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The Citizen Lobby

Media, Democracy & Political Process Series

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The Citizen Lobby: From Capacity to Influence

Leif Thomas Olsen

Contents

Foreword

This publication is prepared as a part of the Digital Democracy Project, in turn constituting a part of the project Innovation Incubator; Grundversorgung 2.0, co-funded by the EU and based at the Center for Digital Cultures (CDC), Leuphana University, Lüneburg, Lower Saxony, Germany.

The tasks given, upon which this publication reports, are:
i) Research on the forms of public sphere, deliberation, decision-making and governance in modern democracies and how they are impacted by evolving online tools and practices
ii) Development of a model for a "digital democracy" based on the best practices found in the research

The first five chapters focus on point (i), while the two final chapters focus on point (ii).

As the full model presented in Chapter 7 is supported by already existing software, a trial can be based upon this publication's outlines for what in the following is called the Citizen Lobby.

Lüneburg, December 2013
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Executive summary

This research sets out to explore why our current democratic models are failing in the face of the interactive Web and its endless opportunities for exchange and dialogue, and how a better democratic model—taking these opportunities into consideration—could be designed.

Following Habermas, this publication assumes a public sphere influencing the governing structures through a four-spoke structure. These four spokes are (i) the private intimate realm (family and social life), (ii) the private economic realm (individual financial and intellectual capital), (iii) the public intimate realm (media) and (iv) the public economic realm (corporations and non-government institutions).

It is further assumed that although the *private intimate realm* formally elects parliamentarians (and hence governments) its influence is limited in both time and scope, since elections only take place with multi-year intervals, while policy—and hence politics—is shaped daily. Day-to-day influences over elected politicians are largely driven by the *public economic realm*, which in turn is influenced by owner-driven interests representing the *private economic realm*, channelled via the *public intimate realm* (media)—to a large extent privately owned and hence overlapping with the *private economic realm*. As these forces lobby the elected incumbents with what Habermas calls "generalised particularism"—biased and typically commercially driven interests that, towards the public, are both re-formulated and re-presented as being of general concern and benefit—the *economic* side of our socio-economic equations is given far more attention than the *social* side. The global trend towards neo-liberalism is built on this priority, which—at the same time as it has created remarkable growth—also caused rapidly increasing discrepancies in both income and wealth, and has given rise to widespread discontent over how our current democratic systems serves to represent their constituencies.

The Internet has been seen for a decade or more as the tool by which the *private intimate realm* shall be able to restore influence over elected politicians. Many initiatives with this aim have been launched, but although some gains have been made the overall impact is still modest. Some also see the emerging peer-to-peer (P2P) mode of production as a promising challenge to corporate power over political life. The road from such a promise to real change, however, still seems long, as P2P yet needs to secure its underpinnings in general, and its financial platform in particular, before it can take on such a monumental task. It is also far from certain that the Web will prove to be any more democratic than our current democratic institutions, since the Web is very quick to build new elites—and elitist practices (which is extensively elaborated upon in this publication). Although the Web may promote *different* elites, and these elites may think and work *differently*, as compared to parliamentarian democracies lobbied by the corporate sector, this does not mean societies by default will become more democratic.

The "long tail"—or the power-law distribution—that is quite manifest on the Internet, will in fact deny the public sphere to establish the kind of broadly supported and well-reasoned arguments that policy *must* base upon. To base policy on opinions is, as Habermas already pointed out 50 years ago, insufficient and shortsighted. This publication therefore outlines a modus operandi for a Citizen Lobby, intended to balance—but not replace—the interests of the institutional lobby. This Citizen Lobby shall be mandatory and remunerated under law, i.e., not based on voluntary input, since voluntary lobbies soon become driven by vested rather than public interests. This new lobby will, based on the Citizen Lobby's day-to-day monitoring, and through an anticipated and entailing shift in focus from election to re-election, motivate elected politicians to give at least equal effort to the interests of the private citizens making up the electorate, as to the corporate citizens who do not.

The framework: From parliamentary democracy to the Citizen Lobby

This introductory chapter aims at providing an overview of how this publication—and its eventual "model"—has developed. Since the research it reports on aims at exploring *why* our current democratic models are failing, in the face of the interactive Web and its endless opportunities for exchange and dialogue, and *how* a better democratic model taking these opportunities into consideration could be designed, a wide range of issues are of importance. This chapter will lay out the issues elaborated on in this publication and give a brief introduction to some of them. The intention nevertheless goes no further than to lay the foundation for further reading, each chapter dwelling on one or a few of the issues raised in this introduction.

A call for action

The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Geneva, a high-profile UN-linked NGO promoting parliamentary democracy as it is known around the world, discussed during their 128th Annual Assembly in March 2013 "the use of media, including social media, to enhance citizen engagement and democracy." A 34-point

summary list of this discussion, including a 28-point reference list to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 20/8, dated 29 June 2012, stipulates in direct response to the UN recommendation

> that parliaments develop strategies and guidelines for enhancing citizen engagement in the democratic process through the use of media, including social media (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013),

and emphasises

> that dialogue between citizens and parliamentarians has the potential to foster greater respect for democracy and democratic institutions, thereby countering declining voter participation and promoting greater accountability. (ibid.)

That declining voter participation equals a democratic deficit is nothing new, but what is new is that this now is seen also by the parliamentarians as a reason to engage in a "dialogue" with voters—rather than just enhancing further their "information efforts," which traditionally have been (and nevertheless also still is) called for.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union's arguments for calling for such a dialogue by their member parliaments were that the UN had urged parliaments and parliamentarians around the world to ensure that their

> citizen engagement efforts are accessible to all regardless of gender, age, socio-economic status, place of residence, dis-ability, religious belief, ethnicity or political affiliation (ibid.),

for which the IPU Assembly felt that personal contacts "in the field" would be of "irreplaceable nature" for all elected politicians. For this they—just as many private citizens do—see social media as a new tool, eyeing

> the potential of social media to facilitate greater citizen engagement through interaction between parliamentarians and citizens (ibid.),

> that media, including social media, may also enhance citizen engagement by allowing people to create networks, motivate each other, engage in monitoring activities and contribute to the decision-making process. (ibid.)

Concerns raised by this group of elite politicians however included that citizens ability to engage with parliamentarians depends partly on access to technology as well as their knowledge of parliament and parliamentary procedure, which is why they felt that "parliamentary work [must] be explained to citizens in a comprehensible and attractive manner" (ibid.). They also noted

> that there are difficulties in using social media to build a con-sensus by gathering various opinions in a balanced manner although they function well in disseminating a certain political opinion. (ibid.)

Furthermore, referring to the UN encouraging

> parliaments to use media, including social media, as part of a platform to interact with citizens, while ensuring that any social media engagement would not replace offline engagement, including through traditional media (ibid.),

the 2013 Assembly confirmed

> that the digital divide may impede citizens' access to information provided through social media, hence the importance of guaranteeing all citizens access to information technologies as well as using traditional media to keep the public informed. (ibid.)

All these quotes can be summarised as a call for a direct dia-logue between elected politicians and the electorate, using social media as a communication tool, while ensuring that also more traditional means of communication such as traditional media and face-to-face dialogue are employed, and, perhaps more

notably, that this dialogue is intended to boost voter participation and engage voters in monitoring political activities and contribute to the decision-making process. This means a stronger role for public participation, which by default means a step back for the representative function of elected parliamentarians—although their role of representatives per se would not be challenged.

This 34-point list is however only a call for their member parliaments to do this. But how it shall be done, and to what extent, is neither stated nor suggested. Difficulties in using social media to build consensus by gathering various opinions in a balanced manner is for instance not addressed, only noted, bringing us right back to Jürgen Habermas' public sphere dialogue—and its dilemma of balancing reason and opinions.

An October 2013 article in Huffington Post by Eduardo Paes, the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, echoes similar concerns; the "old" type of political representation of passive citizens (whether informed or not) by elected politicians is not working anymore. He writes that

> [t]he digital revolution has deepened the crisis within representative democracy. But as it forces its demise, it might also dictate its future. Traditional representative democracy within nations is no longer enough. People want more participation and collaboration with their government. They demand to be closer to institutions and authorities. (Paes 2013)

Elected officials feel the heat. But do they know how to resolve the problems?

The lobby

Colin Crouch, in his book *Post-Democracy*, points to a "problem" that is rarely mentioned by elected politicians, which will not only influence but also in turn be influenced by the kind of development the above quotes suggests: a changing balance (or

perhaps rather imbalance) between private citizens and what is increasingly being known as "corporate citizens"—better known as "the lobby" (Crouch 2010, 17–18).

Crouch describes, for instance, the last decades' most prominent political trend—that towards "liberal democracy," which is not confined to the West but is also (through the process of globalisation) quickly spreading to the non-West—as one

> that stresses electoral participation as the main type of mass participation, extensive freedom for lobbying activities, which mainly means business lobbies, and a form of polity that avoids interfering with a capitalist economy. It is a model that has little interest in widespread citizen involvement or the role of organizations outside the business sector. (Crouch 2010, 3)

Quoting Lindblom, he argues that business lobbies are successful partly because they can claim they will suffer financial losses and therefore possibly move to a different jurisdiction if their concerns are ignored—leading to loss of jobs and tax revenues—and partly because they can view lobbying costs as investments (since successful lobbying creates better conditions for their business, from which they can profit financially). Non-commercial lobbies cannot recover their lobbying cost through increased profits; at least they cannot calculate a return on investment from lobbying in the way the corporate lobby can (ibid., 17–18).

According to Dean, Anderson, and Lovink (2006, xxvii) in their introduction to *Reformatting Politics*, this already strong force also benefits from the trend to discreetly replace traditional democratic representation with "reputation management," by which they refer to the use of the Internet in general, and social media in particular, to build a "name" through high frequency participation—creating high "visibility"—whereby views and opinions can be voiced in ways considered authoritative by many, simply because they appear through such a visible and already recognised channel. This kind of "managed reputation" can quite

easily be developed by well-funded think tanks and lobbies in support of their particular and commercial interests, which by the "reputed channel" is re-formulated as being of a general concern (which Habermas calls "generalised particularism," see Chapter 2). The average blogger, who only can act as yet another voice among many others, may feel like being on par in a public and to many seemingly democratic debate, but has very much less chance of being heard. See further Chapter 4 below, where the Internet's (and P2P's) 80/20 power-law distribution, or "long tail," is discussed.

These authors taken together (being two examples of a growing body of literature) therefore point to the risk that the combination of money and technology, to which a typical corporate citizen has significantly better access than the typical private citizen—risks hollowing out the democratic aspects of our current political systems—and that this is not only well known, but also well planned.

Cluster politics may complicate things even further. In younger parliamentary democracies in general (e.g., India and Kenya), and in those where the so-called "international community" has implemented such a system in particular (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq), political parties often are based on segregating criteria, making political views and opinions secondary to cluster belonging, such as racial, religious or tribal clusters (Olsen 2010, 108). The premise that political parties are the movers of democracy here often proves false, since all such institutional segregation (i.e., where the loyalty factor risks overshadowing the political factor) is dis-advantageous to fair and peaceful political interaction, hampering rather than enhancing political democracy. Among Euro-Americans this often is seen as a problem others may have—but hardly anything they themselves would need to suffer from.

However, if/when the term "cluster" is also interpreted to include *economic* and/or *speculative* interests, where such interests favour

members of a certain cluster—here "lobby"—in a way similar to how the above mentioned clusters (racial, religious or tribal) tend to favour their own members over non-members, this loyalty factor becomes an issue to take into consideration also in mature democracies. In spite of most political parties in the West avoiding to specify their target groups in terms of race, religion or tribe (although, e.g., anti-immigrant parties often do), they normally profile themselves so as to attract certain economic groups, e.g., low- or high-income earners, by promoting higher subsidies or lower taxes respectively, or different sectors of society, e.g., the corporate or public sector by promoting corporate involvement in public services or not, or boosting public sector salaries or not (see also Anthony Judge, chapter 4). These underlying leanings towards one side or another are then exploited by the institutional lobby, acting in clusters to secure political priority for their own interests and concerns.

Although the South East Asian consensus approach to governance, for example, (where rainbow coalitions are more common than elsewhere) actually may help overcome at least some of the problems associated with this—primarily because *more* voters feel represented by *larger* coalitions—each segregating criteria counteracts actual democracy, as segregation is based on exclusion, while democracy is (or at least is assumed to be) based on inclusion. Examples of such segregating criteria also developing in old democracies include several European countries (incl. France, Holland and the Nordic countries), where anti-immigrant parties are gaining significant support for their exclusion policies. In the US the view on taxes and the economy, and the right to speculate also in other people's misery, e.g., health insurances and foreclosures, is a watershed between the parties, whereby economic segregation is implied.

In spite of thousands of NGOs striving to promote equality, they too have failed to prevent a slow re-orientation of parliamentary democracy from electorate-driven to lobby-driven (even if lobbies have always played a role in politics), in the face

of changing economic interests, global resource exploitation and massive migration—and the geo-political as well as cross-cultural conflicts that inevitably follow (Kalniņš 2011, 34–35).

Since the acid-test for democracy is not how the government is elected, but how the elected government deals with non-violent non-supporters (care or ignorance?), these problems will be discussed below by establishing a definition of the term "glocal" in a democracy-context, and by demonstrating the need for a structured approach to public participation—where the dialogue and influence that the introductory quotes by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (and the UN) above called for can become a reality, interacting rather than competing with an updated version of today's representative democracy.

Glocal democracy

Overcoming growing structural problems in a political system designed centuries ago, and more recently re-oriented in favour of economic interest at the expense of social interest, is not trivial. A different approach must be considered, or any changes will be mainly symbolic. In order to do so this publication will use the term glocal to describe the fusion of interests that the interactive Web made possible, where socio-economic interests finally can emphasise *socio*, rather than *economic*.

"Glocal" is a hybrid word, blending *global* with *local* (Olsen 2012, section 2.2). In order to understand the meaning this publication adheres to, it must be stressed that "local" does not only refer to a place or geographical space, whereby "global" counters it by referring to the "whole world." Instead these terms represent a range of complementary meanings, without which "the other" would lose its depth. Examples illustrating—but *not* specifying—this include:

"Local"	"Global"
Civic space	Public space
Cultural communities	Politics
Geographical communities	Markets
Individuals	Collectives
Present traditions	Future Trends
Here and There	Anywhere
Now and Then	Anytime
By "Meta-Local" we mean:	By "Meta-Global" we mean:

By "Meta-Local" we mean:

Ideas, opinions, trends and/ or behaviour that, although observed globally, are based on "local" (as opposed to "global") premises. Such "local" premises can be shared because of, e.g., cultural belonging or nationalism, shared by non-locals who emigrated or fled, or a minority equity / belonging of some sort. Lifestyles based on, e.g., religious affiliation may establish everyday premises / behaviour that differ from those of neighbours with other faiths—but fall in line with people across the globe who have the same faith.

Examples of other "meta-local communities" are diasporas, urban poor, SMEs and HBTs.

By "Meta-Global" we mean:

Influences that lie beyond the inter-action of the global physical / human / economic / ecological community. Such influences include human relationships to spiritual, eternal or supernatural forces, placing such relationships "beyond" the concern of the globalisation debate as it is typically delineated—i.e., as a socio-economic development playing out in the physical / human / eco(logical)—eco(nomic) sphere.

By adding this "meta"-level, it becomes possible to engage in glocal interaction without involving these kinds of meta-global concerns in this already complex debate.

Local vs Global

An interesting expansion of the *meta-local* is offered by Richard Gilman–Opalsky:

> Indigenous Mayans in Mexico were quite surprised in the 1990s to discover their robust common ground and the profound resonance of their claims with environmentalists and feminists and gays and lesbians and precarious and rebellious people everywhere—theirs was a commonality of being on the losing side of power, where power is defined by and for capital (2011, 116).

Meta-locals can in other words include a wider range of categories that, in spite of otherwise being detached, share one or several conditions that exclude them from the ruling majority or system.

In addition to structural concerns—i.e., how the system's design can at all serve its intended purposes—is a growing lack of trust in politicians creating legitimacy problems for public representation in politics and policy-making at large. As Charles Tilly noted,

> trust [in elected representatives], in almost all of its guises and virtually everywhere, from the industrially advanced West to the remote confines of the Third World, appears to be in decline. This development, in turn, is thought to place democracy [...] at considerable peril. (Encarnación 2006, 149)

Both Kenneth Newton (2001) and Natalia Pohorila and Yuriy Taran (2005) agree, the latter opening their article stating: "High expectations of the political elite run parallel with disappointment and distrust of politicians." And according to media there is no shortage of peoples' distrust of politicians. A majority of the world's citizens actually seem to consider this trust lost (cf. Webpages (i)–(x)). This lack of trust also calls for greater grassroots insight and participation in policy-making, in order for the "local" to gain importance vis-à-vis the "global"—throwing us back to the old trust and control dilemma. In this dilemma—well known to anyone who has tried to manage organisations, as well

as to those who have ever felt the frustration of being micro-managed where greater freedom would have been preferred—it is the balance between delegation, based on trust, and control, based on distrust that Charles Handy described as follows:

> Any increase in the control exercised by the manager decreases the amount of trust perceived by the subordinate (control + x => trust–x). Any wish by the manager to increase her trust in her subordinate, i.e., to give her more responsibility, must be accompanied by a release of some control if it is to be believed (trust + x => control–x). (1993, 332)

This also goes for elected representatives, where a decreasing level of trust will call for a greater level of control. People who used to feel trust in their representatives will demand more "control" over what their representatives do, when their level of trust decreases.

Further evidence for the need of an updated democratic model for the EU as well is that European efforts to develop multicultural societies within the existing framework have failed—a failure that has been publicly acknowledged by both Germany's Angela Merkel (Aljazeera 2010) and Britain's David Cameron (Aljazeera 2011). Given the growing numbers of immigrants in most EU-member states, this is a potential threat to socio-political stability, since such failures risk creating large and growing disenfranchised groups, not seen since the introduction of the European welfare state.

Hence, as representative democracy in today's increasingly multicultural environment—where meta-local and meta-global concerns (see above) tend to gain enhanced importance—frequently fails in its intended efforts to deliver "inclusion," and in the worst of cases even thrives from "exclusion," this publication intends to demonstrate both (i) the need for and (ii) a possible design for a structured approach to participative democracy—which we will call the Citizen Lobby.

Such a Citizen Lobby, providing a structured approach to democratic popular participation—well beyond the act of voting—intends to upgrade the current "unstructured" participative approach, which suffers from several problems, including "ad hoc" and notably varying levels of efforts (e.g., Web communities or street rallies), unreliable and often unsustainable funding (e.g., NGOs), insufficient management capacity (e.g., charities and grassroots movements), troublesome competition for public attention (most of them), and—as a consequence of these and other shortcomings—far less impact on actual policy-making than the accumulated resources spent by these "participative forces" would otherwise suggest. These shortcomings put "people issues" at loss versus those issues favoured by "corporate citizens" that via their lobby arms drive the priorities of the political establishment. In other words, if the un-structured forces were to act as effectively (and efficiently) as the institutional and well-structured corporate lobby, the competition for the ears and eyes of our elected politicians would be on an equal footing, i.e., a levelled playing-field would exist where human / individual concerns meet institutional / corporate interests.

This is not to say that the current participative approach has not yielded any success. The list of developments championed by non-elected forces, including NGOs, street rallies and charities (etc.) could be made very long (see, e.g., the SOPA–PIPA debate reviewed in Chapter 4). Nevertheless, and in spite of the many achievements made by these "participative forces" to date, their lack of success in the *overall* policy agenda is still disheartening.

Take, as an example, the endless processes applied to address global environmental concerns (launched some 20 years ago). These are not a sign of democracy—but of procrastination—and Copenhagen 2009 was a clear signal that politics come well ahead of the general public's concerns (Financial Times 2009). Nor can the tsunami wave of neo-liberal policies imposed on the developing world, following the demands by the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), be said to have any democratic platforms. They are, in fact, based on thoroughly autocratic platforms, to which almost no domestic forces have been able to stand up (cf. Stieglitz 2002). For as long as there is no overall modus operandi for *how* they work are today's participative forces easy prey for the *divide and rule'* strategy so frequently applied by various commercially and / or cluster-driven power structures, backed by particular interest groups— so eloquently described already half a millennium ago by Niccolo Machiavelli.

The history of glocal

The term *glocal* is of Japanese origin (Khondker 2004, 14). First used by Japanese farmers adapting rice strains to local conditions, it became more widely known as a term used by Japanese multinationals to refer to products developed for global markets, but modified to suit the expectations of the individual markets where the products were to be consumed.

In the West the term first surfaced in the 1990's, initially in commerce, but eventually as a cultural term (ibid.). A typical application of it is the slogan "think global, act local." The term's popularisation in academia was much due to Robert Robertson's (1994) work in the field of sociology. Following for one Anthony Giddens, Robertson argued that globalisation not only involved economic and political streamlining, but also methodological streamlining—in reality equating to methodological imperialism, which in sociological terms threaten local cultures' possibilities of expression and eventually their outright existence. Hence "the local" must be recognised not only as a mere recipient of global influences, but also as an interpreter of the same, mixing such influences with its local culture (Robertson 1995; Khan 1998; Kraidy 1999; Raz 1999). From this follows, as Bordieu (1993) also suggests, that the local not only plays the role of the receiver of global influences, but also that of a sender, impacting the shape and form of global influences as they hit the local, are mixed at

the local, and then continue their flows around the global, now in a partly modified state.

Robertson stresses that glocal does not assume global to be pro-active and local to be re-active, since there is mutuality in the relationship both will remain dependent upon the other. Critics of Robertson's work, however, point to the fuzziness and fluidness of the "local," making it difficult to identify the "locals" that make up the "global," in turn blurring the analysis as such (Agnew 1997). In fact, this criticism developed into an entirely new debate surrounding the term "glocalism," now focusing on "scale." This debate tried to specify the exact relationship between local and global, and was to quite an extent conducted among "human geographers."

The leading voice in that new debate was Eric Swyngedouw. To Swyngedouw—who had studied under Marxist geographer David Harvey—scales are historical constructs, mediated by social relations, making up the playing fields for "action" and "inaction" (Swyngedouw 1997a). Swyngedouw is critical to the effects of glocalism, noting that as long as the local (i.e., the smaller scale) is seen as a component of the global (the larger scale)—which is how the scale debate typically comes down on the local-global relationship, often with reference to "nested scales"—the capacity of *place* (i.e., the local) will be dependent on the control of *space* (i.e., the global). By this follows that those controlling *space* (such as big business and global politics) can—and possibly will—also control *place*, reducing the local to a dependent rather than a contributor (Swyngedouw 1997b, 2004; Merret 2001; Amin 2002; Collinge 2005).

In essence this view suggests that the local is subordinate to the global, which is quite the opposite of what Robertson et al. claimed when they argued that there is mutuality in the relationship—one that makes both sides dependent upon each other.

Although these are the two key trajectories that have dominated the academic debate on "glocalism," there are also at least two

other trails to follow. One, driven by Sally Marston, John Jones, and Keith Woodward (2005), can be seen as an effort to outright negate Swyngedouw's scale thesis, by arguing for "human geography without scale." Another is the strong effort to link the term "glocal" to the neo-liberal agenda, putting an economic rather than a social or scalar emphasis on how to interpret this concept. Since neo-liberalism views globalisation as a primarily positive development, its approach is also to negate Swyngedouw's arguments; the latter viewing glocalism as a threat to the "local," while the former typically views it as an opportunity.

Starting with "human geography without scale," it must be recognised that this is a niche debate, which, although it spanned over several years, attracted only a small number of contributors. In order to understand the philosophical platform of the Citizen Lobby, it is nevertheless important to understand the ideas brought forth by Marston, Jones, and Woodward. Their main arguments stem from what they refer to as "flat ontology" (ibid., 422). Here they refer both to historical thinkers such as Spinoza and contemporary ones such as Latour, suggesting that flat ontologies consists of self-organising systems

> where the dynamic properties of matter produce a multiplicity of complex relations and singularities that sometimes lead to the creation of new, unique events and entities, but more often to relatively redundant orders and practices. (ibid.)

In differing from what e.g., Smith refers to as a "horizontal ontology of flows" (in Marston, 423), building on among other influences the actor-network theory, Marston, Jones and Woodward argue that a flat ontology "consist of localised and non-localised event-relations productive of event-spaces that avoid the predetermination of hierarchies or boundlessness" (Marston, Jones, and Woodward 2005, 424). By this they mean that permanent borders between binaries such as "here/there," "us/you," "now/then" (etc.) are non-existent—but may appear as

consequences of the events actually taking place. In other words, such fixed scalar hierarchies are simply imagined. In ontological terms they would hence qualify as *a priori*. By ignoring them, they could just as well either turn out not to exist at all, or to have very different scope and content as compared to what had otherwise been *a priori* assumed, which is why it would only be possible to recognise their true relationships *a posteriori*.

As the proposed Citizen Lobby is meant to be an ongoing and, in terms of members, rotating advisory board to the elected parliament, a high level of fluidness (i.e., where permanent borders between binaries such as "here/there," "us/you," "now/then" (etc.) are non-existent—but may appear as consequences of the events actually taking place) is likely in the shorter term, where different groupings initially will view these binaries quite differently. Over time however—when Citizen Lobby activities become part of everyday life and debate—these binaries are likely to take a clearer shape in the eyes of the general public (electorate) amongst whom the Citizen Lobby is recruited, eventually positioning the Citizen Lobby in "the system" where it balances its own interests vis-à-vis the institutional interests represented by the institutional lobbies, just as 50 years ago labour unions eventually became established speaking partners for both employers and politicians.

Turning to the neo-liberal take on glocalism (Courchene 2001a, 2001b; Friedman 2005), economic advances in the local are often seen to be driven by smart utilisation of the global. The global influx, of which the local can make such smart use, is often seen as a part of what Storper and others refer to as "untraded inter-dependencies" (Storper 1997). By this is meant that apart from traded relations (or "traded interdependencies") such as labour, input materials and commodities of various types, traded in the open market, there are other competitive advantages that certain sub-national levels (e.g., regions or cities) can plug into and benefit from (Taylor 2000; Brenner 2004; Sassen 2002; Van der Heiden 2007). Such competitive advantages could include universities

and/or government institutions located in the same region or city as the actor enjoying these untraded interdependencies. It could also involve multilingual populations, strategic geo-location, good infrastructure provided by the national government, or particularly well-connected regional leaders.

In the dawn of the new millennium an initiative was taken by Uri Savir, a former Israeli diplomat then heading the Peres Center for Peace in Tel Aviv. This initiative led to the setting up of the Glocal Forum in 2001, a stakeholder-body aimed at promoting peace and mutual understanding, "while striving to create a new social and economic balance through city-to-city cooperation" (Glocal Forum 2004, 3). This initiative came to blend with the neo-liberal ideas of glocalism (see above), although the centre's *Glocalization Manifesto* itself lacks any such ideological or academic references, and/or analysis. The manifesto is however based on a joint study by the Glocal Forum, CERFE (Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Febbraio '74) and the World Bank Institute (2003), and this study is full of such analysis and references—as well as of a whole range of recommendations.

Although its recommendations reflected high ambitions, there was little new to be found in terms of how all this should happen. Nevertheless, as the main use of this joint study turned out to be the *Glocalization Manifesto*, it is worth looking at what that document ordained. Unsurprisingly the manifesto's starting point was this joint study's recommendations. From here the manifesto took on to elaborate on these recommendations, stressing for example that (Glocal Forum 2004, 8–10):

1. "[C]ities and local authorities represent the focal point of glocalization."
2. "Glocalization is not only to address individual cities and their administrations, but also […] associations such as the United Cities and Local Governments, the US Conference of Mayors, the Summit Conferences of Major Cities of the World and Sister Cities International."

3. "[G]localization practices generate positive returns for the private companies involved, through exposure, public relations, networking and local support …"
4. "In addition to the many kinds of support that national governments could provide, perhaps the most important is the granting of a greater autonomy and empowerment of the cities and local authorities …"

For further guidance, the manifesto listed thirty areas where action was required. Out of these only four were specific enough to evaluate, all the remaining simply suggesting "promoting," "supporting," "recognising," "exploring" and "facilitating" various areas of concern. Comparing the *Glocalization Manifesto* and its underlying joint study with the debate on glocalism analysed above, there is little doubt that the manifesto is a product of the neo-liberal view on glocalism, where the "local" (here specifically interpreted in geographical terms of a city or region) draws heavily on the "untraded interdependencies" that its "global" surrounding can offer. There is hardly any evidence in the manifesto that Robinson's more social and mutually oriented approach to glocalism has influenced this document, since virtually all points of reference—and points of action—presupposes that the "higher" level (of whichever levels are involved) shall take initial action, whether in terms of facilitation, support, empowerment, etc. A higher level taking the cue from a lower level is not listed anywhere, supporting the neo-liberal view that the "local" stands to benefit from the "global," if/when it re-acts in a smart manner, making the "global" the active party and the "local" the re-active one—in direct contrast to Robert Robinson et al.

A study of a handful of European cities engaging in the type of "city diplomacy" discussed above, found that the democratic aspects of these activities rated far below par. In fact most of the decisions were made, and most of the implementation-work undertaken by these cities' civil servants, not by the local parliaments (if any) or their elected leaders. The international activities

these cities engaged in were also, in most cases, bankrolled by non-earmarked funds—in summary making it almost impossible for the citizens to influence and/or follow-up on these activities (Van der Heiden 2007).

The *Glocalization Manifesto* can therefore be said to assume the neo-liberal interpretation of the term "glocalism," which in turn comes out as a political statement. The Citizen Lobby, further explained in Chapter 7, is ideology-neutral, instead focusing on *how* the general public (or "public sphere"), can go about expressing / arguing in favour of *whatever* political opinions they may harbour. The Citizen Lobby builds on Robinson's view of mutuality—not on the neo-liberal view of smartness.

The Cultural Formula

In Chapter 6 the so-called "Cultural Formula" will be applied (Olsen 2005, 56–57). This formula has been successfully used in two comparative cultural studies to analyse the differences in "reason" applied by different clusters (groups of people or cultures), where "reason" is framed by the "premises" that groups use to build their "logic" (ibid., ch. 3). The Cultural Formula aims at singling out the premises, from which a clearer under-standing of that group's internal logic can be achieved—based on anthropologist Melville Herskovits' claim that "Granted the prem-ises, the logic is inescapable" (Herskovits 1955, 361).

The formula reads as follows:

On the Social Level:	+ Cultural Values
	+ Environment
	= Cultural Application
On the Empirical Level:	+ Cultural Application
	+ Environment
	= Cultural Premise

On the Logical Level:	+ Observations
	+ Cultural Premise
	= Cultural Conclusion
On the Action Level:	+ Cultural Conclusion
	+ Resources
	+ Resolve
	= Cultural Behaviour

Explained in simple English this means that the application of our cultural values will be shaped by the environment we operate in. For instance, a newly arrived Libyan immigrant to France may act differently in a given situation in France compared to what s/he would have done in Libya, not necessarily because of an immediate change in his/her cultural values, but because the French environment (in which s/he now operates) is notably different from the Libyan, making his/her normal behaviour impractical, or even unrealistic (ibid., 353). As s/he gains experience from operating in a new environment, this experience will also start to affect his/her premises (underlying assumptions). This means that instead of assuming a certain type of development based on past experiences, s/he will now begin to assume different types of developments, based on fresh experiences in the new environment, combined with the "old" references that s/he still retains. Armed with this new logic, and given whatever resources and resolve s/he has and/or can muster, s/he will act in whatever way s/he *now* finds logical. No doubt this is neither a linear process of development or change, nor one where the different steps always will reveal themselves as individual steps. However, all of them must be passed through before his/her action will change as a consequence of the new cultural influences s/he is exposed to.

This process of a slowly changing logic is something we are all constantly exposed to. Even if immigrants are exposed to it in much more obvious ways (so-called "culture shocks") are also changing times, circumstances and conditions (such as

globalisation, economic boom or bust, etc.) basis for revised premises, leading to revised "logic" (or "reason" as Habermas calls it). This "formula" will therefore be used to illustrate how our relationships to policy-making is likely to change over time, in turn building and explaining the arguments not only for why a Citizen Lobby is at all required, but also for why it must be designed *not* as an independent and/or voluntary online tool, but as a mandatory, integrated and politically recognised tool, operating in harmony—and calibrated in time—with the elected parliament.

The chapters that follow

The following chapters will dwell on a number of key concerns driving the design of the model for the Citizen Lobby, which will be this publication's overall output. These chapters are as follows:

Chapter 2: Jürgen Habermas' discourse on the public sphere. This chapter delves deeper into *which* actors are involved in policy-making, and how history can help us understand the roles of and interaction among these actors, in the complex processes of representation of political will and dissemination as well as implementation of policy.

Chapter 3: How information and communications technology (ICT) has changed the political playing field by allowing almost anyone to access and share information and views, but also by distracting and obscuring the view of who is involved, who represents what, and which intentions underpin which action—all this not only facilitating, but also even further complicating the picture painted by Habermas.

Chapter 4: The emerging discourse on peer-to-peer production as a new way to interact without having to rely on hierarchical organisational structures—and to which extent this mode of interaction is applicable for democratic processes in general and policy-making processes in particular.

Chapter 5: The existing German Liquid Democracy platform, and its two main software applications Liquid Feedback and Adhocracy. These applications are designed to allow grass-roots participation in decision-making in general and has taken two directions: one focusing on deliberation and one focusing on delegation, both with voting as the final step. Scholars have done some independent research on its perceived effects on democracy, which also will be referenced.

Chapter 6: The building of "a model leading to the model," where the previously discussed issues are fed into a multi-facetted chart, analysing the possible scenarios that the various players identified by Habermas are likely to encounter, seen over three time periods, being:

1. the past—but in some areas still current (the corporate era),
2. the present—but in some areas still to come (the media era), and
3. the future—as outlined in this publication's referenced literature (the P2P era).

Chapter 7: The Citizen Lobby Model, its proposed format, function and processes, as well as its expected impact on future policy-making.

Hopefully this introductory chapter has adequately explained this publication's ambitions and laid the foundation for further reading.

Jürgen Habermas: The public sphere and its communicative action

Writings by and on Jürgen Habermas are substantial. His theories on the public sphere and communicative action have challenged the academic community for 50 years—and still do. This is perhaps in itself the most obvious sign of quality; any scientist, whether in the social or natural sciences, whose work is still debated 50 years on must have had something to contribute.

Although Habermas debated a wide range of topics, this publication only discusses his ideas for the public sphere and communicative action. The reason for this is that those are the theories that relate directly to the topic of this publication, i.e., democracy in action. As this publication will explain, these theories are important to grasp if one is to understand this publication's recommendations, both in terms of Habermas' own thinking as well as of the critique it has generated over the years. The critique has in some instances been harsh, and Habermas himself also revised some of his ideas to better reflect the reality they later encountered. But it is because of their underlying structure that his ideas are most useful. This structure helps us understand both the players and the processes involved in

policy-making, a structure that—in spite of its first publication dating back to 1962—still can be used for a constructive analysis of our socio-political environment.

As in so many other instances of thought analysis, it may not be the conclusions made that are of key importance but the usefulness of the steps and components that—together with more case-driven assumptions that may seem less relevant at later stages—lead the author to draw those conclusions. By feeding in new circumstances and new premises, the conclusions are likely to change, but the thought structure can still remain helpful.

Some of those debating the public sphere take its composition for granted, and instead focus on its role—comparing this collective's identity and role to those of other collectives, such as civil society, citizens, commoners or policy consumers. Civil society indeed constitutes a part of the public sphere, since it constitutes the non-state part of society. However just like the public sphere it crosses critical borders when organising itself, and any "civilian" may have interests contradicting those of civil society organisations, but which still risk being considered part of the same collective. Citizens are of course only people with a certain nationality, which officially puts them in a large collective that, nevertheless, falls into a wide range of sub-collectives—if anyone were to try to define its roles and/or characteristics. A commoner, here referred to a member of "a commons," may be anyone who is acting in his/her personal capacity, not necessarily organised in any other way than what is needed for the purpose of inclusion— an identity contrasting both institutional and state structures. Being a policy consumer is a passive role, simply mirroring *one* of all those Habermas includes in the public sphere.

The usefulness of Habermas' public sphere concept is two-fold:
– It structures both individuals and organisations in an interdependent manner, and places this structure in an identified relationship with the state. This structure and relationship can endure even if/when roles and power

balances change, and therefore serve as a framework within
which different societies can be compared.
– It allows for studies and comparisons of both communicative
  and operational flows. From this it also gains its strengths in
  the face of the critique it draws. Such critique actually uses the
  same framework as the original model did, but inserts new
  and/or different premises to argue one way or the other.

Although Habermas' models are keys to understanding also this
publication's trajectories, we will here only present them in five
summary steps, as follows:

– The 1962 version of Jürgen Habermas' public sphere
  (Appendix 1)
– Summary of criticism of Habermas' public sphere model
  (Appendix 2)
– Summary of criticism of Habermas' communicative action
  model (Appendix 3)
– Three points of underhand revision of and by Jürgen
  Habermas' public sphere and communicative action
  (Appendix 4)
– The 1992 version of Jürgen Habermas' public sphere and com-
  municative action (Appendix 5)

Since 1992, when they were first debated in the English-speaking
world, following a 30-year battle-of-minds in German-speaking
academia, have these ideas been widely quoted and re-packaged.
It is however a few conclusions drawn in 1992 that serve as the
key reference points for this project, why the debate leading up to
those are of particular interest here.

The 1962 version

The original version of Habermas' public sphere was famously
referred to as the "tea and coffee houses" where people met
and talked, i.e., informal meeting places where people met and
"public opinion" was shaped. The most important aspect of

this is, perhaps, that people *did* meet, also outside the formal institutions of decision-making, and *did* discuss matters of concern—and that these discussions *did* take on such dignity that their conclusions eventually affected policy-making (Calhoun 1992, 12; Habermas 1991, 54). How could this happen?

Habermas' analysis led to five distinct arenas. The first one was, quite obviously, the state itself, with its government and bureaucracy. That governing arena was in turn governed by the constitution, and operated by the parliament.

The state's counterpart was the public sphere, which in turn fell into two main and four sub-arenas. One main arena was the public realm, which subdivided into two parts (which here, as a simplification of terminology, are called): the "economic realm" and the "intimate realm." I will revert to these below, but in brief the (public) economic realm referred to the corporate and institutional world, while the (public) intimate realm referred to the media.

The second arena was the private realm, which also subdivided into two parts (which here, to simplify terminology, also are called): the economic realm and the intimate realm. Here the (private) economic realm referred to the capital owners and educated classes (in the era of the bourgeoisie sometimes called "men of letters"), while the (private) intimate realm referred to the family.

He thereby set the stage for democratic debate involving five parties, being (i) the state, (ii) the corporate and institutional world, (iii) media, (iv) capital owners and educated classes and (v) the family.

Habermas then identified the roles they played, and the power they held. This, in summary, he defined as follows:
1. The state:
   A governing role infused with political power, driven by the rule of law.

2. The corporate and institutional world:
   A lobbying role infused with political influence based on economic power, driven by institutionalised albeit biased interests.
3. Media:
   A communicative role infused with cultural power, driven by the intent to shape and communicate public interests to the governing realm.
4. Capital owners and educated classes:
   A role to define economic SWOTs (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) and formulate "public will," infused with intellectual and economic powers, driven by "true reason."
5. Family:
   Recipient of culture through media, infused with electoral power, driven by opinion.

This script and role distribution had both benefits and drawbacks. The advantage was that it described a circle of influence that, at least on paper, ensured that all parts of society could be involved. Its weakness was that it reinforced the elitism it had inherited from pre-democratic times, where an economic and intellectual elite controlled both "public-will" creation and the lobbying forces. The former in their capacity as individuals, taking part in the public debate (in the tea and coffee houses as well as the forums following that), the latter in their capacity as owners and managers of the corporate and institutional bodies that lobbied the government and bureaucracy for certain outcomes of the policy-making processes (Calhoun 1992, 7–8).

Habermas, however, draws his reader's attention to the role of media. He argued that although media in the early days of publishing had focused on information, necessary for conducting economic (and religious; author's comment) affairs, it soon developed in two new directions. One was fiction, targeting the family domain, which although often contributing to the social debate on issues of concern, did so in a romantic or dramatised

fashion. This meant that the readers may not have been engaged by "reason"—by which "public will" was to be created—but by fiction and drama, from which less helpful "opinions" could form (ibid., 21).

The other new direction was advertising, which he saw as the start of consumerism, a trend he considered unfortunate, especially if combined with opinions rather than reason (ibid., 24).

In his 1962 version, Habermas therefore saw two competing flows: one from the intellectual class, via their corporate or institutional interests, holding the state in line with the interests of society via its political influence (lobbying); the other being media power over the electorate, where people's increasingly opinion-based and consumerist lifestyles threatened the "rule of reason" (Habermas 1991, 23). This consumerist lifestyle, combined with a negotiating lobby, also increased the "demand for rights," in turn creating a need for a more active state, capable of "delivering" (Calhoun 1992, 22).

However, there were also further issues to consider in this structure. One was that the private realm (whether economic or intimate) could only use its own power for "acclamation"—i.e., only show like or dislike at the ballot-box (Habermas 1991, 176). More specific influences on the governing realm came via the (institutional) lobby and the media, which is why he saw the need for a stronger voice of the private realm. That voice he assigned to the welfare state. The digital-age term "fork" could potentially describe how he saw that role, as compared to that of the constitutional state. The welfare state was to look after the interests of the private realm in the dealings taking place between the public and the governing realms. This however caused some conflicts that required a clearer ranking, and the welfare state's role was eventually specified as subordinate to that of the constitutional state (ibid., 210, 232).

Another issue that concerned Habermas was that the public economic realm (corporations and institutions) developed "public

relations" into an art—targeting not only the governing realm but also the private realm. In this they intentionally made use of the media, which eventually became puppets of the public economic realm—slowly but surely moving from informative communication to manipulative communication (Calhoun 1992, 26).

All this further fuelled the decline of the intellectual and reasoned content of "the debate," as the slowly growing private economic realm also caused "quantification" of this debate—at the expense of its qualities—as Habermas argued, the debate will fail if/when wealth outstrips education (ibid., 25). Habermas even went as far as lamenting that "the world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only" (Habermas 1991, 171). This trend was further strengthened by the development of the political parties' internal agendas. In brief he argued that the consequence of this was that the debate became focused on their predefined agendas and election promises, not on the underlying issues that drove their agendas. This meant that the electorate now only were asked to consider which portfolio of ideas they preferred, out of several on offer, rather than how to best resolve the problems they wished to see resolved (ibid., 216–217).

In the private realm he could also see how the growing circle of inclusion (although he never specified *which* these new groups were) brought about an educational debate, which in turn gave way to more noncommittal group activities, partly reducing the private realm's interest in policy-making. As we will see later, this is one of the most criticised areas of his theory, as it elegantly circumvents, rather than takes on, gender, class and minority issues.

Habermas saw the consequences of these developments to be problematic. He therefore introduced a concept he called "inter-subjective communication." By this he meant a much more sincere dialogue format—meant to counter the "manipulative communication" that media engaged in, with a more direct dialogue between the parties concerned. This format based itself on

(i) clarity, (ii) attitude and (iii) truthfulness. Habermas summed them up as "formal pragmatics" (Habermas 1984, 330), as he argued they constitute three universal pillars of any speech-act anywhere, and therefore possible to extend to all and any type of communication. It could even link art and literature to science and law—and morality—hence holding not only communicative powers, but also those emancipatory (ibid., 331–334). As will be discussed later was this also an often criticised theory, not the least by his contemporary Jacques Derrida, the deconstructionist who was his most well-known adversary. Derrida (and others) claimed that language indeed is a tool of power, and therefore cannot be given such a generalised format and summarised in such general terms. But as will be argued later, there are points in this theory that can be highly useful in a slightly different context.

Habermas and his critics also presented some more general differences that affected these exchanges. One was, as indicated above, the role of the political party, where many defended its role to represent voters, rather than to engage them in debates. Here Habermas meant that voting alone distanced the public discourse from the public sphere from which it had emerged— and by which it had to be owned (Habermas 1991, 203). As a market liberalist he obviously also disagreed with his Marxist critics, who argued that corporate power is anti-social, and must be controlled. He saw corporate power as the most natural of influences, driven by the market's invisible hand.

Whereas critics also argued that "media" has a life of its own, and as such not only exists to serve but also to survive in a competitive environment, it needs to empower itself by making itself important in whatever environment it operates. This in turn can explain its manipulative efforts. Habermas on the other hand rather saw the need to protect the public sphere from the over-representation of biased interests that media often contributes to, and to protect the free flow of intellectual thoughts and critique from the "opinions" that media often channels (Garnham 1992, 367).

When Jürgen Habermas' most well-known works were finally translated into English in the late 1980s, almost 30 years after they were first published in German, a totally new group of readers took it on. Social scientist and intellectuals from the English-speaking world could finally study his original works, and in 1992 a conference was held in the United States to discuss his theories. This conference was later summarised in the book *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, edited by Craig Calhoun. In this book a partly new generation of views are expressed, as 30 years is a long time for a social theory in today's increasingly fast-moving and global landscape. As will be presented below this conference also gave Habermas a good opportunity to update his theories—an update that is fundamental to how this research relates both to his public sphere theory and his "inter-subjective communication" format.

But let us start by looking at the criticism expressed by the new group of readers who were, nevertheless, generally speaking, fairly supportive of his underlying conceptual thinking, with one major exception. This exception was his idea of "universalism." Not only did he argue that universalism was the basis for consensus, he also inserted it as a premise for his inter-subjective communication (McCarthy 1992, 65).

Although Derrida had already long since criticised this approach, using his deconstruction-theory (Borradori 2003, 4–8), Thomas McCarthy now noted that consensus requires compromise, and if "moral consensus" is to be arrived at through political dialogue—which is what Habermas argued in favour of—such moral consensus will have to be limited to one's own cultural sphere (1992, 65–66). Since not even philosophers can agree on what is morally right, efforts to elevate this concept to a general and universal level are difficult at best, and impossible at worst. This thin line between consensus and compromise is, generally speaking, the focus of this criticism, and in his paper from 2000

(unrelated to the conference mentioned above), Bent Flyvbjerg (2000) went as far as openly ridiculing Habermas for thinking that politics and policy-making can expect to achieve consensus at all, as politicians are negotiators by breed, and rhetoric is used to obscure—while at the same time promoting—their vested interests.

Along the same lines as McCarthy Hohendahl (1992, 105)—with reference to Habermas' reliance on historical developments as platform for his modern-day theory—argued that Habermas' model would need to treat "new issues" (e.g., class and gender) as values rather than norms, as long as they are culture specific. This affects the level of aggregate upon which a consensus can be achieved, as such consensus would have to be sought among those who share that cultural value.

In other words, there was neither in 1992, nor is there today, any support for Habermas' idea of universal consensus. This in turn undermines the idea of building a theory of communicative action on "inter-subjective communication" based on such universal consensus.

An equally persistent—but more specific—line of arguments related to how Habermas' model dealt with "power." At the said conference this critique fell into three categories; (i) structural issues, (ii) gender and class issues and (iii) minority issues.

Habermas' public sphere was meant to be an institutional mechanism for rationalising political domination, by rendering states accountable to the citizenry and assuming an ideal and unrestricted rational discussion of public matters, where inequalities of status were to be bridged with debaters deliberating as peers. Nancy Fraser (1992, 112–113) however argued that "accountability" never found its form and, as the public sphere grew, the intended peer-to-peer dialogue turned into mass media and manipulation of public opinion, whereby the degeneration process took over. This view basically overlaps with Habermas' own, although he saw this problem to be a communication problem that could

(and should) be resolved, not a structural one that was doomed by its own design. Fraser further pointed out that the separation of the public sphere's debate (and consequent opinion-making) from the state's decision-making remains a structural problem for as long as the state remains free to act independently from the collective will of the public sphere (ibid., 118). Again this was a matter that Habermas wanted to resolve with "communicative action," something his critics did not think was permissible, given the difficulty of ensuring the "clarity, attitude and truthfulness" required.

The perhaps most re-occurring criticism in the discourse on power was in regards to the model's obliviousness of gender, class and minorities.

Habermas had designated the public sphere an intentional arena, where present status distinctions were bracketed—and hence neutralised—meaning that (e.g.) gender, class and minority status are bridged by "reason." The possibility of parallel collectives applying parallel reason, where women or the working class argued for a different "reason" than what men and capital owners did, was something this model did not take into consideration— just as little as it took cultural differences into consideration. While Nicholas Garnham (1992, 359) noted that Habermas' public sphere simply ignored the parallel "publics" of the working class and romanticises the bourgeois as a benevolent rather than profit-seeking class, Nancy Fraser (1992, 117) gave details by arguing that if private interests and issues are undesirable in the public sphere discourse (which it was in Habermas 1962-version, filtered away by "reason"), it also refuses the argument that gender and care issues—for which women carry historical responsibilities—are not "private," but "political." Due to bracketing—i.e., grouping of concerns in aggregates—societal equality here is not seen to be necessary for political democracy.

A similar argument referred to minorities. Habermas' definition of "participation," where participation in a narrow political sense

equals a direct voice in policy-making, suggests that literary debates in the private realm prepare for the spill-over into the political debate in the public realm, making it possible also for culturally specific and/or relevant issues to become topics for debate. Seyla Benhabib (1992, 85–87) however makes the point that such a narrow and "political" participation must be replaced by participation in the broader socio-political debate, a debate that goes on everywhere, all the time and in different ways and contexts. Since expanding the public sphere also will by default raise the "culture and traditions" agenda—not as culture and traditions as such, but as "problems of meaning in the present," this will also allow minority agendas to be heard. Although Habermas would agree in principle, it seemed to clash with his lack of respect for what he called opinions, which in a stricter scenario of reasoned arguments could be how minority agendas were conceived, since there is no way minority views could gather the assumed consensus.

In the majority-minority debate, the majority's benevolent solution to "difference" (i.e., a minority view as compared to the majority view) is "tolerance." But, as filmmaker Pier Paolo Pasolini wrote:

> [t]his 'difference' […] remains the same both with regard to those who have decided to tolerate him and those who have decided to condemn him. No majority will ever be able to banish from its consciousness the feeling of the 'difference' of minorities. (Warner 1992, 384–385)

This, his critics argued, Habermas had either overlooked or ignored.

Summary of criticism of the communicative action model

Criticism expressed over Habermas' (original) theory for communicative action during the 1992 conference can be summarised in two blocks. One targeted his arguments regarding the relationships between "public" and "reason" on one hand and "mass" and

"opinion" on the other. The second block was about his claims regarding "formal pragmatics."

Habermas' strong trust in "public" and "reason" had its clear opposite in his reserve for "mass" and "opinion." The following quote captures Habermas' concerns in this particular respect:

> In a 'public', as we may understand the term, (1) virtually as many people express opinions as receive them. (2) Public communications are so organised that there is a chance immediately and effectively to answer back any opinion expressed in public. Opinion formed by such discussion (3) readily finds an outlet in effective action, even against—if necessary—the prevailing system of authority. And (4) authoritative institutions do not penetrate the public, which is thus more or less autonomous in its operation. Conversely, opinions cease to be public opinions in the proportion to which they are enmeshed in the communicative interchanges that characterise a 'mass': In a 'mass', (1) far fewer people express opinions than receive them, for the community of publics becomes an abstract collection of individuals who receive impressions from the mass media. (2) The communications that prevail are so organised that it is difficult, or impossible, for the individual to answer back immediately or with an effect. (3) The realisation of opinion in action is controlled by authorities who organise and control the channels of such action. The mass has no autonomy from institutions; on the contrary, agents of authorised institutions penetrate this mass, reducing any autonomy it may have in the formation of opinion by discussion. (1991, 249)

He argued that:

> [w]hereas exposure to the mass media in general increased with a person's position in the stratification system, this [with respect to the "manipulative" media] relationship was reversed; advertisements and radio commercials reached lower status groups more extensively and more

frequently than higher ones. [...] In a phase of more or less unconcealed class antagonism [...] the public sphere itself was torn between the "two nations"—and thus the public presentation of private interests [by/of itself] took on a political significance. (ibid., 191)

Habermas had himself noted that Fraenkel already in 1957 claimed that

[w]ith the help of parliamentary discussion, public opinion makes its desires known to the government, and the government makes its policies known to public opinion

whereby "*public opinion reigns, but does not govern*" [author's italic] (Fraenkel 1958 quoted in Habermas 1991, 239).

His contemporary countryman Leibholz (1952 quoted in Habermas 1991, 239) had however conflicted this by arguing that "the will of the [political] parties is identical with that of the active citizenry, so that the party happening to hold the majority represents the public opinion," whereby "... *public opinion also governs*" [author's italic].

Although Habermas (who felt unease over political parties hold on the policy-debate) was likely to prefer the former to the latter, he here expressed his distaste for manipulative media:

'Opinion management' is distinguished from advertising by the fact that it expressly lays claim to the public sphere as one that plays a role in the political realm. [...] The addressee of public relations is "public opinion," or the private citizens as the public and not directly as consumers. The sender of the message hides his business intentions in the role of someone interested in the public welfare. The influencing of consumers borrows its connotations from the classic idea of a public of private people putting their reason to use and exploits its legitimations for its own ends. (ibid., 193)

Having touched upon its modern twin concept "reputation management" already in Chapter 1, we will return to this argument yet again in Chapter 3 when discussing how the Internet impacts the political playing field.

Habermas verdict was clear: "The public sphere becomes the court before whose public prestige can be displayed — rather than in which public critical debate is carried on" (ibid., 201).

Nicholas Garnham (1992, 367) noted that a problem with media's role in the "reason vs opinion" debate is that media itself never adapted fully to the political concept of representation (based on reason), but remained largely trapped within the paradigm of direct individual face-to-face communication (reflecting opinion).

Both he and Lloyd Kramer (1992) wished to play down Habermas' clear divide between the "public," being endowed with "reason," and the "masses," being driven by opinions. Their argument is that it is neither possible to know if opinions are part of reason or not—i.e., if opinions are managed by media or based on actual debate within the private intimate realm ("family")—nor if media is intentionally manipulating its audience, or if such manipulative effects are because of medias' operational paradigm "of direct individual face-to-face communication."

The second stream of critics—targeting the role of "formal pragmatics"—can be fairly well summarised by Benjamin Lee's rhetorical question:

> Can a theory of communicative action based on an essentially [dualistic] speaker-hearer model of speech-acts be adequate for the mixed, large-scale communicative modes characteristic of modern societies? (1992, 409)

Furthermore he noted that questions could also be raised about the applicability of a general theory of writing or textuality to mixed modes of communication, such as television and movies, combining visual and oral content, and whose production includes print-mediated processes as diverse as script-writing

and audience surveying. His own answers to both were basically negative, in part with reference to the argument that:

> [Habermas] additional claim that all languages contain speech-acts that fit our [European] typologies would also not entail the universality of such acts but would rather point to the robustness of our schemes of translation. (ibid., 414)

So not only does Lee not consider speech-acts as representative of all types of communication, he also doubts we can be certain that all languages are structured in a similar enough way as to ensure compatibility—a key to democratic exchange of "reason."

Three points of underhand revision

Before we move on to the updated version of Habermas' public sphere theory I will highlight three revisions he had made prior to the 1992 conference referenced here, which prompted him to make a more thorough update.

The first one is regarding the role of the welfare state, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union. His original stance had been that the welfare state's legal and administrative functions can overrule market mechanisms successfully, whereby the political sphere becomes an "adjunct for a legislator," as the welfare state's political format is already set. His revised stance reflected the events: "[T]he bankruptcy of state socialism has shown that the legal-administrative mode of regulating [the state is] inappropriate" (Habermas 1992, 443).

The second revision was his view on the capacity of the non-elite to represent itself. Here his original stance had been that a losing communication battle was being fought by the "weak institutions" [e.g., workers, minorities] against those organised powers that communicate with the ambition to "influence the decisions of consumers, voters and clients," why the welfare state must intervene to secure the interests of these "weak institutions." With reference to his altered view on the welfare state itself, his

revised stance argued that neither the borders between "high" and "low" culture, nor between "culture" and "politics," may be so sharply defined after all, nor may the voice of such "weak institutions" be so weak after all—making interventions by the welfare state less critical (ibid, 436–439).

The third revision mentioned here (although others also had been made) is a revision of the above criticised structure of the public sphere, where he originally argued that the degree of power-infusion is measured by the extent to which informal, non-public opinions are fed into the circuit of formal, quasi-public opinion-making by the media—that the state and economy are trying to influence—in essence arguing that this could be controlled. His new stance was that discursively accomplished formation of opinion and will is a "veiled version" of majority power, not a medium for the potential rationalisation of power altogether—from which one may deduce that this was not possible to control, if only the numbers where big enough (ibid., 439–441).

These three revisions pointed towards a greater sympathy for, and trust in, ordinary people, lessening their need for a state-actor to look after them in the face of an elite-driven media and other undemocratic forces. All the above constitute the outset from which we below outline Habermas' 1992 version of his public sphere theory. It is from that we take the cue for several of the arguments underpinning the Citizen Lobby outlined in Chapter 7.

The 1992 version

Habermas' 1992-version of his public sphere and communicative action theory has the same basic structure as its 1962 predecessor. We shall be grateful for that, since that is the key that unlocks the relationships within, which in turn help analyse the power structures that always will decide the outcome of political action. It is interesting that the very fact that Habermas himself showed notably little interest in power in the 1960s seems to have helped to revive the debate around his earlier works,

since—around the turn of the millennium—power had become a key topic for public debate. By adding this concern to his then existing model, a new dimension appeared, creating a new level of interest.

Still analysing the public sphere in two main and four sub-arenas, all four interacting one way or another not only with each other, but also with the fifth arena, the state; the key difference is that the private economic realm is now far bigger than it had been earlier. Not only does this reflect Habermas own mental expansion of this realm, from an intellectual and economic elite of "white, educated and landowning men" (which was the bourgeois starting-point) to the full spectra of social classes and collectives engaged in socio-economic life. But it also reflects the changing times—during which the borderline between our private lives and work has become much more blurred, making such stratification significantly more difficult to do (ibid, 448 and 453–454).

The roles the different participants play are however modified. Although the role of the state is the same, Habermas now introduced a new term to help describe the roles of the public realm. That term is "generalised particularism" (ibid., 445). This term, condensing his view on what he earlier termed "manipulative opinion management," expresses in a peculiar way how biased interests are "packaged," in order to seem equally important to all of us—although they in fact are far more important to those "packaging" them than they are to the rest of us. Habermas argues that the lobby, i.e., those representing the corporations and institutions constituting the public economic realm, actually lobby in favour of their respective institutional cultures' generalised particularism. By this we can understand that they try hard to make all of us believe that what is good for them is good also for us. The power this realm holds is also driven by this ability. The better they argue in terms of general benefits arising from their particular interests, the more impact they will leverage, both politically and economically.

Reflecting on this insight in lobbying, there is little surprise that branding has become a "must do" in marketing. Since branding means we relate more to the corporate "value" the company both controls and profits from, than to the product we actually use, brands can generalise particular interests in ways that make people believe they also benefit, whether they actually do so or not. It also allows for corporate lip service to common agendas, such as oil- and gas- exploration companies investing a marginal slice of their profits into "alternative energy" in order to secure the rights to expand their traditional businesses in, from a bio-diversity point of view, often sensitive environments. By high-profile promotion of their "alternative energy investment" while keeping a low profile for their traditional business—apart from in their IR (investor relations)—they can generalise their particular interests in ways that allows our elected politicians to feel comfortable with their demands.

Habermas also noted that media actually represent and co-opt with this kind of "generalised particularism," as they often write about these interests as if they were common interests, by which they also tend to counter the "tyranny-of-the-majority," which would mean to always let the largest number of voices decide. This is in theory an argument Habermas would have agreed to, i.e., that reason (quality) should outweigh opinion (quantity), but as long as media are involved in manipulative communication this is doubtful—possibly even counter-productive (1992, 447).

As for the roles of the private realm, Habermas now saw the members of the private economic realm as citizen-stakeholders in a collective intellectual and economic debate, while we as members of the private intimate realm participate in a cultural and opinion-based debate in the capacity of clients of the welfare state (ibid., 445).

The changes here are not significant from his earlier version, but reflect the mental expansion of the public sphere, as well as his less troubled view on "mass" and "opinion" as compared

to "public" and "reason." His focus on "citizens" on one hand—who also can be interpreted as stakeholders—and "clients" on the other, indicate the two different roles we actually have as individuals; one being a member of a collective with a "right" to demand and claim, the other being a recipient with individual rights to receive the fruits of that collective's efforts.

It is to this structure that his reference to "deliberative democracy" refers. The deliberation taking place in the private realm coupled with the representation of the "generalised particulars" in the public realm, creates the framework for public debate, and hence legitimisation of public will. Importantly, Habermas' previously so problematic view on universal consensus has been rephrased, and now stresses "[a] legitimate decision does not represent the will of all, but is one that results from the deliberation of all" (ibid., 446).

He nevertheless adds a few criteria necessary for his "deliberative democracy" to work (ibid., 446–448):
– The state must take responsibility for ensuring that all members of the society can participate, and that all topics can be debated.
– Social conflicts must remain open to "rational regulation," i.e., here reason rather than opinion must prevail.
– Public sphere influence over the governing realm must be limited to procurement and/or withdrawal of legitimacy.
– Communicative power cannot substitute the inner (systematic) logic of the public and state bureaucracy.
– It is up to the citizens themselves to critically investigate which mechanisms function to alienate them from the political process (and hence counteract such developments).
– The public discourse cannot govern, but can impact the governing realm in a "siege-like" manner.

As for the communicative aspect of his updated theory, his role-distribution can be summarised as "who" provides and "who" receives legitimacy. Obviously the governing realm, being

the assigned implementer of "collective will," is the "receiver" of legitimacy. The public economic realm provides legitimacy of power on the "generalised particularism" level, while the private economic realm provides the same on the various socio-economic collectives' level. The private intimate realm provides legitimacy on the individual level through the ballot box.

Media's role here becomes to apply its communicative powers to drive compliance, demand and loyalty; by Kramer described as "opinion management"—by Habermas as "manipulative."

Also for this communicative interaction Habermas (1992, 448–452) added a few criteria to observe:
– The state must provide institutional guarantees for both participation and access.
– The public realm shall provide and help maintain supportive patterns of socialisation.
– The private realm shall provide and help maintain supportive cultural traditions.
– The populace shall be accustomed to freedom (or the above will not suffice).

The vehicles he proposed for achieving this last set of criteria included voluntary unions as opinion-forming associations, e.g., labour unions, and political parties serving as direct links between the public sphere and the governing realm, where media (in spite of its manipulative tendencies) remains the (his) vehicle of choice for communicating social, economic and political interests.

Nevertheless, assuming all the above is in place, he still raised a few red flags. Importantly he noted that corporations and institutions acted as "economic invaders" of public space, just as political parties acted as "political invaders" of public space (ibid., 455). He also maintained his original point, i.e., that media has the power to manipulate public space, both as an agent of "economic and political invaders" and in its own right (promoting its own role and interests)—by which he summed up the

"generalised particularism" against which the private sphere in general—and its intimate realm in particular—have to provide a counter-balance.

Since it is the private intimate realm (the individuals) that actually holds values, prioritises topics and creates reason (even if this happens also in other arenas than the family itself), they must be offered—by the state—an organisational format for inter-change and public discourse where they can balance the above economic, political and manipulative invasion of the social public space. This is therefore what the Citizen Lobby is meant to provide: an organisational format where public discourse and will-formation can meet, balance and counter, corporate, institutional, medial and political invasions of public space.

Information and computer technology: How is ICT changing the political playing field?

This chapter looks into the promises, experiences and potentials of using ICT as a means to improve and enhance democracy in our societies in general, and in more IT-savvy societies in particular. Since the overall label of the project under which this publication is authored is Digital Democracy, this may seem like a key chapter. But as the term "digital democracy" has been used in such a variety of ways, its exact meaning is hard to tell. It can nevertheless be noted that this term is commonly used to describe "e-governance"-related activities, i.e., approaches where incumbents seek input from the commoners, rather than where authority is challenged by the electorate. Here the impact is hard to assess in democracy-terms, as it typically relates more to administrative issues than to real decision-making.

Although extensively elaborated upon below, this chapter's overall conclusion is that digital democracy needs to emphasise "democracy" more than "digital," since the success of this development relies more on the social than on the technical.

Trying to frame this fairly complex problem I start out by quoting Matthew Hindman, whose book from 2009 reflects this dilemma right in its title *The Myth of Digital Democracy*:

> [I]f the successes of Internet politics are increasingly obvious, they have also tempted us to draw the wrong conclusions. If we want to understand the fate of politics in the Internet age, we also need to acknowledge new and different types of exclusivity that shape online politics. In a host of areas, from political news to blogging to issue advocacy, [it] shows that online speech follows winners-take-all patterns. Paradoxically, the extreme "openness" of the Internet has fuelled the creation of new political elites. The Internet's successes at democratising politics are real. Yet the medium's failures in this regard are less acknowledged and ultimately just as profound. (Hindman 2009, 4)

For instance, Zafiropoulos, Vagianos and Vrana, in their paper *Influential Greek Political Blogs: What Are They Talking About?* agree. They write that

> [t]hrough a sampling procedure, 127 Greek political blogs [were] recorded. Four indexes of influence and one overall influence index [were] calculated for each one of them to record their influence. Furthermore, content analysis of the blogs reveals how many of them discuss eParticipation topics. Analysis shows that eParticipation topic-discussion is a property of the influential political blogs. (2013, 41)

Again, new elites are being established, here among bloggers.

This is indeed an issue that many observers and authors keep returning to and to which we will pay a significant amount of attention in Chapter 4, where meritocracy is paralleled with democracy.

In order to better cover the debate we will below quote four cases where ICT is deemed a clear contributor to the democratisation process, and four more where reasonable doubts for this are being raised. From here we will discuss how ICT can contribute to the public sphere theory in general and Habermas' theories in particular. We nevertheless start out by looking at this development's success-side, i.e., where ICT clearly contributes to more democratic societies.

Case 1

Evika Karamagioli, discussing "open government" in her paper *Transparency in the Open Government Era: Friends or Foes?* confirms that:

> The decline in citizen engagement in the public sphere has long been one of the main challenges of modern government. Issues of trust, openness, and transparency are being frequently and intensely discussed as the public manifests lack of confidence in public servants and governmental institutions. The advent and development of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) is gradually revolutionizing this situation. "Open government" is an innovative strategy for changing how government works, helping to increase government transparency and accountability at every level. By using network technology to connect the public to government and to one another informed by open data, governments ask for help with solving problems. The end result is more effective institutions and more robust democracy. [...] Socioeconomic variables govern the level and quality of eParticipation. Educational issues, motivational reasons, and specific political conditions are likely to affect citizens "input." We share Coleman's (Coleman & Blumler, 2009) analysis that [for] democratic participation to have a meaningful impact upon political outcomes there is a need

for inclusive and accountable institutions that can provide a space for consequential interaction between citizens and their elected representatives. Internet has the potential to revitalize political communication by enhancing and updating the relation between governments and governed, but it order to be achieved policy interventions need to be designed or redesigned in a way to capitalize opportunities that are provided by the internet. [W]ith suitable policies and institutional support [can] some of the emancipator potential on Internet [...] be realized and democracy reinvigorated. (Karamagioli 2013, 7)

Case 2

Christiana Karayianni, in *Facebook as a Tool for Enhancing Alternative / Counter-Public Spheres in Cyprus,* on the uses and impacts of different forms/media of communication on bi-communal relations there, presents a case-study of bi-communal communication through Facebook groups that took place between 2007 and 2010, which identifies the ways in which certain Facebook groups facilitate bi-communal communication, explaining why they can be considered part of a "counter-public sphere." Her analysis suggests that:

> [G]roups whose voices or discourses are excluded from the public domain/sphere can find through the use of tools like Facebook groups alternative forms of organising and debate, which places them—at least as far as this medium is concerned—on an equal footing with discourses sanctioned by power and hegemonic institutions, such as the press and broadcast media. (2013, 131)

This would certainly be a democratic gain for those involved, if/when it could connect otherwise isolated voices and give them strength enough to make themselves heard.

Merlyna Lim describes in *Lost in Transition? The Internet and the Reformasi in Indonesia*, how Indonesians bypassed authoritarian rule through the use of Internet cafés, serving as both physical and virtual meeting places in a society where both public and private spheres otherwise were micro-managed by the state. Lim here refers to Internet cafés as "civic spaces," to denote a place where "civil society can engage in its daily practices." Since Indonesia's then ruling family Suharto had instituted what she calls a panopticon (with reference to both the giant Panoptes in Greek mythology who had a hundred eyes and thus was known to be a very effective watchman and the thusly named prison design that allows a watchman to observe [-*opticon*] all [*pan-*] inmates without them being able to tell whether they are being watched or not), these integrated *physical places* cum *virtual spaces* provided access to both information from and about the outside world (i.e., the global), and to real people with whom this information could be shared and debated (i.e., the local). One without the other would not have sufficed to build the kind of social resistance that eventually helped oust an authoritarian ruler and his notorious "cronies" (2006, 85–106).

Case 4

In *The Civil Internet Diplomacy and China's Countermeasures*, Shumin Su and Mark Xu argue that

> [t]he Internet Civil Diplomacy is a major revolution and an emerging trend witnessed in the information age. It poses a significant impact on foreign affairs and official diplomacy due to its unique characteristics—freedom, equality, individuality, real-time, convenience and low-cost. (2013, 134)

They suggest that "this has developed significantly in recent years, and in multiple forms, including Web forums, website signatures and event-driven purpose-build foreign affairs sites." They examine two types of impact of the civil Internet diplomacy;

the "expansion effect" and the "resonance effect," both which
they claim

> can inspire the audience sentiment, bring enormous public
> opinion and political pressure to a government and thus
> pose significant impact on foreign affairs. [...] In conclusion,
> China's civil Internet diplomacy has emerged as an influential
> force that affects traditional diplomacy policy, although the
> development is still in its infancy with individual Web users
> as the main actors. (ibid., 139)

Contrary to these four cases, where ICT clearly contributed to a
positive development, other developments described below send
mixed—or even opposite—signals.

Case 5

Hale, Musso and Weare concluded in their study *Developing digital
democracy: evidence from Californian municipal web pages* that

> the internet is likely to support only incremental mod-
> ifications to the democratic system, not the more
> fundamental changes identified by proponents of dem-
> ocratic revitalisation (1999, 98)

and that:

> [M]unicipal use of telecommunications technologies
> concentrates primarily on information provision, not the
> communication linkages that might improve the quality of
> democratic discourse. These results are particularly discour-
> aging, given that municipal governments are close to the
> people and have been argued to be the training ground for
> democracy. (ibid.)

In summary, they write:

> The results of this study are not encouraging. We have
> identified three impediments to democratic participation:
> lack of civic education, citizen apathy, and the disconnection

between citizens and their representatives. Democratic theorists and political reformers have suggested a number of reforms to address these ills. Some reforms call for incremental changes to pluralistic democracy, whilst others call for a more fundamental development of participative democratic processes. We argue that internet technologies clearly have the potential to foster incremental changes to existing pluralistic institutions. In contrast, we contend that it is far less certain that the internet will nurture the rich net-work of social relations and discourse required to develop Barber's vision of a strong democracy. [...] The evidence from California indicates that an important feature of the inter-net is rarely used in ways that can reasonably be thought to lead to incremental reform, let alone democratic renewal. In general, information provision is patchy and the level of interactivity supported does not improve significantly on the telephone. (ibid., 115–116)

Case 6

Shalin Hai–Jew notes in the article *Interpreting "You" and "Me": Personal Voices, PII, Biometrics, and Imperfect/Perfect Electronic Memory in a Democracy* that:

Over a billion people are said to use the www and Internet, with 1 in 6 humans on earth accessing these technological systems. Many of these users have created their own per-sonal profiles online, and all also have "silent information" about them that may be accessed on a variety of connected databases (including many on the Deep, Hidden, or Invisible Web). People use the www and Internet with a semblance of anonymity, but in fact, most interactions online are trackable to Personally Identifiable Information (PII), which allows for the revealing of the individual behind the photo, the video, the information, or other elements. Internet profiles may be coalesced into actual identities, even with inaccuracies, and such information may be kept in perfect electronic memory

into perpetuity. This current reality has implications for citizens' peace-of-mind and degrees of freedom in decision-making. (2013, viii)

Although this case is non-specific, the recent revelations by WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden regarding the US's surveillance in general, and NSA's spying on anything from your own e-mail to Angela Merkel's mobile phone in particular, easily come to mind. Here technology is used to pry on people, in the name of national security.

Case 7

Along similar lines Theodosios Tsiakis, in his paper *The Role of Information Security and Cryptography in Digital Democracy: (Human) Rights and Freedom*, makes a strong case for the often neglected "human factor" of ICT. Tsiakis stresses that:

Information technology is rapidly changing, is inherently complex, and complexity kills security. There is an ongoing technical race to maintain security that does not take into account the human factors. The new technological infra-structure affects the degree of anonymity and confidentiality in mass-market computer-based systems and basically determines the evolution of democratic-political culture. Thus, in examining the issue of security, cryptography, privacy in the use of computers and Internet, forms the primary interest from the moral side of view, about what is the right and wrong thing to do, rather than in a legal frame, about what is legal and illegal. Security and privacy are not ethical or moral issues. They are fundamental human rights. In this societal change, the challenges of the information society are many, but foremost is the protection of human rights. Addressing the critical question of how technological trends are both helping and hindering the advancement of human rights is essential in the specific digital environment. The democratic key concept is the efficient use of digital

resources. We do not only need a culture of security (infor-
mation), we further need to ensure the security of cultures,
meaning that everyone should be able to freely exercise their
constitutional rights. (2013, x)

Tsiakis hereby wishes "to bring to the surface the rights (human)
implications of ICT and the information society," arguing that

ICT enlightens the technical community, which designs,
implements, and secures information and communication
systems, with an understanding of human rights principles
and foundational underpinnings. (ibid., 160)

Case 8

In *Communicating Islamic Fundamentalism as Global Citizenship*
Lina Khatib (2003) describes how Islamic fundamentalism uses
the Internet to serve its quite undemocratic agenda. Quoting
Stuart Hall she defines the process of globalisation as

those processes, operating on a global scale, which cut
across national boundaries, integrating and connecting com-
munities and organizations in new space-time combinations,
making the world in reality and in experience more intercon-
nected. (Hall 1992, 299, quoted in Khatib 2003, 390)

Khatib argues that Islamic fundamentalism is "experienced
locally, but at the same time as a global movement," something
Manuel Castells sees as a conflict between "the Net and the Self"
(Castells 1997, 3, quoted in Khatib 2003, 405), and Hall views
as a "tension between tradition and translation," or between
"ethnicity and global homogenization" (Hall 1992, 312, quoted in
Khatib 2003, 391). In this publication's context it however falls well
within the meta-local domain, see Chapter 1, for which the Inter-
net is an important—if not necessary—means of interaction.

Khatib notes that:

The use of the Internet by Islamic fundamentalist groups reflects an outward vision combined with a global target audience while also paying attention to local issues. The Internet has many uses for such groups. It is used to post messages about the groups' mission statements. It is used to relay photographs and audio and video messages and footage about the groups' activities. It is often used to post the latest news related to the groups and their affiliates. It acts as a convenient way for collecting monetary donations. It allows groups members and supporters to find out about the groups' latest actions. It also allows them to communicate via email and chat rooms. The Internet is also used by the groups to sell books, tapes, CDs, and other materials. The groups can also use the Internet to respond to current political situations. (2003, 396–397)

In other words, what can be done for the benefit of society can, as this story tells, also be done for the benefit of a select few who constitute a threat to another part of society—in this particular case by recruiting both fighters and funds for an armed struggle against Christians in the Indonesian island of Moluccas (Khatib 2003).

These eight cases are presented with the intention of indicating the range of issues, good, not so good, and bad, that intersect ICT and democracy. In summary, this is not "either good or bad." It is both.

ICT and the public sphere

Let us now turn to the more specific link between ICT and the public sphere—which also is where this publication eventually is taking us in the form of a Citizen Lobby "model." Although this discussion transcends this particular chapter (being reviewed from different angles in different chapters throughout this publication), we will now look at how Zizi Papacharissi views this connection.

Just as we did in Chapter 2 Papacharissi scrutinises Habermas' public sphere theories in quite some depth, noting that:

> As a concept, [the public sphere] sets a standard for civic involvement within representative democracy. It also presents a primal form of human civic instinct, expressed through the need to convene and confer within democratic contexts. Conceptualised formally by Jürgen Habermas […], the public sphere has always served as the domain of social life where public opinion is expressed by means of rational public discourse and debate. Based on Kantian emphasis on the use of reason in public debate, it is where citizens go to analyse, discuss, or argue about public affairs. (2010, 113)

As Papacharissi considers a vigorous public sphere important for citizens to "remain plugged into the daily routines of democratic governance and public affairs," she thinks that "several civic uses of the Internet develop in yearning for a long-lost public sphere" (ibid., 114). This observation is a vital key to the Internet's political role. That, however, doesn't prove that the Internet *has* a political role. As indicated in the above eight quotes, it is in young, or simply lip-serving democracies (like China and Suharto's Indonesia) where more dramatic effects may be expected from the introduction of an interactive Web, and/or where truly "political" developments have been recorded from online activities—as was the case during the Arab Spring (although the results there were unwanted turmoil rather than wanted stability). In more mature democracies, however, (many of which are well past their "best-before-date") heavily engrained systems are driving also the young Web-generation's views on what can be expected.

A critical reading of (e.g.) Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal's book *Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society, and Participation* suggests fairly modest expectations of how the interactive Web may change our political landscape. They conclude that

[i]n summary, the use of online political news, chat rooms, and e-mails is associated with increased voting in […] elections. The results indicate that the Internet is related to the increased likelihood of voting through its ability to facilitate discussion, mobilize participation via e-mail, and provide for a greater variety of sources of information. (2008, 83)

They go on to specify that:

[D]igital citizenship supports the achievement of equal opportunity in the liberal tradition, and civic engagement and political participation in the republican tradition. The effects of Internet use are substantial for wages, especially for minorities and less-educated workers. The effects are considerable for civic engagement and voting as well, even surpassing the influence of more traditional media. More-over, the increases in civic engagement are clearest for the young, who tend to be among those who are least likely to participate or be knowledgeable. The Internet not only exercises an independent effect on economic opportunity and political engagement but it also affects those for whom changes will make the most difference—disadvantaged workers and the youngest citizens. (ibid., 89)

These effects are no doubt beneficial, if/when they materialise. However, they still assume that "engagement" is a voluntary act, one that is easier to do with the Internet than without it. It also assumes that political "action" equals voting. But if our societies are to become truly democratic, and we are to exploit the real opportunities that an interactive Web can offer, these assumptions are too limiting. We must rather assume that socio-political engagement is a duty to ourselves and our society, well in line with socio-economic engagement. We must also assume that such political engagement goes beyond e-chatting and voting—voting being (as discussed elsewhere in this publication) both a passive and a pacifying type of engagement designed

to give all real power to an eco-political elite. This publication's overall ambition is to outline what that could and would entail.

Coming back to Papacharissi's take on the Internet as the new public sphere, she also writes:

> Because, according to Habermas, the public sphere has been compromised to the point where its actual existence is in doubt, it is best understood as a metaphor. It is also possible for political activity or discussion to carry civic merit, but exist outside the conceptual locus of the public sphere. I emphasise this point, for, as we examine political tendencies online, it becomes apparent that, while some aspire to the public sphere ideal, several contribute civically, but via a *modus operandi* [that is] conceptually divorced from the public sphere ideal. (2010, 115)

By this she flags a possible difference between the public sphere and the Internet's more civic sphere orientation, where individual rather than collective views are shaped and expressed.

This flag is raised even further by her claim that:

> [I]n contemporary representative models of democracy, politicians, opinion leaders, and the media frequently rely on aggregations of public opinion obtained through polls, as opposed to the rational exchange of opinions fostered by the public sphere. Thus, deliberation of public affairs within the public sphere is postponed as citizens [instead] are called upon to express agreement or disagreement with prescribed options. (ibid., 116)

There is however—in spite of its deliberative shortcomings—often strong support for the kind of "aggregations of public opinion," which Papacharissi and others view as insufficient. Its supporters trust such aggregates truly reflect the view of the citizenry. One such example is referenced in Chapter 4 below (Surowiecki's *The Wisdom of the Crowds*), another is found in a report by the American Association for Public Opinion Research,

Polling and Democracy: Report of the AAPOR Task Force on Public Opinion and Leadership, from September, 2013, stating:

> This report argues that there is an important need for leaders to be able to find public opinion data, judge its quality, and then integrate and summarize it into comprehensible conclusions—whatever their feelings about how much these data should be used as the basis for their decision-making. (AAPOR 2013, 4–5)

In short this report suggests that an existing institution (AAPOR) shall continuously poll and *analyse* public opinion, using selected experts, and deliver this qualitative information to the political establishment for their reference. No doubt this report's authors, at the same time, recognise the obstacles—one being timeliness:

> A challenge here is the fast-moving pace of public opinion research on any given topic. AAPOR-sponsored analyses or reviews of the "state of knowledge" on a topic could take a long time to get through the review process, and by the time they were published could be out of date, given the torrent of new research that pours forth on many topics. (ibid., 8)

However, they also see a role for a more "free" debate, but again only among a selected few.

> AAPOR could encourage the development of an online wiki-type community in which—in open source fashion—interested or qualified participants would be invited to build an ongoing summary of public opinion on key topic areas. This idea would most likely involve a "restricted" wiki process, in which only qualified individuals (including as one possibility AAPOR members or perhaps a vetted subset of AAPOR members) would be allowed to contribute. The contributors could add new data, put in their interpretation of the data, and in general comment on, elucidate, expand on, and summarize public opinion data on specific topics. The

wiki-community would be made available to the general public. (ibid., 8)

Although this report goes at length to detect "the will of people," it suggests that "people" are not qualified to contribute anything but a simple answer to a simple survey question. This is what Papacharissi (among others) laments, with reference to Habermas' far more deliberative ambitions.

Following Papacharissi's argument that most observers tend to assess the democratising potential of online convergent technologies against three criteria, being (i) access to information, (ii) reciprocity of communication and (iii) commercialisation of online space, she concludes that:

> [s]cholarly examinations of the Internet as a public sphere all point to the conclusion that online digital technologies create a public space, but do not inevitably enable a public sphere. [author's italics] (Papacharissi 2010, 124)

Another piece of research, conducted by Katharina Große at the German Zeppelin University adds to Habermas' position. Already in her introductory paragraph she writes:

> Based on critical reflections about the expectations that are currently placed upon it, it is shown that e-participation is not the right tool to mobilise citizen engagement in politics. Further, grounded in an expert survey, it is discovered that in Germany, e-participation plays a role in forming the public opinion and improving political decision making. It cannot however, create higher acceptance for political decisions by providing throughput legitimacy. (2013, 45)

The report continues:

> In order for e-participation to actually fulfil [an] intelligence-function, it must i) indeed generate new information or knowledge, and ii) these must be incorporated by politicians. Otherwise, there would be no improvement in

the decision-quality. Furthermore, it is relevant who participates. If e-participation is only used by a certain group of citizens, not all possibly relevant information or knowledge will be contributed. Additionally, it is important to determine the degree of institutionalisation of e-participation. If it is only applied in certain projects, it is only a marginal development of the traditional system. The change would be more significant, if it were established as an ongoing process in addition to traditional channels. Thereby, truly intelligent structures would be established. (ibid., 48)

A further problem she identifies with e-participation is that:

[R]epresentatives can hold back information or manipulate it and thus, the citizens' decision to keep a representative in office or not is not an informed decision—something more and more people become aware of. Still, they have no means to change this. Thus, the perceived legitimacy of the representatives' decisions decreases. As e-participation is not legally institutionalised and does not create binding decisions, it is no alternative means of input legitimacy. (ibid., 50)

Just as most other studies conclude, Große notes that:

Currently, e-participation is only used irregularly. However, the experts concur that in the foreseeable future, it will become more frequent. While some do indeed think that e-participation will become political standard, the majority of experts agree that it will [be] routinely applied for certain projects only. It can hence be concluded that e-participation will have a defined space in the political process, but will not be a new standard of decision-preparation that might […] replace representative democracy. (ibid., 52)

The concern here is that:

[A]s there will always be disregarded information and knowledge due to the non-representative user group, there

can only be partial intelligence. In accordance with the project-based degree of institutionalisation, e-participation [therefore] has the role of project-based elite consultation. Consultation hints at the fact that because e-participation will only be used for some projects, citizens will not have the possibility to identify problems or set topics themselves. Elite refers to the fact that only a small part of engaged citizens will participate. (ibid., 54)

When it comes to the voting aspect of our democratic systems, she notes that

[g]aining votes lies at the core of the maintenance of political power in a democracy and is thus essential for every politician. In order for e-participation to be the right tool for this task it [also] has to solve the problem [of] non-voters. (ibid., 48)

With reference to those whom Emmer, Vowe, and Wolling (2011) call the "*bequeme Moderne*" (quoted in Große 2013, 49)—a tech-affine non-voting community unlikely to change their offline behaviour because of their online activities, which constitute over 15% of the German electorate—she argues that

[i]n summary, e-participation is not [a] suitable tool to mobilise non-voters, [as] e-participation cannot fulfil a mobilising-function. All expectations to this effect will unavoidably fail and thus should be reconsidered. (Große 2013, 49)

The best way to activate this group as voters would hence be to digitalise parliamentary voting—an issue of significant technical and/or integrity concern, it itself complicated—and beyond the scope of this publication.

Finally Große argues that:

[T]he results of this study have implications for non-e-policies [as well]. It is important that politicians reconsider

their strategy to generate political participation. The tool that they placed their hopes on [i.e., e-participation] is not suitable. There is a need for strategies that foster participation regardless of social status. (ibid., 57)

Große's colleague Alexander Hoose formulates these doubts even more clearly:

> By using modern web technologies to create apps and visualizations, it would be possible to make data easier [and] understandable for the many citizens and also use Open Data to create new business models and increase public value. Schönberger & Zappia in part challenge these utterly optimistic views of a new dawn of democracy and transparency since their assumption is that the broader public does not use these new possibilities of participation, while the already well-connected actors in the political arena gain new channels of influence. This leads to the creation of new intermediaries in public discourse, which are able to shape the public perception in their interest. Their argument is derived from observations that similar projects have also failed to deliver their broad aim of democratizing the political discourse. Such cases were the e-rulemaking initiative by the Clinton administration, which aimed at allowing the public to take part in the rulemaking process, and the blogging movement, which promised to create citizen journalism. In both of these examples [these] authors conclude that elite groups dominate the discourse. In the rulemaking initiative interest groups and companies were the main participants of the participation process and in the blogosphere it [was the] professional bloggers [who] centralized [or] gather[ed] most viewers onto their blogs. (2012, 9)

Große's, Hoose's and Papacharissi's conclusions all are at the core of the debate this publication engages in. The Web is indeed a "public space," like a city park, allowing visitors to engage in any lawful activities they wish. Those who make the effort to go

there are indeed open to the eyes and ears of all other visitors, as well as to whatever legal and semi-legal (and even illegal) surveillance this "public space" is under. They are however not exposed to the views of those who choose to go elsewhere, which is why all expectations of coordination, deliberation and/or logical conclusions based on either the full or a fully representative population coming out of this participation must remain modest, since the input in this debate to a non-negligible extent (which among others Papacharissi, Große and Hoose have pointed out) risks being either elitist or overly spontaneous.

Jürgen Habermas' public sphere, acknowledged by most scholars as being a highly relevant (and perhaps the most generally accepted) description of how "public will" is formed, is however more than any of this. It is in essence an ongoing public debate about socio-political matters of concern to the general public, aiming at a conclusion, which can be forwarded to the incumbent—specifically meant to influence their decisions. Habermas' initial version of a well-functioning public sphere assumed such conclusions to be based on actual consensus. Later versions however departed from this ambition, recognising the diversity of today's global environment, making far-reaching consensus virtually impossible. Although the Web may be the best tool to date for (re-)creating a well-functioning public sphere, it does not equal the public sphere in its own right. For this we need to add a common modus operandi.

To further this viewpoint, it is worth noting the observation Dean, Anderson, and Lovink make:

> [As] political commitment [in the information-age] can be demonstrated with a word, a signature, a click [...] this makes it difficult to distinguish it from apathy. (2006, xv–xvi)

The claim is that people now can be seemingly active, without making any real commitment. Although signing an online petition, forwarding a link or posting something on a blog may seem like a commitment, it requires nothing but a "click," making doing

so more like an everyday social media activity than a matter of taking a serious stance in a case of reason or injustice.

Given the trend towards what Dean, Anderson, and Lovink call "reputation management" (see Chapter 1), this type of "click-your-political-commitment" can be more a matter of a passive repetition of an opinion, than of participating in a reasoned debate. Apparently strong support or backing of one opinion or the other may in fact turn out to be unsupported, or unsustainable, once the actual consequences of the promoted (presumably "great") opinion become clearer. As discussed at length in Chapter 4, this is partly a consequence of the so-called long-tail power distribution, where visibility helps an active minority to drive a more passive majority.

Countering this tendency of self-created "stardom," Dean, Anderson, and Lovink suggest a stronger focus on what they call dot-orgs, by which they mean civil society organisations (CSOs) that use the Web to engage and debate. Here, they argue, the role of the CSO is to balance the debate towards a more reasoned one, where opinions are not only expressed and repeated, but also challenged and scrutinised—very much along the same line that Habermas' promoted.

Governmentality

The manner in which ICT in general and the Internet in particular is changing not only the ways we interact socially (where social media is replacing much of our traditional means of person-to-person interaction) but also how we go about influencing both processes and others' views (through online special interest networks) is not limited to socio-technical aspects. On a deeper eco-political level these changes also alter the way we organise ourselves—both for commercial and political ends—where horizontal meritocracies are replacing our traditionally vertical command-structures. These developments are not mundane, as they carry important consequences for the "good governance"

approach that has been dominating since the late 1980s—heavily promoted by the neoliberal movement—where accountability and transparency have been the resolute line of defence for streamlining "representation" to the point where real term participation by electorates (voluntary or not) in socio-/politico-/economic decision-making is reduced to that of receiving pre-coded information—as and when provided by an executive elite—and possibly, eventually, vote for a predefined alternative.

Saskia Sassen nevertheless points out that going online may not be all that democratising after all, as "network openness does not necessarily produce equality in the resulting distribution" (2006, viii), taking "global finance" as a disturbing example of a very opposite development (ibid., ix). Sassen writes:

> "Finance made it clear – already in the 1980s – that […] networked technologies had the capacity to assemble, disassemble, and reassemble in novel configurations" (ibid.),

suggesting that this development also highlighted the "problematic character of strongly held notions of democratizing outcomes at a time when there was little if any critical input," where "the mix of openness and choice produces something akin to a winner-takes-all-pattern" (ibid., ix–x). This must indeed be seen as an urge for caution against similar mis-representations, when it comes to the rethinking of our democratic systems.

"*Governmentality*"—a term introduced by Michel Foucault—, interpreted by Thomas Lemke as one that

> [allows] us to call attention to the constitution of new political forms and levels of the state such as the introduction of systems negotiation, mechanisms of self-organisation, and empowerment strategies (Lemke 2003, 176, quoted in Dean, Anderson, and Lovink 2006, xvi),

is seen by Dean, Anderson, and Lovink as offering a way out of this dilemma (ibid., xvi). This is because a particular aspect of Foucault's "governmentality," according to Lemke, is its emphasis

on indirect techniques for leading, directing and controlling political processes—rather than simply contrasting freedom and coercion. Since what Dean, Anderson, and Lovink call "networked politics" assumes the distribution of political responsibilities—across different levels as well as different domains, (similar to how glocalism interacts across traditional boundaries, see Chapter 1)—they consider this concept useful for understanding the field in which CSOs form and operate. Here traditional "good governance" concepts like representation, accountability and legitimacy are challenged by "new" concepts like subsidiary, expertise, multistakeholderism and (as noted above) reputation management. It is precisely this challenge that—they argue—calls for new approaches to democracy, which actually embrace these new relationships and new types of interaction.

Subsidiarity refers to decisions being brought to the lowest possible hierarchical level, which in glocal terminology means to the local level. Those directly affected by the decisions shall be those taking them, rather than giving the highest hierarchical level the right to decide because of its hierarchical superiority. The objective here is to identify the natural level for where a decision could or should be taken and rely on whatever expertise is required to resolve the problem in question (Dean, Anderson, and Lovink 2006, xxiii). (The role of real or perceived expertise is further discussed in Chapter 4, where P2P and meritocracy are discussed vis-à-vis democracy.) Here the relativity of "expertise" is an issue (ibid., xxiv). Is expertise always a matter of technical knowledge, or can what is true for one hierarchical level be untrue on another? Should a superior hierarchical level respect a decision by a lower level if it negatively affects the totality? Although this is a debate that utilitarianism conducted for centuries, it can also be seen as a key to glocalism, where local and global concerns constantly are tested against each other, and where an ongoing exchange of premises and priorities negotiates parallel rather than conflicting positions.

The idea of *multistakeholderism* is similar, but one aimed at breaking up overly large collectives whose smallest common denominators are hard to identify, promote or potentially achieve to the satisfaction of the collective. By breaking up such collectives into stakeholder-groups, these groups can enter a dialogue aimed at a compromise, by which a more satisfactory outcome can be achieved for at least a majority of those concerned. This can, e.g., refer to sub-national levels, where national levels otherwise would take all decisions, or corporate executive levels where the board or shareholders otherwise would do so. Here the objective is to highlight the often conflicting interests at stake, and let them represent themselves in a dialogue leading to a negotiated compromise, rather than using expertise to devise a solution (ibid., xxiii). In this we can see a link to the concept of "meta-local," where commonality is driven not by geographical proximity or some kind of "truth," but by cultural, religious or socio-economic, etc. causes.

The UN's World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS) attempted to actually combine more traditional good governance ideals with these more novel kinds of interactive relationships. Dean, Anderson, and Lovink noted two important aspects of network societies (and the world of NGOs) revealed here. CSOs, representing relatively speaking more left-leaning communities based on collectivistic and/or solidarity platforms, showed—at least as compared to relatively speaking more right-leaning communities based on "particular interest"-platforms, typically represented by the corporate lobby—a much greater tendency to maintain burdening overheads, and an inability to shape and operate the type of more nimble organisations needed to deal with these new types of interactive relationships. In short—Dean, Anderson, and Lovink claim—CSOs are well behind corporate-linked NGOs in knowing how to manage people issues, i.e., how to interact with the collective that CSOs claim to represent. The corporate lobby, representing Habermas' generalised particularism—i.e., those particular interests that are deliberately

redefined by their backers as being of general interest, in order to gain traction—is in fact better at understanding how to generate "following" than most CSOs are. To a large extent they ascribe this shortcoming to CSO's struggle for funding, where they are in the hands of governmental or institutional bodies, or donations from the general public, all of which have high expectations when it comes to the recipient's internal "good governance." This makes it a struggle on two fronts: to be big and formal enough to meet all sponsor expectations and small and nimble enough to channel all of the funds to "the cause," rather than spending them internally (ibid., xiv). Little wonder then that, e.g., environmental CSOs are weaker lobbyists than, e.g., the automotive/oil/gas lobby, putting corporate interests ahead of the environmental in the minds of politicians.

This particular chapter's conclusion—also permeating this publication's overall message—is hence that although ICTs certainly make *it* possible, it is people who make *it* happen. Although "digital" can support "democracy," the opposite outcome is also a potential risk.

Although next chapter will look at how emerging peer-to-peer modes of production impact our democratic systems, we will return to the area of ICTs in Chapter 5, where we will take a look at the German concept of "Liquid Democracy" in general, and the software "Adhocracy" in particular. Although "Liquid Democracy" is best known for how the German Pirate Party applies it in their Liquid Feedback software—largely as an internal system for vote-delegation—the fork "Adhocracy" is being used in a more far-reaching range of applications, mainly in order to foster debate and shape public opinion. A special test version of the Adhocracy software was also tailored for the German Parliament (the "Bundestag")—its independent project evaluation we also will take a closer look at.

Peer-to-peer: Is P2P the future mode of democratic action?

Peer-to-peer, or P2P for short, has been touted by Michel Bauwens (2005) as "*a new mode of production*." With this statement he marked that to him (as to many others) this is a matter of an economic activity, and with his chosen phrasing he wished to draw a parallel to the significant socio-economic consequences that the transition from manual production to industrial production brought, suggesting P2P may, over time, bring about changes of a similar magnitude. But, as Bauwens pointed out, financing of these kinds of activities is still a problem, largely failing to attract peers who are in search of income.

In this section I will look at some of the particulars of the peer-to-peer mode of production, as compared to the corporate mode of production, and try to single out some key differences and issues of concern that may affect such developments. I will also try to shift the focus of P2P from sheer "production" to more "interaction," since policy-making (which this publication is all about) is not "productive" in the same sense as, e.g., software programming, music/video recording or distribution, fact and

knowledge compilation, etc., but much more a matter of debate and deliberation.

A closely related area of debate is that of the commons. If P2P in "production-terms" is taken to be the generator of the profit and loss account (= net income), the commons would constitute a part of the balance sheet (= production resources). Whether grazing land, air, water, view, tranquillity, cultural heritage, jointly developed intellectual property, the Internet or any other asset that we define as common, these are assets we may need when we produce something. Whoever controls the distribution of those assets also holds power over production, whether conducted in corporate or a peer-to-peer fashion. As P2P currently is disadvantaged vis-à-vis corporate production, when it comes to financing its operations, all charges linked to the use of the commons will hamper the P2P world more than the corporate world.

For this reason Garret Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" (1968) is also a key concern to peer-to-peer production—a tragedy to which Nobel Prize-winner Elinor Ostrom dedicated much of her research to disprove. Most essays in the Bollier- and Helfrich-edited anthology *The Wealth of the Commons* (2012) also downplays Hardin's tragedy, arguing it is not the truism that Hardin claims it to be. I will discuss, but not exhaust (because of this publication's focus and scope-limitations), several of these issues in the below.

Bankrolling P2P

Starting with the financing of P2P, when viewed as a mode of production, Bauwens clearly recognised this problem, noting that:

> At present, peer production offers no solution to the material survival of its participants. Therefore, many people inspired by the egalitarian ethos will resort to cooperative production, the social economy, and other schemes from

which they can derive an income, while at the same time
honouring their values. (2005, sec. P2P and the Gift Economy)

Clay Shirky, in his book *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organization*, points out that P2P is based on a shared focus—not on profitability. In fact, he argues that for P2P to succeed:

– activities must be "amateurish"; the *wish* to do it is strong enough to make it happen (2008, 60)
– costs must be negligible; *under* the "Coasean floor" (ibid., 44)

Although P2P may be a new term, the concept is as old as social interaction. People have done things together without charging each other for as long as humans have existed. As I will discuss later, Alan Fiske has dedicated significant efforts to map out four different modes of interaction, where "market pricing" is just one. But that does not mean that what Bauwens calls a "new mode of production" is not just that—i.e., a *new* mode of production. But what *is* new is the tool, being the Internet, and his stated objective, being to challenge the currently dominating corporate mode of managed production. But the idea of 'for free' and user-based contributions, from a reputation-driven and non-representative meritocracy, is not new. The Internet however allows people to engage in whatever they like doing—at a truly negligible cost. And as proven over and again the Internet is a place where amateurs blend seamlessly with professionals[1], where interests rather than level of skills decide who is engaged and who is not. In those parts of the Internet where openness rather than restricted access prevail, it is in other words the participants who decide whether to get and/or stay engaged, rather than them being chosen to participate, following some kind of qualification process.

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1   See, e.g., Tapscott and Williams' *Wikinomics* (2006) and *MacroWikinomics* (2010)

Following Shirky, online interaction is therefore, although not unmanaged—since software is pre-programmed to function in a certain manner—a quite loosely managed environment, and therefore 'amateurish' (the *wish* to do it is strong enough to make it happen). Although it may be conducted for social reasons (i.e., for fun) or for the challenge (i.e., for testing and developing one's own abilities without risk or cost), it is typically not conducted in return for the salary which constitutes the normal driving force in a managed organisational environment, where organisational rather than social priorities prevail. In online P2P interaction, professionals become amateurs, which is the very opposite to how corporate logic works.

These activities, however, require that no competitive advantages result from managerial oversight, i.e., there is no need for an overhead structure to manage them—a structure that in turn can be shrunk in order to make the activities more (financially) competitive. Without the need for an overhead structure the core production will be the only cost, a cost that these participants themselves are willing to carry in terms of their time spent. If production is driven by amateurs (whether by true amateurs or professionals by trade)—i.e., the wish to do it is enough to get it done (rather than money being the driving force, in exchange for which people are willing to do "whatever")—and there is no economy of managed scale, there is no need for an organisational structure accumulating surpluses either (Shirky 2008, 45). Below I will call these groups "networked organisations" to differentiate them from "managed organisations" with traditionally appointed hierarchies.

This is where P2P projects can be competitive.

The long tail

A P2P project must nevertheless offer something else than salary to its contributors. Shirky (2008, 260) summarises this "something else" in three levels:

- A viable offer, i.e., an offer stating what is going 'to be', that attracts people's interest
- Provide good enough tools for 'the amateurs' to use, i.e., free-of-charge, easy/fun-to-use
- State the bargain, i.e., lay down the rules clearly enough to guide the input/output cycle

Another key difference between managed and networked organisations is that in the former, everyone is expected to perform his/her role with diligence—or the totality will suffer, since s/he has a "unique" role to play in the process to which s/he has been assigned, and for which s/he is remunerated with money and other personal benefits. In a networked organisation most members will make minor contributions, and even those who cease to contribute can remain part of the group, since nobody appoints anybody to a unique role. Unique roles are instead self-distributed, to those who contribute the most, based on meritocracy—as experienced by the peers.

Shirky points out that in such networks the 80/20 power-law distribution will prevail (ibid., 123–124), where around 80% of the input is contributed by around 20% of the members—and the average contribution is higher than the median one, while the mode is even smaller than the median. This is also known as the "long tail."

This would not be acceptable in a managed organisation where—although members may have different roles, which from another perspective could be weighed against each other in terms of importance—everybody is expected to do (relatively speaking) equally much, which could mean, e.g., that everybody must dedicate *all* the time for which s/he is employed, must perform any given number of activities during any given period of time, generate a predefined level of return, or the like. If 80% of the staff members contributed only 20% of the relative output in such terms, those managing them would either have to replace the 80%, or be themselves replaced. This is because a managed

organisation displaying this pattern—i.e., 80% of its staff contributing only 20% of the relative output (whether or not the end-product's net value was generated this way)—would be seen as inefficient and, in a financially competitive world, uncompetitive. It would, therefore, most probably go out of business very soon. Performance-based activities assumingly display the bell-shaped curve, where most members (typically 60–80%) deliver average performances, while some (typically 10–20%) deliver more/better and some (typically 10–20%) deliver less/worse.

However, a networked organisation not only can but typically also does work like that. Here any contribution is valuable—based on the premise that the "cost" (even if it is only in terms of the contributor's time) is generated per contribution, not per contributor. A long-tail power distribution—rather than the traditional bell-shaped distribution—is to be expected.

Sarnoff, Metcalfe and Reed

As Bauwens, Mendoza, and Iacomella (2012) argue in their study *Synthetic Overview of the Collaborative Economy*, the interactive Internet—Web 2.0—has changed interaction in profound ways. Whereas "portals" (used to develop what they call an "intention economy") are driven by Sarnoff's law, which states that the value of a broadcast network is directly proportional to the number of viewers, "platforms" (used to develop what they call an "attention economy") are driven by Metcalfe's law, which states that the value of a communication network is proportional to the square of the number of connected users of the system (n^2). Nevertheless, as if this was not enough, the collaborative world of "protocols" (developing what they call an "ethical economy") rests on Reed's law, which states that the number of possible subgroups of network participants is 2N, meaning that it scales even faster than Metcalfe's law's pair connections (ibid., 23–24, 54). These multiples make a huge difference, and may indeed be the key reason for why the Internet *seems* to be so democratic. I will revert to Bauwens, Mendoza, and Iacomella's "portals,"

"platforms" and "protocols" and their assumed impact on inter-action later, but I will already note here that although this hugely increases the number of access points, it may not resolve the democratic deficit. One reason for this doubt is that the Internet is governed by the long-tail power-law distribution, which is, as I will argue in greater detail below, quite opposite to the 50/50 distribution that democracy is based upon.

Metcalfe's and Reed's laws' for networks, however, makes the peer-to-peer mode of production effective, although it may not necessarily be equally efficient; whereas, efficiency refers to how well you do something and effectiveness refers to how useful it is. Furthermore, since P2P communities typically do not develop in order to create financial profits, but create other types of benefits valued by the community, they can be both long-lived and successful. They can in other words be successful without being efficient. Whereas hierarchically managed organisations *must* be efficient in order to be successful—and/or in order to be long-lived —, this is not the case for networked organisations. The latter can, as Shirky argues based on several case studies, survive for a very long time without being what we normally would consider successful (delivering a by third party appreciated output), and be long-lived simply because of the social "for-fun" aspect experienced by its members. This in turn means that such P2P communities, through trial-and-error, also can come up with output that is even better than what a managed organisation can do, since its testing costs are below the "Coasean floor," which not even the most R&D-driven corporations can match. Managed organisations must, because they pay people for their time, filter all the ideas before they are tested, in order to exclude ideas that are less likely to generate success. This aims to minimise risk, but will also limit the options, in turn reducing the chances of coming across new ways of resolving problems. Networked organisations do not suffer from this negative spiral, but can test any ideas that inspire its members (Shirky 2008, 235–236).

In short, a managed organisation is hierarchy-, money- and
efficiency-driven, whose members give up their time and
freedom in exchange for a salary; whereas, a networked
organisation is meritocracy-, idea- and effectiveness-driven,
whose members give up their time and salary in exchange for fun
and freedom—and typically also for group recognition.

According to Shirky, this is also how online P2P communities can
avoid the "tragedy of the commons." The peer-group's shared
objective (whether for fun or for the challenge), and its equally
shared focus on effectiveness, rather than efficiency, will help
ensure the group fends off "vandals." The leading example of this
is Wikipedia, where the editorial community erases fraudulent
input and corrects faulty information within minutes. And as the
output is meant to be free for all, over-use and/or similar abuse
is non-threatening. That nevertheless assumes that no physical
assets—having limited quantities—are invested or consumed in
the process.

This last assumption also helps us pinpoint yet another criterion
for how to define P2P; it is more a matter of a process than of a
final result (ibid., 139). The result can be anything or nothing—and
all/any peers can use whatever result they can see evolving, at
any stage of the process and in any way they want. And as we
know from both Wikipedia and Linux, the process may never end,
even if the originally stated objectives have long been achieved.

The challenge for the P2P mode of production is, as Bauwens
hinted at, to ensure that the community members do not "starve
to death" while enjoying their fun and freedom.

Social capital

What do these processes offer, apart from whatever (often
uncertain) results the undertaken processes deliver? If they
are not profitable, why do people engage in them? The answer
is social capital (Putnam 2000). Since all networks are based
on informal involvement where peers share with peers, and

friendship and shared interests serve as the glue, rather than A recruiting B based on A's control and B's formal qualifications—in return for which A gives B some kind of compensation—they also tend to serve as amplifiers of what the network likes, and filters for what the network does not like (ibid., 222).

Social capital is typically defined in two categories: "bonding" capital and "bridging" capital. Bonding capital often works to amplify "likes" and filter the "dislikes." Bonding social capital refers to the *depth* of interaction, i.e., how much interaction is taking place. This social capital tends to be exclusive, centring on dedicated "nerds." Bridging social capital is nevertheless far more inclusive, as it targets the *breadth*—i.e., how many interact.

Here, Shirky points to interesting research conducted by Ronald Burts of the University of Chicago, who concluded that "good ideas," in the sense that they can benefit the entire collective rather than only the sub-collective from which the idea originated, tend to be the result of bridging social capital, rather than bonding social capital (ibid., 229–232). This is possibly one of the most fundamental keys to the ideas that this publication advocates. By increasing the breadth of participating voices in policy-making processes, novel and useful ideas are more likely to emerge, which otherwise will not. Politicians debating policy-making among themselves creates—in this respect—much more "bonding" (social) capital than bridging capital.

One of Sun Microsystems' founders once said: "No matter who you are, most of the smart people work for someone else" (ibid., 254). This truism goes for any country's parliament too.

P2P's 80/20 vs democracy's 50/50

As noted above, the typical P2P community is driven by the 80/20 power-law distribution, i.e., the number of highly active members driving the processes are few as compared to the total tally of members—the majority forming a "long tail." This works well, as peer-contributions are assessed by quality (meritocracy), not by

quantity. But unlike P2P the long-tail power distribution is not suitable for democracy efforts. This is an important difference that in itself calls into question the notions that voluntary, Web-based communities shall be the way to challenge our established and aging democratic systems—whether the communities are called Facebook, Twitter, Reddit or something else.

In democracy, 50/50 is bound to be the inevitable format because (as most free and fair elections throughout the world show) most citizenries typically find themselves divided over issues and candidates in blocks of around half "for" and around half "against." This is of course not always the case, but voting behaviour typically shows a majority of between 1% and 10% in favour of either of two alternatives. An 80+ % vote in favour of a candidate or option would normally make people suspicious of fraud, and is a typical outcome of elections in military-backed dictatorships, where election rigging is the norm. When large parts of eligible voters believe their preferred candidate or option has no chance of winning, the response is likely to be voter non-participation. Only if voters believe that their preferred candidate or option has at least a 50% chance to win, will voters feel motivated to vote.

So while the typical format for P2P is 80/20, which may be both fair and effective in those communities, the required format for democracy is 50/50. From this starting point it will be up to the contenders to argue their case, trying to tip the outcome in their favour.

But as the 50/50 format requires either *full* (100%) or a *truly* representative participation in order to deliver democratic out-comes, incentives must be created that ensures either of these two alternatives. Creating incentives that ensure 100% partic-ipation is—at best—difficult.

The Citizen Lobby model that this publication argues in favour of therefore focuses on creating incentives that establish a truly representative participation in the policy-making process. As

also noted elsewhere in this publication, elected politicians can not be considered truly "representative," since they, throughout their mandate period, work closer to their party leaderships/colleagues and institutional lobbies (i.e., bonding social capital), than with those who elected them (i.e., bridging social capital). Their assessments underpinning policy are therefore biased in favour of political partisanship and the institutional interests for which they are lobbied, not in favour of those individuals who voted for them in the most recent election.

A truly representative community would be a permanent (in the sense of "always"), rotating (in the sense of "changing") and randomly (in the sense of "unplanned") selected community of say a quarter of a per cent of a country's eligible voters. If each randomly selected member were engaged for a 4–6 week period, once or twice during his/her lifetime, the likelihood of this community representing the population at large would be significant.

This rotating and randomly selected Citizen Lobby would balance both partisan interests and the interests of the institutional lobby, since a Citizen Lobby is constituted by a notably large number, but randomly picked, people who in addition to lobbying also will cast their votes in the next election—which the corporate citizens constituting the institutional lobby cannot. Assuming the views of the Citizen Lobby are reported by media in general, and/or debated in social media in particular, the likelihood of elected politicians ignoring its views is small. For a good example of elected US politicians' inability to resist popular views over time, see the SOPA–PIPA debate, briefly summarised in Appendix 6.

Elected politicians will still need to make decisions—as they can only take responsibility for decisions they themselves have made and implemented—and if they are certain about the need for and/or righteousness of a decision opposing that of the Citizen Lobby's majority view, they probably both should and will both defend it and persist. However, if such decisions prove wrong over time, the judgment of those parliamentarians who argue

and vote in favour of those decisions will most likely be questioned by the electorate in general and the Citizen Lobby in particular—inturn their re-election would become far less likely. Re-election would thus become the focus for elected parliamentarians, giving them a clear and strong incentive to communicate with the voters throughout their mandate periods—not only during their election campaigns.

The task hence becomes to establish, populate and maintain such a Citizen Lobby, thus it is worthwhile coming back to Shirky's three-point list of what is needed to form a P2P network:
– A viable offer, i.e., an offer stating what is going 'to be' that attracts people's interest
– Provide good enough tools for 'amateurs' to use, i.e., free-of-charge, easy/fun-to-use
– State the bargain, i.e., lay down the rules clearly enough to guide the input/output formula

The reason for coming back to this list, in spite of the differences between the 80/20 format of P2P and the 50/50 format of democracy, is that the Citizen Lobby in several *other* aspects will emulate peer-to-peer networks (see also Chapter 1). One such aspect is that contributions need to be encouraged across smaller networks linked by "connectors," to ensure that as much relevant input as possible actually enters the debate. Another criterion (supporting the first) is the focus on bridging social capital, compensating for the bonding effect of the individual networks (including that of the elected politicians themselves)—in favour of ideas serving the broader community, based on bridging social capital.

Another similarity is that members cannot be given unique tasks and responsibilities (as they are in managed organisations but not in P2P communities), since the serving time is so short and the process cannot be dependent on individual performances. To the contrary, the output—just as in the case of a P2P community—must here be seen as an ongoing process, whether or

not the objectives of individual contributors have already been met. That the process is constantly ongoing, albeit with rotating and hence constantly changing members, is the most important feature. Even if the Citizen Lobby initially may act irrationally, and make recommendations the parliamentarians neither want nor will vote in favour of, the mere presence of this lobby will not only (i) heighten the awareness of the importance of policy-making among voters (all of whom are called to serve with a 12 month notice), but also (ii) heighten the awareness of the importance for the elected politicians to pay attention to what the electorate may think about the issues that they routinely debate in parliament.

For these reasons and others, Shirky's above-mentioned three-point list is equally useful when forming a Citizen Lobby as when trying to form a P2P community, whereby the three points could be translated into the following:

a) A viable offer, i.e., an offer stating what is going 'to be' that attracts people's interest: **Help influence policy in your preferred field, challenging vested interests with deep pockets.**

b) Provide good enough tools for 'the amateurs' to use, i.e., free-of-charge, easy/fun-to-use: **Both learning and implementation processes, as well as digital tools, are freely available.**

c) State the bargain, i.e., lay down the rules clearly enough to guide the input/output formula: **Remunerated time is provided, as your participation is a societal obligation regulated by law.**

The third point is critical. At least initially, it may be difficult for others than those already interested in politics to see how engaging in a Citizen Lobby offers "fun and freedom"—and possibly group recognition (i.e., the second point) —, thus other incentives must be offered to the broader public. This is also critical, since most people certainly live under time constraints (if not stress) whereby they must make personal priorities and postpone less important activities. If the average voters were

to use their holidays to serve on the Citizen Lobby probably very few (if any) members would attend. But if everybody was obliged by law to attend and a reasonable compensation (e.g., sick-leave pay) was provided (again under law), neither financial nor competitive disadvantages need stop randomly appointed members from participation.

Nevertheless, since most people may not consider partisan party politics problematic from a democracy point of view, a brief discussion of this may be helpful. Although the common view still is what one of Habermas' reference quotes (Leibholz, from the late 1950s) noted, i.e., that

> [...] the will of the [political] parties is identical with that of the active citizenry, so that the party happening to hold the majority represents the public opinion', whereby 'public opinion also governs (Leibholz 1952, quoted in Habermas 1991, 239),

this view is indeed a grave generalisation of the situation at hand. An interesting analysis indeed of the role of political parties is made by Anthony Judge, who argues that political parties are in fact "value managers," acting in the same way as financial fund managers (Judge 2006, Olsen 2010, 119–120). Fund managers minimise risk by spreading their investments across a range of assets that not only have differing risk profiles (i.e., some higher and some lower) but also across assets that will balance each other: should one fall in value due to circumstances over which the manager has no control, another may benefit from that very same development, ensuring that the fund as a whole does not suffer. That does not, however, mean that each one of the fund's clients enjoys the same balance. Most fund managers will package their offerings to have a profile of some sort, attracting certain types of clients. One may be industry-related; another service-related, one may have a *green* or a *fair-trade* profile, while another has a high-tech profile. Clients may therefore suffer individually when their chosen orientation drops in value due to

market circumstances. Smart fund managers, however, are likely to regain from other assets what they lose from those that have dropped in value. At the end of the day, the fund normally "beats the index" in one way or another, giving themselves an opportunity to claim victory, even if/when their clients lose money.

According to Judge, political parties act similarly. They package their offerings to different segments of the electorate with different profiles. Typically political messages aimed at families are differently profiled than those targeting retirees, he argues, and these again differ from those targeting the corporate sector and the labour unions respectively, and so on. From each segment they will try to secure some support, which—as they hope and assume—later can be directly or indirectly converted to votes. Once in a position to execute some level of political power—either in the role of government or in the role of opposition—they will however act strategically, since political influence is a matter of staying with the majority rather than acting faithfully to the offerings they previously packaged (which anyway is difficult, considering the range of different profiles they simultaneously offered). So even if some, or even many, of the previous offerings fail to materialise, the party can always point to those that did, and so claim victorious—even if some (or even scores of) voters feel let down. To the political party, this is a matter of carefully balancing interests close to the party's own core interests (whatever they may be), while at the same time reaching out to as many remote corners of the political landscape as possible to attract a maximum number of marginal voters (ibid.).

Having taken note of Anthony Judge's parallel—whether fully convincing or not—it is easy to see the difficulty for individual politicians to be true to both the party and the constituency. A trade-off is always necessary, and is not made any easier by the influences both s/he and the party constantly are exposed to from the institutional lobby—representing what Habermas in

1992 called "generalised particularism," i.e., their particular interests framed and phrased as if they were of public concern.

When discussing peer-to-peer and a Citizen Lobby, one should not overlook the debate on what Surowiecki (2004) calls "the wisdom of crowds." In brief this refers to the fact that crowds of people can predict outcomes or results more accurately than experts if/when the average of the crowd's predictions is taken as the crowd's collective wisdom, i.e., prediction. In practice this means that if a crowd of people is asked for an answer to a question (to which the answer either is or will prove to be either right or wrong), the crowd's "average" is more likely to be correct (or at least closer to the correct answer) than what any individual expert would offer—if one excludes sheer luck on the expert's behalf. This, however, neither suggests the crowd is full of wise people, nor that the crowd behaves in a wise or logical manner, but rather that the likelihood of a larger number of people generating an average result that is correct (or almost correct) is higher than that of an individual expert being able to make the correct prediction.

This argument, which Surowiecki supports with a wide range of examples in his book entitled *The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations*, would indeed support the argument that bridging social capital is better at generating good ideas than bonding social capital is, which here would refer to those experts whom the crowd can outdo. It should be noted though that the wisdom he talks about is not wisdom generated through experience and/or deliberation, but wisdom established by some kind of statistical laws, where a large enough number of guesses—some qualified, some sheerly random—will establish a good enough average to predict the outcome. This has caused some (Surowiecki himself being one) to argue that this "law" only applies under certain conditions. Surowiecki argues that the required criteria are that (i) there must be a diversity of opinions represented in the crowd—even if some of them are based on

eccentric interpretations of the facts presented —, (ii) that the views represented are independent, and free from influence from others, that (iii) the crowd is decentralised rather than centralised (without a central authority that causes "following") and (iv) that there is some kind of aggregating function, allowing disparate views to be translated into an average of some sort (Surowiecki 2004, 10). Jaron Lanier (2006) went even further in his provocatively entitled piece *Digital Maoism: The Hazards of the New Online Collectivism* by adding his own restriction of the truthfulness of Surowiecki's claim, limiting it to those cases where (v) the crowd is *not* also defining the question it is to answer, (vi) the answer's correctness can be assessed by a simple result (like a number, a yes or a no) and (vii) that the information fed to the crowd is controlled by some kind of "human factor."

Social participation according to A.P. Fiske

When considering the relationship between a Citizen Lobby and the elected parliament, the Citizen Lobby's original label "reference parliament" actually makes this quite clear. As noted already in my book *Good Governance in the New Millennium*, the Citizen Lobby is not—just as little as the institutional lobby is—a decision-making body, but a source of input to the legitimate parliamentary process that the elected parliamentarians engage in on an ongoing basis (Olsen 2010, 140). As also noted elsewhere in this publication, this relationship is the key to retaining rather than replacing representative democracy, at the same time as a strong dose of direct democracy is institutionalised. Elected politicians *must* retain the right to take political decisions and implement them, otherwise they cannot be held responsible for them. If they cannot be held responsible, the entire system of legitimate political action will fall apart. But by taking such decisions while being in direct dialogue with those who elected them, and who may or may not re-elect them, means they will ensure they either act in line with the consituency's wishes and not those of the institutional lobby or external pressure, or they

can offer a clear and acceptable reason for *why* they acted against the Citizen Lobby's recommendation.

This brings us to the type of relationship between the electorate and those elected that evolves from the forming of Citizen Lobbies, as compared to the type of relationship that currently exists. Here Fiske's relationship model theory (RMT) is very helpful. His theory, discussed and applied across a wide range of social science disciplines, and seen by many as robust (in spite of its relative youth as a theory), and in spite of no shortage of competing models (Parson's, Triandis' and Levinson's, just to mention a few), claims that we all have four types of relationships we live by, which we mix and match depending on who we inter-act with and which situation we are in. These four are "communal sharing," "equality matching," "authority ranking" and "market pricing," in most texts abbreviated CS, EM, AR and MP (Fiske 1991, 2013).

Quoting Fiske, CS is "a relationship in which people treat some dyad or group as equivalent and undifferentiated with respect to the social domain in question" (Fiske 2013). Examples include people using a commons, people intensely in love, and people who kill any member of an enemy group indiscriminately in retali-ation for an attack.

In EM relationships, Fiske explains

> people keep track of the balance or difference among partic-ipants and know what would be required to restore balance. Common manifestations are turn-taking, one-person one-vote elections, equal share distributions, and vengeance based on an-eye-for-an-eye, a-tooth-for-a-tooth. (ibid.)

Examples include sports and games and restitution in-kind (with respect to righting a wrong).

AR, Fiske continues, are relationships

based on perceptions of legitimate asymmetries, not
coercive power; they are not inherently exploitative
(although they may involve power or cause harm).

In AR relationships people:

> have asymmetric positions in a linear hierarchy in which sub-
> ordinates defer, respect, and (perhaps) obey, while superiors
> take precedence and take pastoral responsibility for sub-
> ordinates. (ibid.)

Examples are military hierarchies, ancestor worship,
monotheistic religions' moralities, social status systems such as
class or ethnic rankings, or other rankings (such as sports team
standings).

Finally, MP relationships are, according to Fiske:

> oriented to socially meaningful ratios or rates such as prices,
> wages, interest, rents, tithes, or cost-benefit analyses. Money
> need not be the medium, and MP relationships need not
> be selfish, competitive, maximising, or materialistic. MP
> relationships are not necessarily individualistic; a family may
> be the CS or AR unit running a business that operates in an
> MP mode with respect to other enterprises. (ibid.)

Examples are property that can be bought, sold or treated as
investment capital, prostitution, bureaucratic cost-effectiveness
standards, utilitarian judgments about the greatest good for the
greatest number, or standards of equity in judging entitlements
in proportion to contributions, considerations of "spending time"
efficiently, and estimates of expected kill ratios.

In terms of these categories, it can be said that by
institutionalising Citizen Lobbies, the relationship between
the electorate and those elected would move from AR to EM.
In the current AR relationship, the elected have authority over
those electing them, based on a hierarchical system of who
holds political power over whom. With parties (not individual

candidates) standing for election predominantly (presidential elections being an exception), whose candidates may or may not be known by the electorate, the parties' leaderships can control the distribution of roles during the mandate period, through which they can also control the outcome of their party's parliamentary vote. This gives very little room for the electorate to impact policy-making through their local MP, who—in today's AR-relationship system—is the referred contact person for individual constituency members. In the potential EM relationship a new balance would develop where—although politicians retain the right to decide and implement "as they see fit"—the electorate can with a significant level of precision reward politicians who act in its interests, and punish politicians who side with forces countering their interests.

Since this potentially new EM relationship would be the first time the politicians actually knew the reasoned views of the electorate, not only in politically philosophical terms (such as higher taxes and more benefits or lower taxes and less benefits, upon which they go for election) but also on those policy issues they actually debate and vote on in parliament, this new relationship would balance the equality between electorate and those elected significantly, creating a levelled playing field in the area of policy-making.

Equality matching is also the type of relationship that, e.g., Bauwens claims, is the basis for peer-to-peer interaction—although disputed by some (Ronfeldt 2013). This can be considered true in the sense that in P2P everybody is welcome to join, because it holds a large portion of equality, but can be countered by the fact that P2P displays the power-law distribution curve, i.e., the 80/20 distribution that is clearly non-democratic in the sense that a minority holds power over the majority. However—and this is important—this power is mostly "well earned" in the eyes of the peers, based on meritocracy, not a power based on political, financial or military might.

Fiske's explanation that in EM relationships "*people keep track of the balance or difference among participants and know what would be required to restore balance*" [author's italics] is indeed a good way to explain why meritocracy can at all work as a maxim for cooperation. Even if one is not one of those "in power," it is obvious why; either s/he is not capable of impacting those with more knowledge or ability in the field in question, or s/he simply does not spend enough time to gain the leverage that results in "power." As both of these shortcomings can be remedied if one makes them a priority, the situation can feel fair enough even if one is not part of the 20% driving the process.

A valuable lesson can nevertheless be learned from the Web-community "Black & White Maniacs," an online photo club for members to post and comment on each other's black and white photos[2]. Initially no particular rules regulated the commentary, which is why many members posted their own photos but hardly ever commented on those of others—still waiting for their own photos to be commented upon (Shirky 2008, 276). The club then introduced a rule that for every photo they posted, they had to comment on two others, posted by other members, before they could post another one. The result was a harangue of standard but non-committal comments like "nice" or "good," still failing to offer the quality ranking that the site was established for. A new rule was then introduced that such non-committal comments would not qualify as the type of comment required for allowing a new posting of one's own picture, eventually raising both the quantity and the quality of comments to a level where "equality matching" actually was achieved, i.e., a meritocracy could take shape.

The lesson here is that EM requires incentives to members for them to remain as active as possible, and that it is not enough to provide input (in whatever shape or form is expected), but

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2   For further information see https://www.flickr.com/groups/blackandwhitemaniacs/.

one also needs to "listen," i.e., take note of what other members contribute, and offer quality feedback in order to make the interaction a mutual one. In Citizen Lobby-terms this means that members must not only contribute their own views and ideas, but also engage in a debate that refines some ideas and discards others, in a process aiming at—if not Habermas' consensus—a reasoned compromise or a qualified majority at least. A Citizen Lobby that constantly delivers 51/49-votes will not provide any useful guidance to the elected parliamentarians.

Shirky argues that a general trend in networked societies is as new groups not only can form quickly, easily and almost uncontrollably, and also do so—although far from the potential number of groups that according to Reed's law *could* form based on the number of people who are networked —, governments can no longer rely on "prevention." They simply cannot prevent people from getting together and do unexpected things, as the power of networked creativity is well beyond what any governing body can predict. Instead "reaction" will have to become the key to governance, where unwanted action is responded to in prohibitive ways, curbing further (to governments) negative developments (ibid., 308). This argument much reminds us of the shift from large military action, where the largest arsenal wins, to fast-moving hit-and-run guerrilla attacks, to which institutional, heavy and hierarchical military formations have little time to respond, and even less ability to prevent.

From "prosumers" to "produsers"

Coming back to the paper *Synthetic Overview of the Collaborative Economy* by Bauwens, Mendoza, and Iacomella (2012, 48), which although it—as its title suggests—has a focus on economic rather than political activities, has several valuable ideas to be considered when reflecting on how P2P policy-making processes can develop. In a chapter on "Community-Centric Models" five different types of joint activities are described as follows:

1. *Co-creation:* In this stage, the [hierarchy] does not nec-
essarily set the parameters, and the prosumer [i.e., the
co-producer cum consumer] is an equal partner in the
development of new products. An example is the model used
by adventure sports communities and studied by Eric von
Hippel in his book *Democratizing Innovation*. However, [here]
the [hierarchy] controls the value chain.

2. *Sharing communities*: The community creates the value,
using Web 2.0 proprietary platforms, without much inter-
vention of the owners of the platforms. However, owners
control the parameters of the platforms, and control its
design—and monetise the "attention capital" which has been
created by the users (e.g., through sales of advertising-space
on Facebook).

3. *Peer production proper*: Communities create the value,
using a Commons, with assistance from [hierarchies]
attempting to create derivative streams of value. Linux is the
paradigmatic example.

4. *Peer production with cooperative production*: Peer producers
create their own vehicles for [collective] monetisation. The
OS Alliance in Austria and GCoop in Argentina, are examples
of this type of process.

5. *Peer production communities or sharing communities*:
They place themselves explicitly outside of the monetary
economy. Many smaller FLOSS (Free/Libre and Open Source
Software) communities adhere to this model. (ibid.)

The Citizen Lobby would as an institution—given these five
levels—best fit the "peer production proper" level, where com-
munities create the value (here; policy recommendations), using
a commons (here: the "institution" Citizen Lobby), with the assis-
tance from a hierarchy (here: an elected parliament's incumbent
parliamentarians) that attempts to create derivative streams of
value (here: political support and eventual re-election).

However, if one instead considers the role of the Citizen Lobby's *individual* participants, "co-creation" would be a more appropriate level, being the level where the hierarchy may not be setting the parameters (i.e., the ideas and options to debate, which partic-ipating individuals can influence), and where s/he as a "prosumer" (i.e., a co-producer cum consumer) and an equal partner in the development of new products (here: both an equal partner in developing new policy and a consumer of that same policy). Fur-thermore, at this co-creation level the hierarchy is in control of the value chain in the sense that the elected politicians both take the formal decisions and implement them in the way they see fit.

It is therefore relevant to consider the Citizen Lobby concept a part of the peer-to-peer family, although individual members may qualify less than the collective proper as the "peer" of the elected parliamentarian. This will be further reflected in the ensuing Citizen Lobby model (as proposed in Chapter 7), since although this yet to be established institution needs to be considered a grassroots' trickle-up vehicle under the 50/50 format, individual members are not expected to participate on an ad-hoc basis, coming and going as they wish. Instead they are to be randomly called to serve a given term, during which they will both expect, and be expected, to participate on equal terms.

Liquid Democracy: The term, the systems, supporters and critics

In the following we will assume that the Citizen Lobby will use the "Adhocracy" (or an equivalent) software for its online and coordinating activities, as will be further elaborated on in Chapter 7. This software is part and parcel of the Liquid Democracy "school"—perhaps better known for its Liquid Feedback fork, the vote-delegation software used by the German Pirate Party. This chapter looks into the ideas underpinning this school of ideas.

A ready-to-consume description of the concept for *Liquid Democracy* at large includes the following paragraphs (Global Freedom Movement 2011):

> Liquid Democracy is a collective term for different approaches to making democracy more liquid, more trans-parent and more flexible. What all [its] approaches have in common is the concept of delegating your vote for certain subject areas or subjects. This makes it possible to choose to actively participate in some subject areas and delegate your vote to someone else for others.

Organisations and informal groups can use Liquid Democracy to collaboratively develop their goals, strategies, internal rules or positions and to make binding decisions about them. Groups and organisations can involve their members in developing solutions to their problems and thus make better decisions. *[The] web platform implements the two key concepts of Liquid Democracy: structured discourse and delegated voting* [author's emphasis].

Technological progress of the last few years has made global communication a lot easier and faster. These new possibilities have yet to be fully utilized for society. Citizens are involved with organisations, informal groups and networks of all kinds. At the same time, many people feel they are lacking the opportunity to effectively and collaboratively campaign for the issues they are concerned about. This is the problem that Liquid Democracy focuses on.

A community wiki with the same name also offers a wide range of background information—especially to those readers who are looking for commentary and video clips (Community Wiki).

Liquid Feedback

Interestingly enough, already in the 1990s Habermas wrote:

Indeed, a minority of private people already are members of the parties and special-interest associations under public law. To the extent that these organizations permit an internal public sphere not merely at the level of functionaries and managers but at all levels, *there exists the possibility of a mutual correspondence between the political opinions of the private people and that kind of quasi-public opinion.* [author's italics] (1991, 248)

He however noted that "*[t]his state of affairs may stand for a tendency that for the time being is on the whole insignificant.*" [author's italics] (ibid.)

Fast-forwarding Habermas' now 20-year-old comment to our
current-day scenario, where this "state of affairs" seems to be
within reach, the key to actually understanding the difference
between Liquid Democracy's two forks Liquid Feedback and
Adhocracy, is the above quoted statement: "*the two key concepts
of Liquid Democracy [are] structured discourse and delegated voting*"
(Global Freedom Movement 2011). The Liquid Feedback approach
puts the emphasis on delegated voting, while Adhocracy puts its
emphasis on the structured discourse. Although both forks can
offer both functions, the functions are applied in different ways,
so the representatives of both forks confirm that the underlying
needs must be recognised if one is to sympathise with these
differences. Voting and delegated voting is the key in the case
of Liquid Feedback, which—apart from being firmly anchored
in the German Pirate Party as a decision-making tool—is used
in the northwestern German province of Friesland to gauge the
electorates' views on the provincial government's ideas and
activities. The debate function in Friesland's case, although used,
is not emphasised. In the Pirate Party's use, the debate function
is virtually marginalised, as most party debate takes place in
forums parallel to, or altogether separated from, the Liquid
Feedback software proper.

Although both these two parallel uses are of general interest to
the democratic process—in the Pirate Party case because it has
generated a significant increase in terms of party member par-
ticipation, and in the Friesland case because it has created a body
of lay and non-partisan participants in local politics—which must
be seen as a novelty—the level to which it has effected policy-
making is at large still modest. The Pirate Party is a small and
relatively lightweight player in German politics. In Friesland only
a very small part of the constituency is registered as members of
the system, a voluntary registration that nevertheless is required
for anyone wishing to use this system for political participation.

These applications' emphasis on voting also reminds us of the
discussion in Chapter 3, where the act of voting, or otherwise

responding to predefined alternatives, by some commentators were seen as bordering on either the passive or the insufficient—unless proper deliberation preceded it. If/when such deliberation takes place, parallel to or outside the Liquid Feedback system itself, this may not be seen as a problem, but if/when voting or delegation takes place without much prior deliberation, the democratic effects are—with reference to most of the research referred to and quoted in this publication—not necessarily all that significant.

Those developing the Liquid Feedback fork however explain it like this:

> [It b]uilds a chain from direct to representative democracy by introducing a web-based proxy system, where every member can decide who from time to time shall represent "me." Sometimes I will do it myself (direct democracy), sometimes I will delegate my vote to somebody else in the network who I trust—who in turn can delegate it on to somebody he trusts. I can recall my delegation whenever I want and next time either vote myself or delegate it to someone else. (Nitsche 2013)

No doubt the German Pirate Party's by now fairly well-known use of Liquid Feedback has inspired others to pick up on this idea. There are nowadays many similar initiatives across Europe and North America, and in Italy several political parties with seats in the parliament have embraced it. In one case, an initiative by a Democratic Party PM has seen over a dozen PMs from different parties join a common launch, and in another the populist Five Star Movement has launched its own version. Liquid Feedback, however, does not seem to be the first of its kind. On the Web, one can find a range of similar ideas, including these two of pre-Liquid Feedback dates (or at least equally "old"):

– Abdul–Rahman Lomax argues on his website that

> Liquid democracy is pretty close to the concepts I've been working on for about twenty years. Those concepts have boiled down to two: Free Associations and Delegable Proxy. (Lomax 2014)

– Smári McCarthy's blog promoted already in 2008

> A new type of voting system [:…] When voting, a voter is presented with two functions: vote for one of the options, or don't vote. I suggest we add a third: forward your vote to a third party. This is the essence of "representative democracy," but I'm talking about expanding it—in representative democracies everybody forwards their vote to a predefined subset of the people, and each representative has an equal weight in subjects. Here I'm saying anybody can forward their vote to anybody, and forwarding votes increases the weight of that individual's vote. The three functions of the vote: Abstention, Direct vote, Elected proxy. (McCarthy 2008)

Two other examples of similar initiatives are in fact closer to the overall Liquid Democracy school of thought, where consultation is just as much a key as is voting and vote delegation.

> Lobbi is an innovative and unique method of engaging the electorate to become re-enthused and involved with politics on a long-term basis. This is created through the ever-growing power of social media, with a Facebook/Twitter-esque interactive forum and information portal. […] Lobbi provides the voting public with the means to discover current issues that affect them – instantly – via their smart phone, tablet or computer. In addition, they can get their own views across in the same way as they'd post on Facebook or Twitter. But more than this, it's a two-way street, as politicians and elected representatives also interact, giving them a vital link to the public mood on a "real-time" basis. (Wilcox 2013)

With reference to the AAPOR-report referenced in Chapter 3, the task force behind it also suggested a US model they call "Citizen Cabinet," explained as follows:

> a [...] standing panel comprised of a representative sample of the American public, to be consulted on current issues, using new online interactive tools to give voice to the people on an unprecedented scale; [... m]aking [the] same online resources available to all Americans, so they can get better informed and more effectively communicate their views to their representatives. [...] made up of 275 citizens in every congressional district – 120,000 nationwide – scientifically selected to accurately reflect the American people, and connected through an online interface. Each Citizen Cabinet member will serve for 9 – 12 months. (Kull et al. 2013)

Adhocracy

From the Citizen Cabinet, the step to the Adhocracy platform is not far, although this platform is designed for open and free participation rather than selected and restricted as in AAPOR's Citizen Cabinet above.

The Adhocracy website presents this software as a "platform enabling a democratic, transparent, open and focused dialogue" [author's translation] (Liquid Democracy e.V. 2013) that not only provides organisations and interest groups with a way to open up to democratic participation, but also an opportunity for "all citizens" to contribute views and ideas in order to actually create a discussion and help shape the decisions.

This system is designed to offer "everybody the opportunity to be independently represented, at a time and in an area of expertise that suits the individual, allowing them to satisfactorily contribute their own ideas and concerns to the debate." [author's translation] (ibid.) Be it a simple approval or rejection of a proposal or project, or by incorporating their ideas and suggestions in either, or by participating in the editing of a representative text. Every

participant can here, him-/herself, decide to which extent s/he wants to be involved—and how and/or to which extent—s/he would like to be involved in the decision-making.

All "users," the organisations, political parties, companies, NGOs and/or other interest groups operating their respective platforms, and these respective user platforms' individual members, must register a user profile, consequently enabling them to verify their authenticity. Although a range of organisations have designed and launched their own platforms, the most relevant case for this publication to study is the platform that the German Parliament (Bundestag) trialled for a few years. Between February 2011 and January 2013, the Committee of Enquiry of the German Bundestag on Internet and Digital Society collected knowledge, ideas and expertise for policy-making, using this platform, to which ideas, suggestions and opinions on the future of digital society where contributed and shared. This study group project then incorporated these discussions and suggestions directly into the Study Commissions' ongoing work (Gollatz, Herweg, and Hofmann 2013). Although the Bundestag also formally evaluated this trial, and as I write is contemplating whether and/or how to proceed, an independent evaluation by Alexander Hoose is also at hand. This analysis is indeed helpful in understanding the workings of these types of e-platforms. Hoose describes his analytical method as follows:

> Unlike usual methods of social network analysis that analyse and visualize the direct relation between actors, in this paper a two-mode network analysis will be used that analyses the relation between two different types of actors or technical terms nodes. In the case of enquetebeteiligung.de [i.e., Study Commission] the relation that will be focused on, is the connection between users and the proposal. This connection is documented through the act of voting for or against the proposal or by being the author of the proposal. The idea behind this approach is that every user is connected to other

users through the event of voting on the same proposal. (2012, 11)

For the German Bundestag it is specified that an "Enquete Commission" can be established if a quarter of the Bundestag votes for it, after which time it will remain active until the end of the legislative period. The members' appointments are either based on an agreement between the parties in parliament or on each party's corresponding representation in parliament. Such commissions are usually composed of parliamentarians and experts from various fields. By inviting an NGO (Liquid Democracy e.V.) to provide, tailor and operate the platform (i.e., the Adhocracy software), this project also gained a direct channel to the general public, which hence was invited to participate, together with the political parties' appointed members and experts.

This e-platform only had a consulting function however, since the content generated by it only served as an additional input for regular Commission members. Therefore the Commission could decide on issues without taking the users' voting results into account.

Evaluating the Enquete Commission

Alexander Hoose's findings are interesting in the face of the above:

> One important finding in the survey was the education background of the Adhocracy users, which shows a large percentage of highly educated people among the user population. [P]eople with a university degree, Abitur and Phd make up 89% of the total user population, thus showing a clear picture. One important insight that can be taken from these numbers is that the participation on enquetebeteiligung.de seems to have high requirements concerning the capabilities and knowledge of the user. One reason could be that the topics often require expert

knowledge in certain areas in order to be fully understood, therefore alienating people with a lower education background. (ibid., 7)

Another important statistic concerns the intensity of use and shows that only [a] small percentage of the users is participating regularly on [the platform]. This finding makes immediate sense if one thinks of the typical argument brought up for the representative democracy and its professional politicians. The argument is that such [a] constant political work requires a large amount of time and professionalization in order to be successful on a varied field of political issues. In contrast normal citizens often do not have the time and interest to work into every topic that is on the political agenda, therefore they often only choose topics that are of interest to them. This again leads to the problem of professional interest groups using this circumstance to their advantage when trying to manipulate such participation platform[s] as they often have more resources to participate on timely fashion. This is supported by the large percentage of irregular [...] user, since this seems to promote the idea that many users are being mobilized by organizations in order to lobby for single issues. (ibid. 7–8)

Finally the political engagement is of interest, since one of the main goals of the platform is to mobilize the citizens [who] are alienated from the political business. [Findings] show that [it is] not the apolitical citizen [that] uses [...] the Adhocracy platform, but mostly citizens that have already engaged themselves in other political formats. (ibid., 8)

Judging from the user profiles presented [...], that shows high political engagement and a small group of highly active users, it is highly likely that minorities and interest groups are mobilizing their followers to shape the discussions on the [platform]. (ibid., 10)

Quoting another study (Klug et al. 2010), Hoose therefore argues that

> [i]t is thinkable that interest groups [...] not only dominate the discourse by mobilizing their members, but also [by] creating a self-reinforcement cycle that leads other users to ignore smaller discussion [threads] and unconsciously agree with users from such interest group as they predefine the discussion. (Hoose 2012, 10–11)

In summary, Hoose raises three major hypotheses, which he eventually answers as follows:

> Hypothesis 1: Power users are able to act as intermediaries [...] by placing and leveraging topics through their own importance in the network. Power users are understood as users connected to a large number of proposals. [...] [This] hypothesis can be dismissed, which is [...] surprising, as the power user argument is commonly used in the e-participation discussion. (ibid., 11, 18)

> Hypothesis 2: Interest groups dominate the discourse [...] by mobilizing their members to vote on their topics. Interest groups are defined by having created proposals with a homogeneous user group, which is not connected to proposals in other parts of the network or by being presented by an official organization account. [...] [The research provides a] strong confirmation of [this] hypothesis, since [the] results show that interest groups [...] can mobilize many new users for their topic and by this crowd out weaker proposal that do not have organized groups as a backing. (ibid.)

> Hypothesis 3: Proposals that do not exceed a critical mass or do not have well connected users are not able to generate the attention of other users on the platform. [...] [This final] hypothesis [...] can neither be [...] confirmed nor denied, as the results show that generating attention from the overall

network is way less important than securing a core sup- porter group. (ibid.)

In summary, Hoose's report clearly does dovetail with most of the research findings reported on in Chapters 3 and 4. With this in mind, the Citizen Lobby, when using the Adhocracy software (equivalent), will make special efforts to neutralise the tendencies that interest groups take control over/dominate the public debate through "smart" utilisation of interactive platforms, and/or discreet mobilisation of supporting networks. This will however be elaborated further in this publication's final chapter.

Evolving relationships: The model leading to the model

This chapter intends to link the backgrounds, status reports and developments presented and discussed in the above chapters into a flow, showing what the aggregate of all the referenced research suggests about the longer term. It is our hope that based on this chapter—although it requires a more rigorous than usual attention from its readers—the reasons for, and the format of, the Citizen Lobby can be better understood and recognised. It shall nevertheless be noted that neither this chapter, nor this publication in general, attempts to make a full-fledged SWOT analysis of a digitalisation of our current democratic processes. That would be a task beyond the scope of this publication given the many technical aspects that a more complete analysis also would have to include—something this publication falls short of. The research conducted here prioritises the human aspects of digital democracy above the in-depth technical ones.

This chapter builds to a large extent on two theories: Habermas' public sphere theory, as laid out in Chapter 2, and the cultural formula, as presented in Chapter 1. By using the actors and roles identified by Habermas and the process of slowly changing

cultural logics, identified in the "Cultural Formula," we will here draft a scenario for change. The time factor is obviously a matter for debate. Are we in the process of leaving an era of capitalism based on an industrial mode of production, or have we already left that behind? Are we now in an information era, based on e-platforms, or are we still only heading there? Are we already touching upon a knowledge era, driven by computer protocols, or is that simply a vision? Different observers will have different answers to these questions. This chapter simply talks about "the past" (also called the corporate era), "the present" (also called the media era) and "the future" (also called the P2P era). The past is what we are inevitably moving out of, whether we are still there or not. The present is the era which almost all referenced research agrees upon is actually happening—whether it is in its infancy or an already generally accepted way of life. The future is what most observers argue is coming, whether it is around the corner or in a more distant future.

The need for a new take on democracy is nevertheless the same. Either we need to get it right before it is too late, or—if the change is already more progressed than some experience it—there is no time to lose. The argument this publication wishes to stress is that *now* is the time to revamp our democratic models, as it is just a matter of time until they are so obsolete they will do more harm than good. Democratic models firmly anchored in the past—when living in the "present" or the "future"—will not prove very helpful to societies at large.

The developments discussed in this chapter are structured in a such a way that a critical reader him-/herself shall be able to question and test assumed outcomes by changing parameters s/he disagrees with, in order for him-/herself to see which con-sequences such changes possibly could entail. If—for instance—a reader disagrees with the assumption that what Habermas refers to as the private intimate realm (i.e., private individuals) in the long term (i.e., in "the future") is heading towards a type of reality where "*collective experience underpinning their views, concerns and*

general positions in the debate" typically are *"intention-based, where information-search replaces information-feed as main 'flow' to build experience,"* s/he can alter this statement, and see how it affects the overall outcome. In the version of events charted below, the outcome is assumed to be that people "*will engage, since it concerns me and my near and dear*"—making a Citizen Lobby a useful tool. A contrasting outcome could be that s/he "*will not engage, since there is no reward in sight*"—which consequently would make a Citizen Lobby unnecessary. The hereby-attained responsiveness of this model is of course intentional. Without such responsiveness the model could be seen to fail, simply because one assumption upon which its design relies turns out untrue, such as if new legislation cracks down on Internet access, or if the peer-to-peer mode of production fails to develop on the larger scale—beyond cultural production.

For the above reasons all claims are collected and presented in charts below, rather than in ordinary text. To some readers this may seem less reader-friendly. This type of presentation however allows for the kind of flow analysis that ordinary text is less suitable for. The first chart describes how Habermas' public sphere is likely to be populated over time, and how roles can be expected to change. However, in this chart (but *only* in this) are Habermas' spheres/realms slightly reorganised, in order to also reflect the glocal aspect. Here the public economic (= corporate) and public intimate (= media) spheres are merged, and a supra-national level is added. Chart 2 nevertheless reflects Habermas' original role-distribution.

Comparing levels C and E in Chart 1 reveals the real process of change that the referenced research suggests. The "past" is here represented by the private intimate realm's focus on eligibility and voting in general election, the governing realm's focus on legitimacy and party-to-party negotiations, the economic realm's focus on rationality, using arguments, support and sponsorship, with a supra-governing realm focusing on strategy and economic cum military power.

The "future" (i.e., level E) is understood, on the other hand, to have—*in addition to the above*—a private-intimate-realm focus on "on-/offline engagement" and "voting on policy creation," a governing-realm focus on "on-/offline representation" and "negotiating policy creation," an economic-realm focus on "on-/offline manoeuvring" and "influencing policy creation," with a supra-governing-realm focus on "discreet manipulative control" and "manipulating policy creation." Studying Chart 1 in closer detail reveals these developments more recognisably.

Charts 2a–c show how the research presented in this publication assumes that each of Habermas' realms may change over time. Chart 2a shows the past, here referred to as "the corporate era," Chart 2b shows the present, referred to as "the media era" and Chart 2c the future, here referred to as "the P2P era."

These charts allow readers to see the assumed development for each respective realm, era by era. Here the "cultural behaviour" of the private intimate realm moves from "electorate" in the past, via "electorate + Web-active" in the present, to "electorate + lobby" in the future. For the private economic realm the "cultural behaviour" changes from "petitioner" in the past, via "spokesperson" in the present, to "kingmaker" in the future. For the public economic realm, the transition is assumed to be from "institutional lobby" in the past, via "corporate citizen + institutional lobby" in the present, to "queenmaker" in the future. "Queenmaker" means a force influencing the processes from inside, rather than—as kingmakers do—introduce and/or support candidates for the leading roles (compare here the old proverb "behind every successful man stands a strong woman"). Finally, for the public intimate realm, a transition from "kingmaker" in the past, via "lobby channel" in the present to that of a "broker" (of views, opportunities and threats) in the future, is assumed.

Chart 3 is a more condensed and admittedly more speculative summary of how the roles may change over time. Its content is nevertheless derived directly from Charts 1 and 2.

Chart 1 (part 1)

A) THE PUBLIC SPHERE:

Public Sphere's Private Intimate Realm:	Public Sphere's Governing Realm:	Public Sphere's Public and Private Economic Realms:	Public Sphere's Supra-Governing Realm:
General Public Communal Interests	Nation State Interest Arbitrators	Corporations/Institutions Particular Interests	Supra National Geopolitical Interests
Human Beings Local Stakeholders Cultural Communities	Legal Beings Glocal Stakeholders Cultural Organisers	Organisational Beings Global Stakeholders Cultural Influencers	Brokered Beings Geopolitical Stakeholders Cultural Challengers

B) MOVING FROM:

Commodity Consumers Education Consumers Media-Culture Consumers Environment Consumer	Commodity Allocator Education Allocator Media-Culture Allocator Environment Allocator	Commodity Producer Education Producer Media-Culture Producer Environment Producer	Commodity Resource Controller Language Power Controller Media-Culture Access Controller Environment Destiny Controller
Opinion Producers Opinion Based Reason	Opinion Consumer Politically Based Reason	Opinion Brokers Economically Based Reason	Opinion Controller Geopolitical Based Reason
Policy Consumer Passive/Re-active	Policy Producer Strategic/Re-active	Policy Broker Strategic/Pro-active	Policy Strategist Strategic/Pro- and Re-active
Electorate Low Impact Community	Elected Politicians Medium Impact Community	Institutional Lobby High Impact Community	Appointed Elite Peak Impact Community

C) THEN USING THE MEANS:

Eligibility Voting in General Election	Legitimacy Party-to-Party Negotiations	Rationality Arguments, Support, Sponsorship	Strategy Economic and Military Power

Chart 1 (part 2)

D) MOVING TOWARDS:

Commodity Prosumers	Commodity Broker	Commodity Scale Provider	Commodity Resource Manipulator
Education Prosumers	Education Broker	Education Scale Provider	Language Power Manipulator
New Media Prosumers	New Media Broker	New Media Scale Provider	New Media Access Manipulator
Environment Prosumers	Environment Broker	Environment Scale Provider	Environment Destiny Manipulator
Reason Producers	Reason Consumer	Reason Brokers	Reason Manipulator
Cultural Based Reason	Politically Based Reason	Economically Based Reason	Geopolitically Based Reason
Policy Driver	Policy Producer	Policy Driver	Policy Manipulator
Context/Active	Content/Re-active	Strategic/Pro-active	Strategic/Pro- and Re-active
Electorate and Lobby	Elected Politicians	Corporate Citizens and Lobby	Economic Elite Power Network
High Impact Community	Low Impact Community	High Impact Community	Discreet Peak Impact Community

E) NOW USING THE MEANS:

Legitimacy	Legitimacy	Rationality	Strategy
Voting in General Election	Party-to-Party Negotiations	Arguments, Support, Sponsorship	Economic and Military Power
On-/Offline Engagement	On-/Offline Representation	On-/Offline Manoeuvring	Discreet Manipulative Control
Voting on Policy Creation	Negotiating Policy Creation	Influencing Policy Creation	Manipulating Policy Creation

F) REQUIREMENTS FOR GETTING FROM C) TO E):

Knowledge	Knowledge	Knowledge	Power
Information	Information	Information	Intelligence
Tools	Tools	Tools	Tools
Insights	Insights	Vision	Vision

Chart 2a (part 1)

The Public Sphere	Private Realm		Public Realm	
Traditionally/Corporate Era	Intimate	Economic	Economic	Intimate
The Social Level				
+ Values: Core value-platform for the collective described. Values differ from preferences, opinions, etc., by being permeating and stable over longer times	Socio-cultural, where one's local community sets the standards and deviations are modest	Return on Investment (RoI) - whether in terms of intellect, time or money	Organisational, where mission and vision shape a corporate culture	Truth, both in terms of assuming there is a "truth," and that it is what is being offered
+ Environment: The overall setting, conditions and restrictions within which the described collective typically lives and operates	Low impact, where elites master the processes and the general public follows	High RoI, if a part of the elite masters those processes that the general public follows	Corporate power, driven by bottom-line, stock-value and dividends	Stable, both in terms of technical and power-structures
= Application: How the above values are typically applied in the above environment	Reactive, i.e. wait to be asked	Strategic; means to an end	Strategic, targeting market-shares and margins	Analytic; quality beats quantity
The Empirical Level				
+ Experience: Collective experiences underpinning our views, concerns and general positions in the debate	Opinion-based; coordinated information-flows feed people with what to think	Money makes connections and connections make money	Markets can be managed and new markets found	Trusted; confident but arrogant
= Premise: The overarching assumption for response and action	I cannot, why I will await advice	I can, why I will act independently	We can - if/when we try	We are in full control

Chart 2a (part 2)

The Public Sphere	Private Realm		Public Realm	
Traditionally/Corporate Era	**Intimate**	**Economic**	**Economic**	**Intimate**
THE LOGICAL LEVEL				
+ OBSERVATION: Policy-making trends we can observe and build on	Policy is made by politicians	Policy is influenced by power	Policy will be influenced by us	Policy can't build or spread without us
= CONCLUSION: How will I respond to this observation, given the premise noted above	I will not engage, since there is no reward in sight	I will use my power if there is a reward in sight	We engage if we need to prevail	We can culturally manipulate both people and policy
THE ACTION LEVEL				
+ RESOURCES: What type of digital tools can I use if taking action	Portals, driven by its originators	Portals, driven by its originators	Portals, driven by its originators	Portals, driven by its originators
+ RESOLVE: The type of effort needed	Con-/Prosumer	Professional	Particular	Proactive
= BEHAVIOUR: My role in policy-making	Electorate	Petitioner	Institutional Lobby	"King-maker"

Chart 2b (part 1)

The Public Sphere	Private Realm		Public Realm	
Medium Term/Media Era	Intimate	Economic	Economic	Intimate
THE SOCIAL LEVEL				
+ VALUES: Core value-platform for the collective described. Values differ from preferences, opinions, etc., by being permeating and stable over longer times	Meta-local, where one's peers, both inside and outside one's local community, are key value-drivers	Recognition; fame and exposure - whether immediately rewarded in money or not	Global, where trends make us accept a leader vs. follower platform	News, assuming the truth is what can be observed, and that this must be offered
+ ENVIRONMENT: The overall setting, conditions and restrictions within which the described collective typically lives and operates	Medium impact, where group-efforts to influence can pay off if smart or well-coordinated	Winner-takes-all, sharing is forced and deviances are considered abnormal but "tolerated"	Transaction power, driven by cost- and tax- minimisation	Fast-moving, both in terms of technical and power-structures
= APPLICATION: How the above values are typically applied in the above environment	Active, i.e. look for opportunities	Proactive; coached reality	Proactive, targeting cus-tomer loyalty	Content; quantity beats quality
THE EMPIRICAL LEVEL				
+ EXPERIENCE: Collective experiences underpinning our views, concerns and general positions in the debate	Sharing-based; self-made information-flows compete with those externally coordinated	Recognition makes connections and con-nections make money	Costs can be managed and new sources found	Competitive; expressive but noisy
= PREMISE: The overarching assumption for response and action	I can, why I will compare options	I may, why I will act speculatively	Practice makes perfect	We struggle to keep control

Chart 2b (part 2)

The Public Sphere	Private Realm		Public Realm	
Medium Term/Media Era	**Intimate**	**Economic**	**Economic**	**Intimate**
THE LOGICAL LEVEL				
+ OBSERVATION: Policy-making trends we can observe and build on	Policy can be influenced by us	Policy is influenced by power	Policy can be influenced by us	Policy can build or spread without us
= CONCLUSION: How will I respond to this observation, given the premise noted above	I may engage, if overall priorities permit the effort	I will back the power that may benefit me more	We engage to gain influence	We must defend our control over cultural power
THE ACTION LEVEL				
+ RESOURCES: What type of digital tools can I use if taking action	Platforms, driven by its users	Platforms, driven by its users	Platforms, driven by its users	Platforms, driven by its users
+ RESOLVE: The type of effort needed	Prosumer/User	Personal branding	Sustainable	Active
= BEHAVIOUR: My role in policy-making	Electorate + www	Spokesperson	Corporate Citizen + Institutional Lobby	Lobby Channel

Chart 2c (part 1)

The Public Sphere	Private Realm		Public Realm	
Long Term/P2P Era	Intimate	Economic	Economic	Intimate
THE SOCIAL LEVEL				
+ VALUES: Core value-platform for the collective described. Values differ from preferences, opinions, etc., by being permeating and stable over longer times	Glocal, where local, meta-local and global influences meet in an on-going process of value-exchange	Positioning; core/centre/peripheral - whether immediately rewarded in money or not	Glocal, where local, meta-local and global values mix and coexist	Events, assuming the truth is what people make out of what they are being offered
+ ENVIRONMENT: The overall setting, conditions and restrictions within which the described collective typically lives and operates	High impact, where the general public drives the processes - implemented by elites	Networked societies with constant shifts in node-structures and spheres of power	Creative power, driven by ability to utilise distributed resources	Unexpected, both in terms of technical and power-structures
= APPLICATION: How the above values are typically applied in the above environment	Proactive, i.e. keep the initiative	Reactive; responsive reality	Flexible, targeting what is politically correct	Context; presence beats quality
THE EMPIRICAL LEVEL				
+ EXPERIENCE: Collective experiences underpinning our views, concerns and general positions in the debate	Intention-based, where information-search replaces information-feed as main "flow" to build experience	Networking makes connections and connections make money	People cannot be managed but new technologies can be found	Threatened; active but less structured
= PREMISE: The overarching assumption for response and action	I will, why I must act responsibly	I must, why I will act accordingly	We will never stop trying	We cannot control

Chart 2c (part 2)

The Public Sphere / Long Term/P2P Era	Private Realm		Public Realm	
	Intimate	Economic	Economic	Intimate
THE LOGICAL LEVEL				
+ OBSERVATION: Policy-making trends we can observe and build on	Policy can be made for us	Policy is influenced by power	Policy may be influenced by us	Policy does build or spread without us
= CONCLUSION: How will I respond to this observation, given the premise noted above	I will engage, as it concerns me and my "near and dear"	I will help broker power - but keep "all doors open"	We engage not to be left behind	We must secure a stake in cultural power influences
THE ACTION LEVEL				
+ RESOURCES: What type of digital tools can I use if taking action	Protocols, driven by (hidden) code	Protocols, driven by (hidden) code	Protocols, driven by (hidden) code	Protocols, driven by (hidden) code
+ RESOLVE: The type of effort needed	User/Produser	Networking	Connective	Reactive
= BEHAVIOUR: My role in policy-making	Electorate + lobby	"King-maker"	"Queen-maker"	Broker

What sets a P2P-era "Citizen Lobby" apart from the Corporate-era's and Media-era's voter- and Web-active focus in terms of Policy-making?

Role	Corporate Era: Electorate	Media Era: Electorate + *Web-active*	P2P Era: Electorate + *Citizen Lobby*
Voter's incentive	Human right	Human right	Human right
	Pillar of democracy	Pillar of democracy	Pillar of democracy
	Citizen responsibility	Citizen responsibility	Citizen responsibility
	Decide who decides	Decide who decides	Decide who decides
	-	-	Learn about society
	-	-	Learn about politics
	-	-	During working hours
	-	-	Get paid for engaging
	-	Share your view with others	Share your view with others
	-	-	Debate with others offline
	-	Debate with others online	Debate with others online
	-	*May* influence policy	*Will* influence policy
Elect's incentive	Political party-loyalty	Political party-loyalty	-
	-	-	Voter-loyalty
	Election focus	Election focus	*Re*-election focus
	-	Willing listen to voter	Willing listen to voter
	-	-	Willing debate with voter

Role	Corporate Era: Electorate	Media Era: Electorate + *Web-active*	P2P Era: Electorate + *Citizen Lobby*
Democratic effect	Political party rule	Political party rule	Political party decide
	-	-	Citizen lobby impact
	Institutional lobby impact	Institutional lobby impact	Institutional lobby impact
	-	"Movement"-influence	-
	Low risk for populism	High risk for populism	Low risk for populism
	-	Policy debated online	Policy debated online
	-	-	Policy debated offline
	Low feedback-level	Modest feedback-level	High feedback-level
	Policy beyond citizens	Policy beyond online	Policy beyond nobody
	-	-	Policy = citizen-driven
	Parliament/ Government responsible	Parliament/ Government responsible	Parliament/ Government responsible

The Citizen Lobby: The model, the process and the costs

As can be concluded from this publication's previous chapters, we distinguish between two, philosophically speaking, different approaches to citizens' influence over politicians.

One is where elected politicians seek the input from the electorate. Although the more recent version of this includes e-governance, it starts out from the election itself, the run-up to which candidates make election promises for what they shall do if elected, where each vote received can be seen as confirmation that those promises reflect voters' expectations. Another level of this approach is surveys, where statistically relevant numbers of people (normally around a thousand +) are asked to answer "yes" or "no" (or similar) to one or several given alternatives. The ultimate survey level is the referendum—a level of enquiry that nevertheless is very rare outside Switzerland. Neither of these levels is however legally binding for elected politicians who, nevertheless, may feel inclined to use the information (and/or confirmation when applicable) provided through these processes as "guidance."

The more advanced version of this approach is e-governance. Using a variety of Web-based tools, with varying levels of inter-activity, politicians here try to capture the attention of the electorate, asking for their views and opinions, encouraging questions and dialogue. E-governance is, however, just as elections, surveys and referendums are, based on information and/or alternatives provided by the incumbent. E-governance typically targets administrative concerns, i.e., practical issues within the scope of already established policy, structures and principles. E-governance is also, as has been quoted and noted in previous chapters, often unevenly distributed, both geographically and thematically, where the politicians in charge of the geographical and/or thematic area for which the electorate is supposed to be e-governed may or may not be as interactive as s/he would need to be if e-governance were to serve the electorate the way it possibly could. But the main problem with e-governance in democracy-terms is that it is, just like surveys and referendums are, basically a top-down approach, where incumbents seek input from or wish to communicate with the electorate as and when (and to whatever extent) *they* feel it is necessary.

The other approach to citizens' influence over policy-making is a bottom-up model. Here the *electorate decides* what to request from their politicians, based on dialogues among members of the electorate which are not initiated and/or guided by the politicians' perceived need for information and/or confirmation—but on the electorates' perceived need for political action and policy-development. Although the Web is full of sites where such dialogues are taking place in one shape or another, from Politico.com and CNET to Techdirt and Reddit (just to name a few), these are often full of spontaneous and fairly unstructured voicing of opinions. Many debates here have short life spans compared to politics— which is a permanently ongoing process. Many of these sites offer a fascinating mix of anything and everything, from serious to ludicrous. This makes many of these debates gain instant and hard currency—as they offer something to relate to for almost

any Web surfer. This currency, however, tends to pass equally fast, since it (again, relatively speaking, as compared to the political processes and policy-making) soon fades in favour of new topics.

An often quoted example of the online community's victory over the establishment through this kind of Web activism is the SOPA-PIPA debate in the US, which is also referenced in this publication (and briefly summarised in Appendix 6). Since this debate was about the intellectual rights guiding the use of the Internet, it struck the very core of the online community's area of interests and concerns, making it keep its focus both longer and harder than otherwise.

Apart from these types of closely Web-related issues, which in fact constitute only a small part of the overall political process, most policy-making will take much longer time than the typical online community has the longevity to match. More often one debate in one forum is replaced by another debate in another forum, whereby initially strong focus runs the significant risk of getting lost in favour of more general opinion sharing. More specific demands targeting elected politicians, emanating from these debates, are hence not as likely to materialise as the overall, very high, level of Web activism would suggest. Although these processes may give both the electorate and the elected politicians a feeling of "democracy at work," this type of vol-untary engagement often falls short of presenting the kind of reasoned challenges to the incumbents—by the electorate—that Habermas' *communicative action* was in search of. In the end this gives the politicians the upper hand in choosing whom to eventually satisfy: the electorate who voted for them or the institutional lobby that can help pave the way for their re-election campaign.

A more powerful version of this second approach would there-fore organise the efforts of the electorate in a way that both generates those reasoned arguments that Habermas' quite

correctly pointed out differ from mere opinions, and deliver them to the elected politicians in a manner they can neither refuse nor ignore. This is what the Citizen Lobby intends to do.

The model

Before digging into details, it is important to note that the Citizen Lobby is not intended to be a decision-making body—only a consultative body; informing and recommending the elected parliament of its collective view. Its design shall ensure that special-interest groups are *not* what drive the voiced views of, and recommendations by, the Citizen Lobby, but that it reflects the reasoned view of the electorate, based on statistically secured, large enough, numbers.

Another key to the Citizen Lobby is that its role is not to replace, but to balance, the voice of the institutional lobby. The institutional lobby is well organised and well funded, and has the incentive to view lobbying as an investment. There is neither reason to believe, nor reason to suggest, that this will or should change. But a balance must be put in place, and this balance must have an equal opportunity not only to make itself heard, but also to prepare a collective view—reasonable enough to stand up against the ultimately pecuniary special interests that typically drive the institutional lobby in general, and the corporate lobby in particular.

Finally, it must be made obvious what power the Citizen Lobby can wield, at least over time. All politicians are dependent on being both elected and re-elected. In today's system being elected is the key. Once elected, re-election is a matter of strategy; both party internal and voter oriented. Re-election is currently driven more by re-election promises than by scrutiny of his/her past performance, since individual politicians can blame failed efforts and never delivered election promises on political circumstances. Also, today's electorate do not have the time or opportunity to follow policy-making at the level of detail required

to know which politician represents one's own view and/or who is more driven by the institutional lobby's demands—and/or demands by groups or individuals with views notably different from one's own. With a Citizen Lobby that, on an ongoing basis, closely interacts with the elected parliament and MPs, giving the electorate both time and opportunity to review the efforts made by individual politicians (in debates as well as in the votes they cast), PMs who consistently fail to respond to the Citizen Lobby's recommendations, or behave erratically, can be identified and potentially voted out of parliament next election. Thus the incentive to be re-elected will eventually become paramount, since re-election now will become much more a matter of assessing the PMs' past performance record than listening to renewed promises. With such a scrutiny system in place, it is unlikely that those planning to stand for re-election could ignore the public will, represented by the Citizen Lobby, unless they have—and dare to openly declare—good reasons for doing so. Such "good reasons" may or may not impress the electorate, forcing elected PMs to think twice before backing, and/or acting on, conflicting standpoints.

The Citizen Lobby proposed here is meant to serve as a combined physical and virtual meeting place for a (by computer) randomly selected representation of the electorate. Each batch of participants of this rotating lobby collective is suggested to constitute 0.25% of the electorate, and serve for a total of five weeks: one for training and preparation and four for active duty. Participation in the Citizen Lobby shall be (and needs to be, in order to avoid the 80/20 power-law distribution discussed in Chapter 4) mandatory by law (at least once during every permanent resident's lifetime), compensated by the state with the equivalent of each participating individual's sick-leave compensation. The Citizen Lobby can, as a comparison, be seen as some kind of jury duty, similar to what US courts call American citizens to serve on.

The following aspects are of key importance for the design of the Citizen Lobby:

1. Given the research findings presented in this publication, a virtual-only meeting place is not considered enough to ensure serious and fully motivated participation. In spite of the physical participation being limited to the first and the last day of the four weeks of active duty, it is meant to strengthen the commitment of the randomly selected incumbent Citizen Lobby. Details of how these days shall be spent follow below.

2. Every Lobby member—having been given a first call for service 12 months prior (and again 6 and 3 months, as well as 1 week, prior to start)—shall him-/herself select an area of interest within which s/he wishes to serve. This area shall correspond to an existing ministry or sub-ministry of the incumbent government, allowing him/her to focus his/her attention on deliberating issues that relate to his/her chosen ministry (or sub-ministry). The individual participant will hence be part of, and interact with, a group of people who have the same area of interest as oneself—even if views and priorities are both intended and expected to vary.

3. All lobby participants will (based on their residential addresses) be linked to a geographical hub, equalling their nearest university (equivalent). This is where the two days of physical presence shall take place, and where they throughout the five-week period can go for face-to-face interaction, should they wish to do so. If a lobby participant for some reason would like to join a different geographical hub than the one assigned, such requests shall always be granted, although it shall not qualify for any further financial/travel compensation.

4. Out of the altogether five weeks of service, the first week shall be used for training purposes only, since, which has been noted throughout this publication, knowledge is a crucial aspect of policy-making. This includes knowledge not only about the topics debated, but also about the political policy-making process in general, and the Citizen Lobby process in particular.

5. The 0.25% of the electorate, equalling between 10,000 and 100,000 participants per call, depending on the overall size

of the electorate, is assumed to operate in groups of around 50–100 persons per group, based on the assumption that each (European) country has around 10–15 ministries/sub-ministries, and one university per (approx.) 5–700,000 inhabitants. This equals 10–50 geographical hubs depending on which European country is in question.

6. Citizen Lobby hosts shall be appointed for each group of 50–100 participants. On the mandatory days for presence (first and last day of active duty) this host shall be a senior civil servant from the ministry (local or central-governmental) to which the group is linked by its chosen area of interest. For the remaining days it shall be a member of the university staff (with a minimum of a master's degree) from the same faculty that developed the training module delivered during the training week's day 3–4 (see below).

7. A "CL Internal Database" shall be set up to which documents, videos and links can be uploaded by active Citizen Lobby members, making them available to the Citizen Lobby at large. A special sub-section of this database shall also be open for non-active members, to which they can contribute if/when they feel an ongoing debate concerns a topic to which they wish to contribute. This database will be parallel to—rather than integrated with—the Adhocracy software.

The process

Once organised into 10–15 groups (corresponding to the ministries/sub-ministries) with 50–100 rotating members serving one plus four weeks each at 10–50 geographical hubs (depending on the size of the country), adding up to a rotating collective of 0.25% of the electorate referred to as the Citizen Lobby, the modus operandi is suggested to be as follows:

– During the training and preparation week (week 1) each batch will receive online training:

– two days in Citizen Lobby participation/techniques (based on the Adhocracy software)

– two days in the chosen subject area's topic areas (as developed by the university's faculty)
– one day of interaction with outgoing Citizen Lobby members (last day for previous batch)

For the first and the last day of the four-week period of active service (i.e., Monday, week 2 and Friday, week 5) mandatory physical presence shall be required at the geographical hub. A fixed travel allowance will be paid for these days, based on the distance between his/her residential address and the geographical hub to which s/he was originally automatically allocated. Physical presence during remaining days is optional, and travel allowance will be paid only if such presence is confirmed by an assigned lobby host.

Week 1: Introduction and training (online, assisted by help-desk/resource persons)

Day 1–2: Learning the game
– Intro/training re the policy-making process, Adhocracy and accompanying software

Day 3–4: Learning the trade
– Intro/training re the chosen topic-hub/-area (provided by the university's faculty)

Day 5: Relay day
– follow the final day of the outgoing batch's debate and voting activities (online)
– pose questions to, and discuss with, outgoing batch (online)
– query/discuss the standpoints formulated by outgoing batch (online)
– learn "their lesson" via a collective blog (online)

Week 2, Day 1: Joint session for new batch at geographical hub (university/equivalent) for

– registration/identification (by host)
– meeting the people in one's selected/allocated sub-hub (organised by host)
– receiving a summary of debate/fork/voting status from previous batch (by host)
– getting access to existing documentation and debate/voting history (by host)
– logging on to first live parliamentary debate and "trial" Citizen Lobby debate (online)
– asking questions and ensure own ability to participate online (assisted by host)

Week 2, Day 2–5 and week 3–4: Online from home (at geographical hub when preferred) to

– log on to the Adhocracy platform and learn which debates are on-going in opted field
– review documentation available from parliament (e.g., http://offenesparlament.de)
– review PMs' blogs (e.g., http://www.petra-ernstberger.de/transparenz/initiativen-fuer-hochfranken/)
– review documentation from CL-Internal Database, re ongoing/previous CL-debates
– review how other geographical hubs, also debating your own selected topics, argue
– give priority to debates with a shorter deadline over those with a longer deadline
– learn about and pose questions regarding, and debate the full scope of, issues at hand, before targeting more detailed arguments and more specific terminology
– once familiar with the topic, identify the key arguments and concerns to which you wish to contribute, and study other's already posted input before submitting your own

– formulate your input, supporting or criticising previous input, and/or adding your own
- check for support or criticism of your own input, while following the debate at large
- amend or defend your stated view, if/when appropriate
- contribute to your batch's draft statements using Adhocracy's paragraph-edit feature
- initiate new fork drafts when you cannot support what is developing (rather than keep challenging/re-editing statements that are already gaining broader support), and make your own open call for support for this fork, to compete with the one you prefer not to support
- keep updated on relevant documentation available from Parliament, PMs' blogs and the CL Internal Database; communicate directly with PMs if/when required/possible
- contribute a minimum number of activities per day (traceable by the Adhocracy software), or you will be listed as absent on—and therefore not paid for—that day
- help formulate one, or several alternative, collective "final" standpoints for your batch, starting at least one week before the listed date for CL voting on any particular issue
- participate in the vote (digitally with real ID or pseudonym, or by ballot) on the listed issue on the date given for CL voting

Week 5: Active duty (cont'd)

Day 1–4: Online from home (and/or at geographical hub for those who prefer)
- help formulate one, or several alternative, collective standpoints on issues debated, but not scheduled for final CL voting during one's own active CL duty period
- keep updated on relevant documentation available from parliament, PMs' blogs and the CL Internal Database; communicate directly with PMs if/when required/possible

– communicate with other geographical hubs also debating your own selected topics, while formulating your collective's final standpoints/forks; sharing ideas with them

Day 5: Relay day: Joint/final session at geographical hub (university/ equivalent)
– participate (digitally with real ID or pseudonym, or by ballot) in own batch's final statement(s) re all still ongoing debates (for which a final vote has not yet been made)
– introduce/provide summary of debate/voting status to upcoming batch (online)
– de-register as Citizen Lobby member and register as past Citizen Lobby member

Beyond the mandatory Citizen Lobby service called for (and remunerated by the state), voluntary contributions shall *not* be discouraged. Individuals with strong interests in certain issues under debate may wish to contribute input—even if they are not listed for service during that time period. Such non-active individuals shall be free to contribute input to the CL-Internal Database, under the heading "Special Interest Contributions," which active CL members are called to continuously review and consider. Active Citizen Lobby members who find these contributions important can add them to the debate as their own input, which non-active Citizen Lobby members cannot, since all debate taking place on the Adhocracy platform, and all eventual voting that follows, shall be exclusively for active members.

The Citizen Lobby Adhocracy, etc. software shall, in summary, include the following:
– Lists of ongoing debates in parliament; per subject-hub, topic and voting-date respectively
– Lists of/access to documents submitted by voice recordings of elected PMs' submissions
– Lists of/access to voice recordings of interpellations by elected PMs (if any)

–   Timeline: when Citizen Lobby debates start/started, and when CL voting is to take place
  –   Debate fork, visualising the debate's overall development and priorities (see Appendix 7)
  –   Comments by/discussions among CL members (equivalent to a wiki with "history")
  –   CL-Internal Database, to which CL members can download their reference material (etc.)
  –   History of all final wiki-versions of comments/discussions, and of all votes of past debates

The costs

Throughout the work with this Citizen Lobby model, I have met the argument that it will be too expensive. This is a comment that reveals a view on policy-making that sits at the core of the neo-liberal model. As noted in Chapter 1 the neo-liberal model is based on a hands-off attitude when it comes to the citizenries' direct involvement in democratic processes—all policy-making being handled by elected representatives, working under influence from an institutional lobby with a strong corporate profile.

But if we reconsider our respective roles, it is the citizenry that makes up the core of society, and hence would need to have at least an "equal" say in how it is managed. So let us compare what this equal say would cost, as compared to other expenses our societies willingly take on. Take Sweden as an example; here is an estimate of the average cost for the lobby member, multiplied by participant number plus administration and transportation allowances:

Average cost for Lobby Member:	3,000 €
Number of Lobby Members/batch:	15,000
Number of Lobby Members/year:	135,000
	(9 batches/year, equal to parliament's calendar)
Remuneration cost / year:	405 m. €
Admin and travel compensation:	45 m. €
Total cost per year:	*450 m. €*

Although this may sound like a huge amount of money to many, it must be compared to what else has similar amounts allocated in the state budget. The comparable amount in SEK (the Swedish currency krona) is around 3.75 billion. Taking a look at the 2014 budget published by the Swedish Ministry of Finance, the following budget line items are of a similar magnitude:

Community planning, housing programmes and consumer policies:	1.23 bn. SEK
International cooperation (excluding bilateral and multilateral aid):	2.02 bn. SEK
Energy:	2.83 bn. SEK
Regional development:	2.97 bn. SEK
Environment and nature-protection (general):	5.16 bn. SEK
Corporate sector:	5.59 bn. SEK

All these items are, in terms of amounts, at the very bottom of the expenditure list. For further comparison, the following budget lines can be of some relevance:

Integration and equality:	12.43 bn. SEK
Culture, media, religions and leisure:	12.88 bn. SEK
Governing of the state:	12.90 bn. SEK
Net loan from government's debt office:	13.82 bn. SEK

Reaching significantly higher amount levels, we find, e.g., the following:

Bilateral and multilateral aid:	31.83 bn. SEK
Fees to the EU:	37.70 bn. SEK

The Swedish government's budget for 2014 totals at approximately 870 bn. SEK, which means that the suggested Citizen Lobby would add less than half a percent (0,43%) to this. Also, considering the estimated cost is only 12% of the fees Sweden is paying to the EU, the amounts involved for getting a truly democratic state must be considered very modest indeed.

This publication therefore dismisses the argument that the proposed Citizen Lobby would cost too much. To the contrary, it argues that its existence would make our societies more relevant to their members, an outcome to which a price tag is almost impossible to allocate. It can furthermore be assumed that the learning curve—through which each and every Citizen Lobby participant would go—would benefit not only him/her, but also our societies at large; nationally, locally, regionally and internationally. From this, this publication argues, a truly glocal democracy could eventually emerge.

Appendix 1: The 1962 version of Jürgen Habermas' public sphere

	Structure	Role	Power	Problems	Action	Consequences
The State	Constitution Parliament Government Bureaucracy	Governing	Politically driven by public sphere's push for rule of law	Private realm included in "power" only to contribute acclamation	Only the welfare state can secure the interests of the family realm	The "demand-our-rights" view created need for an "active state"
PUBLIC REALM:						
Economic	Corporations	Lobbying	Political and Economic, based on biased but institutionalised interests	Marketing, PR and branding aims to create new behaviour, often requiring policy changes = two front attack	[Corporate] PR industry learned how to engineer consent among the consumers of mass culture = helping one "front"	Institutionalisation and negotiation of interest gave a "demand-our-rights" view – by default targeting the state
Intimate	Media	Communicate	Cultural, intent to shape and communicate public interests to governmental realm	Media become puppets of economic interests, now engaging in manipulative communication	Web of public communication unravel to individuated reception, however uniform in mode	Habermas: "[T]he world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only." (1991, 171)
PRIVATE REALM:						
Economic	Capital owners and Educated classes	Economic SWOT and formulator of "public will"	Intellectual and Economic, based on true "reason"	Increases in debate "quantities," reduces intellectual "qualities"	Confront class limitation with principled openness = democratisation	Wider inclusion brought a more democratic/educational debate
Intimate	Family	Recipient of culture	Electorate	Consumerist, ignorant lifestyles dilutes debate further = culture-receiver	Electoral reform replaced focus on public debate = vote for pre-defined portfolio of ideas	Individuals' literary/ political debate gave way to non-committal group activities

Appendix 2: Summary of Criticism of Habermas' Public Sphere model

Universalism

Habermas' position:

> The formation of consensus based on universal morals - expressed and communicated through Habermas' "formal pragmatics," ensuring that civil society actually could cross-communicate "uninhibited by inequalities of status and power" (cf. Habermas 1984, 330, Lee 1992, 415).

Critique 1:

> Purely philosophical objections to universalism and bound-less consensus exist, most famously from lifelong antagonist Derrida, who argued that de-construction always proves this false and/or unattainable (cf. Borradori 2003, 4-8).

Critique 2:

> McCarthy, for example, criticised this in straightforward, but still friendly terms, while Hohendahl, for instance, tried to explain *why* it is unrealistic. Others, like Flyvbjerg, are ironic in regard to all/any such assumptions (cf. McCarthy 1992, 65-66, Hohendahl 1992, 105, Flyvbjerg 2000).

Power: Public Sphere Structure

Habermas' position:

> Habermas' public sphere being an institutional mechanism for rationalising political domination by rendering states accountable to the citizenry and assuming an ideal and unre-stricted rational discussion of public matters where inequal-ities of status were to be bridged with debaters deliberating as peers (cf. Calhoun 1992).

Critique 1:

> According to Fraser, accountability never found its form and, as the public sphere grew, the peer-to-peer turned into mass media, and manipulation of public opinion, whereby the degeneration-process took over (cf. 1992, 112-113).

Critique 2:

> The separation of debate/discourse/opinion-making on one hand (in the public sphere), and the decision-making (the state) on the other, is problematic, if the state remains free to act independently from the collective will of the public sphere (e.g. Fraser) (cf. 1992, 118).

Power: Gender and Class

Habermas' position:

> Habermas designated the public sphere as an intentional arena where extant status distinctions are bracketed and neutralized, meaning that e.g. gender, class and minority-status is bridged by "reason" (cf. Calhoun 1992, 115).

Critique 1:

> Garnham states that Habermas' public sphere simply ignores the working classes' parallel "publics," and romanticises the bourgeois as a benevolent rather than profit-seeking class (cf. 1992, 359).

Critique 2:

> Fraser argues that, while private interests/issues are undesirable in the public sphere discourse, she refuses the argument that gender- and care-issues, for which women carry historical responsibilities, are not "private," but "political." Due to bracketing is societal equality not seen necessary for political democracy (cf. 1992, 117).

Habermas' position:

> Habermas' definition of participation, where "participation"
> concerns politics; its narrow definition being a direct voice
> in policy making, where literary debates in the private realm
> prepare for/spill over into the political debate in the public
> realm, why also culturally relevant issues can become topics
> for debate.

Critique 1:

> Benhabib argues that participation must be replaced by a
> socio-political debate, that goes on all the time, everywhere,
> in different ways and contexts, since expanding the public
> sphere will also raise the "culture and traditions" agenda -
> not as culture and traditions as such, but as "problems of
> meaning in the present" (cf. 1992 85-87).

Critique 2:

> The majority's benevolent solution to "difference is tol-
> erance," but according to Pier Paolo Pasolini, "this 'difference'
> [...] remains the same both with regard to those who have
> decided to tolerate him and those who have decided to con-
> demn him. No majority will ever be able to banish from its
> consciousness the feeling of the 'difference' of minorities. (in
> Warner 1992, 383-384)

Appendix 3: Summary of criticism of Habermas' communicative action model

Public and Reason vs. Mass and Opinion

Habermas' position:

> Whereas exposure to the mass media in general increased with a person's position in the stratification system, here this relationship was reversed; advertisements and radio commercials reached lower status groups more extensively and more frequently than higher ones. [...] In a phase of more or less unconcealed class antagonism [...] the public sphere itself was torn between the "two nations" - and thus the public presentation of private interests eo ipso (by/of itself) took on a political significance. (Habermas 1991, 191)

Critique 1:

> Fraenkel: "With the help of parliamentary discussion, public opinion makes its desires known to the government, and the government makes its policies known to public opinion. Public opinion reigns, but does not govern." (Fraenkel 1958 quoted in Habermas 1991, 239)

> Kramer: "The problem is that it is impossible to discern whether public opinion has come about by way of public communication or through opinion management." (1992)

Critique 2:

> Leibholz: "The will of the [political] parties is identical with that of the active citizenry, so that the party happening to hold the majority represents the public opinion - whereby public opinion also governs." (1952 quoted in Habermas 1991, 239)

> Garnham: "A problem for media's role in the opinion/reason debate is that it never adapted fully to the political concept

of representation [i.e. reason], but remains largely trapped within a paradigm of direct individual face-to-face communication [i.e. opinion]." (1992, 367)

Communicative action

Habermas' position:

Clarity, attitude and truthfulness (summed up as 'formal pragmatics') are universals of any speech-acts anywhere, why this can be extended also to all other types of communication. Clarity, attitude and truthfulness are also what Habermas claimed link, e.g., art and literature to, e.g., science and law – and morality.

Critique 1:

Derrida: 'An essential quality of writing is its 'iterability'; remaining intelligible despite the absence of any particular addressee or receiver, or even sender or author.'

Lee: 'Can a theory of communicative action based on an essentially [dualistic] speaker-hearer model of speech-acts be adequate for the mixed, large-scale communicative modes characteristic of modern societies?'

Critique 2:

Lee: 'The additional claim that all languages contain speech-acts that fit our [European] typologies would also not entail the universality of such acts but would rather point to the robustness of our schemes of translation. [...] questions could also be raised about the applicability of a general theory of writing or textuality to mixed modes of semiosis, such as television and movies, which combine visual and oral modalities and whose production includes print-mediated processes as diverse as script-writing and audience surveying.'

Appendix 4: Three points of underhand revision of and by Habermas' public sphere and communicative action

The Welfare State vs. the Market	
Original Stance	**Revised Stance**
The welfare state's legal and administrative functions can successfully overrule market-mechanisms, whereby the political sphere becomes an "adjunct for a legislator," as the welfare state's political format is already set.	The bankruptcy of state socialism [read: the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe] has shown that the legal-administrative mode of regulating [the state is] inappropriate.
A losing communication-battle is fought by "weak institutions" [e.g. workers, minorities, etc.] against those organised powers that communicate with the ambition to "influence the decisions of consumers, voters and clients," why the welfare state must intervene to secure the interests of "weak institutions."	Neither the borders between "high" and "low" culture, nor between "culture" and "politics," may be so sharp after all, nor may the voice of "weak institutions" be so weak after all, making intervention less relevant.
The degree of power-infusion is measured by the extent to which informal, non-public opinions ("cultural" assumptions) are fed into the circuit of formal, quasi-public opinion making by the media that state and economy are trying to influence.	Discursively accomplished formation of opinion and will is a "veiled version" of majority power, not a medium for the potential rationalization of power altogether.

Appendix 5: The 1992 version of Jürgen Habermas' public sphere

Structure		Role	Power	Criteria	Vehicles	Concern
	Bodies					
The State	Constitution Parliament Government Bureaucracy	Governing, based on legitimacy gained from public debate	Decision-maker and responsible: - full participation - all topics open	Norms must anchor in the possibility of all affected participating		
PUBLIC REALM:						
Economic	Institutions Corporations	Lobby, in favour of institutional cultures' "generalised particularism"	"Generalised particularism"-driven: - political - economic	Influence is limited to procurement and withdrawal of legitimation	Voluntary unions as opinion-forming associations, e.g., labour unions	"Economic invaders" of public space
Intimate	Media	Representing "generalised particularism" – countering the "tyranny-of-the-majority"	Communicative	Communicative power cannot substitute inner systematic logic of public/state bureaucracies	Communicator of economic and political interests	Media power manipulating public space
PRIVATE REALM:						
Economic	All socio-economic classes and collectives	Stakeholders in deliberation, here as citizen	Intellectual, Sphere."economic," Collective	Critical investigation of: which mechanisms function to alienate citizens from the political process	Political parties, linked to the state and bureaucracy	"Political invaders" of public space
Intimate	Family	Stakeholders in deliberation, here as welfare-state client	Cultural representation, Opinion, Electorate	Discourse doesn't govern, but can impact in siege-like manner		Individual holders of values, topics and reason

Appendix 6: The SOPA–PIPA debate

The below summary is an extract from Benkler et al.'s study of the SOPA–PIPA debate, published in July 2013 under the title *Social Mobilization and the Networked Public Sphere: Mapping the SOPA–PIPA Debate*.

Ten core findings:

1. the networked public sphere is much more dynamic than many previous descriptions. (Benkler et al. 2013, 40)
2. subject-area, professional media, in this case tech media, played a much larger role in shaping the political debate than the traditional major outlets. (ibid., 41)
3. traditional non-governmental organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge played a critical role as information centers and as core amplifiers in the attention backbone [see also #5] that transmits the voices of various, more peripheral players to the wider community. (ibid., 42)
4. the widespread experimentation carried out by new and special-purpose sites facilitated the conversion of discussion into action. (ibid., 44)
5. highly visible sites within the controversy network were able to provide an attention backbone for less visible sites or speakers, overcoming the widely perceived effect of the power-law distribution of links. (ibid., 44)
6. individuals play a much larger role than was feasible for all but a handful of major mainstream media in the past. (ibid., 44)
7. the network was highly effective at mobilizing and amplifying expertise to produce a counter-narrative to the one provided by proponents of the law. (ibid., 44)
8. consumer boycotts and pressure facilitated by online communities played a key role in shaping business support and opposition. (ibid., 45)
9. at least on questions of intellectual property, the long-decried fragmentation and polarization of the Net was nowhere to be seen. (ibid., 45)

10. the narrative and online actions that are observable in the digital record are highly consistent with the description of events that we took away from interviews and personal knowledge. (ibid., 45)

### Inferences and implications: locating the SOPA–PIPA debate in a larger context:

By the end of the 17 months under study, a diverse network of actors, for-profit and non-profit, media and non-media, individuals and collectives, left, right, and politically agnostic, had come together. They fundamentally shifted the frame of the debate, experimented with diverse approaches and strategies of communication and action, and ultimately blocked legislation that had started life as a bipartisan, lobby-backed, legislative juggernaut. While it is certainly possible that behind-the-scenes manoeuvring was more important and not susceptible to capture by Benkler et al.'s methods, what is clear is that by ProPublica's tally, before 18 January 2012, SOPA–PIPA had 80 publicly declared supporters and 31 opponents, but by the next day, the bills had 65 supporters and 101 opponents. The 18 January online protest campaign and its anchor, the Wikipedia blackout, were the core interventions that blocked the acts. But Benkler et al.'s study suggests that this day's events cannot be understood in terms of lobbying or backroom deals; rather, this outcome represents the fruits of the online discourse and campaign by many voices and organisations, most of which are not traditional sources of power in shaping public policy in the United States.

Appendix 7: Debate fork visualisation

The chart below shows how each contributed CL argument is intended to be attached either to an existing box on the fork, or is used to add as the first box of a new fork, branching out from whatever existing box the contributor finds still being in line with his/her views.

By clicking any existing box all the arguments will appear that all/any of the contributors added to it in support of the view that box states, for review in chronological or contributors' order.

The topic below is simply a sample topic and is not meant to illustrate any actual debate.

Q: Study English @ school in Grade 1?	Good idea, as English is helpful	Make studying English a priority	Bring in specialist teachers	Increase school budgets
No good Idea, as kids need other skills first		English still a lower priority	Let current teacher do this	Within existing school budgets
Full focus on other subjects	Start earlier- but not in grade 1	Make it optional, let parents decide		Parents pay extra for "early" English
Keep it as currently organised	Start with english even later			

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Leif Thomas Olsen
The Citizen Lobby: From Capacity to Influence

Day-to-day politics are largely driven by economic lobbies in the interest of what Habermas calls their "generalised particularism," the threat to take jobs and tax revenues elsewhere. Citizens' influence over politicians is twofold: they are asked for their input in elections, referenda, online consultations and surveys, and citizens can initiate issues where they see political action needed. Yet these "participative forces" regularly fail to reach the ears of elected politicians as effectively as those of well-funded corporate lobbies.

A more powerful model would therefore organise the efforts of the electorate in a way that both generates those reasoned arguments and delivers them to the elected politicians in a manner they can neither refuse nor ignore. This is what the Citizen Lobby intends to do.