to discuss what kind of options for security cooperation might be open to them and to identify areas of specific cooperation.

In this chapter, I examine how the Japan-ROK security relationship took shape in response to the 1968 security crisis, and I show how what resulted from that response became the template for their bilateral security cooperation, in the form of economic assistance extended by Japan to contribute to the ROK's security. The cooperation arose and evolved through policy coordination consisting of the ROK's requests for assistance and Japan's responses thereto.[2] I discuss how the two countries identified

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potential areas for security cooperation against a specific security threat at first, but ultimately switched to economic cooperation, initially in the form of drought relief from Japan when severe drought struck the ROK.

Previous analyses by other experts have focused on US pressure and encouragement for Japan-ROK security cooperation.[3] Others yet have gone no further than finding that Japan-ROK security cooperation was prompted solely by the shared threat of the DPRK.[4] In neither case does the analysis hold much interest in the two countries' search for security cooperation that emerged in response to a specific crisis. In this chapter, I look at Japan-ROK discussions over how they should cooperate and emphasize how that bilateral security cooperation actually emerged through their response to the particular threat of low-intensity DPRK aggression.

I begin by considering the essence of the 1968 security crisis, which arose as an extension of the DPRK's doctrine to foment a revolution in the South, which Pyongyang hoped would lead to the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under its control. I look particularly at how the threat of low-intensity DPRK aggression was perceived by the ROK, Japan, and the US in the context of the division of the peninsula. Second, I look at how the three countries debated the threat. Third, I examine the evolution of Japan-ROK discussions over security cooperation to reveal how the domestic political processes on that topic were used as the starting point for the two nations' bilateral security relationship.

2.1 The New Threat of Low-Intensity Aggression

2.1.1 A Volte-Face *for the "Revolution in the South" Doctrine*

On January 21, 1968, DPRK guerrillas conducted a raid on the Blue House. The head of the United Nations Command (UNC) requested a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission to protest the DPRK's provocation. Yet, two days later, the DPRK navy captured the USS *Pueblo*, which was gathering intelligence near the DPRK port of Wonsan. These two incidents stoked a sharp rise in military tension on the Korean Peninsula.

Neither incident occurred by chance. They resulted from the DPRK's militarization since the early 1960s in systematic preparation for a bid at reunifying the peninsula through revolution in the southern half of it. At the December 1962 meeting of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) Central Committee, Pyongyang adopted a new policy line of simultaneously promoting industrialization while bolstering the national defense; priority, however, was on the latter even at the cost of constraints on parts of the national economy.[5] The DPRK pursued this *byungjin* line of military and economic construction in tandem through the middle of the decade, with the goal of military mass mobilization in the North that could support a behind-the-lines revolution in the South. Pyongyang also established the Four Military Guidelines:

arm the entire population, fortify the whole country, train the entire army as a "cadre force," and modernize its weaponry, doctrine, and tactics.

In addition to creating the foundation for revolution, the DPRK attempted to perfect the theoretical basis of its united front tactics. In his concluding speech at the Eighth Plenary Session of the Fourth KWP Central Committee held in February 1964, Kim Il Sung presented new tactics for a united front, the "three revolutionary forces" that he said must be well prepared to achieve victory in the DPRK's revolution: the revolutionary forces of north Korea, the revolutionary forces of south Korea; and international revolutionary forces.

> We have already learned by experience that unless the revolutionary forces in south Korea are prepared, the revolution cannot emerge victorious. If the people in south Korea had risen in revolt in the enemy's rear and fought in response to the advance of the People's Army during the Fatherland Liberation War, we … would have solved the question of the country's reunification already. … The crux of the matter is that the flames of struggle should be spread by the south Korean people themselves in order to carry out the revolution.
>
> Needless to say, even if the south Korean people rise up in revolution, they cannot successfully defeat the US imperialists and their stooges, if the people in north Korea do not actively assist them. … The Korean revolution is a link in the world revolution. … The further the world revolutionary forces are strengthened and the more the US imperialists are driven into a blind alley everywhere in the world, the more the foothold of the US imperialist aggressors will be weakened in south Korea and the sooner the victory of the Korean revolution will be won.[6]

In short, though Kim Il Sung had expectations for revolutionary forces within the ROK, he addressed the importance of the DPRK's revolutionary forces and international revolutionary forces engaged in armed struggle against the US in Cuba and in Vietnam that could lend strength to the southern revolutionaries. Unable to achieve unification through total war since the Korean War ceasefire, the DPRK sought to unify the peninsula through revolution in the South.

In mid-1966, the DPRK's policy toward the ROK underwent a further tactical change, to armed raids. Table 2.1 shows that the number of DPRK provocations surged in 1967 and peaked in 1968. Despite the uptick in opposition in the ROK to the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty,[7] Kim Il Sung's hoped-for maturation of revolutionary forces and armed uprising in the ROK failed to materialize.[8] Consequently, these guerrilla infiltrations suggest Pyongyang recognized that it could not pin its hopes on ROK revolutionary forces. Increased armed raids in the mid- to late 1960s, therefore, reflected a change in the DPRK's united front tactics of the early 1960s, which had focused on unification by military force grounded in industrialization and militarization in the DPRK.

This change was inspired in large measure by the shift in the status of the international revolution, specifically, the Vietnam situation. At a KWP conference in early October 1966, Kim Il Sung stressed that the "liberation of south Korea" could not be delayed, noting that "US imperialism is the No. 1 target in the struggle of the world's peoples. It is the primary task of the socialist countries and the Communist and Workers' Parties to enlist and concentrate the broad anti-imperialist forces in the struggle against US imperialism." He called for international action against imperialism to support the anti-American struggle in Vietnam. Kim emphasized that

Table 2.1 Trend in the number of DPRK military provocations

		1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Significant incidents (number)	DMZ—South of the MDL	42	37	445	542	99
	Within the ROK	17	13	121	219	39
Exchanges of fire (number)	DMZ—South of the MDL	23	19	122	236	55
	Within the ROK	6	11	96	120	22

Source "Report of the United Nations Command to the United Nations," *Department of State Bulletin* (June 9, 1969), 497

"the US imperialists should be set back and their forces should be dispersed to the maximum everywhere and on every front … in all countries, big and small. …"[9]

Indeed, in mid-October 1966, the DPRK began dispatching fighter pilots to North Vietnam and conducting preemptive strikes against the ROK military (Table 2.1).[10] By July 1967, skirmishes occurred near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) almost daily, and DPRK guerrillas were infiltrating the ROK at will, particularly around Mt. Jiri and Mt. Taebaek and in the Ulsan region.[11] This marked the start of (North) Korea-style "Vietcong" activities, a trial of incursions predicated on the North Vietnamese model for armed struggle against the US through the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (the Vietcong).[12]

The DPRK's increasingly frequent and larger-scale incursions reached their boldest with the January 1968 raid in Seoul on the presidential Blue House, bringing its "revolution in the South" line to its peak. In then seizing the USS *Pueblo*, the DPRK managed to put additional pressure on the US, which was bogged down in Vietnam. A telegram from the Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK indicated that the DPRK had completed its preparations for war. The DPRK, it seems, was engaging in risky military provocation on the assumption that the US would be reluctant to face a second front in the ROK amid its deteriorating situation in Vietnam.[13]

When US forces stationed in Japan moved into waters off of Wonsan after the USS *Pueblo*'s capture, however, the DPRK requested emergency military assistance from the Soviet Union. On January 31, Kim Il Sung sent an official letter to Soviet Premier Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin, noting that responsibility for the *Pueblo* incident lay entirely with the imperialist Lyndon Johnson administration and calling on the Soviet Union to come to the DPRK's aid as an ally bound by the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance between North Korea and the Soviet Union. He asked, moreover, that in the event the DPRK engaged the US militarily, the Soviet Union provide the DPRK "without delay with military and other aid and support, to mobilize all means available." The DPRK, meanwhile, began evacuating people from around Wonsan and from factories and from Pyongyang itself in readiness for a US attack.[14]

The Soviet Union flatly rejected Kim Il Sung's requests for assistance, concerned about being drawn into a war of the DPRK's making under the alliance treaty between the two governments, which is what the Soviet Politburo suspected Kim of attempting to do by sending his letter directly to the government rather than the

Communist Party.[15] Kosygin promptly invited Kim to Moscow so that he could convey the Soviet Union's opposition to a war and try to keep the DPRK in check. On February 26, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Leonid I. Brezhnev met with Deputy Premier and Minister of the People's Armed Forces General Kim Chang Bong, who traveled to the Soviet Union in place of Kim Il Sung. Brezhnev expressed his country's opposition to starting a war in clear terms. In addition, the Soviet Union's official response to Kim Il Sung's letter started out by highlighting the defensive character of the treaty between the two countries. It went on to observe that the "problem of military actions is a very difficult question, especially under the current circumstances, when the entire world struggles against war." The Soviet reply also suggested that the USS *Pueblo* incident should be settled quickly by repatriating the ship's crew members lest the DPRK lose its substantive political gain from the incident's early stages.[16] The Soviets urged a change of attitude in the DPRK, to prevent the crisis from escalating and to avoid military conflict.

At the same time, the Soviets informed the US that they had not been involved in the incident and were working to calm the situation and ease overall tensions. The Soviet leadership, concerned that the situation might escalate into total war, sought to avoid tension arising from misunderstanding by reining in the DPRK while clarifying the Soviet position to the US.[17]

In response to Soviet criticism and opposition, the DPRK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement stressing that country's desire for a peaceful solution to the unification of the Korean Peninsula. It called for an apology from the US for spying and proposed exchanging the crew of the USS *Pueblo* for captured DPRK guerrillas. On March 1, Kim Il Sung was obliged to inform the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK that his nation did not intend military action.[18] It seems unlikely that the DPRK's seizure of the USS *Pueblo* was undertaken with total war in mind at the time. It would have been almost impossible to commence an all-out war, with the US Seventh Fleet and other US forces gathered off Wonsan following the USS *Pueblo*'s seizure. And yet skirmishes along the MDL between the DPRK and ROK forces, and DPRK infiltrations into the ROK, continued.

Then, US President Lyndon B. Johnson stunned his allies, the ROK and Japan, by announcing in a March 31, 1968 televised speech that he would halt bombing in North Vietnam and that he would not run for another term as president.[19] The DPRK undoubtedly saw this as the result of US military power being spread too thin and as a sign assuring victory for revolution in the South. Within months, the DPRK staged large-scale infiltrations by 120 guerrillas, some to Jeju Island in August and the rest to Uljin and Samcheok in Gangwon Province in November, in order to construct operating bases in the ROK. This was hardly total war, but the DPRK incursions were rising, in scale and intensity.

2.1.2 The Dual Threat

The ROK had not taken the DPRK's actions particularly seriously until the rapid escalation in DPRK provocations in 1967. Parliamentary inspection of the Ministry of National Defense at a November 10, 1966 meeting of the National Defense Committee of the ROK's National Assembly is indicative: when asked if the provocations might be a prelude to the DPRK opening a second front, National Defense Minister Kim Sung-eun replied that the provocations were designed to discourage the ROK from sending troops to Vietnam, not a sign of another invasion.[20]

American perspectives varied. General Charles H. Bonesteel III, commander of US Forces Korea, and the UNC Korea commander in chief, had assessed the situation as marking the DPRK's shift to a new aggressive policy. But William P. Bundy, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, read it as no more than an attempt by the DRPK to disrupt the April 1967 elections in the ROK.[21]

As the DPRK stepped up its attacks, the perception in the ROK changed. South Koreans felt that the DPRK was attempting to secure bases for guerrilla warfare within the ROK, following the Vietcong model, with the ultimate goal of all-out war.[22] Opinions within the US government about the prospect of total war were divided. There was a deep-seated view that the likelihood of DPRK attacks on the MDL expanding into total war was low, stemming from an inability to judge for certain whether China and the USSR supported the DPRK's guerrilla operations. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believed that the DPRK "undertook its program of violence of its own volition, not under pressure from either Moscow or Peking," and that this program did not "indicate a present Communist intention to invade South Korea." The CIA concluded that without support from those countries, the DPRK lacked the capacity to launch total war on its own.[23]

Consequently, the US emphasis during this period was on how to respond to low-intensity DPRK aggression. To mop up DPRK guerrillas, the ROK had deployed police, rather than regular army forces guarding the MDL and coastline. The US approved, but US Ambassador to the ROK William J. Porter saw a flaw in this approach. If lightly armed ROK police clashed with well-trained, well-equipped DPRK guerrillas, especially in the mountains, the police would suffer "serious friendly casualties" and this, Porter maintained, would cause South Koreans to doubt their government's ability to handle the DPRK threat. Porter accordingly used US emergency aid to provide the ROK with the funds for equipment to strengthen the capability of its police force.[24]

ROK President Park Chung-hee was concerned that the excessive degree of US involvement in Vietnam would complicate the rapid deployment of US forces to aid the ROK in an emergency. The rise in DPRK provocations, as though in tandem with deteriorating conditions in Vietnam, were enough to make the ROK uneasy about US power. In Park's view, Kim Il Sung carried out the guerrilla infiltrations fully aware of the Vietnam situation, in preparation for an all-out attack. To slow the DPRK's momentum, Park pressed for US countermeasures whenever the DPRK violated the

armistice.[25] He argued that the DPRK's localized provocations should be contained before they could escalate into total war.

The Blue House raid and capture of the USS *Pueblo* at the end of January 1968 raised ROK and international awareness of the intent and seriousness of DPRK provocations. General Bonesteel observed that, as DPRK provocations had exceeded US estimates and at a higher tempo, Kim Il Sung might have miscalculated the US capacity to deal simultaneously with a situation on the Korean Peninsula and a war in Vietnam. He noted the danger if the credibility of a US deterrent against overt action by the DPRK remained in doubt and underlined the importance of a US response for maintaining the credibility of the US-ROK alliance.[26] That alliance was forged through the October 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea to deter DRPK aggression.

The Japanese government, meanwhile, viewed the situation on the Korean Peninsula in the context of its connection to the Vietnam War. The security crisis of January 1968 caused Foreign Minister Miki Takeo concern for the impact on Japan of the DPRK's virulent policy toward it. He believed that the DPRK had concluded that the US lacked the capacity to assist the ROK even in the event of a small-scale conventional war on the Korean Peninsula.[27]

At the third meeting of the Japan-US Security Sub-Committee (SSC), which took place on the same day as the Blue House raid, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Ushiba Nobuhiko noted that the DPRK had shifted to a hard line as of December 1967 and was aiming to imitate North Vietnam's campaign in South Vietnam. He even touched on the possibility that the DPRK might have assessed the current situation as more advantageous than that in 1950, when it launched the Korean War. Ushiba gave the following three reasons for this claim:

(1) Because the US had a significant military force in Vietnam, it did not have the resources to dispatch forces on the scale it had during the Korean War should conflict break out on the Korean Peninsula.
(2) With the Vietnam War placing the US in a politically difficult position internationally, the US would be hard pressed to seek the assistance from others to build the international consensus necessary to end yet another war of national liberation on the Korean Peninsula once it started.
(3) Just as international opinion still prevented the US from sending its ground forces north of the 17th parallel even when North Vietnamese regulars conducted attacks in South Vietnam, it would also prevent US ground forces from advancing north of the 38th parallel if DPRK forces engaged in small-scale, limited operations across the demarcation line.[28]

The Japanese government overall, though, did not put a very high probability on the likelihood of total war on the Korean Peninsula. The Security Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised the necessity for studying the three types of military threats in Asia: nuclear, conventional warfare, and low-intensity aggression, emphasizing the last type. It assessed that the US nuclear deterrent made an all-out war from China's use of nuclear weapons or from conventional forces a low probability. It pointed out the potential for armed disputes to be linked with low-intensity aggression under the strategic ideology of a war of national liberation, and

to develop into conflict. From this perspective, it concluded, the ROK was the country requiring the most attention.[29]

2.2 "Complementing" the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty

2.2.1 Military Retaliation Versus Diplomatic Efforts

The US and ROK agreed that DPRK provocations were a threat but disagreed on the response. The ROK argued for military reprisals. The US acknowledged ROK apprehensions yet quashed a military response because of the potential high cost, in lives, land, and more. Instead, it chose a plan to propose talks with the DPRK and requested through diplomatic channels that the Soviet Union mediate.

On January 24, 1968, following the Blue House and USS *Pueblo* incidents, the US Department of State communicated to the ROK government US intentions to resolve issues on the Korean Peninsula through the Military Armistice Commission and diplomatic talks with the Soviet Union. It also expressed opposition to reprisals for the raid on the Blue House.[30] The State Department argued that retaliatory attacks by the ROK would raise tensions and could lead to total war. Unexpressed was that the US, bogged down in Vietnam, would find it difficult to wage war on the second front on the Korean Peninsula.

President Park responded that the absence of retaliation by the US did not preclude unilateral ROK reprisals, arguing that only a hard-line response would keep the DPRK at bay. To stop unilateral military action by the ROK, the US warned that it would pull its forces from the ROK.[31] In other words, the US was worried about one more factor of instability on the Korean Peninsula along with DPRK provocations: ROK reprisals sparking a wider conflict.

Faced with US opposition on this point, the ROK had no choice but to change its stance. On January 24, President Park informed Ambassador Porter that the DPRK was claiming that the attack on the Blue House was part of a popular uprising in the ROK, refusing to apologize, while also ignoring demands for the return of the USS *Pueblo*. Park added that the US stance sent the wrong signal and could damage US and ROK prestige. Nonetheless, out of his respect for the UNC, he pledged not take any unilateral action—in this instance.[32]

The Park administration's taking retaliatory measures presented the Johnson administration with the same predicament that the US had faced 20 years earlier, when Syngman Rhee, the ROK president at the time, wanted to reunify the Korean Peninsula by marching north. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk assessed US-South Korea relations as being at their lowest point since Rhee's time and expressed anger at ROK skepticism of US commitment. US troops had been in the ROK ever since the Korean War. The US had provided the country with economic and military assistance accounting for nearly half of Marshall Plan resources. So the ROK's attitude was simply incomprehensible. Rusk opined that neither nation was a satellite of the

other, sounding a warning of entrapment, the prospect of the US being dragged along by the ROK.[33]

The US had not, of course, completely excluded armed response options. Following the seizure of the USS *Pueblo*, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Pentagon drafted a proposal for the US president of military action, including the mining of Wonsan Port. At a January 25 meeting at the White House, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle G. Wheeler laid out possible military options for President Johnson: (1) place mines in Wonsan Harbor, which would require bombing military facilities there; (2) mine other DPRK ports; (3) interdict coastal shipping; (4) strike any one of a list of targets in the DPRK by air or by air and naval gun fire; or (5) replace the USS *Pueblo* with another ship.[34] Other than the last, these all envisage military reprisals, albeit limited and local.

That such military reprisals were discussed arose from an awareness of how bad things were for the US in Vietnam. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara felt that the Soviets and North Vietnamese would interpret a dovish response as weakness, substantially prolonging the Vietnam War. The Johnson administration initially viewed the Blue House raid not as a unilateral action by the DPRK but as a collusive act between the DPRK and the Soviet Union. The US perceived that all these events were part of a larger Communist conspiracy, as is clear from a comment by President Johnson that he would not be surprised if something happened in Berlin to coincide with what is going on in Vietnam and in Korea.[35]

Yet, when it came to actually taking retaliatory measures militarily, the US was extremely cautious. Some advisors warned that even limited reprisals might fuel tensions and lead to total war rather than prevent it. Clark M. Clifford, for instance, who had just testified before the Senate on his nomination as the next secretary of defense, rejected the possibility of the DPRK launching all-out war but expressed deep caution toward any US military act. He was "deeply sorry" about the ship and its 83 crewmen but did not think them "worth a resumption of the Korean War," and he called for a cool-headed, measured response.[36]

Thus, the Johnson administration turned its subsequent discussion over a response to the Korean Peninsula crisis toward military action in support of diplomatic efforts. Its preference was for talks with the DPRK and diplomatic efforts in conjunction with the Soviet Union to secure the return of the USS *Pueblo*'s crewmembers. It also decided on an airlift of the counter-infiltration package, equipment the ROK needed to stamp out DPRK guerrillas, in accordance with General Bonesteel's request.[37]

However, the difference between the US and the ROK in how to respond to the incidents became obvious at the time of the first secret talks between the US and the DPRK on resolving the USS *Pueblo* issue, held on February 2 in Panmunjom.[38] The ROK feared that these secret talks would be taken as US political recognition of the DPRK, and that they would sideline any response to the Blue House raid.

For the US, however, the USS *Pueblo* incident and the Blue House raid were matters requiring different responses. It felt that pursuing talks with the DPRK over the USS *Pueblo* could secure the immediate release of its crewmen, whereas it judged that the Blue House issue was unlikely to be resolved through direct bilateral talks or

protests made at the Military Armistice Commission. Rather, the US had decided to bolster the ROK military posture and ability to "repel and punish" DPRK guerrillas.[39]

President Johnson noted in a message to President Park that US negotiations with the DPRK to resolve the USS *Pueblo* issue were of a different order to the issue of ROK security. He stressed the greater importance of strengthening ROK military capabilities for the long term. Specifically, he indicated that the US would provide $100 million in assistance in addition to the counter-infiltration package worked out between General Bonesteel and Minister of National Defense Kim Sung-eun.[40]

The ROK nevertheless raised the need for its representation at the US-DPRK talks. But foreseeing the DPRK's rejection of this idea, the US found the ROK's proposal impossible to accept. Instead, the US was forced to take steps to improve public opinion in the ROK without upsetting its secret talks with the DPRK. This included US acquiescence to the ROK's request that President Johnson dispatch an emissary to the ROK.

2.2.2 Visit to the ROK by US Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and the US-ROK Joint Communiqué

One point of contention between the US and the ROK was the issue of complementing their Mutual Defense Treaty. The two countries disagreed on whether to expand the scope of the treaty to include low-intensity aggression. To resolve the disagreement, President Johnson dispatched Special Envoy Cyrus R. Vance to the ROK.

Ahead of Vance's visit, the ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew up several drafts: a joint communiqué, under the direction of the office of the president; a series of secret agreed minutes that included a call for strengthening the ROK's defense capability; and a joint defense declaration containing warnings to the DPRK, including of military reprisals. The emphasis in these documents was on agreement between the US and the ROK to undertake automatic, joint retaliatory responses, including counter-infiltration operations, to North Korean guerrilla incursions, which were not envisaged in the original Mutual Defense Treaty.[41] In other words, the ROK's goal was to expand the concept of threats covered by that treaty to include low-intensity aggression, to supplement any institutional deficiencies justifying military reprisals. On February 10, the day that the Foreign Affairs Ministry drew up these documents, ROK officials held a preparatory meeting with Ambassador Porter to lay out the following framework for consultations with Vance:

(1) Releasing ROK forces from the UNC's operational control so that they can deploy immediately against intruders.
(2) Announcing and taking punitive measures against the DPRK if intrusions continue.
(3) Inserting language in the treaty to the effect that the US president can commit US forces without time-consuming congressional debate and approval, to reaffirm the US commitment to the ROK.[42]

The ROK went beyond merely asserting the validity of its argument to release ROK forces from the operational control of the UNC to enable their immediate

response to an intrusion. It also argued that the principle of "hot pursuit" should be applied to ROK forces engaging DPRK intruders, that is, permitting them to continue their counter-infiltration operations north of the MDL. As for targets for reprisals, the ROK also proposed guerrilla training camps. Finally, as to the issue of language regarding immediate intervention by US forces in an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK floated the idea of revising the Mutual Defense Treaty which stipulated that the US would make a decision to intervene in an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, acting in accordance with its constitutional process.

Upon receipt of this information from Porter, Secretary of State Rusk sent a telegram to Vance expressing dissatisfaction with the ROK's demands for commitments from the US above and beyond the Mutual Defense Treaty. Rusk directed Vance to tell President Park that the treaty could not be revised. He added that the US was opposed to military reprisals for guerrilla infiltrations because they could lead to all-out war. Rusk instructed Vance, moreover, to counter a possible ROK threat to withdraw ROK troops from Vietnam for domestic security deployment with the threat of US troop withdrawal from the ROK.[43]

Curiously, in their talks with Vance, the South Koreans only emphasized the need for retaliatory action but did not raise the issues of operational control or treaty revision.[44] President Park saw the guerrilla infiltrations as reconnaissance operations to test the ROK's defenses. He also expressed concern that the DPRK's momentum might become unstoppable if appeasement continued, ultimately inviting a second Korean War. Park wanted the US and ROK to demand the DPRK cease its guerrilla operations, and to publicly state their determination to retaliate should the DPRK continue its provocations.[45] A warning, he argued, could obviate the need for retaliation and prevent war.

Vance reiterated US opposition to retaliatory action because it might lead to general hostilities. He argued that it would be difficult to establish in advance the scope of reprisals and appropriate action.[46] He rejected the ROK insistence on reprisals against guerrilla infiltrations that were included in the joint defense declaration and the agreed minutes presented by Foreign Minister Choi Kyu-ha because they required revising the existing Mutual Defense Treaty.[47] To counter the ROK's communiqué draft that referred to an "automatic retaliatory response," Vance put forward the US draft language "to undertake immediate consultations" in an effort to limit it to reaffirming the treaty.[48]

Key among the points made by Vance during the talks was that, as the raid on the Blue House could not be regarded as an invasion, he drew a distinction between guerrilla incursions and total war. Vance urged that the Mutual Defense Treaty be brought into play only in the event of total war, whereas low-intensity aggression be approached more cautiously, after bolstering army and police capabilities.[49] In short, the US wanted no expansion of the scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

Interestingly, views on how to manage crises on the Korean Peninsula were not consistent within the ROK government. Vance concluded that the demand for reprisals against the DPRK was not a bureaucratic policy but, rather, an emotional response from President Park.[50] Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon and other bureaucrats had, in fact, asked Vance to constrain Park in his quest for reprisals.

For instance, Chung and Chief Presidential Secretary Lee Hu-rak requested that Vance make clear to Park that his plans for unilateral action against the DPRK would only destroy the ROK's economy and hopes for the future; furthermore, they would seriously endanger continuing US support. Chung also recommended that Vance meet alone with Park and explain that President Johnson, too, had grave domestic problems and that the two leaders should stand together at this time.[51]

Seeking to minimize friction with the US, Lee Hu-rak had advised Park that when stressing the need for unilateral military retaliation to the US, he should ensure that Vance understood that the ROK would consult with the US before undertaking such action.[52] Some ROK army generals did not favor unilateral military action, but they had no choice but to act on orders from Park, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces under the ROK constitution.[53]

The Korea-US Joint Communiqué, issued on February 15 in Seoul at the conclusion of the talks, was a reaffirmation of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Its second paragraph stipulates that:

> … they [Park and Vance] agreed that, if such aggression [by DPRK guerrillas] continued, the two countries would promptly determine what action should be taken under the Mutual Defense Treaty. They reaffirmed the commitment of the two countries to undertake immediate consultations whenever the security of the Republic of Korea is threatened.[54]

In the communiqué's third paragraph, they announced a new US-ROK defense ministerial meeting, which they agreed to hold annually.

President Park initially opposed the public release of the communiqué because it lacked a reference to automatic retaliation. He insisted that his spokesman announce that there were also secret agreed minutes.[55] Ultimately, he agreed to the document's release when Vance suggested that failing to issue a statement might lead to speculation about disagreement between the US and ROK.

The ROK's Foreign Ministry welcomed the second paragraph of the joint communiqué as effectively complementing the Mutual Defense Treaty, for it had suspected that the existing treaty only addressed external armed attack and would not cover provocation by the DPRK in violation of the Armistice Agreement. For that reason, the ministry assessed that the wording in the communiqué's second paragraph that "the two countries would promptly determine what action should be taken under the Mutual Defense Treaty" if DPRK aggression continued meant that the treaty would now cover such acts of aggression, albeit not all-out or overt external armed attack, a noteworthy development.[56]

Also remarkable is how the ministry's analysis and commentary touches on the matter of automatic retaliation specified in the proposed revisions to the Mutual Defense Treaty and to the joint communiqué draft originally presented by the ROK government. The ministry rebutted the argument that the Mutual Defense Treaty needed to be revised because it lacked language on automatic retaliation in the event of an enemy attack, on the grounds that it could find no other example of such language in any other mutual defense treaty that the US had concluded with a free nation.[57]

The ministry viewed the establishment of regular meetings between defense ministers as institutionalizing the Mutual Defense Treaty. Although Article II of the treaty stipulates that "The parties will consult together whenever … the … security of either … is threatened by external armed attack," a consultation framework between defense officials had in fact not existed until that point.[58]

The US side, meanwhile, appeared satisfied that the ROK had abandoned the idea of military reprisals and accepted the US-DPRK talks at Panmunjom for the return of the USS *Pueblo* crewmen. The Americans also felt that their provision of equipment and assistance needed for counter-infiltration operations and to modernize the ROK military had reassured the ROK of the dependability of their alliance. Looking long term, the US assessed that the establishment of defense minister meetings would have the effect of constraining ROK reprisals for DPRK provocations, which it estimated could well become more frequent.[59] In short, the US felt that it had confirmed the dependability of the alliance and dissuaded the ROK from military reprisals.

Further, the US did not interpret the ROK's April 1968 decision to establish a Homeland Reserve Force (a sort of military home guard) as the ROK disengaging from the UNC's operational control but rather complementing it.[60] The US appraisal was that ROK policy had shifted away from reprisals to self-defense, so that the US-ROK alliance would hold in responding to overt hostilities and that this new domestic reserve force, enhancing emergency defense capabilities, would handle counter-infiltration operations.

2.3 Bolstering ROK Police Capabilities and Japan, the ROK, and the US

2.3.1 The ROK in the Context of Japan-US Security Consultations

Following Special Envoy Vance's visit to the ROK, the US Department of State requested that Japan cooperate in concrete terms with the ROK. Prior to that, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku had sent a letter to President Park commiserating with him on the recent attacks[61] and expressing understanding for the ability of US forces to sortie from their bases in Japan to the ROK. The Japanese government had also informed US Ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that, as Japan had not interfered with the US military's aircraft sorties from its bases in Japan during crises on the Korean Peninsula, it would not oppose such sorties to rescue ships on the high seas, even without prior consultation.[62] The State Department, however, was critical that none of the measures Japan had taken were made public for fear of becoming embroiled militarily, a situation which placed the onus on the US for all substantive action.[63]

The US could not disguise its irritation with Japan over its response. Secretary of State Rusk grumbled that Tokyo's dissembling was nearly impossible to bear given that Japan was a major beneficiary of the blood being spilled by the US in

the defense of the Far East and that Japan's attitude needed to change.[64] The State Department demanded substantive cooperation. Richard L. Sneider, the officer in charge of Japanese affairs at the State Department, proposed the following three policy alternatives for Japanese cooperation and stressed the importance of ROK security for Japan and the US:

(1) To strengthen the countersubversion capabilities of the ROK;
(2) To restrain the ROK from an understandable urge to retaliate in kind;
(3) To convince the North Koreans to cease their infiltration and other subversive efforts by measures short of retaliation and not involving the risk of escalation.[65]

Enhancing the ROK's ability to resist DPRK incursions was viewed as the most achievable, albeit costly, of these options. He gave the example of bolstering the equipment used by the ROK police to engage in counter-infiltration operations. He added that ROK retaliatory action out of concern for its security should be avoided. In addition, Sneider cited the need to take symbolic measures to demonstrate Japan's cooperation with the ROK in countering the Communist threat, including suspending Japanese trade with the DPRK, halting the return of ethnic Korean residents in Japan to the North, and addressing other programs of interest to the DPRK and where Japan might hold some policy influence.

On February 19, 1968, based on Sneider's proposals, Assistant Secretary Bundy pushed for Japanese government cooperation through Japanese Ambassador to the US Shimoda Takesō.[66] Ambassador Shimoda suggested that assistance to the ROK police was possible but demurred on the other measures.

Rusk telegrammed Ambassador Johnson in Japan, saying that the fundamental objective was to involve Japan in wide-ranging efforts to ameliorate tension on the Korean Peninsula. Thus the basic policy Japan had pursued to date, being only cooperation to develop the ROK's economy, was inadequate. He wanted Japan to make direct, meaningful efforts to prevent DPRK incursions, thereby forestalling the ROK from retaliating from a sense of isolation, unease, and anger at being stopped from taking military reprisals or putting any sort of pressure against the DPRK. Rusk called on Japan to elevate its political engagement with the ROK and provide the equipment the ROK required to deal with guerrilla infiltrations. To turn these ideas into a concrete policy, he suggested that Japan should send a special envoy to the ROK to gauge the situation there.

At the same time, the US was also encouraging the ROK to appeal directly to the Japanese government for assistance.[67] Ambassador Johnson urged ROK Ambassador to Japan Eom Min-young to do so. According to Johnson, Eom agreed with the proposal but failed to make the request. Johnson, deducing that Eom had not received different instructions from home on this matter, asked Ambassador Porter in Seoul to ascertain the ROK government's intentions.[68] Porter replied that high-ranking ROK government officials had no thoughts or plans to seek assistance from Japan. Porter added that despite broaching the topic whenever he had contact with these officials, they remained incapable of changing their attitude toward Japan.

Johnson then made a direct request on the ROK's behalf to the Japanese government. On February 26, he suggested to Foreign Minister Miki Takeo that, with the

ROK not in a position to take the initiative, Japan needed to make the first move and that the situation was ripe for Japan to extend the hand of friendship. He encouraged Japan to send a senior government official or politician to the ROK to engage in friendly talks with President Park and his ministers. Miki told Johnson that the Japanese government was showing concern for the ROK's security and indicated that he would act on Johnson's proposal.[69]

Around that time, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Diet member Chiba Saburō proposed to Cha Ji-cheol, a National Assembly member from the ROK's ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP), that they convene a roundtable of parliamentarians from both countries to discuss issues of mutual concern. Two months later, on June 6, 1968, the first Japan-ROK parliamentarian roundtable was held in Seoul. The influential Kaya Okinori from Japan's House of Representatives and eight other members of the LDP's Security Committee participated in discussing ROK security issues.[70] The ROK, satisfied that Japan's initiatives to improve relations were sincere, responded by requesting Japanese cooperation in shoring up the ROK's defenses against the DPRK's ongoing provocations.

2.3.2 The ROK's Request for Cooperation

In addition to wanting Japan to cut its trade ties with the DPRK completely, the ROK expected Japanese cooperation in dealing with the Korean Peninsula crisis out of a recognition on Japan's part of the close security relationship between the two countries.

The Japanese government, however, used the excuse of domestic circumstances to avoid enunciating its position on the Korean Peninsula. It had been facing frequent protests over a port call by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise* and the US's use of its Okinawan air bases for B-52 bombing runs on Vietnam. The security crisis arising from the attack on the ROK's Blue House increased Japanese concern about being dragged into a conflict in Asia through its connection with the US.[71]

Moreover, even though the ROK government had communicated the results of its investigation of that attack to Japanese government,[72] major Japanese newspapers were striking a balance between the DPRK and ROK perspectives, such as by citing DPRK statements that the Blue House attack was a domestic uprising and that the USS *Pueblo* had been spying in DPRK waters. The ROK government protested to the Japanese ambassador and minister at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul that the Japanese media reports were distorting the truth.[73] On January 29, it released a statement in which ROK Minister of Public Information Hong Jong-chul pointed out the shortcomings of the newspaper reporting in Japan. Two days later, a staff member at the Seoul bureau of the *Yomiuri Shimbun* was assaulted by South Korean citizens and an anti-Japan demonstration was held outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.[74] Japanese Ambassador to the ROK Kimura Shirōshichi consequently called on Foreign Minister Choi Kyu-ha to express his regret over the incidents, touching

on the potential they posed for sowing division in the friendly relations between the two countries.[75]

Ambassador Eom suggested to his government that he visit Prime Minister Satō to make him aware that Japan's security was directly linked to the ROK's and to seek Japan's assistance.[76] The ROK Foreign Ministry agreed and instructed him to seek such a meeting. The ministry advised that it was not after a simple recognition of the facts by the Japanese government concerning the DPRK acts of aggression. Rather, it desired a statement from Japan on its decision that it would not do anything to help the DPRK in any way, taking a more forward-leaning posture in support of the ROK's position. The ROK, the ministry emphasized, wanted this announced as policy to the wider world.[77]

As mentioned earlier, Satō had sent a personal note to President Park on January 29, 1968, following the Blue House attack.[78] Park responded in a letter to the ROK Embassy in Japan, and Eom used the opportunity of conveying Park's reply to Satō to request Japan's cooperation with the ROK. Eom argued that: (1) the ROK's security was directly linked to Japan's; (2) Japan must not aid, in any way, the aggressive DPRK; (3) instead, Japan should further assist the ROK's economic development and thus help liberate and unify the Korean Peninsula; and (4) such Japanese support of the ROK was consistent with Japanese interests. Thus, close bilateral cooperation was in the mutual interest of both countries in achieving common goals.

Upon receiving a copy of the Park letter, Asian Affairs Bureau Deputy Director General Kanazawa Masao, of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, started by saying that, while Japan supported the ROK's position, the government often had its hands tied, having to take into account domestic concerns that supporting the ROK would lead to Japan being dragged into the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. He also expressed difficulty in understanding what the DPRK had tried to achieve in its attack on the Blue House, giving his read of the situation: the fact DPRK infiltrations had not continued suggested that Pyongyang was nursing a deep sense of failure.[79] Given that there appeared to be no imminent danger of general hostilities, Kanazawa added, Japan's contribution would be to further cooperate through economic means so that the ROK would achieve rapid development.

On February 21, Ambassador Porter asked Prime Minister Chung if he was prepared to accept Japan's help if Japan were to offer to contribute to enhancing the equipment the ROK needed to deal with guerrilla infiltrations. Chung was clearly against the idea, suggesting that they perhaps revisit the issue in a year. He said that the goal of the ROK's Japan policy was to make the benefits that Japan gained from the economic cooperation it extended to the ROK a bargaining chip in the North-South standoff. Chung revealed that the thrust of his government's Japan policy was to induce Japanese investment in the ROK and thereby deepen Japan's involvement in the development of the ROK economy rather than to have Japan assist with counter-infiltration equipment.

Why did the ROK government not want to request Japanese assistance with the equipment it needed to counter DPRK infiltrations? In my personal view, there were two likely reasons. The first was that ROK public opinion was opposed to security cooperation with Japan. Porter observed that the ROK government made no effort to

change public opinion on Japan; it just regarded the way Japanese media reported on the Blue House incident as problematic.[80] To explore security cooperation with Japan amid the lingering aftermath of the protests against the Japan-ROK normalization talks would have been a considerable political burden.[81]

Second, the ROK government may have judged that the immediate challenge was to get economic cooperation with Japan on a solid trajectory. The first Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference was held the previous year, in 1967, and bilateral economic cooperation was just gathering steam under the Japanese government's lead, facts that would have been important considerations for the ROK. The government probably decided that if economic cooperation with Japan advanced and Japanese direct investment increased, Japan would be unable to remain disinterested in ROK security issues.

By February 26, 1968, just five days after Porter's meeting with the prime minister, the ROK reversed its position. It had firmed up plans to introduce high-performance patrol boats from Japan to use for coastal patrols and to prevent attacks and fishing boat seizures by DPRK spy craft. Following the Blue House raid, the ROK had launched an across-the-board effort to enhance police equipment, essential elements of which were deemed to be upgraded telecommunications equipment and bringing in the necessary equipment from Japan to combat guerrilla operations.[82] On February 26, Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) Director Kim Hyong-uk revealed to Japanese Ambassador Kimura that the ROK was working to bolster its police equipment to deal with DPRK guerrilla infiltrations. He requested that Japan assist the ROK by providing three-quarter-ton trucks, jeeps, telecommunications equipment, and speedboats.[83] On February 28, Chief Presidential Secretary Lee Hu-rak informed Kimura that the ROK wanted $10 million, either as a grant or as a low-interest, long-term loan. These requests were not discussed at the administrative level at the ROK Economic Planning Board (EPB) until early March, an EPB official revealed to Japan. The request for assistance by the KCIA director-*cum*-Park confidante and the reiteration by Park's chief secretary of ROK policy therefore suggest that it was around this time that the ROK's Office of the President and related agencies had locked in the policy of asking Japan for assistance with equipment.

On March 8, ROK Deputy Prime Minister and EPB Minister Park Chung-hoon paid a courtesy call on Japanese Prime Minister Satō. He observed that there was little immediate likelihood of general hostilities, yet were they to break out, the ROK could handle frontline national defense. Even should a conventional war start, because of the US commitment, it could be stopped through the joint defense of US and ROK forces. Deputy Prime Minister Park emphasized that the DPRK's intention was to sow chaos and disorder in the ROK to delay the construction of its economy. He then conveyed what he said was a special request from President Park to Satō: special assistance from Japan to equip the ROK police with trucks, speedboats, jeeps, and telecommunications equipment.[84] This clarified that the emphasis of ROK security policy was not on a conventional sort of war but on equipping its police to deal with the frequent infiltrations by armed DPRK agents.

Deputy Prime Minister Park specified that the ROK did not intend to publicly announce that it had requested Japan's assistance with equipment, adding that he

hoped Japan would give the request its favorable consideration. Satō responded positively with a promise to study the matter. At separate meeting, Foreign Minister Miki asked Deputy Prime Minister Park if the ROK experienced many incidents of DPRK infiltrations by sea, showing interest in offering speedboats.[85] Working-level consultations, meanwhile, between Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba and EPB executive officer Yang Yun-se involved a discussion of the funds required to import the equipment.[86] Yang gave his view that handling such funds within the framework for the settlement of property and claims would be impossible.[87]

Back in the ROK, Yang asked Ambassador Kimura on April 26 for equipment, including five 100-ton speedboats, thirty 30-ton boats, and thirty-five sets of auxiliary equipment for the boats, telecommunications equipment, and trucks. He also asked for grants and long-term, low-interest loans to fund this equipment. Furthermore, Yang proposed drawing on around $10 million in cash that the Korean National Railroad had earmarked for rolling stock to get the Japanese equipment for the ROK police in place quickly and quietly.[88]

The fact that the ROK had repeatedly asked Japan for assistance with police equipment was because it considered equipment for police use to be different from arms for military use. The ROK reasoned that Japanese cooperation was possible because trucks, unarmed speedboats, and telecommunications equipment were ordinary export items.[89] The more important issue was securing funds for the equipment. The ROK initially sought grants or long-term, low-interest government loans (5.25% over 15 years) totaling $10 million, possibly drawn from the settlement of claims framework. Bilateral consultations, however, convinced the ROK to take out a long-term, low-interest commercial loan instead.

2.3.3 Japan's Response

The Japanese government's response to the ROK request indicated a willingness to cooperate on security. On April 26, Prime Minister Satō agreed with ROK Ambassador to Japan Eom that cooperation was needed to bolster ROK police capabilities. He observed that military assistance would be problematic, but that Japan could probably help if the assistance was framed as police cooperation.[90]

Working-level discussions in Japan, however, revealed disagreements between Japanese ministries on what exports were possible under Japan's Three Principles on Arms Exports. The difference of opinion arose between Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which supported the equipment exports as ensuring ROK domestic security, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which opposed them. On May 6, representatives of those two ministries and the Japan Coast Guard met to resolve their differences. They identified two points of contention.

First was the question of whether the ROK could be regarded as being one of those "countries involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts" to which arms exports were banned under the Three Principles.[91] The two ministries were already debating the export of police rifles and ammunition to Thailand, with MITI focusing

discussion on Thailand's involvement in the Vietnam War, the state of progress of the Paris peace talks, and the relationship between police and army.[92] In MITI's judgment, the ROK's troop deployments to Vietnam made it a country "involved in … international conflicts," and its relations with the DPRK made it a country "likely to be involved" in one.

Second was the issue of whether speedboats constituted arms. Japanese government policy to date was unclear on whether the Three Principles applied to such police equipment.[93] MITI, however, was convinced that speedboats were a strategic good that could be turned to naval use as defined by the international Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).

Matsuura Kōichirō, an official from the foreign ministry's Economic Affairs Bureau, asked the Cabinet Legislation Bureau for its legal interpretation of the matters in contention between the ministries, namely "countries involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts" and if arms are defined as goods "which are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat." The Cabinet Legislation Bureau response suggested that the choice of interpretation raised policy questions that required high-level political decision-making. The ministry's Northeast Asia Division Director Noda Eijirō then offered this argument to MITI:

> We do not expect that conventional war will break out between the DPRK and ROK. What we seek is to provide assistance to the ROK as it tries to take measures to maintain civil order and deal with DPRK guerrilla activity carried out within ROK territory. So, clearly this matter does not constitute an international conflict. Also, the items in question are not firearms.[94]

That prompted MITI to question if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could say unequivocally that suppressing guerrillas was not an international conflict. Noda replied that yes, it could. MITI then raised the potential military-use issue. Noda pointed out that, in the case of the ROK, the coast guard and maritime police were components of that country's Ministry of Home Affairs, organizations entirely separate from its armed forces. Consequently, he concluded, transfer of the items in question to the military was unlikely; furthermore, it was improbable that these Japanese exports would be transported by ROK forces to Vietnam.

MITI summarized the discussion in a May 18 document, "Introduction of Police Equipment into the ROK," in which its cautious attitude remained unchanged.[95] The ministry admitted that speedboats were provisionally determined not to constitute arms. Yet, it maintained that, as they would be used to counter DPRK guerrilla operations, speedboats might not be arms per se, but they constituted "strategic goods" tantamount to arms. Factoring in Japanese public sentiment, ministry officials felt that, as the responsible authorities, speedboat exports were unwise. They did, though, desire more details of the technical specifications, intended uses, and end users before making a final decision on the matter, including whether speedboats constituted arms.

With the differences of opinion yet unresolved, the discussion turned to the issue of finding a unified government view of interpreting the Three Principles. Foreign affairs officials agreed with their trade ministry counterparts that rather than settling

on a unified view, decisions had to be made on a case-by-case, common-sense basis, but they raised the following issues. First, specific issues (such as the speedboat issue) had to be settled on a case-by-case basis as the ministries ultimately could not resolve their long-standing differences of opinion. Second, the legislative intent of the unified view of the Three Principles appeared to exclude police equipment, which their counterparts tacitly acknowledged. Third, they were concerned that if arms exports became a diplomatic issue in the future, the foreign ministry would lose the ability to plead the standard government view to persuade their MITI counterparts.

As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs struggled to find common ground with its counterpart, its Asian Affairs Bureau firmed up a policy that Japan should cooperate to preserve the ROK's internal security against guerilla infiltration. Bureau officials concluded that, as it was Prime Minister Satō who had responded positively to the ROK's overtures, in the end it was his political decision that was required to settle the matter. They went so far as to point out that if the matter was raised in the Diet, it would need to be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly responding to parliamentary questions, not MITI.[96]

On the issue of payment, whereas the ROK requested a grant or a long-term, low-interest loan to cover the equipment, from the outset the Japanese side had preferred a cash settlement. Japan pointed out that if its annual $20 million interest-bearing loan assistance (see endnote 89) to the ROK was used to pay for the requested police equipment, the scale of the programs that the loan assistance was originally intended for would have to be reduced, which was not acceptable. Japan suggested that it could help with a private-sector commercial loan if the ROK made its speedboat request within the framework of general shipping and fishing cooperation.

But any new loan, public or private, would be intensely debated in the Japanese Diet because the intended use of the speedboats was to defend against DPRK infiltration operations, and so the Japanese side deemed actual export of such items in that case as very unlikely.[97] In working-level efforts to find a solution, Ambassador Kimura noted the delicacy of the loan issue at home and abroad and offered his personal opinion that a cash purchase was best.[98] The Economic Cooperation Bureau within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concurred at that time. It gave three reasons for the difficulty of approving commercial credit in Japan. First, the conditions for deferred payments of a commercial loan would require rigorous examination by the trade and finance ministries. The mere possibility of Japanese equipment being put to military use was anticipated to attract strong opposition from those ministries and the Diet. Second, the purpose of the loan might not fit with the consensus view on the scope of commercial credit provision. Priority had been given to the areas of electric power, public transport, and public telecommunications exports, so the financing of police equipment under these terms might be a challenge. The foreign ministry also calculated that approval of this commercial credit would end up expanding Japan's commercial credit framework for fiscal year (FY) 1968, which would be stiffly opposed by the Ministry of Finance.

The noneconomic nature of the ROK's requested items was the third difficulty. Japan could not offer the long-term, low-interest loan conditions that the ROK sought.[99] As an alternative, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed that the Korean

National Railroad's purchase of rolling stock, contracted to be settled in cash, could be converted to a commercial loan, freeing up that cash to pay for the police equipment. That method, however, also posed problems, the ministry recognized, including the need to garner approval from the parties to the original contract and the impact such a change might have on other, already submitted commercial loan requests.[100]

ROK security issues were discussed at the fourth Japan-US SSC Meeting on June 7. Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba advised that Japan's policy on speedboat exports to the ROK was almost settled and that a decision would be forthcoming in June.[101] That the second Japan-ROK Ministerial Conference was scheduled for the summer probably factored into the timing for this decision; the South Koreans were expected to raise the issue of the equipment exports for discussion at the conference.[102]

Assistant Secretary of State Bundy observed that the issue was how to respond to these new forms of attack that, although "lesser incursions," had serious implications. In turn, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul C. Warnke commented that the most important thing was providing comprehensive support to the ROK to boost that country's capacity, physically as well as psychologically, to deal with DPRK provocations without expanding the conflict. Ushiba replied that Japan could provide economic, but not military, assistance and that the ROK was not seeking military assistance from Japan because it knew well the limits imposed by Japan's Constitution.[103]

The US side wondered if the ROK had asked for assistance for its defense industry. Ushiba told them that the ROK had made mention of shortcomings in that industry but made no specific requests. When Ambassador Johnson recommended that Japan needed to provide more substantial assistance as the ROK's friend, however, Ushiba revealed that the ROK had asked for telecommunications, patrol boats, and other equipment to bolster its police force's counter-infiltration capabilities. He also highlighted Prime Minister Satō's policy direction of offering whatever cooperation Japan could, specifically his wish to be forward leaning in providing equipment for the ROK police.

At the conference of Japanese chiefs of mission in the US held in Washington, DC, two days before the SSC meeting, Ushiba explained to Ambassador Shimoda that there was a debate over the plan to provide speedboats on whether they were an arms export, and that he was in the US to make the rounds to explain the issue in hopes of a confidential resolution. Shimoda replied that the media had not reported on any orders for speedboats for police use, and Ushiba underscored the Diet's sensitivity to whispers of arms exports. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was tiptoeing around Diet sensitivity by explaining that the boats were for police use and had no armaments and that the ROK was not involved in international conflict. Ushiba bemoaned the difficulty of keeping equipment exports to the ROK from becoming a domestic problem. A cash payment for the exports would allow the Japanese government to avoid direct involvement and make even patrol boats a nonissue, he said.[104]

The role of Japan in Asian security issues was subsequently discussed at the Japan-US Planning Talks held in Maryland from June 13. And it was there affirmed that Japan would provide the ROK with "nonlethal military aid"—police equipment and logistical support.[105]

On August 21, a week before the second Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference, Ambassador Johnson spoke with Foreign Minister Miki, who was heading the Japanese delegation. Johnson raised the issue of ROK security and asked if Japan was prepared to provide nonlethal military or police-type aid. Almost all Japanese recognized the direct relationship of ROK security to that of Japan, Miki replied. He further answered that in the event of a clear and overt attack by North Korea on the ROK, Japan would permit the unrestricted use of US military bases in Japan. Touching on the worsening China-DPRK relationship, he suggested that the DPRK was unlikely to start general hostilities on its own in the absence of assistance from China. But, Miki added, Japan's current understanding was that DPRK provocations in the form of guerrilla infiltrations were likely to continue and that Japan would be able to assist the ROK with police equipment if it could be done without arousing opposition in Japan.[106]

2.3.4 The ROK Resets Its Priorities

Contrary to Japanese expectations, the South Koreans did not mention the police equipment issue when the second Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference took place in Seoul on August 27. One possible reason for the change in the ROK's position was the drought in the country's south since late July, which had forced the ROK to seek urgent help from Japan to address it.

On July 31, almost a month before the consultations, Lee Hu-rak informed Ambassador Kimura that the ROK had suffered severe drought damage. Chief Presidential Secretary Lee was putting out feelers for Japanese drought relief aid, couched as a request from President Park to Prime Minister Satō. Stressing urgency, Park asked that assistance prioritize financing (government loans or private-sector credit) for every sort of project to counter the effects of the drought.[107]

At the liaison meeting preceding the conference, Ambassador Eom emphasized strengthening friendly economic relations between the two countries and pushed for working-level talks on drought aid.[108] After the conference, Ushiba subsequently informed the US State Department that the ROK government had put drought measures at the top of its list of agenda items.[109] That left Japan to choose what to prioritize, drought aid or police equipment exports.

Another reason for the ROK's policy shift was domestic opposition to importing police equipment from Japan. The plan for the equipment surfaced in discussion of the supplementary revised budget bill in the Home Affairs Committee of the ROK National Assembly on June 18. Reference materials distributed by the Ministry of Home Affairs to committee members showed that a plan to strengthen the police's equipment premised on securing a commercial loan as well as a budget request had been submitted.[110]

That plan came under fire during budget deliberations in the National Assembly for two reasons. First, sensitive to public sentiment over the ROK's trade deficit with Japan, Home Affairs Committee members, regardless of party affiliation, argued the

need to switch the source of funding the equipment from a commercial loan to either a government loan or US military aid. They urged for a show of diplomatic prowess to find another source of financing, arguing they should avoid an increase in the public debt burden stemming from high-interest rate commercial loans. Given that strengthening police capabilities was a security matter, their preference was to use military aid to pay for it.

Second, distrust of Japan also underlay misgivings about the plan. ROK politicians were skeptical about Japan's readiness to hand over high-performance boats, for example. They questioned why the ROK would discuss national security needs with Japan when it was trading with the DPRK and other socialist states. Fundamentally, would Japan be a reliable security partner? These conundrums fueled debate about the planned equipment purchase.

The negative climate compelled a revision of the plan, from the original bringing in 24 Japanese speedboats to using a US commercial loan to buy the materials to build nine guardships in the ROK.[111] The ROK also decided that it would use a US commercial loan to purchase the other item outstanding, telecommunications equipment.[112] The first additional supplementary budget for FY1968, of 2.7 billion won ($10 million) to finance the augmentation of police equipment, was approved on June 29, adding to the total national debt burden issued after 1969.[113]

Although the ROK did not raise the issue of police equipment at the second Regular Ministerial Conference, it had strong expectations for a Japanese political commitment on the security front. Responding to ROK remarks on security matters, Foreign Minister Miki observed that the Vietnam question, which was slowly coming to an end, had to be regarded as part of the Asian regional situation. Securing peace in one region could not be thought of separately from securing it in others he said, citing ROK security issues as an example. He acknowledged the ROK's position, saying that he was "fully aware" of the state of tension the country faced, especially in light of the January 21 attack on the ROK president's official residence and the August 21 infiltration of Jeju Island by armed DPRK agents. He "sympathized with and understood" the sincere efforts of the ROK government and people to deal with such incidents.[114]

When they were drafting the joint statement from the conference, Japan initially proposed that it read, "We recognize that Asian peace and prosperity is the common goal of both countries and agree to continue to work together in our endeavors to realize that goal." ROK Foreign Minister Choi Kyu-ha insisted on adding, "The ministers of both countries acknowledge that the security and prosperity of the Republic of Korea have an important influence on the security and prosperity of Japan." And Japan ultimately agreed to his proposal.[115] This acquiescence was unusual. When the ROK pushed for the addition of the Communist threat to the joint statement at the first conference the previous year, Japan had sidestepped the matter by noting that its diplomatic policy line was to maintain peace, an exceptional response, one might say. That is why the Japanese public read the August 1968 joint statement as expressing that Japan and the ROK shared a common destiny.[116]

Japan, however, did not acquiesce to the ROK's reference to China. The ROK wanted the joint statement to say, "Focusing on China's development of atomic

weapons and other issues, both parties agreed that the Chinese situation remains unstable and should continue to be monitored." Japan, in part because of divisive domestic views on China, requested that China not be singled out.[117] And the ROK agreed, out of reciprocity for Japan's concession on the statement correlating Japanese and ROK security.[118]

Following the conclusion of the second conference, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs assessed that Japan had accorded the ROK a sense of regional solidarity and conveyed Japan's commitment to cooperating with the ROK to the greatest possible extent. The ministry also noted that the ROK had warmly received the reference in the joint statement that its security and prosperity were inseparably linked to Japan's security and prosperity. The ministry, therefore, deemed the conference a success. But then again, by going well beyond merely showing an understanding of the ROK's position, this assessment indicates Japan's awareness that ensuring the ROK's security had significant implications for its own.[119] From that perspective, the ministry noted its pledge, in response to the ROK's proposed drought relief measures, to send a technical survey team to the ROK to study the drought and to assist giving priority to those measures and projects with a long-lasting impact on that situation.[120]

Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba revealed at the fifth Japan-US SSC Meeting on September 11, 1968 that the ROK had discussed security at the Ministerial Conference in August but not assistance with police equipment. He said the Japanese government found that strange and suggested that the ROK may have focused on drought assistance knowing it was easier for Japan to cooperate in this area because of its domestic constraints.

Ambassador Johnson emphasized that Japanese and ROK security were one and the same and should be treated as such, and appeared satisfied that the conference's joint statement highlighted the connection. Pointing to the US's supply of equipment to the ROK to combat DPRK infiltration operations, he appealed for similarly substantive aid from Japan. He once again emphasized the importance of Japan providing police equipment to strengthen the ROK's primary deterrence against DPRK military provocations. Ushiba mentioned that the ROK might raise equipment assistance again but within the grant-in-aid framework for the following year, indicating that Japan would cooperate in that event.[121]

2.4 Conclusion

The 1968 security crisis occurred in a situation where the division of Korea precluded the use of all-out war to unify the peninsula. The DPRK's and ROK's respective alliances with great powers kept the two opposing halves of the peninsula apart and deterred them from engaging in major military action against one another. Consequently, the focus of ROK and Japanese crisis response shifted from an overt DPRK attack to guerrilla infiltrations and other forms of low-intensity DPRK aggression.

The ROK, agreeing with the US in their joint communiqué of February 15, 1968 to "promptly determine what action should be taken under the Mutual Defense Treaty,"

had aimed to expand the scope of that treaty to include low-intensity aggression. Moreover, the ROK also sought Japanese assistance to improve the equipment of its police forces in their counter-infiltration operations. The ROK informed Japan of its policy to deal with DPRK aggression. It considered total war a low-probability event and that even were conventional warfare to arise, the ROK's response would depend on its Mutual Defense Treaty with the US. It would, however, handle armed guerillas and other DPRK provocations using its police force but needed to bolster the force's equipment, for which it made a request of Japan for special assistance.

Prime Minister Satō and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, determining that the patrol boats the ROK sought were not military arms prohibited under Japan's "Three Principles on Arms Exports," decided as a policy principle to cooperate. The decision was based on the understanding that the purpose of the equipment the ROK had requested was to counter guerrilla activity to ensure domestic security, as Seoul did not predict conventional warfare. Ultimately, the ROK dropped this request for assistance from Japan. A devastating drought in the ROK caused a shift in focus, with the ROK instead asking for Japan's aid to deal with that new emergency on a priority basis. Another factor behind the shift was South Korean distrust of Japan and doubts about Japanese willingness to help with the ROK's security.

It should be noted, however, that through the process of their consultations, the ROK and Japan succeeded in identifying areas of possible bilateral cooperation, including on security. Their search for security cooperation had several characteristics. First, each country's political position on dealing with low-intensity DPRK aggression became clear. They shared a perception of this kind of threat, which they incorporated in this sentence of the joint statement from their second Regular Ministerial Conference: "The ministers of both countries acknowledge that the security and prosperity of the Republic of Korea have an important influence on the security and prosperity of Japan."

Second, bilateral security cooperation was explored with regards to Japan's assistance to enhance ROK police equipment used in counter-infiltration operations to ensure the ROK's internal security. The ROK and Japan found areas where they could cooperate on low-intensity aggression, the new threat they had identified, on the basis of their respective treaties of alliance with the US. This demonstrated the potential for security cooperation between the ROK and Japan.

Third, the ROK ultimately dropped its request for police equipment in favor of emergency economic assistance emphasizing domestic stability amid a drought. As Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had assessed, the process of discussing security cooperation had produced a sense of regional solidarity between the two countries, and it was on that basis that they underscored the importance of economic cooperation.[122] Thus, it became an early example setting the pattern of security cooperation between Japan and the ROK in the form of economic assistance from Japan.

Notes

1. Low-intensity aggression or military provocation involves large-scale internal civil wars or rebellions caused by foreign incitement or interference (see endnote 28 in Chap. 1). My focus is North Korea's guerrilla warfare of infiltrating South Korea to foment uncertainty and insurrection. This low-intensity aggression is distinguishable from military action leading to total war.
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88. Embassy of Japan in the ROK, "Keisatsu sōbi dōnyū," No. 435, from Japanese ambassador to the ROK to Japanese foreign minister, April 26, 1968, *Nikkan keisatsu kyōryoku*, Admin. No. 2010-4101.
89. Embassy of Japan in the ROK, "Keisatsu sōbi dōnyū," No. 467, from Japanese ambassador to the ROK to Japanese foreign minister, May 6, 1968, Admin. No. 2010-4101.
90. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Northeast Asia Division, "Keisatsu sōbi dōnyū mondai no keii ni tsuite (Background to the police equipment introduction issue)," Admin. No. 2010-4101.
91. The Three Principles on Arms Exports, adopted by the Satō administration in 1967, prohibited arms exports to Communist bloc countries, countries subject to arms export embargoes under UN resolutions, and countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. See: https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/index.html (accessed February 22, 2024).
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    A contract for the introduction of raw materials was signed with Nissho-Iwai American Corporation (the US base of Nissho-Iwai Corporation of Japan), with the raw materials for construction of the patrol boats procured from Japan and the telecommunications equipment from the US. Foreign Capital Management Division, ROK Finance Ministry Economic Cooperation Bureau, "Application for Permission for the Introduction of Foreign Capital," top secret doc. 320-18, from presidential secretariat to EPB director, National Archives of Korea, 46.
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116. *Asahi Shimbun*, August 30, 1968.
117. The joint statement's reference to China was designed to strengthen anti-Communist diplomacy and oppose domestic moves to improve Japan's relations with China. In the 1960s,

the Japanese government followed the US's East Asia policy with regard to China. But the members of the Social Democratic Party of Japan, other Japanese progressives, and even some conservative Japanese politicians had a different view of China than that of the US. Their view was underpinned by a sense of cultural familiarity and a sense of guilt over Japan's aggression in China. Wakamiya, Yoshibumi. 2014. *Sengo 70 nen hoshu no Ajia kan* (The postwar conservative view of Asia). Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan, 310–334.

118. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Record of Second ROK-Japan Regular Ministerial Conference, 348.
119. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Northeast Asia Division, Nichi-Bei anpo kyōgi shiryō: "Kankoku jōsei (Materials from Japan-US security consultations: 'ROK situation')," September 1968, Foreign Ministry-disclosed document, request No. 2009-723.
120. Ibid.
121. Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, A-2177, October 29, 1968, Security Sub-committee Meeting, September 11–12, 1968, in Ishii, Osamu et al. 2003, *op cit.*, Vol. 5, 159–162.
122. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Northeast Asia Division, Nichi-Bei anpo kyōgi shiryō: "Kankoku jōsei," September 1968. [KK: *op. cit.* footnote 121.]

Chapter 3
The Reversion of Okinawa and Formation of the Korea Clause (1969)

Abstract Previous literature on negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa to Japan has approached the topic primarily from the perspective of Japan-US relations. In this chapter, the author revisits the subject from the standpoint of Japan-ROK security relations, shedding light on the policy coordination process whereby the security debate over Okinawa's military base functions was narrowed down to a summary in what is known as the "Korea clause." This clause appears in the November 1969 joint communiqué from Prime Minister Satō Eisaku and President Nixon in which they agreed to return Okinawa to Japan, and has often been depicted as the product of Cold War-style cooperation between Japan and the ROK. Yet no easy convergence has been found between the two countries' differing positions on the issue. The author examines the negotiation process from the viewpoint of East Asian regional security, arguing that the Korea clause was more the product of a complex reconciliation of security policy interests than of cooperation.

Japan and the ROK were faced with the reorganization of the Cold War structure in East Asia taking place at the direction of the Richard M. Nixon administration, which had just come to power in 1969. Where they stood on the security issues posed by the reversion of Okinawa to Japan differed, but their differences and the need to adjust their policies brought about a new security relationship between them.

Previous literature has examined the Okinawa reversion talks primarily from the perspective of Japan-US relations. I revisit the subject from the standpoint of Japan-ROK security relations. I shed light on the policy coordination process through which the security debate over Okinawa's military base functions was narrowed to the summary in the "Korea clause." That clause, which concerns the security of the ROK, appears in paragraph four of the November 1969 joint communiqué from Prime Minister Satō Eisaku and President Nixon in which they agreed to return Okinawa to Japan:

> The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security.[1]

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Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, Satō elaborated:

> … if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur [the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore,] should an occasion arise for United States forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas within Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the government of Japan towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition.[2]

All previous research on the Korea clause has emphasized aspects of Japan-ROK security cooperation. Some regard it as an early sign of bilateral cooperation brought about by a turn toward harmonious relations between the two countries.[3] Some analyses highlight the use of language almost identical to the Korea clause in the joint statement from the second Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference in 1968, arguing that what had already been confirmed between Japan and the ROK was incorporated, at the ROK's request, into the Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué.[4]

But there remain some aspects of Japan-ROK security relations at the time of the Okinawa reversion negotiations that cannot be explained simply as Cold War cooperation. At that time, major differences existed between Japan and the ROK regarding the international situation and their respective security policies. The ROK, which faced a grave military threat from the DPRK, was working to maintain the Cold War order in East Asia, deploying troops to Vietnam, in step with the Cold War strategy spearheaded by the US. It judged Okinawa's reversion to Japan would have a large impact on its own security and that of all free Asian countries. And though not a direct party to the reversion negotiations, the ROK asked both Japan and the US to maintain Okinawa as a base for US forces. To the ROK, Okinawa reversion was the epitome of a security problem.

To Japan, which had achieved "growth in its relative national power" thanks to strong economic growth and the system of single-party dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the reversion of Okinawa signified the end of the postwar period and the establishment of an equal partnership with the US.[5] Noting the possibility of détente in East Asia, Japan also judged there to be little likelihood of general hostilities involving China and the Soviet Union breaking out on the Korean Peninsula. Japan consequently was at pains to ensure that the reversion was not addressed only from a security angle.[6] It felt that the ROK's take on the matter, by complicating the Okinawa reversion issue and disrupting the Japan-US negotiations, amounted to interference.

When seen from this perspective, the establishment of the Korea clause—which has been characterized until now as the product chiefly of Cold War cooperation—can be understood, in fact, to entail the policy conflict between Japan and the ROK regarding the ROK's security and their process for coordinating it. Put differently, the Korea clause might be called a product of compromise, created through the coordination of two contrary political and diplomatic positions: a call for security and a bid for détente.

This chapter focuses on four points. First, how Japanese and ROK security policies began to diverge in the context of the structural relationship between the Guam

Doctrine (later renamed the Nixon Doctrine) and the reversion of Okinawa. Second, how that related to the Japan-US negotiations over the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa (*kaku nuki*) and handling of military basing in Okinawa to be on par with mainland Japan (*hondo nami*). Third, the process by which the growth in Japan's relative national power spurred changes in the nature of relations within the liberal camp and led to a new Japan-ROK security relationship. Fourth, a look at the coordinating role played by the US as the dynamic that mended the breach between Japan and the ROK. Through analyses of these points, I will clarify the process by which policy differences over maintaining Okinawa's military base functions were reconciled to produce the Korea clause.

3.1 The Guam Doctrine and the Reversion of Okinawa

Two events in 1969 changed the structure of international relations in East Asia. The newly minted Nixon administration launched a balance-of-power style of diplomacy that completely overturned Cold War norms. The US set about improving its relations with the Soviet Union while at the same time it sought to resolve its standoff with China, the focal point of the Cold War in Asia, in its bid to end the Vietnam War.[7] Nixon's decision to visit China, announced in July 1971, was said to shake the world. Resulting from "more than two years of complex, subtle and determined diplomatic signals and negotiations," it was the climax of a host of diplomatic measures taken toward China.[8]

The second of the year's two events was the agreement reached at the November 1969 Japan-US summit regarding Okinawa's reversion to Japan. The Nixon administration began preparing for the negotiations on this issue shortly after coming to power, resulting in the National Security Council (NSC) National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 5 of April 28, 1969. According to this framing of US policy toward Japan, the US government was concerned that if some visible progress was not made in 1969 on the Okinawan reversion question, the Satō administration might fall, which posed risks for maintaining US military bases in Okinawa and for extending the Japan-US Security Treaty, set to expire in 1970.[9] Nixon's national security advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, believed that returning Okinawa was preferable to maintaining the status quo, judging that "the pressures in Japan for reversion were now unstoppable; agitation against our presence not only posed a physical danger to our use of the bases but also could jeopardize the political position of Satō and the governing LDP, which had initiated and maintained Japan's alignment with the US for two decades."[10] Based on such estimates of the situation, the administration saw the reversion of Okinawa as a political means to bind Japan to the US side.

Japan, too, perceived 1969 as a turning point, to use the growth in national power that it had achieved in the 1960s to press for a decisive shift in its relations with the US. Debate in Japan of what it termed the "1970 issue"—whether to extend or terminate the Japan-US security treaty in accordance with Article 10 of the treaty—suggested that 1969 was the year to prepare for a new era.[11] Some argued that as Japan adjusted

to the revised US strategy for East Asia, it should find its own role in the region, expunging its image as a "free-rider," as the US criticism had been. There were others in Japan who, characterizing the country's pacifism of the 1960s as *hiteiteki* (negative or passive), called for positive or active pacifism.[12] The 1969 edition of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' *Diplomatic Bluebook* assesses that "combined with the relative growth in national power of countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the 1960s, the areas in which these countries could exercise their autonomy have increased."[13] Japan therefore approached the 1970s with the diplomatic goal of getting down to work on international détente and the formation of a peaceful world order, tapping its political stability and economic growth to do so.

At the same time this debate happened in Japan, the US was reexamining Japan's role in Asia and formulating a new Japan policy. The US had long expected Japan to cooperate on security with the ROK and Taiwan, but Japan had continued to limit the goal of its security cooperation to defense of its territory. Having Japan provide economic assistance to non-Communist Asian countries emerged from this situation as the more important Japanese role.[14] National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 13, of May 28, 1969, arrived at the conclusion that the US should avoid "any pressure on [Japan] to develop substantially larger forces or to play a larger regional security role."[15] The hope was that Japan would instead shoulder the burden of economic assistance for East Asian allies.[16]

Just as this discussion was getting underway, however, Nixon outlined his administration's East Asia policy in remarks in Guam on July 25, 1969.[17] (Initially called the Guam Doctrine, it later became officially known as the Nixon Doctrine.) Nixon stressed two points: the US would honor its treaty commitments, but Asian countries should take responsibility for their own internal security and military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons. He implied that the days of excessive US intervention in Asia were over. Furthermore, in his February 1970 report to Congress on US foreign policy, Nixon referred to his November 1969 agreement with Prime Minister Satō to hold talks on Okinawan reversion as among his top achievements. He also indicated that Japan's partnership with the US would be the key to the success of his new Asia policy.[18]

US Ambassador to Japan Armin H. Meyer, the US's chief negotiator in the reversion talks, observed through the course of the negotiations that finding a mutually satisfactory resolution to the reversion issue was consistent with the US's new Asia strategy revealed in the Guam Doctrine.[19] There was a strong structural relationship between the Guam Doctrine and the reversion of Okinawa.

The US, of course, did not want Okinawa's reversion to have a negative impact on its military commitments to East Asia nations. Consequently, it needed to publicly signal its allies, the ROK and Taiwan, that there would be no reduction in the US military deterrence in Asia even after Okinawa's return to Japan.[20] This was one more facet of US policy toward East Asia cloaked in the Nixon Doctrine. In fact, as NSDM 13 indicates, the US had determined that its basic policy for reversion would be to secure at the negotiating table the "maximum free conventional use of the military bases" in Okinawa.[21] In other words, there was room for inserting the

Korea clause and the Taiwan clause in the Japan-US joint communiqué of November 1969 as security public goods in East Asia.

3.2 The ROK in the Okinawa Reversion Negotiations

3.2.1 Kaku Nuki *and* Hondo Nami

In preparation for the start of reversion negotiations, Japan's Okinawa Base Problems Study Group submitted its reporton March 8, 1969, laying out in concrete terms the substance and prospects for Okinawa's reversion.[22] The report, which strongly reflected the intentions of the Satō administration, stood on the premise that the reversion issues should be understood from the perspective of the changing roles of the US and Japan and the future promise of bilateral cooperation. In that sense, it indicated an awareness that the reversion represented an important opportunity for the two countries to achieve an equal partnership. It then offered an analysis of the situation in Asia, which would become the stage for this Japan-US cooperation.

> Moves to end the Vietnam War could be a powerful factor in easing tensions in US-China relations … The situation on the Korean Peninsula has remained unstable in recent years due to the DPRK government making clear its policy of armed unification. The United States and the Soviet Union, however, both appear to be coming to view the region not as an arena for extending their influence but rather as a zone for the balance of power between West and East. China too, while not quite to the same extent, seems to be attempting to accept a similar way of thinking. Therefore, as long as the United States, the Soviet Union, and China continue this prudent approach, we believe that the possibility is extremely slight for small skirmishes in this region to develop into a large-scale local war.[23]

As is clear in that passage, the report sets its assumptions for discussing Okinawa's reversion by raising the possibility of easing US-China tensions with the Vietnam War moving toward closure and assessed there was a very low probability of a large-scale war on the Korean Peninsula involving China and the Soviet Union. It is on the basis of this awareness of the situation that the report argues that the issues of Okinawan reversion must not be handled from the viewpoint of Far Eastern security in a narrow sense, nor must they be dominated only by the maintenance of Okinawa's military functions.[24] From that flows the report's policy recommendations: (1) the importance of stationing nuclear weapons in Okinawa no longer exists, and (2) the use of Okinawan bases by conventional forces should be discussed between Japan and the US, based on the prior consultation system. This is the very formulation of a *kaku nuki*, *hondo nami* (without nuclear weapons, parity with the mainland) reversion of Okinawa.

As grounds for the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa, the report cited the widely acknowledged position that it was better from the aspect of deterrent effectiveness not to station nuclear weapons abroad without a strong request from the intended recipient country, a position arising from advances in arms control theory

and from technological advances for transporting nuclear weapons spurred by the development of ballistic missiles. The report's insistence on parity with the mainland, meanwhile, stressed both the need for Japan-US consultations for a maximum display of war deterrence as well as the importance of trust building that consultations would yield.

Diet deliberations on the post-reversion status of US bases intensified in reaction to the Study Group's recommendations. At a March 10 meeting of the House of Councillors Committee on the Budget, Maekawa Tan, a Diet member from the Japan Socialist Party, raised a question concerning the post-reversion application of the Far East clause, a provision in Article 6 of the bilateral security treaty allowing US forces to use facilities and areas in Japan to maintain regional peace and security. Prime Minister Satō avoided specifics, answering that what the base status would be remained a blank sheet of paper.[25] Discussions of the Study Group's report went further at a budget committee meeting the following day, when the parity with the mainland principle came to light. The prime minister answered that, absent any special agreement, the Japan-US Security Treaty would also apply to the Okinawan bases,[26] and clarified that US military bases in Okinawa would be subject to prior consultation. At a subsequent budget committee meeting on March 13, it was confirmed that the removal of nuclear weapons would be Japan's starting point for reversion negotiations.[27] Satō, in his answer to a question from Diet member Yaoi Hidehiko of the Kōmeitō party, about how nuclear weapons would be dealt with after the reversion, specified that as Article 9 of the Constitution and Japan's three non-nuclear principles were strictly a matter of domestic nuclear policy, they did not apply to the US military's nuclear weapons. He added that US nuclear weapons would be subject to prior consultation. Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi later hinted at a May 7 meeting of the Special Committee on Okinawa in the House of Councillors that the negotiations would likely be in line with the formula "without nuclear weapons" and "parity with the mainland."[28]

In accordance with the Satō administration's policy laid out above, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the formula the centerpiece of its plans for negotiating with the US ahead of Aichi's visit to the US in June.[29] In consultations with the ministry on May 17, Japan's Defense Agency set forth the removal of nuclear weapons and the flexible operation of the prior consultation mechanism as its approach to the status of US bases once Okinawa was returned to Japan.[30]

3.2.2 Base Functions and Prior Consultations

Japan-US Okinawa reversion negotiations at the ministerial level started during Foreign Minister Aichi's visit to Washington, DC, in June 1969. Aichi communicated Japan's position to his US counterpart as follows: (1) Okinawa to be returned in 1972; (2) the Japan-US Security Treaty to apply to Okinawa, without any special arrangements; and (3) nuclear weapons to be withdrawn at the time of reversion.[31] When Aichi met with President Nixon on June 2, Nixon insisted that problems such

as Okinawa must be considered in terms of security. Aichi insisted that the use of military bases post-reversion should be handled pursuant to the Japan-US Security Treaty.[32] Japan's position was for prior consultation to apply to US military bases post-reversion, without diminishing their functionality. The US was left doubting whether the two objectives could be satisfied simultaneously. Its concern was that reduced base functionality might have a negative effect on the security of the ROK, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. The US therefore countered the Japanese position that Aichi presented, pointing to the threat posed by Chinese nuclear weapon and missile development and the state of tension on the Korean Peninsula.[33]

Back in Japan, Aichi observed the need for careful consideration to avoid harming base functionality in his report to the June 12 plenary session of the Japanese Diet's House of Representatives.[34] At a June 17 meeting of that House's Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories, Aichi posited that, in reference to the handling of a prior consultation mechanism, if reversion placed the bases in Okinawa on par with US bases on the mainland, they would no longer be linked to the US-ROK alliance.[35] Aichi's two remarks certainly contradict each other. They show that the Japanese government recognized that a reversion on par with the mainland held implications for maintaining the US-ROK alliance.

Reversion negotiations resumed in July in Tokyo between Aichi and Ambassador Meyer over how to close the gap between the Japanese and American policies laid out above: how to coordinate the management of the prior consultation process with ensuring the unimpeded use of bases. On July 17, Aichi proposed that Japan commit to free use by the US of the Okinawa bases in a "unilateral statement" separate from a Japan-US joint communiqué.[36] The Japanese position on engaging in prior consultations on the use of Okinawan bases by US forces in time of emergency in Korea would be carved out of the joint communiqué, and the Japanese government would give its political assurances on that matter in the form of a unilateral statement. Importantly, the statement would extend the scope beyond a Korean contingency to include the Far East and surrounding areas.

This statement, Aichi explained, would replace the 1960 Korean Minute.[37] That secret agreement stipulates that in the event of an emergency in the ROK involving an attack on UN forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula, US forces stationed in Japan under UN command would engage in military operations without prior consultations with the Japanese government.[38] This means that the Japanese side, with the objective of applying prior consultations comprehensively, was attempting to eliminate the secret agreement on free use of bases while redefining more broadly the geographical scope of the contingency for which US forces could use their bases in Japan.[39]

The foreign ministry's Treaties Bureau spearheaded Japan's push to nullify the Korean Minute. According to the bureau's special coordinator, Kuriyama Takakazu, the Korean Minute entailed legal issues in granting the US essentially *carte blanche* use of bases in Japan.[40] Consequently, the ministry insisted on voiding the Korean Minute to resolve the legal contradictions the secret agreement posed at the same time to establish Japan's equality with the US.

Ambassador Meyer did not accept Aichi's proposal of a unilateral statement. He viewed that replacing the Korean Minute with what Aichi proposed would give the Japanese government a veto over all future US military activities. In the US, U. Alexis Johnson, now the undersecretary of state for political affairs, likewise rejected the Japanese proposal.[41] The US sought to ensure it had unimpeded use of its bases, at least for Korean contingencies.

By August, negotiations had started over the drafting of a joint communiqué. Japan's first draft featured a call for prior consultation regarding the deployment of US forces in Japan under the command of the UNC in Korea. This was something the Japanese had raised at a meeting on July 17, and was indicative of Japan's continuing efforts to get rid of the Korean Minute. The Americans understood Japan's latest proposal as an attempt to exchange the right, under the Korean Minute, of US forces in Japan to use their bases to respond to a situation on the Korean Peninsula for a "less definite commitment."[42]

In talks on August 27 between Tōgō Fumihiko, the director of the foreign ministry's American Affairs Bureau, and Richard Sneider, now a member of the NSC staff (East Asia), Tōgō nevertheless persisted. He asked whether, as the prime minister wished, an alternative to the Korean Minute was possible, provided language was inserted in a unilateral statement by Prime Minister Satō regarding the ROK that Japan would respond "promptly and positively" with respect to prior consultations. Sneider said it was unlikely, stating that Washington wanted both (the Korean Minute and "promptly and positively" language).[43] It was a clear indicator to Japan that the US intended to maintain the provisions of the Korean Minute.

Subsequent talks focused on issues of how to word references to the ROK, Taiwan, and Vietnam in the joint communiqué. On September 8, just four days before the scheduled Japan-US Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Washington, DC, between Aichi and Secretary William P. Rogers, Japanese Ambassador to the US Shimoda Takesō sidestepped what the US had requested. When US forces in Japan needed to carry out military operations in the ROK or Taiwan and requested prior consultations, Shimoda stated, it was Japan's intent to consent, but that it would be difficult for Japan to make a firm commitment before the event. He brought up Japan's domestic political constraints in stressing once again that Japan wanted to avoid public guarantees and secret agreements. He again rejected the secret Korean Minute, which excluded Korean contingencies from prior consultations in writing. Under Secretary Johnson made clear that the US wished to maintain the Korean Minute and had no intention of replacing it with the joint communiqué. Johnson emphasized that the US's removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa depended on maintaining the functionality of its bases.[44]

3.3 Security Friction Between Japan and the ROK Over Base Functions

3.3.1 ROK Security Concerns

The ROK, recognizing how important the Japan-US Okinawa reversion negotiations were for its own security, followed them closely.[45] When Japanese Prime Minister Satō announced "parity with the mainland" at Japan's House of Councillors Committee on Budget meeting on March 11, 1969, ROK Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon reacted. In remarks made on March 15, he opined that he was reminded that one of the causes of the outbreak of the Korean War was former Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson's January 1950 exclusion of the ROK from the US's Far East "defensive perimeter." If the reversion of Okinawa to Japan was inevitable, he observed that Seoul was prepared to provide new bases for US forces in ROK territory.[46] ROK Foreign Minister Choi Kyu-ha stated at a March 25 press briefing that Okinawa's reversion was a Japanese domestic matter in which the ROK had absolutely no intention of getting involved. He did, though, outline his government's public position as follows, indicating that the ROK's interests were tied to the outcome of the reversion:

> As is the case at present at US bases in Okinawa, storage of nuclear weapons should be permitted and their use should be excluded from the scope of prior consultations in Japan. The bases should be continued indefinitely … Given the geographic position and strategic status of Okinawa, the reversion issue has enormous relevance for the security not just of Japan and the United States but of Northeast Asia as a whole. The government of the Republic of Korea has a great interest in the shape that the reversion will take, and at present, with the sharp increase in DPRK provocations and the possibility of a Chinese Communist invasion, we look forward to a resolution that maintains Okinawa's current value as a military base.[47]

Looking back, the ROK of the 1960s had made a positive contribution to maintaining the American-led Cold War system through its dispatch of troops to Vietnam.[48] President Park Chung-hee believed that keeping in lockstep with the US Cold War strategy would strengthen the US-ROK alliance and ensure the security of his country. At the time the US withdrawal from Asia was becoming clear following the July 1969 Guam Doctrine, the ROK was slow to adapt to changes in the US strategy toward Asia.[49] The ROK, then stuck in a Cold War mindset, was convinced that it could guarantee its national security by securing the US's commitment to the ROK by deploying its own troops to Vietnam.

In truth, signs of changes in the relationship had emerged before Nixon, in the final days of the Johnson administration. Dissonance between the US and the ROK in terms of policy were notably evident, as shown in Chap. 1, in the aftermath of the January 1968 DPRK guerrilla attack on the Blue House and, two days later, the seizure of the intelligence collection ship USS *Pueblo*. President Park called for retaliation against the DPRK, but the US refused: the Johnson administration worried that ROK military reprisals could escalate into all-out war. At the same time, the US baffled the ROK in its handling of the USS *Pueblo* incident by negotiating with the DPRK to achieve the release of the US crew in December 1968. When the ROK recognized the

change in US strategy, it sought to establish a regional defense organization, centered on friendly countries fighting in Vietnam, that also would include Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia nations.[50] By that time, however, the US and Japan, preoccupied by nascent negotiations on Okinawa's reversion, were uninterested.

The ROK Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau drew up a report in March 1969, entitled "The Ryukyus (Okinawa) question: points of issue and the government's position,"[51] that raised the following three problems that would arise from a reversion of Okinawa premised on the formula "without nuclear weapons and parity with the mainland":

(1) The inevitability that the US's nuclear deterrence against Communist China and the DPRK will weaken.
(2) Concern that the reversion of Okinawa will strike the DPRK as a trend of US retreat, albeit a partial one, from the ROK and other parts of Asia, that could lead the DPRK to make the miscalculation of attempting another invasion.
(3) The capacity of US forces operating out of bases in Okinawa to assist in the defense of the ROK would definitely be restricted in cases where their use of bases became subject to prior consultations between Japan and the United States.[52]

Mindful of DPRK military provocations and the US lean toward isolationism, the ROK believed that Japan's policy for the reversion of Okinawa would raise serious problems for ROK national security. The report recommended that every effort be made to maintain the status quo to ensure the maximum utility of the Okinawa bases so that, even after their reversion, US forces could have completely free use of them. The ROK firmed up its policy against subjecting Okinawa to the Japan-US prior consultation arrangements, which would constrain bringing in nuclear weapons, which played an essential role deterring Communist aggression, as well as the rapid mobilization of US forces in a contingency.[53]

ROK domestic press coverage was consistent with the government view: fearing that reversion based on the *kaku nuki*, *hondo nami* formula would lead to reduced base functionality, it called for the government to respond effectively to the US's changed Asia policy.[54]

In that atmosphere, the ROK made repeated requests of the Japanese and US governments to maintain base functionality after the return of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. On April 8, Foreign Minister Choi handed US Ambassador to the ROK William J. Porter a memorandum detailing the ROK's position on the matter. Bringing up the topic of the DPRK's military provocations of the previous year, Choi insisted on the desirability of a reversion that maintained the existing configuration for the Okinawan bases. Furthermore, he stressed that reversion was not an issue just between Japan and the US and proposed that the US take the ROK's position into consideration in its negotiations with the Japanese government and to fully consult the ROK government.[55]

On April 9, Choi delivered a memorandum to Japanese Ambassador Kanayama Masahide that firmly requested that Japan achieve a reversion preserving the strategic value of the bases. Kanayama stated that the reversion of Okinawa was a bilateral matter between Japan and the US. Choi, however, pointed out that the geographical area of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty is stipulated in Article 3 of the treaty

as "territories now under their [the US's and the ROK's] respective administrative control" and touched on the potential for Okinawa's reversion to bring about changes in the territories in the said treaty. This, he emphasized, was how closely Okinawa's reversion, and the changes it entailed, was related to ROK security.[56]

Choi's memorandum to Kanayama, referencing paragraph one, section six of the joint statement from the second ROK-Japan Regular Ministerial Conference (August 29, 1968), which states that "the security and prosperity of the Republic of Korea have an important influence on the security and prosperity of Japan," made the following three proposals:

(1) Japan should free itself from the perception of the Okinawa question as an issue limited to Japan and the United States and search for a resolution from the broader perspective of the peace and security of the countries of Asia as a whole;
(2) Japan should avoid harming the strategic value of the bases so that US forces in Okinawa could continue to serve as an effective shield forestalling invasion by Communist forces in Asia, particularly the DPRK; and
(3) The ROK government, thus, requests the Japanese government to acknowledge the importance of the US bases to the security of the ROK and to fully consult the ROK government on any changes relating to the value of US bases in Okinawa.[57]

3.3.2 Japan's Cautious Response

The Japanese gave no indication of a formal reaction to the ROK's request. "The first response to the ROK government's expression of its view has been received, verbally, from the United States," Choi related at an April 10 meeting of the ROK National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee. Japanese Prime Minister Satō, in his January 27 policy speech before the Diet, stated that Okinawa's military bases were closely linked to the security not just of Japan, but of the countries in the Far East; in light of that, Choi wished to study the dispatch of a delegation to Japan and would continue to monitor the situation.[58] Not only did Japan not respond, it failed to even acknowledge receipt of the ROK's memorandum, the US Embassy in Japan reported in a telegram to the US Department of State.[59] When major Japanese newspapers the *Asahi Shimbun* and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* published exclusives on the matter on April 10, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs settled on an explanation, which it communicated to the ROK: there had been a "verbal" expression of interest from the ROK regarding the issue of Okinawa's reversion.[60] At a press briefing two days later, Foreign Minister Aichi declared that Ambassador Kanayama had told ROK Foreign Minister Choi that Okinawa's reversion concerned only Japan and the US and that third-party interference was inappropriate.[61] Aichi was probably concerned that ROK involvement in Okinawa's reversion would complicate Japan-US negotiations. The ROK took exception to Japan's handling of the matter. Aware that a written response would turn into formal consultations, Aichi conveyed a response through the ROK's ambassador to Japan on April 15. Although the government of Japan understood the ROK's position, Aichi told the ambassador, personally, he was surprised at the ROK's

request. There was no need for the ROK to express interest in the Okinawa question: that matter came under the Far East clause in the Japan-US Security Treaty.[62]

Aichi's reference here to the "Far East clause" is noteworthy. Japan was proceeding with reversion talks with the US as it related to that clause in their Security Treaty, keenly conscious of the existence of the pertinent arrangements and secret agreements. Thus, on the face of it, Aichi's response appears to have left room for some form of cooperation to exist, between Japan's attempt to pursue reversion talks on the basis of the Far East clause and the ROK's perception of Okinawa's reversion as an East Asian security issue.

The ROK's involvement in the reversion talks, however, would not just complicate Japan-US negotiations, it would unavoidably make an issue out of Okinawa base functions. If the existence of a diplomatic note from the ROK expressing its view on the matter became public knowledge, the Japanese government was concerned that the Okinawa question might be blown out of proportion, and put Tokyo in the difficult position of appearing to have caved in to the ROK government.

The ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not disguise its irritation with Japan's behavior. While claiming to acknowledge the Okinawan bases' importance for Asian security, Japan was negotiating in a manner that would decrease their value; moreover, it had suppressed the ROK's memorandum expressing its views. The Japanese attitude compelled the ROK to raise its interest in the matter.[63]

As was already evident from the prior consultations issue, Japan was seeking to free itself from any commitment, whether public or secret, to the ROK's defense. Regarding the ROK's call to establish an Asia-Pacific Treaty Organization (APATO), Satō enunciated a policy direction in February 1969 that would reject the ROK's proposal.[64] Foreign Minister Aichi, too, denied the need for such an organization, observing that the Japan-US bilateral alliance was sufficient. Japan held this stance up to the November Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué.

The third Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference was held in Tokyo on August 26 against this backdrop. The ROK, troubled by US military withdrawal from Asia, argued that US commitment must not decrease. Japan at the time was largely unmoved. Of course, maintaining a US military presence in Asia was an important issue for Japan, too. Indeed, Aichi, mentioning the Guam Doctrine, said, "Recent [US] moves are troubling, leaving the impression of a precipitous departure despite its longstanding commitment; [the US] needs a more effective policy."[65] Yet Aichi also observed that "with respect to Vietnam, the US will reduce its overseas commitments, but gradually, not at all once," continuing to indicate a perception that differed from the ROK's. He went on to emphasize the need for efforts to reduce tensions in the region, not confrontation. "We should avoid escalating mutual tensions by solely taking a lop-sided negative stance while demonstrating our readiness to deter any overt external hostilities before they happen, a posture that will further drive our adversaries to harden their stances. We think we should instead guide them to consider gradually meeting us on common ground."[66]

The two countries held diametrically opposed perceptions on relations with the DPRK. The ROK demanded that Japan cease talks with the DPRK about repatriating Korean nationals to the North and halt the export of Japanese products to the DPRK.

Sunobe Ryōzō, the director general of Asian Affairs at Japan's foreign ministry, noted that he understood the ROK's position on the DPRK. He observed, "There is a fundamental difference in our two countries' thinking on relations with the DPRK. I can only hope that the ROK understands that it is an unavoidable practical matter [for Japan]," making clear his perception that it would be impossible to align the interests of Japan and the ROK regarding the DPRK.[67]

The repatriation of Korean citizens was a humanitarian issue for Japan, which also saw contact between the Japanese and DPRK Red Cross organizations as vital to sounding out the DPRK's position so as to avoid an outcome disadvantageous to Japan. As is evident here, the issue of North Korea in the Japan-ROK relationship, owing to their different interests and relations, was one element that impeded stronger bilateral ties. Long awaiting Okinawa's reversion, Japan was looking forward to conditions in East Asia moving in a direction that would reduce Okinawa's military value, i.e., that shifts in US policy toward Asia would make détente in East Asia possible.

So different were their perceptions of the situation, the drafting of the joint statement dragged on, resulting in a one-day postponement in the closing of their third Ministerial Conference.[68] The ROK initially proposed the expression, "The two countries' security and prosperity are interrelated and inseparable." Pointing out that the Japanese public might misconstrue that statement as suggesting the two countries might soon form a military alliance, the Japanese side tried to soften the language to "are closely related." The ROK argued their bilateral relationship was something more than "closely related," and finally "extremely closely related" was adopted.

On the topic of Okinawa's reversion, Japan insisted the issue should not be included in their joint statement, as it was a territorial issue between Japan and the US. The ROK countered that the Okinawan bases have played a significant role in the security of Asia and there should be nothing that hinders them from performing that role in the future. That is why, with respect to the issue of Okinawa's reversion, the largest pressing issue of the time, the joint statement merely included in the latter half of the seventh paragraph, "The two countries' ministers exchanged a wide range of views on the international situation in general and, more specifically, the situation in Asia and the Pacific, and also touched on the Okinawa issue."[69]

3.3.3 Debate at Multilateral Consultations

The ROK government asserted that if Okinawa's reversion diminished the functionality of military bases there, the reversion ceased to be an issue for Japan alone. And it presented its assertion at two international conferences in mid-1969: a meeting of Vietnam War troop-contributing countries (TCC) and a meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC).

In talks with South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu on May 29, ROK President Park Chung-hee expressed his displeasure with Japan's view that Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi had laid out the previous month.[70] Yet, ROK efforts to include

the Okinawa issue into the TCC joint statement met with US opposition. Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson sent a telegram to the US ambassadors to the TCC countries stating that to address the issue of Okinawa's reversion at the TCC meeting would give Japan the wrong impression and lose more than it gained. He also expressed his intention to rein in ROK Foreign Minister Choi Kyu-ha's proposal of formal ROK-Japan consultations regarding the reversion.[71]

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs nevertheless took careful note of the ROK's complaints over reduced base functionality at the TCC meeting. It was guardedly watching what the ROK might do at the fourth ASPAC meeting in Japan on June 9.[72] The ROK's claim put Aichi in a difficult spot: at the very least it might rile the Japanese public, which wanted Okinawa's reversion to occur on the conditions of no nuclear weapons and parity with the mainland; it might also subtly affect the Japan-US reversion negotiations. Aichi also feared that a reference to the bases would leave him open to criticism from Japan's opposition parties, which had been claiming that ASPAC was becoming a military alliance.[73] So, Japan sought to avoid discussing Okinawa's reversion in multilateral settings, let alone bilaterally with the ROK.

US Ambassador to the ROK Porter informed the US State Department of Choi's diplomatic efforts, but he assessed the impact of those efforts to be slight given that the US and Japan shared almost the same view.[74] In the end, the ROK's attempt came to naught: the Okinawa issue was not on the ASPAC agenda, and ASPAC member countries avoided formally discussing it.[75]

At a breakfast meeting with Aichi, however, Choi asked why there had been no response to the note he had handed to Japan on April 9 and when he could expect to receive one. Aichi, avoiding a direct response, offered merely that he was preparing a written interpellation response for the Diet and asked Choi to accept that as a response. Choi countered that this was unacceptable for the ROK government, but the matter was left unresolved. The ROK's diplomatic bid to wrest a concession from Japan at a multilateral forum was forced into retreat in the face of opposition by Japan and the US.

3.3.4 Battle Over the Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué

On October 26, the Japanese press published a draft of the Japan-US Joint Communiqué, save for the passage on the nuclear weapons issue.[76] The passage that drew the ROK's attention was this: "the prosperity and security of the Republic of Korea are important for Japan's security. Japan praised the UN forces' activities in the ROK and UN efforts to maintain ROK security, and it will cooperate (in these)." ROK interest focused on whether Japan had definitely guaranteed that, post-reversion, US forces could conduct operations without the constraint of prior consultation. So on October 29, the ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought an explanation on that point from the US ambassador, but Porter was unable to give a clear answer.[77] The day before, Kim Jung-tae, the director general of the ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau, sought an

explanation from Kamikawa Yō, one of the ministers at the Japanese Embassy in the ROK. Though he did not respond to the request, he did state that the reversion negotiations were approaching the final stage and that there was no reason the ROK should complicate things in the final stage of the talks.[78] Kim replied that while Japan had told the ROK there was no need to worry, it had never explained how it was dealing with the ROK's security. He expressed concern about Japan's approach. Newspaper reports that Japan acknowledged close links between the ROK's security and prosperity and its own were, from the ROK's standpoint, neither a substantive guarantee nor something that reflected the ROK's position on unimpeded base use by US forces.[79]

On November 17, 1969, shortly before the Japan-US summit on Okinawa's reversion and other issues, ROK Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Chin Pil-sik sent diplomatic notes to the US and Japanese ambassadors in Seoul reaffirming the contents of the note that had been sent in April that year and stating the following. "Tensions are rising on the Korean Peninsula owing to recent DPRK provocations and the threat posed by Communist China and by Communist states. Okinawa bases are essential to the security of the ROK and the free nations of Asia. Thus, we strongly hope that you maintain the bases as they are now, without altering their configuration."[80] In the note to the US ambassador, Chin stressed that "Japan had not completed preparations to fill the post-reversion security vacuum. The United States, thus, should insist that its free use [of the bases] be guaranteed."[81]

On November 19, the first day of the Japan-US Summit, Ambassador Kanayama finally revealed to President Park the plan to explain the content of the joint communiqué to the ROK side. Ambassador Porter welcomed Japan's initiative, assessing that "By indicating that it understood the ROK's interest in Okinawa, [Japan] hoped to generate a constructive response from the ROK to the joint communiqué."[82]

The ROK's foreign ministry issued its evaluation on November 22. "The US and Japanese leaders had affirmed that the peace and security of the Republic of Korea was extremely important for the Korean Peninsula and the entire region and that the US military bases in Okinawa played an important role."[83] The ministry added, "It is regrettable that the nuclear weapons issue was left vague, but the US military will be able to use the bases without the constraint of prior consultation with the Japanese government."[84] This latter assessment is thought to have been a response to Prime Minister Satō's National Press Club speech that "… if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur … the policy of the government of Japan towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly… ."[85] By suggesting that Japan had abandoned the idea of prior consultation, perhaps the ROK government was disguising its diplomatic failure in getting Japan to guarantee the US's free use of bases without prior consultation.

Ambassador Kanayama visited the Blue House on November 24 to explain the contents of the joint communiqué to Park. The president said that the document had not gone as far as the ROK government had initially hoped it would, but acknowledged that the US and Japanese leaders had given serious consideration to ROK security. Since the ROK had hoped to maintain the present status for nuclear weapons at the military bases, Park pointed out the inadequacies of the communique: "The

Korean people do not regard as sufficient the method of deciding whether to respond to an invasion through prior consultation, even at the promise of Japan's immediate consent."

At the root of the inadequacies that Park had discussed lay Japan's political situation. Satō had remarked that Japan would make an immediate decision through prior consultations, but it was uncertain how much longer the Satō administration would continue. There was a high probability that a change in the Japanese political situation would cause a change in this policy. More specifically, the ROK feared that the political commitment of the Japanese government to immediately respond through prior consultations might not hold owing to the political situation in Japan.[86] The ROK's concerns about the joint communiqué overall were left unanswered.

The concerns that Park highlighted were borne out by Japan's attempt to revisit the Korea clause in response to changes to the international order in East Asia in the early 1970s. In the later days of the Satō administration, buffeted by the Nixon shock of US-China détente, the Korea clause came to be seen in Japan as impeding better relations with China and the DPRK. As will be discussed in Chap. 5, the Japanese government's attempt to revise that clause fell short of making a concrete policy shift, out of concern for the negative impact on the Japan-US alliance, still asymmetric on the military and security fronts. The government's attempt to revise the Korea clause ultimately appears to have been mostly political rhetoric for the domestic audience.

ROK Foreign Minister Choi, in a response to the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that he would need to examine what, if any, benefits the Korea clause held for the ROK. Noting Japan's continued ambiguity on ROK security, Choi made clear his intent to ask Japan to arrange a venue for consultation before the reversion of Okinawa.[87]

3.3.5 US Policy Coordination

The US, using the removal of its nuclear weapons as leverage, sought a Japanese guarantee of the free use of its Okinawa bases for the defense of the ROK, Taiwan, and Vietnam. It also pressed Satō to send Park a letter guaranteeing that base functionality would be maintained post-reversion.[88] The Americans, responding to an ROK government request for cooperation, had studied having Japan extend a direct guarantee to the ROK as a means to ease the ROK's security concerns. At the same time, the Americans also encouraged the ROK to show restraint, alert to the fact that ROK requests might impinge on Japan-US negotiations.

By April 1969, the ROK National Assembly and mass media were up in arms about Okinawa's reversion. Ambassador Porter told Foreign Minister Choi that Okinawa was a sensitive issue for Japan and the US and asked him to control the uproar.[89] He also informed Choi, who was requesting consultations with Japan, that Japan was asking that third parties not interfere in the reversion negotiations, and he urged Choi to avoid a public argument over the issue.[90] Porter persuaded the ROK to put an end to its uncompromising manner and rein in its frustration.

Secretary of State Rogers met with Choi on November 6, ahead of the Japan-US summit. He assured Choi that the US was fully aware of the importance of Okinawa's bases for the ROK's defense and planned to reflect the ROK's views in the negotiations. Yet Rogers recognized the need to coordinate on the ROK's reaction beforehand.[91] Through Porter, Rogers attempted to ascertain and temper the ROK's reaction to the joint communiqué before it was formally announced. Porter asked the ROK government for its response to the draft communiqué before it was officially released to the press. Although Choi expressed his displeasure with his reply that "there was not one word of value in the draft communiqué," officially he kept his complaints in check.[92] The dismissal by Japan and the US of the ROK's deep-seated concerns about a change in the status of the bases was, for the ROK, a diplomatic failure. And Porter saw the ROK's reaction, which insisted that the negotiations continue until 1972, the year of the reversion, for what it was: a desperate measure to enable the government to escape criticism for its failure.[93]

The US, responsible for the ROK's defense, concurred with the ROK in terms of the assessment of the strategic value of the Okinawa bases. Rogers, in fact, welcomed the ROK's thoughts concerning the question of Okinawa's reversion despite being aware of the trouble it might cause for Japan-US negotiations. He envisaged the ROK defense issue working to the advantage of the US in securing US forces the right to free use of the bases.[94] When he learned of the ROK's reversion concerns from Porter, he decided to provide the ROK with information on the negotiations. Porter also asked the State Department to brief Taiwan as well as the ROK on the negotiations. The State Department responded by sending Richard Sneider, the new deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Tokyo, to the ROK and Taiwan.[95] Sneider judged that the briefing he provided ROK Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon would satisfy the ROK government.[96]

Rogers, who by then saw the ROK's push for consultations as likely to interfere in the US negotiations with Japan, let the ROK know that the US planned only to provide information and nothing more.[97] Rogers determined that arranging consultations with the ROK might prompt a negative reaction from Japan. The US wanted to avoid having ROK interference leave the Japanese government open to attacks from the public and the opposition parties.

3.4 Conclusion

The Okinawa reversion negotiations resulted in the inclusion of a Korea clause in the Japan-US joint communiqué. But it also led to friction between Japan and the ROK over security amid differences in their perceptions of the situation and their security policies. ROK President Park expressed dissatisfaction with Japan's unwillingness to accept the ROK's requests, and the ROK only wound up irritating the Japanese government with repeated requests for consultations.

In terms of the perception of the situation, Japan believed that changes that had begun to appear in Cold War norms reduced the role of the Okinawa bases. That

is why it viewed the ROK's request for base functions to be maintained after the reversion of Okinawa as preventing reversion through its formula of "without nuclear weapons" and "parity with the mainland." Subjected to DPRK provocations, the ROK conversely viewed international détente and East Asian détente as two separate things, and so it emphasized a continued role for the Okinawa bases in East Asia.

In terms of policy, Japan rejected the ROK's request for cooperation as interference in its domestic affairs. It deemed the reversion of Okinawa to be an issue between it and the US alone. And it sought to replace the 1960 Korean Minute, which it secretly agreed to with the US as an exception to prior consultation, with a less-binding, unilateral statement. For its part, the ROK continued to request that Okinawan base functionality be maintained for East Asian security. It pressed Japan to yield on this point, not only through a direct approach, but also by raising the issue at multilateral consultations, such as the TCC and ASPAC meetings.

Both countries' diplomatic efforts were doomed to fail as they ran up against US opposition. The US, by forcing Japan to maintain the Korean Minute, secured free use of its military bases in Okinawa if the ROK were attacked. The US also pressed the ROK to forgo its unyielding attitude and curb its dissatisfaction, concerned that ROK requests to Japan for consultations would trigger a negative reaction from Tokyo.

The contrasting positions of Japan and the ROK, through the influence of the policy coordination by the US, which sought to create the public good of security in East Asia, converged in the Korea clause. The process of that clause's establishment shows that was a product of compromise between the requirements of security and détente.

Notes

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5. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *op. cit.*, 61–62.
6. Okinawa Base Problem Study Group. 1969. "Okinawa kichi mondai kenkyūkai hōkokusho (Report of the Base Problem Study Group)," in Okakura, Koshirō and Makise, Tsuneji (eds). *Shiryō Okinawa mondai* (Documents on the Okinawa issue). Tokyo: Rōdō Junpōsha, 539–541.
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13. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *op. cit.*, 61–62.
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15. National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 13: Policy toward Japan, May 28, 1969, *Japan and the United States*, No. 1074. See also https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/19415-national-security-archive-doc-01-nsdm-13-policy, point 4 (accessed February 23, 2024).
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21. NSDM 13: Policy toward Japan, *Japan and the United States*, No. 1074. [*Op. cit.* footnote 15.]
22. Base Problem Study Group, "Okinawa kichi mondai kenkyūkai hōkokusho," 533. This was the first document to detail the content and direction of the reversion. It led to Satō's March 11, 1969, announcement of a basic position on reversion being that of requiring "parity with the mainland." Also see Nakashima, Takuma. 2012. *Okinawa henkan to Nichi-Bei anpo taisei* (Reversion of Okinawa and the Japan-US security arrangements). Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 132–147; and Senda, Hisashi. 1987. *Satō naikaku kaisō* (Recollections of the Satō cabinet). Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 61–66. [For an English translation of the report see "Report Prepared by the Okinawa Base Problems Study Committee, March 8, 1969," in "Airgram No. 253, from American Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State on Okinawa: Bases Subcommittee Report (March 24, 1969)," Folder: Def 15 Ryu IS-US 1/1/69, Box 1617, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–1969, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.]
23. Base Problem Study Group, *op. cit.*, 536–537.
24. Ibid., 539–541.
25. *Dai 61-kai sangiin yosan iinkai gijiroku 8-gō* (Records of the 61st Committee on Budget, House of Councillors No. 8), March 10, 1969.
26. *Dai 61-kai sangiin yosan iinkai gijiroku 9-gō* (Records of the 61st Committee on Budget, House of Councillors No. 9), March 11, 1969.
27. *Dai 61-kai sangiin yosan iinkai gijiroku 12-gō* (Records of the 61st Committee on Budget, House of Councillors No. 12), March 13, 1969.
28. *Dai 61-kai sangiin Okinawa tokubetsu iinkai gijiroku 18-gō* (Records of the 61st Special Committee on Okinawa, House of Councillors No. 18), May 7, 1969.
29. Nakashima, *op. cit.*, 157–163; and *Asahi Shimbun*, May 20, 1969.
30. *Asahi Shimbun*, May 18, 1969.
31. Memorandum of Conversation: Foreign Minister of Japan Aichi's Call on the Secretary, June 3, 1969, *Japan and the United States*, No. 1082.
32. Memorandum of Conversation: Aichi's Call on the President, June 2, 1969, *Japan and the United States*, No. 1080. See also: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p2/d15 (accessed February 23, 2024).
33. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tokyo, Aichi Visit, State 092722, June 7, 1969, *Japan and the United States*, No. 1085, and Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tokyo, Aichi Visit and Okinawa, State 092811, June 7, 1969, *Japan and the United States*, No. 1086.
34. *Dai 61-kai shūgiin honkaigi gijiroku 27-gō* (Records of the 61st plenary session of the House of Representatives No. 27), June 13, 1969.
35. *Dai 61-kai shūgiin hoppō ryōdo Okinawa tokubetsu iinkai gijiroku 15-gō* (Records of the 61st Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories, House of Representatives No. 15), June 17, 1969.

36. Memorandum of Conversation, Okinawa, in folder of Japanese Materials, July 17, 1969 (United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands [USCAR] High Commissioners' Office Document, Admin. No. U80100013B, 1969–1972, Okinawa Prefectural Archive, 3); "2-5 Okinawa henkan mondai ni kansuru Aichi daijin-Maiya Beitaishi kaidan (2-5 Talks between Minister Aichi and US Ambassador Meyer on the Okinawa reversion issue)"; and "Iwayuru mitsuyaku mondai ni kansuru chōsa, hōkoku taishō bunsho: Senkyūhyaku rokujūnen ichigatsu no anpo jōyaku kaiteiji no Chōsen Hantō yūji no sai no sentō sakusen kōdō ni kansuru 'mitsuyaku' mondai kanren (Investigation into the so-called secret agreement issue documents covered by the report: Documents related to the 'secret agreement' on wartime action in the event of a situation on the Korean Peninsula made at the time of the January 1960 revision of the Security Treaty)," Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Archives Admin. No. 2010-6438. This latter document was declassified in March 2010 and can be found at https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/t_1960nk.pdf (accessed February 23, 2024).
37. The Korean Minute of 1960 refers to a secret agreement arrived at during the talks between US Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II and Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro on June 23, 1960. Despite the requirement for prior consultation established in the revised Japan-US Security Treaty of 1960, the Korean Minute guarantees that in the event of a situation calling for a military response on the Korean Peninsula, US forces stationed in Japan could take military action without prior consultation. The Korean Minute was a key point of contention between the ROK and Japan during the negotiations for Okinawa's reversion and was the basis for the US forcing Japan to accept the Korea clause.

    The existence was confirmed at the reversion negotiations, in NSC6008-1 and NSSM 5, which document US Japan policy regarding the US bases on Okinawa, and in references by both countries. An NSC meeting in 1974 to discuss the dissolution of the UN Command further confirmed the minute's existence in the context of a reference to the use of US bases in Japan. (Memorandum for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Use of US Bases in Japan in the Event of Aggression in Korea, Attachments: Korean Minute, US National Security Council: Institutional Files, 1974–77, Box 53, Institutional Files-MSDMs, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.)

    Japan, however, continued to deny the minute's existence until it was disclosed in its entirety in the Japanese government's 2010 investigation on secret agreements ("2-2 (Gijiroku) [Record]," January 6, 1960, "Iwayuru mitsuyaku mondai ni kansuru chōsa, hōkoku taishō bunsho").
38. Japanese proposal through *bout de papier*, Memorandum of Conversation, Okinawa, in folder of Japanese Materials, July 17, 1969, p. 8.
39. Gabe, Masaaki. 2000. *Okinawa henkan to wa nan datta no ka: Nichi-Bei sengo kōshōshi no naka de* [What was the reversion of Okinawa? Amid the history of Japan-US postwar negotiations]. Tokyo: Nippon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 127.
40. Kuriyama, Takakazu. Nakashima, Takuma et al. (eds). 2010. *Okinawa henkan, Nitchū kokkō seijōka, Nichi-Bei "mitsuyaku"* (The reversion of Okinawa, normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations, and "secret agreements" between Japan and the United States). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010, 237–243.
41. Memorandum of Conversation, Okinawa, in folder of Japanese Materials (USCAR High Commissioners' Office Document), 8.
42. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tokyo, Okinawa Negotiations, State 140943, August 20, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 260.
43. "Tōgō-Sunaidaa kaidan" (8 gatsu 27 nichi gozen) [Tōgō-Sneider talks (morning of August 27)], August 27, 1969, *Okinawa kankei 20: Okinawa henkan* [Okinawa-related document 20: Reversion of Okinawa] (Admin. Nos. F0600-2010-00032, H22-12, 00000015).
44. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tokyo, Okinawa Negotiations, State 151979, September 9, 1969, *Japan and the United States*, No. 1119.
45. The Vietnam peace talks were under way in Paris, and the ROK viewed the direction of the Vietnam War and the Okinawa reversion issue as the central issues of the 1970s. *Minutes of*

69th National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee Meeting, No. 1: Hearing on Report on International Situation, ROK National Assembly Office (April 3, 1969).

46. *Hankook Ilbo*, March 16, 1969.
47. *Chosun Ilbo*, March 26, 1969.
48. Kimiya, Tadashi. 2001. "1960 nendai Kankoku ni okeru Reisen gaikō no sanruikei: Nikkan kokkō seijōka, Betonamu hahei, ASPAC (The effect of three dimensions of Cold War diplomacy on 1960s South Korea: Japan-South Korea normalization, deployment of troops to Vietnam, and the Asian and Pacific Council)," in Okonogi, Masao and Moon, Chung-in (eds). 2001. *Shijō, kokka, kokusai taisei* (Markets, states, and international systems). Tokyo: Keio University Press. Kimiya labeled the ROK's Cold War diplomacy through the deployment of troops to Vietnam an "excessive response."
49. Kim, Chung-yum. 1997. *Oh, Park Chung-hee: Political memoirs of Kim Chung-yum.* Seoul: Chungang M&B, 28–29. According to Kim, who began serving as chief presidential secretary in October 1969, when the ROK government heard about the partial withdrawal of US troops from the ROK in early 1970 it was caught entirely unprepared. Then ROK ambassador to the United Nations, Kim Yong-shik, also recalls that the ROK believed that it would be excluded from the scope of the Nixon Doctrine. Kim, Yong-shik. 2001. *Hope and Challenge.* Seoul: Dong-a Ilbo sa, 182–183.
50. The Asia-Pacific Treaty Organization (APATO) included Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Republic of Vietnam, as well as nations of Asia-Pacific that, like the ROK, contributed troops to the Vietnam War: Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand. See ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Instruction from the President on draft plan for security measures for our country and free Asia, November 26, 1968," *Initiative to establish an Asia and Pacific Treaty Organization (APATO)*, Cat. No. 729.35, Reg. No. 3107. p. 27.
51. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Ryukyus (Okinawa) question: Points of issue and the government's position," *Japan-US Okinawa Reversion Issue, 1969* (Vol. 1 of 2, January–June 1969), Cat. No. 722.12JA/US, Reg. No. 2958.
52. Ibid., 51.
53. Ibid., 83.
54. *Dong-a Ilbo*, March 13, 1969, and *Chosun Ilbo*, March 14 and 15, 1969.
55. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Okinawa, Seoul 1748 and Seoul 1731, April 9, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, 148–151.
56. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Record of Conversation on the Ryukyus (Okinawa) issue," *Japan-US Okinawa Reversion Issue, 1969*, April 9, 1969.
57. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Aide Memoire" [Memorandum handed to the Japanese ambassador to the ROK], *Japan-US Okinawa Reversion Issue, 1969*, April 9, 1969.
58. ROK National Assembly Office, "Minutes of the Foreign Affairs Committee Meeting," No. 1, *Seventh 69th National Assembly Standing Committee Records*, April 10, 1969, 5.
59. Telegram from the Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, ROK Interest in Okinawa, Tokyo 2818, April 12, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, 157–158.
60. Embassy of the ROK in Japan, JAW-04120, received by Minister of Foreign Affairs from the ROK Ambassador to Japan, April 10, 1969, *Japan-US Okinawa Reversion Issue, 1969*.
61. Embassy of the ROK in Japan, JAW-04120, received by Minister of Foreign Affairs from the ROK Ambassador to Japan, April 10, 1969, *Japan-US Okinawa Reversion Issue, 1969*, and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 13, 1969.
62. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Okinawa, Seoul 1873, April 15, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, 176.
63. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Record of Conversation on the Ryukyus (Okinawa) issue (ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Asian Affairs Bureau Director Kim Jung-tae and Japanese Minister to the ROK Kamikawa Yo," April 16, 1969, *Japan-US Okinawa Reversion Issue, 1969).*
64. *Dai 61-kai shūgiin yosan iinkai gijiroku 5-gō* (Records of the 61st House of Representatives Budget Committee No. 5), February 6, 1969.

65. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Record of Third South Korea-Japan Regular Ministerial Conference, South Korea-Japan Regular Ministerial Consultations: Third Round, Tokyo, August 26–28, 1969, Vol. 3: Reports on Results, Cat. No. 723.1JA, Reg. No. 3008, pp. 251–252.
66. Ibid., 228–229.
67. Ibid., 255–256.
68. *Asahi Shimbun*, evening edition, August 27, 1969.
69. Joint Statement of the Third ROK-Japan Regular Ministerial Conference (August 29, 1969) in Asiatic Research Center, Korea University (ed). 1997. *Materials on ROK-Japan Relations*, Vol. 2. Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 640.
70. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Seoul 2875, May 31, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 338–339.
71. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Seoul, TCC Meeting Bangkok, State 77415, May 15, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, 304–306.
72. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Okinawa, Seoul 2949, June 4, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 25.
73. *Asahi Shimbun*, June 1, 1969.
74. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Okinawa, Seoul 2949, June 4, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 25–26. [see footnote 72.]
75. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Seoul 1775, April 10, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, 153; Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Seoul 3343, June 23, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 86.
76. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 26, 1969.
77. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, "Japanese Press Report on Language of Nixon-Sato Communiqué," Seoul 5941, October 29, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 6, 271–272.
78. Ambassador Porter reported to Washington, DC, in a November 8 telegram that the Japanese minister saw no possibility of future consultations with the ROK. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, "Okinawa Negotiation," Seoul 6147, November 8, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 74–75.
79. Northeast Asian Affairs Bureau, Record of Conversation (ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Asian Affairs Bureau Director Kim Jung-tae and Japanese Minister to the ROK Kamikawa Yō), October 28, 1969, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan-US Okinawa Reversion Issue, 1969* (Vol. 2 of 2, July-December 1969), Cat. No. 722.12JA/US, Reg. No. 2959, 58–61.
80. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Seoul 6290, November 17, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 166–167.
81. Ibid.
82. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Okinawa Communiqué, Seoul 6329, November 19, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 180–181.
83. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Telegram WJA-11251, received by ROK ambassadors to Japan and the United States from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 23, 1969, *Japan-US Okinawa Reversion Issue, 1969*, 207.
84. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Public Reaction to U.S.-Japan Communiqué on Okinawa, Airgram-381, November 25, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 197–198.
85. "Nashonaru puresu kurabu ni okeru enzetsu (National press club speech)," in Kajima Institute of International Peace (ed). 1984. *Nihon gaikō shuyō bunsho, nenpyō* (Major Japanese diplomatic documents and chronology), Vol. 2. Tokyo: Hara Shobō.
86. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Record of President Park's Conversation with Japanese Ambassador Kanayama," November 24, 1969, *Japan-US Okinawa Reversion Issue, 1969*, 208–222.
87. ROK National Assembly Office, "Minutes of the Foreign Affairs Committee Meeting," No. 13, *Seventh 72nd National Assembly Standing Committee Records*, March 10, 1970, 10–11.

88. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tokyo, Okinawa Negotiations, State 140943, August 20, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 260; and Tōgō-Sunaidaa kaidan (8 gatsu 21 nichi gogo) [Tōgō-Sneider talks (afternoon of August 21)], August 21, 1969, *Okinawa kankei 20: Okinawa henkan* (Admin. nos. F0600-2010-00032, H22-12, 00000015).
89. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Okinawa, Seoul 1748, 1731, April 9, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 148–151.
90. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Seoul 2997, June 6, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 41–42.
91. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tokyo (Sneider), State 187978, November 6, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 43.
92. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, ROKG Reaction to Nixon-Sato Communiqué on Okinawa Reversion, Porter sent to Rogers, Seoul 6359, November 22, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 191–192.
93. Ibid.
94. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Seoul, State 44757, March 22, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, 123–124.
95. Telegram from the Embassy in Taipei to the Department of State, Taipei 4306, October 28, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 6, 261–263.
96. Telegram from the Embassy in Seoul to the Department of State, Seoul 6147, November 8, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 75.
97. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Seoul and Tokyo, State 67673, April 30, 1969, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, 261–262.

Chapter 4
The Reduction of US Forces in the ROK and Japan-ROK Security Cooperation (1970–73): The "Four Projects"

Abstract The chapter looks at the impact on bilateral security cooperation through economic assistance of the ROK's request that Japan assist it with its heavy and chemical industry (HCI) development policy, known as the "Four Projects", which was established in response to the US withdrawal of troops from the ROK in the early 1970s. The author examines Japan-ROK cooperation on the Four Projects from a policy continuity standpoint using previously unexamined material. The chapter explores, first, how Japan and the ROK identified potential areas for cooperation from the angle of security cooperation through economic assistance in response to the US force reductions. Secondly, it reveals how the ROK's requests for Japan's cooperation changed as it sought to compromise with Japan's responses and what impact this had on bilateral security cooperation.

The Nixon Doctrine, formulated in US President Richard Nixon's February 1970 foreign policy report to Congress, reaffirmed US commitments while urging countries to attend to their own security. As it applied to the Republic of Korea, it emerged as a reduction of US troops stationed in the ROK.[1] Since the late 1960s, the US had been urging an expanded role for Japan in East Asian regional security; the reduction of US forces in the ROK was the event that called into question Japan's cooperation in ROK security. In that context, the ROK requested Japan to act as a provider of military assistance and to cooperate in its Four Projects,[2] which had defense industry applications.[3] And although the ROK's requests changed through the subsequent process of consultation with Japan, the result is thought to have shaped the orientation of Japan-ROK security cooperation in the 1970s.

Previous literature claims that the Four Projects effort ended in failure for lack of Japanese cooperation, forcing the ROK government to shift policy.[4] That body of research regards the failure as a critical turning point in the ROK's policy for the heavy and chemical industry (HCI). Indeed, some analyses even see the failure as prompting a shift in the entity promoting HCI in the 1970s from the ROK's Economic Planning Board (EPB) to the Blue House (the Office of the President).[5] And yet, even after November 1971, when many scholars argue that the ROK government discontinued its push for the Four Projects due to its policy shift, the ROK continued to consult

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Japan on realizing the projects. On January 25, 1973, in fact, the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) started financing the projects.[6] This suggests there are elements missing in the narrative of the ROK's abandoning the Four Projects to shift to an HCI policy, elements that cannot be explained by just a change in ROK policy.

This chapter analyzes Japan-ROK cooperation on the Four Projects from a policy continuity standpoint using previously unexamined material. It explores first how Japan and the ROK identified potential areas for cooperation from the angle of security cooperation through economic assistance in response to the US force reductions in the ROK in the early 1970s. Second, it reveals how the ROK's requests for Japan's cooperation changed as it sought to compromise with Japan's responses and what impact this had on bilateral security cooperation through Japanese economic assistance to the ROK.

4.1 ROK-Based US Military Cutbacks and Japan

4.1.1 The Decision to Reduce the US Military Presence

The Nixon administration, which had come into power calling for an early end to the Vietnam War, set out to reduce the US military presence in Asia amid public opinion and fiscal pressures to do so. As early as August 1969, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird announced his "Vietnamization" policy, which would shift the primary role for prosecuting the Vietnam War to South Vietnamese forces, and set forth a concrete plan for troop reductions.[7] It included pulling 320,000 military personnel out of Asia: 265,500 from Vietnam, 20,000 from the ROK, 15,800 from Thailand, 12,000 from Japan, and 9100 from the Philippines.[8]

The Nixon Doctrine, as formulated in the president's February 1970 report, included the following points:

- The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
- We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.
- In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.[9]

The application of the Nixon Doctrine to the ROK is laid out in the National Security Council's (NSC) National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 48, dated March 20, 1970. NSDM 48 calls for withdrawing 20,000 US troops from the ROK by the end of fiscal year (FY) 1971.[10] The reduction was seen as a good test case of the Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on local forces taking over local defense,[11] and symbolized the push to implement that doctrine in the ROK.

The administration began considering a policy for the drawdown of US forces in the ROK soon after its inauguration, with National Security Study Memorandum

(NSSM) 27 of February 22, 1969.[12] After the relevant departments and agencies had thrashed out their views, an NSC meeting on Korea was held on August 14.[13] Laird questioned maintaining over 60,000 troops in the ROK under a tightened US defense budget and argued that the US should instead improve the ROK's military capability in a "Koreanizing" process akin to the "Vietnamization" policy mentioned earlier. Nixon appeared wary at that time; he felt that it was poor timing to change the number of US troops in the ROK given "Sino-Soviet tension" and "the south Vietnam problem."[14] He may have been concerned that Sino-Soviet tension could undermine the ability of the two countries to constrain the DPRK. His perception is thought to have been influenced in large part by the DPRK's downing of a US Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane near DPRK territorial airspace on April 15, 1969, with the loss of all 31 aboard. Another potential concern was that, with the US withdrawal from South Vietnam becoming a *fait accompli*, a drawdown of US forces stationed in the ROK might cause US allies in Asia to doubt US commitment to the region. Given these political elements, the decision to reduce US troops was not a simple one to make.

Congressional pressure to cut the defense budget nevertheless necessitated reducing the troop count in the ROK. Subsequent discussion focused on what force structure would be appropriate. These troops symbolized the US military presence in the ROK, and someone observed that a complete withdrawal raised the issue of deterrence.[15] The discussion proceeded, split between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and interagency meetings, but they were unable to come up with an appropriate scale for a continued US presence in the ROK. Drawing on these previous discussions, levels for both US and ROK forces and the timing of a US troop withdrawal were raised at the NSC meeting on March 4, 1970.[16] National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger presented Nixon with five policy options: (1) two US divisions plus eighteen ROK divisions; (2) two US brigades plus eighteen improved ROK divisions; (3) one US division plus eighteen improved ROK divisions; (4) one US division plus sixteen improved ROK divisions; and (5) a residual US force plus eighteen improved ROK divisions.

Given the political overtones of US troop reduction, Secretary of State William Rogers proposed a two-phase plan: an initial drawdown of some size followed by further reductions after ROK troops returned from Vietnam. Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard opined that the important problem was Congressional willingness to support modernizing the ROK army, on which drawdown numbers were predicated. Nixon felt that the US could not keep all 64,000 US troops in the ROK, taking the position that some level of reduction was needed in principle, but he offered no specifics. He had noted the need to create the impression that the reduction decision was made at President Park Chung-hee's request, and directed that assistance to modernize the ROK military be used as a means to achieve that. Nixon, as previously noted, was concerned that reductions driven by the US would upset its allies in Asia.

These considerations underlay NSDM 48, approved March 20, which addressed the reduction of US presence in the ROK as well as follow-on measures and guidelines for negotiating with the ROK government. NSDM 48's main points were:

(1) President Nixon would approve a reduction of 20,000 US military personnel in the ROK by the end of FY1971;
(2) the president wished a situation to be created in which "US withdrawals result from President Park's initiative in view of present ROK strength and the agreed need for future improvements in ROK forces";
(3) the US government would submit to Congress plans for military assistance of $200 million annually over FY1971-1975 to modernize ROK forces and for increased economic assistance of $50 million a year;
(4) the US would not withdraw further US troops until FY1972, when ROK forces returned from Vietnam, or "until compensating improvements in ROK forces were well underway."[17]

4.1.2 The Suspension of Additional US Troop Withdrawals

The Japanese government was concerned about the impact on Northeast Asian security of the withdrawal of US troops from the ROK. At the 11th Japan-US Policy Planning Conference on March 3, 1970, Japan argued that because the reduction of US forces in the ROK, in particular the withdrawal of two ground divisions, would have extremely grave consequences, the US should not do it. Even if the aim was to make adjustments for the sake of efficiency, Japan opined that it had to be done gradually, with an eye on circumstances.[18] At the end of June, Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba Nobuhiko told US Ambassador to Japan Armin Meyer that a withdrawal of US forces from the ROK might cause Japan to reconsider its current policy.[19] The inference was that a reduced US military presence in the ROK could very well mean that Japan would rethink its security policy grounded in the Japan-US alliance and turn itself into a military power.

In July, after the US had announced its troop drawdowns, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku met with Secretary of State Rogers during the latter's visit to Japan. "The reduction of the US military presence is quite shocking and the timing is a rather sensitive matter," he said, pointing out the need to proceed prudently. Rogers emphasized that this was merely a modification of the US military's presence through reduction, not a complete withdrawal or a change in basic US policy. He elaborated: "The President believes he needs to garner continued public and Congressional support to achieve his policy of maintaining a powerful US presence in the Pacific."[20]

This security-related anxiety gradually turned to a fear that the US move might force Japan to take up the US military's responsibility. Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Nakasone Yasuhiro, in a July 13 response to the Diet, said, "Japan is a country with its own diplomatic and national defense organizations, a country that pursues policies based on the Constitution to protect the nation's interests. Thus, following its own unique path, Japan must seek its way while evaluating the overall situation in Asia."[21]

As noted above, NSDM 48, which decided the withdrawal of 20,000 US personnel from the ROK, had also mentioned further withdrawals. However, as the discussion

around additional reductions began in earnest, the US State Department began a careful study of the reduction of US forces in the ROK driven by defense budget cuts and the implications for its Asian allies, particularly Japan.[22]

The US Embassy in Japan observed that the reduced US military presence in Asia was stoking Japanese unease about its security, which ultimately might push it into becoming a military power. Japan would likely maintain the status quo, absent any changes in the international environment. But the embassy predicted that "if Japan were to determine that future US action in Asia [from another war in Asia] meant that the United States was abandoning its fundamental commitment to protect [its ally], Japan might be forced to choose a new role as a military power to guarantee its security."[23] It also warned that the timing and method of the reduction of the US presence and commitments in Asia might directly influence the orientation of Japan's policies toward regional issues.[24]

These concerns set the stage for policy differences that emerged on further drawdowns between the State Department, which urged caution given the political implications, and the Pentagon, which wanted to press ahead. The State Department fully outlined its concern that a reduced US military presence might reduce US credibility and cause Japan to rearm.[25] It assessed that Asian allies would perceive defense budget cutbacks not as a theoretical application of the Nixon Doctrine but as a US retreat. Turning to the implications for Japan, it observed that "In terms of US political interests, perhaps more inherently serious would be a sudden reduction of conventional forces, particularly if coupled with a reduction in strategic forces, which could seriously damage Japan's confidence in the US security guarantee and possibly alter the direction of Japanese policy on nuclear weapons."[26]

Ahead of an August NSC meeting, Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs Ronald L. Spiers proposed a change to Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. He suggested that the US should keep its Second Infantry Division in the ROK at least through FY1973 rather than completely withdrawing it in FY1972.[27] The State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs also firmly opposed any further troop withdrawals from the ROK. An internal State Department meeting to prepare for the NSC revealed concerns that a FY1972 withdrawal of the Second Infantry Division would have severe psychological impacts on both the ROK and Japan and that any remaining trust these countries had in the Nixon Doctrine would be completely lost.[28] Rogers and Johnson prioritized the diplomatic impact and adamantly opposed further reductions of US personnel in the ROK in FY1972 and FY1973.[29]

Just before the August 1970 NSC meeting to make the final decision on the defense budget, however, the Pentagon revealed that it was considering additional reduction of forces in Korea in FY1973. The concept was to repatriate 14,000 personnel, or about two-thirds of the Second Infantry Division, and station only 20,000 Special Forces personnel, newly established in the ROK by the end of FY1973.[30] Johnson told Deputy Defense Secretary Packard that the US military presence in the ROK held significant political importance by upholding US defense commitments in Northeast Asia, and so the US should not decide in favor of additional reductions. In a

memorandum to the president, Rogers argued the case for stopping additional withdrawals, emphasizing that the important concern was not so much the ROK as Japan. He argued that if the reduced US military presence in the ROK caused Japan to doubt US capabilities and intentions, he feared it would strengthen the forces in Japan that favored that country's possessing nuclear weapons of its own.[31]

Responding to the interdepartmental conflict, Kissinger observed that while pulling US troops from the ROK was essential, militarily and fiscally, he was against any additional withdrawals on political and diplomatic grounds.[32] Nixon sided with Kissinger. He decided against further withdrawals, citing his determination in NSDM 48 that they "may be considered when substantial ROK forces return from Vietnam or compensating improvements in ROK forces are well underway."[33] It was the president who made the decision in August 1971 to leave a full infantry division in the ROK until FY1973.[34]

4.2 The Four Projects as Security Cooperation Through Economic Assistance

4.2.1 ROK Requests for Japanese Cooperation

ROK Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon met with Japanese Prime Minister Satō on May 21, 1970, and asked for Japanese assistance with the ROK's Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan, slated to begin in 1972.[35] Chung intimated that if the ROK's economic development failed it would destabilize the nation economically and politically. Thus, Japan's positive cooperation, he said, was vital to prove that liberal economies were superior to socialist economies. If the ROK could convince the DPRK that armed reunification was impossible over the 1972–76 period, its later efforts should turn toward an economic fight. Economic superiority would also be an advantage in a future reunification, Chung confided. The meeting occurred after the US had unofficially communicated to both countries its intentions to reduce its military presence in the ROK.

EPB Assistant Minister Hwang Byung-tai on June 22 showed his Japanese counterparts a heavy industry promotion plan, a project that the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan would establish in that period (1972–76).[36] Hwang revealed the ROK had plans for eight industrial facilities, and he handed over the draft plans for three: a heavy machinery plant, a shipyard, and a special steel mill. The other five plants would produce automobiles, foundry pig iron, brass (copper), optical instruments, and telecommunications equipment. Japan later asked at a July 3 meeting if the ROK was expecting cooperation on all eight facilities. The ROK asked for $100 million in total: $53 million for the three main facilities; $28 million for the automobile plant; $9 million for the foundry pig iron plant; and $9 million for the brass, optical instruments, and telecommunications equipment plants.[37]

Yet, this heavy industry promotion plan was recast as a defense industry promotion scheme at a July 3 meeting held at the presidential office. President Park, the relevant ministers, and ROK Ambassador to Japan Lee Hu-rak were finalizing their agenda for the fourth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference. Park directed EPB Minister Kim Hak-ryul to build munition factories to arm the 2.5 million strong ROK Reserve Forces.[38] As talks had just begun with the US concerning modernizing the ROK forces in conjunction with the drawdown of US troops, Park adopted a policy of domestically producing the necessary equipment to arm his reserve forces.[39] From the plan Hwang had already showed the Japanese, Park prioritized the construction of the heavy machinery, shipbuilding, special steel, and foundry pig iron facilities and settled on a policy to build them using yen loans from Japan.[40] This was the formulation of the ROK's Four Projects.

On the basis of the presidential office meeting discussion, Kim Hak-ryul and Lee Hu-rak separately requested Japan's cooperation in the new plan. Kim communicated the new approach with Park's priorities through Japan's Ambassador to the ROK Kanayama Masahide. The approach called for Japan to announce publicly its cooperation in the ROK's Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan and to provide the necessary cooperation to realize the Four Projects in a manner that was separate and independent from the Five-Year Plan. Kim emphasized that the Four Projects were closely related to the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (hereafter, POSCO, the official name since March 2002) integrated steel mill that Japan funded.[41]

Ambassador Lee, meanwhile, sought Japan's cooperation from a security angle. Meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba on July 9, he noted what the ROK needed was "peacetime industries in times of peace but that respond to military demand in an emergency … the sort of thing to make firearms and the like." "To be extremely frank," Lee continued, "we would like for Japanese cooperation with a priority on military assistance to the ROK."[42] Lee, who had attended the July 3 presidential office meeting, clearly spelled out the nature of the Four Projects and sought Japan's cooperation. Ushiba, in turn, suggested that Japan's fund allocation under the June 22, 1965 Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea might be insufficient, making cooperation on such projects difficult.[43] Lee nevertheless pressed for Japan to "at the very least, include language to the effect that 'the Japanese government understood the ROK government's request and agreed in principle to give it sincere consideration and support' in the communiqué at the ministerial conference."[44]

At talks with Japanese Prime Minister Satō on July 14, Lee identified two items of interest to President Park. First, the ROK needed a loan of $100 million in cash to improve the operational status of factories, including the POSCO steel mill, built using Japanese capital. Second, it urgently needed to build facilities to promote heavy industry before launching its Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1972. Lee again clearly characterized the facilities as "special steel production, shipbuilding, and the others as peacetime industries that could shift to war production in an emergency." He noted, however, that the ROK's requests for Japanese cooperation were not intended to fill the gap left by the US drawdown, which could

be accomplished solely with US assistance for ROK military modernization.[45] Lee likely adopted this stance to prevent cooperation being politicized and blocked in Japan. He was cognizant of Japanese domestic concerns about Japan-US-ROK military cooperation and the possibility of Japan having to take over some of the US military's responsibilities. The essential issue for the ROK was that as it discussed ROK military modernization in conjunction with the US force reductions with the US, it was not necessarily desirable for Japan to be the one to fill the gap. Having secured through the ROK-US alliance the capability to deter the DPRK, the ROK was seeking to lock in US military support before getting Japan's cooperation.

Satō responded to Lee's Four Projects cooperation request with understanding of the ROK's circumstances. But he asked that the ROK respond calmly to the US drawdown. He had already told Secretary of State Rogers, Satō explained, that "Japan did not intend to fill the gap after the withdrawal of US forces, and it did not even have ability to do so. Surely, that was not what the Guam Doctrine was about." He offered that "Some amount of reduction was inevitable, I feel. The ROK need not worry as long as the US forces were stationed there, even with some decrease in number."[46]

JDA Parliamentary Vice Minister Tsuchiya Yoshihiko visited the ROK around that time, at the invitation of ROK Vice Minister of National Defense Yu Geun-chang. The ROK presented him with the following three requests for cooperation: (1) that Japan help limit US force reductions in the ROK, a huge problem for Japan too; (2) that Japan bolster its economic and technological cooperation from the perspective of defense in the broad sense, while knowing that military cooperation was difficult for Japan; and (3) that Japan cease exporting high-speed rubber boats, radar systems, and other items to the DPRK that could be used as weapons by its military and guerrillas.[47]

4.2.2 Japan's Response

Elements within the Japanese government opposed having its assistance to promote heavy industry in the ROK be associated with the reduction of US troops there. Even as Japan expressed concern about the troop drawdown,[48] it tried to avoid being pigeonholed as the one to fill the vacuum left by the US force reduction. The Japanese government decided to focus on economic cooperation, including the promotion of heavy industry, while it downplayed the impact of the US drawdown in the ROK on deterrence.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs examined the US force reduction in the ROK not only as an issue of military deterrence, but also from a psychological perspective, the fear of abandonment. According to the analysis by the ministry's Northeast Asia Division, if Japan were to provide aid to modernize the ROK forces and for other military needs, a reduced US presence might still cause some issues for the ROK, of a psychological and a purely military nature, yet the ROK's domestic military capability would remain almost unchanged. Even assuming that not enough military

aid was provided and US ground forces were decreased, the analysis judged that support from the US Air Force and Navy Seventh Fleet using Japanese bases pursuant to the Japan-US Security Treaty, provided they were prepared to assist the ROK, would enable ROK forces to resist a unilateral invasion by DPRK forces.[49]

On the basis of this perception of the situation, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided in July 1970, ahead of the fourth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference, not to get further involved in the US force reduction for four reasons. First, US troop withdrawals from the ROK was essentially an ROK-US matter. The US, moreover, faced massive protests domestically that left it little choice but to reduce its overseas troop count. Second, a large-scale attack by the DPRK was now exceedingly unrealistic. Third, ROK capabilities would see little impact in a purely military sense from the cut in US ground troops and, backstopped by the Japan-US security arrangements, were sufficient to thwart an all-out attack by the DPRK. Fourth, Japan was willing to give all the cooperation it could to ensure the ROK's economic and political stability.[50] The Japanese government thus based its political and economic cooperation with the ROK on how it perceived the situation: no fundamental change in the US military presence in East Asia, and no threat of the DPRK launching full-scale war.

Japan shared these views in security consultations with the US. At a July 22, 1970 preparatory meeting for the seventh Japan-US Security Subcommittee (SSC), Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Yasukawa Takeshi said that the crux of the ROK's issues related less to reduced military capability than to an overreaction stemming from psychological fears of US disengagement. As the US intended to return its force posture in the ROK to the level it was before the January 1968 USS *Pueblo* incident, the US needed to reaffirm that intention with the ROK, he stressed. Stating that Japan could not play a military role, Yasukawa made clear that Japan was caught between the pressures of the US troop cuts from the ROK and the ROK's requests for economic assistance. The ROK, added Yasukawa, was not seeking military aid from Japan; it wanted yen loans of $50 million for projects to build a heavy machinery plant, a special steel mill, and a shipyard and yen loans of $100 million to develop its agricultural sector and export industries. Although it had not yet made a decision, Japan did intend to provide all possible assistance, and was thinking of sending experts to the ROK to conduct feasibility studies of these projects.[51]

At no point in this conversation did the US directly ask Japan to assist the ROK. It is worth noting that Japan handled the issue of Four Projects cooperation based on the perception of its own position between the US's force reduction policy and the ROK's requests for economic assistance. The Four Projects was an avenue of cooperation open to Japan, with which, as Yasukawa noted, it was unable to cooperate militarily.

4.2.3 The Fourth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference

The fourth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference was held in Seoul from July 21 to 23, 1970. The US reduction of personnel in the ROK was predicted to be a main agenda topic, judging from the facts that the US had announced its troop drawdown plan two weeks earlier, and that the US and ROK defense ministers were meeting in Honolulu at around the same time. Japanese and ROK media had already started reporting on the Four Projects, focusing particular interest on the bilateral consultations on that item.

However, Gong Ro-myung, the director of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Northeast Asia Division, suggested a particular focus for the US drawdown issue at a July 13 working-level meeting to set the agenda. "It will be a major topic, but we would like to discuss the matter in the context of last year's Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué policy line."[52] This was probably to avoid having any associations drawn between the US drawdown and Japan-ROK economic cooperation.

To the Japanese delegation paying him a courtesy visit on July 21, President Park stressed the seriousness of the US drawdown for the ROK's security, but noted his concern with media reports that Japanese cooperation would fill the resulting gap. With respect to Japan's cooperation in promoting the ROK's heavy industry, he said:

> It is exceedingly regrettable that the newspapers are writing up stories associating [that cooperation] to the US force reduction issue and linking it to a munitions industry. As I fully appreciate how talk of a munitions industry puts Japan in a difficult position, I myself will speak to the relevant cabinet ministers cautioning them to request cooperation in a way that does not give rise to such talk.[53]

Park, therefore, denied an association between the drawdown and the Four Projects, but he did seek Japanese cooperation concerning yen loans in connection with the force reduction. "The US drawdown is directly connected to a financial issue, and the only countermeasure we have is to increase exports to the greatest extent possible. Therefore, I ask for your understanding of the circumstances for our need for a sizable cash loan to bolster our export industries as they exist now."[54]

EPB Minister Kim Hak-ryul prioritized Japan's cooperation on heavy industry promotion. He underscored that exports were the ROK's only way to offset the foreign capital lost because of the US drawdown. Setting aside such issues as improving the rural sector and public infrastructure, the ROK faced a pressing need to invest capital in its existing export industries, and so sought a cash loan of around $50 million.[55]

At the ministerial conference, both sides shared their own perceptions of the current situation, but the ROK side appeared concerned that the drawdown would weaken the US military presence. On the first day, ROK Foreign Minister Choi Kyu-ha, observing that the US was attempting to gradually reduce its direct involvement in the security and defense of Asia, spoke of the dangers embodied within a hasty application of the Nixon Doctrine.[56] Beyond observations, though, the Koreans made no requests of Japan. In his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Ambassador to the ROK Kanayama Masahide noted that "President Park, Prime

Minister Chung, and Foreign Minister Choi all spoke about the US force reduction issue while the Japanese side just listened. They did not talk about what they wanted from us." He added, "A light reference to the [drawdown] issue will be made in the communiqué."[57]

On day two of the conference, EPB Minister Kim asked for $59 million in financial cooperation for the Four Projects: $7.2 million for foundry pig iron, $5.8 million for special steel, $25 million for heavy machinery, and $21 million for shipbuilding. Japan planned to designate these as industries as linked to POSCO, which it had financed, so that it could provide yen loans from its Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. For the joint communiqué language, it would take a positive attitude toward the projects, but first it would study the them.[58] Finance Minister Fukuda Takeo told Kim that he understood the ROK's plan to boost exports to cover the $70 million in revenue lost from the drawdown. He communicated Japan's plan to provide support for the Four Projects through JEXIM and make another loan to support ROK export companies.[59]

In the joint communiqué, both countries confirmed that the drawdown was intimately related to their mutual security and prosperity. They noted in section 8 that "They both also recognized the significant support the US military presence in the Far East provides, in the current circumstances, to security in the region." In relation to the Four Projects, the two sides agreed in section 18 that "The ROK side requested Japanese cooperation in connection to plans to promote its heavy industry, such as the construction of the machine industry. The Japanese side, recognizing how essential the ROK's promotion of heavy industry is to the efficient operations of the [POSCO] integrated steel mill and to the country's economic development, stated its willingness to cooperate as necessary, such as conducting the required studies of the ROK's plans. Furthermore, the Japanese side pledged its willingness to provide the necessary cooperation as based on the studies." And regarding the cash loans, they noted in section 19 that "The ROK side requested a new loan from Japan of $100 million to guarantee the import of Japanese machinery and materials in order to modernize its agricultural sector, foster its export industries, and promote its small and medium enterprises. In turn, Japan pledged to look proactively at this request."[60] They also concluded a detailed agreement, undisclosed, for $50 million of the new loan.[61]

At the joint press briefing following the close of the conference, Finance Minister Fukuda stated that "The heavy industry-related loan will take shape once the details of the projects are finalized." He added that JEXIM was being considered as the source of financing. ROK Foreign Minister Choi was asked for his views on the Honolulu talks and the Japan-ROK partnership under the tough conditions of the China-DPRK rapprochement and the US drawdown. He observed that modernizing ROK forces was the main topic in Honolulu and that the ROK sought primarily economic cooperation from Japan.[62]

4.2.4 Private Sector Initiative

Based on the agreements from the fourth Regular Ministerial Conference, a Japanese survey mission visited the ROK from October 28 to November 5, 1970. Heading the delegation was Akazawa Shōichi, the director general of the Heavy Industries Bureau of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The visit occurred as the respective governments struggled to react to media reports in both countries implying that Japan's assistance for the ROK heavy industry promotion plan might be linked to supporting the ROK armament industry. On October 23, Japan's Ambassador to the ROK Kanayama Masahide told the ROK side that the visit was to conduct a general survey to promote heavy industry, not to investigate the ROK's proposed Four Projects. EPB Minister Kim Hak-ryul noted President Park's discomfort at this announcement. Kim related the sequence of events: "I reported to the Blue House to instruct the newspapers that the visit's objective was a general survey not limited to the Four Projects, in light of the ministerial conference agreement, and that they should avoid giving the impression of a direct linkage between heavy industry promotion and the defense and armament industries."[63] In truth, the Four Projects were exactly what the ROK hoped the Japanese would focus on. Kim met with the Japanese mission on October 30 and raised the following three points:

1. The ROK wants to realize the Four Projects during the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan. The target date is around 1974, when the POSCO integrated steel works starts operations, aiming to make efficient use of the POSCO plant. Nonetheless, the ROK will implement the Four Projects sequentially starting from what we can do.
2. The ROK is hoping for joint investment with Japanese companies on the Four Projects.
3. The ROK has no plans to use the Four Projects in weapon repair facilities.[64]

Two points are noteworthy. First, the implementation period. The ROK had initially asked for Japan's cooperation when the implementation of the Four Projects was scheduled in advance of the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan. Kim now spoke of a change in policy, implementing the Four Projects during that plan which would start in 1972. Second, the ROK was now seeking joint investment with Japanese companies. It suggests an ROK emphasis on cooperating with Japanese industry on its heavy industry promotion. In other words, it was pinning its hopes on private investment rather than government loans, a marked change from the conditions in the initial requests for cooperation.

On December 10, the Japanese survey mission submitted its report based on the results of its onsite inspections of ROK heavy industry to the Japanese government. "Each [of the Four] Project's specific feasibility was subject to concrete and realistic investigation at later stages of implementation," it stated. But a general evaluation of each project was as follows:

1. Foundry pig iron project: It uses small blast furnaces, so the joint purchase of iron ore and coke will likely be unprofitable without a cooperative relationship with POSCO's integrated steel mill.
2. Special steel project: The ROK should start by simplifying products that can be mass produced, such as special steel for automotive use, and produce everything

at one factory. It should determine, too, whether to produce high-grade alloy steel at that factory or at other, existing facilities.

3. Integrated heavy machinery plant project: Producing machine tools and construction machinery at the same plant presents numerous difficulties. Construction machinery, in particular, is economically unfeasible given the small-lot production of many types of machinery. The plan to nationalize production from the outset should be reconsidered.
4. Shipbuilding project: Shipbuilding is an advanced technology-intensive industry. The ROK should start by partnering with leading shipbuilding countries, by boosting the operating efficiency of idle domestic facilities, and by meeting domestic demand.[65]

The Japanese mission members reviewed their report with ROK representatives on December 21.[66] Akazawa, Japan's mission head, made clear that the report was not final and that what cooperation to extend would be decided after seeing the ROK's revisions. In response, the ROK's EPB Assistant Minister Hwang Byung-tai, explaining that the Four Projects were private sector projects, made the following three assertions. First, the development of heavy industry was the central theme of the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan, and there were political considerations for wanting symbolic cooperation from Japan. Second, if the Four Projects were pursued under standard private-sector contracts there would be no issue, but if they were designated special projects by both countries the ROK wanted special loans beyond those provided by Japan under the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Third, the ROK wanted Four Projects funding to be outside the $60–$70 million per annum deferred payment limit of that agreement and to receive the same deferment conditions as POSCO.

The Japanese side opined that it would not be easy to get new loans. The $200 million in soft loan assistance to the ROK, set when relations were normalized in 1965, was parceled out in annual increments of $20 million. Which meant that as of 1970, there were still five years' worth of soft loan assistance remaining. Akazawa added that no further investigation by the survey mission was needed if private-sector funding was used for projects.

The ROK responded to the survey mission's report on December 22. The policy, Hwang clarified, assumed that each of the Four Projects received commercial loans from Japan, and that each project owner would proceed based on detailed plans drawn up in consultation with their respective Japanese partner companies. The ROK, he said, hoped to receive capital assistance for the projects from outside the general commercial loan framework.

Interestingly, the supplemental material submitted by the ROK side to Japan referenced copper, one of the nonferrous metals identified in the Japanese mission's report; the ROK was planning to construct a copper plant with a capacity of approximately 20,000 tons.[67] Demand for copper was expected to rise with the development of the ROK's automotive, shipbuilding, and electronics industries.

On January 6, 1971, Hwang again requested prompt Japanese cooperation. He also highlighted the difference that had emerged between the two countries regarding the implementation of the Four Projects. The ROK wanted private-sector assistance, but "this is taken by the Japanese side to mean a fiscal loan request, necessitating further investigation. This is surprising."[68] At this point, it appears that the ROK had changed its approach toward seeking private-sector cooperation, in light of the Japanese heavy industry survey mission's opinions. Around that time, in fact, private sector consultations were moving ahead with respect to the foundry pig iron mill. The ROK had also arranged for a visit by an expert from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, with which it hoped to form a joint venture for the heavy machinery plant.

4.3 The Four Projects as the Foundation for HCI Development

4.3.1 Agreement on Financial Cooperation

The EPB began to refine its Four Projects plans based on the Japanese mission's report and the results of the consultations with them. It adopted a policy, as the report suggested, to increase the operating rate of the existing Daehan Joseon Gongsa (Korean Shipbuilding Public Corporation) rather than build a new shipyard. Instead, following the report's advice, it decided to build a copper plant.[69] The Four Projects in need of Japanese assistance thus became heavy machinery, special steel, foundry pig iron, and copper plants, for which the ROK estimated $75.6 million in cooperation financing. The ROK sought easier JEXIM deferred payment terms than those for POSCO (5% down payment; 5.875% interest rate; thirteen-year term). Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested specifying the terms and the amount at the fifth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference on August 10–11, 1971, and so long as bilateral consultations found the projects feasible, it was possible to provide deferred payment credit under an agreement separate from the joint communiqué. This ministry analysis assumed that Japan's thinking on the heavy industry projects had already been presented to the ROK through the Akazawa mission's report and that discussions were proceeding between Japanese and ROK private companies. It meant that Japan's foreign ministry had decided, in advance of the next ministerial conference, to handle the Four Projects as a standard private-sector, deferred payment export terms matter.[70]

At the August 10, 1971 plenary session of the fifth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference, EPB Minister Kim Hak-ryul, in keeping with the Japanese mission's report and his government's response to it, assessed that "Prospects have improved for the project plans concerning the integrated heavy machinery factory, which is currently proceeding apace, the special steel mill, as well as the copper plant." He added a request for financial cooperation: "We look forward to establishing specific methods for financial assistance for the projects at this conference."

According to Kim, ROK and Japanese companies were working out the contracts for the special steel and copper factories, and the ROK government had cleared the projects through its Foreign Investment Committee and they awaited only presidential approval. Also, an ROK construction firm and a Japanese manufacturer had reached agreement on the heavy machinery factory, he said, but the ROK government was withholding approval because the Japanese government's reaction to this was unclear. The ROK construction company for the foundry pig iron mill likewise had not clarified its position, so that project, too, was pending. At that point, Kim stated the ROK's request for financial assistance under terms similar to those which Japan had extended for POSCO construction: interest rate of 6% and repayment term of thirteen years. Japanese Finance Minister Mizuta Mikio countered with ten or twelve years, and, ultimately, Japan pledged financing for the Four Projects at an interest rate of 6% over a repayment period of twelve years.[71]

One line of the joint communiqué reflects this conference discussion (section 11): "[Japan will] cooperate in undertaking the necessary financing for the heavy industry promotion plan under the ROK's Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan."[72] They reached an unannounced agreement on the details of the cooperation, with financing set on a JEXIM basis, 6% interest rate and twelve-year repayment period terms.[73]

The ROK Embassy in Japan's Economic Affairs Office drafted a status report on December 3, 1971. The day before, the ROK copper factory had urged the director general of MITI's Heavy Industries Bureau to grant the export license for the factory construction as quickly as possible, but unresolved issues remained, such as whether the $8.6 million loan included $3 million for raw materials as well as the deferment period. Contracts, meanwhile, had been signed for three of the other projects on November 30, leaving just the negotiations for the issuance of their export license.[74]

A report on the Four Projects, recast as the "five heavy industry projects" with the addition of new shipyard construction, was presented to and approved by ROK President Park on September 20, 1972.[75] The shipyard project was in the hands of Hyundai Construction and backed by the ROK government. Because Japan had refused to help finance a new shipyard, the ROK government opted initially for Japanese assistance in improving the operating efficiency of the Korean Shipbuilding Public Corporation. It did not, however, relinquish its vision of a new, large-scale shipyard, and Hyundai Construction eventually took on that project under heavy government pressure to do so.[76] The report summarized the details of the projects: the selection of ROK project owner, the progress to date, and problems and proposed solutions (see Table 4.1 for the project titles and owners). The year 1972 corresponds to the first fiscal year of the Third Five-Year Plan. This was the situation, then, about six months before the ROK's Presidential Declaration on Heavy and Chemical Industrialization. These five projects may be said to have formed the core of the ROK's HCI drive.

Table 4.1 The five heavy industry projects

Project title	Project owner
New shipyard construction	Hyundai Construction
Copper factory construction	Poongsan Metal Corporation
Foundry pig iron mill construction	Pohang Iran and Steel Company (POSCO)
Heavy machinery factory construction	Korea Machinery Corp
Special steel factory construction	Daehan Heavy Machinery Industry Co., Ltd.

Source Presidential Secretariat, "Report No. 318: Report on Current Status of Progress with Heavy Industry Projects (Projects of Presidential Interest No. 2)," September 20, 1972, ROK Presidential Archives

4.3.2 The Copper Factory as a Test Case

The copper factory became a test case, not least because it was making the fastest progress.[77] Poongsan Metal Corporation, the ROK project owner, concluded a contract with Japan's Nissho Iwai Corporation on July 21, 1971. And the Japanese government approved $8.6 million in facilities and equipment at the end of January 1972. Poongsan projected that, beyond copper production, it would be able to annually produce 210 million rifle shell casings starting in July 1972 and 250,000 small and medium caliber shells and 100,000 large caliber shells starting in April 1976. Poongsan presented a report to the EPB stating that, if it built additional facilities, the factory could produce 80 million rifle shells annually.[78] With Japanese cooperation, Poongsan set up basic facilities for copper production. Then after April 1972, it signed a contract with the French company Manurhin to introduce facilities to produce rifle shells. Poongsan also had a plan to introduce facilities that could produce 100 million rifle shells per annum using copper from the copper factory. The ROK government permitted the plan on the grounds that it would contribute to national defense.[79] Already by this time, the Japanese government had approved the export of the items related to the $5.6 million portion of the loan.

Given its defense industry application, President Park was understandably interested in the copper factory. In August 1972, he approved Poongsan Metal's change of its shell manufacturing equipment supplier to the US company Amron.[80]

Japan-ROK economic cooperation on the Four Projects began with the copper factory test case and was implemented throughout the 1970s with joint Japanese and ROK corporate investment. POSCO became the main driver of the foundry pig iron project. To lower production costs, POSCO chose to build the mill at its site in Pohang. POSCO signed a contract with Mitsubishi Corporation on September 28, 1972, and the loan was implemented thereafter.[81]

Daehan Heavy Machinery Industry Co. was chosen to handle the special steel plant following an April 19, 1972, presidential office report on the status of the heavy industry projects drive and related measures. Daehan contracted for a loan with Japan's Tokyo Sangyo Co. on December 29, 1972, and initiated plant construction. In addition to special steel, the intent was to produce howitzer, mortar, and rifle barrels.[82]

The loan terms, however, required permission for defense industry manufacturing. Tokyo Sangyo demurred, so Daehan contracted with Sumitomo Corporation, and the loan proceeded. There were two reasons given for moving ahead on this special steel project. It had been featured in the ROK government's machine industry promotion policy since 1971 and was backed as one of "five heavy industry projects." It was also something for which a loan could be secured through JEXIM financing.

In November 1971, Hyundai Construction used a loan from Barclay's Bank in the United Kingdom to launch the building of the large shipyard desired by the ROK government. The project surged ahead in December 1972 when Japan's Kawasaki Heavy Industries supplemented the European technologies with technological and capital assistance from Japan that introduced a Japanese style of construction to the proceedings.[83]

The undertaking of these projects disproves assertions in previous literature that the Four Projects were abandoned in November 1971 because the ROK failed to secure cooperation from Japan. There is a need to focus on the policy continuity and pay close attention to how the form of cooperation changed as Japan and the ROK worked together to realize these projects.

Oh Won-cheol, second senior secretary for economic affairs at the Office of the President, pushed for a policy shift in his November 10, 1971 proposal along two lines. (1) As it was possible to produce weapons utilizing existing plants and technologies, discontinue efforts to build new factories under the Four Projects plan. (2) Foster the defense industry as one part of the HCI drive.[84] Oh's memoirs say that President Park accepted his proposals. This testimony alone is insufficient, however, to explain the yearlong gap between the ROK policy turnaround in November 1971 and the HCI declaration in January 1973. The fact is, although Park had accepted the proposal to develop the ROK defense industry as part of the HCI drive, he had appointed Oh his second senior secretary for economic affairs and tasked him to develop the necessary light armament to equip 20 ROK Reserve Force divisions.[85]

In April 1972, the ROK test fired the reserve force weapons that the existing factories had produced and though it was declared a success, the weapons' performance was not of a high level. The weapons performed well on the day of the test firing, but performance deteriorated with repeat firing. The weapons' performance was limited by the processing technology, the processing facilities' level of precision, and the lack of special materials used in production at the existing plants. The impetus behind Park's January 1973 HCI declaration arose from a realization in 1972 that heavy and chemical industries are a precondition for a proper defense industry, according to the memoirs of Chief Presidential Secretary Kim Chung-yum. The ROK needed iron and steel and nonferrous metal industries to produce the iron, special steel, copper, and zinc materials that underpin defense production. It also had to foster a machinery industry for precision machining and advanced processing and an electronics industry for electronic weapons and electronic components.[86]

Weapons development at existing factories was no more than a makeshift measure hurriedly adopted by the ROK when Japan's Four Projects assistance was late in coming. The ensuing trial and error probably heightened the importance of and expectations for the Four Projects. As such, it is worth noting that Japan-ROK consultations

on implementing the Four Projects continued beyond November 1971, when Oh suggested his dramatic policy shift. The binational cooperation on the Four Projects enabled the ROK to pursue much grander plans, such as HCI. Each of the Four Projects, in fact, propelled the ROK's heavy and chemical industrialization. Interestingly, on January 25, 1973, immediately after Park's HCI declaration, JEXIM commenced financing for the Four Projects.[87]

4.4 Conclusion

Facing a reduction of US forces in Korea, the ROK government requested cooperation from the Japanese government on projects to promote its defense industry, called the Four Projects. The ROK, explaining that the projects would meet military demand in the event of an attack, asked for priority assistance out of a desire for military aid. There was resistance in Japan to cooperating in the ROK's defense industry development due to associations with the US drawdown. Nevertheless, perceiving itself placed between the US force reduction policy and the ROK's request for economic assistance, Japan decided to cooperate on these projects.

Japan and the ROK agreed on Four Projects cooperation at the fourth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference in July 1970. They worked out the financial assistance at the fifth conference in August 1971. On January 25, 1973, JEXIM began financing the projects.

Initial ROK plans for which it requested cooperation were transformed through consultations with Japan and the process of implementing them. Instead of shipyard construction, a project to construct a copper plant was added to the Four Projects and was designated their test case.

The ROK Office of the President ultimately pursued five heavy industry projects (with a plan for new shipyard construction added) as the foundation of its HCI drive. Japan's cooperation in the ROK's Four Projects, coupled with the ROK's HCI policy, came to occupy the predominant share of the two nations' security cooperation.

Notes

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Chapter 5
Sino-American Rapprochement and the Recalibration of Japan-ROK Security Relations (1971–73)

Abstract US President Richard Nixon's decision to visit China, announced in July 1971, was an event that upended the Cold War order in East Asia, which had been marked by confrontation between the two nations. This chapter examines how Japan and the ROK began to review their respective security policies in the wake of this rapprochement and the transformation of the East Asian Cold War order. It also looks at the logic that Japan used to persuade the US and the ROK that it should continue its own exchanges with the DPRK (North Korea) despite their opposition and shows how Japan adjusted its relationship with the ROK accordingly. Several works have argued that Japan-ROK cooperation regressed as a result of the change in the regional order, but the author shows that Japan's diminishing concern about being caught up in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula strengthened aspects of its cooperation with the ROK, as the latter channeled its energies into a competition with the DPRK for political and economic legitimacy.

US President Richard Nixon's decision to visit China, announced in July 1971, was an event that upended the Cold War order in East Asia, which had been marked by the confrontation between the US and China.[1] Their rapprochement took the division of the Korean Peninsula in new directions. Namely, a US-China framework for cooperation was now linked to the system of mutual deterrence that had taken shape after the Korean War throughout the 1960s. Thus, a great deal of attention was paid to the direction US-China "joint action" would take with respect to the Korean Peninsula, the main arena for the formation and the transformation of the international order in East Asia. It signified that the US and China, by aiming to stabilize East Asia together, had begun to seek out common interests, unlike the 1960s when the system of mutual deterrence produced by US-China confrontation had made war impracticable.

What impact did this shift in the regional order have on the diplomatic and security policies of Japan and the ROK? And how did they recalibrate their bilateral relationship in response?

Previous literature argues that Japan and the ROK had such conflicting views on the change in the Cold War order that their cooperation diminished.[2] Japan is said to

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have adapted well, revising the Taiwan and Korea clauses, establishing normalized diplomatic relations with China, and moving to expand economic exchanges with the DPRK.[3] The ROK, conversely, was so immersed in Cold War norms that it could not adapt, leading it to decry Japan's moves. These opposite approaches are interpreted as causing diplomatic friction between Japan and the ROK such that their relations reached new lows after two events: the 1973 kidnapping of ROK opposition leader Kim Dae-jung from a Tokyo hotel by ROK operatives and the 1974 Mun Se-gwang incident, when a Japanese-born DPRK sympathizer attempted to assassinate ROK President Park Chung-hee.

But did Japan-ROK relations in the détente era deteriorate (said to represent a "heightening crisis") and their cooperative ties go backwards?[4] If so, how should we understand the strengthening of their political and economic relations during the same period? How did they find common ground despite differing approaches to the change in East Asia's Cold War order?

Following Sino-American rapprochement, in the East Asian region, Japan pursued normalization of its relations with China and the expansion of exchanges with the DPRK from a desire for détente even as it emphasized its established alliances from its need for security. The ROK and DPRK, meanwhile, moved from military confrontation to a legitimacy contest between rival political and economic systems. The change in the post-rapprochement regional order that also eased Japan's concern of being drawn into a war on the Korean Peninsula should not be overlooked. And that became an environmental factor for Japan-ROK economic cooperation aimed at securing the ROK's primacy in the inter-Korean competition for legitimacy. Japan and the ROK rebuilt their relationship under a strategic concept of cooperating to enable an ROK victory in that competition.

With this in mind, this chapter, first, investigates how Japan and the ROK addressed Cold War norms given the shift in regional order. It focuses on the changes to the Korea and Taiwan clauses that the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué touted as the public good of regional security. It pays special attention to how they sought to differentiate those clauses amid rumors that the normalization of Japan-China relations nullified the Taiwan clause.

Second, the chapter analyzes the features of Japanese and ROK policies for détente through a look at the ROK's China policy and Japan's DPRK policy. The focus is on how the ROK began its diplomatic approach to China and how, despite US and ROK efforts to discourage it, Japan pursued contact with the DPRK as part of its attempt to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Third, it also considers how Japan's policy toward the Korean Peninsula changed in relation to its policy toward China. The issue for Japan's China policy was the choice of whether to accept the "one China" argument or not. Its China policy influenced its policy toward the Korean Peninsula, which some (led by Japanese progressives) argued warranted a complete change. The debate over the Korean Peninsula policy and how it translated into policy is outlined.

Fourth, the chapter examines the transformation in Japan-ROK relations. It analyzes how the ROK recalibrated its cooperative relationship with Japan given the changed regional order and, in the process, how the quality and breadth of that

relationship improved as a result. This chapter provides an accurate portrayal of Japan-ROK relations in the era of détente through its analysis of these points.

5.1 Sino-American Rapprochement and the Korean Peninsula

The Cold War in East Asia centered on the confrontation between the US and China, which had a strong bearing on confrontation in three other areas in the region: Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, the US and China had clashed militarily in the Korean War and forged military alliances with the ROK and the DPRK, respectively.[5] Sino-American rapprochement was achieved not by having resolved these regional conflicts but by shelving them.[6] The emphasis was on localization, on separating large-power confrontation from regional conflict. That means that the two countries sought a framework in which US-China relations would not be influenced by the peripheral issue of the Korean Peninsula.[7] By tacit agreement, neither pushed divergent issues.[8] Sino-American rapprochement, recorded former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his memoirs, was a compromise of "principle and pragmatism … existing in ambiguous equilibrium."[9] Rapprochement was only possible because the two countries maintained strategic ambiguity. Hence, the question was whether they could find common ground for stabilizing the region.[10]

In his July and October 1971 visits to China as the assistant to the US president for national security affairs, Kissinger sought to establish that common ground through talks with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. They arrived at one interest in common on the Korean Peninsula: the US military presence in the ROK. Zhou contended that US troops should also be pulled out of the ROK, not just Vietnam and Taiwan.[11] And he asked repeatedly if the US policy was to replace the US troops with the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Kissinger informed Zhou that the US troops in the ROK were not a permanent feature of US foreign policy. He suggested that it was "quite conceivable" that "most, if not all" American troops would be withdrawn before the end of Nixon's second term, depending on the situation in East Asia.[12] As support for the credibility of this foreign policy, he raised the reduction of the 20,000 troops of the US Army's 7th Infantry Division, already completed in 1971.

Kissinger also reminded Zhou that "If your objective is to bring about a reduction of American forces in Korea, I have already told you last time, without making this an international undertaking, this is our policy in any event."[13] He stressed that the withdrawal of US troops from the ROK was a firm US policy, likely in a bid to secure a free hand for US policy. Kissinger stated explicitly that the US had no intention of replacing its remaining forces in the ROK with the Japan Self-Defense Forces. He even suggested that, as the withdrawal of US troops stationed in Japan might prompt Japan to rearm, it was in the interest of the US and China for the US to leave its troops in place. In this way they reached agreement on avoiding a power vacuum that a US military withdrawal from East Asia would create, and on

preventing Japanese rearmament and Soviet expansionism from filling that vacuum. It meant that the US would remain heavily involved in East Asian security.

Another issue for possible common ground was concluding a peace treaty. The problem was how to convert the Korean War Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty that would build a more permanent legal basis for the Korean Peninsula. Zhou noted that "though a ceasefire has been reached in the Korean war, no new treaty has ever been concluded or no new arrangement. … This is an unstable state of affairs and often there are incursions into one's territory and other conflicts." He reiterated that the issue of a peace treaty should have been settled at the 1954 Geneva Conference, called the US reaction at the time regrettable, and pushed now for a better US response. Kissinger replied that, so long as it would not weaken the security of the ROK, the US was ready to cooperate in bringing about a more permanent legal status for the Korean Peninsula.[14] In summarizing the key outcomes from his talks with Zhou, Kissinger felt that US and Chinese interests concerning the Korean question were in agreement on the following: (1) stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and averting the danger of war; (2) checking the expansion of other powers into East Asia, the Korean Peninsula included; and (3) bringing about a more permanent legal status for the Korean Peninsula.[15]

Kissinger's policy briefing to Nixon ahead of the president's visit to China offered an astute observation about China's foreign policy. He noted that the Chinese government was addressing the Korean question from the perspective of Chinese security. Because the Korean Peninsula was the route by which Japan had invaded China in days past, China had positioned the peninsula as a buffer zone that could block direct contacts from Japan and potential adversaries with its own country. In that sense, it indicated that China was providing political and military assistance to the DPRK.[16] It neatly explained why balance of power principles had been supplanted by the Cold War framework of ideological confrontation. On the basis of this analysis, Kissinger made a policy recommendation: if China could accept a continued US commitment to the ROK, the US might be able to accept China's proposal for stabilizing the Korean Peninsula.[17]

In February 1972, during Nixon's visit to China, the leaders of the US and China reaffirmed their common ground and agreed to explore joint action. Zhou spoke of the Korean question to Nixon:

> As for the question of Korea, we know of course your ideas, and of course you also know our ideas. First, the official policy of the President is that he is prepared to finally withdraw troops from Korea in the future, and also to prevent the entry of Japanese forces into South Korea because this would not be beneficial to the cause of peace in the Far East. How does one promote contacts between North and South Korea? How does one promote peaceful reunification? That question will take a long time.[18]

Zhou here is summarizing the tacit agreement reached during Kissinger's secret visits. This was the "common ground" that China and the US had arrived at regarding the issue of the Korean Peninsula.

Nixon responded that "What is important here is that both of us exert influence to restrain our allies," offering his experience of dealing with the ROK's desire to "go

north" and invade the DPRK to unify the peninsula in the 1950s.[19] Nixon wanted Zhou to play the same role in handling the DPRK. He also admitted that the US wanted to withdraw its forces entirely from Taiwan and Vietnam, but he merely emphasized that it was cutting its forces in the ROK under the Nixon Doctrine, thereby avoiding a definite statement regarding a complete withdrawal there. He sought instead to justify differentiating the US commitment to the ROK, remarking "Korea is a different case because in some ways it is tied to Japan."[20]

Both countries, having accepted the situation of a divided Korea, shared the position that seeking to substantially alter the status quo, especially through reunification, would be fraught with difficulties. Their conclusion was perhaps drawn from the history of the division thus far, in which attempts by one side to assimilate the other only lead to heightened tension and war.

Just as the peace and order in Europe of the day had been constructed after World War II based on *uti possidetis*,[21] the US and China sought to construct a stable order in East Asia by maintaining the status quo in Korea. For China, improving relations with the US meant actually abandoning its revolutionary line. Also, it aspired to go back to the division of the peninsula as it had been before the Korean War, in which the US and China fought each other—that is, the situation following WWII. In the meeting with Nixon, Zhou noted that "Korea was indeed divided into North and South by the results of the war [WWII]. According to the terms the Soviet forces went into the north and you went into the south."[22] If at the time of the Korean War, the US had heeded China's warning and not crossed the 38th Parallel, there would have been no military clash between the two countries, he said,[23] again acknowledging the situation on the Korean Peninsula immediately following WWII. It is believed that what he had in mind was to return the division of the peninsula to its pre-Korean War status. In other words, he was trying to differentiate between the division that occurred as an outcome of WWII and the division that was instituted as the result of the Sino-American military clash during the Korea War. By so doing, he presumably thought that China and the US would be able to cooperate and manage the division without having to get into the weighty history of the Korean Peninsula's division that took place through the post-WWII settlement process.

The shape of a new order emerged through the US and Chinese effort to identify common ground and explore joint action, an order in which the arrangements for Sino-American cooperation were linked to the system of mutual deterrence that had formed in the 1960s. The two countries shared the belief that, by coordinating their national interests through diplomacy on the basis of freezing the status quo (by deterring war and not recognizing changes to the status quo by force of arms), it was possible to identify common interests.[24]

5.2 The Nixon Shock and Security

5.2.1 Security Concerns

President Nixon's visit to China signaled an end to the US policy of containing China that began with the Korean War. The détente achieved through this change in power politics among the great powers did not, however, directly translate into the building of a regional peace framework.[25] US-China rapprochement took place against an unchanged array of contentious relations in the region: between the two halves of the divided Korean nation, between Japan and China, China and the ROK, and Japan and the DPRK. Because rapprochement took place with the parties having sidestepped the regional problems, as was previously mentioned, the easing of tensions that should have stabilized the situation in East Asia instead caused security issues in the region. That it, it created a situation in which great power détente was not linked to easing regional tensions.

The announcement of Nixon's visit to China caused a commotion in Japan. Wakaizumi Kei, a scholar of international politics who had served as a special emissary for Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku during the Okinawa reversion negotiations, apprised US Ambassador to Japan Armin Meyer of this. And he communicated the concerns of Japanese political leaders from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and elsewhere regarding (1) the direction of the US's Taiwan policy; (2) suspicions that US and Chinese leaders had deliberated Japan's role in Asia and, apprehensive about Japanese militarism, would keep Japan in line; and (3) worry that the central element of the US's Asia policy might revert back to China and away from Japan, as it had been before WWII.[26] Wakaizumi added that numerous US assurances regarding Japan's security, both official and unofficial, after the Nixon shock had failed to assuage these deep-rooted concerns. He stressed the need for more reliable guarantees.

Japan's concerns related mostly to the potential for normalizing its diplomatic relations with China. Since Japan provided bases for US forces, it remained subject to Chinese criticism, unable to repair their broken relationship, and so even as US-China relations improved, Japan might find itself left behind and isolated.[27] Its fears were not unfounded. Pointing to Japan's expanded role, which was clearly outlined in the Japan-US alliance and in the Taiwan and Korea clauses of the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué, China continued to frame this as the resurgence of Japanese militarism.

In this context, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs began thinking about how to maintain its alliance with the US while making it more flexible, such as examining the configuration of the US military presence in Japan. At the 15th Japan-US Policy Planning Conference in June 1972, following Nixon's visit to China, First North America Division Director Fukada Hiroshi floated the idea of revising the Japan-US Security Treaty to do away with the Far East clause. Richard Sneider, deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Japan, replied that the Nixon Doctrine was intended to sustain US involvement in Asia while responding to a shift in US public opinion.

He argued that Japan's proposal was tantamount to pushing the US out of Asia.[28] The Japanese, in turn, indicated that they were nervous that China might make an issue out of the Far East clause, and they suggested dealing with Taiwan separately from the ROK and other regions in administering the security treaty.[29]

The normalization of Japan-China relations occurred despite such worries. And in November 1972, Treaties Bureau Director General Kuriyama Takakazu touched on the changed situation during a meeting at the US Embassy in Japan but nevertheless presented proposed changes to the Japan-US alliance that included eliminating the Far East clause.[30] Even if it was intended primarily to gauge the US reaction before Japan proposed a definitive policy change, this episode gives some insight into Japan's position to secure a diplomatic free hand in a changing East Asia.

Another source of concern for Japan was the security of the ROK. Even as Japan appeared to fundamentally perceive Nixon's visit to China as contributing to Asian peace and security, it was not certain that the US would maintain its forces in the ROK and remain committed to the ROK's security.[31] Prime Minister Satō was skeptical of moves toward inter-Korean détente inspired by the US-China rapprochement. Noting the possibility of DPRK military provocations, he emphasized that US forces should remain in the ROK as a deterrent.[32] His concern was about the possible failure to deter the DPRK arising from great power détente and the reduction of US troops in the ROK.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was paying close attention to how the change in regional order wrought by Sino-American rapprochement and by China's accession to the UN might transform the Cold War structure that had hitherto regulated the Korean Peninsula. The ministry was focused on the possibility that China's emergence on the world stage as a popular target for diplomatic outreach might lead the ROK and the DPRK to remake their own diplomacies more China-centric. The DPRK, it assessed, would use China's diplomatic protection to boost its own international standing, all the while striving to shake off Chinese influence and stick to its policy of self-reliance. The ministry was also carefully tracking the ROK's move to revise its foreign policy dependent on US support, to simultaneously open a path toward dialogue with the DPRK through Red Cross talks and to begin exploring improved relations with China through the good offices of a third country. The ministry predicted that China's policy response to the diplomatic moves by the ROK and the DPRK would be to expand its influence in both Koreas while fundamentally maintaining the status quo on the peninsula.[33] That is to say, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarded China's growing influence as a factor that would have some bearing on the regional order surrounding the Korean Peninsula and prompt foreign policy shifts in the ROK and the DPRK.

The ROK government, meanwhile, was alert to the danger that it might fall victim to great power politics, should its security become a bargaining chip between the US and China.[34] To dispel those fears, it asked to hold a summit meeting with the US before Nixon's China visit. In September 1971, ROK Foreign Minister Kim Yong-shik went to Washington, DC, bearing a personal letter from President Park Chung-hee requesting "that there be no discussions nor decisions taken concerning Korea without consultation with the ROK."[35] What the ROK government wanted was not

US advocacy on its behalf but rather to close down any discussion of ROK interests. The ROK's negative stance hinted at the concerns it had over security.

On December 13, 1971, President Park pointed out to US Ambassador to the ROK Philip C. Habib that "when the big powers make an effort to ease tensions, then perhaps some of the weak nations become prey to unexpected incidents," adding that Taiwan had already become a victim to Sino-American rapprochement.[36] China's emergence in international society as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, when China still backed the DPRK's policies, was a development capable of shaking the very foundations of the ROK's security, which relied on the deterrence of UN forces and the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned about the impact it would have on the continued presence of the UN Command and on the staging of US strategic air force missions from Okinawa bases.[37] The fact that Tokyo was restoring diplomatic relations with Beijing and expanding its involvement, including economically, with Pyongyang at a time of improving China-DPRK ties was enough to give the ROK a fear of becoming isolated.

5.2.2 Détente Diplomacy Efforts

Following the Nixon shock, the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed that the ROK needed to reconsider its existing security policy in light of the transformed Cold War structure, as described below, in its analysis of the situation, titled *ROK Security and Diplomatic Policy Direction.*

> The security of the ROK, which has maintained a strictly pro-US diplomacy and mutual defense arrangements, is now faced with a new situation in terms of security concepts and policies. In the current situation, where the great powers' talks to ease tensions have the potential to freeze the status quo, temporarily removing the risk of a new war, the ROK needs to reconsider the direction of its security and diplomatic policies to achieve unification through peaceful means and not only to preemptively thwart DPRK efforts to start another war.[38]

In seeking to reconsider the ROK's existing security concepts and policies, the report also makes the following policy recommendations:

- avoid war with the DPRK
- open the door to China and the Soviet Union to create avenues enabling a discussion of their roles on the Korean Peninsula, and host a meeting of related parties similar to the 1954 Geneva Conference, with an agenda that includes the mutual reduction of military forces and mutual nonaggression on the peninsula.

It is noteworthy that the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly interprets the security concerns caused by change in the regional order as a window of opportunity to improve relations with China. This presages changes in foreign policies toward China and the Soviet Union that include South-North dialogue and the subsequent change in direction in the ROK's security policy. The recommendation that the ROK

open a discussion on Chinese and Soviet roles on the Korean Peninsula reveals a reversal of how the ROK perceived those countries, from being threats to its security to regarding them as its guarantors.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the Nixon shock, not only did the ROK propose Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks to the DPRK in August 1971, but they also both announced the South-North Joint Communiqué in Seoul and Pyongyang on July 4, 1972, which espoused the three principles for unification: independence, peace, and national unity. These moves represented diplomatic resistance to great power politics as well as an exploration of a new modality of coexistence in which the two countries opposed and contended with each other.[39] The communiqué's second point states that "In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake military provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents."[40] This is a clear statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy recommendation goals of easing tensions and avoiding the recurrence of war through misunderstanding or accident.

The ROK's new security policy was not limited to a change in policy toward the DPRK, however. As the return of Chinese military representation on the Military Armistice Commission and Beijing's accession to the UN made evident, improving relations with China surfaced as a major task for the ROK's security. Consequently there was a growing awareness within the ROK government of the linkage between better relations with China and the Soviet Union and the country's peace and survival. Ham Byeong-chun, the ROK president's special assistant for political affairs, observed that "intensification of tension and hostility" with either nation would mean that "Korea would again become a source of instability and war." There was thus "no question that Korea must maintain normal and amicable relations" with its neighbors; this was "essential for her survival and for peace," he emphasized.[41]

President Park, in his first press conference of 1973, indicated his perception of the situation: "Unlike the Cold War years, when we could feel relatively safe relying on the strength of our friends, we now can rely only on our own national strength, and we have to carefully observe not only [the DPRK's] moves, but also those of the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union as well."[42] This thinking also underpinned Park's June 23, 1973, Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Reunification (the June 23 Statement).[43] In it, he states that he would not oppose inviting the DPRK to the UN deliberation of the Korean question or the simultaneous admittance into the UN of both Koreas. He adds that the ROK would open its door to countries in the Communist bloc. It was a diplomatic shift seeking to ease tensions through improved relations with China and the Soviet Union. A policy of détente, in other words, was embraced as a component of ROK security policy.

Prompted by the Nixon shock, Japan immediately set out to normalize diplomatic relations with China. That shock, in fact, provoked calls within Japan for a diplomacy independent of the US, and there was a tendency among politicians, the media, and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Asian Affairs Bureau, to view it positively, as a new opportunity to broaden Japan's diplomatic reach.[44] The ministry's 1971 *Diplomatic Bluebook* observed that establishing "multilateral friendly relations [with

Socialist countries] will make it possible for Japan to have more options and to act more flexibly to promote its national interests."[45] The emphasis was to expand diplomatic options and secure a free hand for diplomatic maneuver without becoming isolated in the shadow of great power politics.[46]

Looking back, Japan had undertaken a review of its security policy from a historical and domestic institutional perspective ahead of the 1970 renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty, carrying over from the Okinawa reversion negotiations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had then issued a booklet, "Japan's Security," as an internal reference whose central focus was how Japan could pursue a policy of détente with other nations while maintaining the Japan-US Security Treaty amid signs the Cold War structure would change.[47] The document emphasized the Japan-US alliance as the axis of Japan's security but went further, starting to place some weight on establishing friendly relations with countries whose values and systems differed, including China, the Soviet Union, and the DPRK.

5.3 A Reconsideration of Cold War Norms

5.3.1 The Taiwan Clause Becomes a Dead Letter

When Nixon's plan to visit China was announced on July 15, 1971, a storm of criticism broke out in Japan over the Japanese government's tardiness in updating its China policy.[48] Then, having shifted its policy objective to normalize relations with China, Japan began to explore the possibility of having relations with both the US and with China at the same time. The key challenge it identified was to exclude Taiwan from the geographical extent of the "Far East" in the Japan-US Security Treaty and to revise the Taiwan clause in the November 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué.[49] It feared that security arrangements might hamstring its diplomatic autonomy and become an obstacle to improving Japan-China relations. These clauses regarding the security of Korea and Taiwan in a presumed contingency that the US and Japanese leaders had put in their communiqué, China continuously denounced as the revival of Japanese militarism. The April 7, 1970, China-DPRK communiqué was specifically counter to the Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué. It affirmed the "blood-cemented militant friendship and friendly unity" between the Chinese and DPRK peoples and criticized the Taiwan and Korea clauses in the following manner:

> … Japanese militarism has revived and has become a dangerous force of aggression in Asia.
> … Japan has become an advance base and stronghold for a new war of aggression in Asia.
>
> The Japanese militarists are directly serving U.S. imperialism in its war of aggression against Viet Nam, actively taking part in the U.S. imperialist new scheme of war in Korea and wildly attempting to include the Chinese people's sacred territory Taiwan in their sphere of influence.[50]

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared this criticism of Japan by China and the DPRK might cause internal divisions and make it difficult for Japan to strengthen its self-defense.[51]

Aiming to achieve an early normalization of relations with China in response to Sino-American rapprochement, Japan decided it was necessary to reconsider Cold War norms.[52] The US, however, sought to check Japan's move from the security dimension. On December 9, 1971, ahead of the Japan-US summit meeting in San Clemente, California, Japanese scholar and statesman Wakaizumi Kei met with US Ambassador to Japan Armin Meyer to discern US intentions. Mentioning the remark that National Security Advisor Kissinger had made at a press conference that the Taiwan question would be resolved without the use of force, Wakaizumi said the situation had changed drastically since the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué was issued. In that context, he asked that Japan and the US "re-study" language regarding the defense of Taiwan and the ROK. The purpose was to allow Japan the same latitude in pursuing closer relations with China as the US. Meyer, comparing the Korea and Taiwan clauses to a Pandora's box, pointed out that a review of those provisions could influence the entire Japan-US relationship by "causing a revision of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security."[53] A sense of tension began to emerge between the two countries over whether to reexamine or maintain Cold War norms.

In light of Japan's domestic debate on questioning of norms, US diplomatic and defense officials set to work confirming arrangements for use of US military bases in Japan for Korean contingencies.[54] They were concerned that Japan might block base use. Ambassadors Meyer and Habib joined Commander in Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) John S. McCain Jr. in focusing on two documents related to the US forces' use of bases in Japan: the MacArthur-Fujiyama Minute of January 6, 1960 (Minutes for Inclusion in the Record of the First Meeting of the Security Consultative Committee), and the January 19, 1960, Exchange of Notes concerning the Yoshida-Acheson Exchange of Notes.[55] The former document, signed by then US Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II and by then Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichirō at the Japan-US SCC, appears to be a precursor of the June 23, 1960, MacArthur-Fujiyama Minute, a secret agreement arrived at to deal with contingencies on the Korean Peninsula when the Japan-US Security Treaty was revised in 1960.[56] The latter document reaffirms the note exchanged between Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson on September 8, 1951, granting the use of US bases in Japan by US and other members of the forces constituting UN Command in Korea should events on the peninsula so require. The new exchange of notes continued to guarantee US forces the use of Japanese bases following the introduction of the prior consultation system at Japan's request when the Japan-US Security Treaty was revised in 1960. In conclusion, the US officials were confirming that, so long as UN forces were not withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula or Japan, free use of the bases without prior consultation in the event of an emergency in Korea was guaranteed.

Prime Minister Satō, at a press conference on January 7, 1972, after his talks with Nixon in San Clemente, referred to the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué as "an expression of our perceptions of the situation at that time, not a treaty" and declared

that the Taiwan clause was now essentially null and void.[57] Asked about the Korea clause, however, Satō corrected himself, saying it would be going too far to take what he said as a change in Japanese policy and that it was not appropriate to regard Taiwan as having been removed from the security arrangements. On the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was concerned about possible fallout from his remarks, Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo set the record straight the following day, suggesting that the prime minister had mistaken the Taiwan clause for the "Taiwan situation."[58]

Satō's remarks have drawn attention as a turning point, with Japan seeking to break away from its existing diplomatic policy line in response to East Asia's changing Cold War order.[59] As Fukuda's correction indicates, Satō's remarks were not a clear statement of an actual policy change. A subsequent complaint by Kissinger that Satō said one thing at the summit talks and another at the press conference suggests there was no coordination between Japan and the US.[60] Why the confusion? In his memoirs, Ushiba Nobuhiko, Japan's ambassador to the US at that time, implies that this was simply Satō's desperate bid for a diplomatic free hand.[61] It may well have been an expression of Japan's agitation and impatience at trailing the US on China policy, or even the political impulse toward an autonomous foreign policy.

Once Tanaka Kakuei became prime minister in 1972, Japan stepped up its push to coordinate with the US to adjust the treatment of the Far East clause in the Japan-US Security Treaty and of the Taiwan clause in the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué. At an August 1972 working-level meeting held in preparation for the next Japan-US summit meeting, the US again tried to shut down the turnaround in Japanese policy, insisting that any change to the two provisions would damage the bilateral relationship. Japan's Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Yasukawa Takeshi, out of consideration for China's reaction and a possible domestic backlash, decided to go no further in the Tanaka-Nixon joint statement than reaffirming the unchanged importance of the Japan-US relationship to Japan's security. As for the moves in Japan to revisit the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué, Yasukawa called them "the minimum preventative measure that the Japanese government can take to keep the debate within Japan concerning the issue from developing into a debate concerning the dissolution of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security."[62] The Tanaka administration was evidently conducting a review of the Taiwan clause while trying to maintain the Japan-US alliance treaty.

It was China, ironically, that resolved much of the tension over whether to retain or revise the Cold War norms.[63] The Chinese government, previously critical of the Japan-US alliance and the Taiwan clause, appeared to have a change of policy toward Japan. On July 27, Premier Zhou Enlai met with Takeiri Yoshikatsu, chairman of the Komeitō party, and stated that the Japan-US Security Treaty and the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué would not be raised as an issue.[64] China's acceptance of the Japan-US alliance was based on the theory that if Sino-Japanese relations were normalized the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Taiwan clause would cease to be effective in relation to China. That acceptance removed one roadblock to normalizing the countries' relations.

Kissinger visited Japan ahead of the Japan-US summit in Honolulu and met with the prime minister on August 19, 1972. Tanaka used the opportunity to make a clear statement on maintaining the Japan-US Security Treaty and on the validity of the Taiwan clause of the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué.[65] Reassured by Zhou Enlai's comments, Tanaka probably felt that Japan could normalize its relations with China while it upheld these security agreements. In the event, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations did render the Taiwan clause null and void.[66] Reflecting Japan's recognition of this fact, Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi announced an official Japanese government position on the Taiwan clause on November 8: "The Taiwan provisions state the opinions of Japanese and American leaders as of 1969. Since then, the situation with Taiwan has changed, and armed conflict is no longer a possibility. Given these circumstances, these opinions have changed."[67]

5.3.2 Differentiating the Korea Clause

The ROK government had watched the erosion of the Taiwan clause amid the push toward normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. And it began to keep note of the political implications for the Korea clause. First, the point was raised that advances in weapons systems had reduced the importance of the military function of Okinawa bases, as President Park had told Japanese Prime Minister Satō in July 1971. One more point of concern was that a reexamination of the Korea clause might be linked to a shift in Japan's policy on the DPRK.[68] Just as the Taiwan clause became a dead letter through the process of normalizing Sino-Japanese relations, the Korea clause could suffer the same fate as Japan-DPRK exchanges developed. The ROK's diplomatic objective regarding Japan, therefore, was to keep stressing that the Korean question and the China question were different matters, so as to get the Japanese government to differentiate its foreign policy.

The lack of reference to the Taiwan and Korea clauses in the joint statement from the aforementioned San Clemente summit in January 1972 was reported in Japan as Japan's first move toward a foreign policy independent of the US.[69] Previous literature tends to understand the Korea clause's omission as a message and a starting point for Japan's improving relations with the DPRK. It regards the complete absence of any mention of Japan-ROK security relations as signifying that the Korea clause, created as an ancillary to the Japan-US Security Treaty, had become unnecessary. This, in turn, is seen as sparking Japan-ROK security friction.[70]

Yet the ROK's actual response was very measured. Rather than viewing the absence of direct references to the Korea clause as a problem, the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed to the second and third paragraphs of the joint statement: "the maintenance of cooperative relations between Japan and the United States is an indispensable factor for peace and stability in Asia" and "they highly valued the important role played by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan the United States."[71] It assessed that this language clearly laid out the obligation of the US to maintain security in the Far East and Japan's willingness to

cooperate in that endeavor.[72] It was a flexible and pragmatic response that viewed the Taiwan clause's nullification as inevitable given that Japan's policy aimed to restore diplomatic relations with China. Prime Minister Satō's apparent mix-up at the press conference, too, was read by the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a play to Japanese domestic politics amid pressure for Japan to break from its traditional diplomacy. The ministry also took note of the fact that the "joint statement" format from San Clemente was less formal than the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué. The ROK's reaction was cognizant that the San Clemente meeting had decided to effect the return of Okinawa to Japan on May 15, 1972 aimed at repairing the Japan-US alliance following the Nixon shock.

President Park, in fact, dispatched a letter via Japan's ambassador to the ROK, Kanayama Masahide, to Satō just before his summit with Nixon, asking the Japanese government to represent the ROK's position in San Clemente. Earlier, Park had sent former ROK Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon to Japan on January 3; Satō noted in his diary that Chung had told him that the ROK was developing a munitions industry and had asked for fiscal aid.[73] Satō conveyed the ROK's security concerns to Nixon at the summit and requested that Nixon halt further reductions in US troops stationed in the ROK. Satō explained that the DPRK remained as dependent as ever on Soviet military assistance and raised the issue of support for ROK defense industry development.

Foreign Minister Fukuda likewise asked Secretary of State William Rogers to postpone additional troop withdrawals from the ROK until 1975 and argued the need to foster an ROK defense industry. In drafting the summit's joint statement, Fukuda described the content of the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué as "a matter of course" and asked the US to refrain from further reference to the Taiwan clause to avoid causing an unnecessary dispute in the Diet.[74] He reiterated the importance of stationing US troops in the ROK to the security of Japan and the ROK and opposed additional reductions.[75]

The US, carefully weighing Fukuda's remarks, assessed that Japan would likely oppose a further reduction of the US forces in the ROK for the ROK's sake and for its own.[76] On the basis of that view, Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson informed ROK Ambassador to the US Kim Dong-jo that Japanese government officials had expressed concern over whether the presence of US troops in the ROK would be maintained. He also told Kim it was his understanding that Satō's remarks at the post-summit press briefing were limited to the Taiwan clause.[77]

Fukuda made it plain that Japan differentiated between the Taiwan and the Korea clauses. He told ROK Ambassador to Japan Lee Ho after the San Clemente summit that the issue was the Taiwan clause and that there was no change to the Korea clause.[78] In his May 18 response before Japan's House of Councillors Committee on Cabinet, Fukuda stated that no mention had been made of the Korea clause in the Diet. He appeared to have taken a prudent stance: "As a result of Nixon's visit to China, a climate of détente has appeared across the entire Far East. But the situation in the ROK, unlike that of Taiwan, warrants close attention."[79]

This position of the Japanese government drew the attention of China as well as the US. On June 22, 1972, during Kissinger's third visit to China, Premier Zhou Enlai reiterated that the US should withdraw its forces from the ROK and not let

Japan replace them anytime soon, noting on this point the similarity with Taiwan. Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua followed up by asking Kissinger for his view of Japanese press reports that the Taiwan clause had been nullified, but that the Korea clause remained in effect. In reply, Kissinger, as a way of explaining Japan's position, said "while on Taiwan they are confused, on Korea they expressed the view to me that their security was very closely bound up with the security of [the ROK]." He added that the US was not asking Japan to play a military role beyond the defense of its own territory.[80]

Prime Minister Tanaka and President Nixon affirmed the validity of the Korea clause at their summit in Honolulu in late August.[81,82] Tanaka described the ROK's security as Japan's "lifeline." He also communicated Japan's policy of strengthening economic cooperation with the ROK, highlighting its achievements, and mentioned Japan's plans to assist the ROK's rural agricultural and steel sectors at the upcoming sixth round of Japan-ROK regular ministerial consultations in September. Notably, Tanaka expressed Japan's intent to ensure a higher standard of living in the ROK than the DPRK, clearly indicating a willingness to support the economy of the ROK in its legitimacy contest with the DPRK.

Tanaka concluded his discussion by asking Nixon that the US not withdraw its forces from the ROK. Nixon promised that, even if South-North talks could reduce tensions on the peninsula, the US would maintain its present troop level in the ROK until there were definite changes in the security side, likening the situation to Germany, where notwithstanding the easing of tensions between West and East Germany, there was no reduction in NATO strength. Adding that it would be premature to improve US-DPRK relations, Nixon sought to restrain the expansion of Japan-DPRK exchanges.

Noting that the security of the ROK was essential to the maintenance of the security of Japan, Nixon warned, "we could not stay there [the ROK] if the use of our bases in Japan is restricted," underscoring the connection between Japan and the ROK in terms of security. Tanaka gave assurances that "there would be no such restrictions on US bases in Japan under the Security Treaty," essentially reaffirming the Korea clause. This was perhaps Japan's way of firming up the US military commitment in East Asia as it sought to safeguard its security while it normalized relations with China.

The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meanwhile, took note of the second paragraph of the Japan-US joint statement from Honolulu: "Both leaders reaffirmed the intention of the two governments to maintain the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the two countries, and agreed that the two governments would continue to cooperate through close consultation with a view to ensuring smooth and effective implementation of the Treaty." The Japanese government, it assessed, was handling the matter in a politically pragmatic way instead of following the treaty to the letter.[83]

On July 22, 1973, Tanaka told a foreign press briefing that the Taiwan clause had become null and void, attributing it to Japan's and the US's improving relations with China from 1969 onward. He confirmed, though, that the Korea clause remained in effect.[84]

5.4 The Pursuit of Détente Diplomacy

5.4.1 The ROK Launches Its China Diplomacy

The ROK had witnessed China expand its presence in the UN by forcing Taiwan out of the organization on the basis of the "one China" principle. So, it was naturally worried about China's approach to the Korean question. And, indeed, China called for the ROK to be expelled and replaced by the DPRK in the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).[85] From the start, the ROK's focus on China was the new UN member's attitude toward it in the UN General Assembly. Two possibilities had been rumored: that China would either be flexible in the interests of preserving a good relationship with the US or that it would use its greater presence to adopt a hard line against the ROK. From China's harsh stance in UNCTAD, the ROK predicted a similar Chinese approach on its handling of the Korean question in the UN General Assembly. A confrontation stemming from Chinese antagonism was not necessarily bad for the ROK, from the perspective of a conventional Cold War-style confrontation. However, the change in the international order brought about by US-China rapprochement and Chinese membership of the UN made it increasingly difficult for the ROK to garner support at the UN and elsewhere in the public arena. So if China were to take a hard line against the ROK to foster confrontation in that situation, some in the ROK believed that, conversely, support was more likely to swing in favor of the ROK.[86]

The ROK government, meanwhile, was embarking on a total turnaround in its foreign policy envisioning better relations with China, given the impending normalization of Japan-China relations on the tails of US-China rapprochement. With normalized Japan-China ties on the horizon, the ROK Embassy in Japan underscored for its government the diverse and increasingly complex power relations among the major players regarding the Korean Peninsula. It recommended that the ROK free itself from the Cold War structure and adopt a foreign policy pursuing the national interest. Given that China's accession to the UN and permanent membership of the UN Security Council made it a great power in global politics, the ROK Embassy touched on the need to avoid friction with China in international society and to support China's position in international bodies. The embassy proposed inviting Chinese diplomats to receptions at the ROK ambassador's official residence to encourage diplomatic contacts and, on the sports and culture front, invite China to ROK-hosted international events.[87] The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs judged that the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations would further shift the new international order in Asia toward seeking and maintaining the balance of power arising from great power mutual restraint. Thus, it assessed that the great powers' fundamental interests aligned regarding the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and they would seek to maintain the status quo of a divided Korea.[88] And so the ministry stressed the need to transform its foreign policy, ridding itself of the diplomatic framework that viewed China as a potential adversary, and moving towards a diplomacy of peace.[89]

Two factors lay behind the ROK's foreign policy shift: China had concluded that US troops stationed in Asia were not a threat to its own security, and Japan had normalized its relations with China while upholding its alliance with the US.[90] Also influential was the aforementioned flexibility displayed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in his meeting with Komeitō chairman Takeiri that the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Taiwan clause would not affect Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to China.[91] The ROK, predicting that China was unlikely to push hard for the abrogation of the Japan-US Security Treaty, paid careful attention to how mutual concessions had removed obstacles to normalizing Sino-Japanese relations. For the ROK, such changes in China made its attitude toward the issue of the US military presence in the ROK more predictable. Indeed, the fact that China had adopted a conciliatory stance on that issue had been communicated to the ROK.[92] Changes in the East Asian order surrounding Korea and in China's foreign policy enabled the ROK's transition away from its rigid Cold War diplomacy.

The ROK government approached China through the cooperation of third-party countries: Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France.[93] Yet that called for a clear policy well adapted to the new international situation, similarly to US-China rapprochement and the start of the South-North dialogue.[94] In his June 23, 1973, "Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Reunification," President Park marked the ROK's shift from Cold War diplomacy. The ROK, he said, would "open its door to all the nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality." This was the formal start of a new concept of diplomacy spearheaded by the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[95]

This alone, however, did not entirely clear the ROK's way to improved relations with China. That was a matter that would involve the ROK's adjusting its relations with Taiwan. When Japan was normalizing relations with China, it accepted Beijing's "one China" principle and declared that the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan (the Treaty of Taipei) had ceased to be effective. The ROK did not take that path. The UK Foreign Office had sounded out the ROK's intent to adjust its relations with Taiwan, offering to be the go-between. But Park instructed the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "the effort should be suspended, since there are currently no signs [the ROK] can improve relations with China, there is just the potential to destroy [the ROK's] relationship with Taiwan."[96]

The ministry did, however, continue its approaches to China through third countries, which suggests that Park may have revised his instructions. The ministry's Northeast Asia Second Division, which oversaw China diplomacy, explained to the Netherlands that it had in fact decided to break off its relations with Taiwan gradually and in phases.[97]

In a clear indication of its goal to gradually establish neighborly relations, the ministry also began using China's official name—the People's Republic of China—in references to the impending visit to China by French President Georges J. R. Pompidou in September 1973.[98] It also sent out feelers via the good offices of Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK to probe China's intentions, particularly on the following issues:

1. the simultaneous accession of the ROK and the DPRK to the UN to ease tension and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula
2. the continued presence of the UN Command to keep the Armistice Agreement in force and preserve the military equilibrium, both essential to maintaining the military status quo
3. the Chinese government's plans to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula.[99]

China maintained its reserve and did not show any official reaction to the ROK feelers. Zhou, though, told Pompidou that China neither strongly safeguarded the DPRK's position nor did it respond to the ROK's request for official contacts. Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, taking part in the summit with France, said that while China opposed the Koreas' simultaneous accession to the UN, it did not wish to see the UN Command dismantled for fear of a power vacuum. China was, he said, open to discussing the matter at the UN Security Council.[100] In his meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau a month later, in October 1973, Zhou said that the US and China were responsible for upholding the Korean War Armistice Agreement as its signatories. He emphasized that though the Korean Peninsula lacked a peace treaty, such as that concluding the Vietnam War, dialogue meant no conflict.[101] China was more interested in maintaining stability and the status quo on the Korean Peninsula than in dismantling the Cold War structure or acting to ease tensions there.

5.4.2 Developments in Japan-DPRK Exchanges and Japan-ROK Hostility

In the aftermath of the July 1971 Nixon shock, the Japanese government informed the ROK government that it was pursuing personal exchanges and trade with the DPRK from its position of promoting détente in Asia. The ROK government, in addition to stressing that Japan-DPRK contacts must not strengthen the military power of the DPRK, which still aimed at unification through force, asked that the Japanese government block the expansion of private-sector contacts with the DPRK.[102] The ROK was concerned that enthusiasm in Japanese society for normalized relations with China might factor into a push for a rapid improvement in Japan-DPRK relations.

On September 5 and 6, 1972, a Japanese delegation visited the ROK for the sixth Regular Ministerial Conference. President Park expressed the hope that normalized Sino-Japanese relations would contribute to a relaxation of tensions throughout Asia. But he lamented that Taiwan had become a victim of the vagaries of great power politics and relayed his concern about the possible acceleration of Japan-DPRK rapprochement as a result of Japan's improved ties with China. Park asked Japan to tread carefully.[103] At the conference, however, Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi disclosed that Japanese industry was pursuing the export of large-scale plants for steel, electrical machinery, synthetic fiber, and fertilizer to the DPRK and that Japan planned to use Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) funds for that purpose. The use of export bank financing, the ROK responded reservedly, was an issue of national

sovereignty over which it could not protest formally. But it stated, "we would like for you to proceed in a way that at the very least does not destroy the current power balance between the South and North."[104] It voiced concern that steel and other plant exports could enhance the DPRK's military strength. Another ROK concern was that increased flows of Japanese capital into the DPRK might reduce Japan-ROK economic cooperation.[105] As it pressed Japan to block an expansion of economic contacts that would help boost DPRK military power, the ROK also sought to further strengthen Japan-ROK economic cooperation.[106]

The expansion of Japan-DPRK exchanges thus engendered a policy conflict between Japan, which regarded them as facilitating the easing of tensions, and the ROK, which saw them as a hinderance that could upset the peninsula's balance. The substance and pace of these exchanges became an issue of contention between Japan and the ROK. Regarding substance, the ROK feared that Japan-DPRK trade would enhance the DPRK's military power. The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs was alarmed when a memorandum trade agreement was signed between the DPRK and a mission of Japanese Diet members from the Japan-North Korea Parliamentary Friendship League on January 23, 1972. "The expanding volume of trade under the memorandum, because it directly challenges our government's efforts for peaceful unification by isolating the Northern devil [the DPRK] and forcing it to give up bolstering its military, would only intensify tensions."[107] Moreover, the fact that an oil refinery was one of Japan's items to export in the memorandum was brought up at a January 26 meeting of the ROK's National Assembly Committee on Foreign Affairs, where the expansion of Japan-DPRK trade was criticized as assisting a DPRK military invasion of the ROK.[108]

Regarding the pace, the ROK was concerned that progress in Japan-DPRK relations alone might lead to obstacles being raised in South-North talks. But what the ROK feared most was that such progress might end in Japan's recognizing the DPRK politically when China and the Soviet Union had yet to recognize the ROK—the fear of diplomatic isolation.[109] So the ROK had no choice but to firmly oppose any and all Japan-DPRK exchanges.

In response to the expansion of Japan's exchanges with the DPRK, the ROK government engaged in "protest diplomacy" to force Japan to revise its foreign policy, but its impact was not enough to offset the trend of the times, the relaxation of tensions. Rather, repeated protests damaged the ROK's image in Japanese political and business circles and in the mass media. At the beginning of 1973, the point of contact for the protest diplomacy, the ROK Embassy in Japan, proposed that the ROK should abandon its futile and superficial diplomacy of protest for something more substantive.[110] The embassy suggested that, in light of the new situation, it would be pragmatic for the ROK's response to separate Japan-DPRK economic exchange on a private commercial basis from that with government involvement, for example, the use of JEXIM financing.[111] The ROK's rising economic dependence on Japan necessitated a practical, flexible approach reflective of changing circumstances.[112] In 1973, the ROK shifted from protest diplomacy to ensuring superiority over the DPRK through strengthened Japan-ROK relations. The ROK began to refocus its

policy toward Japan on strengthening and expanding a relationship of economic cooperation and away from protest.

There was an inclination within the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even as gaining superiority over the DPRK remained its basic policy, to include as a specific measure of its Japan policy the acknowledgement that Japan-DPRK economic exchanges contributed to easing regional tension.[113] A ministry report to the president in early 1973 raised concerns about Japanese plant exports and JEXIM funds possibly strengthening the DPRK military. But it also had a plan to encourage Japan to export consumer goods to the DPRK and to expand personnel, language, cultural, sports, and arts exchanges. On the face of it, preventing a recurrence of war was central to the ROK's détente policy. So the Japan-led expansion of exchanges with the DPRK could lead to changes opening up DPRK society, which would be quite desirable in terms of the stability of the peninsula and that of the new East Asian order.

Suffering from fear of diplomatic isolation, however, the ROK could not bring itself to endanger its security by taking a long view and pinning its hopes on Japan's role. To put it another way, the policy challenge the ROK was left with was what amount of Japan-DPRK exchange it could tolerate in the hope that exchange opened DPRK society, while avoiding the worst-case scenario of Japan extending political recognition to the DPRK before the Soviet Union and China recognized the ROK.

5.4.3 Multilayered Japanese Diplomacy

Amid calls for expanded exchanges with the DPRK in Japan and staunch opposition to it in the ROK, Japanese foreign policy officials were having a discussion about readjusting Japan's policy toward the Korean Peninsula. In March 1972, Japanese Ambassador to the ROK Ushiroku Torao sent a telegram to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the subject line "Views on handling the DPRK issue," in which he pointed out the differences between Japan's policy toward the Korean Peninsula and its policies on China and Vietnam.[114] For Japan, China policy was a matter of whether to accept "one China." Japan's choice to normalize relations with China, even if at the sacrifice of Taiwan, was justifiable by China's elevated international status stemming from its permanent seat on the UN Security Council and Sino-American rapprochement. However, the promoting of contacts with the DPRK, though largely inspired by similar efforts with China, had one fundamental difference. Ushiroku characterized the increased exchanges with the DPRK as being limited to promoting the easing of regional tensions, not for normalizing diplomatic relations. He gave two reasons:

1. The UN General Assembly resolution on the establishment of the ROK, the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty, and the attitudes of various countries when recognizing the ROK made it clear that, according to international law, only the South was a state.

2. Factors such as population, area, and status in the international community make it inconceivable that the DPRK would be able prevail over the ROK and take over its position in the absence of unification achieved through armed force or violent revolution.

Based on these points, the ambassador's policy recommendation was that Japan pursue exchanges with the DPRK with an abundance of consideration for the ROK's position. He called for caution so as not to be swept up by sentiment in Japan that "the DPRK is next!" making false analogies to the cases of Japan's approaches to China and Vietnam, which were different situations. Given no serious tension on the Korean Peninsula, he suggested a cautious approach, saying that it was not worth vigorously pursuing a policy of détente at the risk of sowing discord in Japan's relations with the ROK.[115]

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' basic policy for the Korean Peninsula came down to encouraging peaceful coexistence between the ROK and the DPRK.[116] With the ROK, it sought to promote friendly relations through economic cooperation so as to make its foundations as a democratic state secure on the stability of the general welfare. In parallel, Japan would be flexible in forging exchanges with the DPRK, with an eye on shifts in South-North talks and the international situation, to promote a relaxing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

At a meeting of Japan's House of Representative's Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 24, 1972, Prime Minister Satō was asked by LDP politician Aoki Masahisa whether Japan would accept the three principles for the normalization of relations which the People's Republic of China had insisted on.[117] Satō replied that Japan would respect UN resolutions but that "it was an immutable fact that the People's Republic of China was the representative of China." The need to normalize Sino-Japanese relations by whatever means available was foremost. In relation to the ROK and the DPRK, he replied that "relations with the [Democratic] People's Republic [of Korea], too, would be adjusted before long."[118] His mention of the adjustment of relations with the DPRK as he speaks of normalizing relations with China is worth noting. It is a good indication of the basic trajectory of Japan's policy toward the Korean Peninsula.

The succeeding Tanaka administration, which had experienced the ROK's concerns as it normalized Japan's relations with China, sent former Economic Planning Agency Director-General Kimura Toshio to the ROK as a special envoy to assuage those fears. Kimura told President Park that the friendly and cooperative relationship between Japan and the ROK remained unchanged, and that Japan would fulfil the security aspects of its role under the Japan-US alliance.[119] Kimura explained that China had said nothing about the Japan-US Security Treaty or the US military presence in Asia. China, he said, did not seek a US withdrawal of troops from Japan and the ROK that would change the status quo in Northeast Asia fearing it would invite Soviet intervention. Japan had, he added, normalized relations with China based on maintaining the status quo in terms of security. Kimura suggested that Zhou Enlai's four principles on Taiwan were no longer in force. (Those four principles were laid out in a memorandum for the Japanese trade delegation headed by Matsumura Kenzō

that visited China in April 1970. They included China's refusal to trade with companies with strong ties to firms from Taiwan, the ROK, and the US.[120]) Kimura pointed out that Zhou mentioned receiving the chairman of the Japanese company Mitsubishi in Beijing while the company's president had been visiting Taiwan.[121]

Meanwhile, the DPRK, responding to calls within Japan for expanded exchanges with Pyongyang, modified its long-held position that improved Japan-DPRK relations was predicated on abrogating the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty. It became more flexible: the treaty could be maintained as long as Japan pursued an evenhanded policy toward the DPRK and ROK. DPRK Second Vice Premier Park Sung Chul told a group of Japanese newspaper journalists visiting Pyongyang that the Japanese government needed to relinquish its exclusively pro-ROK policy, as this was interfering with Korean unification. Japan should adopt a balanced diplomacy that kept an equal distance toward North and South, he argued.[122] Chairman Kim Il Sung, too, said in an interview with Japan's *Mainichi Shimbun* that "Japan should implement a balanced policy of a non-aggressive nature toward the North and South of the Korean Peninsula."[123]

According to information received by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kim Il Sung believed that Japan and the DPRK could normalize their diplomatic relations if Article III of the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty, stipulating the ROK government as the only lawful government in Korea, was ignored. Kim calculated that Article III would lose approximately 80% of its effect with normalized Japan-DPRK relations, which he said could be established even if the Basic Treaty remained in place. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Northeast Asia Division viewed the DPRK's approach to Japan as mainly economic. It reasoned that the DPRK had designated technological innovation as the central theme in the six-year plan implemented in 1971, but Pyongyang could not expect much assistance in this area from the Soviet Union, China, or other Communist countries. The Northeast Asia Division judged that this left the DPRK little choice but to rely on the developed, liberal countries of the West, particularly Japan, for technological innovation.[124]

The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and other Japanese progressives demanded that Japan should extend the same diplomatic treatment to the DPRK as the ROK. At a November 10, 1972, meeting of the House of Councillors Committee on Budget, JSP Diet member Ashika Kaku insisted that Japan do exactly that given the recent normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Foreign Minister Ōhira replied:

> The South-North talks started in a situation where Japan and the Republic of Korea had diplomatic relations and maintained close ties. … and so the talks started in a balanced situation, … when we consider how to conceptualize a balance in a hypothetical case for starting a policy toward the Korean Peninsula from now, from scratch, in the absence of that very situation, and then we consider the actual balance based on the reality that the South-North talks were started in the conditions we have today, with such a past, … I believe that adopting an evenhanded policy toward the North and the South would be a very dangerous path to go down.[125]

The JSP redoubled its efforts after the DPRK joined the World Health Organization on May 17, 1973, and the ROK issued its June 23 Statement. JSP Diet member Akamatsu Isamu twice submitted letters of inquiry on Korean unification to the

government, on July 7 and on July 21.[126] He argued that amid the evident atmosphere of relaxing tensions on the peninsula, Japan should correct its foreign policy bias favoring relations with the ROK and should politically recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK. The Japanese government replied that, with regard to treating both parts of the peninsula equally, "the decision should be made integrating a variety of factors such as our country's external affairs overall and the impact on the South-North talks," and that "Japan's first priority is to maintain and develop friendly, cooperative relations with [the ROK], and under the current circumstances, we believe that we will have to limit our relations with [the DPRK]."[127] Here, "Japan's external affairs overall" meant that Japan alone could not unilaterally change its policy toward the DPRK when the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries had not changed theirs toward the ROK. The Japanese government's response was shaped by the ROK's request of the US and Japan, when it issued its June 23 Statement, to block them from approaching the DPRK before the Soviet Union and China had recognized the ROK. Moreover, it even asked the US to restrain Japan's push to draw closer to the DPRK.[128]

ROK Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil met with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka. Reminding Japan that it should not seek to improve its relations with the DPRK using the procedure it followed in normalizing its diplomatic relations with China, Kim asked that Japan consult closely with the US on any policy shifts. Tanaka acquiesced. Separately, Kim suggested to Secretary of State Rogers that as Foreign Minister Ōhira took a more practical approach to the Korean problem than Tanaka, the secretary should discuss Korea with Ōhira.[129]

Interestingly, at the Japan-US summit on August 1, 1973, Ōhira recalled that before WWII Japan maintained two divisions of troops in South Korea for security. He added that, because postwar circumstances precluded direct military assistance, Japan had applied an amount equivalent to the cost of maintaining the two prewar divisions toward its economic assistance to the ROK.[130] Ōhira's comment indicates that Japan's connection with the Korean Peninsula from the security perspective had carried over from before WWII with a change of methods, from military to economic. It offers insight into how the Japanese government perceived the security characteristics encapsulated in its economic cooperation with the ROK. His comment was perhaps Japan's response to US demands for it to share the burden for regional security.

The Japanese government expanded its economic exchanges with the DPRK in a prudent manner while it attached importance to its security relations with the ROK. It sought to follow a gradualist approach in developing relations and remain within the framework of the US's Korean Peninsula policy, which regarded political relations with the DPRK as premature.[131] This translated into a strategy of pursuing economic exchange with the DPRK, tacitly acknowledging domestic demands to broaden private-sector exchanges, while avoiding the government's official involvement. The evenhanded foreign policy toward the two Koreas approach, based on thinking that was no more than "sentimentality," to borrow Ōhira's phrase, was carried out cautiously.[132]

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs ascribed significance to Japan's trade relations with the DPRK in two ways: (1) gradually expanding relations with the DPRK would make it easier to maintain and increase economic assistance to the ROK and (2) they would serve to exert international influences on DPRK society.[133] The former of the two, correlating expanded relations with the DPRK to continued economic assistance to the ROK, was a manifestation of the heavy political load of sustaining a pro-ROK policy faced with domestic pressure to do otherwise. It probably also masked Japan's intention to persuade the US, opposed to expanding exchanges with the DPRK, with the pitch that it was taking economic cooperation with the ROK quite seriously regardless of the domestic pressure. In its second point, the ministry was referring to expanded trade as a form of détente diplomacy in relation to the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. Economic exchange had limits, but the ministry saw it as a way of encouraging change within the DPRK and helping to ease tensions, unlike the US policy of containment toward the DPRK.

The ministry's perspective underlay the Japanese government's efforts to win over the US and the ROK, which had been curbing Japan's DPRK policy. In August 1973 talks with Secretary of State Rogers, Foreign Minister Ōhira reiterated the aforementioned significance of Japan-DPRK trade and asked for the US's understanding.[134] Earlier, in June, Ōhira had the opportunity to give his personal views to ROK Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil during his visit to Japan on why the policy shift was needed. Domestic circumstances, he said, meant that Japan "could not sustain the existing relationships of 100 percent ROK, zero percent DPRK."[135] He also informed him that Japan planned to authorize JEXIM financing for the export of a towel-manufacturing plant to the DPRK.[136]

Nakae Yōsuke, the deputy director-general of the Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told his ROK ministry counterparts that due to the expanding economic exchanges with the DPRK, there was a rise in domestic pressure for a policy change toward the North. He also informed them that "Some ministry officials believe that showing a little accommodation toward the DPRK would facilitate a closer relationship between Japan and the ROK."[137] Vice Foreign Minister Hōgen Shinsaku told ROK Ambassador to Japan Lee Ho that Japan "could not inhibit Japan's private sector from trading with the DPRK, in order to cooperate with the ROK to enhance its military capability."[138] Indeed, on October 29, 1973, Uchida Yoshio, the director of the Northeast Asia Division within the trade ministry's Trade Policy Bureau, informed the ROK that Japan was authorizing its first JEXIM financing for the DPRK.[139]

That a liberal, Nakae, and a conservative, Hōgen, who continually took an ROK-leaning position, had come to share an approach with respect to the Korean Peninsula is worth mentioning. It suggested that a new policy toward the Korean Peninsula was taking shape within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a reflection of the changed order in East Asia. And Ōhira was developing a new diplomacy. It indicated an attempt at a multilayered foreign policy balanced between two contradictory political and diplomatic positions: the security requirement that Japan prioritize its relationship with the ROK from the security perspective, and the domestic demand for easing tensions in the region.

5.5 The Recalibration of Japan-ROK Security Relations

5.5.1 Japan's Response to the Inter-Korean Legitimacy Contest

Following US-China rapprochement, Northeast Asia experienced a relaxation of military tensions and a growing emphasis on cooperation for political and economic stability. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs judged that the DPRK was finding it harder to make military provocations and that the economic and political aspects of the Korean Peninsula issue took on greater importance. The ministry told the ROK that the gravity of the Korean question was entirely different from that of Taiwan, and that Japan would co-sponsor a draft resolution in the UN regarding the Korean question.[140] The ministry guaranteed Japan's adherence to the Korea clause as a deterrence against the DPRK and showed it was ready to cooperate with the ROK to ensure its political and economic stability in the legitimacy competition with the DPRK. In short, the ministry had concluded that as prospects for another war diminished with the easing of tensions, the main issues were likely to be political and economic.

Two meetings of the Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conferences became opportunities to recalibrate Japan-ROK cooperation: the sixth, on September 5 and 6, 1972, ahead of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to China, and the seventh, on December 25 and 26, 1973. Both conferences transformed the quality and breadth of bilateral cooperation, featuring separate discussions on the expansion of private-sector investment and on government assistance for infrastructure improvements. The two sides coordinated and agreed that Japanese industry would take the lead in heavy and chemical industries (HCI) cooperation whereas the two governments would cooperate on infrastructure improvements that could not expect corporate investment, such as the Saemaul Undong ("New Village Movement") projects designed by President Park to promote community-led development.

This shift was closely linked to the ROK's economic development policy that fostered its HCI sector, which was more likely to attract foreign and private-sector investment, so that capital and technologies from the HCI sector could then be used to produce high-precision military supplies. The plan was implemented with the understanding that it could also supply the capital in short supply in the ROK as well as aim to transfer technologies from Japan's HCI sector and invite the procurement of the funds in scarce supply in the ROK.[141] The ROK thus moved aggressively to expand cooperation to attract Japanese capital, primarily from Japanese industry.[142] It requested Japan's help to promote investment in the ROK from its industrial sector. Indeed, at the sixth Regular Ministerial Conference the ROK side asked that they set up a business attraction council in the ROK to promote Japanese private corporate investment. Japan agreed, responding that it would be desirable to have active mutual partnerships, such as investment consulting services by private organizations and private-sector investment survey missions, in light of the growing investment in the ROK by Japanese firms.[143]

At the seventh Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference, held after Park's 1973 Presidential Declaration on Heavy and Chemical Industrialization, the ROK asked for appropriate Japan government assistance in furtherance of private economic exchanges in HCI-related sectors.[144] In fact, Japanese industry's investment in the ROK had risen from $21 million in 1971 to $77 million in 1972, and then more than doubled to $173 million in 1973, coming to represent 90.6% of total foreign investment in the ROK. According to Oh Won-cheol, who directed the ROK's HCI as second senior presidential secretary for economic affairs in the Blue House, the country's HCI sector had capital needs of around $10 billion, of which foreign investment was to provide $5.8 billion and domestic capital to supply $3.8 billion. In late May 1973, ROK Deputy Prime Minister Tae Wan-seon headed a delegation to the US and Japan to hold invest-in-the-ROK seminars. Thanks in part to the delegation's activities, the ROK welcomed $3.1 billion in foreign investment from 1973 to 1975. Foreign direct investment in the ROK over the same three-year period reached $415.3 million.[145]

There is a tendency to attribute the uptick in private-sector cooperation to a decreased Japanese government willingness to provide economic cooperation, and thus to regard it as a waning of the bilateral relationship.[146] It should instead be viewed as a greater diversification of the government-to-government cooperation that began in 1965 with the normalization of their diplomatic relations. At the seventh conference, Economic Planning Board Minister Tae Wan-seon, who served as the leader of the ROK delegation, highlighted that the focus of economic exchange and cooperation was beginning to shift to bilateral private-sector contact and cooperation. "I am convinced that our relationship of economic cooperation based on mutually complementary conditions must gradually switch from a government-led to a private sector-driven system of cooperation," Tae said.[147] Foreign Minister Ōhira concurred that the transition of the two countries' economic cooperation to a primarily private-sector basis was natural. He pledged, however, to continue providing government cooperation for agricultural and economic development and for infrastructure construction in which private firms were unlikely to participate.[148]

In dividing roles between the government and the private sector, the ROK and Japan focused their cooperation on the ROK's New Village Movement. Japan in particular regarded these projects as critical "to the ROK winning the South-North legitimacy competition."[149] This suggests the extent to which the strategic concept of victory in the inter-Korean legitimacy contest underpinned Japan-ROK economic cooperation in the détente era. The ROK government ascribed the success in strengthening Japan-ROK cooperation at a time when Japanese politicians' interest was on normalizing relations with China to the interest and efforts of Japan's bureaucrats. It appeared satisfied with the size of the agreed cooperation: $305 million in total, which included commodity loans for price stability, assistance for industrial plant and equipment to enable self-sustaining growth, and support for the New Village Movement projects for balance. Though the latter was scaled down from the ROK's initial ask of $1 billion for eight projects to $800 million for five projects, Japan's decision to provide $80 million in the first fiscal year was an unexpected level of

commitment that the ROK praised as evincing Tokyo's favorable attitude toward these projects.[150]

5.5.2 *The Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conferences Become a Political Forum*

The Japan-ROK regular ministerial conferences were held annually as a symbol of bilateral economic cooperation and friendly relations. But they were postponed for four months following the kidnapping of exiled ROK opposition leader Kim Dae-jung in August 1973 by ROK agents from his Tokyo hotel. The Japanese government demanded an apology from the ROK for violating Japan's sovereignty and called for an investigation by Japanese law enforcement. The ROK's image deteriorated in the eyes of the Japanese public, which also criticized the Japanese government for providing economic cooperation that, far from democratizing the Park Chung-hee administration in the ROK, had supported a dictatorship.

Following a political settlement over the incident,[151] the seventh Regular Ministerial Conference opened in December 1973 in Tokyo, conducted under a different format than previous conferences, and aimed at restoring friendly relations. First, the Japanese government took steps to address the decline in Japanese public opinion of the ROK. It would host the conference amid fears that the negative public sentiment might disrupt the conference and even endanger the ROK delegation. Hence, starting in the preliminary talks stage, the Japanese government worked to create an amicable climate to hold the conference, partly by asking the ROK side for an interim report on its criminal investigation and on the matter of Kim's liberty to leave the ROK for Japan, as a way to mollify the Diet and public opinion.[152] To avoid public criticism, Japan's government requested that the joint communiqué include the wording, "Japan's economic cooperation with the ROK contributes to the well-being of the Korean people."[153] The ROK revised this to read "Economic cooperation between the two countries … contributes to the development of the ROK economy and the improvement of the well-being of its people."[154] In the end, the joint communiqué following the seventh conference included the phrase, "[economic independence,] enriching the people's well-being, [and international cooperation] are basic objectives of the ROK government."[155]

Second, Japan sought to transition the conference from one that primarily addressed issues of bilateral economic cooperation to a political forum.[156] Since the ROK was the only developing country with which Japan held regular ministerial conferences, the event had come to symbolize their special relationship of economic cooperation. By taking economic cooperation off the agenda, Japan was trying to alter the nature of the ministerial conferences into a venue for political discussions of their common policy questions rather than for hashing out the level of Japan's economic aid to the ROK. The Japanese government's proposal to do so framed the change as elevating the talks to high-level policy consultations between the two

governments to match the ministerial consultations Japan held with other, developed countries. Economic cooperation issues could be discussed beforehand at the working level and then be given formal approval at the ministerial conferences.[157]

The ROK later looked back on the outcome of the seventh conference as presenting an opportunity to establish a new direction for the ministerial conferences. The ministers succeeded in furthering cooperation between their countries, and not merely in establishing a higher level of relations through the drafting of the joint communiqué and the format for conference proceedings, which encompassed broad ranging discussions on matters of policy and many other issues, including the international economy and energy.[158] Removing economic cooperation from the ministerial conference agenda had the effect of correcting the perception of the Japanese people that ROK economic development would not be possible without Japan's cooperation, and led to softening the Japanese public's critical opinion of the ROK.

In fact, the scale of economic cooperation had been determined before the seventh ministerial conference. Senior officials from the ROK Economic Planning Board's Economic Cooperation Bureau and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs First Economic Cooperation Division had hashed through the issues in preliminary talks at the working level. And on December 25, the day preceding the conference, they exchanged an informal record of their understanding detailing the substance of their economic cooperation and the scale of Japan's yen loans.[159] In the document, there was also agreement on two loans: $80 million agreed to at the sixth conference to assist with agricultural mechanization, rural infrastructure development, and rural electrification projects for the Sapgyo River, Gyehwa Island, and the Geumchang and Changnyeong districts, all under the New Village Movement; and $45 million of new lending for, among other things, planning and constructing a multi-purpose dam in Daecheon. It was also agreed at these prior talks that JEXIM would provide long-term, low-interest financing up to $45 million for planning and expanding the POSCO steel mill. This was less than the amount initially requested by the ROK, but they reached agreement under a mutual understanding in light of the circumstances (Japan's economic situation brought about by the oil shock, and situation going into the budget compilation for the following fiscal year).

5.6 Conclusion

The change in the Cold War order in East Asia induced by US-China rapprochement forced Japan and the ROK to rid themselves of Cold War diplomacy. The normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the expansion of Japan-DPRK exchanges, and the South-North Joint Communiqué embody the respective efforts by Japan and the ROK to adapt. Given those changes in the regional order, they recalibrated their relationship while vacillating between the political and diplomatic positions required by the demands of security and détente.

Japan, seeking to improve its relations with China and the DPRK, attempted to reevaluate the Korea clause, which was preventing its shift from Cold War policy.

This move, however, did not lead to an actual change of that policy. Japan's diplomatic officials shared a sense that the country's Korean Peninsula policy differed from its China policy, and thus they sought to differentiate the Korea clause from the Taiwan clause. US and Japanese leaders also mutually affirmed the Korea clause's strong connection to the issue of US force reductions in the ROK. For its parts, the ROK did stress the clause's military significance but took a more flexible attitude and placed greater emphasis on strengthening political and economic relations with Japan. As they advanced their détente diplomacies toward China and the DPRK, Japan and the ROK responded to the changing East Asian order, maintaining their security relations by differentiating the Korea clause from the Taiwan clause. Japan's Korean Peninsula policy of the time did not evince the clear change that previous literature indicates it did. Japan instead pursued a multilayered foreign policy that integrated the needs of security and détente.

Japan viewed its economic cooperation with the ROK as its contribution to ROK victory in the South-North legitimacy competition. Trying to expand the scope of that cooperation, the ROK requested cooperation emphasizing development of its HCI and rural sectors. The Japanese government committed to continued cooperation with government loans for infrastructure development in areas where private companies were unable or unwilling to participate, such as rural development and basic infrastructure, implementing cooperation for the New Village Movement as part of that. The Japanese government at the same time pursued exchanges with the DPRK, firmly maintaining that economic exchanges could promote change within the DPRK and contribute to regional relaxation of tensions.

Notes

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2. Cha, Victor D. Kurata, Hideya (trans). 2003. *Bei-Nichi-Kan hanmoku o koeta teikei*. Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing, Chap. 3. [Translation of Cha, Victor D. 1999. *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.]
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4. Cha defines the 1972–74 period as one of "heightening crisis" in Japan-ROK relations. He points to Japan's attempt to renege on the Korea clause, the decline in Japan-ROK economic cooperation, policy disagreements between the two governments at the regular ministerial conferences, the gap between the two countries' DPRK policies, and increasing social exchange between Japan and the DPRK. Cha, *op. cit.*, 118–127. [English edition, 115–140.]
5. The ROK and the US concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953, whereas the DPRK and China concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance on July 11, 1961.

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9. Kissinger 2012, *op. cit.*, 292–293. [English edition, 271.]
10. At their first meeting, Nixon and Zhou Enlai discussed whether they could find common ground given their respective interests. "Shiryō 3: 1972/2/22, Nikuson-Shū Onrai dai 1-kai kaidan (Reference 3: First Nixon-Zhou Enlai talks, February 22, 1972)," in Mōri, Kazuko and Mōri, Kōzaburō (trans). 2001. *Nikuson hōchū kimitsu kaidanroku* (Record of secret talks during Nixon's visit to China). Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 49–51. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d196 (accessed February 25, 2024).
11. "Bunsho 1: Dai 1-kai Shū Onrai-Kisshinjā kaidan, 1972/7/9 (Document 1: First Zhou Enlai-Kissinger talks, July 9, 1971)," in Mōri Kazuko, and Masuda Hiroshi (trans). 2004. *Shū Onrai-Kisshinjā kimitsu kaidanroku* [Record of secret talks between Zhou Enlai and Kissinger]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 32. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d139 (accessed February 25, 2024).
12. Ibid., 34–35.
13. "Bunsho 10: Dai 4-kai Shū Onrai-Kisshinjā kaidan, 1971/10/22 (Document 10: Fourth Zhou Enlai-Kissinger talks, October 22, 1971)," 185–186. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/d44 (accessed February 25, 2024).
14. Ibid., 181, 186.
15. Ibid., 186.
16. PRC briefing papers to President, February 1972, National Security Council Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files – Far East, Box 91, Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
17. Ibid.
18. "Shiryō 4: 1972/2/23, Nikuson-Shū Onrai dai 2-kai kaidan (Reference 4: Second Nixon-Zhou Enlai talks, February 23, 1972)," in Mōri, Kazuko and Mōri, Kōzaburō (trans)., *op. cit.*, 99. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d197 (accessed February 25, 2024).
19. Ibid., 99–100.
20. "Shiryō 5: 1972/2/24, Nikuson-Shū Onrai dai 3-kai kaidan (Reference 5: Third Nixon-Zhou Enlai talks, February 24, 1972)," in Mōri, Kazuko and Mōri, Kōzaburō (trans). *op. cit.*, 150–151. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d199 (accessed February 25, 2024).
21. A principle in international law that recognizes a peace treaty between parties as vesting each with the territory and property under its control unless otherwise stipulated (https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/uti%20possidetis).
22. "Shiryō 3: 1972/2/22, Nikuson-Shū Onrai dai 1-kai kaidan," in Mōri, Kazuko and Mōri, Kōzaburō (trans). *op. cit.*, 69.
23. Ibid., 61–62.
24. The US Department of State foresaw that the US and China could not coordinate on the Korean Peninsula issue when the two countries struggled to agree on how to ensure a peace regime on the peninsula. This will be discussed in detail in Chap. 6.
25. For more on the contemporary debate between the great powers on the Korean Peninsula, see Kurata, Hideya. 2006. "Beichū sekkin to Kankoku: 'Taikokukan no kyōchō' to gunji teisen taisei (Sino-American rapprochement and the ROK: 'Great power collaboration' and the military ceasefire system)," in Masuda, Hiroshi (ed). *Nikuson hōchū to Reisen kōzō no hen'yō: Beichū sekkin no shōgeki to shūhen shokoku* (Nixon's trip to China and the change

in the Cold War structure: The impact of Sino-US rapprochement on neighboring countries). Tokyo: Keio University Press, 153–179.

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27. Memorandum, U. Alexis Johnson to the Secretary, SRG Meeting, August 27, NSSM 122, August 31, 1971, *Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security and Economic Relations, 1960–1976* (Ann Arbor: ProQuest Information and Learning, 2001; below, *Japan and the United States*), No. 1425.
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29. Ibid.
30. Kuriyama, Takakazu. 2010. *Gaikō shōgen roku: Okinawa henkan, Nitchū kokkō seijōka, Nichi-Bei "mitsuyaku"* (Record of foreign policy testimony: The reversion of Okinawa, normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations, and "secret agreements" between Japan and the US). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 146–149.
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32. Telegram from the Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, President/Sato Talk, POL 7 Japan, Tokyo 12458, December 20, 1971, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Series 16, Vol. 7, 272.
33. China Division, Japan Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Bureau, "Chūkyō to Kankoku, Hokusen tono kankei (China's relationship with the ROK and the DPRK)," June 27, 1972, *Chōsen mondai* [The Korean issue], Admin. No. 2012-1788.
34. Kim, Yong-shik. 1987. *Hope and Challenge.* Seoul: Dong-a ilbo sa, 219; and Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, The White House, Letter from President Park Chung Hee to President Nixon, Sep. 21, 1971, POL 7 KOR S, RG59, National Archives II. [For the latter, see page 44 of https://catalog.archives.gov/id/266848790 (accessed February 25, 2024).]
35. Telegram from Department of State to the Embassy in Seoul, Kim Yong-shik in Washington, State 174893, September 21, 1971, Subject Numeric File 1970–73, Box 2424, RG59, National Archives II. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d109 (accessed February 25, 2024).
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42. *Chosun ilbo*, January 21, 1973.
43. Known as the turning point in ROK diplomacy in the Cold War, the June 23 Statement included the following: that the ROK (1) would open its door to all the nations of the world regardless of their ideologies or social institutions; (2) would not object to simultaneous ROK and DPRK admittance into the UN; and (3) would not oppose DPRK participation in international organizations. "Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Reunification," in ROK National Unification Board. 1982. *White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea.* Seoul: ROK National Unification Board, 319–322. [In the English edition, 320–325. This cable reports it with slight wording differences https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=67274&dt=2472 (accessed February 25, 2024).]
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50. "Joint Communique of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," *Peking Review*, Vol. 13, No. 15, April 10, 1970, 3–5. https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1970/PR1970-15.pdf (accessed February 25, 2024).
51. Japanese and U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula, Research and Planning Department, GAIMUSHO, November 23, 1971, 14th US-Japan Planning Talks Briefing Book, Planning Coordination Staff, Record of the Planning Coordination Staff, 1969–1973, Subject Country, Box 403, National Archives II.
52. "Cold War norms" here refer to the principles and practices regulating interstate relations within the Cold War structure that integrated US-Soviet superpower-centric East-West military confrontation, East-West ideological conflict, and alliances with divided states. From this perspective, the Korea and Taiwan clauses could be described as one norm regulating the policies of the states involved. To understand the distinctiveness of East Asia during the détente era, it is important to examine how Japan and the ROK, as states within the same alliance system, dealt with these norms during this period of easing Cold War tensions.
53. Telegram from the Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, President/Sato Talk: Wakaizumi's view, POL 7 Japan-US, Tokyo 12155, December 9, 1971, in Ishii, Osamu et al. (eds), *op. cit.*, Series 16, Vol. 5, 98–101.
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(Million US dollars, %)

	1971	1972	1973		1974	
			Amount	% of whole	Amount	% of whole
Japan	24.8	77.6	173.2	90.6	130.6	80.3
US	21.7	29.7	11.7	6.1	20.2	12.4

Source ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1979. *30 Years of ROK Diplomacy, 1948–1978*, 161–162

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Chapter 6
The Search for Peaceful Coexistence (1974–75)

Abstract Tensions on the Korean Peninsula soared again in April 1975 when North Korean leader Kim Il Sung visited China and made remarks suggestive of an armed unification of the Korean Peninsula, evoking memories of the 1950 Korean War and the military assistance his trips to China and the Soviet Union had garnered, and sparking fears of a possible second war. This chapter examines how Japan and the ROK responded to this new security crisis following the fall of Saigon in April of that same year and explores the impact of that response on their security relations. Drawing primarily on diplomatic records from both countries, as well as US foreign policy documents, the author highlights the gap that existed between Japan and the ROK in their perceptions of threat, and how their responses went beyond simply strengthening joint deterrence capabilities to exploring a new policy of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula soared once again in April 1975 when, following the communization of the Indochinese Peninsula, DPRK President Kim Il Sung visited Beijing. In front of the Chinese leadership, Kim made remarks suggestive of an armed unification of the peninsula; it was enough to bring back vivid memories of the 1950 Korean War and the military assistance that Kim's trips to China and the Soviet Union had garnered then. Consequently, there were growing concerns over the outbreak of a second Korean War. The crisis, moreover, had more than a military aspect to it. To counter the DPRK's diplomatic offensive to have the United Nations (UN) Command in the ROK dissolved, the response of the ROK and Japan aimed to stabilize the situation on the peninsula.

This chapter examines how Japan and the ROK responded to the 1975 security crisis and explores the impact of that response on their security relations. The analysis pays particular attention to the influence that the changing regional order of the early 1970s had on threat perceptions of, and responses to, the security crisis in the mid-1970s.

Earlier literature argues that Japan and the ROK collaborated to deal with the security crisis, and that they resolved the bilateral friction generated in the détente era and repaired their strained relationship evident in the wake of US-China rapprochement.

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It maintains that the US's diminishing presence in Asia, symbolized by its retreat from Vietnam, stirred such fears of abandonment in Japan and the ROK as to facilitate bilateral cooperation.[1] The fact that they both came to share a view of the DPRK threat is cited as a factor in their resumed cooperation.[2] Consequently, Japan-ROK relations overcame the acrimony created by the 1973 kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung in Tokyo by ROK agents and the 1974 attempt by Mun Se-gwang, a Japanese-born DPRK sympathizer of Korean ancestry, to assassinate ROK President Park Chung-hee in Seoul. Stronger Japan-ROK relations, however, paralleled a backward drift in the Japan-DPRK relationship built up during the détente era.

But did the threat perceptions and security policies of Japan and the ROK really converge so readily? Japan had skillfully exploited the change in the East Asian Cold War order following US-China rapprochement and normalized its relations with China, whereas the ROK had not. Also, there are lingering doubts about whether the regression of Japan-DPRK relations should be seen as a policy change due to Japanese political measures.

The eighth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference in Seoul on September 15, 1975, had been expected to reaffirm the countries' security relationship as part of their response to the crisis, yet the countries make no mention of ROK security in the joint communiqué. Did that result from a difference in opinion in how to respond to the security crisis?[3] The literature says only that the bilateral relationship recovered because of changes in international politics. This hardly explains how Japan and the ROK actually came to grips with the changed situation and responded to security issues. Their resumption of cooperation was not simply a return to the past. We must examine how they perceived the situation and what they actually discussed to identify any qualitative change in their security relations. If we are to understand that the opinions Japan expressed at the ministerial conference and its stance toward the joint communiqué were Japan's answer to ROK requests for security cooperation, how did they subsequently coordinate their policies on security issues? What sort of diplomacy did Japan prepare and how did it attempt to engage in building a regional order and sustaining the division of the Korean Peninsula?

To answer such questions in this chapter, I will first take up the topic of how US-China joint action that began in the early 1970s stalled in the mid-1970s, with severe consequences for the search for a new order on the Korean Peninsula. Second, I will highlight the gap between Japan and the ROK that existed not only in their perceptions of threat, but in their responses to it as well. Third, I will argue that the shape their responses took went beyond strengthening joint deterrence capabilities to exploring a new policy, peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. Fourth, I will look at Japan's initiatives to stabilize the division of the peninsula. These analyses will reveal a qualitative change in Japan-ROK security relations had emerged in the 1974–75 period.

6.1 The Korean Peninsula and the Fall of Saigon

6.1.1 The Stall in US-China Joint Action

A May 1975 US government assessment expressed growing skepticism about cooperating with China on East Asian regional issues. China sought US help in countering the Soviet Union but remained uncooperative and aloof with respect to Indochina and the Korean Peninsula. The United States puzzled over how to develop a positive working relationship with China on issues of mutual concern, particular on the Korean Peninsula.[4]

At US-China consultations on May 9, China's Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen informed US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that China supported DPRK Chairman Kim Il Sung's peaceful unification policy line. At the same time, Huang called for the termination of the UN Command and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Korean Peninsula. Kissinger simply reconfirmed the long-standing US position that the US and China should continue their effort of deterring both the DPRK and the ROK from starting a conflict.[5] The US asked China to exercise its influence over the DPRK, but China urged the US to start direct talks with the DPRK.

The US, meanwhile, held to the perception it had formed in the early 1970s that China was not asking for the immediate withdrawal of the US troops stationed in East Asia. However, the policy officials who authored the May assessment notably saw that China appeared to want the areas for stationing US troops restricted to Japan, Okinawa, and Guam.[6] After US-China rapprochement, China had tacitly agreed to US forces in the ROK out of fear of a resurgence of Japanese militarism; this May assessment suggested that China's stance was changing.

The US policy officials also felt that the US had limited leverage over Beijing on DPRK and UN Command issues and that the US could not expect much cooperation from China even if the two countries normalized relations.[7] As US-China joint action stalled, the US submitted a letter to the UN Security Council with the following proposal. If China and the DPRK accepted an ROK-US Combined Forces Command as "successors in command" to the UN Command and agreed to do their part to uphold the Korean Armistice Agreement, the UN Command could be dissolved on January 1, 1976.[8] In other words, the US was exploring unilateral action on the assumption that concerted action with China would be difficult.

Looking back, the limits of US-China joint action on the Korean Peninsula were apparent as early as 1973. On June 19, 1973, Kissinger notified Huang Chen of the content of the ROK's planned June 23 Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Reunification (June 23 Statement). Kissinger requested that China establish contacts with the ROK as the US was prepared to do so with the DPRK.[9] China, however, claimed that the UN Command impeded the development of South-North relations. And it criticized the June 23 Statement's proposition for the ROK and DPRK to be admitted simultaneously to the UN as perpetuating a division of Korea. China asked the US to persuade the ROK government to withdraw its June 23 Statement.[10]

Kissinger addressed the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1975, and spoke of a concept for a new arrangement for peace on the Korean Peninsula. First, the US and the ROK would meet with the other parties to the armistice (the DPRK and China) on preserving the armistice agreement. He also proposed a "larger conference" to negotiate "a more fundamental arrangement" among "all of the parties most directly concerned." Third, he said the US supported the "dual entry" of the ROK and the DPRK into the UN. If, he added, the DPRK and its allies improved their relations with the ROK, the US and the ROK would take "similar reciprocal actions."[11] This is the concept of "cross-recognition." In what was a clear refusal of the DPRK request for direct talks with the US, Kissinger emphasized that the US could not accept proposals for security arrangements on the Korean Peninsula that excluded the ROK from the discussions.

The concept of cross-recognition that Kissinger proposed here was a reaffirmation of the policy held over from the administration of President Richard Nixon of avoiding direct talks with the DPRK while encouraging Chinese contact with the ROK. His reference to preserving the armistice agreement and to "a more fundamental arrangement" answered the Chinese and DPRK criticism that the US push to restructure the UN Command amounted to nothing more than maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

The US approach expressed in Kissinger's address was an attempt at making new and effective arrangements to ease tensions, not limited to short-term measures, such as strengthening deterrence against the DPRK, in the aftermath of the fall of Saigon. This was because the US believed that the changed circumstances in Indochina had reduced the ability for it to restrain the ROK and for China and the Soviet Union to restrain the DPRK. Thus, it was concerned about the risk of the great powers getting dragged into a localized conflict on the Korean Peninsula.[12] The day after his UN address, Kissinger in fact confirmed in a media interview that the US had agreed to end the UN Command, and called for "a larger conference for purposes of more fundamental arrangements, which means moving toward peace."[13]

China, however, remained unenthusiastic toward Kissinger's proposed meeting of the armistice parties. It instead argued in favor of US-DPRK direct talks to settle the question. Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua told Kissinger at a September 28 meeting that the US was exaggerating the instability on the Korean Peninsula after the events in Indochina. The US, he said, should withdraw its troops from the ROK at an early date. Qiao argued against the US policy of attempting to force acceptance of its military presence there and advised the US to have direct talks with the DPRK.[14] Friction between the US and China over an early US withdrawal of its ROK-based troops warrants discussion. As touched on in the previous chapter, Premier Zhou Enlai and Kissinger saw eye to eye on wanting to avoid having the US military withdrawal from East Asia generate a power vacuum that Japan might seek to fill by rearming—a tacit agreement that had been confirmed during Nixon's visit to China. China objected, however, to what it took the US policy to be: a continuous US military presence in the ROK. Their common ground was crumbling.

When Kissinger met with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in Beijing on October 22, the differences in their countries' positions were evident. The US believed that

dissolution of the UN Command would shake the legal foundations of the Armistice Agreement, so it emphasized the establishment of an ROK-US Combined Forces Command to preserve the Agreement and stabilize the situation. In contrast, China pushed to end the UN Command and to convert the Armistice Agreement to a peace agreement. Kissinger argued that dissolving the UN Command without a replacement would undermine the legal status of the Armistice Agreement. Qiao countered that the Armistice Agreement and a peace agreement were interconnected, so it would "not be difficult to settle the issue in principle." He called for a peace treaty without an interim agreement on a UN Command replacement.[15] The "two Koreas" concept of the US and ROK position for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula was in conflict with the "one Korea" argument of the Chinese and the DPRK position. These differences made it impossible for the US and China to devise concrete alternatives to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula within their framework of bilateral cooperation.

6.1.2 Kim Il Sung's Visit to China

DPRK President Kim Il Sung made an official visit to China from April 18 to 26, 1975. His visit took place under the drastic changes in the situation on the Indochinese Peninsula. Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, had fallen to the Communists on April 17, and a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam was almost assured.

At an April 18 welcome reception hosted by Chinese leaders, Kim claimed that the "glorious victory" of the Cambodian revolutionary forces and the imminent collapse of South Vietnam was a manifestation of US defeat in Asia. He described the DPRK's efforts to unite the Korean Peninsula as part of the international "anti-imperialist national-liberation struggle" and spoke of having long supported anti-Park Chung-hee activities in the ROK. In discussing North Korean-Chinese unity, Kim asserted that the two countries' destinies were "inseparably linked." He also hinted at the possibility of unification through force of arms:

> If revolution takes place in South Korea, we, as one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korean people. If the enemy ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely answer it with war and completely destroy the aggressors. In this war we will only lose the Military Demarcation Line and will gain the country's reunification.[16]

Kim, inspired by developments in Vietnam in the late 1960s, had pursued armed guerilla warfare against the ROK under a theory it would generate a "revolution in the South." Revolutionary successes in Indochina and especially in Vietnam undoubtedly made him think that armed unification of the Korean Peninsula was an ever more real possibility.

Kim's remarks were more than mere political rhetoric. He told the Chinese leadership during his sojourn that he was contemplating the possibility of a military solution to unify the peninsula, and he asked for Chinese assistance. China's ambassador to

the DPRK related that Kim tried persuading China that he could take advantage of riots and protests in the South against the Park Chung-hee regime to get involved militarily. Kim tried to create the kind of military situation in the ROK that existed in Vietnam before the Communist victory.[17] In summary, the dramatic changes in Indochina had led to the resurgence of his "revolution in the South" doctrine.

Chinese Vice Premier and Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Deng Xiaoping, in turn, described China-DPRK relations as being "as close as the lips to the teeth." But he did not make mention of some references in Kim's remarks, such as the "noble friendship sealed in blood," an inseparably-linked destiny, or the Chinese People's Volunteer Army's participation in the Korean War.[18] China instead highlighted the importance of peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula during the time Kim and his delegation spent in Beijing, a position that was reflected in the joint communiqué of April 26.[19] China declined the DPRK request for assistance, perhaps to steer clear of involvement in a new war on the peninsula, out of consideration for its relations with the US after their rapprochement. The outbreak of a new war there would not stay limited to localized fighting between the Koreas; it would end up reigniting a clash between the US and China. Rather than grant Kim's request, China confirmed that it would not normalize diplomatic relations with the ROK and would continue cooperating with the DPRK to isolate the "Park Chung-hee clique" internationally, according to a report by the East German Embassy in the DPRK. China also pledged its cooperation on science, technology, and trade.[20]

During Kim Il Sung's visit to Bulgaria (June 2–5, 1975), he met with Todor H. Zhivkov, the general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Kim told Zhivkov that the superior military strength of the US and ROK made unification through conflict difficult. Mentioning the predictions that North Korea would be inspired by what had transpired in Vietnam to attack the ROK, he clearly stated that the DPRK would never attack first. Kim thus revealed a strategic change in the DPRK's unification policy, seeking to unify Korea through a diplomacy of peace that would take a long time, rather than through military means. Specifically, he repeatedly emphasized in formal meetings and informal talks that the DPRK would use the growing divisions within the ROK to force US troops out while internationally isolating the Park regime.[21]

It is interesting that Kim opined that the ROK was not as suited to guerilla war as Vietnam. First, Vietnam was neighbored by Laos and Cambodia, but the ROK was bounded by sea on three sides. If DPRK forces invaded, they faced entrapment and encirclement, Kim observed. Second, the strong military capabilities of US and ROK forces, moreover, meant that small unit infiltration action would not be effective.[22]

That Kim, who supposedly had been inspired by the fall of Saigon, brought up the failure and limitations of guerilla warfare merits some attention. It suggests that Kim himself recognized the need for a tactical change. He also appears heavily affected by his inability to persuade China, on whom he had pinned his hopes, to alter its cautious stance toward military action.

This look at the DPRK's change of tactics brings out an additional aspect of the 1975 security crisis: that the DPRK had come to regard the political and diplomatic dimensions as seriously as the military. Amid the eased tensions in East Asia of

the early 1970s, the DPRK rolled out a war of diplomacy that aimed to boost its international status and isolate the ROK.[23] It normalized relations with some Western nations and, on March 27, 1974, revised its long-established insistence on replacing the Armistice Agreement with a South-North peace treaty and instead called for direct dialogue with the US. It intensified its diplomatic offensive, submitting a plan to the UN General Assembly to dissolve the UN Command with the support of neutral, nonaligned Third World countries. Owing to the DPRK's elevated diplomatic status, the dissolution of the UN Command emerged once again as a serious pending issue after the 1975 security crisis, and became the subject of the widening war of diplomacy.

6.1.3 ROK Security Concerns

The ROK government had two views of Kim Il Sung's China visit. It was possible that the DPRK president went to sound out China for support for armed reunification. President Park recalled that Kim visited the Soviet Union before the outbreak of the Korean War to buy weapons for a military buildup.[24] The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, taking note of Kim's April 18 reception speech, especially his remarks about a war and revolution in the South, interpreted this as an expression of his intention to achieve armed unification through all-out war.[25]

The ROK, which feared the US military presence in Asia would weaken further after the fall of Saigon, wanted the US to reaffirm its defense commitment. But more than that, it sought an immediate, automatic military response, particularly to DPRK provocations in the Yellow Sea. Since the armistice, the two Koreas had contested the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea. And 1975 saw a string of localized military clashes in the vicinity of the NLL. In February, after several DPRK vessels intruded into ROK territorial waters, there was a collision and one DPRK boat sank. In March and June, DPRK planes violated the airspace over Baengnyeong Island. On July 12, DPRK vessels again intruded into ROK territorial waters near Baengnyeong Island.[26] The ROK was alert to the possibility that these DPRK provocations in the area were to test the resolve of the US commitment.

At the eighth annual US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on August 26, 1975, ROK Minister of National Defense Seo Jong-cheol spoke with his US counterpart, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger. Instantaneous US reaction to DPRK provocations in the vicinity of Baengnyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, he said, was pivotal to deterring Kim Il Sung from making a surprise attack on Seoul. Seo reiterated an offer to construct a new US military base on Jeju Island to transfer the forces from US bases that Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan wanted removed. While Schlesinger did not endorse that plan, he did inform Seo that the US planned no adjustment in forces in Korea in the period "immediately ahead" (carefully explaining that there was no plan for any fundamental changes in US support)[27] so as to react immediately to DPRK provocations in the Yellow Sea as well as to bolster their

deterrence capability against the DPRK. Meeting with President Park the following day, Schlesinger related that he foresaw "no basic changes [in the level of US forces] over the next five years."[28]

The SCM's joint communiqué issued the next day referred to maintaining US troops in the ROK; responding to DPRK threats and disturbances (as in dealing with guerilla infiltrations); and providing immediate and effective assistance based on the Mutual Defense Treaty. Schlesinger also said at the press briefing that the US was considering the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort in the event of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula.[29]

Earlier, President Park issued a Special Statement on National Security and the Current Situation to calm the public, stabilize the country, and prepare for the possibility of war.[30] The statement noted the lesson of Indochina, that peace treaties and other dealings with Communists were possible only when a balance of power was maintained. Park referred to Kim Il Sung's trip to China and called on his citizenry to join together in an anti-Communist spirit and wage an all-out war to crush the DPRK's "revolution in the South" doctrine. In a May 13 follow-up, Park invoked the Presidential Emergency Measures for Safeguarding National Security and Public Order (Emergency Measures No. 9), tightening his control over the country.[31] In July, he established a new defense tax to secure funds to expedite the modernization of the ROK armed forces, referred to as the Yulgok Project.[32] These measures evince how seriously the ROK viewed East Asia's changed situation.

Some in the ROK, meanwhile, were skeptical about the need for such concern. They regarded China as unlikely to grant the DPRK's requests given that Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's comments during Kim's stay did not signal any intention to link the situations in Indochina and the Korean Peninsula and that Kim's references to revolution in the South and to war were not reflected in their joint communiqué. The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, read this as a Chinese rejection of the DPRK's bellicose stance. Its rationale was fourfold: (1) China confirmed that it would support independent and peaceful unification by the DPRK; (2) the three principles (independence, peaceful unification, and national unity) supported by China in the joint communiqué were consistent with the principles in the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué; (3) the Five-Point Proposition for National Reunification that China supported in the joint communiqué included eliminating the military confrontation between the DPRK and the ROK and fostering many-sided collaboration and interchanges between the North and South; and (4) China's criticism of the ROK in the joint communiqué extended to Seoul having trampled on the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, sabotaged South-North talks, and aggravated tension on the Korean Peninsula.[33] The ministry thus concluded that, at least while US troops remained in the ROK, China did not want the DPRK to adopt a perilous policy of war. It saw little possibility of direct Chinese military engagement.

The ministry did emphasize the DPRK's diplomatic offensive and it cited the China-DPRK joint communiqué as a valuable document that could find widespread use in the DPRK's foreign policy. Specifically, it saw the DPRK using China's support as the necessary precedent for eliciting Third World support and sympathy at the United Nations. The DPRK might, the ministry felt, draw on that support to claim

at the 30th session of the UN General Assembly status as the sole legitimate Korea, and to call for US troops to be withdrawn from the ROK, the UN Command to be dissolved, and for assistance with a revolution in the South. Accordingly, the ROK government held concerns about the possibility of international isolation as well as regarding its own security.[34]

6.1.4 The Review of US Policy Toward the ROK

Gerald R. Ford assumed the US presidency on August 9, 1974, following Nixon's resignation. His administration's policy toward the ROK focused in the near term on preventing the situation in Indochina from spreading to the Korean Peninsula and on easing the concerns that the ROK and Japan both held about the US deterrence against the DPRK failing. The administration highlighted the differences between the ROK and Vietnam "with respect to the internal situations in both countries, the nature of the US commitments, and their different strategic positions." It differentiated between defense of the ROK and that of South Vietnam.[35] In an April 1975 address to a joint session of Congress, President Ford laid out a policy to strengthen relations with allies in Asia and Europe in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. In that context, he reaffirmed the US security commitment to the ROK and spoke of the mutual benefits of ROK security.[36]

Kissinger worked to undo the sense of the time that the US had failed in Vietnam because of its conciliatory policy stance. He posited that Vietnam was a unique situation and that the US should not try to apply the lessons of Vietnam as universally as it had tried to apply the lessons of Munich.[37] Particularly with respect to the defense of the ROK, he said, unlike South Vietnam's case, "there can be no ambiguity about our commitment because we have a defense treaty ratified by the Congress. If we abandoned this treaty, it would have drastic consequences in Japan and all over Asia because that would be interpreted as our final withdrawal from Asia and our final withdrawal from our whole postwar foreign policy."[38] For Kissinger, the defense of the ROK not only affected Japan, it underpinned the credibility of the US commitment in Asia.

Moreover, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated on June 20, 1975, that if the DPRK invaded the ROK the US would use the tactical nuclear weapons that it had deployed in the ROK.[39] This revealed that the US had tactical nuclear weapons stored in the ROK, something it had previously neither confirmed nor denied.

And yet, it is worth underscoring that such statements by US officials did not stem from predictions of a greater likelihood that conflict would break out on the Korean Peninsula. As Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip Habib made clear, the joint communiqué issued after Kim's visit to China simply used diplomatic rhetoric, and that China could not be regarded as encouraging DPRK armed provocations.[40] US Ambassador to the ROK Richard Sneider provided the ROK foreign minister with an analysis of the situation concluding that the statements from China and the DPRK merely expressed long-established formulaic positions,

nothing new.[41] Habib's analysis took the DPRK's lack of a timeframe for the US to withdraw its troops from the ROK as evidence that its focus was on diplomacy rather than a military threat, attempting to improve its overseas image ahead of the UN General Assembly. On the other hand, he noted, though China had not pledged any military assistance to the DPRK, it might try to prevent it from leaning toward the Soviet Union by refusing to compromise with the US on the issues of the UN Command's dissolution and US forces in the ROK as a show of support for the DPRK's position.[42]

The US government thereafter began a review of its Asia policy to relieve security concerns in the region, and in addition, to prevent conflict from arising because of mistaken readings of the situation by Pyongyang, Beijing, or Moscow.[43]

In a May 7, 1975, "Policy Review on Asia" action memorandum addressed to Kissinger, National Security Council (NSC) staff member W. Richard Smyser identified two points to bear in mind.[44] First, the degree of impact from the fall of Saigon would differ by country. The ROK, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia "appeared to be most deeply affected by Indochinese developments and most in need of careful handling." Japan, Australia, and New Zealand were countries "seeming less affected." Second, Asian countries were now skeptical of US commitment to the region, a skepticism likely to continue until the US displayed "demonstrable popular and Congressional support." Smyser proposed starting new individual policy studies for the ROK and Thailand, the two countries most likely to be affected by developments in Indochina. The ROK was worried about its security following Kim's visit to China. A new government in Thailand had requested that all US troops be withdrawn from the country within 12 months so that it could adjust its policies toward China and the DPRK.

Japan, as noted, was categorized as a country seemingly less affected by changes in Indochina. The US Department of State's East Asia Bureau and Policy Planning Staff explained that this was because Japan's doubts about the credibility of the US's commitment to Japan's defense were less about Vietnam than about changes in US forces in the ROK.[45] An NSC meeting on a study of US policy in the Pacific just prior to Saigon's fall described Japan's position as unclear and pondered if Japan might rearm with nuclear weapons in response to the changing international situation. It was decided that maintaining US troops in the ROK and increasing the credibility of the US's defense commitment to the ROK seemed the most effective policy in relation to Japan.[46]

Kissinger sent the president an action memorandum on a review of US Asia policy premised fundamentally on maintaining the US's defense commitment to the region. The ROK, he emphasized, also needed the US to respond to the DPRK's diplomatic offensive, which the DPRK was intensifying with support in the UN from the Third World. Kissinger pointed out the likelihood that the ROK would establish an independent defense policy if it sensed reduced US commitment.[47] The US needed to respond because ROK President Park had begun nuclear weapons development.

Consequently, on May 27, President Ford directed a review of US policy toward the Korean Peninsula. What emerged was NSC National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 226, which was more than just a study of the US military response to a

DPRK invasion. It called for examination of policy issues such as the termination of the UN Command, ROK nuclear development, and relative to them, US military aid; and the US position toward the DPRK and the ROK, and toward great power relations with them.[48] The policy response on these issues was to be completed by June 30 at the latest and submitted for consideration by the Senior Review Group. The specific review policy toward the ROK was postponed because of a more pressing need for a broader policy review of security and US national interests in the of Asia-Pacific region post-Vietnam.[49] In the meantime, the US policy toward the ROK kept the US military presence in the ROK and prepared for the fall meeting of the UN General Assembly.

6.2 Japan-ROK Security Cooperation Debate

6.2.1 Threat Versus Risk

The ROK government had assessed that there was little threat of China's direct involvement in the situation on the Korean Peninsula. It did not, though, completely discount the risk of the DPRK unilaterally launching a second Korean War with China's tacit approval.[50]

When Saigon fell on April 30, 1975, President Park informed US Ambassador Sneider of his government's take on the situation. Sneider observed that the China-DPRK joint communiqué avoided any direct linkage between the developments in Indochina and the Korean Peninsula. He rejected the possibility that China would assist the DPRK in prosecuting a war because Beijing did not want any type of direct military conflict with the US. Though Park agreed that China was unlikely to provide direct military assistance, he emphasized that the DPRK could launch an attack with China's tacit approval.[51] What he feared most was that the DPRK might launch a surprise attack by itself, and after it occupied Seoul and the northern part of the ROK, China might call for a ceasefire. If that were to happen, it would be impossible for the ROK to continue as a state, and it would eventually end up being absorbed by the DPRK. This scenario posed no disadvantage for China. Not only could it cement its great power status by intervening in a regional conflict, but it could also exercise political influence over the DPRK. Most importantly, as a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, China remained a "related party" in the Korean question, responsible for preserving the Agreement in the absence of a peace agreement since the Korean War armistice. For that reason, it presumably had considerable influence if an emergency situation arose on the peninsula. The ROK was therefore as interested in issues of Chinese influence as concerned about possible Chinese intervention.

Attention in the Japanese Diet turned to a security debate on how it should approach the US use of military bases in Japan and its bringing nuclear weapons into Japan in a Korean contingency. There were growing concerns of a possible failure to deter the DPRK and of being drawn into a second Korean War because

of military action by US forces deployed from those US bases in Japan. Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi sought to address the latter concern by stating that there was no plan to revise the system of prior consultation established under the Japan-US Security Treaty. Prime Minister Miki Takeo, too, stated in his answer before the Diet that Japan would make the decision regarding the US use of military bases in Japan to mount operations during an emergency on the Korean Peninsula on the basis of Japan's national interests at that time.[52]

As early as May, the Japanese government and ruling parties viewed the situation after the fall of Saigon as something temporary and made no attempt to alter the diplomatic policy of pursuing détente. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' perspective, the end of the Vietnam War was an "epoch-making [event] in the history of Asia after World War II," significant as the end to a long period of hostilities in the region.[53] In a question-and-answer session before the Diet, Miyazawa addressed the question of a foreign policy change. "We do not believe that we have consciously tried to change our country's stance toward the ROK or the Korean Peninsula at this particular time, nor do we believe we should." Miyazawa also stated, "Vietnam is over. Once the parties involved recover from the shock of that, they will recognize the wisdom of détente as practiced in the broad sense to date. At that point, we may come back to the issue."[54] Miyazawa appreciated the psychological shock in the US and ROK in the wake of developments in Indochina, but added that he did not think it warranted a new approach from Japan.

Miyazawa's comments did not merely reflect the official government position. Many in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) did not think of the situations in Indochina and Korea as being connected, a May 11 interview of 61 members of the LDP Research Commission on Foreign Affairs revealed.[55] Asked if the Indochina situation would spread to the Korean Peninsula, only eight of the 46 respondents thought that it might, whereas 30 saw no such possibility. What is interesting is that these survey results were consistent with the views held by LDP members on the Vietnam War and Korean Peninsula before Saigon's fall. Most who felt that the Indochina situation would not spread were hawkish politicians in the party's mainstream, such as Funada Naka, Kitazawa Naokichi, and Shōji Keijirō, who blamed Saigon's fall on US troop withdrawals. Their perception of the situation in the ROK was that US forces still remained there and the government was solid, unlike in Vietnam. Diet members who responded that it might spread represented the dovish wing of the party, such as Utsunomiya Tokuma and Ishii Hajime. They blamed the fall of Saigon on what they perceived as an internal collapse precipitated by the government's own weakness and fragility. The ROK government, like that of South Vietnam, did not represent the people, they observed, underscoring the possibility of internal collapse. Differences in their analyses of the Indochina and Korean Peninsula situations aside, the majority of the LDP members (44 of 46) interviewed responded that they affirmed the present course of the country's security policy and that there was no need to revise it.

A contemporaneous and similar Japanese view of the situation can be gleaned from the activities of a group set up in April, under the auspices of Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General (ministerial rank) Sakata Michita, to think about

issues related to Japan's defense. The group's report, which, if translated, would be "The Defense of Japan," became the basis for Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines[56] and offered the following analysis of the Asian situation as the premise for developing Japan's defense capability:

> In terms of a future issue, while Indochina as a whole is likely to gradually become Communist, there is no reason to expect the domino effect to spread to other regions. … The favorable state of US-China and Japan-China relations will likely provide psychological relief to the ASEAN countries and become a source of stability.[57]

The analysis that great power cooperation formed in the détente era was preserving stability in the region became the assumption underlying the following analysis of the Korean Peninsula situation:

> During his visit to China immediately prior to the fall of Saigon, DPRK President Kim Il Sung at first asserted his unwavering determination to unify the country through force. The ROK responded by rallying the country to rapidly strengthen its defenses. These developments may have left an impression of a rapid escalation of tensions between North and South Korea, divided as they are by the 38th Parallel. However, because the Korean Peninsula is a key region for the US, China, and the Soviet Union in terms of their Asia policies, they are unlikely to want conflict. The US does not appear to be withdrawing its troops from the ROK, and China and the Soviet Union seem to be working to maintain friendly relations with the US even as they keep each other in check and constrain DPRK action. The danger of Korean Peninsula tensions developing into conflict therefore seems limited to either of the Koreas misjudging the situation. Otherwise, a major armed clash is extremely unlikely.[58]

The calculation was that the continued US military presence in the ROK would deter the DPRK, and thus there would be no large-scale armed conflict involving the great powers. It went so far as to conclude that the normalization of US-China ties and of Japan-China diplomatic relations had constructed a stable international system. In that context, China, too, would probably constrain the DPRK. The risk was an error in judgment about the situation by the ROK or DPRK.

From such a position, the Japanese government viewed that they had avoided a second Korean War caused by the DPRK threat, so it turned its attention instead to addressing a misjudgment by the Koreas and allaying the confusion and shock in the ROK. At the end of August, JDA Director General Sakata and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger agreed that China's constraint of the DPRK had averted a crisis on the peninsula. Prime Minister Miki, in his meeting with Schlesinger, also concluded that there was no danger of a second Korean War from the DPRK threat. While mindful that a miscalculation by either of the Koreas might lead to military action, Miki said the external threat was less of a concern than the risk of the ROK's internal collapse, precipitated by domestic political and economic instability, and the ensuing chaos.[59] From its perspective of assisting Asian countries seeking to strengthen their internal systems post-Vietnam, the Japanese government opted to stick with its policy of supporting the Park administration, endangered by political and economic chaos. The reason Japan's foreign policy favored diplomatic efforts that encouraged direct US-DPRK talks as well as the South-North dialogue and that maintained Japanese channels of communication with the DPRK was because Japan judged the key to the

stability of the peninsula was removing the risk of the ROK's collapse, rather than the threat of war, as Seoul highlighted.

6.2.2 Security Cooperation Issues

The ROK wanted to repair the harm that the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping and the Mun Se-gwang incident had on its relationship with Japan and advance their security cooperation. But there was a marked difference in how they viewed China's response to Kim Il Sung's visit to Beijing. Their difficult-to-reconcile views were informed by Japan's normalization of relations with China, spurred by US-China rapprochement, and the ROK's failure to do so.

Japan believed that Kim Il Sung's urge to liberate the ROK through force of arms did not come to pass, reined in by China, which had no desire for a new regional conflict. Japan's Vice Foreign Minister Tōgō Fumihiko shared his view in a speech at the Industry Club of Japan that, as China was constraining Kim's actions, the DPRK and ROK would likely coexist on the peninsula for some time to come.[60] When Schlesinger met with JDA Director General Sakata during his August 1975 visit to Tokyo for security consultations, they had arrived at the theory that China was keeping the DPRK in check.[61] Perhaps this was Japan's changed perspective on China, which stemmed from a resolution of their bilateral conflict after they normalized diplomatic relations as Japan reacted to the changes in the configuration of international relations in East Asia.

The ROK had not even improved ties with China despite advancing its own diplomacy of détente that aimed to normalize their diplomatic relations. Consequently, its stance toward China remained quite skeptical, and it regarded Japan's position that China held the DPRK in check as nothing more than a Pollyannaish take on the situation.

The ROK, though, had been sounding out China's views on security-related matters since Park had issued his June 23 Statement, which outlined better relations with China as a policy of détente. It sought China's opinion on broadly three issues: (1) the simultaneous UN accession of both Koreas to ease tensions and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula; (2) the continuation of the UN Command to maintain military equilibrium and preserve the Armistice Agreement, indispensable to maintaining the military status quo; and (3) Chinese thoughts on the best means for peace to take root on the Korean Peninsula.[62]

Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua had replied in 1973 that China opposed dual UN admission, and that the dissolution of the UN Command was an issue that could be discussed at the UN Security Council; he did not respond to the ROK's request for official contacts.[63] That the fall of Saigon happened while the ROK's policy of détente was yet to bear fruit only served to heighten the ROK's threat perceptions toward China and the DPRK.

ROK Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil, meeting with Foreign Minister Miyazawa on May 9, 1975 shortly after Saigon's fall, said that Beijing's claim to have constrained

Kim Il Sung was merely propaganda for external consumption and that China found it desirable to have the DPRK provoking the ROK, whether it be localized or an all-out attack. China, he asserted, had only acted as though it restrained the DPRK so that, in a hypothetical situation where a ROK counterattack resulted in the DPRK's defeat, it could step in and mediate in the nick of time.[64] Kim Jong-pil asked Japan to enunciate a position on ROK security and to serve as the apex on the trilateral security relationship between Japan, the US, and the ROK. He also asked that Japan limit exports to the DPRK using JEXIM financing and apply its government's rigorous criteria for export items. He noted that a boat used by captured DPRK agents was made in Japan and pointed out that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), wetsuits, and other Japanese export items headed for the DPRK could be converted to military use.

Saigon's fall prompted the ROK to improve bilateral ties that had suffered "institutional frictions" following the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping and the Mun Se-gwang incident. This included pressing Japan to signal to the international community the closeness of the Japan-ROK relationship. The ROK also sought an early resumption of their regular ministerial conferences, suspended since the seventh meeting in December 1973, to prove at home and abroad that the bilateral relationship had recovered. Japan, however, remained firm on resolving the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping incident. Absent some kind of diplomatic gesture from the ROK, it would not be possible to hold the ministerial conference.[65] The two countries accordingly made another attempt to reach a political settlement. When Miyazawa visited Seoul in July 1975, he told the ROK that Japan would drop its suspicions of the ROK Embassy's First Secretary Kim Dong-hyun's involvement in the kidnapping. The ROK, in turn, reaffirmed that it would not prosecute Kim Dae-jung for his anti-ROK government campaigning in Japan.[66]

The ROK continued its efforts to deepen security relations with Japan during Miyazawa's visit.[67] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Asian Affairs Bureau, in preparing for the visit, set the goal of strengthening security cooperation among Japan, the US, and the ROK on the grounds that Northeast Asia's security hinged on the stability of the Korean Peninsula and that Japan's security was directly linked to the ROK's. The bureau put emphasis on three points related to ROK-Japan security cooperation.

First, it cited Japan's contributions and cooperation with the US, which enabled that country to fulfill its obligations under the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, specifically referring to issues such as mounting missions from US bases in Japan, providing rear-area support, exchanging information, and other defense-related partnering. With respect to the US military's use of bases in Japan for combat operations, the bureau decided that the ROK needed to confirm Japan's position on prior consultation. The ROK's view of that position hinged on an understanding of the Japan-US Security Treaty and the exchange of notes concerning the implementation of Article VI of that treaty. Prior consultation, it interpreted, applied even when US forces used bases in Japan in order to mount combat operations in defense of areas outside Japan. The Asian Affairs Bureau document noted the need to confirm that the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué and Satō's subsequent remarks at the National Press Club on the use of bases for such operations remained valid.

Second, the bureau highlighted Japanese cooperation to improve the ROK's defense capability, specifically cooperation in projects to plan and develop the ROK economy and in the defense industry.

Third, the bureau emphasized Japan's cooperation regarding measures to counter the DPRK. This involved restraining bilateral political exchanges; limiting its economic exchanges; and restricting its exports of military supplies, such as wetsuits and UAVs.[68] It also involved blocking DPRK espionage activities based out of the General Association of Korean Residents, or Chongryon, of Japan.[69]

ROK Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo met with Miyazawa on July 23, 1975. He observed that their nations' lack of nuclear weapons necessitated their security alliances with the US, which left them in similar positions in terms of international politics. In that context, he stressed the importance of Japan-ROK bilateral security cooperation. Specifically, if war broke out, he speculated, Japan would be absolutely indispensable for US forces to launch combat missions, as a supply base, and for the mutual exchange of information.

To sum up, the ROK sought Japan's reaffirmation of the Korea clause because it needed such Japanese contributions to implement the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The request for mutual information exchange, meanwhile, reflected the ROK's intent to upgrade bilateral security exchanges beyond the personnel exchanges to which it was then limited. Kim Dong-jo emphasized the security policy aspects of their bilateral economic cooperation, encouraging Japan to consider it for the sake of its own security as well. Moreover, he asked for the economic cooperation the ROK needed to develop industries that could be mobilized for national security in an emergency, clearly communicating the ROK's desire for economic cooperation aligned with defense industry development.

During Miyazawa's courtesy call on President Park on July 24, Park opined that behind the DPRK lay the China threat. He stressed the importance of tight-knit cooperative relations between the Japan, ROK, and the US, and declared that the Japan-ROK relationship was nothing less than a US-mediated alliance.[70] Expanding on his Japan-ROK alliance theory, Park said, "The US had formed alliances with the ROK and with Japan. To put it in other terms, if A and B have an alliance, and A and C have an alliance, then there would be a de facto alliance between B and C even without an alliance relationship." Of course, as Park himself added, forging a military alliance between the ROK and Japan was unrealistic still, absent all the conditions, which suggests that this was not the intent of his remarks. However, short of a formal alliance, Park arguably intended to build a more substantive relationship of security cooperation with Japan grounded in the shared recognition of the importance of ROK security to the security of Japan and, by extension, all Northeast Asia.

If we take Park's remarks together with the aforementioned observation by Kim Dong-jo (that both relied on their US ally due to a lack of nuclear weapons), it offers insight into the ROK's perception of Japan at the time. From a strategic perspective, the ROK did not view Japan as a great power. It was, rather, similar to the ROK in that it depended on the US for security. Leveraging that commonality, the ROK saw Japan as a security cooperation partner, one with whom to generate new areas of cooperation that went beyond what they had done so far, to include information exchange and

more. It is interesting that it was the ROK that had noticed such possibilities early on and identified new areas of cooperation.

Japan's reaction was extremely cautious toward the ROK's request emphasizing their security integration. It found it hard to accept the request so focused on security, the ROK's primary policy objective it set after the fall of Saigon. But the ROK's diplomatic persistence in the belief that improved relations were vital to both countries overcame their recent "institutional frictions" and paved the way for these foreign ministerial talks. The ROK government passed Japan a note verbale that closed the matter of Kim Dong-hyun's suspected involvement in the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, which became a second political settlement of the incident.

Miyazawa appeared somewhat understanding of the ROK position. In his aforementioned May meeting with Prime Minister Kim, he had seemed to sympathize with the ROK government for what he said was unfair Japanese and foreign criticism of its strict control of the ROK populace under the Yushin (Restoration) Constitution. He said that the criticism of the ROK by some Japanese journalists and members of the younger generation was an attempt to interfere in ROK domestic affairs, under the delusion that Japan had been democratic for hundreds, even thousands of years. Japanese society's inadequate understanding of the ROK's situation, he opined, was the cause of the institutional friction between the countries.[71] And Miyazawa had addressed the issue of the use of bases in Japan by US forces to mount operations when it had come up at a press conference in Washington, DC, in April 1975. Asked by an ROK journalist if the Korea clause remained unchanged and whether Japan reaffirmed that ROK security was critical to Japanese security, Miyazawa's responded affirmatively.[72] Although Miyazawa reiterated the view that "the peace and stability of the ROK is directly linked to that of Japan" as the fundamental position of the Japanese government, in terms of actual policy he simply stuck to the existing stance.

Park asked that Japan's government act to restrict Japanese companies' exports to the DPRK. If it could not stop them, he suggested that the government take steps such as having their trading companies request a memorandum of understanding from the DPRK prohibiting the use of Japanese exports for military purposes. Park also said it was regrettable that Japan had done nothing to control Chongryon. He said that the DPRK used the issue to drive a wedge between Japan and the ROK, and he requested that Japan establish a basic policy for regulating the organization. In response, Miyazawa explained the Japanese government's policy for controlling arms exports, banning the export of arms that might bolster the military power of parties in countries and regions involved in conflict or likely to be involved in conflict. As for what constituted arms, Japan merely followed international conventions. Citing the current situation where DPRK agents wore Japanese-made wetsuits and used cutting-edge Japanese equipment when infiltrating the ROK, Miyazawa noted that it would be difficult for Japan to limit such exports as the ROK had requested. And the Japanese government's pursuit of trade liberalization had advanced to where the government had almost no control over imports and exports. With respect to stronger control over Chongryon, he explained that under Japanese criminal law they could not clamp down on them for only simulating or advocating in writing an overthrow of the Japanese government. Given the limits under domestic law, he could promise

only that Japan would try to make arrests if Chongryon took concrete action in this respect.[73]

Previous literature echoes the trend in Japanese media reports of the time that regards the Miki administration's freeze on the use of JEXIM financing for trade with the DPRK as being a political measures in response to the security crisis after the fall of Saigon.[74] More attention should be paid to fact that the DPRK was no longer able to repay its debt to Japan as early as mid-1974. That Western European countries decided to suspend trade insurance for the DPRK also became a factor in Japan's decision. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs consequently announced as early as January 1975 that it would not allow JEXIM financing for exports to the DPRK.[75] The Japan-North Korea Trade Association got involved as an intermediary, to try to negotiate repayment extensions.[76] But during his visit, Miyazawa told Park that since the DPRK had fallen behind in repaying its debts, Japan-DPRK trade was unlikely to advance much beyond the current levels for the time being, and it was unlikely that permission for JEXIM funding would be granted in his view.[77]

6.2.3 Debate on Reaffirming the Korea Clause

(1) The revision of NSC National Security Decision Memorandum 251

Prime Minister Miki, Foreign Minister Miyazawa, and Vice Foreign Minister Tōgō decided at a meeting on July 21, 1975, that Japan would not reaffirm the Korea clause at the upcoming Japan-US summit meeting in August.[78] Their reason was that the US had not requested this during the summit preparations. Japanese Ambassador to the US Yasukawa Takeshi, after he met with US Secretary of State Kissinger on July 7, made a public statement to journalists that as the ROK issue was within the framework of the Japan-US Security Treaty, "it [was] unnecessary to reaffirm the Korea clause at the August summit meeting."[79] This was a completely different view from what he had told Kissinger during their meeting. Yasukawa had actually suggested that it would be useful to have the prime minister reaffirm the clause during his visit to the US.[80] It is conceivable this happened because Yasukawa had reasoned that Kissinger had not made any sort of request on this issue.

Why did Kissinger not ask for reaffirmation of the Korea clause? It is thought that he may have been influenced by the decision to maintain the Korean Minute of 1960, which guaranteed the US free use of its bases in Japan in the event of a Korean contingency, even if the UN Command was terminated, a decision the president had made at the time of the NSC policy review of the UN Command issue.[81] The US concern had been that pressuring Japan to reaffirm the Korea clause might jeopardize the Korean Minute. The US had initially wanted to sign a new, more definitive agreement with Japan to replace the Korean Minute to coincide with the dissolution of the UN Command. Termination of the UN Command, it felt, would remove the legal basis for the use of US military bases in Japan in connection with the ROK. National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 251, which laid out

the US negotiating strategy for the UN Command's termination, stated the need for an explicit agreement from the Japanese government which would extend the secret Korean Minute following the termination of the UN Command.

Obtaining the Japanese government's consent to formalize the secret agreement, however, was not a simple task; Japanese objections were all too easy to foresee. The State Department conducted a review of the issue along the following lines. For the US, a new agreement was desirable but, the department predicted, Japan would probably disagree. When the Korea clause was drafted during the Okinawa reversion negotiations in 1969, Tōgō Fumihiko, then the director general of the American Affairs Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had tried to replace the Korean Minute with Prime Minister Satō's unilateral statement at the National Press Club. Based on that experience, it was highly unlikely that Japan would consent to a new agreement. Failure to garner a new agreement, it was feared, might lead to watering down the 1969 Satō-Nixon Communiqué. The Korean Minute might even become null and void, it was argued. Thus Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Sneider stated his view that, based on the 1969 experience with Okinawa reversion talks, the US could not expect to get a new definitive agreement from Japan. Rather than raise the issue directly with Japan, he argued the need for the US to clearly indicate to Japan that the termination of the UN Command in the ROK and of the UN Status of Forces Agreement in Japan would not adversely affect the US ability to deter the DPRK.

In contrast, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff judged that the status of the Korean Minute needed clarification through reaffirmation. The Department of Defense, meanwhile, was prepared to let the Minute lapse, believing that without Japanese political support, the secret agreement would no longer be of use.[82] In the event, the policy recommendation was to leave the issue in essence unresolved to retain the effect of the Korean Minute without seeking a formal extension, regardless of whether the UN Command was terminated or the Japanese government proposed its elimination. President Nixon accordingly approved NSDM 262 on July 29, 1974, determining the US policy of not daring to bring up the issue of updating the Korean Minute with the Japanese government.[83]

Later, there was a debate in Japan over the US military's use of bases in Japan in relation to the issue UN Command termination, under discussion at the United Nations. Sneider, who by then had been appointed as the US ambassador to the ROK, sought to maintain the UN Command facility designation for the US bases in Japan.[84] The significance of the Korea clause had been undergoing a shift, from the military and legal significance it held as of 1969, toward a political significance, according to Japanese Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio in 1974. In a question-and-answer session before the Diet, Kimura had stated the view that Japan's security depended on the stability of the Korean Peninsula, not just on that of the ROK. Internationally, his comments were deemed a move by the Japanese government to revise the Korea clause and became a factor in postponing UN Command termination.

That is why the NSC staff recommended to President Ford that he not raise the Korea clause at his August 1975 summit meeting with Prime Minister Miki.[85]

Kissinger also told Ford in a memorandum that despite Miki's emphasis on the Japan-ROK security relationship his official position was that the US's use of bases in Japan would not be approved unless Japan's security was threatened. Kissinger likewise advised against pressing Miki for an explicit comment.[86]

For its part, the Japanese government wanted a continuing US troop presence in the ROK to deter the DPRK. But it avoided clear statements on the Korea clause that might become the target of opposition party criticism, only going so far as to say that Japan had an interest in ROK security. The talking points that Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had prepared in late July for the Ford-Miki summit meeting indicated that Japan's principled position was that the security of the ROK was important for Japan, irrespective of the existence of the Korea clause.[87]

(2) The Miki-Ford summit

The ROK wanted the joint communiqué from the Miki-Ford summit to guarantee US forces the free use of bases in Japan. Director General Yamazaki Toshio, of the American Affairs Bureau at Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informed the ROK on July 26 that "The reference to the ROK's security in the joint communiqué will be common sense, conveying interest in the stability of the Korean Peninsula post-Vietnam." When Yoon Ha-jung, minister at the ROK Embassy in Japan, asked for details, Yamazaki offered that "The Japanese government perceives no danger of an imminent DPRK invasion of the ROK at present, and sees having peace take root on the Korean Peninsula as the priority." He also explained that "unlike the previous interpretation of the Korea clause as having a legal meaning, the joint communiqué this time will likely treat it as a matter of course."[88] His explanation meant that where the 1969 joint communiqués had held legal connotations regarding the issue of US forces' mounting operations from bases in Japan, the August 1975 communiqué, in contrast, would simply express awareness of the current situation.

At the actual summit meeting, Japan's interest was on advancing economic cooperation in Asia post-Vietnam. Miki told Ford what he had come to understand: that the nations of Southeast Asia, as their emotions over what had occurred in Vietnam cooled, had taken a lesson from the Vietnam experience, which was they keenly felt that they should make efforts to stabilize their own political situations and improve the livelihoods of their peoples.[89] Turning to the situation in Korea, Miki said there was no chance of a DPRK-initiated all-out war with US forces stationed in the ROK. What was needed, he added, was something to alleviate the excessive DPRK hopes and ROK security fears. He was referring to the DPRK's hope that an anti-Park popular movement would destabilize and lead to the "Vietnamization" of the ROK. In the ROK, security concerns were driving it to tighten its internal controls. Miki argued that the most crucial thing was to prevent an armed clash, by moderating both Koreas' overreactions.[90]

Miki said that, with that objective in mind, he had sent Foreign Minister Miyazawa to Seoul in May. By improving Japan's relations with the ROK, it would show the DPRK that its expectations were excessive. At the same time, moving ahead on Japan-ROK economic cooperation would lessen the ROK's fears.[91] Agreeing with Miki's comments, Ford stated, "if a Vietnam situation were to develop in the ROK,

it would invite North Korea to undertake military operations." He reassured Miki that the US would continue its commitment of stationing US troops in the ROK. He also called on Japan to continue to stabilize its relationship with the ROK given the countries' "crucial" security link.

Miyazawa preferred the long-term approach for establishing peace on the peninsula over the US's short-term policy of easing tensions by strengthening deterrence against the DPRK.[92] At a press conference before visiting the US, he stressed the need to address ROK security issues without isolating the DPRK. The DPRK was refusing dialogue with the ROK, opposing the simultaneous UN entry of both Koreas, and refusing to negotiate maintaining the Armistice Agreement following UN Command termination. One of Miyazawa's diplomatic priorities was on drawing the DPRK into dialogue.[93]

Prime Minister Miki's approach to the Koreas assumed the continuation of US forces in the ROK to deter the DPRK's use of force against it and maintain stability on the peninsula. But he was also searching for nonmilitary options. In particular, his explanation during his US visit that, through Miyazawa's visit to Seoul, Japan was working to moderate the overreactions by both Koreas and to stabilize the situation illustrates Japan's development of a policy toward the Korean Peninsula from a broader perspective. This aspect is sometimes overlooked in conventional narratives that perceive Japan's shift from a policy of détente to reinforcing its relations with the ROK after Saigon fell.

The discussion at the August summit covered only the realities of the situation; neither Miki nor Ford discussed reaffirming the Korea clause. The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs consequently withheld comment on the Miki-Ford joint announcement to the press. The ministry's Northeast Asia First Division, which oversaw Japan policy, was directed on August 7 to discard its draft statement welcoming the announcement.[94] And the ROK government, worried about Japan's attitude on security, asked the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an explanation. Nakae Yōsuke, acting director general of the Asian Affairs Bureau, tried assuaging ROK concerns: "It acknowledged the importance of solidarity between Japan, the ROK, and the US on security, which are the existing security arrangements for peace and security in the Far East, and emphasis was placed on reconfirming that." Nakae also commented that in the Miki-Ford announcement, "the Korea clause of the past had been expanded and clarified."[95]

American Affairs Bureau Director General Yamazaki, too, described the 1969 Korea clause as an expression of only Japan's perception at the time in a unilateral statement by former Prime Minister Satō. But the section concerning ROK relations in the recent summit's joint announcement to the press reflected the joint US-Japan perception, and their views were in accord, and thus this was more powerful than before. He added that this reflected the differences in the international situation between 1969 and now, as well as Prime Minister Miki's personal convictions.[96] Yamazaki was essentially asserting that the focus for discussion of the summit's joint announcement should not be whether it was weaker than the 1969 Korea clause but that it reflected an appropriate response to the changed situation.

(3) The eighth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference

Political debate between Japan and the ROK over reaffirmation of the Korea clause came to the fore as they drafted the joint communiqué for the eighth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference. Those talks were scheduled for September 15, 1975, shortly after the Japan-US summit, and the two countries struggled to come to a consensus on the Korea clause and other security issues. The ROK proposed this as the draft communiqué's third paragraph:

> The ministers of both countries expressed deep concern at the current situation whereby tension and the possibility of armed conflict still exist in the region despite the international trend toward détente. Recognizing that the security of the ROK is critical to the security of Japan, ministers agreed that the two countries would continue to cooperate with each other in order to maintain peace and stability in the region.

In so doing, the ROK was attempting to include a reference to "cooperation to maintain regional peace and stability in the region," as per the Japan-US joint press announcement. Japan, however, asked that the paragraph be "deleted because it could be misunderstood, albeit groundlessly, as implying Japan-ROK military cooperation." The ROK also wanted to raise the issue of US troops in the ROK, saying, "ministers from both countries shared the view that, given the current situation, the stationing of US troops in the ROK remains essential in maintaining regional peace and security." Japan questioned whether they should mention that issue in their joint communiqué. Observing that the Japan-US joint press announcement from Prime Minister Miki's recent trip to the US had made no such reference, Japan asked that this sentence, too, be removed.[97] This working-level exchange epitomizes the gap between Japan's and the ROK's understanding of the situation and of security cooperation. It reveals that contrary to the view that their cooperation on security policy converged after the Vietnam War, cooperation had in fact become fraught.

On September 11, Miki, in fact, pointed out to Foreign Minister Miyazawa and the Asian Affairs Bureau director general that the draft communiqué contained language reminiscent of the 1969 Korea clause and instructed them to avoid any wording that might be construed as the clause's reaffirmation.[98] Miki added that since he and President Ford had not referred to the clause, he decided that it was unnecessary to reconfirm the Korea clause that reflected the situation in 1969. He had, he said, asked Ford to leave US troops in the ROK already, so the ROK's call to make a clear reference to that issue in the joint communiqué with Japan, as though the ROK did not trust them, was something he could not accept. Miki instructed his officials not to issue a joint communiqué at all if it hinted at a reaffirmed Korea clause. In short, Miki made it clear that he objected to the ROK request that attempted to raise a sense of bilateral security solidarity, and he would take a pass on issuing the usual joint communiqué to deny that request.

The ROK responded by observing that Japan's claim that there was no actual two-way security cooperation between them was a matter of perspective. It continued to press for the inclusion of its proposed language for the communiqué but ultimately conceded to Japan's draft despite failing to reconcile the two countries' views. At the press conference for the joint communiqué, the ministers followed a script proposed

by the Japanese side that suited both governments.[99] When ROK Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo was asked why there was no reference to ROK security issues in the communiqué, he replied, "There was no particular reason; there was no perception gap at all between Japan and the ROK."[100] Miyazawa similarly said that there was no difference of opinion with the ROK. Both gave the impression of cooperative relations between the two countries.

6.3 Modification of the UN Command Termination Proposal

6.3.1 Attempts at Restructuring the UN Command

The fall of Saigon affected the plan for terminating the UN Command in the ROK. The dissolution of the UN Command was an issue having great bearing on the security of the ROK, such as preserving the armistice arrangements, concluding a peace treaty, and the continued stationing of US troops in the ROK. It had implications for revising the framework of security arrangements that had taken shape under the Sino-US confrontation following the Korean War. Rapid changes in the situation in Indochina, however, forced the US to turn its focus away from fundamentally altering that framework to maintaining the status quo.

Some scholars see the continuation of the UN Command as a manifestation of the US and Chinese policy line of maintaining the status quo, in which it was not desirable to force changes of the armistice arrangements through terminating the UN Command.[101] It was, in fact, a policy coordination failure between two competing approaches. China and the DPRK attempted to use the UN Command's dissolution to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty, whereas the US and ROK made preserving the Armistice Agreement a priority, and to that end drew up a plan to establish a US-ROK joint command in place of the UN Command.

Kissinger and Chinese Premier Zhou discussed this issue on November 12, 1973, well before Saigon fell. Ever since the Geneva Conference (1954) had failed to settle the Korea question, Zhou observed, peace had been maintained under the Armistice Agreement for 20 years. This had given the DPRK and the ROK an opportunity to "move towards peaceful communication." He expressed hope that some way could be found to settle the Korea question.[102] (The Geneva Conference, to which Zhou referred, was political talks held to conclude the war and attain peace, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953; Zhou blamed its failure on then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' intransigence.) In his discussion here with Kissinger, it is understood that Zhou was envisioning that the UN Command would be terminated and that a peace treaty would replace the Armistice Agreement. Kissinger countered that terminating the UN Command would remove the legal basis for the armistice and offered to work with China to find another legal basis. Converting the

Armistice Agreement to a peace treaty was something that he felt could be addressed only after a substitute had been prepared.

And, indeed, the US did focus on such a substitute when it drafted NSDM 251: Termination of the UN Command in Korea.[103] NSDM 251 called for US and ROK military commanders to replace the commander-in-chief UN Command as the US's signatory to the Armistice Agreement, and whose function would be to preserve the Agreement. It also proposed that the ROK and DPRK representatives would then become the principal members of the Military Armistice Commission and, as such, conclude a nonaggression pact. The US contemplated "a Shanghai-type communiqué" that committed it to reduce and then withdraw its forces in the ROK as security on the peninsula stabilized in exchange for "tacit acceptance" by China and the DPRK of a continued US force presence in the ROK in the short term. Because the DPRK's policy priority was a US troop withdrawal, the US hoped China would be supportive of this proposal.[104]

The US was thus prepared to negotiate for Chinese and DPRK agreement on a substitute for the UN Command on the condition of maintaining the Armistice Agreement, an approach consistent with the perception its shared with China that the gradual withdrawal of US troops from the ROK would maintain the status quo and ease tensions on the peninsula.[105] Given that UN Command's dissolution and its substitute would be dramatic amendments to the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 61 of the said Agreement stipulated that the consent of both signatories was required.[106]

US-China negotiations to this effect began in June 1974 but made no progress. On June 13, Winston Lord, director of the US State Department Policy Planning Staff, informed Han Xu, the deputy chief of the People's Republic of China Liaison Office in Washington, DC, of the US policy approach in NSDM 251.[107] The US's negotiating package included substituting US and ROK military commanders for the commander-in-chief UN Command, getting the UN Security Council to endorse this arrangement, having the ROK and the DPRK conclude a nonaggression pact, and getting China and the DPRK to accept a continued US military presence in the ROK as an interim measure.

China was critical. A nonaggression pact between the ROK and the DPRK would lock in the division and obstruct the unification of the peninsula. It suggested that the US's aim was permanent troops in the ROK, and it called for an immediate withdrawal of US troops.[108] The DPRK, which got the US proposal through China, rejected it: "Simply lowering the UN Command flag, without withdrawing US troops and replacing the armistice agreement with a peace treaty, is mere trickery."[109]

The US persisted, deciding there was still room left for negotiating. It got ready for more talks with a revised plan that dropped the nonaggression pact and focused on preserving the Armistice Agreement. It was prepared to terminate the UN Command if China and the DPRK would accept a US-ROK joint command instead.[110] Neither nation responded.

The US's revised proposal had been passed to the DPRK but no response had been received, Vice Foreign Minister Qiao assured Kissinger on October 2, 1974. It then transpired that, without coordinating with China, the DPRK independently submitted a draft resolution to the 29th UN General Assembly calling for the termination of the

UN Command and the withdrawal of US troops from the ROK.[111] To counter that, a resolution backing the ROK was co-sponsored by the US and other Western countries that addressed the termination of the UN Command conditioned on maintaining the Armistice Agreement, as per NSDM 251. The UN General Assembly adopted this resolution in December, which read: "The General Assembly … expresses the hope that the Security Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement … will in due course give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question which fall within its responsibilities, including the dissolution of the United Nations Command."[112] Contrary to US expectations, it proved difficult for China to persuade the DPRK and to reach an agreement. This revealed to the US the limitations of its policy of relying on joint action with China as the way to avoid directly engaging with the DPRK.

Soon after these developments, and Saigon fell, Kissinger undertook a revision of NSDM 251 and reconsidering and replacing the word "termination" with "restructuring."[113] He gave two reasons for going with restructuring. First, he described it as a military issue of administering and implementing the Armistice Agreement following the fall of Saigon. Circumstances no longer permitted the search for a substitute to preserve and implement the Armistice Agreement after the UN Command ended, so Kissinger shifted US policy to maintaining the existing security arrangements built around the UN Command. This policy shift was due to the lack of cooperation with China as well as various thorny issues that cropped up, such as the transfer of operational control authority to the ROK, which is later discussed in detail.

Kissinger's second reason was to counter the DPRK's diplomatic offensive on UN Command termination. He envisaged a restructuring that began by limiting the use of the UN forces' badge and flag to Panmunjom, with the UN Command functions restricted to administering and implementing the Armistice Agreement. The UN flag was lowered on August 25, 1975, at all military facilities except for the UN Command in the ROK directly involved with the operation of UN forces and for the Military Armistice Commission facilities in Panmunjon. The spokesman for US Command in the ROK explained it as "a measure [taken] for our advantage in the UN debate on the Korean question ahead of the 30th UN General Assembly."[114] At the same time, the US began to consciously separate the UN Command from the US Command, arguing in the UN that the US forces were stationed in the ROK pursuant to the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and as such had nothing to do with the United Nations. The continued US presence would enable continued administration of the Armistice Agreement regardless of what happened to the UN Command.

Kissinger hoped that these measures would strengthen the US's tactical position at the UN General Assembly. Several co-sponsors of the resolution backing the ROK believed that keeping the UN Command as is actually worked to the DPRK's advantage.[115] It gave the DPRK an excuse for its diplomatic offensive. The UN accession of nonaligned nations also made it ever more likely that Communist draft resolutions calling for the termination of the UN Command and withdrawal of the US troops from the ROK would be adopted. What had in fact happened in the vote the previous December was that 42 countries had co-sponsored the resolution backing

the DPRK, which called for the withdrawal of foreign troops. It was countered by 28 countries co-sponsoring the resolution backing the ROK, which called for an end to the UN Command premised on maintaining the Armistice Agreement.

6.3.2 The ROK Explores a Unilateral Termination

The ROK, confronted by the DPRK's diplomatic offensive, conceived of its own diplomatic initiative to unilaterally terminate the UN Command. The policy of détente that the ROK had pursued since its June 23 Statement had little to show for it. And its diplomatic advantage over the DPRK had nearly vanished. Between July 1972 and March 1973, the DPRK had formed diplomatic relations with 11 countries that had diplomatic relations with the ROK. In contrast, other countries with diplomatic relations with the DPRK did not seek diplomatic relations with the ROK. In 1971, the ROK had diplomatic relations with 80 countries, compared with the DPRK's 34. In 1975, the figures were 90 to 88, respectively. Accordingly, there was a high likelihood that a draft resolution backing the DPRK by the Communist nations for UN Command termination and US troop withdrawal would succeed. Terminating the UN Command was now unavoidable in order to neutralize the DPRK's diplomatic offensive. Yet to regain the diplomatic initiative, the ROK felt the need to unilaterally request the termination of the UN Command.

At the request of the ROK foreign minister and a Blue House special assistant, ROK Ambassador to the US Ham Byeong-chun asked US Assistant Secretary of State Habib on April 29, 1975, how the Department of State would feel about the ROK unilaterally terminating the UN Command.[116] Ham asked that the US seriously consider handing over all of the UN Command's responsibility for preserving the Armistice Agreement to the ROK. The ROK devised its concept given the recent developments. The US had in fact sounded out China and the DPRK on the establishment of a US-ROK joint command in 1974 to substitute for the UN Command following its termination. But negotiations had stalled when the two countries rejected this proposal. The US had consequently been unable to secure the votes needed to defeat the Communist draft resolution at the 30th UN General Assembly later that year. To counter that draft resolution, which also called for the withdrawal of US troops from the ROK, the ROK came up with a plan to end the UN Command at its own initiative and have operational authority transferred to the ROK. The ROK sought to oppose the diplomatic offensive of the DPRK, which had revised its earlier position that insisted on concluding a South-North peace treaty and, as of March 27, 1974, began calling for a US-DPRK peace treaty.

This ROK proposal signified a stark transformation from its policy of maintaining the UN Command to ensure that US forces could launch operations from their bases in Japan in an emergency on the peninsula.[117] If it had been accepted by the US, it would have been a policy transformation momentous enough to alter the ROK's security framework that had existed since the Korean War. The ROK had once considered replacing an American general with an ROK general as the chief delegate of

the UN Command at the Military Armistice Commission meetings. And the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs probably saw in the changed international political situation following US-China rapprochement an opportunity to translate the concept into policy.[118]

The US premised NDSM 251 on joint action with China, specifically on China's influencing the DPRK to accept the US proposal to end the UN Command in the ROK without debate at the UN General Assembly. The US's primary policy objective was to preserve the Armistice Agreement through the establishment of a new US-ROK joint command approved by China and the DPRK. When the ROK saw that the US's aims were unachievable, it proposed its unilateral termination of the UN Command. This was a desperate measure, driven by a sense of danger and impatience that its diplomatically inferior position at the UN might inevitably lead to the withdrawal of US troops from the ROK, quite apart from the ending of the UN Command.

The ROK proposal came at a time when the US Department of State was grappling with the challenge of how to adjust the ROK-US relationship regarding operational control under a joint command scenario. US Ambassador Richard Sneider emphasized leaving that authority with US forces.[119] Sneider pointed out that doubts over US commitment post-Vietnam might cause the ROK to interpret the US's surrender of operational control to imply a reduced US defense of the ROK. He advised the Department of State not to treat operational control as an "ancillary aspect of efforts" aimed at the UN General Assembly. Later, during the drafting of a letter for the UN Security Council on the UN Command, Sneider advised against any change of UN visibility in Japan that might raise the question of base use,[120] concerned that UN Command termination might obstruct the US's use of bases in Japan for rear support.

Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll observed that a major change, such as unilateral termination, should be avoided because of its impression that the US and ROK were "in a state of panic or under intolerable pressure" because of the DPRK's diplomatic offensive in the United Nations.[121] In negotiations with the ROK, he also suggested drawing on the Indochina situation, Kim Il Sung's visit to Beijing, and other similar events to argue for the status quo. Recent developments, Ingersoll wrote, made the US "more reluctant than earlier to consider major shifts in arrangements on [the] Korean Peninsula without any satisfactory assurance that other sides will accept these shifts and act with restraint."

6.3.3 Japan's Proposal of Direct US-DPRK Negotiations and Japan, the US, and the ROK

With US-China cooperation stalled and no compromise for the Korean question to be found, a standoff was emerging, pairing the US and the ROK against China and the DPRK. At the time, China was not the only one encouraging the US to negotiate directly with the DPRK to end the stalemate. Japan, too, had proposed direct talks as necessary for breaking the impasse. The DPRK was pursuing an aggressive

diplomatic strategy, rejecting the simultaneous UN admittance of both Koreas under its one-Korea doctrine and calling for a US-DPRK peace treaty. The ROK, meanwhile, had embarked on a path to stabilize the division of the peninsula essentially under a two-Korea approach, calling for a nonaggression pact with Pyongyang and simultaneous UN accession.

Influenced by the ROK's policy shift, Japan, too recognized the importance of having the DPRK acknowledge the existence of two Koreas and drafted its policy toward the Korean Peninsula accordingly. Some analyses view this as the Miki administration's attempt to stop the US and the DPRK from bypassing Japan to normalize their diplomatic relations. But in fact, the administration encouraged US-DPRK direct negotiations aware of the opportunity this presented for bettering Japan-DPRK relations. Japan had just finally smoothed its relations with the ROK after the August 1974 Mun Se-gwang incident thanks to US mediation. It now found itself unable to overcome the ROK and US discouragement and roll out its own diplomacy toward the DPRK.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had devised two policy alternatives for the coexistence of the Koreas and the stabilization of the division of the Korean Peninsula.[122] One sought Kim Il Sung's recognition of both Koreas. Since its June 23 Statement, the ROK had explored coexistence with the DPRK by, for example, calling for the two Koreas to enter the UN together, an approach that the DPRK lambasted as embedding the division of the peninsula, as it adhered to its one Korea formula. Japan knew that the stability of the peninsula hinged on the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas and, to that end, regarded their simultaneous accession to the UN through a cross-recognition formula as desirable. So, Japan appealed to the US to support the simultaneous UN admission of North and South Vietnam, to give Kim Il Sung an example to follow of a divided country accession. At the time, the divided Vietnams' application to join the UN was considered a lost cause, as the US was predicted to exercise its Security Council veto. The ROK, though, took inspiration from their application and applied for UN membership ahead of the 30th General Assembly, something that China and the Soviet Union were expected to veto. Japan conjectured that if the US were to change its policy and support the Vietnams' application, it might increase the likelihood of the ROK's application succeeding. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also hoped that the accession of both Vietnams would further pressure Kim Il Sung and bring about a change in the DPRK's policy.

Japan's second policy alternative was to encourage direct negotiations between the US and DPRK, a proposal it regarded could break the deadlock at the UN, particularly on the issue of the UN Command termination. Japan proposed that the two parties seek a joint solution through direct talks before the resolutions backing the ROK and the DPRK faced off in the UN arena. Rather than containing and isolating the DPRK, Japan sought to encourage its coexistence with the ROK. Japan's change of policy toward the DPRK reflected, in part, an expectation of calming Japanese public reaction and ROK opposition to Japan's establishment of closer relations with the DPRK. Its policy would also help avoid unnecessary conflict on the peninsula and improve Japan's relations with the DPRK. Japan knew, however, that its foreign

policy options would expand if the US made the first move, as had been the case when Japan normalized relations with China following US-China rapprochement.

Notably, in its two concepts, Japan can be seen trying to maintain a balance between the ROK and the DPRK. The DPRK had rejected the two Koreas idea, and the ROK rejected direct US-DPRK negotiations. Japan hoped to package the two concepts to achieve a breakthrough.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' concept reflected two positions on the Korean Peninsula. First, moving a step beyond maintaining the status quo to establish a framework for peaceful coexistence and having it take root—this, the ministry thought, was the first step toward easing tensions on the peninsula. Second, if the ultimate goal was to normalize diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, the ministry thought that Japan needed contacts with the DPRK, hence it had to make its relations with the DPRK friendly and stable. That is why it looked favorably on visits to the DPRK by members of Japan's governing and opposition parties. The ministry judged that it could make use of such visits as a potential channel for bilateral dialogue in the short term, and regarded them as facilitating the opening of the inward-looking DPRK in the long term.

Prime Minister Miki said on August 5, 1975, during his US visit, that he agreed with the accession of North and South Vietnam to the United Nations. He stressed that although South Vietnam might now be Communist, it and North Vietnam remained separate entities.[123] Unlike the US, moreover, Japan was not making the admission of North and South Vietnam contingent on the ROK's admission.[124] Kissinger let Miki know that the US would not ask for Japan's support on Vietnam but did want it for the ROK. He said that if the ROK was admitted to the UN, the US could vote for both Vietnams.[125]

Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa maintained that the DPRK should not under any circumstances be isolated.[126] He said Japan was exploring short- and long-term policies to deal with the spillover from the Indochina situation on the Korean Peninsula. As mentioned previously, he had told Japan's Diet there was no need to change Japan's diplomacy because the trend toward détente would resume once the confusion over the fall of Saigon settled.[127] Perhaps recalling his remarks, he judged that tensions were easing and stability was returning, and the time had come to introduce a diplomatic policy of coexistence for the peninsula.

After Kissinger made his address before the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1975, as outlined at the start of this chapter, Japan geared up to request direct talks between the US and the DPRK. At a September 27 meeting with Kissinger, Miyazawa suggested that the quickest way to stabilize the Korean Peninsula would be for the US to establish dialogue with the DPRK and to later bring in the ROK as dialogue progressed.[128] He judged that Kissinger's proposed conference among the parties to the Armistice was unlikely to materialize as the Chinese response to the idea was negative. At the end of October, Miyazawa met with Kissinger as he passed through Japan, en route home from China; afterwards, Miyazawa told reporters "Unfortunately, there was little progress on four-party talks from [Secretary] Kissinger's visit to China. Regardless of how UN debate on the Korean question comes out, the atmosphere will not be conducive for the four-party talks."[129] In

Miyazawa's notes for his October meeting with Kissinger, prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was to feel out the US on the necessity of a US-DPRK preparatory meeting as the first step to a conference of the parties.[130]

Subsequently, Japan, through its ambassador to the UN, communicated its two-step approach to the US.[131] In step one, the US and the DPRK would make contact informally and agree to dissolve the UN Command and maintain the Armistice Agreement. In step two, formal talks on these issues would be held among the US, the DPRK, and the ROK. Japan also suggested a plan to coordinate the US and DPRK positions through the UN, specifically Secretary-General Kurt J. Waldheim, before presenting the UN with a new draft resolution on the UN Command and Armistice Agreement issues.[132]

The US raised two problems with Japan's proposals. One proposal called for direct US-DPRK negotiations and the other for indirect negotiations mediated by the UN secretary-general. The timing of UN Command termination and US-DPRK consultations also was not clear. Supposing the US did accept either of Japan's proposals, it would weaken the US policy of linking UN Command termination with preserving the Armistice Agreement. It would also exclude the ROK at the first point of contact between the US and the DPRK, which the DPRK might later claim made it the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula.

The initiatives also sparked a debate within Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs because the ministry's UN Bureau and the ambassador to the UN had presented them to the UN as the position of the Japanese government, as Foreign Minister Miyazawa had intended. The ministry's American Affairs Bureau, however, was against pursuing initiatives that it believed the US would inevitably reject. A dispute over policy ensued between the UN Bureau, which supported Miki and Miyazawa, and the American Affairs Bureau, which oversaw Japan's US policy. Japan's Ambassador to the ROK Nishiyama Akira also was furious at the initiatives, detailing the various problems in a report back to Tokyo.[133]

The US sought to curb Japan's diplomatic persuasion campaign. It was concerned that Japan's involvement might complicate its policy review, in addition to harming Japan-ROK relations.[134] A plan for US-DPRK negotiations was under consideration by the Department of State but only if the West's draft resolution backing the ROK was adopted by the 30th UN General Assembly. The US, though, first wanted to work with China to avoid the issue even coming down to a vote, as discussions on the Korean question at the General Assembly First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) in October 1975 suggested that the draft resolution backing the ROK was unlikely to pass at the December General Assembly. Given the circumstances, the US planned to put off the vote count with China's cooperation. Failing that, it would explore talks with the DPRK on one condition: the adoption of the West's draft resolution in support of the ROK at the UN General Assembly.

If that came to pass, the US had come up with one option as a possible next step: after consulting with the ROK, enter into two-party talks with the DPRK.[135] The West's draft resolution backing the ROK laid out the following points: (1) the US was prepared to terminate the UN Command; (2) the US and ROK were prepared to designate "successors in command" to take over implementation and enforcement

of the Armistice Agreement from the UN Command; (3) the US and ROK would deactivate the UN Command and implement the alternative arrangement on January 1, 1976, subject only to the agreement to maintain the Armistice arrangements by China and the DPRK; and (4) the US and ROK stood ready to meet with Chinese and DPRK representatives at any time to achieve these purposes.

Direct US-DPRK contact had been an issue of continuing debate within the US Department of State since March 1974, when the DPRK changed its existing policy of building a peace regime with the South and proposed concluding a peace treaty with the US.[136] The US, though, had never responded to repeated DPRK requests for contact through Romania, Egypt, and other countries or even through the UN.

On April 5, 1974, US Ambassador to the ROK Habib communicated his views to Washington that he thought US-DPRK contact prior to UN Command termination was fraught with difficulties. He was concerned that contact might further complicate the issue of termination. Amid talk of reduced US military assistance to the ROK, engaging with the DPRK and agreeing to its peace treaty proposal might cause the ROK to question US commitment, he warned.[137] It was clear to Habib that if the US reached out to and concluded a peace treaty with the DPRK, the DPRK would insist on the US's complete withdrawal of troops from the ROK. He thus urged avoiding any direct substantive contact with the DPRK that would give any impression that the US was contemplating a peace treaty with it.

Voting at the 30th UN General Assembly in December 1975, however, resulted in the adoption of the West's resolution backing the ROK together with the Communist's resolution backing the DPRK. This development undermined the US's precondition for directly negotiating with the DPRK, and so there was no move to implement the State Department concept for direct talks. More specifically, adoption only of the resolution backing the ROK would have implied that a consensus had been garnered from the international community on stabilization of the Korean Peninsula, opening the way for US-DPRK direct negotiations on that basis. Adoption also of the DPRK resolution, however, removed that implication and, accordingly, the possibility of direct negotiations.

Incidentally, the ROK at the time treated UN accession and cross-recognition as separate issues because China and the Soviet Union were against recognizing the ROK even if it became a UN member. The ROK's objective for UN membership was to better position itself to counter the DPRK's diplomatic offensive and, in the event the DPRK did launch a second Korean War, to prevent the international community from treating it as a civil war. Given the slim prospect for normalizing its relations with the Soviet Union and China, even as a UN member, the ROK criticized Japan for encouraging the US to directly negotiate with the DPRK. In October 1975, for instance, President Park made comments asking that Japan not align itself with forces that were trying to destroy the peace on the peninsula, in an effort to check Japan's moves.

The ROK National Assembly questioned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' response to Japanese diplomacy. At an October 22 meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Policy Committee Chair Park Joon-kyu, from the ruling Democratic Republican Party, rebuked the ministry for its handling of Japan's encouragement of direct

US-DPRK contact.[138] There was even talk about the possibility that Japan might not support the draft resolution backing the ROK at the UN in 1976, which raised concerns about the influence this might have on Asia and the nonaligned states.[139]

Japan's ambitious proposal sought to bring about ROK-DPRK coexistence, that is, a stable division of the Korean Peninsula. The ROK found this unacceptable because it understood that Japan's proposal overlapped with the DPRK call for a peace treaty with the US and would undermine the ROK's principle of ensuring its participation in negotiations related to the peninsula. Although Japan and the ROK both sought to stabilize the division of the peninsula, their positions did not easily converge on a specific methodology to attain that objective. Nevertheless, a major feature of their responses to the crisis of this period was that they both groped for alternative solutions that would tie the coexistence of the ROK and the DPRK to actual policy.

6.4 Conclusion

DPRK President Kim Il Sung's visit to China in the wake of the Communist takeover of South Vietnam elevated tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK and Japan struggled to find a mutually agreeable response. The two countries perceived different causes behind the fall of Saigon, which led them to approach the aftermath differently. The ROK girded itself against a new war launched unilaterally by the DPRK with China's tacit approval. In contrast, Japan viewed the post-Vietnam War situation as temporary and stuck with its existing diplomatic policy line promoting détente. For Japan, its approach put greater focus on the confusion and shock in the ROK as well as the potential for both Koreas to miscalculate.

Consequently, Japan and the ROK disagreed on reaffirming the Korea clause at the eighth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference and they made no reference to ROK security in the joint communiqué. Japan's policy emphasis was on opening a path toward peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, to contribute to the long-term stabilization of the Korean Peninsula, more than on reinforcing Japan-ROK security cooperation by reaffirming the Korea clause.

The Japanese government's policy was two-fold. First, to have Kim Il Sung recognize that there were two Koreas. As Japan regarded peaceful coexistence as the key to stability on the peninsula, it viewed the simultaneous accession of both Koreas to the UN as an even better means to that end than the cross-recognition formula. So, Japan engaged in diplomatic persuasion to get the US to support the UN accession of the two Vietnams, in the hope that this example would put pressure on Kim Il Sung, who opposed the dual UN entry of both Koreas, and encourage a DPRK policy shift. Second, Japan also encouraged the US to have direct negotiations with the DPRK. It reasoned that Kissinger's proposed multilateral consultations did not move forward due to his inability to gain Chinese cooperation, in the context of the standoff between the "two Koreas" approach of the US and ROK and the "one Korea" approach of

the DPRK and China. Japan determined that the stalemate could be best overcome through direct US-DPRK talks that would later include the ROK.

Japan's initiative, thus, was similar to the DPRK's position calling for direct negotiations with the US and differed from the ROK's policy prioritizing a nonaggression pact with the DPRK. The US and the ROK, moreover, rejected the idea of talks related to the Korean Peninsula that left out the ROK.

Japan-ROK security cooperation underwent qualitative changes, from discussions dominated by the Korea clause beginning in the late 1960s, through the period of Cold War transformation in the early 1970s, to responding to the crisis after the fall of Saigon in the mid-1970s. In the process, new areas for bilateral security cooperation were demanded, different from what they had achieved by Japanese support of the ROK position, namely, how the two could cooperate on peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. It was a Herculean task, requiring a more meticulous coordination of their interests.

Notes

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Chapter 7
Japan and the ROK Amid the Changing East Asian Order

Abstract The last chapter provides a comprehensive summary of the volume, and reiterates significant details in the development of Japan-ROK relations during a period of turmoil and uncertainty in East Asia. Several insights are emphasized. First, Japan and the ROK took a coordinated approach to security and economic development, with Japan providing economic cooperation based on the view it would help the ROK win the South-North legitimacy competition, which would be conducive to Japan's own security. Second, the shift in the Cold War order led Japan and the ROK to diverge in their approaches to China and the DPRK (North Korea). Rapprochement with the US had brought China onto the world stage, but Japan and the ROK differed over whether China would restrain the DPRK from military action. The changing East Asian order nonetheless compelled them to adjust their relationship, which had vacillated between the demands of security and the demands of détente. Third, no major change occurred in the two countries' positions in East Asia, as neither had sufficient influence to change the regional order to their advantage and neither possessed nuclear weapons, which made their security reliant on their respective alliances with the US.

7.1 The Formation and Evolution of Japan-ROK Security Relations in the Cold War Period

This book argues that Japan-ROK security relations were formed in the process of the two countries' efforts to address the threat perception gap and policy conflict between them. It focuses on how, as they interacted on security concerns, Japan and the ROK went about coordinating their policies and identifying potential areas for cooperation. Their bilateral security relations began in the late 1960s with a search for how to respond to low-intensity DPRK aggression toward the ROK, against the backdrop of the Korean Peninsula's paradox of division. Both Japan and the ROK, having identified this new threat, sought points on which they agreed, and looked for areas where they might cooperate. All possibilities were given consideration in their security discussions, and what emerged was security cooperation in the form of

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economic assistance. Specifically, Japan provided economic assistance to bolster the ROK's security capabilities while avoiding issues in Japan regarding the provision of direct military aid.

A transformation of the East Asian order in the early 1970s prompted Japan and the ROK to deepen their economic cooperation on security while coordinating their antithetical political and diplomatic positions, that is, their opposing interests in the demands of security and the demands of détente. Their conflict over these two interests was thrown into sharp relief by their respective responses to the security crisis precipitated by the fall of Saigon in 1975. And their bilateral security relations formed in the late 1960s underwent a qualitative change as they sought a new regional order on the Korean Peninsula.

7.1.1 The Security Crisis Under the Division of the Korean Peninsula and Japan-ROK Relations

By the 1960s, the opposing alliances that the ROK and the DPRK had forged since the end of the Korean War simultaneously acted to prevent their rapprochement as well as constrain their engagement in overt general hostilities. This institutionalized division that had become entrenched also influenced the shape of, and the respective ROK and DPRK responses to, security crises on the peninsula.

The 1968 security crisis, although far from all-out war, was sparked by the new threat of low-intensity aggression by the DPRK toward the ROK through raids, rear-area infiltrations, and other forms of armed force. The ROK's response was to seek to expand the applicable scope of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to include low-intensity aggression and to seek Japan's aid in upgrading its police equipment for counter-infiltration operations. Specifically with regard to the latter, the ROK assured Japan that there was little likelihood of a total war and that even conventional warfare could be easily addressed under the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The ROK's intent was simply to better equip its police force to deal with DPRK guerrilla provocations, to which end it requested special assistance from Japan.

Prime Minister Satō Eisaku and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to cooperate. Their reasoning was that the police equipment, patrol craft included, that the ROK had requested did not involve combat-related military armament, the export of which is prohibited under Japan's Three Principles on Arms Exports. They discerned that the ROK sought help not for conventional warfare but, rather, in order deal with guerrilla activities and safeguard its internal security.

Japan and the ROK, therefore, chose to cooperate bilaterally to ensure that the ROK police got the augmented equipment needed to thwart guerilla actions undertaken by the DPRK as part of its low-intensity aggression strategy. Through consultations, they identified the threat and found possible areas of cooperation.

Although that particular instance of cooperation ultimately never materialized owing to unexpected economic problems (a drought) in the ROK as well as distrust

of Japan, that process produced a sense of regional solidarity between Japan and the ROK, as the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs later assessed. The concept that the two countries might jointly identify threats and areas of cooperation laid the foundation for emphasizing the importance of bilateral economic cooperation and opened the way for security cooperation in the form of economic assistance from Japan in strengthening the ROK's self-defense capacity.

7.1.2 The Changing East Asian Order and Japan-ROK Relations

Japan and the United States launched negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa in 1969. The ROK was not a direct party to the negotiations, but it vigorously pushed Japan and the US to maintain Okinawa's base functions. It feared that the reversion of Okinawa would have significant implications for the security of all liberal nations in Asia, let alone just for its own.

Japan, conversely, judged that the emergent changes in the Cold War order had diminished the role of Okinawa's bases. It was concerned that the ROK's insistence on preserving the function of the bases might reduce its leverage and complicate the negotiations with the US. Japan therefore steered clear of the ROK's requests on the matter, deeming it interference in Japanese domestic affairs, particularly given that it jeopardized a reversion based on the formula of "without nuclear weapons" and "parity with the mainland."

Japan also sought to rid itself of the Korean Minute (1960), the secret agreement it reached with the US when they revised the Japan-US Security Treaty, that provided an exemption from the prior consultation required of US forces stationed in Japan to engage in military action on the Korean Peninsula. Japan wanted to replace the Korean Minute with a newly issued Japan-US joint communiqué or a unilateral statement by Japan's prime minister. The Japanese government sought to eliminate the exceptional status granted to situations on the Korean Peninsula and institute a real system of prior consultation.

Staunch US opposition forced Japan to abandon this quest. The US wanted at least to ensure its free use of its military bases in Japan should events on the peninsula require US military involvement. It was concerned that, if things had gone according to Japan's plan, Japan would gain the power to veto this. In the end, US opposition left the Korean Minute in place. The 1969 Japan-US joint communiqué included the Korea clause stating that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security." Prime Minister Satō then stated in a National Press Club speech that Japan would decide its position in prior consultations "positively and promptly" if the ROK was attacked. Neither statement superseded the Korean Minute.

Concerned that Japan would react negatively to the ROK's request for consultation on the terms of Okinawa's reversion, the US encouraged the ROK to forgo its unwavering attitude and control its dissatisfaction with Japan. As a result of policy

coordination by the US, which sought to create the public good of security in East Asia, the Japan-ROK conflict over Okinawa base functions converged in the 1969 joint communiqué's Korea clause.

Previous literature sees the Korea clause as the product of security cooperation. This book, however, reveals it to have emerged from compromises designed to coordinate antithetical political and diplomatic positions: the ROK's search for security and Japan's drive for détente.

In 1970–71, the reduction of US forces in the ROK was the moment that set the approach for Japan-ROK security cooperation through economic assistance. The ROK discussed the modernization of its armed forces with the US while it asked Japan for two types of economic cooperation. The first was for Japan to provide loans to foster the ROK's export industries. The ROK wanted to prevent the increase in its military spending due to the US troop withdrawal from becoming a factor limiting the development of its economy. The second was for Japan's cooperation in its Four Projects, which involved the development of industries with military applications. The ROK intended the Four Projects framing to circumvent Japan's prohibition on direct military aid.

Some officials within the Japanese government resisted the idea of cooperating in ROK defense industry development because of its association with the US troop drawdown. The ROK's first request for Japan's cooperation in the Four Projects clearly indicated their connection to the ROK's security, and that raised some concerns that Japan might be compelled to replace the US military's role. There was a more fundamental reason behind Japan's reluctance to comply with the ROK request. The US planned to leave a military presence in the ROK, only removing one army division, so Japan viewed the drawdown's impact on US deterrence of the DPRK as limited. Japan, therefore, focused on the psychological aspects more than the net military impact, that is, on the need to take measures out of consideration for ROK security fears.

Bilateral consultations on the Four Projects made progress, and Japan and the ROK reached an agreement on cooperation at the fourth of their regular ministerial conferences in July 1970. They agreed on the provision of financing at the fifth ministerial conference in August 1971. On January 25, 1973, the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) began to provide funds, kicking off the implementation of the Four Projects as part of the ROK's heavy and chemical industry development.

Previous literature claims that the Four Projects stalled in November 1971 because of Japan's disinterest. In fact, not four but five heavy industry projects were implemented, including a copper factory that they agreed was necessary through the course of bilateral consultations on the projects. Economic assistance clearly underpinned the two countries' collaboration on security. Recognizing that Japan could not provide direct military assistance, the ROK sought Japanese involvement in the construction of heavy industry plants tacitly premised on weapons production. Japan was motivated to comply out of concern for the impact of the US troop drawdown on the ROK. The countries accordingly found common ground in cooperating on security by arranging for Japan to provide economic assistance for the ROK's Four Projects.

This was at a time when the US, hoping to end the war in Vietnam, set about to resolve its confrontation with China that had long shaped the Cold War in East Asia. This demanded a response from Japan and the ROK to the ensuing transformation in the East Asian order. Japan wanted a diplomatic free hand so that it could roll out a policy of détente with China and the DPRK. The demands of détente led it to attempt revising the Korea clause. As this book shows, the political push to revise the Korea clause, that political impulse for an autonomous diplomacy, was a manifestation of Japan's impatience stemming from lagging behind the US on China policy. Japan's fear, however, of any negative impact on its asymmetrical security alliance with the US stopped it from a concrete policy change. Its attempt consequently ended up as little more than political rhetoric for Japanese domestic consumption.

Japan and the US, in fact, confirmed the importance of the Korea clause, the US by pushing for the free use of its bases in Japan, and Japan by asking that US troops remain in the ROK. Prime Minister Satō denied making a turn of policy on the Korea clause. Security considerations also prompted Japan to differentiate the Korea clause from the Taiwan clause. Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo stated that the Taiwan clause was problematic but that the Korea clause had not been discussed in the Diet and that no changes would be made to it. At Japan-US summit talks in August 1972, President Richard Nixon warned that if Japan made it difficult for the US to use its military bases in Japan, the US would withdraw its troops from the ROK. Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei guaranteed the US free use of the bases under the Japan-US Security Treaty. Following the normalization of Japan-China relations, the Japanese government announced on November 8, 1972, that the Taiwan clause was null and void. No reference was made to the Korea clause. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials shared the perception that Japan's ROK policy was different from its China policy, which forced Japan to choose between China and Taiwan.

The ROK, even as it focused the military implications of the Korea clause, took a flexible approach to maintain its political and economic relationship with Japan. It launched dialogue with the DPRK on preventing further warfare and sought improved relations with China to establish frameworks that included a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula.

Due to their security needs, Japan and the ROK attached importance to the significance of the Korea clause and sought to deepen their political and economic cooperation. This reflected their shared perception that as East Asian détente made progress, it would make it difficult for the DPRK to engage in armed provocation, and political and economic aspects of the South-North relationship would gain in importance.

The content and scale of Japanese economic cooperation with the ROK expanded, with an eye toward helping the ROK win the legitimacy contest against the DPRK. The two countries worked to increase Japanese industrial investment in the ROK; at the same time, the Japanese government pledged to keep cooperating by providing government loans for infrastructure development where private companies were unable to participate, such as aid to agricultural development and of basic infrastructure. Underlying this promise was Japan's strategic concept of contributing to ROK victory in the South-North contest of political and economic systems. Japan also attempted to change the focus of the bilateral regular ministerial conference

from discussion solely of economic cooperation to a higher-level political forum on wide-ranging issues, including the international economy and energy.

Meanwhile, Japan sought to take part in relaxing tensions on the Korean Peninsula through exchanges with the DPRK, arguing that private-sector economic exchanges would bring reforms to the DPRK's system. When the ROK asked the Japanese to stop trading with the DPRK, Japan adopted a position that maintaining a relationship with the DPRK, with a certain degree of flexibility, would facilitate Japan's ability to develop a closer bilateral relationship with the ROK and help to strengthen the ROK's military power. The logic was that the Japanese public thought that Japan was biased toward the ROK and needed to be more balanced. If the ROK wanted more cooperation from Japan, it needed to ensure that the Japanese government was seen to be pursuing that balance. Japan's policy toward the Korean Peninsula did not take a definite turn here, rather it donned a multilayered dimension that combined consideration for the ROK from the demands of security with consideration for the DPRK from the demands of détente.

7.1.3 The Search for Peaceful Coexistence

Changes in the regional order in East Asia had a considerable impact on Japanese and ROK perceptions of, and their responses to, the security crisis in 1975. Tensions rose with the visit DPRK President Kim Il Sung made to China after the fall of Saigon. The ROK and Japan perceived this threat differently and so adopted different security policies, a gap not easily bridged. The ROK responded to what it saw as an external threat of a second Korean War initiated solely by the DPRK, whereas Japan perceived that the chaos ensuing from the ROK's internal collapse was the risk to ward off. The cause of this perception gap can be found in their differing views of China. Japan's position was that China was constraining DPRK military action, eliminating the danger of a DPRK invasion. For its part, the ROK was concerned that the DPRK, with China's tacit approval, might launch hostilities on its own and occupy the central area of the peninsula before China would call for a ceasefire. The fact that Japan had normalized relations with China, spurred by US-China rapprochement, whereas the ROK had not, despite its diplomatic efforts, is what made reconciling the gap in their threat perceptions and resultant security policies so difficult.

There was also a gap between Japan and the ROK in how they perceived the end of the Vietnam War. The ROK focused on the potential for the Communist takeover of South Vietnam to incentivize Kim Il Sung. Japan regarded the situation in South Vietnam as something it brought on itself, and so was unlikely to spark hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. Expanding Japanese economic exchanges with the DPRK became a center of focus, but the Japanese government took no political steps to stop it. Japan sought to maintain channels of contact with the DPRK, for its ultimate diplomatic aim was normalized relations with Pyongyang, with a view toward peaceful coexistence between the Koreas. By paving the way toward peaceful

coexistence, rather than by strengthening its relations with the ROK, Japan thus sought to contribute to stabilizing the Korean Peninsula.

The existing literature claims that the 1975 security crisis returned the situation in East Asia to where it had been in the late 1960s. But it was not simply a return to the past: it should be regarded as a qualitative change in Japan-ROK security relations. Security issues, the Korea clause included, were not further discussed at Japan-ROK regular ministerial conferences. The ROK argued that their cooperation on security was inevitable because both countries were in a similar situation: as neither possessed nuclear weapons, they could not safeguard their national security without an alliance with the US. The ROK thus requested that Japan reaffirm the Korea clause as part of their response to the crisis, but Japan dodged the request. Japan and the ROK disagreed in drafting the joint communiqué for the eighth Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference, but ultimately the communiqué made no reference to ROK security. The language went no further than that of the previous communiqué, which simply called for promoting the relaxing of tensions. This might be called the moment when the Japan-ROK security relationship, long shaped by seeking ways to cooperate in response to security crises, underwent a qualitative change. While responses to security crises and economic forms of security cooperation remained the basis of the relationship, the two countries had now come to seek to establish a new cooperative relationship aimed at stabilizing the division of the Korean Peninsula.

The Japanese government's position manifested in two policies. First, it supported UN membership for the ROK and the DPRK. Japan had advocated for the dual entry to the UN of North and South Vietnam despite certain US opposition, thinking that the accession of both Vietnams would convince Kim Il Sung to drop his rejection of a similar approach for UN membership for the Koreas, with the expectation it would lay the groundwork for the "two Koreas" to coexist. Second, Japan proposed direct negotiations between the US and the DPRK. South-North dialogue was suspended, US-China joint action had broken down, and US Secretary of State Kissinger's proposed multilateral conference of the parties to the Armistice was making no progress. This was the context in which the concept arose. Japan's proposal was designed to break the impasse arising from the US-ROK versus China-DPRK standoff that was preventing a compromise, with the objective of bringing the DPRK, which had eschewed talks with the ROK in favor of direct negotiations with the US, to the table. Japan envisaged a two-stage process: first US-DPRK consultations would start, and once they were on track, the ROK and China would be allowed to join. To simply get some movement in the stagnant situation, the concept was full of potential from the points of drawing the DPRK into dialogue and forming a venue in which to seek out a regional order. After the Cold War, in fact, Six-Party Talks were held to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue and build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. These talks began as consultations between the US and the DPRK, later joined by the ROK and the other parties, before an agreement was reached.

Japan's plan for direct US-DPRK negotiations was treated, however, just as the DPRK's request for them had been. The ROK and US were concerned that it could worsen Japan-ROK relations and complicate the US's review of its policy toward

the Korea Peninsula. Reaching political agreement among the countries in question while safeguarding ROK security was not easy.

The experience of the 1970s as it is sketched out in this book suggests the importance of Japan and the ROK engaging in joint initiatives from a grander perspective than bilateral defense cooperation to address issues with the DPRK and to promote coexistence and peaceful unification on the Korean Peninsula. There is arguably an even greater need to prepare a new diplomacy and work to stabilize the regional order to resolve matters that are current stalled.

7.2 The Search for a New Coordinated Approach to Regional Stability

In the first chapter, I noted the importance of analyzing how the Japan-ROK cooperative relationship was constructed in response to the changing order in East Asia in the late 1960s through the early 1970s. I did so as a means of understanding the responses of Japan and the ROK to the changes in the regional order that have occurred since the 2010s. Obviously, there are limitations to looking at Japan-ROK relations simply through the lens of the past. But I believe that ascertaining the elements of the relationship that change from those that remain constant provides clues to aid our understanding of the bilateral relationship as it readjusts to align with a new regional order.

I draw on that analysis to provide insight into the changes that occurred in Japan-ROK relations in the context of changes in the regional order arising from the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and China's emergence as a major power since the 2010s.

The first insight is that Japan and the ROK took a coordinated approach to security and economic development. Under the Cold War order, Japan provided economic cooperation based on a strategic thinking that its contribution to the ROK to help it win the South-North legitimacy competition would also be conducive to Japan's own security. It was likewise a security perspective that prompted Japan's decision to respond to the ROK's request for assistance in fostering its defense industry. Economic cooperation from a security perspective was the approach jointly identified by the two countries so as not to run afoul of Japan's legal and political constraints to engage in direct defense cooperation.

The second insight is that the shift in Cold War order led Japan and the ROK to diverge in their approaches to China and the DPRK. Rapprochement with the US had brought China onto the world stage, but Japan and the ROK differed in their views as to whether China would restrain the DPRK from military action against the ROK. Although they shared the policy goal that stability on the Korean Peninsula was important for regional stability, consensus on a specific policy toward the DPRK eluded them. The changing East Asian order nonetheless compelled Japan and the

ROK to adjust their relationship that vacillated between the demands of security and the demands of détente.

The third insight is that no major change occurred in the two countries' positions in East Asia. Neither possessed nuclear weapons, which made their security reliant on their respective alliances with the US. And neither had sufficient influence to change the regional order to their advantage. That Japan and the ROK shared a similar position in international politics was all the more evident in that period of change occurring in the regional order.

Japan-ROK relations began to undergo a transformation in the 1990s amid the international collaboration prompted by the ending of the Cold War and the embedding of democracy in the ROK. ROK President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō worked together for the purpose of historical reconciliation and building a future-oriented relationship with their Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-First Century (October 8, 1998).[1] The stability of East Asia required the partnership between Japan and the ROK, and with this joint initiative the two countries began to build new, good-neighborly relations in the post-Cold War period.

On the security front, Japan and the ROK strengthened their bilateral as well as trilateral cooperation, including the US, on the basis of their alliances with the US, in response to the common threat posed by the DPRK's nuclear weapons and missiles. This was also a period in which the two countries regularized exchanges between their defense officials and began to explore direct bilateral defense cooperation.[2] In August 1999, the ROK Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force engaged in their first postwar search and rescue exercise (SAREX), which subsequently has been conducted every two years.[3]

Other Japan-ROK security cooperation initiatives included efforts to conclude the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The scheduled signing of the agreements in 2012 was postponed at the last moment at the request of the ROK government because of public opposition. Signing finally took place in November 2016, following the fifth DPRK nuclear test in September that year. These agreements have served as an arrangement to respond to the common threat of the DPRK's ballistic missile launches, and their signing represented an important step in institutionalizing Japan-ROK defense exchange and cooperation.

The order in East Asia has been undergoing change since the 2010s owing to several factors. First, China has emerged as a major economic and military power. It boasts the world's second-largest GDP and has expanded its presence into surrounding waters, particularly in the East China and South China seas. Second, the ROK has become an advanced industrialized nation and a political middle power. Third, Japan, after having long driven the region's modernization and economic development, has seen a relative decline in its influence. Serious diplomatic friction between Japan and the ROK has arisen not only from their differing perceptions of history, but from their different responses to China's rise and its maritime incursions.

The US remains the ROK's most important ally for security, but China is more important to the ROK economically. The ROK also needs China's willing cooperation

to constrain the DPRK's nuclear weapon and missile development and to lead the DPRK toward reform and opening. Japan, meanwhile, has experienced much more assertive Chinese behavior in the East China Sea (and elsewhere) and anti-Japan protests in China. So it perceives China's growing power and presence as a security threat and is working to strengthen its alliance with the US to better align itself with the US policy toward China.

The Japanese and ROK policies toward the DPRK also differ. The ROK pursues a policy of engagement in the hope of improving inter-Korean relations and of denuclearizing the DPRK. Japan, conversely, remains leery about engaging with the DPRK due to distrust stemming from its abduction of Japanese citizens.

This divergence in policy has left the ROK and Japan struggling to figure out how to position each other in their own foreign and security policies. Even as it recognizes the importance of promoting trilateral security cooperation with the US and Japan, the ROK, concerned about Japan's tough stance on China, is hesitant to strengthen it security relations with Japan for fear of provoking China and of sparking anti-Japan sentiment domestically.[4] The ROK, meanwhile, is conspicuously absent from Japan's diplomatic strategies, the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific.[5]

Their struggle to find a common strategy is further complicated by frictions over history. The Supreme Court of Korea issued a ruling in October 2018 ordering a Japanese company to pay compensation to Korean laborers it had conscripted during World War II. This stoked a disagreement between the countries, and all diplomatic efforts to bridge the gap in perceptions on this issue have yet to bear fruit.

The Abe Shinzō administration in July 2019 tightened restrictions on exports to the ROK, citing a loss of trust. Japan hoped that the ROK would respond to arbitration under the 1965 Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation, an approach the ROK had resisted to that point. In retaliation, the Moon Jae-in administration threatened to terminate GSOMIA, which the Japanese hoped would be extended, using the possible termination as a bargaining chip to get Japan to lift its export controls against the ROK. Each side sought concessions through linkage politics, tying issues of history to issues of economics and security.[6]

Japan's tighter export regulations, far from changing the attitude of the Moon administration, have sparked a considerable reaction in the ROK. South Korean companies reliant on the Japanese materials industry began exploring alternatives to gain independence. It is increasingly likely that change will come to the traditional supply chains that Japan and the ROK had forged in the manufacturing of cutting-edge industrial products.[7] These developments have also generated an awareness in Japan and the ROK of the change, obscured until now, wrought by the ROK's becoming a developed country: their longtime vertical economic relationship is now more horizontal. This outcome, notably, reminds us that structural changes in East Asia are not limited to China's emergence as a great power; they are also occurring at the bilateral level between Japan and the ROK.

The ROK's announced termination of GSOMIA drew criticism from the US State and Defense departments for weakening security cooperation among Japan, the US,

and the ROK. As such, the ROK had no choice but to announce a grace period before letting GSOMIA expire. Undoubtedly, this gave both countries pause to rethink their close and long-standing security relationship. They are in what might be called the process of adjustment necessary to build a new relationship.

At the start of the 2020s, the confrontation that has been building between the US and China is also starting to influence Japan-ROK relations. Since the Joe Biden administration came to power in 2021, the exact nature of US-China tension has become apparent: national economies are increasingly taking on a security aspect, with the decoupling of technologies and markets under way. DPRK General Secretary Kim Jong Un has begun hammering out new strategies, including a nuclear doctrine, following the failure of the US-DPRK summit in Hanoi in February 2019. Kim has begun to reinforce his strategies by bolstering ties with China and Russia, exploiting the new international situation posed by the strategic competition between the US and China and by Russia's military invasion of Ukraine.

Under these circumstances, the administration of Yoon Suk Yeol, who was inaugurated as ROK president in May 2022, hastened to improve Japan-ROK relations by seeking a resolution of the conscripted labor matter pending with Japan by having an ROK government-affiliated foundation shoulder paying the compensation. President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio agreed that, along with resuming "shuttle diplomacy," where the two leaders make frequent visits unbound by formalities, they would launch a bilateral economic security dialogue to solve challenges both countries face together, such as enhancing supply chain resiliency and countering the leakage of sensitive technology. They also confirmed the importance of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific and recognized the need to work together to protect a free and open international order based on the rule of law.

Their shift in policy aimed to close the policy gap between them and rebuild their strategic cooperation based on a recognition of their common ground. Japan and the ROK, advanced industrial nations caught between the US and China, have little choice but to engage in strategic cooperation with one another. Enhanced cooperation between Japan, the US, and the ROK has become possible on the foundation of this Japan-ROK relationship. For the ROK and Japan, the changes yet unfolding in the international order in East Asia pose a great test, and at the same time, offer the opportunity to develop and execute a newly coordinated approach to regional stability.

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Afterword

This book is a revised and expanded version of my dissertation, "Nikkan anzen hoshō kankei no keisei: Bundan taiseika no 'anpo kiki'" (Japan and Korea seek national security cooperation: The "security crisis" in the context of the division of the Korean Peninsula), which I submitted to the Keio University Graduate School of Law, and for which I was subsequently awarded a doctorate in July 2011.

Much of the previous research on international relations regarding the Korean Peninsula has focused on relations between the major players, namely the United States and China. Research on Japan-ROK relations, too, generally focuses on the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, with insufficient explanation of how the relationship developed following normalization. This drew me to begin research on Japan-ROK security relations with a view to depicting East Asian international relations through the lens of Japan-ROK relations. My aim was to contribute to research on post-normalization Japan-ROK relations by focusing on how the two countries, with their mutual alliances with the US, identified potential areas for cooperation during the period of change in the East Asian order that occurred from the end of the 1960s through the 1970s.

While pursuing my master's degree in the ROK, I focused on DPRK diplomatic relations. Subsequently, I decided to study in Japan to examine, from a broader perspective, the DPRK's politics and diplomacy and the relationship between the Korean Peninsula and Japan. Guided by the teaching staff at Keio University—the epicenter of research on East Asian international relations—I commenced my work on Japan-ROK-US security relations. Quite fortuitously, after the Democratic Party of Japan came to power in 2009, a series of Japanese foreign policy documents about Japan-ROK relations from the late 1960s through the 1970s was released. I was consequently able to make new discoveries and deepen research that formerly relied wholly on US and ROK foreign policy documents.

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The papers forming the basis of this book were published as follows. All were revised and extended to reflect my latest understanding for the purposes of this book.

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