Routledge Approaches to History

CAPITALIST COLD

EMOTIONS AND THE ECONOMY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

Edited by
Agnes Arndt and Kerstin Maria Pahl

Capitalist Cold

The capitalist system has often been described by its critics as a heartless economic structure corroding social bonds and symbolic values. Its defenders and analysts likewise use narratives that position emotions as central to the economy. This book examines the history of these framings.

To explore the role of emotions in economic practices and imaginaries, the volume presents case studies including original re-readings of well-known texts such as Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, as well as forays into little-known histories such as representations of capitalists in post-war Turkey, and how art dealers strategically used emotions to navigate the market in interwar Germany. Rather than simply reproducing the image of "cold capitalism," however, it offers nuanced investigations into the ambivalent images evoked by living and working within economic structures. In late-socialist Poland, capitalism felt "warm" and "fuzzy," while pop culture of the seventies found it not destructive, but cool, hip, and edgy.

This book is aimed at students and scholars of social, economic, and cultural history.

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Emotions and the Economy in Europe and the United States

Edited by Agnes Arndt and Kerstin Maria Pahl

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Preface

Capitalist Cold grew out of a conference that took place at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development on a cold December day in 2018. Like many projects, it was delayed but not cancelled by the pandemic. Disruptions can make publications lose relevance, but we found that this edited volume came out the other side with more rather than less topicality. While capitalist culture has been hotly debated in previous decades, questions of solidarity and interpersonal care—or the reverse, cold indifference to others—all of which are discussed in this book, have found new resonance in a (post-)pandemic world.

In offering historical case studies on contemporary themes of economic structures and emotional cultures, the book explores *long durée* development and change in experiencing, conceptualizing, and contesting capitalism. It settles on the metaphor of "coldness" but does not take it at face value. Rather, it uses it as a crystallization point to show how economic, social, and affective structures intersect and how, despite its reputation, capitalism has never been unemotional or simply "rational."

Capitalist Cold is an edited volume, but it is also a collaborative project. Authors and editors worked closely together, repeatedly revising and re-angling the chapters with a view to making them better respond to each other. The book is also interdisciplinary, bringing together historians, philosophers, and literary scholars. We warmly thank all our authors for their thoughts and enthusiasm.

At the same time, we are very much indebted to the unfailing support we received from the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and its Center for the History of Emotions in Berlin. Director Ute Frevert encouraged our project from its very beginning, when it was still just a one-page concept for a conference. Emma C. Lawson, Daniela Petrosino, and Karola Rockmann were indispensable for their skills in translating, copy-editing, formatting, securing the image rights, and indexing. Max Novick and Louise Ingham from Routledge provided us with the most

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Agnes Arndt and Kerstin Maria Pahl
Berlin 2024

Introducing Capitalist Cold

Emotions and Economic Structures from the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Century

Agnes Arndt and Kerstin Maria Pahl

Following the financial crisis of 2007–08, the world has seen the rise of movements that seem to be contradictions in terms: conscious capitalism, inclusive capitalism, sustainable capitalism.[1] Their rallying cry is to build a better world and better business through attention to higher purposes, stakeholder integration, and conscious leadership. In a discussion of conscious capitalism, *Forbes* magazine enthusiastically chimed in, denouncing today's "version of heartless, soulless capitalism." "Without a change," it proclaimed, "we are marching into deep disaster."[2]

Heartless, soulless, disastrous—the capitalist system has long acquired qualifiers meant to describe the experience of living and working within an apparently merciless economic structure. The logic of markets, devoid of affection and sympathy, is thought to inexorably corrode social bonds and symbolic values that lie beyond the exchange of money and goods.[3] *Capitalist Cold* is a historical inquiry into such emotional framings of critiques of capitalism. Combining approaches from social, economic, and cultural history, the authors in this volume explore the language, images, and figures evoked in discussions of capitalism in different regions and at different points in time.

Capitalism is widely seen as both an economic system, and thus a force that forms and impacts structures, and an institution that shapes society.[4] Its specific workings beyond business circuits and the influence of images and narratives thus necessarily include people, emotions, and social and emotional interaction.[5] In contrast to projections of the economy as impartial calculus, capitalism is a constructed system, set up by framings, narratives, and knowledge as much as by numbers and data. This volume does not posit the public imaginary or cultural representations as mere complements to empirical histories of business cycles or economic exploitations; rather, it considers talking about capitalism and imagining the economy as integral to the system's operation, including how it changes. In historicizing current discontents with capitalism, *Capitalist*

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Cold combines case studies from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, and Poland, asking about the specific imaginaries that capitalism created and the criticism as well as the fascination it generated. The book thereby contributes to a cross-disciplinary dialogue on the global history of capitalism and critically engages with the emotions at play in this contested field.

The History of Capitalism and Emotions

The research on which this volume is based has developed just as dynamically as capitalism has spread globally.[6] Triggered chiefly by the financial crisis that occurred in 2007 and 2008, studies into the emergence of the first capitalist modes of production from the fourteenth century onwards, industrial capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and financial capitalism in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries have gained considerable momentum.[7] The same can be said about research on critiques of capitalism. Neither the phenomenon itself nor inquiries into it are new, but they are continually being updated with thoroughly new insights to address social inequality, the scarcity of resources, and distributive justice.[8]

Such research has been most innovatively challenged by those inquiries that have focused on aspects beyond the transnational flows of capital, people, ideas, and institutions. Above all, the role of the slave trade and racist violence in the rise of capitalism has been, and continues to be, the subject of dedicated investigation and discussion.[9] This new history of primarily American capitalism reintroduced political economy as a category of analysis, exploring the forces that have shaped modern patterns of economic activity.[10] It examines the connections between markets and political systems of order, but also the interaction between laws, violence, race, and capitalism. With a global-historical, actor-centred, and interdisciplinary approach, it also focuses on economic dynamics that operate beyond traditional labour markets and financial flows that produce their own capitalist markets, which are not only difficult to investigate but virtually impossible to regulate.[11]

Globalization, digitalization, financialization, and not least the ecological effects are among the central themes of this new research into and critique of capitalism.[12] Whether considered in terms of its potential downfall—as many studies do—or constructed as an economic system with no alternative, capitalism and its effects on production, consumption, the world of work, and social cohesion will continue to concern researchers and politicians alike.[13]

Against this backdrop, the relationship between emotions and capitalism has developed into a burgeoning field of research.[14] First, emotions

play an important role in the functioning of capitalism. Joy, fear, and envy influence our choices about what we consume. Pride, motivation, satisfaction, but also disappointment and shame, impact our performance at work. Feeling hopeful, greedy, or anxious determines our investment decisions. Second, and conversely, capitalism generates emotions: the fear of not being able to keep up economically; the apathy caused by being alienated from our own work and the products we create; the envy and anger that stem from unresolved conflicts over opportunities, resources, and their distribution. In recent years, interdisciplinary research from fields as diverse as psychology, sociology, history, economics, and political science has produced instructive insights into the complex interdependencies between the economy and emotions.[15]

The concept of "coldness" is of particular importance here. It is a metaphor for alienation, exploitation, and competition, but it also reflects the lived experience of social coldness brought about by, for instance, poor working and living conditions. Alternative economic models that are geared towards sustainability and justice, and which could reduce the negative effects of capitalism on the environment and society, would, according to many critics of capitalism, lead to a "warmer" world in which people could live in harmony with each other and with nature. But, despite its centrality to many critiques, both historical and contemporary, the trope of capitalism and capitalists being "cold," "emotionless," and "callous" still awaits further systematic examination.[16]

Voicing criticism by shaming one's enemies for their apparent lack of feelings is an affective practice. It appeals to the emotions of an audience, gives the argument a recognizable shape, and thereby attempts to impact how they feel about an object. In Aristotelian rhetoric, pathos (the ability to engage the audience through vivid examples) is one of the three pillars that writers or speakers must employ to make their address persuasive, the others being logos (the argument itself, which is meant to appeal to the audience's reason) and ethos (the credibility of writers or speakers because of the character they project). The charge of coldness, which translates to callousness or indifference and is supposed to engender indignation, outrage, compassion, solidarity, pride, or defiance, is crucial for projecting images, scaffolding narratives, and bringing forward moral evaluations of capitalism.

Labelling one's adversaries cold-hearted has a long tradition. Cold people fail to connect with their fellow human beings, mercilessly pursuing their own goals, whatever the costs. In Western thinking since at least the eighteenth century, refined and cultivated feelings—in contrast to vulgar affects—have been considered proof of sociability, politeness, and civilization, while both overindulgence and a lack of feeling have signalled a social failing. Emotionless people, as Scottish Enlightenment thinkers

such as Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) and Adam Smith (1723–1790) wrote, were the most challenging of all, since feelings—especially sympathy, which today would be called empathy—allow for connection with other people, whereas the insensitivity of others prevents this. A cold heart will always remain closed to us, and what we perceive as exclusion by the other hits us so hard because it denies that we, at our core, are similar to all other human beings. Insensitivity undermines the idea that people can feel with and for each other, and thereby undermines the social cohesion of society.

It is no coincidence that the author of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* of 1759, the most well-known historical discussion of sympathy as the foundational emotion of a functioning society, was also a political economist who wrote the most influential economic treatise of its time, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). In fact, theories of feeling were crucial to Adam Smith's economic theory. Humans, he famously wrote, are dependent on others, but rather than relying on "benevolence," one should "interest their self-love": "Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want."[17] Similarly, Smith believed that, "The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him so much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors." For that very reason, he would always prefer slaves to freemen as workers.[18] While such pessimistic ideas of the self-serving nature of humans may seem at odds with the more idealist notions propounded in the *Moral Sentiments*—that people should emotionally connect with each other—both treatises represent a consistent view: Smith believed feelings to require much work, with indifference being the default condition of humankind. It was appalling to be insensitive, yet it was indeed difficult to become a truly caring individual. Being sensitive was an active choice, one that arose from the insight that an indifferent society was generally a horrible one in which to live.[19]

Both nineteenth- and twentieth-century criticism of capitalism, especially by Marxist and Critical Theory, understood the capitalist order as aligned with collective affective states. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels spoke of the "icy water of egotistical calculation," in which the bourgeoisie had drowned all forms "of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism."[20] Max Weber, when travelling to America in 1906, was both fascinated and troubled by the inescapable "iron cage" that the interplay of Protestant ethics and economic system had created.[21] Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer famously criticized the "cold reason" brought about by the commerce-driven social changes of the Enlightenment, which drew "a strict line between feeling, in the form of religion and art, and anything deserving the name of knowledge."[22] While capitalism's hardness was, for Weber, at least partly rooted in religious

culture, both Karl Marx and Critical Theorists believed that capitalism disconnected people from each other and from nature, either because the property-owning bourgeois class had to cultivate a cool, rationalized distance from others for the sake of economic self-interest, or because workers became alienated and slowly numbed by their working and living conditions.

But a diagnosis does not make a fact. Taking a historical perspective, it is evident that cold-heartedness is often inseparable from political agendas and the desire to control others. Often, the charge of cold-heartedness is used for the purpose of exclusion and self-reassurance. When social issues became particularly explosive in England in the 1830s, with workers demanding the right to vote and better working conditions, and cities impoverished by rural exodus, the term "insensibility" became a weapon of discourse: factory owners and politicians were seen as ruthless because they enslaved the lower classes; workers and street children were said to be numbed by their conditions; doctors were hardened by the excess of disease and desolation, leaving the poor to die.

Feelings of the long-lived and refined kind—not the vulgar, briefly flaring affects—were considered proof of social capability and civilization. A fine line ran between controlling emotion and eradicating emotion. Certain forms of reduced emotional expression were, and still are, considered particularly progressive: composure, self-control and sovereignty are valued in leaders; objectivity and impartiality distinguish scientists and judges; coolness developed in the early twentieth century among marginalized groups in America, first in Black music such as jazz and the blues, then in the youth movement of the 1950s, as demonstrative indifference to injury, humiliation, and social exclusion; unapologetic condescension found its adherents in the dandy and, more recently, the hipster. In contrast, there was the jadedness of soldiers in the nineteenth century, especially the Prussian and Russian troops, who were educated into becoming human automatons through endless drill.

By ascribing a specific emotional habitus or style of belonging to certain social or professional groups, emotions have functioned, and continue to function, as a form of participation. They show a person's place and contribution. In this respect, feelings—especially feelings of solidarity—are a form of social and political engagement. In their expression and accumulation, the importance and value of people and issues are revealed, including on an institutional level. In 1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his acceptance speech for his renomination as presidential candidate, postulated that the government itself should act in the spirit of charity, thus transferring compassion to the level of executive policy; in Europe—and especially in Germany—establishing the welfare state was a way of institutionalizing solidarity.

Conversely, feelings of repulsion and disgust opened up the possibility of demarcation and avoidance. They helped to formulate criticism of social, economic, and political conditions and to mobilize protest. In this way, they often strengthened the boundaries between the socially accepted and the unaccepted. Emotions have been instrumental in promoting what we call a moral economy,[23] and it is precisely this that historically has made it possible to both successfully criticize and repeatedly reform economic conditions.[24]

Sometimes, though, such sentiments also blurred the demarcation. Speaking disparagingly about "new money" enabled those in the superrich stratum to distance themselves from those who had come to "fast money" in a morally questionable way, and at the same time suggested a closing of ranks with those who had "worked hard" and "earned" their money. The fact that some had access to assets and family networks, while others earned their modest wages through shiftwork at a factory or a hospital, was obscured. Similar arguments could be applied to large swathes of a specifically Western critique of capitalism, which met with incomprehension in other parts of the world because it lacked comparable preconditions. Criticism and renunciation of consumption was and is something one needs to be able to afford.

Capitalism offers a highly interesting interpretative foil for the analysis of such emotional states and attributions. Not only the history of capitalism, but also the historiography of capitalism, is still characterized by emotionalized discussions. Since capitalism is recognized as one of the most powerful and structure-forming forces in current life, an economic system of order and an institution that shapes society as a whole, it is paramount to better understand how and through which media, images, and narratives it exercises its power and which counterforces challenge it. In drawing on cultural history and the history of emotions, this book thus joins recent forays into economic narratives, capitalist imaginaries, and the role of identity and subjectivities in economic decision-making that have argued for more attention to be paid to the "emotional force of economic narratives."[25] Recent scholarship, moreover, has repeatedly emphasized that the projection of capitalism as cold and impersonal obscures both the place of values and emotions in capitalism and the way they are harnessed simultaneously by the system and its critics. "Far from being characterized by a growing externality of economy and sociality," Martijn Konings has written, "capitalism operates through their imbrication: morality, faith, power, and emotion, the distinctive qualities of human association, are interiorized into the logic of the economy."[26]

Neither emotional imagery nor criticism provides conclusive evidence of how the capitalist system actually works. They do, however, attest to experiences with it and to the way that people have felt their lives were

bound to economic forces. This edited volume explores how emotions were and continue to be lodged in the framings of capitalism, and thus directly influence how the economic system is more broadly understood by large parts of the population. It aims to link historical explorations of the feelings that capitalism is supposed to trigger with the equally historically specific critique not only of capitalism, but of its entanglements with these very feelings.

The Cold Heart of Capitalism and the Career of a Metaphor

Since the nineteenth century, the cold heart has been an established metaphor in Europe for what capitalism has done to people. A long-standing symbol of a lack of compassion, frozen hearts were early motifs of cultural criticism, translating the apparently inescapable transformation of individuals within economic structures into a tangible and personalized image.

If we understand an emotion's history to encompass the entirety of both feelings and their performance and display, then at first glance metaphors appear to belong to the second category: they are used to express, articulate, and specify emotions.[27] Analogies and metaphors are processes of mapping and transfer. They draw on resemblance in structure or shape to illustrate a statement or a declaration: "capitalists are callous" translates to capitalists having cold hearts. Taking metaphors into account allows us to explore the history and relevance of emotions by looking at how they were discussed, cast, and framed, as well as the social and ethical framework within which they were conceived.

While such a discursive analysis would address the prevalence of phrasings, and thereby offer a view of dominant discourses of the time, drawing on metaphors holds another potential: language may help us to identify the power and potency of articulations. Forms of display and expressions do not just describe emotions as phenomena; they have repercussions, reverse impacts on feelings—they regulate communities, institutions, and social interaction. Thus, they can become prescriptive; they can set the agenda regarding how emotions are talked about and performed.

Articulations also shape emotions. As historians of emotions have repeatedly argued, they may create them through their naming, their labelling, by verbal or non-verbal utterances and predications. Through the role articulations play in practices of display, they may eventually influence the practices of feeling themselves.[28] Metaphors such as the cold heart can help identify dominant discourses, part of the structure that enables capitalism—including its emotions and its criticism.

The "cold heart" of ruthless businesspeople has become proverbial. While the metaphor itself dates back further, the particular link to the

economy is tied to the industrialist era. In 1827, German Romantic poet Wilhelm Hauff published a modern fairy tale entitled "Das kalte Herz" ("Heart of Stone," literally "the cold heart"), now considered the epitome of capitalist-critical storytelling in German culture.[29] It narrates the tale of Peter Munk, a charcoal burner who is unhappy with his profession and resulting lowly position in society. When encountering the spirit of a greedy raftsman, he is lured into selling his heart in exchange for wealth and talent. While the heart of stone he receives in return allows him to acquire wealth, marry the beautiful Lisbeth, and run a successful business, his feelings have become numb. Nothing touches him, nothing delights him, nothing moves him, and his business practices, driven by greed and callousness, are beyond the pale. He peddles fraudulent goods, kicks people out of their houses, and sells an honest worker into the army. It is only after killing his wife in a fit of rage after catching her helping a poor man that he is able to repent, as the fear of God touches even his flinty heart. Eventually, he regains his beating heart from the evil spirit, which causes him to lose his business but makes him a better man. Slowly but steadily, he works his way up.

Hauff's fairy tale has spawned various film adaptations in Germany. In 1950, the German Democratic Republic's film production company, DEFA, released a tremendously successful version, which also happened to be the first colour film produced by the socialist state.[30] While there were no versions produced between the 1980s and the 2010s, three new adaptions have appeared since then, perhaps embracing the mood of the post-financial crisis era. Indeed, critics have noted the topicality of the 2016 movie: trade and commerce are shown destroying long-established artisan traditions; honest and industrious but poor workers are disdained by the very industrialists who rely on their labour; money is portrayed as the only form of power that guarantees social reputation. In a departure from the original tale, the film also supplants the Christian imagery of the original with references to archaic tribal societies through face-painting, visualizing the way capitalism encroaches on traditional communities and how local businesses have become part of a global economic circle, eager to get in touch with non-European entrepreneurs.

In Western traditions, talk of cold hearts has been around for centuries, probably millennia, fusing antique with Christian beliefs. Using the metaphorical freezing of the body's most vital organ to express a lack of compassion has long been part of a broader tradition of thought. In Galen's second-century interpretation of Hippocrates' humoral theory (fifth to fourth century BCE), which remained influential well into the eighteenth century, the two unresponsive temperamental states, phlegm and melancholy, were both associated with coldness.[31] Coldness in general, but also cold hearts, could thus denote general states of indifference

and unsympathetic or cruel reactions to individuals or events, but also conditions later called despair, hopelessness, or lack of courage. In the Bible, hearts of stone are used repeatedly to describe people not listening to or renouncing God (e.g. Isaiah 63:17; Mark 6:52; John 12:40). The Pharaoh both hardens his heart and has it hardened by God when he first refuses to let Moses go and then follows the Jewish people through the Red Sea to his death (Exodus 7:14; 8:15, 9:34; 10:20).

In the English language, the term "cold-hearted" has occurred frequently as a negative attribute, referring to religious apathy or indifference to honour. In his 1623 play, Shakespeare has Anthony accuse Cleopatra of cold-heartedness, which she refutes by arguing that she would rather choke to death on the hail emerging from a cold heart than have no affection for her lover.[32] When "cold-hearted," *kaltherzig*, appeared in the German language (Christoph Martin Wieland was probably the first to use it in 1775), the Brothers Grimm quoted Shakespeare in their dictionary, noting that the term had likely been imported from the English.[33]

But it was through the nineteenth-century linking of cold hearts to the economy that the trope became one of the most enduring images for societies where monetary circulation thwarts social connections because every communication and interaction is assessed in terms of profit. What made the cold heart so potent was its amalgamation of present-day concerns—such as impersonal trade trumping individual handicraft and the direct correlation between social standing and wealth—with well-known Western traditions of image and thought, both pagan and religious. To underline that cold-heartedness and greed were sinful in a religious sense, the envied antagonist of coalminer Peter Munk in Hauff's "Heart of Stone" is named after the biblical prophet Ezekiel, who tells the people of Israel that God will "remove from them their heart of stone and give them a heart of flesh" (Ezekiel 11:19).

In illustrations and the film versions of Hauff's tale, the cold heart is shown in its familiar visual form. A derivative of the sign for a plant leaf (still present in the suit of spades in card games), this particular ideograph has signified romantic love since the late Middle Ages. First appearing in the French courtly romance *Le Roman de La Poire*, it became popularized in modern culture's commercialization of love, especially in conjunction with Valentine's Day. While tokens of love were exchanged before 1800, it was with the introduction of cheap paper and the so-called Penny Post that Valentine's Day took off and the heart as we know it today became a familiar symbol.[34] In 1841, some 400,000 valentines were sent around England; between 1863 and 1871, the number of items posted in addition to the normal quantity on 14 February rose from 430,000 to 1.5 million.[35] Valentine's Day is now usually associated with these nineteenth-century beginnings, but in fact—like the heart-shaped ideograph—it dates back

to the late Middle Ages,[36] when devotion came to no longer just indicate love for and surrender to God; the spiritual meaning was transferred to the secular context of interpersonal relationships. At the same time, as the process of "giving one's heart" to another person exemplifies—whether depicted as kneeling down with hands extended, religious prayer, or sexual surrender—the heart-shaped form came to visualize an emotional economy of exchange.

It is noteworthy that Valentine cards, which seem to perpetuate the association of love and economy, but also stories such as Hauff's and its adaptions, which explicitly reflect on the effect of capitalism on individual characters, cannot be disconnected from their function as goods within the same system. They too have their markets; they too need to sell and circulate and be exchanged. It is a kind of endless mise-en-abîme of fictional works, which expose the corrosion of social and emotional relationships in the current system and are themselves both products and commodities within this system. Or, to put it differently, to a large extent criticism is itself inherent to capitalism and can be utilized for profit.

When Disney's movie *Frozen* was released in 2013, this point was made clear. It was a hugely profitable and successful cultural product that commodified—including through an ongoing billion-dollar merchandizing campaign—both the cold heart and the redeeming power of love. *Frozen* is an adaption of Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tale "The Snow Queen" of 1841, but with a twist. While the Danish author's original tale told of childhood sweethearts defeating the Snow Queen, who had abducted the boy protagonist due to the innocence and purity of the pair's affection, *Frozen* centred on familial love. Princess Elsa, who has the power to freeze whatever she touches, accidentally does so to her sister Anna's heart. Anna can only be saved by an act of true love, a trope of fairy-tale denouement familiar from "Sleeping Beauty" or "Snow White"; however, when she is finally kissed by a man, her heart does not melt. What saves her in the end is an act of sisterly love: Anna throws herself between her sister and the villain, taking the blow of the sword. She is transformed into a statue of ice, which in turn melts her heart. The message is that family, not romance, provides the last refuge against coldness. *Frozen* was the highest-grossing animated film of all time before being overtaken by the live-action *Lion King* in 2019, and it has become a cultural icon—a perfect example of how capitalist dynamics can yoke ideas about value beyond money for the purpose of making money.[37]

Metaphors belong to the category of rhetorical tropes. They work through similarity, bringing together real-life phenomena with evocative images or illustrative comparisons. Such figurative language, cognitive linguists have long argued, plays a pivotal role in everyday life and intellect. "Our ordinary conceptual system," George Lakoff and Mark Johnson

write in their now-classic study on "metaphors we live by," "in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature … *The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another*."[38] This is not limited to language. In an essay on "Visual Metaphors of Value in Art," art historian Ernst Gombrich has noted that:

> The possibility of metaphor springs from the infinite elasticity of the human mind; it testifies to its capacity to perceive and assimilate new experiences as modifications of earlier ones, of finding equivalences in the most disparate phenomena and of substituting one for another. Without this constant process of substitution neither language nor art, nor indeed civilized life would be possible.[39]

As they are conceived within historically specific traditions of thought, metaphors help to clarify frameworks of understanding, conceptualizing, and ethics.

Tropes therefore are, as Michael Foucault has famously argued, part of the social mechanics of power. Because language, he contends, is prescriptive and knowledge ordered by social power relations, actors employ language—including tropes—to exert this power. Notably, Foucault used a financial metaphor to describe the emergence of metaphors in general, as "The first thing we observe is that *analysis of wealth* obeys the same configuration as *natural history* and *general grammar*."[40] To analyse how it comes about that one word is exchanged for another, he draws on the process of exchanging money:

> The theory of value makes it possible, in fact, to explain (whether by dearth and need or by the superabundance of nature) how certain objects can be introduced into the system of exchanges, how … one thing can be posited as the equivalent of another … For its part, the theory of money and trade explains how any given form of matter can take on a signifying function by being related to an object and serving as a permanent sign for it … Money, like words, has the role of designating.[41]

The structure of knowledge and the structure of language, Foucault argues, follow the same mechanisms and the same logic as monetary circulation. Substituting certain words, such as greed or callousness, with metaphors such as cold hearts or hearts of stone is a transfer that mirrors financial transactions. Such substitutions follow the logic of value, of need, and of supply and demand. As Foucault put it, "Systems of natural history and theories of money or trade have the same conditions of possibility as language itself … order in nature and order in the domain of wealth have the

same mode of being … as the order of representations as manifested by words."[42] But this exchange can also serve the purpose of withdrawing from actual activity. Using words can compensate for action; the articulation of ethics and emotions can stand in for their performance.

Language itself can thus acquire value. Metaphors are not merely representations, communicating real-life phenomena in evocative terms, but often partake in processes of (e)valuation. This is especially true for such loaded terms as "cold-hearted" or "callousness." Here, language communicates the assessment of the system, and it does so through affective qualifiers—hence the conceptual framing of the book, hence its focus on the perceived, suggested, or contended coldness of the capitalist system.

Feeling Economic Structures from the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Century: Outline and Outlook

The book is divided into three sections. The first addresses framings of the capitalist system and begins with a view from political philosophy. In Chapter 1, Henrike Kohpeiß traces "bourgeois coldness" (*bürgerliche Kälte*), most prominently addressed in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944). While not elaborating it any further, the two representatives of the Frankfurt School used the term to describe bourgeois indifference in the face of suffering occasioned by the capitalist economy and subjectivation. Bringing together political philosophy and postcolonial theory, Kohpeiß argues that the term allows for reflections on the affective structure of bourgeois life in a global world. While capitalist alienation and self-interest still exist, another critical dimension manifests itself in the affective disregard for others because of the coloniality of emotional structures. European colonialism not only shaped the world economically, but also based its forms of exploitation on a system of racial difference that was established through and with the conquest of the Americas and the transatlantic slave trade. This colonial world order was undergirded by an idea of the subject defined by, and which went hand in hand with, self-ownership. The centrality of property to both the economy and coloniality explains the violent reinforcement of racial difference in capitalist modernity and the affective attitudes that accompany it.

Offering a cultural history exploration of experiences of the capitalist system, Florian Völker, in Chapter 2, delves into German pop culture to demonstrate how tropes of coldness experienced a renaissance in the late twentieth century as an explicit challenge to the fashion of social warmth. From the 1960s to the 1980s, left-wing counterculture in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as in Europe and the United States, fought vehemently against what was seen as the cold structures of the

present, from capitalism to technological progress and industrialization. In direct response, during the late 1970s an artistic movement emerged from its ranks that glorified frigid modernity: "cold pop." While left-wing culture praised "warm" forms of behaviour, such as living collectively, being in nature, and having caring attitudes, cold pop artists—Kraftwerk being the most famous example—extolled the very opposite: industry and metropolitan alienation, technology and self-discipline, artificiality and inauthenticity, and objects made of concrete and steel. They also embraced consumerism and commercialism. Examining the aesthetics of coldness, Völker sheds light on the ambivalence of a counter-counter-movement, which challenged critiques of capitalism while keeping a distance from the "real cold capitalists."

In contrast to such views of the system, the second section centres how capitalism has become personified in the figure of the capitalist. Chapter 3, by Timothy Attanucci, provides a new reading of one of the best-known figures of storytelling about cold capitalism, Charles Dickens' unforgettable miser Scrooge from *A Christmas Carol* (1843). In both the original tale and its countless renderings in films, series, and illustrations, Scrooge is portrayed as the stereotypical callous money-lender, his heart as cold as the snow in the winter setting of the story. Yet Attanucci argues that in the idiom of the time, Scrooge is not only depicted as unfeeling, but specifically as melancholic, adding a layer to the experience of living under capitalism: Scrooge exhibits melancholy in its bipolar form, alternating between depression and mania. By understanding Scrooge's heart as not simply cold, it is possible to reread his final conversion: Scrooge not only warms to familial bonds and the spirit of Christmas; he also, through his overheated spending, now engages in practices necessary for consumer capitalism to thrive. His gloomy melancholic withdrawal may thus be reframed as a bipolar condition that mimics the boom-and-bust structures of capitalism from which he profits and suffers..

Moving from fictional to real personages, Maurice Cottier, in Chapter 4, takes readers to the heartland of capitalism and the centre of twentieth-century economic theory. Drawing on the self-narratives of two of the most influential US economists, John Kenneth Galbraith and Milton Friedman, he untangles how economics as a rational science became popularized through being personified, and thus made affectively relatable, by its practitioners. In comparing their respective memoirs, moreover, Cottier shows that Galbraith and the Friedmans—the latter book was written together with Milton's wife, Rose, who was also an economist—used the autobiographical form to fashion themselves as ideal citizen-subjects of the worlds they envisioned in their political and theoretical texts: Galbraith, a professor at Harvard and a Democrat, portrayed himself as representing

an economy where planning, rather than competition, fuelled capitalism. By contrast, the University of Chicago professor and adviser to the Republicans Milton Friedman and his wife imagined themselves as inhabiting an individualized, neoliberal world, where each family unit had to care for itself. Counterintuitively, however, by interweaving their family life with Milton Friedman's career, the Friedmans framed their world as warm and caring because the domestic sphere, governed by the wife, provided a cushion for male neoliberalism. Galbraith's vision of capitalist living, meanwhile, was more collective, but it was also colder because it was more structured and rational.

Further zeroing in on the life worlds that capitalism, and in this case also modernization, is believed to create, in Chapter 5 Emre Gönlügür examines the popular culture of post-war Turkey. Around 1950, Turkey was both radically liberalizing its economy and establishing a multi-party system, aiming to become a part of the world economy and a Western-style democracy. Due to it being the centre of democratic politics and a sudden nexus of manufacturing, the old Ottoman capital Istanbul became both the "country's industrial lynchpin" and a "monstrous industrial city." When large numbers of the rural population flocked to the resurrected metropolis, they needed a new language for navigating the urban and capitalist environment—and found it in a plethora of movies representing internal migration and the clashes between urban and rural values. Drawing on postwar Turkish cinema, Gönlügür analyses emotional tropes including the "cold capitalist" and the "poor but proud youth" alongside affective non-visual motifs such as the recurring use of melancholic music to demonstrate how film was used to come to terms with the rapidly changing face of capitalist urbanization.

The third section explores coldness and warmth as antagonistic properties of markets, with the first two chapters focusing on the imaginaries cultivated with a view to the East–West divide. In Chapter 6, Marcus Böick discusses capitalist coldness as it was perceived during the process of German reunification. Using current public debates and conflicts about persisting divides in contemporary German society, he explores the role of metaphors of coldness and warmth in the context of post-socialist economic transformation. More specifically, he focuses on the Treuhandanstalt, the Trust Agency created by the East German government in 1990 to privatize state-owned enterprises in line with capitalist ideology, and its legacy. It is in the perception of the Treuhand that emotional and generational differences crystallize. Böick shows that the fears and disappointments of many East Germans after reunification continue to shape the country's collective memory and identity, and that in the specific context of the German East–West debates, cultural-emotional aspects were, and continue to be, closely interwoven with material-economic patterns. According to Böick,

a historiographical look at the emotional economies during and after the post-socialist upheavals could shed light on the genesis of these debates.

Moving to the Polish People's Republic, in Chapter 7 Florian Peters examines how the Polish imagined capitalism in the last decade before it was actually introduced in 1989. For the majority of people in late socialist Eastern Europe, capitalism and capitalists were distant phenomena, but Poland's comparatively liberal border regime, established in the 1970s, enabled a growing number of Poles to gain personal experience of Western consumption and capitalist economy. At the same time, small entrepreneurs, given some leeway by the Polish authorities in the face of a deteriorating domestic economy, provided a focal point for emotions associated with capitalism at home. In tracing the significant changes in the emotional images of both real and imagined capitalism over the course of the 1980s, Peters demonstrates how capitalism and entrepreneurship were seen as "the real thing," as opposed to an ineffective and absurdly planned economy. The emotional connotations of these discourses, he argues, were critical for the course that capitalism was to take in Poland. Contrasting the warm, fuzzy, but sclerotic realities of a late socialist economy with dazzling images of cold objectivity, subversive dynamism, and a fervent greed for profit prepared the intellectual and cultural ground for the eventual neoliberal takeover.

Chapter 8, which closes the book, goes beyond emotional discourse to address how elite figures harnessed emotional attitudes within specific market conditions. In his investigation of emotional practices on the legal and illegal art market in interwar Germany, Paul Franke looks at perceived coldness and warmth in business relationships. Notoriously arcane and closed to outsiders, art markets are called "warm markets" because their dealings rely on personal connections. Emotional bonds of trust, in particular, are critical for transactions. Because connoisseurship as the only true way of determining the value of art can hardly be measured in figures, dealers and potential buyers mostly hear of purchase opportunities through word-of-mouth. Zooming in on art acquisitions in 1920s and 1930s Berlin, including those by museum directors, Franke shows how the protagonists of the art market, from art dealers to lawyers, embraced interpersonal relationships in explicit contrast to rational factors of economic decision-making, knowing full well that while warm markets came with the risk of deceit and duping, the outcome, if successful, could never be matched by other procedures.

Capitalist Cold shows that the rise of movements such as conscious and sustainable capitalism not only reflects the desire to create a better economy, but also the way this desire, its proponents, and its opponents have developed under specific historical conditions. Images, metaphors, and language have played an important role in the understanding of

capitalism as well as in the framing and conceptualization of the critique of capitalism.

Judgements such as "heartless" and "callous" were used to describe the experience of living and working in this system. However, they were also used in reverse when people far removed from capitalism wanted to express their longing for economic security and prosperity. As metaphors for the structural problems of economic systems, these evaluations came both to express and to evoke emotions. Their use not only shaped the affective structures of capitalism, but in turn served to exercise power and to permeate knowledge.

The combination of social, economic, and cultural historical approaches used by the authors of this volume helps to analyse the language, images, and figures that have influenced and shaped discussions about capitalism over the last 200 years. At the same time, they demonstrate that there is no single economic emotion; rather, the field of "capitalist coldness" encompasses a multitude of divergent, sometimes even contradictory, feelings, each of which refers to its own history and socioeconomic culture.

Used to denote alienation, exploitation, and competition, the binding of insensitivity and coldness to capitalism functioned as an indictment but also as an impetus to deal with feelings of fear, apathy, envy, anger, and greed. In politics, literature, and art, experiences of social coldness were criticized, but at the same time supposed metaphors of warmth were counteracted, as cold pop's reaction to left-wing countercultures in Germany and Europe in the decades following the 1960s shows.[43]

The contributions in this volume aim to stimulate further systematic research into the history and critique of capitalism from a cultural-historical perspective. By focusing on the relationship between emotions and capitalism, they illustrate that feelings towards the economy are at least as important for its history as the structural conditions of its functioning. Both the critique of capitalism and capitalism's relative capacity for resistance and renewal cannot be explained without the inclusion of cultural and emotional-historical perspectives.

Notes

1 Ashford, "Why Working"; The Council for Inclusive Capitalism, www.inclusivecapitalism.com; Wood et al., *Global Business Citizenship*; Grayson and Nelson, *Corporate Responsibility Coalitions*; Midttun, *Governance*.
2 Fox, "Conscious Capitalism."
3 Barber, *Consumed*.
4 Clark, Thrift, and Tickell, "Performing Finance"; Aldred, "Money"; Aitken, *Performing Capital*.
5 Ahmed, "Affective Economies."

6 See also the (somewhat controversial) comprehensive account of capitalism by Neal and Williamson, *Cambridge History of Capitalism*.
7 Wallerstein et al., *Does Capitalism*; Hodgson, *Conceptualizing Capitalism*; Kocka and van der Linden, *Capitalism*; Plumpe, *Das Kalte Herz*; Hesse et al., *Moderner Kapitalismus*; Lenger, *Der Preis der Welt*.
8 Piketty, *Capital*.
9 Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*; Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*; Edwards, *Unfree Markets*; Jenkins and Leroy, *Racial Capitalism*; Chatelain, *Franchise*; Johnson, *Broken Heart*; Taylor, *Race for Profit*; Baradaran, *Color of Money*; Walker, *Black Business*.
10 Beckert und Desan, *American Capitalism*.
11 Pistor, *Code of Capital*; Ogle, "Funk Money"; Ogle, "Archipelago Capitalism."
12 Saito, *Marx in the Anthropocene*; Herrmann, *Das Ende des Kapitalismus*.
13 Streeck, *How Will Capitalism End?*; Mason, *Postcapitalism*; Wallerstein et al., *Does Capitalism*; Altvater, *Das Ende des Kapitalismus*.
14 Illouz, *Cold Intimacies*; Ngai, *Ugly Feelings*; Ahmed, *Cultural Politics*; Hochschild, *Managed Heart*.
15 Arndt, "Efficiency and Emotion"; Arndt, "Entrepreneurs"; Carter and Arocha, *Romantic Relationships*; Schmidt and Conrad, *Bodies and Affects*; Donauer, *Faktor Freude*; Akerlof and Shiller, *Animal Spirits*.
16 Coldness as a social attribution and semantic metaphor has been investigated for some time in sociology, philosophy, education, and literary and cultural studies. See Lethen, *Cool Conduct*; Stephan and Szczepaniak, "Cold Fronts"; Stephan, "Kälte als Topos"; Stückler, "Gesellschaftskritik"; Stephan, *Eisige Helden*. On Critical Theory and bourgeois coldness in particular, see Hogh, "Apathie Kälte Verdinglichung"; Knoch, "Die Zerstörung des Subjekts." Because of its topicality, imaginations of coldness, environmental histories and the history of Arctic expeditions have recently garnered renewed interest: see, for instance, Stuhl, *Unfreezing the Arctic*; Herzberg, Kehrt, and Torma, *Ice and Snow*. See also Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen, "ERC Synergy Grant Project 'Cultures of the Cryosphere: Infrastructures, Politics and Futures of Artificial Cooling,'" www.kulturwissenschaften.de/en/projekt/cultures-of-the-cryosphere.
17 Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 17.
18 Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 472.
19 Pahl, "De l'insensibilitéà l'anesthésie."
20 Marx and Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, 5.
21 Weber, *Protestant Ethic*, 181. See also Baehr, "Iron Cage."
22 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 72.
23 Thompson, "Moral Economy."
24 Berger and Przyrembel, *Moralizing Capitalism*.
25 Lenel and Nützenadel, "Economic Narratives: Introduction," 419. On economic narratives, see, in particular, Rischbieter, "Masters of Uncertainty"; Shiller, *Narrative Economics*; Lenel and Nützenadel, "Economic Narratives"; Lenel, "Economists as Storytellers"; Roos and Reccius, "Narratives in Economics." See also Beckert, *Imagined Futures*. On economy and identity, see Akerlof and Kranton, *Identity Economics*; Suckert, "Economic Nostalgia."

26 Konings, *Emotional Logic*, 2.
27 Gerald C. Cupchik has drawn on analogy and metaphor to approach emotions: "Analogies deal with sets of logical implications from one system (aesthetic) that meaningfully inform another (mind-body relations)"; Cupchik, *Aesthetics of Emotion*, 195–196. Aesthetic renderings of lived experiences, Cupchik writes, use a combination of subject matter and style to not only express and evoke emotions but, crucially, to say something about the production of emotions in general: as aesthetics are affective and emotional, sensation is produced by style, emotion by content. Cupchik, *Aesthetics of Emotion*, 11.
28 Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 105–122.
29 The original *Cold Heart* was not an oral folk tale, but a so-called *Kunstmärchen*, an "artificial" or "literary" fairy tale. Now mostly associated with the Romantic era, literary fairy tales were invented by individual authors as consciously artificial variations on literary conventions, naïve storytelling and fanciful plots. See Voss, "Kapitalismus als Ästhetizismus." See also Schmidbauer, *Das kalte Herz*.
30 Fritzsche, "Keep the Home Fires Burning."
31 Lindemann, *Medicine and Society*, 13–19; Vinkesteijn, *Galen of Pergamum*, 230–337, esp. 237–244.
32 "Antony: 'Cold-hearted toward me?' Cleopatra: 'Ah, dear, if I be so, | From my cold heart let heaven engender hail, | And poison it in the source; and the first stone | Drop in my neck: as it determines, so | Dissolve my life!' " Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act III, scene 13.
33 Grimm and Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, 91.
34 Oruch, "St Valentine"; Schmidt, "Fashioning of a Modern Holiday."
35 Vincent, *Literacy*, 44.
36 In 1382, Geoffrey Chaucer wrote the poem *Parlement of Foules* [fowls] to celebrate the engagement of Richard II of England to Anne of Bohemia, stating that birds choose their partners on the day of Saint Valentine—the first connection in the English language between romantic love and this particular day. Around 1600, it was sufficiently established to be mentioned by Ophelia in Shakespeare's *Hamlet* (VI.5). Valentine's Day was, at the time, more erotically connoted and indicated the consummation, not the initiation, of romance. Being a valentine meant, as Ophelia put it, that a man in his room "let in the maid, that out a maid / Never departed more" (Hamlet IV.5).
37 The intersection of popular culture with capitalism, and the ambivalence resulting from the commercialization of countercultural styles, is a prominent theme in subculture studies. See, for instance, Hanks, "Selling Subculture"; Blair, "Commercialization"; Stapleton, "Margins to Mainstream"; Bennett and Kahn-Harris, *After Subculture*; Gelder, *Subcultures*; Alfrey, "Search for Authenticity"; Guidotto, "Cashing in on Queers"; Moore, "Alternative to What."
38 Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors*, 3–5 (emphasis in the original).
39 Gombrich, "Visual Metaphors," 14.
40 Foucault, *Order of Things*, 218 (emphasis in original).
41 Foucault, *Order of Things*, 218–220.

42 Foucault, *Order of Things*, 221.
43 Sven Reichardt, "'Wärme' als Modus sozialen Verhaltens? Vorüberlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte des linksalternativen Milieus vom Ende der sechziger bis Anfang der achtziger Jahre," *Vorgänge* 44, nos. 171–172 (2005), here 175–187.

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Part I

A Cold System?

1 The Cold Bourgeoisie

Affect and Colonial Property

Henrike Kohpeiß

Introduction

The bourgeois subject appears an antiquated object of critique. Much has been said by Karl Marx, the Frankfurt School, and others about the economic and aesthetic pitfalls and powers of bourgeois subjectivity and about the necessity of relinquishing that social position in favour of more equal ways to live within socialism. But the mere observation that bourgeois subjects are alive and well indicates that essential aspects relating to the reproduction of this type of subjectivity, and to capitalism as its enabling condition, have not yet been understood. How, one could ask, does bourgeois subjectivity thrive in a time when the idea of a "social" capitalism is clearly shattered and existential threats such as the ecological crisis no longer concern only the poorest and most marginalized? In this chapter, I argue that not only is bourgeois subjectivity upheld by the economic conditions of capitalism, but it has to be regarded in connection with *racial* capitalism. The concept of racial capitalism acknowledges global racism as an additional factor that structurally supports the bourgeois position by distinguishing it from that of racialized others. With Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Brenna Bhandar and Cheryl Harris, I trace the inscription of capitalism's founding principles of individual self-interest, property, and colonial conquest onto bourgeois subjectivity and its articulation as a social affect that—following Adorno and Horkheimer—I call "bourgeois coldness." Bourgeois coldness is a collectively shared affective state that helps to shield bourgeois subjects from the violence they have committed. I will show how this colonial structure of feeling results from the core principles of capitalism and resides in the very self-conception of bourgeois subjects up to and including the present day.

In their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947), Adorno and Horkheimer present a profound analysis of the bourgeois subject. Although this subject is traditionally conceptualized as a figure who approaches capitalism with a certain moral conscience, Adorno and Horkheimer view the bourgeois

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as a determined businessman[1] or entrepreneur whose focus on profit and indifference to the consequences of his actions allow him to navigate capitalism recklessly and successfully. Referencing the adventurous figure of Odysseus on his journey home from war in Troy, Adorno and Horkheimer remark that "the lone voyager armed with cunning is already *homo oeconomicus*, whom all reasonable people will one day resemble,"[2] thereby offering a conceptualization of bourgeois life within capitalism as risk and venture. They invoke Odysseus and his legendary intelligence in order to point to the seamless entanglement of capitalism and bourgeois reason. Odysseus survives because he is smart and skilled—and because he is reckless in pursuit of his survival. This is how Adorno and Horkheimer see the bourgeois subject within capitalism: not only has the bourgeois class successfully adapted to capitalism, but bourgeois subjectivity occupies an important position within it and drives its reproduction.

Adorno and Horkheimer are invested in the genealogy of the relationship between the figure of the bourgeois, its constitution during the Enlightenment, and the history of capitalism. They view the unfolding of this relationship as a coherent progression from early to contemporary forms of exploitation: "The bourgeois in the successive forms of the slave-owner, the free entrepreneur, and the administrator is the logical subject of enlightenment."[3] They also see capitalist exploitation in direct connection with Enlightenment subjectivity and push back against the idea that bourgeois democracy provides a framework for capitalism *with a human face*, stating that while bourgeois society may have an interest in disguising the structural force and reality of capitalist exploitation, its interest in the profit generated by exploitation is just as strong. They identify a structural similarity between three central figures of capitalist development: the free entrepreneur who is the moving force of the market, the administrator who ensures capitalism's compatibility with bourgeois law, and the slave owner who transforms humans into objects in order to extract the maximum output from them. Bourgeois coldness is an affective posture that characterizes all three positions. This understanding of coldness as a core feature of bourgeois society is, along with the description of the ways in which they themselves experience this coldness, one of the most profound social-affective observations that Adorno and Horkheimer provide. Indeed, coldness is a recurring motif in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, as well as in Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* and some of his late essays.

In this chapter, I rethink the concept of bourgeois coldness introduced by Adorno and Horkheimer and trace the constitution of a colonial affective order back to the installation of capitalist paradigms and modern subjectivity that emerged with the colonial conquest of Indigenous land in North America and John Locke's justification of it. Bourgeois coldness accounts for the reliance of capitalist subjectivity on racial difference. Although a

critical perspective focusing on the colonial aspects of modern capitalist society is given (at most) a very minor place in early Frankfurt School Critical Theory, white bourgeois self-interest is particularly pronounced when the colonial dimension of capitalist exploitation, oppression and extraction is considered. Bourgeois coldness does not refer only to forms of indifference to suffering from or within capitalism, but also to active participation in structural dynamics that secure the bourgeois order through the oppression and neglect of Europe's colonial others. It is a concept that demonstrates the need to offer a theoretical account of colonial feeling. While the sense of coldness that early Critical Theory articulated as a component of capitalism and as an integral part of the rise and fall of German fascism may be specific to that particular historical period, coldness can certainly be sensed beyond the events of the twentieth century when one tunes in to the mundane unfolding of racial violence in the past and present.

Capitalism and Entrepreneurial Coldness: Adorno, Horkheimer, and *The Odyssey*

The project of a "critical theory of society," Horkheimer explains in his famous essay from 1937, is "a theory dominated at every turn by a concern for reasonable conditions of life."[4] In the chapter "Traditional and Critical Theory," Horkheimer sets out the program of the Frankfurt School: it is a social scientific endeavour that aims not only to collect data and produce empirical knowledge, but to study society with the explicit intention of contributing to its change. Marx's dictum that "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it" is the underlying mantra of this theoretical orientation.[5]

Adorno and Horkheimer's work insists that Critical Theory, as opposed to traditional modes of thought, entails the reconfiguration of certain methodological principles. Both thinkers articulate their ideas through practices of writing that depart from sociological as well as philosophical traditions. At the core of what they understand as critique lies a sensibility, a feeling for the condition of society and an attempt to describe and investigate that condition through empirical as well as theoretical and affective means.[6] Adorno's *Minima Moralia* (1951), which bears the subtitle "Reflections from Damaged Life," may be the most experimental book in this regard. In order to understand not merely the political superstructure of fascism, but also its sedimentation in the affective structures of everyday life, Adorno offers observations on the rotten habits of individuals who have been shaped and damaged by capitalism. He problematizes, for example, practices of gift-giving, arguing that these have become impossible in a world where everything is measured by its value. In another instance, he

laments the alienation that enforces stereotypical enactments of masculinity, and in yet another aphorism, he takes on the role of an architecture critic, stating that in modern housing life itself becomes uninhabitable. Adorno's critical method in *Minima Moralia* is to be suspicious of the basic fixtures of life in a capitalist society; this method is also applied in some of his and Horkheimer's more systematic writings.

Looking at the habits of the bourgeois subject, Adorno and Horkheimer consider coldness to be primarily "cold reason,"[7] a form of rationality related to what Horkheimer would later call "instrumental reason."[8] Instrumental reason denotes a deformed type of rationality that serves only the recognition and realization of economic interest and the domination of nature. It conceives of individuals as autonomous entities who are detached from social causes and fully aligned with capitalist principles of self-interest. According to Horkheimer, reason is reduced to an instrument when the concern for concrete material circumstances is neglected and a purely abstract form of thought—one that prioritizes the value form—is applied to social relations and the world. Reason decays to become the sheer execution of power, or its regression to violence.

In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer enter into a long excursus on Homer's *Odyssey*, one of the founding texts of Western literary and philosophical traditions of thought. Establishing Odysseus as a "prototype of the bourgeois individual,"[9] they illustrate how, through his actions, the heroic defeat of nature, the use of reason for cunning, and the subsequent overruling of mythic powers result in a form of rationality that is essentially reckless and boundless. Their excursus outlines an important feature of the type of personhood that capitalism forms and favours: Odysseus's readiness to prevail over even the kinds of powers that are out of humanity's reach—divine powers—is proof of his willingness to assume risk and to subdue any resistance in order to complete his mission. He demonstrates the principle of reification, which I discuss further in this chapter. As a system that relies on the primitive accumulation, and thereby extraction, of resources without adequately accounting for their reproduction or the Earth's general sensitivity to irreversible damage, capitalism is driven by individuals with Odysseus's mentality: capitalist subjects who consider themselves invincible. The push to maximize profit and the ideology of progress produce a cognitive principle that no longer actually considers "reasonable conditions of life," but instead is led by the idea that these conditions will improve through the process of capitalist accumulation alone.

Adorno and Horkheimer are especially concerned about the capitalist formation of the world because nothing is safe from the forces of extraction, and the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* aims to demonstrate how even reason itself is being appropriated and reconfigured by capitalism.

At the core of this development lies the principle of exchange; in capitalism, everything is classified according to its exchangeability. Adorno and Horkheimer consider exchange an ontological principle rather than just an economic mode for the circulation of goods. This mode of circulation presupposes the existence of distinct objects to be exchanged. Accordingly, when exchange becomes a primordial category in capitalism, the world must be separated and organized into different objects in order for the circulation to function.

Reification is defined as the process of turning immaterial things—people or concepts—into material objects. Adorno and Horkheimer are convinced that this condition of existence in capitalism has dire consequences for nature as well as for the humans in it. Reification entails stripping away animateness from things, no matter what they are, so they are able to circulate smoothly. As reified objects cannot easily change their form, they can reliably be exchanged and sold. Adorno and Horkheimer observe that the principle of exchange—a guiding one in capitalist societies—applies the deadly elimination of the living to anything and anyone inhabiting the capitalist system, not just inanimate objects. And it is through this elimination of aliveness that reason becomes instrumental and thus no longer able to serve the improvement of living conditions unless this coheres with capitalist ideas of progress. Reason is measured only by its ability to generate profit—it has itself been reified.

The figure of Odysseus thus serves as a model for understanding how the reification of reason translates into cold bourgeois subjectivity. For Adorno and Horkheimer, Odysseus's abilities, gained as voyager and warrior, are features that enable him to act as *homo oeconomicus*, the economically reasonable man, perfectly adapted to capitalism: he knows how to prioritize his own interest in any situation. Furthermore, the authors compare Odysseus's heroic and ruthless personality with that of an entrepreneur who, on the hunt for profit, is ready to sacrifice anything. This does not mean that ruthlessness alone defines capitalist behaviour, but rather that the combination of Odysseus's cunning, the rationality of exchange, and his commitment to self-interest enables his success. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Odysseus returns from his journey alone, as his companions have all fallen victim to either their greed or the lethal divine powers they encountered. In many cases, Odysseus voluntarily accepted the risk of losing his friends. Without embellishing this aspect, translator Emily Wilson rephrases the first verses of the epic in her 2018 translation of Homer's text: "he worked to save his life and bring his men back home[.] He failed, and for their own mistakes, they died."[10]

Odysseus survives because he does not hesitate to risk his and his friends' lives and because he cleverly uses their labour power, which is at his disposal. One of the epic's most famous scenes, that of the ship and

the sirens' island, makes the relations of production explicit. Odysseus's cunning plan to pass the deadly island is completely dependent upon his companions, who row the ship as he insists on listening to the sirens' song, despite Circe's warning. While he instructs his friends to plug their ears with wax so they will avoid hearing the song and thus escape its seduction, he ties himself to the mast with open ears to experience what no one has survived experiencing. Adorno and Horkheimer draw an analogy between this scene and exploited workers: "Workers must look ahead with alert concentration and ignore anything which lies to one side. The urge toward distraction must be grimly sublimated in redoubled exertions. Thus, the workers are made practical."[11] Without going into further detail about how Odysseus's cunning breaks the absolute nature of divine power, I would like to draw attention to the depiction of capitalist relations of power between the adventurous "entrepreneur" Odysseus and the dependent "workers" at the oars.

Reification applies to broad sections of capitalist society, and Adorno and Horkheimer do not distinguish between the bourgeois and the capitalist when describing social habits and patterns. While it is necessary for historical analysis to be more careful when conflating these roles, Adorno and Horkheimer are interested in bourgeois society's complicity with capitalism as well as in the idea of freedom that derives from the exchange principle as articulated by the bourgeoisie. The limitations of this particular concept of freedom were previously described by Marx and Engels: "It [the bourgeoisie] has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade."[12] Here, freedom is understood as strictly individual; it corresponds with an idea of autonomy that denotes flexibility and success on the free market.

For now, I return to the employment of coldness as an affective description of the capitalist-bourgeois individual. Adorno and Horkheimer hold that the adoption of instrumental reason, a form of reason that focuses on the production of profit, limits or mutes the individual's capacity for compassion. When the logic of exchange has become so ubiquitous that it constitutes not merely an ontological mode but a principle of survival, other motivations are sidelined. This is the point at which coldness permeates the social structure: coldness is a logical way to organize affective life in capitalism. Once coldness has become established as a social principle, or a general way in which people relate to one another, it is increasingly difficult to escape its grasp. In addition, the organization of life in a system hostile to life—which capitalism is—reveals the dialectical and often ambivalent character of coldness. Even if an attitude of coldness appears as the result of all capitalism's wrongs, and even if coldness is the internalization of capitalist interests into individual social-affective existence,

coldness is also a way of responding to capitalism's brutality. "Growing cold" can be a defence mechanism in a world that is increasingly unlivable, and therefore Adorno and Horkheimer perceive bourgeois coldness as related to "Stoic indifference." Stoicism, they believe, is an antidote to the morality of pity and remains committed—in some ways—to "the universal."[13] With this quotation, Adorno and Horkheimer emphasize that coldness is a practice that produces cognitive independence from one's immediate material circumstances; it can be employed in different ways and is therefore not to be condemned prematurely. The critical challenge with which they contend is apprehending the specific form of bourgeois coldness, with its regressive tendencies, while avoiding proposing naive notions of "warmth" as a social response.

In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer develop the idea that a certain type of bourgeois individuality is facilitated by social coldness and indifference because these rest on the principles of capitalist reification and exploitation. Bourgeois individuals would not exist without the material conditions of wealth created through the ownership of the means of production. Nor would they exist without the production of this wealth along another important axis of difference that structures bourgeois social life: racial subjection.

Adorno and Horkheimer do not account for the colonial dimension in the history of capitalism, yet their analysis relates to another historical event of immeasurable violence. Adorno, in particular, identifies (bourgeois) coldness as the social condition that made the Shoah possible.[14] The indifference that is part of reified social relations prepared German society to accept a systematic mass murder without objecting, let alone intervening. Adorno and Horkheimer's remark that, for exploitation and extraction to continue undisturbed, life seen as "other" must be devalued, appears pertinent here: "Odysseus's defenselessness against the foaming sea sounds like a legitimation of the enrichment of the voyager at the expense of indigenous inhabitants."[15] Suddenly Odysseus appears not simply a mythological figure trying to fulfil a task assigned by the gods; he is also aligned with the European explorers from the fifteenth century onwards who set out to cross the oceans. These voyagers, who considered their arrival on another continent a "discovery," enslaved or killed the people they met and appropriated whatever they found. This behaviour was in many respects similar to Odysseus's encounters with the inhabitants of the various islands, as well as to colonizing practices in antiquity.[16] Adorno and Horkheimer recognize the dynamic of exploration and appropriation as the founding principle of bourgeois society: "Bourgeois economics later enshrined this principle in the concept of risk: the possibility of foundering is seen as a moral justification for profit."[17] Violent dispossession can easily be justified in capitalist societies by the economic risk accepted as a

starting point of any journey or entrepreneurial endeavour, and this automatically leads to the dehumanization of those who reside on the land now framed as a source of profit. This demonstrates the congruence of bourgeois economics with colonialism and racialization.

Rather than being an exception in capitalist economies, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, violence is integrated into the social relations that accompany them. Coldness is a technique of prioritizing the maximization of profit over the needs of anything living. As the next section shows in more detail, it is practiced most adeptly by bourgeois subjects who legitimize their execution of power through moral principles formulated in Enlightenment philosophy. A reading of John Locke's second treatise, and more specifically the scene of primitive accumulation and its presentation, illustrates how these subjects are constituted and how bourgeois law and capitalism are entangled.

Capitalism and Ownership of the Self: John Locke and Colonial Conquest

One key aspect of understanding the bourgeois relation with the world is the category of property. As well as being important in terms of the economic existence of the bourgeois class, it must be considered a fundamental element in the bourgeois conception of the self. There are several ways in which property and the self can be related to one another. John Locke has most notably and influentially established the dependence of selfhood on the category of property, and since the history of Western political philosophy builds on his ideas, revisiting them is fruitful for apprehending how deeply property is woven into the fabric of the modern bourgeois self. Adorno and Horkheimer's critique is directed at precisely the social manifestations of Locke's theoretical account of property relations as the necessary condition of social life and freedom.

First, Locke describes the process of property acquisition through labour: working the soil in order to make it fertile entitles the labourer to call it their property, a logic that applies not only to land but also to body and mind; they are a person's property as long as they are *worked* on. Second, Locke was a shareholder in the Royal African Company and therefore directly invested in the slave trade and colonial expeditions. He also participated in the writing of the constitution of the Province of Carolina (1663–1707) in 1669, and thus had a direct perspective on the question of land property and colonial law.[18]

In his *Second Treatise on Government*, Locke states: "Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself."[19] The first principle of a right to nature is to determine the difference between

property and commons, and the transitions between them. Locke makes it sound like a universal principle—that self-ownership is an inalienable right. I will return to the key exceptions of that right later; however, the notion that "the labour of his body, and the work of his hands … are properly his" means, for Locke, that this labour and these hands can extend the property of the man to whom they belong.[20] "Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in," Locke notes, "he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property."[21] Ownership of the self, as well as conferring protection against abuse or injury, can be considered a principle of expansion into the world: someone who owns their body and labour can also own anything that has come into contact with their body and labour. In the process of property-making, labour is the most important way of generating property, and thereby also the most important category to install law.[22]

Once property exists, it can and must be protected. The initiation of a property relation, Locke writes, "excludes the common right of other men,"[23] because the forces of appropriation that unfold through labour rule out the right to common use. Locke, however, wants to be precise: he questions when the apples someone has picked from a tree "begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat?"[24] and answers this by stating that a property relation is constituted in the first act of labour that works to appropriate nature. The decisive point is when "labour put a distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done."[25] Labour transforms the object of consumption or appropriation so it is no longer part of an undefined plenitude of things, but a distinct thing, a property. Locke is interested in this process of detachment of parts of nature *from* nature through man's hand. In this argument, nature and man are not the same; Locke's philosophy grounds the emergence of law in the difference between humans and nature and on the principle of property and its process, in which nature is appropriated by humans. Whereas this definition of property acquisition may be unproblematic when referring to the picking of apples and the hunting of deer, it is more difficult for Locke to determine rightful ownership of land. Barbara Arneil considers Locke's knowledge of and participation in colonial appropriation in order to contextualize his theory of property, stating that while Locke thinks of the English and the Indigenous population of the "New World" as equals when it comes to the appropriation of "spontaneous products of nature," this is not the case for land ownership.[26]

In her 2018 work *Colonial Lives of Property*, Brenna Bhandar engages further with the question of what the primordial positions of property and labour mean for the idea of the subject.[27] She focuses on labour as a

precondition for property, as well as on how it has been weaponized in the context of colonial conquest. If property can only be acquired through labour on land or nature, this rule must also be true for self-ownership. In other words, not everyone can be recognized as an owner of their own body and mind, only those who recognizably *labour* on themselves: "for self-consciousness, or identity," Bhandar argues, "appropriation is the mode through which the self constitutes (or recognizes) itself and is thus a continual process rather than a static one."[28] In order for someone to be considered an individual, their self has to be acquired through continuous labour on its raw material—the mind and the body. This self-relation of caring ownership is the realization of freedom according to Locke: " 'every free man must always be considered *somehow a proprietor, or an "owner" of something*,' which is individuality itself."[29] When employed by Locke as a method of distinguishing white colonizers from racialized colonized people, this principle of self-ownership as duty is used as a tool for the establishment of racial difference and the exploitation of Indigenous people.

Fred Moten and Stefano Harney state that "self-knowledge is self-possession and self-positioning in Locke."[30] Locke's idea of property makes an implicit demand on individuals, asking them to consider themselves their own property and consequently to act upon themselves as they would act upon property. This particular self-relation has been described by Macpherson as "possessive individualism,"[31] a term that refers to the Lockean—as well as Hobbesian—idea that "the individual … is free inasmuch as he is proprietor of his person and capacities."[32] Reinterpreting seventeenth-century political thought, Macpherson offers a reading of Hobbes and Locke that focuses on how they conceptualize the entanglement of selfhood and property, and in doing so looks anew at notions bound to the self. He emphasizes that "it cannot be said that the seventeenth-century concepts of freedom, rights, obligation, and justice are all entirely derived from this concept of possession, but it can be shown that they were powerfully shaped by it."[33] When the self is so closely related to the social agreement on property, and therefore prone to be part of mechanisms of exchange, it should be considered not only as property but also as commodity. Self-ownership is a distinct form of self-relation as well as self-conception. It is thus not a given state that every human being holds; ownership of the self is assigned or acquired on the basis of one's position within property relations.

Scholarship has repeatedly drawn attention to the specific historical situation in which John Locke came to formulate his theory of property and justice.[34] His political activity concerning the constitution of the Province of Carolina has caused debate about contradictions in his work. In the *Second Treatise of Government*, he initially appears to reject slavery, but

then justifies it in the context of colonial warfare. Examining the episode in which Locke describes colonial conquest as an operation of moral necessity sheds light on the key role of ownership for bourgeois freedom and how this notion of freedom manifests in racial violence and coldness.

Locke conceptualizes slavery as "nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive."[35] Whereas Locke finds it of paramount importance to state in the treatise's preface that "I suppose no body hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our common safety, and be again an advocate for slavery,"[36] he seems to draw a clear distinction between slavery in England and slavery in the colonies. In the colonies, slavery exists as a direct result of conflicts of conquest and is therefore to be considered an unproblematic manifestation of "the state of war continued." Locke describes the shape of this relation as "an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other."[37] In his view, slavery is a settlement that ends the violence of fighting and is therefore justified.[38] The importance of property relations to Locke's theory of justice is evident in the scene of colonial conquest. Locke conceives of conquest as premised on the capacity to own property: in the context of English colonialism, not everyone is eligible to be a proprietor of land because not every relation to the land is acknowledged as constitutive of a right to it. Although Locke argues that enslavement has no place in the forms of government that he seeks to establish as just, a closer look at colonial realities and Locke's knowledge of them calls for a materialist reading of his work that considers the consistencies and contradictions between the treatise and certain events in the colonies.

There is no doubt that Locke profited financially from colonial trade and was informed about enslavement in the colonies.[39] As well as the treatise, Locke's authorship of the *Fundamental Constitution of Carolina* (1669) is clear proof of his knowledge of and interest in colonial strategy and government. In the "colonial instruction" that Farr understands his text to be,[40] slavery is referred to as part of the colonial power relation: "Every Freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and Authority over his Negro slaves of what opinion or Religion soever."[41] This leads many to the conclusion that Locke's *Treatise* is consistent neither with the constitution nor with the creation of the constitution during colonialism.[42] Although the apparent contradictions of Locke's views on slavery might be puzzling, the coherence between a rejection of the institution of slavery and its affirmation as a state of war may be found elsewhere.

Reading Locke afresh allows an interpretation in which colonial violence is justified through the establishment of property itself—before slavery is even mentioned.[43] The main reason for conflict is the original appropriation of Indigenous land by the colonizers, described as "so-called primitive accumulation" by Karl Marx.[44] Circling back to the inextricable relation

of property with labour, colonial subjection, conquest, and enslavement find common ground in the relation between humans and land. Därmann has emphasized that Locke's "colonial instructions" do not aim at a mere appropriation of land but at a coherent connection between the work being done and the amount of land being claimed as property.[45] This is how Locke establishes the natural limits of appropriation:

> As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use; there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established.[46]

In this paragraph, Locke seems to bind appropriation to a sense of reason and thereby to protect it from being associated with greed. The acquisition of property has to happen in relation to the self and its capacity for labour. But what at first glance appears to advocate for justice and adequacy can also be interpreted as a duty. If labour is a condition of property, how is land to be used otherwise? And what kind of labour is being recognized as sufficient to base property claims on?

The history of colonial conquest has engaged in precisely this inversion. The preconditions of ownership have been invoked to deny Indigenous people the use of land by presuming them incapable of the labour allegedly necessary to own it. Bhandar highlights the difference between use and ownership in this context, explaining colonial expropriation as a privilege of the latter and disregard of the former. She describes how the ascription of the category of "wasteland" to colonized areas has justified them being put under the colonizer's guard: "The distinction between cultivated land and wasteland ultimately became the basis, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, upon which European colonial powers justified their legal doctrines of *terra nullius* and discovery."[47] Just as self-ownership ultimately tasks the individual with improving their mind and body, unclaimed land constitutes a prompt for civil appropriation and improvement according to the standards of the colonizers.

What this constellation of colonial property relations helps us to understand about the subject that emerges within them is that a constant striving for improvement is the only possible relation to the self. In order to be able to lay claim to oneself—to own oneself—one has to prove the ability to

improve the object of that ownership. That ability, just like the ability to cultivate land in certain forms, is seen as the colonizer's, and it is therefore one important aspect used to establish whiteness as a category of distinction between colonial and colonized life forms.[48] Colonial, and subsequently racial, difference is established in terms of the eligibility for ownership that John Locke conceived of and expounded. This applies to the ownership of land, which is grounded in specific forms of agricultural labour, and it applies to the ownership of the self, which is secured through constant improvement of mind and body.

"Whiteness as Property": Cheryl Harris and the White Claim to the World

The relation between colonial conquest, Indigenous land, the subjects considered owners and those presumed incapable of having any possessions is a founding motif of racial capitalism, and it accounts for the always already racialized dimension of capitalist exploitation. Destin Jenkins and Justin Leroy summarize the main claims made by key contributors to the debate around racial capitalism as follows:[49]

> Racial capitalism is the process by which the key dynamics of capitalism—accumulation/dispossession, credit/debt, production/surplus, capitalist/worker, developed/underdeveloped, contract/coercion, and others—become articulated through race. In other words, capital has not historically accumulated without previously existing relations of racial inequality. This process functions in two ways. First, the violent dispossessions inherent to capital accumulation operate by leveraging, intensifying, and creating racial distinctions. Second, race serves as a tool for naturalizing the inequalities produced by capitalism, and this racialized process of naturalization serves to rationalize the unequal distribution of resources, social power, rights, and privileges.[50]

Cheryl Harris, one of the leading scholars of Critical Race Theory, has described this deep codependence of racism and capital accumulation with the formula "whiteness as property," a term proposing an equation between the concept of whiteness and that of property. She traces the category of whiteness throughout legal history in order to understand how, despite being historically constructed, it has been employed to articulate and enforce legal demands. One obvious example of such a legal claim is that made by slaves who sued for their freedom on the basis of being "too white to be enslaved."[51] Harris invokes the case of her Black grandmother who presented herself as a white person in 1930s America, "passing" in order to secure a job so she could feed herself and her daughters. This

"act of both great daring and self-denial"[52] illustrates the extent to which whiteness is a property, like seed capital, that generates access to a market. Harris's argument takes a broad view of racism and capitalism: rather than thinking of them as two separate social structures, she emphasizes that they are equally fundamental in shaping how property operates, and that the closer we look at the notion of property, the harder it is to distinguish them.

Harris asks for the condition of possibility for property to exist—and identifies this condition in the emergence of racial capitalism. She denaturalizes property as a given social category and thereby interrogates it as a prevalent category of subjectivity and self-relation. She is interested in the ways in which property builds on whiteness and remains attached to it, even if it has come to exist as a universal legal form in the present.

The historical link between ownership and whiteness, established through property as the colonizers' relation to land and racialized slaves, has notable implications for racialized subjectivity today. Through being identified as "the characteristic, the attribute, the property of free human beings,"[53] whiteness has become a kind of personhood that assumes its right to own the world. Harris is interested in the psychosocial manifestations of this, describing whiteness as an "expectation of admission" crucial for the relation between whiteness and institutions.[54] She views institutions and the market as catering to the needs of white people, and legal institutions as the guards of white privilege. Being situated in property relations, as I have explained, means conceiving of the world primarily as a resource to be owned and used. Whiteness thus means to claim universal access to that resource. White people expect to be wanted in any space, to have a right to be protected by the state (the police) from whatever they feel threatened by,[55] and to be in general control of the path of their lives.

Harris discusses affirmative action programs that attempt to address existing injustices by facilitating, for specific racialized groups, access to education that pre-existing structures of privilege often prevent them from. She highlights how these programmes have been accused of institutionally installing "reverse racism," and are under renewed threat. In this case, whiteness manifests as the assumption that any limitation of access for white people is unjust; as Harris states, whiteness is invested in the consequential claim "that the expectation of white privilege is valid, and that the legal protection of that expectation is warranted."[56] She cites a legal case in which a white student successfully sued for university admission on the basis of the fourteenth amendment, claiming to have been discriminated against when Black and Latinx students with lower grades were admitted through special programmes "in their place." With this verdict, the US justice system categorized white people as victims because something to which they had unlimited access in the past had become

unavailable to them. White self-victimization does not follow considerations of justice, but rather those of custom and entitlement, and it does not consider the historical conditions of white access compared with the access of groups supposedly privileged by affirmative action. Once again, according to Harris, whiteness appears as property since it is the condition under which one can make a legally justified claim to something. Harris argues that even if this social arrangement "does not mean that all whites will win," it nonetheless means "they will not lose."[57] Whiteness is the guarantee that something will always be available, some part of the world will always be accessible, and the state will help secure the fulfilment of one's needs. In W. E. B. Du Bois's words, "whiteness is the ownership of the earth forever and ever";[58] it is a property object one can possess and monetize, and at the same time a social structure that organizes the world through property.

Harris's notion of whiteness as property is a direct consequence of John Locke's initial claim that ownership—including ownership of oneself—is based on labour. The reason white people can lay claim to institutions is that racism figures them as the natural owners of themselves, while Black and racialized people, as the formerly enslaved and colonized, are not capable of the labour of improvement on the land *or* on themselves required to qualify for ownership. What was initially a justification of colonial appropriation through John Locke's theory of property and labour has come to form a social relation fundamental to modernity as an epoch of racial capitalism. The formula of "whiteness as property" is a poignant expression encapsulating the conditions of capitalism today: the expropriation and enslavement of Indigenous people and the transatlantic slave trade have fixed the conflation of whiteness with ownership and the conflation of racialized people with dispossessed forms of existence. Harris states that "whiteness was the characteristic, the attribute, the property of free human beings."[59]

Selfhood in capitalism means to claim self-ownership. This claim is historically based on whiteness as a property that makes a person eligible for ownership. The category of property and its dependence on whiteness were established through colonial conquest and manifested in legal and institutional arrangements that still prevail today.

Coldness as Colonial Affect

The concept of bourgeois coldness contains the racialized property relations outlined above because bourgeois subjectivity is one instantiation of whiteness. What Adorno and Horkheimer have described as an alienated, reified relation with the world originated in the prioritization of ownership over use and in the objectification of colonial others: their

classification as savages or their enslavement. The primary importance that John Locke placed on labour as the force that constitutes a property relation does not, as one could assume, disrupt the abstract idea of ownership; instead, it clearly establishes a hierarchy of possessing subject and possessed object—be this land or an objectified person. To see property as a result of labour is to assume a general appropriability of the world through labouring on it, whereas the kinds of labour that bear the force of appropriation have to fulfil certain criteria. When property is a result of labour, one can only lay claim to one's body and mind if adequate work is performed on these.

In *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels describe the progressive potential of bourgeois life as the ability to disempower myth and replace it with calculation. Bourgeois society successfully transforms images of idyllic heteropatriarchy into blunter and less-disguised forms of violence. Marx and Engels view the bourgeoisie as a driving force of exploitation because the freedom of the market is the only freedom it can imagine:

> The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left no other bond between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.[60]

In this passage, Marx and Engels criticize not only the bourgeoisie's economic practices and mindset, but also the specific affective dimensions of bourgeois life. From the bourgeois standpoint, it is never enough to merely change the relations of production to maximize profit; that change must also seem convincing to fellow social agents. Standing up against "religious fervour, chivalrous enthusiasm, philistine sentimentalism" in the name of rationality and enlightenment creates an affective disposition in which the sober calculus of the *homo oeconomicus* appears inevitable. From this particular perspective, anything distracting the human being from their ability to calculate must be drowned in the icy water Marx and Engels invoke in their image of ruthlessness.

This does not mean bourgeois society disallows the appearance of feelings. Rather, a certain affective disposition must be installed as a shared social default in order for capitalism to advance unhindered.[61] In *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels offer a reading of the affective conditions of bourgeois society that identifies its all-encompassing tendency and persuasiveness in promising success for all members and aspirants of the bourgeois class.

The coldness of bourgeois society must be understood as an affective manifestation of the multiple violent preconditions of modern European capitalism. Coldness assumes the self-ownership of European subjects and the enslavement and dispossession of racialized others; it is an attachment to institutions of the state and to rationality as a principle equivalent to justice and freedom. Coldness is to consider the world, the Earth, and all beings on it as resources for human extraction.

Conclusion

The connection between property and white bourgeois selfhood has been illuminated by several historically diverse theoretical positions in order to emphasize the continuities of bourgeois affective and economic situatedness throughout the history of capitalism and colonialism. While Adorno and Horkheimer dig for the roots of bourgeois subjectivity in Homer's *Odyssey*, John Locke's theory of property and labour gives an account of the self-relation employed by the colonial bourgeois subject. The colonial character of white bourgeois relations to land, others and the self is established in the criteria that Locke defines for rightful appropriation and just enslavement, and these criteria prevail in the afterlife of slavery through legal institutions supporting white privilege. Cheryl Harris's analysis pursues an understanding of the deep entanglement of racism and capitalism by equating whiteness with property and assists comprehension of how far the white bourgeois subject, with their claim to legally sustained white privilege, is the carrier of racial capitalism. These different theoretical elements have helped me not only to trace the dependence of white bourgeois subjectivity on property, but also to think about the affective relationship of bourgeois subjects with the world. Coldness as a characterization of the bourgeoisie relates to what Cheryl Harris calls the "expectation of admission,"[62] which marks one manifestation of white "ownership of the earth forever and ever."[63] Crucially, as an affective quality of indifference that accompanies the claim to the world, coldness is concrete and specific. It is a theoretical figure that helps to reflect on ownership as one specific way of relating to oneself and others. While it is not the sufficient condition for the existence of capitalism or racism, it must

be regarded as the white and bourgeois affective strategy for comfortably inhabiting the conditions created through racial capitalism.

Notes

1 I intentionally use he/his pronouns to signal the historically gendered social location of the bourgeois subject as a male individual. Nevertheless, bourgeois subjectivity can clearly be assumed from any gendered position.
2 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 48.
3 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 65.
4 Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, 198–199.
5 Elster, *Karl Marx*, 23.
6 Marasco, *Highway of Despair*; Baeza, "Normative Role"; Mussell, *Critical Theory*; Noland, "Adorno and Affect"; Kohpeiß, "Gefühlter Selbstwiderspruch."
7 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 72.
8 Horkheimer, *Instrumental Reason*.
9 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 35.
10 Homer, *Odyssey*, 5.
11 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 26.
12 Marx and Engels, *Manifesto*, 11.
13 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 80.
14 Adorno, "Education after Auschwitz"; Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*.
15 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 48.
16 Malkin, *Returns of Odysseus*; Rinon, "Pivotal Scene"; Williams, *Savage Anxieties*.
17 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 48.
18 Därmann, *Undienlichkeit*; Farr, "Locke."
19 Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, § 27.
20 Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, § 27.
21 Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, § 27.
22 Därmann, *Undienlichkeit*, 89.
23 Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, § 27.
24 Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, § 28.
25 Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, § 28.
26 Arneil, *John Locke*, 137.
27 Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*.
28 Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*, 166.
29 Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*, 167, using a quote by Balibar, "Possessive Individualism," 302, italics in original.
30 Harney and Moten, "Habits of Assembly," 24.
31 Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*.
32 Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*, 3.
33 Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*, 3.
34 Armitage, "John Locke"; Arneil, *John Locke*; Därmann, *Undienlichkeit*; Farr, "Locke."

35 Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, § 24.
36 Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, 5.
37 Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, § 24.
38 Farr, "Locke," 496.
39 Farr, "Locke," 497.
40 Farr, "Locke," 507.
41 Farr, "Locke," 508.
42 Farr, "Locke," 509.
43 Arneil, "The Wild Indian's Venison"; Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*; Därmann, *Undienlichkeit*.
44 Marx, *Capital*, 871.
45 Därmann, *Undienlichkeit*, 89.
46 Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, § 31.
47 Bhandar, *Colonial Lives of Property*, 49, italics in original.
48 "White" does not just describe an ethnic identity determined by skin colour. Whiteness is a concept that itself is a result of historical construction, and it allowed colonizers to distinguish themselves from colonized people (Allen, *Invention*).
49 Robinson, *Black Marxism*; Robinson, *Robinson*; Gilmore, *Golden Gulag*; Gilmore, *Abolition Geography*.
50 Jenkins and Leroy, Introduction, 3.
51 Owens, interview.
52 Harris, "Whiteness as Property," 1710.
53 Harris, "Whiteness as Property," 1721.
54 Harris, "Whiteness as Property," 1770.
55 Martinot and Sexton, "Avant-Garde," 169; Guenther, "Seeing Like a Cop."
56 Harris, "Whiteness as Property," 1769.
57 Harris, "Whiteness as Property," 1758.
58 Du Bois, *Darkwater*, 30.
59 Harris, "Whiteness as Property," 1721.
60 Marx and Engels, *Manifesto*, 11.
61 Mühlhoff, "Affective Disposition."
62 Harris, "Whiteness as Property," 1770.
63 Du Bois, *Darkwater*, 30.

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2 Cold Pop

How West German Pop Culture Began to Embrace the Modern World

Florian Völker

At the end of the 1970s, German-language pop music saw a new and distinctly German phenomenon emerge: cold pop. I use this term to denote an aesthetic and cultural concept that had coldness at the centre of its performances, song lyrics, and sounds. Its best-known representatives include internationally successful bands such as Kraftwerk, Deutsch-Amerikanische Freundschaft (DAF) and Einstürzende Neubauten. The imagery they used and the conduct they displayed, all of which could be described as cold, made a brief but influential appearance that reached far beyond the music sphere and its broader cold wave in German pop culture (1978–1983). They continue to have an impact on international pop music and bands such as Rammstein; to this day, coldness is globally the most successful and influential aesthetic concept of German pop music.

But coldness is far more than a mere pop music phenomenon. The cold snap in German pop music was part of the genesis of the so-called Neue Deutsche Welle (New German Wave, NDW), which, far from being a pure musical trend or subculture, embodied the changed attitude of an entire movement of young people towards the life-world areas of society, history, aesthetics, pop culture, and (national) identity. The emergence of cold pop is thus closely linked to the profound upheavals that West German society underwent at the end of the 1970s. Cold pop artists' often-aggressive endorsement of the industrialized, postmodern, capitalist and therefore supposedly cold world constituted a reaction to and catalyst for precisely these upheavals. Through juxtaposition with the metaphor and motif of warmth, it becomes clear that the emphatic glorification of the cold represents an act of separation as well as revaluation. With their enactment of distance through pop cultural means, cold pop artists targeted various groups: mainstream West German society, which was perceived as conservative and regressive; the pop music of the Federal Republic, which was regarded as an Anglo-American import; and the representatives of

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the "old" left-alternative counterculture, who were criticized for being anachronistic or even reactionary. Representatives of cold pop, who I will refer to as "78s" to distinguish them from the "68s" (participants in the 1968 protest movement), viewed both the left-alternative hippie milieu and punk subculture as part of an outdated counterculture. Cold pop broke with previous precepts on the subject of cold and created a counter-concept to the warm conduct prevalent in the leftist circles of the 1970s. Social warmth had been viewed as an antidote to those aspects of advancing modernity associated with coldness, such as industrialization, the euphoria of progress, postmodern notions of the subject, and the capitalist system.[1] Capitalism, in particular, was believed to cool interpersonal relationships and lead to social alienation. Through a complete reversal of the bourgeois and countercultural catalogue of values, the artists of cold pop eventually changed not only their perspective on the structural upheavals in West German society that were understood as crises, but also their way of dealing with them.

Through a system of motifs, codes, and strategies, the musicians of cold pop affirmed and aestheticized on textual, performative, and sonic levels all those signs and processes of (post)modernity that were interpreted, by West German society and especially by the left-wing alternative milieu at the end of the 1970s, as negative or even threatening aspects of a supposedly cold world: de-emotionalization and dehumanization; industry and the metropolis; social distance and alienation; artificiality and surface aesthetics; discipline and physical functionality; violence and harshness; signs of decay and images of death; hostility and totalitarian aesthetics; consumerism and hedonism; images of thermal coldness such as snow and ice; building materials such as concrete, glass, and steel; and technical devices such as computers, machines, and robots. Furthermore, the cold pop artists rejected previous countercultural critiques of commerciality and consumerism.

This chapter explores the various approaches and forms of cold pop, which I trace through a discourse analysis of its products (song lyrics, record covers) as well as performances and forms of behaviour. To underline its cultural-historical significance, I situate the emergence of cold pop in the contemporary framework of social upheavals and intra-countercultural conflicts. Comparisons with the contemporaneous forms of behaviour dominant in left-wing counterculture and with the Anglo-American new wave movement underline the unique attempts of the German cold pop artists to diverge from the traditional value models and perspectives of the left. Following my analysis, I pose the question of whether their endorsement of the capitalist world turned the cold pop artists into cold capitalists.

Cold Pop

What are the characteristics of cold pop? One of the most striking ways in which coldness was staged was through the presentation of dehumanized and emotionless beings, as systematically used by Kraftwerk throughout their career. Although the band originally started as a krautrock group, in many ways Kraftwerk formed a bridge to the new wave. From the second half of the 1970s, the band's aesthetic, expressed in performances through robotic movements and uniform clothing, expanded to include the use of mannequins and later robots as representatives of the musicians. The group retained these machine visuals in its stage setup, which often consisted only of consoles, keyboards, and neon tubes. It was particularly notable when juxtaposed with the body-emphasizing, sexually loaded, and often sweaty performances by contemporary rock stars. Similar approaches can be seen in the staging and aestheticization of physical functionality and discipline—for example, the combination of repetitive sequencer rhythms with mechanical body movements. This appears in Kraftwerk's performances, but also—in a far more virile form—in those of the duo DAF, considered pioneers of electronic body music (EBM). It is no coincidence that both Kraftwerk and DAF were from Düsseldorf and the Rhine-Ruhr region, with its unique *mélange* of industrial backdrop, consumer world, and art. The city was the origin of this pop musical engagement with coldness, which aimed at a *neusachliche* aestheticization of (post-)industrial modernity and idealized portrayals of bodies designed for mechanization, hardening, and disciplining. The cold pop attitude was also demonstrated through a staging of artificiality and conformity that went against punk culture and the left-alternative scene—wearing suits and sporting proper short hairstyles, for instance. Other prominent representatives of this aesthetic included The Wirtschaftswunder and Palais Schaumburg.

The strategy of differentiation from left-alternative culture through an endorsement of cold values also included the aestheticization of militarism and totalitarianism. When it came to clothing, groups distanced themselves from left-wing alternative styles and rejected warm fabrics and colours. The bands DAF and Malaria! attracted particular attention with their all-black outfits, often featuring leather and uniforms. In some cases, artists went so far as to aesthetically incorporate totalitarian, fascist, Soviet communist or National Socialist images and aesthetics: a Soviet awards ceremony graces the front cover of the DAF LP *Die Kleinen und die Bösen* (1980), while part of *Der Fahnenträger*, a plaster model created in 1938 by Nazi sculptor Arno Breker to decorate the Neue Reichskanzlei in Berlin, is shown on Die Partei's album *La Freiheit des Geistes* (1981; Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Here we find differences in the use of imagery linked to National Socialism: whereas in early British industrial music (the group

Figure 2.1 Front cover of the LP *Die Kleinen und die Bösen* (1980) by DAF.

Throbbing Gristle, for example) the focus was primarily on the killing machine and the suffering of those victimized by the Nazis, and in punk Nazi symbols were chiefly employed as a means of provocation, the artists of the early NDW aestheticized the signs, propaganda, and products of totalitarian, Soviet-Communist and fascist systems. In keeping with this, cold pop musicians presented an image of the "cold German"—emotionless and humourless, precise and disciplined, more machine than man—that fitted perfectly into internationally prevailing clichés. Following the cold strategy of non-communication, they left it unclear whether this was meant seriously or ironically.[2] To this day, emphasizing supposedly national characteristics is still the most common way that groups like Kraftwerk and Rammstein enter the international pop arena; they are celebrated worldwide, not despite but because of their German lyrics and their characteristic, supposedly typically German, appearance.

Figure 2.2 Front cover of the LP *La Freiheit des Geistes* (1981) by Die Partei.

Many early NDW musicians explicitly distanced themselves from punk rock, which in their opinion was still too strongly oriented towards (blues) rock. They did so through the use of strange and unpopular sounds as well as significantly reduced instrumentation and a minimal song structure. The main focus was minimalist loops (generated by synthesizers and sequencers), to which all other elements such as vocals, guitar or drums—if there were any at all—were subordinated. This reduction to a few audio tracks was interpreted by many reviewers as "passionless," "emotionless," "dehumanized," and ultimately "cold." Protagonists of the early NDW scene frequently attributed their music—or rather its sound and background—to the lifeworld environment, which was perceived as cold and sometimes threatening. In line with this notion of the cold, the cold pop artists did not react to the environment by criticizing metropolitan life, but rather by welcoming the (post-)industrial and urban soundscapes that had been, and still were, largely regarded negatively in the public discourse and left-alternative circles in particular.

The West Berlin group Einstürzende Neubauten, which used scrap metal and tools to produce sound and recorded its first cassette *Stahlmusik* (1980) in a hollow, narrow space under a motorway bridge, made an international impact with its glorification of the supposedly cold city. Here, the strategy of abrasive assent met that of distance, which could increase to the point of hostility towards the listener; musicians from the West Berlin "Geniale Dilletanten" scene—among them Einstürzende Neubauten, Die Tödliche Doris, Notorische Reflexe, and Sentimentale Jugend—were particularly representative of this tendency. For example, according to band member F.M. Einheit, Einstürzende Neubauten's debut LP *Kollaps* (1981) was planned from the beginning of production to be "an unlistenable record" ("eine unhörbare Platte").[3] With these sounds, the dissociation from punk was all too obvious. Finally, there were also various methods of self-dehumanization and distance on a vocal level. These included performances of the vocal part that demonstrated emotionlessness and apathy—for example, through an emphatically bored and indifferent-sounding intonation, characteristic of Annette Humpe from Ideal and the group Die Tödliche Doris, along with many others. Likewise, the use of vocoders that artificially distort human voices and make them robot-like, as in "Die Roboter" / "The Robots" (1978) by Kraftwerk, can be seen as an attempt to transfer elements of coldness into pop music.

Numerous variations on imagery of the cold can be found in lyrics by NDW musicians. Looking at album and song titles, the trend towards words from the subject area of climatic or physical cold is already striking: "Eisbär" ("polar bear," literally "ice bear," 1980) and "Kälte kriecht" ("coldness creeps," 1981) by Grauzone; "Eiszeit" ("ice age," 1981) by Ideal; "Kalte Sterne" ("cold stars," 1981) by Einstürzende Neubauten; and "Kaltes klares Wasser" ("cold clear water," 1982) by Malaria!. This is followed by the affirmative aestheticization of building materials commonly associated with negative aspects. We can see this, for example, in the choice of the title of Einstürzende Neubauten's album *Stahlmusik* ("steel music," 1980), on which "Eisenmolekül" ("iron molecule"), "Stahl" ("steel"), and "Kristallines Eisen" ("crystalline iron") can be found, as well as in the song "Zurück zum Beton" ("back to the concrete," 1980) by the Düsseldorf group S.Y.P.H.: "Back to the concrete / Back to the subway / Back to the concrete / … / Disgust, disgust, nature, nature / I want pure concrete."[4] Terms and signs of industrialization and the world of work are also taken up affirmatively, as in "Industrie-Mädchen" ("industry girl," 1979) by S.Y.P.H. and "Wahre Arbeit—Wahrer Lohn" ("true work—true reward," 1981) by fellow Düsseldorfers Die Krupps: "My muscles are machines / tendons steel, sweat like oil / dirt and grime is true work / pain and rebuke true reward"

Figure 2.3 Label of the twelve-inch single *Wahre Arbeit—Wahrer Lohn* (1981) by Die Krupps.

(Figure 2.3).[5] Related themes of computers, robots, technological progress, machines, and industry—all of which are usually associated in social discourse with processes of dominance and the repulsion of the human being—were reclaimed by cold pop musicians. This strategy was especially favoured by Kraftwerk, which not only expressed this reception of technology, but also released the explicitly techno-positivist concept albums *Die Mensch·Maschine* / *The Man·Machine* (1978) and *Computerwelt* / *Computer World* (1981).

While, as the pioneers of cold pop, the former krautrock-group Kraftwerk created and glorified a predominantly futuristic-utopian vision of the modern technological world, the cold pop artists who followed

also challenged left-wing doctrines they considered misguided by subversively celebrating markers of the allegedly cold world and its signs. This approach found a pop musical expression in the songs of the group Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle (FSK), which had already verbalized an explicit "Yes to the Modern World" on its debut EP (in the song "Moderne Welt," 1980).[6] Another act of simultaneous distancing and political-philosophical reorientation is represented in "Abenteuer und Freiheit" (1980) by Fehlfarben: "It's too late for the old movements / What counts today is cleanliness / … / Hey man, don't you jump me / Get your hands off my suit / You should look at yourself in the mirror."[7]

Furthermore, some NDW bands focused on a positively connoted thematization of urban, post-industrial, and personal decay. Localized manifestations of the same position are evident here: while in chic Düsseldorf assent meant a yes to the industry and smoothness of the city, in desolate West Berlin a yes to unadorned reality was expressed as the euphoria of decay. Einstürzende Neubauten, not least through the band's choice of name—literally "collapsing new buildings"—exemplified the aesthetic exploration of an expected or desired end of the world through sound, staging and lyrics. With titles like "Für den Untergang" ("for the fall," 1980), "Abstieg & Zerfall" ("decline & decay," 1981) and "Kollaps" (1981), Einstürzende Neubauten practised a policy of endorsement regarding the phenomena of political, ecological, and social crisis, thus uniting the horizons of expectation and experience.

Additionally, cold pop artists frequently thematized feelings of alienation and attempts at social isolation, which they combined with the staging of an overt emotionlessness. "Nachtarbeit" (1980) by DAF,[8] and especially the evocation of emotional coldness in "Eiszeit" (1981) by Ideal, serve as examples: "The phone has been silent for years / No one I want to talk to / … / You can't reach me / In my film I'm the star / I can only live alone / … / With me the ice age begins / In the labyrinth of the ice age / Minus ninety degrees / … / All feelings felt a thousand times / Totally frozen—deep-frozen."[9] In the case of Grauzone's commercially successful single "Eisbär" (1980), this doctrine of distancing oneself from and defending oneself against emotions was shifted to the level of desire: "I'd like to be a polar bear / In the polar cold / Then I wouldn't have to cry / Everything would be so clear / Polar bears never have to cry."[10]

Historical Parallels and Frameworks

Cultural and artistic turns towards coldness had a tradition in Germany. About 50 years earlier, forms of cold conduct had experienced their heyday in the Weimar Republic among artists from the Futurist, Dadaist, and especially the Neue Sachlichkeit (New Objectivity) movements, including

the painters George Grosz and Otto Dix, but also writers such as Bertolt Brecht and Ernst Jünger. With their representations of the cold—new urban types of people and behaviour portrayed in new artistic styles—they too reacted to the changed conditions produced by times of unrest. Their aesthetic glorification of coldness set them apart from contemporary concepts of subjectivity and the world, which praised heated artistic styles such as Expressionism and warm social behaviour, as in the community utopias of socialist and *völkisch* movements. The concept of coldness as a specific style of self-management and a form of behaviour originates with the Germanist Helmut Lethen, who traced the cold conduct in the historical avant-gardes of the Weimar Republic, Neue Sachlichkeit in particular.[11] According to Lethen, this conduct was expressed through ostentatious distance, the praise of alienation, and the aestheticization of all things inorganic, cold, and automaton-like. The striking parallels between the cold strategies of the historical avant-gardes and the German-speaking new wave movement, which quite openly situated itself in the tradition of these artistic predecessors, are clear. In both cases, there was an almost inflationary use of different types of cold, with differing functions and reasons: some were drawn to the cold because of experiences of the dissolution of order and the human subject during the war, or because of the transformation into the modern/postmodern era; others recognized in concepts of the cold the logical continuation and consequences of the processes of enlightenment and emancipation, as well as the appropriate instruments for synchronization with the modern world.

In fact, during and especially at the end of the 1970s, a series of radical upheavals and events occurred in the Federal Republic and other Western countries that were also expressed in the field of pop culture, which had an enduring impact worldwide.[12] These included the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the first (1973) and second (1979) oil price shocks, along with the subsequent economic crisis, dramatically rising inflation, growing unemployment, increasing national debt, and a massive transformation in the structure and culture of work. The economic developments resulted in the disappearance of the classic industrial worker and the emergence of industrial wastelands. According to historians Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, this continually reinforced the impression of decline and radiated an atmosphere of decay.[13] For the period following 1970, the two historians developed the term "nach dem Boom" ("post-boom"), which quickly became established in academia. In the social and cultural spheres, accelerated change set in; its indicators were interpreted contemporaneously and also in later scholarship as signifying a process of decline that encompassed the dissolution of the stratified society into new, more fluid social milieux, a changing family structure and perception of gender, a general turning away from the idea of progress

and political utopias, a growing number of people leaving the church, and increased rates of divorce and suicide.[14]

At the same time, the 1970s Federal Republic also witnessed modernization, an increase in general prosperity, significantly improved educational opportunities, an expansion of the social security system, consumer society and pop culture, increased individualization and pluralization of lifestyles, and a comprehensive mediatization of many aspects of the lifeworld.[15] Furthermore, the turn away from utopian progressive thinking did not lead to a general lack of perspective and hope. Instead, on a political and (pop) cultural level, not only the present came into the focus of attention—history did too, and it was expected to provide potential models of identity and guidance for addressing current problems.[16] In particular, the interwar period—which was conceived of as equally crisis-ridden—and cultural and social development in the Weimar Republic moved to the forefront of public consciousness. In view of this simultaneity of contradictory and differently interpretable processes, historian Frank Bösch argues that, instead of just adopting the pessimistic narratives of contemporary social sciences that tend to see the 1970s as a phase of incipient decline, the upheavals of the time should instead be understood in the original sense of the word "crisis": as turning points characterized by an open future and high pressure to make decisions.[17]

In this context of tensions between continuous progress and increasing signs of crisis, which had also characterized the Weimar Republic in the 1920s, the imagery and concept of coldness had a revival. This reanimation was closely linked to these processes in society and the state of transformation, and must be read as a reaction to them. To be precise, the tropes and strategies employed by the cold pop artists of the German-speaking new wave movement were, among other things, a reaction to another reaction: the concerns and fears widespread in West German society at the time, especially in the left-wing alternative milieu, and the resulting way of dealing with the many aspects of a changing world that were perceived as threatening. In the 1970s and early 1980s, critiques and fears were commonly evoked by new technologies and the advancing computerization of work and life.[18] Behind these fears loomed the idea of a machine that was superior to the imperfect human being and worked without errors.[19] But the fears also expressed concerns about the use of modern computer technology by the state—particularly in connection with the manhunt for Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorists—that began in the 1970s and the census scheduled for 1983; these were perceived as menacing intrusions into personal rights.

In addition, contemporary fears about the destruction of all life through environmental pollution and nuclear war as a consequence of rearmament and the beginning of the "Second Cold War" were pivotal to mobilizing

people in a new protest movement. Debates about these issues, which were taken up and pushed by the media and pop culture, found practical expression in the founding of the Green Party (Die Grünen) in 1980 and in the consolidation of the new social movements into mass protest movements, which reached a peak between 1981 and 1983.[20] Historians Susanne Schregel and Frank Biess trace the growth of apocalyptic fears, especially among younger Germans, on an individual and collective level, and note how, in the peace and environmental movements, these fears were cultivated into a new form of angst-ridden subjectivity. This led, in turn, to the revaluation of sensitization, subjectivity, and emotionalization, which were now taken to be the basis for political action.[21] This is where the cold pop artists emerged: as part of alternative left counterculture, they too were characterized by both a crisis consciousness and a euphoric mood, but they rejected as outdated and reactionary the response and values of the alternative left, which were determined by emotionalized criticism and protest attitudes, and which had now found their way into mainstream society through the mass protest movements.

Counter-counterculture

In cold pop, a counterculture to the left-wing alternative counterculture took shape. While the former remained part of the latter[22]—as it primarily consisted of young people with a high level of education who followed the countercultural claim of the creative stylization of the self and of life as a whole—it rejected the latter's behavioural doctrines. The belligerent use of tropes of coldness and cold conduct articulated a reaction against the warm countercultural subject, who was often given the pejorative term "hippie." The practices, models of thinking, perceptions, and values of this hippie milieu described by historian Sven Reichardt can indeed be read as a negative foil to the concept of the cold: communality and closeness, emotive openness and sensitivity, introspection and emotional expressivity, cosiness and comfort, passion and authenticity, naturalness and an affinity with nature. Furthermore, central to these left-alternative attitudes were a moralistic "rhetoric of concern," a demonstrative altruism linked to ideas of temperance and renunciation, a cultural pessimist view and rejection of consumption and progress, and a rejection of bureaucracy and technology—which were held responsible for people's supposedly growing alienation from themselves and others.[23]

As well as attitudes, a number of practices were characteristic of the left-alternative movement that the cold pop artists strongly repudiated. These included "dropping out," which the 78s disdained as an escape from the world, be it in (rural) communes, explicitly intimate flat-sharing communities and other collectives (cults, *K-Gruppen*) or through the consumption

of hallucinogenic or sedative drugs that served to break open one's "body armour" by undoing repressive behavioural teachings. The representatives of cold pop also removed themselves from left-alternative demands for emotional expressivity, holistic and esoteric wholeness, and "authenticity," as well as from the rituals and conduct of communal warmth, which included sensitivity, emotionality, and a culture of closeness. The communal model aimed to abolish all distance and politicize intimate areas of (everyday) life; in confession rituals, individuals had to admit their own supposed deficiencies to themselves and to the collective—"authenticity" became a social commitment. The protagonists of cold pop rejected this communality as regressive and oppressive, instead initiating depictions and behavioural patterns of coldness that were diametrically opposed: the hardening of "body armour" instead of its dissolution, distance instead of closeness, society instead of community, de-emotionalization instead of emotionality, uppers (amphetamines) instead of downers (cannabis) and psychedelics (LSD), urbanity and technology instead of nature and anti-modernism, dispassionate objectivity instead of emotional subjectivity, emphasized artificiality instead of "naturalness" and "authenticity," clear-sightedness and realism instead of utopian dreams, self-discipline and functionality instead of escapism and protest.

Cold pop can be read as part, end, and catalyst of the so-called long 1970s, which ranged from the beginning of the student protest generation and the social-liberal coalition (1968/1969) to the beginning of the conservative-liberal government led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982/1983). The historical parallel becomes evident here: just as the *neusachliche* subject within and at the end of the avant-garde movement opposed the expressionist avant-garde subject that appeared during the long 1920s (which spanned the period from the end of World War I in 1918 to the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933), the artists of cold pop developed an aesthetic subject within and at the end of the countercultural uprising that built on the model of the countercultural subject but rejected its emotional-expressive and anti-modernist manifestations.[24] In cold pop, too, imagery and behaviour connoting coldness had different intentions: sometimes they were a counter-countercultural critique of the counterculturally dominant left; sometimes they were a postmodernist countercultural subversion of reactionary and conservative ideals and attempts; sometimes they affirmed the post-industrial and postmodern world; and sometimes they were a means of armouring the subject who felt threatened. In the process, the appreciation of coldness was linked to historically rooted, socially prevailing patterns of evaluation and association in which the cold had always denoted negative aspects—the imagery and approaches of cold pop represented a revaluation of what had been dismissed.

The songs of the new wave only dealt with political topics very rarely. Instead, the intra-countercultural conflict was carried out through cold behavioural norms and aesthetics, which thus acquired a political dimension. Unlike the '68 protest movement, neither the NDW movement as a whole nor cold pop in particular had an educational agenda. This led contemporary journalists and sociologists, whether conservative or left-wing, to depict the cold conduct of the NDW as an expression of a disillusioned, apolitical, and hedonistic youth.[25] This demonstrates how baffled contemporaries were by the behaviour and world-view of the 78s, who were often influenced by post-structuralist theorists such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, and simply would not fit into familiar models of a subculture or counterculture that they interpreted as essentially resistive-rebellious. Although the artists of the 78s opposed the alleged political conservatism of West German society and identified themselves as part of the left, if not the radical left, they rejected the political, social, and philosophical convictions held by 1970s left counterculture. To them, the very idea that society could, through political activism, be changed for a presumed "better" seemed as naive as it was escapist. In 1981, Diedrich Diederichsen, one of the intellectuals of the 78s and the editor-in-chief of *Sounds*, an important music magazine for the scene, responded to repeated accusations of conformity. He criticized the self-righteous do-gooder attitude of the left-alternative crowd, who he said would probably be better off in an Indian ashram, far away from the complexity of postmodern society: "Conformist? A hollow, worn-out word. Invented by a generation of fuzzy liberal hippies who believe they can change the world through individual behaviour. Off to Poona with this word!"[26]

Capitalist Cold?

The strategy of endorsement was a complex one, and it was used by the NDW and 78s to varying extents depending on their intentions and goals. Their embrace of the modern, anything-but-ideal world did not, of course, mean an unlimited or unreflective affirmation, but nor was it simply ironic.[27] It is difficult to make generally valid statements about where provocation and subversive affirmation ended and where actual approval of the previously disallowed, supposedly bad aspects of the (post)modern, industrialized world began. The line between what was a challenging statement issued to maintain distance from the left-alternative scene and mainstream society, and what was proclaimed seriously out of a changed attitude to the world, was extremely thin and often fluid. Even disruptive elements in artists' performances were not necessarily meant to reveal an as-if attitude. Rather, they represented the fundamental contradictoriness

and differentiation of postmodernism itself, which was welcomed by the 78s precisely because of this quality.

The relationship of the 78s and cold pop artists to capitalism and its life-world manifestations was therefore complex. The NDW movement also continued the anti-capitalist DIY ideology propagated by the punk movement: the Federal Republic saw a flourishing of indie labels that prioritized the distribution of underground music above potential profits (and for this reason went bankrupt in large numbers at the beginning of the 1980s). Accusing musicians who signed with a major label of "selling out" to the "music industry" was still common practice in the NDW, albeit much less so than in punk culture. Furthermore, as already discussed, the imagery of socialist movements and systems was popular with the new wave as a source of illustrations. However, songs criticizing capitalism, such as "Geld—Money" (1982) by Malaria!, remained an exception in cold pop. Instead, NDW artists reacted either with resignation or with subversive or actual assent: the former reaction was displayed by bands in the punk tradition, and in particular the cold apologists for alienation (Ideal, Grauzone) and the representatives of the cult of doom (Einstürzende Neubauten), both of whom were influenced by dark romanticism and fin de siècle.

"For me, the train is moving at breakneck speed and is going to crash somewhere. Why should I rebel against plastic and computers? I have no illusions," explained Annette Humpe (Ideal) in the early 1980s. These words revealed her endorsement's cynical core, which retained the spectre of the imminent collapse of society, the economy, politics, and nature frequently invoked in the peace and environmental movements: "We live here in a capitalist country, and the thing is going through … I'd rather enjoy the last ride until the end."[28] In interviews from the first half of the 1980s, Neubauten singer Blixa Bargeld likewise delighted euphorically in resignation, gleefully welcoming the loss of purpose and cherishing alienation and decay.[29]

This contrasts with the large number of songs and statements by NDW artists that speak in favour of consumption and capitalism, although it is often unclear where subversion ends and actual approval begins. In the track "Montagehalle" (1982), Gorilla Aktiv describes scenes in a factory assembly hall as a celebration of joy, cleanliness, and order, underpinned by synthesizer and metal sample sounds: "There everyone sat in line / The sun shines in and everyone is happy / Because being unemployed is no fun either / The women are neat, the men are manly / The boss is good and everything is good."[30] Known for tongue-in-cheek humour, Trio ("Da Da Da," 1982) embraced commercialization and "selling out," which was considered a cardinal sin by the anti-capitalist 68s, left-alternative

hippies, and punks alike. After introducing its debut album (1981) with the announcement "Don't be fooled / Although at first it looks / As if it's about your entertainment / In the end it's about / You giving your sympathies / And your money / To Trio," the group sold advertising space on the cover of its second album *Bye Bye* (1983; Figure 2.4).[31]

"It was all about making clear decisions," author and scenester Peter Glaser explained in retrospect, stressing that the sharp distinction the 78s drew between themselves and their countercultural enemy figure, the hippie, was not just a matter of discourse but also of economic practice: "For us, hippie was this: 'I leave everything open to me.' … We said: 'We decide, we want clear lines, we put on suits, cut our hair short and do business.' "[32]



Figure 2.4 Trio offers free advertising space on the cover of their LP *Bye Bye* (1983), all of which was filled on the fourth pressing of the same year.

Indeed, some bands from the NDW underground deliberately aimed for the top. In interviews, Gabi Delgado from DAF revealed in no uncertain terms that the band was seeking commercial mainstream success and was not interested in playing the underground forever.[33] Alfred Hilsberg, owner of the ZickZack label, recalls that he had not met any other band that was as businesslike, self-organized, and self-confident as the prophets of doom Einstürzende Neubauten: "Self-confident in the sense that they knew exactly how they wanted to present themselves in public, how they wanted to be marketed, how they wanted to keep everything under control, how they could earn the best and most money with what they were doing."[34] Kraftwerk played a pioneering role as the group that most consistently set itself apart from anti-capitalist ideals common in the counterculture. Not only did Kraftwerk describe and present itself as a group of "music workers"; the band also strove for comprehensive commercialization. Although Kraftwerk only gave interview answers in the "we" form, in order to erase any trace of personality from the external image of the uniform collective, founders Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider were the sole owners of the Kraftwerk project and retained complete control of production and marketing. Drummers Karl Bartos and Wolfgang Flür, with whom they produced their most successful and influential albums, were just employees on fixed salaries who had no contractual right to make any public statements about the band.

That cold pop, in all its manifestations, was a distinctly German phenomenon becomes clear when it is compared with the Anglo-American post-punk and new wave movements. There too, affirmative responses to the allegedly cold world existed, and were also mainly constructed in opposition to alternative and rock ideals within the counterculture. They included the tactical use of suits and short haircuts as well as the restaging of imagery from the worlds of work and business. However, these usually concealed a subversive critique of what was being shown: with song titles "Jocko Homo" (1977) and "Mechanical Man" (1978), the American group Devo parodied the average American citizen, caught between the world of consumption and a white-collar job, as a regressed form of the human being; in the song "Meccanik Dancing (Oh We Go!)" (1978), the British new wave band XTC portrayed the leisurely pleasure of going out as a regimented mechanism analogous to work. Many comparable approaches invoking similar tropes were made by British and American new wave and post-punk musicians—for instance, Ian Craig Marsh and Martyn Ware (The Human League, Heaven 17) from Sheffield. On the one hand they praised high-rise life in urban modernity in the song "Blind Youth" (1979) and presented themselves as businessmen on the cover of the album *Penthouse and Pavement* (1981; Figure 2.5);[35] on the other hand, with "Life Kills" (1980) and "Crushed by the Wheels of Industry"

Figure 2.5 Front cover of the LP *Penthouse and Pavement* (1981) by Heaven 17.

(1983), they depicted everyday working life as a routine of continuous self-destruction.

British industrial music and post-punk pioneers such as Throbbing Gristle and Cabaret Voltaire, which emerged in the second half of the 1970s, also used elements of industrialism and consumerism to expose the supposed entanglement of the consumer industry and the industry of annihilation. British new wave and post-punk bands in particular were characterized by a political activism that distinguished them from most NDW musicians, and especially from the key figures of cold pop. Bands such as Gang Of Four, Au Pairs, The Mekons, and The Fall played for the Rock Against Racism campaign; Heaven 17 released the track "(We Don't Need This) Fascist Groove Thang" (1981), which was directed

against US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; the industrial band Test Dept. supported the striking miners in South Wales with a jointly recorded album in 1985; and bands including The Communards, The Style Council, Madness, and The Smiths became involved in the Red Wedge association, founded in 1986, which sought to inspire young people with socialist ideas and Labour Party politics.[36] The claim, especially prevalent in the British post-punk movement, to advance social change through one's work was completely dropped within the NDW, paving the way for cold assent.

In the West German new wave movement, the break with the political ideals once championed was much more radical, so the cold pop artists were correspondingly aggressive towards followers of rock and punk, who they defamed as anachronistic hippies. Large numbers of the 78s located their own roots in the glam approach of bands such as Roxy Music and sometimes—in DAF's case, for example—in the disco movement. *Sounds* journalist Ewald Braunsteiner (the pen name of Detlef Diederichsen) declared at the beginning of 1980 that disco had formulated a yes to consumption and commerciality and had thus "taken old, now meaningless dogmas off their pedestals": these dogmas included the critique of commerce and the demand for "authentic" or "honest" emotions. According to Braunsteiner, disco was

> the swinging back of the pendulum, the logical and necessary opposition to everything revolutionary, evil, ugly in rock music. Disco as an attitude to life meant a yes to the prevailing conditions, a yes to capitalism, meant outwardness instead of inwardness … a total reversal, a mirror image of the attitude to life of those middle-class sons and daughters who had set out at the end of the sixties.[37]

In the NDW movement and in cold pop, the strategy of affirmative appropriation of the modern world and its signs moved between subverting and establishing a changed view of, attitude to and practice in this postmodern world—and one's own self in it. For bands such as FSK and Palais Schaumburg, saying yes served as an act of empowerment that drew a line under critiques and movements interpreted as outdated and reactionary, and at the same time opened up new scope for action without ignoring critical principles and their dialectics. In a 1982 interview with the German magazine *Sounds*, the new singer of Palais Schaumburg, Walter Thielsch, spoke out in favour of luxury, which "pleasantly lifts people out of the framework of their social status," creates distance "without shaking the social net," generates sales, and secures jobs. "So what could be wrong with luxury?" Thielsch summarized, locating hostility to luxury in the "murky realms of Christian scholasticism." Instead of indulging in open

criticism and protest, he saw the band as affirmatively appropriating not only the allegedly bad world but also what had previously been denied to them: "As an onlooker to the changing image of luxury, between the unconquerable world of money (capital) and the dismantled social world, Palais Schaumburg undertakes the flight forward." To illustrate the subversive strategy of assent, the singer invoked an image of a hole in a golf course fence that the band cut for themselves and others and which, due to its unclear location, could not be discovered quickly "by the enemy of the idea"—although it remains unclear which enemy was meant.[38] Like other NDW and cold pop artists, Thielsch formulated a cheerful embrace of the modern world that neither ignored nor denounced its constraints and flaws, instead understanding them as unchangeable facts on which to base his critically reflected notions of subject and society.

With their own version of cold conduct, the 78s were treading on thin ice—not least because they shared a playing field with other young people whose accentuated conformity was anything but subversive or countercultural. Starting in Hamburg secondary schools but soon spreading nationwide, the youth culture of the "poppers" blossomed at the same time as the German new wave movement and showed a multitude of similarities. The so-called poppers also sought to distinguish themselves from the left-wing alternative milieu and contemporary protest cultures, and succeeded in doing so through a glorification of careers and capitalism that was no less provocative. It manifested in a desire to get ahead and consumer-oriented identification—for example, through expensive designer clothes by Burlington, Fiorucci, Benetton, and Lacoste.[39] Through explicit hedonism, consumerism, and materialism, the poppers—most of whom were politically conservative—marked their difference from traditional conservatism. Even musically, they preferred bands—aside from Roxy Music—such as ABC, Heaven 17, and Haircut 100, as well as other British groups such as Spandau Ballet and The Style Council, which had risen as part of synth and new wave. Unlike the NDW scenes, which consisted mainly of adolescents and had already come to a halt by 1983, the poppers constituted a youth culture that sought to master teenage insecurities by imitating or anticipating the adult world, orienting themselves towards a model of adulthood in which career and demonstrative wealth played a greater role than politics and art. This was a result of their social origins; they came almost exclusively from the upper or upper-middle classes, whereas the stylistically similar mods of the 1960s, who often served as a prototype, had been part of the British working class and lower middle class. Popper culture is thus often correctly interpreted as anticipating the "yuppies," who were solely focused on money, career, and branded goods and who, by the mid-1980s, were haunting the offices of investment banks and stock exchange agencies. Despite analogous appearances, the poppers

had nothing in common with the 78s' rejection of the counterculturally dominant critique of capitalism.

After the Cold

Although the 78s' concept of the cold in West German pop culture remained limited to a distinct part of the German-speaking new wave movement, it did not simply express shifts in the social mood, but rather catalysed larger cultural developments in the Federal Republic. After the once-subversive imagery and codes of the cold pop artists became established in the mainstream at the beginning of the 1980s, they lost their subversive character and consequently stopped being used in this form by the agents of the cold. The year 1982 therefore also marked a break from the concept of coldness. Although the artists of cold pop deliberately distinguished themselves from Anglo-American music culture—and not only through their German lyrics—coldness is, internationally, one of the most successful and influential aesthetic concepts of German pop music. Kraftwerk, DAF, and Einstürzende Neubauten achieved unprecedented global success, unlike emotional German Schlager music or other pop stars. Once the cold had broken into the pop world, it remained an essential, widespread, and soon enough conventional element of international pop music, even after the end of the cold wave. Especially in Goth culture and the various musical subcurrents of post-industrial, (dark) wave and electronic music, cold imagery is still part of the artistic toolbox, whether in thermal (ice, snow), material (steel, concrete, glass), or figurative (human-machines) form. As a result of postmodern pluralization, these cold elements are now usually combined with warm or hot ones—for example, in the form of the so-called Neue Deutsche Härte (New German Hardness), which includes the pyrotechnic enthusiasts Rammstein, or through German gangsta rap that presents itself as cold-hearted and hard, glorifies allegedly cold urbanity, and represents a particularly eye-catching affirmation of commerciality and consumption. In contrast to the latter, however, the cold NDW artists' endorsement of the capitalist world remained ambivalent, complex, and rooted in post-structuralist, explicitly leftist approaches. This makes it difficult to identify them as cold capitalists, though they played an important part in revaluing the role of the musician between the underground and the industry, rejecting the countercultural critique of commerciality as outdated and hypocritical.

Notes

1 See Reichardt, "Wärme"; Reichardt, *Authentizität*, 189–203.
2 See Völker, "Cold German."

3 Einheit quoted in Esch, *Electri_City*, 314. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
4 "Zurück zum Beton / Zurück zur U-Bahn / Zurück zum Beton / … / Ekel, Ekel, Natur, Natur / Ich will Beton pur."
5 "Meine Muskeln sind Maschinen / Sehnen stählern, Schweiß wie Öl / Schmutz und Dreck ist wahre Arbeit / Schmerz und Tadel wahrer Lohn."
6 See, for example, Geer, " 'If You Have."
7 "Es ist zu spät für die alten Bewegungen / Was heute zählt ist Sauberkeit / … / Hey Mann, hüpf mich nicht um / Nimm deine Pfoten von meinem Anzug / Guck dich doch selbst mal im Spiegel an."
8 "Eroticism is over / Machines are fun / Sex is crippled / Normal life in the new age / … / Those who die daily live for the moment / Life is boring." ("Erotik ist vorbei / Maschinen machen Spaß / Sex ist verkrüppelt / Normales Leben in der neuen Zeit / … / Wer täglich stirbt, lebt für den Augenblick / Das Leben ist langweilig.")
9 "Das Telefon seit Jahren still / Kein Mensch mit dem ich reden will / … / Mich erreichst du nicht / In meinem Film bin ich der Star / Ich komm' auch nur alleine klar / … / Mit mir beginnt die Eiszeit / Im Labyrinth der Eiszeit / Minus neunzig Grad / … / Alle Gefühle tausendmal gefühlt / Tiefgefroren—tiefgekühlt."
10 "Ich möchte ein Eisbär sein / Im kalten Polar / Dann müsste ich nicht mehr schreien / Alles wär so klar / Eisbären müssen nie weinen." Lyricist Martin Eicher appeared not to have internalized the cold attitude of emotionlessness that he longed for. The Swiss band—like the majority of punk bands—thus epitomizes the transition from countercultural disenchantment at the end of the 1970s to the explicit *d'accord* at the beginning of the 1980s.
11 Although Lethen distinguishes the concept of coldness from that of coolness, the English translation of his book *Verhaltenslehren der Kälte* (1994) was given the title *Cool Conduct* (2002).
12 See, for example, Jarausch, *Zuversicht*; Raithel, Rödder, and Wirsching, *Weg*; Bösch, *Zeitenwende*; Sarasin, *1977*.
13 Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*, 56. See also cultural scientist Giacomo Bottà's concept of "industrial crisis as atmosphere," which he uses to examine the aesthetic treatment of industrialization and deindustrialization by local (post-)punk bands in industrial cities in the United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden, and the Federal Republic of Germany; Bottà, *Deindustrialisation*.
14 See Bösch, "Krisendeutungen," 218.
15 See Bösch and Vowinckel, "Mediengeschichte."
16 Bösch, "Umbrüche," 30.
17 Bösch, "Krisendeutungen," 218–219.
18 See Schuhmann, "Traum"; Danyel, "Informationsgesellschaft."
19 Cf. Heßler, "Volkswagen." See also the cover picture of *Der Spiegel* from April 17, 1978, which under the headline "The computer revolution: Progress makes people unemployed" ("Die Computerrevolution: Fortschritt macht arbeitslos") shows a robot displacing a worker; accessed September 19, 2022, https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/index-1978-16.html.
20 Cf. Greiner, Müller, and Walter, *Angst*; Becker-Schaum et. al., *Entrüstet Euch!*

21 Schregel, "Angst"; Biess, "Sensibilisierung."
22 The term "counter-counterculture" ("*Gegengegenkultur*") was coined by Diedrich Diederichsen, pop theorist and prominent figure of the 78s; Diederichsen, "Gegengegenkultur."
23 Reichardt, Authentizität.
24 See Reckwitz, *Hybride Subjekt*.
25 See, for example, "In meinem Film"; Härlin and Sontheimer, "Nehmt Abschied."
26 "Angepaßt? Ein hohles, abgenutztes Wort. Erfunden von einer Generation von liberalen Fusselhippies, die glauben, mit individuellem Habitus die Welt zu verändern. Ab nach Poona mit dem Wort!"; Diederichsen, "Von der Industrie," 52.
27 Schumacher, "Deutsch," 237.
28 "Für mich fährt der Zug in einem Affenzahn und wird irgendwo vorknallen. Was soll ich mich auflehnen gegen Plastik und Computer? Ich hab keine Illusionen. Wir leben hier in einem kapitalistischen Land, und das Ding wird durchgezogen … Ich genieße lieber die letzte Fahrt bis zum Schluß." Humpe quoted in Skolud and Stasiak, *Plant uns*, 242.
29 Bargeld quoted in Härlin and Sontheimer "Nehmt Abschied," 81.
30 "Da saßen alle in Reih'und Glied / Die Sonne scheint rein und alle sind froh / Denn arbeitslos sein macht auch kein Spaß / Die Frauen sind adrett, die Männer sind männlich / Der Chef ist gut und alles ist gut."
31 "Lassen Sie sich nicht täuschen / Obwohl es zunächst so aussieht / Als ginge es um Ihre Unterhaltung / Geht es doch letztlich drum / Dass Sie Ihre Sympathien / Und Ihr Geld / Dem Trio geben."
32 "Es ging ja darum, klare Entscheidungen zu fällen … Hippie war für uns dieses: 'Ich lasse mir alles offen' … Wir haben gesagt: 'Wir entscheiden uns, wir wollen klare Linien, wir ziehen uns Anzüge an, schneiden uns die Haare kurz und machen Geschäfte.'" Glaser quoted in Teipel, *Verschwende*, 261.
33 Delgado quoted in Hilsberg, "Räuber," 31. Cf. Delgado quoted in Schober, "DAF," 29.
34 "Selbstbewusst dahingehend, als dass sie genau wussten, wie sie sich in der Öffentlichkeit präsentieren wollten, wie sie sich vermarkten lassen wollten, wie sie alles unter Kontrolle behalten wollten, wie sie mit dem, was sie machten, am besten und am meisten Geld verdienen konnten." Hilsberg quoted in Dax and Defcon, *Nur was*, 66–67.
35 In a later interview, Ware underlined the approach behind this: "The whole idea of hippies sitting around smoking dope all day was anathema to us … We were into action, this super-Protestant must-work-all-day outlook that is very much part of Sheffield." Ware quoted in Reynolds, *Rip It Up*, 166.
36 See Jäger, "Bolschewik-Schick," 324–326.
37 "Sie war … das Zurückschwingen des Pendels, die logische und notwendige Opposition gegen das Revolutionäre, Böse, Häßliche der Rockmusik. Disco bedeutete als Lebenseinstellung ein Ja zu den herrschenden Zuständen, ein Ja zum Kapitalismus, bedeutete Äußerlichkeit statt Innerlichkeit …, eine totale Umkehrung, ein Spiegelbild der Lebenseinstellung jener Bürgersöhne

und -töchter, die Ende der sechziger Jahre aufgebrochen waren … Hier gab es ein 'Ja' zur Konsumierbarkeit, zur Kommerzialität … Es bewirkte, daß alte, mittlerweile sinnentleerte Dogmen von ihren Podesten geholt wurden"; Braunsteiner, "Apologie," 24.

38 "Als Laster behält Luxus seinen irdischen Wert, es hebt den Menschen angenehm aus den Rahmen seines sozialen Standes hervor, schafft Distanz, ohne am sozialen Netz zu rütteln. Luxus schafft Absatz, Luxus sichert Arbeitsplätze, was wäre also gegen Luxus einzuwenden? Luxusfeindschaft stammt aus den trüben Gefilden christlicher Scholastik, und die ist spätestens seit dem 17. Jh. überholt … Als Zaungäste am wandelnden Luxusbild, zwischen nicht zu besiegender Geldwelt (Kapital) und demontierter Sozialwelt, unternimmt Palais Schaumburg die Flucht nach vorn. Das Loch, das wir in das Loch [probably: den Zaun] des Golfplatzes schneiden, könnte auch von anderen durchschritten werden … Das Loch im Zaun liegt an unübersichtlicher Stelle und ist dadurch vom Feind der Idee nicht so schnell zu entdecken." Thielsch quoted in Diederichsen, "Brandnew Schaumburg," 32.

39 See Mrozek, "Ätherkrieg," 296.

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Part II

Cold Capitalists?

3 Cold Melancholy

Tempers of Financial Pathology in Charles Dickens' *A Christmas Carol*

Timothy Attanucci

Introduction

In a recent article for *The New Yorker*, the writer Elif Batuman recalls reading Charles Dickens' *A Christmas Carol* as a child and remembers its hero, Ebenezer Scrooge, as an "asshole" who refuses to give to poor carolling children. Upon rereading the text as an adult, however, she recognizes in the misanthropic old banker the symptoms of depression.[1] This re-evaluation leads to a more nuanced understanding of Scrooge's character; he now appears as both a profiteer and a victim of the brutal business of banking. This complexity often gets lost in the ritual resurrections of Scrooge each Christmas season by readers and audiences of theatre and film. Such renditions often reveal more about contemporary opinions of the *Carol*'s themes of wealth, capitalism, inequality and charity than about the text itself. Indeed, literary portrayals of capitalism are expected to be "critical," if not outright anti-capitalist. In his discussion of capitalism as an "ongoing revolution," the historian Werner Plumpe subsumes the fictional representation of the world of finance under the trope of the "cold heart."[2] While Plumpe borrows the trope for the title of his own book, he portrays others who employ it as Romantics, at best naïve—like Batuman as a child—and at worst reactionary in their understanding of the capitalist revolution. But what if the cold-hearted have an inner, undiscovered warmth, and the hard-headed an unexpected softness? What happens when readers demonstrate empathy, as the adult Batuman does, towards the very characters who appear to be defined by their lack of empathy?

In his essay "Steinherz und Geldseele" ("Heart of Stone and Soul of Money"), first published in 1978, the philosopher and historian of Romanticism Manfred Frank also analyses the symbol of the hard or cold heart and likewise places it in the context of the rise of industrial capitalism c. 1800. Following Hans Blumenberg, Frank understands metaphor or symbol as a "complex sign" that disperses meanings through semantic implications that cannot be captured in a final, conceptual definition.[3] Even

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still, it is notable how Frank's exhaustive analysis requires a supplement, an appendix that outlines the "traditional uses of the metaphor in texts … up to the period of Romanticism."[4] This appendix not only suggests that the full history of the "cold heart" remains to be written, but also shifts the focus of the analysis to the causes of a "cold heart." With few exceptions, these causes are themselves emotions or character qualities, including care or worry (*Sorge*), fear/fright, mourning, guilt, pride, egoism, loneliness, lack of feeling and passion, greed, thrift, and sinfulness.[5]

This semantic dispersion raises a methodological question: how can a metaphor transport so many meanings? Does it "contain" them? What holds this wide range of attributions together? In what follows, I argue—rereading with Batuman the character of Ebenezer Scrooge—that the unifying principle in the metaphors of the "heart of stone" and "cold heart" is not the metaphor's vehicle (cold temperature, hard material), but rather its tenor (heart, soul). What connects the qualities of care, egoism, loneliness, and greed is not just the metaphor, but the (emotional) character described by these terms. Posed in terms of character rather than metaphor, another name for the "cold heart" appears apt: *melancholy*. As Frank observes, early modern writers from Aegidius Albertinus (1560–1620) to Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) describe the character in question in terms borrowed from ancient and medieval discourses of humoral pathology and the doctrine of temperaments.[6] As vehicle and tenor of the same metaphorical structure, "cold heart" and "melancholy" may mean the same thing. Nevertheless, if we follow Frank's argument that new usages of a symbol, such as the positive re-evaluations of the hard and cold heart in the poems of Baudelaire and Rimbaud, "shatter the identity of the symbol," then one can ask whether this applies to melancholic character as a whole, or merely to the cold heart.[7]

While the fact that the historian Werner Plumpe chose *The Cold Heart* as the title for his book on capitalism suggests that the Romantic metaphor itself may not be dead, the psychopathology of modern economic life regularly employs terms such as depression, crisis, burnout, crash, narcissism, enthusiasm, and even psychopathy, all of which are related to the historical tradition of bipolar melancholy.[8] Through an analysis of Charles Dickens' *A Christmas Carol* (1843), a text situated historically between Wilhelm Hauff and Charles Baudelaire, I aim to demonstrate how the discourse of melancholy can be employed not only to show how historical change provides—in Frank's words—a "tear test" (*Zerreißprobe*) for systems of meaning, but also how the "textum" (*Gewebe*) reorganizes itself.[9] Writing for a bourgeois reading public in the 1840s, and despite his commitments to social critique, Dickens is under intense pressure to soften his portrayal of the melancholy of wealth, which in pre-modern times was readily associated with extreme, even criminal, forms of sociopathy.

Borrowing from the sociologist Niklas Luhmann, I thus propose to call the re-composition of a traditional discourse (here: melancholy) under new historical conditions a cultural "re-description."[10] Broader than metaphor, a cultural re-description can employ the entire range of literary and poetic devices, but it also acts selectively with respect to prior forms of the discourse. Because cultural re-descriptions reuse familiar motifs and narratives from tradition, they function to stabilize cultures in times of radical social transformation. Re-contextualized, traditional tropes can foster understanding of a new historical phenomenon such as capitalism, or they may be employed in an anti-capitalist critique. In the case of *A Christmas Carol*, the protagonist displays the melancholic's greed and egoism, but little of his foresight or criminal deviousness. Other elements of a discourse are taken up again but are given new valences. In Dickens' story, the semantics of "cold" apply as much to the weather as to the protagonist's "heart," as befits the thermodynamic and environmental obsessions of the Victorian Age.[11] In this way, a traditional element of the discourse of melancholy, the "cold" bile and its association with the cold earth and the autumn (fall) or winter seasons, is modified and updated by a realist poetics of the milieu.

Thermodynamics also underlies one of the most remarkable uses of the term in Charles Dickens' oeuvre. In the novel *Hard Times* (1854), Dickens describes the landscape of Coketown as a veritable bestiary of industry, including "serpents of smoke," "where the piston of the steam-engine worked monotonously up and down, like the head of an elephant in the state of melancholy madness."[12] As Tamara Ketabgian demonstrates, the monotony of the movement echoes the "mechanical feelings" bemoaned by Thomas Carlyle, to whom Dickens' novel is dedicated, even as the bipolar "melancholy" and the alternatively docile and wild "elephant" suggest an ambivalence: the dull work of the engine could result at any moment in an explosion.[13] In Ketabgian's reading, the "melancholy madness" and explosive potential in *Hard Times* also reside within the soul of the inscrutable factory worker Stephen Blackpool—whose very name evokes the black bile. The association of melancholy with the endless monotony of industrial work as well as other plights of the lower classes, such as poverty, debt, and prison, resonates with other research on melancholy in the work of Charles Dickens, which has focused on his novel *Little Dorrit* (1857).[14]

Along with *Bleak House* (1853), these two novels dealing with melancholy in the early 1850s are considered to be among Dickens' most radical works of social critique. Yet Dickens not only first developed many aspects of theme, character, depiction and narrative strategy, including melancholy, in the earlier *Christmas Carol*, but the *Carol*, as a work Dickens frequently recited at public readings, also remained in many ways contemporary with the later works.[15] Still, if Dickens' concern for the social ills

of his day remained consistent throughout his career, the specific historical context of *A Christmas Carol*, a period of economic depression known as the Hungry Forties, is meaningful.[16] As John Butt has reconstructed, during the writing of the *Carol*, Dickens found himself between work on his novel *Martin Chuzzlewit*, driven by the desire "to show, more or less by every person introduced, the number and variety of humours and vices that have their root in selfishness," and his charitable endeavours, which included lectures and visits to institutions for the poor.[17] After visiting the Ragged School in September 1843, Dickens sent Angela Burdett Coutts what he called "a sledge-hammer account" of the place. This metaphor reappears in descriptions of his second Christmas story, *The Chimes* (1844): "a great blow for the poor." He also abandoned earlier plans for "a very cheap pamphlet, called 'An appeal to the People of England, on behalf of the Poor Man's Child.' "[18] Still, the author appears to have been divided not only between political pamphleteering and literary ambition, but also between the goals of striking blows and raising funds. While the price of *A Christmas Carol* was a relatively modest five shillings, its release was timed to sell at the Christmas market, and Dickens published at his own expense, clearly hoping to benefit from the profits. In this light, his claim that a text published at Christmas would be "a Sledge hammer" that would "come down with twenty times the force—twenty thousand times the force" smacks of rhetorical, if not monetary, inflationism.[19]

This contrast between Dickens the social critic and Dickens the literary entrepreneur is helpful for understanding his turn to the specific poetics of the melancholy of the wealthy in *A Christmas Carol*. At the very least, Dickens' addressees, whose sympathy for the poor his text intends to elicit, are on the moneyed side. While the attribution "melancholy" implies that Scrooge suffers despite, or indeed because of, his wealth, it also explains, as a pathology, the causes of his egoism and greed. Moreover, it points to a potential therapy and cure. In portraying charity and generosity as cures for the melancholy of the miser as well as the misery of the poor, Dickens ties acts of altruism to those of self-interest. By emphasizing the bipolar nature of melancholy, moreover, *A Christmas Carol* (1843) represents an important step in the long history of pathological depictions of wealth that alternates between normalizing legitimation and vicious critique. If Scrooge's transformation indicates that Dickens wishes to redeem the financier under the guise of a proto-Keynesian consumer capitalism, the fact that the cure may be temporary suggests a deeper level of analysis: bipolar melancholy, as a description of recurrent crisis, becomes the emblem of capitalist society as a whole.

These tentative theses represent the direction of the reading that follows, in three parts and with more modest goals, each of which emerges from a different etymological valence of the Latin term *tempus*—which I have

called "tempers" in the title of this article. In the first section, I turn to a tradition that has largely been overlooked as well as Victorian definitions of the disease to argue that Ebenezer Scrooge's *temperament* is in fact best described as "melancholy." The second section addresses the meaning of the visitations of the Ghosts of Christmas Past, Present, and Future, and reads this allegory of *time* with the help of the philosopher Michael Theunissen's temporal theory of melancholy.[20] Finally, the third and final section discusses the importance of *temperature* in Dickens' characterization of Scrooge's melancholy, particularly as it relates to the disease's bipolar form. Warmth may be a necessary cure for a cold heart, but it is not a treatment without risks.

Scrooge's Melancholy: Between Victorian Psychology and the Humoral Tradition

At the start of their famous study *Saturn and Melancholy* (1964), Raymond Klibansky, Fritz Saxl and Erwin Panofsky note: "In modern speech the word 'melancholy' is used to denote any one of several somewhat different things."[21] In consideration of advances in historical semantics, to which their study contributed, one must add that, historically, "melancholy" can denote any one of many, at times very different things.[22] When we read "Scrooge took his melancholy dinner in his usual melancholy tavern" (16) or, even as a child, sat reading alone in "a long, bare, melancholy room" (31), we must ask: how did Dickens understand the word and concept of melancholy when he wrote these lines in 1843?

In her analysis of the "mad melancholy elephants" in *Hard Times*, Ketabgian turns to several period physicians such as John Haslam, George Man Burrows, John Conolly, and William Ellis, who "identified [the disease] both with extreme states of feeling and the apparent absence of emotion."[23] As Burrows observed, for example, a melancholic patient often "falls into long reveries, with look fixed on vacuity," but also exhibits fits of "great fury and excitation."[24] As Ketabgian acknowledges with regard to the seventeenth-century physician Thomas Willis, the link between melancholy and mania is hardly specific to the Victorian Age. Indeed, the bipolar or manic-depressive form of melancholy is addressed in one of the earliest texts on the disease, the so-called "Problem XXX. 1" in the *Problemata physica*, a collection of texts addressing nearly 900 questions in natural science attributed to Aristotle.[25] If anything, the Victorian period marks the beginning of a historical trend that emphasizes the depressive phase, associating melancholy with the "repetition and monotony" of everyday life in the industrial age.[26]

The portrait of melancholy as an alternation between extreme apathy and furious rage also recalls a key literary reference in Victorian discussions

of melancholy. As Lawrence Frank has shown, psychiatrists such as William Hazlitt and John Charles Bucknill refer to Shakespeare's *Hamlet* in their treatises on melancholy, a diagnosis facilitated by their reading of August Wilhelm Schlegel's lectures *Über dramatische Kunst und Literatur* (1809–1811), translated into English in 1815 by John Black.[27] It is likely that Dickens learned about Schlegel's lectures while working for Black at the *Morning Chronicle* in the 1830s. In these lectures, Schlegel asserts the value of literature as a source for medical case studies: "Of all poets, perhaps, [Shakespeare] alone has portrayed the mental diseases, melancholy, delirium, lunacy, with such inexpressible and, in every respect, definite truth, that the physician may enrich his observations from them in the same manner as from real cases."[28] Following this advice, the physician Bucknill concludes that "Hamlet is morbidly melancholic," though in a "state of incubation of disease, 'in which his melancholy sits on brood.' "[29] As Frank argues, the quotation from Shakespeare's play demonstrates the extent to which Bucknill's psychiatric theory relies on the example of literature, down to the very details of the aetiology and progression of the disease. This reliance on literature in medical contexts in turn spurs the literary writer Dickens.[30]

Like the ancient origins of the bipolar theory of melancholy, the complex "process of intertextuality" that leads from *Little Dorrit* back to *Hamlet* suggests that one may need to go further than the immediate context of Victorian psychiatry to investigate the meaning of melancholy for Dickens.[31] By the time the author sat down to write *Little Dorrit*, Dickens could turn to his own earlier work, *A Christmas Carol*, both as an intertext in itself and as a model for the construction of character and plot through intertextuality.

At the start of the *Carol*, Dickens evokes Shakespeare's ghost story, ostensibly to hammer home the point that Scrooge's one-time partner Marley is indeed "dead as a door-nail":

> There is no doubt that Marley was dead. This must be distinctly understood, or nothing wonderful can come of the story I am going to relate. If we were not perfectly convinced that Hamlet's Father died before the play began, there would be nothing more remarkable in his taking a stroll at night, in an easterly wind, upon his own ramparts, than there would be in any other middle-aged gentleman rashly turning out after dark in a breezy spot—say Saint Paul's Churchyard for instance—literally to astonish his son's weak mind. (9)

Given that Scrooge is introduced as Marley's "sole executor, his sole administrator, his sole assign, his sole residuary legatee, his sole friend, and sole mourner," and hence also "the chief mourner," in which capacity

he signed "the register of his burial," there can be "no doubt" that Scrooge is the analogue of the mourning son Hamlet (9). Of course, the comic rewriting of Hamlet as a prank played by a "middle-aged gentleman" on his son in contemporary London raises doubts about whether Marley's ghost is as real as his early modern forebear. Yet, given the Romantic and post-Romantic reception of *Hamlet* outlined by Frank, there can be little doubt that the "weak mind" is a reference to melancholy. Several psychoanalytic readings of the *Carol* confirm this diagnosis, even as they highlight different aspects of Scrooge's melancholy, from his "anal character" to the structuring of the story as therapy, or to the role played by the ghosts as representatives of the "symbolic order."[32]

Hamlet is only one of many references to the centuries-old literary and cultural discourses of melancholy in *A Christmas Carol*. Among these are the designation of Scrooge as "chief mourner" and "sole mourner," who, having "never painted out Old Marley's name," remains in mourning seven years after his friend's death (9). In addition to the idea of ghosts, or "the Ghost of an Idea," Dickens' preface to his *Carol* also "raise[s]" the issue of "humour" and the possibility that people can be "out of humour with themselves, with each other, with the season, or with me" (6). As a comical or "humorous" text, the *Carol* thus attempts to cheer up its readers and realign their "humour" (temperament) with the season. The question of humour and its two meanings lies at the heart of the text's opposing main characters, Ebenezer and his nephew Fred Scrooge, who enters his uncle's office having "so heated himself with rapid walking in the fog and frost, this nephew of Scrooge's, that he was all in a glow; his face was ruddy and handsome; his eyes sparkled, and his breath smoked again" (11). To keep himself "in humour" with the Christmas season, Fred applies one of the most common therapies against melancholy, (fast) walking. As a result, his humour obviously sanguine, the blood visible in his "ruddy" cheeks, and its effects evident in his bright face, warm body, and "irresistibly contagious … laughter and good-humour" (56). By contrast, Ebenezer, in "the haggard winter of his life" (40), has the corresponding humour, as opposed to the sanguine cheer of the story's younger characters, from Fred to Tiny Tim.[33] For this reason, his character is "hard" and "cold" (10)—more on his temperature below.

Allusions to the "dog-days" and "blind men's dogs" (10) suggest, moreover, that Dickens possessed, and could count on his readers possessing, a deep cultural knowledge of the tropes of melancholy, including the association of melancholy and *care*—the Greek word *acedia*, often translated as listlessness or even sloth, means "without care." Before terrorizing him with a vision of his death, the text emphasizes Scrooge's care or lack thereof: "But what did Scrooge care! It was the very thing he liked. To edge his way along the crowded paths of life, warning all human sympathy to

keep its distance, was what the knowing ones call 'nuts' to Scrooge" (10). While the idiom "nuts to" amplifies Scrooge's lack of care, it also implies that the attitude that considers human sympathy worthless is itself nuts. Yet of all Scrooge's traits related to melancholy, the most salient is the one that has been most often overlooked in literary and art-historical research on the humours, namely his greed. In *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), one of the most famous Western works on the topic, Robert Burton collects under subsection 12 "Philarguria: Covetousnesse a Cause" topics such as Plutarch's "the desire of mony is the root of all evill," concluding: "For it is indeede the patterne, Image, Epitome of all Melancholy, the fountaine of many miseries, much discontent, care and woe; this *inordinate, or immoderate desire of gaine, to get or keep mony*."[34]

While Burton discusses covetousness as one of dozens of causes, from "Feare" to "Hatred" and "overmuch Study," including "Poverty and Want,"[35] the association of melancholy with the love of accumulation has a long and influential tradition, which is sometimes explicitly coupled with antisemitic sentiments but more generally reappears whenever there is a need to express anger and resentment against the rich. The second-century Alexandrian scholar Ptolemy includes in his list of types governed by Saturn misers, hoarders, and the greedy.[36] Writing about Saturn, Abû Ma'šar (Albumasar), an astrologer at the Abbasid court in Baghdad in the ninth century, notes that the planet god "presides … over measuring things, division of estates, land and much property, and estates with their wealth; over avarice and bitter poverty; … over blindness, corruption, hatred, guile, craftiness, fraud, disloyalty, harmfulness (or harm); over being withdrawn into one's self; over loneliness and unsociability."[37] For the tenth-century Arab astrologer Al-Qabisi (Alcabitius), Saturn, "when he is evil[,] presides over hatred, obstinacy, care, grief, lamenting, weeping, evil opinion … over miserly gains, over old and impossible things, far travels, long absence, great poverty, avarice towards himself and others [etc.]"; he also "has the faith of Judaism, black clothing, of days Saturday, and the night of Wednesday."[38] As Eric Zafran has shown, the association of Saturn with the Jewish faith, initially based on the day of the Sabbath, has led to an amalgamation of negative stereotypes, especially in the context of Christian antisemitic discourses.[39] While modern re-descriptions often distance themselves from this strain of the tradition—Shakespeare, in *The Merchant of Venice*, splits the portrait of melancholia between Shylock and the "sad" Antonio—it remains a latent component of the discourse that can be reactivated at any moment. In any case, and throughout the Middle Ages, the overwhelmingly negative portrait of the planet god Saturn illustrates a deep cultural scepticism about wealth and money-making practices. Combining various attributes of the usurped and emasculated

Titan Cronus, the Orphic god of time Chronos and the god of "sowing" or "seed" Saturn, the tradition connects these motifs with the distant and slow-moving planet Saturn as well as the associated attributes of melancholy. The wealth, power, and violence of the planet god also point back to myths of Saturn as a treasurer, as the inventor of coin money, and as the ruler of the Golden Age.

Against the backdrop of this mythic-astrological tradition, Ebenezer Scrooge becomes readable as the spitting image of the Saturnine miser: covetous and misanthropic, he spends his evenings alone, reading his account books. Given his Old-Testament name and his refusal to celebrate Christmas, Scrooge may also be an "absent Jew," Jonathan H. Grossman's designation for a character who is denoted as Christian but described in terms that connote Jewishness.[40] Grossman also argues that "the text's suppression of Scrooge's Jewishness would also help to explain why Scrooge's conversion is incomplete."[41] One could say that the anti-capitalist affect expressed in the portrayal of the greedy Scrooge is not exhausted by the overcoming of antisemitism. Yet Scrooge's conversion, complete or not, makes him more sympathetic than the traditional portrait of the wealthy melancholic: his sociopathic tendencies remain within legal bounds; his deviousness is limited to a good business sense; and, by the end of the story, he becomes a respectable philanthropist. While these may be signs of a growing cultural acceptance of calculated self-interest, Dickens' cultural re-description of economic melancholy clearly transports much of the moral outrage that the tradition holds in store. At the same time, he depicts Scrooge's melancholy not only as a temperament, a naturally or astrologically determined disposition, but also as a sickness in need of a cure. Dickens' text thus combines these two strains of the melancholy tradition to great effect. Yet he also draws out a further association, latent in the image of Saturn as Chronos or the god of time. As if responding to Benjamin Franklin's famous dictum that "time is money," Dickens portrays melancholy primarily as a pathological relationship to time, a condition of being "out of humour" not only with the Christmas season but with the very culture of time that marks seasons and holidays as social forms of time-keeping and time-sharing. In Dickens' allegory, time—at least in its linear form—emerges as the flipside of money; it can dampen every manic vision of eternal growth. If we never *can* have enough money, we never *do* have enough time.

The Time of Melancholy or the "Rule of Time"

In his preface, signed in December 1843, Dickens acknowledges that his *Carol*, as a seasonal if not occasional text, has a particular generic relationship to time:

> I have endeavoured, in this Ghostly little book to raise the Ghost of an Idea which shall not put my readers out of humour with themselves, with each other, with the season, or with me. May it haunt their houses pleasantly, and no one wish to lay it. (6)

Despite the apparent assurance ("shall not"), these lines betray the author's anxiety that the ghost-story genre may not accord with the traditional "humour" of the Christmas season.[42] Indeed, understood as a return or *révanance*, a ghost disrupts, by definition, the present flow of time. By qualifying the apparitions in his *Carol* as spirits of Christmas, Dickens ties the achrony of haunting with the normal return of the calendar cycle. The title "Carol in Prose" and the subtitles—"Stave" instead of "Chapter"—suggest that poetic form, by imitating musical structures, can produce a pleasing cycle of repetition.[43] Still, the paradox, if not oxymoron, that the ghost may "haunt … pleasantly," reveals that the experience of returns and cycles is never simple, even as the suggestion that no one "wish to lay" Dickens' ghost raises the possibility that one might not be able to put it to rest—a feature both of Christmas music and the *Carol*, as the history of its reception has shown.

If there is such a thing as a pleasant disruption of the present time, however, it may relate to an experience of the present that is itself not pleasant. This appears to be the case for Ebenezer Scrooge, and it is certainly so for those who suffer from melancholy. While its primary determination in ancient medicine is the mix (Greek *krasis*) of humours, the tradition also provides various associations between melancholy and time. As mentioned above, ancient cosmology links this humour with evening, autumn and the mature age. Because of its long period of cyclicity, the planet Saturn also came to be associated with slowness. One of the key symptoms of (mild) melancholy is boredom, whose equivalents in German (*Langeweile* or "long while") and French (*ennui*) appear frequently in descriptions of melancholy. The paradigmatic experience of *Langeweile*, moreover, is the monk's *acedia*, embodied by the "noonday demon."[44] As a bipolar illness, even ancient melancholy is inherently temporal or "chronic" in its oscillations.

Given these deep connections between melancholy and time, it is somewhat surprising that the first genuinely temporal theories of melancholy did not appear until the twentieth century. According to Michael Theunissen, the possibility of a temporal theory of melancholy emerges in the context of the vitalist school of psychology represented by Victor Emil Gebsattel, Erwin Strauss, and Eugène Minkowski, a student of Henri Bergson.[45] Theunissen—who, like Ludwig Binswanger but with different emphases, seeks a phenomenological grounding for these psychological theories—has provided one of the most comprehensive temporal theories

of melancholy to date. The starting point for Theunissen's analysis is a statement of Gebsattel's patient Ilse K.: "I cannot stop thinking that *time* is passing by."[46] Observing that the patient's suffering is not only related to a fear of death, but also to the monotony of counting seconds, Theunissen proposes that we understand this suffering as an experience of time as *linear* and *fractured* (that is, divisible into ever smaller units). While the philosopher concedes that this concept of time is realistic—it is none other than an Aristotelean concept that underlies natural science—he argues that, "according to the criteria of the human experience of self and world," it is less "original" than the experience of time the dimensions of past, present and future.[47] Because the subjective, dimensional experience of time is more fundamental, Theunissen describes melancholy pathologically as a "breakdown" (*Zerfall*) of the resistance of the subject against the "rule of linear time."[48] Explaining nostalgia and ruminating on the past as secondary to the melancholic patient's loss of future, the philosopher identifies in the melancholic's relationship to time the dominance of prospection (merely seeing into the future), not only over propulsion, the vitalist drive forward ("Nach-vorne-Leben"), and protension, the existential condition of being-in-time in which the knowledge of future death affirms life as the opposite of death. Theunissen calls this existential feeling of being not-yet-dead "living from the start" ("Von-vorne-Leben").[49]

In light of Theunissen's theory, Dickens' temporal framing of Scrooge's melancholy appears all the more remarkable. Not only does Dickens appear to recognize the central role played by linear time in Scrooge's depression; he also clearly identifies—through ghosts that "resemble the allegorical figures in a newspaper cartoon, who bear their names clearly printed on their garments"—how crucial the dimensions of time, past, present, and future, are to its cure.[50] If "the whole series of visitations and visions can … be interpreted as an *inner* psychological experience," as Stephen Prickett argues, then this experience consists in the inner intuition of time as a formal structure in the Kantian sense.[51] All experience of time is thus an "inner" experience. Furthermore, Dickens' diagnosis of Scrooge's temporal melancholy connects it with the banker's relationship to time as the medium of capital accumulation. When we remember, following Franklin's advice to a young tradesman, that "time is money," it becomes evident that thinking about money and thinking about time are one and the same thing. At the very least, this is how Scrooge justifies his aversion to Christmas:

> "What else can I be [but cross]," returned the uncle, "when I live in such a world of fools as this? Merry Christmas! Out upon merry Christmas! What's Christmas time to you but a time for paying bills

> without money; a time for finding yourself a year older, but not an hour richer; a time for balancing your books and having every item in 'em through a round dozen of months presented dead against you? If I could work my will," said Scrooge indignantly, "every idiot who goes about with "Merry Christmas" on his lips, should be boiled with his own pudding, and buried with a stake of holly through his heart. He should!" (11)

If the experience of "finding yourself a year older" corresponds with the melancholy brooding on the passage of time, the addition "not an hour richer" negates the possibility of a "return" on investment that, in Samuel Weber's astute analysis of Franklin's maxim, the capitalist hopes will redeem the hours spent on business.[52] Of course, the fact that one can never become "richer in hours" suggests that Scrooge is already in a deep depression. He may well have "beguiled the rest of the evening with his banker's-book," but financial gains cannot make up for lost time (16). As a banker and creditor, however, Scrooge has nothing but contempt for those who go into debt for the sake of Christmas revelry, and as an employer he is loath to "pay a day's wages for no work," the holiday being "a poor excuse for picking a man's pocket every twenty-fifth of December!" (16). The miser rejects charitable donations on similar grounds, cynically suggesting that "the Treadmill and the Poor Law," which established debtors' prisons and work-houses, which in turn transform debts and lack into time served, are sufficient remedies for poverty and destitution (14). Scrooge, like his future avatar Thomas Gradgrind in *Hard Times*, believes that "everything [is] to be paid for," be it by money, time, or work.[53]

According to the logic of opposites, the people who visit Scrooge in the first stave of the *Carol*, all those who truly "keep Christmas" demonstrate a different attitude towards time (12). The charity collectors, for example, emphasize that the poor "suffer greatly at the present time" (13), adding: "We choose this time, because it is a time, of all others, when Want is keenly felt, and Abundance rejoices" (14). For Scrooge's sanguine nephew, not only is Christmas "a kind, forgiving, charitable, pleasant time," but it is "the only time I know of, in the long calendar of the year, when men and women seem by one consent to open their shut-up hearts freely, and to think of people below them as if they really were fellow-passengers to the grave, and not another race of creatures bound on other journeys" (12). It is significant that the nephew makes a proleptic reference to the "grave" that Scrooge will encounter in a vision of Christmas future. Unlike his uncle, the younger man lives protensively, in all three dimensions of time: "though it has never put a scrap of gold or silver in my pocket, I believe that it *has* done me good, and *will* do me good; and I say, God bless it!" (12, italics in original).

In this way, the nephew's impassioned speech provides the script for the "ghostly" therapy that will cure Scrooge of his temporal malady. First, Scrooge will encounter, in the form of Marley's ghost, not only his double and alter ego, but his ego as it suffers under the eternal duration of linear money-time, symbolized by a chain, "wound about him like a tail," which is "made … of cash-boxes, keys, padlocks, ledgers, deeds, and heavy purses" (19). As Marley's "sole residuary legatee," Scrooge thus cannot conclude his work as Marley's "sole mourner" until the contracts expire (9). Only the three spirits of Christmas, representing the three dimensions of time in their relation to the subject's personal experience, can disrupt the linearity of time and money, a disruption that at first alarms the banker, who fears for the reliability of his contracts, which would be as worthless as "a mere United States' security if there were no days to count by" (27).[54] As the phrase "or his order" indicates, the time of such bills is not Scrooge's own future, but the future as a mere extension of the linear time of all exchange. As Theunissen's existential analysis suggests, the key moment in this therapy, which begins with an emotional encounter with Scrooge's own personal past (29) and gives a hint at the joyful possibilities of the present, is its culmination, when Scrooge's future vision of his own grave throws him back into life and presence. Although the images of want and abundance, solitude and family cheer reinforce Scrooge's healing, his therapy ultimately has a formal, temporal structure.

Yet the ability of the Christmas spirits to interrupt linear time is the key to their power: through retrospective memory, Scrooge can return to the past and understand his present; through visions of the future, he can correct his course. Dickens' text thus emphasizes the conditional modality of Scrooge's temporal journeys. That is, while the visits to the past and present are nostalgic—indeed, they play a central role in establishing an entire culture of Christmas nostalgia—they also produce the immediate wish to change his recent behaviour: "There was a boy singing a Christmas Carol at my door last night. I should like to have given him something: that's all" (32) and "I should like to be able to say a word or two to my clerk just now. That's all" (37). In these moments of regret, the past appears as a contingent set of events produced by actions in the present. The relationship of present action to future retrospection becomes poignantly clear when Scrooge sees his former love's daughter and imagines himself as the girl's father. If the subjunctive mood still expresses the wish in terms of (melancholic) regret, Scrooge's famous question when faced with his gravestone addresses the contingency of the future: "answer me one question. Are these the shadows of the things that Will be, or are they shadows of the things that May be, only!" (75). Dickens does not delve into theological questions here; it is not the Spirit but Scrooge who answers his own question, and thus demonstrates his return into a "protensive"

relationship to the future: "Men's courses will foreshadow certain ends, to which, if persevered in, they must lead … But if the courses be departed from, the ends will change" (75).[55] Certainly, the grave is a necessary end, but an acknowledgement of the necessity of death is the precondition of every possible life. To escape a premature or preternatural death, like the zombie death of his friend Marley, Scrooge thus promises not particular acts of goodness, kindness, or charity, but to live in the three dimensions of time: "I will live in the Past, the Present, and the Future!" (77).

The Temperature of Melancholy

Scrooge's vow to live in all three dimensions of time is a purely formal promise. The dimensions of time are as empty of content as the abstract concept of linear time. While clocks, calendars, and account books are effective cultural techniques for keeping and recording linear time, how does one express the content of dimensional time or of time as a lived experience? As suggested above, the double meaning of the Latin *tempus*, at the root of both temperature and temperament, points to a possible index. As a form of "externalized psychology," the correlation of weather and affect is as widespread in nineteenth-century realist literature as physiognomy and milieu realism.[56] Indeed, the variety and vicissitude of weather conditions are particularly well suited to express subtle gradations and sudden shifts in feeling.

In his portrayal of Scrooge and the weather of a London Christmas, however, Dickens is anything but subtle. In fact, the text's expository introduction provides a kind of instruction in reading weather as an index of affect. Dickens first refers to the weather in the context of the comparison of Marley with Hamlet's father, who appears "at night, in an easterly wind" (9). Significantly, had the father not been dead but merely playing a ghost "literally to astonish his son's weak mind," he would also have chosen to appear "after dark in a breezy spot—say Saint Paul's churchyard for instance" (9), a joke that reveals the artifice behind the association of the dark, wind, and ghosts. In accordance with this poetic principle that character and feeling dictate the weather of a (literary) fiction, Dickens then moves on to his first general portrayal of Scrooge, where we learn that the "covetous, old sinner" is also extremely *cold*:

> The cold within him froze his old features, nipped his pointed nose, shrivelled his cheek, stiffened his gait; made his eyes red, his thin lips blue; and spoke out shrewdly in his grating voice. A frosty rime was on his head, and on his eyebrows, and his wiry chin. He carried his own low temperature always about with him; he iced his office in the dog-days; and didn't thaw it one degree at Christmas. (10)

In this passage, temperature becomes the medium for a reversal of the poetics of "externalized psychology." Rather than providing clues to Scrooge's interiority, physiognomic details ("features" or "voice") and milieu description ("office" or "Christmas") are determined here by "the cold within." This makes Scrooge curiously immune to the weather: "External heat and cold had little influence on Scrooge. No warmth could warm, no wintry weather chill him." In terms of temperament or "humour," the value "cold" is the mark of melancholy and phlegm, though the text drives home the point that, unlike wet phlegm, the humour of the miser is *dry*: "The heaviest rain, and snow, and hail, and sleet, could boast of the advantage over him in only one respect. They often "came down" handsomely, and Scrooge never did" (10). In the slang meaning of "gave money," moreover, the phrase "came down" emphasizes the economic implications of the miser's dry cold.

Still, this fact of Scrooge's character in the exposition does not impede Dickens' employment of the weather as a device for indicating his changing moods once the diegesis begins with "Once upon a time." The meteorological starting point for the narrative is more in keeping with a ghost story than with a Christmas tale: "It was cold, bleak, biting weather: foggy withal" (10). As in Shakespeare's drama, with its "easterly wind," Marley's haunting is accompanied by a worsening of weather conditions: "The cold became intense … Foggier yet, and colder! Piercing, searching, biting cold" (15). Once established, the correlation of weather, mood, and temperament can move in both directions. Dickens personifies the weather itself as a man in mourning: "The fog and frost so hung about the black old gateway of the house, that it seemed as if the Genius of the Weather sat in mournful meditation on the threshold" (16). Just as the text links cold, fog, and wind to melancholy, it also connects heat and light with its opposite, the sanguine or "ruddy" temperament. The shop windows decked in Christmas glory present a strong contrast to Scrooge's mournful threshold: "The brightness of the shops where holly sprigs and berries crackled in the lamp heat of the windows, made pale faces ruddy as they passed" (15). Dickens frequently returns to this contrast in his descriptions of Christmas Present, which one might sum up with the words of twentieth-century songwriter Sammy Cahn: "Oh the weather outside is frightful, but the fire is so delightful." Though Scrooge at first fears the apparition, "turn[ing] uncomfortably cold," (42) the second spirit surprises him by entering in "a blaze of ruddy light" (42), bearing a "glowing torch" (43). Unlike the light shed by the Ghost of the Past, which Scrooge extinguishes in a desperate act of repression, the light of the Present brings with it "an air of cheerfulness abroad that the clearest summer air and brightest summer sun might have endeavoured to diffuse in vain" (46). Significantly, the light's power extends even to

the gloomiest, most melancholy landscapes, such as the "bleak and desert moor" (54) where the coal-miners work, or the "solitary lighthouse" set against "the awful sea" (55).

In these images, the opposition light/dark often corresponds to the poles warm/cold. Still, the difference between the two becomes significant at various points. Light/dark has an epistemological value. "The dense gloom" that surrounds the past represents forgetting, and alternates with the "distinct and clear" form of remembrance (28). The light of Christmas present shines on the allegorical children, Ignorance and Want, a vision by which Scrooge is "appalled" (61), and the "deep black garment" and "darkness" (63) that shroud and surround the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come are signs of the future's inscrutability. By contrast, the valences of warm/cold are emotional. The "mighty blaze" brought by the Spirit of Christmas present brings "that dull petrification of a hearth" in Scrooge's apartment, a near homonymous metaphor for his heart, back to life (43); the future vision of a dead Scrooge lying covered in his bed provokes the outcry: "Oh cold, cold, rigid, dreadful Death!" (70).

Considering these values, it becomes clear that the point of *A Christmas Carol* is not only to open Scrooge's eyes,[57] but also to warm him up—a difficult task considering how the miser likes darkness because it is "cheap" and keeps his fire "very low … indeed" (18). With a mix of light and heat, the therapeutic visits of the Spirits of Christmas Past, Present, and Future clearly achieve this difficult task, though the question remains of whether this "Ghost of an Idea," as Dickens writes in the preface (6), is a good one, or whether only good comes of it. In the tradition of melancholy inaugurated by the Pseudo-Aristotelean "Problem XXX. 1," "hot melancholy" is an ambivalent condition. As this text explains, the patient can suffer at both extremes; when black bile, which is "naturally cold," "is in excessive quantity in the body, [it] produces apoplexy or torpor, or despondency or fear; but if it becomes overheated, it produces cheerfulness with song, and madness, and the breaking out of sores and so forth."[58] In other words, overheated melancholy causes mania, the second of two forms of the illness's bipolar form. And indeed, this appears to happen to Scrooge, who wakes up from the "agony" of seeing his own future grave as the very portrait of the giddy maniac,

> so fluttered and so glowing with his good intentions, that his broken voice would scarcely answer to his call … laughing and crying in the same breath; and making a perfect Laocoön of himself with his stockings: "I am as light as a feather, I am as happy as an angel, I am as merry as a schoolboy. I am as giddy as a drunken man. A merry Christmas to everybody! A happy New Year to all the world! Hallo here! Whoop! Hallo!" (78)

While the comparison with the "angel" points to the religious connotations of mania, the reference to the "drunken man" suggests a more worldly cause. The pseudo-Aristotelean text includes both aspects as well as the violent mood swings—"laughing and crying in the same breath"—which corresponds with the image of Laocoön in stockings, a comic farce of the ancient statue that presents the Trojan priest in a paroxysm of pain and despair.

In accordance with Scrooge's mood, and also with his new, "enlightened" perspective, the weather has also changed: "Running to the window, he opened it, and put out his head. No fog, no mist; clear, bright, jovial, stirring, cold; cold, piping for the blood to dance to; Golden sunlight; Heavenly sky; sweet fresh air; merry bells. Oh, glorious! Glorious!" (78). While the internal focalization gives us a sense of Scrooge's bright outlook, the narration appears to hesitate at the word "cold," repeating it to emphasize the revaluation of the term—from cold melancholy to "bright, jovial, stirring, cold"—but also suggesting a latency. The external cold "stirs" the blood (another metaphor from the humoral tradition), and suggests that a healthy body, like that of a merry schoolboy, may benefit from the test of its fitness. By contrast, the image of "piping," usually reserved for hot air or steam, is paradoxical. Scrooge's blood may be "piping hot," but then it would dance to its own tune. As a result, the image reinforces the causality introduced at the start: temperament determines temperature.

Such ambivalence returns, moreover, in the story's last sentences. In his altered, manic state, Scrooge is a bit ridiculous and earns the laughs of many people, yet "he thought it quite as well that they should wrinkle up their eyes in grins, as have the malady in less attractive forms" (83). Dickens does not specify what the "malady" here is, but Scrooge only knows much about one illness, namely the unattractive melancholy from which he once suffered. Finally, we are told, Scrooge "had no further intercourse with Spirits, but lived upon the Total Abstinence Principle" (83). What are we to make of this resolve, from a man who learned so much from Spirits, especially how to give and enjoy and feel "giddy," to once again become abstinent?

If one believes, with critics such as Edmund Wilson, that Scrooge is indeed the "victim of a manic-depressive cycle," then the reference to abstinence does not forebode well for his sanity, "if we were to follow him beyond the frame of the story."[59] Such heights of Christmas mirth, after all, can set the stage for a hard fall in January. While Scrooge appears to be cured, moreover, he retains a key aspect of his former character: abstinence as a form of asceticism.[60] If Scrooge does suffer from the bipolar form of melancholy, which includes both depressive, cold moments, and manic, warm moments of expansion,[61] what does this mean for Dickens' view of the Christmas economy? On the one hand, Scrooge's newfound

generosity balances out his former parsimony. As he says of his gift to charity, "a great many back-payments are included in it, I assure you" (80). In this way, Scrooge enters the "normal" Christmas or Christian economy described by his nephew Fred in the exposition: as a "kind, forgiving, charitable, pleasant time" that corrects the inequities of the rest of the year (12). On the other hand, Scrooge's transformation also leads to a remarkable shopping spree, including a prize turkey that "never could have stood upon his legs, that bird" (79), a "Christmas bowl of smoking bishop," as well as coal for the fires (83). As critics such as Lee Erickson and Andrew Smith have noted, this amounts to an endorsement of consumer culture as a solution to the excessively harsh saving culture of the miser.[62] In other words, Scrooge may be right to call Christmas an "excuse to pay bills without money." As mentioned above, Dickens wrote the book in time for the holiday rush, and financed the publication himself, so his declared intention to "raise the Ghost of an Idea" might well be read as his attempt to "raise some funds." Bipolar melancholy thus becomes a metaphor for an economy with its own highs and lows, phases of manic spending and depressive savings. Just as the melancholy Scrooge is at risk of a renewed crisis, so too is the economy.

To conclude, there is reason to doubt whether Scrooge's change in temperature will result in a lasting change in temperament, at least if we step outside the narrative frame, as Wilson suggests. From this perspective, Dickens has indeed created a rhetorical "sledge-hammer" that both predates and rivals his condemnation of the "mad melancholy" of industrial capitalism in *Hard Times* or the debtor's depression in *Little Dorrit*. In *A Christmas Carol*, Dickens shows that one way out of a "hard time" is the therapy of our subjective relationship to time. The question of the success of Scrooge's cure depends on the meaning of "ever afterwards" in the story's concluding paragraph (83). Does this tale that began "once upon a time" (10) end happily ever after? At the very least, one aspect of Scrooge's "alteration" appears to be permanent: "it was always said of him, that he knew how to keep Christmas well, if any man alive possessed the knowledge." After this final claim about Scrooge, the narrator leaves the diegetic space to express a wish: "May that be truly said of us, and all of us!" (83). Narrated in the present tense—which one might consider a fourth meaning of *tempus*—the framing narrative of *A Christmas Carol* serves as a reminder that the time of reading literature, like the time of the Christmas holiday, is a special time, a time of exception. Dickens intermittently refers his readers to this presence of reading, most notably when the first Spirit appears, "as close to [his bed] as I am now to you, and I am standing in the spirit at your elbow" (28). Via the medium of literature, *A Christmas Carol* haunts its readers. Unlike the prank played by the

middle-aged gentleman on his weak-minded son at St Paul's churchyard, however, it seeks not to terrify, but rather to spread cheer by reconnecting us—as long as we identify with the cold, melancholic Ebenezer Scrooge—with our own past, present, and future.

Notes

1 Batuman, "Ghosts of Christmas."
2 Werner Plumpe cites Wilhelm Hauff's fairy-tale "Das kalte Herz" (1827) as the source of the trope; see Plumpe, *Das kalte Herz*, 13.
3 Frank, "Steinherz," 413. See also Blumenberg, *Metaphorology*, esp. 1–5.
4 Frank, "Steinherz," 513; in a footnote, p. 426, Frank states his intention to present in the appendix an "exhaustive typology."
5 For the full list, see Frank, "Steinherz," 425; Frank, "Anhang."
6 Frank, "Steinherz," 416. Speaking of "further affinities" in a footnote, Frank appears surprised that the semantics of melancholy cover his topic so well.
7 Frank, "Steinherz," 425.
8 For Plumpe, pre-modern and modern critiques alike see the "lack of limits" (*Entgrenzung*) as the key moral failing of capitalism; see Plumpe, *Das kalte Herz*, 15. Though all humoral pathologies result from an "excess" of humour, melancholy, as the temperament of "outstanding men" (Greek *perittoi*) is itself excessive, and thus provides a structural analogy to Aristotle's critique of chrematistics; see Attanucci and Breuer, "Melancholie," 214.
9 Frank, "Steinherz," 425.
10 On "re-description," see Luhmann, *Gesellschaft*, 892; on "cultural re-description" (my translation of Wegmann's concept of *Wiederaufnahme*), see Wegmann, "An Ort," esp. 238.
11 For all his praise of chimney fires, even Dickens understood that the "sooty atoms" are responsible for the "dingy mist" over London; Dickens, "Christmas Carol," 46. All further references to this work will be cited in parentheses. Atmosphere played an important role in Victorian depictions of urban poverty; cf. Williams, "Clouds."
12 Dickens, *Hard Times*, 23.
13 Ketabgian, "Elephants." "Mechanical feelings" is Ketabgian's paraphrase of Carlyle's statement in the essay "Signs of the Times" (1828) that "men are grown mechanical in head and in heart, as well as in hand," cited by Ketabgian, "Elephants," 654.
14 *Little Dorrit* not only connects to the literary tradition of melancholy via Hamlet, but also to Dickens' own post-traumatic depression via the motif of Marshalsea prison. See Arac, "*Hamlet*"; Frank, "Hamlet's Shadow."
15 On the role of the Christmas books in Dickens' stylistic development, see Butt, "Dickens' Christmas Books." Before the public readings of the *Carol* in 1853, Dickens considered starting a journal on the idea of "*Carol* philosophy," a project remarkably similar to the later *Household Words*, where *Hard Times* appeared; Glancy, "Christmas Books," 192.

16 As a political journalist in the early 1830s, Dickens witnessed first-hand the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832 and the Poor Law in 1843, which Scrooge mentions (14). See Vincent, "Social Reform."
17 Forster, *Life of Charles Dickens*, 314, cited by Butt, "Dickens' Christmas Books," 131.
18 Dickens to John Forster, September 24, 1843, in *Letters of Charles Dickens*, vol. 3, 572; Dickens to John Forster, October 8, 1884 in *Letters of Charles Dickens*, vol. 4, 200; Dickens to Dr Southwood Smith, March 6, 1843, in *Letters of Charles Dickens*, vol. 3, 459.
19 In this letter, from March 10, 1843, Dickens still refers to his idea for a pamphlet, but has already decided to delay its publication "until the end of the year"; Dickens to Dr Southwood Smith, March 10, 1843, in *Letters of Charles Dickens*, vol. 3, 461, 461 n2.
20 Theunissen, "Melancholisches Leiden."
21 Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy*, 1.
22 See Goebel, "Schwermut/Melancholie."
23 Ketabgian, "Elephants," 658.
24 Burrows, *Commentaries*, 353, 592.
25 Aristotle, "Book XXX." On bipolar melancholy as a "prototype for modernity," see Theunissen, *Vorentwürfe*.
26 Ketabgian, "Elephants," 659.
27 Frank, "Hamlet's Shadow," 864.
28 Schlegel, *Lectures*, 137, first edition also quoted in Frank, "Hamlet's Shadow," 864.
29 Bucknill, *Shakespeare*, 101, 102; quoted in Frank, "Hamlet's Shadow," 865.
30 Frank, "Hamlet's Shadow," 863–864.
31 Arac, "*Hamlet*," 35.
32 On the first two points, see Shainess, "Charles Dickens," 352, passim. For a Lacanian reading, see Chitwood, "Eternal Returns," 677.
33 On the ancient origins of the correspondence of seasons, ages, and humours, see Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy*, 3.
34 Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, 283, italics in original.
35 Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, viii–ix (table of contents).
36 Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl (*Saturn and Melancholy*, 146), who note that the Greek scholar "also added deep thinkers," a revealing hint as to the bias of research on melancholy towards the association of melancholy with genius.
37 Abû Ma'šar, Leiden, University Library, Cod. or. 47, fol. 255^{r}, quoted in Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy*, 130.
38 Alcabitius, Bodl. Marsh 663, cited by Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy*, 131, 132.
39 Zafran, "Saturn." More recently, Moshe Idel has studied the Saturnine tradition in works of Jewish authors, who in their self-identification understandably emphasize positive aspects of the planet God. See Idel, *Saturn's Jews*, 44.
40 Grossman, "Absent Jew."
41 Grossman, "Absent Jew," 51.
42 On questions of genre, see Miller, "Genres."

43 Building on Theunissen's temporal theory of melancholy (see below), Breuer, "*Semper eadem*," 133–139, demonstrates how poetry's play of formal repetition and difference can serve as an antidote to melancholic monotony.
44 Solomon, *Noonday Demon*, 293.
45 Theunissen, "Melancholisches Leiden," 221.
46 Theunissen, "Melancholisches Leiden," 218, italics in original.
47 Theunissen, "Melancholisches Leiden," 223.
48 Theunissen, "Melancholisches Leiden," 224 and title, "Herrschaft der Zeit."
49 Theunissen, "Melancholisches Leiden," 236.
50 Butt, "Dickens' Christmas Books," 146–147.
51 Prickett, *Victorian Fantasy*, 57, italics in original.
52 Weber, "Money is Time," 29.
53 Dickens, *Hard Times*, 228.
54 As a result of numerous economic downturns, and without guarantees from the Federal Bank, securities released by individual American states were notoriously unreliable.
55 Theunissen distinguishes between "protension," a dynamic relationship with the future, and mere "prospection," imagining the future as a spectator. When we live protensively or "from the start again" (*Von-vorne-Leben*), we enact the present as the precondition of a possible future. See Theunissen, "Melancholisches Leiden," 236.
56 On "externalized psychology," see Hartley, *Charles Dickens*, 52–54. Weather, milieu and mood converge in the semantics of "atmosphere"; Erich Auerbach thus speaks of "Balzac's atmospheric realism"; Auerbach, *Mimesis*, 473. On weather and character in the context of German realism, see Delius, *Held*.
57 Cf. Tilley, "Sentiment."
58 Aristotle, "Book XXX," 162–163.
59 Wilson, "Dickens," 64.
60 This is, of course, a key thesis of Max Weber (*Protestant Ethic*).
61 In Freudian psychoanalytic terms, this means Dickens turns to the "orality of Christmas" to cure the "anality of a misanthrope"; Shainess, "Charles Dickens," 361, 362. Yet in the Freudian scheme of sexual development, both stages are primitive, and neither involves any meaningful engagement with other people.
62 See Erickson, "Primitive Keynesianism." For a Marxian critique of this ambivalence, see Smith, "Dickens' Ghosts."

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4 Citizen-Subjects of Capitalism

Comparing the Autobiographies of John Kenneth Galbraith and Milton and Rose Friedman

Maurice Cottier

Introduction

Following the Great Depression and the Keynesian Revolution, economics emerged as the leading social science in Western societies and beyond.[1] As full employment, economic stability and steady economic growth became key societal goals, economic knowledge gained importance in the realm of politics and public debate. During the postwar boom, economists—especially those from Ivy League universities in the United States—"attained an unprecedented near celebrity status."[2] This was certainly true for John Kenneth Galbraith and Milton Friedman, who both had distinguished careers as academics, political advisers, and public intellectuals. The fact that they were able to publish and sell their memoirs is a sign of their fame.[3]

Although friends, Galbraith and Milton Friedman were rivals. The former, a professor at Harvard, was a lifelong member of the Democratic Party, where he worked on the campaigns of Adlai Stevenson and John F. Kennedy. The latter, a professor at the University of Chicago, served as an adviser to Republican presidential candidate Barry M. Goldwater and presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. Their political affiliations were reflected in their professional works: Galbraith stood in the Keynesian and institutional traditions, while Milton Friedman was a leading figure of the Chicago School of Economics, a bastion of neoliberalism.[4]

Both were eager to popularize their theories and concepts in the public sphere, presenting their views in popular books and countless magazine articles as well as interviews in the press and on radio and television. At first, Galbraith remained one step ahead. During the 1950s, he published three bestselling books and became a household name in American public debate.[5] Born in 1908, he was four years older than Milton Friedman. But while seniority might have been an asset that enabled Galbraith's early advances, the 1950s were the time when Keynesian economics began to

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dominate the mainstream of economic thinking.[6] The free-market economics taught at Chicago seemed to many inside and outside of the profession an outdated relict of the past; Galbraith was one of the leading proponents of this view.

Milton Friedman first emerged as a public intellectual in the Goldwater campaign of 1964, where he served as economic adviser. His public presence was therefore closely tied to the rise of the American New Right in the 1960s, which rehabilitated not only conservative family and religious values but also free-market economics.[7] In the subsequent decades, his first book, *Capitalism and Freedom*, which initially triggered little reaction upon its publication in 1962, became a highly influential bestseller.[8] In 1980, this was followed by the *Free to Choose* project, funded by corporate sponsorship. The project encompassed a 10-part PBS documentary series and a book co-authored by Milton's wife Rose Friedman—also a trained economist.[9] *Free to Choose* was viewed by some of the production team as a reaction to Galbraith's *The Age of Uncertainty*. Produced by the publicly owned BBC, this series had aired 12 episodes in 1977,[10] and was also accompanied by a book.[11]

After being a household name in economics, politics, and public debate for nearly three decades, Galbraith published his memoirs in 1981. Milton and Rose Friedman, having written their memoirs together, followed in 1998. The publication of these memoirs was further proof of Galbraith's and Milton Friedman's public prominence. Yet these autobiographical texts should be understood not only as the result of the three economists' influence and achievements, but also—and perhaps primarily—as an additional attempt to advance their rival intellectual projects.

Literary scholars have pointed out that autobiographical writing, far from merely factually recapitulating a person's life, is an active and creative practice in which authors create public versions of themselves. This is not to say that autobiographical tales do not state facts or rely on actual events, but how this factual information is selected, remembered, put in order, and narrated—that is, how it is plotted—is a creative task. Therefore, in the process of autobiographical writing, the self is, at least to some extent, a product of the imagination.[12] Moreover, according to Julie Rak, subjectivity, which is formed in the process of autobiographical writing, is always tied to notions of citizenship and thus to questions concerning community. When writing about the self, authors create themselves as ideal citizen-subjects of an imagined community. The autobiographical self stands for more than just the author. Rak convincingly makes her point by comparing Jean-Jacques Rousseau's highly influential political treatise *The Social Contract* with his book *The Confessions*, one of the most famous autobiographies. The two major works should be analysed together since both lay out the blueprint for the citizen-subject of enlightened liberalism,

one by framing the democratic rules of the community and the other by defining the individual's role within the community.[13]

Building on this finding, this chapter offers a comparative analysis of the memoirs of Galbraith, and Rose and Milton Friedman. The analysis includes not just the text but also the visual representations on the book jacket, which are important paratexts.[14] The aim is to show how the memoirs related to Galbraith's and the Friedmans' politico-economic theories of capitalism and to demonstrate that no clear division can be established between the economic theories and the construction or imagination of their own lives and selves. The memoirs, written late in the three economists' lives and careers, were a continuation of their decades-long rivalry and their struggle to define what capitalism is and should be. It is these autobiographies, to a greater extent than their theoretical works, that make it possible to study the respective notions of the citizen-subjects.

This chapter proceeds as follows: it starts with a section on Galbraith's *A Life in Our Times*. My analysis shows that the way Galbraith narrates his life is similar to how he apprehended capitalism—as progress fuelled by individual intellectual achievement. In his narrative, his life, which began on a farm and led him into the academic and political epicentres of the time, bears a resemblance to how he theorized the trajectories of capitalism in the twentieth century. According to Galbraith, during his lifetime, capitalism evolved from a system mostly organized by the competitive accumulation of scarce labour and goods on a free market to a system dominated by large corporations, state intervention, and mass production and consumption. This made planning, rather than competition, the engine of capitalism. In the 1970s, Galbraith promoted a "New Socialism" in which the monopolistic branches of the economy would be brought under government control and run by enlightened officials.[15] In this optimistic narrative, thanks to the increasing presence of government over the course of the twentieth century, capitalism became less labour-intensive and crisis-prone, and more balanced, intellectual, and emotionally satisfying. With a view to this book's topic, one could argue that capitalism, in Galbraith's understanding, gradually evolved to become warmer and less callous in the twentieth century and would soon quietly give way to an even more humane, democratic, resource-saving, and leisure-creating economic system. The drivers of change were the members of a "New Class" that consisted of well-educated citizens like Galbraith himself.

In the second section, I situate Rose and Milton Friedman's *Two Lucky People* within the couple's larger intellectual project. Unlike Galbraith's account, this one systematically includes details of the private lives of the Friedman family. I show how this more personal approach is a means to place the family at the heart of capitalism, with the gendered and hierarchical division of labour—the caring wife at home and the entrepreneurial

husband in the marketplace—ultimately making the system work without the presence and interference of the welfare state. By connecting capitalism to the family, the Friedmans construct a warm image of capitalist societies. Unlike older Social Darwinist imaginaries of capitalism, "family capitalism" is not envisaged as a cold and cruel system of quasi-natural selection for social reproduction but rather as a highly satisfying system of voluntary cooperation between caring families. However, the Friedmans still accepted inequality as an important feature of capitalist societies. I analyse how their emphasis on the role played by luck in their lives corresponds to their understanding of prosperity (and, more implicitly, poverty). The economic success of a family is not thought to be influenced by class or race, but by good or bad luck. The concluding remarks discuss how Galbraith and the Friedmans imagine themselves as ideal citizen-subjects of the economic systems they envision.

The Progress of John Kenneth Galbraith

A Life in Our Times, for the most part, provides insights into the public life of a public person. Galbraith's wife Catherine and his four sons are not entirely absent from the narrative, but Galbraith "deliberately" chooses to take "a view outward on events, people and ideas" rather than detailing his marriage and family life.[16] Galbraith presents himself as a clear-sighted eyewitness and analyst of history. The "outward view" is underpinned by the title of the book, which connects Galbraith's individually lived and recollected *Life* with the collectively experienced and remembered *Times*.

Galbraith's approach corresponds to the memoirs' paratext.[17] The cover chosen for the first edition shows Galbraith's name and the title in a yellow and white serif typeface against a red background. For the word "Memoirs," a scripted typeface imitating handwriting is used. The choice of colour and the serif typeface are reminiscent of Winston Churchill's best-selling *Memoirs of the Second World War*, printed in 1959 by Houghton Mifflin—the same publishing house that would bring out the US version of *A Life in Our Times*. The back cover is illustrated with a close-up photograph (Figure 4.1). His chin resting on his fist, Galbraith looks straight at the viewer. He is dressed in an elegant grey flannel suit and white shirt with a plain navy tie. In the blurred background is a bookshelf. The portrait illustrates the author's elegance, clear-sightedness, decisiveness, and intellect, underlining his ability to recount world history in the form of a personal life story.

The account is, with very few exceptions, ordered chronologically, following Galbraith's journey through the universities and government agencies where he was educated and employed. In accordance with the



Figure 4.1 Back cover of John Kenneth Galbraith's *A Life in Our Times: Memoirs* (1981). Photo by Jim Kalett.

visuals of the cover photograph, Galbraith the narrator maintains a distance between himself and the institutions and people he encounters during his career. Something of a paradox, Galbraith the character is described as an integrated and at times also well-liked outsider. This becomes especially evident in his judgements of the institutional contexts that structured his professional life, and the behaviour of those he met or with whom he

worked. Galbraith, in his own perception, was not formed by institutions or the people who crowded them. Of course, it was the institutions that handed out the diplomas needed for a career in academia and paid his ever-increasing salary, and it was people who offered positions that enabled him to rise in society. He does not fail to mention, and on occasion express gratitude to, his teachers and superiors. But overall, Galbraith strives to keep an emotional distance from the colleagues and institutions of his professional life, frequently employing irony and sarcasm to do so. For example, he explains that at the Ontario Agricultural College, which he attended in the late 1920s and early in 1931, students "were required to make institutional loyalty a substitute for thought" and that a "cultivation of aggressively nonintellectual behavior styles" prevailed among students and faculty. This is not necessarily a tactic of denigrating his rather humble educational beginnings, since Galbraith went on to explain that "the lesson was enduring" because a similar *esprit de corps* dominated academic life at Princeton and Harvard.[18]

The gentle mockery of institutions of higher learning is also a key element of Galbraith's social and economic theory. Since the release of his first bestseller, the 1952 book *American Capitalism*, he had been criticizing the mainstream of his own profession. In Galbraith's opinion, his colleagues kept preaching the same outdated orthodoxy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries while the economic and social world had evolved. Rather than studying actual economic and social problems, economists were preoccupied with defending their theories and models, and with them their distinctive yet irrelevant position. In *The Affluent Society* (1958), Galbraith called this "the conventional wisdom," a term that was to enter everyday language.[19] Most people, and especially most economists, were mentally stuck in the past.

Yet, in Galbraith's mind, history was continuously evolving. Consequently, it was the event and experience of the Great Depression rather than the teachings of the Ontario Agricultural College that led him away from studying animal husbandry and towards economics. "I could there come to understand the real problem, and that understanding might also help me get a job."[20] But he was soon to discover the incompetence of the economists at his institution, and subsequently moved on.

At Berkeley, where Galbraith completed his PhD in agricultural economics between 1931 and 1934, "the mood of the university" was, at least partly, "ranging from liberal to revolutionary," notwithstanding a strong conservative presence.[21] Against the backdrop of the Great Depression, some of Berkeley's economists expressed open support for trade unions and social reformism. Galbraith had fond memories of Berkeley, and the liberal climate must have had an effect on him. But, rather than highlighting the teachings of and interactions with colleagues there, his autobiography

demonstrates that it was reading the great thinkers of economics that made a lasting impression on his younger self.

It was in those years that Galbraith was first exposed to the writings of Alfred Marshall, the founder of neoclassical economics, and the younger John Maynard Keynes. But the most enduring effect at this stage of Galbraith's life came from the works of Thorstein Veblen, the foremost exponent of American institutionalism. It was with Veblen, who had died by this time, that Galbraith felt an emotional bond. Seeing biographical similarities between himself and the son of Norwegian farmers in Minnesota, Galbraith notes that "Veblen was perhaps dangerously attractive to someone of my background."[22] Best known for his evolutionary approach to economics and almost ethnographical analysis of the "conspicuous consumption" of American robber barons,[23] to Galbraith Veblen "was an eruption against all who, in consequence of wealth, occupation, ethnic origin or elegance of manner, made invidious claim (a Veblen phrase) to superior worldly position." He added that, as a farm boy, he "knew the mood."[24] Hence he could not only understand but also *feel* what Veblen was saying.

Galbraith's comparison and identification with Veblen is important in two ways. First, it helped Galbraith to further fashion himself as a witty outsider, a peasant in the world of the well-off and well-educated. In Galbraith's self-perception, the farm-boy continued to exist within the world-famous economist. It was ultimately his rural heritage that was responsible for his immense work ethic and output. To illustrate this, Galbraith recalls a situation that he apparently experienced on several occasions during his tenure at Harvard.

> Regularly since coming to the university, I have been approached at the faculty club, on social occasions and even in the Yard by colleagues who, with an unconvincingly worried look, have said, "Ken, aren't you working too hard?" There was a book last year, another in prospect, my teaching, something in politics. Back of the query lies their natural concern for the union rules. Only with difficulty have I suppressed my reply: "The trouble with you, my friend, is that you've never worked on a farm."[25]

In his typically self-ironic way, Galbraith is quick to explain that such feelings of superiority were, like his work ethic, linked to his rural roots. All farmers around the world, he says, suffer from "a serious sense of inferiority." The "counterpart" to this was a "tendency of assertive compensation" of one's own importance.[26] He was surely no exception.

Second, the admiration for Veblen underlines that Galbraith thought he learned from and emotionally connected to the great thinkers of the

past rather than from his teachers, colleagues, or students who, although often benignly mentioned, are not perceived as having a profound influence on him or his work. Veblen had died in 1929, not far from Berkeley in Menlo Park; Galbraith never met him. The same is true for Keynes, whose *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* deeply altered Galbraith's perception after its publication in 1936.[27] Accordingly, the memoir's chapter on the reading and understanding of *General Theory* is entitled "Revelation."[28] Although Galbraith travelled to Cambridge, England on a scholarship in 1937 with the intention of learning from the master, the two never met as Keynes was on sick leave, recovering from a cardiac arrest.

By highlighting Veblen's and Keynes' influence on his own thinking, Galbraith implicitly positions his own work as a synthesis and advancement of their theories, and himself as their heir. Like Veblen, and to a certain extent Keynes, Galbraith was an evolutionist who believed that societies evolved over time. He was convinced that new realities, like the experience of the Great Depression, brought new potentials and problems that needed new theorization. The theories of the great economic thinkers, especially Adam Smith and Marshall, but also Veblen and Keynes, grappled and aligned with the social realities of their time. While valid for their respective stage in history, they would become obsolete or in need of reformulation once societies evolved. To provide theoretical updates for American postwar society was the self-proclaimed task of each of Galbraith's major works.

The most famous and influential of Galbraith's books was *The Affluent Society*. Originally published in 1958, it quickly became a bestseller and is now considered a classic.[29] Writing amidst the economic boom of the postwar years, Galbraith claimed that the United States was, historically, a novelty. For the first time in history, the basic needs of the people—not only the rich, but the great mass of the population—were fully satisfied. Pockets of poverty still existed, especially in the inner cities and the rural eras of the Appalachians. But never in history had people, on average, been better fed, clothed and housed. The United States was the first affluent society.

Galbraith did not object to the fact that most people had escaped poverty and could now satisfy their basic needs with relative ease. His criticism was that Americans did not change their attitude once the basic needs were covered. Notwithstanding the material abundance of everyday life in the 1950s, Americans' consumption constantly kept increasing. The main reason for this senseless attitude was the omnipresence of advertisement. Once basic needs were satisfied, corporations needed to artificially create new desires in order to increase sales. Increasing consumption and production meant that the workload remained unnecessarily high for workers.

Thanks to more efficient modes of production, industrial capitalism had drastically decreased the time and work required to satisfy the population's basic needs, yet the potential to create more leisure time was left untapped because of prevailing attitudes towards consumption. This critique can be seen as the first challenge of what one historian has called "the hegemony of growth" in the mid-twentieth century.[30]

For Galbraith, people still needed to adjust mentally to economic progress that had installed a situation in which, for most, goods were available in abundance. For the first time, the majority of people were freed from the dull, strenuous, and time-consuming toil of producing food and clothes and building shelter. There existed a real possibility of enhancing what Galbraith would later call "quality of life."[31] Through irony, he tried to convince his readers of the potential this unprecedented situation held. The following passage from *The Affluent Society* can serve as an example.

> In large areas of economic affairs, the march of events—above all, the increase in our wealth and popular well-being—has again left the conventional wisdom sadly obsolete. It may have become inimical to our happiness … So, while it would be much more pleasant (and also vastly more profitable) to articulate the conventional wisdom, this book involves the normally unfruitful effort of an attack upon it. I am not wholly barren of hope, for circumstances have been dealing the conventional wisdom a new series of heavy blows. It is only after such damage has been done, as we have seen, that ideas have their opportunity.[32]

For Americans to truly benefit from the new riches, Galbraith proposed reforms. The "social balance" between public and private expenditure needed to be evened out. Instead of encouraging ever more private consumption of goods that were mostly produced by a small number of giant corporations, the state should raise revenue to provide more, and better, public services: hospitals for healthcare, schools for education, parks, and landscape conservation for recreation. This would truly improve people's well-being. Yet, alongside a social component, an increase in the quality of life also had an individual aspect. If people felt less pressured into buying the latest, and biggest, car model, they would need less purchasing power and could thus reduce their workload. In turn, this would free up time for leisure and non-commercial activities in science, literature, and the arts.

Like other evolutionistic theories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including those of Veblen and Keynes, Galbraith's narrative of social change in *The Affluent Society*, like his other writings, followed a dialectic logic between the current of history and politics. Underneath the surface, history was bound in the direction of progress. Thus, changes were underway regardless of whether people knew or liked it. The task

of intellectuals was to explain "the march of events" to the public so the necessary political adjustments could be made to clear the way for progress.

Galbraith identified a perpetually growing group of people who were, at the same time, the products and the agents of progress: the "New Class."[33] "Education" was the entrance key to the New Class. Members, consisting of professionals, artists, and businesspeople, shared a belief that work should bring "satisfaction" and "enjoyment." They also had higher "intellectual, literary, cultural, and artistic demands." Here, too, Galbraith used his ironic wit when he wrote that the group was unified by "vicarious feeling of superiority."[34] Nonetheless, he saw the emergence of the New Class as a positive element and thought that fostering this class should be "perhaps next to peaceful survival itself [in the context of atomic warfare], *the* major social goal of the society."[35] Expanding the New Class meant the size of the population engaged in "work *qua* work" would shrink, a process that would be accelerated by "the intellectual energies and inventiveness of the New Class … in finding substitutes for routine and repetitive manual labor."[36] This, according to Galbraith, was a positive prospect rather than a danger. "Why," he asked, "should men struggle to maximize income when the price is many dull and dark hours of labor?"[37]

It is not difficult to detect Galbraith, a man of the world, navigating the highest ranks of government, diplomatic circles, and Ivy League universities with ease as a member of the New Class. As well as his professional success, he developed a taste for the arts. For instance, he acquired an important collection of Indian paintings, exhibited at the Harvard Art Museums in 1986.[38] When writing about the evolution of the New Class, he thus talked about his own journey. The story of Galbraith is the story of progress. He escaped from hard toil on a farm to become a firm member of the social group that formed the backbone of *The Affluent Society* and bore the potential of peacefully overcoming capitalism by means of a "New Socialism," in which people would no longer serve the goal of profit but of public service. Like all memoirs, *A Life in Our Times* is thus about more than an individual's life. By ironically commenting on his work ethic and strive for eminence, Galbraith dethrones himself, becoming a perhaps well-known yet not unordinary member of the New Class, and therefore a citizen-subject of the worlds he described and envisioned in his theoretical works.

Milton and Rose Friedman: A Lucky Family of Peddlers

The composition of *Two Lucky People* differs significantly from *A Life in Our Times*. The main formal difference is that it was co-written by a husband and wife. In the preface, Rose and Milton Friedman explain that the

original plan had actually been to write the entire book using the pronoun "we." Although this proved impractical, it expresses a strong desire to tell not solely the story of Milton but of the Friedmans as a married couple. Accordingly, the first chapter opens not with the birth of Milton or Rose but on October 3, 1932, the date the two first met in an economics class at the University of Chicago. Only thereafter does the narrative turn to Rose's and then to Milton's childhood. The rest of the book is arranged in a more or less chronological order.

While some might see the co-authorship as an emancipatory act, I argue that the urge to write their autobiography together tallies with the Friedmans' perception of capitalism, in which the family plays a central and basic role. *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962), which was also partly written by Rose although she was not acknowledged as an author, stated: "The ultimate operative unit in our society is the family, not the individual."[39] Elsewhere in the same book, the pair speak of "the family as the basic social unit."[40] In the Friedmans' view, the economic well-being of an individual is the duty of his or her family, not the welfare state. "In those distant pre-welfare state days," Milton reminisces on his parents' lives in *Two Lucky People*, "immigrants were strictly on their own except for the assistance they could get from relatives and private charitable agencies."[41] If families were properly functioning, the latter was unnecessary or even dangerous to the fabric of the family, and thus to society at large.[42]

Therefore, far from perceiving capitalism as rugged individualism or a Social Darwinist system that fostered a callous yet necessary survival of the fittest, the Friedmans, in both their scholarly and autobiographical writings, create a warm image of capitalism grounded in and built on the family. Yet, in order to fulfil its role, the family has to stand outside of capitalism. In the preface, Rose and Milton explain that they "have never been competitors."[43] Given the crucial role that the Friedmans ascribe to competition as an organizing principle for capitalist societies, this is a remarkable statement that underlines their view of the family as functioning according to very different principles. What might be called "family capitalism" consisted of two separate yet reciprocal spheres. The private sphere was the space of unconditional love, care, and mutual assistance, while the public sphere was the space of competition.

In order to paint a picture of "family capitalism," the Friedmans focus on their private lives as much as they do on their life in the limelight. Whereas Galbraith explicitly refrains from discussing personal affairs, the Friedmans' account contains frequent references to the couple's marriage and family routines. This is deliberate, as Rose and Milton explain that they "have aimed rather to present a personal record of our lives and experiences."[44]

The memoirs show that the partitioning of the two spheres implicitly followed clear gender lines. Although Rose also discusses her studies in economics at the University of Chicago, where she held a PhD, far more of her narrative than Milton's is dedicated to the recollection of family life. When recalling her work as a mother and housewife, she occasionally mocks Milton's ineptness regarding parenting or his clumsiness when it came to repair work. By doing so, she conveys not only the humorous and forgiving nature of their marriage but also her authority and expertise in care work. "Love and caring" were sentimental practices she learned from her parents.[45] She portrays herself as a reliable wife, sister and daughter, and a dedicated mother who, for the sake of a functioning "operative unit," gladly sacrificed her professional career. On occasion, Milton also briefly touches upon details relating to his hobbies (especially hiking) or their children's upbringing. But his contributions, not unlike Galbraith's memoirs, focus predominantly on his academic achievements and interventions as a political adviser and public intellectual.

The gendered approach to autobiographical writing is also expressed in the paratext of the front jacket, which contains the title, the subtitle, and the authors' names in serifed capital letters. The choice of the typeface thus resembles *A Life in Our Times*. However, the front jacket also features a photograph of Rose and Milton (fig. 4.2). Milton, shown from the hips upward, is standing behind the seated Rose, his hands placed gently on her shoulders. He is wearing a navy suit with a white shirt. His Bordeaux-coloured tie features multiple emblems of Adam Smith; it was a tie he frequently chose for public appearances to demonstrate his philosophical and political convictions. Rose is dressed less formally, wearing a white blouse with black dots and a black foulard. Both are smiling, turning their heads slightly to face the camera. The picture represents unity *and* separation. The Friedmans went through life together but with different roles. His appearance underlines his status and the seriousness of his scholarship, constantly exposed to public praise and scrutiny; hers, in contrast, stands for the private aspects of their lives. Together, they are two lucky people, as the title informs us, representing professional success, family values, and happiness rooted in and made possible by a gendered and hierarchical division of labour.

Compared with Rose's prose, emotions play only a minor role in Milton's passages. But when he uses affectionate language, it is to describe his passion for his education. For instance, he mentions that "a love simultaneously for mathematics and poetry" was instilled in him in high school.[46] Like Rose's affection for the family, Milton's strong feelings for education are an expression of the gendered division of labour in which the role of the man is to provide economic resources for the family.



Figure 4.2 Cover of Milton and Rose D. Friedman's *Two Lucky People: Memoirs* (1998). With permission by University of Chicago Press.

As with Galbraith, education was the key to Milton's advancement from a relatively humble background to significant affluence. Yet, when recalling his childhood and youth, Milton does not dwell only on his academic experience—he also gives considerable space to what he calls his early "entrepreneurial ventures" or "peddling activities." These included working as a "clerk" at his parents' ice-cream parlour in Rahway, New Jersey, and selling socks, ties, and used books to fellow students at Rutgers.[47] Eventually, his passion for education and business merged when he gave private summer tuition to high school students who had failed their exams. This, Milton recalls, was a double success since the job was both very profitable—with earnings surpassing a teacher's salary—and instructive, since he learned how to teach less-gifted students, a skill that would later help him in his teaching at university level.

When reading passages on Milton's youthful "peddling activities," it becomes evident that the Friedmans do not view capitalism as particularly cruel but rather as a system based on an almost playful and mutually beneficial exchange between individual sellers and buyers. All that is needed to advance in society is an almost childishly entrepreneurial spirit. The capitalism the Friedmans imagine resembles a playground rather than a callous system of Social Darwinist selection. It appears much more exciting than the vision of a materially productive but uninspiring capitalism dominated by large corporations that was evoked by Galbraith and his likeminded liberal colleagues in the 1950s.[48]

Milton did not cease to be an entrepreneur as he advanced in academia; he perceived himself as an academic entrepreneur. During his career, he continued to be a peddler in what he, and especially his longstanding colleague at the neoliberal economics department, George Stigler, repeatedly called "the marketplace of ideas."[49] It was Stigler's and Milton's belief that ideas, just like goods and services in a market economy, competed against each other and that the better ideas would eventually prevail. This belief is expressed in the penultimate paragraph of the memoirs: "Judged by ideas, we have been on the winning side … We are in the mainstream of thought, not, as we were fifty years ago, members of a derided minority."[50] Milton and Rose understood themselves as having conducted a decade-long marketing campaign for their free-market ideas in academia, politics and among the public at large. Eventually, the peddling of ideas had led to success. The public had bought (into) the product.

Like Galbraith, Milton Friedman was a celebrity persona, conscious of his ability to influence the public mood in the United States and beyond. When the memoirs were published in 1998, he looked back on decades during which he had been on the cover of *Time* magazine, a columnist at *Newsweek* magazine, an author of multiple popular books (with Rose as implicit or explicit co-author),[51] a guest on major TV programmes such as

The Phil Donahue Show and the star of his own documentary series *Free to Choose*. Like Galbraith, Milton had witnessed and contributed to the making of history by serving in presidential campaigns and as an adviser to heads of states, not only in the United States but around the world.[52] Yet in the preface, Rose and Milton underline that, despite the latter's worldwide fame, they were "rather typical of [their] contemporaries."[53] As a child of immigrants, and in Rose's case an immigrant herself, their story was in many regards what they viewed as typical of the twentieth-century United States. They saw themselves as an ordinary couple and family living the American experience. Whether accurate or not, this judgement shows that their memoirs, like Galbraith's, were not solely conceptualized to provide insights into the life of an important and somewhat extraordinary person, but as a projection of a specific citizen-subject of the "family capitalism" they envisioned.

As discussed, Galbraith uses self-irony to portray himself as a regular member of the New Class despite his celebrity status. In order to balance their celebrity status and their perceived existence as "rather typical" contemporaries, the Friedmans emphasize the role of luck in their private and professional lives:

> We are two lucky people. It was pure luck that Rose's mother brought her to the United States three months before the outbreak of World War I—a delay of three months and she might never have made it. It was pure luck that her brother Aaron went to the University of Chicago and brought her there. It was pure luck that Homer Jones was Milton's teacher at Rutgers and made it possible for him to go to Chicago. In all it was pure luck that brought us together and enabled us to have an extraordinarily rich and varied life together.[54]

Like family values and Milton's entrepreneurial spirit, luck was an important element in the plotting of the Friedmans' lives. It functioned in multiple and interrelated ways.

First, the emphasis on luck and contingency goes to show that Milton ultimately understood his intellectual project as situated within a network of like-minded teachers, colleagues, and disciples he was lucky to meet along the way. Unlike Galbraith, who felt a strong connection to the great thinkers of the past whose legacy he believed he carried on, Milton mostly omitted the icons from his memoirs. Adam Smith, despite adorning the tie he wore on the cover, is only mentioned once *en passant* in the text.[55] Milton's emancipatory moments came while listening to and interacting with his teachers and disciples in class rather than from reading the classics in solitude. He thus did not see himself as an agent of history and progress but rather as a member of a tight-knit community, selling a

particular viewpoint in the marketplace of ideas—while facing fierce competition from other economists such as Galbraith.

Moreover, stressing the central role of coincidence in an economically lucrative and prestigious career was a way of avoiding attributing success to intellectual superiority, privilege, or political prejudice. The Friedmans, in their own minds, were simply lucky to have lived, like their fellow Americans, in a capitalist country that—partly thanks to their intellectual project—became freer and therefore even more prosperous during their lifetime. This was the Friedmans' strategy of presenting themselves as regular people. They embodied the message that, with a little luck, everybody could thrive in capitalist societies.

Economic success, from this viewpoint, was mutually beneficial rather than reserved for the survivors of a callous struggle for existence, as was the case in the Social Darwinist imaginaries of capitalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that were promoted by the likes of Herbert Spencer or William Graham Sumner.[56] Yet, at the same time, the emphasis on luck made it possible to overlook the privileges of being white and, in Milton's case, male in twentieth-century America.[57] It also helped to downplay the strong overlap of the couple's interests with those of the wealthy conservative elite. Milton's strong public presence and subsequent celebrity were fostered by conservative and corporate sponsorship directly and through foundations.[58]

The emphasis on chance can also be found in the couple's theoretical contributions. While the Friedmans' vision of capitalism promised general prosperity, success on the family level was mainly thought to be based on luck. "Most differences of status or position or wealth," they explain in *Capitalism and Freedom*, "can be regarded as the product of chance at a far enough remove." Unlike in the callous Social Darwinist conception of capitalism, there were no deserving poor (or rich) in the Friedmans' warm vision. Nor did they claim that wealth and economic success were signs of divine predestination. Not even merit was seen as having a decisive role in the accumulation of wealth or the subsequent inequality: "The man who is hard working and thrifty is to be regarded as 'deserving'; yet these qualities owe much to the genes he was fortunate (or unfortunate?) enough to inherit."[59] The Friedmans did not consider inequality morally wrong and therefore something that needed correction through political intervention—on the contrary. But instead of defending inequalities in wealth as the outcome of the 'survival of the fittest', or somehow deserved or predestined, they argued that it would be unethical to punish the lucky by, for example, taxing them more than others. In Episode 5 of the *Free to Choose* television series, which was titled "Created Equal," Milton compared inheriting wealth with inheriting a certain talent, like playing the violin: both were considered privileges passed down from parents to

children. Following this logic, questioning the right to inherit a large fortune was the equivalent of impeding a promising young musician from blossoming and performing at a high level.[60] Again, it becomes clear that, in the Friedmans' imaginary, the family rather than the individual took centre stage.

Finally, the opposite of luck and coincidence was planning. The Friedmans strictly opposed the latter. The interpretation of their own lives is therefore aligned with how they, along with other neoliberals, believed the economy should function. Quinn Slobodian shows that Milton's colleague and sometimes intellectual mentor, the Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek, theorized the economy as something too complex for any individual or institution to grasp because it is the outcome of countless unforeseeable individual desires, decisions, and actions. Therefore, Hayek argued, it was impossible to successfully conduct the economic planning that was favoured by many Keynesian and socialist economists in the middle of the twentieth century. Instead, von Hayek proposed that economic behaviour should be guided by a set of universally binding and constitutionally guaranteed rules that would effectively protect private property and free movement of capital, goods, services, and sometimes labour across borders. Once this framework was established, markets could operate as an organizing principle for countless human needs, desires, and wishes. The totality of these signals was far too complex for any planning authority to know, let alone manage.[61]

Although the Friedmans did not go into such philosophical detail in their writings, they shared Hayek's critique of a planned and managed economy. Freedom and prosperity, in their view, were only possible if property was protected and markets could operate freely and spontaneously without interference from planners. The Friedmans' understanding of their happy and satisfying lives as ultimately resulting from luck and coincidence is reminiscent of the belief in the beneficial functioning of the market. In unplanned capitalist societies, invisible hands did not just yield freedom and prosperity for all; they also brought soulmates together. The underlying message of *Two Lucky People* is that unplanned and uncoordinated capitalism was mutually gratifying, even if the outcome was necessarily uncertain and dependent on luck.

Conclusion: Citizen-Subjects of Their Worlds

Galbraith and the Friedmans used their memoirs to imagine themselves as ideal citizen-subjects of the capitalist—and, in Galbraith's case, also socialist—societies they envisioned in their theories, their lives mirroring the economic trajectory. Galbraith had evolved on a journey that brought him from a farm life dominated by hard work to an affluent existence in

the suburbs of Boston. He was a prime member of the "New Class," the progressive force of history in the twentieth century; he set an example. No longer preoccupied with satisfying his needs, he was using his creativity and intellect for the noble task of advancing society by means of science, politics, and the arts while also enjoying the fruits of leisure, made plentiful by the economic progress fostered by past capitalist expansion. In his case, this included skiing in Gstaad and spending entire summers in the countryside (without the hardship of country living). Through his lifestyle, Galbraith escaped the superficial desires fostered by corporate capitalism, which he sought to overcome by political reform. After the publication of *The Affluent Society*, he had become increasingly sceptical of capitalism's potential for progress. Instead, he proposed a "New Socialism."[62] The ultimate goal of Galbraith's vision of democratic socialism was that all members of society could join the New Class and progress like he had progressed during his life.

The Friedmans, too, fitted their vision of society to a tee. *Two Lucky People* tells a harmonious story of "family capitalism." While Rose was responsible for the care-work, Milton was the successful competitor in his professional field, an academic entrepreneur in the "marketplace of ideas." If people would follow this gendered separation of labour, the welfare state and all other forms of state intervention would become obsolete. A little luck was all that was needed along the way in order to live a fulfilled life.

It is not entirely free of irony that *Two Lucky People* is a collective work, while *A Life in Our Times* is written by an individual. Neoliberalism is often described as a quasi-religion of uncompromised individualism. After reading the two accounts, though, one feels compelled to ask: who was more individualistic, the socialist Galbraith or the neoliberals Rose and Milton Friedman? The goal of Galbraith's "New Socialism" was that, once the commanding heights of the economy were brought under state control, the democratization of the economy would bring security—from catastrophic warfare, by taming the arms industry, and from economic hardship, by providing an expanding social security net. Then, their basic needs satisfied and freed from the shackles of corporate power, individuals could finally truly thrive. In the Friedmans' vision of the world, individuals remained dependent on the wealth and functioning of the family, the possession of an entrepreneurial spirit, and good fortune.

Notes

1 Fourcade, *Economists*; Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan, "Superiority"; Mudge, *Leftism Reinvented*, 167–213.
2 Yarrow, *Measuring America*, 27.

3 To my knowledge, Galbraith and the Friedmans were the first economists to publish memoirs. In recent years, several central bankers and trained economists have followed suit. See Greenspan, *Age of Turbulence*; Bernanke, *Courage to Act*; Volcker and Harper, *Keeping at It*. On Greenspan's memoir, see Rischbieter, "Märkte."
4 On Galbraith, see the comprehensive biography by Parker, *Galbraith*; Mattson, "Galbraith"; Burgin, *Great Persuasion*, 152–185.
5 Galbraith, *American Capitalism*; Galbraith, *Great Crash*; Galbraith, *Affluent Society*.
6 Mudge, *Leftism Reinvented*.
7 On the rise of the American New Right, see Lassiter, *The Silent Majority*; McGirr, *Suburban Warriors*; Nickerson, *Mothers of Conservatism*.
8 Burgin, *Great Persuasion*, 174.
9 Friedman and Friedman, *Free to Choose*. The TV series is available online: *Free to Choose: The Original 1980s TV Series*, Free to Choose Network, www.freetochoosenetwork.org/programs/free_to_choose.
10 Jack, "Producing," 517–518. On the production, imagery, and popular reception of the TV series, see also Burgin, "Age of Certainty"; Brandes, "Market's People"; Cottier, "Dear Professor."
11 Galbraith, *Age of Uncertainty*. The series is available on YouTube.
12 Wagner-Egelhaaf, *Auto(r)fiction*; Wagner-Egelhaaf, *Handbook*; Wagner-Egelhaaf, "Introduction"; Gasser, "Autobiographie"; Couser, *Memoir*.
13 Rak, "Popular Memoir."
14 The importance of paratexts is highlighted by Genette, *Paratexts*; Barchas, "Prefiguring Genre."
15 Galbraith, *Public Purpose*, 279.
16 Galbraith, *Life*, viii.
17 In the United States, *A Life in Our Times* was published by Houghton Mifflin; the British edition was published by André Deutsch. They had identical covers.
18 Galbraith, *Life*, 14–15.
19 Galbraith, *Affluent Society*, 7.
20 Galbraith, *Life*, 15.
21 Galbraith, *Life*, 23.
22 Galbraith, *Life*, 30.
23 Veblen, *Leisure Class*.
24 Galbraith, *Life*, 30.
25 Galbraith, *Life*, 3–4.
26 Galbraith, *Life*, 3.
27 Keynes, *General Theory*.
28 Galbraith, *Life*, Ch. 5.
29 In 2016, *The Guardian*, for instance, ranked *The Affluent Society* as the 24th best non-fiction book of all time; McCrum, "100 Best Nonfiction Books."
30 Schmelzer, *Hegemony of Growth*.
31 Galbraith, "Quality of Life."
32 Galbraith, *Affluent Society*, 20.
33 Galbraith, *Affluent Society*, 340.

34 Galbraith, *Affluent Society*, 343–345.
35 Galbraith, *Affluent Society*, 345, italics in original.
36 Galbraith, *Affluent Society*, 345–346, italics in original.
37 Galbraith, *Affluent Society*, 346.
38 "Ambassador's Choice: The Galbraith Collection of Indian Painting, February 15, 1986–April 6, 1986, Harvard University Art Museums, Arthur M. Sacker Museum," *Harvard Art Museums* [website], accessed September 6, 2022, https://harvardartmuseums.org/exhibitions/1859/ambassadors-choice-the-galbraith-collection-of-indian-painting.
39 Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*, 33.
40 Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*, 87.
41 Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, 20.
42 For a critical account depicting the importance of family values in the overlapping political ideologies of neoconservatism and neoliberalism that emerged after the 1960s, see Cooper, *Family Values*.
43 Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, x.
44 Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, ix. The Friedmans' autobiography appeared at the dawn of what literary scholars call the "memoir boom" of the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Prior to this, memoirs were usually written by famous people—mostly men—who had witnessed important historical events first hand as part of the high ranks of politics, diplomacy, or the military. Galbraith was a case in point; Milton's contributions in *Two Lucky People* also follow this pattern. From the late 1990s onwards, things started to change as an increasing number of autobiographies by relatively unknown people were marketed. It would be interesting to consider whether the decision to include Rose was influenced by this trend. On the memoir boom, see Smith and Watson, "Memoir Boom"; Rak, *Boom!*
45 Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, x.
46 Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, 24.
47 Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, 26.
48 When leftist economist Samuel Bowles was invited to discuss the new episodes of *Free to Choose*, which were produced in 1990 after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with Milton, he commented that the latter had an unrealistic and overly optimistic image of capitalism. "When I read your stuff, Milton, when I watch you on TV, I think: … Milton has this idea of, you know, Charlie Brown and Linus are gonna have a lemonade stand, and Lucy's gonna have another lemonade stand and *that's* your idea of capitalism. But that's a myth, that's not what capitalism is, we don't have thousands and millions of little firms competing on a level playing field. We have giant industrial corporations that use their power to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of others." Quoted in Brandes, "Free to Choose," 532, italics in original.
49 Nik-Khah, "On Skinning a Cat."
50 Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, 588–589.
51 Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*; Friedman and Friedman; *Free to Choose*; Friedman and Friedman, *Tyranny*.
52 On Milton Friedman's life and political influence, see Burgin, *Great Persuasion*.

53 Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, x.
54 Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, x.
55 Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, 262–263.
56 Hawkins, *Social Darwinism*.
57 The Friedmans were not unaware of racial discrimination. *Capitalism and Freedom* contained a chapter entitled "Capitalism and Discrimination" that argued capitalism worked to the benefit of disadvantaged groups. In his very first *Newsweek* column from 1966, Friedman called "the minimum-wage law … the most anti-Negro law on our statute books"; Friedman, "Minimum-Wage Rates." The Friedmans also felt they were sometimes discriminated against because of their Jewishness. According to *Two Lucky People*, anti-semitism partly contributed to Milton not receiving tenure at the University of Wisconsin in the 1930s; Friedman and Friedman, *Two Lucky People*, 101.
58 For instance, young Milton's journey to the Mont Pèlerin Society—which became the basis of transatlantic neoliberalism—and his lecture series that led to the publication of *Capitalism and Freedom* were financed by the conservative and business-friendly Volker Foundation; Plehwe, introduction, 15; Van Horn and Mirowski, "Chicago School of Economics," 165–168. On the corporate sponsorship of the *Free to Choose* TV series, see Jack, "Producing," 522.
59 Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*, 165–166.
60 Friedman, "Created Equal."
61 Slobodian, *Globalists*.
62 Galbraith, *Public Purpose*, 279.

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5 Hope, Indignation, Nostalgia

The Emotional Navigation of Urban Modernity in Post-War Istanbul

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On 4 July 2012, the *New York Times* published a story about the historic Tarlabaşı district in downtown Istanbul, entitled "Poor but Proud Istanbul Neighborhood Faces Gentrification."[1] Historically a majority Christian, middle-class neighbourhood dating back to the second half of the nineteenth century, from the 1960s Tarlabaşı deteriorated into a pocket of poverty. Its run-down housing sheltered disenfranchised and migrant communities whose livelihoods depended on easy access to employment opportunities in the city's unskilled labour market. The *New York Times* was reporting on the impending transformation of the district from "a sanctuary for Turkey's marginalized populations" to an upscale neighbourhood home to high-end retail and luxury apartments. Tarlabaşı had all the makings of a prime real-estate location: close to the city centre and boasting a great concentration of turn-of-the-century apartments. The district was designated for urban renewal in 2006 and subsequently became the subject of a lengthy legal battle. When, in 2010, an Istanbul administrative court ruled positively on the legality of the urgent expropriations mandated by local authorities, the project was resumed. As *The Times* reported, this dismayed heritage experts and activists, worried the many residents who faced eviction and pleased some property owners, who welcomed the ruling as an opportunity for a much-needed makeover.

The article made a very clear point. In its race to catch up with cities such as New York, London, and Dubai, Istanbul was giving into neoliberal market rationalities at the expense of marginalized communities. This was yet another example of top-down, state-led urban regeneration schemes that lubricated the neoliberal transfer of valuable urban land into the hands of private developers, contributing to the foment of widespread public unrest, which would culminate in the momentous Gezi Park protests the following year. What was particularly noteworthy about the *New York Times* piece was how it framed Istanbul's neoliberal restructuring in emotional terms. The characterization of Tarlabaşı as a "poor

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but proud" neighbourhood revisited a cultural trope that harkened back to the 1970s and to popular cinema. Many films from this period featured as main characters the "poor but proud youth" who suffered humiliation at the hands of wealthy urban elites yet remain uncorrupted by money or the quest for personal gain. The "poor but proud" trope became a byword for moral integrity and emotional resilience against the perils of urban modernity, a trope that still retains a certain currency in popular Turkish television series today.[2]

In post-war Turkey, the urban environment has variously been characterized in emotional terms. The post-war decades witnessed the steady ascendance of capitalist relations in the country, with cities serving as both the instrument and backdrop of significant economic, social and cultural change. Around 1950, Turkey underwent a radical shift towards economic liberalization, which coincided with the transition to multi-party democracy and dedicated efforts to integrate with the world market. Istanbul emerged as a focal point for national development. The city became synonymous with economic opportunity and social mobility; it transformed into an object of emotional investment for Turkish society, presenting a shifting tapestry of optimism, anxiety and bitterness onto which expectations could be pinned and grievances projected. For the post-war generations who had to contend with the changing priorities of national development, Istanbul was simultaneously associated with hope, emotional coldness, resentment, and nostalgia.

This chapter explores the growing pains and internal tensions of capitalist development through the magnifying lens of post-war Istanbul and representations of it. Drawing primarily on a number of films from the 1960s to the 1980s, I focus on the emotional toll that economic growth and capitalist accumulation was purported to have on individuals, families, and communities as they made their way through the economic capital's morphing cityscape. My discussion further traces representations of emotions in popular discourse—newspapers, satirical magazines, and others—in an attempt to identify emotionally charged cultural tropes that helped people make sense of and navigate urban and economic changes. I examine tropes that position feelings such as hope, indignation, and nostalgia against callousness as an emotion rooted in the modern urban condition. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the historical context that pushed Istanbul to the forefront of Turkey's economic ambitions during the post-war years. This is followed by an exploration of three pop-cultural tropes: first, the popular proverb that Istanbul streets are paved with gold; second, the figure of the poor but proud youth; and third, the social type of the courteous Istanbul gentleman. These tropes are firmly embedded in the social imaginary of post-war Turkish society and are central to cultural narratives around migration, class divisions,

social ascendancy, and displacement. I argue that, as capitalist relations took firmer root in post-war Turkey, the hardships and grievances they caused became legible for the larger public through the rapid restructuring of cities—Istanbul in particular—and that these unsettling changes were framed in emotional terms in the popular discourse.

Post-war Istanbul as a Site of Capitalist Accumulation

The historical experience of capitalist accumulation in Turkey can hardly be described as a textbook case of capitalist industrial development. When the country was proclaimed a republic in 1923, it inherited a fairly open economic system from the Ottoman state.[3] The Ottoman economy had been integrated into the world capitalist system by the end of the nineteenth century, but it remained predominantly agrarian. Treaties between the Ottoman and European powers extended special privileges to European citizens and companies in the form of lower rates of taxation and immunity from local laws. These privileges disadvantaged local investors in their pursuit of economic opportunities and, as a result, hindered industrial development in the country. Therefore, early republican reformers prioritized the building of a national economy to secure a financial foundation for the Turkish nation-building project and its accompanying modernization programme. The Great Depression added urgency to their mission, resulting in the adoption of a policy of etatism, which allowed the state to play a more active role in economic affairs by drawing up five-year industrial plans—modelled on the Soviet experience—and establishing and operating economic enterprises in key sectors such as textiles, sugar, iron and steel, paper, and mining.[4] Economic and industrial development in Turkey during the interwar years was thus tinged with a sense of common purpose and feelings of pride at national achievements.

When World War II came to an end, the Turkish political establishment made the unequivocal decision to align with Western democracies. This spelled the end of single-party rule, which had been critical to the success of the wide-ranging social, political, and economic reforms that had been carried out since 1923. The first multi-party elections held in 1946 broke the monopoly of the ruling Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), while the second in 1950 resulted in the transfer of power to the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*). In the economic sphere, too, changes were afoot. Turkey participated in the European Recovery Program in 1947, becoming a recipient of American aid and technical assistance. In exchange for funds from the United States, it started a programme of economic liberalization and was expected in turn to make investment in agriculture a priority. This meant lowering Turkey's industrial ambitions by scaling back direct state participation in economic activity

and instead embracing its newfound role in the global labour market as a producer of agricultural exports. While the first signs of policy change had already appeared in the second half of the 1940s, it was really the Democrat Party's rise to power that marked the decisive turn away from statist policies of development towards an embrace of market forces. The convergence of economic liberalization with the expansion of the political system created a unique historical moment in which the market ideal resonated with broader segments of Turkish society, for whom economic opportunity became synonymous with the promise of upward social mobility. Between 1947 and 1953, Turkey experienced rapid, agriculture-driven economic growth that immediately translated into increased living standards in both rural and urban areas. Despite the economic downturn of 1954, which prompted the government to reluctantly reintroduce protectionist measures, and the broader state involvement triggered by the military coup of 1960 with the adoption of the import-substituting industrialization policy and the reintroduction of five-year development plans, the market ideal continued to appeal to post-war generations. It began to take hold in the social imagination, and by 1980 it had solidified its status as an undisputed social good.

The post-war decades were a period of immense economic and social change during which Turkish society was shaken out of its traditional agrarian mould and gradually learned to adapt to market mechanisms. The changes did not take place overnight, nor did they follow a linear, predetermined path, but steadily they came. Considerable diplomacy was conducted on the part of post-war governments and established state bureaucracy to manage change. Governing authorities tried to strike a balance between planned and market-driven aspects of economic development. They encouraged private enterprise and protected domestic industries from foreign competition by imposing high import tariffs. Meanwhile, they made modest attempts to regulate the market by implementing labour and welfare policies which were intended not only to promote greater social integration (and win electoral support), but also to ensure that the demand for domestically produced goods would match production capacity. For the general public, the tightening grip of market capitalism must have appeared as something of a mixed blessing. The promise of economic development raised their expectations, but also caused a great deal of disappointment. It whetted appetites for self-fulfilment, yet simultaneously upset established norms and conventions. It excited the popular imagination with new ideas and images, but also challenged moral sensibilities which were grounded in the early republican model of citizenship, with its emphasis on the spirit of community and common purpose. These conflicts, along with the grievances underlying them—as well as the anticipation of joy and pleasure implicit in the promise of change—were

most pronounced in cities, and particularly in the drastic transformation of Istanbul that began in the 1950s.

Having stood in Ankara's shadow for more than two decades, Istanbul was set to regain its economic prominence. The former Ottoman capital was outshone by the nation's new capital, which was reimagined and restructured from the mid-1920s on to showcase modern, westernized Turkey. Ankara was also the seat of decision-making for early republican efforts to decentralize economic growth by establishing a wide range of state enterprises across the country. It was not until the 1950s and the end of single-party rule that Istanbul took centre stage for the populist politics of the incoming Democrat Party government, which sought to restore Turkey's connection to its Ottoman past and capitalize on the historical heritage of the city in order to wage a public diplomacy offensive designed to portray Turkey as a respectable member of the international community. The new government also set out to make Istanbul the country's industrial lynchpin—and hence a coveted destination for economic investment. Accordingly, a new generation of large private manufacturing firms and a significantly higher number of small manufacturing businesses began to amass in and around the city, transforming central Istanbul into what one scholar called a "monstrous industrial city."[5] Istanbul became such a magnet for private industry that by 1973 it was home to 44 per cent of all small to large manufacturing enterprises in the country; employment in such enterprises made up 51 per cent of the total workforce in the private industrial sector.[6] The new opportunities for waged employment immediately translated into individual hopes for economic betterment and Istanbul became the preferred destination for migrants from the provinces. The city grew at a rapid pace, changing dramatically in size, scale, appearance, and feel.

To accommodate its growing population, Istanbul also expanded vertically and horizontally. The arrival of migrants caused the city to sprawl outwards with self-built squatter settlements that had little to no infrastructural provisions. Over time, these squatter settlements, known as *gecekondu*s, were legalized and their owners granted land titles through amnesty laws issued ahead of local and general elections. For a great many migrant families trying to make a living in the big city, *gecekondu*s offered the only route to home ownership and served as the principal source of wealth accumulation.[7] Simultaneously, the workings of the market were beginning to drastically reshape Istanbul's urban centre. Old neighbourhoods were extensively rebuilt after legislative amendments cleared the way for individual ownership of flats in multi-storey buildings. The changes helped forge an unspoken alliance between private property owners and an emerging class of small-scale building contractors, whose mutual interest in maximizing the profits that could be obtained from a single building site fuelled a construction boom and resulted in

the demolition of older dwellings to make room for modern, middle-class apartments. From the 1950s on, urban land thus became a major source of capital gains for the middle classes.[8]

This was the context in which market capitalism took hold in post-war Turkey, with Istanbul emerging as the principal showcase of the government's shifting social and economic priorities. The period saw the market ideal gain acceptance and currency in society, while the common sense of purpose that had defined public life since the early years of the republic continued to wane. Emotions were central to the social and economic changes brought by the country's stuttering transition from planned to market economy. They accompanied the promises of economic improvement and prosperity. They helped articulate objections to the escalating excesses of market capitalism. They were further summoned to address and stand against unchecked growth. But what emotions were at work in this period of profound social and economic transition and where should we look for them? In post-war Turkey, the primary outlets of public debate comprised newspapers, opinion magazines, and radio. The social and formal conventions of print and broadcast media, however, left relatively limited room for public expressions of emotion. The expanding realm of popular culture, by contrast, provided opportunities for expressing and representing emotions. It is to this collectively shared set of meanings, as found in popular magazines and cinema, that one might look to understand how social and economic changes resonated emotionally for the post-war generations.[9]

Streets Paved with Gold: Istanbul as a Landscape of Hope

Turkey's transformation from a predominantly agrarian society to an urban one stands out in the larger history of capitalist urbanization not only in terms of its belatedness—a characteristic it shares with other developing countries—but also due to the intensity and dramatic speed with which Turkey's urban and rural areas changed. Between 1927 and 1950, the country's urban population remained relatively stable, with only 25 per cent of the total populace living in cities. In the 30 years from 1950 to 1980, however, the population in cities increased from 5.2 million to 19.6 million, bringing that rate up to 43.9 per cent.[10] In the 1950s alone, cities received approximately 1.5 million migrants from rural areas. How did emotions figure in the constant flux and ruthless churn of unchecked urban growth? This question is entwined with the reasons behind such growth, with the factors that attracted individuals and families from the countryside to cities, and to Istanbul in particular.

It has become customary in scholarship to suggest that agricultural mechanization was a major factor driving villagers out of the countryside, along

with population growth and the construction of highways. Revisionist accounts of rural migration, however, warn against reducing "post-war developments to a linear chain of 'mechanization–dispossession– migration'."[11] The dramatic increase in the number of tractors and harvesters brought more land under cultivation during the 1950s, thus initially fuelling, rather than diminishing, the demand for agricultural labour. It was not until the early 1960s when the limit of cultivable land was reached that continued mechanization lessened the need for labour. So what prompted, according to one rough estimation, one out of every 10 villagers to move to an urban centre by the end of the 1950s? Economic historian Çağlar Keyder writes that a "new economic ethic" was behind the move to cities in post-war Turkey: "the social divisions of the previous era would dissolve when faced by an all-embracing market—as it was usually a short step from the edge of the city to the centre."[12] It was the promise of economic opportunity and social mobility—of hope and anticipation for the future—that attracted people from the countryside to cities, and particularly to Istanbul, where greater exposure to market forces began to erode long-established class divisions. As Keyder, paraphrasing a popular saying from the post-war decades, notes: "The ground in Istanbul was supposed to be paved with gold."[13]

Indeed, that Istanbul's streets were paved with gold had become a byword for the unprecedented social and geographical mobility of the post-war years. It was a staple of newspaper reporting about new arrivals to the country's economic capital, frequently evoked in short stories and novels. But perhaps most memorably, the proverb became a common trope in post-war cinema, serving first as a shorthand to drive home a point about the promises of urban modernity and later as an instrument foreshadowing the reversal of fortunes in cautionary tales about the temptations of seeking wealth and personal gain.

The issue of internal migration was first addressed in Turkish cinema in the 1960s. Before then, the Istanbul-based film industry, also known as *Yeşilçam*, had primarily told urban stories featuring familiar characters that interacted with one another according to well-defined social roles.[14] One of the earliest *Yeşilçam* films to feature migration as a central plot point was *Birds of Exile* (1964).[15] The film tells the story of a family from the provinces, the Bakırcıoğlus, who move to Istanbul in search of a better life. It opens with the family's arrival at Haydarpaşa train station. As the father steps off the train, he declares his resolve to make it big in the city: "*Şah olacağız*! (We'll become kings of the city!)"[16] The family of six then emerge from the station to find themselves faced with an expansive view of Istanbul. The scene, which was shot on the steps of the highly ornate Neo-Baroque waterfront terminal building, has become iconic in Turkish film history (Figure 5.1). One might think that the family's grand

entrance to the city was staged for dramatic effect, yet there was a representative quality to the scene: this particular spot has been the entry point for countless rural migrants who have made the journey to the country's economic capital by train. Director Halit Refiğ highlights the wide-eyed optimism of the new arrivals by having them take in the views of the city. Just as the camera scans Istanbul's historic silhouette across the waters of the Bosporus, so the family members survey their future prospects through the opportunities, excitements, and diversions that unfold before their eyes. The opening scenes, which then take the Bakırcıoğlus on a ferry ride across the Bosporus Strait to their new home in an old, poor neighbourhood, suggest a moment of heightened anticipation. In a voiceover, the father tells the audience how they ended up in the city after the family business faltered: "We all had the same fire burning in our hearts: to conquer this town … We had no choice but to cling to Istanbul whose streets are paved with gold with all our might."[17] However, the trials and temptations of the city ultimately prove too much for the Bakırcıoğlu family to bear, and by the end of the film we see them return to Haydarpaşa terminal to take the train back home. As far as the experience of the individuals and families who continued to pour into Turkish cities by the thousands is concerned, the Bakırcıoğlus' journey back home would have represented the exception rather than the rule. Yet, their defeat—with the two older

Figure 5.1 Bakırcıoğlu family on the steps of Haydarpaşa train station taking in the views of the city; *Birds of Exile* (*Gurbet Kuşları*), directed by Halit Refiğ, Artist Film, 1964. Production still.

brothers coveting things beyond their reach and growing estranged from their father, the family's repair shop going out of business and the family's only daughter dying by suicide—serves to highlight the emotional costs involved in adjusting to life in the big city. Only the youngest son, Kemal, is spared the family's misfortunes. A self-made medical student seemingly immune to the lure and excitements of city life, Kemal is set apart from the rest of his family by his conscientious resolve to seek the common good rather than self-interest. Studying to become a doctor and engaged to his upper middle-class girlfriend, he ends up staying in Istanbul; the moral seems to be that a sense of duty and a stoic disposition are essential for migrants to adjust and integrate into the urban environment.

There is a parallel storyline in the film, that of the minor character Haybeci ('the freeloader'), whose crafty navigation of the urban surrounds contrasts sharply with the Bakırcıoğlus' helpless exposure to the challenges that life in the city presents. Haybeci arrives in Istanbul on the same train as the Bakırcıoğlu family, penniless but determined to succeed at all costs. "Beware Istanbul!" he announces on the ferry, "Haybeci is coming and you'll be mine to rule."[18] Throughout the film, we see him cross paths with members of the family. With each encounter, he appears to have climbed higher up the ladder, starting off as a porter, then becoming a parking lot attendant, an auctioneer, and finally a slumlord. He frequently lectures the family members on the essentials of making it in Istanbul. When they chance upon each other in the carpark where Haybeci works, he reminds the father of the old saying, "Friendship is built on blood, sweat and tears, whereas trade is conducted in shekels," hinting that he would like a bigger tip in return for his services.[19] On another occasion, he warns one of the sons who has been laid off: "This is Istanbul after all, idling won't do."[20] We see Haybeci again at the end of the film, boarding the same homeward-bound train as the Bakırcıoğlus to bring back workers for his new construction business in the city. This chance encounter with the entire family affords the opportunity for one final lecture: "There is no bread in this world for those who do not keep their eyes open and use their minds."[21]

Haybeci is instrumental to the storyline. The figure of the rough countryman-turned-capitalist had become part of the social imagination during the post-war decades. His presence here serves as a counterpoint to the Bakırcıoğlus' gullible optimism, which is eventually shattered by the grind of the big city and its treacherous moral landscape. The migrant family's downfall is a reminder to the audience that, when not guided by a sense of duty and responsibility, hope proves too fickle a foundation for building a future. Haybeci's character, on the other hand, is an embodiment of the relentless pursuit of personal wealth, which breeds an attitude of emotional disinterest and detachment. His presence in the film is meant to suggest that, when reduced to a calculating mentality focused

on self-enrichment, aspirations may lead to callousness. The pairing of the two emotional dispositions is common to many films from the post-war period. In film after film, we see the same formula applied to stories involving good-natured people tried by inequality, disadvantage, and marginalization. It is as though the two emotional poles of Turkey's post-war urbanization—invariably illustrated by a naïve and credulous outlook on life on the one end, and emotional hardening towards others on the other—represent the affective range for individuals' experiences of displacement, alienation and disempowerment.

The Poor but Proud City

Turkey's accelerated push to modernization beginning in the 1950s was not adequately buttressed by social welfare policies, making social inequalities in rapidly developing cities all the more visible. At the same time as the idea of Istanbul as a destination for opportunity and prosperity was becoming a cultural trope, there was a growing sense of disillusionment and bitterness born of the partially fulfilled promises of a national development programme that prioritized urbanization. Celebrated author Yaşar Kemal's journalistic work from the 1950s and 1960s vividly illustrated the emotional toll of migration. In a short piece entitled "Neden Geliyorlar?" (Why do they come?), Kemal chronicles the unresolved tensions built into everyday encounters between Istanbul's old and new residents. He writes of a specific incident on a bus when a male passenger grumbles at the sight of four young workers who appear to originate from the countryside, sneering at their provincial clothes, muddy shoes, and ragged appearance:

> Was Istanbul like this in the past? Really, was it like this, sir? Madam? You all know, men dressed like that couldn't even come close to Taksim Square, let alone get on a bus. Now you see them pacing up and down Beyoğlu. Beyoğlu high street is full of them. Back in the good old days, Beyoğlu was a place of elegance. Then these peasants arrived and they don't even know how to speak properly. They don't even know how to walk … They're filthy. That's why Istanbul is filthy. You can't even get on a bus. If two of them get on a bus, you'd better hold your nose and run away … Back at home, they have everything … Yet they would leave and come here. They would say "the streets are paved in gold in Istanbul" and come here. Though most of them barely scrape by here, they would not go back. Istanbul has dazzled them. They come for pleasure. They come to see Istanbul.[22]

Kemal recounts how the workers at first fall into a long, embarrassed silence, but then one approaches the older passenger to call out the

injustice of his accusations. He calls him a liar and asserts his right to be in the city: "You think Istanbul is your own father's property or what?" After a heated exchange, the party of four gets off at the next stop. Kemal follows the workers and convinces them to share their stories of hardship with the public, such as the "sacrifices" expected of them back home, the "unbearable homesickness" they suffer, and the appalling conditions in which they live and work. This brief glimpse—documented in a newspaper interview in 1960—into the injured pride of the city's newest residents foreshadowed the individual and collective sense of aggrievement and frustration that permeated Turkish society during the 1970s and 1980s. Kemal's journalistic work offers one of the earliest accounts of that sense of being put in one's place by city folk, which continued to be a major source of grievance for those joining the ranks of the city's working class and urban poor every year.

Material and physical hardships were equally central to the emotional experience of urban change in post-war Turkey. Writing in 1958, Richard D. Robinson, a lecturer at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, wondered whether the rapid pace of urbanization in the country was outstripping the capacity of most cities to provide essential infrastructure and basic services for their inhabitants. Robinson was in Turkey from 1947 to 1956, where he served first as a staff member at the Institute of Current World Affairs, then as the area specialist for the American Universities Field Staff. He saw at first-hand how ill-equipped major urban centres such as Istanbul and Ankara were to absorb rural-to-urban migrants. Housing was in chronic short supply, which resulted in the proliferation of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in both cities, and local governments failed to meet rising demands for municipal services such as water, sewerage, gas, electricity, and transportation. Robinson called attention to the hardships faced by urban populations and cautioned against the risk of social disintegration that accompanied rapid urbanization and that might lead to political instability. Turkish society stood to gain in the long run from fast economic growth underpinned by high rates of urbanization, he argued, but the question nevertheless remained: "What happens to the individuals and communities caught up in the process?"[23]

While Western experts and scholars often failed to consider the implications of accelerated urbanization in developing countries, Turkish leaders and administrators were, according to Robinson, much more attuned to the issue and worked to slow the massive population shift.[24] Turkey's state-owned enterprises were a case in point. From the perspective of Western economists, it made little sense to decentralize economic growth by setting up industrial plants far away from markets or sources of skilled labour. The justification was that, while the financial cost of operating these factories would be high, they would prove beneficial in the long

run by offering alternative employment to those who might be displaced from the land, thus preventing a destabilizing influx of rural and small-town populations to major urban centres. The greater role played by state-owned enterprises in developing economies such as Turkey's, Robinson thought, may have to do with this consideration. Besides, any attempt at measuring the profit and loss of these types of undertakings, he suggested, "should perhaps be based on total *national* gain or loss, not on immediate *financial* return."[25]

The American expert was chiefly concerned with the role the emerging field of attitude research could play in developing public policy around rural-to-urban migration.[26] As a branch of social psychology focused on measuring public opinions, beliefs, feelings and sentiments, attitude research "could show why displaced villagers, once they move, tend to prefer the risks of urban misery over the relative security of a provincial factory."[27] Incidentally, Robinson's observations and insights also underscore how emotions were inextricably bound up with the pursuit of national progress. Turkey's ongoing transition from one mode of capital accumulation to another meant the state's role in industrial relations as an employer would diminish over time, leaving displaced populations to the mercy and whim of market forces. In proposing that the short-term benefits of free market mechanisms be checked against what was good for the society at large in the long term, Robinson seemed to be pointing to a widening gap between the emotional regimes of Turkey's interwar and post-war years. The speed at which national development priorities were changing threatened to disrupt the established social order in both cities and the countryside, causing a great deal of emotional suffering for those caught up in the process. Robinson suggested that a greater investment in urban reconstruction might remedy the issues caused by population changes. In his view, the comprehensive demolition and rebuilding programme begun in Istanbul in 1956 under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was an attempt to achieve just that. In a speech delivered in February 1958, Menderes touched on how the physical transformation of urban centres would yield more than just economic benefits:

> And so, these great undertakings are in progress. Do you see that this great and progressive country is becoming one of large, prosperous cities? Do you not see [before you] a large, prosperous city of great buildings and plazas? A little [rebuilding] in Istanbul, a little in Izmir, and then a flourishing, prosperous country? Impossible. Can one contend that a nation can be progressive if all of its towns and cities look like those of the Middle Ages? Never. And more than this, there is the physical and spiritual side to the investment [in new cities]. It is necessary to give due attention to these [aspects]. It is not only a matter of

> economic progress [per se]. There are also the moral and social needs of the citizen.[28]

Menderes's vision for Istanbul was certainly unprecedented (Figure 5.2).[29] It involved the opening up of two new boulevards—50 and 60 metres in width—that forked out from the city centre to connect the historic urban centre with the regional motorway. It also included tearing down the old urban fabric around major Ottoman monuments in order to open them up to view. To accommodate more vehicular traffic, urban squares such as those at Karaköy and Tophane were significantly enlarged, resulting in the further loss of a great many landmark buildings. Additionally, a number of new arterial roads were built on land reclaimed from the sea.

While the redevelopment programme was at first met with almost unanimous enthusiasm by intellectuals, specialists, and the public alike, it soon came under fire for being hastily executed and poorly coordinated. Today the wide-ranging redevelopment campaign is remembered more for the destruction it unleashed on the city than for the improvements it planned to make to Istanbul's historic urban environment. It is estimated that more than 5000 buildings were demolished during the process, a

Figure 5.2 A double-page spread from popular weekly *Hayat*, September 1958, showing new roads cutting through Istanbul's historic neighbourhoods. Source: Author's collection.

notable portion of which had significant heritage value.[30] Whether or to what extent the redevelopment had a direct positive impact on the lives of disenfranchised individuals and communities is hard to say and requires further study;[31] however, it appears that emotions were at the forefront of Menderes' rebuilding campaign.[32] Politicians spoke of the "heart-breaking state of Istanbul," which up until then had been neglected. The country's leading intellectuals wrote about the "inner distress" and the "almost physiological disgust" caused by Istanbul's gloomy, meandering streets and celebrated the "moral uplift" to be gained from an orderly city. Newspapers reported on excited Istanbul residents "happily taking in the views" of recently cleared urban renewal sites. Prime Minister Menderes himself made repeated appeals to national pride and purpose and talked of Istanbul's redevelopment as a matter of restoring self-respect. There is little scholarly disagreement over the fact that, in addition to complementing Turkey's broader modernizing agenda in the post-war decades, the extensive rebuilding programme also served, in urban critic Burak Boysan's words, as "a public relations campaign" to bolster the declining support among voters for the prime minister, who portrayed it as a symbol of "the poor folks' way out of their meagre rations."[33]

It is perhaps not surprising that, as Istanbul continued to open up economically, providing newcomers with opportunities for upward mobility, social divisions became more pronounced. The kinds of grievances predicted and chronicled by Richard D. Robinson and renowned novelist Yaşar Kemal respectively found an outlet in popular culture, most notably in films. In particular, the figure of "the poor but proud youth" became a well-established trope in post-war Turkish cinema, defining a measure of emotional forbearance in the face of adversity and temptation. The trope can be traced back to *Yeşilçam* melodramas of the early 1960s, but it appeared with greater frequency in films from the 1970s—a period described as "the poor but proud years" by novelist Ayfer Tunç who, in a memoir about her childhood, writes of the 1970s as a decade when "values such as morality, good manners, and kindness signified a greater wealth than material wealth."[34] Post-war Turkish cinema used the stock character of "the poor but proud youth" in countless variations. The trope was central to stories of upward mobility told through the melodramatic formulas of cross-class romance or rags-to-riches rises to fame and stardom. It was an affective formula meant to convey the sense of indignation roused by the injuries of class. Often a poor young man—and, in some instances, a poor young woman—was made to feel "less than" for his humble origins or ridiculed for aspiring beyond his station in life.

In the movie *Bitter Life* (1962), the lead character, shipyard welder Mehmet, grows disillusioned after finding out that the love he feels for his manicurist girlfriend Nermin is clouded by her craving for material

wealth.[35] The film opens with the couple's search for a home to move into after their wedding (Figure 5.3). They are dismayed by the sight of the decrepit houses shown to them in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. In the background loom several recently completed apartment buildings, where the young couple can never dream of renting: "We will never be able to afford living in places such as this."[36] Early on in the film, a conflicted Nermin gives into the advances of a wealthy young man and gets pregnant, only to discover later that his father would not approve of a marriage, leaving her in a vulnerable social position. In a melodramatic turn of events, Mehmet wins the lottery and establishes a thriving construction company, becoming the contractor of the kind of flats that he and Nermin

Figure 5.3 Mehmet and Nermin on their way to a check out a rental *gecekondu*. *Bitter Life* (*Acı Hayat*), directed by Metin Erksan, Sine-Film, 1962. Production still.

had previously yearned for. The storyline eventually leads the viewer to an emotionally charged confrontation between the two lead characters. The scene takes place in the strikingly modern house that "once poor" Mehmet has built for himself and where he calls Nermin out for valuing material wealth over true love:

> This love you once disregarded is not meant for you now. I love that Nermin with whom I visited *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. Look! I had this villa built for myself. How big and beautiful, isn't it? Maybe there's not another one like it in Istanbul. But the *gecekondus* we visited were much nicer than this. Because we were going to live there together. You were going to be right by my side. It was once my biggest dream to sleep under the same roof with you … I didn't care whether the house was old, the room was small. I didn't need anything as long as I had you. That's how I used to think … A house should have a soul. Damn these concrete tombs like this. What's a house without you in it?[37]

There is surely more to Mehmet's resentment and indignation than the bitterness of a jilted lover. His anger may appear to be directed at Nermin, but it is really meant as a jab at the workings of an unjust economic system that prioritizes the pursuit of wealth over human dignity and social equality. Another emotionally charged confrontation, this time between Mehmet and the father of Nermin's lover, seems to prove the point. The scene takes us to the office of the father, a factory owner who tries to bribe Nermin to end her relationship with his son. In an attempt to avenge his former girlfriend's honour, Mehmet engages in a morally questionable tit for tat: he seduces the factory owner's daughter. The wealthy father then offers Mehmet money to take his daughter's hand in marriage, a proposition to which he responds with measured contempt: "Is your job in life only to buy and sell? Is this all there is to your definition of what it means to be human? Don't you know anything else? We neither sell nor buy honour. Haven't you learnt that some people's honour is not for sale?"[38] Mehmet eventually feels honour-bound to do the right thing and proposes to the factory owner's daughter. Devastated, Nermin commits suicide, and the film concludes with Mehmet consumed by grief over the loss of his true love.

There are numerous reiterations of Mehmet's indignation in post-war Turkish cinema. Sometimes, the sense of outrage belongs to a young person whose love is considered unworthy of someone from the upper classes; sometimes it is embodied by a young provincial who is treated disrespectfully or made to feel uncomfortable for their country ways. More often than not, "the poor but proud" youth is paired with another stock character of post-war melodramas, "the callous factory owner," who drives

the narrative forward as the main adversary, representing unchecked greed and heartless disregard for others.[39] The moral emotions of resentment and indignation conveyed by the trope of "the poor but proud youth" were key features of *Yeşilçam*'s emotional repertoire. They gave vent to a sense of simmering injustice as market-oriented economic growth made social divisions more pronounced and forces of urbanization brought different social classes into closer proximity than had previously been conceivable.

The trope survived well into the 1980s and 1990s, though it acquired ironic overtones. Turkish satirical magazines such as *Gırgır*, *Avni*, and *Leman*—whose popularity rivalled commercial films of the 1960s and 1970s with weekly circulation figures well above 200,000 copies—recycled it into a stock caricature from the mid-1980s onward. The magazines reworked the confrontation scene into countless variations, often with a man seated behind an imposing desk receiving another, older person in his office. He is often depicted sitting in a swivel chair with his back turned to his visitor; he asks the visitor whether he knew what became of the poor but proud young man who was once turned away at his door. Variations included the young man barging into an office unannounced to utter a similar rebuke. With characters bracing for an imminent face-off, the scene implies a long-awaited moment of justice eventually restored. The tables are turned and the roles are inverted, announcing a delayed but deserved recognition of one's worth. But the emotional diatribe proves inconclusive: the once-poor young man either appears to have bought into the system and cannot remember his reasons for being proud in the past, or his pride proves him wrong, preventing him from adjusting to social and economic shifts. With "the poor but proud 1970s" left behind, the melodramatic trope used to convey moral outrage in *Yeşilçam* became a parody of itself. As the aggressive economic liberalization of the early 1980s transformed the market ideal into an uncontested social good, it became almost nonsensical, and ludicrous even, to idealize the positions of moral clarity and integrity suggested by the figure of "the poor but proud youth," particularly when the transactional rationale of market mechanisms—which had gradually gained ground in Turkey since the 1950s—began in earnest to reorder social relations among urban subjects.

Nostalgia as a Bulwark Against Unchecked Progress

A third trope that pervaded the post-war Turkish social imaginary in connection with urban change is that of the courteous Istanbul gentleman (*İstanbul beyefendisi*). If Istanbul resonated with hope for some and bred resentment in others, then there were those who watched from the sidelines, in nostalgic reminiscence, at the fearsome pace with which the city was transformed. The social type of the courteous Istanbul gentleman

personified that melancholic yearning a great many people had for a world untainted by market relations. Allusions to him abound in popular novels, memoirs, biographical accounts, TV sketches, and films. He is invariably portrayed as someone with a gentle, affectionate temperament, refined tastes, and virtuous conduct. Sometimes he is associated with good breeding and depicted as the last representative of a noble but impoverished Istanbul family. At other times, the term '*İstanbul beyefendisi*' describes someone of humble means, yet distinguished by an unfailing display of common sense, moderation, trustworthiness, and good judgement—qualities that earn him a revered place in society, whether in the self-contained microcosm of a traditional neighbourhood or among the surviving practitioners of an ancient craft or trade that is fast fading away. Allusions to the courteous Istanbul gentleman often precede lamentations for a bygone way of life and a world of moral clarity. He is the embodiment of good manners, refinement, decency, and sound judgement, and as a social type his extinction represents the undoing of old Istanbul along with its urban mores, social rituals, and physical spaces. My analysis is bracketed by two popular films, *Oh, Beautiful Istanbul* (1966) and *Mr Muhsin* (1987).[40] Both were commercially successful, achieved critical acclaim, and have become part of the Turkish cinematic canon. They are light-hearted elegies for a waning world and its outdated values, manners, and emotional modes. Separated by two decades, the two films narrate the story of individuals who feel at odds and out of pace with the changing times. Both films pair an older, seasoned Istanbul resident with a young, new arrival to the city, with Istanbul's unceasing urban renewal serving as a backdrop to their struggles.

Oh, Beautiful Istanbul is about the friendship—and budding romance—between the soulful street photographer Haşmet and wide-eyed Ayşe, who leaves her family home in one of Izmir's *gecekondu* neighbourhoods and moves to Istanbul to fulfil her dreams of becoming a movie star. Ayşe's path crosses with Haşmet, who comes from an old Istanbul family but works as a street photographer, taking portraits and souvenir photos with his antiquated instant box camera. His family's fortune has long since dwindled away and Haşmet lives in a makeshift lodge built in the back garden of the waterfront mansion that used to be his family home. When Ayşe's temporary lodging—the shady *Medeniyet Pansiyonu* (Civilization Guesthouse)—turns out to be a brothel set up to trap young woman into prostitution, Haşmet offers her shelter in his humble abode. To Ayşe's eyes, this ramshackle accommodation—though filled with family heirlooms—appears no different than the *gecekondu*s she so desperately wishes to leave behind, while Haşmet calls it *hüzünler kulübesi* ("hut of sorrows") after the Sufi trope of seeing the world as a place of inconsolable spiritual exile. Ayşe's craving for fame and money leads her into trying situations

that damage her sense of self-worth. After each incident, she finds consolation in Haşmet's modest yet emotionally refined, self-contained world, enriched as it is by the festive company of friends, the melancholic melodies of traditional Turkish *makam* music, and bittersweet reveries about the changing face of Istanbul.

Mr Muhsin similarly centres on an unlikely friendship, this time between Ali Nazik, an aspiring young folk singer, and the middle-aged music producer Muhsin (Kanadıkırık) Bey. Ali Nazik arrives in Istanbul as a country bumpkin with dreams of recording an album of folk songs and Muhsin Bey's address in his pocket. Though reluctant at first, Muhsin Bey eventually agrees to take the naïve young man under his wing. All the while, the character's last name—Kanadıkırık ('the one whose wings are broken')—signals to the audience the futility of his efforts in a world changing so fast that he struggles to keep pace. Muhsin Bey is a man of honour and integrity, but his principles prove a hindrance to success in a business with shifting tastes and eroding standards. He remains opposed to the creeping influence of hugely popular *arabesk* music, a musical genre blending western and eastern forms and associated primarily with those considered outsiders to the urban social order.[41] Muhsin Bey regards *arabesk* with abomination as its highly affective renditions and compositions present a striking contrast to the restrained forms and elegance of the urbane Turkish *makam* music or the artless authenticity of folk musical traditions. As *arabesk* is changing the musical landscape of Istanbul, corrupting the more established genres of music and challenging dominant cultural forms, Istanbul itself is going through yet another epochal transformation as historic inner-city neighbourhoods are bulldozed to accommodate the burgeoning population, increasing traffic and new investments. Muhsin Bey lives in a run-down, turn-of-the-century apartment building, which is itself marked for destruction. Once an emblem of elegant urbanity, the building has degraded into a tenement block full of eclectic residents who can barely get by. Its impending demolition serves as a symbol of disappearing Istanbul. In the end, Muhsin Bey cannot stand against change and fails to prevent his young protégé from drifting into the *arabesk* music scene and performing at seedy music halls. Yet this courteous Istanbul gentleman embraces defeat gracefully, exhibiting a forbearance worthy of the old-fashioned songs of Turkish *makam* of which he is so fond. He appears centred in a disorienting present, secure in the knowledge that he has experienced the emotional refinement of a bygone era.

Both Haşmet and Muhsin Bey live through momentous episodes in Istanbul's history and represent a counterpoint to wanton progress. *Oh, Beautiful Istanbul* was filmed in 1966, a mere six years after the so-called Menderes operations were brought to a halt by the military coup of 1960. The heavy-handed urban renewal program implemented under prime

minister Adnan Menderes changed Istanbul in profound ways—with grand boulevards cutting through historic neighbourhoods, haphazard landfill schemes transforming the city's iconic waterfront and altering its relationship with the sea, and the building of urban freeways that dramatically increased the flow of vehicular traffic around and into the city centre. This whirlwind of change provides the muted backdrop to the reveries Haşmet delivers in occasional voiceover: "I do not know if it still exists today, but beautiful Istanbul continues to live in my heart."[42]

Haşmet and Ayşe first run into each other at Sultanahmet Square, where the photographer is operating a makeshift studio on the sidewalk, complete with a flimsy chair and a black curtain backdrop bearing rudimentary drawings of the city's most famous sights and the words "memento of Istanbul." As Ayşe makes her way towards Haşmet's stand to have her pictures taken for auditions, we see the dishevelled ruins of a historic building in the background. This is no doubt a reference to the tense relationship between old and new that characterizes Istanbul's urban growth, and which continue to play out in the various urban renewal sites that are within walking distance of Haşmet's sidewalk studio. What follows is a tender scene in which we see the young and artless Ayşe, seated before the photographer's curtain, open up as she poses for the camera, talking about her hopes of becoming a movie star. Throughout the film, Haşmet appears anxious about Ayşe's aspirations and cautions her against material temptations and the dangers of deviating too far from one's authentic self. His calls for moderation, tact, restraint, and self-discipline serve as a counterweight to Ayşe's restless pursuit of fame and wealth, which eventually takes her to the city's most coveted address, the ultra-modern Istanbul Hilton Hotel, but leaves her feeling insecure and deficient.[43] On the other side of the city, Haşmet's "hut of sorrows" offers refuge. The makeshift home perched next to his family's former mansion is a sign of impoverishment and a symbol of how Istanbul's old ways cannot stand in the path of development. Yet it is also a dignified response to debasement that calls for holding one's ground by practising humility, acceptance, and affectionate reminiscence.

Like *Oh, Beautiful Istanbul*, *Mr Muhsin* is set against a major urban renewal campaign that saw the city transformed in just a few years. The film was made in the aftermath of the military coup of 1980, when Turkey underwent an economic and cultural transformation of seismic proportions. The coup brutally supressed all public opposition and dissolved established political parties, effectively paving the way for the centre-right Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*), led by former World Bank economist Turgut Özal, to come to power in the 1983 elections. What followed was a strict programme of economic restructuring much in line with the liberalizing reforms of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President

Ronald Reagan. Istanbul was once again pushed to the economic fore, though not as an instrument of developmentalist policies—as was the case with Menderes' vision three decades earlier—but rather as a springboard and showcase for Turkey's integration into the emerging global world order.[44]Özal brought in Bedrettin Dalan as mayor; he embarked on a wide-ranging redevelopment programme that was no less comprehensive or controversial than the demolition and rebuilding campaigns implemented under Menderes. Dalan set out to "transform Istanbul from a tired city whose glory resided in past history, into a metropolis full of promise for the twenty-first century."[45] He pushed small manufacturing enterprises to the outskirts of the city, carried out extensive demolitions on both sides of the Golden Horn in an effort to clean up the city's century-old and heavily polluted industrial zone, oversaw major road building and widening schemes to improve traffic flow, and facilitated the long-term lease of prime public land by foreign investors in the name of tourism. This radical—and somewhat rushed—redevelopment programme was driven by an interest in repositioning Istanbul as a global city by engineering a shift from heavy industry to a finance and service economy. It would have a profound impact on citizens' sense of urban belonging, particularly for members of marginalized communities who found themselves easily pushed aside under the pretence of development. Already in 1984, the city's governor declared it a "privilege to live in Istanbul" and argued that "there should be a price tag attached to it," signalling the mindset shift in urban governance.[46]

Dalan's most memorable undertaking was arguably the construction of the Tarlabaşı Boulevard from 1986 to 1989, which provides the symbolic backdrop to *Mr Muhsin*'s narration. The 36 metre-wide, eight-lane boulevard cut through the historic neighbourhood of Tarlabaşı to establish a direct connection between Taksim Square and the historic peninsula via the Atatürk Bridge. Its construction required the disastrous bulldozing of 368 historic buildings—167 of them with listed status—that were home to Istanbul's dwindling Greek and Armenian communities, migrant labourers and families and the underclass (Figure 5.4). Muhsin Bey's apartment building is among those marked for demolition. With its diverse mix of occupants—an Armenian landlady, a single mother who is also a music-hall singer of mediocre ability, an unemployed B-movie actor, Muhsin Bey himself as a washed-up music producer, and finally the aspiring singer Ali Nazik, fresh from the provinces—the building offers a glimpse into the lives of Istanbul's disenfranchised communities. Just like Haşmet's "hut of sorrows," Muhsin Bey's flat is a vestige of bygone days where he continues to revere and honour virtues and values that are fast going out of fashion. His foray into the real world to secure Ali Nazik a record deal proves

Figure 5.4 Tarlabaşı demolitions, 1986. Copyright Kadir Can.

unsuccessful and he eventually lands in prison for fraud. In Muhsin Bey's absence, his protégé strays into the blatantly commercial *arabesk* music scene. Muhsin Bey returns home defeated only to find that his apartment building, along with the entire neighbourhood, is to be demolished in the name of redevelopment.[47] Yet, just like Haşmet, he remains dignified in defeat, having maintained his integrity and emotional authenticity by not taking shortcuts to immediate gains and refusing to pander to popular tastes.

It would be easy to write off the characterization of both Haşmet and Muhsin Bey as nostalgic indulgences in an irrevocable past. The two courteous Istanbul gentlemen remain dismissive of the popular sensibilities reshaping the world around them and insist on living by the codes of a bygone era. Nostalgia as an affective yearning for the past appears to have acquired its contemporary meaning rather recently. Svetlana Boym identifies it as a "historical emotion" that lies at the core of the modern condition.[48] The term first emerged in the seventeenth century as a medical diagnosis for a severe form of homesickness, but it gradually took on a new meaning to denote "the mourning of displacement and temporal irreversibility" rooted in the modern experience of a fractured present.[49] This semantic shift from a spatial to a temporal meaning of nostalgia was complete by the 1960s and 1970s when the sentimental yearning for a period in the past became a collective phenomenon that permeated popular culture.[50]

Simultaneously, nostalgia took on largely negative connotations in the intellectual discourse of the period; the backwards glance of nostalgia was seen as an incapacity to keep up with the accelerated rhythms of life and an intellectual deficiency in dealing with the challenges of the present.[51] This negative view of nostalgia also dominated the first discussions of the term in the early 1980s Turkish intellectual scene and, to a certain extent, framed the immediate critical reception of *Mr Muhsin*. As popular historian Derya Bengi notes, the film could not escape the charge of nostalgic romanticization directed at it by at least one notable film critic, who saw the figure of Muhsin Bey as indicative of a failure to engage politically and aesthetically with emergent social and cultural forms such as *arabesk* and an attempt to seek refuge in the past instead.[52] However, the subsequent critical and popular success of both *Mr Muhsin* and *Oh, Beautiful Istanbul* proves that there is more to these films than sentimental pleas for going back to things as they were. Of special relevance here is Boym's distinction between "restorative" and "reflective" types of nostalgia. "Restorative nostalgia," Boym argues, "stresses *nostos* (home) and attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home" while presenting itself as truth and tradition. It glosses over contradictions to patch together a sense of community and cohesion through an idealized vision of the past in the present. Reflective nostalgia, by contrast, is a contemplative act that accepts the impossibility of returning home and dwells instead "on *algia* (the longing itself) and delays the homecoming."[53] It allows for an aesthetic reimagining of the present whereby "the past opens up a multitude of potentialities, non-teleological possibilities of historic development."[54] Both Haşmet and Muhsin Bey know that restoring the past "as it was" is not an option. Their quiet acceptance of defeat is neither a plea to wallow in melancholy nor a conservative call to recover a position of greatness perceived to have been lost. In each case, nostalgia is meant to be reflective, a meditation on "what might have been" as opposed to "what actually is" as society goes through a disorienting process of profound social and economic change.

Viewed from this perspective, both Haşmet's and Muhsin Bey's sentimental reverence for the past takes on a critical edge that aligns with revisionist accounts of nostalgia. In a 1998 essay that offered one of the first major reassessments of the emotion, the historian Jackson Lears proposed taking nostalgia as an "energizing impulse" or even a "form of knowledge": "The effort to revalue what has been lost can motivate serious historical inquiry; it can also cast a powerful light on the present. Visions of the good society can come from recollections and reconstructions of the past, not only from fantasies of the future."[55] As a historical emotion endemic to modern industrial society, nostalgia calls into question "linear notions of progress" by suggesting that "once, at least in some ways, life was more humane and satisfying than it is today."[56] Nostalgic evocations of the

past, Lears argued, might also help "restore will and choice to a discourse dominated by the jargon of inevitability" by challenging "the assumption that change is always irreversible and generally beneficent."[57] In calling for an affective engagement with the past, the films *Oh, Beautiful Istanbul* and *Mr Muhsin* reflect such positive appraisals of nostalgia. Haşmet and Muhsin Bey cast their glance backward in retrospection. Their affective disconnect from the tide of change and their inability to move along with it serve as emotional correctives in times of great social transformation. The films cast the two courteous Istanbul gentlemen as figures of care, reminding audiences of the value of work over quick gains, integrity over profit, and community over personal interest. Though it is a cultural trope lodged in the past, the social type of the courteous Istanbul gentleman helps audiences—and the general public—to imagine and uphold an alternative vision for the present as it unfolds into the future.

Conclusion

The post-war decades saw Turkey's steady transition from an agrarian to a predominantly industrial, market-oriented economy. Accelerated urbanization was at once a result of and a major driving force for the gradual but continuous expansion of the industrial sector, with major cities transforming rapidly to accommodate capitalist relations of production. As Turkey's economic capital, Istanbul became the most visible stage of these social and economic changes. The city transformed beyond recognition in the span of a lifetime. For hundreds of thousands of people who left familiar, close-knit rural communities to join the city's growing workforce, Istanbul offered hope in the form of economic opportunity. But it also bred disillusionment and resentment among those who failed to adjust to, or resisted, the cold, impersonal workings of the market. Istanbul gave them a feel and taste for capitalism, whether through lived experience or through the many representations of the city in popular media. Concurrently, the larger Istanbul grew in size and population, the more estranged its residents—old and new—became from the city. Nostalgic attempts to recall its familiar warmth, with tight-knit neighbourhoods, slower rhythms of daily life, reverence for tradition, and continuity, surely proved futile, but they offered a way to come to terms with and make sense of change. Emotions were central to the experience of urban modernity in post-war Turkey. Popular cultural tropes of the period—namely that Istanbul's streets were paved with gold, the figure of the poor but proud youth, and the social type of the courteous Istanbul gentleman—helped bring into public consciousness collectively shared sentiments about the penetration of capitalist relations into all spheres of life. These tropes retain their place in the Turkish social imaginary to this day, occasionally

resurfacing to animate public debate and popular discourse about the side-effects of global urban modernity as it continues to leave anything and anyone who is not aligned with market rationalities "out in the cold."

Notes

1 Bourque, "Poor but Proud."
2 See, for example, the popular TV series *Adını Feriha Koydum* (2011–2012), *Beni Affet* (2011–2018), *Dilek Taşı* (2023).
3 For a brief overview of Turkey's industrialization, see Pamuk, "Political Economy."
4 While the impact of state-owned enterprises on economic growth during the 1930s was modest, they remained an important instrument of economic policy until Turkey's neoliberal transformation in the 1980s. See Pamuk "Economic Growth."
5 Güvenç, "Metropol."
6 Keyder, "Setting," 12.
7 Karatepe, *Construction Industry*, 124.
8 Rutz and Balkan, *Reproducing Class*, 32.
9 Popular magazines and cinema offer valuable source material for the historian of emotions, not simply because they contain a wealth of representations of emotions, be they fictional or not, but also because they possess the potential to circulate en masse certain attitudes and dispositions, influencing the way people think about and express their emotions. On the use of popular culture for the historical study of emotions, see McAlister, "Literature."
10 Işık, "Türkiye'de Kentleşme," 60.
11 Gürel, "Agrarian Change," 204.
12 Keyder, *State and Class*, 136.
13 Keyder, *State and Class*, 136.
14 Elmacı, "Sinemasal Öyküsü."
15 *Birds of Exile* (*Gurbet Kuşları*), directed by Halit Refiğ, Artist Film, 1964.
16 *Birds of Exile*, 0:02:16.
17 *Birds of Exile*, 0:05:35.
18 *Birds of Exile*, 0:05:22.
19 *Birds of Exile*, 0:55:57.
20 *Birds of Exile*, 1:01:54.
21 *Birds of Exile*, 1:30:50.
22 Kemal, "Neden Geliyorlar?"
23 Robinson, "Turkey's Agrarian Revolution," 405.
24 Robinson notes that American administrators stationed in Turkey were largely ignorant of the social consequences of the economic processes that US assistance programs had helped set in motion in the country. He recalled a specific incident in 1949 when an agricultural adviser based in Ankara was questioned about the social impact of a farm mechanization program and exclaimed: "I don't give a damn what happens to the people. My job is to increase production as rapidly as possible." Robinson, "Turkey's Agrarian Revolution," 404.

25 Robinson, "Turkey's Agrarian Revolution," 403, italics in original.
26 On attitude research, see Fleck, "Attitude."
27 Robinson, "Turkey's Agrarian Revolution," 403.
28 Adnan Menderes, *Zafer*, February 27, 1958, quoted in Robinson, "Turkey's Agrarian Revolution," 404.
29 Gül, "Istanbul in Menderes' Hands."
30 Gül, "Istanbul in Menderes' Hands," 152.
31 As a nationwide social welfare system had yet to be legislated into existence, those making their way to the big city relied mostly on informal networks of care and support.
32 For an illustrative account of the rebuilding campaign's reception, see Boysan, "Politik Hummanın Silinmeyen İzleri."
33 Boysan, "Politik Hummanın Silinmeyen İzleri," 89.
34 Tunç, *Bir Maniniz Yoksa Annemler Size Gelecek*, 56.
35 *Bitter Life* (*Acı Hayat*), directed by Metin Erksan, Sine-Film, 1962.
36 *Bitter Life*, 0:08:19.
37 *Bitter Life*, 1:11:44.
38 *Bitter Life*, 1:25:04.
39 Gönlügür, "Filmic Imagination."
40 *Oh, Beautiful Istanbul* (*Ah Güzel Istanbul*), directed by Atıf Yılmaz, Be-Ya Film, 1966 and *Mr. Muhsin* (*Muhsin Bey*), directed by Yavuz Turgul, Umut Film, 1987.
41 When *arabesk* emerged in the 1960s, it helped to articulate people's claims to dignity and respect through vastly popular songs—and later films—that were initially about self-denial, noble suffering, and righteous indignation. As the 1980s wore on, however, it became more about expressing pragmatic demands for a greater share of urban wealth. An examination of how *arabesk* as a form of popular culture mobilized emotions is beyond the scope of this discussion, yet it would not be far-fetched to suggest that the massive challenge it posed to the cultural hegemony of the urban middle and upper classes stemmed from the emotional tolls borne by the first wave of migrants to Istanbul. On *arabesk* as a cultural form, see Özbek, "Arabesk Culture." For a discussion on how the emotional style of *arabesk* came to be associated with images of urban disintegration and disorder, see Stokes, "Turkish Arabesk."
42 *Oh, Beautiful Istanbul*, 0:04:08.
43 Gönlügür, "Consumer Democracy."
44 Keyder writes that "Menderes's vision was certainly not globalizing. It was, however, developmentalist and seemed to recognize that Istanbul had to occupy the dominant position in the political economy of national development." Istanbul's transformation under Özal during the 1980s, on the other hand, was "much more in line with the requirements of the new global era." Keyder, "Capital City Resurgent," 180, 181. See also Gül, "The 1980s."
45 Keyder and Öncü, *Istanbul*, 29.
46 "İstanbul'da yaşamak bir imtiyazdır," *Günaydın*, December 21, 1984, quoted in Ahıska and Yenal, *Aradığınız Kişiye Şu An Ulaşılamıyor*, 294.

47 The iconic Doğan Apartmanı where *Mr Muhsin* was shot was not among the buildings marked for demolition. Located in the historic Galata district, one of the earliest neighbourhoods to undergo gentrification, the apartment block has long since been renovated, its numerous flats becoming some of the most sought-after real estate in the entire city.
48 Boym, "Nostalgia and Its Discontents," 8.
49 Boym, "Nostalgia and Its Discontents," 10.
50 For a detailed account of this semantic change, see Becker, "Meanings of Nostalgia."
51 Boym, "Nostalgia and Its Discontents," 9; Becker, "Meanings of Nostalgia," 241.
52 Bengi, *80'li Yıllarda Türkiye*, 239.
53 Boym, "Nostalgia and Its Discontents," 13.
54 Boym, "Nostalgia and Its Discontents," 16.
55 Lears, "Looking Backward," 66.
56 Lears, "Looking Backward," 62.
57 Lears, "Looking Backward," 66.

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Part III

Cold Markets?

6 Warm Socialism and Cold Capitalism?

The Ongoing Debate Over the Economic Reconstruction of Eastern Germany After Revolution and Reunification, 1989–1990

Marcus Böick

East and West: Renewed Debates Over Germany

Was it happily ever after or a total disaster? A quick glance at the history of German unification reveals starkly divided opinions. From the outside, the swift reunification of the two German states after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 looked like one of the last success stories of the liberal West. From one moment to the next, previously impenetrable walls and deadly borders that cut across the country and continent suddenly opened. The hitherto unshakeable Soviet Union simply gave up its domain, withdrew its nuclear missiles, and relinquished its formidably armed forces, largely without a fight. For tens of millions of people in Central and Eastern Europe, new freedoms and opportunities around the world beckoned. And all this was achieved absent violence or war in the form of a peaceful revolution—and after more than four decades of often profound tension in the global ideological battle between Western liberalism and Eastern socialism that had been waged since 1945.[1]

A dream that had only a short time earlier seemed unimaginable thus appeared to come true in 1989–1990. After a dark century marked by defeat in two world wars, the dramatic downfall of the Weimar Republic, the rise of the Nazi regime and its crimes against humanity during the Holocaust, and the subsequent division of the country and establishment of Communist Party dictatorship in the East, the unexpected happy ending had apparently occurred: a reunited and peaceful Germany at the heart of Europe, an engine of European unification. It was not only in the eyes of the global press that Germans in both East and West seemed, at that moment, to be the "happiest people" in the world.[2] Still today, for outsiders (especially in the United States), this joyful final act provided a satisfying conclusion to the German "miracle."[3]

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All's well that ends well? Take another look at the inner workings of German society: the contrasts could hardly be starker. A familiar issue has returned with a vengeance in recent years: East Germany. In 2023, social media networks, newspaper pages and television programmes across the country were overflowing with the heated question of why the discrepancies between East and West were still an issue—and a highly emotional one at that. Meanwhile, the electoral barometer in many places showed the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a party that oscillates between populism and extremism, leading in the East, where it had overtaken even the leftist Linkspartei (a former bastion of party politics in the region).[4]

Almost three and a half decades since the abrupt end of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the celebrated fall of the Wall and the euphoric reunification, the general astonishment over lingering imbalances—especially in the West—seems all the greater. As former politically active contemporaries fall silent, it is left to the younger generation—artists, academics, politicians, and influencers—to tackle the topic, which is purportedly "over and done with" yet still manages to provoke emotional reactions. Rather than gradually fading away over the generations thanks to the "inner unity" that has been invoked since the 1990s (as political leaders ten years ago had perhaps hoped and those in the historical research landscape feared),[5] since the mid-2010s the discrepancies between East and West have once again been powering the political, social, and cultural faultlines that cut through German society.[6]

In both old and new media, emotional and discursive battles over these discrepancies are being waged. In 2023, two books took centre stage in the debate: Dirk Oschmann's *Der Osten: Eine westdeutsche Erfindung* ("The East, a West-German Invention") and Katja Hoyer's *Beyond the Wall*.[7] Both raised the emotional stakes. While Oschmann, a professor of German Studies from Leipzig, positioned his book as a pointed polemic that addressed long-standing inequalities between East and West and highlighted the structural as well as symbolic disadvantages faced by East Germans due to the West German "invention" of the East, Hoyer, a historian and journalist based in London, took a different approach. Her book, based on oral history interviews, sketched a provocatively warm picture of life in the GDR. It did not take long for both East German authors to come under attack. Oschmann was criticized as a naive stooge of the right-wing populist AfD.[8] Hoyer, meanwhile, was accused by German experts of a fatuous portrayal of the authoritarian state regime under the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (SED) that largely ignored huge swathes of the existing research landscape.[9]

None of this dampened the appeal of the two books. Both titles stormed onto the German bestseller list in the summer of 2023, secured huge print runs and sold tens of thousands of copies—but chiefly in the East of the

republic. Dirk Oschmann's numerous public appearances in the former East took on a near-religious quality. The (rather wooden) professor from Leipzig was eagerly received by mostly older audiences as far north as the Baltic Sea and as far south as the Fichtel Mountains, where he addressed smouldering "truths" openly. Disagreement or dispute seemed largely unwelcome—in fact, near impossible. Hoyer's book, meanwhile, was initially released in the United Kingdom to great acclaim. Clever marketing on the part of her publisher positioned her as a fresh voice capable of telling the story of recent German history not from the familiar standpoint of World War II and the Nazi dictatorship, but by taking a new look at a seemingly dull subject.[10]

The "Oschmann–Hoyer debate" that was subsequently unleashed about past and present tensions between East and West was conducted in highly emotional terms. Nuances or attempts to mediate the war of words and interpretations went largely unheard. The emotional templates[11] of both works dovetailed astonishingly well: Hoyer's inherently egalitarian, warm, and community-minded East German socialist society suddenly and unexpectedly finds itself, after 1990, in Oschmann's frosty world of Western arrogance and capitalist exploitation. In both works, "cold" capitalism flows from the West to the East. The combination of identity politics elements and critiques of capitalism explains in part why the two books were so commercially successful, and why both were swiftly rebutted by specialist audiences.[12]

This emotive form of East German "identity cultivation," a task that has mostly been undertaken between the pages of books or fought via keyboard, was embedded in analogue and digital debates over a wide range of problems and topics. In a present plagued by multiple crises, old arguments resurfaced in new contexts. The aforementioned rise in support for the increasingly radical AfD, particularly in eastern Germany,[13] amid heated debates about migration and asylum-seeking beginning in the mid-2010s, was just one—albeit a central—component.[14]

Other topics that were characteristically framed along familiar East–West lines, permeating and modifying them in specific ways, included the debate in 2020 and 2021 over public health measures to contain the spread of COVID-19 through contact restrictions and vaccinations,[15] Germany's military involvement in Russia's war on Ukraine,[16] and the possible consequences of AI-driven digitalization (and resulting deindustrialization) on work. There was, in short, no lack of potential "trigger points" that could reignite tired East–West debates.[17]

Despite their particularities, these (often navel-gazing) discussions about possible, impending, or surmounted East–West differences in Germany fit within a larger debate about Western liberalism which has gripped Central and Eastern Europe since the 2010s, in the wake of the global financial

and Euro crises post-2008. Though many in the *bleierne Zeit* ("leaden times") of a completely "exhausted" real socialism in the 1980s eagerly awaited it, the decampment to the West often proved to be a decidedly ambivalent endeavour. It was only after the turn of the millennium that the "triumph" of the western market economy, which had more or less been taken for granted, started to be questioned. In politics, among the public, and in academia, the very term "capitalism," which after 1989–1990 was strongly associated with the failed project of real socialism and thus discredited, became utterable once more.

Post-2008, authors such as Viennese historian Philipp Ther began to analyse the ambivalent legacy of the rapid, unchecked triumph of supposedly neoliberal and coldly calculating capitalism in former socialist countries since the 1980s.[18] Just a few years later, with populist right-wing electoral victories in Poland and Hungary looming on the horizon, the apocalyptic diagnosis of political scientists Stephen Holmes and Ivan Krastev seemed almost a foregone conclusion: the once warmly shining light of Western liberalism—with all its golden promises and full-throated pledges of freedom, progress, and prosperity—had now largely dimmed in the east of the continent. Instead of liberalization, globalization, and Europeanization, nationalism, regionalism, and isolationism seemed to be on the march again.[19]

Regardless of whether one wishes to adopt these current interpretations, material conditions and emotional sensitivities are often enmeshed in such diagnoses of crisis, and since the 1970s they have found a common antagonist in the spectre of neoliberal capitalism.[20] This chapter shows how, in the specific context of East–West debates within Germany, cultural and emotional aspects were and are often closely intertwined with material economic factors in discussions about the past, present, and future. A historiographical look (back) at the emotional economies during and after the post-socialist upheavals will help us to better understand the genesis of these social debates.

This chapter focuses on post-socialist economic restructuring, and in particular on the Treuhandanstalt, the organization responsible for the mass privatization (and shuttering) of state assets in eastern Germany between 1990 and 1994. First, I look at the immediate moment of revolution and upheaval in late 1989 and 1990, a period marked by a fundamental tension between the torpor of late socialism and the euphoria of opening up. Next, I discuss the disappointments of the early 1990s, when the consequences of the transition in part led to major societal conflicts. The chapter concludes with an examination of the long-term effects of these conflicts, highlighting the place of the Treuhand and its economic restructuring in present-day German memory culture.

Torpor and Euphoria: From "Third Way" to "Economic Miracle"

The historical emotional template of caring, warm (Eastern) socialism here and cold neoliberal (Western) capitalism there would have seemed somewhat nonsensical to most contemporaries in 1989–1990. After decades of a controlled real socialist scarcity economy, with all its attendant supply and environmental issues, the party dictatorships of Eastern Europe, which were militarily dependent on Moscow, appeared both ideologically and materially drained. The greyer daily life became in the Soviet empire, the brighter shone the many freedoms and unlimited possibilities of Western consumer society—above all, of course, in the United States. Due to their proximity, the rivalry between the two German systems led to asymmetrical patterns of perception: many East Germans gazed with longing at their TV screens or at the packages trundling in from the West, while in the increasingly self-assured Federal Republic of Germany (FDR), the GDR was thought of only as an odd cautionary tale on the fringes—if it was thought of at all.[21]

This long-held desire to participate not only in the political freedoms but also the economic prosperity of the West was a central, if often underestimated, component of the revolutionary upheavals that took place in autumn of 1989. But would socialism, with its rigid planned economy, really be thawed by the heat of capitalist competition? Such an interpretation was very attractive to contemporaries; not without reason did one of the earliest and best-known articles on the economic situation in Eastern Germany—co-authored by eventual Nobel prizewinner George Akerlof and later US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, along with two others—take the telling programmatic title "In From the Cold."[22]

From the Siberian cold of the Soviet planned economy to the enlivening Atlantic maelstrom of the global market: as appealing as this image may have been in the 1990s from a Western perspective, the constellation was not so simple—at least not in the revolutionary days around the fall of the Wall on 9 November 1989.[23] Many East German opposition members and reform communists dreamt instead of a reformed GDR that would take a "third way," a path between the propagandistically invoked "social achievements" of socialism and the performance- and competition-driven dynamics of Western market societies. The "*Nestwärme*" (warm embrace and security) of the socialist welfare state was supposed to tame the worst excesses of untrammelled capitalism. In a modified GDR, social proximity and economic prosperity (as well as, presciently, ecological sustainability) could go hand in hand.[24]

So much for the theory. While East German opposition groups and representatives of the crumbling government headed by the SED were still negotiating the particulars of internal reform at the Round Table of

1989–1990, the borders opened and the East German people voted not only with their feet but also with their wallets. Many made the move to the West, finally purchasing the goods they had been coveting and increasingly wishing for speedy reunification. After just a few weeks, the West was everywhere in the GDR. Meanwhile, the socialist economy sank even further into decline. The CDU's Helmut Kohl, the long-serving and politically floundering West German chancellor, was one of the first to ostensibly sense the political change of mood at the end of 1989. In early February 1990, in the midst of campaigns for the first free elections of the Volkskammer, his government offered East Germans an unexpected and immediate economic union. The resulting "social market economy" would yield a second German "economic miracle" in the East—or so many conservative and liberal strategists promised. The crux of the deal lay in the Deutschmark: a currency union would imminently bring the eagerly awaited D-Marks to the East. In Kohl's astonishing offer, economic and political unity were almost indistinguishable.[25]

Although leftists in the East and West alike positively shuddered at the prospect of German reunification under nationalist and capitalist auspices, fearing what leading left-wing intellectual Jürgen Habermas had termed "D-Mark nationalism,"[26] Kohl's instinct was right. The Volkskammer election on 18 March 1990—which had been brought forward due to the rapid dissolution of state authority in the GDR—became a plebiscite on monetary union and economic unification. East Germans handed the liberal-conservative party alliance a landslide victory that few observers had anticipated. Yet, while all signs now pointed to a quick reunification, the first seeds of doubt were already germinating—not only among sceptics and critics, but also many economists. How would ailing businesses in the east cope with the rapid currency change? Would new social inequalities—unemployment, poverty, mass emigration, and xenophobia—proliferate? Above all reigned the anxious question of whether the so-called capitalist "elbow society" (a term used to describe the jostling to get ahead that many imagined life in the West to entail) would replace the previously shared closeness in the East.[27]

Such concerns initially had scant political impact. Kohl himself brushed off the reservations of his chief economic advisers by appealing to the historic opportunity to overcome German partition. In no time at all, the two governments in Bonn and East Berlin were marking the ground for domestic as well as foreign policy plans. When the Deutschmark was officially introduced in the GDR on 1 July 1990, the general euphoria at first seemed to be largely without exception. Footage of long queues outside banks and people triumphantly showing off their new marks continue to dominate media coverage of the topic today.[28] In the summer of 1990 (for the last time), the euphoria and optimism in both East and West

highlighted the sharp contrast between ossified, run-down socialism and dynamic, progressive liberalism, although in the background, whispers of doubt could be heard. This unique mood—many in the east hoping to attain the western standard of living as soon as possible, West Germans assuming that this would not involve any sacrifice of the affluence to which they had become accustomed—would not last.

Outrage and Disillusionment: The "Slaughterhouse" of "Manchester Capitalism"

The first signs that a major crisis was brewing emerged immediately after the economic and currency union was signed. This agreement was supplemented during the negotiation phase (at the insistence of Lothar de Maiziére's new GDR government) by a social union to cushion possible hardships.[29] One institution would quickly become the focus of the growing East–West conflicts: the Treuhandanstalt, which was instated in mid-June 1990 to manage the rapid privatization of East German companies.[30] The agency, peculiarly situated between East and West, and state and market, had been founded in March, at the instigation of the Central Round Table (Der Zentrale Runde Tisch), initially for the long-term preservation of the GDR's state-owned industrial assets (amounting to some eight thousand companies and four million employees). While the PDS, which had emerged from the SED, and left-wing opposition members would have been all too happy to retain state ownership, the federal coalition government of the CDU/CSU and FDP made it clear to its East German partners during negotiations in the spring of 1990 that a comprehensive denationalization of the East German economy through rapid privatization was the only viable option. The still largely unknown Treuhand agency, under the direction of experienced West German managers and executives, was tasked with the responsibility.[31] The Deutschmark certainly had its price.

These managers, and new Treuhand president Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, who assumed office in August 1990, were the first to realize what the currency changeover politicians were pushing for would entail. That summer, a perfect storm was brewing in the already hard-hit Eastern German economy. After decades of centralized planning and control in service of the SED regime's grip on political power, its industrial combines and companies, which often struggled with considerable investment backlogs and system-related inefficiencies, were hurled onto the global market overnight. Simultaneously, they had to contend with the massive re-valuation shock caused by the abrupt introduction of the much stronger Deutschmark, just as they were at risk of losing traditional markets in Eastern Europe with their outdated products. The billions that politicians in East and West just a few weeks earlier had hoped privatization would yield receded

further and further from view. Meanwhile, Rohwedder and the managers he had brought to the agency realized with alarm that almost all of the oversized combines were making losses, some of them substantial: in July 1990 alone, Treuhand-held companies were desperately asking for loans and grants of almost 20 billion Deutschmarks, just to cover their running costs.[32]

However, in the autumn of 1990, these problems were still largely unfolding behind the scenes, overshadowed by major foreign policy agreements on German unification. In factories and workforces, however, anxieties were brewing. The political accession of the now officially dissolving GDR to the Federal Republic on 3 October and the first all-German parliamentary elections on 2 December 1990 took place amid a strange mix of hope and fear—and with great success for the governing coalition. The mood finally shifted in the spring of 1991. With the backing of the newly re-elected German government, Rohwedder and his management team, which was quickly recruited from West German companies and ministries, announced massive rounds of lay-offs and the shuttering of entire sectors in order to kick-start the privatizations. The leadership of the Treuhand was convinced that it was primarily West German investors, with their "know-how," superior products, and capital, who could manage the comprehensive reorganization of the parts of the East German economy that could still be saved after the conversion shock.[33]

This crash strategy generated considerable social resistance. Veritable shockwaves rang through East German society, which was suddenly hit with unemployment and shutdowns. Rallies, protests, and violent demonstrations throughout the GDR further inflamed the already charged atmosphere in the lead-up to spring. Former opposition members, left-wing politicians, and trade union representatives exacerbated tensions, with the SPD minister president of Brandenburg calling the economic reforms in the new federal states an example of "darkest Manchester capitalism" and the boss of major union IG Metall, Franz Steinkühler, warning of a "slaughterhouse" in the East.[34] Then, on 1 April 1991, as the protests reached their zenith, Treuhand president Rohwedder, who had been the target of extreme public hostility, was fatally wounded by several bullets in his Düsseldorf home.[35]

Even though his successor, Birgit Breuel, a politician from Lower Saxony, continued the course of rapid privatization at an astonishing pace until the end of 1992, despite public, political, and societal pushback, the negative image of the Treuhandanstalt in the East was sealed. The agency now symbolized—for example, in the hunger strike of the potash miners of Bischofferode in summer 1993, which attracted global media attention—the cold mercilessness of a capitalism that forced millions of unsuspecting East Germans into unemployment or into the increasingly

feeble arms of the West German welfare state. Meanwhile, predominantly West German investors and competitors were reaping the benefits of the rigorous "phaseout" (*Abwicklung*) of Eastern concerns through the targeted elimination of unloved competitors or takeover of lucrative production facilities. As critics such as PDS leader Gregor Gysi put it, in the guise of the ice-cold Treuhand (and its "heartless" boss Breuel), merciless capitalism had taken off its mask and built a colony in the powerless East on the smouldering ruins of socialism and its factory-focused "workers' society."[36]

Remembrance and Empowerment: A "Bad Bank" in East German Memory Culture

The Treuhand—the "most hated institution" in the East—did not simply disappear after its highly symbolic closure at the end of 1994. It had essentially fulfilled its task: the majority of companies had been privatized or shuttered at record speed by the end of 1992, but the agency itself, the state, and society paid a high price. The profits promised by proponents of privatization in early 1990 did not materialize; in their place was a huge mountain of debt (almost 270 billion Deutschmarks) as the Treuhand was forced to practically give away companies predominantly to West German investors to ensure their continued operation. Nevertheless, at the time leading Treuhand experts and social scientists such as Wolfgang Seibel repeatedly attested to the agency's "successful failure." According to the title of one authoritative anthology from 1993 featuring a number of prominent economists and lawyers, the Treuhand had "dared the impossible." It functioned as a political "lightning rod," successfully absorbing the anger and disappointment of the Easterners affected by economic restructuring—and thus distracting them from the political system of the Federal Republic.[37]

This form of sociopolitically buffered but fast-paced "shock therapy" was specific to East Central and Eastern Europe. However, while the model propagated by Rohwedder of "privatization as the most effective form of restructuring"[38] relied entirely on a painful short-term transition from planned to open market economy, the related political calculation initially seemed to work: although the Treuhand slowly staggered towards its symbolically staged conclusion after 1993 (in a never-ending maelstrom of revelations, scandals, and partisan debates, including a parliamentary committee of inquiry), the CDU/CSU government was returned to office at the next federal election in autumn 1994 with only minor losses. In addition to the "scapegoat" role described by Seibel and others, a key factor may also have been a change in strategy by the federal and state governments from 1992 onwards, which, in view of the much-discussed

"deindustrialization" of the East with regard to the Treuhand-held companies that remained in the portfolio, now increasingly focused on preserving certain "industrial cores" in East Germany—a policy that the Treuhand leadership around Birgit Breuel vehemently disagreed with, wanting to rely on rapid shutdowns rather than long-term subsidies.[39]

When the Treuhandanstalt officially ceased operations at the end of 1994, journalist Michael Jürgs predicted that the myth that had formed around it during the turbulent years of the post-reunification period would not easily dissipate.[40] Nevertheless, at least in the public sphere (which was mostly dominated by West German perspectives), the Treuhand initially seemed to be forgotten. Indeed, by 2000, the entire economic restructuring of East Germany had largely disappeared from public discussion—give or take the occasional flashback. Yet the "Treuhand-trauma" continued to fester, beyond media reports and specialist debates, on the social level.[41] Beginning in the mid-2010s, the electoral success of the AfD in East Germany fuelled a renewed interest in the possible causes and shape of persistent East–West differences. Since the 1990s, any reticence Germans from the East showed towards Western institutions was typically explained with reference to the "imprints" left by years of living under the authoritarian GDR regime.[42] By the 2010s, however, the plausibility of these interpretations started to diminish. Social and academic debates turned instead to post-socialist experiences of upheaval and transformation in the East.[43]

The Treuhand had a central role in these discussions. In 2016/17, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs commissioned Constantin Goschler and me to conduct an exploratory study tracing the echoes of the agency and the subsequent economic restructuring in the cultural memory. Using a combination of media discourse analysis, expert interviews, and random surveys in the Eastern cities of Leipzig and Eisenach, we were able to provisionally explore this controversial topic.

The media discussion of the Treuhand has not changed much since the mid-1990s. If it is covered at all (reports chiefly surface to mark various anniversaries), it is in the regional press, seldom in national or supra-regional contexts, and the focus is on its scandals or failures. Even interviews with the managers, politicians, and experts who were involved—including former Treuhand president Birgit Breuel, former federal finance minister Theo Waigel, and former minister president of Saxony Kurt Biedenkopf—have failed to yield anything truly surprising. Those who were formerly active in the agency defended their activities as "without alternative" and "successful," while the dark sides of privatization have largely been attributed to the deficits of the planned GDR economy.[44]

In contrast, the results of the random surveys we conducted in Leipzig and Eisenach at the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 proved far more interesting. First, many people reacted somewhat emotionally when we

asked them about the "Treuhand"—and often refused to say anything more on the topic. However, the responses of the 500 people we did manage to interview revealed the contours of a particular cultural constellation of memory. Looking back on the Treuhand and its legacy, we found not only the expected contrasts between East and West, but also notable generational differences. For example, while the Treuhandanstalt was known to almost 95 per cent and 85 per cent of East and West Germans over the age of 40 respectively, only 32 per cent and 20 per cent of younger respondents knew anything about the agency. Members of the *Erlebnisgenerationen* (generations with experience) were therefore very clearly aware of the issues associated with the Treuhand, while the topic was much less familiar to younger people.[45]

A slight East–West difference was already evident at this point. It became more pronounced when we asked people about their personal assessment of the Treuhandanstalt's work in restructuring the East German economy.[46] Older West Germans, for example, rated it more positively on average (3.6) than East Germans (4.2); however, the assessments were all relatively negative. When asked about economic development since 1990 in general, respondents were more positive: almost all considered it between "good" and "satisfactory"; the results of German unification were on average rated as "good" (2.1). The outcomes of unification on the individual were even evaluated as "very good" among many respondents: younger West Germans saw these very positively (1.6); older West Germans were somewhat more restrained in their judgement (2.0). Overall, a trend emerged: while the Treuhandanstalt in particular was rated negatively, the general sentiment about the economic outcome and individual situation was noticeably sunnier. A question about the current relationship between East and West provided a striking outlier. Younger East Germans were the most sceptical on the subject (rating it 3.1, less than satisfactory), older East Germans were only slightly more sceptical (2.8), and West German respondents were similarly cautious (2.7).[47]

With a view to present-day relations between those in the once-divided country, this scepticism (which other studies have also noted) could well be read as a possible harbinger of the East–West controversies that later erupted around the books written by Oschmann and Hoyer. There were few noticeable differences between the genders or regions (large cities vs. small towns) in our surveys. However, the wide spectrum of opinions given, in which the Treuhandanstalt in particular figured centrally in the negative assessments, was further underpinned by the semantic reactions we captured: asked to name the first thing that came to mind when they heard "Treuhand," most respondents said "liquidation" (52), "sell-off" (42), "negative" (33), or "fraud" (24), while more neutral associations

such as "real estate," "administration," "sale," or "privatization" (24 to 16) were much less common, and positive ones virtually non-existent.[48]

Overall, we interpreted this empirical, albeit non-representative, snapshot taken at the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 as a remarkable demonstration of just how fragmented memory culture in post-unification Germany was. While older East Germans reacted extremely emotionally and negatively to the economic restructuring for which the Treuhandanstalt was responsible, three decades after the agency's privatization efforts concluded, the topic was noticeably less well known or contested among younger people, or among West Germans. Our conclusion at the time was that the Treuhand had become a kind of symbolic bad bank for the East German generation(s) who had experienced the transition. It came to represent their negative experiences and disappointments with the Western market economy in particular and with capitalism in general. The basically hostile "takeover" of the post-socialist East by the capitalist West (and its elites, its institutions, and its rules), which the historian Sascha-Ilko Kowalzuck, among others, later sketched,[49] thus had a prominent key symbol: the Treuhandanstalt, which to a certain extent symbolized the (cold) heart of post-reunification darkness—and largely went unnoticed by West German-dominated publics and debates.[50]

Shortly after we conducted the surveys, around 2017–2018, the Treuhand was catapulted back into the public consciousness. Our study was just one part of a larger rediscovery of the agency, its history, and the contested implications associated with it. The German market was flooded with a series of publications that either rigorously defended the Treuhandanstalt or pilloried it as a neoliberal conspiracy. Academic projects on the topic abounded, including a large-scale study financed by the Federal Ministry of Finance (once responsible for the organization), which examined the agency's files, available to researchers for the first time.[51] These new research efforts went hand in hand with a decidedly explosive repoliticization of the topic: both the political left—which had been among the harshest critics of Treuhand policy already back in 1990—and the right-wing populist AfD discovered that the hot-button topic might be a campaign hit. Reappraising the history of the Treuhand has now become a catch-cry in political debates, especially in the former Eastern states.[52]

In the arts, culture, and media, younger people have discovered the myth-couched Treuhand and its ambivalent legacy for themselves. East German artists such as Henrike Naumann have explored the traumas of that period on an intergenerational basis. The first German true-crime series on Netflix, *A Perfect Crime*, which focused on Rohwedder's assassination, is another example.[53] A number of regional initiatives in East Germany have addressed the Treuhandanstalt in recent years through video installations,

plays, and even techno performances.[54] These initiatives typically locate the economic restructuring within a broader sketch of Germany in the 1990s,[55] in which East Germans appear not only as victims of Western capitalism,[56] but also as potentially violent perpetrators in the neo-nationalist frenzy of the "baseball bat years," as described by journalist Christian Bangel.[57] The faultline that our survey highlighted back in 2016 and 2017 is visible here too: the struggle to understand the complexities of the post-reunification period, with the Treuhand as a central (negative) symbol, is not only being waged between East and West Germans, but increasingly also between older and younger people. The outcome is still to be decided.

Hot and Cold: Fluctuating Temperatures Between Socialism and Capitalism

The East–West debate that has reared its head again since the mid-2010s is, I argue, not simply a reiteration of old debates over inequalities, injustices, and asymmetries. While German unification is still regarded internationally as a comparatively unblemished success story, the internal view is marked by major interpretive conflicts that can no longer be linked to the "imprints" of the pre-1989 GDR era but are nevertheless inextricably linked to the dynamics of that period of transformation and upheaval. A historical breakdown of these emotional economies can, as I have suggested in this article, facilitate a better understanding of the conflicts over material discrepancies and symbolic meanings that have become so entrenched in post-unification Germany.[58]

With a view to Germany's economic restructuring, I have attempted to show how the emotional constellations changed in rather rapid succession. By the spring of 1991, little remained of the almost euphoric sense of opening up felt in 1989–1990. Profound disillusionment set in, especially in the east of the country. Instead of a quick economic miracle and swift fresh start, liquidation and dramatic shutdowns seemed to be the defining characteristics of the new era in the market economy. In retrospect, the chill of post-1990s capitalism made the experience of real socialism under dictatorship seem warm and welcoming in comparison.[59]

After 1990, social cohesion in the "elbow society" appeared a long way off. Social inequalities and cultural differences between the "winners" and "losers" of unification quickly became apparent.[60] East Germans not only experienced material disadvantages, but also saw a devaluation of their biographies and depreciation of their culture. While the abrupt shuttering of state-owned East German industries in just a few years was cushioned by the welfare state, the experience of decline and loss in the affected regions and workforces would not be so easily soothed.[61] The engine, in many eyes, of the privatizations that led to these losses, the Treuhandanstalt,

became a symbol of East German disenfranchisement. In memory culture, it was the "bad bank" of German unity, especially in the eyes and recollections of the East Germans who had lived through it. Distant rulers from the West making rash decisions "from up on high" would prove a powerful motif, ripe for populist appropriation still today.[62]

This chapter does not conclude with any particular optimism for the near future. In the ongoing struggle to establish a comprehensive and long-lasting "inner unity" in Germany, diagnoses in the early 2020s seem to be much more critical than before—especially with regard to the ambivalent effects of post-socialist capitalism and its consequences.[63] In part, this has to do with who is speaking: in the 1990s and 2000s it was primarily West German politicians, journalists, academics, and managers whose voices were given the most prominent platform. Since the mid-2010s, younger authors and experts with biographical links to the East have actively engaged in reemergent East–West debates. To them, the "triumphant march" of the West German market economy no longer seems as self-evident as it did a generation ago.[64]

Yet, these more recent discussions have their own thematic blind spots and narrow views. Were the policies of the 1990s—of the Treuhand, but also of the acting federal government—really as one-sidedly and monocausally "neoliberal" as many now assume?[65] Has the country's "inner unity" under West German auspices really been such a failure in the long term? Was the much-discussed right-wing extremist violence—in particular, the xenophobic pogroms in Rostock-Lichtenhagen in 1992 or the racist arson attack in Solingen in 1993—really the decisive characteristic of this period?[66] And how can the disruptions of the era (in the form of liquidation, emigration, and unemployment) be properly assessed in relation to the many new beginnings? Lastly, the final farewell to Western liberalism across Eastern and Central Europe, which many are now lamenting or diagnosing, may not be so final after all. The most recent crises, in the form of populism, pandemics, and wars, have also complicated and exacerbated the discussion. Are there, in fact, more authoritarian "anti-vaxxers," racist migrant-haters, or perpetual "Russia apologists" among those in the former East, as some social media debates would have us believe?[67] Has a new hybrid of nationalism and neoliberalism established itself throughout Central Eastern Europe as a result of the unresolved traumas of the post-1989–1990 upheavals?[68]

The greatest challenge for post-reunification Germany is cracking open these often navel-gazing discussions about the country's future—both thematically and in terms of perspective—in order to let new questions in. Potential candidates are hardly in short supply.[69] For example, was the caesura of 1989–1990 really so deep, stark, and final that we can think of it as a conclusive end-point?[70] Could the dynamic between East

and West be better described, for example, through the concept of "co-transformations"?[71] Could the place of transnational and global phenomena in Germany be more rigorously traced?[72] How can the multifaceted nature of German identity today be better captured in order to further erode the familiar dichotomy between East and West—and to give a place in the conversation to migrant perspectives?[73] How could these debates be anchored more firmly in the broader sociopolitical and cultural memory at a time when Holocaust remembrance, post-colonial initiatives, and East–West discussions are competing for increasingly meagre resources and ever shorter public attention spans? Finally, could the history of emotions and the history of democracy be in even closer dialogue in the future?[74]

Notes

1 See the more or less optimistic "classics": Maier, *Dissolution*; Childs, *Fall of the GDR*; Kowalczuk, *End Game*.
2 As just two examples from a conservative and a left-liberal perspective: Rödder, *Deutschland einig Vaterland*; Winkler, *Germany*.
3 Sen, "German Reunification."
4 "Sun Rises."
5 Port, "Banalities"; Gieseke, "After the Battles"; Mählert, *Die DDR als Chance*.
6 Kowalczuk, *Die Übernahme*; Mau, *Lütten Klein*.
7 Oschmann, *Der Osten*; Hoyer, *Beyond the Wall*.
8 See "Das Reden der Anderen."
9 Conradi, "Katja Hoyer."
10 Wieder, "The GDR."
11 Frevert et al., *Feeling Political*.
12 Gieseke, "Rezensionsessay."
13 "A Generation."
14 See the different papers engaging with this topic in: Leistner and Wohlrab-Sahr, *Das umstrittene Erbe*.
15 Thießen, "Immunity as Relativity."
16 Schmollack, "Von Russlandgegnern."
17 Mau, Lux, and Westheuser, *Triggerpunkte*.
18 Ther, *Europe since 1989*.
19 Krastev and Holmes, *Light That Failed*.
20 See in further detail: Böick, "Wie neoliberal."
21 Villinger, *Vom ungerechten Plan*.
22 Akerlof et al., "East Germany in from the Cold."
23 Trentmann, *Out of the Darkness*.
24 Böick: "In from the Socialist 'Cold.'"
25 See in further detail: Böick, *Die Treuhand*, esp. Chapter 1.
26 Habermas, "Der DM-Nationalismus."
27 Böick, "Chronisten gesucht."
28 See Stephan and Tacke, *NachBilder der Wende*.

29 Ritter, *Der Preis*.
30 Böick, "Pioneers of Capitalism."
31 Kemmler, *Die Entstehung der Treuhandanstalt*; Malycha, *Vom Hoffnungsträger zum Prügelknaben*.
32 Seibel, *Verwaltete Illusionen*.
33 Böick, *Die Treuhand*.
34 Rau, *Die verhandelte "Wende."*
35 Böick, *Die Treuhand*.
36 Engler, *Die Ostdeutschen*.
37 See the different papers by Seibel and others, collected as result of a Treuhand-funded research project in Fischer, Hax, and Schneider, *Treuhandanstalt*.
38 Rohwedder, "An alle Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter."
39 See Böick: *Die Treuhand*.
40 Jürgs, *Die Treuhänder*.
41 Laabs, *Der deutsche Goldrausch*; Pötzl, *Der Treuhand-Komplex*.
42 Kollmorgen, "Theories of Postcommunist Transformation"; Kowalczuk, Erbert, and Kulick, *(Ost)Deutschlands Weg*.
43 Brückweh, Villinger, and Zöller, *Die lange Geschichte*; Böick and Lorke, *Zwischen Aufschwung und Anpassung*; Großbölting, *Wiedervereinigungsges ellschaft*.
44 Goschler and Böick, *Wahrnehmung und Bewertung*.
45 Goschler and Böick, *Wahrnehmung und Bewertung*.
46 For the sake of simplicity, the scale was based on the German school grading system, which differentiates between 1 (very good), 2 (good), 3 (satisfactory), 4 (sufficient), 5 (poor) and 6 (unsatisfactory).
47 Goschler and Böick, *Wahrnehmung und Bewertung*
48 Goschler and Böick, *Wahrnehmung und Bewertung*.
49 Kowalczuk, *Die Übernahme*.
50 See the contributions in: Hoffmann, *Transformation einer Volkswirtschaft*; Hoffmann and Brunnbauer, *Transformation als soziale Praxis*.
51 See the chapters in: Hoffmann, *Die umkämpfte Einheit*.
52 von Lieben, "Wahlkampf mit der Treuhand."
53 Oltermann, "Perfect Crime."
54 Naumann, "Armchair Ideology."
55 Lorenz, "Wie geil böse."
56 See the case studies in: Kössler and Steuwer, *Brandspuren*.
57 Bangel, "#baseballschlägerjahre" as well as the other articles in this issue; recently also the discussion about the book by Rabe, *Die Möglichkeit von Glück*.
58 See, in further detail, Böick and Lorke, *Zwischen Aufschwung und Anpassung*. The broad range of literature on the history of emotions cannot be covered in this article: see Rosenwein and Cristiani, *History of Emotions*.
59 Brunnbauer et. al., *In den Stürmen*.
60 Emmerich, "Cultural Memory."
61 Lindner-Elsner, *Von Wartburg zu Opel*.
62 Hilmar, *Deserved*.

63 See the various contributions in: Böick and Brückweh, "Weder Ost noch West."
64 Kirschbaum, "Global Crisis."
65 Berman, "Consequences of Neoliberalism"; for the broader picture see also Slobodian, *Globalists*; Joppke, *Neoliberal Nationalism*.
66 Molnar, "Greetings."
67 Mau, "Der Osten als Problemzone."
68 Ban, Scheiring and Vasile, "Political Economy."
69 "What's Next."
70 Allen, "Ending Myth."
71 See the different perspectives on that issue (including Phillip Ther's) in Böick, Goschler and Jessen, *Jahrbuch 2022*.
72 Bösch, *History Shared and Divided*; Mark et al., *1989*.
73 We tried to address this issue from very different perspectives very recently in Böick, Goschler and Jessen, *Jahrbuch 2023*.
74 Christina Morina, *Tausend Aufbrüche. Die Deutschen und ihre Demokratie seit den 1980er-Jahren* (München: Siedler, 2023).

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7 "Small Group, Big Business"

Imagining Capitalism and Capitalists in Late-Socialist Poland

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Introduction

Capitalism felt different from outside. Although both capitalism as a distinct economic system and "the capitalists"—the collective agent with which Marxist thought identified it—were distant phenomena for people living in Communist Eastern Europe, the emotions attached to them were no less fervent than in the West—perhaps even more so. The Communists and their official media played on tropes of social coldness to convey a sinister image of the old order that had been fortuitously overcome by "really existing socialism" and its allegedly warmer, more secure, and more humane society. However, Western affluence continued to be an object of imagination and desire for a considerable number of ordinary people throughout the region.

In late-socialist Poland, more than in other Eastern European countries, these imaginaries of capitalism came to be accompanied by first-hand experiences of at least some features of capitalist social and economic relations, both at home and abroad. Due to the comparably liberal Polish border regime, a growing number of Poles had been able to travel to the West from the 1970s onwards and had sneaked a peek at Western consumerism. Many had gained personal experience of capitalist economies as seasonal workers, most frequently in agriculture. Moreover, in view of the dramatic deterioration of the domestic economy towards the end of the decade, Polish authorities granted individual petty entrepreneurs increasing room for manoeuvre within the socialist planned economy. Operating under conditions of ubiquitous shortages, queues, and legal twilight zones, these private traders and small producers provided indispensable goods and services. Their very existence amidst the state socialist economic and social order meant that they showcased capitalist practices and became a focal point for the diverging emotions attached to these. People accustomed to modest but equal socialist welfare, with guaranteed low prices and top-down universal provision of basic needs, tended

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to see these private petty entrepreneurs as dubious profiteers and reckless "speculators." Official mass media outlets played their part in fostering such emotions, which condensed into the derogatory cliché of so-called *prywaciarze* (pejoratively, "private owners").

This chapter investigates how Poles imagined capitalism in the final decade before it was actually introduced in the post-socialist transformation of the 1990s, and scrutinizes the emotionalized attitudes reflected, displayed, and reinforced by these conceptions. It takes as its starting point the observation that the prevalent images of capitalism as a system were to a large extent shaped by perceptions—formed either through first-hand experiences or media representations—of individual petty capitalists and their activities during the 1980s. This specific focus on individual entrepreneurship conveyed certain assumptions about capitalism as a whole that turned out to be highly congruent with neoliberal or even market-populist conceptions of the market order. This chapter then traces how the established images of capitalism and capitalists changed during the 1980s, along with the positive or negative emotions attributed to them. I argue that this profound change, first and foremost, was triggered by individual experiences and the emotions these stirred up rather than by abstract ideological reflections. Economists and political spin doctors played their part in this revaluation, but the lion's share was caused by other actors: activists in the democratic opposition movement who started their political struggle under the umbrella of the working-class Solidarność (Solidarity) union in 1980–1981 but turned into market-oriented underground publishers shortly afterwards; low-paid workers in state-owned factories who discovered the thrills of small-scale trading on informal markets and bazaars; and socialist managers who gave in to the discrete charms of doing business on their own private accounts. As a result, capitalism and individual entrepreneurship increasingly came to be regarded as "the real thing": they were identified with authentic agency and true feelings, be these joy, thrill, or greed. Meanwhile, the dysfunctions and absurdities of the planned economy failed to evoke anything but weariness.

This chapter draws on a broad range of sources, including sensationalist reports in official newspapers, the underground press's subversive appropriations of entrepreneurial semantics, and contemporaneous sociological research. Highlighting how the exhaustive and sclerotic realities of the late-socialist economy were contrasted with dazzling images of cold objectivity, subversive dynamism, and fervid greed for profit shows that both the opponents and advocates of capitalism played on popular emotions in order to foster positive or negative attitudes towards that social order. In exploring the significant shift in emotions towards individual petty capitalists and the concrete practices associated with them that occurred during the last decade of Polish state socialism, this chapter

contributes to recent research into the genealogy of the post-1989 neoliberal takeover in Eastern Europe and beyond.[1]

"*Dolce vita* Polish Style"? Emotional Attitudes Towards Private Business and "Speculators"

For an understanding of the evolution of popular attitudes towards private business in late-socialist Poland, it is essential to challenge one common misunderstanding about Polish state socialism: that it completely lacked popular support throughout the four decades of its existence.[2] This lack of support might indeed be true for the political pillars of the system forcibly imposed on Poland by Soviet troops after World War II, but it is significantly less plausible when it comes to the economic and social order established by the Communists. In light of the immense devastation of the material and emotional textures of Polish society during the war, the Communist approach of a state-driven "leap into modernity" was accepted as an adequate remedy, at least by substantial parts of society.[3]

Undoubtedly, Communist Poland was unique among state socialist countries in featuring an unusually vast residual area of private ownership and traditional economic relations in the countryside due to the failed agriculture collectivization campaign. Moreover, Poles had a long tradition of independently securing individual subsistence by semi-official or outright illegal means; the roots of this went back to the mistrust of state institutions that had been cultivated during foreign rule in nineteenth-century partitioned Poland and revived under German (and Soviet) occupation during World War II.[4] However, these structural specifics cannot be (and hardly ever were at the time) perceived as enclaves of capitalist social relations, since they were predominantly characterized by traditional petty ownership and a mentality of small-scale "muddling through." Nor did the poor and often backward living conditions in Poland's rural areas provide an attractive basis for warm emotions or romanticization. As elsewhere in Eastern and Western Europe, the postwar decades were the heyday of the idea of progress, which was considered intrinsically connected to industrial modernity.[5] Consequently, the Polish Communists did not tolerate private economic strongholds in industry, which was generally seen as the key domain of socioeconomic modernization at the time. They were even more determined to extinguish private ownership in trade and industry than their counterparts in the neighbouring GDR, where small and medium-sized enterprises had officially been left in the hands of their owners until 1972.[6]

Although the level of political resistance to the Communist system proved significantly higher in Poland than in most other Eastern Bloc countries, political contestation more often than not went hand in hand

with far-reaching acceptance of the foundations of the socialist economy and welfare system. This became most obvious during the recurring crises that haunted Communist Poland: in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980–1981, the regime faced substantial contestation from workers and the intelligentsia—precisely those social groups nominally entitled to particular material and ideological privileges under state socialism. Crucially, their consecutive uprisings targeted political mistakes and failures, and their criticism of the political system's keystones grew increasingly radical over time. Yet the vast majority of those engaging in these disruptions insisted all the more on realizing the social and economic promises the system had consistently failed to accomplish.

Even the independent Solidarność union, whose emergence shattered the foundations of the Polish party state in 1980–1981, did not push for doing away with key socialist values in the socioeconomic realm. Quite the contrary: the oppositional mass movement was deeply committed to the ideals of equal distribution of income and consumption, collective ownership of the means of production and decent welfare for everyone.[7] One of the immediate reasons why the Gdańsk shipyard workers went on strike and called for establishing independent unions in August 1980 was the government's decision to expand so-called "commercial" sales of meat, which restricted the consumption of higher-quality meat products to those who could afford them. This was widely perceived as a pernicious offence to officially endorsed and commonly accepted egalitarian attitudes.[8] The spontaneously formulated postulates of the Gdańsk strike aptly expressed the workers' passion for egalitarianism when it came to consumption. One read: "Liquidate all special shops, so that all citizens will stand in the same queues."[9] More generally, Stefan Kurowski, who was considered one of the most prominent and most liberal of Solidarność's economic advisers, clearly asserted the movement's fundamental conviction that "the factories currently belonging to the state, to the government, shall be self-managed and socialized. No-one has the intention of transforming them into capitalist companies."[10]

Therefore, as Poland's planned economy entered its long-lasting final crisis at the end of the 1970s, capitalism was perceived by the majority of Poles as an alien social order. When asked in an opinion poll in September–October 1980 what constituted, in their opinion, the fundamental values of good social order, 90 per cent of respondents supported the notion of "equality and justice," whereas a notably lower share of 62 per cent endorsed the principle of giving ordinary people a bigger say in political decision-making. Only 26 per cent declared themselves in favour of "enabling highly talented and driven people to obtain high incomes," a characteristic of the capitalist social order.[11] The acute economic crisis, which resulted in an unprecedented decline of the Polish national income by a

staggering 23.5 per cent between 1978 and 1982,[12] was not interpreted as a result of failed economic collectivism. Instead, it was mostly blamed on the alleged incompetence and self-interested materialism of the "red bourgeoisie," as they were traditionally termed in leftist critiques of state socialism, that had emerged among Communist cadres and managing personnel.[13] In short, individual profit-seeking was perceived as part of the problem rather than the solution.

Against the background of these sentiments, the Communist government's cautious attempts to liberalize private economic activities in trade and small industry, intended as pragmatic steps to improve the supply of foodstuffs and consumer goods, met with much popular scepticism. As the legal status of private salesmen remained unclear due to incomplete and imprecise regulations, they were swiftly associated with dubious black marketeers, who aroused considerable popular disgust as the supply situation in state-run shops deteriorated. Newspapers run by Solidarność voiced harsh disapproval of the expansion of the black market and undue profiteering, and called on the authorities to take action: "The shamelessness of the merchants is growing in proportion to the inertia of the authorities and the decrease of supplies," deplored the daily paper of Solidarność's regional committee in Lower Silesia, and the Gdańsk union journal joined in: "This cannot go on any longer. We expect the government to take concrete measures immediately instead of making nice-sounding declarations."[14] From August 1981, the reshuffled government headed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski actively furthered this widespread anger by staging a Stalinist-style campaign against speculation.[15] Blaming the "speculators" for all the problems of the planned economy was an easy way to distract attention from systemic failure. However, the Communist propaganda seemed to be quite in line with popular opinion on this issue. This was also indicated by the high rates of approval of the rationing system for basic foodstuffs that the government grudgingly implemented in early 1981 in response to popular pressure.[16]

Under martial law, which had been introduced by Jaruzelski in December 1981 to crush the Solidarność movement, the regime-controlled media continued stirring up strong disapproval of "speculators" and *prywaciarze* by imputing negative traits such as greed, recklessness, or fraud to them. The derogatory term *prywaciarze*, which can be approximately translated as "private owners" or—more pointedly—"capitalists," and encompassed all who were making their living from private economic activities, had been instrumental since the late 1940s in excluding this social group from the respectable sphere of the "socialized" economy.[17] Martial law propaganda revived this tradition by featuring a steady stream of news about successful razzias against black marketeers and other high-profile actions that allegedly restored law and order in the economic

realm, in line with the supposed desires of working class consciousness.[18] Moral legitimacy for this repression was lent by sensationalized reports on private businessmen's twilight activities, such as a series of 20 articles by Mieczysław R. Olbromski in *Rzeczywistość* (The reality), a weekly regarded as the mouthpiece of the Communist Party's dogmatic wing. Although the series was announced as a reportage, claiming the non-fictional character of the reported facts, it was clearly based on the genre conventions of cheap episodic novels, a literary style with which Olbromski had experience. This makes it a rather improbable description of the reality that Polish *prywaciarze* lived at the time, but a vivid (though possibly rather extreme) example of the means employed by official propaganda to arouse negative emotions among the general public towards this group.[19]

Olbromski painted a heavily exaggerated picture of a morally rotten milieu of private businessmen who resembled petty crooks rather than dynamic or even inventive entrepreneurs. The narrative unfolds from the point of view of a former insider, a once-prosperous Warsaw gastronome, "a real shark of private gastronomy," who is presented to the reader as "the owner of a Mercedes, a Fiat, a villa and his attractive wife Danka."[20] As a result of a marital conflict provoked by mutual infidelities, his villa is burnt down. Lying in hospital, he is ready to share with the reporter "how he became a millionaire," as well as the nasty little business secrets of his demi-monde fellows. The protagonists of the consecutive episodes are pretentious *parvenus* and ruthless businessmen of dubious reputation, whose human compassion seems to have been entirely replaced by their greed for money. They are further discredited by the vulgar language the narrator employs. He is constantly talking about "guzzling" (*żarcie*), evoking Bertolt Brecht's famous phrase from *The Threepenny Opera*, "First comes the guzzle, then comes morality." Furthermore, the story is full of sexualized clichés. Marital infidelities and frantic orgies with attractive waitresses or devoted female secretaries are presented as everyday routines. There is a whole bunch of sexy young "floozies" willing to seduce and marry wealthy old businessmen, speculating on their quick deaths in order to grab their money. At the heart of this caricature of "*dolce vita po polsku*," as the author sarcastically calls it, is an omnipresent mutual betrayal—one that seems to epitomize the true character of all protagonists.

One might, of course, dismiss this peculiar "reportage" as cliché-laden propaganda and find it nothing but predictable given its publication in a national-Communist weekly of notoriously ill repute.[21] However, despite all the exaggeration and genre style, there is more to its crudely sexualized—and sexist—tone than might be apparent at first glance. On the one hand, the dubious petty capitalists and their female spouses are pictured as callous and cold-hearted individuals, devoid of any compassion. On the

other hand, their greed for money, like their greed for sex, appears to be a natural biological drive. Whereas the emphasis on the greed-oriented, individual agency of the *prywaciarze* is clearly used to denounce them in this straightforwardly derogatory account, just a few years later the individual agency of private entrepreneurs and their seemingly coherent, quasi-natural motivations would be interpreted in completely different terms: they would be viewed and endorsed as individual initiative, entrepreneurial spirit, and a readiness to take risks. As we shall see, this profound reversal of the emotional attributions linked with domestic capitalists was accompanied by rather unchanged gender stereotypes.

New Experiences and Changing Emotions During and After Martial Law

Although Communist propaganda continued to paint Western capitalism as cold and merciless until the mid-1980s, over time this depiction lost credibility with both its creators and the public. One telling example of this particular propagandist strategy and its public perception is an announcement made by Jerzy Urban, the Polish government spokesman, in May 1986 in response to the US government's offer to Poland of humanitarian aid following the Chernobyl catastrophe in May 1986. Urban declared that Poland would return this favour by shipping 5000 warm blankets and sleeping bags for the homeless to New York. This public relations stunt played heavily on the familiar stereotype of cold-hearted capitalism denying the poor even the most basic needs. But, as Urban acknowledged in retrospect, even he did not take his charitable offer overly seriously: when he announced it during his regular press conference with foreign correspondents, he laughed so much that the relevant part of his statement had to be recorded again before it could be televised.[22] The Polish public reacted with a similar dose of sarcastic humour. The Warsaw correspondent of the West German *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* reported that Poles subverted Urban's implicit claim of socialism's superiority over capitalism by joking about fictitious newspaper adverts that read "Offering a three-room flat in Warsaw in exchange for a sleeping bag in New York."[23]

The bold rhetoric that the Jaruzelski regime directed against "speculators" and other perils of capitalism was, in fact, actively undermined by its own policy regarding capitalism's domestic forerunners. The government's approach was surprisingly pragmatic, to say the least. Ironically, it was at the peak of political repression under martial law that the Polish parliament adopted the first law legalizing private business based on foreign capital in industry and trade. The July 1982 law granted fairly attractive conditions to foreigners investing in Communist Poland, targeting primarily, though

not exclusively, potential entrepreneurs from Polish emigrant communities abroad—the so-called "Polonia." It sparked a genuine boom of what became labelled "Polonia firms": private companies based on foreign capital that profited not only from tax exemptions generously granted by the government, but also from the ravenous Polish market for consumer goods, where nearly anything could be sold at highly profitable rates.[24]

These Polonia firms were small players compared with the big state-owned companies in industry, and they certainly remained a marginal phenomenon in relation to the considerably larger domestic private sector in agriculture and crafts. Nonetheless, their dynamic expansion, as well as the "aura of the great wide world, of dollars, high salaries, and fast enrichment"[25] that surrounded them, aroused a disproportionate amount of public attention and debate. Like black marketeers and *prywaciarze* had done before, Polonia companies polarized public emotions and became a focal point of Polish perceptions of private business and proto-capitalist relations during the 1980s. Compared to petty traders or craftsmen, their economic success was more impressive and less easily questionable, especially against the background of the deepening turmoil of the state-controlled economy. The capitalist owners of Polonia firms became known for paying their employees far better salaries than the state companies, which openly brought into question the conventional image of capitalist exploitation that had been at the heart of Communist ideology. In a letter to the editors of the party weekly *Prawo i Życie* (Law and life), a reader who apparently felt committed to these ideological tenets bitterly accused the Polonia companies of subverting the essence of socialism by reintroducing the "capitalist method of exploitation of Man by Man."[26] However, instead of receiving support or praise for his steadfast stance, the editors of this specialized party journal for law-making elites dismissed his complaint in a laconic reply; after all, they ironized, "no one is pushed to do forced labour" at these companies; workers themselves seemed to prefer being "exploited" as long as they would be remunerated with far better wages.[27]

Similarly, market relations became increasingly relevant to the activists of the democratic opposition movement, who had been forced to continue their work illegally in the underground while Polonia entrepreneurs were being offered preferential treatment by the martial law regime. The bulk of opposition activism shifted from trade union work on the shop floor of state-owned factories to clandestine publishing and distribution of underground press, uncensored books and even music or video tapes. Hence, the movement's emotional bonds with the industrial working class loosened, and producer–customer relations grew in importance. Symptomatically, Polish underground publishers did not adopt the Russian term *samizdat*, meaning isolated "self-publishing." Instead, they called their sphere of action *drugi obieg* ("second circulation"), thus putting the emphasis on the

interactions between producers, distributors, and recipients of alternative culture. Poland's underground publishing movement also reached a level of professionalization that was far beyond that of the dissident *samizdat* in other Eastern European countries. It included the establishment of underground publishing houses and video distributors, as well as the emergence of a market for oppositional merchandise such as stamps and postcards.[28] For some underground activists, the changing everyday practices and increasingly economic calculations made them reconceptualize their own role as "movement entrepreneurs."[29]

Again, a rather unusual type of source sheds light on the emotional connotations of this reconceptualization of underground activism. *The Little Conspirator*, a "guidebook for both beginners and the advanced" that featured practical as well as legal advice for participating in the underground opposition movement, provides telling insights into how its authors addressed the emotional challenges opposition activists faced, such as fear of the police and distrust.[30] The small booklet was printed in 1983 by the Warsaw underground publishing house CDN, and its overall print run is estimated at more than 25,000 copies. This made it not only a true bestseller of the second circulation, but also an economically lucrative endeavour for the publisher.[31] One major reason for its success, aside from its practical usefulness, was the brisk style of the text: instead of pathos-laden references to the grand collective ethos of Solidarność and its heroic fight for dignity, which had beentypical of much underground discourse before, the *Little Conspirator* offered a subversive, snappy reinterpretation of clandestine activism as capitalist entrepreneurship that was aptly summarized by the slogan "Small group—big business."[32]

This reinterpretation was built on well-known concepts of opposition discourse, such as underground society (*społeczeństwo podziemne*), self-management (*samorząd*), and solidarity, but it gave them a new meaning: "The underground society can only work efficiently and with solidarity if it organizes itself from the grassroots, with individual entrepreneurial spirit, and forms independent, self-managed institutions—firms." While referring to the tradition of the Solidarność movement, the authors clearly distanced themselves from the union's social programme: "Don't forget, we cannot afford a welfare state in the underground."[33] The delicate question of money and the individual profits generated from clandestine activities was also answered without much ado:

> Self-sacrifice and voluntary work are the nightmares of communism. Total selflessness, contrary to appearances, is nothing more than disguised ambition… A haughty attitude towards money, the facile assertion that "we are not conspiring for the money," is useless prudery… The Reds will charge us with being on the CIA's payroll anyway.[34]

The ostentatiously matter-of-fact, pragmatic perspective taken by the *Little Conspirator* avoided engaging with political and strategic differences—which, of course, existed inside the opposition camp. Yet it did carry a clear political message: it naturalized capitalism and the free-market order.[35] Although it adopted a seemingly rational approach, proposing to "realize in the underground those principles of rational work organization that Communism had tried to extinguish,"[36] at the core of this was an emotional stigmatization of selflessness and solidarity. These attitudes, seen as typical of social movements, were denounced as unauthentic cover-ups, instrumentalized to hide personal ambitions and self-interest. Instead, the well-written manual linked self-interest to notions of cleverness and effectiveness, and successfully employed humour and irony to portray these notions as central resources for clandestine activities.

Unsurprisingly, there was no consensus in the underground regarding this outlook—conditions did not allow for open discussion. Most opposition activists had become involved with the movement out of political or social motivations, and they tried hard to distance themselves from what they considered the dubious practices of the shadow economy.[37] In order to prevent speculation on uncensored books, a consortium of leading underground publishing houses even attempted to enforce a settlement of fixed prices for their clandestine products.[38] But, over the years, even those who had joined the illegal sphere of the second circulation for purely idealistic reasons were forced to adapt to market rules in order to sustain their activism.[39] These practical experiences favoured the spreading of entrepreneurial self-conceptions, like those propagated by the authors of the *Little Conspirator*. The market-oriented framework of interpretation proposed by the clandestine guidebook reactualized the oppositionists' well-established image of themselves as fighting against the mighty arms of the state's repression organs like David against Goliath but stripped this story of its heroic overtones. In doing so, it offered a feasible alternative to laments over the decline of political idealism, rendering the political struggle a sportive competition between innovative start-ups and the old-fashioned monopolists dominating the market.

Similar reorientations were taking place among functionaries of the Communist Party and the state apparatus. "I don't believe in socialism. I believe in me," claimed a 35-year-old party official in an interview published by the liberal underground journal *Replika* in 1986.[40] Although it is hard to validate the authenticity of this interview, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that the opinions voiced by this anonymous mid-level apparatchik were no exception.[41] His remarkable volte-face, which earned him a benevolent portrayal as a "self-made man from People's Poland" by his interlocutors from the liberal wing of the opposition, was primarily

driven by a peculiarly individualistic interpretation of what might previously have been a materialist worldview:

> I have been to the West, and I have seen how people are living there. Of course, I would prefer it to be the same here in our country. There, I would already be a millionaire and would own a house with twenty rooms, not a hut (*chałupa*) like mine … What's more, I would not drive a Polonez, but a Mercedes-Benz, at least.[42]

While his idea of capitalist affluence was clearly modelled after the West, he asserted—in stark contrast to the officially proclaimed self-image of the state-socialist order—that the struggle for money had already come to dominate social reality in Poland: "The majority of people couldn't care less about independence or socialism; they are fighting for dough (*szmal*)—which is, however, rare, so only very few succeed in grabbing a bigger heap for themselves." Given his background as a Communist Party careerist, the most striking thing was that he did not even seem to be unhappy about his observation that "with money, you can buy everything in this country, already now."[43] Instead of regretting the years for which he had actively upheld this poor version of "really existing socialism," he took the changed circumstances as an opportunity in terms of further career options, preferably in Polonia companies or other private business.

Preparing for Neoliberal Takeover

Such a profound sea change in popular attitudes towards capitalism did not automatically occur because of how legal conditions and practical circumstances for private business in Poland had altered over the course of the 1980s. It was sustained by a shift in the way Poles emotionally related to the proto-capitalist practices—those embodied by Polonia companies or entrepreneurs of the underground movement—that had started to penetrate their life-worlds. But it can also be traced back to the emergence of a discourse that actively promoted economic liberalism and pro-capitalist attitudes among Polish intellectuals, both in the underground opposition and inside the nominally "Communist" Party, which also appealed to emotions for making its case. While proponents of these views had been marginal and eccentric outsiders on both sides of the political barricade at the outset of the decade, their voices significantly gained in popularity later on. Economic liberals sensed that time was on their side as early as 1985, when an underground publisher in Wrocław printed a collection of essays by neoliberal mastermind Mirosław Dzielski under the assertive title *Duch nadchodzącego czasu* (The spirit of the time to come).[44]

Dzielski can be considered the most important trendsetter of intellectual neoliberalism inside the broader Polish opposition movement, although his early death in 1989 meant he did not advance to a prominent position in national politics. Before the emergence of Solidarność in 1980, the Kraków-based philosopher had argued for the establishment of a Pinochet-style authoritarian dictatorship in Poland.[45] During and after martial law, he was actively engaged in the local underground press and inspired the foundation of the Kraków Industry Society (Krakowskie Towarzystwo Przemysłowe), Poland's first independent association of businessmen and liberal intellectuals that lobbied openly for capitalism and the interests of local private business. In his articles and essays, Dzielski distanced himself from both state socialism and the Solidarność movement, which he dismissed due to its collectivism and its misguided (in his opinion) commitment to democracy. Instead, he argued for a somewhat eclectic model of Christian capitalism that combined Catholic conservatism with neoliberal influences.[46] Importantly, Dzielski's argument for capitalism was not based primarily on considerations of its superior efficiency, as usually advanced by economists, but rather on the moral superiority of a social order built on economic freedom and capitalist entrepreneurship. The "civilizing mission" of capitalist entrepreneurship that Dzielski enthusiastically proclaimed rested upon the fact it incited people to make an effort "to produce more and better, in order to earn more," while in socialism they were bound to strive to "take away the fruits of other people's labour."[47] Hence he presented the introduction of capitalism as a moral imperative that would help Poles to overcome their pervasive "herd instinct" and return to a free existence by taking responsibility for their own lives.

Dzielski promoted his view of capitalism by associating it with an entire cluster of positive emotional attributes: whether he was telling anecdotes about rural petty entrepreneurs in the Tatra mountain region or publishing flattering interviews with (anonymized) businessmen from his Kraków circle, he always emphasized the joy that came from the experience of regaining individual agency under adverse conditions. He went so far as to praise the infamous "speculators" and black marketeers for their contribution to building a "parallel Poland" that would become the trailblazer for a "civilized commercial society." His vision of a "parallel Poland from the Baltic to the Tatra mountains" assumed an idyllic harmony of individual interests mediated by the market, which in turn would result in an abundance of happiness: "The parallel Poles are smiling, behaving kindly and cheerfully—in contrast to the perpendicular Poles, who are stiff, solemn and sulky."[48] By pretending to describe existing emotions, Dzielski palpably aimed to elicit them.

It was not by chance that Dzielski's almost mythical view of individual private entrepreneurs had much in common with the narrative constructed by contemporary American neoliberals such as Milton Friedman. Educated in physics and philosophy, Dzielski was neither interested in macroeconomic reasoning, nor did he bother with providing any substantial advice on these issues. He was, however, fascinated by Friedman's popular writings, such as his 1980 bestseller *Free to Choose*, which was based on a TV series of the same title.[49] While it took Friedman some effort to persuade his audience that the major obstacle to freedom in the United States was the ubiquitous and overwhelming state bureaucracy, this claim—the signature tune of neoliberal "market populism"[50]—was virtually self-evident in late-socialist Poland. Therefore, Dzielski could forgo criticizing the state and its institutions and instead focus almost exclusively on presenting small entrepreneurs in heartwarming tones, thus appealing to positive emotions such as mutual trust, commitment to a good cause, and joy derived from individual agency. The obvious critique, that this focus failed to account for the increasing concentration of capital in big private corporations and therefore overlooked a defining characteristic of developed capitalism, appeared less relevant in late-socialist Poland, where such corporations did not yet exist.

While Dzielski adopted the role of intellectual guru to the disparate pro-capitalist groups in the underground opposition, yet another Kraków philosopher played a remarkably similar role inside the Party discourse. Bronisław Łagowski had first made a name for himself and his radical pro-market views with a public speech delivered at the 1 May 1982 (Labour Day) ceremony—the first that took place under the conditions of martial law. On this occasion, he lauded the martial law regime for having effectively crushed the idea of "self-management collectivism" propagated by Solidarność but urged the generals not to miss the chance to implement a liberal market order from above.[51] Of course, as a well-trained Communist intellectual and Party member, Łagowski did not openly advocate capitalism, arguing instead for a combination of economic liberalism and authoritarian socialism. Nonetheless, as a declared proponent of a materialist worldview he emphasized the "aesthetic" dimension of modern mass consumer societies, which had been realized most comprehensively in the capitalist West. In one of his essays, he ironized:

> I am haunted by the feeling that when I am called to Judgement by the Lord, and he asks me what I consider the most outstanding achievement of the human mind—the medieval cathedral or the contemporary supermarket—I will not be able to decide on one of the answers. In any case, I do not wonder about people in the West, who have supermarkets

> and who stop going to church. If they had "branch stores of socialized trade" (*placówki handlu uspołecznionego*), they would surely go.[52]

Instead of denouncing capitalist consumer societies, Łagowski enthusiastically affirmed capitalism's close relation with the senses and its enduring appeal to the emotions of modern mass societies. In his regular writings for reform-oriented party journals, he developed a penchant for debunking anti-capitalist statements made by people who the opposition camp respected as moral or intellectual authorities. For example, he did not hesitate to defend nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism against criticism that Pope John Paul II expressed in his 1981 encyclical *Laborem exercens*. While the Polish Pope reproached that stage of capitalism as a "system of injustice and harm that cried to heaven for vengeance," Łagowski insisted on the substantial social progress pioneered by the doctrines of Adam Smith, especially in comparison to the pre-capitalist feudal order—which had of course enjoyed quite sizeable support from the church.[53]
On another occasion, Łagowski polemicized against Czesław Miłosz, the renowned Polish poet who had been living in American exile for decades and had received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1980. In a lecture given at Yale University in 1984, which was subsequently published by the influential Paris-based émigré journal *Kultura*, Miłosz had reflected on the "feeling of menace" that inevitably overcame people who walked the streets of New York as they were exposed to a ubiquitous "rivalry of billboards, neon lights and showcase windows." For Miłosz, this commercial competition was tantamount to an expression of "bloodthirsty will" and of "the fight of Man against Man," or, in brief, of the "ontological evil" in capitalism.[54] In an ironic twist, Łagowski, who was writing as a member of the Communist Party in a journal officially published by the party's media holding, rebutted Miłosz's argument (which was not even printed legally in Poland due to censorship) by praising the benefits of competitive markets; he indicated that Polish cities, and particularly their "bleak" new housing estates built under socialism, could definitely benefit from "more shops, craftsmen's workshops, transport providers and other services that make life easier."[55]

No less ironic was the metamorphosis undergone by the dogmatic weekly *Rzeczywistość*. Towards the end of the 1980s, the national-communist hardliners who had published Olbromski's grotesquely distorted pieces on dubious *prywaciarze* a few years earlier tried to reinvent themselves by adopting a pro-market outlook. They even rebranded their paper as a tabloid devoted to "entrepreneurial minds with initiative and spirit."[56] This move looked like a desperate attempt to keep pace with the political opening for radical market reforms spearheaded by leading Polish Communists after 1987, but is nonetheless telling regarding the scope of

discursive change that had already taken place before the political shifts of 1989.[57] Furthermore, the way capitalism and capitalists were presented in *Rzeczywistość* and its rebranded follow-up, *Rondo*, was indicative of a general tendency discernible in broader parts of the official Polish press: "managerial" thinking and "entrepreneurial" spirits were regularly promoted via stereotypically gendered images of male capitalists. Besides reprinting Polish translations of essays by Milton Friedman and advertising the establishment of "managers' associations" by former nomenclature directors, *Rondo* took pride in co-organizing a striptease contest called "Miss Striptiz '89." The editors jovially explained that this kind of evening entertainment was daily business for "big managers and businessmen," since "it has been well-known for centuries that a satisfied business partner is half the successful deal."[58] Consequently, *Rondo* also resorted to printing pictures of scantily clad women, presupposing that the capitalist business sphere was an exclusively male world where women would be assigned merely decorative functions. This identification of capitalist business with virility and the freedom to disobey commonplace moral conventions constituted an astonishing continuation of the sexualized notions of private businessmen that had previously been cultivated in Olbromski's sensationalist storytelling; now, though, their valuation had diametrically changed.

Similarly gendered imaginaries of capitalism were propagated in *Pan* (Mister), Poland's first men's magazine, which was launched by the Party-owned media holding in 1987. The magazine was evidently modelled after *Playboy*, and as the enumeration of buzzwords on the front page of its first edition indicated, it was orientated around a hierarchy of subjects and values associated with Western capitalist consumer culture: "Career. Cars. Video. Sport. Sensations. Sex."[59] Compared with today's standards, the editors were quite reluctant to feature nudity on their pages but focused all the more enthusiastically on topics such as men's fashion, consumer electronics, and career advice. In one regular feature, they portrayed successful managers of Polish state-owned companies and joint ventures, presenting them to the readers as role models. Thus, the magazine opened up a window to the world of capitalist business and imagined Western-style consumption that explicitly excluded women ("only for men," as the subtitle of the magazine read) and clearly privileged what the editors conceived of as typically male preferences and interests.

This mixture evidently chimed with the zeitgeist and appeared so attractive in late-1980s Poland that *Pan* immediately became an object of private business, or "speculation." Because the magazine's print run fell short of matching the demand, it was diligently traded at bazaars and semi-official marketplaces—the very spaces of the shadow economy that had aroused so much disapproval in both official and oppositional

discourse only a few years before. Now, instead of crying out in indignation, the editors of *Pan* took this as an unmistakable sign of their success. Printing a picture of "a rascally looking person who sold copies of the men's magazine *Pan* at extortionate prizes to a considerable queue of waiting customers" at a well-known Warsaw marketplace, they commented with a mocking eye:

> Everyone who can identify the culprit of this damnable speculation will receive a new issue of *Pan* as a reward from the editors. The security organs are also pursuing this case intensively, as despite large-scale investigations they have not yet succeeded in obtaining a copy of *Pan*.[60]

The fact that here it is the police rather than the black-market dealers who are being presented as dumb and incapable testifies to the substantial change in the perception and presentation of illegal trading and the sphere of the market. One reason for this may have been that the Communist Party's own press holding (and, indirectly, even the party leadership) had a tangible interest in the commercial success of *Pan*: because of the continuous economic crisis and the equally continuous decrease in Party membership, the Party faced serious financial problems that needed to be covered by surplus revenues from the press holding, including those generated by promoting capitalist values and role models, as was done in *Pan*.[61] Still, this example also illuminates how official discourse skilfully adapted to growing popular approval of marketplace practices, which were increasingly received with positive emotions by more and more segments of Polish society.

Conclusion: A System Without Qualities vs "the Real Thing"

In order to understand the profound changes in the way capitalism was imagined in late-socialist Poland, it is essential to consider the emotional alignments that came with those imaginaries. Most importantly, capitalism was persistently perceived as a highly emotional order, for better or worse. While it had traditionally been labelled a cold and heartless system, and capitalists had been believed to be primarily motivated by callousness, greed and recklessness, these emotional associations were successively replaced by notions of eagerness, individual agency, and joy. At the same time, due to the obvious erosion of the planned economy's coordinating capacity in late-socialist Poland, capitalism suddenly seemed a more rational order compared with socialism. This perception was sustained by the fact that public debates rested primarily upon individual experiences with capitalist economic activities and focused on implementing particular aspects of these into the existing planned economy. Therefore,

capitalism was often identified with individual businessmen—capitalists—whose emotions and passions were easily generalized as features of the social order they appeared to represent. Polish sociologists conducting interviews with factory workers in the mid-1980s were astonished by the extraordinarily emotionalized views their interviewees ascribed to terms such as "*prywaciarz*," "private business owner," and "capitalist," as well as to "exploitation" and "unemployment." They even reached the conclusion that the surveyed workers shared a "certain obsession" with these terms.[62]

State socialism, on the contrary, successively lost its potential to arouse positive or even negative emotions. As the 1980s saw a continuous political stalemate between the regime and the opposition camp in Poland, Poles experienced a gradual disintegration of the economic and social order they had to live within. Inconsistent economic reforms resulted in contradictory regulations, regular work in the state-controlled economy was trumped by black-market trading, and market values of goods were absurdly distorted due to the establishment of a shadow currency system based on the US dollar.[63] "Why does it pay off to work well and efficiently in the West?" asked a 33-year-old mechanic in an interview with researchers from the Communist Party's Institute for Working Class Research in 1985. "In our country, there is much talking, but chaos and mess are still dominating. We have party conventions, meetings, parliamentary sessions all the time, but improvements remain out of sight."[64] In light of the political and economic standstill, state socialism seemed to lose even its most elementary characteristics, like the claim to rational planning or the commitment to collective action for realizing the common good. When asked to compare capitalism and socialism in 1985, a worker from the Poznań Cegielski mechanical plant bluntly complained:

> [Economic] reform is going on and going on, but there's nothing coming out of it … Socialism means democracy, but more in theory, all in all its black magic. You can't foresee anything here, [there's] a total lack of planning, of coordinated action. Capitalism is a system that is better than socialism in practice … For example, capitalism has a better-planned economy. For communism, we'll have to wait and see. If we live to see it, we'll find out what it is.[65]

In effect, state socialism was increasingly perceived as—paraphrasing Robert Musil—a "system without qualities." As such, it proved unable to mobilize more than lip service even among its formal representatives and nominal supporters. After years of stagnancy, it lost even its ability to arouse anger and was regarded with shrugging fatigue by the majority of ordinary Poles. Whether communism, the final stage of human

development that socialism purportedly aspired to, would offer anything more palpable, if it was ever reached, remained no less vague.

In contrast, capitalism seemed to provide two important things that state socialism was lacking: individual agency, the virtues of which were aptly propagated in the *Little Conspirator* underground guidebook; and comprehensible motivations for an individual's actions, such as the will to compete with and surpass others, the thrill of trying out something new, or the greed for money and power. These motivations for individual agency had been judged negatively for as long as they could plausibly be declared obstacles to collective welfare and state-sponsored social justice. However, they gained acceptance as living conditions deteriorated and everyday experiences with the dysfunctional late-socialist economy nourished the impression of living "out of this world," as an interviewee who had grown up in the late 1980s retrospectively phrased it.[66] Against this background, capitalists may have at times been perceived as callous, greedy, fervid, or subversive. But as all of these emotional attributions pitted interest and activity against indifference and boredom, they added up to an image of capitalism that simply amounted to "the real thing."

While there is no point in questioning the accuracy of these popular imaginings of capitalism from behind the Iron Curtain, it is important to note that their features anticipated a specific take on economic transformation that would become influential in Poland and beyond after 1989: namely, the individualizing of capitalism through the focus on petty entrepreneurs, which resonated effectively with the market-populist views that had been promoted for years by a faction of Western neoliberals, most prominently Milton Friedman. The idea of the market as a realm of purportedly free coordination of individual interests thus came to dominate post-socialist economic imaginaries, whereas the notion of private property in the sphere of production remained secondary during the initial years of the Polish transformation. Consequently, the macroeconomic liberalization rapidly implemented by the infamous "shock therapy" of the so-called Balcerowicz Plan was followed by rather reluctant and much-debated approaches towards the privatization of state property in industry.

Whereas capitalism turned out to look pretty different when seen from inside, common assessments of it did not cease to be accompanied by sexualized connotations that served to bolster allegations of the immorality of capitalist business. Significantly, however, such moralizing critique started to be voiced from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. In Koszalin, Pomerania, a congregation of Catholic nuns protested against having to share their building with a "shop for persons above 18 years," which in March 1990 received approval from the local administration to use the premises. To complete the reversal of ideological frameworks, this sex shop was owned and operated by the former head of the regional

"Workers' University" of the Socialist Youth Organization. In any case, the former Communist youth functionary-turned-private shopkeeper told journalists that he already had more sweeping business plans: in a few months he envisaged replacing the sex shop with a retail store, the West German food discounter Aldi.[67] We can only guess how the nuns living on the floor above felt about this prospect.

Notes

1 Recent contributions to this field include Mark et al., *1989*; Kopeček, *Architekti*; Porter-Szűcs, "*Homo Sovieticus*."
2 For classic examples of this narrative, see Roszkowski, *Gospodraka*; Roszkowski, *Historia Polski*.
3 Leszczyński, *Leap into Modernity*; on bottom-up acceptance for top-down policies of forced modernization, see Lebow, *Unfinished Utopia*; Słabek, *Obraz*.
4 Kochanowski, *Back Door*.
5 Peters, "Transformation."
6 Ebbinghaus, *Ausnutzung*.
7 Chwedoruk "Program"; Koryś and Tymiński, "Od socjalizmu."
8 Gadomska, "Polaków świadomość," 21; Zaremba, "Zimno," 34.
9 Chmiel and Kaczyńska, *Postulaty*, 214. All translations are by the author, unless otherwise indicated.
10 Kurowski, "Solidarność," 113.
11 OBOP, "Komunikat z badań," 3.
12 This figure relates to produced national income, which was roughly comparable to net domestic product according to Western national income accounting (albeit with a bias neglecting 'unproductive' public and private services). See Grala, *Reformy gospodarcze*, 39.
13 Szumski, *Rozliczenia*, 40–42. Leftist dissidents, who were of course most familiar with this strand of critique, used the same term for themselves, albeit with an ironic twist. See Arndt, *Rote Bürger*.
14 "Czarny rynek"; Wiśniewska, "I co dalej."
15 Kochanowski, *Back Door*, 108–117.
16 Sobiech, "Reglamentacja"; Zawistowski, *Bilety do sklepu*, 264, 313, 319–320.
17 For a set of retrospective recollections, see Knyt and Wancerz-Gluza, *Prywaciarze*.
18 Muszyńska, Osiak, and Wojtera, *Obraz*, 277–282.
19 Olbromski, "Prywaciarze."
20 Olbromski, "Prywaciarze," part 5, *Rzeczywistość*, no. 4 (January 23, 1983): 9.
21 For more details, see Peters, "Rzeczywistość."
22 See Jerzy Urban's acknowledgement regarding his press conference on 13 May 1986 during an interview with Teresa Torańska in 2002; Torańska, *Byli*, 254.
23 Bremer, "Polnische Witze."
24 Sikora, "Koncesjonowany kapitalizm"; Nitschke, "Firmy"; Grala, "Przedsiębiorstwa."
25 Wiśniewski, "Polonijny Biznes."

26 Krawiec, "Boso I równo?"
27 Chłopecki, "Między niebem," 4.
28 For an English introduction to the phenomenon, see Zlatkes, Sowiński and Frenkel, *Duplicator Underground*; on economic aspects of underground stamps, see Plate, *Briefmarken*, 211–255.
29 Fałkowski, "Social Movement."
30 Bielecki, Kelus, and Sikorska, *Mały konspirator*. *Maly konspirator* was originally published without the names of the authors; they have been added based on retrospective reconstructions.
31 Fałkowski, *Biznes patriotyczny*, 123–125.
32 Bielecki, Kelus, and Sikorska, *Mały konspirator*, 4. For reasons of semantic precision, this and the following two quotations have been translated from the Polish original by the author.
33 Bielecki, Kelus, and Sikorska, *Mały konspirator*, 4.
34 Bielecki, Kelus, and Sikorska, *Mały konspirator*, 5.
35 Gajewski, "Knucie jako biznes."
36 Bielecki, Kelus, and Sikorska, *Mały konspirator*, 4.
37 "Wolne słowo."
38 Sowiński, "Siła wolnego słowa," 664.
39 Sowiński, *Zakazana książka*, 240–254.
40 "Self-made man," 9.
41 Based on contemporary press coverage, see Tittenbrun, *Upadek*, 141–142, 152–153; based on in-house investigations of the state security service, see Wicenty, *Zgniłe jabłka*, 218–234, 404–412.
42 "Self-made man," 9.
43 "Self-made man," 9–10.
44 Dzielski, *Duch nadchodzącego czasu*.
45 Dzielski, "Jak zachować władzę."
46 For a comprehensive collection of Dzielski's writings, see Dzielski, *Odrodzenie ducha*; for a (benevolent) reconstruction of his political thinking, see Plichta, *Wolność i Polityka*.
47 Dzielski, "Nie musimy się śpieszyć," 397.
48 Dzielski, "Polska Równoległa," 496.
49 Dzielski, "Wolni wobec wyboru."
50 Brandes, "Market's People."
51 Łagowski, "Filozofia rewolucji."
52 Łagowski, "Nie bójcie," 5.
53 Pope John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*; Łagowski, "Ogłaszam."
54 Miłosz, "Szlachetność," 10.
55 Łagowski, "Nie bójcie," 7–10.
56 Peters, "Rzeczywistość," 101.
57 Grala, *Reformy gospodarcze*, 275–325; Peters: "Rette sich."
58 B.W., "Superstriptiz."
59 *Pan*, no. 1 (October 1987), front page.
60 *Pan*, no. 1 (1988), 5.
61 Stola, "Partia."

62 Ziółkowski, *Robotnicy*, 213–215.
63 For details, see Grala, *Reformy gospodarcze*; Kochanowski, *Back Door*.
64 Quoted in Gołębiowski and Jakubowska, *Robotnicy*, 267.
65 Quoted in Ziółkowski, *Robotnicy*, 225.
66 "Nie było żadnej wątpliwości, że nie byliśmy częścią tego świata," Szymon Gutkowski, quoted in the documentary film *Pokolenie 89*, directed by Maria Zmarz-Koczanowicz, 2:10.
67 Sznajderska, "UREX."

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8 "Closed Doors, Sealed Lips"

Emotional Practices on Legal and Illegal Art Markets in Early Twentieth-Century Germany

Paul Franke

In 1932, Otto Wacker—art dealer, artist, and dancer—was convicted by a German court of fraud and sentenced a year and a half in prison. His fall from grace was nothing short of spectacular: just five years earlier, he had been a successful and well-respected art dealer with an unassailable reputation. His latest coup had been the acquisition of over 30 paintings by Vincent van Gogh from an anonymous Russian source. Just before these works were exhibited, however, an increasing number of observers voiced doubts about the authenticity of the paintings.[1]

At first, Wacker seemed to be able to dissuade critics: he had secured written expert statements from a number of well-established authorities including Jacob-Baart de la Faille and Julius Meier-Graefe, and the exhibition was organized by the firm of Paul Cassirer, one of Berlin's foremost art dealers. Still the pressure mounted. Soon, de la Faille and Meier-Graefe were worrying about their own reputations. After all, they had lent legitimacy to Wacker's claim that the paintings were authentic, but at least in Meier-Graefe's case, had done so in exchange for money. They pleaded with Wacker to reveal the Russian source and provenance of the Van Gogh works. Wacker answered that he could not. He had sworn on his honour not to reveal this information. All he could offer was a single letter, in Russian, confirming the authenticity of the paintings; he informed his partners that all other correspondence had been destroyed, as promised. De la Faille, unconvinced and concerned about his reputation, now switched sides, and began to voice his own doubts about the authenticity of the paintings. What followed was a public dispute between various art dealers, experts, and museums in newspapers in the Netherlands and Germany. Alliances formed: in one corner the sceptics, chief among them Ludwig Justi, director of Berlin's Nationalgalerie, and the Berlin-based *Vossische Zeitung*; in the other, the liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Berliner Tageblatt*, which Meier-Graefe could count on to publish his continued belief in both Wacker and the authenticity of the Van Goghs.[2]

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The conflict was personal as well. Justi, an art historian and academic, had nothing but contempt for the publicist and engineer Meier-Graefe, who was self-educated when it came to art. He embodied everything Justi wanted to discredit: non-academics without a proper education or an emotional connection to art acting as mediators and shaping preferences and tastes within the marketplace. The lines in the Wacker case blurred. Economic dealings, scientific debates, and personal rivalries came together in a perfect storm.[3]

Justi pursued the confrontation with a passion. In the spring of 1929, he was in the midst of planning an exhibition of Van Gogh paintings that had previously been sold by Wacker in the Nationalgalerie. The supposed forgeries would be shown right next to the originals.[4] He contacted the various buyers, asking them to lend him the paintings. Most did not oblige, fearing that they would be publicly humiliated for buying forgeries. Only one buyer, Elsa Wollf (later Wollf-Essberger), was willing to send her painting, *Cypresses* (1889). However, the police, who by this point had started investigating, objected: the paintings were now evidence in a criminal case. Still Justi did not give up. After examining the paintings, he wrote a damning article in the *Vossische Zeitung*, attacking Meier-Graefe head-on by questioning his expertise, using the term "expert" only in quotation marks.[5]

After multiple investigations by the Nationalgalerie in Berlin, as well as an extensive back-and-forth in the courtroom, a consensus was reached: the paintings were indeed fake, although Wacker stuck to his story of the anonymous source and claimed he had acted in good faith, believing them to be genuine.[6]

The "Wacker Case" remains famous in the history of art and crime because it accelerated advances in forensic analyses of art, stoked an emergent rivalry between forensic approaches and connoisseurship, and provided insights into the opaque world of high-profile art dealers and experts.[7] It also reveals the role emotions can play in a highly capitalized market and elitist business culture: the trust between business partners and the value attributed to individual honour; the fear of being embarrassed because one has bought a forgery or been unable to spot one; the competition between high-profile market participants and experts who sought to embarrass one another. In other words, the case sheds light on what are often labelled "warm" market practices.

These sentiments also played a role in the legal ripple effects of the Wacker Scandal, including the case brought before a Hamburg civil court in May 1930 by Elsa Wollf-Essberger—the woman who had obliged Justi by lending *Cypresses*. She sued the well-established art dealer Hugo Perls for deceit, accusing him of mismanagement. She based her accusation in part on the economic damage she had suffered. Importantly, however,

Wollf-Essberger also claimed that Perls was guilty of violating the trust and emotional bond she had with him as "her" art dealer. In her indictment, her lawyers stated: "If a collector negotiates about buying a painting, a relationship of trust (*ein Vertrauensverhältnis*) develops between both parties, based on which the art dealer assumes far reaching responsibilities."[8] In other words, Perls was responsible for her losses because, as an art dealer, he had acted callously, violating her trust in him either through negligence or criminal intent. Wollf-Essberger further argued that such relationships of trust were the basis for all art market transactions because the "assessment of art requires more than economic knowledge."[9] Without a close relationship between dealer and buyer, the art market could not work as intended. Wollf-Essberger's lawyers even pointed towards a commentary by the Reichsgericht (Reich Court of Justice) in which the court compared trust in the art market to the trust established between a buyer and an agent, or the trust between a buyer and a seller to the promise of confidentiality between a bank and its customers. This commentary seems to support the claim that the trust between buyer and agent was an essential part of the art market's infrastructure.[10]

The case was one of the many shockwaves the Wacker Scandal caused, but it proves especially illuminating as it provides some perspectives on how art dealers and buyers regarded their role and relationships in the capitalist art marketplace. As plaintiff, Wolff-Essberger claimed that she had entered into an emotional relationship with Hugo Perls, which in turn guided their economic dealings and all the market decisions she made. Perls did not dispute this. Instead, his defence built upon the fact that he too had been fooled by the quality of the forgeries, as had many other experts.[11] In the end, he was acquitted.[12]

In Warm Markets, "Everything Serves the Establishment of Trust"

Trust, an emotional bond, was not an intrusion in or side-effect of economic dealings; it served as their foundation—and continues to do so today. In 2007, Michael Stürmer called trust "the soul of the art market": "Research, Experience, Connoisseurship: Everything serves the establishment of trust … Trust is the essential prerequisite. Trust is not everything, but everything is nothing without trust."[13] The art market in particular, he explained, works through and because of the emotional bond between buyer and seller. Trust therefore constitutes a "rare and carefully maintained good."[14]

In his research on the art market, conducted between 2014 and 2016 in Basel, Switzerland, Franz Schultheis identified close personal relationships, networks and the "gut feeling" of buyers and sellers during their interactions as essential for the prizing of objects on the market.[15]

Participants described the market as driven by "unwritten and often tabooed rules."[16] Trust represented one of the most important resources a dealer could possess and an emotional bond was seen as a prerequisite for engaging in transactions: "many collectors proudly report a long-term relationship of trust with their gallerist and emphasize that they only buy from him or her, even though it may be more expensive."[17] Indeed, this trust was considered the only viable way of counteracting the risk of buying forged or illicit goods.[18] Norwegian art dealers interviewed for an anthropological study openly admitted that, in the absence of proper documentation (a common occurrence in the first half of the twentieth century), it was only by trusting their business partners that they could be assured of the authenticity of lesser-known paintings. Some even preferred emotional bonds over proper provenance – which, they pointed out, could be forged as well.[19]

Taking these examples into account, the art market can be categorized as what is in current marketing parlance called a "warm market," a term most commonly used in multi-level marketing, in which personal acquaintances make up the primary groups of buyers.[20] A warm market relies heavily on personal connections, emotional bonds, and closeness between participants. It is also guided by feelings—for instance, pride and embarrassment—and by a passion for the objects traded. These emotions were not only celebrated and publicly staged in early twentieth-century Germany, but also had very tangible economic effects in enabling market interactions, regulating access to the market, and shaping its prices, norms, and structures. A warm market is not a dysfunctional market; it preserves seemingly irrational elements (human relationships and feelings) in the face of the supposed "coldness" of rational capitalism. The art market bridges this divide, being both a capitalist market of a highly sought-after and commercialized good, and being structured and maintained by emotional factors that facilitate market transactions.

Art is not only a commodity and an investment, but also an object of desire. While most people with money might theoretically have the means to buy art, throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was no doubt on the part of art dealers, museum curators, artists, and even law-makers that buyers were not able to determine the value of their purchases, either artistically or economically. Connoisseurship was thus important, shaping the art market into an almost arcane world. Without the right connections, it was thought that outsiders would become hopelessly lost in this world. Only relationships of trust, belief in authority and the bonds between participants could remedy this. At times, these emotional bonds supplemented even laws and formal regulations, helping to constitute the art market in the first place. To this day, illicit and illegal agents, goods, and structures occupy a persistent place in the art

economy precisely because of these economic necessities and the centrality of "warm" factors.

In opposition to emotional facilitators of market activity and feelings as a structuring element of economic interaction is the supposed coldness of capitalism. This narrative of an economy that is cold and feels callous is, at least to some degree, a result of capitalism's potential for emancipation and the greater participation of consumers, most notably its ability to overcome entrenched privileges in the fields of economics and consumption. Business and economic historians Kenneth Lipartito and Lisa Jacobson summarize the perception of capitalism today as: everyone and everything is "ruthlessly exposed to the market."[21] In their view, capitalism is expanding indiscriminately in all directions and into every sector of human life. They also acknowledge the market as a place of wants and desires.[22] Economic historians have traditionally regarded emotions as a cultural residue of sorts, either an interference in the utilitarian principle of economics or an unquantifiable factor that serves as an explanation when mass data reaches its analytical limits.[23] The emotion of trust in particular is subject to this treatment: it has been identified as an important factor in economic processes throughout the modern and early modern period, yet it is often assigned a strictly functional role as historians have struggled to integrate it into their narratives.[24] It is only recently that historians such as Agnes Arndt have approached emotions as historical entities, impossible to separate from modern and thus "rational" (read "unemotional") economic dealings.[25] This contributes to a perception of capitalism as cold and uncaring, as being guided by a rationality defined by a lack of personal relations, beliefs, and feelings.

The art market, however, is a prime example of the decisive impact of emotions within capitalist economies. Warm (that is, emotional) economic practices were not, in fact, at odds with the trend towards cold, callous, uncaring commercialization or with the capitalist orientation of the art market in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As John Page and Tomas Bayer argue in their book on the art market in Britain, capitalist market architectures strive to increase the exchangeability of goods. Connoisseurship, emotional bonds, and warm practices thus facilitate market interactions between interested buyers, artists, and entrepreneurs.[26]

Warm market interactions also provide the link between licit and illicit art economies and markets. Noah Charney, an expert on art crime, argues that the grey market represents a continuation of regular art market norms and practices. The so-called white market, he argues, is itself "exclusive and often opaque":

> The art trade has always been perceived as shady and unscrupulous, full of closed doors and lips, gentlemanly vows of silence and blind eyes.

> What other multi-million dollar market so rarely leaves a paper trail of transactions, regularly hides commodities to avoid luxury tax, and relies so heavily on the unscientific assurance of connoisseurs to determine authenticity and value, with fortunes in the balance?[27]

Trying to disentangle the legitimate, the grey, and the black market of art is difficult, as even the legitimate art market is dominated by informal emotional relationships. "Gentlemen's agreements" and attempts at secrecy are part of everyday business. The illegal art market is both huge and illusive. The illicit art market brings together highly sophisticated criminal networks, terrorist organizations, and small-time thieves, as well as museums, regular art dealers, libraries, and average collectors, whose contribution is often under-estimated.[28] This is only possible because the legal art market shares key features with its dark counterpart, including emotions such as trust, similar social practices of celebrating a shared passion for art, and the promise of secrecy and discretion on all sides of the bargaining table.[29]

This chapter investigates how connoisseurship, emotional bonds, and expertise about art regulated access to both the legitimate and the grey art market in Germany. It focuses especially on the intersection of emotional relationships such as trust, love for art objects, the fear of being embarrassed, and capitalist practices, all of which enabled and shaped each other in the first half of the twentieth century. I argue that emotional practices and relationships profoundly shaped economic behaviours and structures in the art market, not because the art market and its economics were dysfunctional, but because the dichotomy between rational economic actors on the one hand and emotions as disturbances on the other is artificially constructed. The art market required—and continues to require—warm, emotional economic practices in order to work—chiefly trust, the display of passion for the goods, and promises between equally passionate connoisseurs. As essential elements of the art market's workings, emotions are navigated, contested, and constantly (re)negotiated between market participants.

Dealers, Experts, Educators: Emotions as Essential Elements of the Art Market

In recent years, the link between emotions, illicit practices, and the art market has gained much attention from popular historians, economists, and sociologists. Provenance research and art history regularly refer to illicit connections on the art market, yet mostly in the form of looted collections and highly politically charged questions of restitution, especially in the wake of National Socialism. The far-reaching dispossession

and organized plundering of individuals, museums, and entire countries by German authorities between 1933 and 1945 continues to be the focus of this strand of scholarship. In this line of research, the focus remains on individual collections and pieces, and on legal (and moral) questions of ownership.[30]

Studies such as Joanna Smalcerz's book *Smuggling the Renaissance* reveal how important the integration of the history of emotions and a clear focus on illicit activities is for an economic history of art. After the unification of Italy in 1861, Italian Renaissance art became a highly sought-after commodity, triggering the illegal export of art pieces on an unprecedented scale. Smalcerz follows international curators, collectors, dealers and policy-makers through the nineteenth century, showing that museums, states, and legitimate art dealers all engaged in the systematic trafficking of Italian masterpieces in order to satisfy the ever-rising demand of private and public collections.[31] Smalcerz also names a passion for art and the desires individual pieces invoked as powerful drivers of the expansion of the transnational market for Renaissance art and as a common element between participants. Her study, which employs a variant of the Actor-Network Approach, thus links emotional practices of trust and passion for art with economic motives and the development of sophisticated economic structures, although it does not explicitly reference the history of emotions.[32]

Art historian Erin Thompson emphasizes that the friendships between dealer and collector, expert and artist, and dealer and buyer also shape market behaviours, as does the process of collecting and even the collection itself. Rather than feeling manipulated, agents value their business friendships and the high levels of trust that can be found in the art market. Thompson shows that in addition to the artworks themselves, these close emotional ties motivate collectors in the first place.[33]

The close relationship and similarities between the legitimate and illegitimate art markets are often conceptualized as side-effects or negative consequences of the regular economy.[34] Scholars such as Smalcerz and Mackenzie, however, point towards a more interdependent relationship between the two:

> The major problem in the UK, as with other market countries such as the USA, remains that illicit trading in antiquities subsists in the global and local trade relations which are part of the most basic architecture of formal and informal markets that continue to function in relatively plain view, and therefore have become normalised to the point that their organised ties to underlying wrongdoing or immorality have become effectively invisible.[35]

The art market was not dysfunctional because it incorporated illegal dealing and emotional bonds. Rather, its history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the period that saw its integration into a market operating within the structures of capitalism, reveals that both were integral to it and that a clear divide between cold rationality and warm economic practices obscures and distorts the characteristics of market interactions.

In the nineteenth century, exhibitions and museums appealed to the growing middle classes, becoming spaces of spectacle, education, and economy. They provided a place for accumulating cultural and social capital for those who had the financial means to invest in art. As the traditional patronage of the old nobility and the church became less important, art turned into a commodity in capitalist markets.[36] It was this expansion of the art market that created the need for art experts and connoisseurs in specific roles as advisers and facilitators of sales. It fostered a dynamic in which a specific group of gatekeepers occupied a crossover position between the scholarly realm and the commercial sphere. Expert knowledge was critical for determining the value of art pieces. Experts also helped to foster emotional bonds between owner and artwork, as they educated buyers about history, aesthetics, and the "right" way to appreciate art. They thus not only displayed warm practices when they facilitated the purchase of art, but also did so by making sure those who trusted them to buy it on their behalf saw the artwork as more than just another investment.[37]

The lines between art expert and dealer were often fluid. Wilhelm von Bode organized art deals between such interested parties as the Chigi aristocratic family of Italy and the National Gallery in London. In his 1960 book on the sociology of the art market, Samuel Nathaniel Behrman depicted Joseph Duveen, a famous British art dealer, as the great educator of US art collectors, deliberately blurring the lines between businessman, connoisseur, and cultural ambassador. Behrman saw two equally important motives behind Duveen's extensive services for collectors in the United States: "to teach [them] what the great works of art were, and to teach them that they could get those works of art only through him."[38] Duveen was credited with getting US collectors to love the old masters and to stop buying artworks of the Barbizon school and British genre pictures. Duveen's clients trusted him not only to shape their collections but also their tastes. Some, like Andrew W. Mellon, who bought extensively via Duveen, are even quoted as saying that pictures seemed more beautiful if Duveen was present to explain them.[39] In 1949, journalist Lincoln Kirstein wrote in the *New Republic* that Duveen's business books would one day be studied akin to the patronage of the Medici, presenting him as art dealer and patron of the arts capable of shaping the tastes of the people for whom he acquired art.[40] Duveen exemplified a wider trend in cultural institutions

in this regard: art historians, gallerists and intermediaries used catalogues, exhibitions, pamphlets and books to educate the populace, thus enhancing their own prestige and value as connoisseurs as well as their importance within the market.[41] Connoisseurs acted as art dealers, art experts, agents for buyers and sellers, and educators who informed and shaped tastes and preferences. While a market architecture that depended on personal and emotional bonds between participants might be interpreted as an unstable one, criminal law scholars and sociologists show that grey art markets and networks were in fact very stable and able to effectively bring together buyers and sellers.[42]

The lines between social, cultural, emotional, and economic practices are often hard to draw. The notion that economic systems and behaviours are embedded in sociocultural ones is still debated in economic and consumption history; scholars often treat emotions and cultural practices as interrupting rather than enabling interventions in the market. An historical analysis of art market practices, however, reveals how vital both were in the development of the economics of art.[43]

It also helps to conceptualize the role of illicit practices that were apparently so prevalent in the market for art and antiquities. Art historian Carol Helstosky has characterized the art market of nineteenth-century Italy as a structure "developed in such a way as to facilitate the satisfaction of both the emotional and the material needs of foreign clients,"[44] leading many agents to turn towards illegal or illicit networks, practices, and sources for goods.

The case studies presented below show how the trust, emotional bonds, and fluidity that existed between licit and illicit networks and practices structured the art market of the twentieth century. This approach will deepen the historical analysis of these economic practices and how they depended on close human relationships and emotions such as trust, love, and embarrassment.

A *Holy Family* by "Rembrandt": Trust Supplanting Contracts and Documentation (1924–1929)

In October 1928, painter and art trader Willy Laros from Trier in Germany was celebrating the deal of a lifetime. An art dealer named Wilhelm Dunstheimer had approached him a few months earlier with an offer that seemed too good to be true: Dunstheimer had exclusive access to an extensive private collection of paintings of "old masters," which would be sold under very favourable conditions. At first Dunstheimer was unwilling to reveal the source of this information, but after Laros pressed him for details, he revealed that an Eastern European nobleman from Poland had charged Professor Dr Guido Kern with creating inventory lists of the art

gathered at the nobleman's estate. Dunstheimer offered to establish contact with Kern, as the Polish noble wanted to sell the paintings as quickly as possible; Polish state authorities were apparently about to confiscate the collection.[45] Initially, the unnamed nobleman wanted to sell Rembrandt's *The Holy Family with Angel* (1645), a masterpiece that had not yet been put on the free market. Dunstheimer, who claimed to be simply an intermediary, suggested that if Laros bought the Rembrandt, the nobleman might possibly sell him paintings from other masters, such as Matthias Grünwald and Albrecht Dürer.[46]

There were a number of provisions, however, most importantly that the painting would arrive in Germany via "clandestine paths" (*auf Schleichwegen*),[47] as the Polish magnate could not legally sell his paintings without violating export laws. The painting would be smuggled into Germany from a location disclosed only to Kern, who as a former *custos* of the Nationalgalerie in Berlin was trustworthy. Laros, however, wanted additional reassurance in the form of a written statement from Max Jakob Friedländer, privy councillor (*Geheimrat*) at the Staatliche Museen Berlin. Friedländer was an expert in Dutch Renaissance paintings and former assistant to Wilhelm von Bode, the grey eminence of the German art market. Laros wanted Friedländer's opinion on the painting: was it a real Rembrandt? He also demanded assurance that the painting had never been traded on the art market before, and so would constitute a novelty. Weighing the pros and cons, as well as the likelihood of being deceived, not once did Laros openly object to the smuggling, nor did he reject the notion of being implicated in the alleged violation of Polish law. Kern reassured Laros that the painting came from a private collection. The former *custos* of the Nationalgalerie even produced two written statements confirming the painting was a Rembrandt, one from von Bode and the other from Moritz Julius Binder of the Kunstgewerbemuseum. When asked what Friedländer thought of the painting, Kern stated that Friedländer had told his associates that he believed it to be an authentic Rembrandt, but that he would not write a statement as it would have been inappropriate to do so when a statement from von Bode already existed. After months of negotiations, Laros took a leap of faith and eventually bought the painting in the autumn of 1928 for 160,000 Reichsmark.[48]

The celebration of a deal well done was short-lived, however. When Laros tried to sell the painting to an art institute in Detroit, its director raised doubts about the painting's authenticity. Laros, now worried, turned to Professor Cornelis Hofstede de Groot, art historian and expert in De Hague. Hofstede's response was swift and devastating. To Laros's dismay, he was already familiar with the painting, and it was most definitely not a Rembrandt. The "Eastern European nobleman" was likewise a fiction. In fact, the painting had belonged to an associate of Dr

Guido Kern, who had posed as his agent. Hofstede knew the painting to be the work of Dutch painter Barent Fabritius (1624–1673) and added that he had already written a statement on the painting in 1924, four years before Laros had bought it, when it had been circulating on the Dutch art market. In 1927 and 1928, it had also been offered for sale in Berlin. Kern had traded the same painting on the art market for years, where it switched ownership between various business partners, among them none other than Dunstheimer. Laros got the police involved. Their investigations revealed further scandals: Friedländer now claimed that he had said from the outset that the painting was not a Rembrandt but a Fabritius. As he never put that in writing, however, Kern stated that he had simply been misinformed by his associates. The police could not prove that Kern was lying about this point. To make things even more confusing and infuriating for the buyer Laros, a second expert testimony by von Bode from 1926 surfaced, confirming that the painting in question was not a Rembrandt. By the autumn of 1928, Laros had two contradictory assessments of his painting by the very same art historian. At the time of the police investigation, no one could ask von Bode about this strange circumstance, however; he had died in March 1929. Dunstheimer posited that he had trusted Kern because of his extensive knowledge and reputation as an art historian and dealer. Kern, in turn, claimed to have sold the painting for someone else and that he had made no profit from it. He firmly stood by his claim that the painting was indeed a Rembrandt. In the end, the police were able to deduce that an artist, most likely someone from the restoration department at the Berlin Nationalgalerie, had painted over an original painting by Fabritius to make it appear a Rembrandt.[49] The repainted artwork was then presented to von Bode for his opinion. Von Bode, apparently unaware of the (literal) "cover up," pronounced it possible that the painting had been done by Rembrandt. The police were able to prove that a version of the painting had been on the Dutch art market in 1924, but not as a Rembrandt; rather, it was marketed as Fabritius' *Ruhe auf der Flucht* (Rest on the flight). Kern and Dunstheimer claimed ignorance about this too, and the police could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that they had known otherwise. As most sales were not properly documented (because the trust shared between participants had effectively supplanted proper certification), the police were unable to reach a definitive conclusion, either about the succession of ownership or the actual sales. The painting had undergone various transactions, with Guido Kern always acting as the one making the sale, but with no, or at least no traceable, commission. Each time its price increased, climbing from 40,000 Reichsmark to the 160,000 Reichsmark that Laros had paid.[50]

Despite the information the police had gathered, including the true origin of the painting, they closed their investigation. The police stated that

Kern especially had acted most suspiciously, yet no criminal act or intent could be determined. Whether or not the painting was a Rembrandt was a "scholarly" question. In order to prove that Kern and Dunstheimer had deceived Laros, one would have to ascertain that one of them had known about the origin of the painting or that they had withheld information from Laros. But with no paper trail to follow and all concerned claiming ignorance or saying little to nothing, the police could not conclusively confirm that Kern or one of his associates had committed fraud. Laros even contacted the local representatives of his constituency, members of the (conservative) *Zentrum* in the Reichstag, in order to enlist their help—to no avail.[51]

The case is demonstrative of the interwar art market's acceptance, or even its welcoming, of illegal practices. Willy Laros openly noted that he was complicit in trafficking art from Eastern Europe, but neither he nor the police seemed particularly surprised that Guido Kern wanted to smuggle a Rembrandt painting from Eastern Europe into Germany. The secrecy surrounding the Polish noble was certainly extravagant, but not outlandish enough to dissuade Laros or raise serious questions about the transaction. According to the police and Laros's own account, he only began doubting the legitimacy of the deal when confronted with the conflicting statements from the Nationalgalerie concerning the painting's authenticity.[52] Laros had relied on von Bode to adequately assess the information and he trusted Guido Kern enough to not inquire any further into the origins of the painting. He was apparently also emotionally pressured by Dunstheimer, who claimed that the sale had to be completed quickly, otherwise the opportunity would fade. When a criminal court case did not materialize, Laros, who seemed to feel embarrassed and taken advantage of, tried to sue Kern and his associates in a civil court. This also failed. The court judged that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Kern had wilfully lied to Laros.[53]

Although a spectacular case, the *Holy Family* affair is, in fact, representative of many art deals at the time. Not just individual dealers but also major art and culture institutions dealt very discreetly, verging on illicitly, especially when it came to buying from Eastern Europe. When the Soviet Union approached the Nationalgalerie in September 1928, both parties agreed to maintain the utmost secrecy during negotiations.[54] Soviet authorities had started selling artworks from the formerly private collections of Russian aristocrats and from state-run museums on a large scale in the 1920s and 1930s, in return for valuable foreign currency for the Soviet state. In the late 1920s, however, lawsuits by émigrés, such as the widow of Grand Duke Paul, Princess Olga Paley, began to complicate the situation. Paley, then residing in London, sued European and US auction houses and dealers for selling art from palaces and mansions looted during the

October Revolution. Neither the bad press nor the uncertain outcome of the legal battles deterred museums and private collectors from the United States and Europe from buying these works, but they did lead them to enter into a number of semi-official deals with the Soviets. Among them were purchases of such masters as Botticelli, Raphael, Rubens, and, of course, Rembrandt—artworks that had, as most experts were well aware, once decorated the halls of the "enemies of the revolution."[55]

These examples of dealers and curators trafficking in paintings and other art also serve to dispel the myth about art crimes as crimes of passion involving just a few art aficionados. Guido Kern continued to work for museums and auction houses.[56] Wilhelm von Bode had extensive illicit connections to agents in Italy who acquired art he desired and then actively circumvented export limitations when sending it to Berlin. Illegal private collectors were more myth than reality. In the overwhelming majority of cases, trafficked or stolen art was and is sold not to private but to public collectors, state institutions and museums who are versed in not asking questions or wilfully ignoring obvious signs of illegality to gain access to highly sought-after and limited commodities.[57]

Getting "Bright Eyes": A Warm Market and the Passion for Art in the Case of Antonello da Messina (1905–1932)

Warm economic practices in the form of emotional bonds of trust between market participants and of love between object and dealer, and the intimate setting of quid pro quo agreements, were also tangible in a 1932 case concerning a painting of Antonello da Messina (c. 1430–1479). The deal began, as they often did, with differing opinions about whether the painting was a genuine da Messina. Its owner was an 84-year-old former major general (*Generalmajor a.D.*),[58] who wrote to the Nationalgalerie in March 1932. He stated that he had bought a number of very valuable paintings from Count Ubaldini of Urbino in 1905, not with the intention of selling them all but because he had appreciated them. Among them was a painting identified as an Antonello da Messina. The former major general stated that he had sold 15 paintings from his collection not because he was interested in money, but because he had moved from his villa into an apartment and thus no longer had a way to store or display the paintings. He kept 40 paintings, among them the da Messina, titled *Head of a Young Man*. He then discovered on the back of the painting that it was signed by Giovanni Bellini, not da Messina.[59]

After buying the collection in 1905, the major general approached Georg Swarzenski, director of the Kunstgewerbemuseum Berlin and the Kunsthistorisches Institut in Florenz in 1920. Asked whether he wanted to buy the painting, Swarzenski replied that he was interested, but considered

it too risky because the work had been overpainted at least once: "it might be a very valuable painting," he stated, "but it could also be just a fragment."[60] The major general then reached out to trusted art historians and restoration experts, including one Dr Gronau from Kassel, in order to ascertain whether the painting was really by Antonello da Messina. Gronau was unsure: at first, he declared the painting to be a Bellini, then he changed his mind and said it was a da Messina. He even went so far as to say that it might be the most valuable and important work in the entire collection. If it was, its value amounted to a six-figure sum. Gronau even knew someone who would buy the painting, a certain Dr Wendland. The major general was not interested, however. He declared that he had no intention of selling a painting he liked so much, but he nonetheless agreed to have it restored because it was showing some signs of ageing. This time it was director Swarzenski's turn to help out: he offered the support of his institute's best restoration artist, Mr Ettle. Ettle was so fascinated by the painting that its owner described him as having "bright eyes" (*leuchtende Augen*) when working on it. Ettle himself declared: "I seldom had so much joy with a painting, like I had with your Antonello [da Messina], the director's [Swarzenski] eyes will become big."[61]

In mid- to late 1920, the major general felt confident enough to show the work to none other than director Wilhelm von Bode who, the major general assured officials at the Nationalgalerie, had always been a great adviser to him—thus making sure to mention his emotional bond with the authority figure. This time, however, von Bode was of a different opinion, which shattered all hopes that a high six-figure sale would come to pass: "[It] is a very beautiful and very interesting painting, but I don't believe that it is an Antonello [da Messina], but rather a Montagna." A former assistant to Hofstede de Groot (the De Hague art expert who had already worked on the Rembrandt forgery and was now working for a Berlin-based art gallery) disagreed. However, he had no illusions concerning the possibility of selling the painting after von Bode had passed his judgement: "The position of Bode is so high, that all you can say now that if he believes that it is a Montagna, well then it just is a Montagna." He also lamented what the opinion of the art historian meant in terms of money: "As a Montagna it is worth 80,000 Mark, as an Antonello of course it would be worth much more."[62] Accordingly, the owner received an offer for 50,000 Reichsmark from Dr Wendland, but decided against the sale on the grounds that the painting "gave him much joy."[63] He thus acknowledged his emotional bond to the painting as a way of explaining his economic decision-making, while also presenting himself as a serious participant in the market by pointing to his emotional capacities.

This might have been the end of the story, but things took a turn when in 1932 the Nationalgalerie was offered a discreet deal concerning the

expertise of the supposed da Messina painting. The former major general now stated that, due to inflation and his changed economic circumstances, he had to part with the da Messina. He also claimed to have a number of other options: a dealer with far-reaching connections to the UK and US art markets, called only "Count X" (*Graf X*) in the sources, was apparently extremely interested in the work. He wanted to buy and resell the painting but asked the museum to first declare it a legitimate Antonello da Messina. Such a statement would carry a great deal of weight, especially in the United Kingdom. To repay the Nationalgalerie for its cooperation, the major general hinted that he would be able to provide a contact to "Count X," who in turn had access to huge art collections belonging to now-impoverished aristocrats. Count X only wanted the da Messina if the successors of the now-deceased von Bode would be willing to write an assessment declaring the painting genuine. In return, the retired general offered a substantial contribution to the museum's acquisition funds. He also addressed the fact that "after some difficulties," experts at the state museum were now allowed to accept reimbursement for their assessments, without going into specific detail about possible payments. Unsurprisingly, he requested complete discretion in this matter.[64]

The letter hints at a number of warm economic practices: the major general implied that he was no cold-hearted dealer of paintings, buying and selling only for profit, but that he bought out of passion and only considered selling due to extraordinary economic hardship. He presented himself as someone who received much joy from paintings, and that this was the sole reason why he had bought the work in the first place, marking him as a man of both the intellectual and emotional capacity to appreciate art, rather than just treating it as any other good. Every expert who interacted with the painting, from the museum directors to the restoration artist, mentioned how the painting had touched them, how it made them feel, even the bodily reactions it had triggered (getting "bright eyes"). The negotiations and evaluations took years, yet involved a fairly small number of people, all of whom had close relationships to one another and acted in many different roles: expert, potential buyer, facilitator of a potential sale, restoration artist. The lines blurred. The request also hints at the profound influence of authority figures—for example, von Bode—and at the questionable, if not illicit, nature of agreements that operated on a quid pro quo basis.

Such a strong reliance on personal connections and secret backroom deals were part of the art market world; its actors created their own networks of knowledge on art crimes to prevent them from backfiring. Here, too, emotions were critical: not only trust but also the fear of being embarrassed and an acknowledgement of a shared passion for art and antiquities, as well as the strongly felt responsibility to collect and display

cultural treasures.[65] The Association of Museum Workers, in defence against counterfeiting and unfair trade practices (*Internationaler Verband von Museumsbeamten zur Abwehr von Fälschungen und Unlauterem Geschäftsgebaren*), was explicitly founded in 1898 to streamline these efforts. A society of high-ranking museum officials from all over Europe and the Middle East, it was active up until the 1940s, exhibiting forgeries, printing newsletters, and organizing meetings to inform its members about the latest art crimes, forgery trends, and the kind of art pieces that had been offered to them by not entirely trustworthy sources. The association organized all these activities in private, deliberately excluding the public to protect its image but also its business practices.[66] The elite network served as a safeguard against humiliation when museums—prestigious institutions of national pride—had bought forgeries, which would have severely damaged their reputation.[67] These concerns extended to regular buyers of art. Criminologist Cornelia Werr has shown how negative emotions such as embarrassment shape art market interactions and even policies. Since it was embarrassing to be fooled into buying a forgery, a misidentified painting, or stolen goods, buyers not only put a lot of trust in their dealers to protect them, but they would also often refrain from getting the police involved.[68] These deliberations and the practices of the Association of Museum Workers show that while emotions such as trust facilitated market activity, emotions such as embarrassment and the fear of being deceived, of trusting the wrong person or becoming the victim of callous business practices on a notoriously opaque market, had a profound influence on buyer practices.

"Capitalism Rules Everywhere": Preserving the Elitist Structure and Emotional Bonds on the Art Market Beyond 1945

In 1921, Nationalgalerie director Wilhelm von Bode penned an article in the journal *Der Kunstwanderer*, decrying that the role of art historians and collectors was under attack from a powerful force. "Capitalism rules everywhere," he wrote, "terrorizing us poor art historians, baiting us with high salaries and squeezing the waters of our knowledge out like lemons."[69] The nouveau riche would now set the pace and tone when it came to expertise on art, influencing how entire styles were perceived and ultimately priced. According to von Bode, capitalism was subjecting art expertise to the fickleness of trends and the never-ending quest for accumulation, rather than being a source of education, beauty, and improvement. The article links these supposedly new capitalist practices of publishers of art history with the harsh conditions of the Treaty of Versailles and a general decline in morals and business ethics. In so doing, it reveals how the elitist, personal, and elusive pre-war art market and connoisseurship were

now remembered, namely as a striking counter-example to, in von Bode's words, a new capitalism that trivialized art, culture and scholarship. The days when figures such as Duveen had been able to teach rich buyers to love the appropriate art seemed long gone.

Despite being a highly commercialized and capital-intensive investment market, participants in the art world tried to preserve their own emotional relationships to the objects of their desire. Warmth in this case meant that men such as von Bode regarded themselves as educators, lovers of art, serious scholars, and thus responsible market participants. Capitalism, which depends on a broadening of the consumer base and the popularization of commodities, appeared to challenge such notions. These sentiments were not confined to the interwar period.[70] The system of connoisseurs as gatekeepers, educators, and trusted mentors for buyers on the art market was challenged at many points during the twentieth century. Capitalism, with its inherent logic of market expansion and economic freedom, did pose a threat to a historic system that had long focused on personal ties. This became even more pronounced during political crises, when traditional power structures collapsed, exposing entrenched economic practices in the art market to outside forces pushing onto it.

The Berlin art market between 1945 and 1950 is a prime example of how art dealers in the East and the West continued to collaborate with political authorities to preserve the core art market architecture, which depended on intimate knowledge, regulated access, and a strong bond of trust between experts, art dealers and buyers. Berlin's art market had reconstituted itself rather quickly after the war, but it changed dramatically when new actors emerged—entrepreneurs such as junk and scrap dealers, pawnshops, and individuals who now saw a chance to sell paintings and handicrafts. These art-market upstarts irritated established dealers, infringing both on their businesses and on the self-image of an elite and close network. They also represented a political challenge to the German bureaucracy and the Allied occupiers, who were tasked with deciding who could deal art and call themselves an art dealer, and thus receive a licence. Political authorities and traditional art dealers criticized the danger that the expansion of the art market represented for consumers, who could no longer trust their dealers to have their best interests at heart. This was all the more problematic as the Berlin art market was flooded with forgeries and illegally acquired art, plundered from mansions, museums, churches, and bunkers during the last days of the war. The critique went hand in hand with accusations that the new dealers were heavily involved in the flourishing black market, giving rise to a political rhetoric that framed tighter regulations of the Berlin market as a process of cleaning up rather than restricting economic freedom.[71] Already in December 1945, local authorities in Berlin-Wilmersdorf

were arguing that professional art dealerships should be re-established. A local official pointed out that the emerging dealers were not trained in their craft, offered only sub-par art and, moreover, had links to the black market. He also argued that because their expertise could not be trusted, they exposed their buyers to fraud. Only trained professionals were able to protect the "working public" from spending their money on "useless trash."[72]

The quality of the works on offer was one important point the political authorities considered. Another was whether or not the dealers in question could safeguard the interests of potential buyers. Neither Allied authorities nor German officials ever assumed that buyers were able to form their own informed opinion on art. Rather, they were imagined as completely dependent on the trustworthiness of art dealers. In one instance, an established art dealer and a newcomer expressed interest in the same premises to expand their businesses. Local authorities judged that the new dealer was not qualified to trade in art because he "clearly tried to appeal to the lower instincts of his clients."[73] The established dealers were hardly bystanders in this battle. Gallerists, auctioneers, and traditional business owners organized in 1948 to fight what they called "unsuited elements" in the art market. In their founding document, they stated that they wanted to "eliminate illegal competition, support the development of taste of art lovers and protect the artists form fraud."[74] Among the signees were several of the city's most important art dealerships, including the Galerie Gerd Rosen at Kurfürstendamm, and the leading gallery for avant-garde art.[75] They explicitly linked economic motives with the task of fostering a genuine appreciation of art and a paternalistic approach to artists. Their efforts to restrict market access were thus both warm and emotionally charged, and cool and calculating.

Political authorities supported such attempts at self-regulation by introducing two policies concerning the art market in Berlin. First, they decided that not every business could enter the trade and those that did had to decide which objects and pieces they would trade in: old paintings and sculptures from before 1850, objects from special fields of old art (*Spezialhandel auf Sondergebieten alter Kunst*), modern paintings and sculptures from after 1850, or antiques. The authorities stressed that those dealing in items such as rugs, jewellery, furniture, or any other item that also had an everyday use were not permitted to act as art dealers.[76] The second policy was the rigorous surveillance of art dealers. The authorities monitored how much they charged and what they dealt in, and even tested their knowledge on the items they were offering. Officials would visit dealers to ask them about the history of individual pieces and assess whether the prices were realistic.[77] This evaluation was quite extensive, and ultimately determined whether dealers were allowed to continue operating.[78]

Economic freedom was under scrutiny in the immediate postwar period as all four occupying powers tried to introduce some measure of control over the economy after the collapse of Nazi Germany. The close alignment of the art market with the black market also contributed to similar efforts in the East and West to regulate the art trade, regardless of ideologies. The currency reform and de-facto separation of law enforcement in East and West Berlin in 1948 meant there were similar, yet few joint, efforts in this regard.

Conclusion: Keeping Doors Closed and Lips Sealed

The police and political authorities never questioned whether the new art dealers could deliver valuable services—it was just assumed that they would not be able to provide the same expertise as established experts. They could not be trusted to safeguard their clients' interests or to maintain the requisite level of merchandise quality. One art dealer was criticized for pricing paintings not by their artistic and aesthetic value, but by their size, material, and frames. This was considered a strong indicator that he was not qualified to deal in art or to provide the necessary support for his customers in choosing what to buy.[79] His price indicators, on the surface rational and reasonable, disqualified him as a serious art dealer, who would have to demonstrate an emotional attachment to and knowledge of his merchandise, not simply skills in measuring frames.

While these episodes underline the elitist nature of the art trade, they also show that interwar art market practices were still lingering. In the 1920s and early 1930s, men such as von Bode had called for resisting capitalist and populist approaches to the art trade. Dealers and political authorities in the twentieth century actively chose to preserve the elitist and arcane architecture of the art market by putting a strong emphasis on the emotional bonds between dealer, buyer, and art object. The capitalist art market was imagined as depending on warm relationships in the face of cold capitalism, on bonds of trust between participants so important that even legislators and governments had to protect them. Museums and curators tried to safeguard themselves and others from embarrassment, were entangled in intense rivalries, and pointed towards their emotional attachment to art objects not as a flaw but as a prerequisite for being a worthy market participant.

The art market remained a space of closed doors and sealed lips—dependent on emotional practices that continue to shape it to this very day. Dealers employed them, learned how to form them, and defended them. Judges and politicians helped in this effort by reinforcing the supposed need of warm practices as necessary safeguards against fraud and a protective measure for art buyers. It might be tempting to single out

the art market as unique in this regard, as it deals with objects that are investments, traded goods, loved artefacts, national treasures, and cultural items. Rather than an outlier, however, the art market is a representative—albeit colourful—example that can help to illuminate the role emotions play in economic relationships and practices on a broader scale. If the economy shapes social and cultural practices and vice versa, writing sentiments and feelings out of economic history leaves important parts of it in obscurity. Investigating economic practices and networks, and how they employ, create, or disrupt "warmness" between market actors, might help to contextualize and localize capitalism as a set of economic relationships and emotional exchanges.

Notes

1 Koldehoff and Koldehoff, *Van Gogh-Coup*, 58–74. I would like to thank Agnes Arndt and Kerstin Maria Pahl for their helpful feedback on the chapter and Daniela Petrosino for her support during the editing process. I would also thank Sarah Frenking for discussing the connection between trust and illicit dealings on multiple occasions.
2 Ibid., 78–87.
3 Ibid., 87–92.
4 For the detailed planning of the exhibition, see SMB-ZA, I / NG 0723.
5 Koldehoff and Koldehoff, *Van Gogh-Coup*, 92–97.
6 Tromp, *Real Van Gogh*, 63–83.
7 Koldehoff, *Van Gogh*, 80–128, 144–146.
8 SMB-ZA, I / NG 0723, fol. 218. All translations are by the author, unless otherwise indicated.
9 SMB-ZA, I / NG 0723, fol. 218.
10 SMB-ZA, I / NG 0723, fols. 217–219.
11 SMB-ZA, I / NG 0723, fols. 244–245. Hugo Perls later wrote a book that included his views on the Wacker case: Perls, *Kamilla*.
12 SMB-ZA, I / NG 0723, fol. 269.
13 Stürmer, "Vertrauen."
14 Stürmer, "Vertrauen."
15 Schultheis, "Priceless Goods," 74.
16 Schultheis, "Priceless Goods," 77.
17 Schultheis, "Priceless Goods," 80.
18 Schultheis, "Priceless Goods," 80.
19 Runhovde, "In the Dark," 5–9.
20 See for usage MBA Skool Team, "Warm Market."
21 Lipartito and Jacobson, "Introduction," 1.
22 Lipartito and Jacobson, "Introduction," 2–13.
23 Berghoff and Vogel, "Wirtschaftsgeschichte," 10–14.
24 See, for example, Berghoff, "Zähmung," 143–153; Gorißen, "Preis des Vertrauens," 93–96.

25 Arndt, "Entrepreneurs."
26 Bayer and Page, *Art Market*, 14.
27 Charney, "Transnational Trafficking," 139.
28 Beckert and Dewey, "Introduction," 1; Charney, "Transnational Trafficking," 103.
29 Mackenzie and Yates, "Grey Market," 70–80.
30 Unfried, *Vergangenes Unrecht*; Welzing-Bräutigam, *Spurensuche*; Müller and Tatzkow, *Verlorene Bilder*.
31 Smalcerz, *Smuggling*.
32 Smalcerz, *Smuggling*, 19–26.
33 Thompson, *Possession*, 133–139.
34 Beckert and Dewey, "Introduction," 1–2.
35 Mackenzie, "Market as Criminal," 70.
36 Clemens, "Händler."
37 Friedländer, "Kunstsammeln," 1; Baetens and Lyna, "Education," 34.
38 Behrman, *Duveen*, 19.
39 Behrman, *Duveen*, 3–17.
40 Behrman, *Duveen*, 20.
41 Baetens and Lyna, *Education*, 43–44.
42 Robinson and Robinson, *Pirates*, 24–30; Aarons, "Art Theft."
43 Lipartito and Jacobson, "Introduction," 8–11; Thrift, "Glamour," 9–10; Sayer, "Moral Economy," 79, 92–93.
44 Helstosky, "Giovanni Bastianini," 796.
45 GStA PK, I. HA Rep.84a Justizministerium, No. 57247, "Anklageschrift an das Landgericht 2," fols. 63–65.
46 GStA PK, I. HA Rep.84a Justizministerium, No. 57247, "Willy Laros an Landtagsabgeordneten Verhülsdonck," fol. 12.
47 Ibid.
48 GStA PK, I. HA Rep.84a Justizministerium, No. 57247, fol. 5.
49 GStA PK, I. HA Rep.84a Justizministerium, No. 57247, "Beglaubigte Abschrift: Beschluss in der Strafsache wider Kunsthistoriker Dr Guido Kern," fols. 5–7.
50 GStA PK, I. HA Rep.84a Justizministerium, No. 57247, "Abschrift der Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin I," fols. 4–11.
51 GStA PK, I. HA Rep.84a Justizministerium, No. 57247, "Beglaubigte Abschrift. Beschluss in der Strafsache wider Kunsthistoriker Dr. Guido Kern," fol. 25.
52 GStA PK, I. HA Rep.84a Justizministerium, No. 57247, "Willy Laros an Landtagsabgeordneten Verhülsdonck," fol. 12.
53 GStA PK, I. HA Rep.84a Justizministerium, No. 57247, "Klage des Kunstmalers Willy Laros in Trier," fols. 63–74.
54 SMB-ZA, I / NG, 0957, "Kunstgewerbe Abteilung der Handelsvertretung in Deutschland der UdSSR an die Direktion der Nationalgalerie," fol. 231.
55 Bayer, "Past," 7–9.
56 Artinger, "Bilder 'ohne Herkunft.' "
57 Smalcerz, *Smuggling*, 76–101.

58 He did sign the letter, but the signature is unintelligible.
59 SMB-ZA, I / GG 229, "Wiesbaden Brief vom 7. März 1932," fols. 125–127.
60 Ibid., fols. 125, 127.
61 The original reads "wird er [der Direktor] *schöne Augen machen*."
62 SMB-ZA, I / GG 229, "Wiesbaden Brief vom 7. März 1932," fols. 126–127.
63 Ibid., fol. 127.
64 "das die Museumsbeamte sich mit einigen Schwierigkeiten das Recht erworben hätten, sich für Gutachten honorieren zu lassen;" SMB-ZA, I / GG 229, "Wiesbaden Brief vom 7. März 1932," fols. 124, 127.
65 Werr, *Illegaler Erwerb*, 59–69.
66 See, for example, a typical publication: Internationaler Verband von Museumsbeamten, *Verzeichnis*.
67 See, for example, SMB-ZA, I / KFM 063, "Museumsdiebstähle, 1926–1947."
68 Werr, *Illegaler Erwerb*, 121–126.
69 "Der Kapitalismus herrscht heute im Verlagswesen wie überall und tyrannisiert uns armen Kunsthistoriker, ködert uns mit hohen Papiermark-Honoraren und quetscht die Zitrone unseres Wissens bis auf die letzten verwässerten Tropfen aus;" von Bode, "Kunstbücher," 219–220.
70 Duncan, *Civilizing Rituals*, 26, 48–52.
71 Schroll, *Ost-West-Aktionen*, 12–13.
72 LAB, C Rep. 120, No. 1892, "Kunst- und Antiquitätenhandel 1945–1948," fol. 2.
73 LAB, C Rep. 120, No. 1892, fol. 2.
74 Ibid., fols. 55–58.
75 Ibid.
76 LAB, B Rep. 020, 7204IV/2Tgb.Nr.36.00/48, fol. 2; LAB, C Rep. 120, No. 1892, fols. 42, 61.
77 LAB C Rep. 120, Nr. 1892, fols. 55–58. The practice was based on the regulations published earlier: Verordnungsblatt der Stadt Berlin Nr. 7 vom 20. September 1945, 81–82.
78 LAB, C Rep. 106, "127/1+Überprüfung des Antiquitätensgeschäfts Benita Pequeno, Kurfürstenstraße 167, Aug. 1948."
79 LAB, C Rep. 120, No. 1892, fol. 2.

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GStA PK Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz
HA Rep.84a Justizministerium (Ministry of Justice)
LAB Landesarchiv Berlin
B Rep. 020 Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin (The Police President in Berlin)
C Rep. 106 Magistrat von Berlin, Abteilung Wirtschaft (Magistrate of Berlin, Economic department)
C Rep. 120 Magistrat von Berlin, Abteilung Volksbildung (Magistrate of Berlin, National education department)
SMB-ZA Zentralarchiv (Central Archive) der Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin
/ GG Gemäldegalerie
/ KFM Kaiser-Friedrich-Museum (Emperor Frederick Museum)
/ NG Nationalgalerie (National Gallery)

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