Cartographies of Differences

Interdisciplinary Perspectives

EDITED BY
Ulrike M. Vieten and Gill Valentine

Peter Lang

New Visions of the Cosmopolitan

This volume investigates the process of learning how to live with individual and group differences in the twenty-first century and examines the ambivalences of contemporary cosmopolitanism. Engaging with the concept of 'critical cartography', it emphasizes the structural impact of localities on the experiences of those living with difference, while trying to develop an account of the counter-mappings that follow spatial and social transformations in today's world. The contributors focus on visual, normative and cultural embodiments of difference, examining dynamic conflicts at local sites that are connected by the processes of Europeanization and globalization.

The collection explores a wide range of topics, including conflicting claims of sexual minorities and conservative Christians, the relationship between national identity and cosmopolitanism, and the ways that cross-cultural communication and bilingualism can help us to understand the complex nature of belonging. The authors come from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds and all contribute to a vernacular reading of cosmopolitanism and transnationalism, aimed at opening up new avenues of research into living with difference.

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New Visions of the Cosmopolitan

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ULRIKE M. VIETEN AND GILL VALENTINE

Counter-Mappings: Cartography and Difference

The title of this edited collection, *Cartographies of Differences*, is inspired by Avtar Brah's groundbreaking book *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities*. We aspire to create a synergy between interdisciplinary theoretical-analytical approaches and thorough empirical studies, with all the chapters addressing the theme of 'encounters with differences'. Brah suggests the concept of 'diaspora space' (1996: 16, 178), approaching the non-fixed and dialectically constructed spaces of a diasporic identity. Moving beyond her focus on gender, ethnicity and race, framed by and framing diaspora, this collection takes religion, sexualities, nationality and class as further intersecting social categories that are relevant to the notion of difference and differentiation. All of these angles are crucial to how we experience and locate social space, justice and equality in a contemporary world characterised by fluidity and temporality. Jeffrey C. Alexander (2013) coined the term 'the mode of incorporation' to describe current European policies and polemics that are opposed to multiculturalism and aim to stifle the development of a more fragmented, increasingly diasporic and vernacular diversification of lifestyle choices and late modern biographies.

In contrast with the journey towards acceptance of multiculturalism in Britain in the 1990s (conflict-ridden as it was), today in a post 9/11 climate we are witness to much polarising anxiety about ethno-national minorities, particularly orthodox Muslims, in and beyond Europe. At the same time, ideas about intercultural communication, cosmopolitan openness towards 'the Other' and management of diversity do receive approval as signifiers of community cohesion in the twenty-first century. For example, the 'fairy tale' of early September 2015 in Germany and Austria, which saw an immense wave of sympathy towards Syrian refugees, particularly in Vienna and Munich, might indeed be an indicator of the arrival of a 'new',

cosmopolitan and more open version of civil society engagement in some places. Problems arise where structural asymmetry with respect to power and resources is underestimated, and new formations and experiences of social injustice are neglected. Alongside the euphoric cheering and the hospitality shown towards refugees, resentments – and even arson attacks – in some of the more rural areas of Germany, both in the east and the west, remind us that cosmopolitanism(s) means plurality and complexity: it is very much a situated (Vieten 2007), and therefore contested, phenomenon.

Since the early 1990s, the allure of cosmopolitanism has spread across academic and public discourses. A number of scholars engaged explicitly with the concept of cosmopolitanism in the 1990s (e.g. Bhabha 1996, Nussbaum 1996; Brennan 1997; Appandurai 1998; Cheah and Robbins 1998; Nava 1998; Kleingeld 1999). The academic and interdisciplinary scope of research and writing on cosmopolitanism broadened in the twenty-first century (e.g. Derrida 2001; Stevenson 2003; Mouffe 2004; Beck 2006; Calhoun 2007; Fine 2007; Held 2010), and also brought feminist and post-colonial approaches to the debate (e.g. Mignolo 2002; Nwanko 2005; Yuval-Davis 2005; Kofman 2005; Reilly 2007; Werbner 2008; Nava 2007; Vieten 2007; 2012). In the final chapter of *Gender and Cosmopolitanism in Europe: A Feminist Perspective* (2012), Vieten highlights the sophistication in the labelling of different types of cosmopolitanisms. She refers to Nora Fisher Onar (2011: 13), who argues that we might approach a '"cosmopolitan outlook" as a promising formula on how to live together despite our differences' (Vieten 2012: 184). Here, Onar follows Hollinger (2002: 228), listing '"vernacular cosmopolitanism, rooted cosmopolitanism, critical cosmopolitanism, comparative cosmopolitanism, national cosmopolitanism, discrepant cosmopolitanism, situated cosmopolitanism, and actually existing cosmopolitanism"' (ibid). Post- and de-colonial critiques (e.g. Mendieta 2009) provide further intellectual challenges within what has been called the '"cosmopolitan turn" within the social and political sciences' (Strand 2010: 229). As is widely argued (Vieten 2007; 2010; 2012; Vieten and Valentine 2015), the Janus-faced and largely Eurocentric non-feminist imagination of the new cosmopolitanism tends to ignore the structural impact of gendered, classed, racialised and dis/abled positionalities that are present as specific individual 'baggage' beyond the discourses and

phenomena of cosmopolitanism. It is important to reflect on intersecting dimensions within social categories, in order to realise the potential of a cosmopolitan consciousness. Here, the situated (Vieten 2007)[1] context matters most, calling for detailed and analytical exploration of difference and otherness with respect to localities, histories, actors and the interdependences of spaces ('cosmopolitan scales').

Contests and controversies over the notion of group difference and individual identity, and the question of how to keep the balance here, require further investigation. What kind of community cohesion and cooperation do we need in different societies and localities, and how is difference performed, perceived and prejudiced in various places and spaces?

This is why a *counter-mapping of differences* is so important: the pluralisation of lifestyles and migration/mobility axes produces a complexity of new and hybrid forms with respect to social identities and cultural groups, further reshuffling the classic Western division of public and private space. This shifting of the boundary between public and private matters – a restructuring of the 'politics of belonging' (Yuval-Davis et al. 2006) – might affect individual claims to different faiths and religious beliefs, and might also affect the public consensus on gender equality, anti-discrimination policies or notions of secularism.

New and puzzling spheres of conflict emerge: for example, the racist 'panics' which overtook the neighbourhood of Page Hall in Sheffield in November 2013.[2] In this instance, white English and black South Asian 'Brits' organised 'community self-help' against culturally different Roma, who happened to be continental European/EU migrants from Slovakia, both white and 'black'. In some areas of Britain we witness the emergence of new local bedfellows who cross the post-colonial divide: they articulate a much older, and often racist, claim made by established communities willing to defend their material, cultural and social interests against newcomers.

1 While I used the notion of 'situated cosmopolitanisms' in my PhD thesis in 2007, 'situated' was also taken up more recently by Glick Schiller (2015) – Ulrike M. Vieten.

2 http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/15/sheffield-page-hall-roma-slovakia-immigration

However, we also see newly emerging spheres of contact: for example, again in Sheffield, a rising cohort of overseas students, particularly from China and South-East Asia,[3] changing the local social fabric. Local sites of conflict, after all, become contact zones.[4]

The presence of new immigrants, coming from distant empires or European republics, brings a new aspect to the post-colonial struggles of post-Empire Britain. The new *visibility* of more diverse ethnic and 'racialised' groups in Britain, as well as elsewhere in Europe, has generated significant academic, public and policy interest in understanding the current complexity of 'diversity' (Kraus 2011) or 'super-diversity' (Vertovec 2007). Speaking about difference and migration, local spaces have become more socially and culturally complex; experiences of cosmopolitanism might be benign or irritating, but all are experienced in a vernacular context. These new assemblages of local populations, alongside changing patterns of prejudice and cultural crossroads, urge us to analyse spatial and social sites more closely. Or, to put it differently, in the words of Rosa Bradiotti (2005: 171), '[h]ow to dis-engage difference or otherness from the dialectics of Sameness is therefore the challenge.'

Turning now to the (inter-disciplinary) framework of this book: *critical cartography* is located within the discipline of geography but shares with sociology an interest in the mapping and – crucially – the *counter-mapping* of social practices. The focus moves from an interest in maps as objects to maps and mapping as reflections of social relationships. Critical cartography addresses the multiplicity of cultural narratives, and also aims to deconstruct and de-colonialise spaces that are governed by cartographic maps based around control and fixed representations of territories. We regard 'mapping', with Crampton (2009), as an expression of 'performative, participatory and political' processes: counter-mapping follows on from this idea in order to challenge hegemonic perceptions of difference. It may use creative-cultural, performative-(re)representational or organisational-political tools.

3 https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/international/countries/asia/east-asia/china/societies

4 Here we use Marie Louise Pratt's (1991) terminology regarding contact and conflict zones.

We aim to develop a post-cosmopolitan narrative of counter-mappings that tracks spatial and social transformations more specifically; we are looking for embodiments of difference that present global conflicts at local sites, a kind of re-drawing of a map of routes to understand differences. In that sense, *cartography* is the geo-visual expression of a 'micro-geography of power relations that are simultaneously local and global' (Bradiotti 2005: 178).

It is important to emphasise that the wide range of contributions to this collection, in terms of discipline and linguistic/semiotic-cultural location, sets the style of writing, reflection and interrogation. As part of the counter-mapping, we, the editors, follow a de-colonialising strategy by leaving more space for the articulation of each author's thoughts in her and his original voice. Although there is a common thread linking each distinctive part of this book, the way in which the authors play out the theme of 'encounters with difference' remains within their particular disciplinary and cultural reading. In order to make the narrative of the book into a coherent whole, we have organised the parts and chapters in such a way that some of the arguments (and potential counter-considerations) of each contribution align with the subsequent contribution.

The nine chapters presented in this collection follow some of the practices of diversification and illustrate a more complex, but paradoxical, *cartography of differences*. The three parts of the book map out controversies about living with difference as conflict, but also understood as contact zones. In the first part, 'Cartographies of Normality and Normativity', the contributors concentrate on different notions and readings of legal norms, national sites and the *normal* of the everyday. In 'Unpacking Prejudice: Narratives of Homophobia in Cross-National Context', Aneta Piekut and Gill Valentine explore the scale and structure of homophobia in Warsaw and Leeds. Going beyond a comparative approach that examines different spatial (local and national) sites, they adopt a social topographical method (Katz 2001) that addresses Europeanization as an intersecting sphere of influence, thus connecting these two different cities and national spaces. They demonstrate that, despite surveys that show that the UK is more liberal and tolerant towards difference, homophobic prejudices in the UK are simply expressed less directly than in Poland. However, the demographic

profile of people holding such prejudiced views is quite similar to the profile they came across in Poland. The normative structure of the public sphere – i.e. what morality means in this context – is decisive in both societies.

While a web of anti-discrimination legalisation in Britain gives legal protection to sexual minorities, those protections are increasingly competing with individual claims to be exempt from anti-discrimination laws, based on private and subjectively experienced religious grounds. In May 2015, the Newtownabbey bakery Ashers in Northern Ireland was fined for unlawfully discriminating against a gay customer when they refused to bake a cake for him. The cake was intended to display the famous comic characters Bert and Ernie and promote 'gay' marriage. The owrners of Ashers refused to bake the cake on the grounds of their Christian faith. This site of conflict in Northern Ireland links to ongoing legal disputes elsewhere in the UK: in 'When Beliefs Become Property: Liberal Legal Discourse, Employee Resistance and Anti-Gay Christian Politics', Davina Cooper and Didi Herman discuss the normative substance of these competing claims. They argue that what both claims share is a '"social property" paradigm in which beliefs and sexuality constitute part of individual's estate'. In this chapter, different legal cases are analysed, contextualising the way individual claim-making works against anti-discrimination rules, employer commitments and a general language of rights.

The tension between normality and (legal) norms becomes even more complex when one considers the way in which mainstream culture is shaped by conventional understandings of beauty and a presumed right to look at the *Other*. Here, the vulnerability of the *face*, increasingly politicised in the context of female veiling across Europe, is discussed in Rosemary Peacock, Anita Sargeant and Neil Small's chapter 'Facial Difference, Consumer Culture and Being "Normal"'. Whereas the individual effort to comply with gender and/or sexuality norms, for example, might be a decision that individuals take privately, in the public or semi-public realm it is impossible for individuals with facial difference to hide. Peacock, Sargeant and Small expose the 'discursive formation of disfigurement' while critically accessing bodily representations in Western cultures and exploring more concretely the experiences of individuals living with facial difference and their support networks. They argue that we need new ways to think through the

notion of the cosmopolitan, to counter the dominant culture of aesthetics and bodily standards.

The three chapters in the next part of the book examine more closely the idea of 'Cartographies of Citizenship and (Non-)Belonging'. Alongside a diminished general role for 'national identity', we find a strong national-cultural identity present in specific localities, for example Scotland, as Nichola Wood argues in 'National Belonging in Cosmopolitan Times'. In the context of the UK Westminster election of 2015 and the stunning victory of the Scottish National Party (SNP), this is a very timely and urgent issue. Although cosmopolitan advocates are excited about the possibility of overcoming chauvinistic nationalism, Wood shows in her chapter that the emotional drive of feeling connected to the nation and to a specific territory of nationhood should not be underestimated. The tension between parochial, national and regional affiliations, however, is very much situated: in the next chapter, the historical faultlines and ideological legacy of the German ethno-national community, which tends to reject migrant others and non-Christian minorities, are traced in the narratives and testimonies of 'new' Germans from a Turkish and Kurdish background. In 'Notions of Conflict and "New" Citizens' Concerns About Belonging: Post-Cosmopolitan Contestations in Germany', Ulrike M. Vieten argues that in a post-migration and post-cosmopolitan age the cosmopolitan vernacular culture of contemporary metropolitan cities such as Berlin still has to overcome a narrow perception of native national belonging, and also a conventional perception of the migrant Other, who has now become a fellow European citizen. While using narrative methodology to understand the stories individuals tell against a background of restrictive integration debates, Vieten illustrates how 'new' Germans enact citizenship as a cosmopolitan potential, while balancing local belonging and transnational identities against anti-Muslim discourses in twenty-first-century Germany.

In the third contribution to this part of the book, 'Everyday Active Citizenship the Balkan Way: Local Civil Society and the Practice of "Bridge Building" in Two Post-Yugoslav Cities', Piotr Goldstein argues 'that active participation in local civil society can be considered to be a form of active citizenship, even if the sector of civil society in which a person is active is not particularly political'. He draws on extensive fieldwork conducted

in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novi Sad, Serbia between 2010 and 2014, in which he explores a wide range of challenges (and opportunities) within contemporary post-Yugoslav societies.

In the final part of the book, 'Cartographies of Languages and Cross-Cultural Communication' are mapped out. Linguistic dynamics, both as conflict and contact zones, shape personal lives and patterns of friendship, social association and interaction in different social spheres. Alternative routes to bridging difference lead us to the possibility of a deeper communication, indicating potential for a *deeper democracy*. When we think of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, one thing that is crucial to understanding these as distinctive concepts is a certain privileged or de-privileged meaning of *territory*: territory as locality; territory as an ideologically and emotionally loaded geographic space (or the lack of it); territory as the site for attachment or detachment. Naomi Wells takes a challenging look at the limits of territorial regimes, in the context of accommodating the interests of minority languages within nation states. In her chapter 'The Territorial Principle: Language Rights and Linguistic Minorities in Spain and Italy, 1992–2010', she addresses the question of 'how the territorial principle encourages a tendency to oversimplify or ignore multilingual contexts at both sub-state and state levels'. She discusses in more detail how a specific minority language, the Austro-Bavarian Tyrolean dialect, is not explicitly covered in a state policy enforcing the learning of the standard language, 'German'. This failure does not help immigrants to Alto-Adige/Südtirol, who may then be able to speak to people from, for example, Hamburg, but not to residents of the region they are going to settle in, Tyrol/North Italy. These disparities between different dominant languages (e.g. Italian and German), on the one hand, and their minoritised dialect counterparts, on the other, are also apparent in other countries, beyond Spain and Italy. Hence, Wells's considerations are relevant beyond the specific cultural cartography of South-West Europe.

Moving from state policy on language and culture to research with different language communities, Rosa Mas Giralt shares her experiences in conducting cross-lingual interviews, exploring the difficulties encountered when it is less than straightforward to translate and communicate Spanish from the point of view of an English-speaking world. In her chapter

'Conducting Qualitative Research in English and Spanish: Recognising the Active Roles of Participants in Cross-Linguistic and Cross-Cultural Projects', she refers to her fieldwork in Northern England with Spanish-speaking migrants whose cultural and linguistic background is Latin American. Here, the multiplying of hybrid cultural practices becomes visible, engendered in the actual translation of transnational societal spaces. Giralt, a European Spanish (Castilian) speaker (who comes from Catalonia and therefore has another mother tongue), had to cross various layers of linguistic, social and cultural difference when reaching out to her interview partners. In addition, they were speaking through the lenses of *mestiza,* colonialized/post-colonial culture and gendered social class. After all, Giralt highlights the active role of her participants when narrating their selves into the research narrative.

The final chapter, 'Visible Difference, Stigmatising Language(s) and the Discursive Construction of Prejudices against Others in Leeds and Warsaw', by Ulrike M. Vieten and Anna Gawlewicz, explores the issue of translating difference and communicating concepts, terms and views of the world (*Weltbilder*), between and across English- and Polish-speakers. With this, the last contribution, we return to the research project that initiated the book, 'Living with difference: Making communities out of strangers in an era of super mobility and super diversity',[5] which carried out research on the populations of Leeds and Warsaw. Both cities, as urban and local sites, were investigated to understand how diversity, migration and distinctive national histories impact on contemporary approaches to, ideas about and everyday engagement with difference. As Vieten and Gawlewicz argue, 'Polish and English colloquial spoken language offers a window to explore how perceptions of (ascribed) difference are spelled out in private communication'. In their view, it is crucial to understand the similarities and differences as embedded in particular Polish and British histories. What

5 ERC, LiveDifference, 2010–2014, http://livedifference.group.shef.ac.uk. The project was based first at the University of Leeds and later at the University of Sheffield. The chapters in this book are revised version of papers given at the conference 'How do we develop the capacity to live with difference?', held on 12–13 September 2012 in Leeds.

is striking, though, is the finding that 'alongside similarities in the construction of the gendered working class (parallels between *'dresiarze'* and 'chavs'), significant differences are noticeable with regard to how people in Warsaw and Leeds relate to the intersection of ethnicity, religion and gender'. Regarding the discursive overlap between prejudices and dismissive language against socially declassed individuals (e.g. 'chavs') in both national contexts, the social topographic argument about Europeanization made by Piekut and Valentine (chapter 1) could be equally applied here. Furthermore, we may be able to discern a global neo-liberal capitalistic discourse that constructs those who fail within the competitive market system as a global inferior 'Other'.

The chapters presented in this collection come from very distinctive disciplinary angles; nevertheless, they all map the varieties of vernacular cosmopolitanisms as a paradoxical trajectory embedded in transformed local and transnational spaces. Some of these spaces are less visible than others, but all are important in order to understand how a new vision of contemporary cosmopolitanism – or rather, the *post-cosmopolitan condition* – might take shape.

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Part 1

Cartographies of Normality and Normativity

ANETA PIEKUT AND GILL VALENTINE

Unpacking Prejudice: Narratives of Homophobia in Cross-National Context

ABSTRACT: This chapter analyses homophobic responses in two distinctive European contexts, Poland and Britain. It is based on a multi-method research project conducted as part of the ERC-funded 'Living with Difference in Europe' research programme. It adopts a social topographic approach to produce a cartography of homophobia: the analysis looks at the ways prejudices against lesbians and gay men are refracted through the lens of different national histories and socio-spatial relationships. Our findings show that homophobia is more frequently expressed in silent and subtle ways in Britain, whereas in Poland it remains more salient and blatant. We argue that, despite a trans-national narrative of the idealisation of the 'West' as 'homophobia-free', homophobia still is present in both countries. The chapter demonstrates that we need to pay more attention to the different ways homophobia is expressed across Europe, looking more closely at specific national contexts as well as at the inter-connectivity of homophobia in a transnational age.

Introduction

Although it is widely considered that it is easier to be a lesbian or a gay man in contemporary Europe than at any other time in history due to processes of individualisation and detraditionalisation as well as legislative change, including emancipatory success of the feminist and queer civil rights movement, nonetheless homophobia is still commonplace. To-date most of the research which has examined this form of prejudice has done so by drawing on the experiences of those who are targeted by this form of discrimination and harassment (Herek and Berrill 1992, Moran et al. 2003) rather than on

the attitudes of the perpetrators. Here, instead of focusing on the accounts of lesbians and gay men this chapter examines the way homophobia is rationalised and expressed by heterosexual people in everyday life in two diverse national contexts: Britain and Poland.

Britain is a European country that has been at the vanguard of processes of detraditionalisation and individualisation, and consequently is characterised by high levels of mobility and the public expression of diverse social identities and lifestyles. Following the introduction of a range of equality legislation including the introduction of civil partnerships (2004) for lesbians and gay men and subsequently gay marriage (2014) it is perceived to be easier to identify as gay in the Britain than at any previous time. In contrast, Poland as a communist state during the post-war period experienced a period in which international mobility was restricted, resulting in greater population homogeneity (Jasińska-Kania, and Łodziński 2009). Following the end of communism this is now being significantly unsettled by contact with 'others' as a result of the arrival of migrants from elsewhere and increased engagement with global media and cultures. While the new European Union (EU) accession states have been required to adopt European anti-discrimination and equality legislation (e.g. in relation to sexual orientation), the collapse of communism has also allowed a revival of the Church in some national contexts (e.g. Poland) and with it a re-, rather than de-traditionalisation of attitudes and values (most notably in relation to gender and sexuality). This paper therefore considers the significance of national institutions (e.g. State and Church) in the way they influence the nature and form that homophobia takes.

In exploring homophobia in cross-national context we adopt a social topographic approach to produce a cartography of homophobia (Katz 2001a; Katz 2001b). Specifically this approach moves beyond situating knowledge. (Yuval-Davis 1997, Vieten 2007) in specific contexts to provide an innovative framework for understanding relationships between apparently different contexts. In doing so, it transcends conventional comparative perspectives because it explores qualitatively some of the links that connect places (Valentine et al. 2015b). While physical geographers use contour lines to connect places at a uniform altitude to reveal the three-dimensional form of the terrain, the notion of social topographies is an alternative

cartographic approach which links selected different places analytically along lines that represent not elevation but particular relations to a process 'in order to both develop the contours of common struggles and imagine a different kind of practical response to problems confronting them' (Katz 2001b: 722). Hence, a social topographic approach enables us to move beyond a simplistic comparison of these distinct socio-cultural contexts, instead Britain and Poland are treated as nodes which are inextricably linked by wider global processes. In particular, both contemporary states are connected by a shared framework of European legislation and intra-EU mobility through which attitudes, values and social practices are circulated.

The evidence presented in this chapter was collected as part of a European Research Council funded study entitled 'Living with Difference in Europe: Making communities out of strangers in an era of super mobility and super diversity', which undertook quantitative and qualitative research in Leeds, UK, and Warsaw, Poland. Leeds is the second largest metropolitan district in England and the regional capital of Yorkshire and the Humber. It has a long history of industrial diversification and prosperity, as well as long histories of immigration and significant levels of deprivation. The share of minority ethnic groups in Leeds is close to the national average (app. 17.5 per cent, 2011 Census). Warsaw was selected for the study since it is the most socially and ethnically diverse big city in Poland. The transformation of the political system in 1989 brought an opening of national borders, freedom of expression and speech (e.g. the possibility of open discussion on individual identities and difference in the public sphere) and equal treatment for all citizens. In this context Warsaw is considered to be the most cosmopolitan city where all forms of visible difference are present in public space, yet such encounters are situated in a conservative normative structure (Piekut et al. 2014).

The first stage of the research involved a survey which was carried out to explore patterns of prejudice in both Leeds (n=1,522) and Warsaw (n=1,499). On the basis of the responses to the survey 30 participants were recruited in each city to take part in in-depth qualitative case studies. Each qualitative case comprised: 1) a time-line; 2) life-story interview; 3) audio-diary of everyday encounters; 4) semi-structured interview about attitudes towards difference; and 5) an interview reflecting on the emerging findings.

The advantage of using this biographical approach was that it enabled a focus on both the personal and public ways that lives develop and an opportunity to explore both continuities and change in participants' attitudes and values (Valentine and Sadgrove 2014). The interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim and coded with qualitative research software.

Patterns of prejudice and homophobia in Britain and Poland

Homophobia is defined as 'unfounded fear and aversion to homosexuality and to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people based on prejudice similar to racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and sexism' (European Parliament 2006). This is a form of prejudice which like other negative attitudes comprises: *affective* (feelings towards other people), *behavioural* (behavioural orientations) and *cognitive* (thoughts and knowledge) dimensions (Gerrig and Zimbardo 2010). In the survey we explored all three components. We measured *affective attitudes* with a 'feeling thermometer' (Dovidio et al. 2010). Respondents were asked to say how warm their feelings were towards some groups using a scale from 0 to 100. In Leeds the highest levels of prejudice were recorded for travellers, gypsies and Roma as well as refugees and asylum seekers. In Warsaw the highest levels of prejudice were directed towards gay, lesbian, and transsexual people. Figures 1 and 2 present mean values of out-group attitudes towards minority groups (calculated after exclusion of a given minority group) and in-group attitudes in case of attitudes towards white people (attitudes towards own group). Values were recalculated on a scale 0–1 and centred around, value 0.5.



Figure 1. Affective attitudes in Leeds



Figure 2. Affective attitudes in Warsaw

Source: 'Living with Difference' survey, 2012.

Attitudes were described as affective prejudice if respondents expressed colder feelings than the assumed neutral reading of 50 degrees. In Leeds 9 per cent of respondents expressed negative attitudes (<50) towards lesbians and gay men; 41 per cent neutral attitudes (=50) and 50 per cent recorded positive (>50) responses. In Warsaw the distribution between three emotions was more even. Approximately a third (36 percent) of the respondents revealed negative feelings towards lesbians and gay men, the same percentage (36 per cent) were positive, with the remainder (28 per cent) opting for a neutral response. Although the level of prejudice towards gays and lesbians is lower in Leeds than in Warsaw, neutral feelings might indicate a more subtle form of prejudice (see Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Valentine et al. 2015a). Namely there is a reluctance to admit negative feelings towards a given group, but equally an absence of positive feelings to this group. As Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) explain, while blatant prejudice is hot, close and direct, subtle prejudice is cool, distant and indirect. While the first involves rejection of a group, the latter involves opposition to a more intimate contact.

In the case of *behavioural attitudes* respondents were asked: 'If the following people moved next door to you, to what extent, if at all, would you be friendly or not to towards them?' Attitudes were recalculated on

the scale 0–1 (so it is easier to compare them with affective scores), centred around, value 0.5 and presented in Figures 3 and 4.



Figure 3. Behavioural attitudes in Leeds



Figure 4. Behavioural attitudes in Warsaw

Source: 'Living with Difference' survey, 2012.

Homophobic behavioural attitudes were again more common amongst Polish respondents. Most people in Leeds expressed positive behavioural attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (77 per cent) and transsexuals (68 per cent). In contrast, in Warsaw only 40 per cent of people stated they would accept lesbian and gay neighbours and 27 per cent transsexual neighbours. Behavioural attitudes were further investigated in relation to a more intimate form of contact. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statement (5-point scale): 'I would be uncomfortable if my GP or doctor was lesbian or gay'. In Warsaw opposition to a lesbian or gay doctor was expressed more strongly than in Leeds with 34 per cent of people disagreeing with the statement compared to only 8 per cent in Leeds.

Finally, we explored the *cognitive component of attitudes* by asking: 'Thinking about the past 12 months, do you think your feelings towards any of these groups have become any colder? Can you say which has changed the most? And why?' Every third respondent in both cities stated that their feelings towards one of 11 groups had become cooler in the last year. Attitudes towards gay men and lesbians or transsexuals had cooled among respondents in Warsaw (more homophobic – 22 per cent of positive answers, 5 per cent of respondents). This reflects the fact that sexual

minorities have become more visible in public spaces in Poland following its accession to the European Union (Graff 2010). Yet some Poles have struggled to understand or recognise this form of difference. In particular, the presence of lesbians and gay men disrupts the presumed heteronormative nature of public space, creating anxiety that the previously unrecognised or taken for granted hegemony of heterosexuality may be under threat (see Bell et al 1994, Bell and Valentine 1995). As respondents in Warsaw explained: *'they parade around too much, flaunting "otherness"'*, *'they spread intrusive propaganda in media'*, *'they talk too much'*, and *'they took control over media'*. Indeed, in the 2011 Polish parliament elections one openly gay person (Robert Biedroń) and one openly transgender person (Anna Grodzka) became members of the parliament; as a consequence these 'differences' have become more 'mainstreamed' and present in the public discourse. As sexual minorities have grown in visibility so it has mobilised prejudicial discourses about the threat lesbians and gay men pose to the existing social order, specifically the normative regulations regarding the family, sexuality and national reproduction (Piekut et al. 2014).

Although homophobia is more visibly present in contemporary Polish society than in the UK, it does exist in both societies. In Leeds similar prejudicial feelings towards gay men and lesbians also exist but these are generally expressed more subtly. Nonetheless, there are some similarities among the profile of people expressing homophobia in both places. Men are more prejudiced in both cities (Valentine 2010). Previous studies have suggested that this is because male gender roles are more fragile than those of women, and so when traditional gender roles are perceived to be violated men tend to react in more a negative and hostile way than women (Wellman and McCoy 2014).

Likewise, in both national contexts the older generation (people aged 65+) were the group least tolerant of lesbians and gay men. This perhaps can be attributed to the fact that this cohort has been socialised in different times, when sexual difference was not so openly discussed and LGBT rights were not recognised in both countries (see below). Moreover, in both contexts older people are less likely to have everyday contact with lesbians and gay men because the spaces within which they live and move offer them less potential opportunities to encounter or learn about difference

than other generations. This is because older people's everyday activity patterns are at least in part, a product of various processes (age segregation in housing markets, age discrimination and so on) that lead to the marginalisation or social exclusion of older people from public space and public life (Hagestad and Uhlenberg 2005; Vanderbeck 2007). Although it is also important to note that older people have the same capacity to change their attitudes as younger people when they come into sustained contact with gay people (Valentine 2014).

According to our survey, in both national contexts people who do not belong to any religious group are less homophobic than people of faith. Other international studies have also found a similar pattern which in part reflects the fact that sex is still understood by most faith communities to be a functional practice, solely for reproduction, rather than about pleasure (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009). In contrast, within secular society sexuality has become conceptualised in terms of expressions of intimacy and self-realisation, losing its connection with traditional ethical frameworks and wider responsibilities to produce the next generation (Giddens 1992). Thus many faiths have prohibitions against homosexuality (McFadyen 2000; Crockett and Voas 2003) – although research also suggests that heterosexual people of faith often separate their beliefs (as abstract practices) from their actual everyday conduct when they meet LGBT individuals. Their ability to do so is facilitated by: an ethic of care towards marginalised 'others' in recognition of their own complex intersectional identities (e.g. experiences of racism, motherhood etc.) and a religious commitment to compassion which is evident in most faiths. As a consequence while conflicts between sexual orientation and religion/belief as equality strands may be evident in debates about group rights in the public sphere (e.g. in the law courts, media and political/policy debates) they are less likely to be manifest between individuals in everyday public spaces (Valentine and Waite 2012).

In sum, although patterns of prejudice are dissimilar in both Poland and UK, those who expressed homophobic attitudes in both societies share similar motivations and ideological concerns. In the next section we explore further the different historical and societal contexts that refract the expressions of homophobic attitudes in Poland and the UK.

Situating homophobia in the two national contexts

A social topographic approach, linking analytically homophobia and the responses of national institutions to sexuality in each country sheds further light on the patterns of prejudice in both contexts. In Poland we observe a relatively recent growth of visibility of LGBT people and politicisation of the debate on their rights (Graff 2010). The gay and lesbian issues in the UK have already been 'domesticated' (Binnie et al. 2006) and the rapid development of equality legislation in late 1990s and early 2000s has reduced the open expression of homophobia in public space, although it has also contributed to what has been described as a privatisation of prejudice (Richardson and Munro 2013, Valentine and Harris 2016).

Poland: visible and politicised difference

In Poland during the socialism period the expression of any form of difference was not encouraged by the national state, nor followed by people. After the Second World War the authorities decided to promote ethnic homogeneity through a policy of the resettlement of non-Polish citizens and by marginalising the remaining minority ethnic groups in the country (Jasińska-Kania and Łodziński 2009). This policy was linked to the belief that the high ethnic heterogeneity of the pre-war state had contributed to ethnic conflicts and tensions and that becoming a more mono-ethnic state would guarantee a more peaceful coexistence with neighbouring states. This was facilitated by the power of the socialist security services or communist police in the People's Republic of Poland (PRP) to observe and recode ethnic or national difference as "an attempt to erase the borders between private and public" (Heinen 1997: 589).

Our respondents, asked about diversity in the socialist times, claimed that people preferred not to stick out in order not to be labelled as 'different';

otherwise the security services might become interested into them. Moreover, although homosexuality was not illegal after the war, it was used by the secret police as a means to put pressure on individuals to cooperate with the state to become secret informants. For example, between 1985 and 1987 over 11,000 people suspected of being lesbians/gay were arrested as part of Operation 'Hyacinth' which resulted in creating personal files called 'Card of a homosexual', where their personal information and finger prints were recorded (Tomasik 2012). As a consequence, sexual difference was largely hidden during the communist period. Even the 'Solidarity' movement (*Solidarność*), despite fighting for equality and democratic rights for all, failed to recognise the specific needs of either women or minority sexualities (Gruszczyńska 2009).

The political transition in 1989 brought democratic rights including: after all freedoms of expression, speech and international travel. Equal treatment of all citizens was guaranteed in a new democratic Constitution in 1997, which stated that 'All persons shall be equal before the law. All persons shall have the right to equal treatment by public authorities' (article 32, point 1); and 'No one shall be discriminated against in political, social or economic life for any reason whatsoever' (article 32, point 2). However, discourse analysis of the Polish Constitution of 1997 reveals that it resembles the Catholic Church Catechism, especially in the way family and gender roles are described (Mizielińska 2001). For example, it defines a marriage as a union of a man and a woman (Article 18). Such an understanding of marriage, and more widely, of the family, was common among both more conservative and more liberal interviewees in Warsaw. For example, the same understanding was articulated by a woman who was born in Warsaw in 1992 and was bisexual and atheist, and by a woman born in a village in south-east Poland in 1960, who was heterosexual and Catholic. The latter explained:

> I think that a family means a woman and a man. And here, it's [homosexuality] more of a, it's some deviation from normality. I think this way - that it's not a family for 100%, but more as if people were sick [...] as if something bad was happening inside the head. Something not right. (Polish, female, 50–54, heterosexual)

The 'traditional' heterosexual family model, embedded in Catholic religious norms in Poland, has a profound influence on society (Mizielińska 2001;

Piekut at al. 2014). The Catholic Church played a crucial role as the defender of Polishness during the partitions (1795–1918) and during the Communist era (1945–1989). As a consequence, Poles developed a strong sense of identification with the Church, and after the political breakthrough of 1989, the Church was given a privileged political position, guaranteed by the Concordat signed in 1993 (Borowik 2002). Hence the significance of the Catholic religion in shaping the societal response – particularly along older generations – to the growing visibility of gay men and lesbians after 1989 cannot be underestimated. Research participants linked higher level of homophobia in the Polish society with the role played by the Church previously and contemporarily:

> I think that such lower tolerance [towards sexual minorities]... it is largely due to religious beliefs among the elderly, and among the older population on average. Among younger people, I think, I think that probably there's greater tolerance than among the older generation. (Polish, female, 20–24, heterosexual)

> And [prejudice towards] sexual minorities [reflection]... It's also a matter of the Church, well, because after all the Church has a definitely negative attitude and verbalises it. [...] And obviously it's also about the fact that such people haven't met any homosexuals and they think that it is a form of degeneration. (Polish, male, 35–39, heterosexual)

> The influence of the Church, the influence of monoculture, [reflection] well and apart from that some [pause] delay in our civil development [PL: *opoźnienie cywilizacyjne*] related to, I don't know, the partitions, to German occupation. [pause] So this is why sexual minorities are perceived negatively, I guess. (Polish, male, 65–69, heterosexual)

In the 1990s, LGBT groups rarely disclosed their sexual orientation for fear of discrimination and social ostracism. This relative lack of visibility reduced the opportunity for contact, and as a consequence attitudes towards this minority group were shaped mostly by the media and the Catholic Church. However, gay rights became politicised after the presidential elections in 2005, when one of the candidates, Lech Kaczyński, used homophobic sentiments in his campaign including challenging what he described as 'homosexual propaganda' (Graff 2010). In the following years many grassroots initiatives and social campaigns have emerged, such

as 'Love Does not Exclude', 'In Relationship with Love' or 'Close Strangers' (Mizielińska and Stasińska 2014). Ordinary gay and lesbian couples or families with gay/lesbian members have started to talk more openly about their experiences of discrimination and institutional limitations. This increased visibility has in turn been mobilised to justify homophobia and to blame lesbians and gay men for provoking the discrimination they encounter. For example, some interviewees reflected that minority sexualities could be in fact blamed for the discrimination against them:

> I think homosexual people themselves make unnecessary hype about themselves which later causes them to be discriminated against. That's my approach to this, but it's hard to call that intolerance. (Polish, male, 30–34, heterosexual)

Analysis of the press discourse on same-sex relationships suggests that while the media coverage now includes more diverse voices in this debate, including liberal views (Mizielińska and Stasińska 2014), nonetheless in the period between 2011 and 2013 homophobic and exclusionary discourses have been on the increase. This follows heated parliamentary debates in 2011 about legislation to recognise same-sex partnerships (Arcimowicz et al. 2014). In this way, the growing visibility of LGBT activists and equality debates, on the one hand, and an increase in tolerance of different forms of family and relationships (CBOS 2013), on the other, have led to the emergence of more direct and homophobic discourses among some politicians and media (Arcimowicz et al. 2014). This is reflected in the narratives of many of our interviewees which demonstrate that the heterosexual majority still oppose the growing visibility of minority sexualities and their political efforts to gain equal rights. As the exemplary quote below shows, they are 'tired' of sexual minorities 'flaunting' their difference in the media:

> I don't like this... flaunting this difference... I could say that I'm intolerant in the sense that flaunting it annoys me because, the fact that someone is homosexual doesn't bother me, let them be. But it bugs me that they go on parades and take their clothes off at these parades, yeah, because unfortunately they are like this, these parades, they often look like this that they show their sexuality. Gosh, I'm hetero and I don't have to show it, and I don't show it. Why do you show it? (Polish, male, 30–34, heterosexual)

Although, the 1997 Polish Constitution guarantees basic democratic freedoms and condemns any form of discrimination, groups such as lesbians and gay men have not been protected by specific legislation. Until 2010, the Labour Code was the main element of Polish anti-discrimination legislation (amended in 2001, 2003 and in 2008 to comply with European equality directives). It regulated discrimination in the labour market, but not in other spheres of life. The Equal Treatment Act (ETA) – the *Act on the Implementation of Certain Provisions of the European Union in the Field of Equal Treatment* – entered into force on 1 January 2011 (Bojarski 2013). However, the ETA is criticised. First, some grounds for discrimination are excluded, and it does not provide a full protection against discrimination. Second, the compensation covers only material damage (not immaterial), what also limits its protective power. Third, only in employment cases the 'burden of proof' has been moved from the complainant to the respondent. Forth, it did not create a new equality body; instead it designated the existing Ombud's Office (Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection) as an equality body. It has limited resources and powers in terms of resolving conflicts between private parties (Bojarski 2013). Despite these limitations equality legislation and civil partnerships have become increasingly discussed in Polish public debates. However, the evidence of this research is that the growth of visibility and politicisation of sexuality has currently brought intensification rather than a reduction in homophobia; the expression of which had been suppressed during the socialist era. In the next section we will explore specificity of the British context.

UK: domesticated difference and privatised prejudice

After the Second World War homosexuality was illegal in the UK and punished by imprisonment. The *Sexual Offences Act* of 1967 decriminalised consensual same-sex acts – provided they took place in private, and involved two men only aged at least 21 years old. In the 1970s feminist lesbians and gay activist movements emerged campaigning for equal rights. However, in the wake of AIDS-phobia in the 1980s the negative perception of homosexuality was if anything strengthened (Bell 1991). In 1988,

the then Conservative Government introduced 'Section 28' of *the Local Government Act* which stated that local authorities should 'not intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality' or 'promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship' (in force in the UK until 2003). Although no one was ever prosecuted under this legislation its implementation provoked a backlash which led to the growth of lobbying and equality organisations for sexual minorities such as – Stonewall (in 1989). It played a key role in the parliamentary lobbying in the 1990s and mobilisation of celebrity support for the gay/lesbian movement. In 1997, the newly elected Labour Government initiated a programme of equality legislation which included the introduction in 2004 of a *Civil Partnership Act* which gave same-sex partners similar rights to civil marriages. Full equality with heterosexual marriage was achieved in 2014 when gay marriages were legalised. In 2010 a new *Equality Act*[1] came into force which brought together over 116 separate pieces of legislation into one single legal framework. This legislation requires people to be treated equally in most aspects of public life, regardless of the protected characteristics of: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation.

The rights claims of lesbians and gay men and associated legislative change have led to sexual identities and cultures becoming more visible in the media and popular discourse and even achieving relative normalisation within British mainstream culture (see Nava's 2007 account of modernity and English urban cosmopolitanism). Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the lesbian and gay movement has allowed itself to be co-opted, exploited as a niche market – the so-called pink pound – and ultimately commodified (Altman 1997), becoming in the process respectable and acceptable. Although others have observed that while consumption may have played an important part in the sexual citizenship struggles of some gay men not all forms of cultural difference are as easily assimilated as the white middle class (Binnie 2004).

1 See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents (accessed 12/05/2015).

Indeed, despite these broadly progressive changes in legislation and relatively normalisation of some forms of homosexuality in British culture our research found that acceptance of minority sexuality rights and freedoms is still conditional upon an expectation that lesbian and gay relationships are not displayed in public space but rather remain 'private' (cf. Stonewall 2003):

> I mean when you see the [LGBT] rallies at Parliament Square and places like that. [...] They're going about it in completely the wrong way, because all they're doing is disgusting people. When you have families and mothers and kiddies walking along the pavement and they're camping it up and kissing... They're going over the top, they're not going to get much of a sympathy vote there. (White British, male, 30–34, heterosexual)

> We do when we watch the six o'clock BBC News and there's something on about gay marriages, my wife has very strong feelings about it that she doesn't think that it's right to have gay marriages. But I'm a bit agnostic over this issue because I always feel like look, there's loads of people that live together, men and women, and they don't bother about marriage, so why don't these people just live without having to make a marriage. That's my view. You don't have to go and make a public scene of the whole thing. If you're gay and you want to have another, just go ahead and live together and it's none of anybody else's business. (British Asian, male, 75–79, heterosexual)

Homophobic respondents expressed *discomfort* with the increased visibility and public representation of gay men and lesbians. Such discomfort – instead of an open and direct hostility – indicates that prejudice has become what Massey (2009) describes as more 'modern' or 'symbolic'.

In this respect, the views of some of the interviewees from the UK mirrored those in Poland despite the dissimilarities in the legal frameworks in place in the two countries. In a social topographic sense, the common contour which links these two specific national contexts is the shared framework of the European Union. There were clear connections in the way interviewees in both Poland and the UK claimed their own national contexts to have been reshaped by European discourses about equality and by the perceived power of European Courts with the consequence that minorities are perceived to have been afforded too much accommodation or tolerance (this point is explored further in the following section). For

example, in the UK some interviewees argued that their ability to voice disquiet about the acceptance of lesbians and gay men in public space has been silenced by equality legislation which is popularly described as 'political correctness' (Valentine and Harris 2016):

> Gay people – I mean now they're going to let them get married. I know what gay people do, I used to know them. It's called buggery isn't it? Believe me it's not a pleasant sight. Yet I can't say anything against them. I mean I went into a shop today and I asked for some cheese gays and they didn't know what I were talking about. I said but I'm not allowed to say puffs. (British-Caribbean, female, 50–54, heterosexual)

> You've got to be careful, you've got to be so careful of who's around you, because you can offend so many people in so many different ways... I think you've got political correctness. There are a lot of things that you can't say and do in everyday life that you used to be able to... I think that boils over because people are frightened of what they're saying. There's no real freedom of speech anymore, even though you're supposed – we do live in a society that says freedom of speech, but I can't say I don't want to see gays flaunting it. (White British, male, 30–34, heterosexual)

People holding negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men argued that they can only express their views in private spaces – among family and close friends. As a consequence people refrain from expressing homophobia not out of acquiescence with contemporary social norms and equality legislation, but out of a fear of the social and legal consequences of doing so. In other words, there has been a privatisation of homophobia (Richardson and Munro 2013; Valentine and Harris 2016). As such, while equality legislation has contained the public expression of prejudice it has not been sufficient to erase homophobic attitudes from the British society and transform it into a truly progressive culture.

Like the interviewees in Poland, participants in the UK also justified their prejudice towards lesbians and gay men on the basis that same-sex relations are 'unnatural' and do not lead to procreation. One of the British participants explained:

> So I'm not a lenient person with homosexuals, I think they're just freaks. It's nature gone wrong. [...] Like I say I'm not religious, I'm an evolutionist. [...] So if the world was full of gays getting married, in a generation we'd be all gone. So it must be unnatural. So if that's unnatural marriage is unnatural. I mean marriage I suppose

> I really believe that marriage is in church, even though I'm not religious. (White British, male, 65–69, heterosexual)

> But you know, I mean at the end of the day they're all God's people. I certainly don't agree with lesbians getting married. I don't agree with like Elton John bringing up a baby, because I think in a home you need a woman and you need a man – whether they're married or not is irrelevant – but I think for a secure, a well-adjusted childhood there needs to be a male and a female. So this business of them getting married I think's stupid. But that's just my opinion. (White British, female, 80–84, heterosexual)

Drawing the social topography lines between both case studies demonstrates that although in both contexts homophobia was mobilised by increased visibility of gay and lesbian people in the public sphere (in the UK in the 1990s, in Poland in the 2000s), respondents in each city favoured different justifications for their 'discomfort' in relation to gay and lesbian people. In Poland homophobia appears to be anchored in the collective presumptions regarding how the nation and the national culture should be reproduced and with the dominant heteronormative understanding of gender norms and sexuality (Kulpa 2013). In the UK, however, were British people are more likely to support 'biological models' of homophobia than to relate their prejudice to social justifications (see also Furnhama and Saito 2009). It appears that as a consequence of the introduction of equality legislation for lesbians and gay men people do not publicly question the sexual citizenship rights of minorities anymore, as they still openly do in Poland. Instead, homophobic sentiments are privatised and are largely channelled through arguments about biological reproduction.

Cross-national discourses of homophobia – Europeanisation of prejudice

Minority sexual groups became more visible in Polish public discourse following Poland's accession to the European Union in 2004. This led to debates about how to harmonise Polish law with EU standards and the

consequences for national culture. For right-wing and nationalist groups LGBT rights became a symbol of EU interference in the Polish nation-state. As Graff (2010: 585) argues 'collective fears concerning EU accession were projected onto [...] an ultraconservative but only half-serious discourse on gender and sexuality'. Attitudes to sexual minorities have therefore become not just a question of the acceptance or not of non-heteronormative behaviours, but rather a boundary marker between the West and the East (see also Mayblin et al. 2016). Some Polish interviewees for example perceived the acceptance of gay and lesbian rights to form legally recognised civic partnerships as desirable so that Poland could become more 'western' in comparison while Russia and other Eastern European countries who were represented as having 'underdeveloped' equality legislation:

> And they were a couple who was really, they lived together, I met them at some friends', at some party. And they are still together. And I reckon that preventing such people from the right to... let's say medical information, or these inheritance issues, I guess, it is somehow absurd. Especially that I cannot understand how legal regulation of this sort, what threat it poses to Catholic morality in this country. I cannot see any bone of contention, but maybe I didn't tune in enough [laughter] in the topic. But anyway I reckon that it should be resolved legally. And after all Poland doesn't look good in the eyes of Europe. I mean we are not Russia where there can be no parade, but we don't facilitate life of such people. (Polish, male, 35–39, heterosexual)

Other interviewees framed Western European societies as having accorded 'too many' rights to sexual minorities (e.g. by allowing lesbians and gay men to marry or adopt children) with the consequence that the traditional Polish nuclear family is under threat (Mizielińska and Stasińska 2013). This tension is illustrated in the following narrative where the interviewee draws a distinction between the right to a civil partnership which he is willing to accept as a consequence of joining the European Union and the right of lesbians and gay men to adopt and raise children which he perceives as a step too far:

> Right now there is a lot of debate in Poland about the civil unions. Do you have any opinions on the topic? Should they be allowed?

> Unions, yes. Wow. Unions exist, right? Because of this profession [insurance advisor], I sometimes have the pleasure to talk with such people. I also had a problem with this at first, then I got to know it better. These unions are, were and will be. I think that statistics lie – worldwide a certain percentage of people are homosexual. And that's how it is and we can't change that. When it comes to marriage, real marriage and adopting children, I don't know. This may be old fashioned, but I would not be in favour of that. Civil unions, that's fine. If you want to live together, legally in a certain way that is possible. I don't have a problem with that. Because I know that such situations exist. But you see, everyone wants to be that perfect European [pol.: *pięknym*], super open. But on the other hand, when it comes to adoption or raising children [...] this just doesn't suit me. (Polish, male, 40–44, heterosexual)

Indeed high levels of homophobia, including in the media, and the continued acceptance of hate speech towards sexual minorities (including the banning of equality marches) (Mizielińska and Stasińska 2014) has meant that Poland has developed a reputation for homophobia, which Graff (2010: 583) argues represents 'its mark of difference in Europe' (Graff 2010: 583). As a consequence Western European countries have developed a patronising discourse towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, offering help and education. Kulpa (2014) suggests that Poland and other Eastern European countries are framed as a 'homophobic Other' in Europe, not sufficiently liberal and tolerant, a region that has to be 'taken care of' by more civilised Western countries. Such perceptions of Eastern Europe were also present among our British respondents:

> I've been reading up to go travelling next year after I finish university and I was just reading a Europe book, and it said about gay and lesbianism around Europe. It said, it's mostly, you know, fine, in the Western world – more in Western, than the Eastern. (White British, female, 30–34, heterosexual)

The reproduction of such narratives results in an idealisation of 'the West' as 'homophobia free' (Mizielińska and Stasińska 2014). Yet, as we demonstrated in the previous section, while it is not socially acceptable to express homophobia publicly in UK, this form of prejudice is still present – it has just been privatised. However the representation of the UK as a tolerant society compared to Eastern European countries may strengthen prejudice towards other nationalities and minority groups, i.e. Polish migrants,

who may be seen as representing 'backward' and 'homophobic' societies. More importantly, the belief that Western countries, including the UK, are 'homophobia free' may justify private prejudices, because they are not seen as 'harmful' – as they do not result in openly discriminatory behaviours or hate speech, which can be found in 'truly' homophobic countries like Poland.

Conclusions

This chapter has presented homophobic responses by people in two distinctive European contexts, Poland and Britain, confronted with the legal equality (Britain) and public visibility (Poland) of lesbians and gay men. It is based on multi-method research conducted as part of the 'Living with Difference in Europe' research programme. The analysis looked at the way prejudices against lesbians and gay men refracted through the lens of different national histories and socio-spatial relationships. We found out that although homophobic attitudes are expressed differently in Poland from the UK, there are number of similarities among both case studies. First, although the level of homophobia – that was measured in the surveys and talked about during interviews – is higher and more directly expressed in Poland, the demographic profile of people holding such prejudicial views was similar. Men, people aged 65 and over, and those with a religious belief were more likely to express prejudice towards lesbians and gay men in both national contexts. This homophobia was also framed in both places through a discourse about the unnaturalness of same-sex relationships, and in terms of homosexuality as a threat to family life and the reproduction of society. Here the former argument was most prevalent in the UK, where the Polish interviewees placed more emphasis on the preservation of family values and norms (socio-cultural argument).

To some extent the different nature of homophobic prejudice in both contexts is related to the different stages of the national debate about equality legislation and LGBT rights. In both countries equality legislation has

been amended in recent years in response to equal treatment directives from the EU. In Poland, following accession to the European Union in 2004, anti-discrimination directives were implemented for the first time, and in 2011 an Act on Equal Treatment was also introduced. As Poland was the only European member state without an equality body, this legislation established the office of the Ombudsman in this role, as well as providing protection from discrimination in all aspects of public life on the grounds of race, ethnicity, nationality and in part, gender. However, sexual orientation and age were only afforded such protection in relation to employment (Bojarski 2013). Poland won a partial opt-out in relation to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights because of its concerns that the European Court of Human Rights interpretations of the law would lead to a change in the definition of 'family' and require Poland to recognise same-sex marriage. As such, legal recognition and protection for sexual minorities in Poland remains relatively limited and heteronormativity is still politically and institutionally legitimised (Binnie and Klesse 2013). Debates about equality for sexual minorities are only just gaining traction, and are still strongly opposed by the Catholic Church which remains a powerful voice in the public sphere in terms of shaping values and social norms.

In Britain, battles to establish lesbian and gay sexual citizenship have a much longer history. As the chapter has described, this began with the decriminalisation of same-sex acts by men in England and Wales in the 1960s, despite high profile activism throughout the late 1980s and 1990s the introduction of more fundamental equality legislation was only introduced as a response to EU directives in 2003 (Binnie 2004). Yet, despite the introduction of broadly comprehensive equality legislation and measures to combat discrimination in everyday life homophobia has not disappeared. It remains resilient taking on new forms and being mobilised in different spaces (e.g. in private spaces among close friends and acquaintances rather than in public life). In this sense, homophobia in the UK might be characterised as *silent and subtle*, whereas in Poland – it remains more *salient and blatant*.

However, overstressing the distinction between the two contexts in relation to the development of equality legislation risks defining one context, the UK, as more 'advanced' and 'developed' and the other, Poland, as

'backward' and 'less developed'. This hegemonic relation between the West and the East in Europe has been strengthened by the European integration process when countries from Central and Eastern Europe were expected to adjust their laws and standards to accord with so-called 'proper' European values in order to become members of the European Union (Kuus 2004). As Hegde (2011: 3) has argued, 'with the transnational circulation of media images, the hegemony of the West is reproduced in the global imaginary as the site of progressive sexual politics and cosmopolitan modernity' (see also Vieten 2012). Amongst both our Polish and British interviewees the West was commonly idealised as a place free from homophobia. While some Polish participants argued that as homophobia is challenged and reduced Poland will become more 'civilised', British respondents situated this prejudice in Central and Eastern Europe. Here, LGBT rights are falsely read as symbolic of a country's development and sophistication. This assumption that prejudice either happened in another time – the past – or happens elsewhere – Poland, rather than the UK – risks dangerous complacency.

Homophobia is not just a Central and Eastern European phenomenon. Rather, as we have demonstrated in this chapter, it is present in both the UK and Poland, albeit taking a different form and being visible to differing degrees in the two places. As such, we argue there is a need to pay more attention to the different ways homophobia is expressed across Europe by recognising the specificity of different national contexts while also continuing to recognise the connectivity between homophobia in different contexts. In this way we might expose the contours of prejudice which enable us to more effectively pursue policies to eradicate it in all its forms.

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DAVINA COOPER AND DIDI HERMAN

When Beliefs Become Property: Liberal Legal Discourse, Employee Resistance and Anti-Gay Christian Politics[1]

ABSTRACT: This chapter explores contemporary British conservative Christian legal demands that their religious-based objections to providing services to lesbians and gay men be accommodated by employers and other public bodies. Focusing on a series of court judgments, the chapter explores the dominant interpretation of the conflict as one of two groups with deeply held, competing interests. It argues that these interests can usefully be approached as social property – that is, as things that the state recognises, protects and empowers. Drawing on this framework to understand the conflict as one of property, the chapter explores the question of who conservative Christian workers' labour belongs to, whether a property framework can provide a useful language for thinking about resistance and transgression, and finally whether a radical politics in relation to religious beliefs and sexual identity necessitates going beyond property's terms.

Introduction

A striking development in early twenty-first-century Britain has been religiously motivated litigation over lesbian and gay equality arising from the development of recent anti-discrimination laws. Culminating in the

1 This is a revised and edited version of a longer earlier paper, which appears as 'Up Against the Property Logic of Equality Law: Conservative Christian Accommodation Claims and Gay Rights', *Feminist Legal Studies* (2013) 21:61–80.

Equality Act 2010, the Labour government introduced an array of anti-discrimination measures, focused on employment, goods and services. These deepened coverage for existing 'characteristics' such as gender and race, and extended it to new 'characteristics', such as religion and sexuality. These reforms, particularly in relation to sexual orientation, parallel developments across other jurisdictions where anti-discrimination and liberal human rights have been extended. In Britain, developing legal protection for sexual minorities provided a late stage in the institutional manifestation of gay sexual politics, which moved from decriminalisation and the development of local government initiatives in the 1980s, to the equality measures of the post-1997 Labour government. But this move towards formal liberal equality did not go unchallenged. In the face of ongoing conservative Christian attempts to thwart or impede gay rights, twenty-first-century measures to extend anti-discrimination protection on grounds of both sexuality and religious beliefs opened up a new terrain of conflict. For the past few years, conservative Christians have sought to use anti-discrimination and human rights law to legalise their right not to comply with the new gay equality requirements. Cases to end up in British courts include a marriage registrar who refused to officially register gay civil partnerships;[2] a counsellor who felt unable to provide psycho-sexual counselling for same-sex couples;[3] a prospective fostering couple who refused to create a gay-positive home;[4] a church diocese that wouldn't employ a gay youth worker;[5] guest-house owners who wouldn't let gay couples share a room;[6] and a magistrate who asked to withdraw from family court decisions involving prospective gay parents.[7] Similar cases have occurred in other jurisdictions, with some variation in their legal framing, particularly in the USA and Canada.

2 *Ladele* v *LB Islington* [2009] IRLR 154 (EAT); [2010] IRLR 211 (CA).
3 *McFarlane* v *Relate Avon* [2010] IRLR 196 (EAT); [2010] IRLR 872 (CA).
4 *R* (*Johns*) v *Derby City Council* (2011) EWHC 375 (Admin)
5 *Reaney* v *Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance* 1602844/2006 (ET)
6 *Bull and Bull* v. *Hall and Preddy* [2012] EWA 83; *Black and Morgan* v. *Wilkinson*, [2013] EWCA Civ 820.
7 *McClintock* v *Department of Constitutional Affairs* [2008] IRLR 29.

In Britain, this legal drama over conservative Christian withdrawal has generated extensive scholarship (e.g. Leigh 2008; Malik 2011; Parkinson 2011; Rivers 2007; Stychin 2009a, 2009b; Vickers 2010, 2011). What is striking, however, given the diverse sexual politics of the different commentators, is the degree of academic convergence that has taken shape around a particular narrative of the conflict. This is a narrative of two groups with competing interests and attachments, whose respective claims to equality or freedom deserve tolerance, respect and understanding. In the discussion that follows, we seek to explore this shared narrative, which interestingly, despite many commentators' criticisms of the judgments, also pervades the courts' decisions. Our argument is that, at the heart of this narrative, is a 'social property'[8] paradigm in which beliefs and sexuality constitute part of individuals' estate – things that can be invested in, possessed and secured from the (destructive) reach of others. Thus, this approach extends Macpherson's (1962) influential work on 'possessive individualism' which underscored both the role property owning plays in capitalist liberal society, and the extent to which property relations anchor and frame people's relationship to their person, capacities and labour. Today, both sexuality and religious faith have become legally and politically intelligible within the British polity in these propertied terms, as characteristics that belong to subjects and which, to varying degrees, can be developed, shared, accessed, and left. British equality law has done much tacitly to consolidate this framework, with its emphasis on balance, 'property' conflicts and recognised interests. Yet, the terms of social property cannot be reduced to getting the balance right – making sure each identity has what is owed to it. Property claims are far more unruly and multifarious; and subversive practices, such as squatting, defacement, theft or re-appropriation, demonstrate how activities, rendered intelligible in property terms, can work politically to undercut new emergent hegemonies, including gay equality.

8 How religious belief and sexuality have come to function in this way is a complex story. It is also a very partial development, for sexuality and religion in Britain are not only conflicting interests or grounds confronting each other in disputes precipitated by equality law.

A social property approach

> There is no doubt that in many discussions culture is treated as a possessive property of individuals, as a free-floating signifier, as static and given and as a thing that we carry with us. (Anthias 2011, 204)

Dominant social characteristics make different kinds of capital, status and power available, as Cheryl Harris's (1992) influential work on whiteness as property demonstrates (see also Ahmed 2007; Grabham 2009; Keenan 2010; Lipsitz 2006). Masculinity, bourgeois class positioning, Christianity and heterosexuality, in Britain, arguably work similarly. On the one hand, they appear as properties or social characteristics of the self; that is, as qualities which people experience as integral to who they are. On the other hand, such properties function as 'investments' – as kinds of capital or wealth that can be accumulated, worked at and protected in order to maintain their wider social force and impact. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that conservative Christian organisations in Britain, the USA and Canada – most notably in the Boy Scouts of America case[9] – have sought to oust 'out' gay members, students, youth workers, and staff in an effort to maintain control over their collective bodies, to keep their Christian 'property' uncontaminated by dissident sexualities. In the past, such behaviour generated progressive concern but was largely untouchable through law. Now, equality law has entered the fray – a legal structure we can understand as *re-allocating* social property – or at least threatening to. In its refusal to prefer heterosexualities over gay ones or Christian beliefs over others – anti-discrimination law troubles the legal capital (and social power) that particular sexual and religious identities worked intensively to secure and protect; and which, in turn, they relied upon.

We can thus read the legal drama over conservative Christians' refusal to provide gay men and lesbians with equal treatment as a political response to equality laws' recalibration of Christian social property – a refusal on the

9 *Boy Scouts of America* v. *Dale* 530 U.S. 640 (2000).

part of religious proponents to accept the explicit and implicit demotion of Christianity as a valuable attachment. Yet, what is interesting, and perhaps unexpected in the context of British constitutional life with its established Anglican church, is that Christian litigants' demands that their beliefs be respected as a legitimate basis for refusal was largely rejected by the courts. Judges refused to treat the requirement that Christian service-providers and employees treat gay people equally as a form of actionable discrimination against Christians. Drawing on our social property framework, we can understand this judicial denial as a diminishment of Christianity's capital, but how exactly did it take place?

Three judicial techniques stand out: narrowing what counts as the propertied 'object' (i.e. Christian beliefs); restricting the terrain in which such beliefs can exert effects; and authorising a counter-set of propertied interests, namely that of employers to their workers' labour. We will discuss each in turn. If, as Christian litigants claim, religious beliefs should rightly function as grounds for treating people differently (in other words, if religious beliefs can exempt their holders from complying with equality law requirements in relation to sexuality), the question arises as to what constitutes legitimate beliefs. In certain contexts, particularly in relation to 'philosophical' beliefs, this question becomes one of whether *the belief in general* is recognised by equality law.[10] In the cases discussed here, there was no question of whether Christianity, in general, constituted a recognised belief. Instead, a second question was posed: what actually constitutes *Christian* belief? In *Ladele*, a case concerning a London registrar who did not want to conduct same-sex civil partnerships on religious grounds, the judge, Neuberger MR, remarked: Ms Ladele's 'objection was based on her view of marriage, *which was not a core part of her religion*' (213, italics added).[11]

Judicial readiness to determine the parameters of the religious propertied object (just as they might determine the boundary to a piece of land) has not, however, gone unchallenged. Several commentators have

10 E.g. see *Grainger PLC* v *Nicholson* [2010] IRLR 4.
11 *Ladele* v *LB Islington* [2010] IRLR 211 (CA).

criticised judicial attempts to distinguish between a religious core and periphery (the judicial implication being that the latter should not count as power-bearing property). Lucy Vickers (2010, 295), for example, writes: 'It is not for the court to determine the status of religious views as either core or peripheral, as these are matters which are arguably beyond the competence of any secular court.'

If the courts are not to determine the scope of the propertied object, and must simply defer to the views of property-holders themselves, what role, if any, can they play in determining the *geography* of use-rights – those sectors and places where religious attachments are to be recognised, since 'property here is not necessarily property there' (Keenan 2010, 429)? Judges go out of their way to express respect for religious (and other) beliefs as forming *legitimate* attachments. Nevertheless, the courts declare such attachments cannot function as acceptable reasons for withdrawing services or refusing to do one's job. In *Ladele*, the Court of Appeal declared, 'Ms Ladele was employed in a public job and was working for a public authority. She was being required to perform a purely secular task, which was being treated as part of her job.'[12]

Placing limits on *where* religious attachments can be legitimately actualised (and so able to make a social difference) has come under criticism (Stychin 2009a, 35; Ryder 2006).[13] Commentators claim that placing walls around the domains where faith can exert an influence – in effect privatising or closeting religious expression – damages subjects who inhabit multiple overlapping spaces; misreads the world-making character of (much) religion; and undermines the contribution and value of religious identifications. Commenting on the Canadian version of the *Ladele* case, Bruce Ryder (2006, 12–13) remarks:

> Religion is indeed functioning here as the new gay: just as the display of minority sexual orientations in the public sphere invited persecution in Canada in the past, now religious public servants... are being asked to choose between keeping their jobs and acting in accordance with their religious beliefs.

12 [2010] IRLR 211 at 213.

13 For a different approach, see Malik (2011); MacDougall and Short (2010, 149).

What this trade-off between beliefs and work reveals is the complex character of social property. On the one hand, at issue is the propertied attachment of Christian litigants (as public service providers) to their faith; on the other, is the property relationship between such service providers and their work. Central to several of the cases we are discussing is the question: who owns the labour? Does public sector work belong to those who do it, to their employers, to the state, even to God? And how, if at all, do workers' religious attachments affect the character and ownership of their labour? Is the service that Christian 'conscientious objectors' provide as counsellors, adjudicators, police-officers, teachers and marriage registrars *inevitably and legitimately* 'coloured' by their religious attachments or should conservative Christian providers be expected to exercise self-control in order to keep their religious attachments and investments away from their job? If they cannot exercise such self-discipline, what wider relations of belonging and attachment become precarious as a consequence?

Disavowed attachments

For those conservative Christians who refuse to comply with work-based obligations to sign civil partnership registers, provide psycho-sexual counselling to lesbian and gay couples, represent gay sexuality positively as teachers or raise fostered children in gay-sensitive ways, the stakes in the struggle over their labour are high. Disciplinary action, exclusion from state-organised fostering arrangements, and the risk of getting fired suggest conservative Christians' labour (like that of other staff) belongs to the state employer; and that it constitutes a human resource, which employers can use and direct as they deem fit (also Pateman 2002). But, these cases are not simply about litigants' refusal to support, through their labour, an agenda or project to which they are hostile. The relationship of conservative Christian objectors to what it is they are being required to do is more complex and contested since, from their perspective, something of themselves appears involuntarily to stick to the gay-positive future of legal relationships, sexual

coupledom, parenting, teaching and growing up that they are being asked, through their labour, to help create. Conservative Christian litigants seem *morally* implicated in what they do. Thus, they reject the claims of employers and the state that the work has nothing to do with them since they are employed to act on behalf of (or to represent) another body with authority or proprietary rights over what they have produced or done. Conservative Christians refute the moral alienability of their bodies and its actions, that they can simply be tuned (or re-tuned) as employees or public sector agents to a different moral project. If, in Lockean terms, property becomes vested in what subjects have made, here litigants make visible – even as they refuse – this relationship, demanding the right to disinvest.

Conservative Christian litigants' claims that their *disavowed attachments* to their work be recognised and respected have not been upheld by the courts. Rather, the courts argue, since workers' labour belongs to their employer, a local council can quite properly require that all its staff act in a non-discriminatory fashion. In *McFarlane*, a case concerning a Christian therapist who felt unable to give psycho-sexual counselling to lesbian couples, the court held that it was justifiable for his employer, *Relate*, to require that staff adhere to equality principles, which *Relate* regarded as fundamental.[14] Not only are the organisation's principled policies deemed to be beyond the control of (individual) employees, they are also deemed to be autonomous of laws emanating from a 'higher', theistic power. As Laws LJ remarked in the case of *McFarlane*, 'The individual conscience is free to accept such dictated law; but the state, if its people are to be free, has the burdensome duty of thinking for itself'.[15] For the state to behave otherwise would be to allow religious belief to act 'as a solvent dissolving all inconsistent legal obligations owed to the employer. That plainly cannot be right. Indeed, given in particular the fact that beliefs may cover a vast range of subjective opinions, the consequences would be extraordinary' (Elias J. *Ladele*).[16]

14 [2010] IRLR 196 (EAT); [2010] IRLR 872 (CA).
15 [2010] IRLR 872 at 876 (CA).
16 [2009] IRLR 154 at 163 (EAT).

But, while the courts declare that employers' property in their workers' labour, and organisations' property in their policies, can legitimately limit how staff manifest their religious attachments, commentators worry about the consequences. If religious beliefs lose their propertied value, will believers' social and political membership in the polity likewise diminish? In other words, will a decline in what belongs to the religious subject affect the capacity of that subject to belong in turn? Bruce Ryder (2006, 18), writing in a context of rising Islamophobia in Canada, argues: 'The pressures to adopt policies that force people of faith to choose between adherence to their faith and full membership in Canadian society need to be vigorously resisted in the current context.' Ryder's words resonate with the cases discussed here given that a significant proportion of the British cases involve Black Christian members of minority churches – a constituency arguably vulnerable to wider forms of social exclusion.[17] But while such Black British Christians may never have been able to exercise much power *as a result of and through* their faith, no property power is completely stable. It all depends on recognition by authorising bodies and, as such, any religious property can be vulnerable to becoming non-property or even a kind of negative property – in the sense of generating disadvantages rather than advantages for its members.[18] In the United States, activists and commentators have critically addressed the problem of making access to state

17 The fact that a significant number of the cases involve black litigants raises for us important questions – particularly, in relation to how the racialised experiences of Black British employees affect individual choices to enact, and organisational decisions about responding to, non-conforming behaviour within public organisations. To what extent, for instance, do organisational cultures informally accommodate white non-compliance in ways not shown to black and other minority workers? Court judgments also need to be read in terms of their naturalisation of mainstream, white-dominated Anglicanism at the expense of more charismatic and evangelical alternatives, reinforcing the cultural association of Black churches with homophobia – an association explored in other contexts by Douglas, Jivraj, and Lamble, eds. (2011); see also Herman (2012).

18 For a discussion of non-property, see D. Cooper, 'Improper attachments, or who do anti-abortion posters belong to?' http://davinascooper.wordpress.com/2014/03/29/improper-attachments-or-who-do-anti-abortion-posters-belong-to

resources conditional on one's political acceptability, and the relations of exclusion that can ensue as a result (e.g. Hodge 2002; Reich 1964). In the present conflict, conservative Australian commentator, Patrick Parkinson (2011, 294) writes, the 'emerging policy of moral monoculturalism… [denies] employees the right to hold moral positions on the issue of same-sex relationships that differ [] from the majority acceptance of them'. He continues, 'the new majority… [needs to] offer a reciprocal level of respect to those who hold different beliefs' (295).[19]

The problem of excluding people from work, membership or state resources because of their beliefs acquires a particular shape in the court judgments discussed here. People are assumed to be self-possessed, rational, independent decision-makers who can be held responsible for the consequences pursuant to their decisions. Those who don't like the consequences should make different decisions; in other words, they should exercise the property held in their self differently. For Mr McFarlane, the *Relate* counsellor, his case is undermined by the fact that he signed up to his employer's equality policy when appointed – the implication being that if he did not support their policy he should not have taken the job. Maleiha Malik (2011, 34) makes a similar point in relation to *Ladele* – namely, if Ms Ladele did not like Islington Council's equality and diversity policy, she had the 'right to freedom of religion or belief by taking up another job'.

Adopting a liberal framework in which actors are seen to have, and so relied upon having, other options, the courts treat the sexuality equality requirements applied to those taking up public employment (and other goods) as acceptable.[20] Since they can leave and work elsewhere, employees

19 Certainly, in considering the right of public and private bodies to control employees or service users' behaviour, it is important to recognise the extent to which Christian organisations have sought to exercise control over the marital and sexual lives of their employees and members, through the legal right to exclude those, such as 'out' gays, whose personal decisions and identities do not conform to wider organisational values.

20 Although see case of *Eweida and Others* v. *The United Kingdom*; Judgment of the ECHR 15 January 2013, paras 106, 109.

always retain a residual property in themselves (a retention that is crucial, in liberal terms, if the temporary transfer of property in one's labour to an employer is to constitute legitimate employment as opposed to illegitimate servitude). Supporters of a religious right to exemption from sexuality equality provisions, in contrast, reject the notion that a fair choice exists. Adopting a position more commonly associated with the left, they argue that quitting a job so as to avoid compelled compliance with an employer's policies is not a free decision, but one forced on the religious worker. Yet, while conservative Christians question the market value of the residual property right retained in the self on which liberals heavily rely, conservative Christian refusal also provides a very clear affirmation of the 'property' remaining in oneself. This is not a property that is virtual or pending, activated only by quitting as liberals suggest, but a property that is claimed at the very moment that the labouring body refuses to perform the actions that their employer demands.

Beyond the balanced state

Approached through equality law, social property takes on a particular sheen – equated with fair shares and the need to ensure no one is legally dispossessed. Discussing the cases, Malik (2011: 34) argues for a balancing, which gives 'importance to both sets of rights'. Vickers (2012, 210) proposes an approach that is 'open textured', based on 'proportionality and equilibrium between competing interests'. For Stychin, an important part of the move towards resolution is the 'goal of civility and the hope that areas of common ground might be found' (2009b, 749). He remarks: 'we are left with tolerance as a basis for moving forward' (2009b, 753).

The attention commentators have paid to finding win-win forms of resolution is important. It recognises the value of protecting people's income and welfare; not creating embittered losers; being careful about the deployment of state power; and promoting dialogue and understanding

between different constituencies.[21] However, what can get lost in the process of identifying mutually agreeable resolution strategies is a perspective able to stand back from the naturalised attachments, which more proximate accounts of the dispute tend to generate. With some distance from the desire to resolve the conflict according to the terms on which it has been fought, namely of conservative Christian opposition to gay rights, we can consider the wider political stakes, including the demands of a progressive (even radical) institutional politics, and the place of conservative dissent within it. In the limited space remaining, we want to briefly identify how social property can illuminate this broader terrain, providing a language through which the relationship between progressive hegemonic developments and their on-going contestation can be both addressed and affirmed, in the face of equality law's tendency to identify trumping interests or find a compromising balance.

Focused on the relationship between attachment and power, the concept of social property centres belonging, and what it is that relations of belonging can do (see also Cooper 2014). Although the disputes we discuss are foremost concerned with the propertisation of religious faith and sexual orientation (alongside property in one's labour), they also gesture to another property stake – the attachment/ power nexus associated with the nation-state, where the nation is both that which belongs, and that which holds the belonging of others. For pivotal to this legal drama are the terms on which such nation-state belonging is to occur. As politically active conservative Christian organisations resourcing and supporting the litigants make clear, their ambitions go beyond mere accommodation. As the website of Christian Concern, who run the Christian Legal Centre that backed McClintock, McFarlane and the Johns, declares,

> At Christian Concern we have a passion to see the United Kingdom return to the Christian faith. Our nation has been shaped and defined by this faith for hundreds of years. Yet in the last few decades the nation has largely turned her back on Jesus and embraced alternative ideas such as secular liberal humanism, moral relativism

21 For a useful discussion of ways of resolving equality disputes outside of the courtroom, see Afridi and Warmington (2010); see also Valentine and Waite (2012).

> and sexual licence. The fruit of this is rotten… Yet we believe that this nation has a hope, and that hope can be found in Jesus Christ… We need to be passionate about our faith and became a light and a witness to the nation.[22]

Asserting historic ties of reciprocal belonging between church and nation, conservative Christian forces argue for the strengthening and sustenance of such connections (Herman 1997). Legal recognition of conservative Christian religious attachments, and what such attachments are entitled to receive, becomes integral to the task of re-attaching Britain to Christianity so that people can be saved and returned to God. Against this project is a liberal one, overtly less focused on the question of to whom (or what) the nation belongs than on who belongs to Britain. Thus, court judgments in this dispute emphasise Britain's pluralistic character. In *Johns*, the case of the prospective foster parents, unable to present sexual identity in gay-positive ways, Munby J remarked, 'We sit as secular judges serving a multi-cultural community of many faiths. … the laws and usages of the realm do not include Christianity, in whatever form. The aphorism that 'Christianity is part of the common law of England' is mere rhetoric' [Johns, 506].[23] Similarly, in *McFarlane*, Laws LJ commented that no one faith belongs more than any other (877).[24]

Focused on the attachment-recognition-power relationship, the concept of social property elucidates these expectations, claims and relations. At the same time, it also offers a way of recognising and making visible challenges to hegemony – whether from the left or the right. But what value for a liberal democracy can be found in such dissident actions? According

22 http://www.christianconcern.com/about [last accessed 13 January 2013].

23 *Johns* v *Derby CC* [2011] 1 FCR 493.

24 The proprietary character of this liberal form of multicultural belonging – in the sense of the obligations and conditions that attach to members – is not highlighted in the court decisions. This is left to other state processes. While an explicit depiction of citizens or residents as properties of the liberal nation-state (able to be deployed to extend the state's influence and impact) is rarely articulated in contemporary Britain, the *terms* of belonging frequently are – whether it is to speak English, become employed, bear an appropriately shaped body or refrain from 'radical' political activity (also Grabham 2009).

to agonistic feminists and others, institutional processes within a liberal polity should not be too tranquil (e.g. Mouffe 2005). Even progressive forms of order require some disorder, organisation some disorganisation, for a vibrant, dynamic, responsive politics to flourish. Sarah Keenan (2010, 2014) has written about subversive property practices in relation to Aboriginal Australian politics. She (2014) describes such subversive practices as relations of belonging that are out of place – the introduction of things and bodies that unsettle dominant forms of spatial legibility. The disputes discussed here can also be read as dissident (or subversive) property relationships as litigants' refuse to do what is required of them, using the property held in their bodies and labour to reject official policies. Indeed, we might read Christian claims to be exempted from sexuality equality laws as a form of 'squatting', staying in post and refusing to yield; making use of available occupational resources to which they have an uncertain (or denied) right. Thus, while legal commentaries largely focus on outcomes – a focus that generates varying disquiet at conservative Christians' apparent disenfranchisement, an account focused on conservative Christian engagement in subversive social property acts recognises their capacity to act, the performance and accomplishment of subversive property, without necessarily valuing the grounds upon which such challenges are made (see Cooper 2015).

Dissident social property practices are not, however, free-standing, isolated events. Beliefs, bodies and identities can be used to assert a relationship of belonging that, by simultaneously acknowledging and resisting exclusion, expresses a desire to be included within the 'we'. Dissident practices can also give rise to reciprocating counter-actions, of renovation, cultivation, and stewardship, as other actors get involved, keen to resist the encroachments of disavowed, dissident others. In *Ladele*, for instance, Islington council appears, from the judgment facts, to have been impelled to act as a result of the pressure coming from the Christian registrar's gay colleagues (157, EAT). Perhaps motivated by the contingent and precarious character of their own attachment to Islington council (as a place where they could belong and comfortably dwell), council staff demanded that Islington recognise and affirm ownership of its equality and diversity policy as a relationship that created steward-like obligations of operationalisation upon it.

Using the concept of social property here, in relation to liberal democracies, allows us to explore the agonistic, turbulent, dynamic quality of political, social and legal claims and action; where what counts as theft, dispossession, settling, squandering, appropriation, borrowing, gifting, seizures or trespass depends upon one's perspective and the balance of force relations. But while property may identify, elucidate and *even affirm* the value and richness of conflicts often understood in other terms, it also has limitations. Particularly, we want to suggest, it is limited as a normative framework when it comes to sexual orientation and religious belief by its assumption that such phenomena are thing-like: that they can be possessed, invested in, deployed and protected from the predations of others.

Certainly, from a feminist perspective, the depiction of religious faith and sexuality as social property may seem a step on the road to rendering them less structural or systemic social processes. For, as social property, they can be extracted, harnessed and, at least theoretically, transferred or destroyed. Lisa Adkins (2005) makes a related point in her discussion of gender as a flexible occupational resource that male workers, in particular, can take up in non-conventional ways. While her work is critical of the corporate implications of this trend, we might read the de-structuring evident in the disputes discussed as, in part, the state's off-loading of its own social property. As sexuality and religious beliefs cease to be phenomena that *belong* to the liberal state, 'things' that states structurally and systemically deploy (even as the state is structured by them in turn), they become instead properties that individuals, groups and corporations are deemed capable of freely taking up (and, if they choose, relinquishing). But what would it mean to go further and actually *de-propertise* religion and sexuality so that they no longer constituted social properties at all?

Undoing attachments; fragmenting and diffusing sexualities and religious beliefs so that they become fluid and undefinable; refusing to convert either beliefs or sexualities into symbolic forms that make extraction from the social fabric possible; withdrawing the institutional recognition necessary for them to extend their property-holding subjects powerfully into the world – constitute some forms this could take. Certainly, we do not want to suggest such processes are especially evident in the cases discussed. Indeed, our discussion has been premised on the extent to which both judgments

and commentary appear, rather, wedded to a propertied logic of investment, accumulation and attachment, where sexuality and even more religious belief come to form coherent, knowable wholes. At the same time, a thinner conception of both faith and sexuality emerges in the *refusal* of judgments and commentators to compare faith and sexuality's respective normative worth, and in the equivocation expressed when it comes to the question of propertied objects' scope and geography – of what it is exactly that legally counts and where. Together, these tendencies gesture to the possibility of a different, less propertied way of understanding, but also of *forging*, social subjects' relationship to post-rational (or spiritual) beliefs and sexualities. We might imagine a context in which both appear – not as things which belong, or to which constituencies belong, that may be accumulated, fortified, mastered, and which, like other forms of property, help certain subjects to extend into the world in particular powerful ways – but instead as tastes, desires, stimulations, modes of enchantment and cares. What are the implications of such a move towards the plural and contingent re-assembling of faith and sexuality, within liberal democracies, as creative engagements and explorations that cannot be possessed and owned, and that do not, in turn, possess or own either? Might these be processes to which a progressive institutional and organisational politics could productively contribute?

Conclusion

Our analysis in this chapter was originally motivated by the surprising degree of common ground between legal commentators who, despite holding quite different political ideologies, were equally critical of what seemed – at least at first glance – to be gay-positive, secular-affirming court decisions. Our aim was to understand this common ground, to reflect upon its stakes, and to consider whether such stakes could be approached in other ways. This double-move of understanding and de-familiarising the framing of the conflict as one of competing interests, equally deserving of attention and respect, took us to a conception of social property.

Focusing on social property both highlights and re-frames the challenge that equality law poses by its unsettling and resettling of the power that different attachments can generate and exercise. Social property highlights equality law's buy-in to the myth of balance, an aspirational ideal in which different attachments co-exist in equilibrium – discrete entities whose relationship to each other is neither constitutive nor relational. At the same time, it highlights the current position, within British equality law decisions, in which one side's propertied win is the other side's propertied loss. And it also highlights the complex relationship between ownership of beliefs and identity, on the one hand, and ownership of workers' labour and public sector resources, on the other. From a progressive perspective, Christian litigants' refusal to fully give property in themselves or their work to their employers is striking. Treating compliance as moral approval of gay-positive futures, Christian litigants deny a narrative which treats their labour as belonging fully to their employer (or to public authorities). This stubborn refusal of those labouring to recognise the alienation that they have already formally acceded to is criticised by the judges; academic commentators vary in their response. However, where commentators and judges converge (with very few exceptions) is in the value to be afforded religious belief.

Transcendent, post-rational identifications, relations, practices and sensations may provide challenging, enriching, phenomenological ways of experiencing the world. But such forms of enchantment are not what these cases are about. What is, instead, at issue are the conservative dimensions of religious beliefs, where gay sex and same-sex unions are interpreted as 'contrary to God's instructions'.[25] Thus, while we recognise the dangers of excluding people from public resources and from participation within the polity, including through unemployment, our aim here has not been to affirm conservative Christian anti-gay refusal. Instead, we are interested in the challenge that such refusal poses for a progressive state politics.

Thus, in the final part of the chapter, we considered the contribution social property could conceptually make to thinking about the relationship between hegemonic and anti-hegemonic projects. Yet, while property helps

25 *Ladele*, ET quoted in CA, 215.

us think about what is at stake, and while its frameworks and language can provide a grammar for exploring contested political claims and attachments, its emphasis on possession and reification is less useful for thinking about sexuality and faith themselves. Our argument is not that sexuality and religion should *return* to functioning as socially embedded formations (to the extent they no longer work in this way within liberal polities such as Britain, which we, like many others, would question). Rather, what we want to consider is what it might mean to take the recalibration of property in faith and sexuality, which equality law promises, further. Considering post-propertied versions of sexuality and faith is challenging on several fronts. It requires us to think about what disinvestment and detachment might look like; it also requires ways of imagining sexuality and faith as neither subject formations (to which people belong) nor as chosen goods or properties of the (individual or collective) self. Would this kind of detachment render both too light, losing much of the value that sexuality and faith hold in terms of group identification and belonging? Does it, perhaps, mean thinking about faith and sexuality separately from other kinds of collective ethnic and cultural investments? Conversely, could detachment suggest a stronger investment – in terms of 'being' rather than 'holding'? These are open questions, which bringing property's organisational logic into the framing of equality politics might help us – even provoke us – to explore.

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ROSEMARY PEACOCK, ANITA SARGEANT AND NEIL SMALL

Facial Difference, Consumer Culture and Being 'Normal'

ABSTRACT: More than half a million people in the UK have a significant facial difference. Some of these people are born with this. Some acquire difference through accident, for example burns, or as a result of medical treatment, for example for head and neck cancer. People live with visible facial difference in a society that has prevalent discursive formations of difference associated with gendered ideals about health and beauty. In this chapter we consider the relevance of the face for communication and examine implications of facial difference for social selves and, in particular, for personal communities. We report interviews that consider different aspects of an aesthetics of inclusion. Cultural cosmopolitanism requires an ability to empathise with the other, celebrate difference and diversity, and possess interactional and semiotic skills to convey this. There is a tension in achieving the openness to the other required by cultural cosmopolitanism for people with facial difference.

Introduction

The face is not the property of an individual; it is a key part of our communicating body. It is performed, in social interaction (Goffman 1982), and seen and responded to within historicised and gendered ideals of the normal and of beauty. The normal and the beautiful have a particular resonance in a visually mediated consumer society: 'looks matter'. But more than half-a million people in the UK have a significant disfigurement to their face (Changing Faces 2007). This chapter explores the way facial difference illuminates debates on bodily representation. It explores how people living with visible facial difference invoke discursive formations of

disfigurement (Garland-Thomson 2009). It asks how we encounter and respond to facial difference and examines how close personal relationships can offer a source of support. The chapter contextualises the relevance of the face for communication and then examines implications for social selves in personal communities. Seventeen people living with visible facial difference were interviewed as part of a PhD study and interview extracts illuminate different aspects of the aesthetics of inclusion. The study explored patterns of personal communities and the interplay with lived realities of people with visible facial difference. The quintessentially embodied nature of this sort of difference illuminates the experience of the cosmopolitan. Cultural cosmopolitanism requires an ability to empathise with others and to celebrate difference and diversity (Held 2002). It requires that we have the semiotic skills to interpret images of others (Urry 2000). We can see in both the self-perception of people with visible facial difference and in their accounts of the responses of others to them a continuing challenge to achieving cosmopolitanism. It is hard to look past the face.

Bodily representation

Images of the face, alongside idealised notions of self-transformation with the aid of surgery, style advice and appearance make-overs enable a presentation of the self that communicates confidence. These images are widespread in consumer society (Featherstone 2010). Ideals of beauty can be historicised and relativised with contemporary variants positioning beauty as something that can be bought, modified or fixed (Synnott 1988). People with visible facial difference have long lived alongside the promise of plastic surgery and its close relation, cosmetic surgery. Plastic and reconstructive surgery can save lives, improve function and offer a promise of restoring faces closer to facial normality. Cosmetic surgery on the other hand is better known for its promise to smooth over processes of ageing. A celebrity focussed, visual culture has been implicated in producing rising levels

of body dissatisfaction among 'normal' people (Rumsey and Harcourt 2012). It can, however, be viewed as making more commonplace the (surgically) changed appearance, questioning ideas of the 'natural' and thereby increasing interest in understanding the dynamics of altered appearance or modification of the body (Featherstone 2010). Images of facial differences are present in fairy tales, literature, films and on television in the form of make-over shows, dating games and documentaries of facial reconstruction. A range of character positions make apparently physiognomic linkages between visible disfigurement and moral judgements, positioning scarred or damaged faces with 'bad' or 'damaged' character (Twine 2002; Partridge 2012). Although the 'science' of physiognomy has had its day, it lives on culturally through these representations which serve as heuristic devices linking meanings of visible difference and moral judgments about what appearance may say about individual character. These images form part of our collective imaginations about the meaning of visible facial difference and serve as part of our social context.

Twine (2002) historicises discourses of physiognomy, finding indications that judging by appearance is neither timeless nor absolute. But he is not seeking to underestimate embodiment:

> ...my particular critique of physiognomy is not about excluding the body from our self-constitution, but about resisting the body's entrapment within physiognomic discourse that tends to define our bodies for us. (Twine 2002, 83)

Individuals who live with visible facial differences experience higher social visibility. Their difference can affect interactions with other people as well as feelings about the self (Rumsey and Harcourt 2005; Uttjek et al. 2007; Feragen 2012). But Twine (2002) questions the value of popular faith in direct representational relationships between a visual appearance and generalised meaning. This line of argument has been taken by others. Garland-Thomson (2011), taking a perspective informed by critical feminist disability theory, contends that shared human experience of embodiment is influenced by a cultural ability/disability system of significance. This affects how we see and live the limits of our bodies, their aesthetics and appearance. She defines the ability/disability system as:

> ...a pervasive cultural system that stigmatises certain kinds of bodily variation. (Garland-Thomson 2011, 17)

This perspective challenges ideas that differences associated with disability are about inferiority or tragedy. Instead comparison of bodies is seen as embedded in culture and used to interpret an unequal distribution of resources, status, and power within a biased social environment (Garland-Thomson 2011). This broader view of disability is able to include ideological categories such as 'ugly', 'maimed' and 'mad'. Garland-Thomson's argument is that this ability/disability system serves to privilege categories such as 'beautiful', 'healthy', and 'normal' and it is in the interaction between bodies and the world that disability becomes material above and beyond usual human variation.

Appearance norms have a long history within western culture (Synnott 1988) and the perspective offered by Garland-Thomson adds that health norms provide similar cultural functions. These cultural ideas, alongside market mechanisms, push bodies towards a set of standards called 'normal' and 'beautiful'. From this perspective, the idea of beauty has become suffused with the idea of normal, producing a tendency at an individual level to avoid associations of 'disabled', 'ugly', 'fat' or 'raced'.

Encountering facial difference

Two of Goffman's central areas of concern, interaction order and stigma, are key in the sociology of facial difference (Goffman 1963, 1982 and 1990). All encounters take place within an 'interaction order' with socially and culturally situated rules of conduct, which all individuals are both subject to and creative of. Within this order Goffman described 'face-work' as a technique and a metaphor for a version of the self which is projected socially. It has ritualised forms which are recognised by others, such that if we get the rules of an encounter wrong it can be mutually embarrassing. Garland-Thomson (2009) reasons that atypical faces throw simple recognition rituals into

chaos, the loss of ability to read the social situation heightens the risk of uninvited 'face-work' coming about such as staring (we examine staring as both useful and destructive later). Goffman (1963) conceived of stigma as exhibiting both psychological and social processes, it is a condition of the interaction order rather than an objective of it. He identified 'discredited' persons as those whose social status is stigmatised and argued that it is apparent to others who respond to it. There are 'discreditable' person's whose stigmatised social status is not apparent, but who are responded to as if it were. It is significant that Goffman draws from the early work of Macgregor et al. (1953) on facial disfigurement to illustrate his argument. For Goffman the face is not the property of an individual but something performed or acted in social interaction, it is symbolic. Coupled with his conceptions of stigma, 'face-work' produces ways of interacting that seek to maintain 'face' in encounters and social interaction. Social situations are maintained by strategic cooperation between people using reciprocal face-work to maintain their own face as well as others'. This account has been critiqued and developed to incorporate conceptions of power and discrimination into stigmatisation processes (Link and Phelan 2001, 2006; Scambler 2009). Kleinman and Hall-Clifford (2009) suggest that stigma affects 'that which matters most' to people within their social and moral local worlds. That which matters most includes wealth, education, relationships and life chances. The face is central in human interaction, it functions as a means of communication and our face becomes our unique social identifier (Seymour and Lupton 2004). 'Face-work' produces shared ideas about what faces should look like, and how they should move. What is in danger of being lost by the impact of stigma is the integrity of a person's social self. The practices of 'face-work' acts as a mechanism for coping with bodily stigma (Talley 2008). Our eyes are drawn to faces of other people as the face is a key part of our communicating body. Black (2011) uses the idea of a 'multiplex' as a metaphor to understand the fluidity, complexity and lack of fixity that is the face. He argues that multiple accounts of the face (from social, psychological, medical and cultural perspectives) do not fully capture what a face is and what a face does. To see the face only in terms of 'subjectivisation' underplays the anatomical and cognitive uniqueness of the face as a living organ of communication and he argues that it is untenable

to regard communication as detachable from bodily materiality. Turning to how the face is used, Black (2011) highlights the cultural specificity of the ways that social interaction occurs; he writes:

> ...the face as a material component of the body, which is never fully fixed, grasped or possessed by the viewer of the face. (Black 2011, 21)

Socially constituted structures of significance are used to stabilise and fit faces into categories such as 'beautiful', 'ugly' or 'acceptable'. The face is presented as significant in the processes of recognition, communication and in creating relationships between bodies. Black concludes that the lack of fix in these biological and cultural processes leaves room for variation at the level of lived experience. Facial difference can be seen as having the potential to affect a number of complex, multiple, intra- and inter-personal processes involved in the interaction between an individual, the onlooker and society. Effects of bodily difference cannot be set aside in processes of interaction, having a body which is different affects perceptions and behaviour both of the person with the difference and of others. While visible facial difference may not (using a narrow definition of disability) disable, a loss of confidence connected to appearance can prevent people doing what others take for granted. People may need to negotiate difference in everyday life and being visibly different to others is important for both self-identity and inclusion.

A particular example of face work and of the operation of stigma is provided by Garland-Thompson. In 'Staring: How We Look' (Garland-Thompson 2009) she draws on Langer who hypothesised that people stare at 'novel stimuli' as a form of 'exploratory behaviour' (Langer et al. 1976, 461), as a means of reducing unease and uncertainty in an uncertain world. There is automaticity in staring:

> Stareable sights seduce us into an attention crisis in which random visual intrusions, not a disciplined will, assert control. (Garland-Thomson 2009, 21)

Staring has useful as well as destructive powers; it is a form of communication as well as an expression of dominance and stigma assignment. What Garland-Thomson argues is needed is a wedge between acts of staring and

negative judgements. She proposes an ethics of looking and of being looked at, and suggests that we consider how we should stare rather than whether we should stare.

> We become ethical starers by being conscious in the presence of something that compels our intense attention. What gives such attractions power in these formulations is their capacity to vivify human empathy through bearing actual witness..... the impulse to stare at novel sights, whether we understand them as conventionally beautiful or repulsive, can move us toward recognising a 'newness' that can be transformative. These stareable sights disturb not just the visual status quo but the ethical status quo as well. (Garland-Thomson 2009, 188).

Face work and the operation of stigma, including staring and the experience of being stared at, are situated within personal lives and social worlds.

Personal lives and social worlds

Early work (Macgregor et al. 1953) positioned 'facial deformity' as a source of psycho-social difficulty. It was argued that there was a potential for exclusion because of challenges in finding employment or marriage partners. The family was regarded as a haven in a hostile world. The social world is much changed since the 1950s not least through the impact of civil rights, feminist, and disabilities movements as well as questions about whether families are still sources of social cohesion in an individualised, post- modern, post-industrial, consumerist, networked global world (Giddens 1992; Plummer 2001; Bauman 2003 and 2004; Spencer and Pahl 2006). Macgregor et al. (1953) began exploring facial disfigurement in plastic and reconstructive surgery clinics at the end of the Second World War. She identified that having an atypical face was potentially a significant social problem for the person affected, as the face was central to the person and their social relations and interactions. She found the main difficulty associated with facial disfigurement as being a psycho-social threat to mental health. Some people living with disfigurement found establishing relationships problematic

and were hampered by beliefs that they could not be loved because of their appearance. Her interviewees spoke of experiences of rejection and as feeling unsuitable for marriage or their desired employment. Her studies explored families with children who were disfigured from time of birth or during childhood, its impact on the family and specifically on maternal attachment. Adult family relationships were not explored in depth, although 'success' in achieving friendships and marriage was recorded. Interviews were interpreted as indicating that some people had perceptions of having constrained relationship choices and of having married 'beneath their class'. Since Macgregor's work feminist scholarship have challenged the idea of family as simply supportive by revealing gendered inequalities and the role of the family in perpetuating these (Gillies 2003; Jamieson 1998). There has been an increase of divorce, and lower levels of marriage as well as more single parents and greater numbers of step-families. These changes have been used to illustrate significant transformations in personal relationships as developed under the various forms of the 'individualisation' hypothesis (Giddens 1992; Bauman 2003). This hypothesis characterises society as becoming more atomised and individuated. There is an increasing lack of commitment to others and an increase in isolation for some. Shakespeare (2006) expresses concerns that people living with disability may be disproportionately affected by social changes that increase isolation and disconnection. As well as social connection, relationship with others can be seen as constituting the self as a social self (Burkitt 2008; Ketokivi 2012). Burkitt (2008 and 2012) extends conceptions of the social self by taking a dialogic perspective. This takes a thin view of the individual with a thick social relational view to the self (Smith and Sparkes 2008). He addresses how sociocultural conceptions of subjectivity are able to incorporate damaging and conflictive aspects of how humans are with each other and themselves.

The complex and textured personal worlds of people living with facial difference reveal narratives of resisting, developing, and adjusting to living with being visibly different to people who surround them. Through narration of linkages and connections, stories of embodied emotional bonds emerge within a wider web of relationships and with a sense of social location (Smart 2007; Plummer 2001). Experiences which are personal also have social significance; they speak of acceptance, love, reciprocity and

living across difference. They also tell of rejection and loneliness (Smart 2007; Shakespeare 2006). Shakespeare (2006) identified isolation and loneliness at particular points in the life course for people with disabilities that is neither easily overcome by barrier removal nor explained by oppression alone. There are, he argues, well documented difficulties of interaction, reciprocity and respect between non-disabled and disabled people. Social networks and personal relationships enmesh our cultural, emotional, psychological and social well-being (Phillipson et al. 2004). We become who we are through our contacts with others, our friends, companions and families. Benefits are found from support and participation in social networks in areas of health (Gallant 2003), ageing (Allen, Blieszner and Roberto 2000) wellbeing and living with chronic health problems (Vassilev et al. 2010). Individuals' networks are also doorways to resources in the wider social world of work and education. Networks deliver more than support, having relational and affective dimensions of love, friendship, companionship, intimacy and generation of purpose (Smart 2007; Gabb 2008; Mason and Davies 2011; McCann and Roberto 2012). In a study of friendship Spencer and Pahl (2006) used the concept of personal communities to extend understanding of how people in postmodern times value a range of social ties. Characteristically, relationships with families and friends overlap and inter-relate in their functions. They explored degrees of connectedness and belonging, commitment to others and patterns of reliance on 'given' and 'chosen' ties. No single 'normal' pattern dominated. Spencer and Pahl (2006) explored the meanings of relationships within social networks and asked what connections 'do' in individual lives. Their study contributes to a growing number of empirical studies which challenge an 'individualisation' thesis (Jamieson 1998 and 2011; Smart 2007). They suggest that friend and friend-like relationships from families act as 'social glue' and provide a range of social connections. In some people's lives friends were more important than family and they argue that the role of personal relationships is under recognised as a form of 'social capital' that has both health and social benefits.

Spencer and Pahl (2006), for example, investigated individuals' communities to capture patterns and functions associated with active and intimate ties. These are seen as 'communities in the mind', representations

of people's networks across different types of relationships, places and time. It is an approach that differs from a focus on place-based or family-based groupings (Pahl and Spencer 2004). By looking back over the life course, shared histories, times of adaptation and times of continuity can be seen. This has been described as a 'social convoy' and it includes people known at earlier times even if the contact has not been maintained (Antonucci and Akiyama 1987). A number of studies have explored subjective perspectives on personal social networks in self-care and management of long term conditions (Vassilev et al. 2011; Morris 2011), identity (Ketokivi 2010, 2012) and ageing (Kahn and Antonucci 1980; Antonucci and Akiyama 1987; Wenger 1990 and 1997). Wellman and Wortley (1989) found that no single type of relationship provided support, rather it flowed through informal networks, people found different types of support from different people. Ketokivi (2010 and 2012) investigated social selves and found both individuality and social bonds emerged from relational networks. She argued that this is at odds with the societal expectation of an autonomous individuality and that this becomes more apparent when people are dealing with change. Following up these considerations, in the next section a charity will be introduced, supporting people living with facial differences.

Visible facial difference

Changing Faces, a charity prominent in championing the rights of people living with facial differences, describe disfigurement as 'the aesthetic effects on facial appearance of a scar, mark, rash, or a skin graft on a person's facial skin or an asymmetry or paralysis to their face' (Changing Faces 2009, 1). These can be manifest at birth or develop or occur at any time of life. Appearance cannot be measured objectively and there is no specified range for normal appearance (Harris 1997). Expectations of how we 'should' look affect how we see ourselves and others, and they affect our ideas about

what is normal or different about our appearance as detailed above. Facial differences have an embodied and emotional social reality without their being a clear cut objective definition (Talley 2008).

OPCS's Disability Survey (Martin et al. 1988) estimated there were at least 400,000 people in the UK with a disfigurement to their face and/or body defined as a scar, blemish or deformity which severely affected their ability to lead a normal life. This survey did not distinguish location of disfigurement and combined face with any other part of the body. Furthermore the focus of the survey was to identify impairments which interfere substantially with activities of daily living (Abberley 1992). Many people living with visible facial difference do not have continuing illness conditions or necessarily have conditions that affect activities of everyday life but may find themselves with difficulties in particular situations or types of relationships in their social and personal worlds. Consequently, the OPCS survey is thought to underestimate the number of people who live with a facial disfigurement by not including those whose lives are affected by the social or psychological consequences of difference (Newell and Marks 2000; Changing Faces 2007).

Changing Faces have estimated that 542,250 people in the UK have a significant disfigurement to the face (Changing Faces 2007). This estimate used a broader definition than the Disability Survey (Martin et al. 1988) and focussed on the face and head only. The *Changing Faces* estimate also differentiated disfiguring conditions by extent and by location on the face. They included: congenital conditions; accidental causes such as burns, scarring and facial fractures; cancer treatment and disease process; eye conditions such as loss of eye; facial paralysis and skin conditions such as psoriasis, vitiligo and acne. Facial difference does not just affect visual aesthetics; also implicated can be other facial processes and sensations such as smiling, facial movements, vision, speech, hearing and texture of the skin. The multiple categorisations of facial disfigurement complicate estimation of prevalence of disfigurement and no epidemiological studies appear to have been carried out which untangle this area. The subjective aspects of visible facial difference further complicate the ability to produce a judgement of when an appearance can be said to be altered or disfigured.

Recent work from within the field of appearance psychology indicates that the subjective judgement by the person affected is better able to account for degree of distress (Moss 2005).

There are a number of books written by people living with acquired facial difference in the UK; Christine Piff (1986), Simon Weston (1989 and 2003), James Partridge (1990) and Katie Piper (2011) are prominent. These accounts discuss challenges of resisting, adjusting, and achieving in the face of difference. The story of facial difference experienced since birth is different and one less frequently told as identified by Zitzelsberger (2005).

Living with visible facial difference: disruptions, continuities and normalities

A significant change in facial appearance can be a disruptive life event breaking biographical expectations in an acute way. It may require a reworking of relations with significant others, as well as a shift in self-identity (Bury 1982). For people who have lived with a disability or condition for all or much of their life Williams puts forward the idea of biographical continuity instead, with self-identities (both physically and emotionally defined) being generated reflexively through a cyclical process of 'biographical revisions' across the life course (Williams 2000, 57). As a group, people living with visible facial difference do not necessarily share life experiences or the same causative experience or condition even though they may share similar experiences of being stared at or experiences of discrimination (Clarke 1999). The diversity of biographies and causes of visible facial difference, work against there being any essential identity of visible facial difference, or of there being a single pattern of responses or of personal communities. As indicated in the beginning, seventeen people living with visible facial difference were interviewed as part of a PhD study. The following vignettes provide a glimpse of how the multi-dimensional nature of personal communities and the phenomena of living with visible facial difference come together and are mediated or hindered through a cosmopolitan gaze. The vignettes also illustrate a difference between respondents in the extent to which they experienced past or present personal communities as

supportive. They have been drawn from interview accounts, pseudonyms have been used and personal detail in the extracts changed or anonymised. Respondents were recruited via advertisements placed on the websites of charities and support groups concerned with issues of visible facial difference. Respondents volunteered for the study and were living with a range of visible difference from birth or acquired later in life. Interviews were carried out between September 2011 and August 2012.

Vignette 1: Incorporating visible facial difference

'Isobel' talked about how her personal community was strongly embedded within a large family network. In this quote she illustrates how other people outside this network can get confused about what her appearance might mean about her.

> So yes, I think it's being seen as being normal. That's what it always meant to me doing sort of normal activities and not sitting in a corner, but going out and getting on with your life, because you have to have a life at the end of the day.
>
> *Interviewer*: When you use the word normal what does that really mean?
>
> I don't know (laughs) what other non-disfigured people do or what I presume they would be doing. Do you know what I mean?
>
> *Interviewer*: This is an embarrassing question, but do you think that at some level being disfigured makes you abnormal?
>
> No it doesn't, no it doesn't does it, no, (laughs) no to some people it probably makes you abnormal, people think you have special needs and that, you know, educationally, do you know what I mean, but which is really bad that someone should think that because you have got a disfigurement that you are mentally handicapped. But then this view of mentally handicapped people, as well, is completely out of order. But I suppose it's doing what non-disfigured people do. And it's being part of that world as well, and the fact that I don't know, it's just being a part of everything I suppose. I mean there are a lot of people with disfigurement but, do you know what I mean, you are not going to be socialising with them all of the time and, do you know what I mean? I think it is important that you are out in the world.

In her everyday world 'Isobel' challenges assumptions that she is defined by her facial scars through her interactions and activities in her family, personal, and professional worlds. 'Isobel' has lived with visible facial difference from birth and had corrective surgery during her childhood. In her interviews she indicates ways in which she is ready to challenge assumptions at a more public level. She has joined a user council of a charity and is contributing to their development of resources.

Vignette 2: Finding unease in everyday life from the unpredictability of others

'Eve' has a job she loves. She finds the professional environment she has chosen to work in reduces the possibility of untoward comments and stares, enabling her to feel at ease and to get on with her role. A sense of unease can develop when she has to go to new environments as described in the quote below:

> And then meeting people like, part of my job is I go out to other businesses and try and sell [the] products and services that we can offer. Sometimes that can be quite daunting as well because you never know how people are going to react. Not that they ever say anything, but you can see the looks and just little things that you get used to and pick up on really. So it's quite hard. Inside my friends and family I don't think about it but then outside it can become quite uncomfortable.
>
> *Interviewer*: So what's the difference then?
>
> I think it's because with my friends and family I know they have accepted me and I know are not judging and I know they are not thinking, 'oh she is different'.

She has built up a pragmatic working knowledge of others, from a lifetime of encounters with people who have different conceptions of normal behaviour; Eve was born with a visible facial difference. She underlines that the processes involved are emotional and embodied, and contrasts being out in the world with her safer work environments. Her personal community of friends and family members provide a social space where unease can disappear.

Vignette 3: Contributions of friends and family

'Ken' talks about the processes of getting used to 'disturbances' other people experience in response to his facial appearance. He, his family and friends have had to learn how to deal with this in everyday life, after an accident in his childhood that left his face scarred. He calls this 'normalisation', and sees this as a process of developing a life that is not defined by his visible facial difference. For him part of this process included having to learn to recognise his own changed face, later he learned that other people also needed to go through a similar process. These processes of learning how to live with change gave him an understanding of the inter-subjectivity involved and a more flexible range of strategies he could draw on, including building up social connection and support. The significance of change over time can be seen.

> .... you know that what people are seeing is the image that you have got in here now, and then you build relationships and friendships around the fact that it's not that important, and the importance of the scarring and disfigurement goes down and down and down.
>
> And I would say to you now that the people that I have around as friends, family and all the rest of it, it's my visible difference is down here somewhere compared to 20 or 30 years ago. I was first of all aware that I was going to walk into a room and someone was going to stare at me.
>
> There are people who [say], I don't know how you put up with it. Put up with what? You know all those people? What people? I don't see them; I didn't see the people who stare. Sometimes I do and sometimes when I am not in the right mood, I get cross and I've got blinkers on I can remember developing those blinkers, but so you normalise everything.
>
> The friendships the relationships you are going to see are first and foremost about people who are, there are things about my family, obviously, they'll have to deal with the, people who stare, people who look, but they have done the same kind of things, the switching it doesn't bother them anymore.

Vignette 4: When illness has not stabilised

Building up a supportive network takes time and is contingent on one's own preferences as well as others' capability and resources. 'Tom' talked about how his social relationships have changed since his surgery in response to head and neck cancer.

> My illness has literally stopped my social life. It just went.
>
> *Interviewer*: Is that because you stopped organising things?
>
> We were the ring leaders and we stopped.
>
> *Interviewer*: Do you think whether social life is important when you are unwell?
>
> Yes, I think it depends on how ill you are. I have been ill and I am ill, but I can function. I still need to function and get my head on my shoulders and not lock myself in the house and not go anywhere... So I think if you don't, I think we can get into a little corner and you wouldn't see anybody then. You might get the odd call but people just assume 'Oh he doesn't do it anymore and doesn't get involved with anything' and people just leave you alone and you would lose contact with the real world really. I think if you can manage to get out and about and do things, or have people around, or just have some sort of life outside of the couple because you need other conversation. I mean you have to have other people apart from the two of you. I think you'll cease to function as a person I mean, and I feel like that at times.

This extract reveals some of the difficulties faced when confronting a dramatic change of bodily function, facial appearance and social circumstance, which can accompany a biographical disruption (Bury 1982).

Overall, the vignettes provide examples of individual agency on the part of people with facial difference. We have explored the impact of the way bodies are represented in society and of the prevalence and impact of appearance norms. We have considered interaction order and stigma and the active engagement of the person in seeking networks of support, many of them from within their family. But in these examples, although we do hear of the challenges of encountering the often unspoken reaction of others in the public sphere and the temptation to retreat to a safe zone

of the familiar, we also hear of the sense of acceptance and of normality that can be achieved through the individual's actions, supported by those closest to them.

Conclusions

People with a visible facial difference develop personal communities shaped by their life stories. Social experiences are embodied but mediated by the subjectivities of the self and the 'gaze' of the other. Networks and relationships offer positive experiences and meaning making that co-exist alongside negative aspects of disability and injury. A complex reconciliation of tensions is possible over the life-course, evident as a continuous process of adaptation rather than a process with a fixed end point. As Ungar puts it:

> The successful individual or family is the one that functions to a standard he, or she, or it sets in concert with others whose opinions are valued. In such a negotiated realm, individual families (and family members) will be looking to elicit from complex environments meaningful resources. The most resilient will have the most responsive physical and social ecologies. (Ungar 2010, 13)

Professionals are most likely to be helpful when they share with their clients the skills to help cope with change and complexity, focussing not on outcomes but on processes.

We indicated how living with visible facial difference raised particular challenges for the limits of cultural cosmopolitanism. The literature we have referred to, and the examples from the study we report, underline a continuing tension in achieving the openness to the other that cosmopolitanism requires. The tension in cosmopolitanism has been identified as one between hospitality to strangers and a fear of the other (Skrbis and Woodward 2005). This is resolved in many instances by a limited openness, shaped by an aesthetic of inclusion: we embrace and incorporate those who add to our particular formation of cosmopolitanism. In a visual culture this

means that we take few risks in extending hospitality to others who we find uncomfortable to our aesthetic. In Jonathan Glazer's film *Under the Skin* (Studiocanal, 2013) an alien with no compunction about murdering the humans she encounters meets one with a profound facial difference. She engages with him in a way that those in his own 'society' do not, seeming to not notice his face and complimenting him on his 'beautiful hands'. Our skills do not equip us to look beyond some manifestations of embodiment.

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Part 2

Cartographies of Citizenship and (Non-)Belonging

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National Belonging in Cosmopolitan Times

ABSTRACT: The role of the nation in the contemporary cosmopolitan era is hotly contested. In some quarters the nation is perceived to be a divisive relic which needs to be replaced by a more inclusive cosmopolitan alternative. Elsewhere the nation is assumed to have taken-for-granted cohesive qualities which can be used to address the challenges of living in an era of super-mobility and super-diversity. I argue that neither of these polarised positions is helpful and that a more nuanced and emotionally attentive understanding of nation is required. I begin by arguing that current engagements with the nature and contemporary significance of nations are curiously narrow. Then, drawing on my work on the emotional geographies of 'Scottishness', I demonstrate why we need a more meaningful engagement with the nation and suggest one possible route – an engagement with the practices and emotional experiences of nation – through which this might be achieved.

Introduction

Academic literature on nation, nationalism and national identity has traditionally been a minefield of competing and contradictory opinion. Ongoing debates around fundamental questions including, for example, the age and origins of nation (in both abstract and specific terms) and the relationships between 'banal' and 'hot' forms of nationalism (Jones and Merriman 2009) are, in part, what makes this area of scholarship so vibrant and engaging. Over the past two decades or so, in light of the increasing impact of globalisation, debates have broadened to consider the role and significance of the nation and national affiliations in a world which is increasingly interconnected and where identity and belonging are increasingly informed

by transnational and cosmopolitan connections. However, what I want to argue in this chapter is that whilst in some academic quarters the nature and power of nation is keenly studied and explored, in other related areas of academic and public life there appears to be a curiously narrow engagement with what nations are, how they 'work' and their significance in contemporary life. In particular, as I will go on to argue, such narrow engagements tend to down-play or ignore the emotional dimension of the ways in which nations are understood and experienced.

There are, of course, some good examples of works that explore people's emotional engagements with national identity (Edensor 2004). But what I want to argue here is that all too often, in both academic and public life, debates around the contemporary role and significance of nation can become incredibly polarised because of a lack of engagement with emotional experiences of the nation, and that this is potentially dangerous, both socially and politically. This is perhaps most noticeable at both extremes of a political and intellectual spectrum where, at one end, there is a disdain for nations and a belief that we live in a world where nations are a diminishing (and increasingly insignificant) inheritance from a bygone age which should be replaced by a 'post-national' political order based on cosmopolitan principals. Whilst at the other end of the spectrum, the nation is perceived to have (often taken-for-granted) cohesive qualities that are assumed to be inherently beneficial for states that are trying to address the challenges of living with difference in an era of super-mobility and super-diversity. The aim of this chapter is to argue that neither of these polarised positions is useful and that within some academic and public debates there needs to be more nuanced and emotionally attentive engagements with the nation in order to fully understand its role and significance in the *contemporary cosmopolitan world*.

Given the abundance of competing theories of nation, I begin by briefly defining the nation and sketching out its conceptual and etymological history which, as I will argue later, is significant for the ways in which nations are academically researched and instrumentally used in social policies. Building on this work, I then move on to explore three contrasting factors that I argue have negatively influenced the extent and nature of engagements with nation in the academic and policy worlds. The first two

of these factors emerge out of disagreements in understandings of the role and significance of the nation that exist both within and between various academic literatures. The third factor takes the form of a 'blind faith' that exists in some areas of public policy. This arises where policies reflect an assumed belief that national belonging can produce a common and unshakeable ground between the diverse ethnic and religious communities that exist within many state borders. By way of an example, I explore the way in which the UK's New Labour government instrumentally used ideas of 'Britishness' in an attempt to promote social cohesion and question the extent to which national belonging is an appropriate 'tool' with which to achieve this policy objective.

Drawing on my own previous research on the emotional geographies of 'Scottishness' (Wood 2007) the final section of this paper will demonstrate why we need a more meaningful engagement with the nation in the contemporary era. It will also suggest one possible route – an engagement with the *practices* and *emotional experiences* of nation – through which this might be achieved.

Defining the Nation

Whilst today the nation may be defined as 'a named human population which shares myths and memories, a mass public culture, a designated homeland, economic unity and equal rights and duties for all members' (A.D. Smith 1995, 56–57), the meaning of the word nation has shifted significantly over time (Connor 1978; Williams 1983). Originally referring to a blood-related group, by the early seventeenth century nation was also being used to describe the inhabitants of the state regardless of their ethno-national composition. Nation became a proxy for less specific human categories such as *the people* or *the citizenry*. By the end of the seventeenth century the nation began to be used as a substitute for the state itself. According to Connor (1978) confusion of terminology was precipitated by the writings of scholars such as John Locke who, in espousing the

doctrine of popular sovereignty, identified *the people* as the source of all political power.

Conceptions of nation and state were further blurred by ideas of nationalism. As Graham Smith (2000) highlights nationalism refers to two ideas. The first is the idea of belonging to a nation, and the second is the corresponding political ideology which holds that the territorial borders of a state and a nation should be coincidental, producing a nation-state (Seton-Watson 1977). With these distinctions in mind, it is popularly thought that there are two forms of nationalism (Brown 1999; Spencer and Wollman 2002): one that is expressed along ethnic and/or cultural lines, and another that rests on a civic-territorial conception of the nation. However, as I will discuss later in this chapter, the perceived mutual exclusivity of civic and ethnic nationalism has received significant critique (see Calhoun 1997; Connor 1993; Guibernau 1996; A.D. Smith 1986).

Nationalism began to significantly alter the prevailing political system in eighteenth-century Europe (Penrose 1997) as the ideology of nationalism adopted Romanticist conceptions of the nation as the 'natural' units of population that the state should serve. Penrose argues that nationalist rhetoric invests the nation-state with a 'natural, and hence inviolable, right to power' (1997, 18), as nation-states are perceived to be the only political units that allow the needs of the people or, more accurately, the nation to be served by the state.

There are many ways in which this etymological and conceptual history of nation and nationalism is significant for the ways in which nations are understood and studied. However, for the purposes of this chapter I want to draw out three strands that are significant for the development of my argument. The first is perhaps the rather obvious point that the geopolitical system is dynamic and is the product of considerable conceptual shifts; over time the structure of the geopolitical world has changed significantly with, for example, the development of modern nations and states and there is no reason to believe that the world's geopolitical structure will not change significantly in the future.

The second strand that I want to pick up here is that the ambiguity between understandings of nation as an ethnic group and civic conceptions of nation as the people or the citizenry lies at the heart of questions over

whether national belonging is an appropriate tool for promoting social cohesion in states which, demographically, are often multi-national and/or multi-ethnic. I will explore this point in further depth in the following section of this chapter. Finally, the third strand that I wish to draw out is that nationalism is not just a political ideology; rather it is also a *route to belonging*. As such, nationalism relies on personal affiliations and attachments that are perceived to be *essential* and it is through this perceived essentiality that the nation gains its emotional power and political tenacity (Calhoun 1997; Tamir 1993; Wood 2007). For me, understanding the personal emotional attachments that people have to nation is crucial to understanding its present (and future) role and significance in the geopolitical world. It is for this reason that I argue that in order to fully understand the emotional dimension of nation we need to have a more meaningful engagement with this phenomenon. However, before developing this argument I need to firstly explain how and why I think that engagements with the nation are becoming increasingly limited.

Limits to meaningful engagement

For me, a meaningful engagement with the nation is one which takes the nation seriously; which engages with this phenomenon – and its social, cultural, political and emotional dimensions – in an open-minded and critical fashion. My intention here is not to attempt to provide some kind of blue-print for how academics, policy makers and others should engage with the nation, rather I want to demonstrate that current engagements with the nation are, at times, unhelpfully limited. There are a number of factors that contribute to limited engagements with the nation but, crudely speaking, the arguments that I will shortly outline can be summarised into limitations in the *conceptual engagement* with nation and limited engagements with *the 'doings' of nation* (those practices and emotional experiences of nation-building, national belonging and national identity). In this section I want to explore why these limited engagements occur.

Cosmopolitanism and nationalism: opposing ideologies?

It has become commonplace to argue that the pressures of global forces in the contemporary world are undermining the foundations on which the nation and, by extension, the nation-state is traditionally based such as, for example, national sovereignty, economic autonomy and social identity. Mark Juergensmeyer (2002) suggests that civic (or secular) nationalism reached the widest extent of worldwide acceptance in the mid-twentieth century. By the second half of the twentieth century, Juergensmeyer (1993; 2002) argues, the nation-state was becoming an increasingly fragile entity, especially in those nation-states created by retreating colonial powers in Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia and Eurasia. Here it is argued that factors including, border disputes between neighbouring states, threats to economic sovereignty by multinational corporations, and secessionist aspirations by minority ethnic groups began to dissolve the 'ideological glue' that held nation-states together and raised questions about the very idea of the nation as a basis for politics.

Undoubtedly the nation-state (underpinned by the ideology of nationalism) has the capacity to induce internal and external conflicts that can be discriminatory, divisive and violent. As Calhoun argues, the hyphen that ties together nation and state binds the notion of 'a historically or naturally unified people who intrinsically belong together to that of a modern polity with unprecedented military power and capacity for effective internal administration' (2007, 3). This, as the history of the twentieth century tells us, is potentially a recipe for disaster with the nation-state being the source of many social and political evils including, to name but a few, ethnic cleansing, war, enforced migration, and the discrimination of ethnic minorities by dominant national groups. Such atrocities have led not only to the criticism of particular political regimes, but also to critiques of the concept of nation, and a desire to find an alternative and more socially desirable basis for politics. Perhaps the most popular of these alternative forms of politics has been cosmopolitanism (Kymlicka 2001; Yeğenoğlu 2005).

According to Kymlicka, cosmopolitans in the current era are 'almost by definition, people who regret the privileging of national identities in political life, and who reject the principle that political arrangements should be ordered in such a way as to reflect and protect national identities' (2001, 204). Whilst at present cosmopolitanism is almost always defined in contrast to nationalism, this has not always been the case (Bowden 2003; Calhoun 2008; and Kymlicka 2001). Indeed, as Conversi reminds us the term cosmopolitan has its roots in ancient Greece where it described someone 'who considered the entire humankind as more meaningful than his or her own city, group, region or state' (2001, 34). Cosmopolitanism received renewed attention during the Enlightenment when it was argued that the emancipation of individuals from ascribed roles and identities was central to social progress. Modernity liberates people from traditional identities and fixed social roles and 'fosters an ideal of autonomous individuality that encourages individuals to choose for themselves what sort of life they want to lead' (Kymlicka 2001, 203). For one of these Enlightenment thinkers – the Marquis de Condorcet – cosmopolitanism was the 'natural' and inevitable outcome of this process of individualisation. Thus people might be born into particular ethnic, linguistic and religious communities but individuals emancipated from fixed social roles would not see their options as limited or defined by membership of their inherited cultural group (Moore 2001).

Condorcet believed that as membership of cultural groups became optional voluntary ethno-cultural identities would gradually lose their political importance and a single cosmopolitan society, based on a universal language, would emerge. Writing before the age of nationalism, Condorcet could not have foreseen the obstacle that nationalism would present to the fruition of a cosmopolitan society. From the late eighteenth century nationalism became a primary geopolitical force based on (and promoting) the kinds of 'backward' ethno-cultural groups that the Enlightenment cosmopolitans were trying to move beyond. It is perhaps because of the severity of the impact that nationalism has had on cosmopolitan ambitions that cosmopolitanism tends to be commonly perceived as being in opposition to nationalism. This perception has undoubtedly,

in part, been strengthened by some of the exchanges that have occurred between cosmopolitans and nationalists. For example, Ulrich Beck (2002) referred to nationalism as an enemy of cosmopolitan societies arguing that, in the wake of the collapse of communism, nationalism was 'the remaining real danger to the culture of political freedom at the beginning of the 21st century' (2002, 38). Although Beck's thesis has been refined in the post 9/11 era to consider a plural conception of *cosmopolitanisms* that consider non-Western visions of cosmopolitanism (see Beck and Grande 2010; for a feminist critique see Vieten 2012) his work is still grounded in the notion that the nation is not fit for purpose in a world where social, economic and environmental processes, risks and challenges are global rather than national in scale.

Equally, nationalists have often viewed cosmopolitanism with deep suspicion. Ernest Gellner suggests that nationalists have been hostile 'not merely to rival cultures, but also, and perhaps with special venom, to bloodless cosmopolitanism, probably because they perceive it an ally of political centralism' (cited in Conversi 2001, 37). Whilst there is an emerging critique that a false opposition is being perpetuated in the academic literature between cosmopolitanism and nationalism (see, for example, Bowden 2003; Conversi 2001 and Kymlicka 2001), what is important in the context of this chapter is how the opposition between nationalism and cosmopolitanism (whether 'false' or not) influences academics' and policy makers' engagements with the nation.

Beck (2006) argues that there is often a taken-for-granted assumption that the nation and the state are the only social and political forms of the modern world that can organise societies. Where agents subscribe to this belief Beck (2006, 24) calls this a *national outlook* whereby individuals use conceptualisations of nationalism to frame their understandings of society and the geopolitical organisation of the world. Where this belief influences the perspective of academics, Beck (2006) states that this is *methodological nationalism* and, as such, influences the ways in which research questions are conceptualised and the language that is used to understand and describe the empirical world. Beck argues that the world which is currently 'being shaken to its foundations by the problems produced by the triumph of its civilization cannot be adequately grasped, investigated or explained within

the national outlook (of agents) or within the framework of methodological nationalism (the perspective of the scientific observer)' (2006, 24, see also Beck and Grande 2010). To this end, Beck (2006) argues that there needs to be an epistemological turn in the social and political sciences whereby there is firstly a critique of methodological nationalism and, secondly, there is the development of a new paradigm of *methodological cosmopolitanism* and with it a new cosmopolitan imagination.

Cosmopolitanism is a heterogeneous ideology. However, according to Kleingeld and Brown the 'nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan views is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and that this community should be cultivated' (2009: online). Thus cosmopolitans seek to challenge commonly recognised emotional attachments to, for example, fellow-citizens, the local state, and cultural groups in order to create 'citizens of the world' (Benhabib 2008, Nussbaum 2002 [1996]). As with the Enlightenment cosmopolitans, different articulations of contemporary cosmopolitanism envision this community in different ways some focusing on global political institutions, others on universal moral norms or relationships. Different perspectives also exist regarding the extent to which cosmopolitanism can (or should) engage with, or move beyond, traditional social allegiances. At the extreme end of the scale Nussbaum (2002 [1996]) recognises that attachments to other individuals or social groups exist (for example, to family, neighbours and fellow city-dwellers) however, she only recognises and values these attachments because of their instrumental use in achieving universal good (cf. Calhoun 2003). For Nussbaum, attachments to individuals or social groups can (and in some instances should) exist, but the strongest obligation of each person should be to humanity as a whole, not to particular social groups.

According to Calhoun (2003) a more moderate alternative to the 'extreme' cosmopolitanism outlined above is one that recognises that allegiances are multiple and overlapping so that in addition to relationships and affiliations with particular individuals and social groups, 'one also stands in an ethically significant relationship to other human beings in general' (Scheffler 2001, 115, cited in Calhoun 2003, 539). One of the key proponents of this more moderate articulation of cosmopolitanism is David Held

(2010 and 1995) who argues that one of the main appeals of cosmopolitan democracy is that people can gain from the benefit of multiple citizenships, occurring across a range of spatial scales that inform their everyday lives. Calhoun (2003) argues that Held's (1995) approach is moderate because he does not privilege the universal ahead of the particular in all cases and nor does he argue that cosmopolitanism is free from ethnic and cultural particularity (see also Yeoh 2004).

As this more moderate approach suggests cosmopolitanism and nationalism need not necessarily be mutually exclusive. Indeed, as Bowden (2003) argues there may be mutual benefit in some kind of practical mediation between cosmopolitanism (which is often critiqued for being too abstract a concept to attract popular support and loyalty) and nationalism (which is often critiqued for being too introverted and exclusionary). However, all too often cosmopolitanism and nationalism are conceptualised as opposing ideologies and, for me, there has yet to be any sustained meaningful discussion between the two camps, which might usefully address some of the deficiencies (and dangers) of nationalism and some of the emotive and experiential weaknesses of cosmopolitanism. This lack of exchange may, in some part, be explained by concerns by scholars of cosmopolitanism over the reification of the nation and nationalism through methodological nationalism (Beck 2006) and also a desire by cosmopolitans to promote an alternative epistemological framework through methodological cosmopolitanism (cf. Vieten's 2012 discussion of Beck's 'situated' discourse as a member of the German post-Holocaust generation). However, as some cosmopolitan theorists have argued, the emotional and political power of nation and nationalism is not diminishing despite the attempts of cosmopolitans to create an alternative modernity (Cheah 2006; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). It seems to me then that there needs to be a greater understanding of the potential compatibility of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, which requires more rather than less meaningful engagements with the nation. It is one thing to argue that cosmopolitanism may offer a morally and politically more attractive alternative to nationalism, but it is another to hope that by ignoring or down-playing the significance of the emotional power of the nation that it will go away. However, as the next section demonstrates, it is not just cosmopolitans who have limited engagements with the nation.

Conceptual differences in theories of nation and nationalism

The second reason for why there have been limited meaningful engagements with the nation comes from within academic studies of nation and nationalism. Just as scholars of cosmopolitanism have attempted to distance themselves from the insidious and divisive qualities of nation, some scholars of nation have tried to diffuse the emotional power of nation by exposing its modern and socially constructed nature. Whilst most theories of nation and nationalism presuppose the existence of an emotional bond between members of a nation (Anderson 1983; Calhoun 1997; Connor 1993) and the territory or homeland that they occupy (Connor 2001; Penrose 2002), the extent to which the emotional dimension of nationhood is engaged with varies between several different theoretical standpoints. Primordialist theories of nation assume that nations are 'natural' divisions of humanity and that people's loyalty and emotional connections to these phenomena are inbred through primordial ties such as blood, speech, and customs (A.D. Smith 1999).

In recent decades, primordialist theories of nation have received heavy criticism from modern constructionist scholars for their essentialist outlook and have been blamed for triggering the dark and dangerous consequences of nationalism (see, for example, Yuval-Davis et al. 2006). However, as Tilley (1997) demonstrates, critics can sometimes miss the subtlety of primordialist arguments. For example, Geertz presents a far more complex argument in his (1973) book *The Interpretation of Cultures* to the one described in Eller and Coughlan's (1993) critique as he does not argue that primordial ties are 'natural' *per se*, rather he argues that such ties are *assumed* to be 'natural'. The work of primordialists has been maligned and caricatured to such an extent that Horowitz (2004) suggests that there is reason to suspect that many scholars no longer read works that engage with primordialism.

Modern constructionist theorists have, in many ways, attempted to diffuse the dangerous, emotive, primordial elements of nation by demonstrating their relatively recent and socially constructed nature (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1992; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). In detaching concepts of nation and nationalism from ideas of essentialism, 'naturalness'

and perenniality, modernists have implicitly attempted to withdraw some of the grounds on which people legitimise their often violent and divisive claims to nationhood and the need to protect their national identity. However, as some critics have argued, modern constructionists present a dispassionate and often unrealistic, 'rational' account of ideas of nationhood (Hoben and Hefner 1991; Hutchinson 1994), that often bear little relation to people's *lived experiences* of nation. Despite significant attempts by some modernist scholars, people's emotional attachments to nation and national identity cannot be 'explained away' through 'rational' explanations because, as Walker Connor convincingly argues, 'people do not die voluntarily for things that are rational' (1993, 206).

Connor (1993, see also Conversi 2002) is one of a small but growing number of ethno-symbolist scholars who have argued that dispassionate modern constructionist theories of nationhood are not useful because a 'rational' belief in the modern origins of nation does not necessarily negate the *emotional experience* of nation as something that is much older, enduring and 'natural' (A.D. Smith 1986, 1997, 2009; Guibernau and Hutchinson 2004). This idea is significant because it suggests that there is a difference between the 'facts' of nationhood and people's emotional experiences of nationhood. Indeed, as Connor argues it is 'not *what is*, but *what people perceive as is*' (1993, 197) that is important in people's experience of national identity.

What I want to argue here is that modern constructionist theories of nation, whilst being useful for explaining the origins of nation and revealing the ways in which nations are instrumentally 'used' by national elites for their own political, economic and social ends have hindered meaningful engagements with nation; our understandings of how nations 'work' as emotive phenomena and how national belonging is (re)produced and experienced (Wood 2007). This is significant, because if it is agreed that nations can be divisive and dangerous, then it is important that we understand how they gain their emotional power and what kinds of emotional needs and desires need to be met by any future political alternative to the nation (or how current emotional attachments might be tempered). Therefore, there needs to be a more meaningful engagement with the

nation so that we understand not only how these phenomena are produced but also how they are lived and emotionally experienced in *everyday* life (Antonsich et al. 2014).

The assumed power of national belonging

The final reason for why in some quarters there have been limited meaningful engagements with nation differs significantly from those that I have proposed so far. Here I argue that meaningful engagements with nation by scholars and policy makers have been limited by an almost 'blind faith' that nations possess certain characteristics that can be positively 'used' by state policy makers to achieve particular social aims including, for example: loyalty to the state and its endeavours; an emotional investment in a common good; socially cohesive communities and behaviours that are deemed to be morally and publicly desirable. One example that is illustrative of this phenomenon is the former UK New Labour government's instrumental use of 'Britishness', which was largely continued after 2010 by the Coalition Government.

In recent years events like the (2001) urban riots in Oldham and Bradford, and the (2005) 7/7 London bombings have raised serious questions about the challenges of living with and managing diversity and difference (see Amin 2002, 2003; Parekh 2000; Valentine 2008; Yuval-Davis, Anthias and Kofman 2005; Vieten 2013). For example, the key conclusion of the Cantle Report on the 2001 urban riots was that people from different ethnic and faith groups were not mixing and were leading 'parallel lives' (Home Office 2001). Similarly, in the wake of the (2005) London bombings Trevor Phillips, the then head of the Campaign for Racial Equality argued that Britain was 'sleepwalking towards segregation' (Phillips 2005). In an attempt to address these issues the New Labour government developed a number of policy initiatives grounded in a concept of 'meaningful citizenship' (Home Office 2001) that attempted to promote social cohesion across Britain's diverse ethnic and faith communities. These policy initiatives included mandatory citizenship education for 11–16 year olds,

which was introduced to the English school curriculum in 2002, and the introduction of citizenship tests and ceremonies for those seeking to acquire British citizenship (Home Office 2002).

Although these policies utilised conceptions of citizenship to promote social cohesion, the kind of 'active citizenship' (Blunkett 2003) that the New Labour government proposed was grounded in a shared national identity. Rejuvenating and promoting 'Britishness' as a positive and useful political resource was a cornerstone of several policy initiatives that were put into place during the Blair administration and continued to play a central role in the thinking of Gordon Brown's government (Brown 2009). One example of this at work is in the policy literature that discusses the development of citizenship education in schools.

According to the Blair administration's *Advisory Group on Citizenship*, citizenship education aims to bring about a change in the political culture of Britain, both nationally and locally, so that people understand themselves to be *active citizens* who are 'willing, able and equipped to have an influence in public life' (Advisory Group on Citizenship 1998, 7; see also Kearns 1995; Osler and Starkey 2001). Citizenship education is understood to create a 'common ground between different ethnic groups and religious identities' that will promote greater social cohesion (Advisory Group 1998, 17). Indeed, it is hoped that citizenship education will help communities to 'find or restore a sense of common citizenship, *including a national identity* that is secure enough to find a place for the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United Kingdom' (Advisory Group 1998, 17, emphasis added).

Similarly, in a (2007) report by the *Commission on Integration and Cohesion* entitled *Our Shared Futures* it is recommended that the Government's policy on integration and cohesion should include a national shared futures programme that reflects positively on the diversity of experience in Britain. According to the Commission:

> The starting point for this must be the traditions and heritage of the country and its regions stretching back over hundreds of years – with a recognition of the important role dissent and non-conformism have played in the past, alongside a binding national narrative. (Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007, 49)

There are a number of potential problems with assuming that the nation is a route to social cohesion. Firstly, the academic literature on citizenship raises a number of questions regarding the utility of a 'brand' of citizenship that attempts to draw on both a shared national identity *and* a plurality of cultures (such as that promoted by the New Labour government). Kymlicka (2001) argues that liberal accounts of citizenship, that implicitly assume that citizens will share not only a set of political principles, but also a common language and sense of membership in a national community, do not understand the nature of social unity in multiethnic and multination states like the UK. Moreover, I would argue that such accounts also use the unhelpfully ambiguous sense of nation explained earlier which contains the seeds of potential tensions between those who conceive of nation as an ethnic group and those who regard it in more civic terms as the citizenry.

Secondly, there is little engagement with how (in practical terms) a shared national identity and culture might be used as an instrumental route to social cohesion. Beyond the rather vague rhetoric embedded in the policy literature there tends to be little detail on the precise nature of those national narratives that might bind the nation together and little acknowledgement of how these may potentially differ between social communities (based on, for example, ethnicity, faith, gender, sexuality, and age) that are located across a diverse range of spatial locations. In many ways this lack of detail is unsurprising due to the fact that nations are 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) that 'work', in part, because their imprecise nature allows its members to imagine their own place and role within that community. This is not a problem *per se*, but this vagueness does allow for a geography of Britishness to be produced which may contain potentially competing national narratives that divide, rather than unify, a national community.

Hence, it cannot be taken for granted that a shared national identity and culture is a route to social cohesion, rather more research needs to be conducted into the ways in which people experience the nation and understand their role within and relationship to the nation. In particular, a greater understanding of the geographies of national identity and belonging is required before any firm statements can be made regarding its utility as a unifying force at the national scale.

In this section I have made a number of cases for why I think there have been limited meaningful engagements with the nation drawing on the influence of cosmopolitanism, disagreements within the nations and nationalism literature and the 'blind faith' in nations and nationalism that can be perpetuated by some states. In the final section of my chapter I want to demonstrate what a more meaningful engagement with the nation might look like. The following work is not intended to provide some kind of blueprint for future research. Rather it is hoped that it will inspire a dialogue about how nations are empirically researched and offer one potential route (a starting point) to a more meaningful engagement with the nation.

Towards more meaningful engagements with the nation

What interests me in many of the discussions of nation, nationalism and cosmopolitanism that I have outlined above is the curious absence of people's (everyday) experiences, desires and interests. Works on vernacular and visceral cosmopolitanism (see Nava 2007 and Werbner 2011) partially address this gap; these feminist works take into account the voices of everyday people, e.g. in London (Nava 2007). However, cosmopolitanism literature at large also tends to ignore the increasing power of nation and nationalism in the current era. Cosmopolitan scholars may call for a shift to methodological cosmopolitanism but there is still, in many parts of the world, a clear desire for national autonomy. For example, ongoing calls for national secession in the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain (see also the theme of language provisions, in the chapter by Naomi Wells in this book), the recent electoral success by the New Flemish Alliance in Belgium and the rise of the Scottish National Party and substantial support (45 per cent) for independence in the recent (2014) Scottish referendum, as well as the success of the SNP in the 2015 Westminster election, demonstrate that nationalism and the desire for national autonomy is staging something of a comeback at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Gillespie 2015). Whilst various theories have been suggested for this upsurge in nationalism including a backlash against those global institutions that are held

responsible for the 2008 financial crisis (Roubini 2014), what is not clear in these analyses is why it is nationalism (rather than an alternative political response) that has been so popular. What is it about nationalism that is so attractive? What is nationalism perceived to offer people that other political ideologies do not?

Angharad Closs Stephens' (2013) book *The Persistence of Nationalism* partially answers these questions by demonstrating the power of the national imaginary and the difficulties of escaping this. What is missing from this account though (and many others) is an engagement with the experiential and emotional dimension of nations and nationalism. Most theories of nation and nationalism acknowledge the emotional power of these phenomena however, as I explained earlier, many works on nation and nationalism are limited with regards to exploring how nations and nationalism 'work' as emotional doings.

Several years ago I conducted research on the role and significance of emotions in the (re)production of Scottish national identities (Wood 2007). Part of this work was based on a study of T in the Park a weekend, outdoor rock and pop festival (sometimes referred to as Scotland's Glastonbury) that takes place annually and which forms part of the summer music festival circuit. Part of the research that I conducted at this event involved conducting short on-the-spot interviews with audience members as close to the moment of performance as possible (usually at the end of the act) (Wood et al. 2007). What was really revealing about the responses that I obtained was that people (both Scots and non-Scots) often said that they experienced an intimacy between themselves and other members of the audience during the musical performances. Participants were not initially told that my research was exploring experiences of national identity; however Scottishness was frequently used (by Scots and non-Scots) as an explanation for why people were experiencing the performances in the way that they were (Wood 2007). In the absence of any other explanation, membership of a Scottish community and the experience of a shared sense of belonging and national identity was used to explain the feelings of intimacy that Scots experienced and which they perceived other Scots to experience too through their facial gestures and bodily behaviours. What-is-more people often drew on notions of primordial attachments (e.g. shared blood) to explain why this phenomenon was occurring. For example Scots talked

about how other Scots knew 'in their guts' how they themselves were feeling; what it felt like to experience Scottishness and talked of their shared Scottishness as being 'like an instant bond' (Wood 2007, 206). Conversely some respondents also stated that non-Scots couldn't possibly experience the performance in the same way and that they might find the intense atmosphere in the crowd to be intimidating. This research demonstrates not only the strength of attachment that people have to their national identities but it also gives some insight into how national identities 'work' and when they occur. I argue that to ignore or downplay the sense of national belonging that people feel and experience in their everyday lives (as many scholars of cosmopolitanism do) is potentially dangerous as it ignores the emotional power of nations and the 'triggers' to people experiencing their national belonging in intensive and emotive ways. Equally to think that national belonging is always a productive and benign force (as it tends to be when used as an instrument of community cohesion) is equally dangerous as it ignores the ways in which national identity is often experienced as a primordial entity even though people may normally consider their national identity to be more civic and inclusive in nature. It is for this reason that I argue that there needs to be a greater understanding of people's emotional experiences of nation, national identity and national belonging. Of course not all experiences of national belonging are dangerous or divisive, but the way that this phenomenon works emotionally means that the 'triggers' of national belonging have the potential to be used for dangerous and divisive ends. Something that politicians and world leaders know only too well.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to make a case for why there needs to be a more meaningful engagement with the nation in some academic and policy quarters. In recent years engagements with the nation have been limited by, amongst other things, the political aspirations of some cosmopolitan scholars, wholesale rejections of primordialism by modernist scholars of

nation and nationalism, and a 'blind faith' in the cohesive power of national belonging. This, I have argued, has led to a curious lack of meaningful engagement with what nations are and how they 'work'.

Whilst there may be good reasons for wanting to diminish the emotional power of nation (and to lessen its often violent and divisive nature), what I hope this chapter has demonstrated is that this cannot be achieved by ignoring the ways in which nations are emotionally experienced, or through writing the nation out of the political lexicon. Neither is it useful to blindly believe that – at the opposite end of the spectrum – the nation is a benign force that can unite ethnically and socially diverse peoples in an unproblematic manner. What I hope the final section of this paper demonstrates is that the nation is enduring (at least in the medium term) and that in order to properly understand its role and significance in the present (and future) geopolitical system it needs to be engaged with in a more meaningful manner.

I have suggested one possible route to achieving this goal, through a study of the *practices* and *emotional experiences* of nation. My research builds on previous works that unsettle many of the binaries that surround conceptualisations of the nation and highlights the fact that people's emotional experiences of nation can belie the facts of its creation (A.D. Smith 1995; Connor 1993). This means that experiences of nation cannot be taken for granted and there needs to be a greater and more meaningful understanding of how the nation 'works' across space and across different social and cultural landscapes, in order to properly assess its nature, role and possible utility in the current (and future) geopolitical system.

This call for a more meaningful focus on the nation is not to suggest that nations are the only or the best way of organising the geopolitical system. We live in a time when serious political and moral questions are being asked about the role of nations (through, for example, the works of cosmopolitan scholars) and the challenges of living with difference. Undoubtedly the role and significance of the nation has, and is continuing to, change and there is nothing to suggest that, in time, significant changes will not occur in the ways in which the geopolitical system is structured and organised. Indeed, it is precisely because *there is the potential for political change* that we need to have a more meaningful engagement with the

nation. In doing so, we might better understand the nation's tenacity, its emotional power, and the kinds of needs and desires that any political alternative to the nation will need to fulfil.

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ULRIKE M. VIETEN[1]

Notions of Conflict and 'New' Citizens' Inclusion: Post-Cosmopolitan Contestations in Germany

ABSTRACT: The German sociologist Ulrich Beck became renowned as an advocate of European cosmopolitanism; Germany, however, has a very dark history when it comes to cosmopolitan citizens. What is at stake is a gap between symbolic exclusion from the national community, rooted in the long-lasting ideological effect of ethno-national citizenship in Germany, and a rise in mixed-heritage identities on the ground referring to an already existing vernacular multicultural society. In this chapter, focusing on Berlin, different narratives of key minority political activists illustrate individual success despite vulnerability and conflicts, and are juxtaposed with the populist xenophobic debate of the day. In this way the chapter explores the ways hate crime and institutional racism are significant within the background scenario of how 'new' citizens feel and display their belonging within the German national community, and also influence layers of transnational and cosmopolitan identity that include intersecting angles, such as locality, age, class, gender and religion.

Goethe Street, Goethe hiking trail, Goethe museum, Goethe prefab houses, whatever. Discussions and theatre performances are pretty much focused on this. Equally there are a lot of lectures around here. You are permanently confronted, somehow. And the same goes for Buchenwald; plenty of people come to see the concentration camp; and if friends and family are visiting me, of course, I will show them around, and also lead them to visit Buchenwald. It means I am pretty much aware of this, and kind of constantly working on this topic. Talking about Buchenwald, I think it is important to add that Weimar is a place where Nazis also head to. By now, there have been two attempts by Nazis to have big demonstrations organised here. But we also had big counter demonstrations; we've got a left-wing antifascist movement; plenty of people voicing protest against Nazis, and an alliance of citizens

1 If not stated otherwise, all translations from German into English are by the author.

against Nazis here in Weimar and surrounding areas. (Ercan, interview in Weimar, 17 February 2011)[2]

Introduction

Looking back at my research stay in Germany between October 2010 and May 2011, I wondered why it didn't occur to me initially to travel to Weimar, in order to conduct an interview with a 'new' German citizen of partly Turkish (Kurdish, actually) heritage. My prejudiced perspective might have been related to a largely West German 'lens', taking for granted that Berlin is the obvious multicultural metropolitan space in which to look for the mingling of and distinctions between different ethnic and religious groups. Having said that, there are some cities in the West of Germany – Cologne and Düsseldorf, Essen and Duisburg, all in the federal state of North Rhine Westphalia; the *Hanse* cities of Bremen and Hamburg in the North West; Frankfurt am Main in Hesse – where you expect to find larger Turkish communities. However, this goes hand in hand with the assumption that there is no space for Turkish-Germans in the East of Germany.

Indeed, you still don't find that many in Weimar, I learned later.

2 'Goethestraße, Goethewanderweg, Goetheplattenhaus gibt es, Goethemuseum und was es alles gibt. Die Diskussionen und Theaterstücke drehen sich viel darum herum. Es gibt viele Lesungen. Da bist du ständig damit konfrontiert. Und mit Buchenwald auch, weil sehr viele Menschen kommen; sehr viele Menschen, wenn die mich besuchen, bring ich sie zu den Orten und auch nach Buchenwald. Dann sehe ich das ständig und dann setze ich mich ständig damit auseinander. Bei Buchenwald ist noch wichtig, hinzuzufügen oder insgesamt, weil Weimar so ein Ort ist, ist es natürlich auch ein Ort, wo die Nazis viel marschieren wollen. Und es gab schon Versuche, hier zwei Aufmärsche zu machen. Dann gab's immer einen großen Protest dagegen. Es gibt auch ne linke antifaschistische Bewegung; viele Menschen, die dagegen protestieren, ein Bürgerbündnis und äh... hier in Weimar und Umgebung.'

In contrast to Berlin and its metropolitan area of more than 3.5 million inhabitants, Weimar has a population of approximately 65,000; in Weimar, visible minorities are even less visible than they are elsewhere in Germany. So, what is special about Weimar?

Weimar embodies an awful lot of what is (in-)famous about Germany: the Classical writers and intellectuals Goethe and Schiller, the 1920s art and architecture movement *Bauhaus*, 'Weimar' as the First Democratic Republic of Germany, the National Socialist regime following the republic, the concentration camp Buchenwald. Weimar enshrines provinciality as well as German national history, or, to turn this around, German national identity as condensed in provinciality. In that respect Weimar signifies the German *Kulturnation*'s symbolic space, where history has imprinted its presence and leaves its mark on sites which attract crowds of international twenty-first-century tourists. Weimar, which was also a GDR city between 1949 and 1989, is historically charged, and certainly no one can deny its significance to any inheritance of German national identity.

And it is through a link to the famous *Bauhaus* that Ercan enters the scene. Ercan, a 'Wessi' – a West German – who was born in Rüsselsheim, another small city, but located in South Middle West Germany, in the federal state of Hesse. Rüsselsheim is well known for its car industry and is a place where Turkish and Kurdish men, first on their own and later with their families, have settled since the 1960s. Ercan, one of my younger interview partners, originates from a Kurdish and Alevi family background. He moved to Weimar to do his PhD at the Bauhaus University and he is involved with radical left socialist politics and the *Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung*, an educational charity foundation linked to the post-socialist party *Die Linke*. What is fascinating about Ercan's narrative, in particular, is a concrete indication of a more vernacular emergence of 'new' Germans, a merging and melting of different national and cultural histories into the contemporary and future make-up of Germany as a multicultural society. So, is there once again a thriving cosmopolitanism on the ground, going beyond the character of 1920s Berlin to encompass a growing 'relaxation' of the old ethno-past? This leads us to further question the place of migrants and their offspring and the space of hybrid national identities in the concept of cosmopolitan Europe, or cosmopolitan Germany.

Cosmopolitan ambitions of 'new' European citizens

Some contemporary scholars propose a cosmopolitan Europe or suggest we should approach European issues through a cosmopolitan lens (e.g. Beck and Grande 2007, Rumford 2007). These purposeful interventions reflect to a certain degree present-day attempts to normalise what emerged historically as an upper-class and highly individualised cultural competence in different parts of the world and across various societies (Nava 1998; Stevenson 2003; Mouffe 2004; Calhoun 2007). Following Calhoun's (2007) critical view of cosmopolitanism as being no antidote to nationalism, and not living up to its promises of racial, gender and class equality (Vieten 2007; 2012), what matters when looking at the vernacular everyday within nation states is the question of how cosmopolitan openness can be actually lived (Nava 2006, 2007; Valentine 2008). How does a subjective cosmopolitan consciousness relate to nationally and territorially nested classed, racialised and gendered hierarchies, on the one hand, and current spatial-social transformations, on the other?

Nedelcu (2012) convincingly illustrates how contemporary migrants show a specific form of cosmopolitan capacity by linking different localities through and in their transnational lives. In what ways is cosmopolitanism an appreciated topic in contemporary Germany – a Germany with a toxic history concerning twentieth-century cosmopolitans, including the mass murder of Sinti and Roma, as well as Jews?

Mandel (2008) explores in more depth the complicated ethno-relationships in Germany, such as the relationship between majority ethnic Germans with minority ethnic Turks. Whereas a postmodern cosmopolitan image of Berlin prevails in the media and in public discourse, she finds continuing racial stereotyping when it comes to the Turkish community, for example those living in the borough of Kreuzbe.g. However, she also encounters 'in-between' feelings of belonging, torn between the demands of Turkish national identity and German hybrid identities, alongside a very creative cultural and political local space.

Kaya (2012: 161) argues that 'German-Turkish transmigrants' are effectively involved in producing cosmopolitan identities as 'a form of

multilocality [...] in both real and symbolic terms, in order to position themselves *vis-a-vis* the risk of being excluded by the majority society.'

So how do late modern 'national-cultural' cosmopolitan claims and cosmopolitan practices fit together when it comes to the situation of 'new' German citizens?

This chapter is part of a larger theoretical project (Vieten 2013; Vieten 2014) developing the notion of new European citizens as a metaphor for building transnational identities within a framework of Europeanisation, and also highlighting the potential of specific regional identities, typical of federal states, in a transformed and transgressive democratic counter-space of civic society. This original approach supplements more conventional discourses on migration, enhancing our understanding of emerging transnational societies. Through a unique dataset derived from in-depth interviews based on narrative methodology (Andrews et al. 2013; Esin 2011), this chapter demonstrates the practical (and in some cases conflict-ridden) empirical effects of contemporary cosmopolitanisms in Europe, whose conceptual elements have been outlined elsewhere (Vieten 2007; Vieten 2012),

The argument unfolds within two sections. First, I will contextualise some conceptual aspects of the post-migration condition of German society and the relevance of the city space to the idea of 'being a new citizen' in a post-cosmopolitan age. Then, secondly, I will bring in interview sequences drawn from a larger study,[3] introducing some key political activists who live or have lived in Berlin, the capital city of Germany. It is argued here that 'new' citizens are involved in a variety of 'enacted' (Isin and Saward 2013) forms of citizenship, advancing active political practices and civic interventions in the city space where they live their daily life.

'New' citizens' post-cosmopolitan practices and struggles are unfolding alongside and in spite of a strong anti-Muslim discourse in Germany, as we will see later. This anti-Muslim discourse mainly targets Turks as the

3 The study was associated with the 'Inclusive Thinking' research group and generously funded by the Dutch VSB fund; particular thanks go here to Prof. Halleh Ghorashi, VU Amsterdam.

biggest 'ethno'-religious national minority. Even the individual 'new' citizens who I spoke to, who are highly educated and – with regard to social status – can be regarded as very well 'integrated' and successful, share the deeper vulnerability and experience of actual or perceived victimhood felt by the entire minority community. The different narratives are juxtaposed with the populist xenophobic debate of the day. In this way, the chapter will explore the significance of hate crime and institutional racism to the background scenario of how 'new' citizens feel and display their belonging to the German national community, on the one hand, and to layers of transnational identities (which include intersecting angles such as locality, age, class, gender and religion), on the other.

The Turkish and Kurdish communities in Germany

The Turkish community is the largest national minority in Germany in terms of numbers, and also, being predominantly of the Muslim religion, Germany's most vilified non-Christian group post 9/11. They are addressed in the public debate as a single ethnic minority, without further differentiating to take account of, for example, a Kurdish background. Characteristically, Turkish immigrants have settled in big cities, not only in Berlin but (as mentioned above), in Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfurt am Main or cities in North Rhine Westphalia like Essen, Duisburg and Cologne. Whereas long-term settlement of Turkish people took place across West Germany following their immigration as so-called 'guest workers', the different historical make-up of the social and economic fabric of the GDR means that only a few Turkish people live in the east part of Germany, even today. The structural outcome of this lack of long-term ethnic minority settlement in East Germany creates an uneven space for the political-civic participation of visible minorities, and leaves fewer opportunities for individual multicultural encounters on all sides. Despite Germany's 'secular republican' claim, a strong Christian influence persists with regard to its educational institutions as well as its social fabric and welfare system. Also

significant, as a legacy of its communist orientation, is the fact that 'East Germany is one of the most secularized parts of Europe' (Biendarra and Leis-Peters 2007, 2).

The Turkish daily newspaper *Today's Zaman* reported in 2012 that 'about 2.7 million German citizens have a background of Turkish migration. Twenty-seven per cent of Turks living in Germany were born there, and 39 per cent have been living in Germany for more than 30 years.' Further, *Today's Zaman* reckons, 'the proportion of this 2.7 million who consider Germany their homeland has decreased in the past few years; only 15 per cent regard it as home, whereas in 2009 this figure was 21 per cent. A further 45 per cent consider both Turkey and Germany to be home, and 39 per cent named Turkey alone.'

According to Eccarius-Kelly (2010, 105), despite the change in naturalisation law in 2010, '[s]ocietal violence, however, affects the quality of life of Turkish/ Kurdish immigrants and ethnic Turkish/ Kurdish Germans. As permanent residents and citizens, the minorities experience occasional physical attacks by right-wing groups, neo-Nazi organisations, and militant nationalists from Turkey.' The majority of Turkish and Kurdish migrants have settled in big cities, as outlined above. Hence, in the next section I will talk briefly about the city in a cosmopolitan sense, and link the city space to the visible participation of its citizens and denizens.

City space, citizenship and the post-cosmopolitan condition

The city space is central to our images of modernity and cosmopolitan life, and also to the visibility of difference and the presence of minorities. It links to perspectives that stress 'the primacy of the city over the nation' (Christensen 2012, 891), also emphasising the *polis*, the city space where local political organisation and action take shape.

This is true not only for activities such as the Gezi Park protests that took place in Istanbul in May 2013, claiming a democratic right to the city for all citizens, but can also be witnessed when it comes to the rise

of visible anti-Muslim and anti-foreigner protests, for example those in Dresden. Looking at the most recent German far-right populist movements, PEGIDA ('*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*', translated into English as 'Patriotic Europeans against the rise of Islam in and across the West'), visible not only in the East German city of Dresden but mushrooming across the country, it seems that alongside an everyday urban cosmopolitanism a negative cosmopolitanism has (re-)evolved in Europe, which dismisses certain bodies or groups according to shifting racialised and classed boundaries (Vieten 2011; 2012).

Having said that, a new urban generation of citizens from a migrant background underscores the presence of multiple diasporic and transnational identities in Europe (Ghorashi and Vieten 2013; Vieten 2014). The transnational orientation of these 'new' citizens from Turkish or Kurdish backgrounds seems to fit best into the contemporary world of liquid modernity (Bauman 2000).

Following from these considerations, it is argued here that gendered, classed and religiously and ethnically laden symbolic boundaries in contemporary Europe – Germany being a case in point – refer to problematic and contradictory 'post-cosmopolitan' (Dobson 2003) urban spaces. Hence, the contemporary struggle about who has the 'right to the city' (Vieten and Valentine 2015) and the right to belong to the nation is still very much shaped by violent ruptures and ideological barriers (e.g. an ethnic-national imagining of who is included in the 'people'). This long-lasting block in Germany, for example, is perpetuated by violent hate crime incidents which have been downplayed in the past. It exists despite distinctive regional policies which might positively impact on individual social mobility and achievements. Germany, as one of the big players in the EU, has recently subscribed to a more liberal democratic agenda, even promoting a 'culture of welcome' for foreigners and encouraging inclusion. This is a significant departure from Germany's long history of immigration denial and its track record of drawing political boundaries along ethno-national lines.

Still, the transnational and multi-layered aspirations and identifications of Turkish/Kurdish 'new' citizens disrupt the hegemonic narrative of a territorialised, European-bounded national citizenship, particularly if they have been naturalised and obtained legal German citizenship. 'Acts

of citizenship', according to Isin (2008, 39), are 'those acts that transform forms (orientations, strategies, technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being political by bringing in new actors [...] through new sites and scales of struggle'. It is here that 'new', transnationally oriented German citizens disrupt a system that still takes for granted territorial notions of citizenship and belonging. They live in Europe, but they are not regarded as European; or are they? They have German citizenship, but they are not regarded as German; or are they?

What is at stake is a gap between, on the one hand, symbolic exclusion from the national community, rooted in the long-lasting ideological effects of ethno-national citizenship in Germany, and, on the other hand, a rise in mixed-heritage identities on the ground, within a vernacular multicultural society. In what ways has this paradox been inscribed in the lives of 'new' Germans from a partly Turkish or Kurdish background?

Before I turn to my interview partners' experiences and my discussion of the tensions outlined above, I will give some information on the methodology used and on the interview sample itself.

Giving a name to individual voices

This study was part of a larger research project looking at intersecting points of inclusion with respect to 'new' citizens in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands (Ghorashi and Vieten 2013; Vieten 2013; Vieten 2014).

I interviewed 14 Turkish-German key minority activists in some of the largest cities of Germany between autumn 2010 and spring 2011. Apart from a snowball system at a later stage, I got to know my interview partners through personal and political (left-wing) contacts. Further, I approached individuals I came across as publically renowned minority activists (e.g. in newspapers, on TV and on the internet). A comment on the notion of 'key minority activists' might be necessary here: I approached minority citizens who held positions of individual power marked by influence in and on institutions, or who I perceived as intervening in public debates with respect to

local and national affairs. They advocated to some degree the interests of minorities and were involved in human rights and women's rights.

Interviews were conducted in the participants' offices or homes or in cafés, depending on the space they preferred or on what was accessible for the scheduled time of the interview. All 14 semi-structured interviews were transcribed verbatim; they lasted between 50 minutes and 1.5 hours. Two out of 14 interviews were conducted in English; the others were held in German. I interviewed slightly more women than men (8 to 6).

In terms of social class, about half of my respondents' came from working-class families and the other half from a middle- or upper middle-class background. A significant number of my interview partners exemplified upward social mobility and – if they had immigrated as children – they received their education in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. The majority were of Turkish ethnic background (10) and – although this was not explicitly asked and thus indicated – might be categorised as heterosexual. Ten of my interview partners regarded themselves as Muslims, and expressed clear secular views.

Unlike many other empirical studies, in which interviewees' birth names are not disclosed to ensure that they feel safe, in this study 12 out of the 14 interview partners were happy to openly share their names. All but three were well known to the public, and some could be even labeled as VIPs, so they were used to standing up and speaking out publically. In hindsight, I particularly appreciate their willingness to be mentioned by name. One important epistemic element of the research was to not only *give a voice to minorities*, but *name* individual key minority activists in order to strengthen the right to *civic individualisation*. This is not to suggest that my interview partners' more privileged social position could be easily generalised, or lumped into one specific structural group positioning. Rather, it is intended to support the idea of role models and shed light on *individual agency*, actual and *active* civic change.

In the next section, I will focus on minority activists who live or have lived in Berlin. I will examine how we find repercussions of the complexities outlined above in the testimonies of the people I spoke to. What do well educated and politically engaged 'new' Germans have to say about the situation they live in? What are the implications of the pressure to speak German, or the desire to pass as a German?

Berlin: Turkish-German dilemmas and options

In twenty-first-century Germany the *Shoa* is part of the collective memory across the metropolitan city of Berlin. As a visible testimony of mid-nineteenth-century Turkish immigration, we also find in Berlin the first Turkish cemetery, founded in 1861. Compared to the widespread and noticeable commemoration of Jewish culture and pre-Holocaust cosmopolitan life all across Berlin, an awareness of the close nineteenth- and early twentieth-century bond between Germany and Turkey is almost absent in the public sphere.

Today, Berlin is home to the biggest Turkish community outside Turkey (roughly 110,000 people). Official statistical records regarding ethnic minorities and religious belief do not exist in Germany, so information is measured according to 'nationality'. The capital city of Berlin is divided into administrative areas known as *Bezirke* (districts, similar to boroughs in London). The three districts most frequently mentioned in the context of Turkish settlement are Kreuzberg,[4] Wedding and Neukölln. All three districts are located in the old West of the city.

According to Mühe (2007, 64), '[i]n the districts of *Neukölln*, *Kreuzberg* and *Mitte*, the number of welfare recipients makes up more than 11 per cent of the population – the highest in Berlin.' The percentage of welfare recipients can be an indicator of poverty and lower-class status, associated with low income, poor housing, precarious living conditions and lower access to consumer goods.

Since the 1990s politicians have accused the Turkish community, in particular those who live in Kreuzbe.g. of embracing 'parallel societies' (*Parallelgesellschaften*). This negative attitude towards the existence of Turkish-speaking neighbourhoods and the maintenance of non-German

4 Today the *Bezirk* is named Friedrichshain-Kreuzbe.g. Friedrichshain is 'old east' and now a chic place where a lot of tourists go for leisure purposes (restaurants, bars, shops). In contrast to Kreuzberg it is a young, white and middle-class space.

cultural habits may explain the way some of my Turkish-German interview partners reflected on matters *of language, culture and inclusion*.

Prof. Dr H.H. Uslucan, Director of the Centre for Turkish Studies and Integration Research at the University of Essen-Duisburg, moved to Berlin with his mother in 1973. He was born in Anatolia in the 1960s, and he belongs to the generation whose fathers migrated first to West Germany and brought the family at a later stage, all of them settling in the new homeland. Prof. Uslucan reflects on his upbringing in different social-cultural neighbourhoods, pinpointing some of the effects of living in a more homogenous lingual-cultural environment and the advantages of moving to an upper-class area.

> My father moved to Germany at the beginning of the seventies and due to the right to bring in his family he brought us to Germany as well. I went to school in Turkey for two years; in that respect my educational socialisation was shaped by my heritage in Turkey. Well, I came with my brother and my mother to Germany in 1973; first to Neukölln. At that time this district wasn't the notorious place it is known as today, as it is stigmatised nowadays. I attended a German language class for six months, and I was quite successful. It meant I could leave the third class [of primary school] after two months and switch to the fourth class. As far as my educational/ school career is concerned the migration did not impact negatively on my school performance. … We moved to Schöneberg at that time. I think that was a very important push to my personal development. Previously, in our house [in Neukölln] we used to live with six or seven Turkish families; in Schönebe.g. we were the only Turkish family. Thus, learning German, learning the language with my peer group increased; the boys and children who I used to play with in the yard, they were Germans.[5]

5 ‚Mein Vater ist Anfang der 70er Jahre nach Deutschland gekommen und hat im Rahmen der Familienzusammenführung uns nach Deutschland geholt. Ich habe in der Türkei zwei Jahre auch die Schule besucht, also so dass ein Anteil der schulischen Sozialisation auch hier in der Herkunft festgelegt wurde, so dass ich auch einen Teil der… der Sozialisation und der schulischen Sozialisation in der Türkei durchgeführt hab. Ja ich bin mit meinem Bruder und meiner Mutter 1973 nach Deutschland gekommen und äh… zunächst nach Neukölln (Berlin). Das ist damals also kein so skandalträchtiger Bezirk gewesen, wie es gegenwärtig stigmatisiert wird. Äh… und hab nen Deutschkurs besucht, ein halbes Jahr und war recht erfolgreich, so dass ich also die dritte Klasse nach zwei Monaten wieder verlassen konnte und mit der vierten angefangen habe, also so dass, was die schulische Karriere betrifft quasi die Migration

Schöneberg (-Tempelhof) is a more prosperous district of (West) Berlin. Prof. Uslucan remembers it as a crucial turning point in his further educational achievements and learning of German as his second language that his parents moved to a more affluent neighbourhood of Berlin. Even more important, it opened up possibilities for mixing and mingling with German children on a day-to-day basis. From this perspective, it seems that a cultural or linguistic ghetto inhabited by a minority can impede an individual's integration.

We should keep in mind that Prof. Uslucan entered the German education system in the mid-to-late 1970s, a period in which the governing Social Democratic party encouraged social mobility. There was, however, no master plan for the integration of immigrants.

The issue of language and identity also came up in an interview with another academic, who moved to Germany quite recently and had already lived in other countries beforehand. This interview partner grew up in an upper middle-class family in Turkey and gained her doctorate outside of Turkey.

> So in Germany there are two nationalities or two groups, you are either a Turk, undifferentiated for the immigration background, or whatever, you are either a Turk or you are German. It's almost two different categories that are in opposition to each other and of course I don't understand why I am going to be this Turk for the rest of my life because I also made a lot of effort to be German or be just this new German.

Whereas speaking the main language of the country of residence might help with daily communication and increase the chance of career success, this matter proves more complicated when considering that a more cosmopolitan and mobile life might mean moving countries frequently, and – as far as academics and professionals are concerned – English has become the

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> nicht sehr früh schon zur schulischen Beeinträchtigung geführt hat. Wir sind dann umgezogen nach Schönebe.g. Das war glaub ich jetzt für die eigene Entwicklung ein wichtiger Schub. In dem Haus vorher waren wir sechs, sieben türkische Familien, und in Schöneberg waren wir die einzige, also so dass quasi das Deutsch lernen, Sprache lernen im Peerverbund viel größer war, mit den Jungs und den Kindern, die auf dem Hof waren, das waren alles Deutsche'.

lingua franca. Further, the dilemmas implicit in the two-tiered positioning – the positive and privileged position of the citizen of the world or cosmopolitan, on the one side, and the negative view of cosmopolitan activity in which the mobility of migrants is restricted (Vieten 2007), on the other side – are carried through into the contemporary situation of non-Western migrants: although they live an everyday cosmopolitan life, the national integration policy and cultural order attempts to domesticate them.

In the interview we touched on the issue of what it means to raise a child. Here, enforcement of a language creates paradoxical results and even painful mothering experiences.

> R: They said we should talk to her in German hoping her German would improve.
> I: Who told you?
> R: The kindergarten teachers.
> I: Ok.
> R: But I think they are instructed from somewhere that they have to tell these immigrant parents that they have to speak to their child in German. How many times do I have to change my mother tongue with my child? So I continued speaking in English with her and her father was speaking in German. Actually her German is much better than her English but this concept of integration looked absurd to me especially as cosmopolitan people like me who constantly have to change their mother tongue according to the country of integration.

While conducting research on Kurdish mothers in London, Erel (2013) noticed that despite making efforts to raise their children embedded in an understanding of Kurdish history, tradition and culture, the women being interviewed identified positively with British society. 'I have found that all mothers in this study, regardless of their orientation to cultural change or continuity, positioned themselves as part of British society. They claimed rights for themselves and their children' (2013, 981). However, the situation in Germany looks different, with a strong external demand to integrate *culturally*. Most of my interview partners expressed a struggle in identifying positively with Germany, as 'new' Germans.

Mr Kilic,[6] a member of the Green party and an MP in the *Bundestag* at the time of the interview, sums up what the situation looked like when he

6 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memet_K%C4%B1l%C4%B1%C3%A7

moved to Germany as an adult. He immigrated in the early 1990s, pursuing legal studies and completing an MA in European law. He had already trained as a solicitor in Turkey.

> It was a very interesting time to come to Germany; the time of the reunification when the wall went down, a very vibrant period. Having said that there was also a strong nationalistic mood. East Germany … 'We want to have a healthy national consciousness', all these slogans. Or 'The ship is full'. All this somehow fueled Rostock, Hoyerswerda, Lichtenhagen. There were arson attacks on shelters for refugees. In Moelln and Solingen migrants were burnt to death. These were racists who did this. I knew Germany of course for Goethe and Schiller, and particularly my favourite philosopher, Nietzsche. I read his work in Turkish. Of course, I knew immediately that those who attacked refugees and migrants could not be regarded as representative of the German people as a whole. Well, I believe I am not mistaken in this. For sure, there were also people hiding behind the curtain, and actually siding with this, but then there were *Lichterketten*, hundreds of thousands of people went onto the streets, until the Nazis somehow withdrew. At that time I began working with the Ausländerbeiräte.[7]

As will be illustrated next, the shadow of the hate crimes and anti-Muslim racism of the early 1990s is reflected in the testimonies of my interview partners, not only in Berlin, but also in other major cities. In this regard the findings of this study complement Mandel's (2008) observation that Turkish immigrants and 'new' citizens from Turkish or Kurdish backgrounds are

7 ‚Als ich 1990 nach Deutschland kam, war es eine sehr interessante Zeit sozusagen mitten drin in der Wiedervereinigung. Mauer ist gefallen und eine sehr bewegte Zeit. Aber es gab auch ziemlich starke nationale Töne. Ostdeutschland… „Wir wollen auch ein gesundes nationales Selbstbewusstsein haben" - all diese Sprüche, oder „Das Boot voll", haben dazu geführt, dass in Rostock, Hoyerswerda, Lichtenhagen Flüchtlingsheime in Brand gesteckt worden sind, in Mölln und Solingen Migranten verbrannt worden sind. Die Rassisten haben so was gemacht. Ich kannte Deutsche natürlich von Goethe, Schiller, insbesondere mein Lieblingsphilosoph Nitsche. Ich hab ihn in türkischer Sprache gelesen. Ich wusste sofort, dass diese Leute nicht die Repräsentanten des deutschen Volkes sein können. Ähm… ich glaube, dass ich mich nicht geirrt habe. Sicherlich, es gab auch viele Leute, die hinter Vorhängen applaudiert haben, aber dann gab es Lichterketten, Hunderttausende Menschen auf die Straße gegangen, bis die Nazis sich klein gefühlt haben. In dieser Zeit hab ich mich bei den Ausländerbeiräten engagiert.'

not included in the claim of an open-minded European Germany. It is here that the long-lasting shadow of history and the drawing of ethno-national boundaries triggers experiences of exclusion and non-belonging.

Post-Unification Germany in the 1990s: the peaceful change and its violent aftermath

The initially calm and peaceful transition from the communist system in the East and the social-liberal market system in the West (*Rheinischer Kapitalismus*) to the post-1990 united Germany left different sections of German society shattered, shaken and uncertain about their future. What is significant is the scale of racist attacks on black people, refugees and Turkish immigrants from the early 1990s in both West and East Germany, reaching a peak in 1992 and 1993.

Bauböck (2010: 800) reflects on the meaning of the arson attacks in Mölln and Solingen in the context of citizenship status:

> The 1992/93 arson attacks on Turkish immigrants in the German towns of Mölln and Solingen triggered a debate in Turkey about emigrants not being sufficiently protected while they are foreign nationals. The German naturalization requirement to renounce a previous nationality meant, however, that Turkish emigrants would lose their rights to unconditional return to Turkey, to own land and to inherit property there. Turkey therefore introduced in 1995 the so-called pink card, which secured all these rights (apart from the right to vote) for former citizens who had to renounce their nationality.

In the East, Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen became synonymous with racist attacks on non-white refugees. Solingen is a town in North Rhine Westphalia not unlike the cities of Essen, Duisburg and Düsseldorf. Two Turkish women and three girls were murdered here on 29 May 1993. On 23 November 1992, in Mölln, a town in Schleswig-Holstein, a Northern federal state in West Germany, two Turkish girls and their grandmother had died under similar circumstances. In both cases, racists and, as it turned out,

neo-Nazis had targeted Turkish family homes and murdered women and children in cowardly arson attacks.

These racist murders provided a landmark within the trauma of many 'new' Germans from a Turkish or Kurdish background. When I asked my interview partners to name three or four important historical dates or events they remember from the past 40 years, the majority immediately came up with 'Mölln and Solingen'. Some of their comments are given here as examples.

> Solingen and Mölln are central and divisive experiences for me. That ... you know ... people are still being burnt and this is happening at the turn of the 3rd millennium. (Cakir, Frankfurt am Main)[8]

> Clearly Mölln, Mölln is a household name, of course 11 September, too. But I have to say the first thing was Mölln. I was deeply shocked. Well, at that time I often had nightmares, for example, that suddenly ... there was a Turkish family in my neighbouring house, I lived in the Lindenstrasse, and you know they had a house. And I had this dream that their home was burnt. (Yuksel, Bremen)[9]

> Very important is the Turkish house burning in Mölln. I had my first nervous breakdown on that occasion. At that time I was preparing for my first law exams and, in general, was not following that much what was going on around me in terms of political and social events. I was only concentrating on law and my exams, and I was walking in the Schulterblatt [in the St Pauli quarter of Hamburg] and then I saw this poster, on the window of a bookshop. I don't know how I did it, but until then I had ignored completely what was going on and then I saw this poster and fainted on the street. It really got me. Besides, I became sick with shingles. Well, it happened at a time in my life where I was bound to do my studies and could not engage in politics. I think I had to do my law exams four weeks later. Hence, this

8 'Solingen und Mölln sind für mich sehr einschneidende Erlebnisse. Dass... in einem... also kurz vor dem dritten Jahrtausend Menschen immer noch verbrannt werden.'

9 'Also Moelln, Moelln ist so ein Begriff, ne 11 September. Also ich muss sagen, als Erstes, Moelln so. Das war ziemlich ... da war ich ziemlich geschockt. So, und hatte ja damals auch Träume gehabt, dass plötzlich die... das war ne türkische Familie, die im Nachbarhaus, ich wohnte da in der Lindenstraße, und die hatten da ja ein Haus. Und da hab ich geträumt, dass deren Haus abbrennt, so ne.'

> breakdown and realising that I couldn't do anything about what was going on politically was a very influential experience for me. But, you know, I wanted to pass that exam. (Gul, Hamburg)[10]

> Yes, it was 1992, 1993, those fascist attacks against… well, let me think, against migrants, refugees, here in Mölln, Solingen and there were others, because there were a lot of places where these things happened. That was, you know, the debate around the time…. 92/ 93; these were the years when I got politicised. (Ercan, Weimar)[11]

Prof. Karasoglu, another interview partner, also mentioned these years of racist attacks, which for her were connected to a life-threatening personal experience. A Molotov cocktail was placed in front of her office while she was working at Prof. Uslucan's Institute in Essen.

Another interview partner confirmed the centrality of these years in her research observations: 'I find the burning of the houses in Mölln and Solingen very vivid in many of the Turkish immigrants' memories here. Especially then there were other burnings. About 1992, 1993, 1994' (H., Berlin).

10 'Ganz wichtig ist der türkische Hausbrand in Mölln. Da hab ich wirklich meinen allerersten Zusammenbruch gehabt. Also hatte ich dann auch nicht. Aber da steckte ich mitten in der Examensphase in meinem ersten Staatsexamen und kriegte eigentlich weder gesellschaftspolitisch noch überhaupt irgendwas mit. Also ich kriegte gar nichts mit, außer Jura und Examen und ging im Schulterblatt entlang und dann hing ein Plakat, war bei der Buchhandlung. Und ich hatte das, ich weiß gar nicht, wie ich's geschafft hab, aber ausgeblendet bis dahin, bis mir irgendwie dieses Plakat… und brach wirklich mitten auf der Straße zusammen. Es hat mich echt eingeholt. Und kriegte dann sofort ne Gürtelrose. Es war… es war in ner Phase, wo ich partout nicht irgendwas hätte machen können und auch nicht äh… weil ich… ich glaube, ich hab vier Wochen danach Examen geschrieben oder so. Es war irgendwie… aber das ist ganz, ganz prägend, da irgendwas, so was mitzukriegen und nichts tun zu können oder wollen, also ich hätte… können hätte ich ja. Aber ich wollte ja nicht, weil ich wollte ja dieses Examen… ' (Gul, Hamburg).

11 'So 92 bis 93 die faschistischen Angriffe gegen… lass mich überlegen… gegen die Migranten, Flüchtlinge hier…. Mölln, Solingen und andere, weil es gab ja viel andere. Das war… und die Debatte drum herum. 92/93 – das war so das… das waren auch die Jahre, wo ich mich sehr politisiert habe.' (Ercan, Weimar).

As argued at the very beginning, the contested post-cosmopolitan urban space unfolds with contradictory claims: on the one hand there is a vernacular presence of settled migrants across all major West German cities; on the other, persistent anti-Muslim racism prevails, targeting Turkish individuals and families and extending to become institutionalised racism (Vieten 2014). The long-lasting impact of the hate crimes of the 1990s shapes the feeling of all minority communities and individuals in contemporary Germany.

Excursus: The 'Sarrazin' debate in 2010

In late summer 2010, Thilo Sarrazin, a member of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and a former member of the Executive Board of the *Deutsche Bundesbank*, published a book with the title *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany does itself in).[12] Jürgen Habermas writes about this book, and the message it conveys, in *The New York Times*:

> Since the end of August, Germany has been roiled by waves of political turmoil over integration, multiculturalism and the role of the 'Leitkultur,' or guiding national culture. This discourse is in turn reinforcing trends toward increasing xenophobia among the broader population.... 'Germany Does Away With Itself,' a book that argues that the future of Germany is threatened by the wrong kind of immigrants, especially from Muslim countries. In the book, Thilo Sarrazin, a politician from the Social Democratic Party who sat on the Bundesbank board, develops proposals for demographic policies aimed at the Muslim population in Germany. He fuels discrimination against this minority with intelligence research from which he draws false biological conclusions that have gained unusually wide publicity. (28 October 2010)

12 Since then he has published more books with similarly populist titles, such as *Europe does not need the Euro: how political wishful thinking led us into crisis* (2012) and *The new character assassination: the limits of free opinion in Germany* (2014).

In 2012, Sarrazin's populist book became a German bestseller, running in its seventeenth edition and selling 1.5 million copies.

Prof. Y. Karakosoglu, introduced above, told me in our interview:

> This is something which strikes me so much. Two or three or four weeks ago when Sarrazin's book was published. I got a call from Martin Spielberg from the *Zeit* and he asked me 'What do you think about the discourse? What do you think about people thinking about Sarrazin's book?' And I said 'Oh, this book, it was sent to me in advance. I had a glance on it and now in my opinion this will not cause much discussion because it is so un-intellectual and it has such stupid ideas and I think we are far beyond this in Germany with our discourse on integration.' Two days later, I realised that the comments on it, in the newspaper, were so positive. I called him and said, I was totally wrong, I didn't realise what the main ideas in society, the main fears in society, are. What I would say is he [Sarrazin] was able as a social democrat in a very important position in the economic system in Germany to use expressions which the man on the street would like to use and always feared. Of course, he was then considered to be politically incorrect. Now, the barrier is opened, the barrage is open. Everybody is able to speak about the issue the way he or she always wanted to and use all kinds of expressions, can use all kinds of stereotypes, because it is allowed, he is allowed to. .... And people are now happy about being able to do it in a non-differentiated way. And Sarrazin thinks it is an achievement to do this, but what strikes me is a lot of others, politicians and so on, would ... and also scientists would speak about his book as 'Okay, there are some terms and some expressions which are really racist, but mainly using figures that are really, really interesting he did something that helped us to open the discourse.' I don't understand it. Really, I am helpless.

Sarrazin got plenty of media attention in 2010, and therefore was able to spread his opinion among a range of different audiences; neither Chancellor Merkel nor other prominent politicians shunned Sarrazin. Despite the lack of outrage among the German elite about Sarrazin's populist right-wing message, a counter-publication by authors from various ethnic, national and religious backgrounds was released at the beginning of 2011. Edited by Hilal Sezgin, its title *Deutschland erfindet sich neu – Manifest der Vielen* (Germany invents itself anew – Manifesto of the many) engages expressly with Sarrazin's book, but also critiques the way politicians, the media and civil society responded to prejudice against Turkish, Jewish and Muslim communities.

The public debate following Sarrazin's publication recalls events in the Netherlands more than a decade ago, when the 'new realism' (Prins 2002) marked the start of an openly aggressive public 'anti-tabooing' campaign targeting visible minorities and migrants, although in the Netherlands the principal targets were Moroccan-Dutch 'new' citizens.

Concluding remarks

The chapter presented the findings of an original study on the intersectional positioning of minority 'new' citizens, moving beyond the migration debate and approaching Turkish- (Kurdish-) Germans as individual citizens, who have to cope with the post-1989 violence as a collective traumatic experience. All of my interview partners come from a highly educated and elite section of the 'new' German citizens; they have hybrid migrant identities as well as a vernacular post-cosmopolitan life with transnational orientations, despite mostly living a local city life. Speaking the German language and excelling in higher education creates opportunities; individual social mobility means that 'new' Germans have achieved some public and political visibility. When it comes to broader issues of inclusion, however – such as being accepted as a transnational migrating actor – the German *culturalising* discourse (Vieten 2007) falls short of providing an all-inclusive cosmopolitan society. The racist violence against Turkish immigrants that took place in the aftermath of German unification in 1989 has had a long-lasting traumatic effect on most ethnic Turkish- and Kurdish-Germans, despite their individual achievements and successes in the Germany of today.

Following Sarrazin's populist racist writings back in 2010, another unsettling affair hit the headlines in 2013 concerning the racist murder of several Turkish men (and one Greek man) by the NSU (National Socialist Underground). And in 2014, previous waves of racist statements and actions were succeeded by the populist right-wing demonstrations of PEGIDA, which hit city streets in Germany. Having said that, counter demonstrations

still largely outnumber neo-nationalist sentiments. The recent welcoming of (Syrian) refugees by Munich's inhabitants in September 2015, for example, indicates a spontaneous response to the needs of Middle Eastern refugees seeking asylum and a new life in Europe. These positive vernacular actions do offer another model of civic consensus in cosmopolitan compassion. So, is this good news, indicating grassroots changes and a move to a more open and cosmopolitan society in the new Germany?

Societal divisions and conflicts hint at wider contestations about group belonging, inclusion and everyday cosmopolitan openness towards difference and the Other in Germany. It seems the popular mood is divided in the German public domain: on the one hand, the inadequate *institutional* handling of the NSU affair[13] and the lack of robust efforts to tackle the roots of the more recent PEGIDA protests may indicate 'institutional racism' (Vieten 2014), but this exists alongside undeniable vernacular multicultural orientations. On the positive side, my interview partners' left-wing political identities, and their engagement with the local sites in which they live, underline a strong civic identity corresponding with the ideal of the 'good citizen'. As newcomers to German society, however, these citizens from Turkish or Kurdish backgrounds can be seen to have *performed as* rather than identified as citizens of the German city-*polis*.

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13 The Turkish community in Germany published a report on the NSU court case, showing how institutional racism is interwoven into police practices when dealing with crime against Turkish people (*Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland* 2013: 78).

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PIOTR GOLDSTEIN

Everyday Active Citizenship the Balkan Way: Local Civil Society and the Practice of 'Bridge Building' in Two Post-Yugoslav Cities

ABSTRACT: Active citizenship in the post-war Western Balkans has traditionally been studied in the context of either Western-style (and usually foreign-funded) Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or, more recently, protest movements. This chapter highlights a wider range of better- and lesser-known forms of civil society in the contemporary post-Yugoslav space. It shows how interest associations, student unions, religious groups and online communities can all contribute to vibrant civil society, even if their work seems distant from the post-war area's current problems. This civil society, the chapter argues, creates an environment in which the people of the western Balkans can enact their citizenship and, little by little, 'build bridges', across ethnic lines and beyond.

Introduction

Active citizenship, as Fuller et al. (2008) put it, 'broadly understood, can mean any form of productive contribution to society.' In the Western context, however, such 'productive contribution' has been usually seen as connected to either economic activity (ibid., 157) or engagement in the political affairs of the country (Kearns 1995; Marinetto 2003). In the South-East European context, the issue has been mostly discussed in relation to protest movements, particularly the most recent ones in various cities of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 2014 and in other successor states of former

Yugoslavia and in wider South-Eastern Europe since 2011 (Sardelić 2013; Štiks and Horvat 2014).

In this chapter I look at a different type of active citizenship. I argue that active participation in local civil society[1] can be considered to be a form of active citizenship, even if the sector of civil society in which a person is active is not particularly political. Or, rather, that it does not seem to be of immediate political significance when considering the notion of political in its narrow sense: related to party-politics, governance, formal projects of 'democratisation' and other endeavours of quantifiable outcomes. Considering everyday *practices*, this chapter engages with theories which call for appreciation of such practices, particularly the theory of micro-politics (Goldfarb 2006, 2008) and that of everyday peace (Mac Ginty 2013). It also draws close to the theory of acts of citizenship (Isin 2008) and that of vernacular cosmopolitanism (Bhabha 1996).

Jeffrey Goldfarb's theory of micro-politics stem from his study of student theatres in Poland in the late 1970s and of the forces which eventually led to the fall of the communism in the late 1980s (Goldfarb 1980, 2006). Goldfarb argues that the political changes that happened were catalysed by a range of small and seemingly unimportant everyday behaviours and events. Meetings of individuals in spaces of political privacy, for instance by the kitchen table, and poetry events, which were condemned by communist authorities, but during which participants 'conducted themselves as they would at any cultural gathering' (Goldfarb 2006, 11) were according to Goldfarb important catalysers of change. He convincingly argues that 'people acted as if they lived in a free society and a free society resulted' (ibid., 69). In the context of quite different realms and problems Roger Mac Ginty (2013) points out that for post-conflict societies, seemingly small changes, such as 'storeowners painting their storefronts' or 'the resumption of cultural practices that declined during conflict' (ibid., 56), can constitute a more

1 In this chapter I understand civil society in a (neo-)Tocquevillian manner, i.e. as associational life in all its richness (Tocqueville 1956). However, in places, I also refer to the understanding of civil society as the counter-balance to the state, as promoted, most notably, by Antonio Gramsci (2007).

meaningful indicator of positive transmission than Human Development Index, Gross Domestic Product and other formal indicators.

More theoretically, Engin F. Isin distinguishes between *acts* and *actions* of citizenship (Isin 2008). 'To act [...] is neither arriving at a scene nor fleeing from it, but actually engaging in its creation. With that creative act the actor also creates herself/himself as the agent responsible for the scene created' (Isin 2008, 27). And citizenship 'involves practices of making citizens – social, political, cultural and symbolic' (ibid., 17). While acts are not practices (ibid., 18), acts and practices are strongly bound and dependent on each other. The practices which this chapter considers allow for acts of citizenship, allow for creation of scenes within which citizenship is enacted and in which under some circumstances acts can become actions.

Finally, we may perceive everyday active citizenship described in this chapter as an instance of vernacular cosmopolitanism (as defined by Bhabha 1996). Such connection however needs to be made with caution. If we take cosmopolitanism as, first of all, appreciation of (national) cultures other than our own, then calling the 'bridge building' practices in the post-war Western Balkans 'cosmopolitan' is likely to obscure the nature of these practices rather than explain them. For in the area in question, unlike in the Western Europe, 'building bridges' is often about appreciation of a local culture which has been hybrid for centuries, rather than of 'new hybridities' (Beauregard and Body-Gendrot 1999; Binnie et al. 2006), of well-known rather than of unknown (for my short discussion on this see Goldstein 2015). While Nava (2002) tells us that '*ordinariness* and *domestication* of difference are the distinguishing marks of vernacular cosmopolitanism in urban Britain today' (ibid., 94), talking of 'domestication of difference' in Western Balkans would be inappropriate, if not for anything else, for that it would be hard to say which of the cultures would be *domestifying* and which *domestified*. However, if we consider cosmopolitanism more broadly, as appreciation of human (and not only national/ethnic) difference, then we may point out also here, within practices of Western Balkan active citizens, what Bhabha calls '"vernacular cosmopolitan" negotiation [...] between the "insufficiency of the self" [...] and the needs of modern, urban communities of interest and inquiry' (Bhabha 1996). Such negotiation is an important element of the 'bridge building' which this chapter discusses.

In this chapter I link the above theories to argue that the engagement of individuals in the (broadly understood) civil society can be seen as a sign of everyday peace, an important part of micro-politics, a field for acts of citizenship and in many instances for what can be perceived as vernacular cosmopolitanism. Or in other words, that this engagement is worth appreciating as an important step on the region's route to social and political change.

Method and setting

This chapter is based on findings of mixed-methods research conducted in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novi Sad, Serbia between 2010 and 2014, within two larger research projects. The research consisted of ethnographic investigation with local civil society actors combined with 77 interviews, two questionnaire surveys distributed among both leaders and 'regular members' of associations, and photography used as a research method.

The two cities, Mostar and Novi Sad, were chosen for a range of superficial similarities that go in pair with profound dissimilarities which make them an excellent setting to explore a wide range of challenges (and opportunities) of contemporary post-Yugoslav societies. These two cities may at first seem similar: each is in a way its country's 'second city' (Novi Sad is the second biggest city in Serbia, while Mostar is the capital of Herzegovina, one of Bosnia-Herzegovina's two historical constituencies); both cities are multi-ethnic; both had important bridges destroyed during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s; both are post-industrial and both have large student populations.

However, everyday life in these cities is shaped by what makes them very different. Mostar, once multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan, has experienced all the atrocities of the recent wars. Its bridges, most notably the centuries old 'Old Bridge', were destroyed in fighting between former neighbours. The city still bears the stigma of war as it is hard to find a building, particularly in the city centre, that would not be covered in bullet

holes, and war-time ruins are omnipresent across the city. Most importantly though, the city is divided. Bosniak and Croat populations, once evenly spread across the town now live separated by an invisible wall that runs along *Bulevar* – a multi-lane road which used to constitute the front line at the time of war. The two sides of the city are home to two city centres, two universities, two separate post office companies, two electricity and heat providers, etc. Citizens of Mostar sometimes smile when they say 'there is two of everything here', but for many of them this truth is deeply painful.

Novi Sad is very different. It was established in 1748, within Habsburg Empire, as an effect of cooperation between local Hungarians and Danube Swabians and a large Serbian minority and, despite large population shifts after Second World War and throughout recent conflicts, it remains multi-ethnic. Nowadays it is home to a Serbian majority and a multitude of minorities, most notably Hungarians, but also Croats, Ruthenians, Romanians, Slovaks, Roma, Jews and others. Unlike Mostar, it was not affected by direct fighting. Its bridges were bombed, but not by locals, but by NATO, an 'external enemy'. It would be wrong however to think of Novi Sad as untouched by war – many of the city's men were incorporated in the Serbian army and the huge influx of refugees became a root of many today's conflicts. The minorities experienced 'low level violence' (Bieber and Winterhagen 2006), but this was enough for incurring long lasting resentment and mistrust.

Bridge building

During the wars of the 1990s both Mostar and Novi Sad had important bridges destroyed. The destruction of one of them in particular – Mostar's Old Bridge – was frequently used in the Western media as a symbol representing divided communities (Bicic 1993; Sudetic 1993; Williams 1993). In the aftermath of the wars, the international community has sought to rebuild trust and dialogue across communities in order to prevent a return to the violence of the 1990s. A key metaphor has been that of 'bridge

building', and civil society was viewed as having a key role to play in this process. Civil society has been expected to foster inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation, and to assist in many other tasks such as promoting minority rights and gender justice, or healing psychological trauma.

The metaphor of *bridges* and *bridge building*, used by foreign media and donor institutions, was probably even more powerful on the local level. The post-1944 cultural mythology of Yugoslavia was built on the symbol of the bridge and Ivo Andrić's Nobel-winning *The Bridge on the Drina* (1977) was the apotheosis of Yugoslav literature.[2] The bridge described by Andrić was not only a connector between places and people. It was also a witness to events important for the surrounding communities, for men and women, young and old, soldiers and civilians, educated cosmopolitans and those who have never left the town.

Another metaphor is that of the Balkans themselves as a bridge: a bridge between East and West, Eastern and Western Christianity, and the influences of Islam and the Western world.[3] In this context, (re)building bridges can be equated with re-building not only the prosperity, but also the international significance of the entire region.

In the aftermath of the inter-ethnic violence which accompanied and followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, it is easy to think of 'bridge building' in that region mostly in relation to ethnicity. However, there are also other 'bridges' that need to be built. Tensions and discrimination based on gender, age, class, sexual orientation, physical ability, or being local or a newcomer to the city, are all vivid in the region. For many young or elderly people, the generational conflict is the one that they need to face on an everyday basis. For many of the refugees and the displaced, but also for those who moved into a city for economic reasons, being looked upon as unwanted *došljaci* (newcomers), supposedly more primitive than the

2 I am grateful to Dr Adelina Angusheva-Tihanov for this assertion.

3 These metaphors and their echoes were explored, for instance, by Todorova (1997) and Goldsworthy (2002). For further analysis, placed in the particular context of the destruction and rebuilding of Mostar's Old Bridge, see Gunzburger Makaš (2001).

'old settlers' (*starosjedioci /starosedeoci*) of the city, is a significant trauma.[4] Thus, in this chapter I agree with Piekut et al. (2012) who advise us to 'shift the discussion on social diversity from ethnic diversity to broader social diversity'. In line with this scope, I do approach work of civil society actors that operate in the field of 'broader social diversity', and that actively are involved with 'building bridges' across various, not only ethnic, lines.

Local civil society

The literature on Western Balkan/South East European civil societies is often explicit in reducing the study of these civil societies to NGOs or, even further, to foreign-funded NGOs (see, for instance, Dević 2003, 7; Fagan 2010, 50; Kostovicova and Bojičić-Dželilović 2013, 9; Stubbs 1999, v). This is despite the fact that the authors often recognise that such reduction is problematic. One of its consequences is that, as Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović put it, 'a variety of traditional grass-roots institutions, networks, practices and actors, with a potentially more constructive input towards aims of post-conflict transition have been overlooked' (Kostovicova and Bojičić-Dželilović 2013, 9). In this chapter I argue that the part of civil society which has been overlooked is in fact much more ample, and by no means less significant, than that comprised of NGOs.

4 *Starosjedioci* in Bosnian and Croatian and *starosedeoci* in Serbian. The tension between *starosjedioci/ starosedeoci* and *došljaci* has been described, for instance, in Paolo Rumiz, *Maschere per un massacro. Quello che non abbiamo voluto sapere della guerra in Jugoslavia* (Milano: Feltrinelli Editore, 2011, 103–104) and analysed further in Jansen (2005).

(Typical) NGOs

My research revealed that, at least for Mostar and Novi Sad, most people, be they foreign researchers or local activists, define NGOs in a way similar to Claire Mercer (2002). According to her review of literature on NGOs, these are:

> [t]hose organizations that are officially established, run by employed staff (often urban professionals or expatriates), well-supported (by domestic or, as is more often the case, international funding), and that are often relatively large and well-resourced. NGOs may therefore be international organizations or they may be national or regional NGOs. They are seen as different from Grassroots Organizations (GROs) that are usually understood to be smaller, often membership-based organizations, operating without a paid staff but often reliant upon donor or NGO support. (Mercer 2002, 6)

This is a rather Western definition, which would be inappropriate, for example, in Poland, where few of the NGOs are run by employed staff. However, it seems to be accurate in Mostar and Novi Sad. By accurate I mean that this definition in principle encompasses organisations which would consider themselves NGOs and that would be regarded as such, also by local and foreign donors, researchers, and other relevant players. Of course, not all Mostar and Novi Sad NGOs employ staff on a full-time basis; many of them are small and many are badly financed. However, the general idea of differentiating NGOs from GROs, and seeing the former as operating on a possibly larger budget, seems to have a large following.

While such NGOs receive a lot of academic, media and public criticism, it is wrong to think that all such associations are corrupt, inefficient, etc. Similarly, it would be naïve to perceive all other types of civil society actors (as listed below) as automatically good and possessing all the qualities that 'typical' NGOs are said to lack. What is more, there exists a multitude of definitions and some of them would consider all types of the civil society actors I analyse, to be NGOs, as they are non-governmental and to a larger or smaller extent organised. Thus, for the sake of clarity, I refer in this chapter to 'typical' NGOs as defined above, but also to associations, which includes the full range of formal and informal civil society groups, including the 'typical' NGOs. I use the term NGOs (without the qualifying 'typical') whenever this distinction is of secondary importance.

Informal groups, movements, zero-budget initiatives

To register an NGO or in fact an 'association' or 'association of citizens', since 'NGO' is not a legal term in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Serbia, takes money, time and effort. The advantage of registering is that a registered association is a legal entity and, among other things, can receive donations or conduct business to raise funds for its activities and initiatives. However, many groups see no need for such benefits and refrain from registering, either not to waste time and money on what they perceive as unnecessary, or in a conscious act of disengagement with the government's bureaucratic structures. Such groups tend to operate without money or rely on small donations of those involved when there is a need to pay for something. For instance, group members make donations to rent a hall for activities or to buy audio equipment (Interviews #21, August 2010, and #47, January 2011, in Novi Sad). In some cases they arrange in-kind donations.

It would be wrong, however, to think of such groups as always small and insignificant. A good example of such an unregistered, yet significant, initiative (or movement) is Novi Sad's *Inicijativa za Društveni Centar* (Initiative for the Social Centre). The initiative, calling itself 'social movement' (Društveni Centar n.d.), was formed by 'associations of citizens [including 'typical' NGOs], informal groups and prominent individuals, active in the field of creativity, education, humanitarian work, environmental protection, sustainable development, activism, working with children, youth, persons with disabilities, Roma and other sensitive groups' (ibid.). Their idea was to transform the old abandoned building of an army barracks, 7,293 m^2 in size and close to Novi Sad's city centre, into a social centre, a space that would 'enable anyone who engages in activities of significance for society, to accomplish his/her ideas and projects' (ibid.). In practice, this would mean that, for instance, '*Ogledalo*', an independent theatre which in over 20 years of its history never had its own space for rehearsals and performances, could finally find such a space in the barracks' many empty rooms.

I first learned about the initiative in mid-November 2011, when a professionally made film (Gmizić et al. 2011), nearly half an hour long, was posted on YouTube, and promoted through Facebook. In the film, leaders of various associations, along with some internationally known Novi Sad

artists and academics, spoke, mostly from within the barracks, about the great potential of the place. Their contributions were interspersed with shots from former military objects converted into social centres in Slovenia (*Metelkova* in Ljubljana) and Croatia (*Rojc* in Pula).

About one month later, on 22 December 2011, around 100 people gathered outside the barracks, listened to a couple of short speeches (interpreted into sign language) and then entered the place in what they have called 'illegal but legitimate' action. Armed with brooms and spades they instantly started cleaning the barracks. Soon afterwards an intensive programme of events started. These included crafts workshops, lectures, discussions, film screenings, exhibitions, fencing classes for children and adults, fitness classes, regular vegetarian and non-vegetarian meals cooked by volunteers, dancing parties and late evening concerts among other events. Everything was free to attend and only symbolic donations were encouraged in exchange for meals. At the same time thoughtful organisation and some fundraising were evident. For instance, soon after the opening, two serviced mobile toilets appeared on the site. Such amenities cannot be funded by small donations and must have been provided as an in-kind donation by the enterprise managing these toilets. There were additional signs of professionalism, efficiency and engagement on the part of those involved in *Društveni Centar:* excellent media coverage, a professional website, a power generator that allowed events after sunset, and regular publically-announced letters of support from associations and other institutions in Serbia and other post-Yugoslav countries. The occupation of the barracks, and the intensive programme of events that came with it, lasted 22 days, until 13 January 2012, when the activists were expelled from the buildings by military personnel. However, negotiations with the local government and the engagement of many of the activists lasted much longer.

The initiative could have registered and acted as an NGO, but those who formed it decided not to register, despite the suggestion of Novi Sad city council that this would ease the negotiations between the Initiative and the city authorities. In the eyes of people engaged in the initiative, keeping away from the government-operated register made them even

more non-governmental and confirmed their role as a civil society actor.[5] At the same time the initiative was well organised and gathered an impressive number of supporters. According to my interviewee, the initiative was empowered by the work of about 40 'active, loyal and persistent' individuals, who between mid-December 2011 and 24 January 2012, when the interview took place, 'gave 100% of [their] time'. It also had the support and involvement of several hundred more people who, informed through the e-mailing list, would come to participate in meetings and activities (interview #53, January 2012, Novi Sad), and of several thousand 'friends' with the initiative on Facebook (4869 on 15 June 2013).

The opportunities for active citizenship that *Društveni Centar* created were at least of two types. First of all, the people who were engaged in the Initiative made a very active and strong stand on how they wanted the cultural landscape of their city to look like. They wanted change and they worked towards this change, with their words, hands and brooms. But also, those engaged created a certain 'alternative reality' in a broader sense – one based on 'building bridges'. A reality in which all generations cooperated for common good, in which speeches were interpreted into sign language, in which both vegetarians and meat-eaters were satisfied and in which everyone felt that their voice counted and that their contribution was important. Paraphrasing Goldfarb: they acted as if they lived in an equal society, hoping that an equal society will result.

A different example of an active, well organised group which is unregistered and operates without budget is Novi Sad's *FreeTeam Pokret* ('FreeTeam Movement'). FreeTeam regularly organises not only weekly Free Hugs but also Free Salsa, Free Yoga and Free Film Screenings. While this does not sound particularly serious, projects like Free Hugs should probably not be seen as insignificant in a post-war region where reconciliation and the rebuilding of trust are still needed. Also organising Free Film Screenings

5 Informal communication with people involved in the Initiative, December 2011 – January 2012, Novi Sad. This indicates that these activists understood civil society to be most of all the counter-balance to the state, as according to Gramsci (2007).

can be seen as a manifestation of active citizenship. In 2010 neither Mostar nor Novi Sad had cinemas. In Mostar the reason was clear – it could not be decided on which side of the city the cinema should stand. In Novi Sad, copyright piracy was usually blamed, yet some of my interviewees believed that the lack of a cinema was also linked to local politics (interviews #18, August 2010, and #35, October 2010, in Novi Sad).

Facebook and other online communities

Many NGOs use Facebook as a tool. Taking into consideration that 'everyone has it', it is excellent for communication and for spreading news about new events. But at the same time Facebook has proved to be a useful path for initiatives that only later, after a successful start-up as a Facebook group, transformed themselves into real life projects. This was the case of MOSTIMUN – Mostar International Model UN – supposedly the first ever joint initiative of students from both of Mostar's universities (the Bosniak Džemal Bijedić University and the Croatian *Sveučilište*). In this city, divided by invisible barriers along ethnic lines, Facebook appeared to be a safe space to meet and plan a joint event. Online meetings soon became real ones, bringing together not only foreign participants but also young Mostarians from both sides of the *Bulevar*.

While some of the events started on Facebook later led to establishing NGOs, others have remained in the form of on-line communities. This does not mean that their activities are less 'real'. Actually some of Mostar's and Novi Sad's Facebook groups have a much larger 'membership' than many of these cities' NGOs and some organise events and activities on a regular basis. One example of such Facebook group can be *Novosadska Kritična masa* (Novi Sad Critical Mass) – a community group of over 5,000 members which is the main forum for the organisation of monthly cycling rides, many of which are attended by several hundred people. At the same time these groups do remain 'virtual' – they have no employees, no running costs, have very horizontal (if any) leadership structures, are easily accessible, can easily appear, and equally easily disappear. However, their

role as counter-balance to the state or as places of encounter should not be ignored. Similar roles are played by some (but by no means all) mailing lists and other mediums facilitating online communication.

Religious organisations

Religious organisations are often omitted in research on the region's civil societies. This is understandable as including religion and its institutions in a research project always brings in a whole new range of problems and questions and this is even more the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia where religion is considered the determinant of ethnic belonging.

The questionnaire survey which I conducted showed that the world of the religious on the one hand, and of those engaged in all other associations on the other, are quite separate, and/or that religion is a taboo among people engaged in the work of most associations. While only 15.3 per cent of my respondents clearly stated adhering to one of the region's traditional religions, many others did not reply or provided evasive answers, e.g. 'believer' or 'liberal'. What is more, of the 131 respondents to my survey whom I have reached through a range of channels, only two admitted to belonging to a religious organisation.

However, through interviews I discovered that in fact many religious organisations interact with other civil society actors, including 'typical' NGOs. This happens in several ways. First, many religious organisations, especially multi-confessional or protestant, are in their nature and programming very similar to (non-religious) NGOs: they have leadership emergent from, or in another way close to the membership base, they have budgets nourished by sponsors and/or membership fees, they provide for the integration, education (in this case usually religious) and/or recreation of the members, etc.[6] Second, many religious organisations are involved in

6 It was my observation (confirmed in interview #20, August 2010, in Novi Sad) that the choice of programmes and the way that Protestant and ecumenical organisations operate is closer to that of NGOs than of Orthodox or Catholic groups, and that

humanitarian activities and for specific programmes they liaise with NGOs to use their expertise and field-related-experience. Third, religious movements – like, for example, Taizé[7] – are at the same time an alternative and a 'springboard' for engagement in activities of NGOs. They are an alternative because even though they are not considered to be NGOs, they meet the same needs for the individual: a chance to meet interesting people, to travel together, to be involved in something 'big' and so forth. Therefore they are able to attract those who are intimidated by NGOs which are often criticised, or who simply feel better in a large and well established community in which they can remain as passive and as anonymous as they wish. Conversely, these movements can also sometimes be a 'launching pad' since through their meetings or pilgrimages, young people get accustomed to being in a group, engaging in logistical planning, etc., and in this way develop confidence in due course to take on NGO initiatives. By means of training and activities with a 'tag' of a religious group participants become active citizens and in many cases this acquired activism remains by no means confined to their religious community.

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this is mostly because of their more horizontal structures. The same idea was referred to by Putnam who wrote that 'all religious groups blend hierarchy and equality, but networks within Protestant congregations are traditionally thought to be more horizontal than networks in the Catholic Church' (Putnam 1992, 173).

7 According to its official website '[t]oday, the Taizé Community is made up of over a hundred brothers, Catholics and from various Protestant backgrounds, coming from around thirty nations. By its very existence, the community is a "parable of community" that wants its life to be a sign of reconciliation between divided Christians and between separated peoples.' (Taizé n.d.) While the very Community is relatively small, thousands of young people participate regularly in pilgrimages to the French village of Taizé where the monastery is located or to other international encounters organised by the Community, meet regularly to sing songs from these pilgrimages, etc. Thus, one can talk about the 'Taizé movement' consisting of people engaged in all these activities, those who organise local meetings, etc.

Student Unions

Student Unions, both in Mostar and Novi Sad, are bodies traditionally attached to universities. Nevertheless, their activities and scope of work are often similar to those of NGOs and other associations. Furthermore, it seems that they have always been easily accessible (at least for students) and for this reason several of the leaders of associations in Mostar and Novi Sad mentioned activism in student unions as their first leadership experience (interviews #19 and #23, August 2010, and #34, October 2010, in Novi Sad). In Mostar, where the two universities are among the most visible manifestations of division between the different ethnicities, student unions and their activities appear to play an important role in the process of (re)building trust between young people of these different ethnic groups. For example, Bosniak and Croat, the languages of the two universities and according to many, the main reason for ethnically-divided education in Mostar (Hromadžić 2008, 556–558), become a shared '*naš*' (our [language]) when students from the two unions get together to put on a public speaking competition (Interview #13, April 2010, in Mostar).

Associations established in the time of communist Yugoslavia

Professional, interest-based and charitable organisations, such as associations of poets, journalists, fishermen and dog breeders, chess clubs, or associations of people with disabilities, existed in the times of communist Yugoslavia and many of them still operate. However, they are rarely considered in the research on Western Balkan civil societies. Probably one of the main reasons for that is that their status as civil society actors can be easily questioned. In the context of research which is trying to establish links between the work of civil society actors and processes of reconciliation and democratisation, associations of dog breeders or cyclists do not seem worthy of serious consideration. However, one of the points which this chapter is trying to demonstrate is that such associations should not be seen as automatically less significant for the sought after processes of 'bridge building' than the 'typical' NGOs.

A mountaineering club in Mostar, in whose activities I had a chance to participate, is a good example. The club does not resemble 'typical' NGOs: it is not a think-tank, not an advocacy organisation, and it would be difficult to trace any conscious attempts on the part of its leadership to build any kind of bridges. Still, the mountain hikes that it organises are a unique phenomenon in Mostar and it can be argued that they contribute to building numerous 'bridges'. These hikes regularly bring together Bosniaks and Croats, and also young and old, locals and foreigners, and people of different social strata. The contrast between the cheap flip-flops and old T-shirts of some participants, and the expensive mountain gear of others, attracts the attention of people like myself but does not seem to be a serious problem for those regularly taking part in the hikes. Without declaring any pro-diversity agenda the club and the participants of its hikes actively create a new reality. It is a 'small thing' – micro-politics – but an important one at that.

Conclusions

This chapter examined how citizens of two post-Yugoslav cities actively practise their citizenship by engaging in work of local civil society. It argued that it is worthwhile to consider this civil society in its broad sense: as comprised not only of 'Western style,' 'typical' NGOs but also of local professional, interest, sport and charitable associations, informal groups and movements, online groups, student unions and religious associations. These actors dramatically vary in their engagement, or lack of it, in (traditionally understood) politics and in the type of opportunities they create. Their commonality however is that they intend to change today's, often conflicted, reality.

These actors, these 'institutions' of broadly understood civil society, provide for what we could see as *acts of citizenship* (Isin 2008). They form a setting for the 'routines, rituals, customs, norms and habits of the everyday

through which subjects become citizens' (Isin 2008, 17), a setting for 'cultivating citizenship' (ibid.) and for 'enacting' it. A setting in which 'subjects [are] becoming activist citizens through scenes created' (ibid., 38). In which acts may turn into actions. Many of them also allow for practices of 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' (Bhabha 1996), in its broad sense, opening to human other and negotiating common aims across (not only ethnic) difference.

Theories of micro-politics and of 'everyday peace' direct us into recognising the value of seemingly unimportant actors and practices which, little by little and often in a very unpronounced fashion, contribute to changes on a larger scale. Time will show whether this is the case with civil society (in its broad sense) in the post-war Western Balkans and whether its 'micro-efforts' will contribute to serious change. Meanwhile, however, we may appreciate that there are many citizens who decide to be active citizens, to enact their citizenship, and who, through everyday involvement in their associations, do create certain new realities.

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Part 3

Cartographies of Languages and Cross-Cultural Communication

NAOMI WELLS

The Territorial Principle: Language Rights and Linguistic Minorities in Spain and Italy, 1992–2010

ABSTRACT: Under pressure to rethink the state in more plural and inclusive ways, recent decades have seen many states, including Spain and Italy, recognise the rights of speakers to use languages other than the official state language in the public sphere. Such recognition is typically granted only within a specific region or province where a significant community of speakers of a language resides, as is the case for both the Catalan-speaking group in Spain and the German-speaking minority in the north of Italy. Although such policies may appear to support greater societal multilingualism, a rigid implementation of this territorial approach risks reinforcing nationalist associations of languages with territorial boundaries at the regional or provincial levels. This chapter will use the cases of the Catalan- and German-speaking minorities to consider the limitations of the territorial principle in recognising and supporting the multilingual reality of the state.

Introduction

Recent decades have seen the appearance of a shift in Western Europe from the traditional pursuit of a culturally and linguistically homogenous nation-state, to, at least theoretically, a greater recognition of minority groups and their languages. Linguistic minorities have also received increasing attention at the international level, with documents such as the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages providing reasonable expectations for the state to provide some level of services in languages spoken by a significant number of people within the state (May 2003, 148). This shift has been accompanied by what can be described as a 'language rights'

discourse,[1] which primarily concerns 'people's right to live in their language and to enjoy a secure linguistic environment' (Rubio-Marín 2003, 57). Nevertheless, the question of which rights should be applied to which language communities remains a subject of debate, with the impossibility of providing a model for all contexts (Kymlicka and Patten 2003, 34–35). Notably, documents such as the European Charter exclude the languages of migrant communities.[2] Although there is no legitimate justification for excluding migrant groups from recognition of their language rights (Cheesman 2001), it appears to be based on the idea of a greater historical entitlement of so-called 'national' minorities (May 2003, 149), which is often tied to a long-standing presence and geographical concentration within a specific territory.

This reflects and reinforces a tendency to grant minority language rights based on the territorial principle. The territorial principle essentially ties provision for the use of a language to the existence of a geographical concentration of users of that language, meaning that certain rights are granted only within a specific region or area of the state. The theoretically opposing personality principle means that all citizens enjoy the same set of official language rights, and consequently services in their respective languages, throughout the state (Kymlicka and Patten 2003; McRae 1975; Réaume 2003).[3] While the territorial principle is often conflated with the

1 Despite the prominence of the language rights discourse, its relevance to language, from a traditionally individualistic rights perspective, has been questioned due to the inherently social nature of language (Peled 2011). Consequently, while in accordance with the language rights discourse that there is a 'vital human interest in language' (Réaume 2003, 284), this Chapter will also incorporate what Yael Peled describes as a broader framework of language ethics. This addresses, for example, the question of whether majorities should also learn the languages of minorities and vice versa, rather than solely focusing on the recognition of rights for distinct language groups (2011, 448).

2 While this chapter will focus on long established linguistic minorities, it will also attempt to give some space to the question of migrant groups as central to any discussion of language rights and contemporary linguistic and political regimes.

3 However, evidently the state itself is a territory within which the personality principle is applied (De Schutter 2008, 106). While recognising this flaw in the terminology,

official recognition of only one language within a territory (De Schutter 2008, 107), a territorial regime may also recognise two or more languages (McRae 1975, 41), as in the cases of Spain and Italy. While in both states one single language remains official throughout the territory (Castilian and Italian respectively), services in the languages of minority groups have been granted to large and territorially concentrated groups within restricted areas. This is apparent in the cases of the Catalan-speaking group in Spain and of the German-speaking minority in the province of *Alto Adige/Südtirol*[4] in the north of Italy, which will be the main focus of discussion here.

The reliance on a territorial model for granting minority language rights in both cases has important consequences for how societies develop the capacity to live with and communicate across difference, in this case primarily linguistic difference. In particular, the Chapter will address how the territorial principle encourages a tendency to oversimplify or ignore multilingual contexts at both sub-state and state levels. To offer an immediate example, in *Alto Adige/Südtirol* it is actually a significantly distinct Austro-Bavarian Tyrolean dialect that is the everyday language of communication of the local population rather than standard German. Nevertheless, both state and provincial policies have focused solely on the recognition of standard German (Egger 2001, 42–47). This situation can cause difficulties for Italian speakers who are only taught standard German in schools and consequently feel unable to communicate effectively outside of the classroom. It can even become a cause of tension since Italian speakers often see the use of the dialect in their presence as a form of exclusion (Egger 2001, 46). This demonstrates the dangers of the oversimplification of the multilingual contexts and repertoires of speakers, which appears to be reinforced by the approach encouraged by the territorial principle to

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the terms are understood here as distinguishing between rights restricted to a specific area of the state and those which apply throughout the state's territory.

4 The name of the area itself is a point of linguistic contention (Grote 2012, 3), but this chapter will use the official bilingual Italian and German denomination to avoid an explicit implication of bias.

lay claim to a territory in the name of a language, and typically a standard form of language.

The chapter is based on a broader comparative study of the language policies of the central states of Spain and Italy between 1992 and 2010 in reference to linguistic minorities. Three sources of primary data were identified for the purposes of this study: official state documentation and legislation, elite interviews with political and institutional representatives and expert commentators, and state-wide newspapers. This triangulation of data allowed for consideration of concrete laws and regulations, as well as less visible practices, ideas and informal statements of intent which are a key element of language policy studies (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997; Shohamy 2006; Spolsky 2004).

Language rights and disputes in Catalonia and *Alto Adige/Südtirol*

Both the Catalan-speaking group within Catalonia[5] and German speakers in *Alto Adige/Südtirol* have secured official status for their languages, often considered the highest guarantee of language rights (Pérez Fernández 2006, 29), although for both groups these rights are almost entirely restricted to the specific region or province in which they are concentrated. It is, however, important to note significant differences in the specific linguistic regimes in both areas. To begin with *Alto Adige/Südtirol*, it is located on the border with Austria and became a province of the Italian state due to border changes after the First World War. Much of the Italian-speaking

5 While this article will focus on the political region of Catalonia, it should be noted that Catalan also has co-official status within the Balearic Islands. The co-official language of Valencia, 'Valencian', is also often considered a variety of Catalan although there is still debate over whether it should be considered a distinct language (Nicolás 2006, 181).

population arrived after this border change, particularly under fascist rule. As a result, there is a significant division in the region between Italian and German speakers, and memories of fascist repression of the German language appear to have led its speakers to fear close linguistic contact with the Italian group (Baur and Medda-Windischer 2008, 244; Egger 2001, 120).

Language regulations in the province focus on monolingualism, with separate schools for the officially recognised language groups in their theoretical 'mother tongue',[6] although all students are also required to study the 'second language' (art. 19, Special Statute for *Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol* 1972). More exceptional is the use of 'ethnic' proportions, known as the quota system, which requires that within the province positions in public bodies are allocated to members of each language group based on their relative numerical strength within the provincial population (Steininger 2003, 137). The introduction of this measure was aimed at ensuring the German-speaking minority was given appropriate access to employment in public bodies, from which it had previously been largely excluded (Peterlini 2000, 160). Furthermore, these regulations were also introduced as a solution to an international dispute between the Italian and Austrian states, which was only declared resolved in 1992. This approach to minority protection may appear extreme, with Georg Grote noting that it has even been referred to it as a form of 'cultural apartheid', but it is also viewed as a model for allowing previously conflicting groups to live peacefully on the same territory, while maintaining their distinct identities (2012, 118).

In Catalonia, on the other hand, there is no such clear division between Catalan and Castilian speakers, and, with very few exceptions, Catalan speakers are fluent in the state language (*Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya* 2008, 142–144). In common with German speakers, the Catalans did face the repression of their language under fascist rule, which also coincided with a large influx of monolingual Castilian speakers from other Spanish

6 Alongside German and Italian, the language of the smaller Ladin minority also has official status in certain valleys within the province and is subject to similar measures of protection, although schools in designated Ladin-speaking areas teach primarily via the medium of both German and Italian (Egger 2001, 128).

regions (Conversi 1997; Woolard 1989). Consequently, memories of fascist repression are also a cause of continued fear of assimilation. Nevertheless, the aim in Catalonia has been to avoid clear divisions along linguistic lines, in contrast to *Alto Adige/Südtirol*, with Catalan language policies explicitly requiring that students are not separated in schools based on their language use. Furthermore, while knowledge of Catalan, as well as Castilian, is required for posts in the public services (art. 11, Language Policy Act 1998), there is no explicit attempt to award jobs based on ethnic proportions, and indeed any explicit reference to an 'ethnic' division between Catalan and Castilian speakers would be extremely controversial.

However, despite these differences, both cases have in common that after significant periods of democratic and peaceful rule, these language regimes have been increasingly challenged. For example, in *Alto Adige/Südtirol*, the fact that the German-speaking group is now politically dominant within the province, and that the province has significant political autonomy, means that its minority status has been questioned (Egger 2001, 32). Certain political representatives in Italy have claimed that Italian speakers are now discriminated against, and have even argued they should be accorded the status of linguistic minority within the province. For example, in 2004 when constitutional reforms were being debated which would potentially devolve further powers to the province, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the centre-right governing coalition argued that '*è logico che la minoranza italiana abbia un riconoscimento giuridico e formale*' [it is logical that the Italian minority be legally and formally recognised][7] (Franco Frattini cited in *La Repubblica*, 23 February 2004).

Although this proposed amendment was not passed, right-wing Italian deputies from the province later proposed a Bill for the creation of a parliamentary commission to investigate discrimination against the Italian language community (Bill 1711, 29 September 2008). A 2009 Bill even called for an annual fund of 50 million euros to be devoted to '*migliorare l'inserimento nella vita economica e sociale della comunità di lingua italiana della provincia*' [improving the presence of the Italian language community

7 All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.

in the social and economic life of the province] (Bill 2136, 2 February 2009). It would be easy to dismiss such bills as merely right-wing propaganda and attempts to court controversy and publicity, and there have as yet been no serious attempts to have such bills discussed in parliament. Nevertheless, there has been a slight decline of the Italian-speaking population in the province, which has been viewed by some as a sign of discontent within the Italian-speaking community (Carli 2003, 218).[8] A clearer sign that the Italian group may no longer be dominant is a tendency, particularly in German-dominated valleys, for some Italian speakers to declare their children German speakers in order to send them to German-speaking schools, which Anthony Alcock notes may be a sign of assimilation (2000, 189).

Fears of assimilation in the education system are also the primary cause of complaints in Catalonia, although here it is the absence of separate schools for different language groups which is criticised. Since 1992, Catalan has progressively been adopted as the primary vehicular language of education (art. 3.1, Catalan Decree 75/1992). Castilian does, however, remain an obligatory subject in all schools and, most importantly, regional legislation states that by the end of compulsory education all students must be able to use both Catalan and Castilian '*normal y correctamente*' [normally and correctly] (arts. 21.3 and 21.6, Language Policy Act 1998).

Nevertheless, this model of immersion education has been a continual source of controversy, with accusations that this policy is an attempt to recreate the previous assimilationist policies of nation-states on a regional or provincial scale. The conservative Spanish newspaper *ABC* used the now infamous headline, referencing the repression of Catalan under the Franco dictatorship: '*Igual que Franco, pero al revés*' [Just like Franco, but in reverse (DiGiacomo 1999, 123)] (*ABC*, 12 September 1993). Various civic organisations also arose within Catalonia during the 1980s and 1990s to oppose the immersion model (Mar-Molinero 1997, 157). More recently, three identical sentences by the Supreme Court in 2010 responded to appeals by parents

8 Between the 1991 and 2001 censuses in the province, the percentage of people declaring themselves Italian speakers fell by 1.18 per cent, while the percentage of German speakers rose by 1.16 per cent (ASTAT 2002).

who demanded the right for their children to be taught via the medium of Castilian (Sentence 6628/2010; Sentence 6629/2010; Sentence 6632/2010). While the Supreme Court found in favour of the parents, the legal advisor from the Catalan Directorate of Language Policy believes it is unclear whether the Sentence only affects the three families who made the appeal or whether '*tiene un carácter más general y puede afectar a toda la enseñanza*' [it is of a more general character which could affect all teaching] (SI1[9]). However, the sentences clearly place doubts concerning the validity of the current Catalan education model.

Critics argue that the immersion system is aimed at the assimilation of the Castilian-speaking population of the region, in a move towards territorial unilingualism (Herreras 2006, 374). In fact, the conservative Spanish Popular Party went so far as to announce the creation of a special commission in 1993 to investigate discrimination against Castilian speakers (DiGiacomo 1999, 123). In common with *Alto Adige/Südtirol*, there have been claims that it is actually monolingual Castilian speakers who are now the 'persecuted minority' within Catalonia. The higher socioeconomic status of Catalan speakers has been seen as further proof, by establishing a link between knowledge of the language and social advancement (Woolard 1989, 121–122). Ramón Lodares has taken this argument furthest, going so far as to claim that the defence of Catalan is aimed at the creation of an 'elite enclosure' of Catalan speakers (2006, 21).

Bilingual obligations and national majorities

Before addressing the validity of some of these criticisms and how they relate to the territorial principle, it is first necessary to recognise that they are often exaggerated, particularly in the press and in political discourse. While the respective territorial regimes do require certain linguistic adjustments for

9 See appendix for key to interviews.

the resident population (McRae 1975, 41), Italian and Castilian speakers remain citizens of a state where their language is official throughout. For example, to argue that the intensive teaching of Catalan is an attempt to assimilate Castilian speakers is to ignore the fact that the Catalan education system is based on the principle that all students acquire a sufficient knowledge of both languages (Branchadell 1997, 109). Studies have even shown that any imbalance at the end of obligatory education is still in favour of Castilian, despite the intensive teaching in and of Catalan (Areny and van der Schaaf 2000, 26; Branchadell 1997, 103). This reflects the continued dominance of the state language within Catalonia, particularly in the cultural sphere, and it is difficult to imagine a future where Castilian could disappear. Despite the high socioeconomic status of Catalan speakers within the region, as David Atkinson notes, 'this is not reflected as much as one might expect in the language's position, which is in a sense prestigious without being dominant' (2000, 195–196).[10]

However, it is the appearance of a threat to the dominant position of the state language which is typically the cause of such criticisms. This is evident in *Alto Adige/Südtirol*, where attempts to redress the balance with the quota system do have an immediately negative effect on the previously dominant Italian-speaking population. Furthermore, the equal official status of both languages does place certain obligations on both the minority and majority; obligations which appear to have caused Italian speakers particular difficulties. While the choice to use either language with the public authorities means that bilingualism is not an explicit obligation for citizens, there is a strong motivation to achieve bilingualism for work

10 It should also be noted that the lower socioeconomic status of certain sectors of monolingual Castilian speakers is due primarily to the fact that many, and particularly those who emigrated under Franco, had low levels of education and qualifications on arrival, rather than resulting from a conscious effort by native Catalans to exclude them (Atkinson 2000, 192; Woolard 2003, 101). Nevertheless, this should not mean ignoring continued class implications related to the higher social status associated with the knowledge and use of Catalan, even if it may cause discomfort within some Catalanist sectors (Woolard 2003).

prospects, for, as Kenneth D. McRae notes, 'The freedom of the citizen may be the burden of the public servant' (1975, 48).

However, until recently it has been the German language community that has felt this motivation more strongly, with knowledge of Italian widespread (ASTAT 2006, 152). Bilingual demands have, however, typically been a cause of resentment among Italian speakers. Lucio Giudiceandrea, the author of several essays and books on *Alto Adige/Südtirol* and the Italian-speaking community, of which he is himself a member, explains that:

> L'italiano, sempre fino a qualche anno fa, [...] diceva, 'Non è giusto che io venga costretto a parlare un'altra lingua. Io sono italiano, qui siamo in Italia, e se tu come minoranza vivi in Italia, è il tuo obbligo studiare la lingua nazionale ma non il mio obbligo parlare la tua lingua. (II1)[11]

This is not an unusual attitude among national majorities, who view any pressure on themselves to learn the minority language as unfair and even a violation of their own rights, while taking for granted the obligation of minorities to learn the state language.

Both territorial regimes do place obligations on the majority group to obtain a high level of fluency in the language of the minority, which has been the cause of resentment among some members of the majority group. However, as Denise Réaume argues, 'Personal bilingualism is not that difficult, as minority-language communities everywhere prove daily. What makes it seem difficult to majority-language speakers is the absence of support for second-language learning, and, one suspects, an ideology of superiority' (2003, 293). While support for second-language-learning is a legitimate concern to be addressed below, there is clear evidence of this 'ideology of superiority', which has been encouraged by right-wing Italian parties in the province. A similar attitude appears to play a role in the criticisms directed at Catalan language policies, in the assumption that speakers of the official state language should automatically enjoy greater rights than

11 'The Italians, until a few years ago, [...] would say, "It is not fair that I am forced to speak another language. I am Italian, here we are in Italy, and if you, as a minority, live in Italy it is your duty to study the national language but not my duty to speak your language".'

speakers of other languages. Furthermore, the fact that the state language remains official in both contexts means that attempts to have speakers of the state language declared a 'minority' are patently inappropriate.

Linguistic minorities and linguistic borders

Nevertheless, recognising these tendencies, particularly in the rhetoric of vocal right-wing political representatives and of the national press, does not mean placing the linguistic regimes of both regions beyond criticism. As Monica Heller explains, linguistic minority groups can be guilty of taking an excessively rigid approach to linguistic boundaries, with any attempt to blur such boundaries seen as a threat to the group's identity:

> [u]sing the logic of the monolingual, monocultural nation-state, mobilized minorities seek to break apart the monolithic identity of the state within which they search for a legitimate place. However, in order to do so, they must construct a fictive unity, which effectively produces internally structures of hegemony similar to those against which they struggle. (2006, 29)

Linguistic minority groups may reinforce the traditional nationalist ideology of 'one territory, one language', even where the territorial regime actually recognises more than one official language.

For example, in Catalonia the use of the term '*lengua propia*' [own language] to refer to Catalan (art. 2, Language Policy Act 1998; art. 6.1, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006) appears to lay claim to the territory in the name of the Catalan language, suggesting that Catalonia only has one 'rightful' language (Siguán 1993, 91). This despite the fact that as recently as 2008 Castilian remained the habitual language for 45.9 per cent of those resident in Catalonia, compared to just 35.6 per cent for Catalan (Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya 2008, 172). As Albert Branchadell notes, 'Too often Spain is treated as a multilingual (multinational) polity made out of discrete, linguistically (nationally) homogeneous units, Catalonia among them' (2012, 1). This clearly reflects a territorialist conception of

homogenous language communities (Laponce 1984, 92), despite the bi- and multilingual reality of Catalonia.[12]

Furthermore, the immersion education system and the bilingual demands placed on those resident in Catalonia are likely to cause particular difficulties for migrants from outside of Spain potentially required to master two languages on arrival. Admittedly, the Catalan government makes efforts to prevent migrants from becoming marginalised or from being denied an education due to their lack of knowledge of Catalan. For example, while continuing to prohibit the separation of students in schools, the Catalan government provides for a system of 'welcome classrooms'. New arrivals to the region are assigned to a class alongside Catalan classmates, but are separated for several hours to attend intensive Catalan language and culture classes along with other new arrivals to ensure the students' progressive incorporation into normal classes (Vila i Moreno 2011, 135).

Catalan language classes for adults are also funded by both public and voluntary bodies, although Joan Pujolar notes, from participant observation of a course organised by a local voluntary organisation, how these can become a way of marking the territory through language and establishing the legitimacy of territorialised groups (2009, 101). Although the leading proponent of a territorial regime, Philippe Van Parijs, argues that territoriality is distinct from privileging the historical claims of 'the sons of the soil' (2011, 138), this is how it often appears to function in practice, treating newcomers as exceptional and thus requiring them to rapidly assimilate to the language 'in possession' of the territory (Réaume 2003, 277).

Turning again to *Alto Adige/Südtirol*, the attempts to provide services and recognition for the German and Italian, as well as the smaller Ladin,

12 In fact, in Catalonia there is also an officially recognised community of speakers of Aranese, an Occitan variety, in the Val d'Aran (art. 6.5, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006). The official recognition of a third language in both cases, with the previously mentioned recognition of the Ladin language in *Alto Adige/Südtirol*, does show that smaller language communities, or 'minorities within minorities', are not ignored. Nevertheless, the fact that Aranese and Ladin speakers are territorially concentrated within specific valleys, and consequently that services in both languages are primarily restricted to these valleys, again shows a reliance on a territorial approach.

linguistic groups was intended to ensure peaceful cohabitation within the provincial territory. However, a clear danger is that linguistic divisions may be reinforced by the political and administrative system. The focus on the recognition of distinct linguistic groups risks institutionalising these divisions and preventing, or at least discouraging, the development of cosmopolitan forms of sociability across linguistic and cultural divides (Glick Schiller, Darieva and Gruner-Domic 2011, 402–403).

A clear failing of the current system is its inability to recognise or fully accommodate the children from multilingual families in schools, which are estimated to number between 8 to 10 per cent of the population (Baur and Medda-Windischer 2008, 249; Cavagnoli 2000, 368). Bi- or multilingual citizens are also not recognized by the rigid quota system, which reinforces a traditional conception of monolingual, monocultural citizens. Although the fact that more than one linguistic group is officially recognised within the province means it does not precisely fit the 'one territory, one language' requirement, this approach still departs from what De Schutter describes as a 'transparency concept of language'. Promoting what he sees as a Westphalian understanding of linguistic diversity, it means bilingual speakers 'who do not uniquely identify with one of their linguistic belongings are thereby treated as a sort of "free riders" with illegitimate preferences' (2008, 112).

Furthermore, the past two decades have seen increasing attempts to improve German-language teaching in the Italian school system within the province at the request of the Italian-speaking community. This greater focus on German teaching in Italian language schools shows how national majority assumptions are being questioned, with learning of the language of the minority, German, now widely accepted as vital and even beneficial to the Italian language community within the province (Rauzi Visintin 2006, 54). Recent decades have consequently seen various pilot schemes in Italian language schools with a greater focus on the vernacular usage of the German language from a young age (Egger 2001, 110). Nevertheless, these schemes have faced opposition from German-speaking political representatives, primarily within the politically dominant *Südtiroler Volkspartei*. They have argued that the vernacular use of German in Italian-speaking schools goes against the principle of 'mother tongue' education and have focused

on the symbolic value of language as specific to each group (Grote 2012, 118; Fionda 2008, 30–32).

Admittedly, memories of fascist repression have led the German group to fear close linguistic contact or possible language mixing between the two groups as the path to assimilation (Egger 2001, 120). Nevertheless, this rigid interpretation of the principle of 'mother tongue' education as necessarily requiring the continued separation of linguistic groups means that despite spatial proximity, there appear to be limited opportunities for what Gill Valentine describes as 'meaningful contact' across and between these groups (2008). Again, although this separation of linguistic groups within the province is not an example of territorial unilingualism, it departs from a similar ideological position, particularly the principle that languages in contact must be separated as much as possible (Laponce 1984, 91). As Suresh Canagarajah notes, 'Looking at language as immobile has involved treating it as territorialized in one place and owned by one community. It has left us with a strong sense of language ownership, treating those who borrow resources from another language as "illegitimate" users' (2013, 78).

Territoriality and the state

Although criticisms are often directed at the regional or provincial governments for these failings, it should be remembered that it is the central state which is ultimately responsible for designing a system of minority recognition which clings to the territorial principle. Both Spain and Italy have given the appearance that, by recognising the cultural and political autonomy of areas such as Catalonia and *Alto Adige/Südtirol*, they are moving towards multilingual models of state. However, in reality, the policies of both states appear to promote less the vision of a multilingual state than that of a monolingual state with seemingly 'anomalous' and clearly territorially delimited areas where the use of other languages is permitted. For example, the use of German by the public authorities is restricted to the provincial, and at most regional, territory. As Senator Oskar Peterlini from

the *Südtiroler Volkspartei e*xplains, '*Anche noi come parlamentari [...] qui a Roma naturalmente non possiamo parlare in tedesco, parliamo in italiano*' [We also as politicians [...] here in Rome naturally cannot speak in German, we speak in Italian] (II3). Consequently, if German speakers intend to move to any other area of Italy, they will inevitably lose the specific language rights they are entitled to within the province. Although, at a provincial level, it may no longer be appropriate to refer to German speakers as a minority, at the state level their minority status remains undeniable due to the territorial nature of the rights accorded to them.

In Spain too, the institutions of the central state have typically functioned solely in Castilian. However, a 2010 reform did allow for the use of all of Spain's official languages in the Senate (Reform of the Regulations of the Senate, 27 July 2010). The provisions made in the Senate were, however, considered an exception due to its theoretical role as the chamber of 'territorial representation' (art. 69, Spanish Constitution 1978), as the representative from Spain's Office for Official Languages confirmed: '*el Senado es la cámara de representación territorial y es lógico que se permita el uso. En el Congreso no se permite, sólo en el Senado*' [the Senate is the chamber of territorial representation and it is logical that such use is allowed. But not in the Congress, only in the Senate] (SI2). Despite being considered an exception, this reform still represents the first genuine possibility for extraterritorial and official use of Spain's other languages outside of the specific territories concerned.

Nevertheless, a potentially more important limitation of the application of the territorial principle by the Spanish state has been the failure to encourage familiarity or knowledge of Spain's other languages throughout the state (Mar-Molinero and Stevenson 1991, 168–169). For example, at university level, there are more students of Catalan in Germany and the United Kingdom than in areas of Spain outside of the officially Catalan-speaking regions. In the 2007–08 academic year, there were only 205 students of Catalan in Spanish universities not located in Catalan-speaking areas, compared to 866 in the UK, 1053 in France and 1953 in Germany (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011, 267–268). Although universities are independent institutions from the state, no attempts have been made in obligatory education to teach the co-official languages in other areas

of the state or at least to make significant efforts to encourage familiarity with this multilingual reality. Consequently, some Spaniards may legitimately feel unprepared for the potential difficulties they face in moving to an officially bilingual area of the state, which is one of the primary failings of the territorial approach. By focusing on the recognition of specific language groups within specific territories, the question of contact and communication across and between majorities and minorities throughout the state is overlooked (Valentine 2008, 324).

This territorial regime also ensures that the Castilian language remain privileged since, while speakers of co-official languages have their rights restricted to clearly demarcated areas, the rights of Castilian speakers cross all borders within the state (Ninyoles 1994, 153–154). In light of this clear inequality, it is unsurprising that some regional governments have taken a defensive approach to the promotion and protection of other languages within their territorial limits. As Clare Mar-Molinero argues, 'it seems clear that only within their territories can these languages [Catalan, etc.] be protected, and the temptations to do this with aggressive, even monolingual policies must be strong' (1995, 55). Consequently, it remains the case that the central government is viewed as the champion of the official state language, while specific regional or provincial governments are solely responsible for the protection and promotion of specific co-official languages. Particularly when those at the centre advocate a greater use or dominance of the state language, it is easy to see how this approach can foster the desire among minority language speakers for clearer political boundaries and even separatist aims (Réaume 2003, 280). On a related subject, Ash Amin has noted more widely how a territorial conception of cities and regions results in 'a world of nested or jostling territorial configurations, of territorial attack and defense' (2004, 1). The focus of language policies in Spain on the centrality of territoriality and the evident jostling between the centre and the periphery would appear to support this wider critique of a territorial approach to politics and policy.

Admittedly, in both Catalonia and *Alto Adige/Südtirol* there have generally been few demands for more multilingual policies at the state level. The political representatives of the German-speaking minority in particular seem unconcerned with the presence of German at a wider state level, which may

reflect the continued attachment to a neighbouring state. Nevertheless, even if Catalan and German speakers, or at least their political representatives, have typically favoured a territorial model, this does not necessarily prove its wider validity. In fact, this more likely reflects their success in achieving significant territorial control and official recognition for their languages, even if alongside the state language. However, the policies implemented in both areas appear to have reinforced the territorial approach of both states in their treatment of languages and linguistic minorities more generally, leaving little space for the recognition of smaller and less territorially concentrated communities and their typically multilingual repertoires.

Without space to consider other cases in detail here, the idealisation of territorially confined linguistic communities is evident in the wider approach of the Italian state in relation to linguistic minorities. For example, a new Law passed in 1999 to extend recognition to other language groups in Italy excludes both recent migrant communities and long-standing communities which have been associated with a nomadic tradition (Law 482/1999). The exclusion of migrant languages was theoretically due to the focus of the Law on 'historic' minorities[13] but, interestingly, the original Bill had included the languages of the Roma and Sinti populations (art. 1, Bill 169/1996). These groups have been continuously present in Italy since at least the 1400s (Clough Marinaro and Sigona 2011, 583), a long established presence comparable to other historic settlements of speakers recognised in the Law, such as the small enclaves of Albanian communities or the much smaller Croat community of just 2,000 people dispersed over three towns in the Molise region (Cermel 2009, 152). As Valeria Piergigli clarifies:

13 Marina Chini (2011) discusses the possibility of defining recent migrant groups as 'new linguistic minorities', although again the emphasis still appears to be on the need for a territorial rooting of such groups.

> *se si considerano i gruppi rom e sinti di antico insediamento, sicuramente presenti in Italia e formati da cittadini italiani, non sembrano esservi valide ragioni ostative ad estendere loro, per quanto possibile, la disciplina racchiusa nella l. 482/1999. (2011: 895)*[14]

The removal of the Roma and Sinti communities can be primarily explained by widespread discriminatory attitudes, with their removal from the Bill demanded by the right-wing opposition parties in explicitly discriminatory language (*Camera dei Deputati*, 25 May 1998; 17 June 1998). Their removal was ultimately agreed in parliament, despite some opposition, on the basis that a separate Bill would be passed (Bill 169-ter), in response to the supposed need for measures 'adeguate alle loro peculiari caratteristiche storico-culturali' [adapted to their specific historic and cultural traits] (*Senato della Repubblica* 2009: 4). Nevertheless, no such law or action followed, leaving the Romany language excluded from any form of recognition. This demonstrates how the quite clearly discriminatory justifications for their exclusion from Law 482 were ultimately sanctioned due to the implicitly territorial conception of linguistic minorities. Interestingly, a right-wing Deputy also proposed an amendment for this to be made explicit in the Law with the addition of the adjective '*stanziali*' [sedentary] as a requisite for those minorities recognised (*Camera dei Deputati*, 17 June 1998). Although clearly departing from a discriminatory position and rejected by the majority in the Chamber, it would arguably only confirm a discriminatory factor already present in the Law.

As a representative from the Italian Ministry for Education confirmed, the exclusion of the Roma and Sinti populations was justified on the basis that '*non poter collegare la lingua a un territorio ha impedito alle legislature di allora di riconoscere la tutela anche dei Rom*' [not being able to link the language to a territory prevented the governments of the time from also recognising the Roma community] (I12). While it is true that the inclusion of the Roma and Sinti groups would have caused some difficulties in

14 'if we consider the Roma and Sinti groups to be of ancient settlement, clearly established in Italy and composed of Italian citizens, there do not appear to be any valid reasons for preventing the measures contained in Law 482/1999, as far as is possible, from being extended to them.'

relation to the application of the Law,[15] this is due to the Law's reliance on a territorial model of recognition. The fact that their exclusion was accepted as a necessary concession for the passing of the Law demonstrates the impossibility of the legislator to imagine any alternative to a territorially conceived regime. The exclusion of the Roma and Sinti communities offers the clearest example of the reluctance to accept or accommodate any transgression of this incontestable link between linguistic communities and typically a historic claim to a specific territory.

Conclusion

In sum, language policies in Spain and Italy maintain a territorial conception of linguistic minority groups, despite the fact that the neat coincidence of territorial and linguistic boundaries is almost always the exception rather than the rule (Patten 2003, 302). A leading proponent of linguistic territoriality Van Parijs does recognise its limitations in linguistically heterogenous areas, but still argues that 'the guiding principle should remain the same' (2011: 168). However, there are clear dangers in adapting a principle which maintains unilingual territorialism as its ideal model and which reinforces the rigid association of languages with 'territorial boundaries and border control' (Laponce 1984, 91). For example, it may lead those communities which do not fit the territorial model to create the 'fictive unity' described by Heller and thus mask more complex multilingual realities, in order to be deemed deserving of recognition. Even where a territorial regime officially recognises more than one language, as in the cases discussed here, it still

15 It should also be noted that other measures listed in the Law were extremely difficult to apply to those minorities which were included and which equally displayed extremely distinct linguistic, cultural and historic traits. For example, the Law appears to presume the existence of a widely accepted standard form of the languages recognised (Toso 2004, 50), which was not the case, for example, for speakers of Sardinian language varieties (Tufi 2013).

appears to adhere to similar ideological principles such as the need for a clear separation of languages or the legitimacy of territorialised communities over migrant populations (Pujolar 2009).

In theory, officially recognising certain languages within specific territories does not necessarily require ignoring other forms of recognition for a wider range of languages (Van Parijs 2011, 15), but in practice the ideological foundations of the territorial approach may mean state and sub-state authorities are unable or unwilling to envision any alternatives. Understandably, communities such as the Catalan- and German-speaking groups often feel a strong emotive and historic link to a specific place, and there will normally be some practical needs to tie certain provisions for the use of their languages to that place (Réaume 2003). However, as Amin argues, there is a need to develop a new politics of place which does not deny such attachments, but which questions the assumption of a cohesive territorial culture and instead focuses on 'the actual, material dynamics of cultural formation' (2004, 20), which typically means composite and hybrid forms of attachment. Such an approach would also mean questioning the privileging of the rights of specific groups based on claims to territorial 'ownership' of the place and the related concept of indigineity. The recognition of the range of distinct but also overlapping language communities in any one place, as well as the need for communication both across and within these communities, must be the admittedly challenging goal, rather than affording rights only to the majority or historically established groups within each territory.

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Appendix: Key to interviews

II1 – Lucio Giudiceandrea. Interviewed in Bozen/Bolzano, 9 September 2010.
Journalist and author of various essays and books on the Italian community in *Alto Adige/Südtirol*.
II2 – Ministry of Education (Italy) representative. Interviewed in Rome, 7 September 2010.
Representative from the Italian Ministry of Education, and specifically responsible for coordinating teaching activities in minority languages.
II3 – Oskar Peterlini. Interviewed in Rome, 22 September 2010.
Senator for the *Südtiroler Volkspartei* in the Italian Senate from 2001 to 2013. President and Vice-President of the Regional Council of *Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol* between 1988 and 1998.
SI1 –General Directorate of Language Policy (Catalonia) representative. Interviewed in Barcelona, 24 October 2011.
Legal advisor within the General Directorate of Language Policy of Catalonia in 2011.
SI2 – Office for Official Languages (Spain) representative. Interviewed in Madrid, 28 November 2011.
Representative from the Spanish Ministry of Territorial Policy and Public Administrations. Responsible for the Office for Official Languages in 2011.

ROSA MAS GIRALT

Conducting Qualitative Research in English and Spanish: Recognising the Active Roles of Participants in Cross-Linguistic and Cross-Cultural Projects

ABSTRACT: Existing literature on conducting cross-linguistic and cross-cultural projects depicts research participants as relatively passive elements in qualitative research communication processes. In contrast, this chapter considers the active roles of participants as linguistic and cultural agents who construct collaborative verbal accounts with the researcher/interpreter during research. Drawing from a bilingual (English/Spanish) study undertaken with Latin American and Latino-British families and informants in the north of England, I highlight the fluidity of the linguistic processes involved in the design, implementation and writing of cross-linguistic/cultural research and the blurred boundaries between languages when using them in the field. It is in linguistic collaboration with the participants that researchers/interpreters can develop better understandings of the cultural and social meanings carried by the expressions used in the research encounter. This collaboration also helps to foreground how the linguistic and cultural perspectives of the participants inform the findings of research.

Introduction

With the increased importance of international migration and material and immaterial transnational flows, multilingual and multicultural environments have become everyday realities in many localities across the world. The sounds of diversity are multilingual and the ability to speak different

languages or to adjust to language varieties[1] and cross-cultural contexts has been identified as an important element of cosmopolitan communication (e.g. Rönnström 2011). In fact, crossing cultural and linguistic domains has become quite a common experience for many human geographers and other social scientists when trying to develop better understandings of contemporary diverse environments and of the experiences of living with difference.

However, it has proved difficult to agree on a single definition of cross-linguistic or cross-cultural research and on the ways in which they are often intertwined (e.g. Skelton 2009; Smith 1996). In general terms, cross-linguistic research occurs when a project involves the use of one or more languages different from the one in which the research is being conducted.[2] Similarly, cross-cultural research is understood to be conducted in 'different spaces, places, or spatialities to those the researcher would usually identify themselves with' or when 'the researcher may remain in their same "usual" space or place and yet be able to conduct cross-cultural research' (Skelton 2009, 398). Although these definitions can avoid charges of essentialism by acknowledging that languages, cultures, places and people (including researchers and participants) do not have fixed and self-contained characteristics or identities, there is disagreement on how many spatial, linguistic or cultural 'boundaries' need to be crossed for research to be defined as cross-linguistic or cross-cultural (e.g. Skelton 2009; Müller 2007; Smith 1996).

This chapter locates itself within approaches which consider that cross-cultural research can be undertaken in 'usual' places of residence but involving the crossing of what may be defined, as 'cultural' boundaries, including linguistic ones. It draws from a project I conducted in the north of

1 Variety is a term used in sociolinguistics to designate a distinct form of a language. There are two main types of varieties: user-related varieties which are used by a particular group of people and often in particular places; and use-related varieties which refer to forms of a language associated with their function, e.g. legal English ('Variety' in McArthur 2003, n.p.).

2 It could be argued that cross-linguistic research also happens when scientists conduct their work in languages other than their own as is the case, for example, for many non-English native speakers in Anglo-American academia.

England (UK) with a resident migrant population in 2009–10. Therefore, it was undertaken in my usual place of residence (but not my place of birth as I am myself a migrant from Catalonia in Spain) but working with Latin Americans[3] and their children. Thus, it involved the 'crossing' of linguistic and socially constructed boundaries both for me and for the participants. Paradigm shifts in sociolinguistics in the last few decades have destabilised traditional understandings of languages as clearly defined, fixed and demarcated constructs, foregrounding instead their blurred boundaries and their intrinsic diversity, mixedness and fluidity (Blommaert and Rampton 2011, 3). The research on which this chapter is based illuminates a range of linguistic and cultural crossings, including geographical trajectories (i.e. migrant researcher and migrant participants from different sending societies) and language varieties (i.e. varieties of Spanish from Spain and from multiple countries in Latin America; but also varieties of English as a first or second language).

The chapter originates in reflections made during the design, implementation and writing of the research regarding the use of English and Spanish (and their varieties) in the field and of the 'cultural' and 'linguistic' proximities and distances between myself as the researcher and the participants. It is important to highlight that in this project I acted as both researcher and translator. Therefore, the chapter focuses on issues that arose from this dual role during the research. There are related matters that must be taken into account when working with interpreters and translators, who are not the investigators, but these are not addressed here (see for example Birbili 2000; Temple and Young 2004; Lopez et al. 2008; Wong and Poon 2010).

Existing scholarship on cross-linguistic and cross-cultural qualitative research tends to portray research participants as passive elements in processes of interpretation and translation. This chapter explores the combination of English and Spanish (and related cross-cultural issues)

3 The expression Latin America is controversial and has colonial connotations (Mignolo 2005). To counteract these connotations, I recruited participants who self-identified as Latin American and I sought to foreground their own understandings of the term.

during the development of the above mentioned project in order to highlight the fluidity of the processes involved and the blurred boundaries between languages when using them in the field. It starts by considering briefly how issues of translation have been approached in cross-cultural and cross-linguistic research and by introducing the research project on which the chapter is based. It then moves on to explore how cross-linguistic and cross-cultural issues were approached in the project and the insights that may be gained by paying attention to the linguistic and cultural perspectives of the participants.

Translation in cross-cultural and cross-linguistic research

As scholars have highlighted, issues related to interpretation and translation are often not addressed in methodological discussions of geographical and other social research which has been conducted in cross-cultural and cross-linguistic contexts (e.g. Smith 1996; Smith 2009; Temple and Young 2004; Wong and Poon 2010). This omission, which in practical terms is often explained (although not justified) by the word limit of journal articles and other vehicles of academic writing, renders translation and its meaningful cross-cultural decisions invisible to the reader, hiding important epistemological considerations and unbalancing further the power relations between researchers and participants (e.g. Müller 2007; Smith 1996; Twyman et al. 1999).

Traditional understandings of translation as the linear and technical process of finding linguistic equivalences between source and target languages,[4] transparently and without altering meaning, have long been exposed as problematic by linguists and translation specialists (Temple and

4 Source language refers to the 'original' language of a text or speech which is to be translated and target language refers to the language into which this text or speech is to be translated (e.g. Smith 2009).

Young 2004; Müller 2007). Instead, it has been emphasised that the task of translating from one language to another involves more than identifying meanings and finding equivalent terms and concepts. In fact, '[t]ranslators must constantly make decisions about the cultural meanings which language carries, and evaluate the degree to which the two different worlds they inhibit [sic inhabit] are "the same". (...) In fact the process of meaning transfer has less to do with finding the cultural inscription of a term than in reconstructing its value' (Simon 1996, 137–138 cited in Temple 2005, 2.2). Therefore, translators are also analysts and cultural brokers in the sense that they take decisions in relation to meaning and cultural equivalences which are not innocuous and free of subjective biases (Temple and Young 2004). For instance, Müller (2007) has explored the difficulties of capturing the political, historical and linguistic connotations of a term when translating it into another language in which the original richness of references may be lost or obscured. 'Through the inevitable collapse of meaning differences', he suggests, translation 'becomes political by re-articulating meaning in the target language and instituting this meaning as valid vis-à-vis other possible meanings, thus eluding the fundamental polyvalency of expressions in the source language' (Müller 2007, 208).

Thus, translating is not a *neutral* process and the decisions taken by researchers and translators in relation to it have an impact on the interpretation of the findings, how they are presented and on the power relations inherent in the research process, e.g. how participants are represented (e.g. Birbili 2000; Temple 2005; Wong and Poon 2010; Esposito 2001; Lopez et al. 2008; Temple and Young 2004). Such important epistemological and ethical issues require that researchers provide explicit explanations regarding their translation decisions and the techniques adopted when conducting cross-linguistic qualitative research (e.g. Birbili 2000; Temple 2005).

To render both the act and the politics of translation visible, scholars have suggested the adoption of critical approaches which actively engage with the translated text and the agency of the translator (e.g. Müller 2007; Temple and Young 2004). These involve practical steps aiming to 'destabilize and denaturalize the hegemony of the translated text', such as adopting the 'holus-bolus' technique which consists of keeping terms and expressions

in the source language in the translated text (Müller 2007, 209). This technique helps to maintain the presence of the source language in the resulting translation and offers the reader the opportunity to assess the translator's interpretation (Temple and Young 2004).

In addition to these practical steps, another key aspect of adopting a critical approach to translation resides in paying attention to the positionality and personal characteristics of translators as these will play a role in the interpretations and political choices they make (e.g. Müller 2007; Smith 2009). For instance, in cases in which the researcher and translator are the same person, there are a multiplicity of factors that influence the resulting translation, including the biography and personal characteristics of the individual in question, her/his knowledge of the language (or variety of language) and culture of the participants and the researcher's skills and expertise in the language in which the research is presented (Birbili 2000, n.p.). These characteristics must be openly discussed to facilitate an appraisal of how the positionality of the researcher/translator may have affected the 'meaning-making process' of the translation (Smith 2009, 363).

While scholars have highlighted the relevance of the agency of translators and researchers in processes of translation and interpretation (e.g. Müller 2007; Smith 1996; Temple and Young 2004), less attention has been paid to the agency of participants as co-communicators and co-producers of texts in research. This chapter aims to contribute to this area by considering the 'active' role of participants in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural research, particularly in the case of projects conducted with migrants who have some or full command of the language of the receiving society. Working with two languages during research is a more fluid and interactive process than is implied in some of the existing literature exploring qualitative cross-linguistic research (e.g. Lopez et al. 2008; Esposito 2001). In fact, participants are not 'passive' elements in research interactions but active listeners and speakers who are often equally aware of cultural and linguistic differences. Recognising their active role enables the development of better understandings of the cultural and social meanings carried by the terms and expressions used in research encounters. The next section introduces the project on which the chapter is based before considering the lessons learnt when combining languages during the research.

Working in Spanish and English: Latin American and Latino-British families in the North of England

Despite having a long history, Latin American migration to the UK has increased significantly in the last decade and a half (e.g. McIlwaine et al. 2011). The 2011 Census recorded 165,920 people born in Latin American countries in England and Wales, with the majority (71 per cent) residing in London and the South East of England and only 7 per cent resident in the north of the country (Office for National Statistics 2012).[5] Half of these migrants (55 per cent) arrived in the country since 2001 and a third (28 per cent) did so after 2007 (Office for National Statistics 2012). However, Latin Americans have not yet been recognised as an ethnic minority group in the Census, which excludes later generation migrants born in the UK or other countries from this count (Coalition of Latin Americans in the UK 2014). Furthermore, the population is likely to have increased recently as onward migration of Latin Americans from Spain (and other Southern European countries) has become more common since the 2008 financial crisis (e.g. Herrera 2012; McIlwaine 2011).

To date, research on Latin Americans in the UK has mainly been undertaken in London where, as indicated above, the majority of the population resides (e.g. McIlwaine et al. 2011; Bermudez 2010; Sveinsoon 2007). Studies are scarcer for the rest of the country and there is little information on the experiences of children and young people from this group. The project on which this chapter is based aimed to start addressing these gaps in research by focusing on Latin Americans and their children in the north of England. It was conducted in cities and towns in Yorkshire and Greater Manchester with five Latin American and five Latino-British families, including all the

5 Community organisations have highlighted that this total figure may be an underrepresentation due to barriers for Latin American migrants in participating in the Census, including low command of English, abstention due to lack of knowledge and overcrowded living conditions which make it likely that some families did not complete the forms (Coalition of Latin Americans in the UK 2014).

adults and children (8–18 years of age) in the household and totalling 30 participants, and an additional 14 informants and stakeholders. The sample included both long-term and shorter-term migrants (from 20 or more years to a minimum of two) who had arrived as asylum seekers/refugees, economic migrants, students or as a result of marriage to a British citizen. At the time of participation, most of them had regular migration status having acquired British or another European citizenship, but two of the informants were in the country potentially irregularly. Adult participants and informants were born in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico and Peru, and two of the participant parents were born in Britain. In the case of the children, seven had been born in the UK and five in Latin America but had come to the country at an early age. Fieldwork with the families involved a combination of individual and group activities which were conducted in more than one research encounter and included biographical and semi-structured interviews, person-centred diagrams and biographical objects. Other informants and stakeholders took part in semi-structured interviews too.

Command of both English and Spanish was diverse among participants. Spanish was the first language of all the Latin American adult participants and four of the young people who had come to the country at an early age.[6] The rest of the participant children spoke Spanish to differing degrees but, for all of them, English was their preferred language. In the case of the two British spouses who took part in the research, English was their first language but one of them was fluent in Spanish. Although I shared a language (or languages) with the participants (Spanish and/or English), the dynamics of language use between myself as the researcher and the participants were more complex than this statement may imply. Indeed, I shared a first language (Spanish) with most of the adults and some of the young participants

6 There was also the potential issue that I could find research participants whose first language was Portuguese or one of the diverse indigenous languages in Latin America and not Spanish. Although that was not the case for the people who took part in my project (maybe because I published all the material in Spanish and English), I had planned (to the extent possible) to try to find someone who could interpret for me if that had been the case.

but there were linguistic and cultural differences which needed to be taken into account in the course of our communication. I speak Castilian Spanish with a Catalan accent and they use the varieties of Latin American Spanish of their places of origin. For those participants whose first or preferred language was English, there was the additional issue that English, for me, is a third language (I am a bilingual Catalan-Spanish speaker) in which I express myself very comfortably but in which I do not have a native accent.

In addition, the colonial and post-colonial history which connects Spain and Latin America was an important element to take into account as it could potentially affect relationships in the field. To counteract these risks, all through the research I was open about my biography[7] and, if participants wished to do so, I did not shy away from discussing issues related to my personal motivations in undertaking the project or about Spain's imperialism in Latin America and its legacy (see for example Eakin 2007; Meade 2010). Nevertheless, my positionality as 'Spanish' is also full of complexities and contestations; having been born in Catalonia, the history of my nation within the wider narrative of the Spanish nation-state is full of struggles for political recognition entangled with, for example, the Civil War (1936–9) and General Franco's dictatorship (1939–75). As scholars have argued, viewing the research process in terms of insider/outsider or difference/sameness dualisms is a form of essentialism which implies that we can reduce researchers' and participants' identities to a set of fixed social positions, e.g. gender, class, nationality, etc. (e.g. Rose 1997; Valentine 2002). Instead, it has been emphasised that identity categories and the boundaries of the researcher-participant relationship are much more fluid and unstable and can give place to multiple senses of commonality and distance during research interactions (e.g. Mullings 1999; Valentine 2002). The dynamics that I encountered in the field did in fact illustrate this fluidity. My position as a migrant in the UK and personal experiences of visibility, misidentification and otherness provided opportunities for the participants and myself to find shared positions and commonalities (cf. Mullings 1999).

7 My use of Castilian Spanish and Catalan accent also reveal where I come from.

Linguistic fluidity in the cross-cultural field

The preparation work for this project was mainly conducted in English. Most of the literature and scholarship reviewed and the academic conventions I was working in were Anglo-American. As has been pointed out, one of the consequences of English having become the lingua franca of international academia is that scholarship produced and/or published in other languages tends to be side-lined (e.g. Aalbers 2004; Garcia-Ramon 2003). To try to counteract this dynamic, however, I incorporated information resources and academic literature written in Spanish when possible. Nonetheless, the research was undertaken within the conventions of Anglo-American scholarship and its conceptual framework was originally developed in English. The use of these conventions had an impact on how the research and the findings were interpreted and presented.

I designed all the materials related to the research both in English and Spanish. This included information leaflets, research related tools and interview schedules. My aim was not only to facilitate the participation of those who could not speak English or felt more comfortable speaking in Spanish, but also to provide participants with the option of using one or the other language (or both) when undertaking the fieldwork activities (cf. Temple 2005). As scholars working on cross-linguistic research have suggested (e.g. Birbili 2000; Lopez et al. 2008), in order to secure more nuanced and appropriate Spanish versions, I checked the texts by researching the common ways of expressing certain concepts in different varieties of Spanish[8] and by discussing my translations with other Spanish-English speakers, some from Spain and some from Latin America.

However, the most fruitful activity during this process was the use of a pilot to check and compare the English and Spanish versions of fieldwork tools with participants, thus operationalising their input and recognising

8 To research common ways of expressing concepts across different varieties of Spanish I used academic resources and Spanish dictionaries (e.g. Real Academia Española 2001).

their active role. Through the pilot phase, I monitored the reliability of the English and Spanish texts and my verbal explanations by observing and analysing the responses of participants to them and also by discussing directly the language and concepts used. My aim was to produce translations which were culturally appropriate and linguistically comprehensible, therefore avoiding more literal translations (cf. Birbili 2000). As I will discuss further in the next section, through this exercise, for example, I started to reflect on the linguistic nuances involved in discussing issues related to 'belonging' in Spanish, which became relevant for the findings of the project.

During the fieldwork, all of the adult participants, except for one British father, chose to speak in Spanish, this included a British mother who was fluent in Spanish. In the children's case, there was a more mixed situation, four chose Spanish and the others English or a mixture of the two languages, which meant that me/ the interviewer would speak in Spanish and they would answer in English or a combination of the two. I believe that it is more pertinent to describe this phase of the research process as being mostly bilingual, with a combination of Spanish and English being used, or even language hybridity, e.g. with one language being used but with words and expressions from the other intersected or combined in the communication. I tried to illustrate this hybridity in the translated quotes when writing the findings by indicating in italics those words or the whole text that had originally been spoken in English. It is important to clarify, though, that I did not translate all the data that had been collected in Spanish into English for practical and ethical reasons. This would have been highly time consuming and would have 'domesticated' the research data into English too early in the analysis (Temple and Young 2004, 174, this is further elaborated in the next section). In addition, the resulting PhD thesis included the reproduction of the original Spanish texts to offer readers the opportunity to check my interpretations.[9]

9 Unfortunately, I have not always been able to continue with this practice in other types of publications produced from the project due to the word limits applied in most journals.

Overall, scholarship focusing on language and translation issues when conducting cross-cultural research tends to present the use of one language or another as a clear cut reality, i.e. interviews or focus groups were conducted in the first language of the participants, although some authors acknowledge the impact of differences within the same language (e.g. Lopez et al. 2008; Esposito 2001). However, I found that when conducting research with immigrants who had differing degrees of knowledge of English or with children who had lived most of their lives in the UK but embedded in linguistically diverse families, languages were used more flexibly and interchangeably. This flexibility was helped by the fact that participants knew that I could understand both languages. For instance, on many occasions participants were speaking in Spanish but used an English term to describe a situation or concept as they felt the English word conveyed better what they were trying to communicate or they could simply not remember the Spanish word they were looking for.

An example of this blurring of linguistic boundaries came from Susana[10] (40s, Colombian, 20+ years of residence in the UK, education professional), one of the mothers in the families that participated. While speaking in Spanish about her understanding of the concept of Latin America, Susana chose to use two English words (in italics) in the following passage:

> SUSANA. I don't think you can talk about Latin America as a group, I think that is where the misunderstanding lies. We are many cultures in a *landmass* erm and we have things in common but others very, very, very different. (...) No, it is a very big place, because we are minorities, we are like many minorities within a single place without a common identity or common *column*, I think so.
>
> [*SUSANA. Es que yo creo que no se puede hablar de Latinoamérica como un grupo, y yo creo que ahí es dónde está el mal entendido. Nosotros somos varias culturas en una landmass erm y tenemos cosas en común pero tenemos cosas muy, muy, muy diferentes. (...) No, es un sitio muy grande, porque somos minorías, somos como muchas minorías en un solo sitio sin una identidad o como un column que es común, yo creo que es eso.*]

10 All names used are pseudonyms to protect the identity of the participants.

It could be argued that participants like Susana, who had a good command of English, had lived in the UK for a long period of time and had been involved in a Latin American community group for a number of years in the past, also acted as 'cultural brokers' in the research. Susanna, like other participants, 'translated' her personal experiences and understandings in the context of the project and on the basis of the knowledge she had acquired about the frames of reference in English and in her receiving society. In contrast to a great deal of scholarship that tends to present participants in a passive light in respect of how language is used during qualitative research fieldwork (e.g. Lopez et al. 2008; Esposito 2001), I argue that many participants have an active cross-linguistic and cross-cultural role in research.

Qualitative research translations 'need to capture the meaning, context and nuances in conversational speech' (Lopez et al. 2008, 1736); thus recognising that communication is a dynamic and context dependent process between active linguistic agents. When conducting my fieldwork, I found that participants were equally aware of the differences in our use of Spanish and often checked that a word or expression they were using had the same meaning for me. The interview transcripts were full of moments in which we engaged in linguistic diversions, contrasting how we used certain words and what expressions were used in our different societies of origin. For instance, in the group interview of one of the participant families, Jake (14, Chilean) was talking about image and fashion issues and how he felt that, after having lived in the UK, he would not 'fit in' with some of the styles common among his peers in Chile. In doing so, he used a Chilean urban slang expression ('flaite') which his mother (Louise, 30s, Chilean) quickly identified as a term possibly unfamiliar to me. In turn, the stepfather (Paco, 40s, Chilean) also contributed to clarify the meaning of the word in an English context.

JAKE. I don't want it, I don't like to... I don't like to look flaite.
LOUISE. That's a Chilean expression, what does it mean?
JAKE. How can I say it?
LOUISE. *Chav*... it's very *chav* [laughs].
INTERVIEWER. Very *chav*... ok.
PACO. The contrary of *posh*...
[*JAKE. Que yo no lo quiero, no me gusta, no... quiero verme flaite.*

LOUISE. Eso es un dicho chileno, ¿qué significa?
JAKE. ¿Cómo se puede decir?
LOUISE. Chav... es muy chav [ríe].
ENTREVISTADORA. Muy chav... vale.
PACO. Lo contrario de posh...]
Jake (14), Louise (30s) and Paco (40s) – Chileans, parents had university education but were working in semi-skilled jobs, short-term migration.

Differences in varieties of Spanish became more of an issue with young participants as they were used to the Spanish that their parents spoke and were generally unfamiliar with the vocabulary and accent of the Spanish I speak. However, I tried to be careful when expressing my questions, sometimes using terms which are not so 'natural' for me but which I know are more common in varieties of Latin American Spanish, or even double-checking the question in English. On one of these occasions, a young participant wanted to conduct his personal interviews (and complete the related diagrams) in Spanish. Although he was able to understand my questions and enjoyed the opportunity to practise the language, after a while, I had to encourage him to switch to English as he was struggling to convey complex ideas in his answers and I was concerned that he was not able to express himself freely and fully.

Languages in the analytical and writing process: recognising participants' linguistic and cultural perspectives

I transcribed[11] all the interviews verbatim in the original language or languages in which they had been spoken and I proceeded to analyse all the data collected by using both languages. Translating all the interviews into English would have been very time consuming but I also considered that, by

11 I had some external assistance with transcription although I subsequently checked and corrected each transcript.

working with the original languages, I could develop my analysis framework in a richer and less constrained manner, that is, by avoiding translation too early in the process of interpretation. As Temple and Young (2004, 174) have highlighted, 'early 'domestication' of research into written English may mean that the ties between language and identity/culture are cut to the disadvantage of non-English speakers'. Therefore, the 'thematic framework' developed to analyse the data contained codes or themes both in Spanish and in English (cf. Ritchie et al. 2003); this work involved comparing themes to decide which ones made reference to the same topic or subject of interest.

An example of the ways in which the linguistic and cultural standpoints of the participants informed the findings of the research can be found in the topic of belonging. The Spanish equivalent of belonging or to belong, *pertenecer*, is not a concept/term used with ease in everyday parlance. This does not mean to imply that the concept does not exist or is not employed in this language, but that it is adopted more readily in academic and formal language. Interestingly, Antonisch (2010, 646) has also highlighted this semantic complexity and difficulty in the case of French and Italian, which seems to indicate that, for these languages, it sounds more natural to express sentiments of belonging in everyday speech as notions of feeling at home, being part of or from a place (see also Sidaway et al. 2004 for related translation issues). Therefore, in analysing the participants' accounts collected in Spanish, I had to take into account the multiple ways in which participants expressed notions of attachment, membership or comfort in relation to place/s, locations and everyday situations. For instance, Martina (50s, Spanish-Colombian, born and raised in Colombia, 20+ years of residence in the UK, professional occupation) offers an example of the emphasis placed on expressions of 'being or becoming from a place' in Spanish to express notions of belonging.

> MARTINA. And now I'm cultivating the land [on an allotment] and since I've been cultivating the land, I'm here one hundred per cent, because before I was always like out of synch... like with the climate, or the weather, the times, the seasons, because in Bogotá there are no seasons, so it was like if I was never completely here but now I'm here and it is simply because I'm cultivating the land. Then let's say that little by little, little by little I'm becoming more and more from this place, and it's not that I'm less from Colombia, no, but yes I'm more and more from this place.

> [MARTINA. *Y entonces ahora estoy, estoy cultivando la tierra y desde que estoy cultivando la tierra, estoy aquí ciento por ciento porque antes siempre estaba como en desfase... como que el clima, o el tiempo, las horas, las estaciones, porque en Bogotá no hay estaciones, entonces como que nunca estaba del todo aquí pero ahora como que estoy aquí y es simplemente por lo que estoy cultivando la tierra. Entonces digamos que poquito, a poquito, a poquito, a poquito con que cada vez soy más de este sitio, y no es que cada vez sea menos de Colombia, no, pero si cada vez soy más de este sitio*.]

The Spanish narratives of participants related to processes and feelings of belonging brought centre stage everyday experiences of attachment to places and expressions of growing bonds and emotions. These perspectives informed the findings of the research which highlighted the salience of individual micro-expressions of attachment in order to understand the ways in which migrants bond to their receiving societies, contributing to current understandings of the emotional geographies of belonging (Mas Giralt, 2015).

Conclusion

As scholars have emphasised, the linguistic decisions, interpretations and representations undertaken when conducting research in more than one language are not innocuous or free from the positionalities of the researchers or translators involved (e.g. Birbili 2000; Temple 2005). Therefore, we are ethically bound to discuss these issues explicitly in our research. However, existing literature presents research participants as somewhat passive elements in the qualitative research communication process (e.g. Lopez et al. 2008; Esposito 2001). The experience in this project points towards the need to acknowledge their active roles in constructing collaborative verbal accounts with the researcher/interpreter.

Participants are agential individuals who are also aware of linguistic and 'cultural' differences. Research encounters are interactive and verbal/non-verbal processes of communication. Therefore, scholars working in cross-linguistic research can benefit from engaging with the linguistic and

cultural world of participants by actively asking them to clarify or elaborate on the meanings and connotations attached to certain expressions and words. This should be considered as well when involving interpreters. It is in linguistic collaboration with the participants that researchers/interpreters can develop better understandings of the cultural and social meanings carried by the terms and expressions used in the research encounter.

Recognising the active linguistic and communicative role of participants is an integral part of accepting the constructed nature of knowledge. With the exception of fully participative research approaches, the power to interpret and represent the data collected will ultimately lie in the hands of researchers who, for ethical reasons, are asked to do that critically and reflexively. However, by making sure that we create the positional spaces and tools to co-operate more fully with participants, we can 'work towards a critical politics of power/knowledge production' (Rose 1997, 318).

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ULRIKE M. VIETEN AND ANNA GAWLEWICZ

Visible Difference, Stigmatising Language(s) and the Discursive Construction of Prejudices Against Others in Leeds and Warsaw

ABSTRACT: There is a growing interest in – and urgency around – the understanding of cultural difference in and across European societies. Language matters crucially to how difference is perceived and conceptualised. Against this backdrop, the consequences of encountering difference through language still require research. In response to this need, this chapter looks into the use of prejudiced terms addressing difference with respect to axes of gendered ethnicity/religion (Muslim men) and gendered class (male underclass) in two European cities. In doing so, it traces the vernacular embedding of perceptions of specifically coded difference in Poland and the UK. As such, it explores how the same categories of difference are discursively produced in two national contexts and enquires in what ways perceptions differ, overlap or refer to an increasingly global discursive framework.

Introduction

Kürti (1997) argues that the projection of Eastern Europe as a peripheral region is 'akin to the orientalising project known from colonialism, whose totalising and hegemonic perspective was so important for exploitation of the colonies by the colonizers, and which was supported by a nationalist elite lending credence to its expansionism' (1997, 31). Thinking of Poland, it is important to stress that the periods of partition (Davies 1981) indicate various historical stages of being incorporated *culturally* into hegemonic empires (e.g. Habsburg, Prussia, Tsarist). In effect, there are historical phases

of being exposed to the dominance of hegemonic languages (German, Russian). Importantly, although Poland experienced periods of dependence, which also holds true for the dependence on the USSR until 1989, it also remained at certain times a colonial power in relation to some regional and ethnic entities (e.g. the collectively labelled 'Eastern borderlands'), which fuelled the production of Polish as the legitimate language of the Polish peoples (Bakuła 2007; Gosk 2010).

In the contemporary world, English has become the *lingua franca*, widely used as a vernacular and professional second or third language. In this context, there is little research on how distinctively positioned European (Continental) cultures and languages such as Polish relate to English as a hegemonic language, and what the consequences of encountering difference through language are in this respect. This matters crucially when comparing individual experiences with difference in two linguistic contexts where local perceptions of distinctive minorities might be conveyed in specific stigmatising slang terms. Dylewski and Jagodzinski (2012) traced the lexical borrowings from African American slang in Polish youth slang, arguing for a broader connectivity linked to the cultural globalisation of different emanations of the English language. Engaging with the transnational effects of Europeanisation (Cowles et al. 2001; Graziano and Vink 2006) and the need for the deepening of an inter-cultural understanding across Europe (Vidmar-Horvat 2012), this chapter will turn to the phenomenon of abusive *slang words* as a form of 'sub-cultural' codes in two differently positioned European languages, and to the question of how privately connoted informal language expresses and transmits prejudices against visible minorities in Poland and Britain. As argued here, Polish and English colloquial spoken language offers a window to explore how perceptions of (ascribed) difference are spelled out in private communication alongside a publically sanctioned or politically correct 'acknowledging' language of difference.

The chapter introduces the findings of a larger comparative research project, LIVEDIFFERENCE,[1] which explored how individuals experience

1 The research was funded by the ERC between 2010 and 2014; the PI and Grant Holder was Prof. Gill Valentine, University of Sheffield.

and speak about difference in Warsaw, Poland and Leeds, England. It is based on interviews with two sets of respondents, residents in Warsaw and in Leeds, exploring each participant's experiences as well as attitudes towards difference.

It is crucial to note that the interviews with residents in Warsaw were conducted in Polish by Polish nationals while residents in Leeds were interviewed in English by both British and non-British nationals. Hence, our research involved a complex cross-cultural methodology with the complicated positionalities of the researchers written into the research process (Rose 1997; Kim 2012). The quotations we include in this chapter were either transcribed verbatim (in case of the Leeds sample) or carefully translated into English to maintain conceptual equivalence i.e. comparability of meanings between the original utterance and the translated piece (Birbili 2000; Temple 1997). We further utilised narrative analysis (Earthy and Cronin 2008) to explore how and why people use certain linguistic expressions to talk about their experiences and attitudes towards difference.[2]

First, we discuss how language, e.g. subcultural speech, tends to transmit attitudes towards difference, including prejudice. Further, we consider both national contexts, the British and the Polish, and argue that the language that refers to the axes of difference has been distinctively produced in these settings as a consequence of unique histories and legal developments.

Here, we particularly draw upon the concept of *postdependence* (Gosk 2010) in order to explain how certain understandings of difference are uniquely embedded in the Polish context. Then, we turn to the empirical material and illustrate how research participants in Warsaw and Leeds labelled specific minorities, and in what ways prejudices conveyed in stigmatising slang also hinted at a 'private' view of difference alongside a legally and morally sanctioned public demand for 'political correctness'. We particularly focus on visible difference distinguishing gendered belonging to class (e.g. a sub-proletarian working-class male), race (non-white) and religion (Islam).

2 When quoting our respondents we use italics to emphasise forms of discursive othering through slang. An ellipsis in brackets indicates that a section of text has been removed to facilitate readability of quotations. All names in the chapter are pseudonyms.

Prejudice, translating culture and social representations of Others

In an increasingly globalising world (Morley and Robins 1995, Castles and Miller 1998), social-cultural geographies are changing rapidly. The opportunities for people from different countries and languages to meet and try to make sense of each other are manifold. Curiosity and cosmopolitan openness, as a positive outlook (Breckenbridge et al. 2002; Nava 2007), as well as more sceptical feminist views of its ambivalences (Kofman 2005), including shifting racialised group boundaries (Vieten 2012), encompass altered ways of communication and encountering difference in Europe and beyond. Hence, we link our own research interest to a growing public and academic awareness of 'super-diversity' (Vertovec 2007) and diverse local spatial sites.

In a recent study on prejudices and racism against Roma, Goodman and Rowe (2014, 43) claim that 'a taboo is in place only against racism' but [other] prejudices are regarded more acceptable'. Still, there is a significant scale of prejudices, and as we argue here, the 'national language of difference' is crucial to detect the construction of prejudices cross-culturally. According to Collins and Clement (2012) language plays a central role in the production and transmission of prejudice. They furthermore claim that the role language plays in producing and transmitting prejudice, understood as 'antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization' (citing Allport 1954; 2012, 337), is rather underestimated. Their study demonstrates that 'explicit expressions of prejudice are relatively rare given current social norms condemning them, which might explain the lack of research in the field' (2012, 380). This 'lack' might be partly due to the rise of national 'hate speech' laws and the penalising of prejudiced language in the public sphere. However, the situation in Britain and Poland has developed over decades, and quite distinctively. Despite a basic liberal ideal of 'free speech', abusive and racist speech in the British public sphere has become largely unacceptable, first with the 'Race Relations Act

1965',[3] and, more recently, with the 'Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008' (Bleich 2011).

In Poland after 1989, 'hate speech' legislation regarding ethnicity, nationality, religion and gender was incorporated into the 1997 Penal Code. In 1999 additional legislation was passed 'banning Nazi and Communist Symbols' (Bazyler 2006, 9). Furthermore, Poland has blasphemy laws protecting the religious from insults directed towards symbols of faith or religion (Bazyler 2006). Bojarski (2011) argues that there is a very low level of legal awareness in Polish society and people's passive attitude to seeking legal help prevents many individuals from attempting to claim their rights, and enforcing the existing laws. In sum, there are significant differences between Britain and Poland with respect to the way penal law works, and the ways in which people on the ground relate to the different legal frameworks. (See also the chapter by Piekut and Valentine in this collection, for further details.)

Next, we turn to a discussion of what culture and difference means, and relate this to the everyday experience of cultural difference across a majority/minority divide.

Marciniak (2009) suggests the term 'post-socialist hybrids' to capture 'the lingering past' (2009, 175) of socialism paired with an 'upgraded' new European identity' for Poles. This identity could be explored within the frame of an emerging postdependence[4] paradigm recently claimed as a suitable way to characterise the position of Poland vis-à-vis various European countries and/or the hegemonic eighteenth-century empires (e.g. Habsburg empire), the USSR or the iconic 'West' (Gosk 2010). Polish history encompasses both moments of dependence on external powers as well as periods of imposing power. Importantly, however, the country has never been colonialised in

3 A number of different penalising laws followed: the 'Public Order Act 1986', then the 'Crime and Disorder Act 1998', and the 'Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006'.

4 The discussion of the concept of postdependence is beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, we only mention this emerging conceptual lens and refer readers to the broader literature (e.g. Gosk 2010).

the sense of extra-European racist colonialism targeting non-white people. Therefore, rather than 'the colonialised', its intricate position could be better described as a 'colonizing colonized' (Gosk 2010) or in 'triple relation' as former colony, former coloniser and in relation to 'the Western hegemons' (Mayblin et al. 2014). This complex positionality has had a profound influence on Polish national identity and values (Janion 2011) and is fundamental to how people understand and relate to diversity and difference.

Beyond this national-cultural specificity, the meaning of language as a tool for producing and transmitting prejudice has to be discussed further. According to Collins and Clement (2012, 383) 'language is not a neutral vessel [...]; it has an unyielding transformative effect: changing what it carries and distorting the perception of those who are exposed to it. This influences prejudice by activating culturally shared ideas and creating implicit expectations that subtly transform the perception of groups and group members'. Linked to this function is the observation that social representations are communicated through slang. Slang is frequently used in sub-cultural groups (e.g. youth culture, local communities) to produce group identities (Bucholtz 2000). Moscivici (1973) argues that social representations fulfil two core functions; they order social reality and facilitate communication between different individuals. Hence, they work as a cultural code, which is shaped by group interests and knowledge of a particular social phenomenon. Such a cultural code is used to cope with a new idea or perception, and could be employed when analysing the perception of an unfamiliar and visible ethnic and 'racial' group difference. As a way of processing social representations individuals anchor the representations in their networks of significance (e.g. the familiar social fabric) and resort to objectification to make the abstract more concrete. Metaphor might also be used to signify 'the Other'. This metaphorical element, for example, might be transmitted through the use of pejorative slang.

The use of explicitly prejudiced language that our research found in one-to-one interviews challenges the perception of a civic consensus around non-prejudiced attitudes towards difference. This is happening in distinctive ways in Poland and Britain, recognising the specifics of the cultural contexts. The ways in which culturally and historically situated social representations of difference impact on the perception and evaluation of minority group differences is most relevant to this insight.

The urban sound of difference: Warsaw and Leeds

Poland is a European postsocialist state, politically and socially 'isolated' between the end of the Second World War and the late 1980s due to the Communist regime (Borowik and Szarota 2004). The consequence of this was, relatively speaking, the ethno-national homogeneity of Polish society, furthermore described as predominantly Roman-Catholic (Eberts 1998). Against this backdrop, Warsaw, the capital city, remains the most ethnically diverse area in Poland with a 3.3 per cent ethnic minority population. The city has offered an attractive labour market to foreigners since the collapse of Communism, and its social fabric has become increasingly multicultural (and multi-linguistic) over the last two decades. There are significant minorities from Vietnam, Armenia, Turkey, China, Ukraine, Russia, as well as French, German, British and American transnational migrants (Piekut 2013). Despite this increasing diversity in Warsaw and a growing number of people who declare themselves as atheists or agnostics (GUS 2010), it remains a largely Roman-Catholic city. The city's economy is based on services and boasts a greater proportion of non-manual workers than Poland as a whole; its profile includes, nevertheless, pockets of both wealth and deprivation – the latter being shaped by class dynamics as well as social and educational status (Piekut et al. 2012).

By comparison, Britain is a country whose colonial history has produced complex patterns of ethnically, nationally and religiously diverse immigration in a post-colonial context throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In this context, Leeds – one of the largest cities in the UK – offers a particularly useful research site with a proportion of minority ethnic population close to the national average of 19 per cent (according to the 2011 Census). Stillwell and Phillips (2006) emphasise that a notable feature of Leeds is the size of its Pakistani and Pakistani-British community which, together with Indian, Bangladeshi and other South East Asian groups, constitutes over half of the city's non-white population. Importantly, Leeds is located in direct proximity to Bradford, the third largest site of South Asian settlement in England. Leeds is furthermore quite diverse in terms of religion (e.g. substantial Jewish, Muslim and Sikh communities) and is an important labour market, in particular in finance

and business. Although it represents a successful transition from an industrial city into a post-industrial urban location of considerable prosperity, nonetheless (like Warsaw) it contains areas of poverty, exclusion and deprivation (Stilwell and Phillips 2006). Partly affected by the ethnic conflicts that erupted between the racially segregated and classed populations in Northern English cities (including nearby Bradford) in 2001 (Amin 2001; Vieten 2011), Leeds has faced challenges regarding the communitarian capacity to live with difference (Stillwell and Phillips 2006).

In the following sections we explore the distinctive use of slang terms in both localities, in English and in Polish. We look more closely at the gendered dimension of prejudiced language cross-culturally, focusing particularly on the notion of masculinity it portrays. Goodnight et al. (2013) stress that facets of traditional masculinity as 'status', 'toughness' and 'antifemininity' have a prominent position in detecting the formation of interests, e.g. prejudices. In order to perform strong traditional 'masculinity', it is argued, a constant effort is required to live up to the expectation not to be 'feminine', 'resulting in a fragility that is unique in the masculine gender role' (Wellman and McCoy 2013, 2). Therefore, men struggle to re-establish dominant masculine gender roles. Intersecting with class, ethnicity/race and religion, 'status' and 'toughness' in the performance of the male gender become the cultural lens through which different masculinities are measured and categorised. In this sense, the racialising of the Other has also to be read against a dominant cultural model of a specific masculinity.

Warsaw: Constructing 'Arabs' and 'typical dres'

The interviews with Warsaw residents draw attention to some interesting patterns regarding the discursive understanding of Muslims (and of Islam more broadly), as well as the classed and gendered '*dres*'/'*dresiarze*'[5] culture.

5 We use both forms – '*dres*' (singular) and '*dresiarze*' (plural) – in this chapter. While they relate to various ideas ('*dres*' means a sports tracksuit in Polish, yet may also

While looking more closely at the way Muslims were addressed by our respondents in Warsaw, we noticed that they were not unfavourably perceived in general, but only when equated with what research participants construed as 'Arab people'. When asked, for instance, about their encounters with Muslim people, the vast majority of respondents would routinely swap the term 'Muslim(s)' with the expression 'Arab(s)'.

This misconception appears to build on the influence that history and politics has had on the wider Polish society. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Polish Communist government developed close political relations with the countries of Maghreb, Mashriq and the Near East such as Syria and Iraq, as a consequence of broader global geopolitics. This resulted in an influx of students from these countries, some of whom decided to stay and settle down in Poland (Gasztold-Seń 2012).

Importantly, they embodied visual difference through their phonotypical features (e.g. darker skin, black hair). Needless to say, in the context of a nationally, ethnically, racially and religiously non-heterogeneous[6] Polish society, singular Arab Muslim individuals were not only racialised, but also viewed as a homogeneous group.

Furthermore, narratives frequently included other forms of discursive othering. One such narrative, indicating that 'race' in terms of non-whiteness intersects with minority religion (Islam), is presented below. Here, both elements become signifiers of negatively prejudiced difference.

> For example in Asia, Asian countries, they have their own 'you do it your way, we'll do it ours'. *Arabs* – 'You do it your way, and we'll do it ours', they're *slobs*, these are *wild nationalities*, they'll [...] cut a human's throat as [they do with a] goat's. It's simply, in the name of Allah.
> (Mieczysław, male, 60–65 years old)

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denote a person who wears one; '*dresiarze*' refers to the group/subculture), they both designate young working-class males.

6 We stress that we speak of Communist times when Poland was politically propagated as a 'homogeneous' socialist state. We also acknowledge that a small white Muslim-Tatar community has lived in Poland for six centuries now. It has been, however, excluded from racialising discourses as it is socially constructed as an element of folklore, not an Islamic tradition (Górak-Sosnowska 2012).

Whereas the 'gender' of those labelled as 'Muslim Others' is not explicitly addressed as male, but implicitly conveyed in this quote, the following analysis of the slang words '*dres*'/'*dresiarze*' is typically used for visible difference associated with class, a younger age group and the male gender. The sole usage of the term *'dres'* not only designates difference, but was commonly employed in prejudiced narratives. The term '*dresiarze*' emerged in Poland in the 1990s and became socially associated with usually young working-class men living in urban tower blocks (Stenning 2005). Their visibility was emphasised through their distinctive appearance (i.e. tracksuits, jewellery), which was claimed to be a symbol of strength, the rejection of social normativity via the rejection of mainstream fashion, group pride and solidarity (Dąbrowski 2005). '*Dres*' or *'dresiarze'* seemed to embody 'the other' face of a post-socialist working class, particularly burdened with unemployment and social exclusion as a consequence of the transition from the Communist to the capitalist system (Stenning 2005). Stereotypically, they are presented as uneducated, anti-social, aggressive and vulgar. As such, although produced in a distinctive postsocialist context, the image of '*dres*' could be compared with that of 'chavs' in Britain, explored later in this chapter.

The quote below is illustrative of how our Warsaw informants narratively distanced themselves from '*dresiarze*' and constructed them as visibly different, intellectually inferior and socially unwelcome. Although the respondent claims to hold fairly 'neutral' attitudes towards those whom she considers '*dres*', at certain times she seems to employ quite a stigmatising rhetoric.

> I do know them [*dresiarze*] by sight so of course we say 'hello' to one another [...] [but] we do not have any closer contact, because this is not my company. [...] Since we were from different schools, then through one of my friends I met his friends [...] and they were evidently such *dresy*. But they are also humans and perhaps there's not much to talk about with them since they are *not exactly intelligent*, but if they are there, then I think, there is nothing wrong and I always think that they are OK and if they know somebody long enough, one can count on them by all means. Whatever they are, they have their own code of honour.
> (Paulina, female, 20–24 years old)

In the narratives we collected from our informants, '*dres*' rarely appeared as referring to a single person, but occurred as a stigma in plural form – i.e. *'dresy'*

or '*dresiarze*'. This indicates that interview respondents regarded their annoyance as caused by their being members of a *group*, several individuals acting out their difference in the streets, for example, or in neighbourhoods with their peers. Some respondents reflected that individually *'dresiarze'* were nice and not dangerous, but that they behaved differently when in a group. Hence, the group-related image was central.

Having introduced some of the prejudiced slang words addressing visible difference in Warsaw, we look next at Leeds. Do we come across similar slang words targeting the same gendered and visible difference?

Leeds: Avoiding ethnic slurs, but stigmatising 'chavs'

Whereas amongst the Warsaw participants in our study Muslims were commonly homogenised and mistaken for 'Arabs', this occurred infrequently amongst respondents in Leeds, who were more likely to mention particular ethnicities. As such, the city's Pakistani or British-Pakistani population was frequently referred to. This appears to reflect the increased awareness of distinctive social, ethno-national and cultural histories of Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi communities across different regions in Britain (Vieten 2013), created and encompassed by a body of academic literature (Modood et al. 1998; Brah 1996; Brah 2006) and local community reports produced in response to the 2001 Northern riots (e.g. Ouseley Report 2001).

Here, we would like to give one example, which also introduces the moral control of language, hinting at the prominence of legal sanctions for 'hate speech' in the British public sphere.

> Interviewer: Do you think that prejudices have changed over the course of your lifetime? [...]
>
> Emma: Well, yeah – well when I were younger it were just more like *Paki shop*. Oh God I shouldn't call it that – I've always called it *Paki shop*.
>
> (Emma, female, 30–34 years old)

As Collins and Clement (2012: 389) argue, there are 'inconsistent findings on the role of self-censorship norms, which has implications for the utility and effectiveness of both inclusive and positive language campaigns and also social norms that suppress explicit expressions of prejudice. The second is related to conditions under which communication strategies are, or are not, effective in attaining communication goals such as impression management (e.g. appearing unprejudiced).'

When Emma spontaneously utters 'Paki' in the interview, followed by the remark 'I shouldn't say that', she makes it clear that she is aware that ethnic slurs are penalised in Britain. It is here that some of our project findings hint at a complicated tension between public practices and individual (hidden) attitudes, and we can evidence that some changes have occurred in the more self-reflective use of slang terms. This *conscious correction* indicates a cautious reasonable reflection of a more immediate 'emotional' negative evaluation of visible minority difference.

More prominent in the conversations, however, was the explicit blaming and shaming of a 'white underclass' – the 'chavs' or 'scally'. This is most relevant to the notion of a dominant (hegemonic) notion of masculinity which on the one hand is based on securing status for the traditional gender ('the role of the bread winner'), and on the other on anxiety about failing in this regard. As pejorative and explicitly racist words like 'nigger' are penalised in the British public sphere, it seems that there is a greater popular *consensus* that whiteness, when combined with a lower-class background, provokes moral panic (Valentine and Harris 2014). It brings to the fore an individual attitude of wanting to keep a distance from this stigmatised group. This applies to working-class men and women alike, though the interview respondents more often referred to the gendered male. It also confirms the findings of other research (Jones 2011; Nayak 2006). Like the case of '*dresiarze*' in Poland, the expression 'chav' is meant to designate working-class males in Britain. The term 'chav' was popularised in the first decade of the twenty-first century by the British mass media to refer to an anti-social youth subculture in Britain. In the early 2000s the term became widespread, signifying a white working-class youth who, by wearing sham designer clothes and specific jewellery, appeared to exemplify urban and

classed difference. Jones (2011) controversially suggests that the expression stigmatises poverty and social exclusion in Britain.

In the interviews with Leeds residents (excluding Polish migrants), many of the respondents used the term 'chav' to describe their class prejudices. They often accused 'chavs' of claiming benefits extensively and being unwilling to work for their living. Unlike some other prejudices, respondents were unashamed of their unfavourable attitudes towards 'chavs'. Rachel, in the quote below, felt particularly irritated by people who don't obey the ethics of work.

> I think the main group of people that I can't tolerate, is the people [...] that don't do anything, that don't think they have to work, that come from that *chav society*, that type of person no matter what colour they are or where they're from. [...] These people choose not to take the job.
> (Rachel, female, 35–40 years old)

In some cases, narratives included somewhat contradictory attitudes (from prejudice and avoidance to sympathy) towards what is generally constructed as class difference, yet involved various hierarchies of acceptable and unacceptable otherness.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have attempted to understand how language and difference play out in two distinctive national and urban settings. We have explored how ethnic/religious and class/gender difference are discursively produced in these two distinctive socio-historical national contexts, Poland and Britain respectively. Alongside similarities in the construction of the gendered working class (parallels between '*dresiarze*' and 'chavs'), significant differences are noticeable with regard to how people in Warsaw and Leeds relate to the intersection of ethnicity, religion and gender (i.e. non-white Muslim or ethnic minority people in our study).

We have analysed and presented how the use of explicitly prejudiced language that our research found in interviews challenges the perception of a civic consensus in non-prejudiced attitudes against difference. We examined specific slang words that appeared in interviews with English and Polish participants. The slang words used reflected the particular histories and perceptions of visible difference in Warsaw and Leeds.

The narratives of Warsaw residents demonstrated that they equated nationality ('Arabs') with religion (Islam/'Muslim men') as well as demonised gendered working-class youth ('*dres*' or '*dresiarze*'). This was mirrored in Leeds with regard to class/gender ('chavs'), but was less noticeable in reference to ethnicity/religion. Leeds interviewees used distinctive ethnic and national categories to a much greater degree, revealing a familiarity with their post-colonial history, equality legislation or social pressure to conform to political correctness. Whereas intersecting dimensions of gender, 'race' and religion play out very differently with respect to historically and geographically situated experiences with non-white Muslim communities ('Arabs', 'Pakis'), the slang signifier of a morally disregarded 'white working class' came up in both lingual-national settings *('dres'*; 'chavs'), both in Warsaw and in Leeds. As we noticed in the Warsaw case study, Leeds respondents did not hold back their social prejudices against 'chavs', distancing themselves from their so-called 'anti-social' behaviour and carefully manoeuvring their own social narrative of 'working hard' and being members of the 'deserving' working class. It might be worthwhile to advance this research by looking at how broader international and global neo-liberal discourse targets social deprivation as individual biographical failure, and hence creates an ideological and social climate of anxiety for all people across different countries who risk being trapped in a position of low social status.

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