

Henry Heitmann-Gordon

Accommodating the Individual

IDENTITY AND CONTROL
AFTER ALEXANDER



Die hellenistische Polis als Lebensform

VA
VerlagAntike

Henry Heitmann-Gordon Accommodating the Individual

Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0

© 2017, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz

ISBN Print: 9783946317142 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317838

Herausgegeben von
Martin Zimmermann

Die hellenistische Polis als Lebensform BAND 8

Henry Heitmann-Gordon

Accommodating the Individual

IDENTITY AND CONTROL
AFTER ALEXANDER


VerlagAntike

Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0

© 2017, Verlag Antike e.K., Mainz

ISBN Print: 9783946317142 – ISBN eLibrary: 9783946317838

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über
<https://dnb.de> abrufbar.

An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libraries working with
Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open
Access for the public good. The Open Access ISBN of this book is 978-3-946317-83-8.

More information about the initiative and links to the Open Access version can be found at
www.knowledgeunlatched.org.



This publication is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives
4.0 International license, at DOI 10.13109/9783946317838. For a copy of this license go to [https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Any use in cases other than those permitted by this license requires the prior written permission
from the publisher.

© 2017 Verlag Antike e.K., Heidelberg

Satz: Henry Heitmann-Gordon, München
Einbandgestaltung: disegno visuelle kommunikation, Wuppertal
Einbandmotive: Modelle von Knidos mit freundlicher Genehmigung
von H. Bankel, V. Hinz und S. Franz. (Abbildungen in Band 1 dieser
Reihe, Stadtbilder im Hellenismus, S. 114, und 115.)

ISBN 978-3-946317-83-8

www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com

Dedicated to my parents

List of Contents

Acknowledgements	11
1. Introduction	13
1.1 State of research	15
1.1.1 King-centric research	16
1.1.2 Polis-centric research	18
1.1.3 Systemic analyses: Kings and cities	22
1.2 ‘Network’ – a conceptual phantom?	26
1.3 Identity	32
1.4 A new approach	35
1.4.1 Why theory?	36
1.4.2 Organising this study	37
1.4.3 Sources	39
1.5 Summary	42
2. Power as networks: concepts and method	43
2.1 Approaching power as a network	43
2.2 Networks of power	45
2.2.1 Actor-Network-Theory	49
2.2.2 Quantifying network theory	56
2.2.3 Harrison White: Narrative struggles for control	63
2.3 Advanced power concepts	67
2.4 Power as networks: concepts	73
2.4.1 Identity	73
2.4.2 Actor	74
2.4.3 Interaction	76
2.4.4 Contingency and trust	77
2.4.5 A note on legitimacy	78
2.5 Power as networks: Questions and method	79
2.5.1 Method	80
2.5.2 Three final notes	81
2.6 Summary	83
3. Individual and collective in Theophrastus’ <i>Characters</i>	85
3.1 Individual and collective	85
3.2 The source material	89
3.3 Theophrastus’ <i>Characters</i> and the construction of identity	89
3.3.1 Polis society	89
3.3.2 Theophrastus’ <i>Characters</i> – the work and its world	91

3.3.2.1 The text and its author	91
3.3.2.2 Date, context, and world.....	100
3.4 Individual and collective – public and private?.....	119
3.5 Adding power: Constructing contingency in the <i>Characters</i>	130
3.5.1 Existential contingency in the <i>Characters</i>	132
3.5.2 Social contingency in the <i>Characters</i>	135
3.5.3 Normative contingency in the <i>Characters</i>	137
3.6 Collective contingency in the <i>Characters</i> : Sanction and meta-control	139
3.6.1 Collective contingency.....	140
3.6.1.1 Love, <i>philia</i> , and trust.....	141
3.6.1.2 Religion.....	146
3.6.1.3 Money and the economic interaction mode	149
3.6.1.4 Truth	154
3.6.1.5 Thematising the system.....	157
3.6.2 Contingency caused by undermining collective cohesion and agency.....	159
3.7 A network of values	162
3.7.1 The cognitive network: Meta-control under tension.....	162
3.7.2 The social network: Sanction in the <i>Characters</i>	167
3.7.2.1 Space	172
3.7.3 The social network dynamics of the <i>Characters</i>	174
3.8 Conclusions.....	176
4. Individual and collective in emergent Hellenistic court society	181
4.1 Setting the stage: Previous scholarship and source material	181
4.1.1 The source material.....	190
4.2 Xenophon's <i>Cyropaedia</i>	193
4.2.1 Source criticism and previous research	196
4.2.2 Individual and collective in the <i>Cyropaedia</i>	209
4.2.2.1 Network boundaries: Public and private?	224
4.2.3 The construction and control of contingency in the <i>Cyropaedia</i>	234
4.2.3.1 Existential contingency	235
4.2.3.2 Social contingency.....	236
4.2.4 Control regimes and normative contingency.....	239
4.2.4.1 <i>Philia</i> : Love, trust, and friendship.....	239
4.2.4.2 Religion and the divine.....	247
4.2.4.3 Money and the economic system	252
4.2.4.4 Truth.....	261
4.2.4.5 Space	264
4.2.5 Conclusion	265
4.3 Emergent Hellenistic court society as a network of contingency control.....	267

4.3.1 Distribution, de-individualisation, mediation.....	271
4.3.2 Storytellers and translators.....	287
4.4 Conclusion	301
5. Of monsters and men: Aspects of control between court and city	305
5.1 Semiotics between court and city	305
5.2 Harpalos.....	310
5.3 Courtesans as city-takers	320
5.4 <i>Philoï</i> as monsters	328
5.5 Conclusion: Monsters in the city?.....	336
6. Rhodes in the networks of the Diadoch period.....	341
6.1 Rhodian society before the siege	341
6.1.1 Colonisation and identity	342
6.1.2 Myth	343
6.1.3 The political relevance of myth.....	346
6.1.4 The synoecism.....	348
6.1.5 The consolidation of Rhodian domestic politics.....	357
6.1.5.1 The Hekatomnids and the Social War (357-355 BC).....	357
6.1.5.2 Trade.....	360
6.1.5.3 Rhodes and Alexander	361
6.1.5.4 Rhodes after Alexander's death	364
6.2 Rhodes and the Antigonids in the Diadoch period	366
6.2.1 The siege of 305/4 BC	372
6.2.1.1 Source criticism.....	373
6.2.2 Rhodes before the siege	375
6.2.3 Constructing agency during the siege.....	378
6.3 The Colossus of Rhodes	387
6.3.1 Image.....	388
6.3.2 Text.....	395
6.4. Conclusion	407
7. Summary and conclusions	411
Glossary of terms	421
List of abbreviations	427
Bibliography.....	429
Literary sources	429
Papyri	430
Defixiones	430

Inscriptions	431
Secondary literature.....	433
Indices.....	469
Index nominum et locorum	469
Index nominum modernorum.....	473
Index rerum	474

Acknowledgements

This book is a revised version of my PhD Thesis that was submitted and defended at the Faculty of History and the Arts of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich in Summer 2016. Any creative endeavour invariably incurs many a debt and this book is no exception to the rule. The first debt of gratitude I owe to my supervisors, Prof. Dr. Martin Zimmermann (Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich) and Prof. Dr. Christof Schuler (Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des DAI), for being extremely supportive when it was needed, while also giving me free rein to work in ways I enjoyed, and for trusting me to see the project through to completion. In the same vein, many a foundation for this project was laid during my studies as part of the Classics MA programme at the University of Exeter. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my teachers there, especially Prof. Richard Seaford, Prof. Stephen Mitchell, and Prof. Karen Ni-Mheallaigh, for opening my eyes to many aspects of Ancient Studies that would have gone unappreciated otherwise.

The second debt owed is hardly less significant. The Munich Graduate School of Ancient Studies “Distant Worlds” not only very generously funded this project for three years, but also served as an intellectual haven that has influenced the book in ways both great and small. Gratitude is due in particular to the members and postdoctoral coordinators of two focus areas, Constructions of Elites and Memory and Forgetting, as well as to Prof. Dr. Susanne Götde and Prof. Dr. Hans-Joachim Gehrke for their encouragement and many stimulating remarks. The same tip of the hat must go also to the Distant Worlds research forum and the departmental colloquia that offered much helpful discussion.

Finally, special thanks are due to Dr. Alexander Free, Dr. Florian R. Forster, Dr. Katja Kröss, Dr. Jean Evans, Daniela Heilmann, Moritz Huber, Saskia Kerschbaum, Hardy Maas, Martin Stahl, Zsuzsanna Vegh, and Prof. Dr. Jennifer Finn for reading and critiquing parts of my work. All remaining errors and idiosyncrasies naturally remain my own. Last but by no means least, I thank Kathleen Burns for her unwavering support and invaluable help with the notes.

As far as the physical form of this work is concerned, my gratitude is due once more to Prof. Dr. Martin Zimmermann for inviting me to publish in the series “Die hellenistische Polis als Lebensform” and to publisher Martina Trampedach for her support and assistance. It goes without saying that without my parents, Prof. Dr. Annegret Heitmann and Prof. Dr. Richard Gordon, to whom this book is dedicated, not a single word would ever have been written.

Munich, November 2017
Henry Heitmann-Gordon

1. Introduction

*Kingship is rule without accountability. For not only the virtuous are free, but also kings, since kingship is unaccountable rule, which none but the wise can maintain. Neither nature nor justice gives kingdoms to men, but they belong to those who are able to lead an army and handle affairs of state sensibly; such as Philip was, and the successors of Alexander. For family relations did not benefit [Philip's] natural son at all because of the weakness of his character. But those who were entitled to nothing became kings of almost the entire inhabited world.*¹

The nature of Hellenistic kingship, which this passage from the Suda implicitly attempts to pin down, has been much debated also in modern research on the Hellenistic period. Ever since Johann Gustav Droysen developed the conceptual category that distinguished this part of Greek history from the Classical period, the fascination of this question has been obvious, since its potential answers constitute one of the main differences: the Greek world of poleis was now under a fundamentally new kind of structural tension due to its interpenetration with monarchical court culture.² After the apparently Herodotean and Thucydidean Classical period, history and society seemed dominated by individuals, men in the mould of Alexander the Great, who succeeded in accomplishing deeds without

¹ All translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated. Names are generally kept in their Greek form, but authors and literary figures are latinised where that form is more familiar. The quotation is from the Suda s.v. Βασιλεία (Adler Beta 147): Βασιλεία ἐστὶν ἀνυπεύθυνος ἀρχή. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι τοὺς σπουδαίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλέας. ἡ γὰρ βασιλεία ἀρχὴ ἀνυπεύθυνος, ἥτις περὶ μόνους ἂν τοὺς σοφοὺς συσταίη. Βασιλεία. οὔτε φύσις οὔτε τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδίδουσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς βασιλείας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡγεῖσθαι στρατοπέδου καὶ χειρῶν πράγματα νουνεχῶς: οἷος ἦν Φίλιππος καὶ οἱ διάδοχοι Ἀλεξάνδρου. τὸν γὰρ υἱὸν κατὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν ὠφέλιμον ἢ συγγένεια διὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδυναμίαν. τοὺς δὲ μὴδὲν προσήκοντας βασιλεῖς γενέσθαι σχεδὸν ἀπάσης τῆς οἰκουμένης. Cf. also Suda s.v. Βασιλεία (Adler Beta 148) on royal property. It is hardly surprising that the same basic thought occurs in the biography of the Stoic Zeno at Diog. Laert. 7.122. On this passage of the Suda see e.g. Müller, Olaf. *Antigonos Monophthalmos und das "Jahr der Könige"*. Bonn 1973, 110f.; Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Der siegreiche König. Überlegungen zur hellenistischen Monarchie", in: *AKG* 64 (1982), 247-277, here 252-266. On the contemporary Hellenistic counter-concept of rule as honourable service (ἐνδοξος δουλεία), cf. Volkmann, Hans. "Die Basileia als ἐνδοξος δουλεία. Ein Beitrag zur Wortgeschichte der Duleia", in: *Historia* 16:2 (1967), 155-161.

² Droysen, Johann G. *Geschichte des Hellenismus*. 3 vols. Edited by Erich Bayer. Reutlingen 1952 [1833-46]. For a critical assessment of Droysen's work see recently Bosworth, A. Brian. "Johann Gustav Droysen, Alexander the Great and the Creation of the Hellenistic Age", in: Pat Wheatley and Robert Hannah (eds.). *Alexander & His Successors: Essays from the Antipodes*. Claremont, CA 2009, 1-27. On this structural difference in opposition to Droysen's idea of fusion see Lane Fox, Robin. "The First Hellenistic Man", in: Erskine, Andrew and Llewellyn-Jones, Lloyd (eds.). *Creating a Hellenistic World*. Swansea 2011, 1-30, here 1-5, 18.

precedent by commanding the agency of many – a command they exercised by virtue of apparently purely personal qualities. Their actions were to fundamentally change the *oikoumene* for centuries, not only politically, but also culturally and economically. This individualist, even Machiavellian face of the period has had a great impact on attempts at understanding the mechanics of the complex political systems of the Hellenistic kingdoms in the Eastern Mediterranean, which Alfred Heuss once aptly described as a “bunte[r] Wirrwarr [von] zwischen Stadt und Herrscher verlaufenden Handlungen”.³ The matter accordingly continues to occupy ancient historians. One of the possible reasons for the ongoing fascination with these intricacies and the search for new approaches is apparent,⁴ in my view, already from the vague phrasing of the Suda entry: the problem lies quite simply in conceptualising a system that is constantly in flux, lacks clear institutional rules, and can be reduced to *χειρίζειν πράγματα νουνεχῶς*, so to a vague “sensibly”, a diffuse impression of super-human agency and of overwhelming individual ability to order the world.⁵

This study offers a contribution to this discussion by concentrating on a number of hitherto underappreciated aspects of this system in its period of genesis, the period of the Diadochi, Alexander’s immediate successors. Focus is shifted from an understanding of this period as a time of war structured by the struggle to legitimate violence especially among a number of great individuals, to

³ Heuss, Alfred. *Stadt und Herrscher des Hellenismus in ihren staats- und völkerrechtlichen Beziehungen*. Aalen 1963², 217.

⁴ The Diadoch period has enjoyed renewed interest not only in the 1990s with the publication of numerous fundamental studies on the individual kings, but also more recently in various edited volumes. These include: Erskine, Andrew and Llewellyn-Jones, Lloyd (eds.). *Creating a Hellenistic World*. Swansea 2011; Alonso Troncoso, Víctor and Anson, Edward M. (eds.). *After Alexander: the Time of the Diadochi (323-281 BC)*. Oxford 2013; Hauben, Hans and Meeus, Alexander (eds.). *The Age of the Successors and the Creation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms (323-276 BC)*. Leuven 2014.

⁵ See Lane Fox 2011, 17f.: “[...]If we fasten on kings and courts as the age’s distinctive feature, the ‘ideal type’ of a Hellenistic man needs to be rather different: he is calculating but also impassioned, combative but generous, guided by the gods but capable of a furious ferocity, educated but fearless in hunting, given to planning, and city-founding; in short, he is exemplified by Alexander, the first ‘Hellenistic man.’” Consider also the similar description of Alexander’s practice by Eumenes at Diod. 18.60.5 as “organising all things pertaining to the kingship productively” ([...] πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν διοικεῖν ἐνεργῶς). It is further obvious that these kinds of definitions already impose limitations on “rule without accountability” (*ἀνυπεύθυνος ἀρχή*), unless of course that is to be considered a purely institutional category. Ultimately, the problem therefore appears to be one of assessing individuals historically, i.e. the relationship between individual and collective.

investigating this period at a societal level as a period of productive reconfiguration of individual and collective norm through narrative.⁶ Instead of asking: “How did the successors achieve obedience?”, the question thus becomes: “How did society accommodate these individuals?” Before this new perspective is developed and a variety of answers to this question are offered, however, the state of research needs to be briefly canvassed to contextualise the approach taken here and establish its point of departure. In doing so, three observations shall be made, to which this study responds by formulating a new approach.

1.1 State of research

The confusing mess of interactions between city and king identified by Alfred Heuss has left its traces upon modern research on the political cosmos of the early Hellenistic period, which is accordingly difficult to abstract – doing so *in extenso* would be quite a task in itself.⁷ The following passages seek to make it manageable by distinguishing a number of core areas of research without, however, claiming that these categories are in any way monolithic or isolated – in practice, study of these areas has always overlapped. The areas of research covered here are accordingly chosen in essence because they produced results relevant to the study at hand in that they develop and apply conceptions of rule and power either explicitly or implicitly. To simplify presentation, the history of research will hence be treated in the following categories:

- 1) Historical research based on a biographical or narrowly political mode of presentation and interested primarily in the kings as historical agents. This strand of research will accordingly be termed ‘king-centric’.
- 2) Studies that aim at reconstructing institutions, domestic and inter-state policy, as well as cultural policies of Greek city-states. Research with these and related interests is considered ‘polis-centric’.

⁶ “Norms” are always to be considered in this sense, i.e. not as fixed and reliable rules for action, but as putatively communal points of reference in a weave of narratives that provides structure to action. Positive rules are invoked to negotiate the extent to which they can be bent. See Flaig, Egon. “Wie relevant ist die Praxeologie für die Kulturwissenschaften?”, in: Markus Bernhardt, Stefan Brakensiek and Benjamin Scheller (eds.). *Ermöglichen und Verbindern. Vom Umgang mit Kontingenz*. Frankfurt and New York 2016, 23–48, here 33.

⁷ See also the more in-depth overviews by Seibert, Jakob. *Das Zeitalter der Diadochen*. Munich 1983; Cartledge, Paul. “Introduction”, in: Paul Cartledge, Peter Garnsey and Erich Gruen (eds.). *Hellenistic Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography*. Berkeley 1997, 1–19.

3) The third and final category consists of research that aims at reconstructing the overall system of Hellenistic politics. This research combines the two poles considered here and addresses the system either as a whole or in its thematic components at an abstract level, occasionally with an interest in ideal types. This strand of research includes dedicated studies of the nature of Hellenistic power, its institutionalisation, and the ‘glue’ that held the Hellenistic political cosmos together, i.e. the interactions between city and king.

In sketching the content of these three categories, the main focus is necessarily on publications that engage with the period of Alexander’s successors and the early Hellenistic period in general, as this study aims to investigate the period that saw the structural genesis of this political cosmos. Generally speaking, however, the number of directly pertinent publications is limited, largely due to the fact that the Diadoch period and especially the third century BC suffer from the lack of coherent written sources and the relative dearth of epigraphic material by comparison with the High and Late Hellenistic period. Moreover, due to the caesura marked by the beginning of Polybius’ work, diachronic studies on specific aspects of political discourse are on much safer ground in the High Hellenistic period, which is much closer to the beginning of Roman involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean. The focus in research is thus oriented more towards the changes brought about by the impact of Rome than with the structural continuity between the late fourth and the third century BC. In my view, abstract research into the overall system of the early Hellenistic period is therefore relatively scarce.

1.1.1 King-centric research

It is self-evident that different perspectives will produce different historical analyses of a given political cosmos. If great individuals are brought into focus, as by the author of the Suda passage, we find monographs on individual rulers or the dynasties they establish, and accordingly much of the research on the early Hellenistic period has traditionally been structured in this way, directly continuing the narrative patterns employed by Diodorus and Plutarch.⁸ In order to organise the political complexity of the Diadoch period, these kinds of approaches emphasise the individual protagonist’s place in a configuration of events and evaluate

⁸ Fundamental is the political history of Will, Édouard. *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique: De la mort d’Alexandre aux avènements d’Antiochos III et de Philippe V*. Nancy 1979², e.g. 56f. Some older examples are Tarn, William W. *Antigonos Gonatas*. Oxford 1913; Seibert, Jakob. *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios’ I*. Munich 1969; Bengtson, Hermann. *Herrscher gestalten des Hellenismus*. Munich 1975.

the resulting individual performance.⁹ This approach further allows both for the organised reconstruction of the political history of the Hellenistic world in general and of the specifics of its power configuration(s) in particular. Good examples are provided by studies of the first two Antigonid kings, Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes, who are the focus of the written sources.¹⁰ Later studies have tended to broaden their interests, signalled by subtitles, and attempt to reconstruct the monarchical system and state structures of the Diadoch period. These include important works on Hellenistic kings and kingship, such as Richard Billows' *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, Helen Lund's *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*, and John Ma's *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor*.¹¹ Clearly these works already encroach upon the category of system research, as they aim to draw supra-individual and thematic conclusions about the overall political system of the Hellenistic period. Nevertheless they focus relatively narrowly on the agency of an individual king and his

⁹ Will 1979² [1966], for instance, is organised based on the great historical actors. On the difficult chronology of the Diadoch period see now the eclectic synthesis of high and low chronology by Boiy, Tom. *Between High and Low: A Chronology of the Early Hellenistic Period*. Frankfurt a.M. 2007, and more recently the discussion in Yardley, John C., Wheatley, Pat and Heckel, Waldemar. *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic history of Pompeius Trogus. Volume II Books 13-15: The Successors to Alexander the Great*. Oxford and New York 2011, 8-22, both with extensive bibliography. These discussions provide the basis of most of the chronological statements in this study.

¹⁰ The main literary sources on the Diadoch period, Diodorus books 18-20, as well as Plutarch's lives of Eumenes and Demetrios Poliorketes, mainly focus on the Antigonids. Diodorus' focus is due to his use of Hieronymus of Cardia: Hornblower, Jane. *Hieronymus of Cardia*. Oxford 1981; Billows, Richard A. *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*. Berkeley 1990, 329-333; 341-348. Fundamental on the first Antigonids are Wehrli, Claude. *Antigone et Démétrios*. Geneva 1969; Briant, Pierre. *Antigone le Borgne. Les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'assemblée macédonienne*. Paris 1973; Müller 1973; Bengtson 1975, 64-90; Engel, Rudolf. *Untersuchungen zum Machtaufstieg des Antigonos I Monophthalmos: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühen Diadochenzeit*. Kallmünz 1977. For the history of research see Seibert 1983, 179-183; 196-198; 203-206.

¹¹ Billows 1990; Grainger, John D. *Seleukos Nikator. Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom*. London and New York 1990; Lund, Helen. *Lysimachus. A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*. London and New York 1992; Ellis, Walter R. *Ptolemy of Egypt*. London and New York 1994; Bosworth, A. Brian. *The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*. Oxford 2002; Thonemann, Peter. "The Tragic King: Demetrios Poliorketes and the City of Athens", in: Oliver Hekster and Robert Fowler (eds.). *Imaginary Kings. Royal Images in the Ancient Near East, Greece and Rome*. Stuttgart 2005, 63-86. Cf. also Ma, John. *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor*. Oxford 1999, as well as Schäfer, Christoph. *Eumenes von Kardia und der Kampf um die Macht im Alexanderreich* (=Frankfurter althistorische Beiträge 9). Frankfurt a.M. 2002.

institutionalisation of interactive structures.¹² The dominant interest is in intentional empire building and the consolidation and extension of sovereignty, as well as in macro-political conflict and tension. While this structural interest entails the analysis of relationships, interactions, and personnel, the political historiography of the Diadoch period nevertheless remains focused essentially on *Realpolitik*. The implications of these processes for cognitive spaces of action and expectations for future interaction, i.e. for the level of subtle, societal power, are addressed only occasionally, for instance by John Ma, whose admirable work on Antiochos III is naturally concerned with the more fully developed High Hellenistic period, rather than with the period of change and uncertainty that followed Alexander's death.¹³ Accordingly, there seems to be a gap here that this study will aim to address by considering the substructures of the monarchical cosmos of order that helped determine royal agency in the early Hellenistic period. This consideration leads one into the recently revitalised area of court studies, which will be discussed below as an aspect of system studies.

1.1.2 Polis-centric research

The second area of research pertinent to this study deals with the politics of the early Hellenistic polis and its citizen actors, who are visible especially in the epigraphic record and were long neglected due to the perception of the Hellenistic period as an era of decadence.¹⁴ In the last forty years, however, the plurality of the Hellenistic poleis, their forms of institutional organisation, their local and supra-local identities – both 'mythical' and 'historical', their economic, domestic

¹² Billows 1990, 198-285, for instance, analyses structures of rule in the context of Antigonos' motivations and interests, i.e. as idiosyncratic, personal actions. Cf. similarly Grainger 1990, 114-154; Lund 1992, 51-79; Ellis 1994, 28-35. A recent synthesis of such macro-political, state-based analysis is available by Ma, John. "Hellenistic Empires", in: Peter Fibiger Bang and Walter Scheidel (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean*. Oxford 2013, 324-360.

¹³ Ma 1999, esp. 179-242, a section that is particularly sensitive to language and the plurality of meanings reproduced in different contexts in the Empire of Antiochos III. This trend has of course gathered steam since, see recently for instance Kosmin, Paul J. *The Land of the Elephant Kings: Space, Territory, and Ideology in the Seleucid Empire*. Cambridge 2014.

¹⁴ Consider only the famous dictum of Glotz, Gustave. *La cité grecque*. Paris 1928, 448: "[Chaironea donne] une date précise à ce grand événement, la fin de la cité grecque." For a history of research see Mann, Christian. "Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten in der hellenistischen Polis: Überlegungen zum Stand der Forschung", in: Christian Mann and Peter Scholz (eds.). *"Demokratie" im Hellenismus: von der Herrschaft des Volkes zur Herrschaft der Honoratioren?* Mainz 2012, 11-27, esp. 11f.

and inter-state agencies, and the cognitive modes of world organisation they accommodated and associated in human interaction have been the subject of increasingly detailed and differentiated study.¹⁵ Christian Habicht's work, particularly on Hellenistic Athens, is especially important here, as are the monumental efforts of Louis Robert.¹⁶ With their meticulous study especially of the Archaic and Classical poleis, the Copenhagen Polis Centre under the direction of Mogens H. Hansen has also contributed much to the study of this specific culture of political coexistence and cooperation, benefitting our understanding also of the Hellenistic polis.¹⁷ The number of dedicated studies of individual Hellenistic

¹⁵ On the development of this plurality in Ancient History see Mann 2012, 19. Important studies in this area include the contributions in Zanker, Paul and Wörrle, Michael (eds.). *Stadtbild und Bürgerbild im Hellenismus. Kolloquium, München, 24. bis 26. Juni 1993*. Munich 1995; Archibald, Zofia H., Davies, John K., Gabrielsen, Vincent, and Oliver, Graham J. (eds.). *Hellenistic Economies*. London 2001; and in Matthei, Albrecht and Zimmermann, Martin (eds.). *Stadtbilder im Hellenismus*. Berlin 2009. See further Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Myth, History and Collective Identity: Uses of the Past in Antiquity and Beyond", in: Nino Luraghi (ed.). *The Historian's Craft in the Age of Herodotus*. Oxford 2001, 286-313; idem. "Bürgerliches Selbstverständnis und Polisidentität im Hellenismus", in: Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp et al. (eds.). *Sinn (in) der Antike. Orientierungssysteme, Leitbilder und Wertkonzepte im Altertum*. Mainz 2003, 225-254, Ma, John. "Peer polity interaction in the Hellenistic age", in: *PC&P* 180 (2003), 9-39. Significant studies on domestic and inter-state interaction modes of Hellenistic poleis include: Quass, Friedemann. *Die Honoratiorenschicht in den Städten des griechischen Ostens. Untersuchungen zur politischen und sozialen Entwicklung in hellenistischer und römischer Zeit*. Stuttgart 1993; Ma, John. "Fighting Poleis of the Hellenistic World", in: Paul van Wees (ed.). *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*. London 2000, 337-376; Fröhlich, Pierre. *Les cités grecques et le contrôle des magistrats IV^e-I^{er} siècle avant J.-C.* (=Hautes études du monde gréco-romain 33). Geneva 2004; Chaniotis, Angelos. *War in the Hellenistic World. A Social and Cultural History*. Malden, MA 2005; Dimitriev, Sviatoslav. *City Government in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor*. Oxford 2005, esp. 11-106; Grieb, Volker. *Hellenistische Demokratie. Politische Organisation und Struktur in freien griechischen Poleis nach Alexander dem Großen*. Stuttgart 2008; Carlsson, Susanne. *Hellenistic Democracies. Freedom, Independence and Political Procedure in Some East Greek City-States* (=Historia Einzelschriften 206). Stuttgart 2010; Ma, John. *Statues and Cities. Honorific Portraits and Civic Identity in the Hellenistic World*. Oxford 2013.

¹⁶ Habicht, Christian. *Athen: Geschichte der Stadt in hellenistischer Zeit*. Munich 1995; idem. *Untersuchungen zur politischen Geschichte Athens im 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Munich 1979. Louis Robert's response to Gustave Glotz (n. 14 above) is famous: "La cité grecque n'est pas morte à Chéronée, ni sous Alexandre, ni dans le cours de toute l'époque hellénistique" (Robert, Louis. "Théophraste de Mytilène à Constantinople", in: *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres* 1969, 42-64, here 42); on the continuity of the euergetic habit see Gauthier, Philippe. *Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (IV^e-I^{er} siècle avant J.-C.). Contribution à l'histoire des institutions*. Athens and Paris 1985, 67f.

¹⁷ Especially helpful is the polis inventory: Hansen, Mogens H. and Nielsen, Thomas H. (eds.). *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*. Oxford 2004, and the overview by

poleis is steadily growing, profiting from the wealth of epigraphic material produced by the epigraphic culture that characterised especially the first half of the Hellenistic period.¹⁸ Even more important, however, are thematically organised, comparative studies on institutions and the agency of civic collectives. As mentioned above, these address domestic dynamics, including financial policies, administration and law, as well as politics of identity and self-representation, but also inter-state relations, including the role of delegates and ambassadors, the use of external judges, the politics of *asylia* and *isopoliteia*, the negotiation of mytho-historical kinship, and finally their long-neglected military activity.¹⁹ As a result of

-
- Gauthier, Philippe. “Les cités hellénistiques”, in: Mogens H. Hansen (ed.). *The Ancient Greek City-state* (=Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre 1). Copenhagen 1993, 211-231.
- ¹⁸ Particularly well-studied examples include Priene: Raeck, Wolfgang. “Der mehrfache Apollodoros: Zur Präsenz des Bürgers im hellenistischen Stadtbild am Beispiel von Priene”, in: Wörrle and Zanker (eds.) 1995, 231-238; von Kienlin, Andreas. “Das Stadtzentrum von Priene als Monument bürgerlicher Selbstdarstellung”, in: Ernst-Ludwig Schwander and Klaus Rheidt (eds.). *Macht der Architektur. Architektur der Macht*. Mainz 2004, 114-120; Raeck, Wolfgang. “Neue Forschungen zum spätklassischen und hellenistischen Priene”, in: Fahri Işık, Elmar Schwertheim, and Engelbert Winter (eds.). *Neue Forschungen zu Ionien* (=Asia Minor Studien 54). Bonn 2005, 147-163; Kos: Höghammar, Kerstin (ed.). *The Hellenistic Polis of Kos. State, Economy and Culture*. Uppsala 2004; Rhodes: Wiemer, Hans-Ulrich. *Krieg, Handel und Piraterie. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des hellenistischen Rhodos*. Berlin 2002; Ephesos: Walser, Andreas V. *Bauern und Zinsnehmer. Politik, Recht und Wirtschaft im frühhellenistischen Ephesos* (=Vestigia 59). Munich 2008, and of course Athens: Krumeich, Ralf and Witschel, Christian (eds.). *Die Akropolis von Athen im Hellenismus und in der römischen Kaiserzeit*. Wiesbaden 2010.
- ¹⁹ Thematic studies include: Scheer, Tanja. *Mythische Vorväter: zur Bedeutung griechischer Heroenmythen im Selbstverständnis kleinasiatischer Städte*. Munich 1993; Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. “Eine Bilanz: Die Entwicklung des Gymnasiums zur Institution der Sozialisierung in der Polis”, in: Daniel Kah and Peter Scholz (eds.). *Das hellenistische Gymnasium*. Berlin 2004, 413-419; Walser, Andreas V. “ΔΙΚΑΣΤΗΡΙΑ – Rechtsprechung und Demokratie in den hellenistischen Poleis”, in: Mann and Scholz (eds.) 2012, 74-108; Maier, Franz G. *Griechische Mauerbauinschriften* (=Vestigia 1-2). 2 vols. Heidelberg 1959-1961; Meier, Ludwig. *Die Finanzierung öffentlicher Bauten in der hellenistischen Polis*. Mainz 2012; Giovannini, Adalberto. “Greek Cities and Greek Commonwealth”, in: Bulloch et al. (eds.) 1993, 265-286, here 274-286; Rigsby, Kent J. *Asylia. Territorial inviolability in the Hellenistic World* (=Hellenistic Culture and Society 22). Berkeley and London 1996; Migeotte, Leopold. *L’Emprunt public dans les cités grecques: recueil des documents et analyse critique*. Quebec and Paris 1984; idem. *Les souscriptions publiques dans les cités grecques*. Quebec and Geneva 1992; Ager, Sheila L. *Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World, 337-90 B.C.* (=Hellenistic Society and Culture 18). Berkeley and London 1996; Curty, Olivier. *Les parentés légendaires entre cités grecques: Catalogue raisonné des inscriptions contenant le terme syngeneia et analyse critique*. Geneva 1995; Ma 2000 and 2003; idem. “Une culture militaire en Asie Mineure hellénistique?”, in: Couvenhes, Jean-Christophe and Fernoux, Henri-Louis (eds.). *Les cités grecques et la guerre en Asie Mineure à l’époque*

more interdisciplinary engagement with archaeological work, building policies and spatial politics, for instance on the acropoleis and agorai as well as in the theatres, bouleuteria, and gymnasia of the poleis, have also attracted increasing attention.²⁰

The question of how to conceptualise power in the Hellenistic period is particularly pertinent when it comes to the polis. Paul Veyne and Friedemann Quass have raised numerous questions that may, somewhat inadequately, be reduced to a single one, namely ‘who has power *in* the Hellenistic polis?’²¹ Important answers have been offered in the debate about the structural significance of euergetism for the Greek poleis in the Hellenistic period,²² the closely related discussion about the nature and shifts of democratic governance,²³ as well as in studies of the role played by foreign garrisons and other manifestations of external powers

hellénistique. Actes de la journée d'études de Lyon, 10 octobre 2003. Tours 2004, 199-220; Chaniotis 2005, esp. 18-26.

- ²⁰ On civic space see for instance: Giovannini 1993, 268-274; Chaniotis, Angelos. “Theatricality Beyond the Theater. Staging Public Life in the Hellenistic World”, in: Le Guen, Brigitte (ed.). *De la scène aux gradins. Théâtre et représentations dramatiques après Alexandre le Grand dans les cités hellénistiques* (=Pallas 41). Toulouse 1997, 219-259; Sielhorst, Barbara M. A. “Hellenistic Agorai. Formation, Reception and Semantics of an Urban Space”, in: Angelikē Gannikouri (ed.). *The Agora in the Mediterranean from Homeric to Roman times.* Athens 2011, 31-46, as well as the contributions in: Kah, Daniel and Scholz, Peter (eds.). *Das hellenistische Gymnasium.* Berlin 2004; Zimmermann, Martin. “Stadtraum, Architektur und öffentliches Leben in der hellenistischen Stadt”, in: Matthaai and Zimmermann 2009, 23-40; Krumeich, Ralf and Witschel, Christian. “Hellenistische Statuen in ihrem räumlichen Kontext: Das Beispiel der Akropolis und der Agora von Athen”, in: Matthaai und Zimmermann 2009, 173-226; von den Hoff, Ralf. “Hellenistische Gymnasien: Raumgestaltung und Raumfunktionen”, in: Matthaai und Zimmermann 2009, 245-275; Ma 2013b.
- ²¹ Veyne, Paul. *Le pain et le cirque. Sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique.* Paris 1976, 201-271; Quass, Friedemann. “Zur Verfassung der griechischen Städte im Hellenismus”, in: *Chiron* 9 (1979), 37-52; 1993.
- ²² These include: Gauthier 1985; Rosen, Klaus. “Ehrendekrete, Biographie und Geschichtsschreibung. Zum Wandel der Polis im frühen Hellenismus”, in: *Chiron* 17 (1987), 277-292, esp. 282-292; Quass 1993; Habicht 1997; van der Vliet, Edward Ch. L. “Pride and Participation. Political Practice, Euergetism, and Oligarchisation in the Hellenistic Polis”, in: Onno M. van Nijf and Richard Alston (eds.). *Political Culture in the Greek City after the Classical Age.* Leuven 2011, 155-184. The significance of the gymnasium as a source of euergetic agency has been studied by Schuler, Christof. “Die hellenistische Gymnasiarchie”, in: Kah and Scholz (eds.) 2004, 163-192.
- ²³ The state of research is discussed by Mann 2012, esp. 18f. Important contributions include: Gauthier 1985, e.g. 55f.; 66-75; Müller, Helmut. “Bemerkungen zu Funktion und Bedeutung des Rats in den hellenistischen Städten”, in: Wörle and Zanker (eds.) 1995, 41-54; Habicht, Christian. “Ist ein Honoratiorenregime das Kennzeichen der Stadt im späteren Hellenismus?”, in: Wörle and Zanker (eds.) 1995, 87-92; Gehrke 2003, esp. 235-240; Grieb 2008, esp. 15-18 and 355-378; Carlsson 2010, esp. 287-293.

within the cityscapes.²⁴ The same applies to work on the institutions of the *poieis* – assembly, council, law courts, *ephebeia*, etc. – all of which show strong continuities or even intensification down to the late 2nd century BC.²⁵ While it is therefore now generally acknowledged that polis and ‘democracy’ did not end with the Lamian War and that their practical and cognitive significance for the Hellenistic Greeks was in fact amplified by comparison with the Classical period, the situational and proportional significance of the various strands of social, political, and cultural interaction modes continue to be debated, as do the shifts in their proportional importance and organisation both in the early Hellenistic period and under Roman influence.²⁶

1.1.3 Systemic analyses: Kings and cities

In sum, these studies, all of which have significant individual value, contribute to an overall discourse on the system of Hellenistic politics that attempts to embed

-
- ²⁴ On garrisons in general see: Labarre, Guy. “Phourarques et phouroi des cités grecques d’Asie Mineure à l’époque hellénistique”, in: Couvenhes and Fernoux (eds.). 2004, 221-248, esp. 235-237; on conflicts and co-existence see for instance: Chaniotis, Angelos. “Foreign Soldiers – Native girls? Constructing and Crossing Boundaries in Hellenistic Cities with Foreign Garrisons”, in: idem and Pierre Ducrey (eds.). *Army and Power in the Ancient World*. Stuttgart 2002, 99-113; Ma, John. “Oversexed, overpaid, over here: a response to Angelos Chaniotis”, in: Chaniotis and Ducrey (eds.). 2002, 115-122; Chaniotis 2005, 78-96.
- ²⁵ Grieb 2008, 355-378; Carlsson 2010, esp. 279-293, esp. 283f.; Mann 2012, 11-15; Walser 2012. On the continuities and changes in the *ephebeia* at Athens see: Burckhardt, Leonhard. “Die attische Ephebie in hellenistischer Zeit”, in: Kah and Scholz (eds.) 2004, 193-206 with the comments by Tracy, Stephen V. “Reflections on the Athenian Ephebeia in the Hellenistic Age”, in: Kah and Scholz (eds.) 2004, 207-210, as well as the fundamental study by Pélekidis, Chrysis. *Histoire de l’éphébie attique des origines à 31 avant Jésus-Christ*. Paris 1962. See further on the *ephebeia* in Asia Minor and Macedonia: Chankowski, Andrzej “L’entraînement militaire des éphèbes dans les cités grecques d’Asie Mineure à l’époque hellénistique: nécessité pratique ou tradition atrophiee?”, in: Couvenhes and Fernoux (eds.) 2004, 55-76.
- ²⁶ Gehrke 2003; Mann 2012, 12f.; Leppin, Hartmut. “Theophrasts ‘Charaktere’ und die Bürgermentalität in Athen im Übergang zum Hellenismus”, in: *Klio* 84 (2002), 37-56, here 49f.; Strootman, Rolf. “Kings and Cities in the Hellenistic Age”, in: van Nijf, Alston and Williamson (eds.) 2011, 141-153, here 144.

city and king by addressing overall structural questions, be they economic, cultural, political, or social.²⁷ The central underlying question is thus ‘How did Hellenistic society work in these categories, both specifically, and in general?’²⁸ The answers offered consist in more or less skilfully differentiated definitions, ideal types and normative abstractions, but at the same time stress the plurality of interactive configurations in evidence throughout the Hellenistic period. Their interest, overall, is in the complexity of the system of Hellenistic politics and in how it functioned.²⁹

Such research on the overarching nature of the system proper was long dominated by the search for an integrated legal structure. Attempts to solve the problem posed by the apparent lack of a structural formula capable of describing Hellenistic sovereignty and relationships of authority hinged on the history of institutions and aimed to uncover an implicit structural principle in categories of constitutional and inter-state law.³⁰ The best-known and most influential example is undoubtedly the model proposed by Elias Bickerman, closely followed by the fundamental alternative proposed by Alfred Heuss.³¹ Although the latter’s approach was fundamentally organised in categories of inter-state law and sought to

²⁷ For the history of research see Seibert 1983, 176-179. This includes some of the great standard works of Hellenistic socio-economic history, including Bickerman, Elias. *Institutions des Seleucides*. Paris 1938; Rostovtzeff, Michael I. *The Social and Economic History of the Ancient World*. 3 vols. Oxford 1941; Will 1979² [1966].

²⁸ Cf. Ma 2013a. On the formation of the Ptolemaic state see also Manning, Joseph G. *The Last Pharaohs: Egypt under the Ptolemies, 305-30 BC*. Princeton 2010, e.g. 1-6.

²⁹ E.g. Heuss 1963²; Préaux, Claire. *Le Monde Hellenistique*. 2 vols. Paris 1978.

³⁰ One pointer here is the note in Arr. *Anab.* 4.11.6 that even the Macedonian king ruled by virtue of *nomos*, “law”, rather than *bia*, “force”, but what that actually means is not quite as clear as my glosses may suggest (probably something like “consent contingent on reason and tradition”). See already Hammond, Nicholas G.L. and Griffith, Guy T. *A History of Macedonia. Volume II: 550-336 B.C.* Oxford 1979, 385-388, who also reject the constitutional model (p. 398). For the problem see e.g. the observations of Ogden, Daniel. *Prostitutes, Polygamy and Death: The Hellenistic Dynasties*. London 1999, xvii-xix.

³¹ Elias Bickerman’s (1938) model, elegantly described by John Ma as the “surrender and grant model” (1999, 152; cf. idem 2013a, 335-342), is the antithesis of Heuss’ and hinges on a liminal moment, a siege, for instance, that erases the legal status and the sovereignty of a polis. Thereafter, this *tabula rasa* is re-inscribed in a unilateral, external act, which redefines the status of the polis with the ruler as new sovereign. For the Diadoch period research conducted on this model includes the work by Müller 1973; Engel, Rudolf. *Untersuchungen zum Machtaufstieg des Antigonos I. Monophthalmos: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühen Diadochenzeit*. Kallmünz 1976, which investigated the legality of the behaviour exhibited by Antigonos Monophthalmos, as well as Orth, Wolfgang. *Königlicher Machtanspruch und städtische Freiheit*. Munich 1977. The Hellenistic political system in general was treated in terms of these categories by Klose, Peter. *Die völkerrechtliche Ordnung der hellenistischen Staatenwelt in der Zeit von 280-168 v. Chr.* Munich 1972;

reconstruct the legal structure of inter-state relations with an aim to reconstructing their ideal types,³² Heuss is nevertheless at times almost phenomenological in his differentiated discussion of interactions in practice, which ultimately led him to reject a model based in categories of constitutional law.³³ The work is characterised throughout by the honest attempt to grapple with the complexity and heterogeneity of the material – I have already cited his “bunte[r] Wirrwarr der zwischen Stadt und Herrscher verlaufenden Handlungen” – but even so the work’s fundamental concern is to develop ideal types on a legal basis, albeit with numerous caveats and qualifications. The formalism inherent in this approach had a deleterious effect on later attempts to grapple with this fundamental question of Hellenistic politics.³⁴ The categories and language used suggested that there must have existed a coherent legal structure, thus implying an overall scheme that Heuss seems never to have intended, but that weighs on his discourse.³⁵ We can therefore return only a mixed judgement: Heuss’ admirably nuanced analysis of individual interactions was weakened by an a priori commitment, inherited from previous research, to implicit legal structures. It is no wonder that the work’s reception was controversial.³⁶

In the 80s, this search for a primarily legal basis for Hellenistic rule was challenged by Hans-Joachim Gehrke’s use of Max Weber’s concept of charismatic authority to describe the Hellenistic king. Rather than searching for meaningful and stable legal structures, the essence of Hellenistic power was sought in the legitimation of violence through the cultivation of belief in the super-human

Mehl, Andreas. “*Doriktetos Chora*. Kritische Bemerkungen zum ‘Speererwerb’ in Politik und Völkerrecht der hellenistischen Epoche”, in: *AncSoc* 11/12 (1980/1981), 173-212, and recently by Mileta, Christian. *Der König und sein Land. Untersuchungen zur Herrschaft der hellenistischen Monarchen über das königliche Gebiet Kleinasiens und seine Bevölkerung*. Berlin 2008, esp. 73f., 78f., whose study provides a welcome update of this discourse. Fundamental criticism of the entire approach has been famously voiced by Gehrke 1982, 247-277, esp. 248f. with n. 6.

³² Heuss 1963², III.

³³ He was of course roundly criticised for this approach by Bikerman, Elias. “La cité grecque dans les monarchies hellénistiques”, in: *Rev. Phil.* 13 (1939), 335-349, esp. 346-348. That this criticism was not entirely justified is visible for instance at Heuss 1963², 225-229; 275f.

³⁴ Heuss 1963², 217.

³⁵ Heuss 1963², 275-278. The criticisms of Orth, Wolfgang. *Königlicher Machtanspruch und städtische Freiheit*. Munich 1977, 178-187, are surely too harsh. Cf. also the more sympathetic, but perhaps somewhat idealising defense by Bringmann, Klaus. *Geben und Nehmen: Monarchische Wohltätigkeit und Selbstdarstellung im Zeitalter des Hellenismus*. Berlin 2000, 109 n. 1.

³⁶ Cf. the discussion by Ma 1999, 152f.

agency of individuals.³⁷ One fundamental problem with this approach lay in the nature of the theoretical model it drew on: in practice, sociological ideal types are difficult to map onto diachronic historical developments.³⁸ Gehrke was of course fully aware of this issue and accordingly emphasised only the hermeneutic advantages provided by a theoretically informed catalogue of features characteristic of the model Hellenistic ruler, as it could serve to point up historical deviation and specificity.³⁹ Even with this caveat, however, a second integral problem remains. Using Max Weber's typology of legitimate authority to conceptually elucidate the political system of the Hellenistic period not only runs into difficulties when attempting to conceptualise the actual struggle for legitimacy, but also gives undue weight to individual actors, especially the kings. The complexity of the power processes and the plurality of scenarios of interaction and negotiation that shape them are thereby misleadingly levelled, since this approach projects a simplified semantic system: put provocatively, such an analysis falls prey to the intentions of the historical actors it seeks to analyse.⁴⁰ Attempts to counteract this by digging deeper and differentiating the influence of ideal types on a case by case basis soon run into the limitations of such categories, because such an approach necessarily dissolves their hermeneutic potential.⁴¹

³⁷ Gehrke 1982. The persistent popularity of this model is apparent e.g. in Seibert, Jakob. "Zur Begründung von Herrschaftsanspruch und Herrschaftslegitimierung in der frühen Diadochenzeit", in: idem (ed.). *Hellenistische Studien. Gedenkschrift für Hermann Bengtson* (=Münchner Arbeiten zur Alten Geschichte 5). Munich 1991, 87-100; Bringmann 2000, 53f. Before the publication of Hans-Joachim Gehrke's seminal essay, Claire Préaux had already noted this dynamic, but without drawing on Max Weber's terminology, see Préaux 1978, 1, 178-181.

³⁸ Comparable approaches are visible in Quass 1993, 11-17, who uses the Weberian concept of the regime of dignitaries and Mileta 2008, 66-70, who draws on Oppenheimer's criticism of Weber.

³⁹ Gehrke 1982, 251f. For a more recent application of Weberian ideal types cf. also Schäfer 2002, esp. 16-18; 167-172, who implicitly applies a Weberian concept of legitimate authority, but without acknowledging his theoretical debt.

⁴⁰ Cf. Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Politik der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M. 2000, 26f.

⁴¹ For such an approach by a historical sociologist cf. Mann, Michael. *The Sources of Social Power*. Vol. 1. Cambridge 1986, but cf. also Paschidis, Paschalis. *Between City and King. Prosopographical Studies on the Intermediaries Between the Cities of the Greek Mainland and the Aegean and the Royal Courts in the Hellenistic Period (322-190 BC)* (=Meletemata 59). Athens 2008, 22-24, who distinguishes power, ideology, and interaction, but purely by virtue of his superior retrospective point of view. Ma 1999 variously (e. g. 107, 142, 150) refers to Weberian ideal types, but uses them, like Gehrke, as theoretical contrast rather than as hermeneutic structure. This approach is justified by the material, as the Seleukid Empire under Antiochos III shows elements of all three Weberian types of legitimate authority.

Finally, a third integral problem of Weberian models relates to their narrow interest in the legitimacy of authority and the diffuse quality of ‘charismatic rule’. Both the legitimation of power and the legal structures sought by Alfred Heuss are secondary systems of meaning that organise and normalise existing configurations of power on both the emic and the etic level of analysis. They both have in common, however, that they presuppose communication: that ‘knowledge’ be transferred is the prerequisite for their efficacy, but this always occurs in interaction that is embedded within an extremely complex discursive web that operates both situationally and through memory. An example may serve to illustrate the problem: Considered in these categories, the Weberian charisma of ancient rulers, their super-human aura, consists in their direct, face-to-face communication of an idiosyncratic world-construction, which is met by an “irrational belief” that requires constant reproduction through renewed action.⁴² It appears as a short-term, complexity-reducing and agency-producing instrument of power that is increasingly open to immense uncertainty and possesses only a relatively short range. But the crucial action that underlies ‘charisma’ is the communicative self-fashioning of the ruler; accordingly attention should be focused on the categories in which this idiosyncratic construction of the world operates, to its semiotic links and boundaries. The concept is thus little more than one descriptor among many and can really be used only to define situational aspects of rule, rather than being able to single-handedly explain a political cosmos that characterised the entire Eastern Mediterranean for several centuries.⁴³ As a consequence, the first of the three observations that contributed to this study is that a theoretical conceptualisation of Hellenistic power cannot operate on the basis of ideal types without accepting certain heuristic limitations, limitations that are not without alternative, as I will now attempt to show.

1.2 ‘Network’ – a conceptual phantom?

As was already noted above, more recent research on Hellenistic politics has become increasingly diverse in its interests. Among other trends, interest in concrete lines of contact and interaction between city and king has grown and become more sophisticated, both as regards the actual actors involved – John Davies’ “human hinges of Hellenism” – and the interactions they performed by drawing on a plurality of more or less institutionalised modes of interaction.⁴⁴ In

⁴² Weber, Max. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Tübingen 1972⁵ [1922], 124, 140-148.

⁴³ Cf. Paschidis 2008, 20.

⁴⁴ Davies, John K. “The Interpenetration of Hellenistic Sovereignities”, in: Daniel Ogden (ed.). *The Hellenistic World: New Perspectives*. London 2002, 1-21, esp. 8-13, quote from

the abstract, the overall socio-political system would then emerge from the sum of these modes. This re-orientation also finds expression in the fact that the kings as individuals recede into the background, becoming elements of a political cosmos that is increasingly understood as a flexible and dynamic field on which power is constantly being negotiated in a complex mesh of concurrent discourses.⁴⁵ Accordingly 'culture' is now routinely reflected as woven into the mesh of 'politics':⁴⁶ the socio-political nexus of acts of communication and exchange documented in the dedications and reifications of honour produced by euergetism now appears as a very significant and impactful strand of Hellenistic political discourse.⁴⁷ The space and contexts in which cultural objects took effect, including the courts and palaces of kings, the *agorai*, *temenea*, and *ἐπιφανέστατοι τόποι* ("most conspicuous places") of the cities, and the various, especially Pan-Hellenic sanctuaries, have accordingly received more attention and been studied with respect for their diversity.⁴⁸ The same can be said of human activity in these

p. 11. This is visible for instance in the interest of Strootman 2011, who now pursues an integrated approach by contrast with the comparable, but somewhat older handbook contributions by Ma, John. "Kings", in: Andrew Erskine (ed.). *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Malden 2003, 177-195, and Billows, Richard. "Cities", in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 196-215.

- ⁴⁵ Fundamental remain Habicht, Christian. "Die herrschende Gesellschaft in den hellenistischen Monarchien", in: *Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 45 (1958), 1-16; idem. *Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte*. Munich 1970² [1956]. For more modern approaches cf. e.g. Strootman 2011, 141-153; Ma 2013a.
- ⁴⁶ See for example: Schalles, Hans-Joachim. *Untersuchungen zur Kulturpolitik der pergamenischen Herrscher im dritten Jahrhundert vor Christus* (=Istanbuler Forschungen 36). Tübingen 1985; Hintzen-Bohlen, Brigitte. *Herrscherrepräsentation im Hellenismus*. Cologne 1992; Stewart, Andrew F. *Faces of Power: Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics* (=Hellenistic Culture and Society 11). Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993; von den Hoff, Ralf. "Tradition and Innovation: Images and Donations on the Early Hellenistic Acropolis", in: Olga Palagia and Stephen Tracy (eds.). *The Macedonians in Athens 323 – 229 B. C.* Oxford 2003, 173-185; idem and Schultz, Peter (eds.). *Early Hellenistic Portraiture: Image, Style and Context*. Cambridge 2007.
- ⁴⁷ Fundamentale are the volumes by Bringmann, Klaus and Ameling, Walter (eds.). *Schenkungen hellenistischer Herrscher an griechische Städte und Heiligtümer*. 3 vols. Berlin 1995-2000, who provide both catalogue and analysis. See further Gauthier 1985, 39-53; Billows 1995, 71-78; Ma 1999, 179-242; Kotsidu, Haritini. *TIMH KAI ΔΟΞΑ. Ehrungen für hellenistische Herrscher im griechischen Mutterland und in Kleinasien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der archäologischen Denkmäler*. Frankfurt a.M. 2000.
- ⁴⁸ On city-scapes see for instance the contributions in Wörrle and Zanker (eds.) 1995; Schwandner and Rheidt (eds.) 2004; Matthaei and Zimmermann (eds.) 2009, and especially the third volume of Bringmann and Ameling (eds.) 1995-2000 by Schmidt-Dounas, Barbara. *Geschenke erhalten die Freundschaft. Politik und Selbstdarstellung im Spiegel der Monumente*. Berlin 2000. On the palace as a functionally pluralistic space of representation see Nielsen, Inge. *Hellenistic Palaces: Tradition and Renewal*. Aarhus 1994,

spaces, as performativity and theatricality have both attracted attention in the context of questions of power.⁴⁹ In simple terms, therefore, recent research focuses strongly on spaces of action and interaction both in the polis and at court.

In prosopography, the substantial amount of epigraphically attested individuals involved in these spaces is accordingly subdivided by drawing on this fundamental dichotomy, which allows for easier handling. The polis has its ‘civic’ or ‘local’ elite of outstanding citizens⁵⁰ and the court is populated by a court society⁵¹

esp. 18-26, 209-212, who notes the interplay between theatrical facade and palace architecture, both of which aim to produce impactful visual stimuli. On spatial dynamics in sanctuaries see for instance the work on Delos by Dillon, Sheila and Baltes, Elizabeth P. “Honorific Practices and the Politics of Space on Hellenistic Delos: Portrait Statue Monuments along the Dromos”, in: *AJA* 117:2 (2013), 207-246, and on the sanctuary of Athena Lindia on Rhodes by Squillace, Giuseppe. “Alexander the Great, Ptolemy I and the offerings of arms to Athena Lindia”, in: Alonso Troncoso and Anson (eds.) 2013, 215-224; cf. also Scott, Michael C. “Displaying Lists of What is (not) on Display: the Uses of Inventories in Greek Sanctuaries”, in: Matthew Haysom and Jenny E. Wallensten (eds.). *Current Approaches to Religion in Ancient Greece: Papers Presented at a Symposium at the Swedish Institute at Athens, 17-19 April 2008*. Stockholm 2011, 239-252, on displaying what is absent through monumental text.

⁴⁹ See e.g. Chaniotis, Angelos. “Sich selbst feiern? Städtische Feste des Hellenismus im Spannungsfeld von Religion und Politik”, in: Wörle and Zanker (eds.) 1995, 147-172; idem 1997; idem. “Theatre rituals. The Greek Theatre and Festivals”, in: Peter J. Wilson (ed.). *The Greek Theatre and Festivals: Documentary Studies*. Oxford and New York 2007, 48-66; idem. “Empathy, Emotional Display, Theatricality, and Illusion in Hellenistic Historiography”, in: idem and Pierre Ducrey (eds.). *Unveiling Emotions II. Emotions in Greece and Rome: Texts, Images, Material Culture*. Stuttgart 2013, 53-84; cf. also generally Gehrke 2003, 241f. and for a specific example from the Diadoch period Thonemann 2005 on Demetrios Poliorketes.

⁵⁰ On civic elites see e.g. Quass 1993; Paschidis 2008; Dreyer, Boris and Weber, Gregor. “Lokale Eliten griechischer Städte und königliche Herrschaft”, in: Boris Dreyer and Peter Franz Mittag (eds.). *Lokale Eliten und hellenistische Könige. Zwischen Kooperation und Konfrontation*. Berlin 2011, 14-54, and above chapter 1.1.2.

⁵¹ Recent definitions of the court elite are provided by Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. *Geschichte des Hellenismus*. Munich 2008⁴, 53-55, as well as Strootman, Rolf. *Courts and Elites in the Hellenistic Empires. The Near East After the Achaemenids, c. 330 to 30 BCE*. Edinburgh 2014, 117-135. Central studies include Herman, Gabriel. “The ‘Friends’ of the Early Hellenistic Rulers: Servants or Officials?”, in: *Talanta* 12-13 (1980-1981), 103-149; Le Bohec, Sylvie. “Les *Philoi* des Rois Antigonides”, in: *REG* 98 (1985), 93-124 and eadem. “L’entourage royal à la cour des Antigonides”, in: Edmond Lévy (ed.). *Le Système palatial en Orient, en Grèce et à Rome: actes du Colloque de Strasbourg 19-22 Juin 1985*. Strasbourg 1987, 315-326; Billows 1990, 360-452; Weber, Gregor. “Interaktion, Repräsentation und Herrschaft. Der Königshof im Hellenismus”, in: Aloys Winterling (ed.). *Zwischen ‘Haus’ und ‘Staat’. Antike Höfe im Vergleich* (=Historische Zeitschrift Beiheft 23). Munich 1997, 28-71; Herman, Gabriel. “The Court Society of the Hellenistic Age”, in: Cartledge, Garnsey and Gruen (eds.) 1997, 199-224; Savalli-Lestrade,

that is almost entirely 'elite' in the literal sense of that word. While the polis simply remained the established frame of reference for civic elites, the new court societies were the result of the gradual creation of a new, stratified socio-political system of meaning. Over time, what had been an alternative, peripheral source of identity for Greek individuals long before Alexander the Great was transformed into a formal socio-political system tangible in titles and etiquette, which can in turn be collected and historically analysed.⁵² While having a dichotomy of categories is immensely helpful in organising material and providing fundamental analytical

Ivana. *Les "Philoi" royaux dans l'Asie hellénistique*. Geneva 1998; Weber, Gregor. "Der Hof Alexanders des Großen als soziales System", in: *Saeculum* 58:2 (2007), 229-264; Spawforth, Anthony J. S. (ed.). *Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies*. London 2007; Ma, John. "Court, king and power in Antigonid Macedonia", in: Robin Lane Fox (ed.). *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedonia*. Leiden 2011, 521-544.

The discussion obviously also touches on intellectuals, who often occupied a conflicted middle ground, see fundamentally Meißner, Burkhardt. *Historiker zwischen Polis und Königshof. Studien zur Stellung der Geschichtsschreiber in der griechischen Gesellschaft in spätclassischer und frühhellenistischer Zeit* (=Hypomnemata 99). Göttingen 1992; Weber, Gregor. "Hellenistic Rulers and Their Poets. Silencing Dangerous Critics?", in: *AncSoc* 29 (1998-99), 247-274; Ehling, Kai. "Gelehrte Freunde der Seleukidenkönige", in: Andreas Goltz, Andreas Luther, and Heinrich Schlange-Schöningen (eds.). *Gelehrte in der Antike. Alexander Demandt zum 65. Geburtstag*. Cologne 2002, 43-57; Erskine, Andrew. "Between Philosophy and the Court: the Life of Persaios of Kition", in: idem and Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 177-194; Weber, Gregor. "Poet and Court", in: Benjamin Acosta-Hughes, Luigi Lehnus, and Susan A. Stephens (eds.). *Brill's Companion to Callimachus*. Leiden 2011, 225-244. Philosophers occasionally played a part in negotiations on the grounds of their supra-national identity, intellectual authority, and wide range of elite contacts (Lane Fox 2011, 15f.): for instance, Plut. *Demetr.* 46.2-4, mentions a certain Krates negotiating for Athens, who is probably to be identified with the Theban Cynic Philosopher; see Paschidis 2008, no. A48 and especially p. 152 for the prominence of this mode of interaction.

On identity and agency of Hellenistic queens see for instance: Carney, Elizabeth D. *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia*. Norman, OK 2000; Savalli-Lestrade, Ivana. "La places des Reines à la cour et dans le royaume à l'époque hellénistique", in: Regula Frei-Stolba, Anne Biemann, and Olivier Bianchi (eds.). *Les femmes antiques entre sphère privée et sphère publique. Actes du diplôme d'Etudes Avancées, Université de Lausanne et Neuchâtel, 2000-2002* (=Echo 2). Bern 2003, 59-76; Müller, Sabine. "The Female Element of the Political Self-Fashioning of the Diadochi: Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and their Iranian Wives", in: Alonso Troncoso and Anson (eds.) 2013, 199-214; Ramsey, Gillian. "The Queen and the City: Royal Female Intervention and Patronage in Hellenistic Civic Communities", in: Lin Foxhall and Gabriele Neher (eds.). *Gender and the City before Modernity*. Chichester 2013, 20-37.

⁵² Gehrke 2003, 225f.; Mooren, Léon. "The Nature of Hellenistic Monarchy", in: Edmond van't Dack, Peter van Dessel, and Wilfried van Gucht (eds.). *Egypt and the Hellenistic world: Proceedings of the International Colloquium, Leuven, 24. - 26. May 1982*. Leuven 1983, 205-240; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 251-287, esp. 275-281.

categories, it also perpetuates a fundamental discursive strategy of power that obscured the plurality of identity and agency possessed by certain individuals. Political actors in discourse both modern and ancient are appropriated or distanced by means of labels that mark out their internal or external association, situationally disambiguating their identity and assigning them to either king or polis.⁵³ This process constitutes a manifestation of a power dynamic that calls for explanation, as it serves to lay claim to and thereby transfer the agency of individuals by producing or re-producing identities for them.

The second observation follows directly from these increasingly diversified approaches to spaces of interaction and actor identity, as the messy interactions observed by Heuss are increasingly being referred to as a ‘network’, especially in French and Anglophone scholarship. John Davies, John Ma, Ivana Savalli-Lestrade, Paschalis Paschidis, Rolf Strootman, and many others have drawn on the associative visual power of this term to express and communicate the impression of complex connectivity and interconnectedness that one rapidly gains when dealing with Hellenistic material.⁵⁴ My second observation is now that this term is generally not employed as a theoretically reflected concept or as a methodological key capable of unlocking added meaning. Since the meta-question of how to conceptualise the mesh of interactions that emerges from the sources and constitutes the socio-political cosmos of the Eastern Mediterranean in the centuries after Alexander’s campaign remains open for debate, it seems to me that this term might be turned into a concept capable of aiding in the search for an answer.⁵⁵ This suspicion seems especially apposite when considering that the concept has already been used with heuristic success in other areas of Ancient Studies,

⁵³ A good example of this dynamic is the famous Athenian decree in honour of Kallias of Sphettos, a citizen with loose ties to his homeland as a high-ranking officer in the service of Ptolemy I, for whom see Shear, T. Leslie Jr. *Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 B.C.* (=Hesperia Suppl. 17). Princeton 1978; Paschidis 2008, Λ47. For this dynamic in the polis, where it is of course mainly attested, see especially Ma 2013b, 132f.

⁵⁴ Examples include Davies 2002a, 9 and *passim*; Ma 2003a, 13-15 and *passim*; Paschidis 2008, 500f.; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 332 (“reseau des amis”). Cf. Gehrke 2003, 245-250; Strootman 2014, 36. As a key metaphor of modernity, the term is unsurprisingly popular and occurs as a central metaphor already in Mitchell, Lynette G. *Greeks Bearing Gifts: the Public Use of Private Relationships in the Greek World 435-323 BC*. Cambridge 1997, e.g. 1-23. Cf. also Shipley, Graham. “Recent Trends and New Directions”, in: Glenn R. Bugh (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Cambridge 2006, 315-327, here 320.

⁵⁵ On this meta-question see Davis 2002, 2f.

although it is my impression that there is still room for improvement.⁵⁶ For this reason, the following section will be devoted to examining its use more closely.

Hitherto, the term 'network' has primarily been used to aid readers by providing them with a visually intuitive structural metaphor that expresses complex interconnectedness. Usually, however, the concrete shape and configuration of the structure are largely irrelevant to the point being made. As such it has been applied to describe all three spaces of interaction outlined above: the social space of the court, the civic space of the polis, and especially the intermediate limbo 'between' these two more concrete, physically delimited socio-political spaces. Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with this: On the one hand, it is obvious that the individuals whose memory survives to the present day thanks to honorary decrees, other kinds of inscriptions, and literary sources did indeed form a 'social network' of personally acquainted socio-political actors, as is the fact that this amorphous group contained sub-networks of varying degrees of interpenetration and interconnectedness.⁵⁷ On the other, prosopographical research has produced a wealth of data, consisting mainly of names, places of origin, careers, and offices, that is immediately suggestive of an immensely complex, but only partly accessible political interaction network, as it is full of references to interaction: after all, the epigraphic monuments themselves served the purpose of perpetuating interactions for socio-political reasons.

Nevertheless, the observation that the term 'network' is but seldom used as an analytical tool, paired with the more general under-theorisation of the Hellenistic period in Ancient History, now begs the question as to how this general impression might be made more hermeneutically productive.⁵⁸ As was briefly mentioned, attempts have been made in Ancient History, and even for the Hellenistic period, to transform this metaphor into a heuristic concept, for instance

⁵⁶ Reflected applications include: Malkin, Irad. *A Small Greek World*. Oxford 2011; Pont, Anne-Valérie. "Aphrodisias, presque une île: la cité et ses réseaux d'Auguste à 249/250", in: *Chiron* 2012, 319-346; Collar, Anna. "Military Networks and the Cult of Jupiter Dolichenus", in: Engelbert Winter (ed.). *Von Kummuh nach Teloch. Historische und archäologische Untersuchungen in Kommagene. Dolichener und Kommagenische Forschungen IV* (=Asia Minor Studien 64). Bonn 2011, 217-245; eadem. "Network Theory and Religious Innovation", in: *Mediterranean History Review* 22:1 (2007), 149-162; Nina Fenn and Christiane Römer-Strehl (eds.). *Networks in the Hellenistic World: According to the Pottery in the Eastern Mediterranean and Beyond*. Oxford 2013; Mack, William. *Proxeny and Polis: Institutional Networks in the Ancient Greek World*. Oxford 2015.

⁵⁷ Cf. Cline, Diane Harris. "Six Degrees of Alexander: Social Network Analysis as a Tool for Ancient History", in: *AHB* 26 (2012), 59-70, who confirms this in a case study on the social dynamics of the leading figures of Alexander's campaign.

⁵⁸ This lack of theoretical reflection was observed by Davies 2002a, 1f.; Shipley 2006, 318-320.

by drawing on social-network-analysis (SNA).⁵⁹ This approach considers individuals and their interactions as a matrix of nodes and links that can be mathematically analysed. Unfortunately, the data available for the Hellenistic period is hardly ever accurate and complete enough to allow for meaningful results – especially if the interest is in new facts. In my view the pertinent attempts have revealed that this approach can usually do little more than corroborate the status quo: The gaps in our material often compel scholars to simplify, which in turn makes the validity of the results questionable; glossy diagrams serve only to obscure this fact.⁶⁰ In my view a different perspective is both more interesting and more productive: what keeps networks together, what structures and shapes their configurations and their dynamics both large and small?⁶¹ In the words of John Davies, the problem is thus “to assess how, and how far, the areas controlled directly or indirectly by the post-Alexander monarchies came to behave (or: continued to behave) as a system, viz. a set of interacting networks which shared structures, mechanisms, boundaries and vectors.”⁶² When considered in the context of SNA, the question then becomes: what underpins the links that SNA approaches identify?

1.3 Identity

In my view, this question leads back to the buzzword-concept of identity. Greek identity formation and development have of course been much discussed in scholarship, especially at the ethnic and cultural level, as well as in their interplay with politics. Prominent fields of interest are the processes of ‘ethnogenesis’ in the Archaic period, the Persian Wars and their long-term consequences for self-fashioning, the impact of Rome in the Hellenistic period, and the ‘post-modern’

⁵⁹ On SNA see also the more extensive discussion on p. 60.

⁶⁰ Cf. for instance Cline 2012, who struggles to produce new results while also abandoning the methodological progress made already by Michael Alexander and James Danowski in their analysis of Cicero’s letters: Alexander, Michael C. and Danowski, James A. “Analysis of an Ancient Network: Personal Communication and the Study of Social Structure in a Past Society”, in: *Social Networks* 12 (1990), 313-335. The qualitative aspect of social networks is crucial to their modelling, as they are far more complex than scientifically assessable network structures. Again, see Chapter 2 below for more detail.

⁶¹ Davies 2002a, 2.

⁶² The analysis published in Cline 2012 bases its links on a vague concept of “association”, but without really being able to make qualitative distinctions (p. 61).

dynamics of the Second Sophistic.⁶³ Here, the interest is in the relationship between socio-political power and identity construction. Accordingly, a differentiated engagement with the concept of identity is called for, which will be offered in the following chapter. Nevertheless, a few brief remarks on the state of research are called for here, before the aims and structure of the main argument are outlined.

The study of individual and collective identity is not traditionally a focus of the historical study of power politics. That said, the production of social and societal meaning has of course attracted attention in Greek history, especially for the Classical period. Democratic Athens has been the subject of numerous studies on civic values and norm, especially in the categories of ethics, morality, and law.⁶⁴ The work of Polly Low provides an excellent example of such an inquiry, in that it demonstrates the informal, normative structures that characterised inter-state relations in the Classical period, encoded in socio-political expectations that were sanctioned in a host of different ways, all deeply and inextricably entangled in power politics.⁶⁵ It is therefore crucial to acknowledge that such subtle norms transport a certain kind of socio-political order, the constant and consistent reproduction of which is essential to socio-political interaction, and hence to the determination of what belongs to self and other.

⁶³ Examples include: Hall, Edith. *Inventing the Barbarian. Greek Self-definition through Tragedy*. Oxford 1989; Hall, Jonathan M. *Hellenicity between Ethnicity and Culture*. Chicago 2002; Gruen, Erich *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity*. Princeton 2011a; idem (ed.). *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean. Issues & Debates*. Los Angeles 2011b. On the Second Sophistic see, for example: Borg, Barbara E. (ed.). *Paideia: the World of the Second Sophistic*. Berlin 2004. On Rome: Schmitz, Thomas (ed.). *The Struggle for Identity. Greeks and their Past in the First Century BCE*. Stuttgart 2011.

⁶⁴ Whitehead, David. "Cardinal Virtues: The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens", in: *Classica et Mediaevalia* 44 (1993), 37-75; Mitchell 1997, esp. 178-191; Veligianni-Terzi, Chryssoula. *Wertbegriffe in den attischen Ehrendekreten der Klassischen Zeit*. Stuttgart 1997; Low, Polly. *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece. Morality and Power*. Cambridge 2007. The study of the subtle distinctions between *demokratia*, *eleutheria* and *autonomia* conducted by Grieb (2008, esp. 360-373) is guided by a similar interest, arguing against the older view that the terms are not interchangeable and associate constitutional organisation and political agency respectively; cf. also Carlsson 2010, 84-100, who specifies this argument especially as regards *autonomia*, arguing that *autonomia* is referenced primarily when in need of assertion, paralleling the usage of *homonioia* (p. 97f.).

⁶⁵ E.g. Low 2007, 252-257, esp. p. 254: "[...] we have also, I think, confirmed rather than resolved the problem identified by Carr of separating the moral aspects of interstate activity from questions of power. Instead, the mutual and inextricable connection between these two themes has become clear."

For Hellenistic identity politics, the work by Hans-Joachim Gehrke on the construction and significance of civic and polis identity remains a crucial point of reference.⁶⁶ By engaging with the epigraphic record, especially with the evidence discovered in-situ at Priene, and inspired by Pierre Bourdieu's search for *le sens pratique*, Gehrke addressed the question of the semiotic order implied in the inscriptions between the individuals and the collective they assign themselves to (and are assigned to).⁶⁷ Gehrke identified a wealth of different factors that contribute to the value order of polis citizens and need to be constantly reproduced in various contexts in order to maintain validity both collective and individual. These factors range from the isolated normative ideal expressed in language to the construction of community in ritual, institution, and history, which can then be self-reflexively and collectively presented as a unified value system both within the polis and towards others.⁶⁸ These "circles of identity" possessed by every individual continue to provide a productive model that can be used to approach 'the citizen' of the Hellenistic polis.⁶⁹ In his exhaustive and highly differentiated study of honorary statues and their significance for civic identity, John Ma has recently taken this approach further, demonstrating the complex mesh of relations revealed in honorary inscriptions attached to civic monuments.⁷⁰

My third observation that follows from this research into the order(s) implemented in reified language and performance is thus that normative concepts are subject to persistent construction processes, since the pressure of constantly shifting socio-political configurations necessitates their persistent reproduction. As a result they are always under a certain amount of tension, evident in the persistent renegotiation and struggle for the control of cognitive webs of

⁶⁶ Gehrke 2003, drawing on Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford 1992 [Original: *Le sens pratique*. Paris 1980]. Cf. Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Greek Representations of the Past", in: Lin Foxhall, Hans-Joachim Gehrke, and Nino Luraghi (eds.). *Intentional History: Spinning Time in Ancient Greece*. Stuttgart 2010, 15-33. On individual self-fashioning in the Hellenistic period see already the contributions in Anthony Bulloch et al. (eds.). *Images and Ideologies. Self-definition in the Hellenistic World*. Berkeley 1993. For a study of numismatic evidence as a mirror and medium of polis identity in the Hellenistic period see Matthaei, Albrecht. *Münzbild und Polisbild. Untersuchungen zur Selbstdarstellung kleinasiatischer Poleis im Hellenismus*. Munich 2013, esp. 131-135; cf. generally Papadopoulos, John K. "Money, Art, and the Construction of Value in the Ancient Mediterranean", in: idem and Gary Urton (eds.). *The Construction of Value in the Ancient World*. Los Angeles 2012, 261-287. Conflicts of identity at the Hellenistic court have been touched on by Herman 1997.

⁶⁷ Gehrke 2003, 225f.

⁶⁸ Gehrke 2003, 227-230; 233-239; 241-245. On the construction of history as a process of collective identity formation see also Scheer 1993; Gehrke 2001.

⁶⁹ Gehrke 2003, 245-250, quote from 245: "Identitätskreise."

⁷⁰ Ma 2013b, e.g. 291f.

knowledge.⁷¹ Looking at values at this smaller scale has the advantage that the resulting identities can be treated in the context of power without necessarily being entangled in strong macro-level discourses of alterity (such as ‘Median’ – ‘Greek’). It is my impression that Gehrke’s study – and the line of research it is part of – is in fact underpinned by the search for an understanding of the self as negotiation, made manifest in a network of interactions and interaction modes between a plurality of variously constructed insides and outsides. It is further my impression that such processes have hitherto been underappreciated in research as an aspect of power pertinent to the early Hellenistic period in particular, a period that would benefit from reconsideration in terms such as these. My interest is hence in trying to formulate a method capable of assessing the cosmos of power interactions that characterised the period of the Diadochi as to the value-normative construction processes establishing the self in this period. If successful, this would in turn automatically produce a new perspective on this period of macro-political contingency and subtle transformation.

1.4 A new approach

The following chapters therefore attempt to adapt current research trends in the study of norms and identity to the study of socio-political power in the Diadoch period. The core aim is to combine concepts of identity and power by means of a reflected conception of ‘network’. The first observation – regarding the inadequacy of ideal types for the study of socio-political systems – results in the methodological consequence that the political cosmos of the Diadoch period will be studied as a nexus of interaction on a case by case basis, but without abstraction of an ideal-typical model, let alone a master narrative. Within this nexus, constructions of identities and the agencies entangled with them are treated with a view to the societal dynamics they elicit, with case studies ranging from the individual level to the collective and inter-collective. In essence, therefore, the interest is always in reconstructing expectations for interaction and the modes of political interaction that communicate meaning and order. In an effort to react to the relative lack of theoretical reflection in Hellenistic scholarship, the methodological principles of the relevant studies will be explicitly reflected upon in the following chapter, in order to lay bare their foundations. In sum, the novelty of

⁷¹ Ma 2013b, 293: “The ‘archaeology’ of civic space and civic discourse hence leads to a redefinition of ‘civic’ – the civic does not need to be the history of the successful hegemony of *polis* over individual (let alone the never-ending triumph of ‘democratic’ ideology), but should be able to accommodate the presence of competition, manipulation, and pressures [...]”

the approach pursued here therefore consists in its nuanced interest in the cognitive web that underpinned the realities of socio-political life in the Diadoch period.

1.4.1 Why theory?

At this point, a few words of *apologia* may be called for regarding the heavy use of theory in the following chapters. Why work with theoretical models in historiography? Two main reasons informed this choice. In my view, it has become increasingly difficult to write history – and particularly ancient history – that aims and claims to discover historical ‘truth’, given the discipline’s now well-established methodological self-reflexivity and the questionable relevance of such interests to modern society.⁷² Besides a diffuse contribution to societal knowledge and cultural tolerance, Ancient History produces results that in the eyes of the many could hardly be as significant as those of disciplines such as Chemistry, Physics, or Engineering. An important opportunity to strengthen the discipline in a university context and in its societal visibility is to link it to other disciplines in Ancient Studies and the Humanities in general, in order to lend greater emphasis to the contribution these disciplines make to the plurality and quality of society.⁷³ In my view, one of the most productive avenues in interdisciplinary cooperation is abstraction, which allows for trans-disciplinary comparability of results and for discussion that goes beyond the observation of ‘interesting’ parallels and differences. At least in principle, translating results into theoretical terms and models unlocks the potential for these results to gain significance beyond the limits of specific case studies.

The second reason emerges from the topic at hand, as well as from the research done on the political system of the Hellenistic period in the last couple of decades. To a certain extent, theoretical reflection raises one’s awareness of the prejudices with which one approaches one’s material and so supports and guides one’s study of historical sources. As the discussion above has shown, research on Hellenistic politics has already significantly profited from the incorporation of theoretical models. However, this development also has a downside: abstracting ideal types provides handy definitions and cognitive shortcuts, but fails to reflect

⁷² See especially the structuralist arguments of White, Hayden V. “The Structure of Historical Narrative”, in: *Clio* 1:3 (1972), 5-20; idem. *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*. Baltimore 1978, esp. 81-99. For a discussion of the aims of Ancient History see also Shipley 2006, 318.

⁷³ The Graduate School ‘Distant Worlds’ that provided funding for this study is an excellent example of such an effort.

the dynamics of the system and instead ossifies it, while also conceptually dismembering what was once a largely coherent socio-political experience.⁷⁴ Explicit attempts to develop an integrated political model are rare and usually confined to common sense categories, such as those used in John Davies' powerful topological model.⁷⁵

It is my conviction that harnessing theory to describe the specific power configuration of the emergent Hellenistic period provides a way forward that avoids such conceptual dismemberment and is capable of improving upon the valuable existing models. To that end, the method developed in the following chapter combines various strands of theoretical research in order to offer a new way of imaging the socio-politically contingent Diadoch period.

1.4.2 Organising this study

A fundamental challenge that faces any academic text – and particularly one with a theoretical foundation – is how to organise the information it hopes to impart. This problem may well be one reason why the network concept has been used mainly in a visually associative and metaphorical sense. It is clear, of course, that presentation must depend on the epistemological interest pursued. In Ivana Savalli-Lestrade's fundamental work on the *philoí*, for instance, she weighs a number of organisational schemes, which include either focusing on the reconstruction of historical causality, or developing a historical-sociological typology in the Weberian sense.⁷⁶ As I will attempt to read the political actors of the Diadoch period in terms of identity negotiation, to understand their interactions as struggles for control in and of multiple interdependent networks of discourse, and to develop a 'history' of identity and agency in the Diadoch period, the scheme adopted here is a different beast. Central to networks of identity are communal discourses of value, norms for instance, that are altered, misunderstood, and countered and so serve as islands in a sea of change and reproduction. Rather than viewing norms as ideal types and studying their development over time, I study narratives of their employment and interplay at three different levels of social discourse: individual/micro – collective/meso – inter-collective/macro, all

⁷⁴ On this problem of theoretical disintegration cf. Ma 2003b, 178f. The topological model of Davies 2002a, the Weberian approaches of Gehrke 1982, Quass 1993, Schäfer 2002, Mileta 2008, and the *peer polity interaction* model of Ma 2003a or the speech act theory used in Ma 1999 are all examples of this modern dynamic.

⁷⁵ Davies 2002a, 4f.; 7-10.

⁷⁶ Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 289f. Paschidis 2008 adopts a geographical organisational scheme parallel to that of the epigraphic corpora he uses.

of which influence one another and are thus distinguished only to make analysis feasible. By adopting a heuristic structure based on the strata of societal organisation I hope to be able to paint a more subtle picture of Diadoch period politics that allows for deeper insights into the dynamic nature of early Hellenistic power configurations.

The first two levels of analysis are co-dependent in both practice and concept, since the individual necessarily constitutes itself vis-à-vis (and via) others and therefore via the collectives relevant to it, which in turn emerge dynamically out of multiple individual interactions. Both these polar elements are further institutionalised in language and artefact, and thereby take shape to both individual and collective – a process that recursively reiterates.⁷⁷ The interaction networks that configure the semantics of these relations naturally differ in their configurations, but are often treated in discourse as though they were fixed; in other words, their workings are obscured by language in order to reduce the complexity of the world. The Diadoch period now provides a period of macro-political contingency that makes them perceptible, as the sources, themselves actors in these webs of discourse, have to thematise and legitimise how they re-negotiate individual and collective interests in a cosmos with strong, pre-existing, and institutionalised norms and values. The importance of these processes is obvious, given that control over a society's networks of values is the most fundamental form of power.

Naturally, the aim of such a study cannot be to identify states in which a comprehensive and stable consensus of values is 'established'. Rather my concern is with the production of narrative configurations in which such order is produced, resulting in the acceptance of certain actors or actor-configurations as bearers of said order in society, which is in turn viewed as a web of such narratives.⁷⁸ In Chapter 3 I analyse the *Characters* by Theophrastus of Eresos as a specific configuration of control between individual and collective in 'polis society'. Chapter 4 then draws on Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and the extant anecdotes and historical

⁷⁷ The following outline occasionally draws on terminology which will be developed below in Chapter 2. Cf. generally Du Boulay, Juliet. *Portrait of a Greek Mountain Village*. Oxford 1974, esp. 41-51, for a modern study of such processes. Historical sources make such dynamics visible in language, for instance in the self-reflexive designations of collectives, such as *φρατρία*, *δήμος*, and *φυλή* (e.g. IG II² 646:32f.) in polis society, or the *φίλοι* (e.g. Plb. 23.1.6), *οἱ περὶ τοῦ βασιλέως* (e.g. Plb. 28.12.8; 29.6.2), or *αὐλικοὶ* (e.g. Plb. 16.20.8; 22.13.5; Plut. *Demetr.* 17.2) in court society. On discourse control in honorary decrees see Ma 2013b, 45-66.

⁷⁸ As per Derrida's famous dictum that there is nothing without context: Derrida, Jacques. *Of Grammatology*. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore 2016 [1976], 172-174, 177.

narrations relating to early Hellenistic interaction ‘at court’ in order to construct ‘court society’ as a network of identity on the same terms.

In a second step, a third level of analysis will be considered in order to investigate how inter-collective power processes operate at this societal level in the early Hellenistic period. Chapter 5 aims to contribute to the study of intermediaries by investigating their societal role in the libellous discourses between the two highly organised collectives with established systems of values sketched in the previous chapters. More specifically, this chapter analyses the tangible evidence for such discourses *about* intermediaries by applying Yuri M. Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere. If collectives attempt to operate as expansionist discursive networks of cognitive order precisely via their border-crossing intermediaries, this compels the actual actors to transform their identities in order to control the modalities of interaction in these ‘limbo’ situations. In doing so, they not only extend their semantic world orders but also expand the ‘catalogue’ of identities they possess: they become hybrids. Put schematically, this results in new contingency, which is obviously relevant to the political system and requires integration and control by others and thus informs discourses of hybridity.⁷⁹

Lastly, Chapter 6 analyses a specific case of inter-collective exchange, namely the famous siege of Rhodes conducted by Demetrios Poliorketes, as a particularly dense example of a situation in which agency is being negotiated on an inter-collective level. The focus of the analysis is on the processes of narrative identity consolidation on both sides of the confrontation and especially on the agency developed by the artefacts and texts, especially the Colossus of Rhodes, in the identity politics that characterised the aftermath of the siege. The results are then summarised and reflected upon in a brief conclusion.

1.4.3 Sources

It is a sad and trivial truth of historical writing that one can only write about what is documented. The divergent nature of the case studies outlined above is both due to and has forced me to use quite heterogeneous sources, which makes it difficult to address matters of source criticism in a consolidated fashion. A discussion of the specific voice of each source can therefore be found in the respective chapters.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, two general notes may be called for here.

⁷⁹ See Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture*. London 1994, 36f., 56.

⁸⁰ The discussion of the pertinent literary sources by Billows 1990, 327-352 is fundamental.

First, it is my conviction that the reconstruction of agency and identity hinges on narratives, since they provide complex, contextualised information. Literary sources provide this to a much greater extent than most epigraphic material. That is not to say that the latter weaves no socio-political narratives – the former are simply far easier to assess systematically. Generally speaking, the epigraphic evidence available for the late fourth and early third century BC is neither quantitatively nor qualitatively as good as the material available for the High and Late Hellenistic period.⁸¹ This is true in particular as regards civic honorary decrees, especially since the ‘career decrees’ awarding *megistai timai*, which are so central to the discussion about the development and character of Hellenistic democracy, are only just beginning to emerge in the early third century BC.⁸² Furthermore, the extant historical material results from formalised processes that express different ‘transactional orders’ rather than purely ‘social’ narrative. For the most part, the narratives to be found on stones are thus neither detailed nor cohesive enough to provide answers to the questions of interest in this study, especially since they emerge from extremely biased forms of expression that are very successful at obscuring the tensions this study seeks to identify.⁸³

That being said, the extant, albeit often all too brief inscriptions provide a crucial background when considered as intentional and integral interactions within a network of power. Brief honorary decrees for external benefactors are relatively numerous in the Diadoch period and provide much of the known information about intermediaries, particularly at Athens, Samos, Ephesus and Miletus; analysis of this evidence is accordingly indispensable in reconstructing the interpenetration of the socio-political cosmos of the emergent Hellenistic

⁸¹ Lamented also by Wallace, Shane. “Adeimantus of Lampsacus and the Development of the Early Hellenistic Philos”, in: Alonso Troncoso and Anson (eds.) 2013, 142-158, here 152f.

⁸² For the discussion see fundamentally Gauthier 1985, 77-92, 103-112, who also notes the precursors; see further Rosen 1987; Quass 1993; Habicht 1995. Good examples are the Athenian decree for Kallias of Sphettos (270/269 BC), a combination of an honorary decree for a citizen and for an external benefactor (see Shear 1978), and IG II² 657, the honorary decree for Philippides of Kephale (see Paschidis 2008, no. A40).

⁸³ On the concept of ‘transactional orders’ see Ober, Josiah. *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*. Princeton 1989, 153f. On the procedure for the production of honorary decrees which involved the honorand (IG II² 657:54f.) see Gauthier 1985, 83-88; Paschidis 2008, 125. In conjunction with the contested nature of Diadoch period politics, this could result in extreme flattening, in evidence for instance in the career decree for Philippides, son of Philomelos (SEG XLV 101), which avoids any mention of contemporary events (see Paschidis 2008, 105).

world.⁸⁴ Numismatic evidence will likewise be of only secondary importance, although coins are occasionally touched upon in their capacity as vehicles of value that anchor, communicate, and reproduce collective identity and value discourse. This is mainly due to the fact that dedicated work on coins already exists and I felt unable to contribute much beyond what had been achieved.⁸⁵

The second general point is quite obvious: I prefer contemporary material where possible, since it promises to provide far superior insights into the mesh of power discourses that characterised the period of their creation. As any scholar of the late 4th century BC knows, such material is scarce and often fragmentary. As such, it has to be supplemented with the major literary sources of later date, Diodorus' *Bibliothēke* and Plutarch's *Bioi* of Pyrrhos of Epeiros, Eumenes of Cardia, and Demetrios Poliorketes, as well as the *Apothegmata*. These are simply too important to discard and fortunately they largely rest on contemporary sources of relatively good quality and their biases have received a great deal of study.⁸⁶ I have further chosen to incorporate Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, which was not only written long before the period I study but also derives from a different world – a choice I defend at length below.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ See e.g. the collections by Olshausen, Eckart. *Prosopographie der hellenistischen Königs- gesandten: Von Triparadeisos bis Pydna*. Leuven 1974; Le Bohec 1985; Billows 1990, 361-452; Savalli-Lestrade 1998; Paschidis 2008.

⁸⁵ Matthaei 2013 is a recent example of a focused analysis of numismatic materials and their role in Hellenistic identity politics.

⁸⁶ On the contemporary situation, complexities, and biases of Diodorus see Sacks, Kenneth. *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century*. Princeton, NJ 1990; idem. "Diodorus and his Sources: Conformity and Creativity", in: Simon Hornblower (ed.). *Greek Historiography*. Oxford 1994, 213-232; Schmitz, Thomas A. "The Image of Athens in Diodorus Siculus", in: idem and Nicolas Wiater (eds.). *The Struggle for Identity. Greeks and their Past in the First Century BCE*. Stuttgart 2011, 235-251; Rathmann, Michael. "Diodor und seine Quellen", in: Hauben and Meeus (eds.) 2014, 49-113. Diodorus has, at least to an extent, been redeemed and is a good source for the period of the Diadochi, which is (suspiciously) fortunate as he is largely without alternative. On Plutarch see Sweet, Waldo E. "Sources of Plutarch's Demetrius", in: *CW* 44 (1951), 177-181; Bosworth, A. Brian. "History and Artifice in Plutarch's Eumenes", in: Philipp A. Stadter (ed.). *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition*. London and New York 1992, 56-89, esp. 78-80; Pelling, Christopher. *Plutarch and History*. London 2002, 65f., who argues that Plutarch worked from a single source in an initial stage of composition, which he then supplemented and reworked to emphasise his interests. He further argues (p. 70) that the *Apothegmata* are a later product related to the production of the *Lives* but not their precursor or basis, which enhances their value in that it diversifies the cross-section of discourse available in his work.

⁸⁷ See below p. 193.

1.5 Summary

This study is an analysis of ‘power politics’ of the Diadoch period, seen here as a period of macro-political contingency and societal reconfiguration, conducted with an eye toward deep, societal processes of negotiation. By studying narratives as attempts at control over cognitive networks of meaning, this approach aims to offer a different perspective on the socio-political dynamics that characterised the phase between the death of Alexander the Great and the battle of Kurupedion in 281 BC. In referencing these two events, I do not mean to signal that I regard them, especially the latter, as fundamentally transformative – they merely serve the purpose of conveniently focusing the inquiry. The processes studied here are in operation wherever humans interact, and the specific forms identified are intimately related to those found in other periods of Greek history: the configurations we shall find are akin to the patterns seen in a kaleidoscope, at once new and familiar. That said, this period shakes up the kaleidoscope, making new patterns visible in the sources.

The theoretical methodology applied to these sources is thus intended to coax out a deep socio-political history of a period of change, based on the observation that the Greek societies of the early Hellenistic period had to accommodate fluctuations and transformations in their sets of societal rules. The existing political structures were firmly entrenched and well enmeshed within the cognitive world order of every actor. The true challenge in this period lay in creating new structures in an already well-structured and self-reflexive socio-political context. In these circumstances a *tabula rasa*, as implied by the old ‘death of the polis’ fantasy, was out of the question. Structures had to be adapted and modified, semantics subtly rewired and shifted. The case studies presented here offer one way of understanding how this happened and the societal impact the process had.

2. Power as networks: concepts and method

2.1 Approaching power as a network

The discussion of previous scholarship in the introduction revealed a number of problems that now need to be made productive via conceptual reflection: 1) the under-theorised use of network terminology; 2) the prevalence of non-societal models of power and rule; 3) the focus on state institutionalisation. The fundamental aim of the following methodological reflections is hence to theoretically underpin the underspecified network concept identified in previous scholarship and transform it into a heuristically valuable tool that can be used to address hitherto understudied questions of power in the Diadoch period. This task made it necessary to develop a tailor-made set of conceptual tools and a historiographical method based on them, rather than on conventional instruments, such as plausibility and comparative source criticism. It is important to emphasise that despite its theoretical substance, this method should not be considered a strict application of theory from other disciplines to ancient sources, since this would create new methodological and hermeneutic problems: The ancient historian simply does not dispose of the amount and quality of data required to apply sociological principles without adaptation.¹

Besides the reflection of the network concept, a second objective that has grown out of the observations made in the introduction is to develop a hermeneutic method capable of dealing with fluctuating power structures without crystallising or projecting ideal-types.² The main reason behind this rejection of existing ideal-typical models lies in the specific configuration of early Hellenistic power structures: to a contemporary observer, the political culture of the Diadoch period surely appeared entangled in an extremely unpredictable macro-political configuration. At this level, the system was subject to strong dynamics of re-negotiation and is therefore difficult to abstract using ideal types.³ The wealth of

¹ But cf. Mann 1986, who does not seem to be affected by this issue to the same degree due to his study's macro-political focus.

² I am aware that the ideal type in sociology (Weber 1972⁵ [1922], 3f., 10) was designed to allow such flexibility by outlining abstract, purely rational conceptions that explicitly differ from every real-world manifestation of social structure. In translating these concepts into historiography, however, I fear that this qualification is often lost and that insight is generated by using ideal types as comparanda or, worse, as explanations in themselves. For critical discussion of the ideal type see Foucault, Michel. *Dits et Écrits. Schriften*. 4 vols. Frankfurt a.M. 2003, vol 4, no. 278, p. 34-38.

³ See for instance the political history by Will 1979² [1966], 45-117. Cf. Green 1990, 3-35, 78f., 119-134. The quote from the Suda that opened this study (p. 13) can also

heterogeneous political interaction evidenced by artefacts and textual sources, combined with the fundamental historiographical problem of coherently conceptualising and narratively presenting an era of political confusion and unstable discourse, leads to a need for flexible concepts when pursuing an analysis of societal power dynamics. For this reason, this chapter seeks to bring together two concepts, power and network, which will be combined in the following and will underpin the analysis throughout.

The path taken here in attempting to fulfil these self-imposed requirements consisted in perusing various, especially sociological, approaches to the term 'network' and to the complex subject of socio-political power. Again, the aim of this interdisciplinary research was not to select a single conception to be applied to the power-political cosmos of the Diadoch period, but rather to combine individual elements in order to produce a conceptual framework tailored to the subject at hand and capable of integrating as many forms of political discourse as possible. Particularly problematical were objects that affected the socio-political configuration of society, including, for instance, monuments with epigraphic components, as well as value-laden gifts of both permanent and ephemeral nature.⁴ Accordingly, the concepts presented in the second half of this chapter are not based on an exact appropriation of sociological theory, but are the result of eclectic synthesis that forms a 'lens' through which the historical sources are to be studied. This lens had to be honed in such a way that it did not presuppose an in-depth study of other disciplines to make the results more widely accessible and more readable; the consequence is a process of cross-disciplinary translation that naturally incurs certain losses. In sum, the theoretical part of this work hence fulfils two main functions: on the one hand, it is designed to guide the study of the sources, highlight aspects hitherto considered insignificant, and recast them in a new light. On the other hand, the aim is to develop a terminology and a method capable of unifying the various isolated pieces of information available in the diverse source materials and relating them to one another, in order to enable abstract analysis of societal power relations in network terms. Methodologically rigorous, sociological study was never the aim.

The following sections provide an overview of various existing approaches to the concept of network and its conceptualisations in the context of power-theory. Along the way, their respective advantages and disadvantages will be discussed, giving rise to a new, syncretistic conception. All the terms used in the historical analysis to follow will be defined at the end of the chapter and then employed in

serve to exemplify this, due to the vivid impression it gives of a new world of infinite opportunity and dynamism.

⁴ On Hellenistic gift-giving and its monumentalisation see Bringmann and von Steuben 1995-2000.

sketching out the method. All concepts developed here can also be found – with brief explanations – in the glossary of terms appended to the end of the study.

2.2 Networks of power

I argued above that the concept of network has hitherto been used mainly in a descriptive fashion within the discipline of Ancient History, in which it expresses a visually connoted notion of the significant, complex connectedness of a number of elements. The American sociologist Linton Freeman has described this particular quality of the term ‘network’ as its “structural intuition” and this metaphorical quality was long sufficient to justify the use of this concept even at higher levels of abstraction in disciplines such as sociology and mathematics.⁵ Over the last few decades, however, a variety of scholars have attempted to develop more theoretical models. This section draws on these theories to create a concept of network, which can then be related to a concept of power as a pervasive societal dynamic.

It may advisable to begin with a very basic, ‘pre-theoretical’ definition of ‘network’. Very simply put, the term describes a set of elements that can be distinguished from the relationships between these elements.⁶ This definition already makes abundantly clear that networks are matters of perspective: Configurations that can be conceived of and described as networks do not *have* to be studied as such, but are the product of a conscious analytical process, a specific way of selecting, seeing, and interpreting. This conscious process shall here be referred to as a ‘network perspective’.

The search for a more precise, theoretical approach to the concept of ‘network’ in the context of power politics has led ancient historians to the sociology

⁵ Freeman, Linton. *The Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study in the Sociology of Science*. Vancouver 2004, 2-3: “The social network approach is grounded in the intuitive notion that the patterning of social ties in which actors are embedded has important consequences for those actors. Network analysts then, seek to uncover various kinds of patterns. And they try to determine the conditions under which those patterns arise and to discover their consequences. [...] SNA is motivated by a structural intuition based on ties linking actors.”

⁶ See e.g. Schulz-Schaeffer, Ingo. “Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie. Zur Ko-Konstitution von Gesellschaft, Natur und Technik”, in: Johannes Weyer (ed.). *Soziale Netzwerke. Konzepte und Methoden der sozialwissenschaftlichen Netzwerkforschung*. Munich 2011², 277-300, here 277; Holzer, Boris. *Netzwerke*. Bielefeld 2010², 34. According to the standard sociological definition, “a social network consists of a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them” (Wasserman, Stanley and Faust, Katherine. *Social Network Analysis. Methods and Applications*. Cambridge 1994, 20).

of rule and legitimate authority, notably Max Weber. The great disadvantage this immediately incurs is that a network has no inherent connotation of hierarchy and is not a dichotomous but a connective structural concept.⁷ By focusing on the term network, this study has thus already begun to tread a path apart from that trodden by Weberian historiography and accordingly disregards the concept of rule – and of power as a zero-sum game – in favour of an interest in societal power dynamics. The first step then leads not to Weber, but to Michel Foucault, who conceived of power as a network in the sense of discourse, as a web of ideas.⁸ Although this metaphor appears in a number of different variants throughout his work, these are quite unstable and differ from text to text in an essayistic fashion.⁹ In his late works, Foucault nevertheless offers some very useful definitions that may serve as a starting point. In an interview given in 1977, he described power as a productive web that pervades the entire social body.¹⁰ Elsewhere, he summarised his ideas in more detail by observing that power exists only as exercised by the ‘one’ upon the ‘others’, meaning that it exists only in action. A power relationship is thus a form of action that does not directly and immediately affect someone else, but affects their actions, making power consist in action on action, be it future or contemporary, real or potential. Whereas relationships of force have direct effects upon their subjects without potentiality, power relationships are constructed in such a way that the ‘others’ whom they affect remain acknowledged and maintained as the subjects of the action until its end.¹¹

In establishing this, Foucault addresses a number of fundamental issues. He expresses the notion that power relationships are not merely a matter of rulers and subjects, of authority and order, but pervade society in a way that can be imagined as networks of action and meta-action, penetrating the very foundations

⁷ This point is made by Latour, Bruno. “On Actor-Network Theory. A few Clarifications”, in: *Soziale Welt* 47:4 (1996), 369-381, here 371f.

⁸ See Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality. An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. Harmondsworth 1984, esp. 92-95. [Original: *La volonté de savoir*, 1976]; Foucault, Michel. “Das Subjekt und die Macht”, in: Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (eds.). *Michel Foucault. Jenseits von Strukturalismus und Hermeneutik*. Frankfurt a.M. 1987, 243-261. See further the summary by Anter, Andreas. *Theorien der Macht zur Einführung*. Hamburg 2012, 103-117. Foucault drew on Gilles Deleuze’s concept of culture as rhizomatic: Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix. *Rhizom*. Aus dem Französischen übersetzt von Dagmar Berger. Berlin 1977.

⁹ See also Anter 2012, 116f.: “Das disparate Bild, das sich in diesen Beschreibungen bietet, beruht tatsächlich darauf, dass Foucault zu viele Dinge als Macht bezeichnet.”

¹⁰ Foucault, Michel. *Dispositive der Macht. Über Sexualität, Wissen und Wahrheit*. Berlin 1978, 35; 75f. (Original: “Intervista a Michel Foucault”, in: Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino (eds.). *Microfisica del Potere*. Turin 1977, 3-28).

¹¹ Foucault 1987, 254.

of social action and giving it form and structure.¹² I have adopted this basic interest and approach for this study, in that the aim is to use narrative texts and objects to trace the modalities and complexities surrounding the production of action in the Diadoch period. These texts shall further be understood as embedded, productive, and re-productive actors within these networks of action. Finally, Foucault stresses that power differs from violence/coercion in that it leaves options open for both parties, but nevertheless takes effect in subtle ways and thereby generates order. For historiography, this argument has the significant consequence of excluding from the analysis actions that are simply coercive.

Returning to our interest in networks, however, Foucault's use of the term seems vague and draws only on its 'structural intuition' as identified by Freeman: "power relationships are rooted in the entirety of the societal network (*réseau*)."¹³ Of course, these limitations may well be due to the fact that he was writing before the network concept was theoretically elaborated. As a consequence, however, while Foucault's conception of power is truly stimulating, he cannot help with theorising the network character of power relationships at the societal level.

A far more well-developed conception of power-politics as networks can be found in the first volume of Michael Mann's *The Sources of Power*.¹⁴ Its drawback, however, is that Mann's conception is based on ideal types, as it rests on Talcott Parsons' refinement of Weber's ideal types of legitimate rule. Mann argues in favour of dissecting power into individual strands that come together as a network.¹⁵ In Mann's model, the four 'sources' of social power he identifies, i.e.

¹² Foucault 1987, 257: "In Gesellschaft leben heißt jedenfalls so leben, dass man gegenseitig auf sein Handeln einwirken kann. Eine Gesellschaft »ohne Machtverhältnisse« kann nur eine Abstraktion sein."

¹³ Foucault 1987, 258.

¹⁴ Mann, Michael. *The Sources of Social Power*. vol. 1. Cambridge 1986, 1-3; 14-18; 22-32. This model influenced Ma 1999 (e.g. p. 106f.), and Schuffert, Frank-Gernot. *Studien zu Krieg und Machtbildung im Frühellenismus*. Diss. Gießen 2005, 69 with n. 329, as well as recently Chrubasik, Boris. *Kings and Usurpers in the Seleukid Empire. The Men who would be King*. Oxford 2016.

¹⁵ For an overview of research into socio-political power see Cannadine, David. "Introduction", in: idem and Simon Price (eds.). *Rituals of Royalty*. Cambridge 1987, 1-19. Max Weber's ideal types of rule are developed in: Weber 1972⁵ [1922], esp. 122-147. Other classical theories of power sociology that will not be discussed here are the study of power and violence in the context of absolute rule by Arendt, Hannah. *Macht und Gewalt*. Munich 1987, as well as Bourdieu, Pierre. *Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft*. Frankfurt a.M. 1982 (Original: *La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement*. Paris 1979) on the social structures generated by taste and habitus. Parsons, Talcott. *The Structure of Social Action*. New York 1968, who developed a truly epic, integrated model of society as system, is neglected here in favour of Niklas Luhmann; on Clifford Geertz' hermeneutics of culture and its implications for the sociological

political, economic, military, and ideological power, form constellations that can be conceived of as networks and used to explain historical developments.¹⁶ The historical case-studies Mann explores in the four volumes of his all-encompassing history of power, are generally situated on an abstract macro-geopolitical and -economic level, with the result that his observations are difficult to map onto in-depth studies of a smaller-scale historical situation; in his view, these processes are too complex to analyse as networks.¹⁷ As a result, the complexity of the power-network as a process between individuals and collectives, as a societal phenomenon in Foucault's sense, which is precisely my concern here, slips through his methodological grasp.¹⁸ Again, this problem hampers all models and approaches based on ideal types.¹⁹ At the local level, interaction between actors has a plethora of layers, strands, and interconnections, any and all of which contribute their mite of meaning to the cosmos of power politics.²⁰ Only by considering these detailed interactions can one arrive at the 'rules' of interaction that characterise a specific game of power-politics at the level of individual action and describe the system as a historical construct specific to its time. The reason why I have nevertheless discussed Mann's conception here, is that he uses the term 'network' to fill the gap between history as lived reality and the abstract ideal types of sociology. This suggests that the concept of network need only be articulated without appeal to ideal types in order to unlock great hermeneutic potential.

study of power see for instance: Geertz, Clifford. "Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power", in: Joseph Ben-David and Terry N. Clark (eds.). *Culture and Its Creators: Essays in Honor of E. Shils*. Chicago 1977, 13-38. Geertz' approach has been widely influential and obviously underpins this study.

¹⁶ Mann 1986, 22-32.

¹⁷ Mann 1986, 1 and *passim*; note especially the diagram on p. 29.

¹⁸ See for instance Foucault 1984, 38-49 on how the discourse of sexuality functions as a dynamic of power.

¹⁹ Cf. Max Weber's discussion of the value of ideal types in sociological analysis: Weber 1972⁵ [1922], 9-11. I do not deny the value of the ideal type as a sociological method, at least in the hands of a master such as Weber. This study simply pursues a different aim in the hope of supplementing the discussion about Hellenistic power politics by offering a contrasting perspective.

²⁰ Foucault 1984, 92-95: "It seems to me that power must be understood in the first place as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate [...]. [...] Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. [...] [P]ower is not an institution, not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society." Cf. also Bourdieu 1982, whose interest is of course directed elsewhere, but describes structures that fall within this context.

2.2.1 Actor-Network-Theory

A promising approach in this vein is offered by Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), which is likewise sociological in origin. It pursues an approach focused on social constructivism and aims to dispense with categories of *a priori* validity, suggesting that it might be able to provide the conceptual flexibility sought here.²¹ Born from a search for a “new sociology” for a modern society increasingly permeated with technology and characterised by its cooperative development and versatile theoretical form, ANT can, however, be a difficult instrument to wield, especially for a non-sociologist.²² Besides its lack of a unified theoretical basis, the continuous critical evolution of this model, as well as its self-reflexive and self-deconstructive tendencies, complicate its interdisciplinary use.²³ The point of engaging with these ideas is thus primarily to contour certain methodological principles of this study prior to integrating them into the discipline of Ancient History. Given that caveat I feel justified in ignoring the dispute about the principles of sociology that suffuses much of the ANT literature, as well as its main focus, the modern sociology of technology.²⁴ Accordingly, the main interest will be in the way representatives of ANT have dealt with problems of the sociology of power. Although these too are explored using questions from the sphere of the sociology of technology or of science, their methods and overall results are certainly worth taking into consideration and even adopting, at least up to a point.²⁵

²¹ For the discussion of ANT I have drawn on the overview by Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer 2011², as well as select works by ANT scholars, including Bruno Latour’s programmatic ‘introduction’ (idem. *Eine neue Soziologie für eine neue Welt. Einführung in die Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie*. Translated by Gustav Roßler. Frankfurt a.M. 2007) and the ANT Handbook: Belliger, Andréa and Krieger, David J. (eds.). *ANThology. Ein einführendes Handbuch zur Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie*. Bielefeld 2006. To avoid unnecessary confusion, this study will not use one of ANT’s central concepts, the actant. An actant may be (inadequately) described as a compound translator, a network figuration of entities that generates action, be they objects or humans (see Latour 2007, 78-102, esp. 95f.). The category of ‘actor’ (which I use) is thereby expanded to encompass the non-individual and the non-human (Latour 1996, 369).

²² This search for a “new sociology” provides Bruno Latour (2007) with his title.

²³ On self-reflexive deconstruction see Schulz-Schaeffer 2011², 284f.; 290-293. As a constructivist approach with an explicit interest in the sociology of science ANT is forced to reflect on itself as its genesis, development, and usage are processes that demand analysis in themselves.

²⁴ See Latour 2007, 9-30, for the debate between ANT and the “sociology of the social”.

²⁵ On ANT’s objective to explain society as a whole see Schulz-Schaeffer 2011², 277; 295-298. It is worth noting, however, that the main thrust of this objective is to theorise in how far human life is structured by non-human actors by investigating how objects constitute the social (see Callon, Michel and Latour, Bruno. “Don’t Throw the Baby

Put simply, ANT scholars study social action by understanding actions and the sum of influential factors that affect this action as a network, with the aim of making the complexity of social action apparent.²⁶ The radical dimension of this seemingly simple principle may be best illustrated by offering an example. In an influential article, the French sociologist Michel Callon, who is with Bruno Latour one of the main representatives of ANT, addressed the attempts by scientists to save the population of a species of bivalve, *scrobicularia plana*, which is unique to the Baie de Saint-Brieuc on the Côte Émeraude (Bretagne). Doing so led him to engage with questions that are central also to this study.²⁷ He based his analysis on three controversial premises: 1) the sociologist should describe interactions as neutrally as possible. 2) All parties involved in the configuration observed should be described in the same categories. 3) All differentiations between the natural and the social, which seem to exist *a priori*, need to be abandoned.²⁸

The first two of these principles can be easily adopted for the study conducted here, although the reasons and their final form will differ – after all, the objective is not the description of modern society. For Callon, the premise of neutrality entails that the categories of analysis are not prescribed, but are determined by the interactions of the actors.²⁹ The consequence is that non-human entities, the scallops in Callon’s case, should be analysed in the same way as human actors. These ideals are understandable, but even in the form envisioned by Callon, are very difficult to implement fully. Our perception of what is relevant to any given interaction presupposes a process of selection that cannot be neutral, as it is necessarily performed by an observer – “every decoding is another encoding”.³⁰

Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearly”, in: Andrew Pickering (ed.). *Science as Practice and Culture*. Chicago 1992, 343-368, here 359).

- ²⁶ Schulz-Schaeffer 2011², 286f., provides a summary of the various objectives of the ANT approach.
- ²⁷ Callon, Michel. “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay”, in: John Law (ed.). *Power, Action, and Belief. A New Sociology of Knowledge?* (=Sociological Review Monograph 32). London and Boston 1986, 196-232. Although *scrobicularia plana* (in French ‘scrobiculaire’, in English ‘Peppery furrow shell’; in German ‘Große Pfeffermuschel’) is the sole member of its genus, and not a true scallop at all, I adhere in what follows to the term used in Callon’s paper.
- ²⁸ Callon 1986, 196; 200f.
- ²⁹ See also Callon, Michel. “Techno-economic Networks and Irreversibility”, in: John Law (ed.). *A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination* (=Sociological Review Monograph 38). London and Boston 1991, 132-161, here 143.
- ³⁰ The quotation is from what might be called a ‘network-novel’: Lodge, David. *A Small World*. New York 1984, 25. For its academic background see Hall, Stuart. “Encoding / Decoding”, in: idem, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis (eds.). *Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972–79*. London 1980, 128-138, and

Despite this caveat, expanding the inquiry to include historical actors that are usually not treated as such, or treated as categorically alien, is certainly a principle adopted in my study, largely because of my interest in identity.³¹ In accordance with my general agreement with the first premise, I also adopt Callon's definition of the social actor, as it is flexible enough to allow for the description of the entities evidenced in the surviving source material as actors within a closed political interaction network. An actor is thus "[a]ny entity that more or less successfully defines and builds a world filled by other entities with histories, identities and interrelationships of their own." This in effect describes all entities that change meaning in a given situation, a definition that leads back to Foucault but expands upon him by adding a helpful narrative dimension.³² We have thus taken an important step forward in combining networks and power for the purpose of analysing narrative.

The second premise, categorical equality in description, is likewise central to this undertaking. Approaching actors and actions with identical methodological tools creates comparability and allows the reconstruction of a coherent political system rather than one fractured into many different shards. This aim is achieved by employing a unified, abstract terminology across the board. At the same time, focusing the research interest on questions of power as a pervasive societal dynamic helps to avoid the kind of analytical levelling this kind of broad application of the same analytical categories might entail otherwise.

The third premise presents a thornier problem. It relates to a fundamental interest of ANT, namely the treatment of non-human entities as actors on an equal footing; in formulating it, the sociologist interested in technology is obviously concerned with things such as sheets of aluminium, baggage trolleys, electrical door openers, etc.³³ The dichotomy between the natural and the social is accordingly viewed as a construction that is perpetually being re-performed by

Bakhtin, Michail M. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Austin 1986, 160f.: "the interpretation of symbolic structures is forced into an infinity of symbolic contextual meanings and therefore it cannot be scientific in the way precise sciences are scientific." While ANT does develop a kind of pure observer who need only follow the semantic systems of the actors observed, the fundamental subjectivity of any available perspective seems underproblematised. On the problem of social observation see Luhmann 1988, 69f.; 92f.; 1117-1126.

³¹ I take it for granted that a 'neutral' perspective can never be achieved, and I nowhere postulate it.

³² Callon 1991, 140. This further constitutes a further significant expansion of Max Weber's definition of social action (Weber 1972⁵ [1922], 11-13).

³³ See the overview by Schulz-Schaeffer 2011², 280-284, as well as the neat summaries by Callon 1991, 139 and Latour 2007, 24-27.

actors, and is thus in permanent flux.³⁴ Since this question is not my primary field of interest and introduces a large number of further analytical steps, I will retreat to firmer ground, found in the considerations of Alfred Gell regarding the ‘agency’ of (art) objects.³⁵ In his view, individual persons are equal to the sum of their external relations and interactions, and objects are traces of their agency. This makes objects, and especially artefacts, secondary, but reflective of human consciousness via their analogous structure. The difference between human and object actors then lies in the complexity of their networks of relations, as humans develop a far more complex network than objects do, on account of their capacity for ‘direct’ agency. On the other hand, since the agency of both objects and humans is the product of cultural action, both are necessarily generated by human actors.³⁶ This does not mean, however, that object agency is *in all cases* secondary, let alone non-existent.³⁷

Let us return to Michel Callon and the seafood problem. In applying these three premises in his analysis of the scientific project to save the scallops of St. Brieuç bay, he first identifies the various actors involved, including the scientists, the interested wider scientific community, the Briochin fishermen with their economic interests, and finally the key element, the scallops everything hinges on. The interactions between these actors are conceived of as connections that can be abstractly understood as transforming the actors into a network situationally unified by an objective: ‘save the scallops.’ This network is first created and then modified by so-called translations, i.e. changes or re-interpretations of the relations between the entities involved.³⁸ In this case, these are mundane things such as meetings, incentives, agreements, and publications, but they are more broadly relevant to an interest in power politics as they allow an actor to establish itself as

³⁴ Callon 1986, 221. See also Latour 2007, 185-187.

³⁵ Gell, Alfred. *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory*. Oxford 1998, 220-223. For similar critical caveats see Schulz-Schaeffer 2011², 295; 297f., but note Callon 1991, 140f. Ultimately, the difference is not really very substantial and hinges on the question whether agency is assigned only to the ‘originator’ of an action or to both originator and mediator. Gell’s approach has been used to resolve similar difficulties also by Collins, Derek. *Magic in the Ancient World*. Malden, MA 2008, e.g. 94f.

³⁶ Compare the concept of *autopoiesis* and the development of communication in system theory; see Luhmann 1988, 65f., 80-91. In system theory terms, objects are not subject to double contingency, as they are unable to reflect on, or even hold, expectations for future action. This provides a clear theoretical solution to the problem.

³⁷ Cf. Gell 1998, 220: “Artworks are like social agents, in that they are the outcome of social initiatives which reflect a specific, socially inculcated sensibility.”

³⁸ Callon elsewhere defines translations as all “(re-)definitions of the identity, the characteristics, and the behaviours of any entities that are intended to establish connections between them, i.e. form networks” (1991, 140).

an *obligatory passage point* (OPP) for a specific set of interactions related to the objective. In this capacity, it acts as a central point of reference and an instance of control capable of defining the significance of the world within this network.³⁹ On this model, therefore, power consists in the *creation, maintenance, and semantification of interaction networks*, which results in qualitative and quantitative changes in connectivity within such a network.

A significant advantage of the ANT approach is that it allows Callon to differentiate these translations based on functional criteria rather than a catalogue of ideal types. As has become clear, the translation process begins with what he calls a *problématisation*, the identification of a problem or aim, as well as the actors related to it.⁴⁰ The entire model is thus both subjective and constructionist: the ‘problem/aim’ appears as the centre of the world and of the network configuration of actors established around it. The next step, which Callon terms *intéressement*, consists in the interaction processes actors pursue in practice in order to construct this network, which in turn usually involves the self-construction and acceptance of one as OPP.⁴¹ This involves, for instance, gauging the motivations of the relevant actors. Closely related is the third step of *enrolment*: the actor constructs and communicates a value order so as to achieve his goal of *mobilisation*. This final step consists in the actor’s employment of the OPP status to generate and direct agency in accordance with the value system he has constructed. If these steps are successful, the actor establishes itself as the controlling instance for a specific set of interactions in relation to the other entities, which in turn enables the attainment of the translation’s goal over time.

From my point of view, the pivotal advantage of this approach is that it is functionally oriented rather than typologising: interactions are not studied in terms of ideal types, which often occur in the real world only as diffuse amalgamations and are ultimately just *a priori* constructs, but are categorised on the basis of their function in structuring a network over time. Once one looks beyond the single world Callon picks out, the translation processes identified by him are therefore concurrent, plural, and ‘nested’, which in turn means that they can be traced at all levels of human interaction, from the individual to the inter-collective.

³⁹ Callon 1986, 196; 203-218. In this scenario, the ‘world’ is very small, consisting only of the problem of saving the scallops and the network of translations and actants revolving around it. The strengths of this approach therefore lie in situational analysis, not in theorising society.

⁴⁰ Again, to keep things manageable, I speak simply of actors and largely disregard the ANT concept of actant, which would admittedly be more precise.

⁴¹ The Petit Robert defines *intéressement* as “action d’intéresser (une personne) aux bénéfices de l’entreprise, par une rémunération qui s’ajoute au salaire”.

The basic principles of this analytical method, i.e. its focus on situationally constructed value orders and the means of their construction and stabilisation through narrative connections, shall thus number among my principal methodological tools throughout the following case studies.

The networks of ANT are infinitely situational and consist of translations, i.e. definitions of one actor's identity by another within the 'world' of the translation.⁴² Two processes, *convergence* and *irreversibilisation*, further determine the dynamics of the translation process as a network. Successful definition attempts generate a shared space and create equivalence among actors, whereas unsuccessful processes result in the opposite.⁴³ The greater the *convergence*, the clearer and more accepted the identity definitions, i.e. the relational equivalence of the entities involved.⁴⁴ Particularly dense and normatively organised networks are also the most *irreversible*, i.e. offer the most resistance to actions that aim to revert or redefine the translations that shape them.⁴⁵ These specifications have a certain general relevance for the study of the Diadoch period, as they allow for a more precise assessment of the abstract structures of normatively organised networks, as they emerge from the source materials.

Before we continue our investigation of power as network, a number of critical points need to be mentioned in order to avoid blindly appropriating interdisciplinary methodology. It is important to realise that any translation and any *problématisation* is itself the result of other network configurations, all of which Callon smoothly disregards in his small-scale case study: "Where they [the scientists] came from and why they act is of little importance at this point of the investigation".⁴⁶ The categories he develops are thus suited to the description of analytically isolated groups of interactions focused on a specific core that is of interest, but the act of selection that precedes the analysis is always fundamentally arbitrary. The fact that the boundaries of the network to be analysed are purely subjective is a basic methodological problem that is particularly pertinent to

⁴² Callon 1991, 142f.; Latour 1996, 371-373.

⁴³ Callon 1991, 145.

⁴⁴ Callon (1991, 149 n. 38) considers using word-context-analysis as an empirical means of quantifying the success of translation, on the premise that translations are positively manifested in texts that function as actants.

⁴⁵ Callon 1991, 150f.: "Minimally, norms for interfaces require at least one pertinent variable which may take one of two possible values – for instance good or bad, pass or fail. But they can extend to fine tuning between multiple continuous variables by way of upper and lower threshold limits. The more precise and quantified these standards, the more a successful translation becomes irreversible. A network which irreversibilises itself is a network that has become heavy with norms." (Quotation from p. 151).

⁴⁶ Callon 1986, 202-204, quotation from p. 203. Cf. Callon 1991, 142.

studies concerned with contemporary subject matter. In the context of Ancient History, this problem, though present, is in practice less severe due to the nature of the source material – the networks that can be reliably addressed are already limited by the information available, which results from discourse deemed significant enough to be recorded. Still, three things should be briefly noted: 1) Any selection of a network for the purpose of study is ultimately arbitrary and a subjective network process; 2) for practical reasons, any investigation has to leave large parts of the network uninvestigated, treating them as black boxes that are not necessarily always as predictable and transparent as M. Callon asserts;⁴⁷ 3) communicating research results is itself a complex network process, rendering the theory self-reflexive.

A more significant problem in applying this method in another disciplinary context, however, is that it does not explicitly develop an analytical meta-level beyond providing descriptive and categorising concepts, preventing its use as a convenient hermeneutic aid in historical analysis. This limitation is a fundamental principle of ANT, born from its self-reflexive criticism of sociology, and certainly makes sense in an inner-disciplinary context: the social is not to be reduced to a mere component that can be used to explain other things, but is to emerge from the mesh of the actors and networks as the critical result of sociological inquiry.⁴⁸ For the project pursued here, this is not sufficient: the aim must be to offer insights into the reconstructed networks that go beyond their description. In my view, it is not enough to identify the genesis, maintenance and semantic structure of a network and describe its diachronic development, i.e. to tell the story of a network. In its methodologically pure form, ANT limits itself to describing potentially unlimited networks of interaction, which are constrained in practice only by the author's stamina, the maximum capacity of a printing press, and the efficacy of the translation process that is ANT itself. In effect, its focus on interaction networks that involve technological actors then results in insightful descriptions of aspects of modernity, which, unlike ancient history, are interesting as such due to their contemporary relevance.⁴⁹

In order to be able to inject such an abstract meta-level into the analysis, other approaches to the interpretation of power processes as networks need to be added

⁴⁷ Callon 1991, 152f. On the concept of the black box in systems theory cf. Luhmann, Niklas. *Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie*. Frankfurt a.M. 1984, 156f. It denotes 1) a complex system that cannot be investigated in the analysis and 2) a system at the beginning of a communication process that becomes 'whiter' over time. Both meanings are pertinent here.

⁴⁸ Latour 2007, 254: "Ich habe noch nie eine gute Beschreibung gesehen, die eine Erklärung benötigt hätte."

⁴⁹ Latour 2007, 255f.; Schulz-Schaeffer 2011², 288-298.

to our toolbox. The focus of ANT has directed the search towards action theory, since it claimed that action resulted from the relations between actors, i.e. from their networks.⁵⁰ Before continuing the search, however, it may be worth recapitulating what this consideration of ANT has shown. Callon's model provided two things. The first is a concept of 'actor' that holds that power-correlated action always consists in the *creation of compound actors*, a process he terms 'translation'. The second is a set of terms that allow for the description and categorisation of actions within this process, which consists in the creation of a narrative world, based on whether they develop problems, enrol other entities in this construction of the world, or mobilise their agency to resolve the problems outlined. This having been observed, let us now consider other approaches to the interpretation of networks that may help to add a theoretical meta-level.

2.2.2 Quantifying network theory

Let us concentrate first on the network aspect, with which this chapter originally opened. Another way of approaching its theoretical abstraction is to consider quantifying approaches from the natural sciences, specifically graph- and network-theory. Here, interdisciplinary transfer and abstraction is fortunately facilitated by the work of the Hungarian physicist Albert-László Barabási, who has summarised this research in a form accessible to a wider academic audience.⁵¹

Network theory emerged from mathematical network analysis and offers both a set of terminological tools for the description of networks and a range of abstract classifications and behavioural models derived from mathematical patterns.⁵² In their visualised form, the elements of a network are accordingly described as nodes, their relations as edges or links. The dataset may also contain additional information about the elements, adding a layer of qualification to the

⁵⁰ Callon 1991, 134: “[E]very actor contains *a hidden but already social being*; that agency cannot be dissociated from the relationships between actors.” Italics in the original.

⁵¹ Barabási, Albert-László. *Linked. The New Science of Networks*. Cambridge, MA. 2002. For a self-contained, practical application in the field of cellular biology see Barabási, Albert-László and Oltvai, Zoltan. “Network Biology: Understanding the Cell’s Functional Organization”, in: *Nature Reviews Genetics* 5 (2004), 101-113.

⁵² Barabási 2002, 13-24. The original impetus behind network research was the improvement of the work done on random networks by the mathematicians Paul Erdős and Alfréd Rényi. In the field of Ancient History, this network-based methodology has been successfully applied by Irad Malkin, who used it to illuminate the dynamics that underpin the development of Panhellenic identity: Malkin, Irad. *A Small Greek World. Networks in the Ancient Mediterranean*. Oxford 2011.

quantifiable base data. Generally speaking, quantifying network analysis, consisting for instance in the mathematical evaluation of a network's connectivity or directionality, is more worthwhile and meaningful if the dataset is larger.⁵³ The reason is simply that network analysis offers mathematical tools to describe the configuration and structure of a network, providing points of comparison with other networks.⁵⁴ However, since the networks studied here will never be able to measure up to the standards of data integrity and precision necessary for such network analysis, these mathematical instruments will have no bearing on this study.⁵⁵

Looking beyond mathematical analysis, Barabási also makes us aware of empirical studies that suggest that the structure of real-world networks is not purely random, but in fact based on specific regularities that can be expressed in mathematical formulas. The most important of these observations appears to be that real-world networks tend towards centralisation, meaning that the distribution of the number of links between the nodes of a network does not graph as a

⁵³ For the sociological perspective cf. Holzer 2010², 55-63. In practice, empirical network analysis focuses on clearly delimited groups of small to medium sizes, though big data and data aggregation obviously offer opportunities here: Jansen, Dorothea and Diaz-Bone, Rainer. "Netzwerkstrukturen als soziales Kapital", in: Johannes Weyer (ed.). *Konzepte und Methoden der sozialwissenschaftlichen Netzwerkforschung*. Munich 2011², 71-108, here 73f. For a classic practical application in the Social Sciences see for instance Krackhardt, David and Hanson, Jeffrey R. "Informal Networks. The Company behind the Chart", in: *Harvard Business Review* (July-August 1993), 104-111.

⁵⁴ These mathematical analytical tools include the calculation of a network's density that determines to what degree nodes are connected on average: Denser networks are less likely to contain nodes that monopolise connections. Irad Malkin (2011) draws on the general rule that greater density results in greater network connectivity for his analysis of the small world development of Archaic Greece. Another essential analytical tool consists in measuring the various degrees of centrality possessed by a network's nodes, i.e. their relative importance in the network. Examples are degree-centrality, i.e. the number of connections per node, and betweenness-centrality, which describes the probability that a path between two given nodes passes through a specific node and thus designates a node's significance as a mediator (Holzer 2010², 38-48). A third tool measures connectivity patterns, such as circularity or linearity, that can aid, for instance, in identifying social schisms and closed factions.

⁵⁵ The most important standard is that the network is complete (on this problem see Erlhofer, Sebastian. "Missing Data in der Netzwerkanalyse", in: Christian Stegbauer (ed.). *Netzwerkanalyse und Netzwerktheorie. Ein neues Paradigma in den Sozialwissenschaften*. Wiesbaden 2010², 251-260), a demand that can hardly ever be met in historical studies. This kind of meta-analysis that draws on mathematical tools therefore seems useful mainly for discourse studies with a limited focus and statistically sound data. Ideally, such a study would dispose of extensive, contemporary materials as points of comparison.

bell curve, but like an exponential function. Networks that show such a distribution are termed scale-free, as their distribution does not vary with absolute size.⁵⁶ Paired with a growth dynamic, Barabási labels this phenomenon “preferential attachment”, arguing that nodes with more links are more attractive and obviously connective than nodes with fewer, resulting in networks consisting of a small number of nodes with many links and a much larger number of less well-connected nodes. He is able to trace this phenomenon in many different contexts, including the spread of the HI virus, of computer viruses or information, but also in the very infrastructure itself, be it the internet or electricity grids. All these scale-free networks can be expressed using the mathematical parameters identified by Barabási and his colleagues:⁵⁷ their observations suggest that the distribution patterns often approximate 4:1 (the so-called 80-20 rule) and that successful nodes tend to become more successful (the so-called rich-get-richer phenomenon).⁵⁸ It is worth noting that all his examples ultimately derive from human interactions. The basic tendency towards network centralisation and the other phenomena observed can therefore also apply to human behaviour in interaction – Barabási considers this a “natural” principle.⁵⁹ In an interdisciplinary use as a hermeneutic aid in Ancient History, however, such references to apparently ‘natural’ phenomena are of course more problematic, especially since the networks studied here can never be treated in their entirety. Barabási’s investigations do not face this problem, since the networks identified therein are generally scientifically quantifiable. In that respect, they can be considered closed and complete, rendering the two principles sufficient for their identification.

⁵⁶ This conception of network is based on a network’s basic form, the matrix, i.e. a table that charts the links between all entities in the dataset. For an example see e.g. Holzer 2010², 35. Scale-free means that altering the scale of the table does not alter the structure and the matrix shows a relatively static power law distribution no matter how much data is added.

⁵⁷ On “preferential attachment” see Barabási 2002, 85-92; HI and computer viruses: Barabási 2002, 123-142; 153f.; the circulation of information: Barabási 2002, 128f.; the structure of the internet: Barabási 2002, 143-153; electricity grid: Barabási 2002, 50; 115f. A scale-free network is characterised by a ratio of connections to nodes that can be expressed as a power law, meaning that a small number of nodes have many connections, while the majority have very few. As a result, the network’s ratio is roughly independent of its absolute size and can be scaled up or down. On scale-free networks see Barabási, Albert-László and Bonabeau, Eric. “Skalenfreie Netze“, in: *Spektrum der Wissenschaft* (July 2004), 62–69; Barabási, Albert-László and Albert, Réka. “Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks”, in: *Science* 286 (1999), 509-512.

⁵⁸ 80-20 rule: Barabási 2002, 65-78; rich-get-richer phenomenon: Barabási 2002, 79-92.

⁵⁹ Cf. the analysis of the spread of HIV: Barabási 2002, 123-142.

In the context of complex human interaction networks, however, the problem arises that these are not necessarily scale-free, but are subject to the limits of human ability and connectivity – meaning that if nodes are human, the maximum amount of social links they can maintain is not unlimited. As a consequence, Barabási's principles need to be subjected to further scrutiny; in practice, any instance of 'preferential attachment' will have to be broken down to the strands of interaction that actually produce it. Nevertheless, the results achieved by network analysis in the Natural Sciences do provide a relevant background to this investigation, especially as regards scale-free networks. This will manifest mainly in the terminology adopted and in statements made about the potential dynamics of the reconstructed networks identified. Structural figurations may for example be described as centralised, decentralised or distributed networks.⁶⁰ Centralised networks are characterised by the existence of a hub, a node that possesses significantly more links than all the others do. Accordingly such figurations are always likely to be scale-free networks and subject to the regularities identified by Barabási. Decentralised networks possess several such hubs, whereas distributed networks show an even distribution of links across the nodes and lack hubs. The 'inventor' of these distinctions, Paul Baran, was in fact concerned with a question of relevance to processes of power, namely the question of maintaining the functionality of communication networks in cases of node failure or hostile attack. His results were clear: centralised systems were more susceptible to such fallout, since disabling central nodes would single-handedly destroy much of the network's connectivity. Distributed systems did not show this weakness to the same degree as the redundancy of their links was capable of cushioning the impact. Along with these basic principles, we should also bear the dynamics of 'preferential attachment' in mind, as they too can characterise social networks.⁶¹

We are now faced with the question whether it is possible to weld these empirically founded regularities onto a concept of power. It seems to me that directly applying these 'laws' to historical social networks is problematic for various reasons, especially in the case of the power processes considered here. Social networks need to be very heavily simplified in order to be able to consider them akin to simple 1/0 circuit boards: as the earlier discussion of the ANT approach has already shown, knowing the number of nodes and the links between them is

⁶⁰ See Barabási 2002, 144f. with fig. 11.1, and Baran, Paul. *On distributed communications: Introduction to distributed communications networks*. 1964, 1f., https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM3420.pdf (Accessed 21.09.2017).

⁶¹ Cf. Holzer 2010², 33f.; 94f., who draws on Luhmann (1984, 43f.; 60-62) in speaking of the 'autopoiesis' of networks. However, the complexity of social networks and the plurality of situationally 'attractive' aspects should not be underestimated.

not sufficient for an analysis, as the quality of the links and the plurality of networks involved are of crucial significance.⁶² This qualitative level is of course due to interactions being embedded in a world order, which is itself produced by an inestimable wealth of interactions.⁶³ Another complicating factor is the obfuscating effect networks seem to have in life.⁶⁴ This is due to the limited human ability to penetrate complexity: complex socio-political processes are opaque for the actors involved. The more complex these webs of interaction, the greater the significance of the processes of translation identified by Callon, as they limit human perception of contingency, which should be the consequence of such complexity.⁶⁵ The key point is then simply that the network structure of social networks is in itself a cause of societal power processes at the narrative level. Although it has thus become clear that network science is not directly of use in unravelling power processes, which in turn necessitates further consideration of network approaches to power, we can nevertheless note that structurally conceptualising power relationships as networks allows for greater terminological and conceptual precision, which will benefit the study at hand.

A first step in considering such approaches is to assess the merits of social network analysis (SNA), a scientific method that was developed roughly in parallel to network science with the aim of analysing the structures of social networks.⁶⁶ Its focus lies on human relationships, especially those that exceed mere role-play, in that it addresses specific rather than universal interactions.⁶⁷ Applications of

⁶² Cf. Holzer 2010², 9-11. This may be one of the reasons why the concept of network remains underspecified in Foucault and Mann.

⁶³ Cf. Luhmann 1984, 61. 'Order' here describes a state in which the nexus of expectations – or identities – that codifies expected behaviour, operates and adapts relatively smoothly. On 'normality' as a symbolic cipher for 'expected expectation' see Luhmann 1984, 416.

⁶⁴ Cf. Barabási 2002, 6-8.

⁶⁵ The fundamental treatment of contingency used here is Luhmann 1984, 46f.; 152. The sheer number of elements and relationships in the world render it infinitely complex and impose a biological-psychological imperative on any actor to reduce this complexity. The aim (in a non-teleological sense) of social order is the reduction of this complexity, which obviously takes the shape of many different figurations. This generates contingency, defined as the fact that a given selection of elements and relations is neither necessary, nor impossible, but possible in an extremely wide variety of configurations. For actors, this establishes 'risk' or, perhaps better, uncertainty in acting. On the societal relevance of power see Luhmann, Niklas. *Macht*. Stuttgart 1988², 90f.

⁶⁶ On this see the overview by Holzer 2010², 34-72.

⁶⁷ Holzer 2010², 11. In practice this means that social network analysis is concerned with firms or groups of friends rather than the many fleeting social contacts of a cashier, for instance. On roles in personal relationships see extensively Goffman, Erving. *Wir alle spielen Theater. Zur Selbstdarstellung im Alltag*. Munich 2003 (Original: *The Presentation*

this methodology aim at empirically studying the structures and dynamics of human interaction and at abstracting theoretical patterns from these observations. Empirical data, compiled into sociomatrices, is visualised as networks and analysed using neutral descriptive terminology and mathematical tools similar to those mentioned above.⁶⁸ Significant theoretical results that have gained wider acclaim are the small-world studies by Stanley Milgram and Mark Granovetter's strength-of-weak-ties theorem.⁶⁹ The small-world studies showed empirically that the connectivity of social relations is degrees higher than had been previously supposed. The experiments suggested that any given human being is separated from any other by only six links in a global social network, transforming the vast social world into a small world. One should note, however, that the results have been criticised for underestimating the impact of cultural and socio-economic cleavages. Accordingly, the variance in the lengths of the links between individuals can be very substantial.⁷⁰ The strength-of-weak-ties theorem holds that new information, innovations for instance, predominantly spread via low-intensity relationships rather than close ones, since the former connect social clusters (i.e. densely enmeshed groups) and thereby increase the potential pool of information, whereas the latter are strongly redundant when it comes to spreading information. The study of similar figurations has also led to increased scientific interest in

of Self in Everyday Life. New York 1959), who describes the phenomenon of social role-play as a complex process of control determined by collectivised expectation (see p. 217-231).

- ⁶⁸ A sociomatrix is basically a table that holds information about nodes and connections with varying degrees of detail. See on this Holzer 2010², 34-36, and the various examples given by Stegbauer, Christian. "Beziehungsnetzwerke im Internet", in: Johannes Weyer (ed.). *Konzepte und Methoden der sozialwissenschaftlichen Netzwerkforschung*. Munich 2011², 249-274.
- ⁶⁹ Milgram, Stanley. "The Small World Problem", in: *Psychology Today* (May 1967), 60-67; Granovetter, Mark S. "The Strength of Weak Ties", in: *American Journal of Sociology* 78 (1973), 1360-1380. On these dynamics see in general Jansen and Diaz-Bone 2011², 76-84; Holzer 2010², 16-22; 63-72; on Granovetter's observations see also White 2008², 43-45.
- ⁷⁰ Criticism was prominently voiced by Kleinfeld, Judith. "The Small World Problem", in: *Society* 39 (January-February 2002), 61-66. According to Pierre Bourdieu (*Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge 1977, 80-85) socio-economic fields tend towards homogeneity and harmony due to the dynamics of habitus-formation; the world within a field is therefore always "smaller" than a world that extends across field boundaries. This obviously constitutes a problem for quantifying network analysis.

mediators and brokers, which has revealed the enormous structural significance of such intermediary figures in the social world.⁷¹

What is the value of these abstract results for a data-starved, historical analysis of power relationships? If these are considered processes of communication that spread information, all these theorems are relevant, since the dynamics they identify can apply to the social figurations under discussion here.⁷² That being said, they are usually too general in nature to be of assistance in a detailed analysis of power relationships in the abstract as they are too closely linked to their empirical foundations. Our knowledge of early Hellenistic history is often too good to be content with what we would learn by applying the theoretical statements produced by SNA, but not good enough to perform actual SNA. That is not to say, however, that the theoretical insights of SNA are not valuable in Ancient Studies, for instance where good archaeological material coincides with a dearth of textual sources.⁷³ For the present purposes, SNA is significant more as a heuristic aid that contributes to formulating the network perspective adopted here. This is especially true of the concept of the broker, as such mediators between network clusters can correspond to the OPPs of Callon's translation model, which similarly hinged on the negotiation of information as a crucial element of power dynamics.⁷⁴

⁷¹ See the summary by Holzer 2010², 18-22; 46-48, who also provides an overview of the different kinds of brokerage identified in the Social Sciences.

⁷² On power as a system of communication see Luhmann 1988², esp. 4-9; cf. also Foucault 1987, 243-247, on power as a double form of subjection: "Schließlich kreisen all diese gegenwärtigen Kämpfe [gegen Macht und Unterwerfung] um dieselbe Frage: Wer sind wir? Sie weisen die Abstraktionen ab, die ökonomische und ideologische Staatsgewalt, die nicht wissen will, wer wir als Individuen sind, die wissenschaftliche und administrative Inquisition, die bestimmt, wer man sei. Man kann zusammenfassen: Das Hauptziel dieser Kämpfe ist nicht so sehr der Angriff auf diese oder jene Machtinstitution, Gruppe, Klasse oder Elite, sondern vielmehr auf eine Technik, eine Form von Macht. Diese Form von Macht wird im unmittelbaren Alltagsleben spürbar, welches das Individuum in Kategorien einteilt, ihm seine Individualität aufprägt, es an seine Identität fesselt, ihm ein Gesetz der Wahrheit auferlegt, das es anerkennen muss und das andere an ihm anerkennen müssen. Es ist eine Machtform, die aus Individuen Subjekte macht. Das Wort *Subjekt* hat einen zweifachen Sinn: vermittels Kontrolle und Abhängigkeit jemandem unterworfen sein und durch Bewusstsein und Selbsterkenntnis seiner eigenen Identität verhaftet sein. Beide Bedeutungen unterstellen eine Form von Macht, die einen unterwirft und zu jemandes Subjekt macht." (246f.).

⁷³ On the use of SNA results to make sense of archaeological findings see e.g. Knappett, Carl (ed.). *Network Analysis in Archaeology. New Approaches to Regional Interaction*. Oxford 2013.

⁷⁴ Two crucial factors are the exclusivity and redundancy of the network position in question. A simple messenger, for instance, is highly exchangeable and his brokering function hardly exclusive, which generally prevents him from establishing consistent

In sum, one can say that considering quantifying approaches to network analysis has produced only very few notable results. These include the observation that real networks have a fundamental tendency to grow and be connective, and that large networks and well-connected nodes are particularly attractive. Furthermore analyses of their structural configurations reinforce pre-theoretical assumptions regarding the significance of broker figures, i.e. nodes with exclusive links, and the advantages for information control that derive from being well-connected. Nevertheless, the search for a theoretical meta-level to fuel our conception of network must be taken still further. One more approach from the Social Sciences seems promising, which will take us into the realms of general social theory, namely the dedicated theory of social structure built on the basis of a network concept by the American sociologist Harrison White.

2.2.3 Harrison White: Narrative struggles for control

While comparable and compatible to systems theory, White's central conceptual building block is the network rather than the system.⁷⁵ Like all general theories in the Social Sciences, it is far more substantial than is helpful or necessary for the present purposes and I will therefore present only a few key points. Before I do so, however, one caveat is worth raising: making interdisciplinary use of White's model is made more challenging by the fact that he extensively operates with neologisms and re-defines common-language terms, which makes the theory difficult to access and complicates both its use and any brief presentation. The following will thus introduce only a selection of White's terminology for the purpose of communicating the relevant key theses.⁷⁶

control of the communications he mediates. A translator with rare language skills on the other hand might be in quite a different position.

⁷⁵ White, Harrison. *Identity and Control. How Social Formations Emerge*. New York 2008² is White's *magnum opus* in its second, heavily revised and re-structured edition. A summary is provided by Holzer 2010², 81-93, who worked with the first edition that evidently suffered from structural problems largely resolved in White's revision.

⁷⁶ Rather than using White's central concept of identity as epidemically as he does I will continue to speak of actors in the sense outlined above. Only two things are described as identities or identity: a) situationally reproduced and adapted, memorized sets of interaction expectations, i.e. the concrete manifestation of the actor, and b) the sum of all these interaction expectations in a relational network that constitutes the actor in the abstract (White 2008², 17f.). For the sake of clarity the central concepts of *netdom*, *discipline*, and *style* will be abandoned as they seem ultimately to express subdivisions of networks on the basis of ideal types. It may be worth re-emphasising that the aim of this chapter is not to identify a specific network methodology to be applied to the letter, but to develop an eclectic, historiographical method.

The most important of these is that actors fundamentally strive for control over the insecurity of world experience, of its contingency, by creating safe(r) situations through action.⁷⁷ Action generates what White terms *social footing* and equates to situational control. White thereby considers the actor to be created by and contingent upon his interaction with the world, rendering his approach constructivist in nature.⁷⁸ Every social situation is then fundamentally agonistic, which also happens to allow White to smoothly explain social inequality.⁷⁹ The construction of the world order, which effectively reduces contingency in general, happens by *switching* from one social situation to the other.⁸⁰ This process of transferring expectations (inherent in *footing*) into new situations creates an awareness of the experiences being remembered, establishing them as modes of interaction, which can then be further reproduced in interaction with other actors. White calls these patterns of action *identities* and uses them as the basic units of his inquiry.⁸¹ New interactions establish new links between these identities, generating changing configurations – a constantly shifting hierarchical mesh inside the actor’s psyche that White imagines as a network of identities that lends

⁷⁷ White 2008², 7; 17; 20. His approach is thus comparable to that of systems theory (cf. Luhmann 1984, 156-162) and White generally considers his model compatible with systems theory (White 2008², 1 n. 1).

⁷⁸ White 2008², 2: “Identities trigger out of events – that is to say out of switches in surroundings – seeking control over uncertainty and thus over fellow identities. Identities build and articulate ties to other identities in network-domains, netdoms for short. [...] Thus the world comes from identities attempting control within their relations to other identities. In their search for control, identities switch from netdom to netdom, and each switching is at once a decoupling from somewhere and an embedding into somewhere.”

⁷⁹ White 2008², 298f. Cf. Luhmann 1988², 6: “Kommunikation kommt nur zustande, wenn man die Selektivität einer Mitteilung verstehen und das heißt: zur Selektion eines eigenen Systemzustandes verwenden kann. Das impliziert Kontingenz auf beiden Seiten, also auch Möglichkeiten der Ablehnung [...]. Eine Rückkommunikation von Ablehnung und die Thematisierung der Ablehnung in sozialen Systemen ist Konflikt. Alle sozialen Systeme sind potentiell Konflikte; nur das Ausmaß der Aktualisierung dieses Konfliktpotentials variiert [...]”

⁸⁰ White 2008², 17: “Switchings are the vehicles of meaning for identity and control.” This theoretical postulate is highly significant for historical analysis as such processes of transfer and re-contextualisation can on occasion be identified in the source material.

⁸¹ Cf. accordingly Luhmann 1988, 94: “[Alle Kommunikationen] bilden (2) Strukturen als Selektionsschemata, die ein Wiedererkennen und Wiederholen ermöglichen, also Identitäten [...] kondensieren und in immer neuen Situationen konfirmieren, also generalisieren.”

meaning to the world.⁸² In certain contingent situations, these identities can further coalesce into a compound, abstract identity, most visibly as self-reflexive personhood.⁸³ To avoid terminological confusion, I will on occasion refer to the former as sub-identities, or simply as expectations for future interaction. Such expectations only define which interactions are more or less surprising, or anticipated, in a given social context, i.e. what results in perception of contingency and what does not. White's model thereby escapes theorising social determinism.⁸⁴

The theory's key principle is the notion that actors are constantly competing for control of social situations by exerting agency.⁸⁵ The very structures of social action are thereby understood as continuous processes of negotiation about the control of identities and agency, which are further formulated and exchanged in narratives – White speaks of *stories* – and codified in memories both individual and collective.⁸⁶ Meaning and order are generated by collective participation in such narratives that interpret the lived reality of the interaction network and are themselves to be understood as networks of meaningful sub-elements.⁸⁷ This results in an integral paradox: control is generated both by the action-dampening effect of the world order, which itself makes action expectable and offers security, and by the exertion of agency in opposition to or within this order.⁸⁸ Order is

⁸² White 2008², 17f., 337. White's concept of identity is complex and possesses five aspects, the first of which is the one described here: "The first sense is identity as the smallest unit of analysis. Persons consist of a bundle of these identities."

⁸³ White 2008², 17; 20; 129f. This is White's fourth category of identity. It emerges from the constructivist approach, which implies that a person has no abstract existence but can only be situationally constructed either by itself or by others. The reassuringly static nature of identity is thus mere illusion.

⁸⁴ Constructivist approaches have a problem with determinism because actors are conceived as striving for the absence of contingency. This should theoretically lead them to complete assimilation to expectation to the point of static determination. See Luhmann 1984, 414 and cf. Düring, Marten and von Keyserlingk, Linda. "Netzwerkanalyse in den Geschichtswissenschaften. Historische Netzwerkanalyse als Methode für die Erforschung von historischen Prozessen", in: Rainer Schützeichel and Stefan Jordan (eds.). *Prozesse – Formen, Dynamiken, Erklärungen*. Wiesbaden 2015, 337-350, here 340.

⁸⁵ White 2008², 292f.

⁸⁶ On *stories* see White 2008², 20-38; on agency as a product of control, i.e. situational security, see White 2008², 292f. On memory and its significance in the attribution of meaning see Luhmann 1988, 44-46. On individual and collective memory see esp. Assmann, Jan. *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*. Munich 1992, 34-42, who summarises the work of Halbwachs.

⁸⁷ White 2008², 31, 37, 158.

⁸⁸ White 2008², 279-292, 297: "Getting action thus has to take account of meanings and to rely upon them; but the principal task is to stay ahead of and strip away meaning." (282); "Hegemony seems to rest on stasis, whether or not authority speaks of change."

thus a dynamic and, at an abstract level, infinitely delicate, but nevertheless non-contingent result of continuous processes of negotiation within and ‘in between’ networks. It is maintained by *control-regimes*, collective narratives that provide societal ‘meta-control’, so a level of control beyond the individual’s constant search for footing.⁸⁹

What bearing does White’s model have on the project pursued here? Its great value lies in the conceptual link it creates between the term ‘network’ and other central terms, such as actor, identity, agency, contingency, and – crucial to this project and Ancient History with its literary sources – narrative. Rather than presupposing a ‘coherent’, empirically static actor – e.g. an individual described as acting in a historical source – White makes us look inside the actors and emphasises that their constitution is itself socially constructed and dependent on the networks an actor moves in on many different levels. Foucault and Callon had already made us aware that an essential form of power consists in providing an individual with identity, a process that provides order and structure, but also enrolls it in narratives of control.⁹⁰ White now highlights that the entirety of the world, ranging from a single individual’s composition to macro-societal processes, can be conceived of as a continuity of narrative interrelations that can be addressed as networks, which may in turn show dynamics we discussed above. White’s perspective allows us to relate actor and action on all levels of analysis, as they are conceptualised in the same terms: just as an actor appears as a diachronically reconfiguring network of identities that is constantly under tension due to the dynamics of contingency control, its interaction-based social networks are structured on the same principles. Finally, the fundamental agonality of social existence in White’s model makes the question of control present in every narrative, and thus in every historical source. This provides a conceptual opening that allows us to attach further considerations about power, since unfortunately White himself does not specifically discuss it.⁹¹

(292); “[...] [C]ontrol must be a two-edged concept: control may be realised by stopping change and thus blocking action, as well as by getting action [...]” (297).

⁸⁹ See White 2008², 220-229, esp. 222f.

⁹⁰ Foucault 1987, 243-247; Callon 1991.

⁹¹ White 2008², 298. That said, the model itself is obviously concerned with questions closely related to power.

2.3 Advanced power concepts

Such considerations can be found in Niklas Luhmann's theory of autopoietic systems, which includes explicit reflections on power.⁹² Combining these different approaches is legitimate, for Luhmann's theory and White's model are not incompatible.⁹³ Both theoretical models share not only a fundamental focus on contingency control and complexity reduction, based on a postulate of the fundamental agonality of social situations, but also a certain constructivist core.⁹⁴ One needs to bear in mind, however, that systems theory in Luhmann's conception is highly abstract and in fact strictly divorced from the 'reality of life' as its systems of communication exist *beyond* actors. As far as terminology is concerned, this study will therefore prefer White's, as the network concept allows the analysis to profit from the reader's existing associations and the concept's 'structural intuition', something that would be complicated by using the language of systems theory.⁹⁵ Luhmann's core terms of communication and system evoke more organised and mechanical notions that are not the focus here.

So what is power? So far, Foucault has made us aware that one essential form of power consists in giving an individual identity, a process that provides structure and order, but also control and submission. This is the form of power that is of interest here. Callon's approach further provided a method and terminology that allows interactions to be distinguished on the basis of their function in attaining situational control by redefining other entities. Power thus equates to the definition of others, as evidenced by the impact this has on their future actions. By adding the distinct perspective of Luhmann's systems theory, we shall now infuse further precision into these considerations.

⁹² Summarized in Luhmann 1988².

⁹³ Holzer 2010², 93f. White himself considers his model compatible with Luhmann's systems theory: White 2008², 1 n. 1.

⁹⁴ Luhmann 1984, 16f.; 1988², 5; 7f.: "Statt dessen gehen wir von der Grundannahme aus, daß soziale Systeme sich überhaupt erst durch Kommunikation bilden [...]."

⁹⁵ On the one hand, the objective here is not to simply apply systems theory since one of the aims is to reflect on the network concept already extant in research. Focusing on systems would suggest the former. In addition, networks have other connotations: Whereas systems are rational and organised, the associations attached to 'network' are more neutral and contain connectivity, openness, flexibility, and growth. I am grateful to Prof. Stefan Rebenich (Bern) for prompting me to address this question. 'Interaction' is not a core concept of systems theory. In Luhmann 2011⁶, 294, it denotes the concrete situation of communication including feedback processes, and in Luhmann 1984, 15f., it appears as a type of system that is higher in the conceptual hierarchy than communication.

For Luhmann power exists on two levels: as a generalised symbolic code and in the operations of communication that ‘produce’ the former.⁹⁶ Before this division makes any sense, however, it is first necessary to outline the basics of his theory of autopoietic systems as well as his concept of double contingency.⁹⁷ In a hypothetical social cleanroom, the experience of two human participants in interaction would be infinitely open: the potential choices or selections that can be made are infinite, but none are necessary.⁹⁸ In this theoretical case, the situation is thus *equally* contingent, i.e. uncertain and incalculable, for both participants, making contingency double.⁹⁹ This terrible theoretical situation is resolved by the participants gradually and cautiously making contact (Luhmann speaks of “Abtasten”), generating expectations for the future and orders that guide the selection of alternatives in situations of interaction.¹⁰⁰ Making selections among alternatives under the pressure of contingency, which itself results from the fundamental distinction between ordered, non-contingent system and chaotic environment, is central to what has so far appeared to be a theory of action.¹⁰¹ However, describing Luhmann’s systems theory as a theory of action is fundamentally misleading,¹⁰² as these selections are rooted in communication that is conceived not in terms of familiar models of communication between actors themselves, but is itself understood as an autopoietic and self-referential system.¹⁰³ Luhmann holds that communication cannot be reduced to a simple transfer of information between sender and recipient, but consists in prompting and accepting selections from a pool of potential options. These options are limited to things that can be processed within the rules of the specific system of communication (self-referentiality), a fact that contributes to reproducing the system (autopoiesis), without

⁹⁶ See the summary by Anter 2012, 119-132. These are not interactions in the normal human sense, such as talking or smiling.

⁹⁷ Luhmann 1984, 148-162; 166-173. Cf. White 2008², 57f. Luhmann presupposes certain ontological facts, including the existence of systems and their subjection to a distinction between system and environment: Luhmann 1984, 30-34; Luhmann 1988², 5.

⁹⁸ Luhmann 1984, 152.

⁹⁹ Luhmann 1984, 159.

¹⁰⁰ On the concept of expectation in systems theory see Luhmann 1984, 139f.; 396-404. On making contact (“Abtasten”) as the origin of autopoietic order see Luhmann 1984, 150-168. This may be illustrated by imagining a first encounter with a stranger: Perceiving appearance, posture, smell, etc., making eye-contact and verbal contact all serve to resolve the social situation by having recourse to generalised identities and reproduce the identities appropriate to the situation.

¹⁰¹ Luhmann 1984, 22-27. Trust as a mechanism of contingency reduction applies at this point and facilitates the resolution of contingency via communication (179-182).

¹⁰² Luhmann 1984, 227-229.

¹⁰³ Luhmann 1984, 191-201.

fundamentally influencing its constitution.¹⁰⁴ Only in a second step is this process ascribed to *ego* or *alter(i)*, which itself constitutes a process of contingency reduction.¹⁰⁵ The important thing to take away from this is then that the actions of every-day life are thus the result of systems of control that encode what choices can be made.

This seemingly contrived remodelling of the fundamental process of communication allows Luhmann to differentiate various high-level social systems, such as law, religion, love, or economy, and evaluate their divergent, symbolically generalised codes, the dichotomous rules that simplify the world within these systems of communication and structure the ascription of action.¹⁰⁶ Luhmann further considers these systems to be largely independent of one another, which allows him to explain, for example, the empirically observable independence of economic interactions from moral codes.¹⁰⁷ His conception of power naturally works along the same lines: power itself appears as a specific kind of system that is comparable to money in that it acts as a symbolically generalised code or medium that reduces the complexity of the process of selection in social interaction by *unbalancing it in ego's favour*.¹⁰⁸ Like other autopoietic systems, the system of power thus exists above and beyond individual action, operating as a closed system that allows contingency reduction, but only within itself, on the basis of identifiable communication that conforms to the system's integral code.¹⁰⁹ This code of power consists in generalised expectations about what signifies a power interaction. These expectations allow actors to categorise *alteri* and/or interaction situations into 'has power' and 'has no power', which in turn affects the choices

¹⁰⁴ Note that systems that no longer handle operations cease to exist: Luhmann 1984, 77-80.

¹⁰⁵ Luhmann 1984, 226-236; Luhmann, Niklas. *Ökologische Kommunikation*. Wiesbaden 1986, 269: "Soziale Systeme bestehen demnach nicht aus Menschen, auch nicht aus Handlungen, sondern aus Kommunikationen."

¹⁰⁶ Luhmann 1984, 220-225.

¹⁰⁷ Luhmann 1988², 90-97; Anter 2012, 120f.

¹⁰⁸ Luhmann 1988², 4-8. The issue of origin need not be discussed here, as human communication already exists in the period under discussion here. This conception further resolves a number of problems that plague the fine subdivision of ideal types.

¹⁰⁹ Luhmann's notions of autopoiesis and operational closure are contrived, but fortunately inconsequential for this project; they are openly considered a priori assumptions around which the general theory of systems is built: Luhmann 1984, 30.

available.¹¹⁰ In practice, the code thus contains expectations about behaviour, its legitimacy, and sanctions for misbehaviour.¹¹¹

At an individual level, *ego* thus has power over *alter* if he or she is capable of affecting the selections made by *alter* by applying this system of communication to generate a specific form of order between the two parties.¹¹² In this case, power hinges on generating and transferring meaning that operates on the code of power, which is itself socially constructed and dependent on expectations and value order.¹¹³ It follows that power is not a negative dynamic, but a crucial principle of order that applies whenever commodities are limited and the access of individuals needs to be limited for the purpose of reducing contingency.¹¹⁴ Luhmann further specifies that power is only in operation when *alter's* options are constrained, but not reduced to one. This distinguishes power relationships from coercion: the total reduction of options to one, often by means of violence, is not a process of power since no order is generated. Instead, *ego* usurps *alter's* agency directly.¹¹⁵ Accordingly, Luhmann's theory holds that *ego's* power grows in proportion to the number of options left open to *alter* while *ego's* control over these options is maintained.¹¹⁶ Power thus emerges as a paradoxical balancing act that causes *ego's* power to grow with *alter's* freedom, and vice versa. It is hence strongest when

¹¹⁰ Luhmann 1988², 42-46. Luhmann describes the code as providing a "binärer Schematismus" (42), a positive reduction of complexity that is integral to the establishment of order.

¹¹¹ Anter 2012, 125.

¹¹² Luhmann 1988², 5f.; 9-11, as well as Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Politik der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M. 2000, 19.

¹¹³ Luhmann 1988², 11: "Die Funktion eines Kommunikationsmediums liegt in der Übertragung reduzierter Komplexität. [...] Abhängigkeiten, die über Kommunikationsmedien laufen, [heben sich dadurch ab], daß sie einen Prozeß der Kommunikation voraussetzen, der durch Symbole konditioniert werden kann. Sie sind dadurch kulturell formbar und evolutionär veränderbar und mit einer größeren Zahl an Systemzuständen kompatibel."

¹¹⁴ Luhmann 1988², 13. See also the summary by Anter 2012, 122f. One must note that power is of course a source of contingency, as the decisions of those in power are only to be anticipated if they adhere to the code of power. The crucial point is that expectations exist that govern these decisions (Luhmann 2000, 19).

¹¹⁵ Luhmann 1988², 9: "In dem Maße, als Zwang ausgeübt wird – wir können für viele Fälle auch sagen: mangels Macht Zwang ausgeübt werden muß –, muß derjenige, der den Zwang ausübt, die Selektions- und Entscheidungslast selbst übernehmen; die Reduktion von Komplexität wird nicht verteilt, sondern geht auf ihn über." Cf. Anter 2012, 124f.: "[I]m Moment der Gewaltanwendung entfallen alle anderen Möglichkeiten des Einsatzes von Machtmitteln. [...] Die Androhung negativer Sanktionen [ist] vielmehr nur so lange wirksam, wie sie nicht realisiert werde[n]."

¹¹⁶ Luhmann 1988², 10: "Macht steigt mit Freiheiten auf *beiden* Seiten [...]."

unnoticed: a (hypothetical) order that functions without opposition is both infinitely stable and infinitely powerful.

For the present study, these observations have three important consequences: 1) Luhmann corroborates Foucault's argument that episodes of coercion are to be largely excluded from an analysis of societal power dynamics. This results in a shift of analytical focus to interaction modes within identified networks of interaction. 2) Even at the individual level, this approach to power immediately dissolves a one-sided focus on those in power, that is on rulers in the general sense, as the hermeneutic interest is directed towards the configuration of the code both sides subscribe to in order to avoid the use of socially expensive sanctions.¹¹⁷ 3) The code of power as a binary code is a trivial evaluative dichotomy. Rather than focusing on the code itself, the negotiation of borders between systems and the circumstances of code applicability thus need to take centre stage in the analysis.

The concept of power, which Max Weber had largely abandoned in favour of the more precise concept of rule, has now suddenly become heuristically useful.¹¹⁸ The result is clearly visible in Luhmann's definition of power, which modifies Weber's standard formula: Whereas Weber described power as sociologically amorphous and consisting in any opportunity to assert one's will over others, irrespective of resistance,¹¹⁹ Luhmann is now able to specify the parameters much more clearly. Power thus becomes an opportunity to increase the probability of improbable selections and their transfers.¹²⁰ Conceiving of power along Luhmann's lines is thus a conscious step away from theorising rule, which tends to align itself with the rulers' perspectives, and towards studying power as an aspect of value-correlated agency at the societal level.¹²¹ For the purpose of historical analysis, it further seems appropriate to remove the potentiality inherent in both definitions, as the analysis is necessarily conducted *ex post facto* and there-

¹¹⁷ Anter 2012, 125. Avoiding sanction is crucial: Luhmann 1988², 22-24.

¹¹⁸ On Max Weber cf. Luhmann 2000, 26f.

¹¹⁹ Weber 1972⁵ [1922], 28: "Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht."

¹²⁰ Luhmann 1988², 12: "Damit kann man formulieren, daß Macht eine Chance ist, die Wahrscheinlichkeit des Zustandekommens unwahrscheinlicher Selektionszusammenhänge zu steigern." The concept of power thus always entails an element of resistance, cf. Foucault 1984, 95: "Where there is power, there is resistance. [...] [The] existence [of power relationships] depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are everywhere in the power network."

¹²¹ Luhmann 2000, 24-27.

fore in a context that is void of both future probabilities and present opportunities. The concern must then be to identify *which selections* occurred *in which configurations*, and to investigate to what degree these selections were transferred, in order to develop answers to the question of how this kind of power – rather than violence, coercion, or legitimate authority – took effect in the Diadoch period.¹²²

On the other hand, it is obvious that violent coercion was an integral component of the dynamics of the Diadoch period. War, especially as sudden surges of organised violence against people and goods, was so very visible and common that it came to be normalised and deeply integrated into the value order of rule.¹²³ As a consequence, focusing on power in the sense outlined here, rather than on dynamics associated with legitimate rule, such as the transfer of resources and the military negotiation of agency, results in a conscious restriction of analytical interest.¹²⁴ Naturally, the historiographical source material is predominantly concerned with war – but wars also incorporate other networks of power interactions that do not revolve around coercion and reduction of options. These include processes that allow individuals to be mobilised and motivated for the purpose of honing collective agency that is presupposed by coercive action. These processes are certainly of interest here.

The sum total of this review of concepts is then as follows: 1) power describes a quality of interaction in networks of social interaction, namely the *interactive alteration of action by changing identity*. 2) The aim of power interactions is to acquire a *degree of control over the agency of others*. 3) Mapped onto White's theoretical conception of the actor as network, these processes can be understood as *narrative reconfigurations of actors' networks of situational identity*. 4) The incorporation of Luhmann's work into practical analysis finally brings the *narrative construction of the applicability of different codes of social interaction* into focus. With Callon, the interest

¹²² Luhmann speaks of "Modalisierung", referring to *alter's* awareness of *ego's* abstract potential power as a source of power and therefore as part of the code of power: Luhmann 1988², 24f. Cf. also the summary of Foucault's conception of power in Foucault, Michel. "Das Subjekt und die Macht", in: Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (eds.). *Michel Foucault. Jenseits von Strukturalismus und Hermeneutik*. Frankfurt a.M. 1987, 243-261, where power relations are "definiert durch eine Form von Handeln, die nicht direkt und unmittelbar auf andere, sondern auf deren Handeln einwirkt. [...] Gewaltbeziehungen wirken auf Körper und Dinge ein. Sie zwingen, beugen, brechen, zerstören. Sie schneiden alle Möglichkeiten ab. [...] Macht [...] erhöht oder senkt die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Handlungen" (p. 255f.).

¹²³ See esp. Chaniotis 2005, 1-18, as well as the contrasting studies in Chaniotis 2002 and Ma 2002.

¹²⁴ Schuffert 2005 provides an extensive study of this kind of 'power' for the fourth century BC and the Diadoch period, although it remains conceptually basic.

must be in how *narrative about the application and distinction of such social codes*, such as love, payment, religion, and truth, *aids in translation*.¹²⁵ Put simply, our aim will therefore be to identify how historical stories solve such questions.

2.4 Power as networks: concepts

Having surveyed the various theoretical influences that underpin this study's conception of power as network, I shall now summarise the different concepts and sketch out the method adopted here, though the discussion of power will not be reiterated. As a matter of principle, occurrences of these conceptual terms in the following chapters signal that the discussion is operating at a meta-level to be conceived of in the manner outlined here.

2.4.1 Identity

Conventionally, 'identity' denotes an individual's more or less reflected awareness of alignment to a group – i.e. its identity with/equivalence to other members of said group.¹²⁶ This conventional concept is refined here, because it is committed to the illusion of static stability: 'I am X, you are Y'.¹²⁷ In my view, a study of historical interaction networks requires a more flexible concept capable of questioning such illusions of stable normative order. It stands to reason that the smallest unit of power interaction is in fact *expectation*, i.e. an actor's conception of what is normal in a specific interaction with specific *alteri*, which derives from experience and is encoded in memory. Here, such expectations shall be called *identities*. It follows that the concept of identity employed here is not only plural, but also relational and situational. Identities in the plural are understood as *sets of*

¹²⁵ Luhmann himself considered organisations the most powerful elements of society (Luhmann 1988², 98-115; cf. Anter 2012, 128-131). For the Hellenistic period, adopting this focus would, however, lead back to an old formula, the routinization of charismatic rule via the incorporation of traditional and bureaucratic elements (see Gehrke 1982, 267-271), as it would lead one to study empires and institutions.

¹²⁶ On this concept of identity see e.g. Erikson, Erik H. *Identität und Lebenszyklus*. Frankfurt a.M. 1973. Cf. Assmann 1992, 130f.; 144.

¹²⁷ The illusion of stability is revealed already by its situational, discursive character and the plurality of its relational layers, as Ronald Cohen has demonstrated in the case of ethnicity as a category of identity (*idem*. "Ethnicity. Problem and Focus in Anthropology", in: *Annual Review of Anthropology* 7 (1978), 379-403, esp. 387-389). On the illusion of causality in action cf. Luhmann 2000, 23f.

expectations, encoded in memory, and both generated and adapted through interaction. Identities in this sense reduce perceived contingency and thereby configure agency. At the same time, they are created and adapted by action, establishing identity as a dynamic both between individuals and between individual and collective. In the singular, identity designates the reflexively abstracted sets of relational expectations relevant to the given situation and thus comes close to the term's conventional usage. In order to avoid confusion, 'sub-identity' or 'expectation' will also be used where this is not meant.

2.4.2 Actor

Following White, actors appear as networks¹²⁸ of such identities. As identities are generated and made relevant by action, actors can be defined as all entities that produce changes in the relational configuration of entities to one another: *actors influence identity*.¹²⁹ These changes are generally reactions to other changes in this configuration, which allows us to conceive of all action as reaction in a pre-existing, infinitely complex social web that can be conceptualised and studied as a network. This conception does not express a deterministic worldview, but is always the result of retrospection: In fact, the infinite network complexity of any actor prohibits determination as all interactions are subject to double contingency.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ 'Network' still designates a set of elements that can be distinguished from the relations that exist between these elements (Holzer 2010², 34; see also above p. 45). Note again that networks are produced by applying a heuristic perspective, a specific way of selecting, seeing, and interpreting that is certainly not without alternative. This study attempts to identify networks at multiple levels of interaction, ranging from the individual to the inter-collective. To an extent, doing so will allow these networks to be compared, revealing structural patterns.

Power networks specifically are here defined as narrative configurations that have recourse to a generalised code of power but in practice continuously reconfigure its boundaries and applicability by 'playing' with the boundaries between social codes and by crafting translations.

¹²⁹ White 2008², 154; Callon 1991, 140. This argument is circular to an extent, since identity is only relevant where action occurs. The origins of action, outlined above, are not strictly relevant to this study, but see Luhmann 1984, 160f., who locates them in the experience of the difference between psychic system and environment.

¹³⁰ See Luhmann 1984, 414: "Erwartungserwartungen (i.e. the expectation that *alter* expects certain behaviour; my parenthesis) veranlassen alle Teilnehmer, sich wechselseitig zeitübergreifende und in diesem Sinne strukturelle Orientierungen zu unterstellen. Damit wird verhindert, daß soziale Systeme in der Art bloßer Reaktionsketten gebildet werden, in denen ein Ereignis mehr oder minder voraussehbar das nächste

Employing such a flexible definition of the actor is essential, as this concept must be capable of covering all forms of political action, the evaluation of which derives from the actors' view of their own world order as it is presented in textual reflection and/or artefact. The central importance of divine action and of acting objects in the ancient world, for instance, immediately forces one to acknowledge that the category of 'actor' cannot be restricted to human beings. The reified language of texts and inscriptions, as well as other monumental and non-monumental, inanimate objects play a crucial part in these processes due to their large communicative surface and their near infinite potential for re-reading and action that far exceeds that of the original human authors.¹³¹ The principles of ANT sketched above have provided an extensive theoretical foundation for the inclusion of non-human entities in networks of power by considering them part of compound actors created through translation, and for treating them as actors, simply because objects qualify and even substitute human action.¹³² A publicly exhibited inscription, for example, can be seen as standing in for a human speech act, encoded in petrified text, but finitely perpetuated under the conditions of limited double contingency.¹³³ The formal structure and syntax of Greek honorary inscriptions, decrees, and letters clearly betray their proximity to the spoken

nach sich zieht. [...] Die Reflexivität des Erwartens ermöglicht dagegen ein Korrigieren (und auch ein Kämpfen um Korrekturen) auf der Ebene des Erwartens selbst. Das ist ein kaum zu überschätzender Vorteil, denn Erwartungen geben den Strukturen einen revidierbaren Inhalt.”

- ¹³¹ To a degree, inscriptions can thus be considered plural texts in the sense of Roland Barthes (idem. *S/Z*. Translated by Jürgen Hoch. Frankfurt a.M. 1994², 7-26, esp. 18). On the concept of the political public in which these interactive texts participate see Habermas, Jürgen. *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M. 1990, as well as the conceptual modifications by Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. *Öffentliche Meinung. Die Entdeckung der Schweigespirale*. Frankfurt/Berlin 1989. For an application of the concept in Ancient History cf. Kuhn, Christina. “Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt: Einleitende Bemerkungen”, in: eadem (ed.). *Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt*. Stuttgart 2012, 11-30, esp. 14f. In my ‘network-perspective’, the public is conceived as a discourse network of actors with interactions considered generally valid.
- ¹³² Latour 2007, 122-124: “[...] dann ist *jedes Ding*, das eine gegebene Situation verändert, indem es einen Unterschied macht, ein Akteur [...]”; (quote from p. 123, original italics). Latour lists a whole range of qualifications that serve to nuance non-human agency: “Außer zu »determinieren« und als bloßer »Hintergrund für menschliches Handeln« zu dienen, könnten Dinge vielleicht ermächtigen, ermöglichen, anbieten, ermutigen, erlauben, nahelegen, beeinflussen, verhindern, autorisieren, ausschließen und so fort” (p. 124).
- ¹³³ On performative speech-acts see still Austin, John L. *How to do Things with Words. The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955*. Oxford 1980.

word.¹³⁴ Taken with a grain of salt, the stone thus stands in for a human actor constantly repeating its wording, since it remains capable of affecting the mesh of semantic negotiations within others. By contrast with the ANT position, however, I hold that objects generate identity only within human actors, causing their networks of identity to be purely external and contingent upon context. Their physical form is an expression of culture and thus of identities, causing their agency to be generated by the networks they are part of. The crucial theoretical difference between object and human actors is that objects are not fully subject to double contingency, since they are incapable of reflecting on the actions of *alteri*. These limitations have consequences for networks of political action as they allow actors to *create* less complex actors for the purpose of generating and adapting semantic order.

2.4.3 Interaction

The events that alter the relationships between actors and the configurations of networks are their interactions.¹³⁵ This study focuses on interactions relating to power, here understood as the control of insecurity (i.e. contingency) by altering actors through the dynamic of translation. It is here assumed that all relevant interaction is directed within a network, i.e. that it originates from one actor and is reactively perceived by others, creating a mesh of interaction between actors and an interface between physical and cognitive space. Interactions are not limited to individual actors, but can also aim at constructed collectives, or even take place

¹³⁴ On performance in epigraphy and monumental constellations of text and image see Ma 2013b, 59. Inscriptions being read in public is mentioned for instance by Dem. 20.63f. (at a trial), and IC III iii 4 (=Chaniotis, Angelos. *Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Poleis in der hellenistischen Zeit*. Stuttgart 1996, no. 28), l. 40-47 (annual, festive re-performance). See recently Chaniotis, Angelos. "Listening to Stones: Orality and Emotions in Ancient Inscriptions", in: John Davies and John J. Wilkes (eds.). *Epigraphy and the Historical Sciences*. Oxford 2012, 299-328. Rhetorical structures in honorary decrees are visible in their structures of resumption, which can be analysed with linguistic methods and establish coherence that guides reader and listener through the sometimes extensive argument. Examples are provided by the ἐν τε τοῖς πρότερον χρόνοις ... καὶ νῦν formula, employed for instance in IG XII 4, 1, 30:2-5 or FD III 4, 414:7f.-12, or by the structuring use of τε particles, e.g. IG XII,4 1, 99: 6-21. On the linguistic analysis of textual structure see Brinker, Klaus, Cölfen, Hermann, and Pappert, Steffen. *Linguistische Textanalyse. Eine Einführung in Grundbegriffe und Methoden*. Berlin 2014⁸, esp. 29-57. I am grateful to Florian R. Forster (Munich) for the τε example.

¹³⁵ This is equivalent to the acts of translation identified by M. Callon (1991, 140).

between such collectives via intermediaries. On a functional level, interactions are treated using the categories devised by Callon in his sociology of translation. When using these categories in analysing interactions reflected in historical sources, the central questions must then be whether and for whom these functioned as *problématisation*, *intéressement*, *enrolment* or *mobilisation*, as well as whether and how these steps were successful and how they affected the socio-political network they took place in. The complexity and interactive nature of the source tradition itself are respected in that the analysis aims to reconstruct discursive rather than factual reality.

The survey above has shown that interaction between actors establishes precedents in the form of expectations for future interaction, here termed identities. A constant stream of concurrent interactions tends to weaken such identities over time, especially those that codify unlikely choices, so that the effect of interactions declines.¹³⁶ If the contingent world order generated by earlier interactions is to be preserved, interactions need to be reproduced and interaction modes ‘maintained’. This dynamic is particularly relevant in the context of power interactions because reproducing identities that codify unlikely selections are particularly liable to resistance. Only their successfully repeated performance can stabilise order.¹³⁷

2.4.4 Contingency and trust

In White’s social theory, actors interact to control the experience of *contingency*, i.e. the openness of social complexity, and thereby generate security, since action establishes relational identity for the future.¹³⁸ Contingency thus exists whenever action is to take place, so constantly. The perception of contingency is specific to

¹³⁶ On the superimposing dynamic of forgetting see Eco, Umberto. “An Ars Oblivionalis? Forget It!”, in: *PMLA* 103:3 (1988), 254-261, esp. 259f. (translated by Marilyn Migiel): “One forgets not by cancellation but by superimposition, not by producing absence but by multiplying presence.” Cf. further Lachmann, Renate. “Die Unlösbarkeit der Zeichen: Das semiotische Unglück des Mnemonisten”, in: Renate Lachmann and Anselm Haverkamp (eds.). *Gedächtniskunst. Raum – Bild – Schrift. Studien zur Mnemotechnik*. Frankfurt a.M. 1991, 111-141, esp. 116f., and Ricoeur, Paul. *Gedächtnis, Geschichte, Vergessen*. Munich 2004, 679-690, who discusses the complexities and layers of memory in relation to forgetting. I thank Verena Schulz (Munich) for discussing memory dynamics with me.

¹³⁷ Luhmann 1988², 12: “Die Funktion der Macht liegt in der Regulierung von Kontingenz.”; 31: “Die Leistung ist die Übertragung reduzierter Komplexität [...]”

¹³⁸ Luhmann 1988², 19; White 2008², 1-4. Luhmann (1984, 63) further emphasises that control is never unilateral, but always contributes to general order, meaning that those in power are compelled to adhere to their own order.

each individual actor and its network configuration.¹³⁹ It becomes particularly perceptible, however, when configurations change and the actors' expectations no longer conform to the web of action that constitutes their environment. Even when this happens, the vast majority of these shifts is minimal and can be easily absorbed by reproducing existing expectations, without requiring extensive action or fundamental adaptation.¹⁴⁰ This ability to handle contingency is based on an acquired trust in expectable action, i.e. the projection of past experience into the future, whereby *alteri* acted in accordance with ego's expectations *despite* contingency.¹⁴¹ Trust thereby generates agency, normality and relative tranquillity.¹⁴² In the context of power, this means that the creation and maintenance of trust in order, i.e. that others act in alignment with *translated* expectation, offers the safest path towards a stable network of power. A nuanced mixture of power interaction (i.e. change) and expected interaction therefore aids in preventing the order from appearing contingent. This contingency can also be obfuscated, for instance by constructing and controlling other sources of contingency through interaction.

2.4.5 A note on legitimacy

Given the theory applied here, the question of whether the interactions studied here were legitimate in a legal or sociological sense, either ancient or modern, is of only secondary importance.¹⁴³ The reason is that this study is concerned with subtle, systemic aspects of power rather than with coercive threats or violence: societal power operates in categories other than overt authority and its study is therefore not concerned with individual relations of command and obedience. Although the question of legitimacy is often central to studies of Hellenistic rule, this study thus takes a simply phenomenological approach to the question of an action's legitimacy: if an action is successful, it is also legitimate.

¹³⁹ Luhmann 1984, 159f.

¹⁴⁰ Luhmann 2014⁵, 27-31.

¹⁴¹ Luhmann 1984, 179-187. See *in extenso* Luhmann, Niklas. *Vertrauen: Ein Mechanismus zur Reduktion sozialer Komplexität*. Stuttgart 2014⁵, 1-9; 29. For Harrison White trust is not a central concept, but rather a 'style', i.e. a 'quality' of social interaction (2008², 112f.; 161).

¹⁴² Luhmann 2014⁵, 29.

¹⁴³ On legality as a secondary encoding see Luhmann 1988², 42f., 45f. On legitimacy and (situationally performative) value consensus as a necessary ingredient of rule see *ibid.* 149f.; 174f. On legitimacy cf. Weber 1972³ [1922], 122-124.

This means that the locus of legitimacy is the *de facto* network of interaction.¹⁴⁴ Factors such as participation in a shared normative and legal discourse, as well as in other collectivised narratives, can of course affect the configuration of this network and blend together in informing the concrete reactions power interactions elicit.¹⁴⁵ These reactions can be understood as being located on a gradient: Once a certain critical point on this gradient is reached, reactions stop being neutral and turn negative. How easily this point is reached, however, obviously depends on the nature of the interaction and its network environment. Legitimacy thus emerges as a secondary discourse *about* power interaction that modulates but does not determine its efficacy and is thus not central to this study.

2.5 Power as networks: Questions and method

In our final step, these concepts will now be turned into a set of questions and a concrete method to be applied to the historical material. Let me offer a brief summary of what we have achieved so far. The concepts formulated above marry ideas taken from Network theory, Foucault, Luhmann, and Callon by rethinking them in terms of the fundamentally narrative theory of society elaborated by Harrison White. In a nutshell, I have argued that people interact to control uncertainty, and that power helps them do so, since power consists in influencing what is considered normal. Societal power therefore lies in structures of subliminal order. As a result, changes in power can be identified by considering interactions as Callonian translations that engage with the boundaries of code applicability, for instance by shifting norms. As White's theoretical emphasis on stories showed, these constructions of normality are *narrative* in nature, and can thus be conceived of as networks of storytelling.

Now how does this help us analyse historical sources? Consider first that the dynamics of power networks, and thus our sources, are generated by the necessity to constantly reproduce power interactions in order to maintain network structure, a dynamic that results from the fundamental agonality of social existence theorised by White. Network structure needs to be continuously reinforced to

¹⁴⁴ Traditional studies of the legitimacy and legitimation of Hellenistic rule are provided by Orth 1977; Gehrke 1982; Préaux 1987, 1, 183-186; Seibert 1991, 87-100; Schäfer 2002; Schuffert 2005, esp. 357f.

¹⁴⁵ This concept of a gradient of reactions is lifted from Chester I. Barnard's organisational theory of authority and incentive (*idem. The Functions of the Executive*. Cambridge, MA 1953, esp. 161-171). In the form it is developed by Barnard, the concept is too simplistic, however, as it neglects to account for the heterogeneity of the actors involved and the complexity of their relations.

cement the identities that secure the relative positions of actors in these networks and reduce complexity. Combined with White's argument that stories are essential to the production of social meaning, this observation provides five questions that can be addressed to the source material:

- 1) Which contingencies are constructed in a given source?
- 2) In response, which identities and codes of behaviour are presented as directing agency and offering control?
- 3) What boundaries are constructed between these codes, i.e. how are their areas of applicability defined?
- 4) Which actors are constructed as performing these constructions and translated into obligatory passage points (OPPs)?
- 5) How is OPP status mobilised to generate collective agency and construct collective order?

2.5.1 Method

These questions can help illuminate the source material available for the Diadoch period on three interrelated levels: individual – collective – inter-collective. The intention is to produce a history of socio-political agency in the Diadoch period that focuses on a nuanced investigation of how actors construct their agency in this period of macro-political turmoil. Accordingly, the questions inform the following method:

1) In a first step, I identify figurations in the source material that are elaborated to a degree that allows me to answer the questions outlined above. The sources either need to be contemporary and implicitly or explicitly reflect their own time, or reliably thematise reconfigurations and conflicts that make subliminal network order visible. Such reconfigurations consist in actors prominently translating networks of actors, which necessitates processes of adaptation and reinforcement that are visible in the source record, but can also be exposed by deconstructing contested narratives.

2) These reconfigurations can on occasion be considered in Callon's categories. Accordingly the interest is in the narrative creation of problems (*problématisation*), i.e. the creation of sources of contingency, which always goes hand in hand with the creation of solutions (*enrolment*) that require collective agency, and finally with the performance of action (*mobilisation*) in alignment with this construction of world order (or its failure).

3) System theory has shown that there are elementary social interaction modes, or systems of evaluation, that reduce complexity by categorising action. These provide basic structure to human existence and include codes such as payment, activated by money, belief, activated by transcendental constructs, love, the discursive construction of complete mutual identity, or truth, the evaluation of acceptable and unacceptable action. Accordingly, the Callonian translations traced in the source material will be investigated as to how they draw on these basic codes, how they construct them and their applicability, and how they are used to abstract underlying narratives of the socio-political network's structure itself.

4) These networks are traced across the three levels of political activity noted above in order to approximate a more nuanced view of the power processes at work in narratives of the Diadoch period. By comparing these constructs at different levels as abstract networks, this approach aims to highlight how identities are constructed, collectivised, mobilised, and situationally adapted in exchange, so how imaginaries of society are created to allow for the continued production of agency.

2.5.2 Three final notes

Visualisation

Digital innovations allow us to process and visualise very large amounts of data efficiently and easily. Such visualisations are particularly valuable in that they can at least attempt to give readers an immediate impression of complexity, a feat text cannot achieve.¹⁴⁶ However, the tests I conducted using *Cytoscape* showed that the results did not sit well with the approach adopted here.¹⁴⁷ Visualisations of networks, which are always suggestive, even if based on 'hard data', unavoidably create the illusion of scientific accuracy and objectivity. In order to avoid producing apparently 'objective' representations of the far 'softer' data derived here from the interpretation of narratives, no visualisations are included here.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Bourdieu 1982, 211, on the problem of linear representation and the value of multi-dimensional visualisation.

¹⁴⁷ Cytoscape was designed for genetic modelling and cellular interactions, but is highly configurable. See Shannon, Paul et al. "Cytoscape: A Software Environment for Integrated Models of Biomolecular Interaction Networks", in: *Genome Research* 13:11 (2003), 2498-2504.

Growth and preferential attachment

Despite the difficulties noted above in the discussion of scale-free networks regarding the applicability of Albert-László Barabási's results to socio-political networks, it will be worth evaluating whether these regularities can be applied to the results of the following analyses, so to the abstract network configurations developed in historical narratives.¹⁴⁸ Barabási showed that networks can tend towards centralisation and growth, while new nodes prefer to attach themselves to already well-connected hubs. Although power networks are generally more complex than the figurations analysed by Barabási, as they are incredibly situational and fluid, growth and preferential attachment are useful base hypotheses for the dynamics of isolated power networks. The following studies will be putting their usefulness to the test, especially considering the fact that power networks are plural and competitive in periods of systemic change.

Connectivity and rivalry

The analysis will also test the applicability of other results of network theory. Much of the research in question concerns itself with connectivity in networks and with their respective attractiveness for attachment.¹⁴⁹ Considering power networks in this vein turns the usual perspective on its head and emphasises the competition between them. Scale-free network theory would indicate that the 'attraction' of networks, even those of power interactions, correlates with its size and surface, qualified by its environment.¹⁵⁰ However, it is necessary to consider that the surface of socio-political networks is itself a potential source of contingency that needs to be controlled, rendering network growth and connectivity a double-edged sword. The underlying problem here is of course that every node in a socio-political network is itself a compound actor capable of generating meaning and exercising – and thus also requiring – control. This then leads to the question of how to control connectivity, which is of course a non-question as power is omnipresent.¹⁵¹ Power networks are thus under tension both due to the potential openness and connectivity of individual nodes and the plurality of competing power networks at all societal levels. The other results that concern

¹⁴⁸ Barabási 2002, *passim*.

¹⁴⁹ Barabási 2002, *passim*.

¹⁵⁰ The inverted commas around attraction signal that the attractiveness of power networks is obviously culturally constructed. At the societal level, however, networks of power are attractive as they establish order and control; cf. Luhmann 1988², 11-13.

¹⁵¹ Foucault 1987, 257.

network connectivity are of secondary importance, as social networks are always small world networks.¹⁵²

2.6 Summary

The results of these methodological considerations can be briefly summarised as follows. The source material pertaining to the Diadoch period will be analysed using the ‘network-perspective’ developed here. With ANT, every text and every object, and thus also every historical source, is here considered an actor in a network. Since with White actors strive for control over the complexity of the world and do so by weaving networks in stories about how the world works, these sources emerge as traces of contingency control relating to the Diadoch period. This ‘network perspective’ thus functions as a heuristic lens that produces results by changing the way in which texts and objects are read, treating them as actors in networks of discourse that contribute to constituting ‘reality’. The main interest of this perspective lies in identifying a specific form of power, of power as consisting in the controls that determine the relational places of self. The sources themselves are thus traces of contingency control in that they develop narrative models of how to control contingency: they weave imaginary societies that solve problems by implementing social controls.

These controls have been identified in the constructions of uncertainty or contingency visible in source material and the means developed to combat its perception. These mechanisms consist in the generation of identity at both an individual and a collective level, and are ultimately concerned with the collectivisation of identity in social story or norm, as well as the network structures that regulate the situational pertinence of such norms. The most significant of these forms of meta-control are akin to the systems studied by Luhmann, which include love, religion, economy, truth. The rivalling conceptions, translations, and code boundary formations visible in the source materials are then the core subject of this study in their conflicts at an individual, collective, and inter-collective level.¹⁵³ As part of this analysis, terminology and analytical results from the theories outlined here will be employed to provide a new way of looking at the politics of the early Hellenistic period.

¹⁵² Holzer 2010, 64-66.

¹⁵³ Boundary formations as projects of control that generate meaning are discussed in White 2008², 345f.

3. Individual and collective in Theophrastus' *Characters*

3.1 Individual and collective

The aim of this chapter is to investigate processes of control that shape agency within the confines of 'the polis' in the Diadoch period.¹ For the purposes of this chapter, the main interest is in the polis as a constructed community of citizens,² since this is the collective that is most easily accessible in the source material available and the level of social organisation most relevant to the macro-political processes that will be discussed in the later chapters. Since the protagonists of the processes studied in this chapter are all 'Greek' individuals, questions of hybridity and cross-cultural exchange can be left to one side for now.³ Even without hybridity, however, no two 'Greek' individuals are the same, nor is a collective

-
- ¹ The term polis is left intentionally vague. My interest here is in reconstructing situational mentalities in socio-political contexts that are characterised by being located within the confines of the polis, which here means simply that the political community in question self-identifies as living in a polis. The intricacies of definition seem to me irrelevant to the discussion at hand. Furthermore, I do not mean to claim that the processes traced here are universally valid, let alone that they apply to every polis in every situation. By offering this analysis, I only mean to suggest that the dynamics observed here could also potentially help to explain processes in other contexts.
- ² Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1274b41: ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλήθος ἐστίν ("For a polis is any one mass of citizens").
- ³ The single quotation marks are supposed to indicate my awareness of the controversial discussion about static and dynamic concepts of culture (on this see e.g. Ulf, Christoph. "Rethinking Cultural Contacts", in: *Ancient West & East* 8 (2009), 81-132, esp. 81-86; Strootman 2014, 80f.). The use of this category is thus not intended to imply a monolithic concept of ethnic identity. It seems impossible, however, to discard the term as a descriptor, since it provides an immensely useful heuristic short-cut. In a recent volume on Greek identity in the Hellenistic period, Eftychia Stavrianopoulou succinctly summarized the new orthodoxy: "Any attempt to trace a one-way flow of influence or to emphasise only select elements of the 'dominant' culture disregards two essential factors: first cultures cannot be approached as fixed entities but must be understood as dynamic social systems with structures that both enable and regulate transformations in response to internal and external factors; second intercultural encounters affect the discourses and practices of *all* parties involved." (see eadem. "Hellenistic World(s) and the Concept of 'Greekness'", in: eadem (ed.). *Shifting Social Imaginaries in the Hellenistic Period: Narrations, Practices, and Images* (=Mnemosyne Suppl. 363). Leiden and Boston 2013, 177-205, here 179; italics in the original). While Greekness itself is thus to be considered a discursive negotiation process about the semanticisation of the world, a working definition is nevertheless required. Ascriptions of Greekness from the point of view of the historian should be based, if possible, on emic criteria. "Greek" individuals are here simply actors who self-assign to a polis as her citizens. This narrow category is supplemented by persons who describe themselves as Greeks in certain

consisting of such individuals uniform. The relation is invariably one of contrast: Since collectives exist in abstract language that is used to signify and semanticise groups, they obviously have meaning only through difference, through processes of in- and exclusion.⁴ By providing such relationships of identity and difference, a collective's ability to sanction and to negotiate between the cognitive networks of individuals by being invoked or performed in interaction, causes it to underpin individual interaction in ways that may be experienced both positively and negatively.⁵ This fundamental tension between the collective and its individual members can hence be investigated with a view to the negotiation of footing and security within a social network, a process that can further be read as a struggle for control between individual meaning and collectivised meaning.

The background of such struggles is simple. An individual necessarily constitutes itself both in opposition to and by means of differently configured *alteri*, and the contingencies involved in this process effect the discursive formation of

interactive contexts and situations without being challenged. Obviously, such self-assignments are rare. As a practical consequence, judgements by others, or even etic categories, such as the presence of certain cultural characteristics, including language and nomenclature, must suffice. The categories of identity given by Hdt. 8.144.2 (lineage, language, religion, and customs) should thus be seen as part of complex, situational arguments and processes of discursive ascription (see also Davies, John K. "Greek History: A Discipline in Transformation", in: T. Peter Wiseman (ed.). *Classics in Progress. Essays in Ancient Greece and Rome*. Oxford 2002, 225-246, esp. 245f.). This is obviously the case already for Herodotus, since his definition of Greekness is explicitly embedded in a political argument of existential significance (see esp. Hall 2002). Cf. also the anthropological study by Cohen, Ronald. "Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology", in: *Annual Review of Anthropology* 7 (1978), 379-403, esp. 380-387 and 395-398, as well as the recent study of "self-hellenisation" in Hanisa, Cappadocia conducted by Christoph Michels. "The Spread of Polis Institutions in Hellenistic Cappadocia and the Peer Polity Interaction Model", in: Eftychia Stavrianopoulou (ed.). *Shifting Social Imaginaries in the Hellenistic Period: Narrations, Practices, and Images* (=Mnemosyne Suppl. 363). Leiden and Boston 2013, 283-307.

⁴ On collective identity see e.g. Assmann 1992, 130-133. In essence, collective identity exists through the belief of its constituent individuals, i.e. the fact that individuals attribute significance to an abstract construct in discourse. This causes the collective to have "real" consequences.

⁵ These processes are not necessarily explicit. On collective action and the collective in individual action cf. Luhmann 1984, 270-282, here 273f.: "Auch kollektives Handeln ist selbstverständlich Einzelhandeln, [... e]s muß nur besonders ausgezeichnet sein durch Symbole, die verdeutlichen, daß das gesamte System dadurch gebunden wird. [... K]ollektive Handlung heißt immer kollektive Bindung, und dies heißt: daß die kollektive Handlung als Prämisse in den Sinn anderer Handlungen des Systems übernommen und auf diese Weise Möglichkeiten limitieren wird."

collectives out of groups of individuals.⁶ These collectives become institutionally reified via political interests and directives, and thereby take clearly identifiable form for the individual. The structure of these figurations becomes normative and their dynamics are collectively obscured as a means of reducing perceived contingency.⁷ In other words: the institutionalisation of structures of political negotiation creates the illusion that the structures of political life are stable and predictable. Despite this, however, the dynamics persist, since the collectives continue to be interaction networks and reconfigure to some degree in every situation. As a consequence there can never be a total, permanent value consensus among all individuals of a collective, even if this consensus is performatively evoked, for instance in rhetoric. Instead, we are dealing with social and performative configurations in which order is constituted through the momentary absence of perceived contingency, brought about by certain actors.⁸

To demonstrate the workings of these processes, the analysis must not seek to simply identify and catalogue concrete interaction expectations, but should operate at the level of abstract interaction mode, since these structure interaction at the level this occlusion happens. They do so by providing a mesh of flexible expectation templates that negotiate experience both between individuals and between individual and collective.⁹ Their underspecified and redundant encoding

⁶ White 2008², 2. Cf. for a similar view also Elias, Norbert. *Die höfische Gesellschaft. Untersuchungen zur Soziologie des Königums und der höfischen Aristokratie*. Frankfurt a.M. 1983, 47-51, who warns against assuming – even implicitly – that actors are ‘purely’ individuals and societies ‘purely’ structures.

⁷ Contingency within a socio-political network means that the connections between the actors come to be perceived as uncertain. These connections exist as a combination of expectations and concrete interactions, which can fall out of sync when the network configurations of the actors change. The repeated occurrence of such de-synchronisation erodes the bond of trust between the actors, which exists as a result of the memories of successful interactions. In this study, contingency is thus a constructivist concept, meaning that the occurrence, or better: perception, of contingency depends on the individual actor. See Luhmann 1984, 152f.

⁸ Norms and values thus have no ontological existence. Instead, their existence is equivalent to their reproduction and re-contextualising modification in situational interaction and possesses no logical consistency (cf. Bourdieu 1977, 37). As a result, normality can easily accommodate competing value systems as long as their incompatibility does not create acute problems in social practice.

⁹ “Within the cognitive identity network of the individual” naturally presupposes an approach informed by network theory. Values are here understood as nodes in a cognitive network that is constantly involved in evaluating interaction, but exist as hybrids, namely as means of individual control and of collectivised meta-control: White 2008², 220-233; cf. Luhmann 1984, 317-325. On Greek morality in the fourth century BC see fundamentally Dover, Kenneth J. *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*. Oxford 1974, esp. 208-242. On popular and individual values of the

of interaction expectations is flexible and thus potentially contingency-resistant, facilitating action by determining and securing the sphere of possible action, as well as defining risks.¹⁰ Since these templates exist only as discourses embodied in semiotics, however, they function as mediators that allow the contextualisation, evaluation and ascription of action.¹¹ This mediating role is what grants them their illusion of stability, which in turn informs their capacity to reduce contingency and thus allows them to function as particularly efficient structures of change and reproduction of control.¹² These figurations are thus of key importance here because they determine action. Controlling these pivotal elements of a society is hence the deepest, most pervasive form of power, which is what we are interested in.

So how are social interaction modes controlled? Attempts at such control necessarily refer to existing identities and interaction modes, but also make new references and thereby re-contextualise them in subtle but decisive ways. In keeping with the methodological observations made in the previous chapter, the core questions to be posed to the material are: Which expectations and contingencies are constructed? How are these contingencies combated and controlled? Which discursive borders and network structures can be identified within the resulting control mechanisms? And how do all these structural elements come together to shape a cognitive network and what are the consequences for the dynamics of the social network they structure? Once these structures of socio-political interaction have been identified, one can then ask *who* adapts and changes them, which actors prescribe what counts as order and normality, and whether and how they profit from this authority. In seeking to answer these questions, one must of course bear in mind that society can only really be assessed through contrast; as a consequence, texts of the fourth and later third century BC will on occasion function as a contrastive background that allows for the identification of change within the specific historical situation of the Diadoch period.

high and late Hellenistic period see the contribution by Konstan, David. "Conventional Values of the Hellenistic Greeks: The Evidence from Astrology", in: Per Bilde, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Lise Hannestad and Jan Zahle (eds.). *Conventional Values of the Hellenistic Greeks*. Aarhus 1997, 159-176. Konstan identifies a tendency towards individualism in the astrological source material, but the nature of the source material and the highly personal setting of these interactions should warn us against generalising these results. His work is thus a good example of how value configurations differ based on the frame of social interaction.

¹⁰ Luhmann 1984, 312-317.

¹¹ On the construction of action see Luhmann 1984, 124-127.

¹² White 2008², 228f.; 231-233.

3.2 The source material

So what material we shall be putting our questions to? The following analysis of socio-political control within the confines of the polis, as negotiated through cognitive networks and value systems, is based on literary sources, but also occasionally draws on the traces preserved in the contemporary epigraphic material relating to politically active individuals and collective action. As I noted above, looking to literary sources for guidance seems inevitable to me, since they provide the only way of accessing emic conceptions in context. While it is obvious that all available sources are biased, this study is interested precisely in these ‘biases’, because they are the fabric of real political interaction. In selecting the literary sources, my main consideration was to minimise the anachronistic distortion of value judgements inevitable in later material: my focus is precisely on contemporary ‘bias’, which is understood as part of the underlying networks of expectations. The scarcity of contemporary sources with an interest in the processes occurring in polis society then led me to focus almost exclusively on Theophrastus’ *Characters*, which has the advantage of being a truly contemporary text. This of course means that once again one is forced to concentrate on Athens, despite the unique traits of its political culture.¹³ While a wider scope would be desirable, the surviving source material renders it impossible, thus preventing one from claiming that one has discovered universal patterns.

3.3 Theophrastus’ *Characters* and the construction of identity

3.3.1 Polis society

Before we look at the text, a few words must be said about the kind of society portrayed within it. As I have pointed out, the core of polis society consists, at least for the purposes of this chapter, of individuals who are citizens of the polis. This is a simple legal criterion, based on a bureaucratic institution.¹⁴ As David

¹³ On the significance, history, and politics of the city in the Diadoch period see Ferguson, William S. *Hellenistic Athens. An Historical Essay*. New York 1969 [1911], 1-187; Habicht 1995a, 41-103; Grieb 2008, 51-85. See now also Bayliss, Andrew J. *After Demosthenes: The politics of early Hellenistic Athens*. London 2011, who argues in favour of the strength of democratic ideology in early Hellenistic Athens.

¹⁴ On citizen enrolment see Whitehead, David. *Demes of Attica*. Cambridge 1986, 97-104; Hansen, Mogens H. *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*. Oxford and Cambridge, MA 1999², 88f. On the complexities of terminology and contextual register that complicate citizen status cf. Blok, Josine. “Recht und Ritus in der Polis. Zu Bürgerstatus und Geschlechterverhältnissen im klassischen Athen”, in: *HZ* 278:1

Whitehead noted in his study of the demes of Attica, polis society is complicated by its multiplicity of formal and informal organisational levels, emerging as a macro-network consisting of multiple layers of nested face-to-face networks, including the demes, phratries, *hetaireiai*, cult communities, and households. A polis as large as Athens is thus not a face-to-face society, but consists of tiered, intersecting networks of relationships of varying intensity and significance, some of them embodied in formal institutions, such as the deme assemblies and cult associations.¹⁵ The crucial observation is that the creation of a communal frame of reference, here the concept of polis, establishes a significant communal concept that is invoked by individuals to generate or maintain a sense of normality for the individual members of that collective in the absence of face-to-face relationships.¹⁶ The following analysis of the *Characters* will try to demonstrate the workings of this dynamic between 'individual' and overarching 'polis society' as they are constructed within that text. The aim is not to produce some kind of 'objective' map of what constitutes an abstract civic individual in the period of Alexander's successors, since that seems not only quite impossible but also pointless in the light of the observations made above concerning the nature of actors. This chapter should rather be understood as one possible reading of a specific contemporary perspective on the structures of negotiation and interaction that shaped individuals in their socio-political networks in this macro-politically contested period. For this purpose, I attempt to view these dynamics from two points of view, that of the individual actor and that of the collective, fusing them together to fathom the tensions in the web of interactions taking place between and in reference to these poles, a conflict about agency carried out through the negotiation of norms in networks of identities.

(2004), 1-26, esp. 1-4. A neat political definition of the citizen is given by Aristot. *Pol.* 1275a22f.: πολιτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς, "simply put, a citizen is distinguished above all by his participation in passing judgement and the exercise of office."

- ¹⁵ See Whitehead 1986, 223-252, esp. 226f. with n. 13, highlighting the personal manageability of deme community and the comparative complexity of polis community mentioned by Thuc. 8.66.3; see further Connor, W. Robert. *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*. Princeton 1971, 25-32, 67-75; Bleicken, Jochen. *Die Athenische Demokratie*. Paderborn 1995⁴, 186-198. See also Theophr. *Char.* 25.6 where the Coward confirms that the relevant judges of his behaviour are the members of his deme and tribe, whom he speaks to individually.
- ¹⁶ This is due to the dynamics of contingency perception; the denser the web of available identities, the less visible the contradictions: White 2008², 29f.

3.3.2 Theophrastus' *Characters* – the work and its world

3.3.2.1 The text and its author

As has already been noted, Theophrastus' *Characters* are a literary source of particular value for the analysis of the networks of control at play between individual and collective in late 4th century civic society at Athens.¹⁷ The *Characters* are a collection of keenly observed anecdotes taken from Athenian every-day life that

¹⁷ The recent literature on the *Characters* is not very substantial. The fundamental study is by Millett, Paul. *Theophrastus and his World*. Oxford 2007, who treats the *Characters* from a variety of perspectives, but generally with an interest rather different from mine, as his focus is on philosophy and Theophrastus' world rather than on political history and power dynamics. Where his interests overlap mine, as in his discussion of honour and shame (58-92, esp. 58-60), he summarizes his view of the *Characters* as follows (105): "What emerges from the *Characters* [...] is necessarily restricted but significant in its specificity. Theophrastus has created for his audience an implied code of conduct: a perspective on honour and shame, co-operation and conflict, as they might impinge on upper-class citizens with reference to civic society peculiar to democratic Athens." This view appears partly the result of an exchange with Lane Fox (1996, 127-170), who concludes (154) his discussion of the validity of using the *Characters* as a historical source by saying that the most productive way of using them is through inversion, reading their account as a negative of the discourse on how citizens should behave. He also explicitly refers (146) to processes he identifies as informal networks and interrelations. One of the major current discussions concerns the civic mentality visible in the *Characters*. Whereas Millett 2007, 34f. and Leppin, Hartmut. "Theophrasts 'Charaktere' und die Bürgermentalität in Athen im Übergang zum Hellenismus", in: *Klio* 84:1 (2002), 37-56, esp. 48-54, have stressed the visibility and apparent virulence of democratic elements, Schmitz, Winfried. "Der 'Knigge' der besseren Gesellschaft – Theophrasts Charaktere oder Noblesse oblige", in: Rüdiger Kinsky and Jan Timmer (eds.). *Fröhliche Altertumswissenschaft. Festbuch für Wolfgang Will zum 65. Geburtstag* (=Antiquitas Reihe 1 Abhandlungen zur Alten Geschichte 64). Bonn 2014, 1-26, esp. 8-20, reads the *Characters* as a document that anticipates the developing "Honoratiorenregime", or regime of dignitaries (for the debate see Quass 1993; Habicht, Christian. "Ist ein 'Honoratiorenregime' das Kennzeichen der Stadt im späteren Hellenismus?", in: Wörrle and Zanker (eds.) 1995, 87-92). This question will be addressed in the course of the chapter. Other recent analyses of the *Characters* include the work by Volt, Ivo. *Character Description and Invective: Peripatetics between Ethics, Comedy and Rhetoric*. Tartu 2007. Despite the length of Volt's dissertation, actual analysis of the *Characters* is limited to some 20 pages (118-134), which do not add much, since they amount to a collection of material grouped around eight categories that are hardly reflected or contextualised. See also idem. "Not Valuing Others: Reflections of Social Cohesion in the Characters of Theophrastus", in: Ralph M. Rosen and Ineke Sluiter (eds.). *Valuing Others in Classical Antiquity* (=Mnemosyne Suppl. 323). Leiden and Boston 2010, 303-322, where he points out that the *Characters* express communal value judgements, with which one can only wholeheartedly agree.

are grouped into now 30 abstract, and always deviant, behavioural types.¹⁸ Their main value for me lies precisely in the fact that the work discusses deviant behaviour: this text identifies the Other within its potential audience, its in-group, and draws its narrative energy and humour from the resulting tension between identity and difference. As I aim to show, its close observation of the self in society allows insights into the lived incoherence of socio-political discourse that the text is itself part of and reproduces as a social actor within late fourth-century Athenian society. The level of abstraction that characterises the work renders this discourse far more accessible. However, before the text can be used as a historical source for processes of contended identity construction, a number of problems with the text and questions of its context, genre, and intention must be addressed to put our analysis on safer ground.

The networks of identities, expectations, constraints, and discourses that shape any given text are especially complex in the case of Theophrastus' works in general and the *Characters* in particular, due to the former's own complex identity, intelligence, extensive scholarship, and universal interests, as well as the latter's unorthodox genre and textual complexities.¹⁹ Let us begin with Theophrastus' biography. Since the philosopher came from Eresos on Lesbos, he was legally an outsider in Athens, not a full member of civic society, but a metic, who allegedly

¹⁸ The edition of the text used here is Diggle, James (ed.). *Theophrastus, Characters, edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (=Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 43). Cambridge 2004, with extensive commentary. Translating the names of the individual characters is always a challenge and has resulted in many versions; see Diggle 2004, always ad loc. and the list compiled by Millett 2007, 159-164, for discussion. I generally adopt James Diggle's renderings, as they seem thoroughly well-reasoned. For a discussion of the work's title of ἠθικοὶ χαρακτήρες and its rendering as "behavioural types" see Diggle 2004, 4f. The number of the sketches is hard to ascertain, since two sketches in the extant text seem to be compounds (Theophr. *Char.* 5 and 19), consisting of half the original sketch and half of another, with 19.8-11 apparently belonging to 11. See Diggle 2004, 15 with n. 49; Jeffrey Rusten (idem and Cunningham, Ian C. (eds.). *Theophrastus Characters, Herodas Mimes, Sophron and other Mime Fragments*. Cambridge, MA 2002², 148) considers the possibility that a leaf of papyrus fell out in between. Diggle 2004, 18 also argues that Theophr. *Char.* 6 and 8 have been heavily interpolated.

¹⁹ As Diggle 2004, 5 states "the *Characters*, in conception and design, is a novel work: nothing like it, so far as we know, had been attempted before." On Theophrastus in general see the fundamental collection by Fortenbaugh, William W., Huby, Pamela M., Sharples, Robert W., and Gutas, Dimitri. *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*. 2 vols. Leiden and New York 1992-1993. The immense variety of Theophrastus' interests and works is attested mainly by Diog. Laert. 5.42-50.

spoke Attic just a little too well.²⁰ There is thus a case to be made for the view that the *Characters* are one expression of their author's 'hybrid' existence, which is supported by the information provided by Diogenes Laertius. His report of Theophrastus' will clearly shows that the scholar was wealthy and well-connected via the social network of the Peripatetic school, with personal contacts reaching into the high echelons of pro-Macedonian macro-politics.²¹ It is unsurprising that his school was later mocked as treating substantial wealth as the mark of the free man (ἐλευθέριος).²² On the other hand, the will also shows that he was accused of

²⁰ This tension of identity is attested in an anecdote first reported by Cic. *Brut.* 172 (=Fortenbaugh et. al 1992, fr. 7A), in which an old woman treats Theophrastus harshly on account of his slightly different accent and calls him *hospes*, i.e. ξένος, causing him to bridle (*tulisse eum moleste*). Accent as an identity marker was a topos since at least the time of Solon (fr. 36 West, l. 11f.), and there certainly are reasons for relating such an anecdote to the concerns of the second-century sophists about their own Attic (cf. e.g. Goldhill, Simon. "The Anecdote. Exploring the Boundaries between Oral and Literary Performance in the Second Sophistic", in: William Johnson and Hold Parker (eds.). *Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome*. Oxford 2009, 96-113, esp. 99f.), but it does fit broadly with the other sources on Theophrastus' background and life. The most important of these is Diog. Laert. 5.36-41, and the will given in *extenso* at 5.51-57 (=Fortenbaugh et. al 1992, fr. 1). For the impact of Theophrastus' complex persona on the *Characters* see the discussion by Lane Fox 1996, 133-139. On Theophrastus' background see Millett 2007, 20-27, and the sources collected in Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, fr. 1-36. On metics at Athens in general see Whitehead, David. *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic*. Cambridge 1977.

²¹ Diog. Laert. 5.56f. shows Theophrastus as well connected, as the guarantors of his will are Hegesias, probably the son of his steward Hipparchus, a certain Olympiodoros, and a certain Adeimantos. The latter is located outside Athens, since a bearer of the will is specified, and will probably have been Adeimantos, son of Androstenes, of Lampsakos, the Antigonid *philos*, on whose illustrious career (Strab. 13.1.19) see Billows 1990, 362-364 no. 1, and recently Wallace 2013. Lane Fox 1996, 134 plausibly identifies Olympiodoros as the hero of Athenian democracy in 287 BC (Paus. 1.26.1-3), who seems to have been a prominent supporter of Demetrios Poliorketes 294-292, since he iterated as archon (IG II² 389 and 649). For his career see Habicht 1995a, 83; 102; 131; 145; Gabbert, Janice J. "The Career of Olympiodoros of Athens (ca. 340-270 BC)", in: *AnW* 27 (1996), 59-66. Both these individuals are very prominent political actors on the Greek political stage of the late fourth and early third century, capable of negotiating the tensions between royal and civic power and thus of guaranteeing the will.

²² The source is a fragment of the third century BC Cynic philosopher Teles of Megara: Teles 40f. Hense: τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔδει ὑπόδημα ἔχειν, καὶ τοῦτο ἀκάττυτον [ἤλους οὐκ ἔχον], εἶτα χλανίδα, παιδῶν ἀκολουθίαν, οἰκίαν μεγάλην, εἰς τὸ σύνδειπνον ὅπως ἄρτοι καθαροί, ὄψον μὴ τὸ τυχόν, οἶνος ἠδύς, ὑποδοχὰς τὰς ἐπιβαλλούσας, ἵνα πολυτελῶς· ἐλευθέριος γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναστροφὴ ἐκρίνετο | "For then out of sheer necessity one must have sandals and these untrimmed and [without studs], also a fine upper-garment of wool, a following of slaves, a great mansion, for the joint meal splendid white loaves, choice delicacies, sweet wine, and

ἀσέβεια and forced to leave the city after the fall of Demetrios of Phaleron, probably through the agency of Demochares; he also seems never to have been fully integrated through naturalisation.²³ Despite his evident popularity, physical grooming and sophistication, there remained a hint of the outsider that could be exploited by those so disposed.²⁴ The outline of his biography and the titles of some of his works indicate that his political views may have been similarly complex, oscillating between democracy, kingship, and oligarchy, and probably resulting in an a- or super-political stance, since as a philosopher he was “theoretically beyond citizenship”.²⁵ Such complexity is typical of the period: the con-

piled on entertainments, amounting to great expense; for among them ‘eleutherios’ is considered this kind of inversion (of all that is natural)’]; cf. Diog. Laert. 6.90, where Theophrastus is portrayed as being known for his rich attire.

- ²³ Diog. Laert. 5.37f. Lane Fox 1996, 133f. not only traces Theophrastus’ valuable contacts (further corroborated by Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, fr. 30, where he appears as capable of providing aid to Dinarchus in exile, according to Habicht 1995a, 97 via his contact with Demetrios Poliorketes (Dion. Hal. *Deim.* 9)), but also plausibly suggests that he may have received the formal privilege of ἔγκτησις, perhaps during the period of dominance by his friend and pupil Demetrios of Phaleron (Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, fr. 18.5), since Diog. Laert. 5.39, 52f. unequivocally attests his ownership of land. Cf. also Millett 2007, 23 with n. 81. On naturalisation at Athens see generally Osborne, Michael J. *Naturalization in Athens*. Volume 3 and 4. Brussels 1983, 141-168, who points out (142f.) that naturalisation required a gesture of benefaction to the Athenian people ([Dem.] 59.89f.). On the post-colonial concept of hybridity see fundamentally the work of Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture*. London 1994. Analysing such situational processes of hybridisation and the concomitant power dynamics for Greek society would, I fear, be a project of itself.
- ²⁴ His popularity is attested by Diog. Laert. 5.37, 41, and his personal grooming and lively style by Athen. 1.21a-b (=Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, fr. 12). Cf. also Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, frs. 15; 18; 23.
- ²⁵ Quote from Millett 2007, 73. This is mainly supported by his description as apolitical by Philodemus (Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, fr. 27) and the general spirit of the “exiled” Athenian philosopher, visible, e.g., in his self-description as σχολαστικός (Diog. Laert. 5.37 with Millett 2007, 105, who translates “free from the distractions of business and politics”), but also generally at Cic. *Tusc.* 5.107; Plut. *Mor.* 605a-b (=Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, frs. 24 and 25). Besides the general condemnation of the peripatetics as pro-Macedonian, oligarchic traitors by Demochares (Athen. 11.508f-509b, 13.610e-f; see Green 1990, 49), however, his works also tell a different story, although the note in Plutarch that Theophrastus helped to defeat tyrannies at home in Eresos further confuses the picture (Plut. *Mor.* 1097b-c; 1126e with Lane Fox 1996, 133): A treatise on kingship addressed to Kassander (Πρὸς Κάσανδρον περὶ βασιλείας, listed by Diog. Laert. 5.47; considered spurious by Athen. 4.144e-f; cf. Suda s.v. Θεόφραστος (Adler Theta 199), which states he was honoured by Kassander), his work on kingship in general, as well as on the education of kings (Diog. Laert. 5.42 and 49), along with two fragments

tinuously reconfiguring, situational web of socio-political ideas, but also of factions and interactions in late fourth century Athens is the background of the *Characters*, which are themselves the product of a keen observer operating within this contested network. A good example is provided by Aeschines' invective against Demosthenes in his speech against Ctesiphon, where he contrasts the 'friend of the people' and the 'oligarch':²⁶ the former is brave and free-born, by both parents, has an ancestral legacy of heroism on behalf of the democracy, is temperate and self-restrained (σώφρων καὶ μέτριος) to the point of financial sovereignty, and an eloquent speaker of sound judgement, whereas the oligarch is the polar opposite (τὸν δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν πάντα δεῖ τὰναντία τούτων ἔχειν)! The complexity of the discourse is self-evident – it was now impossible to define “the democrat” or “the oligarch” in a normative way, but they remained powerful argumentative labels in the web of interaction that is lived discourse. Lane Fox has aptly described this incoherent unity of discourse as “double-think”, drawing on the terms of George Orwell's now topical *1984*.²⁷ Theophrastus' biography is itself then an excellent though lacunose example of the results the entanglement between the micro- and macro-political power networks of the time and an individual's web of interactions could have, producing an impression of inconsistency, contingency and tension.²⁸

Pinpointing the authorial interests that actually underlie the *Characters* in any more detailed way is difficult, as is answering the important question of genre, which of course shapes the expectations of the audience and marks the author's location within the social web of textual production.²⁹ Graziano Ranocchia's re-

(Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, fr. 600f.) suggest that Theophrastus held responsible kingship in high regard and maintained contacts to kings (Paschidis 2008, A45). If we add to this his work on the best constitution (Περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, Diog. Laert. 5.45) and how to best manage *poleis* (Πῶς ἂν ἄριστα πόλεις οἰκοῦντο, Diog. Laert. 5.49), the picture is hardly apolitical in the strict sense. Unfortunately the content of these works is almost entirely unknown, which makes this point speculative. In the fourth century AD, Themistius judged him financially independent from Demetrios of Phaleron (Them. *Orat.* 23.285c =Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, fr. 29), which might suggest dissociation, but is hardly reliable and is contradicted by other evidence (Habicht 1995a, 82). Cf. on this also Sweet 1951, 180f.; Lane Fox 1996, 133.

²⁶ Aeschin. 3.168-175.

²⁷ Lane Fox 1996, 153.

²⁸ Cf. Lane Fox 1996, 134: “Theophrastus [...] was not alone in these compromises.”

²⁹ Ranocchia, Graziano. “Natura e fine dei «Caratteri» di Teofrasto: storia di un enigma”, in: *Philologus* 155:1 (2011), 69-91, offers a helpful survey of older and current positions. Other recent scholars have likewise highlighted this problem, including Diggle 2004, 12-16, 37; Millett 2007, 28-31.

cent and expansive survey of the various interpretations tries to sift through various suggestions – part of a treatise on ethics,³⁰ morality, or comic poetics, a rhetorical crib, or a piece of humorous literature – and discards ethics and morality, but also high literary humour, concluding that the *Characters* may have functioned as a stand-alone exercise for use in rhetorical training, or, preferably, as an appendix to a treatise of poetical theory, both of which would allow for their relatively simple and repetitive style.³¹ However, on account of the lack of good extant parallels, the evidence available to answer these questions of authorial intention and genre is thin at best, and both these options have equally been criticized with reference to the work's obvious wit, subtlety, and lack of any explicit motivation;³² even the fundamental question as to whether the *Characters*

³⁰ An interpretation suggested by Diog. Laert. 5.47 listing Ἠθικῶν σχολῶν and Ἠθικοί χαρακτήρες in conjunction. Diggle 2004, 12 denies this with conviction: “The work has been tailored, by more than one hand, to serve an ethical purpose. [...] When we are rid of these accretions [the prooemium, the epilogues, and the definitions] the work lacks all ethical dimensions. Nothing is analysed, no moral is drawn, no motive is sought.”

³¹ Ranocchia 2011, 79-82; 87: “Ora, come si è potuto appurare nel ripercorrere la storia della questione, tra le varie posizioni espresse dagli studiosi è possibile individuare quattro tesi principali, che possono essere sintetizzate come segue: 1) i Caratteri sono un complemento a un trattato di filosofia morale; 2) costituiscono un'opera letteraria scritta in una prosa artistica con un intento umoristico; 3) rappresentano un esercizio di tipo retorico; 4) sono l'appendice di un trattato di teoria poetica ad uso dei poeti comici.” Incidentally, the same conclusion was drawn already by Fortenbaugh, William und van Ophuijsen, Johannes M. S.v. “Theophrastus”, in: *DNP* 12/1 (2002), 391f. On the style of the work see Diggle 2004, 19-25; its evaluation hinges largely on the common occurrence of hiatus and the absence of literary or rhetorical tropes and devices, but Diggle shows that the *Characters* exhibits a great variety of stylistic quality, ranging from the clear and evocative to the obscure. This certainly indicates that the work was not complete or intended for publication.

³² While it is clear from its transmission in rhetorical manuscripts that the *Characters* was later used in the teaching of rhetoric (Diggle 2004, 38), Rusten (2002, 22) points out that the known fragments of Theophrastus' rhetorical works (Fortenbaugh et. al 1992, fr. 667-707) show no signs of an interest in characterisation.

Prof. Friedhelm Hoffmann (LMU Munich) has observed to me that there is an instance of similar characterisation in a hieratic papyrus, the text of which can be dated to the reign of Ramses II (~1279-1213 BC): Gardiner, Alan H. *Hieratic Papyri in the British Museum*. Vol. 1. London 1935, no. 3a (=Brit. Mus. 10638), 11. This unique text (p. 20) is part of a dream book and offers fragments of an abstract characterisation of several types of individuals and their actions. In keeping with the book's dichotomous structure, both character and action are the result of Set's influence (p. 21). The types include the lone man (i.e. the “bachelor”), the red man (cf. Plut. *De Iside* 30, 33), and the drunken man. The sketch of the latter, for example, includes scenic attributes such as drunken aggression, failure to act properly towards married women and others (?),

were finished and complete in the (amended) form they have today, is every bit as slippery as it is crucial.³³ The text's evidently tumultuous history further indicates that whoever edited it for publication, possibly by including what seemed like plausible definitions as the text's structural paradigm, and whoever added the *prooemium* and moralising resumes were similarly confused as to the purpose of the text they were dealing with.³⁴

Fortunately, the interest here lies elsewhere, namely in using the *Characters* as a historical source for identity configuration, for self-fashioning, an issue of methodological legitimacy that has been well canvassed by Robin Lane Fox. As it happens, he concludes his discussion of this problem by endorsing precisely the kind of approach to be adopted here, namely investigating the *Characters* in inversion to coax out the attitudes to life they show.³⁵ This methodological procedure seems permissible: Scholars seem to generally agree that, once the *résumé* passages are excluded, the *Characters* are neither overtly moralising, nor dominated by a particular philosophical interest,³⁶ and while their humour is present, it is not

as well as his tendency to break pots. The similarities especially between this last sketch and the *Characters* are striking and cultural exchange may thus conceivably have played a part in the work's genesis, though proof is impossible. Note, however, that the Egyptian text is obviously religious.

³³ The obvious comparanda are Old and New Comedy (from which however the *Characters* differ substantially in their apparent realism and close social observation) and the late third century BC *Characters* by Ariston of Chios, which does not survive beyond the fragmentary quotations in Philodemos' *Περὶ κακιῶν* 10.16-24 (Jensen), and by a certain Satyros, which does not survive at all beyond a brief quotation in Athen. 4.168c-d. Ariston's work seems to have been organised in a remarkably similar way to that of Theophrastus, but is far more analytical, moralising, and generalising. Ranocchia 2011, 85f. is accordingly sharply critical of the analogy. Cf. also Lane Fox 1996, 139-142, who adduces the interesting parallels found in Plutarch's characterisation of Phokion, and the account by Diggle 2004, 5-12; 25-27.

³⁴ On the transmission and the text's numerous problems and stages of interpolation see below p. 98.

³⁵ Lane Fox 1996, 154-156, here 154: "It is safer to move to a more general level: the values which the sketches presuppose. [...] Historians who use these texts have not mistakenly inverted their telescopes: rather they must invert the texts, and then they recover a 'discourse' in Alexander's Athens of how citizens should behave."

³⁶ Cf. Ranocchia 2011, 76: "a) la dottrina del giusto mezzo, così fondamentale nell'etica aristotelica e anche per Teofrasto, che nelle sue opere morali ad essa espressamente si richiamava, vi è del tutto assente; b) le definizioni (oltre a non essere teofrastee) sono estremamente semplici e lapidarie. Più di una volta Aristotele afferma nella Retorica che questo genere di definizioni sono sufficienti allo scopo che là si prefigge, lasciando intendere che esse non lo saranno invece per altri intenti, ad esempio per la caratterizzazione morale; c) gli esempi sono presi dalla vita quotidiana e sono di tipo descrittivo, e mai normativo. Essi, cioè, non sono costruiti in modo logico come in un

distorting, since the recognisability of the sketches is paramount.³⁷ Their lack of genre may be an early emblem of the deconstruction of literary boundaries observable in the Hellenistic period, for instance in the work of Kallimachos, and seems liberating, rather than lamentable.³⁸ Leaving genre as a strict system of categorisation aside, the work consists of a more or less coherent collection of anecdotes, of underspecified, poignant, memorable narratives, loosely grouped around character traits according to more or less consistent criteria.³⁹ As Simon Goldhill has argued for the Second Sophistic, anecdotes are situated between the oral and the literary and “require an agreed recognition and acceptance of the ordinary in order to have their *frisson* of the surprise, [they] perform the ideological function of linking a speaker and an audience in a shared normative frame”.⁴⁰ In essence, the *Characters* are thus an eminently social text, a text to be located in an intellectual milieu somewhere between comedy and philosophy, a text designed to make intellectuals laugh or at least chuckle at variations of themselves and their environment, a text that is a composite, literary reflection of orally circulating knowledge and discourses of self-fashioning.⁴¹ Accordingly, the *Characters* are used here primarily as a window onto these historical processes of social negotiation and will be treated as a collection of anecdotes that provide reasonably reliable information as such, rather than as a fully coherent work, since no further authorial intention or a specific genre have emerged from centuries of scholarship.

Despite this methodological sleight of hand, one cannot avoid saying something about the textual complexities of the work. The manuscript tradition is difficult, which itself suggests once more that the text is unstable – a fact that

trattato di filosofia morale.” For the identifiable traces of mainly Aristotelian philosophical thought see Millett 2007, 28-30, who concludes (30): “Not philosophy then, but the work of a philosopher, arguably meant for the appreciation of other philosophers.” The technique of corroborating good through the exploration of evil is visible as a general paradigm e.g. at Plut. *Demetr.* 1.1-6, which Plutarch then attributes to Plato (1.7).

³⁷ Lane Fox 1996, 139-141.

³⁸ On genre boundaries in Hellenistic literature see Gutzwiller, Kathryn. *A Guide to Hellenistic Literature*. Malden, MA 2007, 173f. The best example is provided by Kallimachos' *Aitia*. Cf. Fantuzzi, Marco and Hunter, Richard L. *Tradition and Innovation in Hellenistic Poetry*. Cambridge 2004, 32-41.

³⁹ See Goldhill 2009, 100, for a definition and typology of the anecdote.

⁴⁰ Goldhill 2009, 111.

⁴¹ A parallel interest in character traits is visible in a very similar context in Diogenes Laertios' biography of Zenon of Kition (e.g. 7.16-19), organised in a similarly anecdotal form. For texts as social, both intertextually and as a result of reader response dynamics cf. Greenblatt, Stephen. *Shakespearean Negotiations. The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England*. Oxford 1988, 5.

constitutes a significant problem, since it is imperative for this study to gain access to the late fourth century version.⁴² The text seems to have been divided up and quite substantially interpolated, and is, in its current form, almost certainly the product of numerous hands.⁴³ A number of passages have attracted specific criticism due to their apparent incoherence, resulting in debates about the text's stability and in the reorganisation of certain parts.⁴⁴ As consequence, the *prooemium* and moralising abstracts at the end of a number of sections have been consensually discarded as later additions, whereas the opening definitions are generally deemed reasonably authentic, due to the attestation of one of them in the first century BC in a quotation by Philodemos.⁴⁵ However, they are often quite incongruous with the text of the sketch they introduce and Markus Stein has shown that some are close to pseudo-Platonic and pseudo-Aristotelian definitions of the third and second century BC. As a consequence both he and the text's most recent editor, James Diggle, have emphatically argued in favour of removing them from the text in order to arrive at what Theophrastus may once have written.⁴⁶ Once removed, each of the 30 sections consists of a definition clause, beginning with δ $\delta\epsilon$ [...] τοιοῦτός τις, followed by a varying number of more or less coherent and detailed micro-narratives in infinitive constructions, the first one beginning with οἶος, but usually connected simply by *καὶ*, that more or less aptly explicate a situation in which this character trait comes to the fore.⁴⁷ This paratactic sequence of statements depends solely on the brief definition clause. As a result, this structure will probably have characterised the 'published' version in Antiquity. While this version need not, of course, have been established by Theophrastus himself, this analysis strongly suggests that the headwords used to describe the sketches are authentic, whereas the definition paragraphs that precede them can be ignored. While the latter are obviously an early addition and it would thus be

⁴² On the numerous problems of this unstable text and its complex manuscript tradition see the dated, but still useful overview in Jebb 1909², 161-164, as well as the in-depth discussions by Stein, Markus. *Definition und Schilderung in Theophrasts Charakteren*. Stuttgart 1992, 3-20 and esp. Diggle 2004, 37-61. A brief summary is offered by Millett 2007, 3-5.

⁴³ Diggle 2004, 17-25.

⁴⁴ Especially problematic is Theophr. *Char.* 5.6-10, which does not sit well with 5.1-5, but seems to fit 21. For further examples of interpolation and spurious passages see Diggle 2004, 17f.

⁴⁵ Philodemos cites Theophr. *Char.* 2.1; see Diggle 2004, 25; 37f.

⁴⁶ Stein 1992, esp. 283-285, and Diggle 2004, 17. Previously, the definition paragraphs had also occasionally been regarded as spurious due to their unimaginative blandness and unscientific nature (Diggle 2004, 17 n. 57).

⁴⁷ On the grammar and style see Diggle 2004, 19-25; 168f.

valid to use them in more general arguments, they probably reflect high Hellenistic thought and a different authorial persona, precluding their use in this chapter.

3.3.2.2 Date, context, and world

As for the date of the *Characters*, the date of the work's publication, the date of composition of the individual anecdotes, and the dramatic dates of the individual sketches are all heavily disputed.⁴⁸ Besides its ascription to Theophrastus, the only criteria for dating the text are references to political actors and circumstances found in the work's intradiegetic narratives. Gaining an idea of the relationship between the different references is crucial for any reconstruction of the dramatic date(s) of the *Characters* and consequently for their time of composition. On the one hand, the unified narrative of the Rumour Monger's tale (*λογοποιός*) details his invention of a battle in or near Macedon between Polyperchon and *the* King on the one side, and Kassander on the other, which allegedly affects the composure of those *ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν*, who act secretly.⁴⁹ The narrative suggests that the newsmonger expects sympathy for Kassander from his listeners, which places the events during Kassander's protectorate of Athens and narrows down the internal date of this tittle-tattle's episode to 317-307 BC.⁵⁰ The mention of *the* king in the singular rather than plural may refer to Herakles, son of Barsine and Alexander the Great, who was briefly instrumentalised by Polyperchon in his direct confrontation with Kassander.⁵¹ This would effectively place the dramatic

⁴⁸ For discussion of dating see Diggle 2004, 1-3, 27-37, esp. 36f., and Stein 1992, 21-45, esp. 44f., who also discusses the historicity of the occurrence of liturgies. Cf. also the extensive discussion of the historical contexts of the individual datable passages by Lane Fox 1996, 129-139, and the brief notes by Jebb 1909², 5 and Habicht 1995a, 127.

⁴⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 8, esp. 5-7. 8.5 may be spurious, see Diggle 2004, 283. Οἱ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν means "those in state office", cf. Thuc. 3.28; Dem. 9.56 (LSJ s.v. III.2), and does not in itself suggest oligarchy. Cf. also Dem. 25.23, where the *boulē* and *areopagus* are necessarily secretive even in a very "democratic" context.

⁵⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 8.7. Technically 319/8-318 BC could also be possible, during the pre-eminence of Phokion, but the reference is to a single king, rather than two. See also Diggle 2004, 32.

⁵¹ Diod. 20.201-2; 28.1-3. This is the preference of Lane Fox 1996, 138, tentatively accepted by Diggle 2004, 32. The problem is complicated by the difficulty of assessing the degree of knowledge possessed by the cities and the various parts of the Macedonian Empire about who was king. In Babylon and Egypt, for instance, Alexander IV continued to be counted as king after his death (Mehl, Andreas. *Seleukos Nikator und sein Reich*. Leuven 1986, 131f., 139-147; Boiy, Tom. "Royal Titulature in Hellenistic Babylonia", in: *ZAVA* 92 (2002), 241-257, esp. 247f.; Boiy, Tom. "The Diadochi

date of this particular passage between 310 and 309 BC. On the other hand, some passages also allude to events of the 330s and 20s BC, such as to Alexander's campaigns, Antipater as *strategos* of Europe, and the grain shortages in Athens.⁵² In my view, the references to events of the 320s offered by the Boastful Man (*ἀλαζών*) seem to be largely retrospective in nature, unlike the necessarily contemporaneous account of the Rumour Monger, although they are obviously akin in being fictitious. They are presented as being part of a not immediately verifiable past, which is obviously in the character's interest, and thus their temporal relationship to the setting of the intradiegetic narrative is deliberately obscured.⁵³ An exception here is the reference to Antipater, which seems to affect the narrative present and implies a possible continuation of contact, if the Boastful Man was not also scared of the consequences of involvement with Macedon.⁵⁴ As Conrad Cichorius first argued in 1897, the most plausible dramatic date for that anecdote is indeed 319 BC, before Antipater's death.⁵⁵ The positive internal evidence thus provides two specific dates, 319 and 310/309 BC.

The third and thorniest problem of dating regards the evaluation of the political system and mentality expressed in the text. These have previously been used as indicators for dating, but invariably lead us into the murky waters of the debate about democracy and oligarchy in the fourth and third centuries BC, the depths of which were already hinted at above in discussing the Aeschines passage.

History in Cuneiform Documentation", in: Anson and Alonso Troncoso (eds.) 2013, 7-16). On the other hand, Athenian politicians demonstrated detailed knowledge of who was in power in Macedon after 287, see Paschidis 2008, 157.

⁵² Theophr. *Char.* 23.3-5.

⁵³ With Diggle 2004, 28f., I differ here from Lane Fox 1996, 134f., who argues that such boasting would necessarily be related to relatively current events. When his audience is explicit, the Boastful Man invariably speaks to strangers (23.2, 3, 6, 9), who cannot possibly test what he says. The splendour of his deeds and the names he associates himself with (campaigns with Alexander, gained rich booty, his company and business coveted by Antipater, his generosity during the famine) are quite unspecific in that they hold value throughout Greece at the time (cf. e.g. Diod. 18.71.2; 19.11.2; 19.51.1). As Lane Fox himself notes, the city was also almost continuously hungry in the 330s and 20s (Kingsley 1986, 171; and again after the Antigonid defeat at Ipsos, see Habicht 1995, 89f.); the boaster's unspecific reference can easily refer to a coalesced memory loosely related to actual events (IG II² 457:9-12, for example, shows how alive memory of Alexander's campaigns was in 307/6 BC). The allusions to the orator Aristophan and the time of Lysander at 7.7 are similarly marked as references to the remote past (on these see Millett 2007, 45 with n. 151 and Diggle 2004, 271-273, who suggest dates of 365/5 and 400 BC).

⁵⁴ Theophr. *Char.* 23.4.

⁵⁵ Bechert, Malwin et al. (eds.). *Theophrasts Charaktere. Herausgegeben, erklärt und übersetzt von der Philologischen Gesellschaft zu Leipzig*. Leipzig 1897, lvii-lxii; Diggle 2004, 28f. On the date of Antipater's death see Boiy 2007, 136.

Since this is precisely what this chapter is about, however, we can use the question of dating as a guide to a full discussion of these political intricacies.

The first point one might make is that attestations of 'democracy' within the text would seem to exclude a date under Demetrios of Phaleron and would generally sit uncomfortably with the many changes of constitution, political personnel, and possibly mentality Athens underwent between 322 and 287 BC, i.e. within the time-frame during which the lifetime of its author and the interests of this study overlap. One way of evaluating these political changes is by briefly analysing their institutional implementation, especially as regards the census required for political rights, and combining this with what is known about the discourse of political mentality. The sequence of 'regimes' experienced by Theophrastus in the period under discussion here includes the following, all decorated with inverted commas to highlight the contested discourse that affects their labelling:

1) The 'oligarchic' years from 322/1-318 BC were ushered in with the violent deaths of leading Athenian politicians, notably Demosthenes,⁵⁶ and exhibit various centralising and restrictive tendencies, including the franchise census of 2000 drachmae,⁵⁷ the possible restriction of the *dikasteria*,⁵⁸ and the introduction or reform of the office of *anagrapheus* that interrupted the tribal cycle of *grammateis*.⁵⁹ The establishment of a Macedonian garrison in the Munychia constituted the first foreign occupation of Athens after 403 and began a history of interference in the

⁵⁶ See generally Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. *Phokion. Studien zur Erfassung seiner historischen Gestalt*. Munich 1976, 92-95; Grieb 2008, 51-60; Bayliss 2011, 150f. The violent deaths of the leading Athenian politicians are most prominently documented in Plut. *Dem.* 28.

⁵⁷ Diod. 18.18.1-6 not only attests further fracturing of the demos in that Antipater allegedly offered the disenfranchised land in Thrace, while suggesting also that this was the general strategy of Antipater after the Lamian War (18.18.8), but also that the census line was a manifestation of a long-standing faultline in the Athenian demos (18.10.1). See further Plut. *Phoc.* 28.4 and cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1292a39-b7, 1300b1-3 on census restrictions as oligarchic.

⁵⁸ Suda s.v. Δημάδης (Adler Delta 414).

⁵⁹ On the *anagrapheus*, an office that may even have effectively controlled legislation (Bayliss 2011, 86) see Dow, Sterling. "The Athenian Anagrapheis", in: *HSCPh* 67 (1963), 37-54, esp. 40f., 50, and the overview of recent discussion in Boiy 2007, 109f. and Bayliss 2011, 85f. Decrees passed between 321/0 and 319/8 suggest that the *anagrapheus* functioned as an oligarchic office, harkening back to fifth century predecessors of the *nomothetai*, since its holder precedes the eponymous archon in the dating formulae (archonships of Archippos (e.g. Meritt, Benjamin D. "Greek Inscriptions", in: *Hesperia* 30 (1961), 205-292, here 289-291; Agora XVI 97) and Neaichmos (e.g. IG II² 380). In the prescripts of 319/8 it first comes to be placed on the same level as the archon but is then relegated to last place (archonship of Apollodoros, e.g. IG II² 387 with SEG XXI 314), suggesting that the office became contested before it vanished.

sacral and political topography of the city.⁶⁰ The resulting unrest was probably intensified by the uncertainty about the possession of Samos.⁶¹

2) The 'democratic' period between 318 and 317, during which the *anagraphens* was abolished and regular *grammateis* reinstated. Various individuals who had co-operated with Antipater, most notably Phokion, were executed. IG II² 448:35-86 documents honours for Euphron of Sikyon on account of his efforts for the liberation of Athens and Greece in the Lamian War and the restoration of these honours in the fourth prytany of 318/7 with explicit democratic language.⁶²

3) The 'regime' of Demetrios of Phaleron from 317 to 307 was of course still backed by the Macedonian garrison, but seems to have largely retained the institutions of the state, as it derived from more bilateral negotiations. The most clearly oligarchic aspects are the census of 1000 drachmae,⁶³ the existence of *nomophylakes* who managed the *graphē paranomōn* and thereby prevented 'unwelcome' politically-motivated accusations from being heard in court, the strengthening of the areopagus,⁶⁴ and its legislative and institutional interference in

⁶⁰ The garrison is attested by Diod. 18.18.5; on the religious consequences of the interference see Mikalson, Jon D. *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*. Berkeley 1998, 50-53, who points to the changes in the cult of Artemis Mounichia and Artemis in general.

⁶¹ Diod. 18.18.9. Samos was promised to the Athenians as part of Polyperchon's edict (18.56.7), which was never implemented. There may, however, have been fighting on Samos; see generally Shipley, Graham. *A History of Samos 800 – 188 BC*. Oxford 1987, 165-172.

⁶² The unrest in the city during the transition period and the uncertainty about the garrison and the outcome of the various possible alliances is well captured by Diod. 18.64.1-67.6, who also describes the execution of Phokion and his friends, on which see in greater detail Plut. *Phoc.* 33.1-35.2. For commentary on IG II² 448 see e.g. Osborne, Michael J. *Naturalization in Athens*. Volume 2. Brussels 1982, 103-108. On the events of 318 see Habicht 1995a, 58-62; Bayliss 2011, 98-101.

⁶³ Garrison and census of 1000 drachmae: Diod. 18.74.1-3; Parian chronicle for 317/16 (IG XII,5 444:116). On the significance of the census see van Wees, Hans. "Demetrius and Draco: Athens' property classes and population in and before 317 BC", in: *JHS* 131 (2011), 95-114.

⁶⁴ *Nomophylakes* are attested by Philochorus FG² 328 F 64; strengthening the areopagus: Pollux 8.102 (see O'Sullivan, Lara. "Philochorus, Pollux and the νομοφύλακες of Demetrius of Phalerum", in: *JHS* 2001 (121), 51-62).

matters pertaining to individual *oikoi*, a trait of anti-radical democratic politics.⁶⁵ Demetrios himself also held the eponymous archonship of 309/8.⁶⁶

4) Ushered in with an overwhelming, sincere sense of gratitude, the 'protectorate' of Demetrios Poliorketes from 307/6-301 was reasonably 'democratic', though the pressures exercised by the 'protector' became increasingly apparent.⁶⁷ The garrison, the census and the *nomophylakes* were removed, the cycle of the tribal

⁶⁵ Legislative and institutional interference in the 'private' sphere, e.g. in the form of the *gynaikonomoi*. Athen. 6.245b and Philochorus FGrH 328 F 65 with commentary (other sources in Williams, James. "Ideology & the Constitution of Demetrios of Phalerum", in: Charles D. Hamilton and Peter Krentz (eds.). *Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics, War, and History in Honor of Donald Kagan*. Claremont, CA 1997, 327-346, here 335 n. 24); cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1300a4-10; Plat. *Rep.* 344a-b; Lys. 12.20-22 with Cohen, David. *Law, Sexuality, and Society*. Cambridge 1991, 230-234.

⁶⁶ Diod. 20.27.1 and the Parian Marble FGrH 239 B19. The regime also seems to have been frugal, although it is by no means certain that the allowances for attending assemblies, courts, and festivals were actually abolished, since the argument rests mainly on the invective by Duris (Athen. 12.542b-c = FGrH 76 F 10), the lack of payment provisions in IG II² 450 and his alleged financial skills at Diog. Laert. 5.75. At the same time, the liturgies of *choregia* and trierarchy may have been abolished, an 'oligarchic' measure in that it must have favoured the rich (see Williams 1997, 338f. for sources). In essence, Demetrios may thus have aimed to consolidate the wealthier section of the citizen body, preventing internal strife by asserting the equal rule of law and collective assignment of honour, but simultaneously instituting oligarchic control over these democratic features. On the other hand, the honorary decree IG II² 1201 suggests that he modelled himself on Lykurgos and was certainly viewed as positive by some sections of the populace for bringing peace and establishing good laws (on the decree see O'Sullivan, Lara. *The Regime of Demetrios of Phalerum in Athens, 317-307 BCE. A Philosopher in Politics*. Leiden 2009, 298); Diog. Laert. 5.5.77 suggests that he received many honours, though much is probably exaggerated; confusion with Demetrios Poliorketes is very likely. His regime thus emerges as a fascinating blend of democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic features, symptomatic of the instability of the time. For a detailed and cautious recent assessment of the evidence for changes to the constitution under Demetrios of Phaleron see O'Sullivan 2009a, 108-163, who shows just how paper-thin it is. See also the important evaluations by Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Das Verhältnis von Politik und Philosophie im Wirken des Demetrios von Phaleron", in: *Chiron* 8 (1978), 149-193; Habicht 1995a, 62-69; Grieb 2008, 61-68. Bayliss 2011, 73f., 77-88, 90f. argues against O'Sullivan in emphasising the oligarchic elements. On the religious developments of this period see Mikalson 1998, 72-74, who paints a picture of general stability.

⁶⁷ See for this esp. Habicht 1995a, 78-89. On the gratitude of the Athenians see Mikalson 1998, 84f., citing IG II² 3424, SEG XXV 149; XXX 69. The restoration of democracy is attested by Diod. 19.45.1-46.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 8.4-9.2.

secretaries was resumed,⁶⁸ a corps of soldiers was created to protect the Piraeus,⁶⁹ and the uniquely copious decrees have a democratic flavour in that they stress transparency and collective control.⁷⁰ The citizen body also fought Kassander in Attica on its own behalf in the Four Years War, during which the 'protectorate' showed its weaknesses.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the collective and individual actions preserved in the decrees clearly accommodate Antigonid interests, most visibly in the fact that Demetrios' main supporter in the city, Stratokles of Diomeia, figures as the proponent of numerous honorary decrees for Antigonid officers; he also fiddled with the Athenian calendar to make it possible for Demetrios to be initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries. As time went on, Demetrios increasingly interfered in domestic politics, backing Stratokles in 304/3 and forcing his opponent Demochares, son of Demosthenes, into exile until 286/5. The latent schism within the city is most visible in the fact that Stratokles vanishes from the epigraphic record immediately after the Antigonid defeat at Ipsos.⁷²

5) The subsequent 'tyranny' of Lachares is obscure in date, extent, and impact, with positions differing substantially, mainly regarding the dates. The institutional structures seem to have remained unchanged.⁷³ Lachares' rise to political dominance in Athens was probably a gradual result of internal strife. The process seems to have extended from 302/1 to 295, with Lachares eventually (297?) exploiting his position as commander of the foreign mercenaries (ὁ τῶν ξένων ἡγούμενος) to stage a coup. He defeated the hoplite corps stationed on the Acropolis and had their commander Charias and three others executed, drawing on Kassander's support to cement his position. The Piraeus seceded from the city,

⁶⁸ See O'Sullivan 2009a, 121.

⁶⁹ On the creation of the Peiraikoi soldiers to protect the Peiraieus see Bayliss, Andrew J. "Curse-tablets as Evidence: Identifying the Elusive «Peiraikoi soldiers»", in: *ZPE* 144 (2003), 125-140, esp. 137f.

⁷⁰ Habicht 1995a, 79; Hedrick, Charles W. "Democracy and the Athenian Epigraphical Habit", in: *Hesperia* 68 (1999), 387-439, here esp. 413f.; 423.

⁷¹ See Oliver, Graham J. *War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens*. New York and Oxford 2007, 117f.

⁷² On Stratokles of Diomeia see Billows 1990, 149f., 170; Habicht 1995a, 80; Paschidis 2008, A19, now in detail Bayliss 2011, 152-186; on his reconfiguration of the Athenian calendar see Plut. *Demetr.* 26.1-3; SEG XXXVI 165. Demetrios' interference in domestic politics is attested by Plut. *Demetr.* 24.3-5. Dion Hal. *Dein.* 3 (=Philochorus FGrH 328 F 66) also records trials and death sentences *in absentia* for the circle of Demetrios of Phaleron. On the significant religious changes that resulted from the Antigonid protectorate see Mikalson 1998, 78-104, who paints the popular experience of Antigonid action as functionally godlike (82f.).

⁷³ On the institutional structures see Habicht 1995a, 91.

thus causing a famine in the *asty* and allowing Demetrios Poliorketes to oust Lachares, who may have fled to Lysimachos' court.⁷⁴

6) The second Antigonid 'protectorate' from 295/4-287/6 seems to have been harsher than the first, since garrisons were installed in Munychia and on Museion hill. It also shows oligarchic institutional elements in the return of the office of *anagrapheus*, and the iteration of Olympiodoros in the archonship.⁷⁵ Demetrios Poliorketes also recalled individuals exiled by the democracy, further suggesting an oligarchisation of the political system. Meanwhile, democratic elements (e.g. full franchise) persisted and IG II² 646:22f. (295/4) remarkably praises Herodoros, *philos* of Demetrios Poliorketes, for adorning the city with eternal democracy – an expression that reinforces our earlier impression that by now such terms had become detached from any anchorage in institutional reality and functioned as mere discursive tags.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ The sources for the dates are Plut. *Demetr.* 33.1-4; Paus. 1.25.7f., 29.10; P.Oxy 10.1235; 17.2082 (=Phlegon FG+H 257a F 1-3; F 1 with the emendations by Thonemann, Peter. "Charias on the Acropolis", in: *ZPE* 144 (2003), 123-124); Polyaeus. *Strat.* 3.7.1-3; IG II² 644). For discussion see Habicht 1979, 1-21; Osborne 1982, 144-153; Habicht 1995a, 88-94, esp. 90 with n. 58; cf. also the protracted, but ultimately unconvincing argument by Dreyer 1999, 17-110; see further Bayliss 2003, 139f.; Thonemann 2005; Paschidis 2008, A41; O'Sullivan, Lara. "History from Comic Hypotheses: Stratocles, Lachares, and P.Oxy. 1235", in: *GRBS* 49 (2009b), 53-79. On Lachares' doubtful links to Lysimachos cf. also Lund 1992, 92f. The dramatic impact of Lachares' re-circulation of the precious metals tied up in the dedications on the Acropolis on the prestige of Athena Polias is highlighted by Mikalson 1998, 90-92.

⁷⁵ See now Paschidis 2008, 138f.; Bayliss 2011, 65. On the reappearance of the *anagrapheus* see Habicht 1995a, 97. Olympiodoros' iteration and the *anagrapheis* are attested in Dion. Hal. *Dein.* 9; IG II² 649:1; IG II² 389:1 (with SEG XXI 354); Agora XVI 167; see for discussion Dinsmoor, William B. *The Archons of Athens in the Hellenistic Age*. Cambridge, MA 1931, 37-44. Dion Hal. *Dein.* 2f., 9 also attributes the recall of the exiles to the initiative of Demetrios Poliorketes.

⁷⁶ Bayliss 2011, 65 n. 8 explains IG II² 646:22f. (=Osborne 1981-1982, D68) by stating that the regime was initially 'democratic'. This rests on an alternative and ingenious solution to the problem of Nikias' double (?) archonship (IG II² 644:1; cf. Gauthier, Phillipe. "La réunification d'Athènes en 281 et les deux archontes Nicias", in: *REG* 92 (1979), 348-399; modified and redated by Osborne, Michael J. "The Archonship of Nikias Hysteros", in: *ZPE* 58 (1985), 275-295). This solution was proposed by Thonemann, Peter. "The Tragic King: Demetrios Poliorketes and the City of Athens", in: Olivier Hekster and Richard Fowler (eds.). *Imaginary Kings. Royal Images in the Ancient Near East, Greece and Rome*. Stuttgart 2005, 63-86, esp. 66-74. Assuming that Elaphebolion 296/5 marked the ousting of Lachares by Demetrios Poliorketes, Nikias might have become the sole eponym of a condensed intercalary year, while the original archon of that year was cut from history. This would also account for the double election of Phaidros of Sphettos as general (IG II² 682:21-24). Besides placing great weight on the grammar of IG II² 644, Thonemann's explanation requires that the city's

To my mind, two main conclusions emerge from this survey. One is that 'oligarchy' and 'democracy' were complex, densely palimpsestic concepts at the end of the fourth and beginning of the third century BC, woven into a political discourse heavily conditioned by domestic strife and bloodshed, by long-standing political faultlines, such as the rule of law and the status of liturgies, but also by the new and ever-increasing involvement of the Diadochi.⁷⁷ Given such experiences, the oral political discourse of the time must have been even more unstable, and surely characterised by an oversemanticisation of core terms such as 'democracy' and 'oligarchy'. Thus, despite my general agreement with Andrew Bayliss' recent study of the domestic politics of this period, I do not think it plausible that these events left the cognitive configuration of the Athenian demos unaffected.⁷⁸ Rather they further destabilised the semiotic web surrounding core political terms, contributing to a cacophony of increasingly personal views. The ostentatious reassertion of a specific form of democratic ideal in the epigraphic language of 318/7 and 307-304 marks this lack of stability and the necessity for clarity and reconfiguration perceived by those now in semantic control – such

calendar was edited substantially, the institutional implementation of which would have been quite absurd – a fact that might explain Philippides' ridicule (Plut. *Demetr.* 26.3). Nevertheless, such a re-assertion of collective hegemony over the official calendar is quite attractive, since it fits well with the destabilisation of order visible in this period. Moreover, the gravity of the situation makes the idea of a symbolic new beginning seem plausible, and I do not myself see any alternative scenario that better accounts for the various pieces of evidence. As for Theophrastus' personal experience, Diog. Laert. 5.51f. suggests that the Peripatetic school may itself have been damaged in the fighting of 287/6 BC.

⁷⁷ I here take a somewhat different stance than other scholars. This whole matter has recently been studied in depth by Bayliss 2011, 61-128, criticising previous scholarship for whitewashing the character of the oligarchies of this period. He argues that there was a consistent and clear understanding within the demos of what democracy entailed, which is why the oligarchic regimes were so shortlived (59f., 94-98), and that it was abundantly clear to everyone that the "regimes" of Phokion, Demetrios of Phaleron, and Lachares were oligarchic and dependent on the support of Diadochi (91-93). Cf. also Lape, Susan. *Reproducing Athens. Menander's Comedy, Democratic Culture, and the Hellenistic City*. Princeton 2004, esp. 68, who argues that Menander shows a similar insistence on a "democratic ethos", consisting in deep-seated values surrounding marriage and citizen identity, which find their expression in the implicit norms that govern the reproduction of the citizen body in his plays. Millett 2007, 46 finds the same in the *Characters*. On the rule of law as a core aspect of radical democratic fourth-century politics (cf. Eur. *Suppl.* 431-7) and a contentious subject, especially in political theory, see Hansen 1999², 299-304.

⁷⁸ Bayliss 2011, 59f., 94-98. This insistence on a democratic ethos seems at odds with his differentiated account of political plurality elsewhere (e.g. 112-128; 213), but perhaps needed to be strongly re-affirmed at these points.

emphasis is called for in times of uncertainty.⁷⁹ Furthermore, Stratokles of Dioemeia, the main Antigonid supporter of the first protectorate, for instance not only worded many of these 'democratic' decrees, but could also be described as committing the same offense he himself had used to attack the supporters of Demetrios of Phaleron, namely the "dissolution of the citizen body" (*κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου*).⁸⁰ Depending on the point of view, the regime of Demetrios of Phaleron, for example, was 'democratic', not 'oligarchic'; at the level of rhetorical and political discourse, the semantic fields of these words were constantly in flux during this period, as were the institutional structures. In my terms, such evidence points to the conclusion that *situational* and *ephemeral* semantics, irrespective of whether they were voiced by a 'democratic hero' such as Hagnonides of Pergase or the 'oligarch' Demetrios of Phaleron, dominated this period of macro- and micro-political destabilisation of meaning.⁸¹

The second conclusion is that this period at Athens must have been characterised by an awareness of the deeply contingent nature of human experience,

⁷⁹ Note Aristot. *Pol.* 1296a6-b1 that highlights the conceptual closeness between democracy and oligarchy.

⁸⁰ Plut. *Mor.* 851e; cf. also Plut. *Demetr.* 12.4f. The source is Philippides of Kephale, who later became a *philos* of Lysimachos, highlighting that Athens became a contested political space due to its entanglement in macro-politics. The case of Philippides can also serve to exemplify another reason as to why the "dissolution of the people" is such a prominent accusation: his honorary decree (IG II² 657:20-31, dating to 287 BC; see Shear 1978, 94f.) refers to the effects that mercenary service might have on the citizen body, since it might well end in captivity. Philippides is thus honoured for repairing the citizen body by ransoming its captive members and returning them to freedom. On Stratokles and Philippides see Mikalson 1998, 77; Habicht 1995a, 81 n. 17; Grieb 2008, 59f.; O'Sullivan 2009b, 72f.; Bayliss 2011, 125f., 162f., and esp. Paschidis A19 (78-106), A40 (116-125).

⁸¹ Strab. 9.1.20 (=FGGrH 228 T 3b) considers the regime of Demetrios of Phaleron to be democratic, apparently drawing on Demetrios' own account, and we can hardly assume that Demetrios was alone in this assessment of his governance of Athens; cf. also Diod. 18.74.3. The plurality of perspectives and opinions, on the other hand, is revealed by Plut. *Demetr.* 10.2 and Paus. 1.25.6, both of whom condemn him as a monarch and tyrant. While Grieb 2008, 355-364 and Bayliss 2011, 94f., assert that democracy is clearly understood in Athens in the early Hellenistic period and consequently defended by the full citizen body that maintains intellectual and institutional control, the many contradictory decisions by the (very same!) citizen body in the Diadoch period seem to call this into question. A prime example is afforded by the honours for Euphron of Sikyon with their history of annulment and restoration (IG II² 448, esp. 58-67) – an epigraphic document born from this discourse conflict, since the speaker is Hagnonides (39f.), the man who had Phokion put to death (Plut. *Phoc.* 34-37). The diffuse rhetorical malleability of 'democracy' lies at the heart of the matter and the *demos* was evidently characterised by a great variety of attitudes, as even Bayliss (2011, 58f.) himself allows.

i.e. by perceived contingency, especially among the actors prominent enough to have survived in the historical record. The violence done to the socio-political network of the Athenian *demos* in the form of constant changes of institutional, spatial, and cultural structure, the franchise restrictions, which Plutarch paints as painful and shameful, the state's interference in the *oikos*, the bloodshed and strife, the feeling of being tossed about by greater, even godlike forces, and the destabilisation of meaning – all of these elements factor into individual and collective uncertainty, fuelling attempts at renegotiation of meaning and identity, so attempts at control.⁸² It may then be appropriate to close this discussion of context by pointing to the fact that the period under discussion here saw a highly significant change in the conception of *τύχη* (“fortune”). Jon Mikalson has stressed the establishment of *ἀγαθὴ τύχη* as a polis-level deity in late fourth-century Athens and the rapid loss of significance the cult experienced in the third century.⁸³ This dynamic seems to mark a relevant development within the field of polis religion as it constitutes an awareness of contingency itself, made manifest in an attempt at meta-control in the form of a specific religious strategy, the deification of contingency itself.⁸⁴ Mikalson has also noted the conceptual reflection and theoretical self-awareness perceptible in the rather ragged literary tradition relating to *τύχη*.⁸⁵ In a fragment of his *Περὶ τῆς τύχης*, preserved by Polybius, Demetrios of Phaleron gives written form to a discourse of self-reflection, circulating among the elite at any rate, around the theme of unprecedented historical change, which he links to *τύχη*. Fortune is here defined as containing an inherent difficulty and harshness (*τὸ χαλεπὸν*), that is made manifest in her anti-rational, unfathomable dynamics, which explicitly affect the future.⁸⁶

⁸² Plut. *Phoc.* 28.4. Bayliss (2011, 68–70. On the dynamics visible in the city's sacral topography and cognitive cosmos see Mikalson 1998, 82f.; Thonemann 2005; Kuhn, Annika B. “Ritual Change During the Reign of Demetrios Poliorcetes”, in: Eftychia Stavrianopoulou (ed.). *Ritual and Communication in the Graeco-Roman World*. Athens 2006, 265–281, who too readily accepts Plutarch's version of Demetrios' behaviour at Athens as fact, given that it comes from hostile sources born of inner-Athenian faultlines.

⁸³ See Mikalson 1998, 62f.; cf. Mikalson, Jon D. *Athenian Popular Religion*. Chapel Hill, NC 1983, 59–62; on *τύχη* see in general Nilsson, Martin P. *Geschichte der griechischen Religion. Zweiter Band: Die hellenistische und römische Zeit*. Munich 1961², 200–210.

⁸⁴ On *τύχη* as the linguistic embodiment of events running counter to expectation see e.g. Diod. 20.30.1.

⁸⁵ Most notably Demetrios of Phaleron's own reflections (FGrH 228 F 39), preserved by Polybius (29.21.1), and the comic poets Menander and Philemon.

⁸⁶ In the various variants of FGrH 228 F 39, fortune is variously *ἀδιαλόγητος/ἀσύνθετος/ἀσύνετος* (“unreasonable/unconstrained/unintelligible”); *παρὰ λογισμὸν τὸν ἡμέτερον* (“contrary to our calculations”), and *τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς παραδόξοις ἐνδεικνυμένη* (“its power is made evident in events contrary to all expectations”). This is very close

The establishment of a state cult then constitutes an attempt by the collective to bind the very concept of contingency into the system of individual and collective contingency control that is religious action at polis level, while also imposing a collective configuration of meaning on it by explicitly invoking *good* fortune. In the reading presented here, it is surely no coincidence that contingency itself emerges as a new element of (religious) experience within the cognitive cosmos of Athenian individuals at precisely this point in time. The collective attempt at making contingency itself a personifiable, positive entity endowed with reason (*βούλησις*) reinforces the second point and may serve to round out this account of the contested discursive context of the *Characters*.⁸⁷

The next step is now to locate the content of the *Characters* in relation to this contested discourse; bear in mind, however, that any interpretation here depends on an inversion or counter-reading, so the following should not be understood as an exclusive reading. As Lane Fox has pointed out, the textual society depicted in the *Characters* is dominated by well-to-do adult citizens, who engage in the institutions of the Athenian state.⁸⁸ The large majority of the narratives explicitly show individuals who own slaves, hold symposia, go to the gymnasium, the *odeion*, and the bath house, and participate in the cultic, cultural, and political institutions of the polis, e.g. the theatre, the assembly, and the law courts.⁸⁹ Some also have

to modern concepts of contingency, which is made manifest precisely whenever expectations for action cannot handle actual action.

⁸⁷ On *τύχη* as calculating and a concept that epitomises the spirit of the time see Men. *Aspis* 97f., 146-148, where *τύχη* actually appears on stage as an omniscient, positive force, *πάντων κυρία τούτων* ("mistress of all this"). Cf. also Plut. *Demetr.* 25.5; 28.1; 31.4f.; 50.1. It may be no coincidence that the *Life of Demetrius* is itself structured around the principle of changeable fortune and involves various attempts at laying claim to control over contingency itself, both by Demetrios Poliorketes and by Seleukos after Demetrios' final defeat. It is of course also no coincidence that the Epicurean school, founded at this time, developed a sophisticated philosophical programme to combat this divine concept of contingency by resolving the contingencies of money, divinity, death, love, and of course pain through friendship: esp. Diog. Laert. 10,81f., 146f.

⁸⁸ Lane Fox 1996, 129-131: "social, slave-owning spectrum" (131). Accepted by Leppin 2002, esp. 39; Volt 2007, 119; Millett 2007, 34f., 52. Note that no sketch thematises language or dialect, although, as we have seen, Theophrastus himself may have had no interest in highlighting this as a register of difference.

⁸⁹ Slaves and servants: Theophr. *Char.* 9.3; 10.5; 12.12; 13.4; 14.9; 16.11A; 17.6; 18.2, 8; 20.5, 9f.; 21.4f.; 22.10; 23.2, 8; 27.12; 30.11, 15, 17; symposium and sacrifices: Theophr. *Char.* 2.10; 5.5; 6.3; 7.7; 9.3; 10.3, 11; 12.11; 13.4; 17.2; 21.2, 7; 24.9; 30.2, 4, 16, 18; gymnasium and palaistra: Theophr. *Char.* 5.7; 7.4; 27.6, 14; baths: 9.8; 19.6; 27.14; 30.8; law court: Theophr. *Char.* 1.2; 5.3; 7.7; 11.6; 12.5; 14.3; 17.8; 29.2, 4f.; assembly: Theophr. *Char.* 4.2, 6; 7.6; 13.2; 21.11; 22.3; 26.2, 5; theatre: Theophr. *Char.* 2.11; 7.7; 9.5; 11.3; 14.4; 22.2; 30.6. Some of these individuals also have and entertain *xenoi* and act as ambassadors: Theophr. *Char.* 5.4, 8; 9.5; 20.10; 23.9; 30.3, 7.

money for liturgies and military service – and tellingly no one but the ‘Man who has lost all sense’ seems to actually do any work.⁹⁰ While some sketches seem to show individuals that do not belong to these wealthy groups, closer inspection shows that they too must indeed be relatively wealthy citizens, making the *Characters* cover roughly the range of individuals that remained citizens under Antipater's census.⁹¹ As Hartmut Leppin has rightly observed, political activity is further a tacit standard among the slave-owning individuals portrayed in the text: even the Country Bumpkin attends the assembly and the Arrogant Man (*ὑπερήφανος*) is criticized for declining to perform an office.⁹² This does not necessarily mean, however, that the *Characters* offer the ‘democracy’ he identifies.⁹³

The pivotal issue for the evaluation of the political culture of the *Characters* is whether the ideal of collective ‘equality’ guaranteed by law actually exists in the *Characters* in the radical egalitarian form claimed by Leppin. Winfried Schmitz has argued – with the benefit of hindsight – that the implied ideal of the *Characters* is not the egalitarian citizen in a radically democratic city ruled by laws given by the

⁹⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 6.4f. Liturgies and military activity as civic body: Theophr. *Char.* 22.2; 24.12; 25.3-6; 26.6; 27.3; 30.7 (on military activity of citizens in the Hellenistic age cf. Couvenhes, Jean-Christophe. “Mercenaires et soldats-citoyens dans le monde grec à l'époque hellénistique”, in: Jean-Christophe Romer and Laurent Henninger (eds.), *Armées privées, armées d'état. Mercenaires et auxiliaires*. Paris 2010, 13-30). On the *Characters* depicting individuals enjoying leisure see Millett 2007, 102.

⁹¹ Theophr. *Char.* 6.4f., 9 depict a man performing base jobs for copper coins, but his “loss of sense” must necessarily consist in the fact that he does not have to do this, otherwise the sketch is pointless; in general, the *Characters* do not focalise people who have to work in these kinds of jobs simply to make ends meet; portraying the poor being poor is hardly funny or indicative of character. Millett (2007, 35) argues similarly, also including the Country Bumpkin (Theophr. *Char.* 4), who keeps slaves and conducts business. Lane Fox 1996, 130 raises the objection that the Boastful Man lives in a rented house (Theophr. *Char.* 23.9) and thus is probably not rich. Still he owns a slave (23.8) and seems to have a lot of leisure time (23.2-7). His sketch therefore circles around the same construction of the free citizen, highlighting the issue of someone faking the characteristic habitus. On the correlation between census and social class see Lane Fox 1996, 131.

⁹² Theophr. *Char.* 4.2f.; 24.4. The case of the Oligarch (*ὀλιγαρχικός*, Theophr. *Char.* 23.1-6) suggests a democratic world (cf. also the democratic value triad (*parrêsia, demokratia, eleutheria*) invoked at 28.6). On country-dwellers attending the assembly see Hansen 1999², 61, 126f.: “It need not be doubted that the meetings of the Assembly were dominated by the people from the city and its suburbs and that the attendance of the country people did not match their proportion of the citizen population, but the scanty sources present a less unbalanced picture than might at first be supposed.” On rusticity in the Athenocentric discourses of Greek civic morality and philosophy see Dover 1974, 112-114, 122 and the overview by Diggle 2004, 207f.

⁹³ Leppin 2002, esp. 39; cf. similarly Millett 2007, 34f.

citizen collective irrespective of wealth, but a prefiguration of the educated and socially privileged euergete of the high and late Hellenistic period:⁹⁴ a wealthy individual who dedicates his life, his money, and his time to the civic community, shares his personal space and possessions freely, and is accorded honour in return, all in a culture of mutual respect and trust between demos and euergetic group, wherein the demos respects the superiority and political leadership of a sharply delimited group in regular receipt of honour.⁹⁵ At the level of political culture, Paul Veyne and Friedemann Quass have described this phenomenon in Weberian terms as a regime of dignitaries or notables (*Honoratiorenregime*), a kind of meritocratic aristocracy that is the result of democratic decadence.⁹⁶

I would agree with Schmitz that the *Characters* presuppose no radical democracy. It is evident that the section of society depicted is relatively wealthy and the text accordingly makes no reference to three of the crucial features of radical democracy, namely allotment of office, the *eisphora*, and Demades' famous "glue of democracy", the payments for civic activity, i.e. for attending, e.g., assembly, law court, and theatre.⁹⁷ The Talker (*λάλος*) can also, for instance, casually abuse

⁹⁴ Schmitz 2014, 8-20, esp. 14f. One aspect that supports Schmitz' argument but is not referenced by him is the change of habit visible at Theophr. *Char.* 5.2 where *κράτιστος* ("mightiest") first occurs as an obsequious greeting that later came to be used to greet people of the dignitaries' standing; see Lane Fox 1996, 143 with n. 168. *Cic. Off.* 2.55f. (=Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, fr. 514) might also lend him support, if Cicero is correct in that Theophrastus lauded the use of wealth for the purpose of gaining public prestige. Unfortunately Cicero gives very few details and is not always reliable.

⁹⁵ A typological definition of the notable politician is offered by Quass 1993, 185f. A study of euergetic practice in Greece is provided by Veyne 1976, 201-207, 269-271. On trust as a significant controlling dynamic in social interaction see Luhmann, Niklas. *Vertrauen*. Stuttgart 2014⁵, esp. 27-39.

⁹⁶ For Weber's original conception of the *Honoratiorenregime* see Weber 1972⁵ [1922], 170f., but cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1304b19-1305a7, who already outlines scenarios of the notables overthrowing democracy. The detailed study of Hellenistic city politics as *Honoratiorenregime* by Quass 1993 (see esp. 11-17) is based on the interpretation by Veyne 1976, 201-271. Quass' analysis rests on the epigraphic phenomenon of permanent honorific monumentalisation that is the result of collective recognition of mainly financial or finance-related service.

⁹⁷ On these features of fourth-century democracy see Hansen 1999², 112-116, 230-237, 315-319. The quotation is from Plut. *Mor.* 1011b. Payment for attendance at the assembly was probably abolished by Demetrios of Phaleron, though there is no positive evidence: Habicht 1995a, 68; O'Sullivan 2009a, 28. On the *theōrikeion* and its societal function in Demosthenes' Athens see also Harris, Edward M. "Demosthenes and the Theoric Fund", in: Robert W. Wallace and idem (eds.). *Transitions to Empire. Essays in Greco-Roman history, 360-146 B.C., in honor of E. Badian* (=Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture 21). Norman and London 1996, 57-76, arguing that it acted to ensure social

“the masses” (πληθῆος) in conversation with his peer group.⁹⁸ On the other hand, although radical democratic thought is nowhere to be seen, the text does not show a regime of dignitaries.⁹⁹ Two things are crucial for such a regime: scope and attitude. The group of notables must be relatively small to allow for the personalisation of political action and the *demos* must trust in their privileged superiority.¹⁰⁰ The basic problem with Schmitz's interpretation, then, is that the key marker of the regime of dignitaries, namely the visible and emphatic assignment of honours by the collective to a very small and coherent group of citizens, who are trusted to provide a comprehensive euergetic administration, is absent from the text.¹⁰¹ Also missing are the institutional consequences of this phenomenon that were to materialise only under the Roman Empire, but also the notion

equilibrium between the two ‘classes’ constructed by the orators, the wealthy and the poor. In the *Characters*, theatre attendance is in fact paid for at Theophr. *Char.* 9.5; 30.6.

- ⁹⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 7.7. His social deviation lies not in the attitude, but in its hackneyed expression, which bores his listeners stiff (Diggle 2004, 266). The fact that he is reporting from the assembly does not automatically date this to a period of census-based disenfranchisement, since this kind of communication would occur at any time given the maximum attendance of 6-8000 (Hansen 1999², 130-132; Diggle 2004, 271).
- ⁹⁹ The sketch of the Oligarch (Theophr. *Char.* 26) offers an inversion of democratic thought, but not of radical democratic thought – he demands monarchy (2 and 6), privatization of politics (3), and the abolition of courts (5) and liturgies (6). His ultramontane version of oligarchy far exceeds the bounds even of the destabilized discourse of this time, rendering him an atemporal caricature with conventional elements. In that respect, he can be read as emblematic of semantic uncertainty, insofar as he is outside the complex sphere of contemporary politics.
- ¹⁰⁰ Veyne 1976, 110-118; Quass 1993, 348f. Cf. Grieb 2008, 359, who views the institutionalized *demos* as maintaining hegemony until the mid 2nd century BC. Habicht 1995b, 87, points out the key importance of mutual trust (87: “Sie konnten [aber nur den Ton angeben], weil sie das Vertrauen der Bürgerschaft besaßen und (wie Perikles) immer wieder erhielten.”).
- ¹⁰¹ Quass (1993, 38f.) argues that one of the main differences between radical and Hellenistic democracy is the communal acknowledgement of individual effort on behalf of the community, which resulted in a bipartite internal division, insistently monumentalized in the institution of *stelai* inscribed with honorific decrees and bound by a specific value cosmos. Two sketches in the *Characters* may serve to illustrate crucial differences between this form of democracy and the world of the *Characters*: 1) in connection with the Boastful Man's alleged generosity (Theophr. *Char.* 23.5f.) no mention is made of public recognition of his action – he does not pretend to have received public recognition in monumental form but refers rather to the tacit honour implicit in the actions themselves. 2) The occurrence of a *mikrophilotimos* (21, with Diggle 2004, 405) probably implies *philotimia* as a virtue, since Theophrastus wrote a work on the subject (Diog. Laert. 5.45). The semantics of this term in the literature of the day are quite complex, cf. for example Isoc. 5.110 (of Herakles, addressed to Philip II); Xen. *Mem.* 3.3.13 (of the Athenian *demos*); *Hier.* 7.3f. (of a tyrant's ambition and as

that the collective is prepared to acknowledge individual effort on behalf of the collective in an inflationary manner.¹⁰² While this does not mean to say that certain elements of this long-term development are not perceptible already in fourth-century Athens, including, for example, the rise in the number of decrees honouring citizens and invoking abstract value-laden language, in my view the textual world implicitly emphasises the hegemony of a specific construction of the *demoi* and its fundamental distrust of individual agency by implementing collective control mechanisms, as I will demonstrate below.¹⁰³ Furthermore, the label 'regime of dignitaries' is too vague to be of much help here: Veyne himself argued that the system of liturgies, a core component of radical democracy, anticipated the regime of dignitaries, an argument that serves to highlight the hallucinatory quality of these labels.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, Schmitz is forced to overemphasise certain aspects

characteristic of real men: ἄνδρες δὲ καὶ οὐκέτι ἄνθρωποι μόνον νομιζόμενοι "these are considered (proper) men and not just ordinary human beings"; Plat. *Rep.* 553c (contrasted with a base desire for money). In the course of the second half of the fourth century the term *philotimia* comes to form part of a nominalized and standardized honorific formula in decrees for both citizens and non-citizens, often paired with *eunoia* and other virtues (e.g. IG II² 360:15f.: στεφανῶσαι χρυσῶσι στεφάνῳ εὐνοίας ἕνεκ / α καὶ φιλοτιμίας τῆς πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων. (325/4; honouring Herakleides of Cypriot Salamis who provided affordable grain during the famine of 330/29 and others, see Oliver 2007b, 242 n. 61); cf. IG II² 379:2 (321/0 or 318/7); 394:11 (321/0-319/8); on this development see esp. Whitehead, David. "Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: *Philotimia* in Democratic Athens", in: *Classica et Mediaevalia* 34 (1983), 55-74, esp. 60-64; idem 1986, 241-252. The word's associations are thus somewhat ambivalent, connoting ambition always in the context of the pursuit of visible distinction. The crucial issue is whether this ambition is conceived in the *Characters* as being under collective control, as in the period between 350 and 320 (e.g. Dem. 18.257 and Aeschin. 1.129), and during the first Antigonid protectorate (307-301; see Hedrick 1999, 420f.), in other words whether *philotimia* was *demotia philotimia*, acting as "a spur and a rein" on both citizen and foreigner (Whitehead *ibid.*, 65f.), or whether it is conceived of as a primarily individualistic virtue, leading to emphatic differentiation. The sketch in question refers mainly to ostentatious displays of distinction, and a hiatus between individual and collective evaluation of what constitutes honour and honourable action. On an inverse reading, I would claim, *philotimia* is here simply acting in agreement with the collective evaluation of honourable action, and thus appears as *demotia philotimia*.

¹⁰² On the inflation of honours and the long-term institutional changes to the council and political cooperation see Quass 1993, 34f., 381-421.

¹⁰³ See below chapter 3.6. On the increasing number of honorary decrees for citizens in the second half of the fourth century see Whitehead 1983, 67f.

¹⁰⁴ Veyne 1976, 200: "Le système liturgique préfigure le régime des notables." As Habicht 1995b, 87-89 observed, the problem is simply that the concept also applies to figures of Classical democracy. Cf. for discussion also Grieb 2008, 359; van der Vliet 2011, esp. 159f. The posthumous honours for Lykurgos implemented by Stratokles during the period of Antigonid-sponsored democratic revival (IG II² 457; Plut. *Mor.* 851f-

of the *Characters*, while discarding others in order to even make his case. The Toady (κδλαξ), whom he sees as a new and integral persona, occurs already in Aristophanes' *Peace* in the 420s, where such creatures surround the powerful in droves.¹⁰⁵ The emphasis on pedigree and education that Schmitz identifies as novel seems nowhere to be attested in the *Characters*, but is of course already present in Aeschines' famous definition of "the friend of the people" (δημοτικός), which I discussed above.¹⁰⁶ Reading the *Characters* through the lens of a socio-political development that clearly marked the later Hellenistic period thus seems to me reductionist, though we can freely admit that the text is indeed located within the emergent discourse that fed into the expansion of monumentalised euergetic practice observed by Veayne and Quass.

In my view, the world of the *Characters* is fundamentally an accurately incoherent, discursive 'reality', masterfully perceived by an outsider with supreme skill in abstraction.¹⁰⁷ This world is best described not as 'democratic', 'oligarchic', or as a 'regime of dignitaries' – since it combines elements of all these discourses and thus fits neither – but by drawing on the flexible concept of the πάτριος πολιτεία, which was invoked implicitly and explicitly so many times in late fourth-

852c) are perhaps the best illustration of the complexities of this time with their emphasis on an individual citizen's generosity and political spirit, but also on his immaculate performance when undergoing *euthyna* (Plut. *Mor.* 852d).

¹⁰⁵ Aristoph. *Pax* 756; cf. *Vesp.* 655-690. Schmitz 2014, 4f. rests part of his argument on the definition paragraph (n. 19: Theophr. *Char.* 2.1). Without the definition, the sketch of the Toady paints a picture of a man who acts as though he was a servant, not someone who desires gain. That communicates a rather different ideal, namely that of equality.

¹⁰⁶ Aeschin. 3.168-175. In the *Characters* pedigree is completely unimportant, since no fathers appear. Allusion is made to genealogy only in the context of the Slanderer (Theophr. *Char.* 28.2), but occurs there in the context of a mere question of identification. In the case of *paideia*, Schmitz (2014, 22) again builds on a definition paragraph (4.1) and on 27, probably on 27.2f., 6f., 13f., but literary learning only occurs in a traditional symposium context. The rest of 27 refers to the physical training of the *ephebeia* and the gymnasium in general. In fact the strongest attestation of *paideia* is 26.2, where the oligarch is ridiculed for knowing only a single line of Homer. However, being expected to know more than one line of Homer was hardly a new development, but was a traditional hallmark of education, recognisable already by Aristophanes' audience, i.e. roughly half of the Athenian citizen body, all of whom could afford to attend the theatrical performances. See e.g. Xen. *Sym.* 3.5; Plat. *Prot.* 325e-326a; Aristoph. *Pax* 1089-1098, 1265-99. See also Harris, William V. *Ancient Literacy*. Cambridge, MA 1989, 39.

¹⁰⁷ Here I differentiate the assertion of Millett (2007, 105), who lauds the *Characters* for presenting an "internally consistent" social image. The *Characters* are consistent, but only insofar as reality is a fabric woven of very different threads.

century Athens, but also throughout the cities of the Hellenistic Age.¹⁰⁸ The Athenian *patrios politeia* was rhetorically malleable, a retrojected imaginary that included certain institutions that generally embody some form of what one might call moderate democracy, as well as democratic heroes, but whose connotations depended above all on argumentative context.¹⁰⁹ As Christian Habicht already pointed out, history itself, especially in its Herodotean form, was similarly malleable, and rewritten, reified, and reimagined to serve different current agendas – in particular during the rise of Macedon.¹¹⁰ This kind of re-imagining reappears constantly in situations of collective stress or after a failure of collective agency, especially catastrophic defeats such as the Peloponnesian or Lamian Wars.¹¹¹ The

¹⁰⁸ This is a topical term of the period (Habicht 1995a, 54f.), as is visible, e.g., in Diod. 18.18.3-6, esp. 5; 20.24.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 27.5; Plut. *Demetr.* 8.5. An example of its significance in Hellenistic discourse is provided by IG II² 687:15f., the decree that preceded the Chremonidean War (266 BC). It could also be applied to the regime of Demetrios of Phaleron (Strab. 9.1.20). On the concept see Finley, Moses I. *The Ancestral Constitution*. Cambridge 1973 and Hansen 1999², 296-304. On its political use in late fourth-century Athens cf. also Gehrke 1976, 89f. with n. 23; Grieb 2008, 56f. This interpretation accounts for Millett's observation (2007, 44) of the absence of structural political change in the *Characters*.

¹⁰⁹ Hansen 1999², 298f.: "What after all did the Athenians really know about the history of their own constitution? A hundred years after Kleisthenes no one even knew any more the exact wording of his laws, although they really were the foundation of democracy. Most Athenians in Demosthenes' time no doubt genuinely believed that their democracy went back to Solon (or even Theseus); for they made no distinction – as we pride ourselves on doing – between history and myth." The *Characters* notably include law courts (Theophr. *Char.* 1.2; 5.3; 7.7; 11.6; 12.5; 14.3; 17.8; 29.2, 4f.) and *ekklesia* (Theophr. *Char.* 4.2, 6; 7.6; 13.2; 21.11; 22.3; 26.2, 5), but neither the *boule* (only indirectly in an *ekklesia* context at 21.11) nor the Areopagus, the first two institutions being the ideological cornerstones of the *patrios politeia*. There is even an explicit reference to Theseus as a democratic hero in Theophr. *Char.* 26.6. The liturgies (Theophr. *Char.* 22.2, 23.6, 26.6) are similarly a part of this cognitive reality, since they were such a long-standing institution (see Bleicken 1995⁴, 297f.; Hansen 1999², 110-116). Deme-level obligations undoubtedly continued to exist (O'Sullivan 2009a, 171).

¹¹⁰ Habicht, Christian. "Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege", in: *Hermes* 89:1 (1961), 1-35, esp. 9, 29-31; Davies 2002b, 240-242. Cf. for similar reassurance by means of fifth century models of memory in the period after 286 BC Shear, Julia L. "The Politics of the Past: Remembering Revolution at Athens", in: John Marincola, Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, and Calum Alasdair Maciver (eds.). *Greek Notions of the Past in the Archaic and Classical Eras: History without Historians* (=Edinburgh Leventis Studies 6). Edinburgh 2012, 276-300.

¹¹¹ Hansen 1999², 300. On the Lamian War cf. Habicht 1995, 47-53. Lys. 34, delivered in 403 BC, attests to its significance after the Peloponnesian War. Hyperides' funerary oration, delivered while Antipater was still under siege at Lamia, is the most interesting source here, since it stresses the unity of the Athenian demos in order to generate

'ancestral constitution', with its inherent non-specificity of reference, is surely the best foil for the discursive complexity visible in the *Characters*.¹¹²

The stage on which the deviations described in the *Characters* play out is thus a selectively constructed Athens: a wealthy Athenian self-image is being channelled through a uniquely perceptive observer in all the apparent incoherence that characterises lived reality. Not only are the individual sketches "piecemeal", to use Lane Fox's term,¹¹³ but the setting of the diegesis as a whole consists of a patchwork of entwined discourses. Passed through Theophrastus' complex authorial persona, the *Characters* reflect a lived discursive reality shot through with fragments of pre- and post-Lamian War 'historical' memory, a world of thought that the work selectively updates and reinforces to expound a societal model that will be the subject of the following analysis. Viewing the *Characters* in this way allows us to at least tentatively locate the textual world of the work in the complex cognitive network that existed in the extremely contingent phase of the early Diadoch Wars. Returning to the original question of dating, this interpretation also frees us from having to bend over backwards to assign the individual pieces a specific dramatic date.

When exactly the work was actually written and 'published' thus remains entirely unclear. The references to various political actors of the 320s and 310s BC make it fairly plausible that the time of composition of the sketches should be located within this timeframe, extending perhaps into the 300s BC, but this is a mere guess.¹¹⁴ Lane Fox has shown that the *Characters* seem generally consistent with our knowledge of late fourth-century BC Athens, which seems to tentatively exclude at least unqualified later interference.¹¹⁵ What is important, however, is that the *Characters* is an 'incoherent' text full of hermeneutic opportunities, underpinned by a specific Athenian self-image. It may well have been composed piece

further collective civic agency to continue the war for freedom (6.5, 7f., 10f.; 15f.). For commentary see Herrman, Judson. *Hyperides. Funeral Orations. Edited, translated and commented*. Oxford 2009. The relevance of such cohesive actions is immediately evident when considering, e.g., the outcome of the battle of Krannon when Antipater insisted on individual negotiations that fractured the Hellenic alliance (Diod. 18.17.7-18.1).

¹¹² It was not for nothing that Moses Finley chose to deliver his inaugural lecture at Cambridge on precisely this topic (Finley 1973a), whose complexity in Antiquity was so enthusiastically re-appropriated into the discourse of the English Revolution.

¹¹³ Lane Fox 1996, 138f., 141; Millett 2007, 38f.: "At its simplest, a Character might consist of an accumulation of actions, disconnected save that they indicate an identical disposition."

¹¹⁴ On this problem see esp. the clearly differentiated account of Diggle 2004, 1-3, 27-37, esp. 36f. Stein 1992, 35f. also argues that the text was written relatively quickly.

¹¹⁵ Lane Fox 1996, 144-155.

by piece, but from my point of view that is of little consequence.¹¹⁶ Even though individual episodes look as though they could be dated, the text is generally – and probably intentionally – underspecified, aiming at the general recognisability of a certain plausible cognitive reality.¹¹⁷

This observation also applies to the textual world of the *Characters*, which leads us to the last preliminary point, a rough outline of the work's apparent geographical and political horizons. Again, its blend of general recognisability and occasional historical specificity make the situation somewhat complex.¹¹⁸ In keeping with the nature of the *Characters* as piecemeal, a few anecdotes are unequivocally located in Athens – Theseus' city as the Oligarch reminds us – whereas others evoke unspecific dramatic spaces.¹¹⁹ The Erian gate on the Kerameikos, the various Dionysia, and the Eleusinian Mysteries, for example, are all attested and various other indicators corroborate this impression.¹²⁰ The less specific narratives can also be located in Athens or Attica without difficulty. The political horizon of the *Characters* is generally limited to mainland Greece, since only Polyperchon, Kassander, and Antipater are mentioned as relevant macro-political actors, and no specific civic actors seem to be mentioned at all.¹²¹ Geographically, the range is much wider, reaching from Malta and Thurioi to Rhodes and Kyzikos

¹¹⁶ This is also the conclusion of Lane Fox 1996, 154f. This prevents one from uncritically treating the sketches as unified individuals, though some seem to provide more coherent micro-narratives.

¹¹⁷ On the *Characters*' underspecification cf. Lane Fox 1996, 156f.: "The general types were conceived and often instantiated in Athens' unique setting, but none the less belong in a common Greek culture." We simply cannot know whether some of the anecdotes may have been recognisable allusions to real events and persons in the context of the Peripatetic school and Theophrastus' audiences.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Ranocchia 2011, 72: "Più in generale, i caratteri di Aristone possiedono una gravità, universalità e astrazione speculativa che sono invece del tutto assenti in quelli di Teofrasto, i quali, al contrario, sono concreti e calati in una ben precisa cornice storica, privi di ogni idealizzazione o affermazione generale."

¹¹⁹ Theseus' city: Theophr. *Char.* 26.6. The Lover of Petty Honours (μικροφιλότιμος) addresses the popular assembly as *prytanis* (Theophr. *Char.* 21.11). For a full account of these Athenian features see also Lane Fox 1996, 129 and Volt 2007, 119.

¹²⁰ Mysteries, gate, festivals, Sabazioi: Theophr. *Char.* 3.3f.; 14.13; 22.6; 27.8. The Oligarch (ὀλιγαρχικός) refers to Athens as Theseus' city at 26.6. Owls and Athena are mentioned at 16.8. The tragic *agōn* is mentioned at 22.2 and the trierarchy features in 23.6 and 26.6. The *ephebeia*, which was an exclusively Athenian institution at the time, appears at 21.3. Cf. also Lane Fox 1996, 129.

¹²¹ The few names of Athenians that occur in the *Characters* seem to bear no real-world significance, see Theophr. *Char.* 3.3 (Damippos), 4.13 (Archias, vendor of smoked fish), 8.4 (Archeios, a flutist in the army; Lykon the military contractor – these might well not be Athenians), with Diggle 2004, 202, 221, 282.

via Sparta and Delphi.¹²² Athens thus emerges as the (geographical) centre of the narrative, is explicitly identified as the work's spatial context, and is most probably also the site of the work's creation and original use, whatever it may have been. However, the generalising tendencies inherent in the text, manifest in the relative scarcity of concrete location markers, suggest that it may be legitimate to cautiously generalise some of the information offered by the *Characters* if one proceeds with enough care. In fact, if one wanted to do so, the lack of comparable alternative sources for Athens, let alone other cities, makes such a procedure a sheer necessity. There is, however, no reliable way of ascertaining the text's impact or its general validity as a representative contemporary imaginary, especially given the unique features of Athenian political culture.

3.4 Individual and collective – public and private?

Now that the pitfalls inherent in the material have been marked out, I will move into my analysis. To repeat, my aim is to use the *Characters* to trace part of the discourse that controls and generates identity and agency within the polis in the Diadoch period. The first step is to investigate the processes of interaction constructed in the *Characters*: Who are the actors depicted, what do they do, and where do they do it? When addressing these questions, it is necessary to bear in mind a simple caveat, namely that the *Characters* deals with behavioural deviations from ἀξία, from what is deemed proper or adequate.¹²³ They do not feature deviant behaviour that is illegal, but what one might call 'moral' divergence.¹²⁴ As such they depict and organise interactions that are characterised by an actor behaving in a manner that is judged to be out of sync with the identities encoded in the minds of the reader or audience, as well as the intradiegetic *alteri* who stand in for

¹²² Macedon, Polyperchon, and Kassander: Theophr. *Char.* 8.5, 7, 8; Antipater: 23.4. Malta: 21.9; Sicily, Sparta, Thurioi: 5.9; Delphi: 21.3; Byzantion, Kyzikos, Rhodos: 5.8; note also the contrast between Europe and Asia at 23.3.

¹²³ For this meaning see LSJ s.v. ἀξία II. Since the *Characters* lack any authentic description of intent or purpose, this descriptor is not found in the text, but is my interpretation.

¹²⁴ The *Characters* offers an exception to all attempts at generalisation. The worst case scenario of the *Characters*, Theophr. *Char.* 6.6, shows a small-time thief, who also spends time in prison. Dem. 20.104 also suggests that the Slanderer (Theophr. *Char.* 28.6) might be acting illegally when he disparages the dead, though the enforcement of Demosthenes' Solonic law will undoubtedly have been problematic. In this case, however, the exceptions confirm the rule.

them.¹²⁵ Put simply, they are thus a document of social, rather than legal control.¹²⁶

The first general answer to the questions posed above is that the actions depicted in the *Characters* are performed by individual adult male actors, often acting as citizens in the 'public' sphere, and thereby represent but a small slice of the entire sphere of what a modern observer might consider social action.¹²⁷ If we apply the technique of inversion, this means that the sphere of intra-familial interaction, the 'private' space of interaction between husband, wife, and children is marginalised in keeping with the text's homosocial construction of society: deviant behaviour exhibited there seems largely irrelevant to the text and is apparently not classified as social.¹²⁸ It stands to reason that this marginalisation is connected to the well-known Athenian discourse on the inviolability of the household, which considered control of the *oikos* the sole prerogative of the *κύριος* ("lord, master, husband").¹²⁹ One of its most famous textual manifestations is Lysias' speech *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*, which exemplifies the socio-economic

¹²⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 21.1. On 'etiquette' in the *Characters* see the extensive discussion by Millett 2007, 58-92.

¹²⁶ On the significance of social control, its manifestation in through agency and reproduction through social interaction see Cohen 1991, 236f. and *passim*.

¹²⁷ Cf. Leppin 2002. On the citizen in the Hellenistic age cf. Gehrke 2003, 226-228. On the construction of the private-public dichotomy in Athenian society see esp. Cohen 1991, 70-97, who identifies the physical confines of the *oikos* as the core of the 'private' realm and anything outside it as 'public', but is fully aware of the great elasticity and relational fluidity of these concepts in discourse (76f.), unlike the classic work by Habermas 1990, esp. 12f., who imagined there was a static division between private and public spheres in the ancient polis. The semantic fields associated with the opposing terms, developed by Bourdieu 1977, 140-157, are now well known: private – public; inside – outside; concealment – visibility; dark – light; secret – open; shame – honour; female – male (Cohen 1991, 80). One may be tempted to add individual – collective, but the construction of these poles is not as simply dichotomous, a complication that will be addressed in due course. The terms public and private are used in inverted commas to express that they function as aids to convey what is meant in conventional language, but are not meant to signify a static dichotomy.

¹²⁸ Volt 2007, 120, 131-133 does not share this view. In my opinion many of the passages he adduces as depicting the family sphere are in fact descriptions of social interaction among adult male citizens *about* this sphere and document the enmeshed nature of the *oikos* rather than an interest in the interior of the household itself. Millett 2007, 71-82 has a whole chapter on conduct "at home", but considers it in a mainly spatial sense, without addressing the complexity focused on here.

¹²⁹ On the legal manifestation of this discourse about *kyrieia* see: Harrison, Alick R.W. *The Law of Athens*. Vol. 1. London 1968, 30-36, 70-78, 200-205; MacDowell, Douglas M. *The Law in Classical Athens*. New York 1978, 84-86.

and sexual contingencies tied to the legal aspects of this discourse in Athenian society.¹³⁰

The *Characters* respond to this same discourse by focusing on interaction and interaction spaces wherein adult male citizens, to be imagined as *kyrioi*, interact with one another, although this interaction can also consist simply in an observation process.¹³¹ As a result of this focus, they leave a narrative gap in their world, one of several blank spaces left largely unaddressed, namely intra-familial interaction in the strict sense.¹³² The most obvious manifestation of this gap is that the characters seem to have neither (living) fathers, nor male children of a more advanced age, nor does inheritance ever feature.¹³³ The generation conflict between father and son, a result of the necessity of splitting up the estate and/or passing *κυρ(ε)ία* from generation to generation within a single household, is thus completely absent.¹³⁴ Mothers, women and wives, small children and daughters all occur on the sidelines, but are never focalised, nor is the focus generally on intra-familial relationships – especially in the case of daughters – but on their interaction with a (male) third party, or on the contingency they experience as dependants because of the man's actions.¹³⁵ The Illiberal Man (*ἀνελεύθερος*), for example, tries to cut costs at his daughter's wedding, keeps his children out of school on festival days, and has his wife make do with the occasional hired servant girl. In all three scenes, the focus is upon the primary actor's deviant behaviour in a

¹³⁰ Lys. 1, esp. 24-36. On social control and its interplay with legal norms, especially concerning adultery and sexual control, see Cohen 1991, 133-170.

¹³¹ Adapting Luhmann's far more complex conception (1998, 69f.; 538) to my own purposes, I treat all observation as action and view it as consisting in the identification of difference and concomitant semantic sortition.

¹³² Other such blank spaces include polis religion and female action.

¹³³ An actor's own father occurs only in an intradiegetic narrative about genetic disease at Theophr. *Char.* 19.2, and at 13.8, where the Overzealous Man (*περίεργος*) informs his father that his mother is already in bed; the *Characters* here reflect the complexity of the social discourse, allowing only approximate generalisation. As a rule, however, the oldest sons are ephebes, who occur at 7.5; 21.3; 27.3, 6, 13 (21.3 is marked by his hair being cut, possibly as part of the *κουρεῶτις*; on coming of age at Athens see Garland, Robert S. J. *The Greek Way of Life: From Conception to Old Age*. London 1990, 179-187). Cf. Millett 2007, 79.

¹³⁴ The exception is Theophr. *Char.* 17.7, but the conflict is located in a distant future. Such conflict is visible in comedy, the most prominent example being Bdelycleon and Philocleon in Aristophanes' *Wasps*. See Garland 1990, 154-157.

¹³⁵ Mothers occur at Theophr. *Char.* 6.6; 13.8; 19.8; 20.7, one left to starve, one insulted, two embarrassed. Daughters: 22.4; 30.19 (only in a marriage context). Children: 1.6; 5.5; 7.4, 8; 9.5; 14.10; 16.11A; 17.7; 20.5; 21.3; 27.3; 30.6, 14. Wives: 3.2; 10.6, 13; 16.11A; 18.4; 19.5; 21.11; 22.6, 10. Women: 11.2; 12.3; 13.10; 17.3; 27.9, 15; 28.3f. *Hetairai*: 11.8; 17.7; 20.10; 27.9.

sphere of interaction subject to specific expectations, rather than on their intra-familial implications: the daughter's celebration is a neighbourhood event, the children are visibly absent from school, and the wife's maid is noticeably different every time.¹³⁶ The sphere of family interaction itself is thus conspicuously absent, an empty space on the sidelines of the narratives of the *Characters*: even the Talker (λάλος) stops at this liminal threshold of the house and does not actually pursue his victim inside.¹³⁷

However, the *Characters* does not simply reflect a normative ideal, but rather offers the full, lived incoherence of Athenian reality, including the fact that Athenian conceptions of what we call the public and the private sphere were anything but neatly dichotomous.¹³⁸ About fifteen passages do thematise interactions that could potentially be located inside the family sphere without the direct involvement of other male actors, including, for example, the Offensive Man's (δυσχερής) custom of sleeping with his wife without washing beforehand, or the Country Bumpkin's (ἄγροικος) unseemly domestic activities.¹³⁹ Such passages themselves exemplify the constant threats that challenged the ideal privacy of the domestic sphere in practice. As David Cohen and Virginia Hunter have shown, the *oikos* was not a space that could be disconnected from the social network, not a space that could be kept blank to the eyes of others.¹⁴⁰ Slaves and day labourers, nurses and teachers, guests, friends and neighbours could all pass to and fro, providing a flow of information about domestic affairs in the form of gossip.¹⁴¹ The same anxiety can be seen in the frequent assertion in forensic speeches that slaves provide information about private (i.e. secret) matters.¹⁴² In the *Characters*,

¹³⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 22.4, 6, 10.

¹³⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 7.6.

¹³⁸ Cohen 1991, 70-97, maps out the situational complexities of the concepts. On gendered spaces in Athens and beyond see Trümper, Monika. "Gender and Space, 'Public' and 'Private'", in: Sharon L. James and Sheila Dillon (eds.). *A Companion to Women in the Ancient World*. Malden, MA 2012, 288-303.

¹³⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 4.9-11; 10.5f., 13; 14.6, 9; 16.4, 7; 17.3; 18.4; 19.5 (ἀναπόνιπτος ἐν τοῖς στρώμασι μετὰ τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ κοιμᾶσθαι [...]); 20.2, 5, 7; 27.10; 30.11.

¹⁴⁰ In-depth analysis in Hunter, Virginia J. *Policing Athens: Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420-320 B.C.* Princeton 1994, esp. 70-93; Cohen 1991, 84-97; cf. Nevett, Lisa C. *House and Society in the Ancient Greek World*. Cambridge 1999, 174f. and similarly Millett 2007, 73-81.

¹⁴¹ On the presence of nurses and teachers see Theophr. *Char.* 9.5; 16.11A; 20.5; 27.13. Theophr. *Char.* 14.9; 17.2; 18.2 shows household slaves going out without supervision, providing a link to the public sphere. At Theophr. *Char.* 4.6; 17.2 we find slaves acquiring intimate information. Plat. *Leg.* 738d-e assigns the same function to friends who link public and private. On the function of gossip see also Cohen 1991, 64-69.

¹⁴² E.g. Lys. 1.16, 18; Dem. 30.37; Lyc. 1.29; Isae. 8.12.

the Disagreeable Man's (ἀγδής) breach of order consists precisely in broaching sensitive familial subjects before the extended household, shaming his mother in the process.¹⁴³ While the *Characters* thus seem to reinforce a specific construction of individual male agency, they also reflect the cracks in the normative discourse and thus the stable incoherence of social construction.¹⁴⁴ The crucial point is that such information is only available because it has escaped from the *oikos*, marking a failure of individual male agency and control.¹⁴⁵ The consequence of this failure is that the *Characters* seems to tentatively include this sphere in the proving ground that is the social life of the adult male citizen, complicating the boundary between the 'private' and the 'public' spheres.

Now what do these observations mean for the construction of the individual offered by the text in light of the approach adopted here? A simple correlation between individual and collective, private and public has emerged as too starkly dichotomous, as incompatible with the social complexity reflected in the text.¹⁴⁶ Perhaps the best way of conceptualising the individual actors depicted in the *Characters* is not as deep, personal individuals in the modern psychological sense, a conception that Christopher Gill rightly judges inappropriate to Antiquity,¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³ Theophr. *Char.* 20.7f.

¹⁴⁴ On the stable incoherence of Athenian culture see Cohen 1991, 236-240.

¹⁴⁵ Millett 2007, 58-68, like Cohen 1991, mainly reads this process of information control in the context of social honour and shame.

¹⁴⁶ See also Blok 2004 and Sourvinou-Inwood, Christine. "Männlich – weiblich, öffentlich – privat, antik – modern", in: Ellen E. Reeder (ed.). *Pandora*. Baltimore and Basel 1995-1996, 111-120, who both identify a gendered "doubling" of polis society, whereby Dem. 54.110-113 (for instance) attests a conception of females as acting in the polis, especially in the context of embedded religion. Conceiving of individual religious action as a series of overlapping networks (Eidinow, Esther. *Oracles, Curses, & Risk among the Ancient Greeks*. Oxford 2007, 210-219, 228; eadem. "Networks and Narratives: A Model for Ancient Greek Religion", in: *Kernos* 24 (2011), 9-38) serves to further contrast the discourse visible in the *Characters*. Note, however, that the prytany decree Dow 1937, no. 36 (212/1 BC) nevertheless explicitly differentiates the *demoi* from women and children, marking a discursive distinction between political community and dependents. On female networks of interaction and social capital cf. also recently Taylor, Claire. "Women's Social Networks and Female Friendship in the Ancient Greek City", in: Lin Foxhall and Gabriele Neher (eds.). *Gender and the City before Modernity*. Chichester 2013, 213-230.

¹⁴⁷ See Gill, Christopher. "Peace of Mind and Being Yourself: Panaetius to Plutarch", in: *ANRW* II.36.7 (1994), 4599-4640, esp. 4638. See Aristot. *Pol.* 1252a-b for the view that women and slaves, the *kyrioi*' dependents within the *oikos*, are *naturally* secondary and that the deme consists solely of the patrilineal community. It is hardly a coincidence that Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1112b24-29 mentions mediated action only within the exclusively male sphere of *philo*. This discourse too is obviously conflicted, but to my knowledge the male prerogative and control is never really challenged, cf. Xen. *Oec.* 7;

but as what we might call 'situational composite meshes', consisting mainly of identities (i.e. expectations about interactions), but also of what we would consider other actors. In psychology, this conception is also known as the *distributed self* and is more or less identical to Callon's model of the situational translation of compound actors, outlined above.¹⁴⁸ There is some evidence that the *oikos* could, in some contexts, be understood emically as part of the individual's distributed self,¹⁴⁹ with evidence deriving mainly from contemporary curse tablets. In the *Characters*, the Superstitious Man (δαισδαίμων) is at great pains to cleanse not only his own person but also his entire house and his wife and children once he suspects *he* has been cursed.¹⁵⁰ The evidence shows that possessions and family members could be considered parts of the 'self' of the individual attacked by a curse, since the indications that one has been cursed are found everywhere in the personal sphere, in humans, animals, and crops, in bodily and mental faculties,

Plut. *Per.* 37.2-5; Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 26.4. Within an ANT-framework one might conceive of distributed selves as actants, the parts of a compound actor, on which see Latour 2007, 76-108, esp. 95f. See also Konstan 1997a, 16f., for a discussion of the fundamental difference between antiquity and modernity constituted by the invention of the private, reflected self with a discursively constructed psychology.

- ¹⁴⁸ Callon 1991, 139-143. Further on the concept of the 'distributed self' see Wetherell, Margaret and Maybin, Janet. "The Distributed Self: A Social Constructionist Perspective", in: Richard Stevens (ed.). *Understanding the Self*. London 1996, 219-280, esp. 221-229. In the constructionist perspective, the self 'expands' and 'shrinks' situationally and can be thought of as a sort of dynamic thread that ties together aspects of body, psyche, and environment in ever-changing configurations. The key point is again that identity is socially produced and always the result of joint interaction. The idea is thus not new here but was refigured by the composite actor-as-network concept developed on p. 74.
- ¹⁴⁹ The Greek word *οὐσία* means both 'property' and 'being' (see LSJ s.v., A and II). The wide connotations of the word *oikos* suggest the same conclusion, cf. Finley, Moses I. *The Ancient Economy*. Berkeley 1973, 18f.
- ¹⁵⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 16.7, 10, 11A. See for this conception also Collins 2008, 16f., 87, 94f. On the Athenian practice of cursing in general see Eidinow 2007, 139-155. Cf. Plat. *Leg.* 933d-e (ὅς ἂν φαρμακεύῃ τινὰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ μὴ θανάσιμῳ μήτε αὐτοῦ μήτε ἀνθρώπων ἐκείνου, βοσκημάτων δὲ ἢ σμηνῶν εἴτ' ἄλλη βλάβῃ εἴτ' οὖν θανάσιμῳ [...]), which likewise suggests that the people dependent on the head of a family are 'part' of him, as are his flocks and beehives. The same dynamic is apparent in the conceptualisation of pollution, *miasma*, which seems to possess a materiality that is removable through ritual action and only later becomes metaphysical; see Chaniotis, Angelos. "Greek Ritual Purity: from Automatism to Moral Distinctions", in Petra Rösch and Udo Simon (eds.). *How Purity is Made*. Wiesbaden 2012, 123-139, here 123-126. Accordingly Plat. *Euthyphr.* 14e can consider ritual cleansing as operating on a societal payment code (δυσίτης is tentatively equated with an ἐμπορικὴ τέχνη).

even hopes and dreams. This documents precisely such a distributed conception of the self.¹⁵¹

This observation brings us closer to identifying the complexities of identity underlying the individuals portrayed in the *Characters*. We have seen that the individual characters seem to derive from a web of identities that constructed (and at times deconstructed) the *oikos* as a space under the sole control of the adult male, an individual space conceived of as closed to the agency of other adult male actors.¹⁵² While some of these deconstructions are unsanctioned and are hence ignored by the text, some of them are built into the discourse as identity clusters: symposia or visiting friends, for instance, transformed parts of the household into what one might call a ‘semi-public’ space for a limited time. Viewed in terms of the distributed self, however, the identities associated with such states emerge as a set of behavioural expectations that regulate the contingencies of this situation, adapt the distribution of the self, and render it normal rather than divergent.¹⁵³ The identities governing friendship, for instance, similarly sanction the presence of male friends in the house.¹⁵⁴ The evidence of the *Characters* considered so far suggests that the text conceptualises the individual as a compound, distributed actor under the sole control of the translator: the enrolled component parts contribute to his agency, which is itself paramount in exerting control over the other members of his *oikos* and the physical house. The discourse tends, however, to obscure the actor’s compound nature in order to reinforce his control. The

¹⁵¹ Cf. Eidinow 2007, 142-152. DTA 49, 50, 53, 56, 66 are some examples for the common act of binding tongue and spirit. Others (e.g. DTA 68, 74, 89, 97, 98) aim to confine members, faculties, and economic activities. The longer curses DTA 55 and 68 also attest the binding of families and households. In general the curse tablets seem to reflect a somewhat less economically potent, urban stratum of society, since inn- and shopkeepers are common and the concerns are local. Their concern is with controlling the agency of others through disabling communication and faculties, as well as excluding the target from society (e.g. SGD 48).

¹⁵² Cf. Du Boulay 1974, 19 for a modern Greek parallel as well as Bleicken 1995⁴, 422-427, who observes a “Nebeneinander und Ineinander” (425) of private and public for the Classical period.

¹⁵³ Theophr. *Char.* 2.10; 5.5; 6.3; 7.7; 9.3; 10.3, 11; 12.11; 13.4; 17.2; 21.2, 7; 24.9; 30.2, 4, 16, 18. On the symposium as a social space see: Davidson, James N. *Courtesans & Fishcakes. The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens*. London 1997, 183-186 (where he considers the *oikos* as little more than an economic container).

¹⁵⁴ Cohen 1991, 84-86; cf. Konstan 1997a, 82. The value of *philia* enmeshes individuals into the self by equating them with kin (Plat. *Leg.* 738d-e; Isae. 3.19, 4.18f., 9.10f.). Since friends are normatively expected to participate in the major events of public family life, including festivals, weddings, larger sacrifices, and funerals (Dem. 58.40; Isae. 2.3, 8.18; Aristoph. *Acharn.* 1056, 1067f.), they become woven into the social network of household and self.

individuals of the *Characters* are thus constructed as equals interacting with one another in a social space that is 'public' in the sense that it exists on the fluctuating line between distributed selves, i.e. between actors who embody their 'private' space.¹⁵⁵ This finally explains why what I called the intra-familial sphere, i.e. the interior of the individual actor's compound identity, is largely occluded, but can appear in scenarios of control failure.

So much for the individual side of the initial dichotomy. Let us now attempt to unpack the other side and investigate how the text constructs the collective. The structuring technique of the *Characters* is to focus on interactions in multi-actor scenarios that do not correspond to 'normal' expectations about such interaction. In other words: the *Characters* reflexively focus on a web of observation, evaluation, and judgement that falls into place once the distributed individual is stretched beyond the normative boundaries of the distributed self and encounters other such individuals.¹⁵⁶ This web surrounds – and exists in – individual interaction between these 'exposed' individuals, spreads via meta-communication, e.g. gossip and mockery, and is registered in memory in the form of 'identities', i.e. expectations about behaviour. In the *Characters*, agora, *ekklesia*, theatre, bathhouse, and gymnasium, but also symposia and shrines emerge as fora of seeing and being seen, all of which have their own specific rules.¹⁵⁷ The Toady (κόλαξ) explicitly thematises this social process when he praises the superior social and physical grace of the object of his flatteries by pointing to the onlookers' reaction to his presence, their awed stares and admiring gossip.¹⁵⁸ I have opted to trace this social process of observation and evaluation along a gradient, ranging from overt manifestations to the most subtle. The location of a specific scene on

¹⁵⁵ Obviously this applies to female actors as well, but their absence from the *Characters* precludes a discussion here; but see my later treatment of the matter (p. 210) apropos of a different text.

¹⁵⁶ Simply put, in system theory, observation, i.e. differentiation and application of semantics, is the foundation of society (Luhmann 1988, 92f.). Second order observation allows for the observation of others' observation processes and thus for the construction of self-awareness. See also Millett 2007, 71f. This web is a social phenomenon that Thucydides (2.37.1-3) makes Perikles deny in the Funeral Oration, stressing the freedom of individual conduct in Athens, which is also a freedom from *ὑποψία*, "suspicious surveillance". Obviously this is an ideal, designed to emphasise the ordering capacity of neutral law, strengthening collective cohesion in the process.

¹⁵⁷ E.g. Theophr. *Char.* 5.7; 7.7; 19.7 and p. 110, n. 89 above. On the *agora* as a forum of interaction within the text see in detail Millett 2007, 93-98. I will return to the spatial entanglement of these power dynamics later on, see p. 172 below.

¹⁵⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 2.2. For a characterisation of the Toady in the *Characters* see Diggle 2004, 181: "The Κόλαξ confines his flattery to a single patron, whom he attends with deference bordering on the servile [...]."

the gradient is determined by the number of actors who can potentially observe and judge it, but also on the amount of time necessary for an evaluation. The point of this gradient is that it highlights the differences in impact attached to the various kinds of interactions outlined in the text, which will be useful for the next step, namely considering how these interactions define and control social contingency.

The most overt manifestations of this process are interactions that focus on physical appearance. A passage now assigned to the Obsequious Man (*ἄρεσκος*), but probably originally from another sketch, shows this with exceptional clarity, since the protagonist seems to reflect on the contextualised nature of his own social figure and accordingly positions himself in contexts that will show him in the very best light.¹⁵⁹ An interest in the quality and fit of footwear as well as in the cleanliness and quality of body and clothing pervades the work, especially as regards the visual hallmarks of the civilised, city-dwelling (*ἀστειός*) Athenian citizen, his walking stick and his *ἰμάτιον*.¹⁶⁰ The attention paid to oil flasks and oiling also

¹⁵⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 5.7. On the textual problems of the Obsequious Man see Diggle 2004, 18.

¹⁶⁰ Examples of an interest in shoes are Theophr. *Char.* 2.3, 7; 4.4; 22.11. The prominence of cloaks (*ἰμάτια*) is visible in their frequent occurrence and the attention paid to their quality and cleanliness: Theophr. *Char.* 2.3f.; 4.7; 5.6; 18.6; 19.7; 21.8, 11; 22.8, 13; 26.4; 27.5; 30.10. The cloak is so crucial that taking it off marks the transformation of citizen into young man at 27.5. By contrast, walking sticks occur only once (Theophr. *Char.* 5.9), which may suggest that the norms governing walking sticks were less prominent in the cognitive network. Beyond the *Characters*, funerary art is the main source for this particular self-image of the Athenian citizen. The consistently recurring image of the Athenian man as a cloaked, public figure on Attic funerary reliefs has led Johannes Bergemann (idem. *Demos und Thanatos. Untersuchungen zum Wertsystem der Polis im Spiegel der attischen Grabreliefs des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. und zur Funktion der gleichzeitigen Grabbauten*. Munich 1997, 76-78 and 127-130) to identify a “Normierung des Politenideals bis ans Ende des 4. Jhs.” (p. 129). Paul Millett (2007, 101-104) has analysed these incidents of splendour in personal attire as aspects of “conspicuous consumption” by reading them through the lens of Thorstein Veblen’s *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions*. Introduction by Robert Lekachman. New York 1994 [1899]. However, conspicuous consumption is an analytical tool that is more difficult to wield than it might appear. Colin Campbell (idem. “Conspicuous Confusion? A Critique of Veblen’s Theory of Conspicuous Consumption”, in: *Sociological Theory* 13:1 (1995), 37-47) has highlighted a number of issues with the idea that wasteful consumption of resources (such as time and money) in public results simply and inevitably in an estimation of “pecuniary strength” and thus in “envy” and “emulation”. While most are pertinent only to sociologists, the *Characters* certainly warn also the historian against employing the concept in too simplistic a way, and Millett (2007, 103) accordingly criticises Veblen briefly for underestimating the control of emulation implemented by “the dual function of etiquette [...], simultaneously promoting and circumscribing competition.” Put differently, the text emphasises the web of norms

makes us aware that supple skin and pleasing odour were likewise sensory hallmarks of well-to-do Athenian habitus.¹⁶¹ The deviant behaviour of the Country Bumpkin (ἄγροικος) offers a nice contrast: in the *ekklesia* he reeks of *kykeon*, offending his neighbours' noses, and his ill-fitting, rustic clothes and overly large shoes immediately identify him as an outsider to civic life.¹⁶² Other obvious physical deviations range from the disgusting to the vain: skin diseases, body odour, rampant body hair, open wounds, and filth are considered extremely offensive. But the critical gaze also takes in excessive personal grooming, brilliantly white teeth, over-frequenting the hairdresser's, and ostentatiously clean and rich clothing.¹⁶³ All this is important because the implicit norms regarding the body and its public presentation rank very high in the web of social observation and evaluation, so that failure to respect them is serious to fatal. With theorist Silvia Bovenschen one might finally suggest that the acute prominence of these concerns is itself due to the contingency of the time, which calls for the reassertion of the norms of self-presentation.¹⁶⁴

The next category on our gradient is behaviour that requires situational knowledge on the part of the observer to be 'properly' judged. The Toady provides another fine example: in the theatre he snatches the cushion carried by his 'object's' attending slave and goes out of his way to place it on the seat himself.¹⁶⁵ This action is visible to those around and is in this case probably legible due to

surrounding both conspicuousness and consumption, exposing the complexities of social construction that surround what Veblen considered a "human instinct". The constructivist perspective adopted here casts doubts on the validity of such absolutes in contextualised lived reality.

¹⁶¹ Theophr. *Char.* 4.3; 5.6, 9; 11.8; 16.5; 19.6; 24.11; 30.8.

¹⁶² Theophr. *Char.* 4.2-5, 7. *Kykeon* is attested as a drink mainly in the context of the Eleusinian mysteries, cf. Hom. *H.* 2.205-210, but was evidently a beverage with a non-urbanized air, see Diggle 2004 ad loc. For a contrasting dichotomisation of *asteios* and *agroikos* that highlights the unattainable natural purity of the rustic during the Second Sophistic, cf. Philostr. *Vit. Soph.* 553f. with Goldhill 2009, 107.

¹⁶³ Disgusting features: Theophr. *Char.* 19.2-7; 26.5; vanity: 5.6; 21.8, 11; 26.4.

¹⁶⁴ See for this thought Bovenschen, Silvia. "Über die Listen der Mode", in: eadem (ed.). *Listen der Mode.* Frankfurt a.M. 1986, 10-30, here 12f.: "In Zeiten des Umbruchs, der Orientierungsverluste, der Sinnkrisen, des schwindenden Vertrauens in den geschichtlichen Fortschritt und in die Zukunft generell kommt die Mode in Mode. Mode ist ein Krisenthema." However, this can be no more than a tentative point, since Bovenschen's arguments relate to modernity and the existence of ancient 'fashion' is debatable in itself: it is primarily an elite phenomenon, but the *Characters* are of course an elite text. Furthermore, in a court context, fashion, in the sense of a never-ending drive towards cultural innovation and iteration, may well have existed, see for instance Briant 2002, 291.

¹⁶⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 2.11.

the embodied markers of external appearance and action that differentiate slave and wealthy citizen, but also transient.¹⁶⁶ Some interactions are of course more easily noted than others: noticing that the Obsequious Man consistently hangs around the most prestigious and frequented places requires long-term (or shared) observation, whereas the cushion on the seat is a matter of a moment. The interactions attributed to the Late-learner (ὄψιμαθής) and the Tactless Man (ἄκαιρος) also have to do with time, though in quite different ways: the Late-learner mingles with and acts like the young although he is old, and the Tactless Man performs actions that are inappropriate mainly due to their timing.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ In reality, visual differentiation could actually be difficult, although the claim of uniform raggedness made in [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.10 is undoubtedly polemically exaggerated. At the abstract normative level of the *Characters*, however, the citizen actors are marked by their leisure and thus should be distinguishable from slaves in behaviour, comportment, physical grooming (hair and beard), as well as attire, as is visible in the deviant nature of the scenes in which they act slavishly (e.g. Theophr. *Char.* 2.5, 8, 9 (cf. 22.7), 11; 4.4, 7, 10, 12, 6.4f., 9; 18.8, 20.5; 27.13). While household slaves might of course be recognised individually, especially within a social network of friends, public situations require the normatively controlled markers noted above (p. 127). One can therefore assume that there was a difference in shoe and garment quality, style, length, and number, in hair style and personal grooming, as well as manners and deportment, or, in short, their naturalised habitus and hexis (cf. Bourdieu 1977, 87–95). While most of these markers are readily apparent from the *Characters* alone, Aristot. *Pol.* 1254b21–36 may serve to highlight the normative difference in body and comportment (upright as opposed to bowed). The key point is that the expectation, the relational identity tied to slaves, is *legibility* within the network of observation, which in itself reduces the social contingency of slave-holding; actual practice is inevitably more complex. On the discourses concerning physiognomic determinism, differentiation between slaves and elite, as well as the construction of the legibility of slaves in everyday life see recently Wrenhaven, Kelly L. *Reconstructing the Slave: The Image of the Slave in Ancient Greece*. London 2011, 43–89, esp. 62f., as well as 90–107 on their visual differentiation on Attic tombstones. Cf. also Schumacher, Leonhard. *Sklaverei in der Antike. Alltag und Schicksal der Unfreien*. Munich 2001, 71–77, who similarly argues that it was difficult to distinguish slaves and free men by their clothing, the artistic response being an exaggeration of difference. Sociologically however, it is worth noting that Starbatty, Angelika. *Aussehen ist Ansichtssache. Kleidung in der Kommunikation der römischen Antike* (=Münchener Studien zur Alten Welt 7). Munich 2010, 118f., argues for the Roman Empire that collective visual differentiation might in fact facilitate the creation of collective slave identity and thereby of agency, a process slave-owning societies would not wish to encourage on a systemic level. As its explicit attestation shows, however, the discourse in Rome was evidently fundamentally different, so should not be lightly transferred to late-Classical Greece.

¹⁶⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 12; 27.4, 6.

The final category covers verbal interactions involving a small audience. The Dissembler (ἔϊρων), the Chatterbox, the Talker, and the Rumour Monger all provide many examples of such behaviour: The Dissembler feigns ignorance and friendliness, the Chatterbox talks incoherently and without paying heed to the situation, the Talker's loquaciousness causes social turmoil, and the Rumour Monger spreads lies.¹⁶⁸ Their visibility is generally low, and their social impact depends on acute observation or concentrated listening. Now that the gradient of impact attached to the various kinds of interactions in the text has been outlined, this allows us to consider how these interactions define and control social contingency, beginning with the perspective of the individual deviant actor.

3.5 Adding power: Constructing contingency in the *Characters*

Since the main focus of this study is upon the power dynamics that shape the generation of individual and collective agency, social deviation is here read primarily in terms of contingency, i.e. uncertainty about outcomes. Since the individual obviously exerts agency to produce any form of action, including those deemed deviant by the audience, any deviation is a result of a specific configuration of the actor's identity network and therefore a reaction to perceived contingency.¹⁶⁹ The deviant actions preserved in the *Characters* are, however, not simply traces of contingency. Positive and negative deviations are subject to meta-communication, which can be assumed to be roughly proportional to the breach of order, i.e. its degree of divergence from expectation.¹⁷⁰ This process of meta-communication shifts the observers' network of expectations, so that they can anticipate the deviant behaviour more successfully and so reduce 'contingency'.¹⁷¹ The *Characters* are an abstract, universalised, and literary product of these meta-communicative social processes. Any deviation marked as such in the *Characters* is

¹⁶⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 1.2, 4; 3.2-4; 7.2-7; 8.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1112b31-34; 1113b3-21, where Aristotle establishes that individuals exert voluntary agency to act in both good and bad ways.

¹⁷⁰ Cohen 1991, 80f., remarks on the general conviction that the reputation of every individual in a local community is accurately assessable by his peers (Dem. 18.10; Lys. 21.18).

¹⁷¹ The society of the *Characters* is a highly connective social network that shows small world features in that average path lengths in the social network of the deme are very short, so that the degree of clustering is probably very high. News accordingly travels very fast. On gossip in the *Characters* see Millett 2007, 58-68. Cf. the explicit occurrences of gossip e.g. at Theophr. *Char.* 3.3; 4.6; 8.2f.; 17.7; 28.26; 29.4, as well as their implicit attestation through the allusions to domestic anecdotes listed above at p. 122, n. 139.

thus itself a trace of the workings of this mechanism of control. This hardly needs illustration, but let us at least consider their worst case scenario, the passages assigned to the ἀπονενοημένος, “the Man who has lost all sense”.¹⁷² The heading already points out that he is characterised by behaviour that runs counter to all collective norms, adhering to which is presented as ‘sensible’. The anecdotes show him involved in petty and shady economic transactions, in and out of court as both prosecutor and defendant, and neglecting his family duties to the point of letting his mother starve and spending more time in prison than at home.¹⁷³ As it happens, Isocrates provides a list of connotations of the very same word,¹⁷⁴ which corroborates the impression that the crucial characteristic of this sketch is complete disregard for others. In that, these passages point towards the most important mechanism for reducing individual contingency that underlies many of the deviant actions in the *Characters*, namely the individual’s desire to preserve the existing identity configuration and resist change. The ἀπονενοημένος achieves this state in perfection and cares only about himself and the survival of his fundamental core, paying no heed to his agnate family, to the gods or to society. In so doing he achieves total individualisation – something society cannot possibly tolerate, since it renders all mechanisms of discursive control ineffectual: if ‘public’ in the *Characters* carries connotations of control in a mesh of peers, the Man who has lost all sense thus achieves ‘privacy’ in perfection.¹⁷⁵

This state, however, is the exception that confirms the rule that individual action and collective norms are always entangled – the *Characters* precisely never discusses individuals in isolation. If we are to reconstruct the power dynamic between the individual and the collective, we nevertheless need to try and pry these layers of control apart, at least analytically. It is obvious that contingency in my sense is felt only by individuals and not by abstract entities. Their perceptions of contingencies can, however, be subdivided into four categories based on the source of uncertainty, which can be perceived both by the protagonists of the

¹⁷² Theophr. *Char.* 6. Diggle regards 6.2 and 6.7 as interpolations. For discussion of the heading see Diggle 2004, 250.

¹⁷³ Theophr. *Char.* 6.4–6, 8f.

¹⁷⁴ Isoc. 8.93: [...] τίς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε, πλὴν εἴ τις παντάπασιν ἀπονενοημένος ἐστί καὶ μὴθ’ ἱερῶν μήτε γονέων μήτε παίδων μήτ’ ἄλλου μηδενὸς φροντίζει πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου μόνου τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν; “Who could agree, apart from someone who is completely devoid of sense and has no regard either for cult, for his parents, for his children or for anything else save only for the time he can spend by himself?”

¹⁷⁵ Cf. obviously Aristot. *Pol.* 1253a1–11 on the ζῶον πολιτικόν. Formulating this behaviour as a deviant type also has political relevance, since Dem. 25.25f. suggests that it was possible to argue that the individual was free to act as he chooses, making his “own will” (βούλησις) “law” (νόμος) and “authority” (ἀρχή). See Cohen 1991, 229f. with n. 21 for further sources and discussion.

sketches and the implied reader. Most of these types can be subdivided further, and are therefore discussed at greater length later on.

1) Existential anxiety, which arises from situations of possible physical danger, fear for one's life or loss of freedom, loss of livelihood, condemnation by a court for a capital crime, etc.

2) Social contingency, which can be produced by social interaction altering the configuration of the self.

3) Contingency deriving from norm, i.e. anxiety caused by a perceived incongruence between individual and collectivised norm.

4) 'Collective' contingency, which is perceived as a result of an individual adopting a vantage point that judges the actions of others according to what the individual perceives and portrays as collectivised norm.

This final type is what I believe the implied audience of the *Characters* experiences in engaging with the sketches. The humour signals that the portrayed behaviour is to be rejected, confirming all sorts of settled value judgements rather than causing micro-adjustments to them. Accordingly collective contingency is by far the most important type for this study and an entire section (3.6) is therefore devoted to it. Before turning to that, however, let us begin our discussion with the first item on the list, existential contingency.

3.5.1 Existential contingency in the *Characters*

The most obvious source of contingency is existential, i.e. concerns threats to the physical integrity of the self in matters of life, death, or injury.¹⁷⁶ Generally speaking, these are present only on the margins of the *Characters*, conceivably because these contingencies are not acutely felt by the class of people depicted, because the *Characters* occludes them to preserve the humorous tone, or because the web of social observation and evaluation does not extend to the isolated individual and his existential fears. The funeral and corpses mentioned in passages assigned to the Obtuse Man (*ἀναίσθητος*) and the two occurrences of wounds, illness, and decay do attest a certain concern with physical integrity, but it is far from dominant and visible only in combination with social counter-strategies that protect

¹⁷⁶ This form of contingency is what emerged from David Konstan's survey of the astrological evidence (idem. "Conventional Values of the Hellenistic Greeks: The Evidence from Astrology", in: Per Bilde, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Lise Hannestad, and Jan Zahle (eds.). *Conventional Values of the Hellenistic Greeks* (=Studies in Hellenistic Civilization 8). Aarhus 1997, 159-176. He showed that the concerns addressed are fundamentally related to what has here been treated as the distributed self, focusing largely on the household in its existential dimension.

the individual from these contingencies.¹⁷⁷ While the contingency that results from the death of others is countered by a verbal expression of grief (which the Obtuse Man naturally gets wrong), wounds and illness are countered by a communication of disregard and an attribution to inalterable ‘genetics’ respectively. The most explicit reference to experiences of existential contingency is the case of the Coward (δειλός), who cares for his own life to the point of disregarding the patriotism and readiness to sacrifice oneself that are expected in such crisis situations as war. He trembles at the thought of any situation of high risk, fearing storms and pirate attacks at sea, death and injury in warfare.¹⁷⁸ The Coward seeks to counter these existential threats by resorting to complex social strategies. At sea, he not only runs up and asks the helmsman if they are already halfway to their destination but also appeals to the collective coping mechanism for existential contingency, namely religion: he refers his fears to a prophetic dream and wonders whether the entire vessel might not be endangered because any of the passengers have failed to be initiated (say at Samothrake).¹⁷⁹ In the case of war, he stays behind among the reserve troops, and when they too are called upon to fight, pretends he does not know whether the figures in the distance are friends or foe; and then – oh! he realises he has forgotten to bring his sword – and naturally, the only blood he is covered with comes from the wounded mate he pretends to help. His entire ingenuity is directed towards avoiding the fight yet making his demesmen and fellow tribesmen believe that he is another Lysander.¹⁸⁰ Beyond these crafty machinations, the most interesting sketch in this regard is probably the Superstitious Man. As I have indicated, religion, from the point of view of system theory, is understood as a collective coping mechanism that seeks to minimise the threat of existential contingency by attributing it to divine will; though this is in

¹⁷⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 13.9; 14.7, 13; 19.2; 27.10.

¹⁷⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 25.2-4. It is interesting to note that the Rumour Monger’s tale of Polyperchon and Kassander (8.6-10) does not seem to effect existential contingency.

¹⁷⁹ On religion as a mechanism of contingency control see Lübbe, Hermann. “Kontingenzerfahrung und Kontingenzbewältigung”, in: Gerhart von Graevenitz and Odo Marquard (eds.). *Kontingenç*. Munich 1998, 35-47, esp. 40-47: “In religiöser Lebenspraxis verhalten wir uns zu derjenigen Kontingenç, die sich der Transformation in Handlungssinn prinzipiell widersetzt” (p. 41), meaning that religion addresses the unfathomable complexity of the human condition, rather than social and normative contingency, which are caused by individual action and defused by interaction expectation, i.e. by identity. The dream is an ideal vehicle for exploring the tension between the subjective and the collective, as it is by definition an individual experience that is culturally constructed as bearing collective significance, at least in some cases. See Weber, Gregor. “Herrscher und Traum in hellenistischer Zeit”, in: *AKG* 81 (1991), 1-33, esp. 28-30.

¹⁸⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 25.6.

itself beyond ordinary human understanding, society has developed methods of divining and manipulating it and so reducing contingency.¹⁸¹ For the Superstitious Man, the world is so contingent that he focuses all his energies on interpreting and countering the innumerable *potential* threats to his own well-being and that of his family: the religious mode of existential contingency control monopolises his agency.¹⁸²

While domestic economic concerns, thoroughly investigated by Paul Millett, are probably the most prominent theme of the *Characters*, they do not generally appear to be existentially threatening in my sense.¹⁸³ Prices and loans, trade and investments, money and production appear in almost every sketch and indeed three of the behavioural types are devoted exclusively to such matters.¹⁸⁴ Although food and money are intrinsically linked in the *Characters*, this is mainly the case for meat derived from sacrifices.¹⁸⁵ The only mention of hunger and grain shortage is in relation to the Boastful Man's faux generosity in countering it.¹⁸⁶ The chronic precariousness of the city's grain supplies and its dependence on the Piraeus in the Diadoch period are not reflected by the interactions in the *Characters*; the 'individuals' portrayed are either conceived as being too wealthy to be affected or the matter is occluded.¹⁸⁷ That said, the economic system – although

¹⁸¹ Eidinow 2011, esp. 16-18.

¹⁸² Theophr. *Char.* 16.

¹⁸³ The economic concerns in the *Characters* have been studied by Millett 2007, 93-98 and *in extenso* idem. *Lending and Borrowing*. Cambridge 1991, esp. 139-159.

¹⁸⁴ These are Theophr. *Char.* 10 (μικρολόγος); 22 (ἀνελεύθερος); 30 (αἰσχροκερδής). Prices: 3.3; 4.15; loans: 1.5; 4.14; 6.9; 9.2; 9.7; 10.2, 10, 13; 12.11; 14.8; 15.7; 17.9; 18.5, 7; 22.3, 9; 30.3, 13; trade: 2.6, 7, 9; 4.13, 15; 5.7-9; 9.4, 6, 8; 10.4, 7; 11.4, 7f.; 12.8; 14.9; 15.4; 18.2; 18.9; 22.4, 7, 10; 23.7f.; 30.5, 12; investments: 23.2; 30.15; money: 4.13; 5.7; 6.4; 10.6; 12.4; 14.2; 18.3; 21.5; 23.2, 5f., 8; 24.12; 28.4; 30.7, 9, 14; production: 2.12; 3.3; 3.6; 6.5.

¹⁸⁵ Meat is implicitly valuable throughout, and is a relatively more common concern of these wealthy individuals (Theophr. *Char.* 9.3f.; 12.11; 18.2; 21.7; 22.4, 7; 30.4), by comparison, e.g., with fish (4.15; 6.9). In Old and Middle Comedy, by comparison, various kinds of fish are by far the most common food mentioned and also strongly associated with luxury and deviance (Davidson 1997, 3-20); the explanation for this discrepancy lies in the fact that meat is strongly bound to the social occasion of sacrifice, a prime setting of the *Characters*, though some puzzlement remains as to why Theophrastus' text does not exploit the discourse outlined by Davidson. On meat and fish as foods see Wilkins, John H. and Hill, Shaun. *Food in the Ancient World*. Malden, MA and Oxford 2006, 142-160, esp. 158f.

¹⁸⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 23.5.

¹⁸⁷ Dem. 20.31-33. On the precariousness of the food supplies in early Hellenistic Athens and their great political relevance see Oliver 2007b, 48-64; cf. Lane Fox 1996, 134f. On response strategies to shortage see Gallant, Thomas W. *Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece. Reconstructing the Rural Domestic Economy*. Cambridge 1991, 113-142, esp. 140f.

in principle, as an organized system, a means of reducing contingency – generates its own social and collective contingencies, which will be discussed below.

The third form of existential contingency that is just barely tangible in the *Characters* has already been touched on and straddles the gap between existential and normative contingency. The distributed nature of the self of the *kyrios* is itself a source of existential contingency, since it affects the coherence of the individual in a fundamental way – I argued that its extent is visible by inversion in the degree to which it is occluded in the *Characters*.¹⁸⁸ The normative demand that the household network be kept cohesive and under the sole control of the *kyrios* is revealed in the text only in the absence of domestic conflict between father and son, which was noted above.¹⁸⁹ Attacks upon the parts of the distributed self are harmful to the whole, but since this construction of the self is closely tied into its normative nature, this is largely a case of normative contingency, and will be discussed later.

It emerges that the *Characters* touch on existential contingency in various forms, but that it is not their core interest, conceivably because the social focus of the work necessarily marginalises existential threats. The few experiences that can be identified however are countered by the individual controlling the contingency by imposing their individual semanticisation on the contingent situation. As a result, discussions of existential contingency in the *Characters* are always bound up with social and collective contingency, as we saw in the case of the Coward.

3.5.2 Social contingency in the *Characters*

Put very simply, the second source of contingency is social interaction perceived as aiming to alter the existing identity configuration of the individual self, i.e. power interactions one notices.¹⁹⁰ Constructing and controlling social contingency is one of the dominant social processes visible in the *Characters*, but is usually entwined with normative processes of various kinds; by contrast, this subsection attempts to delineate more or less exclusively social contingencies. Essentially, any situation in which individuals come together can cause them to perceive contingency, but not all situations described in the *Characters* contain

Attitudes to the Piraeus were ambivalent and it is often cast as a marginal “world apart”, see e.g. Millett 1991, 191f.; von Reden, Sitta. “The Piraeus – A World Apart”, in: *GeR* 42 (1995), 24-37.

¹⁸⁸ See above p. 132.

¹⁸⁹ See above p. 121.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Luhmann 2014⁵, 6, 27f.

markers of such perception. The Dissembler, for example, encounters a personal enemy (*ἐχθρός*) and is forced to go to court against him, or meets someone who asks him for a loan, to trade, or for information.¹⁹¹ These encounters cause him to perceive the unpredictability of the potential chain of actions incurred by this opening situation because they threaten the Dissembler's distributed self. The text provides numerous parallel situations: the Chatterbox encounters someone he does not yet know in the assembly and responds by talking his ear off, the Obsequious Man is unhappy to be pressed to make potentially disagreeable decisions for others, the Talker is confronted with information that conflicts with his own views, and the Penny-pincher sees his economic status under threat by others over-indulging or profiting at his expense.¹⁹² Finally, the Friend of Villains (*φιλοπόνηρος*) explicitly desires to learn how to behave in court so that he may be φοβερώτερος, "more frightful" – an explicit, highly personal response to contingency perceived as originating from the social fabric surrounding him.¹⁹³

The sketches show three ways of applying individual agency to deal with such perceived social contingency. These are denial of communication, faux communication, and excessive communication, all of which reassure *ego*, but can potentially cause *alter* to perceive the interaction as contingent instead, and thus may have long-term consequences for the connectivity of *ego*'s social network. The best example of denial of interaction is provided by the Illiberal Man, who perceives a potential expense and goes out of his way to avoid it.¹⁹⁴ The Self-centred Man acts in much the same way, ignoring requests for assistance and refusing to provide his share of the entertainment during the symposium.¹⁹⁵ Similarly, the Arrogant Man exerts complete control over access to his person, staring fixedly at the ground on the street and sending callers away when he is indisposed.¹⁹⁶ Perhaps the most telling instance of this strategy is exhibited by the *alteri* of the *Characters*, who try to simply walk away and thereby deny the protagonists' idiosyncracies.¹⁹⁷ As for the second strategy, the Dissembler communicates a great deal, but adopts a non-committal stance to counter all requests that

¹⁹¹ Theophr. *Char.* 1.2, 5.

¹⁹² Theophr. *Char.* 3.2-4; 5.3-5; 7.2; 10.

¹⁹³ Theophr. *Char.* 29.2.

¹⁹⁴ Theophr. *Char.* 22.3, 9.

¹⁹⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 15.2, 10.

¹⁹⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 24.8, 11. While the activities at 24.11 need not necessarily be located within the *oikos*, but could also take place in the bathhouse or at a market stall (cf. Theophr. *Char.* 11.4; 19.6), the words *ἔασαι ἄν εἰσελθεῖν* strongly suggest actually entering the *oikos* and that the Arrogant Man's direct control is provided by the slave manning the door (on which cf. Theophr. *Char.* 4.12).

¹⁹⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 7.3, 5.

would require a reconfiguration of his self, using evasive language to remain uncommitted.¹⁹⁸ Finally, the Country Bumpkin and the Talker, for example, tackle the contingency they perceive when venturing into the city or meeting strangers by communicating continuously and excessively, attempting to reassert their control of the situation by structuring it by means of their own network of values, filling the semantic void with non-contingent personal knowledge.¹⁹⁹

3.5.3 Normative contingency in the *Characters*

Before moving on to discuss the collective side of contingency in the *Characters*, there is one final form of individual contingency to sketch. The perception of incongruence between the configuration of self and a collectivised norm can also manifest as contingency for the individual actor, especially when the norm is perceived as valid.²⁰⁰ This tension within the identity network of the self is well exemplified by the Self-centred Man, who first attempts to deny interaction by refusing to contribute to a benevolent “neighbourhood loan” (ἔρανος), but then suddenly turns up with the money, grudgingly conforming to expectation.²⁰¹ Generally speaking, these kinds of internal conflicts can also be resolved by asserting individual agency via the interactive strategies outlined above: As we saw earlier, the Coward develops a narrative that fakes his adherence to the norm of civic bravery, while allowing him to escape existential contingency.²⁰² The Boastful Man similarly uses faux communication to pretend he is over-fulfilling a norm he regards as desirable, namely wealth.²⁰³ The Illiberal Man stays at home when his cloak is being cleaned, thereby denying communication because he is incapable of reconciling the normative demand for proper attire in the ‘public’ sphere with the parsimony that is his dominant frame of reference for the evaluation of action.²⁰⁴ The Ungrateful Grumbler over-communicates by complaining about being forced to accept a neighbourhood loan collected for him by his friends, but

¹⁹⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 1.2-6.

¹⁹⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 3.2-4; 4.2-5, 8, 12-15.

²⁰⁰ Most aspects of this complex interweaving of control processes will be discussed below under collective contingency (chapter 3.6).

²⁰¹ Theophr. *Char.* 15.7. On ἔρανος see in detail Millett 1991, 153-159; further literature in Diggle 2004, 175.

²⁰² Theophr. *Char.* 25.4-6.

²⁰³ Theophr. *Char.* 23.7-9.

²⁰⁴ Theophr. *Char.* 22.8.

nevertheless unwillingly conforms to the others' expectation of acceptance and also to the normative reciprocal commitment it incurs.²⁰⁵

A special case of normative individual contingency is visible in the anecdotes that relate to the inside of the *oikos*, since they do not feature any social counter-strategies by the main actors. Their existence alone marks the failure of the *kyrios* to keep the network of the distributed self in order – a violation of a core norm, since the position of the *kyrios* and thus the legitimacy of the entire construction of male agency, and by extension of collective agency, depends on it.²⁰⁶ A *kyrios* must not be laughed at by his children, let his cook make him do the work, treat his slaves better than his peers, or be disrespectful of his parents – or at least no one can know.²⁰⁷ The collective interest is that the individuals that form the collective remain equal, stable, and cohesive, whereas the individual – in the ordinary modern sense – is faced with the contingencies of the social interaction within the household and has to handle the tension between the necessity of allowing its individual constituents their own agency and constructing them as part of himself as a distributed individual.

It has emerged from this survey of different sources of individual contingency that the *Characters* can indeed be read in this way, despite their dominant interest in normative control. The text not only constructs a number of forms of individual contingency, but it also documents various strategies of contingency control through the exercise of individual agency, thereby granting insight into individual attempts at control. The forms of contingency constructed are existential, social and normative, the control strategies social.²⁰⁸ All these instances are thus *the result of the distributed self attempting to maintain stability and cohesion within its network of identities by continuously reinforcing its configuration through its agency*. It has also emerged, however, that the *Characters* marginalise these processes of individual contingency perception and generally aim to occlude the motives of the individual, simplifying their actions as deviations in the eyes of constructed collective, but maintaining their agency, the whole point being that they have the capacity to act differently. In Harrison White's terms, the contingency constructions here identified in the *Characters* reflect individuals gaining footing, or individual social

²⁰⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 17.9.

²⁰⁶ See p. 122, n. 139 above for the references.

²⁰⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 4.6, 10; 6.6; 7.10.

²⁰⁸ In his discussion of the moral virtues as the middle term between two poles, Aristotle (*Eud. Eth.* 1221a16-19) makes no difference between, e.g., the existential fear that underlies cowardice and the social concerns that underlie many other moral qualities (cf. 1220a9-12; 1220b7-20). As is the case with the *Characters*, his typology of moral quality does not consider the differences in contingency that the virtues counter, but considers them all $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$ (1221a14).

control, by simultaneously developing and deploying agency in narrative, asserting semantic control over the social situation.²⁰⁹ At the same time, the *Characters* reflect the mechanism of a regime of control, a form of reified, collective narrative, that affects the identity networks of individuals and achieves meta-control over their individual attempts at control.²¹⁰ This is particularly clear in the case of normative contingency. We turn now to the nature of this control regime in the *Characters*.

3.6 Collective contingency in the *Characters*: Sanction and meta-control

These constructions of individual contingency are obviously all anticipated by the text, which in turn allows readers to anticipate such situations simply because language exists to address these behavioural deviations. This in itself constitutes one aspect of the narrative of meta-control at the level of the regime of control that is the collective of well-to-do citizens constructed as relevant in the *Characters*. The text's main effect on the reader or audience, however, is to sanction both the existence of these individual contingencies and the response strategies used by the individual actors, in other words: to establish (or re-produce) a narrative of meta-control.²¹¹ The text achieves this effect by prefacing its descriptions of behaviour with a key word that triggers a diffuse, but negative association in the reader's mind, followed by a presentation of highly recognisable, underspecified micro-narratives, which offer no alternatives and no discussion, profiting from the reader's common sense and recognition.²¹²

The next analytical step must hence be to adopt the perspective put forward by the narrative voice of the *Characters* and to investigate what kinds of individual

²⁰⁹ White 2008², 5-18, 292f. Cf. Mohr, John W. and White, Harrison C. "How to Model an Institution", in: *Theory and Society* 37:5 (2008), 485-512, here 493: "At this level of social existence interpretive systems are organized as stories that are told to oneself and shared with others about the immediacy of events, actions, and agents that are known, witnessed, and participated in. Within any given network, meanings are shared through collective participation in repertoires of stories that serve to give an interpretive face to the lived experience of interactions. Stories are themselves constructed out of a patterned relation of meanings [...] and they also operate in sets, so there are relational semiotic systems both within and between stories."

²¹⁰ That is control of control processes. See White 2008², 220-229, esp. 222f.

²¹¹ This is productive sanction, rather than the coercive, limiting, and contingency-generating form of sanction that Luhmann's conception of power (1988², 23f.) seeks to avoid.

²¹² The text's structure (see p. 99) is crucial here, since the reader already has to have an idea what the terms mean that the *Characters* purport to be defining.

actions are sanctioned, how they are sanctioned, and what the consequences are for the construction of collective agency and the control of individual agency. In my view, the answer to the first question is that the actions portrayed are all in some way or form in violation of established and collectivised contingency-reducing value systems. While not all of the interactions visible in the *Characters* can actually be explicitly shown to decrease the individual perception of contingency outlined above – due no doubt to the efficacy of the narrative of meta-control – they certainly *all* show an increase in the perception of contingency for the abstract collective, embodied in the underspecified *alteri* the protagonists interact with. Obviously these collective contingency-reducing value systems are embodied only in individual interaction and their social truth is contingent on the perception of the individuals involved, who persistently evaluate their recognisability and consistency with their own expectations.²¹³

3.6.1 Collective contingency

As I indicated in Chapter 2, contingency-reducing value systems can be equated with Luhmann's generalised symbolic media of communication. That means that they reduce the complexity of social interaction by implementing a dichotomous and incentivised code for the purpose of evaluation, thereby lowering the thresholds that this interaction has to overcome in order to achieve acceptance and produce further interaction.²¹⁴ These codes are embodied in interaction and can be conceived here as encoded in identities held by actors that determine whether

²¹³ This is made explicit by Isoc. 1.17. Cf. White 2008², 223: “Values fuel these unending conflicts for control among distinct actors, whether individual or composite, which indeed are channeling and affirming the values in the course of reaching some equilibrium despite duplicity and contention.”

²¹⁴ On generalised symbolic media of communication see in depth Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*. Stuttgart 1998, esp. 203f., 319-321. Luhmann 1984, 222f. lists truth, love, money, religion, and power as examples of such media. I opt to phrase this as a comparison since Luhmann (1998, 331) held that ancient cultures did not fully develop generalised symbolic media of communication, though in his view Athens came close. On the relationship between generalised symbolic media of communication and morality see Luhmann 1998, 370f., 751f., arguing that the function of morality is to enforce the validity of the media codes within their own operations.

observed behaviour is consistent with expectation, which in turn allows for follow-on interaction.²¹⁵ Since each code associates specific semantics, the ‘rules’ for their application and non-application, these codes can conflict in practice, generating further contingency due to the overlap of these semantics in the signs used in social interaction.²¹⁶ For the present analysis, I opt to investigate these value systems in the sense of control regimes, as suggested by White.²¹⁷ The *Characters* explore such value systems in concrete deviant interactions, all of which use linguistic or behavioural signs in contexts deemed inconsistent with general usage. The following survey aims to establish the various negotiating value codes at work in the *Characters* and to identify how they are constructed in the interactions portrayed in the text. In a second step, their intersections and conflicts will be investigated by conceptualising the value systems as a cognitive network that comes under tension in interaction. This sets up a third step of abstraction that will lead to the core of this network of interrelated collective values, the core narrative of meta-control mentioned above. The first of these value-systems to be investigated is the thorny nexus of friendship, love and trust, which will emerge as the primary code asserted by the text.

3.6.1.1 Love, *philia*, and trust

Although Luhmann identifies romantic love as a generalised symbolic medium of communication that might be expected to feature in an account of social deviation, both it and sexuality hardly occur in the *Characters*. One might even say that alongside other things, such as the sphere of serious legal dispute and most of the internal workings of the *oikos*, these two fields are in fact occluded.²¹⁸ Accordingly marriage appears mainly as an occasion for stinginess, although the

²¹⁵ A problem here is that this study operates at the level of interaction rather than the systemic level covered by system theory. This makes it more challenging to map Luhmann’s theoretical concepts directly onto texts; cf. White 2008², 237-241 on this issue of relatability.

²¹⁶ Luhmann 1998, 360-363; cf. White 2008², 238.

²¹⁷ White 2008², 241: “The term *control regime* attempts, with critical association onto Luhmann’s subsystems, to define the specific channeling of action. Thus, the term focuses more on the specific programming for the application of his “codes” of realms, rather than on the codes themselves. [...] Luhmann] makes a distinction between the binary code and the programming, the latter containing the conditions and procedures by which one of the binary codes is applied [...]” Emphasis in the original.

²¹⁸ Luhmann 1982, 21-23; Luhmann 1998, 344-347. Observed also by Lane Fox 1996, 149. This is hardly surprising given the very different attitude to ‘love’ in fourth-century Athens, see Dover 1974; Cohen 1991; Garland 1991.

Tactless Man also misuses it as an occasion to voice his opinions of the 'fairer sex'.²¹⁹ Interactions from the sphere of sexuality and 'romantic' interaction only appear as causes of collective contingency when actions that belong in a specific context spill out beyond its boundaries. In the *Characters* such scenarios include three cases of indecent exposure, the love-drunk behaviour of the Late Learner (ὄψιμαθής), who fails to batter down a girl's door, and the Tactless Man serenading his girlfriend (ἐρωμένη).²²⁰ The employment of elements from the 'romantic' interaction mode (i.e. serenading, physical posturing) is evidently accepted only for young men, and only when they are performed within the frame of social expectation.²²¹ Transgression of the constructed boundaries, e.g. of age and between individual and collective space, by bearers of normative order, i.e. well-to-do citizens, calls the construction of the code into question and destabilises it. Finally, the Country Bumpkin's attempt to pursue his baker girl is not problematic in itself, since it takes place within the house, but rather due to his failure both to achieve success and to prevent the story from getting out, which challenges his semantic hegemony over his distributed self.²²²

The matter is more complicated, and accordingly more visible, in the case of the central normative construction that regulates the transition of individuals into the distributed self, namely the value of *philia*, generally rendered simply as friendship.²²³ The semantic field of this term is wide, but in the context of a well-to-do civic community may generally mean 'optional, reciprocal, positive interactive disposition among equals' and is one of the main concepts that structure positive reciprocal relationships due to its inherent component of altruism.²²⁴

²¹⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 12.6; 22.4; 30.19. I do not of course mean to suggest that marriage in the wealthy circles of ancient Greece had anything to do with the code of romantic love in Luhmann's sense (1982, 163-182), but that a code of positive interpersonal relations exists in any society.

²²⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 4.7; 11.2; 12.3; 22.13; 27.9. In two cases of indecency, the violation consists more in being inadequately clothed, i.e. deviating from the collectively sanctioned physical image of the citizen, than in sexual transgression.

²²¹ Cf. Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1158e11-13.

²²² Theophr. *Char.* 4.7. Hdt. 3.150.2 suggests that a σιτοποιός would be a slave.

²²³ Friends link 'public' and 'private' (Plat. *Leg.* 738d-e) by participating in major events of social life, including family festivals, weddings, sacrifices, and funerals (Dem. 58.40; Isae. 2.3, 8.18; Aristoph. *Acharn.* 1056, 1067f.). A definition is provided by Konstan, David. *Friendship in the Classical World*. Cambridge 1997, 1, stressing the loyalty and love it associates, as well as the optional quality of friendship. On *philia* see further Cohen 1991, 84-86; Mitchell 1997, 178-191, who outlines the tensions the concept held and masked as a connective concept entangled in discourses that aimed to limit its connectivity.

²²⁴ See basically LSJ s.v. φιλία, but the concept is more complex than that. Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* empirically applies it to a whole range of situations characterised by differences in

Within the methodological framework adopted here it describes the quality of individual non-contingency produced by a perceived harmony of identity, which is itself derived from the construction of ‘complete’ mutual appreciation due to a perceived partial or total similarity between individuals.²²⁵ This goes to the point of individuals being so trusted (i.e. non-contingent), that they can stand in for one another within social interaction networks, becoming a situational part of the constructed self on the basis of an identity that regulates the reciprocation of this extension of self.²²⁶ Obviously these suspensions of contingency are based on individual perception and the objective truth of the matter is, as so often, irrelevant.²²⁷ As a result, the concept of *philia* generates a realm of closeness and trust for individual and collective alike, creating a release valve for the pressure generated by the conflict between the norm of *oikos*-control and practical necessity.²²⁸ Through the social mechanism of trust, friends are thus woven into the social network of the distributed self, which would in turn accord them greater potential for contingency if this were not occluded by the value of *philia*. This in turn causes

the configuration of the participants. These include young lovers (1156b2), lifelong friends (1156b12), polis collectives (1157a26), political and business contacts (1158a 28), parents and children (1158b20), fellow travellers and soldiers (1159b28), members of the same religious association (1160a19), or of the same tribe (1161b14), but also isolated business transactions (1163b35). This complexity is visible also in what remains of Theophrastus’ own conception of friendship in Aulus Gellius *NA* 1.3.9-29 (=Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, fr. 534), where the outcome is precisely that the value of friendship in specific interaction should be judged on a case by case basis. At the same time, Theophrastus seems to have asserted the possibility that all three Aristotelian types of friendship (pleasure-based, utility-based, virtue-based) might exist also in unequal relationships (fr. 533), which is called into question by other fragments (fr. 536f.) that cast doubt on the practical possibility of evaluating friendship in unequal relationships. The discourse appears to have become increasingly incoherent and situational, although the fragmentary nature of the evidence is a hindrance. On reciprocity see Millett 1991; Mitchell 1997, 111; Konstan, David. “Reciprocity and Friendship”, in: Christopher Gill, Norman Postlethwaite and Richard Seaford (eds.). *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*. Oxford 1998, 279-301; Schaps, David M. *The Invention of Coinage and the Monetization of Ancient Greece*. Ann Arbor 2004, 23f.; Millett 2007, 99-109.

²²⁵ Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1155a32-35; 1156a7-16; 1156b7-20 (typology of friendship). Aristotle also remarks that a friend is ideally a second self (τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα; *Nic. Eth.* 1169b6). This is in fact remarkably similar to Luhmann’s analysis of love, though Aristotle seems to be thinking primarily of extending agency. Cf. for a similar thought Cic. *Amic.* 80. See also Luhmann 1982, 17.

²²⁶ Cf., e.g., Isae. 7.8, where the bond of friendship leads one friend to stand as hostage in place of the other.

²²⁷ Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1155b25f. has the same thought.

²²⁸ Cohen 1991, 86-89.

this value to require sanction, resulting in an eternal cycle of normative and interactive reproduction and adaptation.²²⁹

These observations make it come as no surprise that *philia* is one of the value constructs that comes under increasing tension in the early Hellenistic period. As such it will reappear frequently throughout this analysis and a few words of discussion may be in order here. David Konstan has argued that the fragments of Theophrastus' *Peri Philias*, which mainly survives in a brief summary by Aulus Gellius, show traces of a relativist reformulation of Aristotelian conceptions of *philia*.²³⁰ Rather than considering *philia* a universal value that ideally goes hand in hand with *to kalon* and *to dikaion*, Theophrastus evidently emphasised the complexity of the considerations that should affect the value of friendship in interaction, to the point of avoiding general rules.²³¹ With Konstan one might argue that the complexities of political and social context in the early Hellenistic period were instrumental in intensifying existing tensions within the mediating social value-concept of *philia* by emphasising the problem of socio-economic imbalance in friendship.²³² The first step in gaining an understanding of the significance of this value-concept within the context of the power politics of the early Diadoch period at the level of identity negotiation is thus to evaluate how the *Characters* construct the value with regard to the control of contingency in the civic sphere.

The *Characters* describe a number of violations of the value of *philia* in a variety of interactive contexts, since *philia* functions as an interaction modifier in the identity network and is normatively constructed as universally tempering contingency perception. Since the *Characters* predominantly show interactions between fellow citizens, *philia* is always involved on some level, since it implements the core value of reciprocity. As a result, only particularly explicit examples will

²²⁹ On trust as an underlying mechanism of contingency-reduction see Luhmann 2014⁵, 27-39. In Luhmann's analysis, trust is an advance on the suspension of contingency (p. 27: "riskante Vorleistung"), in that it is a key response to contingency that makes social action possible and seamlessly blends into basic expectations of interactive consistency and continuity.

²³⁰ Gellius *NA* 1.3.9-29. See Konstan 1987, 7f.

²³¹ Gellius *NA* 1.3.26, 28: 'Has tamen' inquit 'parvitates rerum et magnitudines atque has omnes officiorum aestimationes alia nonnumquam momenta extrinsecus atque aliae quasi appendices personarum et causarum et temporum et circumstantiae ipsius necessitates, quas includere in praecepta difficilest, moderantur et regunt et quasi gubernant et nunc ratas efficiunt, nunc irritas.' "Nevertheless", he said "the smallness and magnitude of things as well as all these evaluations of duties are sometimes affected by outside forces and are qualified, regulated and directed, so to speak, by additional necessities, as it were, of persons, causes, timing, and circumstance, which are difficult to include into general principles, with the result that they are now certain and now uncertain."

²³² Gellius *NA* 1.3.26, 28. See Konstan 1987, 14f. Mitchell 1997 discusses earlier attitudes to imbalanced friendship.

be discussed. The predominant position of *philia* within the configuration of the network of values is itself protected in a variety of ways. The narrative developed by the Coward to hide his cowardice is sanctioned because it deceives and endangers his friends, more specifically the members of his deme and tribe, but probably also because he emphasises his own bravery precisely by explicitly and repeatedly referring to the man he purports to have saved as a friend, thereby using the value as a shield for his own behaviour.²³³ Similarly the Ungrateful Grumbler (μεμψίμοιρος) places his own negative attitude, which of course protects him from perceiving contingency, above the value of *philia* by emphasising his own, negative interpretation of events rather than conforming by acknowledging the kind gift sent by his friend and giving thanks (χάρις) in return.²³⁴ The Slanderer's most despicable action, placed climactically at the end of his sketch, is naturally directed against his friends and relatives (οἰκεῖοι), an act he attempts to justify by reference to core democratic values.²³⁵ The Rumour Monger similarly violates this trust relationship by employing faux communication:²³⁶ Lies, once discovered, obviously render people unpredictable by destroying trust.²³⁷ In his case one can even observe the dissimulation mechanisms he employs to fake trust, the behavioural and linguistic markers of a trust relationship. Smiling (μειδιάσας), and hiding his true self (καταβαλὼν τὸ ἦθος), he plays off the identity network of his interlocutors by authenticating his information with sources, and finally appealing to particular intimacy by emphasising the exclusivity of the information he imparts.²³⁸ *Philia*, trust, and truth are thus presented as being closely linked, a nested network of values within the collective narrative of meta-control.

²³³ Theophr. *Char.* 25.5f. On the boundaries of *philia* cf. Konstan, David. "Are Fellow Citizens Friends? Aristotle versus Cicero on *Philia*, *Amicitia*, and *Social Solidarity*", in: Ralph M. Rosen and Ineke Sluiter (eds.). *Valuing Others in Classical Antiquity* (=Mnemosyne Suppl. 323). Leiden and Boston 2010, 233-248.

²³⁴ Theophr. *Char.* 17.2, 9.

²³⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 28.6. On this see Halliwell, Stephen. *Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to early Christianity*. Cambridge 2008, 237-243, who highlights the normative tension between *parrësia* and *kakologia*.

²³⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 8.2-8. 23.9 also craftily invokes (guest-)friendship as a shield for his lie. A parallel story about a high-profile politician of the time, Stratokles of Diomeia, is attested by Plut. *Demetr.* 11.3; *Mor.* 799f., where he is said to have invented an Athenian victory at Amorgos (for an explanation see Bayliss 2011, 158f.); cf. similarly Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1f., where the death of Antipater provides an occasion for such stories.

²³⁷ Luhmann 2014⁵, 36. There lies a certain irony in the fact that trust itself depends on self-deception that is necessary to occlude that the individual is in fact suspending potential contingency perceptions (p. 38f.). Trust can be restored via social institutions, including the sanctions outlined below, e.g. on p. 155.

²³⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 8.4, 9.

The sketch of the Toady now emphasises that *philia* can exist only between individuals that are judged as equals. If we discard the spurious definition paragraph, the fundamental problem of the sketch is not that the Toady abuses *philia* for gain – the sketch significantly shows no gain, he is no parasite – but rather the disruption of the equality between the partners. He behaves like a slave by fixing his master's personal appearance and improving his comfort with a cushion,²³⁹ and even erodes the equality between his object of affection and the other citizens by praising him beyond measure.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, he inserts himself into the social network of his object by acting as a mediator, even though this social network is itself governed by *philia*.²⁴¹ Mediating functions are characteristic of unequals if they are not balanced out through reciprocation, which does not occur in the sketch. In a similar scenario, the Arrogant Man has his friends over for dinner, but does not dine with them, having an underling keep them company instead, thereby breaching the same maxim of equality.²⁴² The *Characters* thus constructs a narrative nexus of *philia*, trust, truth, and equality that functions as a collective narrative of meta-control, a control regime in White's terminology.

3.6.1.2 Religion

It is now commonplace to treat also religion as such a control regime, i.e. as an anxiety-reducing system of values.²⁴³ Esther Eidinow, for example, has recently re-read the perceived dichotomy between polis religion and personal religion in terms of nested networks of contingency control, in a way that is compatible with the approach adopted here.²⁴⁴ She argues that the sphere of religious experience was characterised by individuals possessing a plurality of different identities across different social networks, with individuals dynamically reconfiguring around specific sets of rules for religious interaction as the situation demanded.²⁴⁵ Within

²³⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 2.3, 5, 7-9, 11.

²⁴⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 2.2,4, 6, 7, 10, 12.

²⁴¹ Theophr. *Char.* 2.8. Against Schmitz 2014, 4f., see above p. 115, n. 105.

²⁴² Theophr. *Char.* 24.9.

²⁴³ Luhmann 1998, 230-237 understands religion as based essentially on secrecy, i.e. specific non-communication that ties the observer to the things he can communicate, identify, or define, thereby reducing contingency. On religion in Athens during the Hellenistic period see esp. Mikalson 1998, esp. 46-104, arguing against Ferguson's classic account (1969 [1911], 86) that religious action at the polis level was reaffirmed through re-organisation during the period under discussion here, the notable change being the addition of ruler cult rather than a decline of religious authenticity.

²⁴⁴ Eidinow 2011, esp. 31-35.

²⁴⁵ Eidinow 2011, 32f.

this nested network scheme, the polis functions as a particularly strong, integrative meta-structure, a control regime that provides the individuals with a particularly forceful set of semantics intended to maintain meta-control through the master-narrative of polis religion, asserting and slackening control based on the situation or context.

The *Characters* contains fragments of the actual implementation of such a master-narrative through interaction in that the text constructs an individual who is supposed to respect the gods in ways not judged as negative. While explicit ‘religious’ actions are not common, they are obviously woven into the social fabric as a contingency-reducing value system. Only Athena, Hekate, Sabazios, and Zeus are explicitly referenced by name, with the latter being responsible for rain on both occasions.²⁴⁶ The festivals and rituals of polis-level religious practice occur casually in narrative but not as actual settings, and are accordingly never the subject of deviation.²⁴⁷ Not even the Man who has lost all sense or the Ungrateful Grumbler dream of disrespecting collective festivals; the wealthy citizens of the *Characters* are constructed as being unable to even think of deviance in this context. Polis religion is thereby implicitly presented as a set of identities marked by social conformity – the reason may simply be that deviant behaviour at religious festivals would come dangerously close to being punishable by law and might also have brought Theophrastus himself closer still to the ever-looming accusation of ἀσέβεια.²⁴⁸

Religious deviation thus occurs only at the non-collective level of ‘individual’ religion. Even weddings, sacrifices, and symposia are relevant mainly as social occasions of display and economic expense, though obviously they have a ‘religious dimension’ that is seamlessly woven into these situations, sanctions them, and enforces the code of *philia* that governs them.²⁴⁹ For instance, the Penny-pincher’s offering to Artemis at a communal meal is the smallest of all the attendants, but he nevertheless makes an offering.²⁵⁰ The Man of Petty Ambition sets up a dedication in a temple of Asklepios, but the focus is on his overly ostentatious maintenance of the dedication, not on deviant religious practice.²⁵¹ This

²⁴⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 3.3; 14.12; 15.4, 7f.

²⁴⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 3.3f.; 21.8; 22.2, 4, 6; 27.8.

²⁴⁸ Dem. 21.8-11, 147, 175. See Garland 1984, 79f. On ἀσέβεια as a real threat and political tool in the late fourth century see O’Sullivan, Lara. “Athenian impiety trials in the late fourth century B.C.,” in: *CQ* 47:1 (1997), 136-152; Mikalson 1998, 63-68; cf. Green 2003, 275f., who highlights the religious dimension.

²⁴⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 2.10; 5.5; 6.3; 7.7; 9.3; 10.3, 11; 12.11; 13.4; 17.2; 21.2, 7; 24.9; 30.2, 4, 16, 18.

²⁵⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 10.3.

²⁵¹ Theophr. *Char.* 21.10.

apparent occlusion of the religious value-system is balanced out by a passage placed climactically at the end of the sketch of the Self-centered Man, which chides his lack of prayer to the gods.²⁵² The same positioning highlights the deviance of those who use the value *kosmos* of religion to authenticate their actions without being truthful, i.e. who use oaths lightly.²⁵³ These sanctions are supposed to prevent the perception of contingency by enforcing the value system in its relational configuration with the other control regimes.

The most elaborately religious sketch and one of the longest overall is that of the Superstitious Man, whose fear of the gods leads him to treat them as an overwhelming source of contingency.²⁵⁴ His behaviour consistently and repeatedly destabilises the identities that regulate the application of religion as a contingency-reducing interaction mode, by broadening and questioning the number and form of semiotic fields it controls.²⁵⁵ Do mice nibbling sacks constitute divine interference or not?²⁵⁶ The obsessiveness and pertinacity of his behaviour, which in isolation might be only mildly deviant, cause observers to perceive contingency more strongly, since he so measurelessly oversemanticises his environment and thus applies the contingency-reducing value system in the 'wrong' situations, destabilising normality not only for himself but also for everyone else. He does this both within and outside the household, disrupting not only the maxim of the *kyrios's* control over the household as the bearer of semantic hegemony, but also ignoring the collectively sanctioned religious authorities, in this case one of the official interpreters of the sacred law;²⁵⁷ after a portentous dream, he gets not only

²⁵² Theophr. *Char.* 15.11: δεινός δὲ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς μὴ ἐπεύχεσθαι ("such a one is also capable of not giving thanks to the gods").

²⁵³ Theophr. *Char.* 13.11.

²⁵⁴ See also p. 133 above. On fear of the divine, which is of course the semantic core of *δεισιδαίμωνων*, see Chaniotis, Angelos. "Constructing the Fear of Gods: Epigraphic Evidence from Sanctuaries of Greece and Asia Minor", in: idem (ed.). *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World*. Stuttgart 2012, 205-234. He notes the various degrees to which fear of divine punishment motivated communities and individuals in contingent situations, observes the continuum of evaluation from *εὐσέβεια* to *δεισιδαιμονία*, and sketches the semiotic environment that reproduced these attitudes, i.e. the epigraphic landscape of sacred space.

²⁵⁵ Indicated by Theophr. *Char.* 16.2, where the Superstitious Man elaborately invokes divine protection simply to be ready for a normal day.

²⁵⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 16.6.

²⁵⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 16.6. On the *exegetai pythochrēstoi* and *eupatridon* at Athens cf. Dem. 47.68-71; Isae. 8.39; IG II² 403:19f. These exegetes provided a sanctioned authority that infused structure and order into highly contingent situations, i.e. criminal offenses and religious concerns, such as pollution, by offering a sanctioned solution in accordance with the law. They represent a contingency-reducing locus of authority in the context of religion that seems from the forensic speeches to have been generally accepted. For

a second, but even a third opinion as to its meaning.²⁵⁸ His excessive semanticisation of the world as being full of interfaces into the divine realm, all of which trigger fear of the divine and the ever-mounting need for control, as well as his scepticism of established response patterns, therefore destabilise institutions of contingency control by asserting individual control over them. It is not for nothing that the sketch of the Superstitious Man culminates in him encountering a truly crazy person (*μαινόμενος*) – after all, this is precisely what he himself must be branded to ensure the stability of social control.²⁵⁹

3.6.1.3 Money and the economic interaction mode

The fact that the nature of ‘the ancient economy’ remains a thorny subject complicates any discussion of money and economic interaction modes. Obviously, this is not the place to address this matter in depth.²⁶⁰ For the purpose of this chapter, and based on the evidence of the text under discussion, I will thus state

what little is known see Parker, Robert C.T. *Athenian Religion. A History*. Oxford 1996, 220 with n. 10; Garland, Robert S. J. “Religious Authority in Archaic and Classical Athens”, in: *ABSA* 79 (1984), 75-123, here 82f.

²⁵⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 16.11. On the significance attached to dreams as omens see Harris, William V. *Dreams and Experience in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge, MA 2009, 123-127, who notes the wide variety of attitudes, concluding that normally dreams were not regarded as illuminating the future, though they could come to do so in certain situations. The Superstitious Man is hence disregarding this constraint.

²⁵⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 16.15.

²⁶⁰ See Cartledge, Paul. “The Economy (Economies) of Ancient Greece”, in: Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden (eds.). *The Ancient Economy*. New York 2002, 11-32, and Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard. “Introduction”, in: Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, and Richard Saller (eds.). *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*. Cambridge 2007, 1-12 for summaries of the debate. The two major proponents of an ancient economic ‘primitivism’ as outlined in Max Weber’s concept of the consumer city (1972⁵ [1922], 729, 732), are Karl Polanyi (*The Great Transformation*. Boston 1944) and of course Moses Finley, who influentially argued that (1973b, esp. 21) “[the ancients] in fact lacked the concept of an ‘economy’ and [...] the conceptual elements which together constitute what we call ‘the economy’”. Of course they farmed, traded, manufactured, mined, taxed, coined, deposited and loaned money, made profits or failed in their enterprises. And they discussed these activities in their talk and their writing. What they did not do, however, was to combine these particular activities conceptually into a unit, in Parsonian terms into ‘a differentiated sub-system of society.’” Finley’s argument thus hinges on the absence of self-awareness and conceptual language, not the absence of interaction modes, and that is the crucial point for the present purpose, though of course there is no denying that there is a strong discourse of embedding, e.g. at Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.5-7; see also Tordoff 2012.

only that I agree with the central notion of Karl Polanyi's and Moses Finley's approach, namely the embedded nature of civic economic transactions within the value cosmos of the late fourth century, i.e. its underdevelopment as a full societal system.²⁶¹ This acceptance necessarily complicates and qualifies any use of thought built around the central modern definition of economic action in the neoclassical vein, which holds that economic interactions are generally characterised by rational choice and independent, informed action with the aim of maximising utility and profit, the resultant tensions between the actors being worked out in markets.²⁶² Despite these qualifications, however, I argue that the *Characters* show an implicit awareness of what we might call an economic system, which is present at the level of abstract identity, while the choices made by the individual actor, which are then made manifest in interaction, are tempered by the complex identity networks studied here.²⁶³ The embeddedness of the economic system thus exists at the level of interaction, but not necessarily at the level of identity – there seems to be a movement towards money associating non-embedded interaction. As a matter of fact, Karl Polanyi himself saw late fourth century Athens on the brink of becoming a full market economy.²⁶⁴ As a result, my reading of the *Characters*' economic contingency-reducing value system will make use of modern theory that presupposes an economic subsystem.

As was already observed above, the *Characters* construct a monetised society:²⁶⁵ Even the Country Bumpkin thinks in money and knows what coins are supposed

²⁶¹ Polanyi (et al. 1957) viewed embedded economic interaction as incompatible with market economy and as embodied in an undeveloped economic system characterized by reciprocity and redistribution.

²⁶² A summary of the fundamental principles of the neoclassical economic model is offered by Weintraub, E. Roy. "Neoclassical Economics", in: David R. Henderson (ed.). *Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*. Online 2007. <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html> (Accessed 21.09.2017). On rational choice see Becker, Gary S. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago 1976.

²⁶³ This is clear from the fact that the *Characters* depict economic interactions not in isolation from social interaction but rather as a distinct category of social interaction. Examples are Theophr. *Char.* 1.5 (emphasis on communication); 2.9 (emphasis on visible haste); 4.15 (meta-communication about transactions); 5.8f. (emphasis on visibly exotic wares); 6.4f. (shame of making a great deal out of small interactions); 9.4. Cf. Luhmann 1998, 328, for whom the development of coined money in Lydia ushers in the development of the economic subsystem. For Schaps 2004, 32f. anonymity is crucial.

²⁶⁴ Polanyi 1944. On the contested attitude to money in Classical Athens see e.g. Tordoff, Robert. "Coins, Money, and Exchange in Aristophanes' 'Wealth'", in: *TAPhA* 142:2 (2012), 257-293.

²⁶⁵ Lane Fox 1996, 147 and see above p. 134. Concerns with prices: Theophr. *Char.* 3.3; 4.15; monetized loans: 1.5; 6.9; 9.2; 10.2, 10; 12.11; 14.8; 15.7; 17.9; 18.5, 7; 22.3, 9;

to look like.²⁶⁶ This is not surprising, given the social standing of the individuals portrayed, the general contingency of economic wealth traced by John Davies, and the high level of monetisation Athens enjoyed in the fourth century, a dynamic that was further intensified by the coined gold and silver generated by Alexander's campaigns.²⁶⁷ The contingency-reducing value system of coined money is thus well established in the text and is never the subject of deviation in itself. The individuals portrayed think in terms of money and use it throughout to express value judgements: for instance, the Boastful Man actually has someone tot up the fictitious sums he claims to have spent on aiding his friends and fellow citizens, and the Absent-minded Man forgets the totals of a similar calculation, while the *ὑπερήφανος* shows his arrogance in having his slave perform these kinds of financial transactions with his equals in his stead.²⁶⁸ The only problem that is thematised on one occasion is the materiality of ancient money and the trust relationship necessary to authenticate it. When the Country Bumpkin challenges and tests a coin (*ἀργύριον*) on account of it looking too leaden (*μολυβρόν*),²⁶⁹ he implicitly thematises the constructed nature of this value system, i.e. the trust

30.3, 13; investments: 23.2; 30.15; money itself: 4.13; 5.7; 6.4, 9; 10.6; 12.4; 14.2; 18.3; 21.5; 23.2, 5f., 8; 24.12; 28.4; 30.7, 9, 14.

²⁶⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 4.10; 4.13 also shows him being economically active in the city and thinking in terms of money. It is nevertheless possible that two contradictory associations of *ἀγροικία* might coexist.

²⁶⁷ Davies, John K. *Athenian Propertied Families: 600 - 300 B.C.* Oxford 1971, 260; idem. *Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens.* Salem 1984, 76; Davidson 1997, 183-210; Mørkholm, Otto. *Early Hellenistic Coinage from the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea (336-188 B.C.).* Edited by Philip Grierson and Ulla Westermark. Cambridge 1991, 23f., 42f.; Shipton, Kirsty. *Leasing and Lending: The Cash Economy in fourth-century BC Athens.* London 2000, 7-14; Reger, Gary. "Hellenistic Greece and Western Asia Minor", in: Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, and Richard Saller (eds.). *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World.* Cambridge 2007, 460-483, here 470-472.

²⁶⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 10.4; 14.2; 23.6; 24.12.

²⁶⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 4.10. On counterfeit coins with a lead core, cf. Hdt. 3.56; Dem. 24.214. The text is uncertain and the low level of detail means that no interpretation can claim final authority. Diggle 2004, 215f. is sure that the reason for rejection is a social issue, not the testing, arguing that his inexperience with money makes him unaware that worn silver can look leaden – a joke that only works if the coin appears to Theophrastus' 'normal' Athenian clearly *not* to be made of lead. On the other hand, Rusten 2002, 63 n. 6 (note to 4.13), suspects that the error lies in preferring shinier, but less valuable money over duller, older, and therefore heavier coin, but his parallels hardly bear out his point; Lane Fox 1996, 147 thinks that he is suspicious of the coin being under weight from long use, which Diggle 2004, 216 counters by asserting that "[w]e want an unreasonable quibble, not the kind of thinking which would prompt an Athenian to consult the *δοκιμαστής*." My interpretation thus offers an added level of meaning, based on the social irritation the action evidently causes.

required of the individual to accept coins as valuable. By labelling the episode as deviant, the text defends the coin and its individually, collectively, and institutionally guaranteed weight and value against such suspicions.²⁷⁰

As an aside, it is interesting to note here that the Boastful Man sketch may make reference not to silver money, but to gold (*χρυσίον*), which he obviously considers more prestigious, due to its far greater value (10-9,5:1).²⁷¹ While this point must remain very tentative, since *χρυσίον* can simply mean 'money', which need not even be minted,²⁷² it stands to reason that in the 310s minted gold coins would be Alexanders, i.e. coins minted on the Attic standard but conveying semantics chosen by a Macedonian king.²⁷³ The Boastful Man's general pretenses to Macedonian economic contacts may lend this hypothesis further plausibility, though it is hampered by the fact that actual deposits in Athens have revealed

²⁷⁰ The coin is individually guaranteed by the trust normatively inherent in the *philia* relationship of economic exchange (Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1163b35f). Assuming that the coin in question is to be imagined as an Athenian silver coin, its worth was collectively and institutionally ensured in that the Athenian *boule* appointed public slaves as *δημόσιοι δοκιμασταί*, expert officials who were responsible for authenticating the silver content and marks of Attic and Attic-looking coins in the agora and the Piraeus, taking counterfeit coins out of circulation (SEG XXVI 72:3-5, 10-13, 16-18). See Stroud, Robert S. "An Athenian Law on Silver Coinage", in: *Hesperia* 43:2 (1974), 158-188, esp. 164-167, who also points out that these duties were still being carried out in 306/5 BC, citing IG II² 1492b:102, 111, 137. This inscription seems to attest that the *dokimastai* now also authenticated Alexanders (101f.: [ἀργυ]ρί[ο]ν Α]λέξαν[ν]δρ[ε]ί[ο]ν/[δοκι]μαστὰ τάλ[α]ντα [Ἰ]Δ[Δ]...)], so the money in question need not be Attic for the argument to be valid.

²⁷¹ On the relative value of gold and silver in the period under discussion here see Mørkholm 1991, 43; Lambert, Stephen D. "IG II² 1471A and the Value of Gold at Athens in the 320s B.C.", in: *ZPE* 110 (1996), 84-86.

²⁷² E.g. at Dem. 34.5. It can also be explicitly differentiated from *ἀργύριον*, however, as at Lys. 19.47. This is the only attestation of *χρυσίον* in the *Characters*, otherwise *ἀργύριον* is used: Theophr. *Char.* 4.13; 14.8; 15.7; 17.9; 18.3. Of course this may be pure coincidence, but an intentional choice fits the context of boastfulness.

²⁷³ On the proliferation of Alexanders in the late fourth century see generally Reger 2007, 470-472. Cf. also Aristophanes' complaint (*Ran.* 718-726) about subaerate and gold coinage being un-Athenian, after the failure of the Sicilian expedition necessitated the minting of emergency money in 407/6 BC (see Thompson, Wesley E. "The Date of the Athenian Gold Coinage", in: *AJP* 86:2 (1965), 159-174). The emergency subaerate issue seems to have been later recalled (Aristoph. *Ecol.* 816-822; around 392 BC). Gold coinage recurred only under Lachares in 296 BC (Plut. *Mor.* 379c); it thus seems unlikely that the gold mentioned here would be in the form of Athenian staters. On Athenian coinage at the time see generally Mørkholm 1991, 86f. The 'repersonalisation' of coinage is a feature of the Hellenistic period and constitutes a distinctive difference from the impersonal coinage of the Classical period (Seaford 2004, 152f.).

only relatively few Macedonian coins.²⁷⁴ This sketch is nevertheless the best example of contacts to the new macro-political powers generating wealth and prestige through its ostentatious display, but also of non-Athenian money being more prestigious than Athenian money. Both these sketches thus hint at contingency experiences potentially attached to coinage in the late 4th century BC, though they are not made very explicit.

Despite these two scenes, coinage itself nonetheless generally appears as an unquestioned contingency-reducing value system in the *Characters* and is neither thematised in its controlling function, nor really deviated against. This result is unsurprising in that the monetary system of exchange is not constructed and controlled by the *Characters*' civic collective alone, but constitutes a macro-level medium of value translation. So why discuss it if it is not a source of collective contingency? The problem is not with coinage itself, but lies in the nature of money as a medium in interactions characterised by payment: the system dictates that the presence of payment in an interaction marks it as an economic interaction, its primary evaluative code becoming payment/non-payment.²⁷⁵ The value judgements necessary to balance out the transfer of wealth inherent in payment are facilitated by the contingency-reducing value system of money, one of Luhmann's symbolically generalised media of exchange. As such, money is capable of establishing impersonal relations across boundaries, transcending difference and always tending towards *universal* applicability.²⁷⁶

The occurrence of money in interaction further serves to categorise interaction, reducing the contingencies surrounding the selection of the correct social code. The 'economic' interaction code activated by the occurrence of money includes behavioural maxims, such as making profit.²⁷⁷ The social interaction that

²⁷⁴ Theophr. *Char.* 23.3f. On Macedonian money in the archaeological record of Athens see Lönnqvist, Kenneth. "Studies on the Hellenistic Coinage of Athens: The Impact of Macedonia on the Athenian Money Market in the 3rd Century B.C.," in: Jaakko Frösén (ed.). *Early Hellenistic Athens. Symptoms of a Change*. Helsinki 1997, 119-145, esp. 134f. His data does, however, include one gold Alexander (127, table 4).

²⁷⁵ The concept originally derives from Talcott Parsons. The economic code of payment/non payment and money, its generalised symbolic medium, are elaborated in Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M. 1988, 54f.; 224; 230-243.

²⁷⁶ Luhmann 1988b, 232 with n. 4. This explains the situationally aggressive protection of currency by Greek cities outlined by Sokolowski, Franciszek. "The Athenian Law Concerning Silver Currency (375/4 B.C.)", in: *BCH* 100 (1976), 511-515, here 512f. Cf. also Davidson 1997, 119f.

²⁷⁷ While the maxim of profit in ancient economic interaction was called into question by Finley (Scheidel, Morris, and Saller 2007, 3), this dynamic is apparent in Aristot. *Pol.* 1257b1-5, where the introduction of profit into exchange is the crucial development. On Athenian attitudes to trade, wealth, and money see also Bleicken 1995⁴, 116-133.

follows therefore obeys rules different from those that govern other social interaction.²⁷⁸ In the *Characters* a related sense of collective contingency hence derives from money's function as a medium capable of spanning multiple social interaction modes.²⁷⁹ Because of this expansive versatility, the embeddedness of money, and the social interaction modes tied to the medium, the collective needs to control the contexts in which money is a legitimate value standard, since its misuse can introduce contingency.²⁸⁰ As in the case of religion, the *Characters*' treatment of economic interactions therefore documents a struggle for collective control over the boundaries of an interaction mode in practice. Since this is a core concern of the text, this shall be analysed below when we turn to the interplay within the network of these control regimes.²⁸¹ Before we do so, however, a few other value systems needs to be discussed.

3.6.1.4 Truth

Among many other things, decrees, particularly those of a honorific nature, document the exercise of collective semantic hegemony. The motivation formulae of honorary decrees can be seen as perpetuated manifestations of how the institutionalised citizen collective sets itself up as the authority that ultimately evaluates 'good' in relation to said collective, e.g. by means of the usual formula *ἐπειδὴ ἀνήρ*

²⁷⁸ On profit see Luhmann 1988b, 55-58, esp. 57f.: "Sozial wird das System von Reziprozität unabhängig und damit unabhängig von Bedingungen, die sehr stark durch den sozialen Rang der Beteiligten beeinflussbar sind. Erst diese Ausdifferenzierung aus der normal erwarteten Reziprozität macht die Wirtschaft autonom, nämlich fähig sich selbst zu regulieren. Profit ist ein zustimmungsunabhängiges Motiv, und es selegiert das Handeln auch nicht durch die Erwartung, dass sich der andere komplementär verhalten wird [...]. Profit ist mit alledem für soziale Konditionierungen weniger anfällig als Reziprozität." An independent economic system of interaction rules features in the *Characters* in the passage that criticises the Penny-pincher for overcharging because the re-seller will not be able to make any profit (*Theophr. Char.* 10.7), the expectation of profit is thus crucial on both sides of the transaction. In doing so, however, the text suggests the need for balance in the transaction, moderating the autonomy of the economic code and complicating the situation by documenting the lived entanglement of the social codes.

²⁷⁹ Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1133b10-22 already observes the versatility of money as a means of creating relational measurements of value between disparate objects.

²⁸⁰ Aristotle's discussion of money (*Pol.* 1257a1-1258b8) already outlines a number of fundamental problems. See on this Meikle, Scott. "Aristotle on Money", in: *Phronesis* 39:1 (1994), 26-44, esp. 26-29.

²⁸¹ This unease regarding monetary exchange corresponds to the role of money in bringing about a new kind of individual self in the first place: Seaford 2004, 294.

ἀγαθός ἐστιν περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων (“because he is an excellent man in relation to the people of Athens”).²⁸² On brief honorary bases that is all the reader has to know, which makes the performativity of this collective enforcement of value-judgement through the exertion of collective agency particularly visible; John Ma has recently called this “the ontological primacy of community over individual”.²⁸³ He has also pointed out, however, that the decrees invariably constitute an act of negotiation between individual and collective interests and therefore manifest a compromise: “[t]he *polis* needed to maintain equilibria between competitive pressures, between the affirmation of the public sphere and the constitution of an elite, between community ideology and family expression [...]”.²⁸⁴ This contested nature of truth, which, I would argue, is the underlying concern here, is visible also in the *Characters* in that they are concerned with exercising control over the relational configuration of the semiotic and semantic webs of significance that regulate these equilibria. Drawing an example from the same context, the Man of Petty Ambition (μικροφιλότιμος) behaves deviantly in that he derives distinction vis-à-vis his fellow citizens via interaction modes that are not sanctioned by the collective. Unsanctioned expressions of distinction within fora of interaction thus need to be sanctioned, since the individual is exercising individual hegemony over the construction of social difference and the honour differential that keeps the equilibrium in balance.²⁸⁵ Similarly, the Friend of Villains (φιλοπόνηρος) and the Slanderer (κακολόγος) impose their own judgements of good and bad on their environment, undermining collective judgement in the process.²⁸⁶

The concept of truth is obviously a crucial underlying component in all contingency-reducing value systems, as it underpins the power dynamics of society: dictating what is true is the quintessence of power.²⁸⁷ In the constructivist perspective adopted here, truth is a correlative value, a harmony check between

²⁸² Ma 2013b, 55-63. An example from the period under discussion here is, e.g., IG II² 450:13. The value cosmos of Athenian honorary decrees has been studied in depth by Whitehead 1983 and 1986, and Veligianni-Terzi 1997. On the honours and the formulas see fundamentally Henry, Alan S. *Honours and privileges in Athenian decrees: the principal formulae of Athenian honorary decrees*. Hildesheim 1983.

²⁸³ Ma 2013b, 62. The first honorary decrees in fifth-century Athens are of this type: Whitehead 1983, 61.

²⁸⁴ Ma 2013b, 238.

²⁸⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 21.2-5, 7-11.

²⁸⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 28, esp. 5f. and 29.2-5.

²⁸⁷ Foucault 1978, 51: “Jede Gesellschaft hat ihre eigene Ordnung der Wahrheit: d.h. sie akzeptiert bestimmte Diskurse, die sie als wahre Diskurse funktionieren lässt; es gibt Mechanismen und Instanzen, die eine Unterscheidung von wahren und falschen Aus-

perception-based constructions, and is thus closely entwined with the trust relationships covered by *philia* at an individual level. At the same time, it is also collectively developed as a generalised symbolic medium of communication that can be invoked by using the markers and techniques associating this medium, for instance the attribution of information to external sources.²⁸⁸ The *Characters* reinforce the prerogative of the collective to define the relevant signifiers and meanings for individuals, i.e. to determine what is good and what is bad. Accordingly, the *Characters marginalise individual control of contingency perception and sanction individual world-fashioning*: the Boastful Man, the Toady, and the Coward are all branded for their creation of narratives that do not harmonise with collective perception, but are deceptive in their potential truthfulness.²⁸⁹ The Slanderer lays claim to the protection of *parrësia* in order to sanction his malicious vilification of his friends and fellow citizens – a triple deviation against truth, the crucial democratic value of free speech, and the central control regime of *philia*.²⁹⁰ It is surely no coincidence that this is the Slanderer's final sketch, the culmination of his deviance. The same prerogative is visible in the case of the Friend of Villains, who associates precisely with those whom the collective has officially branded as deviant, namely those who have lost a case in a court of law.²⁹¹ He further destabilises the collective value judgements necessary to establish cohesion and order by relativising categories of good and evil – e.g. by casting the *πόνηρος* as *ἐλεύθερος* – and undermining the court's decision when acting as juror.²⁹²

The most nuanced example is provided by the very first character type, the Dissembler: his threat to the constructed society of the *Characters* lies precisely in his interference with this collective prerogative of semantic control. His dissemblance and lies interfere with the web of observation and evaluation woven by the collective – which depends on truth – and thereby increase potential contingency within the social network by reducing the predictability of social interaction.²⁹³ It

sagen ermöglichen und den Modus festlegen, in dem die einen oder anderen sanktioniert werden; es gibt bevorzugte Techniken und Verfahren zur Wahrheitsfindung; es gibt einen Status für jene, die darüber zu befinden haben, was wahr ist und was nicht.”; cf. White 2008², 224f.

²⁸⁸ Luhmann 1998, 339f.

²⁸⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 25.

²⁹⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 28.2-6, esp. 6. On *parrësia* and truth see Foucault, Michel. *Das Wahrsprechen des Anderen. Zwei Vorlesungen 1983/84*. Frankfurt a.M. 1988. In fourth-century Athens, the evaluation of truth is bound to the trust placed in the actor, which is in turn grounded in moral non-deviation, i.e. adherence to control regime, which generates predictability via absence of perceived contingency.

²⁹¹ Theophr. *Char.* 29.2-6.

²⁹² Theophr. *Char.* 29.3-6.

²⁹³ Theophr. *Char.* 1 *passim*, esp. 1.2-4.

seems that the perceptible nature of his deceptive interactions is enough to incur sanction: the Dissembler's linguistic manifestation of doubt is sufficient to disturb communication in a problematic way, fundamentally affecting the social network around him.²⁹⁴ But this sketch is also interesting for another reason, since his very first micro-narrative (indeed the first in the entire text!) in fact addresses the destabilisation of other contingency-reducing value systems through violations of collective semantic hegemony:²⁹⁵ The Dissembler has personal enemies (ἐχθροί) in the polis – a societal problem in and of itself since it encourages the dissolution of the community into smaller groups – but rather than showing his enmity, he disguises it, thereby generating divergent versions of reality with different semantic control regimes. This further adds to the existing social stress produced by the enmity. The constructed society of the *Characters* has to sanction such behaviour, especially since the macro-political tensions of the time already benefit the creation of subjectivist world orders, which can in turn lead to individually dominated group formation and a concomitant loss of collective agency.²⁹⁶ He also employs collective linguistic constructs designed to thematise and correct interactions that fail the truth harmony check, but uses them to further destabilise truth rather than to stabilise the semantic world.²⁹⁷ While the Dissembler looks quite harmless at first glance, his behaviour thus fundamentally threatens the connectivity of the collective social network.

3.6.1.5 Thematising the system

In sum then, the worst source of collective contingency related to the interference with contingency-reducing value systems appears to lie in the thematisation of the constructed nature of these systems. Speaking about the constructed nature of the rules that organise the social network potentially destabilises social interaction to the point of collapse, because it strips away the occlusion effected by the efficacy of contingency-reducing dynamics and their network structure. Up to a point this dynamic is inherent in any of the transgressions and is part both of the text's subtle wit and of the reason why transgressions need to be collectively sanctioned, but the *Characters* also offers a number of more explicit examples:²⁹⁸

²⁹⁴ Theophr. *Char.* 1.6.

²⁹⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 1.2.

²⁹⁶ On collective agency see Luhmann 1984, 271-274.

²⁹⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 1.6.

²⁹⁸ On the wit of the *Characters* see Millett 2007, 38-40, who identifies a blend of “naturalism and exaggeration across and even within individual *Characters*” (38). Ivo Volt (2007, 113f.) similarly noted their situational comedy and reliance on the reader's prior

in the case of *philia*, the Grumbler explicitly complains about owing his friends favours in exchange for an *eranos* loan, irritating his interlocutor by showing the wrong reaction, self-reflexive unhappiness rather than content.²⁹⁹ The Disagreeable Man not only explicitly discusses “his parasite” at dinner with a guest friend, but also implicitly applies this label to all his friends, whom he likens to a “leaking *pitbos*”, decrying them all as leeches violating the reciprocity of *philia*.³⁰⁰ When the Arrogant Man insists that his interlocutor remember the good deed he has received, he explicitly thematises the debt incurred, destabilising the value system by making the implicit obligation explicit and lamenting the dynamics of memory that enable it to function.³⁰¹ A particularly strong case of system thematisation can be found in the sketch of the Slanderer, who openly communicates his processes of observation and evaluation, but does so in a negative and falsifying way.³⁰² He thus thematises the dynamics that ensure the transparency of interaction and the semantic hegemony of the collective, while also violating the value system of truth that maintains the stringency of this system. As we saw earlier, truth is also visible as a relative construction in the passages of the Boastful Man, the Coward, the Dissembler, and the Rumour Monger.³⁰³ As for religion, the Superstitious Man's oversemanticisation likewise challenges the normality of religious practice along these lines.³⁰⁴ In the economic sphere, the Self-centred Man

cultural knowledge. The wit of the text accordingly lies in the subtle deviations from the audience's expectations and the creation of a functional and meaningful context for this perceived incongruence, e.g. by generating and exaggerating situations. See e.g. Schwind, Klaus. “Komisch”, in: Karlheinz Barck et al. (eds.). *Ästhetische Grundbegriffe*. 7 vols. Stuttgart 2000-2005, 3 (2000), 332-384, here 333: “Im Komischen werden für die Wahrnehmung inkongruente Kontexte über zwei- oder mehrwertige Bezüge auf eine ungewohnte Weise überraschend miteinander kombiniert, so dass plötzlich eine Durchlässigkeit zwischen diesen Kontexten aufscheint.”

²⁹⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 17.9.

³⁰⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 20.9f.: *καὶ τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸν τετραγμένον πίθον*. The same man is also far too explicit about the flute-girl he has ‘ordered’. The parasite appears largely as a literary phenomenon in New Comedy, but was an established social role already in the Archaic period (Archilochos fr. 124b West), easily identified but evidently not spoken about (Konstan 1997a, 98-100). The creation of a specific social role that brands these people and their evidently continuous existence – based solely of course on the continuous occurrence of the literary trope – serves as a means of communicating the illicit blending of economic code and friendship code.

³⁰¹ Theophr. *Char.* 24.3.

³⁰² Theophr. *Char.* 28, esp. 8.5.

³⁰³ Theophr. *Char.* 1.2-6; 8.4-10; 23.2-9; 25.3-8.

³⁰⁴ Theophr. *Char.* 16.3, 5f., 8f., 11-14.

thematizes the economic dynamic of profit, exposing the fundamental egocentrism of this value system.³⁰⁵ The violation of the contingency-reducing value systems that exert social meta-control thus always entails a potential threat to the illusion of normality. This threat manifests as perceived contingency and is countered by the exercise of individual agency *in harmony with the collective norm*.

3.6.2 Contingency caused by undermining collective cohesion and agency

*If everyone were like me, there'd be no more courts, people would not drag each other off to prison, there would be no war – everyone would be contented having moderate possessions.*³⁰⁶

Knemon (Menander *Dyskolos* 743-745)

The second form of collective contingency is even more fundamental than the violations of its prominent control regimes, since it is constructed in response to the collective's concern for its very existence, i.e. the integrity of the social network and its manifestation in the exercise of agency. In order to maintain the master-narrative of the control regimes, the constructing body, the collective, needs to maintain its configuration in action. While it obviously does so also by living the control regimes outlined above, the *Characters* also shows more direct threats to this collective's cohesion. The first of these expands on a point made earlier in the analysis of the truth regime: it consists in the creation by individual interaction of sub-networks of semantic control that split up the civic collective and fracture the communicative cohesion of its social network. The Oligarch inviting his friends to withdraw from the web of observation in place in the sanctioned fora of collective interaction and the Country Bumpkin disclosing information from the assembly to slaves and non-citizens are the most obvious examples of this contingency being controlled through sanction in the text.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 15.4.

³⁰⁶ Menand. *Dyskolos* 743-745: [εἰ τοιοῦτοι πάντες ἦσαν, οὔτε τὰ δικαστήρια/ ἦν ἄν, οὔθ' αὐτοὺς ἀπήγον εἰς τὰ δεσμωτήρια./ οὔτε πόλεμος ἦν, ἔχων δ' ἄν μέτρι' ἕκαστος ἡγάπα. The *Dyskolos* was performed in 316 BC and is thus roughly contemporary with the *Characters*. The passage quoted is part of a retrospective self-defence offered by the titular grumbler, Knemon, after his reformation. While Green 1990, 73f., reads this passage as a plea for a simpler world, I think it probable that social discourse is once again more complicated: The passage is a construction of a retrojected social imaginary that marginalises the newly perceived contingencies while simultaneously integrating them.

³⁰⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 4.3; 26.3.

The quotation from the *Dyskolos* above evokes a perfectly cohesive world based on complete identity across society, and thereby makes us aware of a number of things to be found also in the *Characters*. The first is that this kind of societal fracturing is countered by another control regime, namely that of equality.³⁰⁸ The *Characters* offers a specific construction of this value in that there is no talk of *ισότης*, a notion of equality that was subject to substantial semantic tension. Various critics of Athenian democracy, such as Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle, to name a few, document a discourse that contrasts a meritocratic form of equality with a levelling form; unsurprisingly, these particular intellectuals prefer meritocracy.³⁰⁹

The *Characters*, I would argue, sidestep this issue by simply avoiding the contested word and implementing a related concept via the construction of a community of *ἐλευθέριοι*, of “free, wealthy men who act the part.” *Eleutherios* thus describes the implementation of a specific concept of *eleutheria* in interaction. Visible also elsewhere in Theophrastus and even criticised as a social ideal peculiar to the Peripatetic circle,³¹⁰ this concept is most explicit in the *ἀνελεύθερος* sketch, rendered by Diggle as the ‘Illiberal Man’. In describing behaviour inappropriate to a free man, the text seems to focus exclusively on parsimonious behaviour, which fits well with the criticism levelled against the Peripatetics, but also highlights that the avoidance of paying for slaves and clothing constitutes a destruction of the visible markers of an *eleutherios* and thus interferes with the legibility of the social sphere and its web of observation and control.³¹¹ A closer look reveals further interference with collective agency: rather than manifesting the collectively and institutionally assigned honour granted by his choral victory in an appropriate fashion, the Illiberal Man chooses the cheapest possible option, a wooden headband with minimal inscription. In the second scene, he quietly slinks out of the *ekklesia* rather than honouring the collective’s call for *epidoseis*.³¹² These situations are alike in that the collective is vulnerable and its cohesion and its implementation of control through the exercise of collective agency depend on an individual

³⁰⁸ It is also countered by the collective sanctioning certain kinds of social sub-networks in certain contexts, e.g. the symposium.

³⁰⁹ Isoc. 3.14; 7.21. Plat. *Rep.* 558c and *Leg.* 757b-c; Aristot. *Pol.* 1301a26-1301b4; 1302a7.

³¹⁰ Teles 40f. Hense; cf. Diog. Laert. 6.90 where Theophrastus is portrayed as being generally known for his rich attire. Cf. also Isoc. 4 49; Aristot. *Pol.* 1339b5, where the term is used to refer to refined education and taste; in Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.22 it is a positive, visible quality.

³¹¹ Theophr. *Char.* 22.5-13. Slaves: 4, 7, 10, 12; clothing: 5, 8, 11, 13. Cf. Millett 2007, 101-103.

³¹² Theophr. *Char.* 22. Cf. Theophr. *Char.* 13.2, where the Overzealous Man may be committing himself to financial aid he cannot actually provide, generating similar contingency in a vulnerable situation for the collective.

responding – in the first case the collective has assigned a distinction the individual is expected to confirm, whereas in the second scenario, the collective is dependent on the financial aid of its constituents, again in exchange for honour. The Illiberal Man thus disregards the value of honour that ensures the collectively guarded balance between said collective and the distinguished individual, so disregards the medium that maintains equality in difference. The Toady similarly deviates against this control regime of equality by exhibiting slave-like behaviour that is inappropriate to someone who has the means to be an *eleutherios*.³¹³ The Arrogant Man treats his fellow citizens as inferior, to the point of rejecting offices he has been elected to,³¹⁴ and the Oligarch emphatically dissociates himself from those he perceives to be of lower social standing.³¹⁵ All these passages document the destruction of the cohesion of this constructed community through actions that remove individuals from this value-correlated group and impose individual control over the construction of the relevant community.

The second issue raised by the quotation from the *Dyskolos* is the significance of collective agency. Knemon claims that perfect collective identity would abolish the need for institutions of collective agency, naming courts and warfare as examples. The constructivist approach easily dismantles this wishful thinking by highlighting that the cohesion of the collective is renewed precisely via the constant exercise of agency as a collective. Ensuring collective agency in the courts, the smooth functioning of the fora and the networks of sociopolitical exchange in general is hence a core concern of the *Characters*. The Talker, the Tactless Man, the Repulsive Man (βδελυρός), the Overzealous Man (περιεργος), the Obtuse Man (ἀναισθητος), and the Friend of Villains all interfere with collective action and thus prevent the exercise of agency in sync with the normative order, resulting in its disturbance.³¹⁶ Whereas the Talker's appreciation of his own voice leads him to halt progress in the law court and the theatre, the Man who has lost all sense, for instance, destabilises the law court by being so frequently involved in legal disputes and by disrupting procedure by introducing motions and bringing excessive amounts of evidence.³¹⁷ The Obtuse Man finally wastes the time of his fellow citizens by missing an appointment at court and generally by being an untrustworthy part of the social network.³¹⁸ In the assembly, the Slanderer besmirches

³¹³ Theophr. *Char.* 2.5, 8 (acts as go-between); 9 (goes shopping in the women's agora, cf. 22.7); 11 (explicitly tears the pillow from the slave's hands in the theatre). On acting like a slave cf. Millett 2007.

³¹⁴ Theophr. *Char.* 24 *passim*.

³¹⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 26.3-5.

³¹⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 7.7f.; 11.3, 5, 8; 12; 13.2f., 5-7, 11; 14.3f.; 29.6.

³¹⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 6.8.

³¹⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 14.3 and *passim*.

the speaker's reputation, similarly harming the bonds of trust necessary for collective action.³¹⁹ The *Characters* further highlights that collective agency is developed not only at the political level of polis politics, but also at the social level of collective meals, where the individual's contribution to collective agency is similarly enforced. Hence the Penny-pincher's sub-par contribution to a communal meal is a case of the deficiency of the part weakening the whole.³²⁰ The smooth functioning of the social network of the constructed collective of *eleutheroi* as embodied by the exercise of collective agency by a firmly delineated, value-correlated collective is thus reinforced throughout the text, ensuring that the collective value constructs are constantly being enacted in individual interaction.

3.7 A network of values

Now that the text's construction of contingency has been charted, the final step in this analysis of the *Characters* consists in drawing together the individual value systems outlined above. According to Harrison White, values fuel unending struggles for control among actors, whether individual or composite, who are constantly employing and affirming their value configurations in the course of reaching some equilibrium in the face of duplicity and contention.³²¹ The *Characters* can be read as both reflection and *response* to this dynamic, an assertion of meta-control via a specific narrative construction of a hierarchical network of value judgements. This is particularly visible wherever tension between value-systems is tangible in the text and the following section is devoted to mapping these conflicts between the collectively contingency-reducing value systems outlined above. After that, I will explore the mechanisms that maintain this network, i.e. the mechanisms of sanction that implement meta-control, and finally abstract the social network structure the *Characters* thereby develops as its ideal, drawing on network theory to outline its dynamics.

3.7.1 The cognitive network: Meta-control under tension

The plurality of existing value regimes, including the prominent ones outlined above, *philia*, economy, religion, and truth, naturally contributes to their misapplication in individual interaction as their boundaries are constantly being tested

³¹⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 28.5.

³²⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 10.3.

³²¹ White 2008², 223.

in individual responses to contingency. Unfortunately, the text's extensive occlusion of collective religious practice precludes the evaluation of related conflicts, since the text shields these interaction modes from social deviation. Nevertheless, the *Characters* does show some examples of the resultant tension between the value systems. The three 'economic' sketches are the most explicit portrayal of the extensive misapplication of a collectively valued interaction mode.³²² As a result, tension between interaction modes is visible most prominently between the economic mode, associated by actors in interactions involving the transfer of wealth, especially in the form of money, and the positive reciprocity and trust associated by *philia* relationships, which are ensured by truth and equality.³²³ Let us now consider a few particularly significant examples from the text in an effort to hone in on the value network painted by the *Characters*.

The Illiberal Man, for instance, overapplies the economic principles of profit maximisation and expense minimisation by extending them to *philia* relationships, affecting not only his monetised dealings with the citizen collective, but also with his family and friends.³²⁴ In doing so, he disregards the Aristotelian solution to this issue of code switching by not accepting the predominance of *philia* and the measure of esteem that makes up the difference.³²⁵ It is not surprising that the description of the Penny-pincher also provides many examples of such tension: he forbids his wife to perform an essential neighbourhood service that greases the social network surrounding the *oikos*, namely lending small items of every-day use, and himself forbids others from partaking of his fruit trees.³²⁶ When a fellow citizen does him a favour by saving him a trip to the market, he complains about the expense – i.e. economic loss – rather than reinforcing the trust relationship that enabled the action.³²⁷ The value configuration of the text seems to dictate

³²² Theophr. *Char.* 10; 22; 30. This form of bad timing is generally visible in the Untimely Man sketch (12), though it obviously derives from a lack of perceptiveness, a failure to coordinate perception and identity in accordance with norm. The other prominent form of code misapplication is the misuse of sanctioning mechanisms, for example the use of corrective communication and meta-communication in disagreement with truth, visible e.g. as slander (28), rumour (8), and faux disbelief (1.10). These sanctioning mechanisms will be discussed below, e.g. p. 155, as they are integral to the social network structure.

³²³ Konstan 1997a, 82, notes the non-economic nature of friendship. For the conflict observed here see also the theoretical observations by Luhmann 1988b, 240f.

³²⁴ Theophr. *Char.* 22.2f. (collective), 4, 6, 10 (family), 9 (friends).

³²⁵ Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1163b10-20. With Finley 1973b, 21 this appears as a conceptual consequence of the underdevelopment of the economic sub-system.

³²⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 10.8, 13. Dem. 55.23 shows that the normal cordial behaviour between neighbours extended to bonds between the women.

³²⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 10.4.

that friends be treated as economically privileged partners through balanced or positive reciprocity, the collective demanding the precedence of the *philia* modifier over the economic code. This constructed primacy of *philia* is intended to allow for the resolution of all social situations by providing a hierarchy of interaction modes, while simultaneously curtailing the social connectivity generated by the economic interaction mode. Economic fraud among friends, as in the case of the Shabby Profiteer, who sells his friend watered-down wine, is thus characterised as particularly heinous, precisely because two contingency-reducing value systems conflict, both of which are sanctioned by the collective.³²⁸ The prominence of the *eranos* loan as a social institution in the text is thus not surprising, because it blurs the boundaries between *philia* and economic interaction mode: unsurprisingly, the Illiberal Man evades such a loan, taking advantage of social meta-communication to apply the economic interaction mode.³²⁹ The Ungrateful Grumbler, on the other hand, ultimately agrees to contribute to a loan for a friend, controlling individual contingency by reproducing the collective norm.³³⁰ The Distrustful Man (*ἄπιστος*) is similarly on the cusp, since only very close friendship or a blood relationship can convince him to give precedence to *philia* over the economic mode.³³¹ Notably, the primacy of *philia* over the economic mode goes so far as to cause the Penny-pincher to be sanctioned for not allowing his business partner any profit-margin of his own after a sale.³³² The priority of the *philia* system over the economic code is thus asserted even within purely economic transactions and emerges as the central structuring principle of the *Characters'* abstract network of identities.

The reason for this may lie in the nature of the economic code, which simplifies interaction by offering an absolute code for its evaluation – is payment complete or not? – and invites the attachment of subsequent interactions that operate on the same code.³³³ This runs counter to the model of social connectivity developed in the *Characters*, which hinges on the value nexus of *philia*. The latter implements reciprocity, truth, and trust, i.e. the fundamental expectation that every social action incurs an equivalent or better reaction designed to move towards balancing a virtual tally without ever achieving balance due to the complexity of social interaction. This paradoxical chain of social dominoes aids in the constant reproduction of social interaction in accordance with the constructed value order and thereby enforces collectivism, the precedence of the collective of

³²⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 30.5, 12.

³²⁹ Theophr. *Char.* 22.9.

³³⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 15.7.

³³¹ Theophr. *Char.* 18.7.

³³² Theophr. *Char.* 10.7.

³³³ Luhmann 1988, 244.

other, but equal individuals, i.e. the wealthy citizens of the socio-political community constructed by the *patrios politeia*. The narrative of the *Characters* with its underlying, unspecific, mediating norms impresses on the individual that he is to construct contingency and resolve its perception in accordance with these collective configurations: while *reciprocity* removes individual contingency since the individual is reassured that any action will produce an equal or equivalent reaction, *collectivism* levels the individual, reducing and focusing the idiosyncratic plurality of identities that form the individual and cause the deviations visible in the *Characters*. Thereby, the collective takes possession of the individual's agency. Put differently, this means that the individual has to endure the individual contingencies he perceives in order to reduce contingency for the collective. To that end, contingencies are countered by individual agency constructed in the sense of the collective, i.e. in response to collective contingency.

The next step is to provide a more detailed analysis of these two *mediating* value systems normatively implemented in the *Characters*' social imaginary. Even a cursory reading of the *Characters* will reveal that an insistence on reciprocity is central to the text, as it was to Greek culture.³³⁴ Besides the sphere of social and divine interaction,³³⁵ this is particularly visible in the economy of sharing, lending, and borrowing that can be traced in almost every sketch, taking the shape of what Thomas Gallant has called a "hierarchically differentiated support network".³³⁶ This economy, which has been thoroughly studied by Paul Millett, consists in helping one another out and in sharing not only items of every-day use, but also information, relating, for instance, to trade and society.³³⁷ A more specifically economic aspect is the socio-economic institution of *eranos* we touched on above,

³³⁴ On reciprocity in Greek culture see e.g. Herman, Gabriel. *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*. Cambridge 1987, esp. 92-94 (on trust and reciprocity); Millett 1991, esp. 30-44, 110; Gallant 1991, 146-152; Mitchell 1997, esp. 1, 16, 164-166; note also the contributions collected in Christopher Gill, Norman Postlethwaite, and Richard Seaford (eds.). *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*. Oxford 1998.

³³⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 15.3 (greeting); 15.11 (gods).

³³⁶ The economy of sharing, lending, and borrowing encompasses everything from communal loans to items of every-day use and information: Theophr. *Char.* 1.5; 2.6, 9, 10; 3.3 (information about the price of grain); 4.13-15; 9.3; 10.2-4, 8, 11-13; 11.7; 12.4 (standing bail); 14.8; 15.5, 7; 17.2; 17.9; 22.4, 9; 30. See esp. Millett 1991, esp. 143-148; Gallant 1991, 143-169, esp. 152-155 (quotation from 152). Gallant abstracts the value-correlated social network he is discussing in the form of concentric circles. As the problems for the individual grow, the further afield his search for support takes him, in a progress from close friends to distant polis-level benefactors. On the practice of lending in the early Hellenistic period cf. also Walser, Andreas V. *Bauern und Zinsnehmer. Politik, Recht und Wirtschaft im frühhellenistischen Ephesos*. Munich 2008, 105-195.

³³⁷ Cf. e.g. Lys. 1.14 and Aristoph. *Eccl.* 376-477, where information and services are shared in a similar fashion.

a communal meal or an interest-free neighbourhood loan that evens out the wealth distribution within a social peer group, conserving its socio-economic cohesion.³³⁸ We have now seen that collective sanction is employed against individuals that refuse to participate in interaction networks structured by *philia*, or participate only selectively or even exploitatively. Reciprocity as the interaction mode of *philia* thus emerges as a central, contingency-reducing expectation for interaction. Since it is particularly crucial within a social network like the one constructed by the *Characters*, in which the male civic community is supposedly egalitarian, it is not at all surprising that this value system is so prominently policed in this text.

The second central mediating value system is collective precedence, made manifest in the collective hegemony over truth and its intent on self-preservation. The centrality of this value concept is visible already in the fact that 'excessive' engagement for the collective in accordance with the normative cosmos is not found as a deviant behavioural type in the *Characters*.³³⁹ The previous analysis of contingency construction has shown that the collectivism implemented in this text consists in prioritising contingencies constructed by the collective over contingencies that may be perceived by the individual, meaning that the individual subscribes to the value judgements of society and employs his agency in compatible ways. This is the result of a continuously reinforced consensus about the nominal equality of the individual constituents of the collective and the resultant precedence of majority interest,³⁴⁰ which is of course deeply embedded in the political institutions that embody collective agency, namely the majority vote and the lot.³⁴¹ The value is thus tied to the maintenance of collective agency. In the context of the dichotomy between individual and collective studied here, collectivism has another level to it, namely a certain degree of individual transparency: collective observation and evaluation have been constructed as a prerequisite for the stability of the collective. As a consequence, the individual has to endure the

³³⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 1.5; 15.7; 17.9; 22.9.

³³⁹ Cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 10.3, where Hypereides is made to contrast individual gain and collective welfare: ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ σκοπεῖτε μόνον εἰ πικρὸς, ἀλλ' εἰ προικᾶ εἶμι πικρὸς ("Athenians, test not only whether I am harsh, but whether I am harsh without being bribed").

³⁴⁰ On egalitarianism see Schofield, Malcolm. "Political Friendship and the Ideology of Reciprocity", in: Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett, and Sitta von Reden (eds.). *Kosmos. Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens*. Cambridge 1998, 37-51, here 43-47. The precedence of majority interest is also visible in the monopoly of honour exercised by the institutionalised political collective (Ma 2013b), made manifest in the civic space through monumentalisation (e.g. also at Theophr. *Char.* 22.1f.).

³⁴¹ On the majority vote see Bleicken 1995⁴, 193-209, and recently Flaig, Egon. *Die Mehrheitsentscheidung: Entstehung und kulturelle Dynamik*. Paderborn 2013.

individual contingencies identified above by subscribing to the superimposed collective narrative of contingency.

3.7.2 The social network: Sanction in the *Characters*

One major aspect has hitherto remained unaddressed, namely how the collective constructs and controls the actual sanctioning mechanisms that maintain its value regimes. While one can assume the general validity of the social sanctioning mechanisms identified by Kenneth Dover, i.e. honour, shame, and the gods, our textual analysis has hitherto established only that the collective necessarily sanctions through the individual.³⁴² While the text does not generally discuss this process, making explicit analysis difficult, this apparent gap can be read as an elegant mechanism if we recall Luhmann's argument that productive power has to *avoid* sanction at all costs: having sanctions be purely implicit and therein relegated beyond the diegesis makes the text far more socially productive and therefore powerful.³⁴³ Even if we accept this general observation, however, more can be said about the construction of sanction in the text, though it is largely implicit. One possible way of approaching the matter is to consider the text's documentation of the misuse of normative tools, assuming that this will provide some insight into the construction of these tools, which would then be valid in both the textual and the 'real' world it projects.

The only scholar who seems to have studied this aspect of the *Characters* is Paul Millett. Buttressing his argument with anthropological work, he unsurprisingly argued that the most important corrective social tool in the *Characters* is shame, as well as its positive counterpart, social honour.³⁴⁴ As was observed above, these would be implemented through communication and meta-communication, i.e. gossip, and encoded in collectivised memory. The strongest case in point is the sketch of the Shameless Man (*ἀναίσχυρος*), who secures individual

³⁴² Luhmann 1984, 270-282; Dover 1974, 217-272. The gods keep the individual in check even where collective agency cannot probe (258f.). In general, mechanisms of social sanction apply only to individuals who assign relatively high value to their social network (217).

³⁴³ Luhmann 1988², 23f.

³⁴⁴ Millett 2007, 58-68. An exception is the Man who has lost all sense (whom Jebb 1909² called 'the Reckless Man'), since he comes into conflict with the law and spends time in prison: Theophr. *Char.* 6.6, 8. His case may be at the very end of the spectrum, but one must bear in mind that the legal sanctioning of deviant behaviour in the courts of law is similarly based, at least in part, on shaming the individual in the eyes of the collective.

economic advantages by exploiting the value of *philia*.³⁴⁵ His epithet implies that his defining trait is his immunity to the social corrective of shame that is supposed to prevent such behaviour – a suspicion confirmed by the fact that the Shameless Man invariably interacts with equals in the sanctioned fora of interaction. In general, the *Characters* thematise numerous scenarios in which individuals praise or decry the behaviour of others in 'public' situations, naturally always in deviant ways. The Toady, for instance, praises his 'object's' attire, conduct, and assets.³⁴⁶ The Slanderer maliciously overapplies the social device of gossip: rather than reinforcing collective values, he knows no limit, abusing people's looks, their wives and their conduct within the household, and even his own friends, relatives, and the dead.³⁴⁷

So far, identifying shame and honour as the key collective sanctioning mechanisms seems plausible and their real power in this society is beyond doubt.³⁴⁸ But perhaps we can go a step further? Consider that the narrator of the *Characters* never details the concrete collective reactions to the deviant behaviour described – the non-focalised figures do not generally have agency. Paul Millett's preferred corrective of collective assignment of honour and shame through communication and meta-communication is thus tangible only implicitly and in inversion, as are its consequences for the individual. The reason why this aspect has been omitted thus far is now that in the perspective adopted here, sanction can emerge as being tied into the social network configuration envisaged by the *Characters*. Reading the *Characters* as snapshots of micro- and meso-level social networks at play allows me to suggest that what is actually explicitly visible within the text is another – but more significant – aspect of the same dynamic, namely the effect of honour and shame on social contact and the connectivity of the social network. This in turn obviously depends on an underlying premise of the text, namely that social connectivity is valuable, as is implied by the web of observation and the maxim of collective cohesion we identified earlier.³⁴⁹

This being a textual analysis, two levels will need to be differentiated, the intradiegetic and the extradiegetic, before the results can be abstracted and integrated into a final conclusion, which will present the text itself as a society on a network model.³⁵⁰ At the intradiegetic level, a connectivity dynamic manifests

³⁴⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 9.2-8.

³⁴⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 2.2-4, 10-12.

³⁴⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 28.3f.

³⁴⁸ See Dover 1974, 226-242; Cohen 1991.

³⁴⁹ See p. 126 above.

³⁵⁰ On these levels of narrative see Genette, Gérard. *Die Erzählung*. Munich 1998², esp. 163: "Jedes Ereignis, von dem in einer Erzählung erzählt wird, liegt auf der nächsthöheren diegetischen Ebene zu der, auf der der hervorbringende narrative Akt dieser

most explicitly as denial of contact, visible in the sole occurrence of a collective reaction to deviant action in the *Characters*: in the Talker's sketch his listeners turn and walk away, denying him the social surface necessary to assert his idiosyncratic world configuration, and reaffirming collective value-judgement through their agency.³⁵¹ The same dynamic is naturally more common in inversion, for instance when the Shameless Man moves out of range of communication after committing his transgressions against the butcher and the bath attendant, when the Illiberal Man slinks across the street to avoid a loan-seeking friend, or when the Arrogant Man denies access to his person.³⁵² In order to maintain its cohesion, however, the social network needs to be resilient and attempt to enforce control in ways that do not immediately affect connectivity, which of course needs to be preserved for the exercise of collective agency.³⁵³

Accordingly, communication of distrust also works as a social corrective. The Dissembler illustrates this well, since his behaviour partly consists in misapplying a sanctioning interaction mode: on the one hand, he shies away from criticism, hides enmity, and ignores wrong-doing,³⁵⁴ on the other he uses language designed to exclude or enforce collective judgement, such as “I don't believe it!” or “But that was not the account he gave me”, in the wrong contexts.³⁵⁵ Despite the limited evidence offered by the text, these observations seem to suggest that the three contingency-reducing interaction mechanisms observed for the individual above, non-communication, faux communication, and excessive communication, may be similarly used by the collective as sanctioning mechanisms, though obviously ‘faux’ here applies solely to the deviant individual's perception of what the collective sees as ‘truth’ and the ‘excess’ describes his perspective on the repeated,

Erzählung angesiedelt ist.” Applied to the *Characters*, the intradiegetic level refers to the anecdotes as a narrated world, whereas the extradiegetic level is occupied by the narrator offering the definitions, as well as his audience. Some sketches feature meta-diegetic narratives, e.g. the stories told by Coward and Rumour Monger (Theophr. *Char.* 8; 25,4-6). Millett (2007, 58-68) conflates textual and real world, which obscures some of the peculiarity of the *Characters*' social construct.

³⁵¹ Theophr. *Char.* 7.3, 5f. The Chatterbox sketch also implicitly envisages a breach of contact and denial of connection (Theophr. *Char.* 3.2-4).

³⁵² Theophr. *Char.* 9.4, 8; 22.9; 24.2-11.

³⁵³ One further interaction mode of social sanction is mockery (σκώλητις), explicitly evoked in its misapplication at Theophr. *Char.* 7.10, where the Talker is mocked by his own children. However, it never occurs in collective reaction.

³⁵⁴ Theophr. *Char.* 1.2f., 5.

³⁵⁵ Theophr. *Char.* 1.6: καὶ τὸ εἶλον δεινὸς τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τρόπῳ τοῦ λόγου χρῆσθαι· Οὐ πιστεύω· Οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνω· Ἐκπλήττομαι· καὶ· Λέγεις αὐτὸν ἕτερον γεγονέναι· Καὶ μὴν οὐ ταῦτα πρὸς ἐμὲ διεξήκει· Παράδοξόν μοι τὸ πρᾶγμα· Ἄλλω τινὶ λέγε· Ὅπως δὲ σοὶ ἀπιστήσω ἢ ἐκείνου καταγνώ, ἀπορούμαι· Ἄλλ' ἔρα, μὴ σὺ θάττων πιστεύεις.

reinforcing communication of collective value-judgement that is brought to bear on him. Only continued individual nonconformity is then sanctioned by reducing the individual's social surface and connectivity within the complex social network of the collective.

In inversion, the *Characters* thus document snapshots of a differentiated and robust continuum of sanctioning interaction, ranging from situational corrective communication to total exclusion from the social network of the value community. Theophrastus therein observes the self-maintenance strategies of a complex social network, since the maxim of collective cohesion and configuration stability dictates that connectivity needs to be repairable. If all else fails, the end point of the gradient is exclusion, causing the individual's social network to crumble away, as is visible for instance in the fact that the Man who has lost all sense has no connective social interactions with equals whatsoever.³⁵⁶

Now that we have considered the dynamics visible within the narrative, the extradiegetic function of the text itself needs to be discussed. Despite the lack of information about this aspect of the *Characters*, it seems reasonable to assume that in essence the implied reader, the audience, is guided into functioning as the sanctioning authority of the text, aided by the text's subtle humour that occludes its value judgements. After all, without the typological definitions, the *Characters* consist of a covert, authorial narrator talking about others in an unfocalised, third-person 'narrative'. The typological marker (e.g. ὁ δὲ εἴρων τοιοῦτός τις κτλ.)³⁵⁷ that invariably introduces the humorously exaggerated narrative induces the reader or listener to expect negative behaviour. The fundamental prerequisite of the *Characters* is the reader's knowledge of the society portrayed, since the wit of the text hinges on this social understanding – so on an existing sense of place – to generate positive and, if necessary, negative laughter.³⁵⁸ If we imagine a group audience for the text in its original setting,³⁵⁹ the communal laughter generates community

³⁵⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 6.

³⁵⁷ Theophr. *Char.* 1.2.

³⁵⁸ On the wit of the *Characters* cf. also Lane Fox 1996, 141f. On the double character of laughter in Greek society see Halliwell 2008, 25-38. For an ethological perspective on smiling and laughter see Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus. *Die Biologie des menschlichen Verhaltens: Grundriß der Humanethologie*. Vierkirchen-Pasenbach 2004⁵, 648f., who observes its universal reassuring impact.

³⁵⁹ Diggle 2004, 14-16 and Lane Fox 1996, 141 consider this plausible given his popularity and lively lecture style as attested by Diog. Laert. 5.37; Plut. *Mor.* 78d; Athen. 1.21a-b.

among a sub-group of those individuals portrayed in the *Characters*, wealthy educated citizens.³⁶⁰ Since the *Characters* portray underspecified deviant actions without offering any explicit moralising judgement, the result is an extremely subtle constructive strategy, a portrayal that never explicitly abstracts an ideal normality but nevertheless smoothly communicates implicit value judgements. The subtlety of the *Characters* therefore reflects the core need to maintain cohesion within this group. The impact of this dynamic on network configuration should not be underestimated: Agathokles, for instance, is said by Diodorus to have mockingly imitated (ἐἰκάζειν) some of his fellow citizens to evoke communal laughter, which explicitly functioned as a tool of power.³⁶¹

Given the prior knowledge required to decode the *Characters*' humour as well as the original context of the Peripatetic school, the question as to the function of *paideia* in the text obviously needs to be addressed here. Might not (philosophical) education be what the text envisages as remedying the social deviation portrayed, rather than the sanctioning mechanisms discussed above? A partial answer to this question was already given above, when I rejected the argument that the implicit ideal of the text involves *paideia* on the grounds that the standards of *paideia* actually referenced in inversion seem relatively standard rather than specifically philosophical: there are no references to philosophical training and philosophers occur only once alongside other groups.³⁶² References to education are conventional, i.e. to privately motivated and financed physical exercise and the memorisation of useful literary passages, e.g. of Homer, a condensed civic ideal that is not particularly specific to the late fourth century and agrees with the *patrios politeia* construction identified here as the text's imaginary model.³⁶³ While it may thus seem plausible to view the form of social sophistication that the philosophers saw as the result of a philosophical education as a remedy for the deviant behaviour portrayed in the *Characters*, the text itself does little to encourage such an interpretation. I do not deny that the laughing Peripatetic community may

³⁶⁰ Compare Asper, Markus. "Group Laughter and Comic Affirmation: Aristophanes' Birds and the Political Function of Old Comedy", in: *Hyperboreus* 11 (2005), 5-29, esp. 23f. who highlights the significance of communal (i.e. "socio-positive") laughter for political cohesion in the context of Old Comedy. With Durkheim (see above p. 187, n. 23) one should note that the laughter performatively glosses over the inevitable differences of understanding, creating a community despite the differences in identity configuration within the audience and between audience and narrator.

³⁶¹ Diod. 20.63.2f.

³⁶² See above p. 115. Philosophers occur alongside sophists, fencing masters, and musicians as clients interested in a private *odeion* at Theophr. *Char.* 5.10.

³⁶³ Theophr. *Char.* 5.7, 10;7.4; 9.5; 14.10; 22.6; 26.2; 27.2f., 6, 13; 30.14. On traditional *paideia* see Marrou, Henri I. *Geschichte der Erziehung im klassischen Altertum*. Freiburg 1957, here 155-157, 171-186, 237-240.

well have imagined itself, at least in the moment of performance, as being too cultured to display such behaviour, reinforcing its superiority through *paideia*. However, the scenarios are so varied and underspecified that they can apply to anyone, making them not primarily philosophically elitist in their impetus.

3.7.2.1 Space

While we have now established the sanctioning mechanisms themselves, they are supplemented by another mechanism, namely their spatial embedding. Closely connected to this construction of collective mechanisms of sanction is the regime of control that ensures the enforceability of said mechanisms by stabilising their prerequisite, the social web of observation and evaluation. It was observed above that the *Characters* predominantly show interaction in a sphere of action characterised by the multi-lateral extension of distributed selves beyond their normative cores.³⁶⁴ This is the result of a control regime that constructs the spaces adequate to social interaction among male adult citizens of a certain status.³⁶⁵ This cognitive control of space is related to the collective's monopoly of truth – and in turn the collectivity of all control regimes is ensured and perpetuated precisely by ensuring control over the interactive fora. Individual action within these fora thus automatically associates behavioural constraints, the efficacy of which is visible nicely when the Penny-pincher goes shopping without buying anything, showing himself as participating in public social activity despite being unwilling to actually spend any money.³⁶⁶

The *Characters* accordingly reproduce and thereby maintain specific fora of social action, focusing on the agora, the street, the *ekklesia*, the law court, the theatre, the bath house, the gymnasium, and the *odeion*.³⁶⁷ Non-participation in these spaces is occluded, marginalised, made unthinkable: as we have seen, there is no *ιδιώτης* in the *Characters* and even the Country Bumpkin participates in the collective political institutions.³⁶⁸ The household itself can also become a semi-transparent theatre of action in some scenarios of its complex construction, since

³⁶⁴ See above p. 125.

³⁶⁵ On this see Cohen 1991, 72-74, 230f., where the emphasis is on keeping the positively connoted male public space free of taint to ensure the working of 'politics of reputation'.

³⁶⁶ Theophr. *Char.* 10.12.

³⁶⁷ On the actual maintenance of the agora by the collective as a space of social action see also IG II² 380, esp. 26-28 (=Syll.³ 313), which documents the institutionalised maintenance of the roads and the agora in the Piraeus for the year 320/19.

³⁶⁸ Theophr. *Char.* 4.3.

the *Characters* allow for individual semantic control within this sphere, but sanction both its absence and the exercise of control in deviation from control regime. As such, control of the *oikos* by the *kyrios* is almost paradoxically part of the control regime, which is in turn associated by the *oikos* setting. All the spaces created by the text are underspecified, cognitive spaces constructed not by reference to specific spatial features, but simply reference identities in the audience's minds.³⁶⁹ The text's treatment of space thereby beautifully corresponds to the under-specification of the regime of collective control developed within it, but nevertheless anchors it by reproducing which spaces are socially populated by the web of observation. This reinforces the association between action and space, and ensures audience and thus sanctionability.

The best example of such spatial enforcement is provided by the Oligarch (*ὀλιγαρχικός*) who wishes to withdraw from the 'public' sphere to conduct political discussion, hampering the web of observation and withdrawing from the social network. He thereby dismantles the spatial control regime in itself, seeking its dissolution by questioning its validity.³⁷⁰ Accordingly, the creation of spatial control regimes by individuals is criticised whenever they exert semantic control over their valuation: the *odeion*-scene now assigned to the Obsequious Man is the most explicit example in that personally owning an *odeion* is already deviant, but publically emphasising one's ownership is the pinnacle of deviation.³⁷¹ Constructing and controlling the interaction fora within the architectural space of the city thus appears as a crucial component of societal control as a whole.³⁷²

³⁶⁹ See the spaces discussed above on p. 126.

³⁷⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 26.2f., 5f. A similar instrumentalisation of the collective is also found in the *Characters*' worst case scenario, the Man who has lost all sense (Theophr. *Char.* 6.7).

³⁷¹ Theophr. *Char.* 5.9f. Cf. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.9f. which thematises the same discourse about private and public ownership of space; public baths and sacrifices are here obviously decried as ochlocratic.

³⁷² On spatial context see e.g. the contributions in Zanker und Wörrle 1995; Oliver, Graham J. "Space and the Visualization of Power in the Greek Polis. The Award of Portrait Statues in Decrees from Athens", in: Peter Schultz and Ralf von den Hoff (eds.), *Early Hellenistic Portraiture. Image, Style, Context*. Cambridge 2007, 181-204. The architecturally structured city combines with the cognitive network to form an identity-level network structure with interactive hubs, such as the agora, which simultaneously serve as hubs of normative control. These dynamic processes are simultaneously reinforced and facilitated by the built environment that manifests and reinforces the value cosmos because it is itself the product of collective action.

3.7.3 The social network dynamics of the *Characters*

The final step in this analysis of Theophrastus' *Characters* is now to abstract the ideal structure of the social network implicitly envisaged in the text's normative inversions. Translated into network terms, the emphasis on equal, balanced connectivity embodied in *philia* equates to a value-correlated quantitative and qualitative balance between in-degree and out-degree for every node in the network. That simply means that every individual's outgoing and incoming interactions are supposed to be in balance, because they are controlled by *philia*. The individual interactions visible in the *Characters* are therefore envisaged as being never truly dyadic, but always triadic in that they are being controlled by the collective, which is present not only within the identity configurations of both *ego* and *alter*, but, as we just saw, is also embodied in the spaces sanctioned for interaction by said collective. In Callon's terms, this configuration, whereby an abstract collective acts as the obligatory passage point for all interaction, is both highly irreversible and convergent, i.e. stable.³⁷³ At the level of the overarching societal network, the text seems thus to be aiming to keep this network as stable and as perfectly formed as possible, maintaining very high and even connectivity across all nodes by means of the implemented control regimes. Ideally, social connectivity is equal across all nodes, resulting in a fully distributed network structure.

This configuration imposes caps on the growth dynamics of individual nodes, limiting the clusters individuals like the Oligarch can form, and further denies the addition of new nodes beyond the established network bounds. From the point of view of any individual node, the consequence is a balanced growth dynamic that increases the density of the network rather than its size, further contributing to the high connectivity of the social network as a whole. All these factors result in a cohesive small-world structure of the collective social network and cause so-called "weak ties", relationships between people who are not close friends or family, to be strengthened in that the value cosmos that governs strong ties is applied also to them.³⁷⁴ The dynamics of such a social structure would theoretically not only allow for the maintenance of collective control over said structure by means of the web of observation, but should also increase the resilience of the network to external and internal attack, while also enabling information to cascade across the network rapidly.³⁷⁵ Information can thus be smoothly evaluated by the entire collective. It is worth emphasising that these dynamics are

³⁷³ Callon 1986, 196, 203-218. See above p. 54.

³⁷⁴ On strong and weak ties see Granovetter 1973a.

³⁷⁵ On cascades and rapid processes of diffusion in networks, see Barabasi 2002, 119-121, 211; on information cascades see Granovetter, Mark S. "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior", in: *American Journal of Sociology* 83:6 (1978), 1420-1443; Bikhchandani,

well suited to resisting external change that is not collectively vetted, as long as actions are being correlated with the normative order developed here, as the cascade would shut undesirable change down quickly.³⁷⁶ Even in terms of network dynamics, the network is therefore built with an eye towards boundaries rather than towards unfettered connectivity and growth.

Let us put these results back in context. As I argued above, the socio-political discourse of Athens in the 320s and 310s BC was characterised by a destabilisation of meaning, which manifested most prominently in the census restrictions imposed from 322-318 and 317-307 BC that destabilised what it meant to be an Athenian citizen.³⁷⁷ In the late fourth century, the size of the social group depicted and constructed in the *Characters* may potentially be located somewhere in the range of 10-20.000 individual (male) citizens.³⁷⁸ Conceived of as a social network, a group of this size would necessarily appear as a complex network, even if it were artificially limited to include only the well-to-do citizens as the *Characters* does. The conflicted socio-political discourse that produced this text both naturally and manifestly exerted pressure on the configuration of this complex network. In response, the societal model of the *Characters* seems to envision an ideal configuration for this Athenian elite social network, but expressed in a faux-realistic,

Sushil, Hirshleifer, David, and Welch, Ivo. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades", in: *Journal of Political Economy* 100:5 (1992), 992-1026; Goldenberg, Jacob, Libai, Barak, and Muller, Eitan. "Talk of the Network: A Complex Systems Look at the Underlying Process of Word-of-mouth", in: *Marketing Letters* 12:3 (2001), 211-223.

³⁷⁶ Baran 1964, 1-10; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992. All these hypothetical statements are obviously still located at the level of discourse.

³⁷⁷ This line of conflict is visible also in the description of the build-up to the Lamian War at Diod. 18.10.1.

³⁷⁸ This range is suggested by the figures given for the census restrictions implemented in the periods predominated by Phokion and Demetrios of Phaleron (Diod. 18.18.1-6 and 18.74.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 28.4; see O'Sullivan 2009a, 108-116 for discussion). A network of this size would be complex by definition. On the concept of the complex network see Strogatz, Steven H. "Exploring Complex Networks", in: *Nature* 410:6825 (2001), 268-276. For an overview of real complex social networks see Estrada, Ernesto. *The Structure of Complex Networks: Theory and Applications*. Oxford 2011, 402-408. Complex networks are notoriously difficult to study empirically, as is pointed out by Goldenberg, Libai, and Muller 2001, 212f.: "The spread of information in a given social system may be described as "an adaptive complex system", i.e., a system that consists of a large number of individual entities which interact with each other (in what is sometimes an indiscernible manner), ultimately generating large-scale, collective visible behavior. Although the individual interactions may be simple in many such adaptive systems, the large scale of the system at work allows the emergence of patterns which are hard to predict, hard to track empirically, and are often almost impossible to analyze analytically."

inverted form. The value-correlation of the social network in the *Characters* has emerged as aiming to produce and reproduce a qualitatively assortative social network,³⁷⁹ while also keeping the natural scale-free tendencies within this network in check: equals are to associate more strongly to keep individualism under control, and are thereby reinforced as equals. Expressed in graph terms, the value-correlation constructed here aims to dampen the network's tendency towards power-law distribution (meaning that a small number of nodes have most of the connections) and pushes for normal distribution (meaning that connections are evenly distributed among all nodes), thereby levelling extremes of clustering within the network. This is achieved by pushing for high internal connectivity, which is produced by inclusively sanctioning individuals for actions that affect their connectivity either positively or negatively, always in non-conforming ways. The Grumbler's and the Arrogant Man's behaviour, for instance, affects their connectivity negatively, whereas the Toady, the Boastful Man, and the Overzealous Man all increase their social surface, but in ways that are not compatible with the value cosmos implemented in the text.³⁸⁰ In so doing, the text implicitly imposes a distributed small-world structure that aims to limit scale-free dynamics by dampening preferential attachment and rejecting growth.

3.8 Conclusions

On my reading, Theophrastus' *Characters* has emerged as an incoherent yet paradoxically cohesive observation of lived discursive reality in late fourth century Athens, rendered as snapshots of interaction. The work appears as the bones of a theory of society expounded not by means of straightforward exposition but through the practice of close observation and its narrative re-shaping, a theory that recognises the centrality of deviation-control by means of value regimes and social density. This 'practical theory' is highly specific to its time, the late 320s and 310s BC, in that it is embedded in a contemporary discourse among the group of individuals who identify as wealthy citizens about the nature of the 'democratic' Athenian collective, which was under threat due to the contemporary exacerbation of political faultlines. These include, but are by no means limited to, the problem of external affiliation to Kassander or any of the other Diadochi, the franchise debate engendered by Antipater, the questions surrounding the rule of

³⁷⁹ Assortative networks are characterized by links being most common between similarly connected nodes, see Estrada 2011, 31. In the terminology of social network analysis, this equates to positive degree-degree correlation.

³⁸⁰ Theophr. *Char.* 2; 13.5; 17.2f., 7-9; 23; 24.2, 6, 8-12.

law and its degree of interference in the household, the contention about payments for civic participation, as well as the question of liturgies and the assignment of individual honour.³⁸¹ This bundle of social, political and legal issues contributes to a socio-political discourse under stress with which the *Characters* interacts with. The text does so by rephrasing what has here been cast as the social network configuration of a specific group, emphasising the construction of this group as socio-politically relevant and the construction of its agency as the source of collective significance, and re-formulating the ways in which this agency should function and be employed.

Within this discourse, the text seems to offer a very specific solution to complexities and faultlines perceived by Theophrastus within his contemporary discursive reality. The *Characters* provides both a societal model and its implementation by negotiating between male adult individual and the collective generated by their interactions and relations among one another. We have observed the tension between individual and collective when it comes to generating social cohesion while maintaining individual agency: the individual's construction of his own actions tends to differ from the collective's construction due to the plurality of interaction modes available. These tensions have to be harnessed to allow for the deployment of collective agency. The *Characters* shows how this can be done, by sketching out how individual and collective agency can be constructed, channelled, and constrained in tandem. First of all, the text acknowledges individual contingency perception and agency, implicitly giving it substantial room by documenting it and thereby making it thinkable and even – to a certain extent – acceptable. If one considers that the complexity of networks can have occluding effects, one might then say that unperceived complexity in social action takes effect to reduce contingency, since the plurality of anticipatable behaviour makes unanticipatable situations rarer. By humourously reinforcing cognitive categories and interaction modes for deviant behaviour the *Characters* thus facilitates social cohesion at an extradiegetic level. In that, the text gives shape to a paradox of contingency-control: in narratively controlling behaviour, it is codified. That said, truly bad behaviour is actually placed beyond the text, implicitly rendering it unthinkable within the textual society.³⁸²

Secondly, however, the work implements a clearly configured cognitive network of value regimes designed to shape individual and collective agency along a collectivist line of thought. While the *Characters* appears to be blantly individualist at first glance, the second part of the text's underlying message in fact

³⁸¹ See above p. 102.

³⁸² White 2008², 36f.

consists in the construction of collective normative control, whereby an abstracted collectivist identity defines and controls the parameters of contingency. To do so, the text establishes a social space in which this normative control takes effect by implementing a construction of the individual as a distributed self and a sphere of action that is constituted by the very fact that it is occupied by the actions of these distributed individuals. Within this sphere of action, it then asserts the primacy of a specific construction of *philia* by developing a set of collective control regimes and interaction modes over which the prevalence of *philia* is asserted, particularly in relation to the economic interaction mode.

The text implements this configuration by introducing a range of sanctioning control mechanisms at a variety of textual levels, while also placing certain aspects of life beyond question, for instance by excluding collective (or 'polis') religion from its subject matter. Implicitly, asserting collective agency via collective-conforming action is thus portrayed as the field of action on which the wealthy individual can adequately deploy his individual agency. The text thereby evokes and reaffirms a collective of the well-to-do, levelling individual deviation of all kinds, ensuring relationships and connectivity, and implicitly bolstering the collective agency of its *eleutheroi* by reasserting how crucial it is to observe others. In this construction, which seems reminiscent of prior formulations of the *patrios politeia* and appears as a re-formulation rather than an innovation *ex nihilo*, societal power and contingency control lie in the cohesive collective agency of this group. Although its members act as individuals within a value-correlated social network to define the world and its meaning, they are also configured as being continually sanctioned by the embodiment of collective observation and sanction infused both into every individual and into civic space, into the very streets of the polis. To put it rather drastically, the text thus denies that the exertion of semantic hegemony lies within the scope of the individual's agency by writing it out of the normative boundaries and asserting the polis-collective of friends as the ideal locus of self. While it thus accommodates the individual to an extent, it ultimately locates it in the collective.

The *Characters* affirms the power of the collective in yet another way by implementing resilient social network dynamics as well as control regimes suited to their preservation. Rather than presenting these dynamics and regimes, the text offers narratives that reflect processes of contingency control in inversion and thereby subtly ensures that the constructed collective remains relatively stable and can assert semantic meta-control over the constructed society without explicitly formulating positive norms.³⁸³ Based on the evidence available in the text, one

³⁸³ Cf. Eidinow 2011, 33 who makes a similar observation in relation to the sphere of polis religion.

can thus posit that this construction, viewed as a social network, is envisaged as dense and distributed, with a balanced distribution of ties among its nodes, allowing for both resilience and information cascades due to high connectivity and low centralisation. In so doing, the text implicitly imposes a distributed small-world structure that simultaneously aims to limit scale-free dynamics in that the unbalanced growth of individual nodes and centralisation are rejected.

Finally, it seems necessary to return to the wider observations and claims made at the beginning of this chapter. I emphasise once more that this analysis claims to be nothing more than one possible interpretation of a facet of the power discourse that existed within the *poleis* of the early Hellenistic period. This has not been a comprehensive study of ‘the individual in polis society’ – to my mind, and within the conceptual framework adopted here, that seems impossible to achieve, even if the evidence were better than it is. What I hope to have offered is a considered, structural assessment of a unique literary construction of the well-to-do Athenian and his social mesh as a reaction and contribution to contemporary Athenian discourse. This construction seems typical of its time in that it is concerned with controlling tensions within an existing collective configuration by activating a historical imaginary. In analysing this construct, value-correlated social connectivity emerged as the essential check on this textual Athenian society. Shaping this control mechanism is true power, and the text subtly locates this power within the distributed collective of individual citizens rather than elsewhere.

So far, this citizen collective has been treated in isolation, with the result that it has appeared to be supremely capable of controlling its constituent parts, the main tension being between individual and collective control. The early Hellenistic power discourse – or any power discourse for that matter – is obviously more complicated than this, and further analysis shall reveal how conservative and simplistic the *Characters*’ imaginary is, and how extensively it occludes external tensions. The results achieved here accordingly call for qualification and shall be contrasted with a study of the interpenetration of collective networks of meaning. Before I can address that task (in Chapters 5 and 6), however, a parallel enquiry needs to be undertaken in order to establish a point of comparison. We thus turn now to my second societal imaginary, that of the emergent Hellenistic court.

4. Individual and collective in emergent Hellenistic court society

In order to be able to contrast the network construction and power dynamics suggested for early Hellenistic Athens through the lens of Theophrastus' *Characters*, the next step in this analysis of power discourse must be to consider the construction of emergent Hellenistic court society.¹ In doing so, keen attention will be due in particular to the discourse surrounding the concepts of kingship and friendship that provides its key structures at the level of identity. This chapter will again make the working assumption that the social system under consideration is a closed one, attempting to coax out a specific social narrative of emergent Hellenistic court society from the constructions preserved in the existing sources. The primary concern is once more to offer tentative answers to the core questions of this study, which may be worth reiterating here: how are individual and collective constructed in different situations and by whom? What kinds of expectations define this society and how are they reproduced through the construction of contingency? What regimes of value and control respond to this contingency, and how do they work together as situational networks? And finally, which dynamics do these network structures show through the lens of network theory? Before these questions can be addressed, however, it is necessary to briefly outline the key concept involved here, namely the royal court, followed by a preliminary discussion of previous approaches to emergent Hellenistic court society and of a number of challenges the analysis faces.

4.1 Setting the stage: Previous scholarship and source material

The nature of court society in general and of its Hellenistic variant in particular has been defined in various ways, mainly in the disciplines of historical sociology and history.² Generally speaking, Hellenistic court society developed out of the

¹ 'Court society' is a conventional concept in scholarship, firmly established by the fundamental sociological study of Elias 1983, but occurring, for instance, in German historiography of Alexander already in Berve 1926, 1, 65f. For a definition of court see below p. 185. On the complexity of definition see Strootman 2014, 31f., 111-135, who defines it as the courtiers, the royal household in its social and economic aspects, and the spaces filled with this social configuration. Cf. also Weber 2007, 232f., who places greater emphasis on the *oikos*, and Nielsen 1994, esp. 18-26, who approaches the question by looking at the palatial space.

² Fundamental for the study of court societies are Elias 1983 with the critical discussion by Duindam, Jeroen. *Norbert Elias and the Early Modern European Court*. Amsterdam 1994. On the ancient court in general see Winterling, Aloys. "HoP. Versuch einer

variously qualified, but ultimately personal decisions of individuals to attach themselves to the individuals whom Alexander's demise left in prominent positions.³ It was thus at least initially divorced from the land and people it ruled over and was based on bilateral, personal bonds, cast in the traditional language of friendship. Its discursive representation centred on strong value-laden terms such as *εὐνοία*, *φιλία*, and *πίστις* ("good will, friendship, and trust").⁴ It was thus characterised, at least in the early period that is of interest here, by a notable absence of hereditary and territorial factors, as well as of written rules and formal institutionalisation.⁵ As such, it is permissible to view the early Hellenistic court as a social network governed by a complex code of primarily social communication.⁶

idealtypischen Bestimmung anhand der mittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Geschichte", in: idem. (ed.). *Zwischen "Hof" und "Staat". Antike Höfe im Vergleich*. Munich 1997, 11-25; as well as the contributions in Anthony J.S. Spawforth (ed.) 2007. Habicht 1958 remains fundamental on the "ruling class" of the Hellenistic monarchies. Other pivotal studies on the Hellenistic court and the *philoi* in particular are Mooren 1975; Le Bohec 1985, 1987; Lund 1992, 178-182; Weber 1993, esp. 18-32, 1995, 1997; Herman 1980/1, 1997; Savalli-Lestrade 1998; Heckel, Waldemar. "King and 'Companions:' Observations on the Nature of Power in the Reign of Alexander", in: Joseph Roisman (ed.). *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*. Leiden 2003, 197-226; Paschidis 2008; Dreyer 2011, as well as the recent comprehensive study by Strootman 2014, 31-38, who also provides a succinct summary of previous research (13-15). The outstanding work of Elizabeth Carney on the Argead court is now also available in a collected volume: eadem. *King and Court in Ancient Macedonia: Rivalry, Treason and Conspiracy*. Swansea 2015.

³ Diod. 18.14.1; 18.28.6.

⁴ This obviously corresponds to the essentially personal nature of Hellenistic kingship that rests to a high degree on the agency of the king, expressed in concrete action, see Goodenough, Erwin R. "The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship", in: *Yale Classical Studies* 1 (1928), 55-102; Walbank, Frank W. "Monarchies and monarchic Ideas", in: *CAH* 7.1 (1984), 62-100, here 63-67; Billows, Richard A. *Kings and Colonists. Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism*. Leiden 1995, 56f. On Hellenistic court society in general see e.g. Weber 1993, 18-32 (particularly for the early Hellenistic court); Weber 1997, 38-40; Herman 1997, 208, who explores the significance of *xenia*, and now Strootman 2014, 111-135, esp. 117f. on the transition from landed *εταίρος* to personal *φίλος*, and 145-184.

⁵ Billows 1990, 243f., 250. For the development of such constraints in the high Hellenistic period see Strootman 2014, 165-184, highlighting the emergence of tiered court titles (165-172), a speaking order in the synhedrion (167), a finely tuned system of taste and behavioural evaluation (174f.), as well as a catalogue of personal qualities, including being able to converse in an elegantly learned and entertaining fashion (175). The basis of these developments is the de facto possession and inheritance of landed estates by the courtiers (176).

⁶ The absence of formal institutionalisation is crucial to Herman 1997, 222 and 224.

These abstract observations are borne out by the dominant emic views of the court for which we have evidence in this early, formative period, which seem to represent it as a permanent if relatively flexible institution centred upon the person of the king and bound by a certain habitus. The terminology in evidence in the sources variously highlights 1) the time spent with a specific individual, i.e. the king, (διατριβειν); 2) the personal attendance and service (θεραπεία) devoted to this individual, prompted by the bonds of friendship (φιλία); 3) the spatial configuration arising from occupation of the same space (αύλη → αύλικοί) or, to put it more abstractly, from the enduring co-presence of the constituent elements of this centralised social construct (οἱ περὶ τὸν δεῖνα), on occasion expressed in spatial rather than personal terms (οἱ περὶ τὴν αύλήν).⁷ Subtending these more specific

⁷ On emic conceptions of the Hellenistic court as visible in the language involved see Weber 2007, 232f.; Strootman 2014, 38-40; 118f., though it is necessary to distinguish insider and outsider perspectives, as well as take into account the varying degrees of affiliation to an essentially personal and thus situationally fluid social construct. Many of these designations are most commonly found in Polybius, the best source on the Hellenistic court, who is representative of a period of more developed conceptions. See e.g. Plb. 5.26.9 (ἡ αύλή); 4.42.2 (αύλικοί); 5.36.1 (οἱ περὶ τὴν αύλήν). Διατριβειν is commonly found in early honorary decrees for ‘courtiers’ (e.g. IG II² 495:11; IG XII.6 1:30:8; IG XII.9 198:1), and therefore represents the point of view of a sympathetic citizen outsider. In honorary decrees from Eretria (IG XII.9 210:5f.; 212:6), being around the king (εἶναι περὶ τὸν βασιλέα) is found as a qualification of early Antigonid ‘courtiers’. Unsurprisingly, φίλος is attested even as a self-description (CID 4.11:3; see further Billows 1990, 248f. with ns. 19-21 for further evidence of its usage already in the Diadoch period) and OGIS 9:2 (=I.Ephesos 5, 1452) attests the use of the related οἰκεῖος, which makes the close bond between friend and household explicit, also in an honorary decree. While Plutarch can distinguish between θεραπεία and φίλοι (*Demetr.* 5.3; 16.3), Diodorus has the option not to, even when both must be meant (19.11.3). Strootman 2014, 39, rightly notes that these designations seem to overlap on occasion. His caution regarding the exact significance of θεραπεία appears overstated, however. It seems relatively clear that θεραπεία encompasses a larger group than the φίλοι and included slaves, hetairai, eunuchs, guards, and indeed personal effects of various kinds (for variations cf. e.g. Plut. *Demetr.* 5.3; Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.6.1; 7.5.65; for hetairai consider that the famous Lamia was initially captured by Demetrios Poliorketes at Salamis, who ‘took’ her from Ptolemy; see Plut. *Demetr.* 16.3 with Wheatley, Patrick. ‘Lamia and the Besieger: An Athenian hetaira and a Macedonian king’, in: Olga Palagia and Stephen V. Tracy (eds.). *The Macedonians at Athens 322~229 B.C.* Oxford 2003, 30-36, here 30). Θεραπεία is thus the Greek expression for the ‘trappings’ that play a large part in making a court a court and a king a king, i.e. for everything that concerns the king’s distributed self. The φίλοι, on the other hand, are those within this self linked to the king’s person by friendship, not paid service or ownership. The terms thus appear functionally distinct, but encompass overlapping social groups in that the ‘friends’ could function as retinue and even servants might be called ‘friends’, displaying different situational identities in different contexts to different partners in interaction. The

formulations are basic conceptions of the ruler as a distributed individual that find linguistic expression in *οἶκος*, *βασιλεία*, and *φίλοι/φίλια*.⁸

The Hellenistic court, long ignored as a topic, has recently been discussed by Rolf Strootman in what may well become the standard work on the topic.⁹ Basing himself in part on a study of the early-modern absolutist court by Jürgen von Krüdener, Strootman analyses the court as an amalgam of various intertwined socio-political, economic, and symbolic functions. The result is the emergence of the court as 1) an arena of political negotiation, 2) an administrative centre, 3) a symbolic centre, 4) a stage for self-representation, and finally, 5) a redistributive centre.¹⁰ I find his analysis of these various functions extremely valuable, but use them here as a foil since his overall project is rather different from mine.

We differ in three main respects. The first is that his work does not dwell on the formative period of the Diadochi in great detail, mainly because Strootman has designed his book as a synthetic handbook.¹¹ This difference is significant as

phrases *οἱ περὶ τὴν ἀλλήν/τὸν δεῖνα*, as well as *ἀλλικοί* appear to include both *φίλοι* and *θεραπεία*, and hence function as an indiscriminate master category.

⁸ Strootman 2014, 38-40; 121 with n. 39. Rulers as individuals are fundamentally constructed as more extensive, although of course every individual situationally encompassed by them is also ‘distributed’. The ancient terminology used for court society, especially in the case of the *φίλοι*, thus makes the construction of a social network as the core of this social dynamic explicit, but the conception of this network as located within the *οἶκος* as a distributed individual immediately imposes centralisation upon this network.

⁹ Strootman 2014.

¹⁰ Strootman 2014, 34-38; cf. Billows 1990, 251-268, who emphasises the administrative dimension, and Weber 1997, who analyses the court as an amalgam of rule, representation, and interaction. Krüdener 1973, esp. 39f., 70-72, emphasises two things: 1) the generation of a social rather than political attractiveness of court society by virtue of the charismatisation of the ruler and his environment, as well as the refinement of fashion, resulting in a depoliticisation of the aristocracy, which is compensated for by increased social distinction; 2) the concomitant deindividualising effects of court society that impose upon courtiers a heteronomous definition of self in terms of function for someone else, i.e. the monarch. One should note that Diadoch kingship is not directly comparable to absolute monarchy in the form attributed to, e.g., Louis XIV as it lacked both an institutionalised aristocracy and extensive claims to divine legitimation founded on an institutionalised religion that hinged on metaphysical belief; see Habicht 1970², 230-242; Préaux 1978, 1, 183-271; Gehrke 1982, 254-257 and *passim*; Lund 1992, 169-174; Weber 1993, 3-8, 22-26; more recently Müller, Sabine. “Demetrios Poliorketes, Aphrodite und Athen”, in: *Gymnasium* 117:6 (2010), 559-573. Religious responses hinged on the agency displayed, not on a belief in the king’s transcendental ‘godlikeness’ (see e.g. Chaniotis, Angelos “The Divinity of Hellenistic Rulers”, in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 431-445, here 432f., 436).

¹¹ Strootman 2014, 41; 112-117.

the court society of the early Hellenistic period is characterised by undeveloped structures embroiled in a period of transition. In other words, if the Diadoch period is characterised by the fact that there is paradoxically no ‘king’ and no ‘court’, and many ‘kings’ and many ‘courts’, is it valid to speak of ‘court society’?¹²

This lack of formal distinctions makes the investigation more challenging and is traditionally responded to by studying the individual actors and their actions, as has been variously done. By contrast, the network perspective used here studies ‘court society’ in the Diadoch period by considering the processes of translation that emerge from the source material as being attached to these ‘kings’ and their ‘courts’. This in turn necessitates, at least to some degree, the inclusion of the army due to the structural importance of military activity for the development of the power discourse of the Hellenistic period and the identities of the actors involved.¹³ This has consequences for the definition of ‘court’ as a societal figuration of contingency control. In line with the conception adopted in the discussion of the *Characters*, the court is therefore understood as the distributed self of the ruler, which results from his translation of other entities into his construction of the world.¹⁴ This happens through communal story-telling, through narratives told within the social network thus formed.

As Tony Spawforth has further pointed out, it is important to respect that the court is not merely a social, but a socio-spatial figuration.¹⁵ Combined with the

¹² Billows 1990, 242-250, and Lund 1992, 169-174, for instance, do use the term.

¹³ On the systemic omnipresence of war in the Hellenistic period see Préaux 1978, 1, 295-297; Chaniotis 2005, 1-12, 154-157. Schuffert 2005, 253-350 discusses the wars of the Diadoch period in detail. On the triad of king, friends, and forces see famously OGIS 219 (=I.Ilion 32):12-29; I.Magnesia 86:15f.; I.Priene 14:6f. (=Welles 1934, no. 6, with the obligatory comparandum of OGIS 11 (=I.Priene 14):10f., where the people of Priene had forgotten to include the friends in their good wishes). See further Habicht 1958, 3f.; Orth 1977, 44f., 67; Musti, Domenico. “Syria and the East”, in: *CAH* 7.1 (1984), 175-220, here 179.

¹⁴ In the Diadoch period these individuals of course come to be called βασιλεύς. On this cf. Herman 1997, 203-207, 221f., who highlights that court societies are social formations, in which power is concentrated in the hands of a ruler and his immediate entourage, controlled by an unformalised system of agency constraints in the form of etiquette.

¹⁵ Cf. Spawforth, Tony. “Introduction”, in: Anthony J. S. Spawforth (ed.). *Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies*. Cambridge 2007, 1-16, here 1-4: “It is clear, though, that the ancient Greeks and Romans had conceptualised the court at least to some degree. Thus the Greek word from which the modern neologism ‘aulic’ derives, αὐλή, along with the Latin equivalent *aula*, is used by ancient writers both of the ruler’s dwelling as a physical entity and in a more abstract sense of the people to be found there – ‘those περὶ τὴν αὐλήν’. This idea, that ‘the court’ is both the spatial framework of the ruler’s

above definition and put into network terms, this means that the distribution of the ruler's self encompasses also the built and object 'environment', and that this mesh-like self is the locus of contingency-control through narrative. The interest is thus in court society as a broad, productive socio-spatial web that comes to function as the primary source of meaning and contingency control for the individuals it encompasses, including the king. As a consequence of this distinct theoretical approach, this study focuses on how such a narrative of contingency and control is produced.¹⁶

Another related difference accordingly concerns the underlying notion of power employed in analyses of the Hellenistic court. Strootman draws on Max Weber, Michael Mann, and Charles Tilly, and in doing so emphasises the significance of violence and coercion, or rather of legitimate authority in avoiding them. On my approach, violence and coercion already presuppose power, understood as sets of identities that produce collective agency. That is not to say that I necessarily disagree with his conclusions: the self-reinforcing feedback effects of power – violence produces subject territory, subject territory yields revenue, revenue permits more violence – are real and vital; but these are surface effects.¹⁷ Power begins earlier and lies deeper, a point that Strootman summarily dismisses so as to keep things more manageable: "In a world accustomed to monarchic rule for many centuries there was no need to justify the existence of kingship as such."¹⁸ Nevertheless, this justification needs to be constantly reproduced, especially within the Greek world with its strong negative discourse on kingship. This reproduction depends on the actors involved being moved to provide their agency to pursue the value-constructs produced in story-telling.¹⁹

The fundamental question thus concerns the production of meaning, the stories that enable the social network of the court to persist through change, thus allowing for the continuous creation of collective agency and at the same time

existence and also the social configuration with which he shares that space, is fundamental in modern attempts to define and analyse the court." (p. 3f.).

¹⁶ Although Strootman regularly employs the term network as a metaphorical conceptual aid with regularity (2014, 36, 57, 96, 120, 145, 162 etc.), he does not use it as a heuristic tool.

¹⁷ Strootman 2014, 51f.

¹⁸ Strootman 2014, 53. Herman 1997, 206, similarly holds that court formation is a natural process.

¹⁹ Elias 1983, 8; Herman 1997, 200; Brosius, Maria. "New out of Old? Court and Court Ceremonies in Achaemenid Persia", in: Anthony J.S. Spawforth (ed.). *The Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies*. Cambridge 2007, 17-57, here 53f.; Strootman 2014, 93-184.

naturalising the court as a social system.²⁰ Since the early Hellenistic court was barely formalised, the interest must be in the social interactions that make up the court and constitute it as a discursive space, as a hub in a network of story-telling.²¹ Since the reality of such a complex network of interactions in the remote past is irrecoverable, I will shift the focus to the stories themselves and attempt, as in Chapter 3, to reconstruct the abstract ideal.²² In other words, I use the texts not to identify historical interactions and their interplay, but treat them as the products of stories told at court that transport a construction of the world.²³ In tracing this process, I will try to avoid presupposing the exceptionality of the king *a priori*, since it is here considered a contingency-controlling product of narrative rather than self-evident or traditional.²⁴

Previous research on the Hellenistic court as a social system has addressed such questions up to a point, but they have never constituted a core interest, because the focus has usually been on later Hellenistic developments. This is of course largely due to the sources available. In a pioneering discussion of Polybius, Gabriel Herman worked through the historian's loathing of courtiers and his portrayal of their society as a vipers' nest full of intrigue, while pointing out patterns in the chaos. In his view, which owes a lot to Norbert Elias, Polybius sets up a paradox, an absolute king with limited power, circumscribed by tacit rules that

²⁰ This question was explicitly posed by Herman 1997, 200: "How did any individual [...] assisted only by a small coterie of hangers-on, manage to impose his will for so long upon such vast territories and upon subjects who so overwhelmingly outnumbered his own followers?" On the significance of stories and signs cf. Geertz 1977, 152, who is, however, thinking along more conventional lines of the symbolics of power.

²¹ Cf. Weber 1995, 290. On contested imperial story-telling see Ma 1999, 226-242.

²² On texts as actors see Callon 1991, 140f.

²³ Strootman 2014, 43f., based on Kertzer, David. *Ritual, Politics and Power*. New Haven and London 1988, 76, notes that ritual, or rather collective action, does not presuppose a value-consensus across all individuals involved, arguing that Durkheim showed the cohesive efficacy of ritual despite division. I would stress, however, that collective action generates a situational social network configuration that can be performed as consensual and thus, in constructivist terms, *is* consensual. This works by creating an identity set capable of "suspending" total consensus, obscuring difference. If this set of identities that associate communality and social order can be transferred, extended, and blended into other situations, this specific form of collective action unfolds a wider significance in the construction of a control regime.

²⁴ Cf. Elias 1983, 66-69; Herman 1997. The focus on the kings is evident from the way in which scholarship on the Diadochi is most prominently organised, namely by individual actor. See e.g. Seibert 1983; Billows 1990; Grainger 1990; Lund 1992; Schäfer 2002; Anson, Edward M. *Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek among Macedonians*. Leiden 2004.

demanded clever strategies, including the promotion of dependence, the monopolisation of ties and resources, the creation of emotional, personal bonds that bypassed formal court hierarchy, and playing the courtiers off against one another.²⁵ Overall, however, the overwhelming impression is one of a society systematically riddled with faultlines and contingency.²⁶ Looking at the evidence much more broadly, Gregor Weber saw a more productive, informal, and honest system in place, especially in the case of the Diadochi, characterised less by endemic intrigue and violence, and more by communal agency and solidarity in representation and rule.²⁷ He also made a valuable distinction between the court as a sphere of interaction, an instrument of rule, and as a locus of representation. Léon Mooren took a similar line, rightly emphasising the high degree of smooth functionality the court achieved at the level of the *synbedrion*, the advisory council.²⁸ Again under the influence of Polybius' views, Burkhard Meißner finally depicted the Hellenistic court as a dynamic system of exchange, an incredibly lucrative, but high-risk form of give and take, constantly threatened by danger and violence.²⁹

In sum, this sophisticated debate about the nature of court society has brought out numerous keywords and dichotomies, including reciprocity, community vs. competition, self-determination vs. treachery, violence and danger, access and favour. Their relative structural importance has, as we have seen, depended on the

²⁵ Herman 1997, 211-213, 221f. The parallels to Elias 1983 are not surprising, as the work functions as an explicit foil (p. 201f.). In my view, Herman contradicts himself by first pointing out the enmeshed nature of court society with its mutual constraints on agency (p. 212) and then closing with the assertion of the king's complete authority over courtiers' existences (p. 221). Moreover his identification of clear symbolics (p. 222) that assign relational place sits uneasily with the idea of systemic chaos.

²⁶ Herman 1997, 221f. Cf. also Heckel 2003, esp. 224, who similarly emphasises the systemic chaos of Alexander's court and marvels at the fact that it did not collapse under the weight of intrigue: "What is surprising about the reign of Alexander the Great is not that conspiracies occurred but rather that there were not more of them and, more significantly, that no one ever came close to doing the king any physical harm."

²⁷ Weber 1997, esp. 67f.; 70. Note, however, that he (p. 29 with n. 10) is very sceptical of using theory to underpin his notion of social system, a position this study obviously cannot accept; although his criticism of vague definitions of power is apt, I do not believe that ignoring theory is the only, let alone a good, alternative.

²⁸ Mooren, Léon. "Kings and Courtiers: Political Decision-Making in the Hellenistic States", in: Wolfgang Schuller (ed.). *Politische Theorie und Praxis im Altertum*. Darmstadt 1998, 122-133, here esp. 131-133.

²⁹ Meißner, Burkhard. "Hofmann und Herrscher: Was es bei den Griechen hieß, Freund eines Königs zu sein", in: *AKG* 82 (2000), 1-36, esp. 26-34. Polybius' view of court society was negative, emphasising the intrigues and the backstabbing (visible generally at Plb. 5.26.12f. and specifically e.g. at 4.87 (Apelles, Aratos, Philip V); 5.37-39 (Nicagoras, Sosibius, Cleomenes III); 5.56 (Hermeias, Antiochos III)).

author's overall perspective on and/or relation to Polybius.³⁰ This is especially true of the concept of friendship that structured Hellenistic court society, with positions differing as to whether it was affective or institutional, egalitarian or hierarchical.³¹ Strootman's most recent analysis of the social dynamics and hierarchical structures of Hellenistic court society accordingly focuses largely on such relations, as well as the complementary nexus of gift-exchange relations, emphasizing their value in negotiating rank and advancement within the court.³² His conclusion is a variant on Elias' model that points out the sources of conflict within the court and the methods of control available to kings in manipulating these relationships.

In my view, the noticeable emphasis upon the conflicts and faultlines of court society, which naturally figure prominently in the conflict-oriented genre of ancient historiography, has led to a misrepresentation of court society as a world of inherent or systemic contingency. Gift-exchanges seem often to figure as a social release valve barely capable of keeping a society functioning that depended on keeping individuals a state of uncertainty to produce action.³³ For me, these

³⁰ Strootman 2014, 175-184. The importance of favour and access as categories for evaluating the courts of the early Roman emperors is highlighted by Weber 1997, 46f.; 50f. and *passim*; Winterling, Aloys. "Hof ohne 'Staat'. Die aula Caesaris im 1. und 2. Jahrhundert n. Chr.," in: idem (ed.). *Zwischen "Haus" und "Staat": Antike Hilfe im Vergleich*. Munich 1997, 91-112, esp. 98-101, and idem. *Aula Caesaris. Studien zur Institutionalisierung des römischen Kaiserhofes in der Zeit von Augustus bis Commodus (31 v. Chr. - 192 n. Chr.)*. Munich 1999, esp. 92f. On intrafamilial or amphimetric conflict at the Hellenistic court cf. also Ogden 1999, esp. ix-xxx, somewhat qualified by Strootman 2014, 175-184, who highlights the control offered the king by singling out favourites as buffers.

³¹ Weber 1997, 42f., 58-61 emphasises the plurisemy of the concept between affection and business and the significance of *kolakeia*; Herman 1980/1, 118-124 emphasises the discourse of *kolakeia* attached to the *philoí* in Greek literature and discusses it as a response to the contested friendship conception in the Hellenistic period; on the *philoí* in Polybius see Herman 1997, 210, 220, Mooren 1998, 125f., who emphasises the personal nature of the friendship, which was both strength and weakness, and Meißner 2000, esp. 32-35, who argues against an egalitarian conception of Hellenistic *philia*, which he sees as an instrument of subordination. See generally also Gehrke 2008⁴, 53-55; Strootman 2014, 145-184, esp. 145-149 and contrast Erskine 2011, 181-183.

³² Strootman 2014, 145-159, esp. 149, 156-159. On the relationship between gifts, friendship, and treachery in polis discourse see Mitchell 1997, 181-186.

³³ On ancient historiography as rooted in the sequential arrangement of individual events see Darbo-Peschanski, Catherine. "The Origin of Greek Historiography", in: John Marincola (ed.). *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*. Malden, MA 2007, 27-38, esp. 30, 37f. Events worth noting are invariably related to conflict (usually war) and its byproducts, which merit explanation (Fornara, Charles W. *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome*. Berkeley 1983, 32-36 62-64), an observation that holds true

conflicts are purely surface effects that never called the societal productivity of the court into question. I therefore attempt to develop a model of the emergent Hellenistic court as a system of contingency control that in fact offered relative security for its members at a deeper level. This involves tracing the translations that occur in the extant stories about the early Hellenistic court, teasing out their use of social codes, and abstracting the ideal network configuration they develop. To achieve this, the relevant sources will be reviewed using the questions set out at the beginning of this chapter.³⁴

4.1.1 The source material

Any such analysis has to deal with the fact that there is no literary source that provides an account of normative constructs for court societies that can approach even the coherence of Theophrastus' text. Information that can be read using my method can only be extracted from very heterogeneous sources, very few of which are contemporary, though all have roots in contemporary discourse. Apart from the scanty early Hellenistic royal letters,³⁵ the texts that tell us something of the events at the successors' courts are mainly historiographical and anecdotal. While it will be necessary to bear in mind throughout that most usable information has already been passed through a variety of (later) perspectives and narrative intentions, these texts will here be taken as traces of socially productive story-telling and provide the evidence for the second part of this chapter.³⁶ Given

particularly for Hellenistic historiography given the continuous conflicts of the period (Chaniotis 2005, 217-223). For Polybius in particular see Sacks, Kenneth. *Polybius on the Writing of History*. Berkeley 1981, 21-78, for a discussion of Bk 12, Polybius' endeavour to write seriously researched, pragmatic history, and his mode of selection and interest in education (e.g. Plb. 2.35.5-9; 12.27). On courts as a sociological constant cf. Herman 1997, 206, but in my view even so-called constants are constructs, especially if they exist in an environment of alternatives, as in the Diadoch period. If we accept with White (2008², 1) that individuals are constantly striving for control, any kind of 'natural' society is implausible, though individual control through translation of others is probably the least complex form of society.

³⁴ For a standard account of the genesis of Hellenistic court society, located under Alexander, see now Strootman 2014, 112-117.

³⁵ Welles 1934, no. 1-6.

³⁶ For a defence of the use of anecdotes in writing Hellenistic history see Herman 1980-81, 120; Weber 2007, 256. On Plutarch's sources in the Demetrius see Sweet 1951, 177-181, who argued that Plutarch's anecdotes stem largely from Duris of Samos, albeit in mediated form; note, however, that the second part of Athen. 14.614f. (=Phylarchus FGrH 81 F 12) is paralleled by Plut. *Demetr.* 25.6, which may render Phylarchus

the parallels between the individual emergent dynasties, the information pertaining to different courts can be combined for the purposes of such a systemic overview.³⁷

Using anecdotal material is dangerous. Anecdotes are living texts of particular vigour, whose anonymous authorship, aphoristic nature, and sensational content allow them to be easily stripped of context and personnel, and then recombined at leisure.³⁸ As a result, they often provide more insight into what was considered plausible and normatively sound in the time of secondary or later use, rather than illuminating the conventional values of the society or period from which they purport to come.³⁹ Nevertheless, viewed as narratives, they always express a view of the world by means of a specific example, offering a scene rather than abstract argument or rules. The anecdote is an inherently dynamic form of story-telling very appropriate to the mobile, dynamic impression one gains of the early Hellenistic court, documenting reconfigurations and reproductions of identities, preserved in easily memorable and entertaining stories. I therefore treat them as

the source of that, although he may have taken the anecdote from Duris. Cf. also Lund 1992, 11f., who is cautious, but her interest is primarily in factual history.

- ³⁷ Most literary evidence relates to the Antigonids. Despite its obvious problems, such syncretism is an established procedure in Hellenistic scholarship. See Walbank 1984, 65; Herman 1997, 207; Strootman 2014, 14f. In the Diadoch period, the emergent court societies are dealing with similar macro-political situations, though their micro- and meso-political issues and circumstances differ substantially and are very unevenly illuminated by the sources. As part of the Macedonian nobility, the first generation of protagonists also derives from similar processes of socialization (Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 342f.; Lane Fox 2011, 13), for the content of which see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 383-404.
- ³⁸ The examples are innumerable. Consider, for instance, the encounter between Demetrius Poliorketes and the old woman who chides him for behaving unlike a king (Plut. *Demetr.* 42.3-4), which recurs for Philip II of Macedon (Plut. *Mor.* 179c-d), or Front. 1.1.13, which is Plut. *Demetr.* 28.5, retold for Crassus. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8.5 is similarly almost identical to Plut. *Mor.* 177d, where it is attributed to Philip II, who clearly acts as a container for narratives of Hellenistic royal behaviour. The anecdote is also told for Hadrian (Cassius Dio 59.6.3).
- ³⁹ Brunt, Peter. "On Historical Fragments and Epitomes", in: *CQ* 30 (1980), 477-494, esp. 477-480: "We may then assume that in general Athenaeus is fairly reliable" (480). On the difficulties of using Athenaeus as a historical source, mainly due to his drifting compositional habits, his compression of narratives, and his rapid and sometimes inadequately marked transitions, cf. Pelling, Christopher. "Fun with Fragments: Athenaeus and the Historians", in: David Braund and John Wilkins (eds.). *Athenaeus and his World. Reading Greek culture in the Roman Empire*. Exeter 2000, 171-190; Gorman, Richard J. and Vanessa B. "The *Tryphé* of the Sybarites: A Historiographical Problem in Athenaeus", in: *JHS* 127 (2007), 38-60. While notable, these problems do not, however, diminish Athenaeus' value significantly.

discursive strategies of control responding to perceived contingency already in their time of origin. On that assumption, I feel it is permissible to make careful use of them here, especially of those that show a clear bias in favour of certain kings or are very specific in their content or personnel.

As they stand, these pieces of evidence are all characterised by a significant distance from the time of the event. The only moderately accessible historiographical source produced by an actual court insider is the work by Hieronymus of Cardia, whose narrative history was itself coloured by his sympathy for his countryman Eumenes and his later affiliation with the Antigonids, and has anyway been adapted and abbreviated by Diodorus.⁴⁰ Other fragmentary works, e.g. by Demochares, Duris of Samos, and Phylarchos, are even more problematical, as it is impossible to make sound statements about their positions and attitudes, quite apart from our uncertainties surrounding their veracity, sympathies, and judgements. These authors have traditionally been accused of producing vivid ‘tragic history’, full of emotional detail and reversals of fortune, as well as moralising and individualising tendencies, all of which impinged on their truth-value. Although they have recently been rehabilitated to some degree, the problem for me remains that they are all highly fragmentary and written by court outsiders.⁴¹ These issues,

⁴⁰ Hornblower 1981, esp. 107f., 154-179; Billows 1990, 329-333; Meißner 1992, 450-454, 503. On historiographers as court insiders see generally Meißner 1992, 488-493, 500-507, who notes the material benefits and pressures.

⁴¹ Their fragments are collected in Demochares FGrH 75; Duris FGrH 76; Phylarchos FGrH 81. Aristot. *Poet.* 1451a38-b5 famously draws a fine line between (universal) tragedy and (particular) history, a line that is in practice consistently diffuse. Even passages of Thucydides go in a ‘tragic’ direction (a view recently restated by Bruchmüller, Ulrike. “Das Verhältnis von Vernunft und Gewalt im Krieg: Thukydidēs’ tragische Gestaltung seines Geschichtswerkes”, in: *WfHB* 51 (2009), 5-26. Plut. *Nic.* 1.1-5 accordingly highlights his *pathos*, *enargeia* and *poikilia* before aiming to add new facts (!) and abstractly moralising and individualising historiographical tendencies are not a Hellenistic phenomenon, but can be found already in the early fourth century, for instance in the treatment of the Spartans in Xenophon’s *Hellenika*, on which see Dillery, John. *Xenophon and the History of His Times*. London 1995, 236f., 249-251, who emphasises the contrasts Xenophon draws between individual and society in his writing of history. Accordingly Walbank’s old argument that tragic history is a style, not a principle has merit (Sacks 1981, 170). The passage fundamental to tragic history as a category of investigation is Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchos (2.56-63; see the succinct discussion in Billows 1990, 337-339). Duris fared little better by Plutarch’s quill (*Per.* 28.1-3), adding him to the list of suspects. While Cicero’s praise of Duris (*ad Att.* 6.1.18) does complicate the matter, Cicero himself aimed to bend the veracity of history, praising individualisation and moralisation (*ad Fam.* 5.12 *passim*); see again the careful discussion in Billows 1990, 333-336. Already Peter Brunt (1980, 480) warned against taking ancient historical criticism too seriously. On these authors see further Pédech, Paul. *Trois historiens méconnus: Théopompe – Duris – Phylarque*. Paris 1989, 314-338, 443-475;

together with the desirability of having a unified construction to analyse as a basis, have induced me, perhaps surprisingly, to fall back on a much earlier literary work, Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, which will provide a model for a narrative court imaginary.⁴² In a second step, this model will then be compared with the more problematic sources just outlined.

4.2 Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*

Completed in its current form between the death of Ariobarzanes during the satrap revolt of 362/1 BC and Xenophon's death (± 355 BC), this pseudo-historical work on the life-long learning, rise to power, successes, and failing legacy of the Achaemenid founder figure Cyrus II 'the Great' obviously reflects discourses of the first half of the fourth century and not of its end.⁴³ Despite this time-gap, the

Kebric, Robert B. *In the Shadow of Macedon: Duris of Samos*. Stuttgart 1976, 15-18, 19-35, who notes Duris' moralising voice, his interest in tragedy, his anti-Macedonian contacts and sentiment, and finally the close relationship between tragedy and history in the Hellenistic period. For a recent reappraisal of tragic history with bibliography see more recently Marincola, John. "Polybius, Phylarchus, and Tragic History: A Reconsideration", in: Bruce Gibson and Thomas Harrison (eds.). *Polybius and his World: Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank*. Oxford 2013, 73-90, who reinterprets Polybius' seminal attack on Phylarchos as being directed against the latter's misuse of perfectly appropriate historiographical tools (vivid detail, emotion, *peripeteia*), the core accusation being that his narrative is fundamentally counter-factual (85), before arguing that the contention grew out of historians' endeavours to control tragedy's superior prestige and claim to truth (88f).

⁴² Early Hellenistic philosophical thought on kingship does not survive in forms that permit detailed analysis. See the still enormously valuable account of Walbank 1984, 75-84 and further Billows 1995, 57f. with n.1, as well as more recently Erskine 2011, 177-194, who notes the very Hellenistic tensions apparent in the biography, or rather narrative tradition, of the Stoic Persaios, associated with the court of Antigonos II Gonatas.

⁴³ As Due, Bodil. *The Cyropaedia: Xenophon's Aims and Methods*. Aarhus 1989, 15 noted, "paideia" here extends throughout Cyrus' life, making the title aptly chosen. The most explicit internal indicator that can be used for dating the text is Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.8.3f. with its mention of Mithradates and Rheomithres, who appear as protagonists of the satrapal revolt at Diod. 15.90.1-91.7. Since the epilogue (8.8) is now generally considered authentic, the passage can provide a *terminus post quem* for the completion of the whole text, which may, however, have been written over a substantial period of time (Badian 2004, 48). On the date see also Due 1989, 16; Gera, Deborah L. *Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Style, Genre, and Literary Technique*. Oxford 1993, 23-26, 300; Nadon, Christopher. *Xenophon's Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia*. Berkeley 2001, 140-142; Reisert, Joseph. "Ambition and Corruption in Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*", in: *Polis* 26:2 (2009), 296-315, here 297. On the satrapal revolts see in depth Weiskopf, Michael. *The*

substantial degree of correlation between the *Cyropaedia* and the value cosmos implicit both in Alexander's conception of monarchy and that of the early Hellenistic period suggests that the work reflects a construction that seems to have been relatively durable.⁴⁴ It is worth noting that the first half of the fourth century was the formative period of the generation of Philip II of Macedon, whose influence on the Diadoch period is significant, right up to the death of Antigonos Monophthalmos in 301 BC.⁴⁵ Moreover, philosophical input on kingship was both sought by and provided to the Diadochi – its real influence is a matter of contention, but as a discourse – and that is what counts here – it certainly featured within the power-dynamics of the emergent Hellenistic court, both informing and constituting tools of power.⁴⁶ The *Cyropaedia* is also valuable for another reason, namely that it differs so greatly from other fourth-century texts on ideal kingship that were produced in a polis context: it involves Persia as a projected setting, seems to anticipate Alexander's conquest in its imperial scope, and provides a detailed narrative of individual interactions in contexts very similar to those encountered

So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt," 366-360 B.C.: Concerning Local Instability in the Achaemenid Far West (=Historia Einzelschriften 63). Stuttgart 1989, esp. 94-99 with the critical notes by Moyssey, Robert A. "Diodoros, the Satraps and the Decline of the Persian Empire", in: *AHB* 5 (1991), 113-122, arguing that the unrest in Western Asia Minor during the 360s was neither unprecedented nor threatening to Artaxerxes II. See similarly Briant, Pierre. *From Cyrus to Alexander. A History of the Persian Empire*. Winona Lake 2002, 656-675, who notes the satraps' continued adherence to the Achaemenid system of royal favour (p. 674) and the centre's persistent capacity for action. On the *Cyropaedia* as a pseudohistorical text see Whidden, Christopher. "Cyrus's Imperial Household: An Aristotelian Reading of Xenophon's «Cyropaedia»", in: *Polis* 25:1 (2008), 31-62, here 32f. with additional literature in n. 5, and already Cic. *Ad Q. Fr.* 1.1.23.

⁴⁴ Faber, Joel. "The Cyropaedia and Hellenistic Kingship", in: *AJP* 100 (1979), 497-514, esp. 514 shows the high degree of correlation between the kingship ideal in the *Cyropaedia* and Schubart's (1937) reconstruction of the ideal Hellenistic king from documentary sources; for this point see also Nadon 2001, 6, 163; Carlier 2010 [1978], 353f. notes the central importance of euergetism. Cf. also more recently Mueller-Goldingen, Christian. *Xenophon. Philosophie und Geschichte*. Darmstadt 2007, 95-109, whose more popular account highlights euergetism, *nomos empsychos* and philanthropism as key areas of overlap (cf. for the Diadochi e.g. Lund 1992, 165-169). Compare only Plut. *Mor.* 183c and Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.2.9f.; 5.3.46-51; 5.4.15-18; 7.5.45 – the intensely personal conception of monarchy and the constructed significance tied to individual agency in matters of strength, justice, and goodness are readily apparent.

⁴⁵ Billows 1990, 321-325.

⁴⁶ Walbank 1984, 75-84; Billows 1995, 57-70, esp. 59. Allowing critical thinking about kingship is in itself a double-edged sword for the system, potentially both reinforcing and adapting its construction. Plut. *Mor.* 189d casts reading philosophical literature as an avenue to disinterested advice free of *kolakeia*, presumably as it is created beyond the confines of the court.

by the Diadochi, namely the army on campaign and the emergent court.⁴⁷ Accordingly, the many parallels between the *Cyropaedia* and Alexander's and Hellenistic kingship have often been noted.⁴⁸ Furthermore, it charts a development that parallels that of the Diadochi from general to king, and provides an extensive narrative, unique of its kind, of the transition from the one to the other, even including the establishment of a court.⁴⁹ I feel that these considerations outweigh the problems in using the *Cyropaedia* to provide an extensive and detailed foil for the later items of information that relate more directly to the emergent courts of the Diadoch period. I freely admit that I am making the text function as a kind of prosthesis for a missing early Hellenistic text that might have provided authentic insights into the value-normative level of the relevant socio-political networks, and, like all prosthetics, this tack has advantages and disadvantages. Recall, however, that the basic assumption is that these texts can be treated as actors, i.e. as stories within a social network that contribute to structuring the world of its members and thus controlling perceived contingency at a societal level.⁵⁰ The intent behind considering the *Cyropaedia* here is then to gain more comprehensive insight into how such a story might function.

⁴⁷ Other important fourth-century treatises on kingship include Isoc. 2, esp. 15f.; Plat. *Polit.* 293c-294a; *Leg.* 711e-712a; Aristot. *Pol.* 1284b35-1286a8, and esp. also 1284a9f. Aristotle briefly envisages (*Pol.* 1285b30-33) a form of absolute, patriarchal kingship described as pambasileia and roughly comparable to that of the *Cyropaedia*, but generally prefers oligarchy blended with democracy (*Pol.* 1252a). Theophrastus' treatise *On Kingship* does not survive beyond three meagre fragments (see Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, fr. 600-609 for all fragments relating to kingship), nor does Epicurus'. See in general Walbank 1984, 75f. The text mirrors Alexander's conquest and the Diadochi in that it discusses a conquest of Asia and the processes of transformation from general to king in the context of war. As Due 1989, 262 points out, it is not a conqueror's handbook (cf. Schuffert 2005, 153-155), nor is it a warning against imperial conquest, as argued by Carlier 2010 [1978], 362-366. The text's engagement with mytho-historical Persia is highly significant, as this setting lends itself to real deliberations about imperial-scale monarchy far more than a polis context where the counter-concept of tyranny is never far. This is well exemplified by Xenophon's *Hiero* and also by the well-known constitutional debate of Hdt. 3.80-84 (cf. Carlier 2010 [1978], 356-358, for this contrast with tyranny). See also Higgins, William E. *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis*. Albany, NY 1977, 44f., 55; Due 1989, 24f., 210f., who similarly emphasise the heroisation of kingship that is possible in a Persian setting.

⁴⁸ Faber 1979; Schuffert 2005, 153-156.

⁴⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.37-85.

⁵⁰ White 2008², 31, 37f. A text's impact in this vein obviously need not be limited to the time of its creation, though it itself does not of course reveal how the text was read later.

4.2.1 Source criticism and previous research

Over the last couple of decades or so, there has been a considerable revival of interest in the *Cyropaedia*, which both simplifies and complicates the task of assessing its character.⁵¹ Fortunately, the text itself is, bar a few corruptions and interpolations, relatively reliable and based on a solid manuscript tradition, though one plagued with variants.⁵² The authorial perspective behind it is that of an exiled, wealthy Athenian ἱππεύς, whose point of view was tempered by a blend of discourses, including estrangement from Athens and Athenian radical democracy, an approving outsider's views of legendary Persian and especially Spartan virtue and kingship, both of these aspects of a growing appreciative discourse on monarchy, and finally Socratic thought.⁵³ As a result, Xenophon's authorial interests

-
- ⁵¹ Some of the most pertinent studies include Tatum, James. *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction. On the Education of Cyrus*. Princeton, NJ 1989. Mueller-Goldingen, Christian. *Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Kyrupädie*. Stuttgart 1995; Nadon, Christopher. *Xenophon's Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia*. Berkeley 2001; Azoulay, Vincent. "The Medo-Persian Ceremonial: Xenophon, Cyrus and the King's Body", in: Christopher Tuplin (ed.). *Xenophon and His World: Papers from a Conference held in Liverpool 1999*. Stuttgart 2004, 147-174, as well as the contributions in Hobden, Fiona and Tuplin, Christopher J. (eds.) *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry*. Leiden 2012.
- ⁵² See the *praefatio* to Marchant, Edgar C. *Xenophontis Opera Omnia*. Vol. 4. Oxford 1910, v-xiii. The only substantial problem is the authenticity of the final passage, i.e. Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.8; see Sage, Paula W. "Dying in Style: Xenophon's Ideal Leader and the End of the 'Cyropaedia'", in: *CJ* 90:2 (1994), 161-174, here 161f. for discussion with bibliography). Since it is included in all manuscripts and is now generally regarded as authentic (e.g. Carlier 2010 [1978], 362; Due 1989, 16-22; Tatum 1989, 223-225; Gera 1993, 299f.; Tuplin, Christopher J. "Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Fictive History, Political Analysis, and Thinking with Iranian Kings", in: Mitchell and Melville (eds.) 2013, 67-90, here 71-73), it is here considered authentic, but see p. 203 below for discussion.
- ⁵³ Diog. Laert. 2.48-59 provides a basic, though not particularly reliable biography of Xenophon. On Xenophon's life see still Breitenbach, Hans R. S.v. "Xenophon [6]", in: *RE* IX A,2 (1967), 1569-2052, here 1571-1578; for a more recent, critical assessment of the sources for Xenophon's life see Badian, Ernst. "Xenophon the Athenian", in: Christopher Tuplin (ed.). *Xenophon and his world: papers from a conference held in Liverpool 1999*. Stuttgart 2004, 33-54, esp. 41f. on his relationship with Athens. Aspects of the fourth-century discourse on monarchy are visible for instance in Isoc. 2, 3 and 5, and Tuplin 1994, 127-132 concludes that Xenophon "was at ease with what will have seemed to many Greeks the ethnic paradox of crying up the virtues of Achaemenid barbarians as a model for Greek *kaloi kagathoi*" (131), and was capable of considering both Sparta and Persia as models in many though not all things. On Xenophon's attitude(s) to Persia see in depth Hirsch, Steven W. *The Friendship of the Barbarians: Xenophon and the Persian Empire*. Hanover 1985, esp. 68f. on the *Cyropaedia*, who notes the complexity of Xenophon's attitude and concludes that he was much more positive towards Persia than earlier commentators have assumed; he is thus forced, however,

are wide-ranging, though certain recognisable political attitudes run through the *œuvre* and he remained in some sense true to his Athenian roots.⁵⁴ Like the *Characters*, the *Cyropaedia* is thus the product of an intellectual outsider's critical engagement with a form of socio-political structure he was not born into, though Xenophon gained first-hand experience of the younger Cyrus and of Agesilaos in the years after 402/1 BC.⁵⁵ As a result, he can be read as a figure not completely dissimilar to the Greek *philoi* of the early Hellenistic kings, an involved but reflexive observer.

As far as the genre of the text is concerned, we are on much safer ground than in the case of the *Characters*, but are again faced with a degree of literary novelty. The opening passages state that the *Cyropaedia* serves to investigate the secrets of establishing and maintaining an Empire, of rule and obedience, of inspiring fear and a desire to please in one's subjects, the underlying assumption being that the ability to do this rests in the individual ruler and his *ἐπιστήμη* ("understanding, knowledge, know-how").⁵⁶ As such, the text is a paradigmatic 'mirror for princes' and develops a specific conception of individual leadership – as well as a less explicit concept of kingship, i.e. monarchical *politeia* – in the form of a political

to consider the negative epilogue of the *Cyropaedia* spurious. I do not feel that this is necessary: Greek views of Persia were situationally complex, full of both admiration and hatred, with admiration often being projected into the past and hatred being reserved for the contemporary imbalance of power, always in keeping with the very same tendency visible in Athenian law-giving or constitutional policy – older is always better, but simultaneously open to more projection and adaptation, allowing for the contingency-reducing configuration of self in the context of and relation to the past. On this cf. e.g. Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Greek Representations of the Past", in: Lin Foxhall, Hans-Joachim Gehrke, and Nino Luraghi (eds.). *Intentional History. Spinning Time in Ancient Greece*. Stuttgart 2010, 15-34.

⁵⁴ Azoulay 2004b, 15; Badian 2004, 49f.

⁵⁵ Breitenbach 1967, 1574f.

⁵⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.3, 5. In Xenophon's version there is no foreshadowing of Cyrus' greatness in the form of auspices, as at Hdt. 1.107.1-108.1, nor is the Oedipus-story present (Hdt. 1.108.2-116.1). Individual agency is crucial; despite the importance of the gods throughout, they do not determine reality (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.5f.). See also Due 1989, 16.

treatise.⁵⁷ No less important, however, is the claim that the privilege of rule extends to all male individuals who exercise control over other human beings.⁵⁸ Its implied audience thus includes not only those interested in questions of constitution and in individual leadership qualities, but extends to every *kyrios* of a (prosperous) household.⁵⁹ That said, questions of genre and audience are complicated by the fact that *Cyropaedia* is not a straightforward treatise on kingship, but often reads like a mixture of novel, Thucydidean history, campaign report, and Socratic dialogue.⁶⁰ My own approach to the work thus takes it as a story, a theoretical work in narrative form, which *shows* its message to its readers rather than telling it and plays with conventions of genre, weaving different elements into a stylistically unified, compound tapestry.⁶¹

On this basis, any judgement of the text must take into account its variable narrative structure and elegant, unobtrusive style.⁶² The text features an anonymous authorial narrator, who speaks of himself in the first person (plural or singular), but intrudes only very rarely, most prominently in the framing introduction and epilogue.⁶³ When he does so, it is to offer commentary or thematise the uncertainty of the facts, maintaining the fiction of critical enquiry that the text opens with (τούτον τὸν ἄνδρα ἐσκεψάμεθα: “we have carefully examined this man”)

⁵⁷ Hirsch 1985, 69f.; Due 1989, 25; Tuplin 2013, 70f. Based on Plat. *Leg.* 694c, the *Cyropaedia* was considered part of a semi-hostile debate with Plato about the best constitution during the Roman Empire: Athen. 11.504f-505a; Gellius *NA* 14.3.3f.; cf. Diog. Laert. 3.24 (see Tatum 1989, 1-35; Sandridge, Norman B. *Loving Humanity, Learning and Being Honoured. The Foundations of Leadership in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus*. Cambridge, MA and London 2012, 13; but note Gray 2011, 260f.). The *Cyropaedia* is interested not only in constitutional matters but also in practical political implementation and the consequences for the individuals involved, especially the leader.

⁵⁸ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.1f.

⁵⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.1-3. On the complex genre see Hirsch 1985, 67f.; Gera 1993, 1-12; on audience see generally Due 1989, esp. 234-240; Gera 1993, 24.

⁶⁰ Due 1989, 10; Mueller-Goldingen 1995, 1f.; Tuplin 2013, 74. On the novelesque elements see further Reichel, Michael. “Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* and the Hellenistic Novel”, in: Gray (ed.) 2010 [1995], 418-438.

⁶¹ Similarly Sandridge 2012, 120.

⁶² Reiser 2009, 298. On the *Cyropaedia* as fictive history: Tuplin, Christopher J. “Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*: Education and Fiction”, in: Alan H. Sommerstein and Catherine Atherton (eds.). *Education in Greek Fiction*. Bari 1996, 65-162, here 108-154; Tuplin 2013, 70 n. 10. For a rehabilitation of Xenophon’s stylistic merits and narrative skill see Higgins 1977, 2-20.

⁶³ Due 1989, 29f., understandably equates the extradiegetic narrator with Xenophon, but the varying arguments in favour of irony and narrative complexity in the text – which is explicitly intended to persuade its reader (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.3) – should warn against considering the relationship a simple one.

by offering comments to a Greek audience.⁶⁴ Throughout, he marks his perspective as being limited in ways designed to suggest a historical treatise, for instance by use of λέγεται (“it is said”) or φασίν (“they say”). While these are often read as source markers, it is telling that no source is ever cited explicitly; these words thus serve to mark information and direct speech as unverified, generating ambiguity or non-specificity by using the conventions that usually mark a historical text for whose veracity the author assumes responsibility, as far as he can.⁶⁵ Moreover, the narrator occasionally marks a temporal distance between the narrative time and the ‘present’ by drawing parallels and remarking on continuity or change.⁶⁶ The extent to which uncertainty is thematised should then make us suspicious of the text’s intermittent claims to historical veracity, a guise it only really adopts at the very end.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Quotation from Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.6. The narrator’s first-person voice appears, to give but a few examples, at 1.1.1, 4, 6; 3.3.59; 4.2.12-14; 8.3.1; 8.4.5. Comments that unequivocally suggest a Greek audience are in fact rare, but the ‘hellenisation’ of the Persians, their customs, religion and gods, is a device well suited to making Cyrus and his origins palatable to a Greek audience; the differences from Herodotus’ account are marked. Due 1989, 234, accordingly asserts a Panhellenic readership and even speculates about female readers, based on the elements of romance.

⁶⁵ Due 1989, 31 with n. 9. λέγεται occurs 32 times in the text, mostly in extradiegesis (e.g. 1.1.4; 1.2.1; 1.3.4, 15; 1.4.25-27; 1.5.1; 1.6.1, 31; 2.1.11; 4.2.13 (direct speech), 15 (omen), 30; 4.5.9 and 4.6.11 (reputation reports); 5.2.20 (direct speech); 7.2.15 and 7.3.4 (intradiegesis, reported event); 7.5.22 (intradiegesis, generally known fact); 8.2.9 (report of the Persian king’s qualities); 8.2.13-19 (a long description of Cyrus’ qualities); 8.3.26; 8.6.19; 8.6.20)), as does ὡς φασίν, e.g. at 7.3.16. It is telling that these uncertainty markers are far less common in Xenophon’s actual historical works, the *Hellenica* and the *Anabasis*. In some cases information would obviously have to have been acquired after the event if the fiction of historiography were to be maintained. Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.43-45, for example, has the authorial narrator report the Assyrian king’s speech to his soldiers and then describe Cyrus’ direct reaction, even though Cyrus cannot possibly know what was said at that point.

⁶⁶ Due 1989, 32f., 35. Examples are Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.3-6 (prologue); 1.4.27 (kissing in greeting); 7.1.3f. (golden eagle ensign); 6.1.29f. (scythe-bearing chariots); 7.5.70 (the city guard of Babylon); 8.1.6-8 (the institutions of rule); 8.8 (decay of Persia in the narrator’s day). This distancing technique is significant for the intention of the work as an act of communication with a Greek audience.

⁶⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.8.2 suddenly states that the objective of the inquiry is truth (ἀλήθεια) and embarks on providing proof in the form of diachronic comparison. On the *Cyropaedia*’s claims to truth in general see Tatum 1989, 63; Müller-Goldingen 1995, 1f., both rightly emphasising the work’s non-historiographical conception of truth and its novelistic elements. All the more striking is the claim expressed at the end of the work, which both seem to overlook. Accordingly, this has been harnessed by interpreters inclined towards ironical readings (e.g. Whidden 2008). A non-ironising explanation may lie in

This extradiegetic narrative voice generally switches between authorial focalisation and various degrees of character-focalisation. In practice, it generally follows an individual protagonist, Cyrus, narrated in the third-person style usual in historical writing with occasional interjections, foreshadowings, and variable tempi.⁶⁸ At times, the narrator has direct access to Cyrus' thoughts, whereas at others they are marked as being uncertain; for much of the work, however, Cyrus is an 'acting enigma', opaque to the narrator.⁶⁹ In key scenes, he thematises Cyrus' deliberation process and his ratiocination, highlighting the wisdom that sets him apart as a good ruler, though sometimes in a speculative fashion.⁷⁰ The narrative is further complicated by shifts in focalisation, such as in the episodes surrounding Pantheia and Abradatas, Pheraulas and the Sacian, or during Gobryas' and Gadatas' assassination of the Assyrian king.⁷¹ The various intradiegetic narratives delivered mainly by Cyrus, but also by other characters, range from the edifying to the ridiculous and further break up or even subvert the dominant 'mirror for princes' narrative mode, as do the speaking names given to Chrysantas ("golden bloom") and Pheraulas ("bearer of the court").⁷²

the different discursive levels of the frame-narrative, intended to bridge the gap between reader and narrative. As the text returns the reader to his contemporary frame of existence, the mode of interaction becomes more historiographical, but also more directly educational, highlighting the distance and the concomitant moral decay. Accordingly, the frame requires authentication markers.

⁶⁸ The relationship between story time and discourse time is malleable: On some occasions the narrative covers every moment of a day from breakfast to bedtime (e.g. 3.3.29-4.1.7), on others it fast-forwards years at a time (1.5.1). As Tuplin (1996, 100-103) notes, the bulk of the work covers a single campaigning season. The work is therefore not a balanced biography of Cyrus or a chronicle of his reign, as his actual kingship is merely glossed. As for foreshadowing, the interactions with Gadatas, for instance, anticipate the importance of eunuchs later on. As the narrative progresses, they become increasingly more prominent, no doubt so as to acquaint the reader with their loyalty before Cyrus decides to incorporate them into the machinery of his Empire (for instance in the case of Panthea's loyal eunuchs at 7.3.15f.). Similarly, Artabazus' hailing of Cyrus as a "natural king" (βασιλευς γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς σὺ φύσει πεφυκέναι; 5.1.24) – which is the first occasion after 1.4.9 on which the notion of Cyrus' kingship is introduced – foreshadows his gradual transformation into master (δεσπότης) and king over the course of book 7, e.g. at 7.2.9; 7.5.46f., 56f.

⁶⁹ Uncertain intentions are visible for instance at Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.2.29.

⁷⁰ This is most apparent when Cyrus is creating the structures of his Empire: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.22.

⁷¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.4.2-11; 7.3.14f.; 7.5.26-30; 8.3.28-50.

⁷² Humorous scenes include, e.g., Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.2.2-5; 2.2.6-10; 2.2.22-28; 2.2.28-31; 8.3.28-32; 8.4.15-27. Chrysantas is Cyrus' "golden bloom" or "golden brilliance", his prime product, as is visible in the fact that Chrysantas stands in for him and extends his points in argument (e.g. 8.1.1-6) and in his self-comparison to the nurturing earth

While the complexity of Xenophon's narrative stance in the *Cyropaedia* is thus readily apparent and undoubtedly related to the complexities of genre, providing a deeper explanation or motivation for it is difficult. In principle, one might say that such complexity is directed at self-aware, intellectual audiences capable of appreciating it.⁷³ On a relatively conservative, political reading, therefore, one might argue that the technique is designed to generate personal sympathy for Cyrus and provide entertaining but undamaging contrasts that highlight his abilities. At the same time, the text self-consciously maintains an enigmatic distance between reader and character by repeatedly switching focalisation and imposing the limitations of the writer of history on the narrator, and thus stimulating discussion of the overt argument without weakening it.⁷⁴

The historical accuracy of the work is hence unsurprisingly disputed, with some scholars maintaining that some of Xenophon's details, such as troop numbers or certain procedures, may be accurate.⁷⁵ Comparison with Herodotus and the fragments of Ktesias makes abundantly clear, however, that the text does not aim to reflect 'authentic' Persian thought and history – even through Greek eyes – but rather develops a very specific and even ideal conception of its own. The social imaginary produced in the text blends Socratic concepts, established accounts and legends of Cyrus' reign, as well as real and literary experience of Asia Minor and the Achaemenid Empire.⁷⁶ The figure of Cyrus was well suited as a

at 8.7.25. Pheraulas quite literally comes to bear the court as master of ceremonies (8.3.1-8) and is of course crucial in implementing Cyrus' rule (2.3.7f.). Hystaspas is a historical Greek version of a Persian name (e.g. Hdt. 1.209), as is Abradatas. On the names see also Henderson, John. "Pheraulas is the Answer, What was the Question? (You Cannot Be Cyrus)", in: Hobden and Tuplin (eds.) 2012, 541-562, here 550.

⁷³ The multiple Socrateses of this text are a case in point, appreciated mainly by the intellectual circles of Athens. They include Cyrus (*passim*), Cambyses (1.6), and the unnamed philosopher figure in Armenia (3.1.38f.). On Socratic elements see Gera 1993, 50-72.

⁷⁴ On Xenophon's narrators see Gray, Vivienne J. "Xenophon", in: Irene J.F. de Jong, René Nünlist, Angus M. Bowie, *Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative. Volume One* (=Mnemosyne Suppl. 257). Leiden 2004, 391-401.

⁷⁵ Notably Kuhrt 1995; Briant 2002; Brosius 2007. On the Persian court see now esp. Llewellyn-Jones, Lloyd (ed.). *King and Court in Ancient Persia 559 to 331 BCE*. Edinburgh 2013, which also includes passages of the *Cyropaedia* in its collection of sources, e.g. no. B2.

⁷⁶ See for an in-depth comparison Mueller-Goldingen 1995, 3-24; cf. also Hirsch 1985, 68; Tuplin 2013, 87 n. 90. Some brief examples may suffice here. The narrative as a whole bears very little relation to Herodotus' version of Cyrus' origin story, conquest, especially of Media, and finally reign (Hdt. 1.107-245), or to what is known of Ktesias' account (Ktes. F9 =FGrH 688 F 9). Xenophon's austere and Republican Persia is an intellectual Greek's response to perceived Achaemenid inconsistencies, not a faithful

projection plane for this literary construction as he already existed in a multitude of different narratives both ‘Persian’ and ‘Greek’ – Herodotus notes that he encountered Cyrus as a complex discourse – and was clearly admired, not only in the fourth century BC, as an Empire-builder and paragon of virtue.⁷⁷

portrayal (Tuplin 2013, 87f.). The religious practice in the text is Greek (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.1), as it prominently includes libations to gods such as Zeus and Hestia (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.1; 2.3.1; cf. Hdt. 1.132). Hdt. 1.153.2 claims that the Persians had no markets, which is at odds with the camp-markets that Cyrus maintains (Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.5.42; 6.2.38f.). Xenophon does, however, include the custom of kissing in greeting (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.2, 14.27f., 5.5.6; cf. Hdt. 1.134) and Median clothing features prominently (e.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.4.26, 2.4.1 and 4-6; cf. Hdt. 1.135), though is not worn by Persians until the end. The story of the conquest of Babylon (Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.1-34), for instance, is similar to Hdt. 1.191 (lowering the water-level of the river, festival distracts the inhabitants), but the surrounding narrative is quite different and far more openly teleological. Moreover, while Xenophon notes that Cyrus did not speak the languages of his subject peoples (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.5; on the prevalence of translation in the Achaemenid Empire cf. Briant 2002, 507-511), no translators – an element of historiography – are ever mentioned (contrast e.g. Xen. *Anab.* 1.8.12). On the text as a historical romance see Stadter, Philipp. “Fictional Narrative in the *Cyropaedia*”, in: *AJP* 112:4 (1991), 461-491; Whidden 2008; Sandridge 2012, 4. On Spartan elements see Tuplin, Christopher J. “Xenophon, Sparta and the *Cyropaedia*”, in: Anton Powell and Stephen Hodkinson (eds.). *The Shadow of Sparta*. London 1994, 127-182, esp. 150-161, who notes parallels in Xenophon’s attitudes to Persia and Sparta (137f.), but denies that Sparta played any real part in Xenophon’s considerations (162-164), maintaining that praise of Persia was acceptable in itself, without a hidden agenda, especially if said Persia was in fact Greek.

⁷⁷ See Briant 2002, 14-16. In the context of the *Cyropaedia* add Breitenbach 1967, 1708; Carlier 2010 [1987], 332f. with n. 15; Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Heleen. “The Death of Cyrus: Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* as a Source for Iranian History”, in: Gray (ed.) 2010 [1985], 439-453, here 441f., 452f. and *passim*; Due 1989, 22f.; Tatum 1989, 40; Sandridge 2012, 2f.; Newell 2013, 129f.; Tuplin 2013, 73-75. Cyrus’ biography is explicitly described as existing in multiple versions by Hdt. 1.95.1; 1.214.1. Isoc. 9.37f. also reflects on Cyrus’ conquest as being universally admired, but easy to achieve, while Isoc. 5.66f. uses Cyrus as an example of a ruler arising from the most adverse initial conditions. Plat. *Leg.* 3.694a-695e also discusses Cyrus as an admirable paragon, who established Persian greatness through his wisdom. Dion Chrys. 15.22 uses him as an exemplary bringer of freedom and Diog. Laert. 6.1.2 notes that the Cynic Antisthenes, still closely tied to the Socratics, used Cyrus as an exemplary figure regarding his resistance to pain. By contrast Polyæn. *Strat.* 4.3.32 describes Alexander’s alleged scornful reaction to Cyrus’ extravagant dinner arrangements. This narrative plurality, blended with his generally exemplary character, is undoubtedly in part due to Cyrus’ existence as a heroic construct, most visibly in his instrumentalisation as the founder of an Achaemenid Empire by the underlegitimised Darius I in the Behistun inscription (see Kuhrt 1995, 2, 664f.; Brosius, Maria. *Women in Ancient Persia (559-331 BC)*. Oxford 1996, 193; Briant 2002, 62f.; 92, on the other hand, is more cautious).

Due to revived scholarly interest in the work, there are a number of current readings of this text that need to be briefly addressed as they affect the reconstruction of power discourse pursued here. The most contentious question concerns the nature and moral evaluation of the political model elaborated in the text and naturally focuses on the work's ambiguities. The influential argument by Leo Strauss that Xenophon was in fact a cunning, highly ambiguous writer who donned a mask of banality to uncover deep philosophical truth, and that strong 'Machiavellian' elements, such as egocentric individual ambition, deception, deceit, and manipulation, pervade Cyrus' behaviour,⁷⁸ has given rise to a string of 'dark' readings of the text as fundamentally ironic and continuously deconstructing its own overt portrait of a benevolent, gracious ruler.⁷⁹ This debate is stoked by the marked difference between Cyrus' Empire in books 7 and 8, and the apparently glowing description of the Persian *politeia* in the account of Cyrus' 'primary' education in book 1.⁸⁰ Tied to this debate is the question of Xenophon's own interest

⁷⁸ The *Cyropaedia* and Xenophon were admired by Machiavelli, who used this work as the Classical model he wished to supersede, see Strauss, Leo. *Thoughts on Machiavelli*. Glencoe 1958, esp. 59, 290f.; Newell, Walter R. "Machiavelli and Xenophon on Princely Rule: A Double-Edged Encounter", in: *Journal of Politics* 50 (1988), 108-130. On the *Cyropaedia* as ironic, see for instance Strauss, Leo. *On Tyranny. Revised and Expanded Edition, Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence*. Edited by Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth. Chicago 2000, 181. On the debate see Rasmussen, Paul J. *Excellence unleashed: Machiavelli's Critique of Xenophon and the Moral Foundation of Politics*. Lanham 2009; Dorion, Louis-André. "The Straussian Exegesis of Xenophon", in: Gray (ed.) 2010 [2001], 283-323; Johnson, David M. "Strauss on Xenophon", in: Hobden and Tuplin (eds.) 2012, 123-159; Newell, Walter R. "Machiavelli and Xenophon's Cyrus. Searching for the Modern Conceptions of Monarchy", in: Mitchell and Melville (eds.) 2013, 129-155.

⁷⁹ According to Gray 2011, 246-290, these "dark" readings take their beginning from Strauss 1958 and include Carlier 2010 [1978]; Tatum 1989, 220-239; Nadon 2001, 87-100, 136-146. They are prefaced by Schwartz' and Prinz' allegorical readings of *Cyropaedia* as advocating a Panhellenic, Isocratean crusade led by Sparta (see Hirsch 1985, 61f.). Add recently Whidden, Christopher. "The Persian Regime and Cyrus's Persian Education in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*", in: *The Review of Politics* 69 (2007), 539-567; idem. "Deception in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*", in: *Interpretation* 34:2 (2007), 129-156; idem 2008, 36 with n. 19; Reisert 2009, 296f. Gera 1993, 296-300 is more balanced. Criticism of such readings has recently been voiced also by Danzig, Gabriel. "The Best of the Achaemenids: Benevolence, Self-interest and the 'Ironic' Reading of *Cyropaedia*", in: Hobden and Tuplin (eds.) 2012, 499-540, and Sandridge 2012, 44.

⁸⁰ See Gray 2011, 264f. This contrast is considered problematical by Newell, Walter R. "Tyranny and the Science of Ruling in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus", in: *Journal of Politics* 45 (1983), 889-906; Carlier 2010 [1978], 138-143, 160-162; Gera 1993, 286, 290, 299; Nadon 2001, 26-60, 139-146.

and agenda in writing the *Cyropaedia*. Is he suggesting the real possibility of a glorious conquest of Persia by a Greek individual as the epilogue suggests? Or is he emphasising the inevitability of moral decay and corruption that affects any imperial power, as seems to be adumbrated by the conflict between Cyrus and Cyaxares?⁸¹

Any good narrative text is ambiguous and these questions need not be viewed as exclusive options clamouring for definitive answers.⁸² Since the *Cyropaedia* is used here as an instance of fourth-century power discourse, however, an attempt does need to be made to assess the extent of 'literariness' within the text. Regarding the 'dark' readings outlined and rejected by Vivienne Gray, Gabriel Danzig has recently added that they all suffer from a modern preconception that the portrayal of Cyrus is inherently 'unrealistic' and accordingly disregard the moral construction of Cyrus' actions within the text.⁸³ He points out that other fourth-century philosophical treatises attest to a widely held conception that an ideal individual could indeed, by virtue of his individual qualities, overcome the need for rule of law and other institutional collective constraints.⁸⁴ To a philosophically-minded, fourth-century audience, then, the *Cyropaedia* would thus not have been unimaginable or despicable *per se*.⁸⁵ Cyrus' use of deception, for instance, is explicitly and extensively justified at the beginning of the text.⁸⁶ Furthermore, these ironic readings depend strongly on the critical epilogue of the text, which Paula Sage has aptly described as having "a history of disturbing rather than fulfilling reader's expectations."⁸⁷

⁸¹ These apparent opposites are combined lucidly by Carlier 2010 [1978], 362-365. On the readings of the Cyaxares-Cyrus conflict see Gray 2011, 267-276.

⁸² For this thought see for instance Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith. "Ambiguity and Narrative Levels: Christine Brooke-Rose's *Thru*", in: *Poetics Today* 3:1 (1982), 21-32.

⁸³ Gray 2011, 246-290; Danzig 2012, 500-506.

⁸⁴ Cyrus' conflicting relationship to law was explored by Tatum 1989, 98f. In the *Cyropaedia's* Persia, law, which applies equally to all, is equated with justice (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.17f.), a principle that is retained even when Cyrus becomes king of Persia (8.5.25).

⁸⁵ Tuplin 1994, 135.

⁸⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.27-33. See in detail Danzig 2012, 517-519.

⁸⁷ See esp. Sage 1994, 163 and p. 196 n. 52 and p. 203 n. 78f. above. The passage in question is Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.8 and the main problems are as follows: Its forceful rhetorical tone, exaggerated content and stated intention (8.8.2, 8) seem thoroughly at odds with the aim formulated in the prologue (1.1.6) and the work's laudatory spirit so far. Rather than summarising in the abstract how Cyrus managed to control the unruly human spirit of so many people, it sketches the contemporary decay of Persian morals and customs. To do so, the extradiegetic first-person narrator suddenly becomes very overt and presents what he defends as a true argument (8.8.2), which he has never done so far. The king's function in this decadence is far less prominent, occurring only in a blanket statement (8.8.5) and a slight against Artaxerxes (8.8.12; probably Artaxerxes

In my view, Sage and Gray have shown that this passage neither undermines Cyrus nor ironises the text as a whole.⁸⁸ While the epilogue seems to invite criticism of Cyrus in that he apparently neglected the *paideia* of his successors and thus contributed to moral decadence – an argument used already by Plato⁸⁹ – this ignores what the text actually shows: in fact he is explicitly presented imparting wisdom to his sons even on his deathbed, making every effort right to the very last in order to ensure the stability of the order he has constructed.⁹⁰ As Plato's

II Mnemon, with whom Xenophon obviously shared unpleasant personal experiences (e.g. *Anab.* 1.8)) – the narrator is suddenly interested in painting the Persian collective as having decayed in a whole range of aspects (oath-keeping 8.8.3f.; greed, injustice 6, 18; laziness 8.8.8f., 19; overindulgence 8.8.10-12; bad education 8.8.13f.; effeminacy/weakness 8.8.15-17; military decline 8.8.20-26) which is strangely at odds with the consistently individualist and laudatory argument of the main text. Moreover, several passages are concerned all of a sudden with a Greek point of view (8.8.3, 7, 26) and the narrator introduces the younger Cyrus' expedition and the satrap revolts of the 360s (8.8.3f.), which are the only contemporary events mentioned in the entire work.

⁸⁸ In light of the decadence of the Empire in Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.8, Paula Sage (1994) has argued forcefully that the stark contrast between the bulk of the text and 8.8 serves the purpose of emphasising Cyrus' achievements (163-165, 167, 172f.) and thereby fulfils the programme of 1.1.6. This is due to the absence of any criticism of Cyrus himself, as the linking passage 8.8.1 still lauds the ruler and his successes. See also Gray 2011, 250f., 262f., and 255 on the exaggerations of 8.8 by contrast with the *Anabasis*. This was similarly argued by Breebaart, Abraham B. "From Victory to Peace: Some Aspects of Cyrus' State in Xenophon's Cyropaedia", in: *Mnemosyne* 36 (1983), 117-134, here 133; Due 1989, 19. It is worth noting also that Xen. *Const. Lac.* 14, similarly constitutes a kind of negative then–now epilogue that bridges the gap between the Spartan constitution and their contemporary reality.

⁸⁹ Plat. *Leg.* 3.694c-d highlights his lack of *paideia* and *oikonomia* in neglecting the upbringing of his sons by allowing the women to turn them into spoiled brats. See Hirsch 1985, 96-100, for discussion of the interplay between Plato and the *Cyropaedia*, arguing that Plato's praise of old Persia (694a-b) stems from the *Cyropaedia*'s description of Persia, which makes Plato praise the model Xenophon has Cyrus supersede. See further Tatum 1989, 215-239, who offers a very subtle reading of the epilogue as a pragmatic revision of a fictional ideal by confronting it with Plato's criticism (Plat. *Leg.* 3.694c-695b).

⁹⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.7.8-16. I do not fully concur with Paula Sage's argument (1994) on two points: on the one hand, Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.3 does not seem to introduce a model impossible to follow (164), it is just very difficult – otherwise what is the point of the text? (Cf. similarly Due 1989, 20, 24, but the discussion is brief). It needs to be a model in the sense that its exploration of basic tenets, such as life-long learning and toil, the continuous self-critical exercise of agency to lead in accordance with tempered utilitarian principles, inspires the readers to reflect. On the other hand, I doubt very much that Cyrus did not educate his sons (173f.), bringing about the system's downfall. That would make Cyrus less than perfect, even foolish, given the emphasis on *paideia* in this text and 8.7.10 explicitly states that Cyrus trained his sons (*ἐπαίδευον*). Carlier 2010

(and obviously Herodotus') testimony suggests, Xenophon was faced with the problem of a semi-historical discourse that treated Cambyses II as a tyrant who murdered his brother and sharply contrasted with his virtuous father, contributing to the need to bridge the gap between the Persia of Cyrus and the Persia contemporary with the frame narrative.⁹¹ The text resolves these issues by linking socio-political order to the lived example of the ruler, exhibited through his agency.⁹² The epilogue clearly makes exactly this point: "Seeing this, all those in Asia have been turned to impiety and injustice. For whatever the rulers are, such also those under them largely become. In this they have now become more unlawful than before."⁹³ Since Cyrus explicitly states that his soul, though immortal, will no longer affect the world after his death, agency is constructed as ending with death.⁹⁴ Institutions on the other hand are never considered resilient enough to ensure political stability – instead Cyrus points to *αἰδώς* ("reverence") and the gods.⁹⁵

The epilogue can then be read as an illustration of the consequences of flawed rulers assuming power, since a patriarchal-philanthropic system such as Cyrus' is wholly dependent on the king's personal qualities.⁹⁶ In that respect, the epilogue could constitute a criticism of Cyrus' political system as a whole. On closer inspection, however, the system is actually still intact after his death: the letter of the law persists, but its spirit is gone.⁹⁷ The epilogue is thus internally consistent with the main body of the text, in that it describes development ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ("for

[1978], 364f., who argues similarly, also provides one possible solution: an Empire like Cyrus' is a setting hostile to the ongoing pursuit of *paideia* once the core collapses.

⁹¹ Plat. *Leg.* 3.694a-695e. Due 1989, 234f. notes the common occurrence of bridging formulas, such as those that activate the reader's knowledge of his own time in order to draw him into the narrative. Cf. also Tuplin 2013, 72f., who regards the palinode as a distancing formula from the contemporary world, but notes the complexity of the discourse as identified by Bodil Due.

⁹² Cf. Breebaart 1983, 133; Due 1989, 19; Gray 2011, 259-261.

⁹³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.8.5: ταῦτ' οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πάντες ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσεβές καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τετραμμένοι εἰσὶν: ὁποῖοι τινες γὰρ ἂν οἱ προστάται ὡσι, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ ὑπ' αὐτοῦς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνονται. ἀθεμιστότεροι δὲ νῦν ἢ πρόσθεν ταύτη γεγένηνται. The very same idea is visible in a letter by Antigonos II to Zeno of Kition at Diog. Laert. 7.7, attesting its relevance to early Hellenistic kingship, at least in its later reception as a kingship discourse.

⁹⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.7.17-22. The only agency he envisages takes effect through the respect (*αἰδώς*) of others for his soul; the only other constraint are the gods (22). Cf. Danzig 2012, 502, who adduces a similar conception expressed in Xen. *Mem.* 1.2, where the teacher cannot be made responsible for the actions of his pupils in his absence.

⁹⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.8. This is in marked opposition to Plato's *Laws*.

⁹⁶ Sage 1994, 172-174. The patriarchal system is explicitly discussed at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.1, 8; 8.8.1. Cf. also Aristot. *Pol.* 1252b20-23 with Whidden 2008, 37-62.

⁹⁷ Thus already Carlier 2010 [1978], 363, who speaks of perversion.

the worse”) by drawing on values and customs explicitly discussed before, except that now they have been perverted.⁹⁸ Though Cyrus crafted his system well, adapting the Persian system, blending it with the Median, and partly overwriting the Assyrian, others can also overwrite his content, though it persists as the shadow text of a twisted palimpsest.⁹⁹ While the epilogue thus serves to problematise Cyrus’ construction and reconcile its laudatory image of Persia with fourth century Greek discourse, it does not ironically undermine the text’s individualistic political model, but rather reinforces its validity by emphasising the exceptional nature of Cyrus’ own achievement.¹⁰⁰

As for the disparity between the Persian *politeia* and Cyrus’ imperial monarchy, it needs to be pointed out that the *Cyropaedia* portrays a development and is thus a dynamic rather than a static and unified treatise: Cyrus explicitly thematises his transformations from Persian individual to army commander to king of a ‘multi-ethnic’ Empire.¹⁰¹ These changes of circumstance necessitate changes of political

⁹⁸ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.8 singles out a number of virtues, some of which are explicitly implemented in the main text, and traces their perversion: oath-keeping 8.8.3f.; greed, injustice 6, 18; laziness 8.8.8f., 19; overindulgence 8.8.10-12; bad education 8.8.13f.; ef-feminacy/weakness 8.8.15-17; military decline 8.8.20-26 (see also p. 204, n 87 above). Cf. Gray 2011, 257-259: “Xenophon seems to have his cake and eat it too in his praise of Cyrus in *Cyropaedia*. [...] To have [the Persians] abandon the customs altogether would mean that they placed no value on them and would contradict contemporary Persian realities. Far better that the custom endures because of its excellence, but contemporary Persians are unable to live with its implications.” (259). Cf. also Due 1989, 21f.

⁹⁹ See e.g. Azoulay 2004a on how Cyrus combines the two systems in his final model. Being ‘overwritten’ and thereby deposed is actually a threat throughout (e.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.72-85) and is plotted out as a fundamental dynamic from the very beginning (1.1.3). This is a consequence of the relativist approach to reality put forward in the text in conjunction with utilitarian principles, on which see Gray 2011, 265-267 and p. 215 below.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Gray 2011, 276-289; Sandridge 2012, 10. On fourth-century Greek attitudes to Persia as mirrored by the contested discourse on appropriating the Persian Wars see Marincola, John. “The Persian Wars in Fourth-Century Oratory and Historiography”, in: Emma Bridges, Edith Hall, and Peter J. Rhodes (eds.). *Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium*. Oxford 2007, 106-130, linked to Persian stability in the fourth century under the long reign of Artaxerxes II Mnemon (Kuhrt 1995, 670-675). For Xenophon’s attitude beyond the *Cyropaedia* see Tuplin 1994, 129-132, who identifies an attitude between neutral and negative, but contrast Hirsch 1985, 140, who plausibly diagnoses a wide spectrum of attitudes, ranging from positive to negative. I incline towards the latter view, see above p. 196, n. 53.

¹⁰¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.46. Noted by Tuplin 1996, 87-95; Carlier 2010 [1978], 365.

system.¹⁰² Rule of law is suited to a city-state like the Persian one, where continuous observation by the collective is possible; accordingly their system is applauded in its proper context.¹⁰³ On an imperial scale, this model is not feasible, though elements of it are present in the construction of court society.¹⁰⁴ It therefore needs to be supplemented by the king, who functions as embodied, seeing law, implemented via a value-correlated pyramid of deputies.¹⁰⁵ To emphasise this, both the Persian system and the Median system are depicted as having flaws: the Persian system wastes its manpower and potential strength due to its lack of funds and conservative, collectivist mind set, and its abstract, rigid laws are unjust.¹⁰⁶ The Median system, on the other hand, is characterised by greed for its own sake, as well as by effeminacy and overindulgence.¹⁰⁷

These observations also answer the question of intention. As Bodil Due has argued, there is no explicit indication of a Panhellenic political agenda of an Isocratean kind in the text.¹⁰⁸ The discourse is one of political science, leadership theory, and constitutional theory, but obviously reflects fourth-century Greek attitudes to Persia as well as very different attitudes towards Cyrus as a paradigmatic mytho-historical figure. With Pierre Carlier, one might even suggest that Xenophon's experiences led him to warn against a Greek conquest of Persia by underlining the inevitable decadence of such a personalised, imperial regime of

¹⁰² Danzig 2012, 500f. accordingly argues that Xenophon is sensitive to the necessity of adapting *politeia* to circumstance (as is Aristot. *Pol.* 1288b10-1289a25). This in itself is thus a pragmatic necessity even in political philosophy and should not be read as a sign of ironic self-deconstruction. Cf. Isoc. 1.36 on the necessity for the individual to adapt to the current value order, be it monarchic or democratic.

¹⁰³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.9.

¹⁰⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.85f. See Newell 1983, 904.

¹⁰⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.22. At the end of the *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus is the ultimate, embodied law of the Empire, *βλέπων νόμος*. I differ here from Higgins 1977, 55, and Gray 2011, 288f., who argue that Cyrus is only adding an element of enforcement to existing Persian law, in that I prefer to see this as a fundamental move away from the Persian system. The entire passage (8.1.21-39) stresses the superiority of Cyrus' system, which is pervasively personal and hinges on his continuous action as paragon of and educator in his value order; written or common law do not feature at all.

¹⁰⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.2, 15; 1.3.16-18; 1.5.5, 8-11. Cf. Danzig 2012, 517 n. 37.

¹⁰⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.2, 4-7, 10f., 18.

¹⁰⁸ Most famously Isoc. 4, the *Panegyricus*. On Panhellenism in the fourth century see Marincola 2007, 106-130 and Mitchell, Lynette. *Panhellenism and the Barbarian*. Swansea 2007, esp. 30f. and *passim*. For Xenophon's position on this see Due 1989, 23, who also discusses earlier scholarship; for similar criticism see also Tuplin 1994, 135.

conquest.¹⁰⁹ However, the text's story-telling, aided by Xenophon's smooth prose, renders its intentions thoroughly ambiguous and dependent on the reader, and thus needs to be considered within the intellectual milieu it was received in.¹¹⁰ While the political complexities addressed, as well as the difficulties posed by genre and narrative stance, should thus caution scholars against using the *Cyropaedia* as a source for 'factual' information about sixth- to fourth-century Greece, Persia, or the Achaemenid Empire, we have at least established that the work is a serious narrative contribution to constitutional theory that can be taken at face value and need not be read in inversion.¹¹¹

Tracing the value-correlated power dynamics as they are constructed within this shard of early- to mid-fourth-century elite Greek discourse on individual leadership and monarchical politics thus seems permissible. To begin with, it will be necessary to look at how the text constructs and handles the two 'identity containers' that have here been theoretically identified as the main bearers of agency, namely individual and collective, followed by the various constructions of contingency and agency-driven responses for the purpose of self-definition and control. As always, the constructions of the actors are enmeshed in the value order and made manifest in the exercise of agency; but for heuristic reasons, they must here be subjected to separate examination.

4.2.2 Individual and collective in the *Cyropaedia*

In Chapters 2 and 3, a constructionist perspective on the self was adopted that involved treating any given individual as a distributed entity, a network that is capable of constant change depending on circumstance.¹¹² This approach will be retained here and once again necessitates the investigation of the text's fundamental constructs, beginning with the actor, before its imaginary of contingency and control can be analysed. The first question is thus: "who is seen acting in the *Cyropaedia*?"

¹⁰⁹ Carlier 2010 [1978], 365f: "Absolute monarchy makes it impossible to maintain the traditional *παιδεία*. [...] The abandonment of *παιδεία* brings about the decadence of the empire."

¹¹⁰ Due 1989, 234-237.

¹¹¹ See esp. Breitenbach 1967, 1709-1718; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2010 [1985], 439-453. This has been done fruitfully, e.g. by Kuhrt 1995; Briant 2002; Brosius 2007. Details of the structures described may be reliable, though where the lines should be drawn must always be subject to debate.

¹¹² Wetherell and Maybin 1996, 219-280, esp. 221-223.

Although it focuses almost exclusively on adult males, the basic premise of this text seems to be that all human individuals possess agency, tempered by individual will.¹¹³ As a consequence, all human individuals appear as potential actors, although one must note that those actually portrayed as acting individuals in any sort of significant capacity are all ‘free’ in that they are not “subjects” (ὑπηκοοί).¹¹⁴ As for the gender of these actors, it seems clear that female agency is invariably discussed through male eyes.¹¹⁵ It features only on a handful of occasions in the text, beginning with Cyrus receiving advice from his mother Mandane, and is most fully explored in the Pantheia romance, whose name (“wholly

¹¹³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.1-3 asserts this in the abstract and the text adheres to this principle. A passage of the centaur parable is worth noting here as it discusses a difference in agency between men and horses (4.3.21): the horse is a tool with its own senses, but evidently no more. On the centaur parable itself see also Johnson, David M. “Persians as Centaurs in Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*”, in: *TAPhA* 135 (2005), 177-201, who reads it as a subversive reflection of the unnatural and unstable transformation Cyrus performs. On the significance of horses in the Persian Empire see Llewellyn-Jones 2013, 83-85.

¹¹⁴ The category of freedom is less straightforward in this monarchical world. A case could be made that at least in some situations freedom depends on the exertion of agency by the individual and thus lies in the individual’s capacity: after all, Cyrus *makes himself* king. However, Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.78-86 outlines a fundamental distinction between rulers and subjects in the society developed at the end of the *Cyropaedia*, to the effect that rulers have liberty due to their merit and virtue. Chrysantas’ speech at 8.1.3f. further constructs freedom as the freedom to do willingly what others do unwillingly, obeying willingly due to intellectual insight and understanding of the necessity of value-correlated, hierarchical order, rather than coercion. This is linked to the utilitarian elements of the *Cyropaedia*. Freedom is then situationally expressed in action born out of virtuous insight within the context of collectivisation.

¹¹⁵ On women in Xenophon see Cartledge, Paul. “Xenophon’s Women: A Touch of the Other”, in: Harry D. Jocelyn and Helena Hurt (eds.). *Tria Lustra: Essays and Notes Presented to John Pinsent Founder and Editor of “Liverpool Classical Monthly” by some of its Contributors on the Occasion of the 150th Issue*. Liverpool 1993, 5-14, which also discusses Pantheia and argues that Xenophon at least imagined himself as creating female agents. On female agency at the Hellenistic court see generally Macurdy, Grace H. *Hellenistic Queens: A Study of Woman-power in Macedonia, Seleucid Syria, and Ptolemaic Egypt*. Baltimore 1932; Le Bohec 1987; Ogden 1999; Strootman 2014, 107-110. On the agency of Achaemenid royal women see Brosius 1996, 186-190, 195-198, noting instances of economic independence and tracing their ability to act at court within a rigid female hierarchy, for instance by entreating the king. She dismisses Greek narratives that cast female action as politically destabilising. On early Hellenistic and Macedonian royal women see Carney, Elizabeth D. “Being Royal and Female in the Early Hellenistic Period”, in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 195-220; eadem. “Putting Women in Their Place: Women in Public under Philip II and Alexander III and the Last Argeads”, in: eadem and Daniel Ogden (eds.). *Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives*. Oxford 2010, 43-53; eadem. *Women and monarchy in Macedonia*. Norman, OK 2000.

divine woman”) is surely no coincidence.¹¹⁶ Her story initially highlights a passive form of agency in that females are said to have negative effects on males rather than acting themselves, but her upright rejection of Araspas’ advances, her loyalty to her husband Abradatas, her brokering activity between Cyrus and her husband, and her final suicide show her imagined as being capable of self-determination.¹¹⁷ Both Araspas’ description of Pantheia and her later comportment thus illustrate that she is potentially capable of acting of her own accord, but at the same time all her actions are portrayed as being fully in keeping with proper decorum, i.e. with the existing construction of female agency, as developed by the narrator.¹¹⁸ Cyrus’ nameless wife, Cyaxares’ daughter, is similarly granted the ability to express a desire to marry Cyrus, but otherwise appears only as the mother of his sons, absent even from his deathbed.¹¹⁹ Her wish to marry Cyrus is only a relevant expression of agency as it corroborates male action – after all, only those already married would not want to marry this perfect man.¹²⁰ Both these occurrences of female agency cast the women as acting in accordance with the *Cyropaedia*’s construction of freedom in that they act obediently and in full recognition of virtue.¹²¹

Although their agency thus renders women a potential source of contingency, this de-facto construction of the female prevents them from having any great part to play in the *Cyropaedia*’s world of *σωφροσύνη* (“self-control”) and *ἐπιστήμη* (“understanding”).¹²² Put in terms of the distributed self, this means that they are

¹¹⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.13, 15-18. At 4.2.32 the Armenian king’s wife and daughters occur as mediating actors, but have no voice. Another interesting episode is 3.3.67, the description of the reaction by the camp women to the impending defeat of the Assyrians at the first battle of the camps. The narrator shifts focalisation to outline their panic and their attempts to control the situation by imploring the fleeing men to protect them, briefly showing how they create stories to rally the forces and reforge collective agency. On the Pantheia episode see Tatum 1989, 163-170 and 175f. on her speaking name; Gera 1993, 200-202, 221-245; Reichel 2010 [1995], 425-430.

¹¹⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.1.2-18; 6.1.31, 45-49; 6.4.2-11; 7.3.14.

¹¹⁸ At Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.2.28, Croesus describes his wife as being spared the contingencies of real action in her life, by contrast with the life of the politically active male individual, here the king.

¹¹⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.5.19, 28; 8.7.28.

¹²⁰ Tigranes’ wife is not attracted to Cyrus, since she is loyal to her husband (Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.1.41; see Gera 1993, 198f.). Marriage discussions among men occur at 4.6.9; 5.2.12; 8.5.28 and are treated as a means of transferring wealth through dowry and inheritance. The conceptual basis of this construct is a specific form of family love, implied at 5.1.10.

¹²¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.4f.

¹²² This is most visible in the context of war where they are constructed as objects, as booty to be distributed (Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.3.1f.). One must note, however, that this also

generally regarded as being integrated into the selves of men. Only exceptional circumstance generates female action that appears in the registers of action thematised in the *Cyropaedia*, namely the absence of the responsible *kyrioi* – Mandane speaks in Cambyses' absence and Pantheia is forced to act as she has been separated from Abradatas. The final banquet scene at Babylon confirms this, since it shows that the status of women – of course an aspect of the distributed selves of males – is conceived in terms of hierarchical complementarity.¹²³ Only Pantheia's agency goes beyond this basic conception in that she acts on her own, inciting Abradatas to greater courage and later reflecting with Cyrus on their joint responsibility for his death, i.e. on their agency.¹²⁴ In keeping with the value order, Cyrus' reaction to Abradatas' death is to assign Pantheia to a new *kyrios*, an action presented as being without alternative.¹²⁵ Instead, Pantheia stabs herself in the chest with an Achaemenid honorary sword (*ἀκινάκης*), a heroic act that is portrayed as a decision in favour of her deceased husband, who is to be her *kyrios* for eternity, reasserting the very same model.¹²⁶ Since these swords were tokens of royal favour,¹²⁷ she thus takes Cyrus into herself in her final act, and Cyrus' final reciprocation is hence to monumentalise her, leaving her and the implications of her complex agency neatly entombed – the narrator accordingly forgets about her immediately. This narrative thus maintains women as part of the distributed male self and women are never shown controlling men. The suicide of Pantheia's eunuchs and the occurrence of her handmaidens do show, however, that females can themselves be distributed individuals. I would argue, therefore, that the narrator's elegant disposal of Pantheia is a joint result of this complexity and of conceptual necessity, since it rids his narrative world of the contingency that is a woman with her own self: She is rendered a malleable, controllable, and tragically romantic story rather than an unleashed actor.¹²⁸

happens to male prisoners of war, although they are set free to work the land (4.4.5-9).

- ¹²³ During the banquet, Cyrus acts out the ideal that the male individual should be matched with a complementary wife (Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.13-27), making apparent a concept of male-directed male-female complementarity also visible in the bee parable of the *Oeconomicus* (Xen. *Oec.* 7.10-43).
- ¹²⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.4.2-11; 7.3.9f. Inciting him to courage makes her a situational bearer of value order.
- ¹²⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.3.12.
- ¹²⁶ This is expressed by her ambiguity at Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.3.13f.
- ¹²⁷ Many passages attest this significance of the *akínakes*, e.g. Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.27. See Briant 2002, 305f.
- ¹²⁸ Cf. Cartledge 1993, 15. On female agency in Herodotus contrast the reading of Blok, Josine H. "Women in Herodotus' Histories", in: Egbert J. Bakker, Irene J. F. de Jong, and Hans van Wees (eds.). *Brill's Companion to Herodotus*. Leiden 2002, 225-242, who

The central figure of Cyrus and the great majority of individuals portrayed in the text are obviously male and, by contrast, emerge as distributed individuals to an extent that exceeds even Pantheia. Throughout, the boundaries of their selves can be seen shrinking and expanding in relation to shifts in identity configurations.¹²⁹ Let us begin with the core of the individual. Generalising what we are told about Cyrus himself, every individual seems to be described as being tempered by natural and acquired qualities: *γενεά*, *φύσις*, and *παιδεία* (“family, nature, and education”).¹³⁰ As Cyrus is handsome and hardworking, descended from Perseus and two lines of kings, his natural qualities and hybrid cultural identity serve to set him apart from all others already in the very first passage, indicating a certain *a priori* difference between individuals.¹³¹ The same passage summarises his qualities along three trajectories: *φιλανθρωπία* (“kindness to others”), *φιλομάθεια* (“love of learning”), and *φιλοτιμία* (“love of being esteemed”).¹³² Put in the

highlights the prominence of female actors throughout the *Histories* and their massive quantitative contrast with Thucydides. She concludes that Herodotus modelled his work on the *oikos* with its division of roles.

¹²⁹ This is of course not a point of view explicitly put forward in the text, but my interpretation.

¹³⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.6: [...] ἐσκεψάμεθα τίς ποτ’ ὦν γενεάν και ποίαν τινά φύσιν ἔχων και ποία τινὲ παιδευθεὶς παιδεία τοσοῦτον δὴήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνθρώπων. *Physis* and *paideia* are thus key qualities of the ruler. In Greek thought, *physis* was often considered to derive largely from the father and the latter is explicitly attributed, at least in part, to the paradigmatic and didactic abilities of Cambyses (e.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.11; 18; 1.4.25; 1.6.2-45). On the typically patrilineal notion that the father was the crucial factor in producing children see, e.g., Aesch. *Eum.* 657-661; Eur. *Or.* 552-554; Diod. 1.80.3f.; Aristot. *Gen. Anim.* 728a-729a; cf. Garland, Robert. “Mother and Child in the Greek World”, in: *History Today* 36:3 (1986), 40-46, here 40f.

¹³¹ His favourite friend Chrysantas, by contrast, is small and has a hooked nose (Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.20f.). On the question of innate qualities see Due 1989, 147-152.

¹³² Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.1. His heritage is emphasised by Artabazus and Croesus (4.1.24; 7.2.24). The tripartite division of qualities has been studied in depth by Sandridge 2012, who treats it as the base of Xenophon's theory of leadership (119-124). He also regards the qualities as innate (17) and discusses the meaning of the terms (25f.). On *philanthropia* see also Due 1989, 163-170 and Azoulay 2004b, 320-326; Danzig 2012, 509f. None of these value constructs are specific to Xenophon, nor are they original inventions. In [Aeschylus] *Prom.* 11 *philanthropia* describes Prometheus' attitude towards mankind, in the Hippocratic corpus (*Prac.* 6) it is a quality of the physician, and at Plat. *Enthyph.* 3d7 a quality of Socrates. It appears as an abstract value concept in Demosthenes, for whom it expresses an altruistic, collectively-minded attitude (e.g. 24.24). As for honorary decrees, it features already in IG II² 1186:4 (fourth century BC), though this is an outlier; see Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 216, 293. In the context of rule, Isoc. 2.15 also points out its significance for the ruler; for the Hellenistic period see Schubart 1936, 10f.; Faber 1979, 509. See also Ferguson, John. *Moral Values in the Ancient World*. New

critical terms of this study, the narrator thereby constructs a fundamentally social individual: Individuals are differentiated on the basis of their intrinsic motivation and ability to take part in the cognitive networks of *alteri* through agency (*φιλοανθρωπία*),¹³³ to expand their own cognitive network of identities (*φιλομάθεια*), and to leave positive marks on others by acting in accordance with positive value-constructs (*φιλοτιμία*). These three core value gradients thus encapsulate positive connectivity and individual network growth and, as Norman Sandridge has recently shown, all three form an indissoluble triad.¹³⁴ If we consider the anti-Cyruses, the Assyrian kings, it is obvious that they are constructed along the same lines, but inverted: rather than being generous and kind to others, they are jealous and fearful, focused only on money; rather than learning, they lie and are jealous of others' successes even to the point of killing their betters; rather than striving for honour through positive action, they breed only hate, fear, and depravity.¹³⁵ These three normative trajectories thus seem to define any individual, good or bad.

At a more fundamental level, the individual itself is conceived as collective, as a distributed network that possesses dynamic integrity. This is easiest to exemplify by pointing to the fact that Cyrus repeatedly makes efforts to maintain the distributed self, by acting as a philanthropist, a healer, or a matchmaker.¹³⁶ In so

York 1979 [1958], 102-117; Dover 1974, 200-205. *Philomatheia* is a predominantly Socratic value concept, occurring prominently at Plat. *Phaid.* 67b4, 82c1, 82d9, 83a1f.; *Rep.* 499e; Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1117b29, but also at Isoc. 1.18.1; Plat. *Phaedr.* 230d-e1 (=Lys. *Eroticus*); Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.6. On the ambivalent value of *philotimia* see Whitehead 1983; Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 211f., 268f., 292, 302-306, who observes that it specifically denotes particular zeal, and above p. 113, n. 101. This ambivalence of the value of ambition in the collectivized order of democratic Athens is visible also at Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.14, where *philotimia* is associated with opponents of democracy.

¹³³ This particular quality is expanded upon in the summary account of Cyrus' imperial organization at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.1f.

¹³⁴ Sandridge 2012, 14f. 34-37, 43f., 123. That *philotimia* and *philanthropia* are here merged is clear at Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.7, where Cambyses describes the act of supplying everyone with the necessities of life and with order as worthy of admiration, and at 8.4.6-8, where Cyrus prefers non-harmful ways of acquiring honour.

¹³⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.5.2f. (bribes and lies); 3.3.44f. (emphasis on money as the gain from war); 4.2.3f. (the Hyrcanians' hate of the Assyrians); 4.6.1-7 (Gobryas' story of his son's murder for outperforming the Assyrian prince); 5.3.5-7, 19 (incapable of remorse, mutilator); 5.4.34-36 (enemy of gods and men, who hates those better than himself; supported by scoundrels); 6.1.9f. (atmosphere of fear). Of course, none of these passages are self-descriptions but the emphasis on money at 3.3.44f.; to a certain degree that is certainly suspicious, especially since neither king gets the opportunity to defend himself. The narration thus seems to be taking the easy way out.

¹³⁶ Cyrus' care and match-making ability: Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.17; 1.6.21; 4.5.48f.; 5.4.10-12; 5.4.15-18; 6.1.45-50; 7.5.46f.; 7.5.59f.; 8.1.43f.; 8.2.2f., 22; 8.4.18-21, 25. This same

doing, he aims to make the individual 'whole', to lead it to perfection in that it becomes "as it should be" (*εἶναι ὅς δεῖ*), an estimation that depends on Cyrus himself.¹³⁷ This ability is prefigured by the pivotal coat judgement scene that exemplifies the failings of the Persian *politeia*: when asked to judge a case in which a big boy had exchanged his small coat for a big one owned by a small boy, Cyrus decided this was fitting, whereas the law condemned the act, causing our hero to be punished by a Persian elder for failing to apply the law. Already in this childhood scene, Cyrus thus displays his own superior sense of justice that makes things 'proper' according to two key normative principles, namely utilitarianism and meritocracy.¹³⁸ In so doing, he causes others to construct their own selves as 'containing' him – or rather: the traces of his actions as relational identities – but in exchange he grants everyone else proportionate 'possession' of himself.¹³⁹ The most interesting manifestation of this dynamic is the muted conflict between Cyaxares and Cyrus about control of the army in general and the Medes in particular.¹⁴⁰ When Cyrus convinces most of the army to follow him, he draws on the little pieces of himself he has implanted in their distributed selves, leveraging a network of identities established over the course of the campaign by using a particularly well-suited individual, his Median admirer Artabazus, as a broker or catalyst.¹⁴¹ Meanwhile, Cyaxares can only retain those who are directly in personal contact with him at dinner, and thereby part of the network of his self as his guests.¹⁴² The composition of these networks of distributed selves thus emerges as being conceived as potentially volatile. The final configurations are stable only

dynamic also underlies Cyrus' construction of his redistributive Empire at 8.6.23. Cyrus is accused of lack of care by Cyaxares in their pivotal conflict scene: 5.5.33f., but 6.1.45 by contrast shows that the Assyrian king is the counter model, a selfish match-breaker quite unlike Cyrus. See on this also Gray 2011, 329.

¹³⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.16. Cf. Sandridge 2012, 28f. The same notion underlies the idea that the completeness of the individual is achieved through the marriage of complementary men and women (8.4.13-27), revealing a concept of male-directed male-female complementarity also visible in the bee parable of the *Oeconomicus* (Xen. *Oec.* 7.10-43). In the *Cyropaedia* this is achieved through Cyrus' reorganisation of his self.

¹³⁸ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.17; the principles are finalised at 8.1.19f. and 8.4.29f. On the significance of this scene in the project of the entire text see Danzig, Gabriel. "Big Boys and Little Boys: Justice and Law in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and *Memorabilia*", in: *Polis* 26:2 (2009), 271-295; cf. briefly Danzig 2012, 516f. On meritocracy as characteristic of positive conceptions of monarchy cf. Isoc. 3.15f.

¹³⁹ This exchange of self in the form of identities is visible for instance at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.25, where Hystaspas presents Cyrus' friendship as his property, with positive consequences.

¹⁴⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.2.11.

¹⁴¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.2.10.

¹⁴² Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.2.11.

if they concur with the respective leader's capacity for control, embodied in his distributed self along the three trajectories outlined above, and constantly re-performed in action.¹⁴³

As these three trajectories of *philotimia*, *philanthropia*, and *philomatheia* already imply, the individual's social existence is predicated upon a natural dichotomous order, implanted in every individual by divine will: As Araspas puts it, every individual has a good and a bad soul, but their balance and configuration are subject to the individual's will and agency, as well as others'.¹⁴⁴ The range of abstract values referenced in this context is substantial, but in essence the bad soul is characterised, e.g., by shameless *ἐπιθυμία* for *κέρδος* ("desire for material gain"). It achieves *ἡδονή* ("pleasure") through instant gratification, whereas the good soul has *αἰδώς* ("shame, respect") and *ἐγκράτεια* ("self-control"), classic prerequisites for the exercise of mastery.¹⁴⁵ As was noted above, Cyrus and the Assyrian kings are the prime examples of this dichotomy: Before the first battle of the camps, the Assyrian king embodies the negative soul in his speech to the assembled army, confining his argument to the promise of *κέρδος* and the threat of loss.¹⁴⁶ By contrast, Cyrus' army situationally develops and collectively embodies a value-configuration consisting, among others, of *προθυμία* and *φιλοτιμία*, which the narrator judges the most awe-inspiring of all due to the collective effort necessary to produce it.¹⁴⁷

The individual's will is thus conceived as fundamentally egoistic and self-interested, and is further subject to a teleological pursuit of *ἡδονή* and, ideally, *εὐδαιμονία*, i.e. the absence of perceived contingency both on a situational basis and as a consistent state of existence. This is particularly well visible in the

¹⁴³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.5.6-9. See Danzig 2012, 516f.

¹⁴⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.1.41. This dynamic is an omnipresent threat (7.5.83) and divinely ordained (8.2.20). Cf. also Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.18-25 with Gray 2011, 251f. Obvious parallels are provided by Plato's charioteer allegory, which is similar in structure though more metaphysical (Plat. *Phaedr.* 253d-254e), and the discussion of the tripartite soul at *Rep.* 435c-d, 439d, 440e-441d (divided into *λογιστικόν*; *θυμοειδές*; *ἀλόγιστον καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν*). On this see Gera 1993, 232f.

¹⁴⁵ *Ἐγκράτεια*: Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.8. Unsurprisingly, feelings and emotions are thus also natural components of all individuals: 7.5.78f. Different conceptions of pleasure are thematised at 4.1.5, 13-18. On gain as being at odds with happiness see e.g. 8.3.40. The notion that these qualities are prerequisites for control of others can be found in Isoc. 2.29-32 (see Dover 1974, 208f.). Ogden 1999, 267, notes the discourse on courtesans being detrimental to these qualities, which is also in evidence in the *Cyropaedia* (5.1.8-18). Courtesans are accordingly absent from the text.

¹⁴⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.43-45.

¹⁴⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.59. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.24f.

Pheraulas episode.¹⁴⁸ *Philomatheia* now ensures that these fundamental dynamics are constructed as being capable of direction, for instance by *σωφροσύνη* (“sense, discretion, self-control”) and *ἐπιστήμη* (“knowledge, understanding”).¹⁴⁹ The corollary of this intellectual and cognitive construction of human agency is a marked emphasis on *paideia*, which allows natural predispositions and environmental obstacles to be controlled either by mastering them or by adapting to them through knowledge.¹⁵⁰ This dynamic is necessary as the text treats self-interested desire for gain as the core element of human nature that cannot be completely overcome: introverted growth of self based on material gain is thus strongly contrasted with distributed, or social, growth of self.¹⁵¹ The latter can, however, temper the former, for instance in the form of generosity, which can in turn be constructed as a source of more refined *hedonē*. This kind of pleasure is the result of individual exercise of agency for the purpose of social growth, so for social rather than material distribution in positive correlation with the value-order.¹⁵² This construction is further cemented by the assertion that the pragmatic result of virtue in interaction should be for the good to have more than the bad, which is normatively institutionalised by the meritocratic principle that Cyrus implements and polices. The basic human dynamic of material gain is thus inserted back into the value order as a positive virtue.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁸ *Eudaimonia* is the aim of life, both living and giving it: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.23; 8.3.48-50; 8.7.6-9.

¹⁴⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.2 notes the individualist tendencies of human nature, as does Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.4; 4.6.6, which is a kind of Socratic version of rational choice theory, whereby humans act in accordance with self-interest and subjective justice, cf. Danzig 2012, 511f. The episode between the Sacian and Pheraulas (8.3.44-50) illustrates an idiosyncratic search for *eudaimonia* within the parameters of the collectivized control regimes (Gray 2011, 287f.; on the significance of Pheraulas see also the recent deconstructivist but cryptically insightful article by Henderson 2012). Note that the text's emphasis on *ἐγκράτεια* and *σωφροσύνη* parallels Achaemenid self-fashioning as self-controlled, see e.g. Schmitt DnB §3 A-F.

¹⁵⁰ Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.1f. notes the conjunction of natural foundation and *paideia* in shaping individuals (Sandridge 2012, 18).

¹⁵¹ Cf. Danzig 2012, 510: “Xenophon thus attributes to Cyrus a relentless pursuit of self-interest which somehow coexists with a genuine concern for the good of others.”

¹⁵² This is most clearly explored in three episodes, the Cyrus-Pantheia-Araspas episode (Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.1.8-18), the Cyrus-Croesus episode (8.2.13-23), and the Pheraulas-Sacian episode (8.3.35-50). Pheraulas' story shows that even the lowest-born free men are capable of this kind of self-determination and control (cf. Henderson 2012). On the pleasure derived from good behaviour (8.5.79f.; 8.7.25), see Sandridge 2012, 38-40.

¹⁵³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.17; 1.5.9; 2.3.1-4, 16; 7.5.72-85; 8.4.29.

Given the dependence of this system on knowledge, it is not surprising that Cyrus is portrayed as a veritable sponge for learning and information, never forgetting and constantly deliberating, adapting, and innovating, asking for feedback and collecting intelligence reports.¹⁵⁴ As his distributed self grows with the expansion of his army and body of friends, his cognitive network is thus also constantly growing and adapting to the situations at hand. This pool of knowledge includes a diverse range of identities, ranging from abstract value-concepts to specific practical skills and experiences, all of which allow the individual to take responsibility for its own fate through the exertion of agency in alignment with this knowledge: As Cyrus' father Cambyses asserts early on, the gods help those who help themselves, smoothly rendering successful outcomes of actions the privileged marker of divine approval and normative validity.¹⁵⁵ This concept of self-determination in alignment with value order is one of the guiding principles of the text and one of the reasons for the Persians' superiority throughout, as it derives from their superior implementation of this 'good' value construct.¹⁵⁶

Knowledge, however, is presented neither as a purely individual concept, nor as an ideal one, but is itself a social dynamic, which leads us to a discussion of the collective. The *Cyropaedia* does not rely on, e.g., the Platonic forms or metaphysics to locate its values in a protected, inviolable space, but thematises the construction and adaptation of values in interaction – although of course the gods are potentially capable of expressing their approval or disapproval via the success or failure

¹⁵⁴ On Cyrus' *φιλομάθεια* see Sandridge 2012, 45-57, 97-105, 120; cf. Isoc. 1.18f. The key importance of knowledge and learning is programmatically formulated in Cambyses' speech to Cyrus at Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.2-46, esp. 22f. and has triumphant consequences, for instance in his discussion with Croesus about why Cyrus prevailed: Croesus had less knowledge and understanding (7.2.23-25). Among other things, Cyrus' decision to transform himself into a king in the eyes of all is the result of an intellectual process (7.5.37, 70f.) and his prodigious memory and its uses are thematised at 5.3.46-51. Moreover he actually invites feedback, e.g., at 6.2.39; 8.3.2, and frequently gathers intelligence or discusses its significance: 1.6.16; 2.1.2-8; 3.2.1f.; 4.2.1-4; 4.4.4; 5.2.21; 5.4.19f.; 5.4.40; 6.1.24-26; 6.1.36-40, 42-44; 7.2.2f.; 8.2.10-12 (the "eyes and ears" of the king). The *Cyropaedia* also shows others learning and being trained, e.g. at 1.2.6, 8; 3.1.17-20; 4.1.5; 4.3.10-14; 8.4.11f., documenting that this is a global effect.

¹⁵⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.3-6. cf. Tuplin 2013, 82f. This does not contradict Xenophon's well-known piety, as the gods remain a powerful force and is also entirely in keeping with traditional Greek values.

¹⁵⁶ Collective Persian superiority is most clearly visible in the battles, but is apparent *passim*. Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.59, 70; 4.3.4-23; 4.5.4; 7.1.46f. At 5.2.15-20 the focaliser is Gobryas who realises that the Persians are *pepaideumenoi* governed by *sophrosunē*.

of agency.¹⁵⁷ Before the first battle of the camps against the Assyrians, Cyrus explains these long-term dynamics of *paideia* to his friend Chrystantas: Rousing speeches alone cannot improve men either physically or 'psychologically', as excellence requires long-term training. While *ἔθνικὰ* ("markers of *ethnos*") provide groups with basic cohesion, they develop reliable collective agency only by being steeped in a collective value-cosmos, which in turn depends on laws and above all teachers to encode and reproduce its validity.¹⁵⁸ Both law and these living embodiments and conduits of collectivised values construct chains of value-associations (e.g. freedom – honour – goodness – happiness) and expose those who do not comply as bad (*κακός*) in order to make these association chains part of the nature of each individual and thereby of the collectives they form, generating a uniform collective.¹⁵⁹ The source of this knowledge resides in real-world experience, practice, observation, and innovation,¹⁶⁰ and its success is exemplified by the Persians themselves: First they learn how to fight as a phalanx and then as heavy cavalry, and later conduct an orderly and virtually casualty-free retreat after the first battle of the camps; after the second battle, they stand by, organising the supplies and guarding their allies with great self-control, while their *symmachoi* rape and pillage.¹⁶¹

At the same time, however, the *Cyropaedia* asserts very clearly that teachers may be wrong or even bad themselves, as is the man who instructs Cyrus in

¹⁵⁷ See Sandridge 2012, 12f., who contrasts the *Cyropaedia* with Plato's conception of leadership. The gods are visible as the ultimate guardians of world order in the extensive attention they are paid (e.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.5.6; 1.6.1-5, 22f., 44-46; 3.2.3f.; 3.3.20-22; 4.1.2; 4.2.12-14; 4.5.14f.; 4.6.10; 5.1.19-23; 5.3.20; 6.2.40f.), as a sanctioning authority that situationally provides insurance and motivation. This functionality is ensured by the fact that the gods are themselves egoistic in demanding maintenance (1.2.7); the relationship is one of proportional *charis*.

¹⁵⁸ Ethnic identity markers are used throughout the text to refer to groups of individuals as abstract peoples. These national units form the basic principle of the army's organisation (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 1.8.8f.), of the distribution of booty (Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.3.1f.), and of the satrapal system (8.6.1, 7). Fear can also generate cohesion and agency, though less reliably: 3.3.43-45; 6.1.1-6; 8.1.25 (fear of the gods); 8.2.10-12 (fear of the king's ears and eyes). It is generally detrimental to collective agency (1.1.5; 3.3.53, 58; 4.2.12-14; 6.1.9f.; 6.2.21; 6.4.20; 7.1.23f.) and is thus a tool of control, as well as a learning tool (3.1.25f.) and a weapon against others (1.6.40; 5.2.31-37; 5.3.25).

¹⁵⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.49-53.

¹⁶⁰ This is visible e.g. at Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6; 2.1.2-8, but is evident *passim*. Cf. Isoc. 1.18f., 21.

¹⁶¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.1.9-22; 4.2.32; 4.2.38-47; 4.5.3-7. The situation is complicated, however, by the honour inherent in making booty (4.4.1-3).

στρατηγία (“generalship”) – a contingency that is controlled only by further learning and network growth, and ultimately by Cyrus’ perfect leadership.¹⁶² Through teaching, the individual’s quality and φρόνησις (“thought, prudence”) thus feed directly into collective excellence, but not along simple lines. In the *Cyropaedia*, collectives are always led, directed, and hierarchically structured,¹⁶³ and ideally consist of obedient individuals who consciously or unconsciously understand that the best way to act effectively is as a team and under direction of the best leader, an insight the *Cyropaedia* constructs as ‘true freedom’.¹⁶⁴ Even Cyrus himself can be observed adapting to the values of the various collectives he is part of at the beginning, demonstrating his excellence within the parameters of the given system, but also putting pressure on these parameters in pursuit of an idiosyncratic value order.¹⁶⁵ However, as we have seen, the text’s premise is that these collectives resist being directed because of the individualism that characterises any actor.¹⁶⁶ Throughout, the quality of the leadership and of the individuals in the team thus have to be melded together to create collectives capable of successful action, the value of which in turn reflects the quality of the collective by comparison with others.¹⁶⁷ This is facilitated through a social web of interaction, i.e.

¹⁶² Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.12-15. Despite the ideal nature of Cyrus as a leader, this contingency is tangible throughout, most visibly in Cyrus’ deathbed speech (8.7.7).

¹⁶³ This applies to age groups, hunting parties, military detachments and armies, ethnic groups, and even empires.

¹⁶⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.57; 8.1.3-5. The absence of the leader results in chaos until new leadership is established, as is demonstrated during the trial of the Armenian king (3.1.30).

¹⁶⁵ Contrast the time in Media at Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.4 with Cyrus’ resubmission to the value-order of Persia at 1.5.1. He gradually shifts out of this dependency on others; the confrontation with Cyaxares (4.5.33; 5.5.8-36), during which Cyrus slowly imposes his own γνώμη is the final turning point in this development, as is made clear by Cyrus’ subsequent behaviour towards him and his manipulation of the war council (5.5.41-6.1.19). Both his behaviour in Media (e.g. 1.4.5-15) and his attitude towards Cyaxares (3.3.13-19; 4.1.8-21) show an individual pushing the parameters of the *status quo* along the trajectory of growth of the distributed self defined by *philomatheia*, *philotimia*, and *philanthropia*.

¹⁶⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.1f. This point is exemplified by the fact that Cyrus’ enemies, unlike his own army, are associated with deserters: 4.5.5f.; 6.1.25f. It is worth noting that this fundamental individualism is also characteristic of the *Characters*.

¹⁶⁷ This construction of group dynamics is exemplified by Adusius’ strategy against the Carians, whom he reunifies by reconciling their leaders (Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.4.3-7). Accordingly, the Assyrian armies are constructed as bad (1.4.23; 3.3.63-68; 5.4.33-36), as is Croesus’ army (6.2.14-22; with the exception of the Egyptians: 7.1.41-44). Cyrus’ army on the other hand is always presented as good (3.3.9f.). This dynamic allows Cyrus to construct and maintain the collective of subjects as incapable of action (8.1.43-45), while striving to make the collective of ruler-friends as able and obedient as possible (8.1.2-4, 42): the subjects are bad, the friends good and thus merit the

by the acts of communication the *Cyropaedia* makes its centre piece: The continuous maintenance of collective agency through interaction, through distribution of self, is clearly visible throughout in the text's innumerable assemblies, dinner-time discussions, and speeches. These story-telling performances produce and reproduce value-configurations that either facilitate or directly generate collective agency.¹⁶⁸ Besides the main narrator of Empire, Cyrus himself, Cambyses, Cyaxares, Tigranes, and Pantheia, Gobryas, Gadatas, and Pheraulas, as well as Hystaspas, Chrysantas, and Artabazus, all contribute in various ways as co-narrators to weaving the story that structures the world of the *Cyropaedia*.¹⁶⁹

The collectives constructed by the story-telling in the text may be divided into two categories: ethnic groups and the individually constructed collectives that either do or do not include their leader. Examples of the former are the Persians, Medes, Armenians, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Hyrcanians, Cadusians, and Sacians, while the latter include the *ἐπικαίριοι* ("the most important people"), the *φίλοι*, and the allies, but also the *ὑπήκοοι* and the *πλήθος* ("subjects and masses").¹⁷⁰ The reason behind this categorical distinction is that ethnic collectives appear not to be subject to agency in the text; in that respect, the identity they produce is in fact constructed as being relatively static, though the collective agency these identities

treatment they receive – the interactions with the disobedient Daïphernes during the grand procession at Babylon exemplifies the enforcement of this boundary through interaction (8.3.21f).

¹⁶⁸ E.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.5.7-14; 4.1.2; 4.5.15f.; 5.1.19-23; 5.4.19f.; 7.5.37-44. Even during battle Cyrus is constantly talking to his comrades in arms (3.3.59-61). This dynamic is also visible in the use of *πειθομαι* throughout (e.g. 1.1.1, 2, 3; 1.2.2 and *passim*) to designate obedience, which emphasises linguistically the interactive quality and potential volatility of obedience. Cf. Isoc. 3.5-9, who makes the power of speech and persuasion the core distinguishing quality of mankind.

¹⁶⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.2-46; 8.5.22-27 (Cambyses); 2.4.1-8; 3.3.13-22; 3.3.28-33, 46, 56; 4.1.13-18; 4.5.8-12, 19-34; 5.5.1-6.1.19; 8.5.17-20 (Cyaxares); 3.1.14-43; 5.1.27 (Tigranes); 6.1.31-35, 45f.; 6.4.2-11; 7.3.9-16 (Pantheia); 2.2.2-5; 6.1.1-6; 8.4.9-12 (Hystaspas); 2.3.5f.; 3.3.48-56; 6.2.21f.; 7.5.55f.; 8.1.1-6 (Chrysantas); 5.1.24-26; 6.1.9f.; 7.5.48-54; 8.4.12, 26f. (Artabazus); 5.2.1-21, 31-37; 5.3.5-8; 6.1.11; 7.5.24-31; 8.4.6-8; 8.4.13f. (Gobryas); 5.3.9-19; 5.4.10-14, 29-31, 33-39; 7.5.24-31 (Gadatas); 2.3.7f.; 8.3.2-8; 8.3.35-50 (Pheraulas). Obviously the other allies contribute their narratives as well, though in more perfunctory ways (e.g. the Hyrcanian king at 5.3.20). Over the narrative trajectory as a whole, the individual voices are translated into a single narrative that culminates in the finalization at 8.4 and the ominous *Leerstelle* of Cyrus' actual reign.

¹⁷⁰ On the complexity and genesis of ethnicity see Cohen 1978. Cyrus' Empire consists of peoples (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.2; 8.8.1). The *epikairioi* and officers occur, e.g., at 3.3.12; 5.3.29-34. *Philoi*: 1.5.7-14; 1.6.24; 2.1.11; 2.2.28; 6.4.13-15. *Symmachoi*: 4.2.12-14; 4.5.3; 4.5.44f.; 5.4.40; 5.5.44-48; 6.1.1-6; 6.1.20-25; 7.5.36; 7.5.72f.; 8.3.1; 8.3.15-18; 8.4.28. *Hypēkooi*: 7.5.78f.; 8.1.37f.; 8.1.42, 45; 8.2.1; 8.8.1. *Plethos*: 7.5.55, 66-68.

potentially produce obviously is not, but hinges on leadership through action.¹⁷¹ It is important to note here that Cyrus' kingship is not national, but, at least until his father's death, personal, so this collective dynamic does not apply to the Empire he develops.¹⁷² In consequence, all the text's more pertinent collectives are ultimately alike in that their cohesion in interaction is precarious and their cohesive power contingent: even the best collectives are difficult to maintain without the continuous, successful exertion of collective agency.¹⁷³ Isolated individuals, on the other hand, are constructed as rational and controllable by bringing individual superiority to bear upon them through communication.¹⁷⁴ As a consequence, collectives depend on the individual for their cohesion in action, rather than being portrayed as stable due to their collective, distributed nature.¹⁷⁵ For this reason, the *Cyropaedia* devotes much attention to centralisation and delegation as means of generating relays of personal contact between individuals, harnessing the fundamental egoism of the individual for collective action.¹⁷⁶ As a rule, an actor's proximity to the centre is proportionate to his conformity to Cyrus' meritocratic value regime, i.e. his degree of similarity to Cyrus.¹⁷⁷

Within the conceptual framework adopted here, the primary consequence of this construction of the collective is that individuals are conceived of as possessing a variable social surface and pliable 'content' within the resultant fluctuating network of distributed selves. An assembly within Cyrus' army, and later Empire,

¹⁷¹ See e.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.5.8f. with its distinction between personal and national identity. Gender and family on the other hand are subject to agency, as Gatasas' story (5.3.9-18; 5.4.29-31) and the other eunuchs (7.5.62-65) illustrate.

¹⁷² The pivotal scene is Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.37, but see also 4.2.9f.; 5.3.46-51; 5.4.15-18; 7.5.45. This observation is crucial, as it makes the conception parallel the form(s) of kingship developed during the Diadoch period (compare e.g. Plut. *Mor.* 183c).

¹⁷³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.10; 8.1.2f.

¹⁷⁴ Individuals controllable: 3.1.9-31 (Armenian king); 5.4.24-28 (Assyrian king); 3.3.20-22 and 5.5.35-37 (Cyaxares). See generally the parable at 5.3.49f., which addresses the drawbacks of collective distribution by comparison with individually tailored communication.

¹⁷⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.7.13 notes that every individual is responsible for the creation and maintenance of its own social networks.

¹⁷⁶ See for instance Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.5.5; 2.1.22f.; 4.2.27; 8.4.3f.

¹⁷⁷ Visible already in the characterization of the Persian pyramid of honour (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.12; 2.3.7f.; 7.5.45) this structuring principle underlies the entire text, appearing, for instance, in the distribution of spoils at 8.4.29f. or the hierarchy of cups at 8.4.26f.; cf. 8.3.33 and 35 for the custom of giving cups to guests. On the latter as a structuring principle of the Hellenistic court cf. Strootman 2014, 152-159; on the double-edged quality of the dynamic that is gifting and consumption at court see Duindam 1994, 85-90 and 95, who emphasises the pressure it imposed on those at the top of the hierarchy of prestige.

may thus be imagined as a series of overlapping and intersecting social 'circles', as in a complex Euler or Venn-diagram: an officer who takes part in this assembly situationally embodies his subordinates, is then reinforced as part of Cyrus' self by incorporating his set of values into his own self, and finally re-extends his new altered self by communicating these values to his troops, while thereby also increasing Cyrus' social surface.¹⁷⁸ This cascading dynamic is most clearly visible during the campaign, but culminates in the system Cyrus establishes to structure his Empire. This system constructs him as the philanthropic patriarch, the father of all, who encompasses all others, but especially the satraps, within the discursive boundaries of his own self and is capable of sustaining this extended self until his death.¹⁷⁹ In the case of Chrysantas, this process actually creates a 'second Cyrus' – the ideal of this construction.¹⁸⁰ The same can be seen in the case of the other kings encountered during the narrative, who can of course be addressed as an individual embodiment of their peoples (e.g. the king of the Armenians is simply ὁ Ἀρμένιος), thereby embodying their people within their selves also in language.¹⁸¹ In interactive situations that facilitate and create collective agency, the individual thus needs to become collective and the collective individual, generating a cohesive network that obscures the individuality of the component parts.¹⁸² In sum, this analysis has therefore shown that the preferred model of the collective developed by the *Cyropaedia* casts it as a collectivised individual, so a distributed self that is expanded to truly imperial size.

¹⁷⁸ E.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.36-38; 8.4.18-25. If they are not repeatedly reinforced, these constructions of course decay.

¹⁷⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.1, 43f.; 8.7. Daïphernes' resistance to being enveloped by Cyrus is most telling here, as Cyrus' response is his exclusion from his self (8.3.21f.). The same general principles underpin the court mechanisms that force people into his presence (8.1.16-19). On the patriarchal system see Carlier 2010 [1978]. The main difference between the army and the Empire is that the latter contains a tiered system of identity construction, see below p. 222. The obvious historical parallel is the rhetoric of fatherhood adopted by the Roman emperors and imitated also at the civic level, e.g. in Olbia (IosPE I² 174:9).

¹⁸⁰ In conversation with Hystaspas, Cyrus explicitly represents Chrysantas as a second self: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.9-12. Compare Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1161b18-20, 28f. (applied to children); 1166a32; 1169b6f; 1170b6f.

¹⁸¹ E.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.1.1; 3.1.31; 5.3.20.

¹⁸² This is visible, for instance, in the various discussions that end with Cyrus getting everyone to agree: Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.2.28; 3.3.28-33; 4.2.45-47; 5.3.29-34; 6.1.1-19; 7.5.57.

4.2.2.1 Network boundaries: Public and private?

This conception of the collective is a potential source of perceived contingency for the individuals it encompasses, simply because it is not static and difficult to control. Before we move on to the discussion of contingency and control, therefore, we need to address the question of network boundaries. A network boundary is necessarily a construction and accordingly results in a struggle to maintain certain identities as prerequisites for enrolment in the network: In the case of the *Characters*, we for instance observed that they treat citizen status as their prerequisite for interaction within the world they construct. This issue becomes yet more pertinent if the collectives in question are constructed as collectivised individuals, because the collectivisation itself is dependent upon the centralised, rather than distributed maintenance of power. In the first place, the *Cyropaedia* – like the *Characters* – implements a web of social observation, rooted in every individual via the three value principles of *philotimia*, *philanthropia*, and *philomatheia*.¹⁸³ Observing one another, evaluating behaviour according to value-judgements, and learning, correcting, and adapting are thereby built into the individual's core. The crucial difference between this construction and the Theophrastan variant of this social dynamic is that there is no sanctioning third party, no abstract collective as the locus of order and norm: while the law is occasionally mentioned, especially in the context of the Persian *politeia*,¹⁸⁴ the emphasis on teachers and their simultaneous deconstruction in fact suggest that normative rules are at least potentially questionable and can be subordinated to the individual: in the humorous dinner-scene in book two, Cyrus himself defends lying for the greater good, which amounts to an assertion of the legitimacy of individual evaluations of value and truth.¹⁸⁵ This theme becomes more marked as Cyrus moves beyond external,

¹⁸³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.41f. (within the army in battle formation); 4.4.12f. (paired with rewards to break the network cohesion of the enemies); 7.5.85f. (as an integral factor of Empire within the ruling class); 8.1.16 (the court as forum of this observation); 8.1.22 (the good ruler as embodied law that is the seat of this observation). On the significance of the evaluative gaze cf. Harman, Rosie. "Viewing, Power and Interpretation in Xenophon's «Cyropaedia»", in: Jakub Pigoń (ed.). *The Children of Herodotus: Greek and Roman Historiography and Related Genres*. Newcastle 2008, 69-91, who is ultimately more interested in the implied (Greek) reader's reactions to the spectacles performed in the text, rather than in their significance within the world of the text.

¹⁸⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.2; 1.3.17f.; 3.3.52; 8.1.22. The law obviously did not play this part in the *Characters*; instead I observed the construction of the collective as a cognitive actor that affects the generation of individual agency at a social level rather than a legal one.

¹⁸⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.3.11-16. Cyrus obviously lies, deceives, and dissembles for the greater good throughout, exhibiting utilitarian ideals (1.6.27; 2.4.9-17, 22-26; 4.2.23; 5.3.9-18; 6.3.15-17; 7.5.71) despite Cambyses' basic insistence that deception towards friends is

institutionalised laws, which are enforced in Persia through communal observance and sanction, towards embodying the law based on his own sense of justice and the judgements he pronounces. This trajectory culminates in the creation of a centralised network of 'eyes and ears' within his subject body, all for the good of the collective, or rather the collectivised individual.¹⁸⁶ Cyrus himself thus collectivises the network of observation and knowledge integral to every individual, with the result that the *Cyropaedia* offers a construction of this social dynamic that is fundamentally different from that of the *Characters*:¹⁸⁷ Abstract collective observation and sanction is presented as being impossible; instead, individual observation and sanction are to be controlled through the collectivisation of individual semantic hegemony.

It follows that the text develops no fundamental distinction between a private and a public sphere that could correlate to an equally fundamental division between individual and collective. While an *idios* – *koinos* dichotomy certainly is maintained throughout the text, the locus of this construct shifts from being rooted in the dichotomy between *oikos*, so a sphere of non-collective concern, and its opposite, non-*oikos*, in the frame narrative, to being situated wholly within the Persian system of mutual observation and collective control, to finally existing within the parameters of *κοινωνία* ("partnership") defined by Cyrus.¹⁸⁸ As a result, the construction of the individual changes yet again: the individual's distributed self, including both its material components and the persons it encompasses,

bad (1.6.19, 30-33). Cyrus therein makes himself master of others' perception. This will be explored in greater depth below, p. 263.

¹⁸⁶ Laws enforced in Persia through community watch: Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.3f.; eyes and ears: 8.2.10-12. Faber (1979, 597) agrees that Cyrus becomes functionally equivalent to the law (explicit at 8.1.22). Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 3.1284a3-17 emphasising that the law applies to those equal in virtue and ability, but not to those that so far surpass all others in virtue: *αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος* ("for they themselves are law").

¹⁸⁷ By contrast Faber 1979, 505 argued on the basis of Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.35 that Cyrus moved beyond the need for *philotimia* as there was no one left to assign him praise. However, both Cyrus and the narrator explicitly state that he is to be held to the same standards as his friends (7.5.85f.; 8.1.12). "Collectivises" is here meant in keeping with the terms of collective construction outlined by the *Cyropaedia*, i.e. describes a directed collectivised individual.

¹⁸⁸ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.1 describes the baseline of the narrative frame by describing *kyrioi* in their own houses (*ἐν ἰδίοις οἴκοις*). As for the Persian system, 1.2.14 shows the elders of the Persian state trying cases of both collective (*koina*) and individual/private concern (*idia*) and 1.2.2 highlights the systemic collective determination of the individual. Later scenes that illustrate the development of these conceptions include 6.2.34, with its differentiation between the utility of items for personal/individual and common good, and 8.1.2 that brands concern for personal safety as the downfall of collective agency and cohesion (cf. for the same thought 2.3.3; 3.3.10).

comes to exist within the *koinōnia* constructed by Cyrus' self, i.e. within a *koinōnia* that is both *idia*, so to speak, and acts as a huge container in its distribution.¹⁸⁹ As we shall see, the content of the selves of those involved in court society thus ultimately comes to be constructed as deriving from their relationship to Cyrus,

¹⁸⁹ A first step in this direction is Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.2.19f., where a distinction is made between common possessions acquired by collective agency and the prerogatives of the commander to determine the modality of distribution among the collective he generates. This argument is crucial in facilitating the introduction of the meritocratic principle. 2.2.25 deepens this idea, arguing that groups of companions (κοινωνοί), i.e. collectives, need to be normatively streamlined by weeding out bad seeds, while 4.2.21 outlines the performative integration of others, in this case the Hyrcanians, into the *koinōnia*. 4.5.33 shows Cyrus taking over the *koinōnia* from Cyaxares by subjecting it to his assessment of its interests, producing a *koinōnia* wherein Cyrus is the judge of what is the common good. In 5.4.15 the Cadusian king does not communicate (lit. ἀνακοινῶ – he fails to reestablish *koinōnia*) with Cyrus, which results in his defeat, causing Cyrus to reimpress (5.4.20) that safety for friends (τοῖς φίλοις ἀσφάλειαν παρέχειν) hinges on communication (κοινῶ), or rather the reinforcement of *koinōnia*. Cyrus' pivotal debate with Cyaxares similarly hinges on the reinterpretation of *koinōnia* (5.5.19), obscuring that the parameters have changed. The system is finalised in a number of scenes in the second half of the work. 7.5.35 shows the distribution of houses (οἰκίαι) to the partners in action, creating a physical sense of place that is now derivative of Cyrus. The *epikairioi* (“elect officers”) and the *homotimoi* (“those equal in honour”) are designated his *koinonoi* (“partners”) in both toil and reward (7.5.71), a partnership which is, however, subject to Cyrus' mechanisms of control (8.1.16). The collective of *koinonoi* is further to be god-fearing to protect the collective (8.1.25) and to subscribe to the same value order and self-configuration (8.1.36, 40). Their cohesion is visible in the distributed evaluation of pleas that shapes Cyrus as a collective individual with great social surface during the grand exhibition of his distributed self at the procession (8.3.20) and especially at the feasts that performatively generate this construct (8.4.6): *Koinōnia* is lived at court banquets in that food is distributed, even to distant friends, but always based on Cyrus' evaluation. The same thought is present in Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1159b29–36. On the significance of the banquet scene as the practical epitome of the philanthropic conception of Empire see further Noël, Marie-Pierre. “*Symposion, phil-anthrōpīa* et empire dans la *Cyropédie* de Xénophon”, in: Pascale Brillet-Dubois and Edith Parmentier (eds.). *Φιλολογία. Mélanges offerts à Michel Casenitz*. Lyon 2006, 133–146, arguing that the banquet signifies the harmonic blend of Median and Persian culture effected by Cyrus (e.g. 8.1.40f.), though her argument about the Persian dance is far-fetched (139): The armed war-dance described at Xen. *Anab.* 6.1.9f. is danced by a Mysian, rendering this a supra-national label. Finally, the significance of *koinōnia* for the text is reaffirmed even in Cyrus' death-bed speech, in which he expresses the wish to be as one with the earth (8.7.25: [...] νῦν ἡδέως ἂν μοι δοκῶ κοινωνῆσαι τοῦ εὐεργετοῦντος ἀνθρώπου. “[...] now it seems pleasant to me to become a partner in what benefits men (i.e. earth).”). On the banquet in Hellenistic kingship see Vössing, Kai. *Mensa Regia. Das Bankett beim hellenistischen König und beim römischen Kaiser*. Munich 2004, 178–186, who notes the plurality of models and the theatrical qualities.

down to the regimes of control that configure individuals' identities. From the perspective of individuals that are not Cyrus, Cyrus becomes the core of their selves over the course of the narrative, while Cyrus 'himself' is progressively distributed throughout his *koinōnia* and indeed the Empire.¹⁹⁰ The Pheraulas episode shows the cascading applicability of this principle, as everything that Pheraulas *is* now derives from Cyrus, which he then further distributes across the loving *koinōnia* between himself and the Sacian.¹⁹¹

The force that lies behind this dynamic between individual and collective is the transformation of the entire Empire into Cyrus' own *oikos* via the patriarchal system and the concomitant 'privatisation' of society itself: if society has become subsumed under a single collectivised *oikos*, the distinction between private and public in the sense employed in the narrative frame no longer applies.¹⁹² Before drawing this section to a close, then, the conceptualisation of *oikos* in the *Cyropaedia* merits a more detailed investigation, since these observations do not necessarily entail that there are no network boundaries in the *Cyropaedia*: while Cyrus' collectivised self contains no such boundaries, the individuals it collectivises certainly are differentiated.

It is no coincidence that the *Cyropaedia* opens with the claim that *oikos* and state are alike in that they are often characterised by *kyrioi* unable to assert their control.¹⁹³ In the frame narrative, every individual, or at least every *kyrios*, is thus a 'state' unto himself and is treated as belonging to the same register. At first glance, this conception seems to persist: in the Assyrian king's address to his troops before the first battle of the camps, he highlights their individual motivations in fighting for their fatherland, singling out the protection and growth of

¹⁹⁰ *Koinōnia* applies only to his partners in conquest (*symmachoi*) and his friends (*philoí*), whereas the Empire also includes the subject peoples who are similarly part of the distributed self in that they too call him father (Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.43f.).

¹⁹¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.3.35-50, esp. 38 (everything derives from Cyrus) and 49f., which resolves the problem by having Pheraulas and the Sacian strike a deal to engage in a kind of symbiotic relationship. The Sacian administers all the material possessions, but also the *dioikesis* of the household, while Pheraulas satisfies the growth imperative and devotes himself to his friends. This partnership is grounded in love. The scene exemplifies how the natural paradigm of gain, i.e. growth of the distributed network of the self, and the concomitant growth of contingency through potential loss can be controlled by distributing these dynamics within a partnership based on mutual *philia*, i.e. a collective individual self. On the Pheraulas episode cf. also the discussion of its Socratic context by Gera 1993, 173-183.

¹⁹² The "privatization" of society and the *oikos* ideology of the *Cyropaedia* are aptly noted also by Carlier 2010 [1978], 358f.; Due 1989, 219-221. Whidden 2008 argued accordingly that Cyrus effectively transforms everyone he encounters into women and children, establishing *kyrieia* over them.

¹⁹³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.1; 5.3.49f.

the individual *oikos* as two of these motivations.¹⁹⁴ The overwhelmingly and consistently negative characterisation of the Assyrian king, however, calls this apparently straight-forward and perfectly acceptable speech into question.¹⁹⁵ The reasons are spelled out by Cyrus himself in his immediate reaction to the Assyrian king's exhortation: he emphasises that mere words cannot make anyone good, who is not good already.¹⁹⁶ If adherence to value order, i.e. the definition of goodness put forward by the collectivising individual, is crucial in the creation of collectivisation, Cyrus' explanation makes clear that a short-term appeal based on individualisation, which is linked to the use of *oikos*, the very core of the individual distributed self and the site of failure in the frame narrative, cannot result in a construction of a cohesive collective, but in fact emphasises the naturally individualising, centrifugal tendency of individuals. Cyrus thus makes clear that the only way to establish a true collective is through long-term collectivisation based on the implementation of collective value regimes, associated with a reconfiguration of the *oikos*.

Further examination of the use of *oikos* over the course of the narrative reveals that *oikoi* seem to occur mainly in narratives that thematise their dissolution and reconfiguration within Cyrus' self. The first example is provided by the eunuch Gadatas, whose *oikos* is explicitly doomed from the outset due to his inability to have children. The solution is the dissolution of his *oikos*, which is literally packed up and incorporated into Cyrus' itinerant self, replacing the individuality of the *kyrios* with a bilateral friendship bond.¹⁹⁷ The second good example is Cyrus' uncle, the Median king Cyaxares, whose death causes his *oikos* to be incorporated into Cyrus' self due to their ties by blood and marriage.¹⁹⁸ The childless deaths of Abradatas and Pantheia also seem to allow for the complete integration of their

¹⁹⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.44.

¹⁹⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.5.2f.; 4.2.1-4; 4.6.1-7; 5.2.23-25; 5.4.33-36.

¹⁹⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.48 (positive description of the exhortation by Chrysantas) and 50-52 (Cyrus' immediate negative reaction).

¹⁹⁷ Gadatas' doom and salvation are described at Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.3.18f., 29-39; 5.4.10-14; 8.4.2. Gobryas' situation is similar, though more interesting as he is not emasculated. As Tatum 1989, 202f. observed, Gobryas is without sons and too old to produce more (4.6.5), but attempts, unlike Gadatas, to draw Cyrus into his own *oikos* by getting him to marry his daughter (4.6.9). Cyrus gently rebukes this and finally inverts the patriarchal relationship Gobryas was attempting to establish over him (8.4.13-16).

¹⁹⁸ The crucial scene is Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.5.17, which shows the exchange of *oikos* for *oikos*, but on very different terms: Cyrus gives Cyaxares an *oikos* in Babylon, distributing his self into Cyrus' close sphere, but in exchange Cyrus actually absorbs Cyaxares' *oikos* after his death.

kingdom of Susa into Cyrus' Empire.¹⁹⁹ The final example is Pheraulas, whose original down-to-earth existence, grounded in his Persian *oikos*, is gradually dissolved over the long trajectory of the *Cyropaedia's* movement to Babylon and ultimately replaced with an existence derivative of the action performed by Cyrus' collectivised self, i.e. the conquest of Assyria.²⁰⁰ While the concept of *oikos* itself thus persists, the significance of the individualist *oikos* as a locus of self is minimised over the course of the narrative, giving way to a conception of self that exists mainly within its reciprocal bonds to Cyrus, whose self is in turn configured in a complementary way.²⁰¹ These bonds include friendship, marriage, and gifting, and are contingent on normative conformity and obedience, i.e. on collectivisation.²⁰² Accordingly, while there is a discourse about the *oikia* with its hearth as a treasured refuge (οὔτε ἡδιον οὔτε οικειότερόν ἐστιν οὐδέν: "nothing is either sweeter or dearer", i.e. home sweet home), the *oikos* is not developed as the actual locus of the individual's distributed self, for instance by being systematically placed beyond the control of others.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ See Tuplin 2013, 75, who points out that the couple appears to be childless; at least no children are mentioned for whom Pantheia might want to live on. However, the *Cyropaedia* does not press this matter.

²⁰⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.3.35-40. Akin to Gadatas, Pheraulas is the conduit that reproduces the second tier of relational identity, the presentation of the *philoï* and army to the subjects (8.3.5f.). Cf. Weber 2007, 258, who notes that this procedure was crucial also to Alexander's court.

²⁰¹ The normal concept of home is visible nicely at Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.4, where Cyrus' grandfather Astyages seeks to distract the young Cyrus to prevent him feeling homesick (ἵνα ἦττον τὰ οἰκαδὲ ποθοίῃ "so that he might pine less for the things that are homewards"). Contrary to what LSJ s.v. οἰκαδὲ A. III suggests, I would argue that the trajectory implied by οἰκαδὲ as opposed to the use of οἴκοι one expects is significant, as it highlights the overextension of the self away from its normative centre, a move the *Cyropaedia* later repeats again and again.

²⁰² Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.4.29f., 34. In Cyrus' death-bed speech, these links appear in fact to be tiered (8.7.14), with blood-relationships outweighing all others, including co-citizenship (πολιῖται) and mess-mates (σύσσιτοι). This is a deviation that contradicts the meritocratic and utilitarian principles of the text: Cyrus himself, for instance, has no qualms about leaving his family behind, though of course he is not married.

²⁰³ On the hearth as a place of rest and safety see esp. Cyrus' move into the palace at Babylon at Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.56. Cf. also the description of the flight of the Lydians to Sardis (7.2.1), where the home is described as a crucial refuge, a space characterised by non-contingency; however, this construction is also negative in that it is individualist rather than Cyrean. The difference between these two conceptions is also marked out in Cyrus' discussion with Croesus about the treasury. While Croesus posits the *oikos* as the potential location of the θησαυρός, Cyrus points to his distributed self in the form of his friends (8.2.15). This same construction is also found in an anecdote relating to

The tool that accomplishes this is the campaign, the text's main narrative trajectory. It involves an itinerant existence and the subordination of the individual to the collective, creating a very extensive state of limbo – in White's terms: a large-scale *switching* of identities into a new configuration; in Callon's: a sweeping *intéressement*. In the *Cyropaedia*, this state is used to translate the plurality of individual *oikoi* that existed in the Persian *politeia* and was grounded in institution and law, into this Cyrean configuration, in which the *oikos* re-appears in a fundamentally different form.²⁰⁴ The *Cyropaedia*'s lengthy middle section therefore functions as a trajectory that facilitates this re-semanticisation by acting as a narrative of dissociation. This narrative reorganises the conception of self and culminates in the scenes that show Cyrus distributing houses (*oikíai*) to his partners in action. This final act creates a physical sense of place that now derives solely from Cyrus, a gesture which they reciprocate by assigning him the palace.²⁰⁵ The long scene that forms the end of book 5 and beginning of 6 and discusses the continuation of the campaign accordingly marks the pivotal moment on this trajectory in that it settles whether the collective accepts the new configuration of home or returns to the old one.²⁰⁶ The dissociation of the *kaloi* from everything bar the social network is here beautifully expressed by Artabazus, who narratively transforms the

Hellenistic kingship, though turned to the negative: Diod. 29.29.1 (= *Excerpta Constantiana* 4 p. 364) tells the story of Ptolemy V Epiphanes, who when asked how he would fund his campaign pointed to his friends, his walking money-bags (cf. Jerome in *Dan.* 11.20, where the anecdote is attributed to Porphyry and concerns not Ptolemy but his opponent Seleukos IV Philopator).

²⁰⁴ After the campaign is concluded, Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.84 again mentions the *oikoi* and *sómata* of the community of the court. *Oikos* is further used in conjunction with gifts of land and houses that can be passed on (8.4.28). The same is true at 8.6.4f. where Cyrus gives estates and households to his friends in the subordinate lands, which are also heritable. The crucial change is apparent only in one short clause: *αὐτοὶ δὲ οἰκοῦσι παρὰ βασιλεῖ*. “they (the friends) themselves, however, live nearby the king”. Pheraulas explains the process in greater detail (8.3.35–40): wealth used to be the product of individual agency, and was located within the *oikos*, as was the individual; now wealth is the product of Cyrus' collectivisation, located within the gift bond that is the result of the slow trajectory of motion that overextends the distributed self and ultimately establishes a new centre.

²⁰⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.35, 56. Cyrus' move into the palace is then sanctioned with sacrifice (7.5.57) and reinforced by an act of *diioikeia* (7.5.58–60), which includes the establishment of a bodyguard composed of eunuchs. Cf. Tuplin 2013, 86f., who views the focus on Babylon as a way of expressing the narrative tension between *ἐγκράτεια* and decadence.

²⁰⁶ The whole passage in question is Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.5.44–6.1.19. See esp. 6.1.9f., where Artabazus resemanticises their original existence at home as a state of constant contingency, and 6.1.16, where the collective is now envisaged as being at sea, with no *oikeioi topoí* around.

“homeward” trajectory (οἶκοι) into a war zone, a sphere of contingency and fear, and their current state of success in limbo into a state of “festivity” (πανήγυρις).²⁰⁷ The upshot is that they move on, ultimately allowing for the re-embedding of this de-localised collectivised self in a new configuration of cognitive space: by the end of the text, Cyrus’ *oikos* as a whole is mobile, entailing a plurality of *oikiai* throughout the Empire, but only one *collective* locus of self, only one home, namely Cyrus himself.²⁰⁸

At the end of the *Cyropaedia*, the locus of Cyrus’ distributed self then lies not in his own person, not in a palace, but consists precisely in its distribution, which is continuously realised through agency within the circle of *philoï* and beyond. The patriarchal system is the perfect embodiment of this conception in that it explicitly applies to both the meritocracy of *philoï* and the subjects. It not only grants Cyrus an interaction mode in which his self encompasses everyone, but also provides everyone with a source of social footing that derives solely from conformity to collectivised value order, not from individualised control.²⁰⁹

Let us now consider the boundaries this system implements to prevent such individualised projects of control. Fundamentally, the meritocratic *philoï*, i.e. the courtiers who live the value order, live their lives within the distributed self of Cyrus. This existence is conceptualised as a competitive social network of the *kaloi* that includes Cyrus himself.²¹⁰ Within this network, however, there is a gradient of ‘private’ and ‘public’, tied to access and favour, which rests on conformity to value order and is therefore a measure of ‘Cyrus-ness’. This is made clear by three

²⁰⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.1.9f. While the maintenance of the ethnic qualifiers provides a fundamental semantic structure (1.1.4f.; 8.3.25, 32f.), the Empire proper is organized territorially (8.6.7f.). The court society is created as a distinctly Cyrean semantic amalgam consisting, e.g., of Median dress, Persian normative code, and Cyrean meritocracy, all of which are gradually developed within Cyrus’ distributed self over the course of the text’s trajectory: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.40-42. The *Cyropaedia* implicitly thematises the tension that arises between ethnic qualifier and Cyrean semantic structure in that it explicitly notes the low degree of centrality possessed by Cyrus’ bonds to Persia, which he visits only seven times (8.7.1), while at the same time showing that the Persians are privileged in that there is a distinction between Persians and *symmachoi* (e.g. 8.7.27), in that all the satraps are Persian (8.6.7), and that Cyrus dies in his homeland (8.7.1-5). The tension inherent in the construction is resolved via the “agreement” (συνθήκη) established between Cyrus and the Persian collective under Cambyses paternal control (8.5.23-27).

²⁰⁸ Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.49 (Artabazus becomes Cyrus *oikeios*); 8.5.2 (Cyrus’ itinerant kingship); 8.6.4f. (plurality of *oikiai*, but king as locus of self). This is different from the Hyrcanians’ habit of living on the move (4.4.2) and from Gadatas removal of his *oikos* (5.3.18f., 29-39).

²⁰⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.43f. See Luhmann 1984, 63, on the impossibility of unilateral order.

²¹⁰ The definition of the courtiers (“those at the gates”; οἱ ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις) as living a good life is given at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.33; cf. also 8.1.39; 8.3.25-28.

scenes: the inner-most level of distribution is performed in Cyrus having supper only with the eunuch Gadatas, who acts as a broker to the wider circle of *philoï*, a conduit that reproduces Cyrus' meritocratic order, for instance by organising the symposium's hierarchical seating arrangement.²¹¹ The second, and most important, level finds its expression in the symposium scene, but is most clearly visible when Cyrus subjects himself to the observation of his friends, encouraging them to scrutinise his actions to ensure collective virtue.²¹² Finally, he restricts his visibility to the Empire at large to the grand processions and the itinerant court, which display a very different relational identity, one of distinction, which is communicated by the inclusion of the inner tiers of the distributed self, as well as the army, in a ritualized encounter between those in the procession and those observing. At the same time, such encounters also establish order within the collective.²¹³ Here, Pheraulas acts as a broker between Cyrus and the outer tiers of the collective by organising the performance in accordance with the value order, which is what is on display during the procession.²¹⁴ While the individual can thus be alone, it is never permitted to leave the control regime.²¹⁵

Cyrus thus takes control of a process constructed as being embedded in the individual and thereby acts as obligatory passage point (OPP) for the network he translates. As part of this process, any individual, including the ruler, is therefore transformed in its basic conceptualisation: it is plurally enrolled in other individuals in bi- or multilateral processes that are constantly shifting. In other words, the ideal individual is possible only within a network of peers, as is made clear during the extensive symposium in the final book. On the one hand, this symposium is an instrument of rule that serves to reproduce the meritocratic principle and Cyrus' superiority to everyone else. It also provides a stage on which to perform the relative positions of everyone involved. On the other hand, however, it also shows Cyrus as part of a laughing community, as allowing insight into his system, and as literally belonging to his friends.²¹⁶ The symposium-scene is thus an example of the situational complexity of the key collectivisation of *philoï* that

²¹¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.2-5. On the significance of the symposium as an act and mirror of Empire cf. Noël 2006.

²¹² Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.23-39.

²¹³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.37; 8.5.2-14, esp. 3 and 8. Ultimately, of course, the all-seeing gods provide another layer to this dynamic that acts as a normative fallback (8.7.22).

²¹⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.3.2-8. That the collectivized value order is on display is shown by Cyrus' treatment of Daïphernes (8.3.21f.). On royal processions as interfaces see Strootman 2014, 247-263.

²¹⁵ Again the example is Pheraulas, who lives the value order even in his home and is the only character to be shown without Cyrus (8.3.49f.).

²¹⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.1; 8.4.25; 8.4.31-36.

Cyrus implements. The king is shown as capable of acquiring the universal goal of happiness – which exceeds non-contingency – only by being embedded into a multilateral network of peers.

In sum, the *Cyropaedia* develops a supremely individualistic conception of the individual, fundamentally tempered by an innate value-configuration that is pervasively social and exists *a priori*, though is fully developed only in Cyrus. Collectives are always collectivisations of such individuals and are directed, produced and reproduced by the individual's agency. Put into network terms, the *Cyropaedia* conceives of a monarchical, court-based social system as one single distributed individual that gradually grows into an encompassing and centralised network. Within this network, Gadatas and Pheraulas act as essentially exchangeable brokers between the centre and tiers of lower-hierarchy nodes, thereby aiding in formulating and reproducing the identities that maintain the network hierarchy and protect the central hub.²¹⁷ This structure therefore appears to be scale-free since it overcomes the limits of human beings through the collectivisation of Cyrus' self. This impression is further corroborated by the fact that the basic imperative is network growth, both material and social, all of which is negotiated via Cyrus. This dynamic is capable of characterising all components of the self because the centre both encourages and redistributes its own growth, while functioning as an obligatory passage point (OPP) for interaction.²¹⁸ The *Cyropaedia's* process of collectivisation accordingly consists of cascades of translations in Callon's sense. The individuals collectivised, i.e. the *philoï* and the army, are 'irreversibly' enrolled in this collective and give up their potential OPP status in exchange for freedom from contingency.²¹⁹

In order to refine this first analysis of individual and collective, the next step is to consider the norms that underlie this conception in more detail and investigate how they regulate the social dynamics of this construct. This amounts to investigating the ways in which this freedom from contingency is constructed and achieved through control in various situations, which will allow for the abstraction of the value regimes the text develops. Finally, these values will be studied in their abstract network configuration, in order to allow for the formulation of the societal model developed in the *Cyropaedia* in terms of a value-correlated social network, which can then be compared to the evidence relating to the court society of the Diadoch period and to my reading of the *Characters*.

²¹⁷ Cf. Strootman's (2014, 175-184) emphasis on the structural role of royal favourites as buffers in court society.

²¹⁸ Callon 1986.

²¹⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.3.49f.

4.2.3 The construction and control of contingency in the *Cyropaedia*

On numerous occasions, the narrator and characters of the *Cyropaedia* reflect on the sources of insecurity they face and discuss – or simply employ – responses that will help to minimise perceived uncertainty and consolidate agency. The prevalence of contingency in the *Cyropaedia* is not surprising, given that it deals with a drawn-out process of transformation.²²⁰ In keeping with the idealising discourse of the text, contingency can be controlled extremely well in almost all cases, extending even to the ultimate incalculable event of human existence, death.²²¹ As it has emerged that the *Cyropaedia*'s construction of the actor does not allow for a self-sustained construction of collectives, collectives are obviously denied the capacity to control contingency as separately conceived entities – unlike what we observed for the *Characters*. Here, collectives can only be guided into perceiving the same contingencies as their constituent individuals, which in turn is a consequence of their being nothing more than narratively collectivised individuals.²²² If contingency is not responded to with collective action, the collectivisation unravels, causing collectives to devolve back into individuals – which may of course be desirable, for instance in the case of hostile armies.²²³

The only partial exception to this rule is the Persian collective sketched at the beginning of the text, which confirms the rule in that it is portrayed as expending its entire collective agency on self-maintenance and self-reassurance, on the basis of a body of abstract law.²²⁴ As soon as individuals need to be released from this collective to combat an existential threat and are so made to focus their agency elsewhere, the exceptional Cyrus takes control of them by creating a meritocratic

²²⁰ The rise of contingency in proportion to growth was already noted by Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* 1155a11f.).

²²¹ The most extensive discussion is the account of Cyrus' own death of old age at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.7.1-3, 28. Even this final event of his life is still under the control of his own agency, as he covers himself over (*ἐνεκαλύψατο*).

²²² On translated agency generation see esp. Callon 1986; 1991, 140f. Cf. e.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.5.33, where Cyrus explicitly devises the common good. 5.5.44-48 discusses the creation of collective opinion via individual competition.

²²³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.1; 5.4.1f., 38f.; 6.2.12; 7.1.23f.; 7.5.78-84. The two main dynamics that are presented as generating this disintegration in the *Cyropaedia* are fear (1.6.40; 3.1.23-25; 3.3.53; 6.4.20; 7.1.23f.; 7.2.29) and happiness (7.5.78-85). Fear has a double significance in that it can also enforce value-configurations when it operates at the level of social and normative, rather than existential, contingency: 1.1.5; 8.1.25; 8.2.10-12 (see also p. 219, n. 158 above). Complacent happiness, on the other hand, causes the loss of Cyrean self-control (*ἐγκράτεια*) and the decay of agency through complacency.

²²⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.2-16; 1.3.18; 1.5.1.

hierarchy based not on law but on an OPP.²²⁵ Within the conception of the *Cyropaedia*, the imperialist polis under the collectively sanctioned rule of law is thus not presented as a viable model and can hence be ignored.²²⁶ As a consequence, the focus here is exclusively on the *Cyropaedia*'s representation of court society as a successful contingency-controlling construct.

4.2.3.1 Existential contingency

The first group of individual contingencies is the one most explicitly outlined in the *Cyropaedia*. It comprises existential factors that are conceived as affecting every individual alike, since they derive from the physical body: examples are toil, heat and cold, hunger and thirst, illness and injury, and of course the lurking threat of death.²²⁷ The basic response to these threats is training, i.e. first-hand experience of these contingencies on a trial basis, which results in identities that anticipate and thereby defuse them for the future: in a simile that seems to relate life to the arduous assembly of IKEA-furniture, the text even astutely describes such identities as *γνωρίσματα* ("marks") that facilitate future action.²²⁸ In language, these identities are encapsulated in normative concepts, such as "self-control" (*ἐγκράτεια*, *σωφροσύνη*) and "endurance" (*δύνασθαι φέρειν*), etc., which are continually invoked in the narrative, thus underlining their value for planned or possible collective action.²²⁹ Stockpiling resources and other forms of preparation are related strategies employed throughout the text and obviously, like training, tie into the leader's *philomatheia* in that they presuppose the continuous acquisition and processing of information, the constant reproduction and re-extension of his distributed self, and the ability to project all this information into the future. As far as control of existential contingency is concerned then, the text represents the leader as the architect of collective contingency-control at the existential level.²³⁰

²²⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.5.5.

²²⁶ Hirsch 1985, 64f.; Carlier 2010 [1978], 358-361. In the Hellenistic period, this was indeed no longer to be a valid model, see Baker, Patrick. "Warfare", in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 373-388, esp. 382f., and Ma 2000, esp. 360-362, both of whom highlight the *local* contexts and concerns that continued to induce Hellenistic citizen collectives to mobilise collective agency as military interaction.

²²⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.1.13f.; 8.1.34-36. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.1f., where control of these contingencies distinguishes Socrates.

²²⁸ Quote from Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.1.27. Training is a concern throughout the text; see e.g. 1.4.25; 1.5.1, 7-14; 1.6.5f., 41; 2.1.21-29; 3.3.53; 6.1.20-25.

²²⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.5.7-14; 1.6.25; 1.6.36; 6.4.13-15; 7.5.80-82; 8.1.30-32, 36.

²³⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.12, 16, 41f.

Illness and injury are likewise countered by training and obedience, but are also defused as sources of contingency by the presence of experts, as well as by Cyrus' *philanthropia*, as is nicely exemplified by his care for the wounded Cadusians, as well as the 'health insurance' scheme he develops at the end of the text.²³¹ While death is constructed as the ultimate contingency throughout and obviously persists as inevitable, Cyrus is in fact capable of narratively defusing it, for instance when he reinterprets Abradatas' ridiculously predictable death as heroic sacrifice, or when he reflects on his own death and the almost 'Solonic' state of *eudaimonia* he has achieved.²³² The leader thus emerges as exercising control even over the physical body, thanks to his translation of the individuals that form his collectivised self. In sum, the *Cyropaedia* thus constructs existential contingency as controllable and the success of this control in turn reinforces the translation.

4.2.3.2 Social contingency

The second complex of contingencies is social in nature, meaning that human interaction is constructed as the source of uncertainty. Unfortunately, it will again prove impossible to cleanly disentangle these processes from the normative level. This is because the *Cyropaedia* mainly constructs social contingency as deriving from the individual's innate self-interest, its resultant tendency towards normative idiosyncrasy, and the natural dichotomous gradient of evaluation inherent in the concept of good and bad souls. Fundamentally, social contingency in the *Cyropaedia* therefore results from the fact that any actor can potentially translate their own value order and propagate it by employing their agency.²³³ The collisions that result from this self-interested propagation of idiosyncratic value order create perceived contingency for the actors involved, especially when these orders themselves come to be collectivised. It is this dynamic that underlies the collapses of collectives throughout the text's military campaign.²³⁴ On the other hand, the

²³¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.14-17; 4.1.3f.; 5.4.15-18; 8.2.24f.

²³² Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.4.11; 7.5.34; 8.2.24f.; 8.7.17-28. On Solonic *eudaimonia* (Hdt. 1.32) and its construction in the *Cyropaedia* see Lefèvre, Eckard. "The Question of the ΒΙΟΣ ΕΥ-ΔΑΙΜΩΝ: The Encounter between Cyrus and Croesus in Xenophon", in: Gray (ed.) 2010, 401-417.

²³³ In the Persian *politeia* outlined at the beginning of the *Cyropaedia* this is curbed by the rule of law and continuous societal self-policing: Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.12-14; 1.3.18. It is obvious enough that the work as a whole asserts that such individualization is contingent upon according to some form of ideal control regime that ultimately resides with the gods (8.7.22).

²³⁴ E.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.59-70; 4.2.21-32; 5.3.25; 6.2.12.

more subtle fractioning or individualising effect caused by this collision can be seen in one of the few moments of crisis found in the text, the conspiracy within Gadas's social network that almost costs him his life.²³⁵ Accordingly Cyrus' core concern at the end of the text is with *ἀσφάλεια* ("safety"), i.e. a state beyond the experience of contingency that results from stable cohesion within the collective of individuals constructed as possessing agency.²³⁶

I would argue that this state of cohesion is rooted in a stable relational network of supporting value-constructs. The most telling passage in this context is again the treatment of Daiphernes during the grand procession, who resists Cyrus' summons in a vain effort to be *ἐλευθερώτερος* ("freer"), but thereby acts in keeping with a concept of freedom that no longer exists.²³⁷ In response, Cyrus immediately punishes him through exclusion, severing his ties to the OPP and reasserting the *Cyropaedia's* conception of freedom through obedience, which is closely linked to its utilitarian conception of safety.²³⁸ By striving for safety, Cyrus is therefore attempting to control the contingency of losing this state of stable cohesion, for instance due to rebellion, or by being assassinated. This is played out when he briefly falls in battle but is protected by his friends, showing that this contingency is best controlled by maintaining the cohesion of the value-correlated social network.²³⁹

This potentially shifting dynamic of individualisation can be conceptualised as distributed selves shrinking and expanding in a mesh, a process that can itself be perceived as contingent. The most clear-cut examples of this are collectives collapsing due to the destruction of their centre; the effect Pantheia's suicide has on her attendants, who commit suicide themselves, is a case in point.²⁴⁰ Similarly, the collective of the Cadusian troops, Cyrus' allies, loses its leader along with many of its members in a disastrous military expedition and returns in the shape of scattered individuals. Its cohesion is restored by Cyrus taking control through action, physically and socially 'mending' its members, and then re-forging it under a new leader.²⁴¹ As for individuals losing elements of their distributed self, such

²³⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.4.1f. The same applies to Cyrus' initial moment of crisis that he experiences when his friends challenge his leadership when he fails to secure a privilege from his grandfather (1.4.11-13). Crises are thus played out using children and eunuchs.

²³⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.1.7; 8.1.45; 8.2.21-23. Throughout the text, Cyrus constructs the development of agency as being dependent on resources.

²³⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.3.21f.

²³⁸ On the *Cyropaedia's* concept of freedom in obedience see Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.2-6 and above p. 210, n. 114.

²³⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.1.36-38.

²⁴⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.3.15f.

²⁴¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.4.15-23.

experiences can obviously also result in perceived contingency. As Gabriel Danzig has pointed out, the confrontation between Cyrus and Cyaxares about the leadership of the army provides some insight into precisely this kind of social dynamic, into the “perspective of a little boy who has lost his oversized coat and been given one that fits better.”²⁴² Although Cyaxares does not initially agree with Cyrus’ utilitarian argument that he took the army for Cyaxares’ greater good, he ultimately acknowledges Cyrus’ point of view. Before he does so, however, he describes himself as being emasculated, making the shift from one collectivised individual to the other explicit.²⁴³ The text later confirms this transformation in an unequivocal fashion by having Cyrus marry Cyaxares’ daughter and inherit his kingdom.²⁴⁴ Even for the collectivised individual, the text thus envisages social contingency control founded on its gradual and ultimately full incorporation into Cyrus’ value order, in which Cyrus is the most meritorious figure and thus the safest source of norm.²⁴⁵

In order to maintain this translation, Cyrus implements measures designed to prevent encounters like the one with Cyaxares: for instance, he and his broker Pheraulas delegate punishments down the network hierarchy and obscure their agency in the assignment of honour – both actions that might cause the perception of contingency – and thereby defer contingency down the network hierarchy.²⁴⁶ Furthermore, the terms of the translation carry a strong component of emulation that controls what actions are in line with the value order, structured by the three trajectories of *philomatheia*, *philanthropia*, and *philotimia*: hunting and training, acquisition and gift-giving, learning and discoursing are all combined with the central concept of freedom through obedience to create a control regime that limits the capacity of the collectivised individuals to deploy agency in ways that can generate uncertainty within the network, especially for the network’s centre.²⁴⁷

²⁴² Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.5.8-37. See Danzig 2012, 529.

²⁴³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.5.28-36.

²⁴⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.5.17-20.

²⁴⁵ Again the best example is Pheraulas, who has so fully incorporated the value order that he continues to act as a collectivised individual even upon suffering apparently random physical violence (Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.3.27-30).

²⁴⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.27f.; 8.3.2-8; 8.4.11.

²⁴⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.80-86; 8.1.21-39. Obviously, this conception of *kalokagathia* is imparted in a centralised fashion to future generations (7.5.86; 8.6.10). On the royal pages at the Hellenistic court cf. Strootman 2014, 136-144.

4.2.4 Control regimes and normative contingency

In between and beyond these two groups of contingencies lie the normative sources of contingency, i.e. systems of control that come to be perceived as contingent. It may be worth restating that the function of these systems is to lower the thresholds for social interaction by controlling contingency in a collectivised fashion, i.e. by providing identity that is universal and allows individuals to anticipate what others might do.²⁴⁸ The existence of a plurality of such systems causes contingency in that their applicability in real life is not always clear-cut.²⁴⁹ As we saw in the *Characters*, for instance, buying from a friend is a problem because different regimes collide. The overall aim of any such regime of 'meta-control' must hence be to reduce this 'meta-source' of contingency by implementing a hierarchy of control-regimes based on the situation and by maintaining boundaries between them. In order to investigate the *Cyropaedia's* construction of this regime of meta-control, we shall first briefly survey the control regimes implemented, again using four of Luhmann's most central systems as guidance, beginning with love, trust, and friendship. We shall then investigate how the terms of the translation process that enables the collectivisation of the individual in the *Cyropaedia* account for normative contingency by giving primacy to one or the other of these systems.

4.2.4.1 *Philia*: Love, trust, and friendship

As has often been observed in scholarship, *philia* is the central value employed in the text to structure not only social interaction, but also the social world of the *Cyropaedia* as a whole:²⁵⁰ At his core Cyrus is, among other things, a friend.²⁵¹ The

²⁴⁸ White 2008², 220.

²⁴⁹ Luhmann 1984, 289-296. This principle is the foundation stone of systems theory.

²⁵⁰ Studies of friendship in Xenophon include Due 1989, 221-223; Tatum 1989, 64-66, 188-214; Azoulay 2004b, 27-37; Gray 2011, 291-330. Bodil Due treats the friendship concept of the *Cyropaedia* as a throw-back to aristocratic patronage relationships. James Tatum emphasises the initial discussion of animal husbandry as ideal rule (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.2) and its rejection of true friendship based on the argument that friendship prevents maximum utilisation of animals. Accordingly his interpretation renders Cyrus a cold, manipulative, and yet supremely attractive siren who destroys others (188). His discussion casts doubt on the veracity of friendship in the *Cyropaedia*, but I believe underestimates the extent to which the 'herdsman' himself is constrained. Vincent Azoulay and Vivienne Gray offer more nuanced analyses. The main point of contention is the question of equal vs. unequal friendship that emerges from the apparent imbalance between leader and follower.

²⁵¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.1. See Carlier 2010 [1978], 344f., 353.

correct treatment of *philoí* is thematised throughout the text and Cyrus repeatedly addresses groups of individuals as such, performatively translating them into situational collectivisations of his self, the size of which varies considerably.²⁵² The value of *philia* seems to denote ‘affection’ in a very broad manner and is explicitly differentiated from *ἔρως*, “romantic love”, which is a fiery, destructive force that impinges on the distributed exercise of agency and normative self-control necessary to maintain the translation of self: as Cyrus himself says, *erōs* is slavery, the opposite of control.²⁵³ This is apparent from its explicit discussion in the Pantheia episode and the performance of this distinction vis-à-vis Artabazus, whose clearly physical love Cyrus accepts as useful, but controls, transforming it into a durable, hierarchical relationship – kisses are reserved only for Chrysantas, the ‘second Cyrus’.²⁵⁴ The Pantheia episode further highlights the fact that *erōs* generates ties that resist translation, an individualising dynamic that directly counteracts Cyrus’ construct, which brings us back to the neat narrative resolution of the problem embodied by Pantheia that was observed above.²⁵⁵ As in the *Characters*, *philia* rather than *erōs* therefore generally acts as the vehicle that communicates the text’s construction of its normative world order. Friendship divides the world into an ordered (rather than passionate) inside and a contingent outside. As a result, this value is not only a matter of explicit reflection, but also acts as a communicative marker that facilitates the creation of collective agency within this world.²⁵⁶ Friendship is thus crucial to contingency control.²⁵⁷

²⁵² Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.7; 1.4.26; 1.5.7-14 (the *homotimoi* as a community of friends); 1.6.3; 2.1.11; 2.2.28; 6.4.13-15.

²⁵³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.1.12. On this see Tatum 1989, 163-172.

²⁵⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.4.27f.; 5.1.10; 8.4.26f. On the paradoxical ‘frigidity’ of Cyrus and his control of the relationship with Artabazus see esp. Azoulay 2004b, 408-418, who casts Cyrus as a withdrawn and thus unattainable locus of sexual attraction capable of controlling passion and making it productive within the translation. On the boundary between love and friendship in the context of royal friends cf. also Konstan 1997a, 106f., who observes its disintegration in Dio Chrysostom’s third oration on kingship to Trajan.

²⁵⁵ See above p. 212. Cf. Nadon 2001, 152-156, who similarly regards love as a challenge to the construct, but, in keeping with his ‘dark’ reading, understands this as criticism of the regime as a whole (p. 161). Plut. *Alex.* 22.3 echoes Cyrus’ treatment of Pantheia in Alexander’s alleged treatment of Darcios’ wife.

²⁵⁶ The space of the *Cyropaedia* is human space and in that it is dichotomous in the sense that, as it is traversed and explored, as more and more peoples follow Cyrus’ cause, and as fortresses fall and are taken over, the spaces they occupy become familiar and friendly, defusing the contingency of the unknown (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.28; 5.2.2-6, 5.3.56; 6.1.16). The border between *echthroí* and *philoí* is thus mutable, not constant as in the case of the Persian value construction presented at the beginning (1.6.28-34).

²⁵⁷ Aristotle similarly held that friendship is the core of the state (*Nic. Eth.* 1155a23f.).

The configuration this value exhibits in the *Cyropaedia* is very specific, which is unsurprising given that we are dealing with a conception of the collective that hinges on individual translation rather than on distributed community. To bring out its specificity, let us briefly survey other fourth-century BC conceptions.

The main Aristotelian notion of friendship considers *philia* to hinge on mutual fondness shown out of altruism rather than egotism. Unsurprisingly, friendship is therefore made apparent in interaction between two individuals.²⁵⁸ The typology of *philia* relationships Aristotle extrapolates on this basis is accordingly characterised by a basic distinction between equal and unequal friendship, and by three ideal types, utilitarian, pleasurable, and virtuous *philia*. These three types are all located on a value-gradient that hinges on the degree of equality and altruism apparent in the processes of social exchange that constitute the friendship. The ideal end-point of this gradient is non-difference to the point of mutual identity of self through selflessness.²⁵⁹ Unequal friendship is accordingly characterised by a significant gap in the absolute, numerical equality of individuals, which Aristotle considers integral to friendship.²⁶⁰ As a rule, kings accordingly have friendships that equate to the relationship between fathers and their children, characterised by a debt of *charis* that can never be paid back.²⁶¹

Isocrates, by contrast, adopts a bottom-up perspective in his letter to Antipater and develops an ideal royal friend who can be gained by euergetic, top-down action and then functions as a cultivated, intelligent, eloquent, and loyal locus of truth – as opposed to the flatterer – and as a provider of pleasurable company.²⁶² In his conception, equality exists in the parameters of the exchange relationship: truly great men of power honour the truth, and great friends tell the truth.²⁶³

These considerations on friendship from the later fourth century BC reveal a number of categories for evaluation: the role of absolute and proportional equality, the provision of utility and pleasure (mutual or unilateral), the pursuit of virtue, and finally the role of truth. Applying these categories to the *Cyropaedia* helps to expose its specific construction of friendship. So far, Cyrus has emerged as the structural OPP of the social network he creates, a centralised network with

²⁵⁸ Aristot. *Rhet.* 1380b36-1381a2; *Nic. Eth.* 1157a18-21.

²⁵⁹ Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1157b7-13, 32-1158a1; 1158b1-25. See Konstan 1997a, 93-95.

²⁶⁰ Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1158b25-40; 1159a1-20. Aristotle further notes the occurrence of exceptions, which suggests a flaw in his theory. On arithmetic (absolute) and geometric (proportional) equality see Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1130b30-1132b20, esp. 1131a24-33; 1131b8-1132a2; cf. Plat. *Leg.* 6.757b-c.

²⁶¹ Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1160b24f.; *Eud. Eth.* 1239a1-7. Whidden 2008 reads the *Cyropaedia* in this context. On hierarchical friendship see Konstan 1997a, 105-108; Herman 1980/1.

²⁶² Isoc. *Ep.* 4.2-5; Konstan 1997a, 93-95.

²⁶³ Isoc. *Ep.* 4.5f.

a strong communal growth dynamic that hinges on *kalokagathia*.²⁶⁴ Friendship, the primary semiotic vehicle that maintains this network, is thus located within a societal model that hinges on the hierarchized direction of agency rather than its equal distribution as in the *Characters*.²⁶⁵ This observation is crucial as it entails that absolute equality, which Aristotle makes his foundation, is non-existent in the society of Cyrus' distributed self: it characterises only the relation between men and gods, while everything else is subject to a teleological gradient of growth and virtue, the benchmark of which is the collectivised individual and its success in reproducing itself.²⁶⁶

Friendship has its place in this teleology, as it serves to reinforce the firm sense of place and relational safety the translation offers all the individuals that are part of it.²⁶⁷ This control is founded in the concept's associative reproduction of the fundamental dynamics of the system as a whole, namely the acquisition of collective perfection along our three value-trajectories. As such, it constantly reproduces the construction that a community of translated selves is a prerequisite for the pursuit of *kalokagathia* and *eudaimonia*, i.e. of a state of contingency control (*asphaleia*) in and through alignment with what is 'naturally good'.²⁶⁸ This also constitutes the primary utility of friends, which is clearly conceived as being utilitarian in design, meaning that its paradigm is maximum distributed rather than egoistic benefit and its aim is maximisation in proportion to the meritocratic hierarchy.²⁶⁹ In that, the entire conception comes close to one of Aristotle's exceptional cases of friendship: good men can be friends with their superiors if their virtue is proportionally equal to the difference in rank.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.3.25-28 explicitly describes the friends as a community of *kalokagathoi*.

²⁶⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.5.46f.; 5.3.46-51; 5.4.37; 5.5.44-48; 7.5.71; 8.1.19f., and especially 8.7.24, where *philia* is applied to the relationship between parents and children, as it is applied to the relationship between friends. Religious practice is similarly treated in a utilitarian mode: 7.5.57. On unequal friendship see Konstan 1997a, 53-92; Herman 1987, 57, 97.

²⁶⁶ See on this further Carlier 2010 [1978], 145; Due 1989, 209f., who offers a comparison with Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates; Tuplin 2013, 83-85. The relationship between men and gods is cast as one of communal respect: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.27f.; 8.7.22. Benchmark: 8.1.33-39.

²⁶⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.1.7; 8.2.19, 22.

²⁶⁸ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.33. The ultimate safety lies in happy death (8.7.27).

²⁶⁹ Utilitarianism as a principle: Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.5.46f.; 5.3.46-51; 5.4.37; 5.5.44-48; 7.5.57; 8.1.19f.

²⁷⁰ Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1158a33-37; 1158b23-28.

It is unsurprising, then, that pleasure too is explicitly located within the community of friends in the form of entertainment, conversation, laughter, and consumption, all of which are subject to the dynamic of competition and reward.²⁷¹ This competitive element feeds back into the teleological pursuit of virtue and happiness within the circle of friends, which acts as a connective network that recruits all individuals who can inspire improvement in keeping with the translation.²⁷² Finally, the pursuit of truth is guaranteed by the trajectories of teleological perfection and *philomatheia*, which allows Cyrus' friends to speak their minds – truth is constructed here not as a competitive, contingent value as in Isocrates, but as a unifying one that exists *within* the translation.²⁷³

The *Cyropaedia* thus does away with Aristotle's criterion of equality/inequality by making inequality integral to the pursuit of virtue, of *to kalon kai dikaiion*, and blending together the forms of friendship that Aristotle tried to distinguish.²⁷⁴ Isocrates' conception of pleasure and truth in exchange for euergetic generosity is likewise linked to the normative teleology and applied across the network of Cyrus' distributed self, acting as the general principle of the value order for everyone rather than as the terms of a dyadic exchange relationship. As a result, utility, pleasure, virtue, and truth are all distributed within the community of *philoï*. Xenophon thus already integrates key points of later conceptions of friendship into a single system.

The core of this conception of friendship, then, is the fact that the dynamic of *philanthropia* and the affirmation that friendship is generated by pervasive altruistic benefaction – including compassion and the use of possessions for others through gifting – is combined with a teleological and agonistic model of society.²⁷⁵ In other words, using friendship as the normative tent pole of a hierarchical

²⁷¹ Competition and reward: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.39; 8.2.26. On consumption as pleasure cf. Davidson 1997, 231f., 278-283, who speaks of the "pleasure class" in analogy to Veblen; on consumption as a Hellenistic court dynamic see Strootman 2014, 152-159.

²⁷² Recruitment through excellence: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.39.

²⁷³ That truth is here the truth of the individual, a collectivised construction of the world that is paramount and can be pursued collectively in a consistent direction is apparent at Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.1.1-6; 8.4.9-12. Its situational collapse is played out at 6.2.12-24. Tatum 1989, 195, 198, argues that the symposium dialogue shows the renegotiation of relationships between Cyrus, an overpowering, dangerous entity, and his friends, citing as evidence the new politeness visible in the scene. In my view, this is not compelling. The dialogue constitutes an announcement of principle to all his friends, as is clear from Artabazus' humorous interjection (8.4.12). Not wishing to anger one's friends applies to any friendship and Cyrus' response publically invites openness (8.4.9). On the ideal of *parresia* among *philoï* see Konstan 1997a, 93f.; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 434.

²⁷⁴ Explicitly at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.23.

²⁷⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.24. On Persian gifting see Llewellyn-Jones 2013, 87f.

society allows for the construction of society as a centralised and dynamically hierarchized value-correlated network that rests on genuine affection and especially on selflessness.²⁷⁶ This affectionate altruism consists in the continuous distribution of Cyrus' self across the translated collective of friends, which provides them with contingency control, and in his friends' translation into Cyrus' self, which provides him with the same control. This in turn hinges on voluntary insight into and acceptance of the terms of this translation, including the acknowledgement that leadership constrains the 'natural', 'evil' dynamic of individualisation.²⁷⁷ Centralised public contests and symposia not only serve to make relative standing visible to the community of friends in practice, but also act as a recruiting ground for friends and as a forum for the reproduction and theoretical explication of the principles of relational worth.²⁷⁸ The resulting network is thus not only fundamentally open and connective, but also ideally ensures voluntary adherence to its order and the reflective transparency of its categories.²⁷⁹

This competitive and hierarchical, affectionate and non-romantic conception of friendship then allows the selves of all the friends – including Cyrus – to be cast as selfless: they ideally love Cyrus more than they love themselves and than he loves himself.²⁸⁰ In network terms, they all function as mediators, as conduits between Cyrus and everyone else, operating in a social network constructed on the normative foundation of friendship, which accordingly holds that non-mediating individual translation is destructive of the value order.²⁸¹ This dissolution of

²⁷⁶ Empathy finds its expression in attention and in aid, as well as in the distribution of economic value according to merit: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.1f. Pheraulas possesses a similar quality but its scope is far smaller (8.3.49f.).

²⁷⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.3; 6.2.1; 8.4.1 (the criterion for invitation to the final symposium is a desire to “increase Cyrus” (οἱ μάλιστα αὐτὸν αὐξέειν τε βουλόμενοι)).

²⁷⁸ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.4, 26; 8.3.25-33; 8.4.1-5, 9-12, 29-35. 8.3.19-24 thematises the display of the network hierarchy to the Empire during the procession, while the itinerant court described at 8.5.2-15 summarizes as εὐταξία (“order”) the network configuration that results from the clear sense of relational place every member of Cyrus' self gains as a result of the translation. 8.6.2 explicitly remarks on the transparency of the institution of the satrapal order.

²⁷⁹ Cf. Krüdener 1973, esp. 39f., 70-72, who emphasised the deindividualising effects of court society triggered by the generation of a heteronomous definition of self in terms of the monarch.

²⁸⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.1. Cf. for the Hellenistic *philoï* Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 343f. with n. 195, who notes occurrences of ἀγάπη (“love”) and φιλοστοργία (“affection”), i.e. affective vocabulary, but the evidence is late.

²⁸¹ This is explained in the Pheraulas episode. The friendship sketched there is in keeping with the terms of the translation, as it transforms Pheraulas into a mediator between Cyrus and the Sacian: the ‘content’ of Pheraulas' self derives from Cyrus (Xen. *Cyrop.*

self in mediation keeps the system constantly in flux, reproducing and extending the terms of translation and its connectivity through redistribution of value, which serves to internalise the value order and cement the system as a whole.²⁸²

The system further imposes an absolute numerical cut-off point that restricts the extent of selflessness of the central hub, a proportional choke on the relationship between the central node's incoming and outgoing actions: Cyrus' economic 'worth' will always exceed that of the number two in the hierarchy in keeping with their proportional merit, virtue, and honour, imposing a constraint on selfless action that serves to maintain the ability to translate the collective and offer control and *eudaimonia*.²⁸³ In keeping with this restriction, it maintains centralisation at all costs, for instance by delegating negative interactions, limiting pluralisation, and hampering other individuals' ability to translate others, thereby centralising the cohesive power of friendship.²⁸⁴ The simple alternative is reduction of connectivity to the centre and involvement in the redistributive community, followed ultimately by exclusion from the network, which results in the excluded individual having to face contingency on its own, without having recourse to the systems contained within Cyrus' self.²⁸⁵ Losing Cyrus equates to the loss of self due to the trajectory of dissociation all the friends have undergone, rendering the system highly irreversible.

As a control regime, the story of friendship told in the *Cyropaedia* then accomplishes something immensely productive: *it abolishes contingency*. All interactions within the community of friends, which is constituted through Cyrus' performative speech acts, reproduced by adherence to value regime in interaction, and

8.3.34-38; cf. 8.3.3; 8.6.4f.) and even their association itself is the result of Cyrus' mediation (8.3.26-29). The friendships Cyrus controls as contingent (8.6.1-15), i.e. his relations with the satraps, where the terms of the translation have to maintain control over the greatest agency, are characterised by their construction of connectivity boundaries within the social network of Cyrus' self, impinging on his fundamental all-encompassing brokering function. The satraps' own mediation of goodness is highlighted accordingly (8.3.6). It is important to note that mediation does not afford individuals control, as it is constructed as selfless and redundant, and is furthermore controlled by Cyrus through the ranking system of *philia* (8.3.19-23).

²⁸² The Pheraulas episode is a clear example of the redistribution of Cyrus' favours and gifts. The alternative to self-dissolution of self is dissolution of self by Cyrus: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.16-20; 8.3.21f.

²⁸³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.13-23; 8.4.29-35. Reisert (2009, esp. 310-312) accordingly argued that Cyrus rules through *philotimia* by setting himself up as the source of *timē*. This is in line with a traditional interpretation of court dynamics derived from Elias 1983, esp. 201-250, esp. 201-208, 238-241, who observed this for the court of Louis XIV, but also stressed the constraints imposed by this social dynamic.

²⁸⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.27f.; 8.3.7f.

²⁸⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.29; 8.3.21f.

enforced by collective normative policing,²⁸⁶ are to be evaluated on this code of *philia*, a dichotomy between *philos* and *echthros*.²⁸⁷ By locating the key source of contingency in the individual's ability to resolve contingency on its own terms while also denying it agency over its own response patterns, any translated individual is therefore offered complete control. The 'only' cost is the dissolution of self, the content of which is to be derived solely from the central node.²⁸⁸ Association with a good leader on his terms is thus the ultimate response strategy to all contingencies of life: giving up the self is the road to *eudaimonia*.

In keeping with this conception of friendship, the *Cyropaedia* obviously also develops an idiosyncratic conception of trust that fits its value order. Cyrus' trust features extensively and consists in him extending good will into the future based on past value-conform action – but it is always reinforced and flanked by control.²⁸⁹ The principle is spelled out right at the beginning by Cyrus' father: never trust uncertainties on which rule depends.²⁹⁰ It is visible in operation throughout the campaign and especially in the final *dioikesis* of Cyrus' household, when he explicitly controls his personal existential contingency by trusting eunuchs as guards and attendants, whose loyalty is ensured by their complete dependency of agency.²⁹¹ The core of his Empire, namely the centralised translation of the friendship network, is likewise minutely controlled by his superiority of means, his habit

²⁸⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.19.

²⁸⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.3 and 8.7.28. The general principle of world-division into *philos* and *echthros* (Dover 1974, 180-184) is so central it figures even in Cyrus' final words.

²⁸⁸ The entire elite of the Empire is explicitly treated as a centralised friendship network at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.47f.; 8.2.1. Cyrus' praise of Chrysantas (8.4.9-12) shows that the implementation of selflessness consists in selfless growth, i.e. in growth that is mediated into Cyrus: Chrysantas' actions, performed without command but nevertheless in complete alignment with the translation of self effected by Cyrus, facilitate the centralisation and the maintenance of the friendship network. 8.4.31-36 outlines the concept of collective wealth, based on the transparency of means and the utilitarian conception of value as rank, tied to competition and redistribution as principles of Empire (8.6.6, 23).

²⁸⁹ Luhmann 2014⁵, 13f., 27-29.

²⁹⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.9: ὅμως δὲ τούτοις πιστεύεις τοῖς ἀδύλοις, "And yet you trust in those contingencies?"

²⁹¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.2.5-8, 20 (alliance with the Hyrcanians, who are required to deliver hostages to generate trust in an alliance); 5.2.2-11 (trust for trust in the exchange with Gobryas); 5.4.1f. (trust as operating to structure and reinforce the agency of traitors and enemies); 7.5.59-65 (the eunuchs' dependency consists in their having no higher-value social ties than the one to Cyrus, a principle that applies to all at 8.2.9). Finally, an example of a complex negotiation of trust is provided by the relationship with Araspas and Pantheia (5.1.2-18; 6.1.31-44). Although Araspas violates Cyrus' trust in pursuing Pantheia, the relationship is restored when he fakes a trust relationship with

of delegating negative identities down the network hierarchy, and of binding individuals into his physical presence.²⁹² Trust is thus ultimately equated with obedience and adherence to the terms of the translation, and thus with identity of self: the good are trustworthy friends because they are translated and therein submit to the truth hegemony of the individual. Obviously, however, identity of self is a bilateral constraint, maintained in practice mainly by Cyrus' systemic dissociation from negative action and his prerogative to redistribute connections down the network hierarchy.²⁹³ This value association chain nicely rounds out the results of this investigation of friendship, in that it highlights the key importance of this value construct as a structural norm of the social network of the *Cyropaedia*. It now remains to be seen how this control regime relates to the others that can be identified in the text and how they are either integrated or controlled in relation to it.

4.2.4.2 Religion and the divine

Besides friendship, one of the most explicitly discussed and accordingly most interesting control regimes of the *Cyropaedia* is divine will. It appears as a universal value-construct that is based on the assumption of the existence of a divine realm

the Assyrian king. This appears as the ultimate test of loyalty and obedience, as his capacity of controlling contingency in alignment with the Cyrean value order is confronted directly with another individual translation. On the significance of Araspas cf. Danzig, Gabriel. *Apologizing for Socrates: How Plato and Xenophon Created Our Socrates*. Lanham 2010, 171-174, who argues that both Cyrus and Araspas compare unfavourably with Socrates at Xen. *Mem.* 3.11 who is able to gaze upon beauty without showing weakness; however, Cyrus appropriates the seductive qualities of Pantheia at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.40-42. Cf. also Nadon 2001, 158f.

²⁹² Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.19 (use others for deceit and say only what you clearly know (λέγειν ἄ [...] σαφῶς εἰδεῖν) so as to avoid eroding trust, which is the prerequisite of obedience); 8.2.5-7 (kitchen); 8.2.8f. (munificence and precious, rare materials used to signify hierarchy); 8.2.13-19 (gifting as the basis of Empire); 8.2.21-23 (numerically unlimited friendship and loyalty (*eunoia*), gaining him safety (*asphaleia*) and good fame (*eukleia*)).

²⁹³ Identity of self on the value gradient is reflected in the Pheraulas episode and in the satrapal order, which consists in imitation and emulation in miniature within the terms of the translation: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.15f., 30-34; 8.3.44-50; 8.6.1-15. On imitation as a principle of Empire see Tatum 1989, 205-207. As 8.6.13 states, obedience is cast not as a relationship of command (as it is by Tatum 1989, 189), but as the mutual identity and communality of self throughout the network hierarchy via the cascading intersection of the component selves (see above p. 222). On command relationships cf. M. Weber 1972⁵ [1922], 122; on the inapplicability of command – obedience relationships to Hellenistic court society see G. Weber 1997, 43.

or principle, τὸ θεῖον, and is a pervasive, though generally latent, factor in all action.²⁹⁴ The power of the divine lies in the fact that it is conceived as a locus of knowledge about the future and as a locus of potential control over it.²⁹⁵ Divine will is thus the embodiment of authority within a providential world-view, embedded into the collectivised identities of the social network. As such, it functions as a second-order web of social observation and interaction that infuses contingency and control into action performed alone.²⁹⁶ To enable control over the contingency of continuous observation, the divine realm relates to the human world via a diffusely reciprocal relationship:²⁹⁷ The practice of religion consists in the maintenance and valuation of interfaces with the divine realm, which include sleep and death, but mainly consist in the human half of notionally reciprocal transaction, i.e. in sacrifice and gift-giving.²⁹⁸ In principle, therefore, the gods are conceived of as a black box with outputs that sanction action either positively through its *de facto* success, or negatively through its *de facto* failure.²⁹⁹ Accordingly the black box receives inputs in proportion to success, which are vetted and mediated by religious experts, the *magi*.³⁰⁰ In essence, therefore, religion is here a value-system that is theoretically a source of contingency due to the agency assigned the divine, but is constructed around a pragmatic interaction mode, reciprocity, and a response system, sacrifice and divination, both of which allow for its control through continuous reproduction and interaction, ideally in person rather than through mediation.³⁰¹ Control of contingency in general thus both includes and equates to

²⁹⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.7.22. 1.2.7 lists gods, parents, and the law as powerful entities that need to be respected and τὸ θεῖον occurs explicitly at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.8.2. Generally on the divine in the *Cyropaedia* see Tuplin 2013, 82-85, who rightly stresses the work's anthropocentrism and the perfunctory buzz of the divine within it. On the formulaic concept of τὸ θεῖον, which is a very common abstract noun, see Nilsson 1961², 200f.

²⁹⁵ E.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.5.6; 1.6.1-6, 18; 1.6.44-46; 3.2.3f.; 3.3.20-22; 4.1.2; 4.2.5-7; 4.5.14f.

²⁹⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.44-46; 5.4.31 (the gods see and hear all); 8.3.32 (Pheraulas invokes them as guardians and agents behind the *charis* relationship with the Sacian).

²⁹⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.7, programmatically develops gods, parents, country, and friends as the key value-sanctioned entities that need to be maintained through *charis* and *aidōs*. Cf. Isoc. 1.16, which gives the laws (*nomoi*) as an authority to be observed instead of country (*patris*).

²⁹⁸ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.7.1.

²⁹⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.2; 3.2.29, and esp. 3.1.6, where the god (ὁ θεός) is said to have granted Cyrus jurisdiction over the Armenian king on the grounds of *de facto* victory, i.e. success.

³⁰⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.5.14f.; 7.3.1f.; 7.5.35, 57; 8.1.23f.

³⁰¹ Personal interaction with the divine: Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.2.

control of the divine as a source of contingency, expressed as divine favour and thus 'good' action.³⁰²

Within this cognitive construction, the divine realm, especially in its figuration as *τύχη*,³⁰³ thus embodies the very concept of contingency itself, as *τύχη* can stand for the unlimited openness of future lived experience, rendered both as abstract chance and as directed, supra-human agency.³⁰⁴ At the same time, however, this construction sets up a response mechanism that provides control at what the *Cyropaedia* treats as the highest level of order, since the divine realm embodies contingency itself, but in an entity capable of interaction, and thus of exercising and being subject to control.³⁰⁵ It thus embodies not only contingency, but also meta-control, and therefore represents the entangled nature of contingency and control within the semantic order. In other words, as a control regime, this concept thereby obscures the constructed nature of the value-cosmos, which is necessarily contingent in itself. *Τύχη* and the divine realm therefore give expression to the

³⁰² Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.4; 5.1.19-29 (pivotal scene); 6.4.12; 8.1.25.

³⁰³ In the *Cyropaedia* *τύχη* is a concept under tension. As a narrative concept of high-level contingency it is precisely what Cyrus' actions are designed to control, and thus functions as meta-control in and of itself (e.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.2.25 and cf. also Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.13, where *τύχη* clearly means "chance *beyond* human control"). Since Cyrus' actions in the grand narrative invariably succeed, however, *τύχη* also becomes something akin to "lack of foresight and preparation", as for instance at Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.2.3-5, where the ridiculous and uncultured man who loses out during the meat distribution at dinner, in a dramatic gesture attributes his personal failure to *τύχη*, or in Gadatas' complaint about his lot in life (5.4.31). At 4.2.25 Cyrus views *τύχη* as a contingency that can be within the realm of human control and needs to be guarded against. This principle is formalised at 4.5.51 as *ἀγαθή τύχη*, invoked to bless a plan that has been resolved upon but is uncertain in its outcome. Cyrus' actions reproduce *ἀγαθή τύχη* through the construction of *philia*, using the divine realm in its figuration as *τύχη* to buttress the societal construct. On *τύχη* in general still Herzog-Hauser, Gertrud. S.v. "*τύχη*", in: *RE* 7A, 2 (1943), 1643-1689; Nilsson 1961², 200-210, and, on her fourth-century BC cult at Athens, Mikalson 1998, 37, 62f., on which see also above p. 109.

³⁰⁴ LSJ s.v. *τύχη* A II. reveals the difference between objective and subjective perspectives, i.e. between chance and causality.

³⁰⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.7.22. On Hellenistic oracles and divination see Nilsson 1961², 103-113, 229f., who offhandedly paints the Hellenistic kings as rationalists who disregarded oracles; cf. Eidinow 2007, 125-138 on risk-control at Dodona. Cyrus' *omen mortis* (8.7.2) parallels a historiographical tradition, known from early and late Hellenistic history, that highlights the dreams of kings for purposes of divine legitimation and narrative dramatisation, cf. Weber 1991, 1-33, esp. 12-15, 28-30; cf. Theophr. *Char.* 3.2 for dreams as a subject of every-day discussion in the Diadoch period – as we saw, the Chatterbox's error lies in excessively communicating trivia, not in the subject matter itself.

paradoxical construction of contingency itself, offering control by abstracting it and integrating it into interaction modes designed to counter this experience.

Leaving for a moment the level of extreme abstraction and returning to the level of individual and collective action, we should note that the *Cyropaedia* never explicitly discusses the significance of collective religion as cohesive activity. With the partial exception of the *paian*, which is considered a device for controlling fear and thus consolidates collective agency,³⁰⁶ religious action is not reflected on as a separately constructed communal or collectivising interaction mode with its own advantages. Generally speaking, the apparent marginality of this negotiating value system seems striking and has led Christopher Tuplin to remark on its perfunctory nature.³⁰⁷ Close scrutiny of the text, especially of Cyrus' speeches, however, reveals that the gods are continuously and actively invoked as omnipresent actors that need to be factored into collectivisations of individual action.³⁰⁸ Cyrus himself is capable of considering their worship as a distinct area of activity that has bearing on his translation and development of agency.³⁰⁹ As a consequence, their inconspicuous but pervasive presence on the side-lines reflects not simply unconscious embedding, but a specific, reflected construction of religious practice and thought as being inextricably embedded into every-day life as a power structure.³¹⁰

The most telling point is now the way in which this control regime is linked into the value association chain of friendship, i.e. into the terms of the translation. I would argue that it is made to sanction the translation through the construction of divine favour as *de facto* success. As successful action is good action, the embedding of religion aids in the creation of collective agency, as it provides an apparently universal, supra-individual value-construct that facilitates communication and action by embodying contingency and control. The way in which this control dynamic between gods and individual is presented in the *Cyropaedia* is crucial in that it is contingent only in theory: already early on, Cyrus very tellingly

³⁰⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.3.58; 7.1.9, 25f. In this context, the narrator explicitly comments that the performance of the *paian* by a community of *δαισιδαίμονες* (in the usual neutral sense) lessens their fear of men. Fear results from existential threat, the awareness of contingency, and destroys agency, reducing collectives to individuals. The narrative transformation of individual fear into collective fear of god grants contingency control (3.3.53-61). On fear and the unifying power of the *paian* cf. Aen. *Tact.* 27, esp. 1-4.

³⁰⁷ Tuplin 2013, 83.

³⁰⁸ E.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.5.6, 14; 1.6.1-6; 2.2.2, 10, 18, 29; 2.3.1, 4, 12; 2.4.14, 19; 3.1.6, 28, 34, 40; 3.2.29; 3.3.20-22, 31, 34; 4.1.2-6, 10f.; 4.5.14f., 51; 4.6.8-11; 5.1.23; 5.4.21f., 35; 6.2.25, 29, 40; 7.1.10-12, 15, 17, 20, 35; 7.2.17-20; 7.5.22-24.

³⁰⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.23-25.

³¹⁰ See Kindt, Julia. *Rethinking Greek Religion*. Cambridge 2012, 16-30.

remarks that the gods are his *friends*.³¹¹ Our discussion of the work's construction of friendship reveals the import of this statement: like humans, the gods give to Cyrus more than he gives them, making possible the amazing non-contingent realm he constructs. As the leader is successful, the gods are with him.³¹² For any given individual, the best way of controlling cosmic contingency is thus to adhere to successful leadership in friendship.

Despite this partial translation of the divine realm, the evaluative code of faith that regulates the interfaces with this system of contingency control is thus left intact and remains applicable only to relations with the divine realm.³¹³ This allows for the specific way in which it is harnessed to cement the OPP translation of Cyrus: rather than being explicitly drawn upon to exalt the ruler via ruler cult, the web of divine observation and sanction is left intact, retaining the gods as a Janus-faced embodiment of contingency and control that can be constructed through narrative as sanctioning the value order by means of the fear this construct is used to reproduce.³¹⁴ While the divine thus nominally remains beyond individual (and

³¹¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.4: πάντων μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ πάτερ, ὡς πρὸς φίλους μοι ὄντας τοὺς θεοὺς οὕτω διάκειμαι. ("Certainly then, father", he said, "I am so disposed towards the gods that they are like friends to me."); 5.4.35 (his enemies are the enemies of gods and men); 7.2.17-24 (Croesus explains the difference in piety between him and Cyrus, which lies in self-knowledge of divinely ordained status). On the motif of god-friendship cf. Herman, Gabriel. *Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens*. Cambridge 2006, 318.

³¹² Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.4.37.

³¹³ On this code see Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Religion der Gesellschaft*. Stuttgart 2000, 53-92, esp. 77-82, 205f. Luhmann speaks of the encoding of religion as a correlation between immanence and transcendence that hinges on the maintenance of boundaries (see also p. 146, n. 243 above).

³¹⁴ Similarly Tuplin 2013, 82f. Cyrus strives to be the most devout of all his court, which serves to reinforce this dynamic: Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.23. Contrast Mitchell, Lynette. "Alexander the Great: Divinity and the Rule of Law", in: Mitchell and Melville (eds.) 2013, 91-108, who argues that Alexander made use of divinity as a means of reconciling rule of law and kingship. The *Cyropaedia* resolves the same tension by embodying law in the individual without the need for divinity. Note that the matter of Alexander's divinity is complex, or has been made so in scholarship (see already Balsdon, J.P.V. Dacre. "The 'Divinity' of Alexander", in: *Historia* 1 (1950), 363-388, esp. 383-388, for a clear discussion of Alexander's divinity as an issue that allowed for negotiation of power within the *polis*). See more recently Chaniotis 2003, 444f. and Dreyer, Boris. "Heroes, Cults, and Divinity", in: Heckel and Tritle (eds.) 2009, 218-234, both of whom similarly conclude that it was a form of negotiation of status, but in informal terms: deification had to be voluntary and was a final response to substantial benefaction (233) and thus to experience of agency. Note also that the Diadochi did not immediately follow Alexander's model in their relations with the Greeks, although they soon accepted ruler cult when offered it, e.g. the Antigonids by Athens in 307 BC and in Teos already in 311 BC (OGIS 6; see esp. Habicht 1970², 165-168, 230-242; Bayliss 2011, 161f.). At

collective) control, its relationship to the sphere of human agency is altered in crucial ways. Finally, this construct is rendered yet more piquant by the fact that the divine relationship is the only form of both absolute and proportional equality found in the *Cyropaedia*: all individuals are subject to the same in relation to the gods and a collective is stronger for presenting a community of faith towards them, unifying them in contingency control, which in practice here hinges solely on the translated collective and thus on the value order, not the individual.³¹⁵

4.2.4.3 Money and the economic system

Now that we have seen how religion is embedded in the *Cyropaedia*, we can move on to the economic interaction mode of payment and its function as a regime of contingency control.³¹⁶ It was argued above that the dissolution of self in mediation keeps the social network of the court constructed in the *Cyropaedia* constantly in flux, reproducing and extending the terms of translation and its connectivity through the redistribution of value. This distribution of value brings us into the sphere of economics, as quantifying value relations is its foundation.³¹⁷

As in the case of religion, the economic system in principle provides a value structure that is not part of the translation and maintains a contingency-reducing interaction mode that allows for the evaluation and creation of relational place; this mode is payment.³¹⁸ Cyrus is never seen manipulating this system, nor is the

least within the Greek world, the Cyrean model is thus more appropriate than that of Alexander.

³¹⁵ The community of the faithful is developed at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.24f., binding every individual into a collective under Cyrus' leadership due to the principle of agonality being applied to it.

³¹⁶ See on this also the discussion above p. 149. On payment with money as the essential operation of a differentiated economic system see Luhmann 1988, 14-16. For Schaps 2004, 32f. anonymity is crucial. This raises the question whether the *Cyropaedia* shows a differentiated economic system or an embedded economy. The differentiation between payment, gifting, and other modes of acquisition is attested in the later Hellenistic period e.g. in I.Cret. III iv 9:133f. (112/1 BC), a very exciting text that observes as a generalisation that [... ἄνθρωποι τὰς κατὰ τῶν τόπων ἔχουσι κυριείας ἢ παρὰ προγόνων παραλαβόντες αὐτοὶ [ἢ] πριάμενοι] // [κατ'] ἀργυρίου δόσιν ἢ δόρατι κρατήσαντες ἢ παρὰ τίνος τῶν κρεισσόνων σχόντες...] ("men have proprietary rights over land either because they have received the land themselves from the ancestors, or because they have bought it by giving money, or because they have won it by spear, or because they have received it from one of the mightier"). The association of distributed self boundaries is here linked in a differentiated fashion to blood, payment, coercive force, and gifting.

³¹⁷ Polanyi, Karl. *Ökonomie und Gesellschaft*. Stuttgart 1979, 321f.

³¹⁸ Polanyi 1979, 318f.

nature, origin, or appearance of its medium, money, ever thematised. In his negotiations with the Armenian king, pre-existing weight measures and quantification methods explicitly lend structure to the interaction, and the distribution of booty after the battle of the camps is similarly rendered in absolute monetary measurements, though no mention is made of coins.³¹⁹ The monetary value of items appears to be fixed by collectivisation of negotiation and is evaluated on the basis of both quality and quantity. As in the case of religion, therefore, the non-interference of the translation makes this system appear reliable and places it beyond question. Rather than aiming to influence or change the system of direct numerical value correlation, the OPP therefore seems to reproduce it as super-individual and objective, which ties into the text's assertion that the acquisition of wealth is human nature, following the maxim of unlimited growth.³²⁰ Having a standard measure of this value is crucial and in fact the Cyrus – Croesus scene accordingly explicitly discusses wealth as *the* measure of the individual.³²¹ Far from being judged negatively, this system of valuation is therefore used even to evaluate individuals and accordingly placed beyond contingency.

With the fundamentals established, the next point to investigate is whether there is money in the *Cyropaedia* that is employed on a payment code, i.e. is there a concept that an obligation can be expressed as x quantity of y signs and resolved completely by the transfer of said equivalent from one self to the other?³²² The answer is yes and no, given that, rather than modifying the valuation scheme itself, the translation of the collective within the specific construction of friendship defines the codes on which this valuation scheme is applied. While markets (*ἀγοραὶ*) and selling (*πωλεῖν*) exist and serve to exchange quantifiable money (*χρήματα* and *χρυσίον*) for commodities (*ἐπιτήδεια*) or services (*μισθωταὶ*) in zero-sum equations, these exchanges are located exclusively at the interface between inside and outside, between *philoï* and *echthroï* – they play no noticeable part in Cyrus' Empire itself.³²³ The exchanges that do occur are further delegated to every individual, rather than being conducted by the OPP; they are therefore clearly excluded from the terms of translation and thus left unaffected in principle, as Cyrus' involvement consists only in authorising them and in offering a reward to the best

³¹⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.4.9-17; 3.1.30-34; 3.2.26-31; 4.5.40f.

³²⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.20-23.

³²¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.19f.; 8.2.15-18. τὰ ῥᾶστα καὶ κερδάλειώτατα ("the easiest and most advantageous things").

³²² Thomas, Nicholas. *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific*. Cambridge, MA 1991, 14f. notes that this value correlation is a zero-sum exchange (x quantity A = y quantity B, no remainder).

³²³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.4.23; 4.5.38-42; 6.2.20 (mercenaries), 38f. (markets); 7.5.72f. (νόμος of conquest).

merchant, an interaction that again operates on the utilitarian and meritocratic code of friendship.³²⁴

That Cyrus does not use the code of payment to structure his Empire is further evident from the basic tenet that those who are good – and thus friends – should have more, excluding ‘market dynamics’ from the network that operates on the friendship code, i.e. the Empire and especially its value-correlated elite.³²⁵

³²⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.2.39. The list of officials appointed by Cyrus at 8.1.9 includes paymasters (δαπανημάτων δοτήρες), but their function is not explored, nor does it touch in any way upon court society. Similarly Cyrus’ considerations about financial administration (8.1.12-15) seem to hinge on the practical organisation of redistribution using a pyramid of officials; it is not a discussion of payment (the word is τέλειν, which is not an economic word but related to taxation in that it describes the fulfilment of dues).

³²⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.17f. This is of course conventional aristocratic norm (Konstan 1997a, 81f.), the circular value-association-chain being goodness – merit – utility – friendship – reward/gain. This seems to conform to the substantivist model of the embedded economy, which holds that market dynamics, such as profit maximisation through specialised over-production for the purpose of trade, mutually productive rather than consumptive debt, and the depersonalisation of economic exchange through monetarisation and banking, had not yet been theoretically abstracted into what Niklas Luhmann would call the economic system, so a self-reflexive system that hinges on shortage and money as a medium (Polanyi 1979, 150; Finley 1973b, 141; cf. Luhmann 1988, 46-75 and p. 149 above). On the primitivist – modernist and substantivist – formalist debate cf. the overview by Schaps 2004, 20-25, and the balanced appraisal by Morris, Ian. “The Athenian Economy Twenty Years After ‘The Ancient Economy’”, in: *CPh* 89:4 (1994), 351-366, esp. 357, which was triggered by the differences between Millett 1991, who followed Finley in stressing the embedded nature of much economic practice in small- and large-scale acts of lending and borrowing, and Cohen, Edward E. *Athenian Economy and Society. A Banking Perspective*. Princeton 1992, esp. 4-8, 87-90, who argued in favour of the institutionalisation and scope of non-elite banking in fourth-century Athens. Morris notes the “economic imaginary” (356) that distorts perceptions of the economy in written source material, ultimately equating to a societal power process that structures lived reality with its normalised (and thus contingency-controlling) but at the same time obfuscating imposition of boundaries between systems – within this process, apparently individualist economic interaction draws the short straw as it is overlaid by collectivism, the prevalence of social over economic currency (at 358-360, Morris speaks of “transactional orders” in analogy to the argument concerning political theatricality put forward by Ober 1989, 153f.). This societal dynamic is what is of interest here, not some form of abstract reality. On the problem of modelling ancient economics due to the dearth of quantifiable data available on the same cognitive registers see further the deconstruction by Davies, John K. “Ancient Economies: Models and Muddles”, in: Helen Parkins and Christopher Smith (eds.). *Trade, Traders, and the Ancient City*. London 1998, 225-256, esp. 230-233, and the recapitulation of the debate by Morley, Neville. *Trade in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge 2007, esp. 2-9. On the Hellenistic economy in this light see Davies, John K. “Hellenistic Economies in the Post-Finley Era”, in: Archibald et al. (eds.) 2001, 11-62. The

Within the Cyrean network of self, economics thus find no application: growth is correlated with virtue, extraction, and utilitarian redistribution, not the calculation of profit margins in money-commodity (or even commodity-commodity) exchanges, let alone in money-commodity-money exchanges.³²⁶ Products and supplies 'magically' appear through allies on the code of competition for virtue and honour, i.e. through personalised ties of friendship that obscure production modalities and the pyramidal structures of exploitation: Initially, the Medes and other allies provide supplies and weapons, on campaign Cyrus' army plunders its foes, and the Empire finally exploits subjects through taxation and tribute based on the universal constant that is the right of conquest, and motivates its allies to contribute by infusing growth through the competitive aspect of the code of friendship, which operates on utility, merit, and affection.³²⁷

The construction of the ruler as father and friend thus has the Empire operate on the benevolent, redistributive code of Xenophontian *oikonomia*.³²⁸ While gold and possessions are collectively reproduced as embodiments of a cognitive system of value that is placed beyond the individual's control, is universally valid, and made the central object of human desire, this value system is used only to measure growth and mark standing within a hierarchical system of social bonds that take

complexity of Hellenistic economic practice is summarised by Reger, Gary. "The Economy", in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 331-353, esp. 331-333, 346, stressing its diversity, but arguing that the royal economy was entirely embedded in the socio-political agonality that found its expression in war and philanthropic benefaction (note the different positions of Austin, Michel M. "Hellenistic Kings, War and the Economy", in: *CQ* 36 (1986), 450-466 and Bringmann, Klaus. "Königliche Ökonomie im Spiegel des Euergetismus der Seleukiden", in: *Klio* 87 (2005), 102-115, who are 'primitivist', and Aperghis, Makis. "Population – Production – Taxation – Coinage: A Model for the Seleukid Economy", in: Archibald et al. (eds.) 2001, 69-102; idem. *The Seleukid Royal Economy. The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire*. Cambridge 2004, who is 'modernist'. See finally also the debate set out in Roman, Yves and Dalaison, Julie (eds.). *L'économie antique, une économie de marché? Actes des deux tables rondes tenues à Lyon les 4 février et 30 novembre 2004*. Paris 2008, and cf. also above p. 149.

³²⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.8-12, 19f., 26 (individual quality governs the quality of the institution, officials are installed on the basis of virtue); 8.4. On the different valuations of these kinds of exchanges (Aristot. *Pol.* 1252b26-1257a4) see Seaford 2004, 169.

³²⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.9-11; 2.1.21 (Medes and other allies); 4.2.34-37; 4.5.8; 5.4.23 (plunder); 7.5.36, 72f. (allotment of producers based on natural law of conquest); 8.6.23 (spirit of competition among the allies). This equates to the concept of spear-won land prominent in discussion of the legitimacy of the Diadochi (e.g. Diod. 19.105.5), on which see Müller 1973, 116-121; Mehl 1980/1; Billows 1990, 244f.; now differentiated by Mileta 2008, esp. 130f.

³²⁸ Announced already in Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.1f.; cf. Xen. *Oec.* 7-9. On *oikonomia* see Carlier 2010 [1978], 361; Tatum 1989, 190-192; and especially Whidden 2008.

the form of social, rather than economic, debt (*charis*).³²⁹ This debt is essential as it maintains social cohesion on the terms of the translation, but it is also thoroughly non-economic, as it is not expressible in money and cannot be resolved on the payment code.³³⁰ The reason is simple: as the economic system persists outside the translation and is retained as a means of controlling the contingency of useful relationships between inside and outside, allowing this zero-sum interaction network to bleed into the network within the distributed self would provide people with a competitive alternative interaction mode.³³¹ As in the *Characters*, this mode would be capable of avoiding the generation of reciprocal ties by allowing any individual to control contingency in a self-contained, even impersonal manner by employing money as the medium of interaction.³³² In other words, people, especially the friends, might get ideas about paying Cyrus and thereby gaining independence as well as entitlement to measurable responses of equal quality.³³³

The text's emphasis on the gift as the container of exchange relationships thus comes as no surprise.³³⁴ As Nicholas Thomas astutely argued, gifts have rank rather than value, and Marcel Mauss showed already in the 1920s that their be-

³²⁹ On *charis* in Xenophon see the full study by Azoulay 2004b, esp. 41-89.

³³⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.7 pretends it is.

³³¹ Plato (*Rep.* 371b) and Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* 1133b16-18) accordingly integrate money-based economics into the *koimonia* of the polis. See Seaford, Richard. *Money and the Early Greek Mind*. Cambridge 2004, 131f.

³³² On payment as annulling obligation without leaving a social residue of gratitude etc. see Polanyi 1979, 317.

³³³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.46-8.2.1, outlines the control of friends through centralisation of the friendship network. On the individualisation effected by money see Seaford 2004, 292f.

³³⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.5.41-43; 6.1.25f. On the Achaemenid Empire and the Hellenistic Empires as complex economies with gifts and markets operating side by side see Briant, Pierre. "Prélèvements tributaires et échanges en Asie Mineure achéménide et hellénistique", in: Jean Andreau, Pierre Briant, and Raymond Descat (eds.). *Économie antique. Les échanges dans l'antiquité: le rôle de l'État*. Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges 1994, 69-81, here 76: "un système tributaire [...] ne vit ni en économie «fermée» ni en économie «naturelle»; il a un besoin d'accès au marché, c'est-à-dire à des échanges qui lui permettent en particulier d'écouler ses surplus et ainsi d'échanger des produits naturels contre de l'argent [...]. Ces échanges peuvent être initiés par des marchands privés [...] ou par l'administration royale elle-même [...]; les échanges ne sont jamais réduits à leur dimension étatique; les marchands privés interviennent certainement à titre d'intermédiaires [...]." This is borne out especially by evidence from the Diadoch period, namely the famous letter of Antigonos Monophthalmos (Welles 1934, no. 1). On gifting in the construction of Hellenistic kingship see e.g. Bringmann, Klaus. "The King as Benefactor: Some Remarks on Ideal Kingship in the Age of Hellenism", in: Bulloch et al. (eds.) 1993, 7-24.

stowal is culturally constructed to produce long-term social relationships by perpetuating debt in the form of an obligation to accept and reciprocate, a relational identity triggered by the giving of objects outside of situations marked as concerning numerically equivalent exchange.³³⁵ Furthermore, gifts are akin to money in that they are objects and therefore signifiers, but, unlike money, are constructed as being capable of bearing different relational identities that are in turn constructed from their immediate utility and other cultural values, as well as their histories and exchange relationships.

This construction imbues them with agency that operates beyond payment, but not beyond power.³³⁶ As the 'poisoned' gifts given to Cyaxares through clever delegation show, gifts are treated in the *Cyropaedia* as being subject to OPP control, the aim always being to reinforce the translation as a whole.³³⁷ The scheme of individual evaluation developed in the exchange between Cyrus and Croesus is thus in fact a method of assigning rank based on accumulated gifts.³³⁸ Ultimately, the relational identities of the collective of the *philoí*, i.e. their clothes and attire, as well as all their possessions and even their behaviour, are exclusively produced by Cyrus' gifting. Their very bodies are shaped by physical manifestations of the social ties of translation, since gifts extend the individual through distribution of self, leaving identities that anchor future interaction through their inalienability and reification.³³⁹

While the gifts given within the Cyrean social network generally follow Mauss' 'theory' of the gift in that they force a response and impose the obligation to reciprocate, they are modified in two crucial respects, both related to the construction of the collective.³⁴⁰ In the first place, they are encoded to evoke response

³³⁵ Thomas 1991, 14-16; Mauss, Marcel. *The Gift. Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*. Translated by Ian Cunnison. London 1966 [Original "Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques", in: *L'Année sociologique* 1 (1923/4), 30-196], 10-12, on the gift as socially productive debt.

³³⁶ See recently Carlà, Filippo and Gori, Maja. "Introduction", in: idem (eds.). *Gift Giving and the 'Embedded' Economy in the Ancient World* (=Akademiekonferenzen 17). Heidelberg 2014, 7-47.

³³⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.5.51f. Cyaxares is made a laughing stock, since the process of distribution evokes his association with womanising and consorting with slaves. The act of gift-giving here serves to erode his position by highlighting the contrast between Cyrus and Cyaxares and capitalising on the ambiguity of the gifts as objects.

³³⁸ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.19f.; 8.2.15-23.

³³⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.40-42 (auric bewitchment of non-friends through etiquette and attire); 8.2.7f. (food, garments, gold jewellery, horses); 8.3.4 (garments). These interactions are described by the narrator as forms of *θεραπεία* (8.2.7), but with an inbuilt restriction. See on the historical significance of Persian garments Llewellyn-Jones 2013, 61-66.

³⁴⁰ Cf. Isoc. 2.54.

in a different medium, obedience, and are designed to produce unilateral debt that reinforces the translation and the mediation of self; accordingly they are retractable, as they never leave Cyrus' self.³⁴¹ Secondly, as they are objects moving within a self, gifts are projected downwards and are thus not inalienable in the usual, purely dyadic sense, but generate cascading connectivity down the hierarchy through their redistribution, while always maintaining the link to Cyrus.³⁴² It is crucial to note that in order to accomplish this modification, Cyrus violates familiar 'rules' of gifting throughout, including the obligation to accept and the inalienability of the gift, by rejecting gifts. This unacceptable behaviour is visible for instance when he rejects a splendid robe Cyaxares offers him, and when he acts not as a recipient but as a redistributing mediator and destroys the bonds of *charis* generated between giver and recipient by replacing the gift's link to the original givers with his own in the name of *philanthropia* and *philotimia*.³⁴³

These two changes are crucial, as they allow Cyrus to transform the cultural dynamic of gift-giving on his terms. His gifts no longer establish competitive dyadic relationships that operate on the same code, namely gift-*exchange*, but function as a reactive and connective currency that signifies rank within his distributed self. This currency cascades down the centralised network of friendship while racking up connective debt, *charis*, but without allowing for equal reciprocation. This connective currency is portrayed as being stronger than blood ties and accordingly also replaces 'economic' loans, as the distributed self does not engage in zero-sum

³⁴¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.19f., 29.

³⁴² The text is inconsistent here. Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.8 states baldly that certain valuable types of objects are limited to the king's gifting and unambiguously mark royal favour. On the other hand, the emulation dynamic precludes a royal monopoly of gift-giving (8.2.13-23) and mediated, pyramidal gift giving is expressly enjoined at 8.3.3. While the discussion between Pheraulas and the Sacian does not specify whether gifts are indeed distributed on (8.3.49f.), the emphasis on the further administration of acquired gifts essentially excludes their removal from further exchange. Finally, the exchange between Hystaspas and Gobryas is also marked by lateral gift-giving (8.4.14-17), and the satrapal courts must obviously be structured by gift-giving of their own if they are to replicate Cyrus' value order – indeed the distribution of food from the table is explicitly mentioned (8.6.10f.). The circulation of gifts is hence constrained by the meritocracy: Gifts 'circulate' in the sense that gifting includes sources of extra-network revenue that can themselves be transformed into gifts by the recipients within the translation. In other words, they are a mediated currency that shapes identity in exclusive tiers.

³⁴³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.4.26; 2.4.1-8; 5.5.41. On the inalienability of gifts see Weiner, Annette. *Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-while-giving*. Berkeley 1992, 6-8; Thomas 1991, 14-16. Familiar inalienable possessions are the legendary Homeric objects with their 'object biographies' (e.g. *Od.* 21.31-41; *Il.* 10.260-271); Cyrus, by contrast, occludes such biographies, changing the way the objects function.

relationships with its constituent parts.³⁴⁴ The construction of the translated individuals as mediators further results in the system reinforcing itself, as all *charis* relationships conducted within the network flow back to the OPP. In the process, they intensify the centralisation of relations even in lateral exchanges and reify the reproduction of the ranked value order by embodying the links to Cyrus in the gifts as object actors. Examples of these include the hierarchized cups made from precious metals, high-quality garments, and other prestige items Cyrus distributes based on merit and permits to be redistributed on the same register.³⁴⁵

Individual economic growth, here constructed as contingent to the collective by casting it in terms of greed and as a natural evil dynamic, is then controlled through its full incorporation into the translation, inside which wealth is distributed as rank – not monetary value – across the translated community by the OPP. This causes actual economic interaction on a payment code to be relegated beyond the boundaries of the translated network of friends, a boundary that excludes even the sources of wealth.³⁴⁶ This centralised, hierarchical network of friends operates not on a code of unrestricted gain, but on meritocratic distribution via gifting. Although value continues to be assigned on an apparently economic code of valuation, the absence of the payment code translates all economic value, even food and other consumption, into social rank without the involvement of money.³⁴⁷ Objects are thus visual manifestations of Cyrus's memory.

This system functions 'economically' only insofar as this semi-translated, rank-assigning currency circulates in the network's lower tiers, whereas the centre obviously denies gifts that come from within. All growth is generated from outside the network, mediated through Cyrus, and finally redistributed via gifting.³⁴⁸ As a consequence, it has none of the contingency-controlling advantages payment has for the individual; instead 'economic' interactions are embedded within the

³⁴⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.2.26-31 (favour offered to the Indian king in exchange for gold, but the narrative never cashes it in); 5.1.19-23 (deliberation scene that marks the tipping point of the translation, phrased in terms of favour); 8.2.9 (gifts outweigh agnatic ties); 8.3.19f. (given in response to petition); 8.4.24-26, 31-35 (wealth distributed in the community of friends). See Mauss 1966, 10-12. This also explains the absence of Cyrus' 'actual', i.e. agnate family as a key component of the court (cf. Tuplin 2013, 82).

³⁴⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.3.3-8, 33; 8.4.27.

³⁴⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.1. The friends 'increase' (*αὐξάνειν*) Cyrus and thus the content of the distributed network of self as a whole.

³⁴⁷ Cf. Athen. 4.145e-f, which gives Herakleides of Kyme's description of a dinner at the Persian court and remarks on the oddity of treating food as if it were money.

³⁴⁸ The growth thematised at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.1, 9-12 is growth from outside the network of friends and does not operate as gift exchange.

power-code of friendship, but in a way that suggests an awareness that the economic code needs to be limited rather than dissolved if the translation is to be durable. The ranking of gifts reinforces, reifies, and communicates individual standing within the meritocracy, generating a clear sense of place for the individual within the translated community. The payment code, on the other hand, now provides an alternative interaction mode available for use on the network's outer boundary, which it simultaneously helps to mark. This solves a fundamental problem of the Persian *politeia*, its waste of manpower, and thus potential *kalo-kagathoi*, caused by the fact that the less wealthy work the land:³⁴⁹ Cyrus as the redistributive container of all, who observes all and evaluates all, can therefore exceed the Persian *politeia* by virtue of his gifting. Whereas in the Persian system all are equal based on the concept of individual property, in Cyrus' translation all are equal before the application of rank, which makes all elite manpower available for use.³⁵⁰

The one significant source of contingency that nevertheless always persists arises from the pressure of individualisation. The problem is that the maintenance of the quantifying value-scale also maintains peoples' customary desire for individual property, which forces Cyrus to grant at least the most distinguished of his allies possession of their own estates and other sources of revenue. The main danger is of course that estates might become a source of individual gifting, so of individual translation on the same codes Cyrus attempts to monopolise.³⁵¹ The *Cyropaedia* falls short of offering a real systemic solution to this contingency (and thus fails as a theory), sketching out only a number of practical, and more or less coercive, response strategies, such as forcing disobedient individuals to court by dispossessing them. The only systemic check is the mediation of self inherent in the construct of *philia*, but Cyrus himself is the best example of a translation that circumvents existing order on the grounds that it is inferior. This observation brings us to the limits of the economic – or anti-economic – system of the *Cyropaedia*. Time to turn to the final regime of control, the construction of truth.

³⁴⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.1.9-18. It is no coincidence that the military reform operates on the code of gifting, with weapons being given by Cyaxares and horses being captured and given by the allies.

³⁵⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.13; 8.1.22; 8.2.10-12.

³⁵¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.2-33; 8.6.1, 10.

4.2.4.4 Truth

Addressing the construction of truth in the *Cyropaedia*, i.e. its construction of the terms under which individual identity and environment coincide,³⁵² involves tackling two main issues. In the first place we need to consider how Cyrus prevents his normative cosmos from coming to be perceived as a source of contingency. Secondly, we need to investigate how the constructed boundaries between the control regimes are maintained. Since Cyrus is the obligatory passage point (OPP) of his translation, he embodies truth within its terms as long as they are reproduced: he is the architect both of the problems the system faces and of their solutions.³⁵³ The control the OPP realises depends on the maintenance of this state, which requires him to prevent others acting on codes other than those of the translation: Since translation is a process that departs from a prior state and always conflicts with other translations, the danger of collapse is always lurking, especially when the translation comes to be perceived as contingent on the terms of another regime of control.³⁵⁴

³⁵² This is a constructivist rendering of Thomas Aquinas' basic correspondence formula of truth, "*veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*" (*quaestiones disputatae de veritate* q. 1 a. 2 s. c. 2; something like "truth is the correlation of objective reality and subjective perception"), which is found implicitly, albeit in an underdeveloped form, already in Aristotle (*Metaph.* 9.1051b6-9), who, in modern terms, defined truth as correlating reference in language to ontological fact, which is grounded in the chain of causes (cf. *ibid.* 2.994a-b). Besides the solvable problem that truth as correspondence is clearly a self-reflexive issue (i.e. the criteria for the evaluation of truth need themselves to be true), the more fundamental problem for my purpose here is whether truth is objective or subjective. In keeping with the method adopted in this study, truth is understood as a power process, a discourse that produces distinctions between true and false (see Foucault, Michel. *Dits et Écrits. Schriften*. 4 vols. Frankfurt a.M. 2003, here vol. 3, no. 193, p. 212 & vol. 4, no. 278, p. 34); accordingly it is subjectively constructed and collectivised in a regime of truth. This is made manifest in *de facto* interaction: true is what is accepted, the criterion being non-opposition, and this is what is sought in the text. White 2008², 284f. similarly treats truth as the spinning of control out of a negotiation over different stories in interaction with a control regime. On the philosophical problems of defining truth cf. Puntel, L. Bruno. s.v. "Wahrheit", in: Hermann Krings, Hans M. Baumgartner and Christoph Wild (eds.). *Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe*. 3 vols. Munich 1973/4, 1649-1668, esp. 1651, 1662f., who identifies the definitions of *adaequatio, rei,* and *intellectus* as the crucial issues.

³⁵³ On truth in the sociology of translation see Callon 1986, 196, 202-210, who notes that truth explains nothing unless we also examine how it is generated in interaction, and goes on to show how this occurs in OPP formation.

³⁵⁴ On the collapse of translation see Callon 1986, 211-213, who highlights the complexity of the network involved in any translation and the difficulty in controlling all contributing factors.

So how does Cyrus ensure that all his actions are regarded as true by default, or even as beyond the evaluative code of truth altogether, i.e. as not subject to individuals' decisions about true and false? Many of the themes relevant to this regime of meta-control have already been touched on, as they are embedded in both the relationship between individual and collective and in *philia*. The *Cyropædia* begins by locating truth in collective enforcement and training in institutionalised and collectivised law (*nóμος*), which is the criterion that is applied in interaction to evaluate right and wrong in the Persian *politeia*.³⁵⁵ As was shown above, over the course of the narrative trajectory, Cyrus ultimately comes to embody law very literally in that he comes to function as the obligatory passage point of an evaluative and redistributive web that defines the identities of its members. The result of this construction is that the control regime of truth cannot be directed against Cyrus, as his very existence embodies it to the translated collective, which is dependent upon him for its control of contingency: Cyrus is therefore true by default and the code of truth begins to apply only lower down the network hierarchy.³⁵⁶

As Cambyses says to Cyrus in his programmatic educational passage in the first book, truth is also a subjective value, the locus of which lies in individual knowledge.³⁵⁷ As we have seen, Cyrus' achievement lies in subsuming the collective within his own self, maintaining the applicability of this dynamic, but on a very different basis, as other individuals are dissolved into a community located within Cyrus' distributed self. The challenge to this regime is incomplete translation as a result of inadequate communication or understanding, which impairs the irreversibility of the translation, as it allows the individual to revert to applying individual knowledge to test the truth of the translation.³⁵⁸ This fundamental issue of imperfect translation is countered by controlling existential contingency and by spreading the value configuration Cyrus develops. The most important of the measures that accomplish this are the court's itinerancy, which increases its exposure, and especially the fact that the pyramidal structure of the network hierarchy derives directly from Cyrus, who personally selects the entirety of the second tier, who in turn select the third, and so on.³⁵⁹ In order to control the imperfections in this selection process, controls are put in place within the network of *philoí* that

³⁵⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.6; 1.3.17f.; 1.6.30-34; 3.3.52; 8.1.22. See Carlier 2010 [1978], 339. Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 3.1284a3-17, who emphasises that the law applies to those equal in virtue and ability, but not to those that so far surpass all others in virtue: *αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος* ("for they themselves are law").

³⁵⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.12-23.

³⁵⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.19.

³⁵⁸ Callon 1986, 211f.

³⁵⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.8-16; 8.5; 8.6.1-14, 22.

curtail their agency. These include their being tied to court or the fact that all soldiers are directly tied to Cyrus by *philia*. Within the network, these measures create redundant connections that maintain connectivity in the socio-spatial network of Empire even if some ties are severed.³⁶⁰ The main systemic control, however, is the delegation of contingency down the network hierarchy. In his Empire, Cyrus ideally only distributes agency, but does not act, at least not in ways that could be perceived as contingent on the basis of their deviation from the identity control implemented. This is what truly renders the truth code inapplicable to his actions: he *is* truth, a remote locus of non-contingency capable of making things as they should be, i.e. setting them in alignment with translation.³⁶¹ This process generates trust in the centre, and produces the ideal non-contingency of the system as a whole.

This account has implications for the debate about Cyrus' deceit and lies, which play an important part in the discussion regarding the text's supposed 'darkness' and irony.³⁶² His calculated deceitful actions emerge as a Callonian *enrolment* mechanism, necessary during the translation process, but ultimately replaced by the finished system – in utilitarian terms this is a higher purpose than full disclosure every step of the way.³⁶³ During the translation process contingencies are narratively employed to balance one another out, to obscure the growing construction by drawing a network of interdependent links that maintains the fragile whole while it still faces contingency. The final construct, however, attains a high degree of systemic perfection and contingency control through the dissolution of self, selfishness having been constructed as the source of all contingency.³⁶⁴ This kind of strategy is closely paralleled by stratagem literature, for instance about Alexander, and therefore carries no ironical subtext.³⁶⁵

In sum, we have therefore seen that in the *Cyropaedia* both the economic code and the faith code are partly placed beyond the translation and partially translated,

³⁶⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.6; 8.6.9.

³⁶¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.27f.; 8.3.2; 8.6.6.

³⁶² See particularly Nadon 2001, 164-178, refuted by Gray 2011, esp. 264-276. See in greater depth above p. 203.

³⁶³ The three watershed moments are the exchange with Cyaxares (Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.5.5-37), his usurpation of the campaign (5.5.44-6.1.19) and the drama that creates the court (7.5.37-57). During this process, deceit is pushed further down the network, and the final system with its brokers no longer requires it of Cyrus, the deferred core. The Persian *politeia* with its web of observation and rule of law does not allow for deceit, but also fails to produce agency.

³⁶⁴ On the theme of balance see Azoulay 2004a.

³⁶⁵ An example is provided by Polyæn. *Strat.* 4.3.19, 28-30. These passages are particularly explicit narratives of a commander weighting contingencies and employing obfuscation and deceit to arrive at what is best for the common good.

with the result that crucial elements of these contingency-control regimes are co-opted into the single-code system of *philia*, and thus into the truth regime. Their potential threat to the individualistic system's hegemony of contingency-control is bypassed by controlling their applicability and relation to the community. This is achieved by imposing boundaries on the options held by the translated individuals, which are ensured by the mechanisms that ensure the truth regime.³⁶⁶ For the translated individuals, the theoretical availability and persistence of the alternative systems of control nevertheless reduces the contingency of the translation. The truth regime merely changes the terms under which value systems are used, but does not fully incorporate, monopolise, or neutralise them. The truth code therefore controls the gaps left in the translation of the other control regimes and prevents their plurality from resulting in contingency for the individuals translated by Cyrus.

4.2.4.5 Space

The construction of the network of *philia* and its integral gifting dynamic, as well as the reification of Empire, further serve to embody the truth regime in space. As Christopher Tuplin noted, however, the *Cyropaedia* is surprisingly non-monumental: Cyrus does not create or alter the palace at Babylon, nor does he build any monuments apart from two tombs.³⁶⁷ That does not mean, however, that space is irrelevant; it is simply not *physically* changed by Cyrus.³⁶⁸

I pointed out earlier that the world of the *Cyropaedia* is presented as binary social space, divided into *philoï* and *echthroï*. Initially, the geographical narrative space of the *Cyropaedia* is a patchwork of imperial territories with identifiable borders, including Persia, Media, Armenia, Assyria, Hyrcania, and Cadusia. Over the course of the narrative, this space is unified and entirely subsumed into Cyrus' self, into a community of *philia* that spans the *oikoumene*.³⁶⁹ As the truth regime expands, space therefore becomes friendly, as is nicely visible in the gradual transformation of Gobryas' realm into friendly territory.³⁷⁰ As space is traversed and

³⁶⁶ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.1-5.

³⁶⁷ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.3.15 (the passage may even be an interpolation); Tuplin 2013, 78f.

³⁶⁸ The general importance of geography to the leader is asserted e.g. at Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.16; 2.4.27-30; 5.4.40. This construction markedly contrasts with Herodotus' version of Cyrus' campaign, which includes information about marching routes and movements (e.g. at Hdt. 1.154, 157), though there are exceptions (e.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.2.25). See also above p. 240, n. 256.

³⁶⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.4; 8.6.21.

³⁷⁰ Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.6.8-11; 5.2.1-21.

explored, as more and more peoples follow Cyrus' cause, as fortresses fall and are taken over, the spaces they occupy become familiar and friendly, defusing the contingency of the unknown through extension of *philia*, which is now made manifest in every existing architectural feature.³⁷¹

The same is true of the courtiers' *oikiai*, which are all gifts that result from Cyrus' value-correlated redistribution. The centre of the network is of course also made manifest in an *oikos*, the palace, with the court manifesting as an assembly that takes place every morning in a specific liminal space between the two gates of the palace (ἐπι θύρας).³⁷² In other words, the court is at least sometimes constructed as a space between inside and outside, as a contact zone. Every day, this zone and the social life it is filled with therefore make visible the dissolution of self in mediation that is crucial to the translation process, and give physical form to the central, redistributive role of the king.³⁷³ Naturally, the court moves with the king as he is its true centre and maintains its centralised spatial configuration even in camp. Xenophon's description of such a camp and its utilitarian and meritocratic scheme of organisation provides a clear image of the ordered sense of place granted every individual within Cyrus' system:³⁷⁴ Spatial order directly reflects socio-political order. The same principle applies to the Empire: the system of roads and couriers Cyrus installs generates centralised connectivity that is engraved in the geography, and the network of fortresses and other architectural features embodies the king's network of *philia*, but also the web of observation and control this implements. This same doubling is most clearly apparent in the roaming extensions of his self, his 'eyes', 'ears', and 'relatives', who embody the collectivised knowledge of the distributed individual and increase its spatial extent.³⁷⁵ Although Cyrus does not build and mark out his Empire in a monumental fashion, therefore, his translation of every individual's identities allows the system to harness the existing spatial configuration to create control through translation.

4.2.5 Conclusion

At the societal level, the court system developed in the *Cyropaedia* is not fundamentally dissimilar to the construction of society I analysed in the *Characters*. Both

³⁷¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.28; 5.2.2-6; 5.3.56; 6.1.16. This contrasts sharply with the Persian value construction at the beginning, where the border is static (1.6.28-34).

³⁷² E.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.6; 8.6.10. This is an socio-architectural feature found in cities of the ancient Near East, visible for instance at Gen 19:1; Dtn 21:19.

³⁷³ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.4; 8.3.19-22.

³⁷⁴ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.5.3-14.

³⁷⁵ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.10-12; 8.6.3-9, 16-18.

assert the primacy of friendship over other codes of contingency control, making it their key binary code of interactive evaluation and thus their central contingency-control dynamic at a normative level. Under the microscope, however, their conception of friendship and the collective is differ heavily: The court society is characterised by a centralisation of friendship based on a competitive individualist model of the translation of individuals into collectives. The contingency of this competition is resolved by enclosing society within a container, a single distributed ‘mega-individual’ that acts as the obligatory passage point of interaction within this society. This nullifies perceived contingency through the de-individualisation of all individuals, who are cast as willing, mediating conduits. The normative structure that makes this possible is again the construction of a chain of value associations within the translation, consisting in goodness – friendship – trust – truth, which effectively bounds the social network at the normative level. The economic code is radically pushed beyond the boundaries of this social network and largely replaced by a gifting dynamic that generates productive debt as a system-integral, reproductive currency. The faith code is similarly left intact but modified in that divine favour, like property, is now directly correlated with merit and success, making it significant, but only theoretically so, as it is non-contingent.

Contingency is thus controlled by monopolising all systems in such a way that they are no longer available as options the individual can use to control contingency outside the system: The gods cannot be used to criticise, people cannot use payment to avoid accruing social debt, etc. This monopoly is very elegant: The control regimes are not fully translated, but their contingency-control capacities are integrated into the terms of the translation without modification of their cores, i.e. the divine realm itself and the economic valuation scheme. By applying a single binary code, the system thus removes the core source of contingency itself: individuals can no longer legitimately deviate from expectation, because there is only one relational identity left, that of friendship. This ideal society, especially within the court where the translation is strongest, therefore allows for complete control of contingency; the ‘only’ cost to the individual is that individual translation of collectives is always cast in terms of mediation of Cyrus rather than individualisation. Note finally that the fear Cyrus is said also to rule by,³⁷⁶ is therefore not contingency within the translation, as within the construction fear stems solely from transitioning outside it. That is fully in keeping with the construction: outside the system, contingency reigns.

This system is of course horrifying to a modern reader. As a system of power, however, it has merit as it succeeds in controlling the fundamental openness of

³⁷⁶ E.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.1.5; 8.2.10.

experience. It does so by constructing two ‘natural’ dynamics that serve as constant sources of contingency – the anti-collective growth dynamic of individuals and evil – and by developing a unified scheme of control to combat them. This scheme provides relational place to every individual by accommodating its ‘natural’ growth dynamic while also imposing societal constraints on the ‘evil’ soul and on individual agency. In network terms, the *Cyropaedia* therefore develops a scale-free model of society, though purely at the level of societal construction – the actual interactions are not quantifiable. This network is characterised by Barabási’s two core features: an insatiable growth dynamic that is only content when it spans the entire *oikoumene*, and preferential attachment, as everyone prefers Cyrus to the flawed alternatives, such as the Assyrian king and Cyaxares. While the system observed in the *Characters* worked hard to keep these dynamics in check, the *Cyropaedia* harnesses them and makes them central to its scheme of contingency control. This text has thus revealed how the embedding of social systems is itself a power process, as is their distinction into systems that individuals can choose between. In setting out its ideal societal imaginary, however, the *Cyropaedia* does not confront its construction with dissenting voices or with opponents who might seriously threaten its central normative web: While it may not strictly be a utopia, it is certainly a story, and a very smooth one at that. Let us therefore now move on and relate this text to the vibrant narrative imaginary of Diadoch court society as it emerges from the historiographical and anecdotal sources.

4.3 Emergent Hellenistic court society as a network of contingency control

Establishing this substantial foil has provided a number of points of comparison that will now allow us to examine emergent Hellenistic court society. The manner in which this investigation will be conducted differs from previous accounts in that it treats this society as a productive social network with a societal capacity to control contingency for its participants, to offer safety and social footing that enabled agency.³⁷⁷ Due to the length of the preliminary discussion, it may be helpful to briefly recall the basic structure of court society as such a network in the Diadoch period. Much like polis society, court society is fundamentally expected to appear as a situationally diverse set of nested and diverse interaction networks centred on the individual actors, who are structured by relational identities that respond to contingency in interaction, drawing on collectivised control regimes

³⁷⁷ On the agency of courtiers see Habicht 1958; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 324-333; Strootman 2014, 121-123.

and stories in the process. As was noted in the discussion of definitions above, the groups and individuals encompassed within this network are not formalised by means of a secondary institutional or legal framework, but are tied into this society by social means, so by this mesh of identities itself.³⁷⁸ Accordingly, objective factors, such as palace architecture and titles, are of limited use in defining the court society under discussion here, as it is often itinerant and depends on unformalised social processes.³⁷⁹ In lieu of a communal ethnic container with real integrative power,³⁸⁰ the key entity that establishes this social figuration has so far been identified as the distributed, socio-spatial self of the leader or emergent 'king', which all individuals situationally identify as being linked to, as they all hold heterogeneous ties to this individual – this configuration is fundamentally equivalent to citizens identifying with their ties to the polis.³⁸¹ Viewed in its entirety,

³⁷⁸ Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 326; Strootman 2014, 100f. For a standard account of the genesis of Hellenistic court society, located under Alexander, see Strootman 2014, 112-117. On Alexander's court see Heckel 2003; Weber 2007.

³⁷⁹ On Hellenistic palace architecture and its functions see esp. Nielsen 1994, 209-217 and *passim*; Strootman 2014, 54-91, esp. 88-91, who highlights the reification of distinction produced by the palace, as well as the gradation of access it could provide and reify. On titlature see Mooren 1975; Le Bohec 1985, esp. 123f.; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 251-287; Strootman 2014, 118-121. Military ranks have a certain bearing on the matter since they provide a formal structure to interaction, at least to an extent. However, this system appears to have been highly dynamic in the Diadoch period, with promotions and executions reducing its societal impact as a stabilising institution (see e.g. Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 254-265).

³⁸⁰ Iust. 13.3.8f. has Perdikkas appeal to ethnic unity after Alexander's death, but his failure, as well as Demetrios' problems with Pyrrhos in Macedon (Plut. *Demetr.* 44.3-7) exemplify the volatility of these kinds of arguments in the Diadoch period, as the category was so contested. The same faultline is thematised at Diod. 18.60.3; 62.3-7; 19.13.1, where an explicit ethnic boundary is constructed in the context of Antigonos' conflict with Eumenes, though the impact of this construct seems likewise to have been low: Schäfer 2002, 172; Anson 2004, 233-258, esp. 246. Anson, Edward M. "Discrimination and Eumenes of Kardia Revisited", in: Hauben and Meeus (eds.) 2014, 539-558, has recently restated his view, assigning the explicit construction of the faultline to Hieronymus (557f.); the important point is that the relevant identities are not constructed along ethnic lines, but are mainly socio-political, with Eumenes using the ethnic argument only to assuage fears he was trying to become like Perdikkas and Antigonos (Diod. 18.60.3). Note that the faultline is certainly in part due to Plutarch's emphasis on it as a consequence of his pairing of Eumenes with Sertorius, on which see Bosworth 1992, 58f.

³⁸¹ This is the conclusion of Brosius 2007, 53f.; cf. e.g. Habicht 1968, 7; Mooren 1998, 126; Strootman 2014, 95-98. The fundamental subdivisions used in the scholarship are inner and outer court, as well as a distinction between family members, courtiers, and servants. Inner and outer courts are best understood as a situationally complex gradient

the socio-political network of an emergent court should, however, be far less complex than that of a polis, given its significantly smaller absolute size: emergent Hellenistic court society is in essence face-to-face and very dense, but also potentially extremely flexible.³⁸²

With a view to power dynamics, we have also seen that controlling and adapting the relational identities of others through translation should play a central part in the dynamics of these networks, marking attempts at controlling their overall configurations. The central question again regards the construction and reproduction of world order for the purpose of generating social footing and contingency control, a question that ultimately concerns the construction of agency through

on which individuals are located, based on their degree of access and physical proximity to the king, which is of course situationally apparent. Put like this, however, the lack of organised, functionally distinct terminology for court affiliation stands out all the more strongly and marks a difference in value configuration (on terminology see Strootman 2014, 118-121; see also Billows 1990, 249f., on the possible hierarchisation of friends already by Antigonos Monophthalmos, though the language is probably not formalised).

³⁸² The figures available for the Hellenistic court are generally much smaller than the number of citizens in a large polis such as Athens (cf. esp. Habicht 1958, 5f.; Strootman 2014, 120f.). The survey of Hellenistic *philoi* conducted by Ivana Savalli-Lestradé (1998, 234-236) suggests a range of around 50 men, on the basis of the individuals positively attested in the epigraphic record. At the other end of the spectrum, the figure given for the τῶν φίλων σύνταγμα at the grand procession at Daphne conducted by Antiochos IV is 1000 people (Plb. 30.25.7f. = Athen. 5.194f) and Diodorus similarly considers all 500 of Eumenes' companions at Nora 'friends' (Diod. 18.41.3). Despite the encompassing fluidity of the term – and its resultant versatility as a tool of power – even these extremes are significantly lower than the several thousand individuals found in a large polis, although of course the court is not composed of the *philoi* alone, but included many other individuals, organised as a multiplicity of nested and interconnected networks (these are tangible esp. for royal women, see Carney 2011, 199; Strootman 2014, 107-110). I here refer to the social network 'proper', i.e. that produced by interaction, rather than the cognitive identity of rule it itself produces, which is capable of far greater range, both in the case of the polis and of the court. Both these networks naturally fluctuate, and we can observe the utility of a distribution of self in contingent times (e.g. Plut. *Demetr.* 45.1). As a rule, the ethnic makeup of the early Hellenistic court is predominantly Greek and Macedonian (Strootman 2014, 41, 124-131), though source bias is no doubt a factor, as the isolated attestations of non-Greek names show (Lund 1992, 180-182; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 124f.; Strootman 2014, 133-135); both figures and realities are hazy, particularly as we are badly informed about the situation in the satrapies and their involvement with the court centre (Billows 1990, 305-311; cf. for Alexander also the collection of *anonymi* by Heckel 2006, M1-14, which already reveals the tendency to deny non-Macedonians names).

narrative within this social network.³⁸³ The method applied here holds that this societal process can be traced in the negotiations of these dynamics that are made manifest in story-telling, which constructs, diffuses, and reproduces value hierarchies, defines the contingencies within the network, and provides their control through the development of control regimes.³⁸⁴ The basic hypothesis is that this contemporary story-telling is tangible even in later and highly selective texts, including those produced by Diodorus, Plutarch, Justin, Athenaeus, and Polyaeus. In keeping with the method used here, these texts are considered echoes of the textual actors that built the early Hellenistic world by providing stories about it, rather than as sources that can be read for ‘factual’ information. The social imaginary they construct can be analysed in network terms, which can then be compared with that reconstructed for the *Cyropaedia* and the *Characters*.

That having been established, the importance of the *Cyropaedia* stands out more clearly, as the preceding analysis has in fact provided a very extensive theoretical example of precisely such a story about the world, while also showing how this story-telling might be imagined to function within an emergent court society. Naturally, there is one important caveat: If Xenophon’s text was, as it were, an example of a complete court-themed jigsaw puzzle, the discourse pertaining to the early Hellenistic period is but a jumble of several different puzzles, all of which have most of their pieces missing. As a matter of course, any reconstruction of their pictures will be extremely tentative.

In summary, the objective is now to evaluate the constructions visible in the court-based stories from the Diadoch period as reflections and actions of translation by drawing on Xenophon’s text as a model. The aspects that have emerged from the model as worth investigating are as follows: Is there a concept of individuals being mediated within a collectivised individual that constitutes the community? Is the narrative society portrayed as though it has the narratives available to resolve contingency by de-individualisation? Do the stories envisage translations enrolling economic and religious codes? Is there a monopolisation of contingency-controlling codes by an obligatory passage point and how does the translation embed or segment evaluative codes of contingency control? The multiplicity of available narratives will render the tentative answers to these questions more complex and conflicted, as the plurality of story-tellers in this contingent period made any narrative a contested one. It is worth noting, however, that this plurality of narratives also allowed for a degree of individual contingency-control in and of itself.³⁸⁵ As for the spatial contexts, the sites of these narratives are tent

³⁸³ Cf. already Elias 1983, 10f., who notes the corset of social organisation characteristic of society in general and courts in particular.

³⁸⁴ On story-telling as integral to society in this sense see White 2008², 27-31, 37, 158.

³⁸⁵ White 2008², 17.

and palace, ship and camp, and even the battlefield, accommodating symposia, synhedria, audiences, and proclamations.³⁸⁶

4.3.1 Distribution, de-individualisation, mediation

The nature of the texts and of the translation dynamic itself necessitates that these stories are almost universally dyadic in their fundamental structure, operating between an individual, the emergent king, on one side of a communication situation and a collective or other individual on the other. Often, the anecdotal material creates a helpful narrative illusion of perfect communication, especially in situations of narrative tension deriving from interactive configurations that discuss the loss, negotiation, and reassertion of control over contingency.³⁸⁷ As a consequence, these stories provide material and structure to a society that is forming a translation and equate to dynamic reflections of translations that themselves control contingency by being diffused in a social network through the telling and evaluation, as well as the adaptation, rebuttal, or re-telling, of stories.³⁸⁸ The underspecified setting and narrative frame of anecdotes allow them to engage individual problems in isolation and mark out their subject's ability to translate a configuration without having to deal with the qualification of these acts in their social entanglement, while also profiting from the memorable and incredibly 'circulatable' format of the anecdote.³⁸⁹

These fundamentals having been observed, the first question to be answered concerns the evidence for a narrative concept of the emergent court society as the distributed self of an individual. As the analysis of the *Cyropaedia* showed, such a configuration entails the de-individualisation of actors and their enrolment within a 'collective' self, that of the king. In the *Cyropaedia* this process hinged on a communally developed narrative of norm-formation, paired with a centralised network that redistributed goods as rank and thereby transformed actors into

³⁸⁶ Examples of these settings include tent and camp: Plut. *Mor.* 182c-d; palace: Plut. *Demetr.* 29; ship and battlefield: Plut. *Mor.* 183c-d. The synhedrion features as locus of justice e.g. at Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.1; Diod. 19.46.1-4; symposia: Plut. *Mor.* 181f; audience: Plut. *Mor.* 183d. The tent, *σκηπή*, always carries the semantic plurality of theatrical backdrop, signifier of kingship and agency, and accommodation, as we can see already at the Susa wedding (Chares FGrH 125 F 4). All these settings are socially embedded spaces populated and situationally identified with the distributed self (cf. Hammond and Griffith 1979, 396f.).

³⁸⁷ E.g. Polyæn. *Strat.* 4.3.25; Plut. *Mor.* 183d.

³⁸⁸ White 2008², 31, 158.

³⁸⁹ See p. 98 above.

mediators. It is obvious now that the historiography of the Diadoch period can be read as a narrative tapestry that derives from the contested attempts of the 'kings' to establish collectives. In the texts, the result is that society appears to be located primarily between these collectivised individuals.³⁹⁰

Some examples may serve to substantiate this claim. Let me begin with the observation that Diodorus characterises the individual Diadochi with abstract qualities that serve to make them 'attractive'.³⁹¹ Ptolemy, for instance, is distinguished by his *ἐπιείκεια* ("fairness") that attracts friends to his side – an interactive situation of negotiation Diodorus describes as being motivated by the fact that Ptolemy acted in alignment with established norm.³⁹²

Within this contested situation, being a friend is accordingly constructed as taking sides, so as an act that can be understood as offering protection by clearly defining the sources of contingency in the competitive environment of contested translation.³⁹³ So while the friendship between Antipater and Antigonos obviously motivates the latter to protect the former's interests against Perdikkas, this consequently and predictably causes Perdikkas to make an attempt on Antigonos' life.

³⁹⁰ This is well exemplified by the anecdote concerning the reactions of uncertainty and over-compensation at the emergent Seleucid court when Demetrios Poliorketes was imprisoned there: Plut. *Demetr.* 50.1-6. See Grainger 1990, 173.

³⁹¹ On the attractions of the court see Habicht 1958, 8; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 335.

³⁹² Diod. 18.14.1; 18.28.6. Similar scenes are available for Antigonos (Diod. 18.23.1) and Demetrios (Diod. 19.81; Plut. *Demetr.* 4.1-4), as well as for Lysimachos (Iust. 15.3.1-16) and Seleukos (Iust. 15.4.1-9). The same pattern of characterisation appears in the case of Agathokles (Diod. 19.3.1f., 4.5-7, 5.1-3) and the phenomenon is presented as a general dynamic at Iust. 13.1.10-15. Plut. *Demetr.* 4.4 describes Demetrios as naturally inclined towards *epieikeia* and *dikaiosynē*, which equate in interaction to the establishment of redistributive balance between individuals in alignment with a meritocratic scheme. Diod. 20.76.6 closes the narrative of the failed Antigonid excursion into Egypt with a description of Ptolemy celebrating with his friends at a lavish sacrifice, sharing the fruits of victory, and reinforcing the bond that enabled the collective action through redistribution. Diod. 18.47.3 notes the power of such kindness, likening it to a "love spell" (φίλτρον) of supernatural cohesiveness.

³⁹³ Diod. 19.90.1-5 distinguishes between Seleukos with an army and with his friends and attendants, which mark two circles of his self; the former is ultimately brought together in a community of contingency experience and control (συγκινδυνεύοντες). The dynamic itself is of course a two-way street, since the same is true of accepting a friend: Plut. *Mor.* 177d tells an anecdote that has Philip II reject demands to turn a friend away for slander, preferring to keep the matter within the collectivised self. Plut. *Mor.* 179a, on the other hand, attests to the precise opposite, the rejection of Krates for his crimes, with the result that he is ousted from the collectivised self. The difference lies no doubt in the relative gravity of the offences, since Krates was involved in a serious breach of order, which would reflect badly on the collective, whereas the other anecdote only concerns communicative dynamics.

In his flight, Antigonos takes not only his family, but also his own friends with him, signalling the mutual relationship of dependence already established and clearly marking out the structure of his world.³⁹⁴ Kassander's origin story among the Diadochi shows similar themes in that his first action is said to have been to retire with his friends, thereby segregating them from their social environment and situationally severing them from the world order they were embedded in, and then individually convincing them to join their agency with his. The word used is *koinopragia*, joint action, which tellingly contrasts with the *idiopragia* often said to mark the transition from loyal subject to individualist deployment of agency.³⁹⁵ When Antigonos withholds funds from the two kings, this is similarly said to reveal him configuring his agency in accordance with *idiopragia*, so action obeying a self-determined truth regime of the distributed self. This double shift of *koinopragia* being paradoxically established in *idiopragia* therefore equates to precisely the kind of reconfiguration of the locus of agency and self demonstrated above for the *Cyropaedia*.³⁹⁶ Accordingly, the fundamental construction of individual and collective applied in these narratives is hence akin to the competitive individual collectivisation model found in that text.

In the following, Kassander is then able to expand his socio-political network outward from the core of friends, drawing on his now established self-distribution in *koinopragia*.³⁹⁷ At least in historiographical discourse, the competitive pressure produced by the perceived contingency and individualisation that resulted from the collapse of Alexander's court thus serves to reinforce the friendship groups, discursively eliminating truly individual action and making the Diadochi emerge almost from the get-go as distributed compound collectives structured by *philia* relationships of truly existential significance. Perdikkas' fate in Egypt can serve to corroborate this impression: when his friends are said to desert him for Ptolemy

³⁹⁴ Diod. 18.23.1.

³⁹⁵ Diod. 18.31.1-3; cf. 18.52.7 (where the commander changed sides as well, see Billows 1990, 365). At 18.42.5 Eumenes is said to have created *eunoia* and *homonoia* among those stuck with him in Nora by acting like them, i.e. by being 'identical' to his friends. His identity allows for the creation of a collective of individuals with one mind (*homonous*). Similarly 19.14.3 has Peithon, son of Krateuas, satrap of Media, inviting Seleukos to aid him and "share in his hopes" (*κοινωνεῖν τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων*).

³⁹⁶ Diod. 18.52.8; 19.90.1-5. Cf. 18.52.2f. where Antigonos accuses the satrap Arrhidaios of doing wrong by besieging an allied Greek city, of intending rebellion, and of transforming a satrapy into a personal domain, a *dynasteia*. The accusation operates on exactly the same lines.

³⁹⁷ At Diod. 18.54.2 Kassander is said to have more private conversations with his trusted friends and uses them to act in his stead, obscuring his involvement through delegation and profiting from the obfuscating effect the complexity of network figurations have on human perception.

in droves, this is a centrifugal element that enters the discourse only to signal times of crisis and is generally occluded as counter-productive, as it is emblematic of individualisation counter to the de-individualising system of contingency-control. Accordingly the collapse of the compound self is directly related not to individual deliberations of the wavering friends, but to flaws of the core, to the failure of its communal agency deployment, which ultimately maintains the occlusion.³⁹⁸ Accordingly one might say that the friends are tellingly constructed not as individuals, but as a social amplifier that intensifies the agency and increases the surface of the leader through concerted and distributed action.³⁹⁹

Alongside other social gatherings, the council of friends hereby appears as the central locus of this distributed self, the interactive community that is instrumental in reducing the contingency of this world that derives from the contested individualisation model of collectives diagnosed in the *Cyropaedia* and is endemic to early Hellenistic history.⁴⁰⁰ It provides the reproductive communicative situation

³⁹⁸ Diod. 18.33.1f. On Perdikkas see Rathmann, Michael. *Perdikkas zwischen 323 und 320. Nachlassverwalter des Alexanderreiches oder Autokrat?* Vienna 2005, 76-79. Narratives of betrayal (see e.g. Billows 1990, 369f., no. 12, 382f., no. 35, and 410f., no. 81) stand beside narratives of loyalty, of cohesion in the face of translation attempts by others (cf. Lund 1992, 179). For instance, 500 loyal friends stayed with Eumenes in Nora (18.41.3, cf. also p. 269, n. 382 above), bound together by *eunoia* and an oath to the death, which lends meaning to the situation. Similarly, Eumenes himself is said to have reflected on his value as a friend, one aspect of which is his loyalty (18.42.2). Diod. 19.86.1-3 recounts another anecdote, this time about Andronikos, the Antigonid garrison commander at Tyre, who was offered gifts and honours by Ptolemy, but remained steadfastly loyal (cf. p. 299, n. 478 below). The inevitable breach of trust is blamed on the soldiers, who obviously operate on a payment code, and accordingly mutiny and deliver him up to Ptolemy. Ptolemy forgives and forgets, loading him with gifts and integrating him among his friends. Acting in this way enlarges Ptolemy's distributed self, making men eager for participation in *philia*. This integrative mode of sharing prosperity throughout the collectivized self comes very close to the Cyrean model.

The collectivization of self is visible also in Plutarch's narrative of the battle of Ipsos (Plut. *Demetr.* 29.3-5). At the height of the battle, the collective agency of the opposing army is focused on one figure, Antigonos, the network core. In this situation he is made to explicitly reflect on the subsumation strategy of kingship, the unification of the collective in the one. His death results in the renegotiation of the collectivisation of self, ushering in a limbo state characterised by individualization and dissolution of collective agency (Plut. *Demetr.* 30).

³⁹⁹ Diod. 18.34.4.

⁴⁰⁰ Diod. 18.49.4; 18.50.5; Iust. 6.10-13. The other important communication situation is the symposium (for example the one held by Eumenes at Plut. *Eum.* 11.1-2), but speeches to the assembled army also feature extensively (e.g. Diod. 19.81). Epistolary communication helped maintain the integrity of the socio-political construct over long distances (e.g. Plut. *Eum.* 5.2; Diod. 19.46.3), but could also function as an invasive

that allows for communal world-building, for planning that collectivises the individual order of truth upon the world, as Antigonos does when he re-distributes satrapies he does not possess – the factual reconfiguration of the world through the extension of the distributed self is preceded by its narrative remodelling that projects agency into the future and implicitly cements the collectivisation.⁴⁰¹ Constant communal reproduction and display are therefore crucial: these gatherings function as a hub of communal story-telling about one another and others – and especially of self-reflection about the communal self – rendering this social group a narrative world of control unto itself.

The best – and a famous – example of such a scene is again provided by Plutarch, who describes Demetrios denying others the royal title and sanctioning his friends' slights against Seleukos, Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Agathokles, which tellingly consisted in designating them by honourable titles that were *given* rather than earned and thus the result of another's agency.⁴⁰² In this situation of narrative world-fashioning within a community that has subscribed to a specific individual collectivisation, Demetrios thus appears as greater than the sum of his competing world narrators, as a source of truth sanctioned by collective laughter that reaffirms unison in an ongoing experience of contingency. Tellingly, this experience is lurking even below the surface of the designations the other kings are accorded: *Elephantarchos* Seleukos was to inflict a crushing defeat on the Antigonids at Ipsos a year or two after this scene, causing Demetrios to be chased from the Aegean by *nanarchos* Ptolemy. Constantly reproducing audience and narrators as a community, in this case a laughing community willing to naturalise the world developed, was therefore crucial to sanctioning the world narrative developed within it and integral to the agency constantly deployed by these collectives, whose members were incredibly active in high-risk undertakings.

The media that buttress this narrative *enrolment* mechanic are acts of communication, especially gifts and promises.⁴⁰³ As in the *Cyropaedia*, gifts operate on a

weapon or productive instrument (Iust. 14.1.9-15). All these are equivalent to the structure diagnosed in the *Cyropaedia*.

⁴⁰¹ Diod. 18.50.5 (Antigonos); 18.55.1 (Polyperchon). On the council see Habicht 1958, 2-5; Billows 1990, 246-249; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 324; Strootman 2014, 172-174.

⁴⁰² Plut. *Demetr.* 25.3-6. Seleukos is named *elephantarchos*, Ptolemy *nanarchos*, Lysimachos *gazophylax* and Agathokles *nesiarchos*. The royal title is of course likewise both given and earned (Plut. *Demetr.* 17-18; see Billows 1990, 155-158; cf. Strootman 2014, 227-230), but in the Hellenistic period always carries, at least conceptually, the claim to singular distinction and to the king's role as protector, benefactor, and saviour; see still Préaux 1978, 1, 194f.

⁴⁰³ Their significance is programmatically expressed at Diod. 18.40.5; 19.81.6 (cf. Carney, Elizabeth D. "Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander", in: *CPh* 91:1 (1996), 19-44, here 28), which also details a Cyrean

meritocratic regime that rests in the evaluation of the individual, collectivised throughout his self, and are added on top of base payment.⁴⁰⁴ While gifts establish

distinction between distribution according to individually recognized merit and the simple distribution of booty. Examples of gifts are legion, but some examples may be singled out. Plut. *Demetr.* 6.3 marks the final act in an exchange of acts of restoration and gifting as socio-political weapons between Demetrios Poliorketes and Ptolemy after the battle of Gaza (cf. similarly 38.1). Plut. *Demetr.* 22.3f. reports two identical and exceptional coats of armour worn by Demetrios and Alkimos of Epeiros. This creates a blend of identity between Alkimos and Demetrios, as Alkimos is physically distinguished by his great strength and warlike disposition – the interaction mode of gift giving collectivizes the supremely individual strength of the *philos*, in effect making it the strength of the king via the double nature of the object transferred. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5.3f., which is a narrative of contested ‘national’, rather than personal kingship, features a passage on the power of gift-giving at court and the redistribution of gifts, constructing the king as a redistributive conduit under pressure. On controlling the court by such tactics of *divide et impera* see Strootman 2014, 175-184. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8.4f. reproduces the familiar norm of being eager to return favours and settle debts in a productive fashion, especially those of *charis* rather than those quantifiable in money – the former being personal and highly specific. Finally, Plut. *Eum.* 14.1 (once more) observes the basic dynamic, while 2.4f. discusses Eumenes’ disagreements with Alexander over Hephaistion, representing him as skilled at handling social situations involving gift-giving, as well as understanding the value of reciprocity in money matters and favour. This is particularly apparent in his use of Hephaistion’s death to advance his own standing by honouring the deceased. He is said to have taken advantage of the transformation of Hephaistion into an object, here a tomb, on the economic code by contributing to its construction costs and profiting from his contribution to the collective control of the contingency created by such a death.

⁴⁰⁴ See e.g. Diod. 19.20.1-4. Just as problems are constructed as being directly connected to the leader, i.e. to the core of the collectivization, their resolution is constructed by means of the distribution of gifts and acts of communication: Antigonos provides ample provisions, “talks to the soldiers in a benevolent manner” (φιλανθρώπως ὁμιλήσας τοῖς στρατιώταις), and distributes gifts of pack animals or replaces lost horses, thereby regaining *enoia*. On gifts and pay in the Macedonian army see Carney 1996, 25. The principle of selection and promotion that forms the other half of this relationship can be seen at work in, e.g., Plut. *Alex.* 27.6; *Mor.* 180d (cf. Lane Fox 2011, 130). Three elements of Plutarch’s *Life of Eumenes* also attract attention in the context of the *Cyropaedia*: at Plut. *Eum.* 4, Eumenes creates a cavalry force by distributing horses and levying riders from the populace through tax exemption, while also consolidating his group of friends with gifts, honours, and communal training. At Plut. *Eum.* 8.5, he conquers territory and distributes it like a king to his soldiers, rather than paying them in money, binding the people to him through the gift code. These gifts are dependent upon the persistence of the network configuration that awarded them, as their reward pays out over time and thus lends stability to the network. Finally at Plut. *Eum.* 8.6f. the bodyguard created for Eumenes is also bound into his distributed self via gifts, which are marks of royalty: the purple clothing distributed personally defines the physical identities of others and creates a collective self that is sartorially unified. All

productive debt in the present and very literally anchor the relationship in both memory and physical reality via the transfer of physical objects that function as traces of the relationship,⁴⁰⁵ promises and hopes go hand in hand with the narratives of diachronic world order diagnosed above, building identities contingent upon the relationship between friend and narrator. In doing so, there is mutual feedback between the *idion* of all the individual components and the narrative establishment of a *koionon*. Antigonos satisfies desires, generates hopes, and thereby causes every individual to enlist in his self, which is now a collective that offers contingency control by being entangled in a narrative of future growth and the deployment of agency in the present.⁴⁰⁶

In discourse, the gifts hence become a connective currency that can transform the individual components of the self into mediators of the collective individual. This is visible, for instance, in the anecdote regarding Alexander's gift of money to the philosopher Xenokrates, who denies the gift as an individual, whereupon Alexander highlights the importance of distribution and re-distribution.⁴⁰⁷ Antigonos' anecdotal response to the Cynic Thrasyllos similarly serves as an instance of the very generic narrative that marks out the fundamental expectations governing proportional gift adequacy, as in the meritocratic regime of the *Cyropaedia*: gifts need to be proportionally adequate to both the giver's construction within the social network and to the recipient's degree of incorporation into said network.⁴⁰⁸ Plutarch's more extensive narrative of the events following the battle of Salamis and the assumption of kingship by the Diadochi likewise contains a similar anecdote regarding Antigonos' proportional scheme of rewards based on reciprocity and proportionality: the 'tardy' messenger Aristodemos is to be rewarded lavishly in accordance with the significance of his message and of his agency in general, but will receive said reward in a delayed manner, communicating a

three elements were identified also in the *Cyropaedia* in the discussion above, see p. 228 n. 198 and p. 257 n. 339.

⁴⁰⁵ On this apparently paradoxical social function of gifts see esp. Weiner 1992, 6-12, 31; Carlà and Gori 2014, 31-36.

⁴⁰⁶ Diod. 18.52.2. Cf. also the anecdote at 21.12.1, where Lysimachos shows himself as steadfast. While hard pressed for food in hostile territory, that is in a situation of acute existential contingency, his friends are made to offer decollectivisation, i.e. the 'self-preservation' of the king, and only the king, as an option. The discourse responds with a value-normative reassertion based on justice (*dikaion*) that contrasts "shameful self-salvation" (*ἴδια σωτηρία αἰσχρά*) with collective salvation. Within the logic established, individualisation is not an option, for the collectivised individual is now necessarily constituted by the collective consisting of army and friends.

⁴⁰⁷ Plut. *Mor.* 181e.

⁴⁰⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 182e (and 551e). Note that this is a very generic anecdote; Plut. *Mor.* 179f-180a gives the same basic formula for Alexander, for instance.

conception of direct proportional reciprocity.⁴⁰⁹ While these processes are obviously extremely contested in any historical reality, their existence as discourses that inform the behaviour exhibited within the social network of the king's distributed self is of great systemic significance in binding the content of the collectivised individual to a narrative that provides contingency control.

The significance of the gift being such, it is not surprising that a discourse that constructed the king as a collectivised individual and source of contingency control also attempted to construct the meaning of the material content of the distributed self. In an anecdote recorded by Plutarch, Ptolemy is said to have generally slept and feasted at his friends' residences and to have made use of their furnishings on the few events he hosted himself, as "he owned nothing but the necessities, saying that enriching was more kingly than being rich" (*αὐτὸς δ' οὐκ ἐκέκτητο πλείω τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλουτεῖν ἔλεγε τὸ πλουτίζειν εἶναι βασιλικώτερον*).⁴¹⁰ Leaving the reality of this anecdote aside, this passage attests a familiar discursive construction of the king as a collectivised individual distributed across the likewise distributed selves of his component elements; rather than being a centralised individual full of personal content and surrounded by barriers, he distributes wealth to others, functioning as a deferred, but omnipresent redistributor and an evaluative medium of the kind developed by the *Cyropaedia* – although of course Cyrus never dines elsewhere without proportional reciprocation.

In the itinerant world of the Diadoch Wars, however, this distributed construction of the material self is itself a source of contingency, as it can be attacked: It is no coincidence that a guiding motif of Plutarch's tragic *Life of Demetrius* is his repeated loss of his *βασιλική ἀποσκευή* ("royal baggage").⁴¹¹ The first occurrence of this theme is followed by the content of Demetrius' self being returned to him by Seleukos and Ptolemy along with his friends; the restoration includes individuals as components of the distributed self, which similarly reveals the system of contingency control as a concept of compound self: Interference in its structure and even its restoration via a third party are excellent ways of undermining its cohesion. The Rhodians' capture of splendid clothing made for Demetrius by Phila, which is ultimately sent to Ptolemy in Egypt, likewise appears as a narrative

⁴⁰⁹ Plut. *Demetr.* 17.1-4.

⁴¹⁰ Plut. *Mor.* 181f.

⁴¹¹ Phrasing used by Diod. 19.85.2f. The theme occurs at Plut. *Demetr.* 5.3; 9.3f.; 30.1-5. The construction of the life of Demetrius as a series of tragic revolutions of *τύχη* is explicitly stated at Plut. *Demetr.* 1.7f.; 53. The relationship between Demetrius and Athens emerges as the centre piece of this theatrical performance, with Athens and Demetrius as the main characters who pervert one another in a downward spiral of moral decadence (e.g. 14.3; 23.1-3; 24.1f.; 27.2).

of invasion into a distributed self conceptualised in this manner: The Rhodians are essentially interfering with his body, the very core of his self, and exerting control over it, while also meddling with the communication network that maintains the cohesion between the distributed parts of Demetrios' self, here exemplified by the gifts sent by his wife Phila.⁴¹² This action is systemically relevant for two reasons: for one, the account of the siege of Rhodes, to which we will return, emphasises the stunning and therefore agency-impairing impact Demetrios himself has as a hero in body and beauty.⁴¹³ As in the *Cyropaedia*, this awe-inspiring magnificence is related also to royal attire, since appearance controls contingency by embodying and clearly communicating meaning and relational place. Secondly, narratives of the Diadoch period show wives and friends acting as a spatially distributed network of components of the self that afforded agency through the resources they maintained, protecting against contingency like a distributed network.⁴¹⁴ The Rhodian action thus engages with two fundamental aspects of this narrative construction of the distributed self, its distributed structure in itself and its redistributive network content. Similarly Antigonos' capture of the baggage train of the Silver Shields resulted in their defection from Eumenes, as this interference in their distributed selves confronted them with existential contingency

⁴¹² Plut. *Demetr.* 22.1. On the significance of clothing in Plutarch in relation to characterisation see Duff, Timothy E. *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice*. Oxford 1999, 124-126, who shows that it is linked to stage costume. In the *Demetrius*, clothes are used quite overtly to signify triumph and reversal (e.g. 9.7; 11.11-13; 41.5-7; 44.9). The passage singled out here is also in Diodorus (20.93.4), however, and therefore probably derives from Duris of Samos or Hieronymus (see Wiemer, Hans-Ulrich. *Rhodische Traditionen in der hellenistischen Historiographie*. Frankfurt a.M. 2001, 250f., who discusses the latter only). Note that Athen. 13.593d-e provides a similar narrative, in which the Rhodians free a courtesan of Seleukos II and send her home to her king.

⁴¹³ Diod. 20.92.3. Plb. 2.56.11 associates this with the impact of tragedy. Chaniotis 2013, 82 argues that this dynamic results from the emotional impact at the heart of Hellenistic historiography, and by extension politics.

⁴¹⁴ For example, Antigonos' wife Stratonike evidently leads a siege force at Diod. 19.16.1-5. Plut. *Demetr.* 30.2f.; 32.1-3; 45.1 seem to indicate that the wives of Demetrios Poliorketes did not generally accompany him. On this systemic element as a factor in the agency of Hellenistic queens see e.g. Carney, Elizabeth D. "Being Royal and Female in the Early Hellenistic Period", in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 195-220, esp. 204-208. Strootman 2014, 103-107 notes the control afforded the king by his family, which allowed him to have multiple presences and courts. Diod. 20.109.5 shows that the relationship between Demetrios and his father Antigonos was constructed along similar lines, with friends, friendship and fatherhood operating as the real and normative links between the components of self. The limit of society is thus conceptually situated 'between' the kings' selves. This is clear from Diod. 21.15, for example, where Demetrios concludes a friendship with Agathokles by means of gifts that are mediated by Agathokles' son and Demetrios' friends.

to such a degree that it exacerbated the existing faultlines within the collective Eumenes had been struggling to maintain as a cohesive network.⁴¹⁵

Looking beyond material possessions and their circulation, the distributed self also emerges from these narratives as a cognitive unit at the level of identity. As the embodiment of the internal workings of a collectivised self, the council functions as the centre of a network of world knowledge, which serves to defuse the contingency of the world, countering existential contingency in the same way as Xenophon's Cyrus: by exercising *philomatheia* and drawing on the distributed experience and specific skills and links of others to bolster the repertoire possessed by the collectivised individual.⁴¹⁶ As such, the council acts as a communal forum within the collective of self, as is visible in Antigonos' anecdotal rejection of his brother's request to conduct his trial in his private house, preferring instead to try him before the eyes of all, making even his family members equal in relation to the deferred core of the collectivised self.⁴¹⁷ One passage in Diodorus is especially well suited to illuminating this dynamic of collectivisation via a specific construction of knowledge: after the Antigonid defeat at the battle of Gaza in 312 BC, Diodorus emphasises that Demetrios lost a great number of his friends, including old confidants of his father's. One of their number, Boiotos, is distinguished by the fact that he "shared in all secrets" (*μετεσχηκώς παντός ἀπορρήτου*).⁴¹⁸ A similar qualification occurs in the negative when Plutarch has Philippides, the Athenian comic poet who became a friend of Lysimachos, remark to his patron

⁴¹⁵ Diod. 19.43.2, 7-9. The explicit motivation given is an interest in their "own safety" (*ἰδία ἀσφάλεια*), signalling the collapse of *κοινοπραγία*. On the Silver Shields see recently Roisman, Joseph. "The Silver Shields, Eumenes, and their historian", in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 61-82; Baynham, Elizabeth. "Alexander's Argyraspids: Tough Old Fighters or Antigonid Myth?", in: Anson and Alonso Troncoso (eds.) 2013, 110-120.

⁴¹⁶ On the use of *philoi* in missions tailored to their abilities see Billows 1990, 232f., 248f.; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 355-359. Diod. 20.108.4-6 exemplifies the capacity of the council (here of Lysimachos) to control contingency by communal reinforcement and pooling of knowledge, which results in the distilling of a collective opinion, a pooling of relational identity that reinforces social cohesion through unification of selves into a collective. The plural forms used (*οἱ περὶ τὸν Λυσιμαχὸν πυθόμενοι [...] συνήδρευον, βουλευόμενοι [...]; ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς [...]; οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τὸ δοχθὲν [...]*) are telling, especially in contrast with Antigonos, who is portrayed as an individual actor.

⁴¹⁷ Plut. *Mor.* 182c. On Antigonos' brother Marsyas see Billows 1990, 399f. no 67. He considers the anecdote reasonably authentic and places it at the satrapal palace of Kelainai.

⁴¹⁸ Diod. 19.85.2f. On Boiotos see Billows 1990, 378 no. 25. On the battle of Gaza see recently Wheatley, Patrick. "The Besieger in Syria, 314-312 BC", in: idem and Robert Hannah (eds.). *Alexander & His Successors: Essays from the Antipodes*. Claremont, CA 2009, 323-333.

that he will gladly take gifts, but never his secrets (‘ὦ Φιλιππίδη, τίνοσ σοι τῶν ἐμῶν μεταδῶ; ‘μόνον,’ ἔφη, βασιλεῦ, μὴ τῶν ἀπορρήτων.’ “Oh Philippides, what of mine may I share with you?” “Anything”, he said, “oh King, but your secrets.”).⁴¹⁹ Besides the language of sharing they are rendered in, these passages are remarkable especially for their insistence on a communicative boundary: both an in-group and an out-group structured by knowledge are tangible here.⁴²⁰

This narrative of access to secrets, so to superior knowledge, and of membership in a community that shares this knowledge can be read as a trace of a narrative of contingency control that hinges on a discursive construction of a society loosely comparable to the inner elite model proposed by John Baines and Norman Yoffee.⁴²¹ While the inner elite model posited that a closed, self-reproducing group exercises a factual monopoly of cultural knowledge and many other factors of society, the reality of which is debatable, it holds value when shifted to the discursive level: communal self-perception as an in-group is here being reproduced by a communal narrative of superior knowledge that potentially affords a stabilisation of world experience crucial to the *mobilisation* of collective agency. The simple fact that sub-leaders are individuals chosen from the collective by the leader and then re-forged into a collective of the elect also serves to reinforce the value configuration of the selectors, contributing to the community of knowledge being constructed on the terms of the collectivised individual through communal reinforcement.⁴²²

The importance of knowledge becomes yet more obvious if one considers that knowledge control is obviously essential to warfare and accordingly features prominently in the contested narratives considered here, especially in connection with Eumenes and the unruly behaviour of the Macedonian troops, beginning

⁴¹⁹ Plut. *Demetr.* 12.5; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 183e. For Philippides’ career see Paschidis 2008, no. A40. On the narrative contrast constructed by Plutarch between Philippides and Stratokles see recently Monaco, Mallory. “The ‘Bema’ and the Stage: Stratokles and Philippides in Plutarch’s ‘Demetrius’”, in: *ICS* 38 (2013), 113-126, arguing that their contrast is a deeper literary reflection on the nature of statesmanship as being intrinsically tied to the promotion of public welfare over personal profit.

⁴²⁰ Cf. also Plut. *Mor.* 177d, where Philip II is made to refuse his friends’ request to banish an abusive man from his court, preferring to keep slander within the community of knowledge.

⁴²¹ Baines, John and Yoffee, Norman. “Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth in Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia”, in: Gary Feinman and Joyce Marcus (eds.). *Archaic States*. Santa Fe 1998, 199-260, esp. 236-239, where they note the significance of knowledge and hermeticism for elite-fashioning. For generally critical discussion see the contributions in Richards, Janet and Van Buren, Mary (eds.). *Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth in Ancient States*. Cambridge 2001.

⁴²² E.g. Diod.19.83.5.

with the famous ‘mutiny’ at the Hyphasis in 326 BC.⁴²³ A first example is provided by Plutarch’s description of Eumenes struggling to maintain information control while under pressure by Krateros and Antipater, ultimately managing to contain specific information – the fact that the opposing commander is the accomplished Krateros – within a specific sub-section of the social network of the army. This secret is kept by generating a multiplicity of discourse, so by spreading false information that serves to create an ambiguity of truth and obscures the true contingency of the situation by overlaying it with another.⁴²⁴ Likewise, during his drawn-out battle of wits with Antigonos, Eumenes counters Antigonos’ letters announcing the prize he is offering for Eumenes’ head – designed to splinter and break the other’s socio-political network – by summoning an assembly that brings the collective together on his terms.⁴²⁵ His act of communication then consists in first offering thanks (*charis*), renewing the communal bond of reciprocity, while also reminding the audience of the divinely sanctioned oath they had allegedly all sworn.⁴²⁶ Finally, he takes control by adding a narrative twist of his own, namely

⁴²³ Arr. *Anab.* 5.24.8-29.5. Disintegration of collective agency, for instance due to demands for arrears of pay, is a central theme of Diadoch period historiography, affecting Perdikkas (Diod. 18.33.1f.; 18.36.2-5), Antipater (Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.6.4), and Eumenes (Iust. 14.3.11-4.21), among others (e.g. 19.37f.). In her study of ‘mutiny’ under Alexander and Philip, Elizabeth Carney (1996), not only noted the – Cyrean! (e.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.1.21; 29) – impact of drill in hampering mutiny (p. 25 with n. 34), but also observed that the impact of mutiny is not a Weberian issue of command and obedience, but a socio-political one, since its target was the relationship itself (42), so that ‘mutiny’ worked directly against what I call the ‘collectivisation of self’. This is applicable also to the ‘mutiny’ after Alexander’s death (e.g. Iust. 13.3.1-5), which resulted from the reconfiguration of this socio-political relationship. Finally, the prominence of the theme of knowledge control in passages relating to Eumenes is at least in part due to the ethnic faultline constructed by Eumenes himself and others in the narratives concerning him. See further e.g. Anson, Edward M. “Discrimination and Eumenes of Cardia”, in: *AnclW* 3 (1980), 55-59; idem 2004, 117-120; Schäfer 2002, 15-18; Heckel and Wheatley 2011 ad 14.1.3.

⁴²⁴ Plut. *Eum.* 6.3-7. On Plutarch’s construction of these passages cf. Bosworth 1992, 61-63.

⁴²⁵ On the letter as a medium of interpenetration see Ceccarelli, Paola. *Ancient Greek Letter Writing: A Cultural History (600 BC - 150 BC)*. Oxford 2013, esp. 292-328, though her use of a rigid private – public dichotomy as an explanation behind the variations in epigraphic habit (p. 327f.) seems unfortunate in terms of terminology, as the official letters of the chancellery were, in my view, intended precisely to bridge this gap and effect translation.

⁴²⁶ The evidence for such oaths is relatively limited, but fortunately relates precisely to the Diadoch period (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5.2; *Eum.* 12.2; Iust. 13.2.13; 14.1.10-15). Hammond, Nicholas G.L. *The Macedonian State: Origins, Institutions, and History*. Oxford 1989, 65-67, accepted it also for Macedon in general. In the later Hellenistic period reciprocal oaths

that the letters were in fact a test devised by him, and thereby envelops the enemy's device in his construction of truth.⁴²⁷ As a result, he develops security as being a collective concern, not a personal matter of him fearing for his life: selflessly hunting potential traitors is contrasted with personal fear. He further establishes a precedent, an identity for the future that creates a response pattern for these types of situations and refocuses individual and collective agency on himself as the core, as the source of identity: By exposing himself as a dissimulator, he reclaims the monopoly of truth Antigonos had attempted to undermine, acting as a source of both contingency and control.⁴²⁸ Finally, in his earlier struggle to maintain initial control after the death of Perdikkas, Eumenes controls the underlying contingency of individualisation through full disclosure, creating a situational collective that perceives itself as in possession of the truth, thereby attempting to disable the potentially disintegrating dynamic of gossip by explicitly offering his men the option to leave the army, challenging every individual component to locate itself.⁴²⁹ While all these narratives obviously document the characteristic contest between multiple narratives of truth in the Diadoch period, they therefore also reveal a systemic truth dynamic closely comparable to that of the *Cyropaedia*.

The final element one can detect in this construction of self is that of collective maintenance and patriarchal responsibility, so the construction of the collectivised self as being philanthropically mended and cared for by its deferred core.⁴³⁰ One example of this element playing a part is found in Justin's characterisation of Lysimachos, which contains a number of features, including a version of the story of his fight with the lion as well as his philosophical training and great courage.

appear to have been common, especially in relation to mercenaries (for Egypt: Plb. 15.25a.11; for Eumenes II of Pergamon and his mercenaries: OGIS I 266).

⁴²⁷ Iust. 14.1.9-15.

⁴²⁸ Wheatley and Heckel 2011 ad 14.1.9-14 raise doubts concerning this anecdote, which seems to parallel the far more detailed description of invasive letters in Diodorus, which occurs in the context of the Argyraspid business (Diod. 18.62.4-63.5), but without the forgery twist, which occurs in a different context at Diod. 19.23.1 and Polyæn. *Strat.* 4.8.3. Bosworth 1992, 61-63 may well be right that this is due to Plutarch's thematic approach in his parallel biographies, which recombines historical material in a patchwork fashion. The important point here is of course merely that this narrative circulated at all.

⁴²⁹ Iust. 14.1.1-5.

⁴³⁰ This construction is attested for Alexander the Great, e.g. Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.5; 2.12.1; Plut. *Alex.* 8.1-4; 41.2-5; and is thus a general characteristic of kingship, e.g. at Plut. *Enum.* 10.1. On Alexander's use of this see esp. Greenwalt, William S. "Macedonian Kings and the Political Usefulness of the Medical Arts", in: *Ancient Macedonia* 4 (1986), 213-222, esp. 218-222 with n. 25, though the conclusions of Carney 1996, 28, are to be preferred.

The whole narrative distinctly favours Lysimachos and accordingly probably derives from his court; as such it unsurprisingly includes an omen of future royal authority coming directly from Alexander, who is said to have used his diadem to staunch the flow of blood from a wound he had accidentally inflicted with his spear, an object symbolical of royal military agency and aristocratic venatorial lifestyle.⁴³¹ In the present context, the important point is that Alexander is here cast as a mender king, as also occurs elsewhere: the narrative formula used to communicate the narrative transfer of legitimacy is one of restoration and healing, so of reintegration of a wounded friend into the self through the literal and metaphorical mending of the rift inflicted. This theme is broadly visible also in an anecdote relating to Philip II's treatment of Nikanor, who complains about the king on the grounds that he is suffering financial worries despite being part of the king's distributed self.⁴³² Accordingly Philip's reaction is to remedy this hurt,

⁴³¹ Iust. 15.3.1-16, esp. 13-14 (paralleled by App. *Syr.* 64.337f.). For an evaluation of this fantastic episode see Lund 1992, 3, 6-8, who concludes that it must have some basis in a contemporary encomiastic tradition (7), and the commentary of Heckel and Wheatley 2011, ad loc. On the entanglement between these narratives and coinage see Hadley, Robert A. "Royal Propaganda of Seleucus I and Lysimachos", in: *JHS* 94 (1974), 50-65, esp. 64, where he notes the significance of these stories as the reassuring 'mythology' of the Diadoch period. On spear-won land see esp. Mehl 1980/81, 187-195; idem 1986, 208f. with the criticism of Billows 1995, 26 with n. 3, who argues that this element indeed played a part in the construction of Diadoch kingship. It certainly figured in the later Hellenistic discourse (e.g. Plb. 5.67.4-7; 18.51.1-6 on Antiochos III with Ma 1999, 29). On hunting as a field of Macedonian elite activity in analogy to that developed by Xenophon (e.g. Curt. 4.14-17; Plut. *Alex.* 40.3f.) see Anderson, John K. *Hunting in the Ancient World*. Berkeley 1985, here 57-82, esp. 76-81, and on the Diadochi Seyer, Martin. *Der Herrscher als Jäger: Untersuchungen zur königlichen Jagd im persischen und makedonischen Reich vom 6.-4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. sowie unter den Diadochen Alexanders des Großen* (=Wiener Forschungen zur Archäologie 11). Vienna 2007, 125-171 and esp. 189-192, who highlights the importance of these narratives in both text and image for the creation of the Diadochi as kings in both the Argead and the Achaemenid tradition, but also notes the allegorical use we find occasionally. Not all his conclusions are unassailable, given the vagaries of the literary tradition and the anecdotal nature of all the hunting narratives he studies. A famous contemporary example of hunting scenes is provided by the much-debated so-called Alexander sarcophagus in Istanbul, see Schefold, Karl and Seidel, Max. *Der Alexander-Sarkophag*. Berlin 1968 for detailed photographs. Cf. for the Hellenistic court also Strootman 2014, 199-202.

⁴³² Plut. *Mor.* 177d. This anecdote is emblematic of the overall agency of the king to forgive and forget, mending the collective by dint of his idiosyncratic dispensation of justice; see also Carney 1996, 26. In the Diadoch period this restorative agency is also used as a weapon to interfere with another's control of his collectivised self, especially between Demetrios Poliorketes and Ptolemy: Plut. *Demetr.* 5.3; 6.2f.; 16.2-17.1; 38.1. The fragments of Bk 21 of Diodorus, which treated the establishment of the dynasties, contain a whole range of such anecdotes with an emphasis on pardon, restoration, and

thereby employing his redistributive agency to balance out disorder and re-assert control by implementing the normative paradigm of balanced stability within the self. Finally he also asserts his power over the regime of truth within the network of his self by closing with a remark on his control of collective opinion, while of course also relegating the free play of economic forces beyond the boundary of his self.

Diodorus' narrative of Ophellas' conflict with Agathokles of Sicily after his defection from Ptolemy, which appears to derive from a very hostile source, probably Timaeus,⁴³³ interestingly associates this sort of restorative power not only with doctors, but also with friends, who are said to provide aid (ἐπικουρία).⁴³⁴ The mender king is here present in the negative: In the failure of Ophellas, a pretender, to provide the aid expected of him one glimpses the underlying conceptualisation of the distributed self as unfolding this restorative and cohesive agency through its distribution across a collective, which includes specialists that broaden the identity spectrum of the self, as was also the case with Cyrus. A similar conception is visible in the famous love-story involving Antiochos, Seleukos, and Stratonike, which develops a vibrant imaginary of a more established, palatial court scene.⁴³⁵

undoing mistakes (e.g. Diod. 21.21.3, 5-8). Diod. 21.9 relates that Demetrios Poliorketes allegedly arrested people who opposed him in assemblies but let them off unharmed, citing in justification a saying by Pittakos of Mytilene (=Diog. Laert. 1.76) as illustration, namely that "consension is preferable to retribution" (συγγνώμη τιμωρίας αἰρετωτέρη). In doing so, Demetrios therefore both demonstrated power over the body of the individual and conveyed the impression of empathy, so of self-extension and -identification (on the king's *epimeleia* cf. Habicht 1970², 230f.).

⁴³³ See FGtH 566 for commentary and biographical analysis. Timaeus' attitude towards Agathokles is problematised in the famous invective by Plb. 12.3-28, esp. 15. Diodorus' account seems to have combined the favourable account of Duris of Samos (Kebrić 1977, 76) with Timaeus, who had been exiled by Agathokles (Diod. 21.17.1-3) and was accordingly ill-disposed towards him, as well as the eulogistic account of Kallias of Syracuse, Agathokles' court historian (FGtH 564 T 3 (=Diod. 21.17.4)). See recently Gray, Benjamin D. *Stasis and Stability: Exile, the Polis, and Political Thought c. 404 - 146 BC*. Oxford 2015, 346-349.

⁴³⁴ Diod. 20.42.2. On Ophellas see Heckel, Waldemar. *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great. Prosopography of Alexander's Empire*. Oxford 2006, s.v. Ophellas [2].

⁴³⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 38.2-9; cf. App. *Syr.* 59-51. On the anecdote see Brodersen, Kai. "Der liebeskranke Königsson und die seleukidische Herrschaftsauffassung", in: *Athenaeum* 63 (1985), 459-469, who not only plausibly shows that Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 7.37 (=123) makes Kleombrotos of Keos the historically more likely candidate for the doctor (p. 462), but also argues against many earlier authorities (such as Rostovtzeff 1941, 434 with n. 232) that this is not a Hellenistic story at all (464-469). The problem is impossible to resolve definitively (Pliny himself has both versions: *Nat. Hist.* 29.3) and as with all the material considered here, the narrative will undoubtedly have been transformed by Plutarch's and Appian's day, probably due to its use in rhetorical training,

In this scene about the alleged love of Antiochos for his father's younger wife, Stratonike, the focaliser is the physician Erasistratos, who is cast as an acute observer of the movement about court, especially of beautiful women coming to visit Antiochos, in an effort to identify the latter's object of affection by studying the physiognomy of the love-sick prince. The scene therein communicates an intense impression of the delicacy of the matter within a court environment, the agency of all involved being curtailed by a tragic constellation of various collectivised normative constructions, including the age difference between husband and wife, the contested dynamics between father and son, as well as the pressures of social observation and emotion. Having diagnosed Stratonike as the source of Antiochos' ailment, Erasistratos resorts to a ploy to ease Seleukos into providing the only treatment constructed as possible: handing Stratonike over to his son. The physician claims that Antiochos has fallen in love with his own wife, spurring Seleukos into an argument that invokes the code of friendship in an attempt to ensure self-sacrifice, so the dissolution of self in mediation, for the greater good of the unity and harmony in the house, Seleukos' collectivised self. When the ploy is revealed and Seleukos has to apply this argument reflexively, Erasistratos re-asserts the patriarchal model that casts Seleukos' multiplicity of identities (father – husband – king) in conjunction, combining it with the role of physician for his household, who is best capable of restoring, nurturing, and mending his collectivised self.⁴³⁶ The important twist is that this deployment of agency here entails what looks like self-dissolution, so demands an ultimate act of redistribution according to need. The friends are invoked to ease this process of transition through their agency, working together to sanction Seleukos' actions, to help him maintain value-normative control and effect the transition both for Antiochos and Stratonike. The anecdote thus nicely summarises the conceptualisation of the

as traced by Brodersen. Nevertheless Grainger 1990, 152-154, is right to note that the action itself makes logical sense and that 'unorthodox' marital and extra-marital practices were common (see Ogden 1999, 119f.; Ogden, Daniel. "How to Marry a Courtesan in the Macedonian Courts", in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 221-246, here 221; Strootman 2014, 101-110). Daniel Ogden (1999, 121-123) has further pointed to the danger Stratonike potentially posed to the smooth transition of succession, as she might have produced more sons – a danger that was elegantly removed by marrying her to Antiochos and which had a precedent in Dareios I. As I hope to show, the narrative is quite plausible in terms of my categories, particularly given its insistence on familiar models. On the story's variants see further Müller, Carl W. "Der König, der kranke Prinz und der kluge Arzt: eine hellenistische Novelle in kaiserzeitlicher Brechung", in: Clausen, Jens P. (ed.). "Iubilet cum Bonna Rhenus": *Festschrift zum 150jährigen Bestehen des Bonner Kreises*. Berlin 2004, 91-114.

⁴³⁶ Plut. *Demetr.* 38.7: [...] καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ καὶ ἀνὴρ ὢν καὶ βασιλεὺς αὐτὸς ἅμα καὶ ἰατρός εἴη τῆς οἰκίας ἄριστος ("[...] for as father, as husband, and as king, he himself was at the same time also the best physician of his household.").

king and the friends as enmeshed in a collective of mediators that redistributes based on a utilitarian evaluative principle directed at the collective self thus created: after all, Stratonike remains within the distributed self.

In sum, the first part of this evaluation has shown that the narrative conceptualisation of the control dynamic developed in the emergent Hellenistic courts contains many of the elements diagnosed in the *Cyropaedia*. This apparent stability of an evidently productive social discourse, which of course persists also in the Roman Empire and exists before the *Cyropaedia*, makes these fragments of early Hellenistic discourse tentatively appear as an assertive layer in an elaborate stratigraphy of relational values that lent integrative power and attractiveness to this social figuration. The existence of extensive sets of stories gleaned or abstracted from more or less historical interactions within emergent court society served to make interaction appear predictable despite the strong perceptions of contingency, reworking existing, timeless patterns of normative organisation. As underspecified story sets, these narratives reduced the complexity of experience and provided individuals with footing in a very productive way, as the underlying master narrative of the collectivised individual is always tangible and communally reproduced. In view of these results, the next step is now to consider how these narratives translate this construction of collectivised self into an obligatory passage point for interaction and how contingency is constructed and controlled in terms of code translation.

4.3.2 Storytellers and translators

In order to accomplish this aim, the interest must be in scenes that thematise reflexive narration, so in stories that envisage intradiegetic narration of value configurations. Within these narratives, the thematisation and application of societal codes – payment, faith, love, and truth – will then demand particular attention as they aid in creating obligatory passage points at a discursive level, i.e. insert the collectivised individual into the identities of its components, thereby reinforcing the collectivisation. The point here of course is not simply that the court provides an audience to a single storyteller, who unfolds his or her power (in the Weberian sense) by building worlds and giving commands – although the fact that individuals do so is beyond question,⁴³⁷ as is the observation that they construct contingencies in their narratives that they can then control.⁴³⁸ Ambiguity of self

⁴³⁷ E.g. Diod. 19.25.4-7.

⁴³⁸ Two good examples of constructions of existential contingency in narratives pertaining to the Diadochi are Plut. *Demetr.* 36.3-37.2 and Diod. 18.40.1-4. The first scene is part of the negotiation of control with Alexander, son of Kassander, and thematises the

may aid in this process: the words used to characterise the new kings in these narratives, *ὄγκος* (“gravity, dignity, pride, self-importance, pretension”) and *φρόνημα* (“will, high spirit, resolution, pride, arrogance”) are both ambivalent and keep semantics open within the social network, allowing for situational flexibility.⁴³⁹ Even at the level of language, the adoption of kingship therefore adds gravity to the agency of the individual and transforms its identities, a transformation that is visible primarily in the context of the court and in communication. But the real point is that this narrative activity is always a communal activity with many layers: every story told is not simply told once, but retold and reshaped. At the systemic level, contingency control accordingly depends on this composite mesh of narrative conceptualisation.⁴⁴⁰

The most important narrative pattern that can be identified in this context is deferment, so the construction or reproduction of another entity to which authority is yielded, but which is then controlled through translation. This procedure in turn reasserts control of the collectivised self as a whole. This fate was met not only by Alexander himself and his father, but also by the surviving members of the Argead house after Alexander’s death, including Philip III Arrhidaios, Alexander IV Aigos, Herakles, their mothers, and Alexander’s (half)-sisters Thessalonike and Kleopatra, whom Kassander, and Eumenes and Antigonos respectively attempted to exploit for their blood relationship to Philip and Alexander, whom death had transformed into little more than an object actor.⁴⁴¹

struggle for control in symposium situations governed by expectations of decorum and mutual suspicion (*ὑποψία*, “covert observation”), as well as information control, in the interpenetration of the other’s distributed self. Demetrios wins by dominating the situation with a grand display of his retinue and troops, i.e. of his distributed self and the agency it embodies. This disintegrates the other’s collective agency and results in his death, which spawns fear, and in turn permits Demetrios to offer his account of events and provide a construction of truth. The second scene thematises a mutiny in Eumenes’ camp, which is soon suppressed. Eumenes’ reaction is to execute the leaders and distribute the remainder of the mutineers throughout the army, thereby breaking their existing networks both by diffusion and violence, and reaffirming the agency of the core as the greatest source of both contingency and control (cf. the treatment of the Silver Shields by Antigonos: Diod. 19.48.3f.). At Plut. *Eum.* 25.4f. Eumenes finally acts in the inverse as a storyteller who counters an impression of existential contingency by ridiculing his opponent Antigonos as weak while portraying his own collectivised self as a lion. He thereby constructs a specifically semanticised list of dichotomies designed to refocus cohesion and agency.

⁴³⁹ Diod. 18.50.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 18.3f. On the semantic fields of the words see LSJ s.v.

⁴⁴⁰ White 2008², 186-189.

⁴⁴¹ Iust. 14.1.7-9. On these individuals see Heckel 2006, s.v.; for an assessment of this use of Alexander see Errington, Malcolm. “Alexander in the Hellenistic World”, in:

The point I would like to make in highlighting this narrative pattern is quite simple and can best be illustrated by an example: When Kleopatra had proved problematic to Antigonos by exerting her own agency to determine her fate and resisting becoming a pawn in a marriage alliance, Antigonos seems to have had her killed through intermediaries, whom he was then able to punish after the event. In doing so, he restored order on the Homeric narrative model of avenger

Bosworth, Albert B. and Badian, Ernst (eds.). *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* (=Entretiens Hardt 22). Vandœuvres and Geneva 1976, 137-179, here 145-158, who notes the potential and real faultline apparent in the use of relationships to either Alexander or Philip, i.e. direct succession vs. Argead precedence (visible in the murder of Kynnane by Perdikkas, see Heckel 2006, s.v. Cynnane), as well as the magisterial discussion by Stewart 1993, 229-323. On the agency of the widows of Alexander see recently Harders, Ann-Cathrin. "Königinnen ohne König. Zur Rolle und Bedeutung der Witwen Alexanders im Zeitalter der Diadochen", in: Hauben and Meeus (eds.) 2014, 345-377, though in my view she overstates her case; the marginalisation of Persian wives has little to do with gender and more with the ethnic faultline activated by the Diadochi (e.g. Strootman 2014, 124-135). Examples include the following: Eurydike Adea used Philip III as a medium to deploy agency, as attested by Diod. 19.11.1-8; Iust. 14.5.1-4, 8-10; on Philip III see Carney, Elisabeth D. "The Trouble with Philip Arrhidaeus", in: *AHB* 15 (2001), 63-89. Similar is the case of Kratesipolis, who successfully responded to the assassination of her husband, Polyperchon's son Alexander, presumably by using his objectification in death to reassure his army against contingency and take control of the situation (Diod. 19.67.1f.). Olympias fatally attempted to use Alexander IV in a bid against Kassander (Diod. 19.11.2) and Kassander buried Philip III and Eurydike Adea with royal honours to reaffirm his construction of agency in the face of the contingency of Olympias' murder and the plurality of kings (Diod. 19.52.5). Herakles' use by Antigonos, Polyperchon and ultimately Kassander is attested by Diod. 20.20.1f.; 20.28.1-3 and Iust. 15.2.3-5, but the details are impossible to determine. If the sources are correct, both Herakles and Alexander IV were interred secretly, but see Heckel and Wheatley 2011 ad 15.2.3-5 for discussion of Alexander IV, especially regarding the questions of the archaeological remains at Vergina, the correct identification of which seems impossible without epigraphic evidence, as there are far too many plausible candidates (see for reconstructions Adams, Winthrop L. "The Royal Macedonian Tomb at Vergina: An Historical Interpretation", in: *AncW* 3 (1980), 67-72; idem. "Cassander, Alexander IV and the Tombs at Vergina", in: *AncW* 22 (1991), 27-33; Alonso Troncoso, Víctor. "Some Remarks on the Funerals of the Kings: from Philip II to the Diadochi", in: Waldemar Heckel and Robert Hannah (eds.). *Alexander & his Successors: Essays from the Antipodes*. Claremont, CA 2009, 276-298). More recently Landucci Gattinoni, Franca. "Cassander and the Legacy of Philip II and Alexander III in Diodorus' *Library*", in: Elisabeth D. Carney and Daniel Ogden (eds.). *Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives*. Oxford 2010, 113-121, esp. 119-121, proposed an argument that fits nicely with the line pursued here, namely that Alexander IV was exumed and later re-buried in royal style by Demetrios Poliorketes after 294 BC in an attempt to create a heroic narrative on the Homeric model, which cast Demetrios as the avenger of the Argeads through having killed the murderer's descendants (Plut. *Demetr.* 36.3-37.3).

and grieving lover/relative, and further exerted control by establishing a strong link to Kleopatra through performance and memory, anchored in the tomb as a *lieu et objet de mémoire*.⁴⁴² In other words, her transformation into an urn enclosed in a tomb, so into an object that has meaning but unfolds it primarily through the mediation of others, made her subject to Antigonos' agency as the royal funeral he staged for her performatively asserted his control of the situation.⁴⁴³ For the collectivisation of self, translating other actors into objects, which can nevertheless be deferred to as significant, but always within the terms of the translation, offers a powerful narrative of contingency control. This narrative affirms the control the collectivised self exercises over the world by showing it controlling an isolated, liminal situation, in this case a royal burial, and transferring the mesh of meaning the object actor embodies into the collectivised self.⁴⁴⁴ Other examples are easily found, Ptolemy's translation of Alexander's body into his own distributed self obviously being among the most powerful, as is the expansion of the memorial landscape at Aigai.⁴⁴⁵

The conspicuous emphasis on letters in narratives relating to the Diadoch period can be read in the same vein. As was hinted in the previous discussion of

⁴⁴² On Kleopatra see fundamentally Errington 1976, 148-152; in the context of Antigonos and Eumenes see Billows 1990, 61-64, 143-146; Schäfer 2002, 99-103; Anson 2004, 85-100. The archetype of this model is provided by Achilles and Patroklos (Hom. *Il.* 23.1-35), but it was of course performed also by Alexander upon his accession and in relation to Hephaisstion (Diod. 17.2.1; 17.114f.; Arr. *Anab.* 7.14). See esp. Landucci Gattinoni 2010, 120. A related strategy of exercising control over actors turned objects occurs at Diod. 19.11.8 where Olympias attempts to destroy the reputation of Antipater and Kassander by dismantling his brother's tomb and killing another brother. As part of a larger project, the exercise of agency over the reifications of such relations serves to transport a specific construction of good and bad.

⁴⁴³ Diod. 20.37.4. On this episode see Billows 1990, 143-146.

⁴⁴⁴ On royal burial as one of the most powerful liminal situations see for instance Geertz 1977, whose exemplary discussion of accession 'progresses' shows the diffusion of what he calls the centre in order to control this liminal moment. In the case of the Moulay Hazan (Hassan I of Morocco, 1836-1894), the sultan's death was concealed to maintain collective control until the liminal moment was overcome by the ascension of his son to the throne (p. 160-165). Plut. *Demetr.* 53.1-3 provides a parallel in its description of Antigonos II Gonatas' naval progress; the young king is said to have presented the silver urn with his father's ashes in the harbours the navy visited. Note that this is a powerfully tragic scene reminiscent of the significance the urn carries in Sophokles' *Elektra*, for instance.

⁴⁴⁵ Paus. 1.6.3; Parian Chronicle for 321/20 BC: IG XII,5 444:112a. On Alexander's body see Errington 1976, 141-145; Stewart 1993, 214-225. The latter's text fig. 9 shows a potential reconstruction of the hearse.

forged letter stories,⁴⁴⁶ letters obviously allow for the narrative deferment of agency into objects in a connective fashion, making it both tangible and transferrable from one collectivised individual to the next, but also open up opportunities for third-party evaluation.⁴⁴⁷ In the narratives, letters therefore not only afford connectivity and allow for deferment and control, but are also constructed as a source of contingency that can be controlled in turn, for instance when Eumenes destroys his letters and papers (*γραμματεῖα*) to protect his secrets.⁴⁴⁸ As connective, intermediary, and narrative objects, they bolster the agency of the collectivised self by suggesting extended distribution; they further reflexively thematise the power of narrative, as in the anecdote concerning Alexander and Hephaestion, who allegedly shared in Alexander's letter-reading, but has his mouth sealed with Alexander's signet ring. This act of course renders him a letter, an object actor that is being locked into a tiny community of knowledge.⁴⁴⁹

Besides letters, another prominent instance of this kind of narrative formula is the report and exegesis of dreams, which are cast not as fleeting, individual

⁴⁴⁶ See p. 271. Letter stories relating to the Diadochi include Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6.1-5; 14.1.10-15; Plut. *Eum.* 13.1f.; Diod. 18.60.2; 18.63.1-6; 18.65.1; 19.15.5; 19.23.1-3; 19.46.1, 3. Their actual significance is attested by CID 4.11:3.

⁴⁴⁷ Iust. 14.1.9-15. This narrative power is reflected in Plut. *Demetr.* 24.3f., which gives the story of Kleinetos, son of Kleomedon, being spared a fine of fifty talents by Demetrios Poliorketes' epistolary intervention (see Paschidis 2008, 96f. for date and discussion; cf. also Plut. *Demetr.* 51.1 where Demetrios is made to dismantle his own epistolary authority). The alleged response was an edict that no letters by kings should be brought before the Athenian assembly or permitted to interfere with domestic politics. Demetrios' alleged irate reaction is said to have caused the decree to be rescinded and its proposer executed. Olympias interfered at Athens in a similar manner (Diod. 18.65.1). The exiles decree can also be cited here, since it was, in essence, a letter of Alexander with far-reaching consequences: see Errington, Malcolm. "The Date of the Mytilene Decree", in: *ZPE* 83 (1990), 194-214, here 213 with n. 59; Zahrtnt, Michael. "Versöhnen oder Spalten? Überlegungen zu Alexanders Verbanntendekret", in: *Hermes* 131:4 (2003), 407-432). Cf. on letters as bearing reliable, reified authority Theophr. *Char.* 23.4; 24.13, where they pose a similar threat to the cohesion of the collective; see also Ceccarelli 2013, 293-395. Letters as powerful objects are characteristic of monarchical systems in general, compare for instance Polyain. 7.21.5 on the resonant letters of the Persian king and IvP I 13:40-45, the famous oath of Eumenes I soldiers, which includes the stipulation to turn in letters, seal unbroken.

⁴⁴⁸ Plut. *Eum.* 16.2f.

⁴⁴⁹ Plut. *Mor.* 180d; Plut. *Alex.* 39.5. On this anecdote and its plausibility within Hephaestion's assignment as chiliarch see Reames, Jeanne. "The Cult of Hephaestion", in: Paul Cartledge and Fiona Greenland (eds.). *Responses to Oliver Stone's Alexander: Film, History, and Cultural Studies*. Madison 2010, 183-216, here 202-205. On Hephaestion see further Heckel 2006, 133-137 s.v. Hephaestion; on the office of chiliarch see further Meeus, Alexander. "Some Institutional Problems Concerning the Succession to Alexander the Great: Prostaia and Chiliarchy", in: *Historia* 58:3 (2009), 287-310, here 302-310.

experiences but occur as collectively relevant stories in the sources. At the same time, they are the only real point of contact with the faith code that can be observed for the Diadochi in the court context, besides the communal cult of Alexander and other shared activity, which engages with elements outside the network proper, and the underspecified relationship between victorious leadership, so proof of collectivised agency, and divinity.⁴⁵⁰ As was noted apropos of Cyrus, portentous dreams obviously cast the individual as a mediator between a metaphysical realm and the socio-political network, drawing on a set of identities that is embedded into the cultural practice of dream interpretation and hinges on the conceptualisation of the world as divine and of the divine realm as a source of future knowledge and contingency control. The resulting narratives can hence be used to construct communities and refocus agency and network structure.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁵⁰ The communal cult of Alexander attested for Eumenes and Perdikkas is discussed on p. 295 above. The courts of the Diadochi were not made theatres of the divinity of living rulers (Nielsen 1994, 16) and in this respect parallel the *Cyropaedia*. As a community, the court could of course engage in cultic action, but probably on an individual basis (as did Demetrios Poliorketes and his friends on Delos: IG XI,2 161b:75-85 with Billows 1990, 371). In the 'Greek' world this kind of explicit formal translation of the belief code occurs solely in the polis, notoriously of course in the ithyphallic hymn to Demetrios Poliorketes (Athen. 7.253d-f = Duris FGrH 76 F 13), on which see Mikalson 1998, 75-104; O'Sullivan, Lara. "Le Roi Soleil: Demetrios Poliorketes and the Dawn of the Sun-King", in: *Antichthon* 42 (2008), 78-99 (the sun imagery is echoed later by Alki. 4.16.1); Chaniotis, Angelos. "The Ithyphallic Hymn for Demetrios Poliorketes and Hellenistic Religious Mentality", in: Panagiotis P. Iossif, Andrzej S. Chankowski, and Catharine C. Lorber (eds.). *More than Men less than Gods. Studies on Royal Cult and Imperial Worship* (=Studia Hellenistica 51). Leuven 2011, 157-196). See generally Habicht 1970², 230-242; Préaux 1978, 1, 238-259; Lund 1992, 170; Mikalson 1998, 81-84; Green, Peter. "Delivering the Go(o)ds: Demetrios Poliorketes and Hellenistic Divine Kingship", in: Geoffrey W. Bakewell and James Sickinger (eds.). *Gestures. Essays in Ancient History, Literature, and Philosophy presented to Alan L. Boegehold*. Oxford 2003, 258-277; Chaniotis 2003, 431-445; Lane Fox 2011, 6 with n. 32; Erskine, Andrew. "Ruler cult and the early Hellenistic city", in: Hauben and Meeus (eds.) 2014, 579-597. This amounts to the translation of the ruler by the polis into one of its fundamental tensions, that between the longing for individual salvific control and its resolute rejection (Green 2003, 259f., 266f.), as the categorisation of rulers as divine associated paradoxically productive configurations of identity (White 2008², 345-347), which also cushioned the contingency of royal interventions in the sacral landscape of the polis as outlined e.g. by Mikalson 1998, 90-104; Kuhn 2006; Ogden 2011, 229f. The result is an ambiguous relationship between the divine and the early Hellenistic court, at least in its narrative translation – an ambiguity that was productive, as it allowed for more tension in story-telling. Diod. 18.61.3 echoes this in likening the leadership of the emergent kings to divine leadership, but without making them gods.

⁴⁵¹ The best example is Diod. 19.90.3-91.5, where Seleukos, who currently commands only 1000 men, reinforces his collectivised self on the way to Babylon by pointing to

While the prominence of portents in early Hellenistic narratives reflects the literary power of these elements, it therein also mirrors both the strong perceived contingency of the period and the collectivised individual as the fundamental response, a construction that loosely parallels the *Cyropaedia*.⁴⁵² In his fundamental study of the dreams of Hellenistic rulers, Gregor Weber argued that the power of dreams results from the interesting tension between proximity and distance that characterises these experiences.⁴⁵³ While dreams are extremely individual and by definition subjective, under-signified, and thus enigmatic, they are also a universal human experience and thus a *connective* source of world meaning and content.⁴⁵⁴ Put differently, dream narratives are therefore an ideal case in point as they require communal exegesis and embedding in the web of discourse that binds the collectivised self together – their meaning is invariably produced communally. Considering dreams in this way unlocks the key to the prominence: they structurally mirror the paradox of the collectivised self. And while there are, especially for Eumenes, instances of purely individual, authoritative exegesis by the leader-cum-dreamer, the important point is that these gateways to a deferred, meaningful source of significance that is not subject to re-configuration are embedded in communal interpretation and meta-communication, reinforcing the collectivisation of self.⁴⁵⁵

a whole number of factors, including oracles and a dream of Alexander granting him kingship (cf. App. *Syr.* 9.56). In doing so, he emphasises the necessity of contingency endurance, which he accomplishes by making himself equal to all component parts, thereby laying stress on personal closeness and forging a community of *συγκινδυνεύοντες* (“those who are partners in danger”, and thus share contingency control).

⁴⁵² On Cyrus’ dreams see above p. 249, n. 305. On the literary use of dreams, at least in poetry, see Walde, Christine. *Die Traumdarstellungen in der Griechisch-Römischen Dichtung*. Munich 2001, esp. 417-419, who demonstrates their significance for purposes of characterisation, foreshadowing, and moral evaluation. In her view they therefore function as a kind of petri dish for the narrator, but they are also often made social, communicative experiences (p. 425), which parallels Weber (1999). See further Harris 2009, esp. 122.

⁴⁵³ Weber 1999. Artem. 1.2 abstractly formulates the long-standing tradition of giving significance to the dreams of important or distinguished individuals, as they have collective impact (visible already at Hom. *Il.* 2.80-82). A dream narrative with clear legitimacy impact is Plut. *Mor.* 183a on the connection between Antigonos’ vision and Mithridates; see Billows 1990, 404f. no 73.

⁴⁵⁴ Weber 1999, 31f.

⁴⁵⁵ On interpreters and credibility see generally Harris 2009, 134-141; Trampedach, Kai. *Politische Mantik. Die Kommunikation über Götterzeichen und Orakel im klassischen Griechenland* (=Studien zur Alten Geschichte 21). Heidelberg 2015, 443-497, esp. 476-480, and specifically King, Carol J. “Plutarch, Alexander, and Dream Divination”, in: *ICS* 38 (2013), 81-111, esp. 108, who argues that professional interpretation of dreams was usual in the context of Alexander’s campaign as part of the king’s religious status and

A good first example is provided by the dream of Medios. In the difficult situation within emergent Antigonid court society after the failure of the Egyptian campaign in 304 BC, Plutarch records the dream of a certain Medios that casts the defeat in terms of the collectivised self, i.e. “Antigonos and the army” (Ἀντίγονος μετὰ τῆς στρατιᾶς), running out of steam on a run together and barely making the finish line after a strong start.⁴⁵⁶ It is probably no coincidence that Plutarch chases this anecdote, which is hardly difficult to interpret, with a remark on Antigonos’ great bulk in age, nor that he is cast in these narratives as a jovial joker.⁴⁵⁷ In the right context, the jibe about Antigonos’ weight and concurrent lack of stamina could have served as a communal experience that narratively cushioned the communal failure in the delta – the narrative is comparable to the funny banter scenes in the *Cyropaedia*.⁴⁵⁸ By being deferred to the divine authority behind dreams, the humour further anchors the failure in a plausible scenario of world construction, granting it double productivity.⁴⁵⁹

also provides a discussion of the literature. Cf. for the Ptolemaic court Evans, Trevor V. “The Court Function of the Interpreter in Genesis 42.23 and Early Greek Papyri”, in: Tessa Rajak et al. (eds.). *Jewish Perspectives on Hellenistic rulers*. Berkeley 2007, 238-252, who notes the familiarity and plurality of ἐρμηνεῖς in third century BC Egypt. In the *Characters*, the Chatterbox of course discusses his dreams in an overly detailed manner, controlling contingency by projecting a highly idiosyncratic experience into the inter-individual sphere, and the Superstitious Man oversemanticises his, consulting several authorities to ascertain their meaning (Theophr. *Char.* 3.2; 16.11).

⁴⁵⁶ Plut. *Demetr.* 19.1f. It seems plausible to identify this man with the amply attested Medeios of Larissa, son of Oxythemis, a trierarch in Alexander’s campaign, who gained unfortunate glory for potentially hosting the dinner party that killed Alexander (Diod. 17.117.1, 5) and later changed sides to Antigonos from Perdikkas (Arr. *Ta met’ Alex.* 24.6). Making him the dreamer in an Antigonid defeat by Ptolemy’s hands thus gains an added element of significance, as he had prior experience of the effects of such a defeat, even though he was probably on Cyprus. On his career see Billows 1990, no. 68 with the addition by Bayliss, Andrew J. “A Decree Honouring Medeios of Larissa”, in: *ZPE* 140 (2002), 89-92; Heckel 2006, 158 s.v. Medius, and on the Egyptian campaign Billows 1990, 162-165.

⁴⁵⁷ Plut. *Demetr.* 19.3. Antigonos’ gruff humour and ability to take a joke are visible at Plut. *Mor.* 182a-f; Plut. *Eum.* 15.1f.; see Billows 1990, 10. Generally speaking, the dreams given in the sources are not difficult to decode even without specialist knowledge of the kind discussed by Artemidorus. This obviously serves to make them more useful narrative tools. An exception is the reference to the Chaldeans at Diod. 19.55.7f., who tellingly occurs in the context of a narrative about Seleukos.

⁴⁵⁸ Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.19-24. This also associates the theme of *tryphē* vs. self-control (e.g. Polyain. 4.3.32; Athen. 12.539b), see for instance Briant 2002, 288.

⁴⁵⁹ The benevolent divine realm as a source of dreams is attested explicitly at Artem. *praef.* See Harris 2009, 123-127; Trampedach 2015, 391-442, though I find the latter’s use of the word ‘Theologie’ somewhat daring, especially since he himself proceeds to note the instability of notions of the divine.

The similar Plutarchan *ex-post-facto* narratives of the bad omens that foreshadowed the disastrous outcome of the battle of Ipsos for the Antigonids have comparable effects. The loss of battle and king causes a fault-line within the collectivised self, resulting in its potential and actual centrifugal disintegration and a collapse of agency.⁴⁶⁰ Even in their negativity, the narratives accordingly reproduce a construction of the world as anticipatable via communication with the divine realm and reassert a model of justice – or perhaps: appropriateness – that hinges on debt and the deferral dynamic, when they reference Alexander’s importance as a bringer of victory in the watchword anecdote.⁴⁶¹ In the doubly liminal situation of a collective having to negotiate defeat and weather its reconfiguration around a new centre, the *ex-post-facto* narrative makes the disaster seem anticipatable and thereby reproduces collective story-telling, reconstitutes the audience as a collective, and systemically allows for the reassertion of control and new deployment of agency due to the deferment strategy employed.

Finally, Eumenes provides an example of the combination of several deferral strategies. This narrative is prefigured by Curtius’ and Justin’s notes that the body of Alexander was set amidst the assembled generals to witness and sanction the decisions made at Babylon after the king’s death. In this highly contingent socio-political situation, Alexander’s presence is here cast as a sanctioning authority, so as a deferred and strong, but essentially translatable centre of a socio-political network in flux.⁴⁶² In Curtius’ extensive narrative of the situation this configuration is the result of Perdikkas’ construction of the king as an assemblage of objects, consisting of key symbolic elements of the king’s distributed self, his diadem, clothing, and weapons. Perdikkas finally added the king’s signet ring, which he had received from Alexander on his death bed, supplementing this object actor with an object that signified not only the community and boundaries of knowledge Alexander established with it, but now also embodied the link between Perdikkas and the hollow shell of Alexander he had first constructed and finally laid claim to by returning the ring.⁴⁶³ While Perdikkas’ construction had therefore already begun to imbue this object actor with specific semantics, the significance it was to gain in the following debate about the succession appears fundamentally

⁴⁶⁰ Explicit at Plut. *Demetr.* 29.5-30.2, who notes the desertion of friends and the loss of troops.

⁴⁶¹ Plut. *Demetr.* 28.3-29.5.

⁴⁶² Curt. 10.6.4; Iust. 13.4.3f. On the presence of Alexander as object see Errington 1976, 138-145. For a recent discussion of the events and the debate on the degree of formalisation of authority that hinges on them see Meeus 2009.

⁴⁶³ Diod. 17.117.3; 18.2.4; Curt. 10.5.4; 10.6.4-9. On the socio-political dynamics surrounding the succession see the table by Rathmann 2005, 32-52; cf. Ogden 1999, 45-48.

contested. This was partly related to the competition of translation that characterised this debate, as it involved a dispute about the significance of Alexander's body: was he a unique, irreplaceable individual or essentially an Argead, one of many?⁴⁶⁴ Curtius' narrative vividly describes the struggle for the *enrolment* and *mobilisation* of this object actor between Ptolemy and its creator Perdikkas: While Perdikkas attempted to use it to mark out the prestige of his solution, which called for the appointment of a regent and the delay of accession until the birth of Roxane's indeterminate offspring, and was sanctioned by the signet ring that linked the object actor and Perdikkas, Ptolemy attempted to translate the throne into a symbol of Alexander's exceptional status, making the object actor itself the king, embedded within a system of majority votes among the generals and friends.⁴⁶⁵ The outcome, of course, is well known: Meleagros' argument in favour of an Argead king, rather than in favour of Alexander's exceptionality, results in the rather abrupt culmination of the debate in a showdown now set around the actual body of Alexander, which ultimately effects the compromise solution.⁴⁶⁶ In this anecdotal game of translations, the individual aims for collectivisation by transforming himself into a mediator between a 'true centre', which is of course contested, and the rest of the network, thereby casting himself in a strong structural position. The object actor therefore aids in controlling the contingency of the situation through the narrative pattern of deferment, which is essential in re-shaping this world.

Eumenes' variation on this pattern is similar in essence, though his translation is more complete and comes with an added twist.⁴⁶⁷ Diodorus provides two very

⁴⁶⁴ This is evident from the debate scene in Curtius between Perdikkas, Nearchos and Ptolemy: Curt. 10.6.4-15. See Errington 1976, 145-153.

⁴⁶⁵ The significance of the throne is attested by Diod. 17.116.2-3; Plut. *Alex.* 73.3-4. See Picard, Charles. "Le trône vide d'Alexandre dans la cérémonie de Cynda et la culte du trône vide à travers le monde gréco-romain", in: *Cah.Arch* 7 (1954), 1-18; Anson 2004, 150-152, and especially Schäfer 2002, 26-36f., who offers an excellent discussion of the significance of the throne in both Greek and Achaemenid culture. On the latter see also Llewellyn-Jones 2013, 70f.

⁴⁶⁶ Curt. 10.8.16. See Errington 1976, 141.

⁴⁶⁷ See on this the assessment by Schäfer 2002, 19-39, who shows the broad cultural and legitimacy significance of these episodes, and criticises the older view of Launey, Marcel. *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques*. 2 vols. Paris 1950, 2, 945-947, which saw this as a military cult, an interpretation directly suggested by Plut. *Eum.* 13.3 (δεισιδαιμονία). Launey did, however, acknowledge the legitimacy force of the cult. This kind of deferment strategy has a long tradition and may well have been inspired by the Mesopotamian substitute king ritual, on which see e.g. Kümmel, Hans M. "Ersatzkönig und Sündenbock", in: *ZAW* 80 (1968), 289-318, who notes that it was notoriously misunderstood by Greek authors, for instance in the context of Alexander the Great (p. 293), but possibly also by Ktesias (F13.12). For more recent discussions

similar accounts of Eumenes countering internal strife at Kyinda by pointing to a dream he had had that made Alexander himself suggest a council-based leadership of the army. This is developed as being based on a neutral tent dedicated to divine Alexander and governed by an empty golden throne, adorned with objects of royal signification.⁴⁶⁸ He mentions that these objects were crafted or taken from the treasury at Kyinda, so the actor was at least narratively created from scratch to control the contingency of the situation, evidently in analogy to the organisational narrative developed by Ptolemy after the king's death.⁴⁶⁹ A working configuration for the deployment of collective agency is thus created by communally reproducing a generally acceptable locus of control and footing for all, namely Alexander, who is made spatially manifest in the "royal tent and throne" (σκηνην βασιλικην και θρόνον).⁴⁷⁰ The deferred network configuration is thereby made spatially manifest.

In summary, the narrative pattern of deferment has therefore emerged as embedding new narratives of network configuration in a semantic web that is given significance, but constrained within a single, often physically manifest actor that can be immediately translated into a specific configuration designed to enrol others in the establishment of a collectivised OPP.⁴⁷¹ As such it provides a relational sense of place to audience and storytellers by facilitating the location of self

in relation to Alexander's kingship see Abramenko, Andriik. "Der Fremde auf dem Thron. Die letzte Verschwörung gegen Alexander d. Gr.," in: *Klio* 82 (2000), 361-378, who argues it was a veiled attempt at assassination; Müller 2003, 175f., who rejects the whole thing, but somehow seems to assume someone actually sat on Alexander's throne and had to be lawfully executed as a result – this is hardly convincing in the context of an organised court. While the sources are very confused, as she acknowledges, I myself would nevertheless agree with the interpretation as a substitute king ritual as reaffirmed by Boiy, Tom. *Late Achaemenid and Hellenistic Babylon*. Leuven 2004, 112f., though he shows little awareness of the debate.

⁴⁶⁸ The model is of course provided by Alexander's own tent and throne as described by Athen. 12.539e. Cf. Peukestas' use of Alexander the Great and Philip II as the centre of his socio-political network in a symposium situation at Diod. 19.22. The spatial organisation of the feast in concentric circles around Alexander mirrors Peukestas' construction of network hierarchy and truth but defers this truth to the integrative power of the divine Argeads, the 'true' centre of the network. On this dream see Schäfer 2002, 21-23; Anson 2004, 150-152.

⁴⁶⁹ Plut. *Enum.* 13.3f.; Diod. 18.60.4-61.3; 19.15.3f. See Anson 2004, 150f. for the creation of the ensignia.

⁴⁷⁰ Plut. *Enum.* 13.3. See Schäfer 2002, 36f. on Eumenes' translation of the empty throne. Add that the emptiness of the throne very clearly communicates the *Leerstelle* left by Alexander, while simultaneously stabilising the contingency this engendered.

⁴⁷¹ In this respect, this phenomenon structurally prefigures and narratively parallels the use of favourites as buffers in Hellenistic court society, as Strootman has argued (2014, 175-184).

in a new configuration and allowing for the control of contingency by creating a self-sustained web of meaning akin to a line of dominos that serves to obscure the contingency of the value-judgements involved. In the *Cyropaedia*, deferment was not so prominent, as Cyrus' narrative was not contested. Nevertheless, it was integral to the translation implemented in that the core of Cyrus' self was increasingly deferred, aiding those in his distributed self in controlling contingency.

The second pattern one can identify has to do with payment, along with its medium of money. It goes without saying that money has been regarded as essential to the power dynamics of the Diadoch period in keeping with their Machiavellian face, and its significance is naturally not to be disputed, though one should not forget that at least initially its acquisition appears less lawless than one might imagine.⁴⁷² Accordingly, the tension and ambiguity associated with money are pronounced. As the cohesive power of gifts was already remarked on above, the interest here is in the use of money as a narrative translation mechanic, based again on the argument that, societally speaking, the use of money activates the payment code for the evaluation of relationships, so signals a *limited* relationship

⁴⁷² The pivotal importance of money is nicely shown by Plut. *Demetr.* 49.4, where the gold concealed in Sosigenes' belt promises salvation when Demetrios Poliorketes and his friends are surrounded by enemies in the dead of night. This significance is paralleled by its construction during the Armenian campaign in the early stages of the *Cyropaedia* (Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.4.9-17; 3.1.30; 3.1.32-34). Initially acquisition of treasure from treasuries appears to have been sanctioned by royal letter in negotiation with the satraps or guardians (e.g. Diod. 18.58.3-59.3, 60.2, 62.2, 63.4-6; 19.17.3; Plut. *Enum.* 13.3f., 16.4, 18.2); see Lane Fox 2011, 5. Diod. 18.52.8; 19.90.1-5, shows that disrespecting this rule for reasons of *idiopragia* definitively reveals the self-interest of the Diadochi. Overall, the sources are rife with references to money concerns, e.g. Diod. 19.15.5; 19.31.3f.; 19.46.3; 19.55.1-3; 20.75.1-3; 20.108.1-3; Plut. *Demetr.* 27.2; 32.1; *Enum.* 13.6; Polyæn. *Strat.* 4.6.4. For the idea that money is essential to Hellenistic kingship as it is the prerequisite for the acquisition of forces and friends (e.g. Diod. 18.50.2f.; 18.61.5, on which see Anson 2004, 150) see e.g. Errington 1976, 153; Préaux 1978, 1, 208-212 ("l'obligation d'être riche"); Austin 1986 (who made this concern his foundation stone of Hellenistic kingship); Briant 1994 (who pointed out the fundamental importance of the ability to transform grain into money for the royal economy). On the impact of coined money already in the Classical period see Trundle, Matthew F. "Coinage and the Transformation of Greek Warfare", in: Garrett G. Fagan and Matthew F. Trundle (eds.). *New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare*. Leiden 2010, 227-252, who studies the nexus of military relationships associated with money from then onwards. On the coins themselves and their impact as 'object actors' see also Newell 1927; Hadley 1974; Mørkholm 1991, 23f. and *passim*; Kroll, John H. "The Emergence of Ruler Portraiture on Early Hellenistic Coins: The Importance of Being Divine", in: von den Hoff and Schultz (eds.) 2007, 113-122; de Callataÿ, François. "Royal Hellenistic Coinages: From Alexander to Mithridates", in: William E. Metcalf (ed.). *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman coinage*. Oxford 2012, 175-190, here 179-181; Erickson, Kyle. "Seleucus I, Zeus and Alexander", in: Mitchell and Melville (eds.) 2013, 109-127.

consisting in a potentially *zero-sum* exchange of money for agency (in a variety of forms).⁴⁷³ For the Diadochi, this dynamic and its use are apparent on a number of occasions, most prominently in the case of Eumenes, whose portrayal notably diverges from the Cyrean ideal of relegation of payment beyond the bounds of the self. This Cyrean conception is, however, the norm, as is visible in inversion in Plutarch, when he discusses Demetrios Poliorketes' and Seleukos' negotiation for Stratonike's hand. In another situation of political contingency three years after Ipsos, Demetrios met Seleukos at Rhosus to celebrate the marriage. In Plutarch's narrative all begins well: Seleukos is perfectly "charming" (*ἄσπεϊός*) and the marriage is concluded.⁴⁷⁴ However, Demetrios had evidently plundered Cilicia on his way to Rhosus, occupying the area in the process. As a result the Besieger had effectively surrounded Syria given that he already controlled Cyprus and parts of Phoenicia.⁴⁷⁵ The narrative now turns sour: Seleukos allegedly made requests aimed at getting Demetrios out of the area, first offering to buy Cilicia from him before simply demanding Tyre and Sidon.⁴⁷⁶ Demetrios' alleged response is full of indignation, and this is where it gets interesting: the shift in communication is cast as the transfer of the exchange originally conducted in marital terms, so as producing a durable interpenetration of collectivised selves, onto the payment code. In other words, Demetrios intradiegetically re-constructs the exchange as payment for a familial relationship, "saying that not even if he were to lose innumerable further battles at Ipsos would he be content to have Seleukos as a son-in-law for pay" (*φήσας οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις ἠττηθῆ μάχας ἄλλας ἐν Ἴψῳ γαμβρὸν ἀγαπήσειν ἐπὶ μισθῷ Σέλευκον*).⁴⁷⁷ The construction put forward is one of equal collectivised selves that use money as a generalised medium of collectivisation, but not among one another, because it is culturally embedded in a semantic nexus that signifies subordination – an association the story here tellingly chooses to activate.⁴⁷⁸ As these and other episodes show, the translation of this underlying

⁴⁷³ See above p. 247, n. 292. Obviously this is also a strategy of deferment via a generalised medium of collectivised interaction (Luhmann 1988, 230-236).

⁴⁷⁴ Seleukos and Demetrios were joining forces through the medium of Stratonike in order to counter the alliance between Ptolemy and Lysimachos (Plut. *Demetr.* 31.3-5). See Grainger 1990, 138f.

⁴⁷⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 31.3-33.1. On the situation see Grainger 1990, 140-144, who makes Seleukos a mastermind and Demetrios Poliorketes an erratic charmer. On the significance of the marriage see Grainger 1990, 152f., 164f.; on the actual events Ogden 1999, 121.

⁴⁷⁶ See Grainger 1990, 143f. for a plausible reconstruction of events.

⁴⁷⁷ Plut. *Demetr.* 33.1.

⁴⁷⁸ The same construction is apparent from the use of bribes: Diod. 19.36.6; 19.61.5; 20.75.1-3; Plut. *Demetr.* 15.1f. and in Eumenes' payment of Eudamos for his delivery of the elephants, which likewise associates *enrolment* (Diod. 19.15.5). It also explains the

construction of code non-applicability allows for situational control of contingency, especially in its inversion as a weapon, although of course Plutarch does not preserve this in a very detailed manner.⁴⁷⁹

As was mentioned, the exception is Eumenes, because he appears as using both the payment code and economic dynamics as a mechanism of contingency control. Both Diodorus and Plutarch have narratives of Eumenes taking hostage the money of the other prominent leaders in his army,⁴⁸⁰ thereby utilising a loan dynamic to make others invest parts of their selves into the collectivisation and drawing them into his own collectivised self. As repayment hinges on either victory or an acknowledgement of Eumenes' authority to act in the name of the king, this action cemented his translation of collective agency via the economic code and the *pistis* relationship implied by the loan, as there is no other authority available to appeal to as long as the construction holds.⁴⁸¹ This translation is interesting especially because it replaces friendship with greed, so identity of self on the trust code with identity of self on the economic code, to generate *asphaleia*. Turned into its figuration as debt, the relationship can be extended into the future – and in Plutarch's narrative this is actually successful, as two commanders betray the plan to save Eumenes in order to be able to recover the money they had lent him.⁴⁸² Ultimately, however, this translation collapses on the same code, as the connectivity of the economic code betrays Eumenes: Antigonos' capture of the Silver Shields' baggage, the locus of their selves in this translation, results in Eumenes

narratives of loyalty that hinge on the rejection of bribes as we saw in the case of Andronikos (Diod. 19.86.1-3; cf. p. 274, n. 398 above). Naturally money also associates the topos of the greedy tyrant (Lys. 12.5-7), which crops up also in Timaeus' negative characterisation of Agathokles (Diod. 20.4.1), who is said to have acquired money by stealing from orphans, temples, merchants, and women, as well as by murdering the wealthy. On this topos in tragedy, where it was always comfortably at home, see Seaford, Richard. "Tragic Money", in: *JHS* 118 (1998), 119-139. Note, however, that little is made of it in narratives relating to the Diadochi – Eumenes is a positive figure and Plutarch's Demetrios is not characterised by greed. It is applied, however, to parts of the distributed self, see Chapter 5 below.

⁴⁷⁹ See, for example, the characterisation by Plutarch's hostile source of Lysimachos as *gazophylax* (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.4f., cf. p. 275, n. 402) and as wanting to pay Seleukos for Demetrios' murder (51.3). For an assessment see Lund 1992, 128-134.

⁴⁸⁰ Diod. 19.24.1; Plut. *Eum.* 13.6.

⁴⁸¹ At Diod. 19.15.5 Eumenes pays the Macedonians from the treasury at Susa on the authority of the letter from the kings.

⁴⁸² Plut. *Eum.* 16.2.

being delivered to his foe and thus in the reassertion of the normative marginalisation of the economic code, as Eumenes fails to become king.⁴⁸³

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to look at the literary sources relating to the emergent court societies of the Diadoch period with an eye towards their potential societal impact as story-telling in their potential original lived reality. To do so, a possible model for such a narrative was abstracted from Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. This model held that the king is narratively, and thus communally, constructed in response to likewise communally constructed contingency as a collectivised self. This collectivised self is capable of providing an agency-imbued, and thus attractive, relational sense of place for other individuals in certain situations. This self was observed as being developed as a dynamically growing, redistributive socio-political network that hinged on a principle of meritocratic redistribution, though the latter was qualified by an element of circulation, since all components of the network are cast as mediators of the value-order. In that, it showed a scale-free structure at the level of discourse, as the mediation of identity that unfolds in the network through this value regime serves to insert Cyrus into every interaction conducted within it.

It was further argued that this societal narrative, this story of the world, unfolded its efficacy by defining the applicability of specific codes of complexity-reduction, such as love, belief, payment, and truth. This mesh of collaborative story-telling about the value order and about how to control the uncertainty of life, helped to translate this construction of a collectivised self into an obligatory passage point for interaction in the minds of all those enmeshed in its logic. The meta-story that resulted from this provided an effective regime of control at a very basic level of societal organisation because it was capable of abolishing contingency itself at an imaginary level, of pushing the very experience of uncertainty beyond the bounds of the society constructed.

In the second part, this model was used to scrutinise a selection of the extant narratives relating to the period of the Diadochi, which were treated as the literary abstractions of traces of such societal story-telling within emergent court society. The non-teleological and pervasively contested nature of these narratives made them harder to study coherently, but in essence, the narratives showed a very

⁴⁸³ Plut. *Eum.* 16.5-17.2; Diod. 19.31.3f. Eumenes is previously said to have 'impounded' the baggage of Sibyrtios to control him at 19.23.4. This diagnosis corroborates Hénaff, Marcel. "Is there Such a Thing as a Gift Economy", in: Carlà and Gori (eds.) 2014, 71-84, here 83, who argues that the economic system is unable to give meaning to society.

similar construction to that identified in the *Cyropaedia*. Emergent court society is developed as a collectivised self joined in its experience of contingency and its exercise of control through narrative. By consequently viewing the court society of the Diadoch period in this way, this study contrasts previous approaches to these social figurations, which viewed them primarily in terms of decadence and apparent structural turmoil. The emphasis was on the underlying societal qualities of the system in controlling contingency in the period of the Diadochi that emerge when close attention is paid to story-telling.

The most interesting observation is that the plurality of stories and story-tellers tangible throughout the source record in fact serves not to destabilise the court, at least not at the societal level, but actually makes the collective that processes narratives all the more crucial, as the contested nature of these narratives turns ‘passive’ normative reproduction into ‘active’ *enrolment* and *mobilisation* mechanics that interfere with processes of collectivisation. This was well exemplified by the final story of Eumenes’ use of economic codes as socio-political glue: after first helping him, the highly connective code backfired once Eumenes lost OPP status for economic interactions, flooding his network with contingency and contributing to his failure. Emergent court society thus appears as a bounded social network structured by constant story-telling, as a locus of identity production that stabilises individual agency and resolves perceived contingency through its construction in terms of a collectivised individual that provides situational identity of self at all times. Of course, the plurality of stories available is itself a potential source of contingency, but, at least systemically, the neat construction of the king as the OPP within these narratives provides an element of control even within the perception of this problem.

Finally, can these dynamics be expressed in terms of network theory? The answer to this question must be tentative in the extreme, given the contested nature of the narratives encountered, but shall be offered nonetheless. For the sake of contrast, let us remind ourselves of what the *Characters* showed: that text constructed a dense socio-political network of communication acts, rooted in specific spatial fora, that came to actually embody normative collectivism. This collectivism was produced by the distributed nature of the observation processes that formed the text’s implicit core and by its insistence on an array of normative values that were policed and provided connectivity to the network. By contrast, then, the narratives investigated here have of course revealed a more centralised dynamic, namely the construction of a collectivised individual as society itself. The competitive growth dynamic of these figurations is amply attested, which renders them scale-free, at least at the level of identity discourse (rather than historical individual).

The crucial point, however, is that both in the *Cyropaedia* and especially in the narratives relating to the Diadochi, the pressure of contingency is met not only by narratives that define and counter contingency through creating value regimes, but also by a strategy of deferment. Put into network terms, this strategy constructs a transcendental centre, entangled with various value-bearing cultural systems, for which the collectivised self can then act as an obligatory passage point, as a mediator. While this is an obvious power strategy, this configuration of a ‘centralised’ network further harnesses an obfuscation effect by tying meaning to the collectivised OPP and the semi-translated systems, rather than to the components themselves. This twist results in systemic control, because this regime of meta-control can be implemented via scale-free cascades of story-telling, rather than having to be perpetuated via concrete social contact. This regime is thus characterised by an unlimited growth dynamic that is fundamentally at odds with the construction we observed within the *Characters*. Rather than witnessing the insistence on a bounded, balanced, and distributed network that works hard to keep its scale-free elements in check by promoting the individual as integral to maintaining this society, we saw a societal imaginary that seeks to productively dissolve the individual in value-correlated mediation.

This discrepancy of societal imaginaries having been identified, the next step in the investigation must of course be to bring these two fundamentally incompatible figurations together and observe the effects this had within the socio-political cosmos of the Diadoch period. We shall proceed to do so at two levels. First, we shall consider the discursive creation of the concrete intermediary actors who were forced not only to reconcile these imaginaries in concrete socio-political interaction, but also to control the contingencies inherent in this experience (Chapter 5). After that, we shall return to a more concrete level of interaction by the considering a concrete example of a political collision between these imaginaries and investigating how they responded to this challenge (Chapter 6).

5. Of monsters and men: Aspects of control between court and city

5.1 Semiotics between court and city

So far, this study has largely pretended that ‘city’ and ‘court’ were isolated socio-political networks structured and made safe by narratives with purely internal relevance, woven by their members with only internal interference. ‘Objectively’ speaking, the early Hellenistic period would of course appear to be characterised in fact by the very opposite, by contingency resulting from, among other things, continuously contested narratives being told within a diverse socio-political network that consisted of individuals straddling multiple different categories of identity.¹ The interactions and interaction contexts, as well as the categories of brokering activity conducted by these individuals that moved between court and city have been assessed in great detail by other scholars: the mercurial agencies of such intermediaries have been variously noted, highlighting their configurations as personal brokers for multiple polities, as envoys of peace, as brokers of symmachies and negotiators, as reinforcing agents, as representatives, and as cultural or military solicitors, but also as aggressors capable of interfering in or procedurally delaying action, as well as acting as commanders.² In short, these individuals have therefore emerged as extending the collectives they are primarily translated into, be they the citizen bodies of *poleis* and/or the collectivised selves of kings. They bring these networks of meaning together in socio-political space by mediating these collectives through their own agency, vetted by *eunoia*, *pistis*, and *philia*, values that bridge gaps between individuals and collectives.³ The concomitant result of this socio-political action is a systemic interpenetration of these discursive networks as part of a larger, macro-level network configuration. Accordingly John Davies influentially termed these individuals the “human hinges

¹ See e.g. Ma 1999, 20.

² A good example of such a broker figure is provided by Nikomedes of Kos (Billows 1990, 411f. no. 82). His brokering activity is visible in civic decrees honouring individuals for help in gaining access to the king. Other famous examples include Kallias of Sphettos (Paschidis 2008, A47: “the *Idealtyp* of the intermediary”, p. 149) and Demochares (Paschidis 2008, A49). The character of the monarchical intermediary figures of the Hellenistic period was discussed already by Mooren, Léon. “Die diplomatische Funktion der hellenistischen Königsfreunde”, in: Eckart Olshausen and Hildegard Biller (eds.). *Antike Diplomatie*. Darmstadt 1979, 256-290, esp. 260-274. See more recently also Strootman 2014, 151f.

³ See e.g. Strootman 2014, 145-159; Paschidis 2008, 483-486.

of Hellenism”, identifying them as crucial “load-bearing components of the system” that negotiated and integrated vertical and horizontal axes of interaction within his model of Hellenistic power dynamics.⁴

For the purposes of this study, the fact that there is so much prior work on this topic is fortunate as the material is so substantial and difficult to canvass: thanks to the recent close analysis of citizen intermediaries by Paschalis Paschidis, whose invaluable work now supplements the various existing prosopographies and studies of the royal *philoï* and envoys, this overarching network of intermediation and brokering now emerges with great clarity at the historical level.⁵ As these individuals have already been so extensively studied, this chapter will not conduct yet another expansive survey of material, but attempts instead to offer a new perspective on a specific aspect of intermediary existence in the early Hellenistic period at the societal level by investigating the plurality of discourses *about* intermediaries, which are discussed in research in terms of the discourse about *kolakeia* and *philia*.⁶ In a recent article, Shane Wallace concluded that one of the most prominent early Antigonid *philoï*, Adeimantos of Lampsakos, developed “multiple

⁴ Quote from Davies 2002a, 11.

⁵ Paschidis 2008. The royal *philoï* were covered by Mooren 1975 and 1977; Le Bohec 1985; Billows 1990, 361-452; Savalli-Lestrade 1998. On brokering cf. Duindam 1994, 86; Herman 1997, 207-210 (who highlights both distributed *xenia* relations as a recruitment network and brokering activity by mutual friends); Strootman 2014, 151f.

⁶ This goes back to an argument by Gabriel Herman (1980/81, esp. 103-108, 119-123), who posited that the primary attitude in the Greek cities towards intermediary figures, especially royal friends, was negative. Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 251-354, esp. 277-279, 335-354 qualified this interpretation on two counts. First she argued that there was a complex mentality behind the appellations used in the honorary decrees, with vague terms being employed by independent *poleis* to emphasise the non-formalised quality of their relationship, whereas subject cities used titles more frequently (cf. on this eadem. “Intitulés royaux et intitulés civiques dans les inscriptions de cités sujettes de Carie et de Lycie (Amyzon, Eurômos, Xanthos). Histoire politique et mutations institutionnelles”, in: *Studi Ellenistici* 24 (2010), 127-148). Second, she argued that much of the negative discourse was due to the combination of imperial Roman experience with pre-existing inter-court conflicts, though she noted that “[la *kolakeia*] est avant tout une arme de la lutte politique entre les citoyens dans le jeu des alliances avec les dynastes et les rois [...]”. Herman 1997 and Meißner 2000, whose appraisals were based primarily on Polybius, showed that this tension is visible prominently in his history; cf. also Bayliss 2002. On *kolakeia* and *philia* see further esp. Konstan 1997a, 93-105. Emerging from an old discourse, the distinctive markers of distinction in the Hellenistic period are a now more socio-political conception of “frankness” (*παρρησία*), which contrasts with the flatly positive and silkily adaptive, uncritical behaviour of *kolakes*, as well as the degree of self-contribution, which contrasts with non-contribution of self, so non-mutuality of the self-mediation that characterises friendship (attested for instance in Pind. *Pyth.* 2.81-88; Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1127a7-10).

identities” that he displayed in his operation between city and emergent court.⁷ At face value, this observation is hardly surprising: the theoretical reflections that underpin this study would have any individual possess a multitude of contextual identities. Nevertheless, the observation raises an important point when translated into the terms of the constructions investigated in the previous chapters: The existence of a constant distributed and narrative struggle for translation into networks of collective agency forced those individuals that connected the two networks developed above, polis and emergent court, to develop and reproduce identities that allowed them to achieve control in relation to both these well-developed sets of societal control regimes.

The narratives studied so far have been considered as operating in socio-political networks that were fundamentally structured by discourses these narratives were specific manifestations of. As a result of their translation and growth dynamics, social networks are fundamentally connective, which constantly results in confrontations and perceived contingency in every-day interaction.⁸ The narrative constructions of network configurations we have analysed so far handle this fundamental dynamic of social life very differently: while the construction of the polis society in Theophrastus’ text sought to limit connectivity and bound the network, striving for domestic balance, the court narratives revealed an expansive scale-free structure hungry for growth and the constant expansion of boundaries. Borrowing Paschalis Paschidis’ words, the result of the interaction between these narratives was thus unsurprisingly “a combination most often resembling an explosive mixture rather than a harmonised blend.”⁹ Given the fundamental systemic similarities between these narratives, but also the crucially different network structures they were configured in, these observations finally suggest that a certain amount of schizophrenic ‘doubling’ was required on the part of the intermediary figures who translated between these networks to create control.

The interest here is in how this ‘doubling’, i.e. the systemic intermediarity of individuals and their embodiment of two control regimes, could itself contribute to societal control over the contingency that resulted from this fundamental

⁷ Wallace 2013, esp. 143, 152-154. To an extent, Adeimantos is an unusual case, as he was not only a royal *philos*, but also a formal official as one of the *probhedroi* of Demetrios Poliorketes’ short-lived Corinthian League, adding a layer of institutionalisation to his interactions vis-à-vis the cities that was not necessarily the norm (Agora XVI 122:4-8; see Billows 1990, 362-364, no. 1). Cf. similarly Paschidis 2008, esp. 483-486. See also Erskine 2011 for a similar case study of Persaios of Kition, obviously with greater emphasis on the role of philosophy as a second or third ‘identity’.

⁸ Holzer 2010, 71f.

⁹ Paschidis 2008, 486.

difference in societal control regime and the scale-free tendencies of these networks, especially the monarchical one. This societal control will be sought in the narrative reflections on intermediaries, the question being how the discourse about them could fundamentally help to control the contingency caused by the pluri-centric construction and macro-political volatility that made systemic intermediarity so essential.¹⁰ The extensive previous work on this subject shall thus be tentatively supplemented with a tentative systemic conceptualisation of this dynamic, specifically of the discursive significance of select narratives of ‘in-betweenness’ available for the period of the Diadochi. Accordingly this chapter investigates how the interactive ‘biographies’ of intermediary individuals might be understood to have functioned within the web of discourse between court and city as negotiations of control between these larger collective narratives of world organisation, using a couple of select individuals as examples.

How might one approach this question conceptually? The avenue I would like to suggest is to look to semiotics and draw upon Yuri M. Lotman’s seminal concept of the semiosphere to understand the societal significance of court and polis as semi-entangled systems of meaning in their contested narrative nexus, thereby extending a point made by Harrison White.¹¹ Lotman observed that “[...] in reality, clear and functionally mono-semantic systems do not exist in isolation. Their articulation is conditioned by heuristic necessity. Neither, taken individually, is in fact effective. They function only by being immersed in a specific semiotic continuum, which is filled with multi-variant semiotic models situated at a range of hierarchical levels.” This tiered and complex continuum of meaningful systems he describes in spatial terms as a ‘semiosphere’.¹² In view of the network terminology adopted here, a semiosphere can now of course be understood as a network, or rather as a set of interconnected and nested networks, but at the same time, this concept is helpful mainly because it qualifies the expectation of binary connectivity and growth that fundamentally characterises networks.¹³

¹⁰ This is therefore a modified, less absolute restatement of Herman’s case (1980-81, 122), who argued that the anecdotes are not simply to be discarded, but are traces of differing perceptions and of value judgements under stress. Cf. Bayliss 2011, 56-60 for the faultlines of ‘ideology’ in early Hellenistic Athens.

¹¹ Lotman’s conception parallels White 2008, 36f., 337, 345f., who similarly argues that a multiplicity of stories, both positive and negative serve as opportunities for coupling and decoupling into different identities and thereby provide meaning to the world in networks. This process is further produced also by the construction of semantic boundaries, which have to be constantly maintained and struggled for in interaction.

¹² Lotman, Yuri M. “On the Semiosphere”, in: *Σημειωτική - Sign Systems Studies* 1 (2005), 205-229, here 206.

¹³ Barabási 2002, 86-89. The basic assumption is thus a struggle for the maintenance of boundary in the face of connectivity, rather than the other way around.

Lotman continues by arguing that the semiosphere is the prerequisite of semi-osis and that it is defined by its boundary, which is pivotal to the generation of meaning from difference as it exists in both semiotic and non-semiotic space:¹⁴

*The border of semiotic space is the most important functional and structural position, giving substance to its semiotic mechanism. The border is a bilingual mechanism, translating external communications into the internal language of the semiosphere and vice versa. Thus, only with the help of the boundary is the semiosphere able to establish contact with non-semiotic and extra-semiotic spaces. As soon as we move into the realm of semantics, we have to appeal to an extrasemiotic reality. However, let us not forget, that this reality becomes for a given semiosphere 'a reality in itself' only insofar as it has been translated into the language of the semiosphere [...].*¹⁵

The beauty of this concept is now that, like the concept of network, it can be applied at all levels of analysis, as semiospheres consist of inter-connected groups of semiospheres.¹⁶ That means that a semiosphere is not only, for instance, the entirety of a language community, but can be employed to describe any group of entities distinguished by semiotic patterns of identity and difference. Lotman further holds that dialogue and traversal across a constructed boundary on the peripheries of semiotic systems generates new core meaning, a process that can be imagined now as broadly distributed also in time, rather than being rigidly synchronic and dichotomous:¹⁷ “The opposition of centre/periphery is replaced by the opposition of yesterday/today. An appreciation of internal and external space is not fixed. The very fact of the presence of a boundary is significant.”¹⁸

In narrative, Lotman concludes, experience of the boundary of the semiosphere is reflected in socially marginal figures and doubles, in mirroring and various other forms of symmetry that provide variations on identity and difference in that they are both identical and completely alien.¹⁹ Adapting Lotman’s

¹⁴ Lotman 2005, 208f.

¹⁵ Lotman 2005, 210.

¹⁶ Lotman 2005, 225: “Since all levels of the semiosphere – from human personality to the individual text to the global semiotic unity – are a seemingly inter-connected group of semiospheres, each of them is simultaneously both participant in the dialogue (as part of the semiosphere) and the space of dialogue (the semiosphere as a whole), in each can be seen manifestations of ‘rightism’ and ‘leftism’ [...]”

¹⁷ Lotman 2005, 215; 220: “The translation of information through these borders, a game between different structures and sub-structures; the continuous semiotic “invasions” to one or other structure in the “other territory” gives birth to meaning, generating new information.” (p. 215).

¹⁸ Lotman 2005, 212.

¹⁹ Lotman 2005, 220-225.

concept of the semiosphere to describe the systemic situation of the early Diadoch period therefore allows one to postulate that intermediaries, the Callonian translators between the constructed and bounded networks of meaning investigated in the previous chapters, would be rendered marginal outsiders that bring change and innovation into the centre of the sphere. I would accordingly argue that this kind of othering within the self is a defining characteristic of the systemic, inter-collective discourse of the Diadoch period that enables the productive adaptation to the ‘new’ world by both insisting on self-location and marking out common ground within narratives attached to the individuals that effect the interpenetration. In Harrison White’s theory, this kind of paradoxical plurality allows for added opportunities for engagement in networks of social action.²⁰ The following will therefore attempt to show how the agency of intermediaries, located in constant flux between the ‘stable centres’ of meaning, the citizen body and the king’s collectivised self, is societally – and apparently paradoxically – stabilised by the discursive option to both destabilise and enhance their status, reducing systemic contingency by allowing for the assertion of individual appraisal and collective appraisal on the various codes discussed so far.²¹

5.2 Harpalos

Before moving into the period of the Diadochi, it is worth considering a relatively well-documented episode from the tail end of Alexander’s reign, namely that of Harpalos, who excellently encapsulates the narrative constructions of interest here. Famous as the great king’s ‘minister of finance’ and one of the catalysts of the Lamian War, Harpalos was the key figure of “the greatest of all fourth-century political scandals” in Athens, making him a figure of contention between court and city.²² He is notorious in the sources for the discourse that surrounded the

²⁰ White 2008², 36f., 337.

²¹ Cf. Herman 1997, 205, 214f.; Davies 2002a, 12. An example of such contested narrative is most easily given by pointing to Demetrios Poliorketes: Plut. *Demetr.* 24.1-3 paints a picture of a predatory monster hunting pretty little boys, while 8.1-9.1 heaps him with praise. Demetrios is a special case of civic penetration by a king, which cannot be covered here in detail, but operates in similar categories. Accordingly the negative discourse about this king should be treated with extreme caution.

²² Hansen 1999², 293. Diod. 17.108.4 describes him as “entrusted with the custody of the treasures in Babylon and of the revenues” (τῶν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι θησαυρῶν καὶ τῶν προσόδων τῆν φύλακὴν πεπιστευμένος), which is a gloss, not a title. On Harpalos see fundamentally Berve 1926, 2, no. 143; Badian, Ernst. “Harpalus”, in: *JHS* 81 (1961), 16-43; Jaschinski, Siegfried. *Alexander und Griechenland unter dem Eindruck der Flucht des Harpalos*. Bonn 1981; Worthington, Ian. *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus. Rhetoric and Conspiracy in*

two flights from Alexander's service attributed to him, the first of which allegedly took him to Megara, whereas the second one led him to Athens, where his month-long stay resulted in the famous trial of Demosthenes and others, and finally to Crete, where he was murdered by one of his *philoi*, Thibron, who thereafter conducted a relatively short-lived campaign on this island and in Kyrene.²³ By contrast with the many other peripheral figures who attempted and failed to become Diadochi, such as Peithon and Ophellas,²⁴ he stands out in the record because he left a relatively extensive narrative trace that thematises the exercise of individual strategies of contingency control, as well as the demonstration of agency and individual collectivisation in an attempt to navigate between and translate the narratives investigated here at an inter-collective level.

Later Fourth-Century Athens. Ann Arbor 1992, 44-71; Worthington, Ian. "Alexander and Athens in 324/3: on the Greek Attitude to the Macedonian Hegemony", in: *Mediterranean Archaeology* 7 (1994), 45-51; Blackwell, Christopher W. *In the Absence of Alexander: Harpalos and the Failure of Macedonian Authority*. New York 1999; Müller, Sabine. *Maßnahmen der Herrschaftssicherung gegenüber der Makedonischen Opposition bei Alexander dem Großen*. Frankfurt a.M. 2003, 194-213; Heckel 2006, s.v. Harpalos. Much of the debate relates to his impact on Greece and how that in turn reflects on the state of Macedonian control in the lead-up to the Lamian War. Whereas Worthington considered the outcome of the Harpalos affair a result of firm Macedonian control in Greece, Blackwell (1999, esp. 134-151) has challenged the assertion that it attests strong Macedonian authority. While one can certainly read the Harpalos affair as a renegotiation of power relations in the network between Macedon and Athens, the outcome of the Lamian War shows that the coercive power Macedon could wield in scenarios of collapsing power relations remained intact even after Alexander's death, roughly until the death of Antipater.

- ²³ The flights are attested in Diod. 17.108.6-8; Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.6f.; and most significantly at Athen. 13.595f. On the problem of the first flight, which has attracted many interpretations, see Badian, Ernst. "The First Flight of Harpalos", in: *Historia* 9 (1960), 245-246; Jaschinski 1981, 10-18; Carney, Elizabeth D. "The First Flight of Harpalos Again", in: *CJ* 77 (1982), 9-11; Worthington, Ian. "The First Flight of Harpalos Reconsidered", in: *G&R* 31 (1984), 161-169; Kingsley, Bonnie M. "Harpalos in the Megarid and the Grain Shipments from Cyrene", in: *ZPE* 66 (1986), 165-177 (tentatively accepted by Blackwell 1999, 11); Worthington, Ian. "The Chronology of the Harpalos Affair", in: *Symbolae Osloenses* 61 (1986), 63-76, who criticised parts of Badian's reconstruction. Elizabeth Carney in particular has also dismantled a number of implausible interpretations. Historically speaking, I am in favour of Bonnie Kingsley's argument that the first flight was a mission for Alexander, which was recast in the later discourse. On the second flight see esp. Badian 1961 (with p. 43 for the chronology); Jaschinski 1981, 23-43; Blackwell 1999, 11-16. On Thibron see Berve 1926, 2, no. 372; Ehrenberg, Victor. "Thibron [2]", in: *RE* VI A,1 (1936), 275f. and Heckel 2006, s.v. Thibron. His 'career' is attested by Diod. 17.108.8; 18.19.2, and Arrian FGrH 156 F 9.
- ²⁴ Heckel 2006, s.v. Peithon [3] and Ophellas [2].

In the extant sources – notably Diodorus and Athenaeus’ quotations from Theopompus and various plays, all texts that have their roots in contemporary discourse – Harpalos is mainly associated with three themes in addition to his flightiness:²⁵ physical deformity, money, and *hetairai*, so social actors that are constructed as very literally embodying a blend of payment and love codes.²⁶ The first of these themes is properly tangible only in a brief note by Arrian that describes why he was made “treasurer” (ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων); the reason was that “his body was unfit for matters of war” (αὐτῷ τὸ σῶμα ἐς τὰ πολέμια ἀχρεῖον ἦν).²⁷ One is therefore confronted with an individual who is portrayed as being of very noble birth, as having been a childhood friend of Alexander’s, and as having shared his future king’s exile, but who did not fit the Homeric mould, as he lacked its central heroic element.²⁸ The discourse about treasurers, on the other hand, could of course be thoroughly negative, likening them to eunuchs, which adds another element of bodily emasculation to the imaginary of this individual, all encapsulated in one line of Arrian.²⁹

²⁵ I generally agree with Jaschinski 1981, 10, that the tradition on Harpalos is fundamentally distorted, whether by Ptolemy or not is impossible to determine. Serious historians routinely dismiss such stories as nonsense, see e.g. Kingsley 1986, 168f.; Billows 1990, 387.

²⁶ Diod. 17.108.4-8; Athen. 13.586d; 596a-b; Plut. *Phoc.* 22.1f.; Paus. 1.37.5.; Hyp. 5.13-15, 20f. All extant speeches of Dinarchos relate to the Harpalos trials, see Worthington 1992, v, 41-82. The comic poets are Alexis, Philemon, and Python of Katane. Theopompus is edited as FGrH 115; see on the letters to Alexander Flower, Michael A. *Theopompus of Chios. History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century BC.* Oxford 1997, 39f., 258-262, who takes the letter as genuine. I see no real reason to be as sceptical as Daniel Ogden (2011, n. 34), though it will of course have been edited. On the tension of ambivalence inherent in the word *hetaira* that could mean anything from ‘female friend’ to ‘whore’ see Konstan 1997, 47f.

²⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.6.

²⁸ See Heckel 2006, 129. On the Homeric warrior as a Macedonian ideal lived by Alexander (Plut. *Alex.* 15.4f.) see e.g. Palagia, Olga. “Hephaestion’s Pyre and the Royal Hunt of Alexander”, in: A. Brian Bosworth and Elizabeth J. Baynham (eds.). *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction.* Oxford 2000, 167-206.

²⁹ Beginning with Thersites at Hom. *Il.* 2.211-277, physical deformity marks the socio-political other. On treasurers as emasculated see Plut. *Demetr.* 25.4-5. The same discourse is tangible regarding Philetairos, founder of the Attalid kingdom, whom Strab. 13.4.1 and Paus. 1.8.1 portray as a eunuch – a tradition that may have existed purely because he was left in charge of substantial sums at Pergamon by Lysimachos. The tradition that his mother was a hetaira (Athen. 13.577b) goes in a similar direction, and places him in illustrious company. See Hansen, Esther V. *The Attalids of Pergamon.* Ithaca, N.Y. 1947, 15-22, esp. 16. Finally note that Strab. 16.2.40 links γαζοφυλάκιον (“treasury”) to tyranny.

The second theme is far more amply documented, as treasurers obviously deal with the extraction, storage and distribution of money. If Bonnie Kingsley's argument is correct, Harpalos was known to the Greek cities, especially at Megara and Athens, already from 334 BC as a negotiator they dealt with in claiming subsidised grain supplies in times of existential crisis. Throughout his career, he was similarly trusted with and distributed immense amounts of money, both during his stay in Megara and thereafter, tangible for instance when he sent staggering amounts of arms to Alexander in 326 BC, acting in his capacity as one of the king's links to the West.³⁰ As a consequence of these actions, he seems to have been honoured by the Athenians with citizenship, possibly already in the early stages of Alexander's campaign – the benefaction certainly seems to have been related to the grain supply.³¹ The general association both within the court and in Athens was therefore that of an unbelievably rich individual who skilfully juggled immense sums in extracting tribute and organising logistics, but also as a generous benefactor, both local and throughout the Greek world.³²

Thirdly, he is said in various sources to have subsequently attracted from Athens two *betairai*, Pythionike and Glykera.³³ Both women are said to have received lavish presents and to have been the subject of cult; he also apparently had a daughter by Pythionike.³⁴ After Pythionike's death, Harpalos conducted a funerary procession and had two tombs built, one at Athens on the road to Eleusis, the other at Babylon, spending huge sums and instituting cultic honours for Pythionike Aphrodite.³⁵

³⁰ Curt. 9.3.21; Diod. 17.108.4-8. Kingsley 1986 argued that the first 'flight' was a mission for Alexander, possibly related to supplies and the organisation of subsidized grain in 334/3 to combat Persian naval pressure. This explains Harpalos' re-acceptance (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.7) and excellent contacts at Athens (Plut. *Phoc.* 22). The amount of money necessarily involved in the negotiations surrounding SEG IX, 2 strikes me as a particularly strong argument.

³¹ Diod. 17.108.6.

³² On the significance of Harpalos' actual activities and administrative competences see Diod. 17.108.4; Arr. *Anab.* 3.19.7. Besides the gift of grain to Athens and possibly other cities discussed above (Athen. 13.596a-b), Athen. 13.595c-d may suggest euergetic activity in Rhosus and Tarsos, as well as Babylon.

³³ On these see Berve 1926, 2, nos. 231 and 676; Heckel 2006, s.v. Glycera and Pythionice.

³⁴ Plut. *Phoc.* 22.1f.

³⁵ Athen. 13.594e-f (=Poseidonius FGrH 87 F 14), 595a-c (=Theopompus FGrH 115 F 253). This parallels the cult for Phila Aphrodite mentioned by Athenaeus (254a and 255c) as having been instituted by Adeimantos of Lampsakos and the cults attributed to Demetrios Poliorketes (see Wheatley 2003; Ogden 2011, 227). On the tombs cf. Dillon, Matthew. *Girls and Women in Classical Greek Religion*. London and New York 2002, 196, who does not mention the story of Gyges of Lydia building a tomb for a

What can one make of these three themes? In order to arrive at an interpretation, one must first return to the basic element of his flightiness, which provides the core narrative tension in conjunction with the 5000 talents he took from Alexander's treasury at Babylon. As Ernst Badian masterfully showed, the flight must be considered in the context of Alexander's return from the East and the "reign of terror", which, in the terms of this study, equates to his reassertion of his translation, which had been increasingly breaking down, especially following the rumours of his death after his severe injury at the hands of the Mallians.³⁶ Considered simply as a purely rational action, fleeing from Alexander made perfect sense in this context, given the behaviour Harpalos had probably demonstrated and the socio-political faultlines that might potentially be levelled against him within court society.³⁷ Nevertheless, leaving the king's self was of course an act of open defiance, an attempt at imposing an individual translation along monarchical lines. Going to Athens was similarly sensible, since, as Diodorus notes, they could conceivably be expected to accommodate him, based on his citizenship and the good relations he cultivated with members of the political elite, and might even be able to protect him militarily.³⁸ The conflict within the city that his surprising appearance exacerbated is tangible in the trials that resulted from the Harpalos affair, which consisted in allegations of bribery (and therefore treachery) against a number of prominent politicians, including Demades and Demosthenes, and is symptomatic of the conflicted translations of the time; the ill-coordinated involvement of Olympias, Antipater, and Philoxenos, *hyparchos* of the Asian coast, further corroborates this impression of chaos.³⁹ Harpalos thus appears as an intermediary figure that exacerbated existing faultlines in both semiospheres under discussion here: In Lotman's terms, his appearance in Athens wrought change and transported 'innovation' from one sphere into another, traversing the thin boundary between them via the identity he had gained on the codes of honour and money.⁴⁰

How did the semiospheres respond to this transgression? I would argue that he was transformed into a narrative vehicle of contingency control. A scrap of

betaira (Athen. 13.573a-b), which stems from Klearchos' *Erotica* (F 29 Wehrli) and renders the passage a parallel early Hellenistic discourse.

³⁶ Badian 1961, 19-21. These rumours are attested by Diod. 17.108.4; Curt. 10.1.1-5. The source for Alexander's injury is Arr. *Anab.* 6.9.3-10.3.

³⁷ Badian 1961, 19-23; cf. more recently Müller 2003, 204-206.

³⁸ Curt. 10.2.1; Diod. 17.108.6; Arr. *Ta met' Alex.* 16. See e.g. Müller 2003, 205.

³⁹ The surprise is attested, at least tentatively, by Hyp. 5.18. See Badian 1961, 36; Whitehead 2000, 359-364. On gifts becoming bribes in accusations of treachery see Mitchell 1997, 181-186. On Philoxenos see Heckel 2006, s.v. Philoxenus [1] and [2].

⁴⁰ Lotman 2005, 215-220.

information preserved by Athenaeus sheds some interesting light on how this was done. According to Athenaeus, the otherwise unknown Python of Katane apparently wrote a miniature satyr play entitled *Agēn* (“leader”, named for Alexander himself) about Harpalos’ flight that transformed him into a marginalised, monstrous figure using the four themes identified so far.⁴¹ This play, Athenaeus says, was performed in a Dionysiac context at the Hydaspes, after Harpalos had fled to the sea and departed.⁴² This location has proved a bone of contention for reasons of chronology – Harpalos fled in 324, but the army was at the Hydaspes in 326 – and Lawrence Tritle has recently reaffirmed arguments that the play was in fact performed at Athens, rejecting the extensive older argument by Bruno Snell that attempted to justify Athenaeus’ location.⁴³ Overall, I agree with Tritle that Snell was probably incorrect in placing the play in 326 BC: why bother to make fun of Harpalos when he had just sent reinforcements and weapons?⁴⁴ However, Tritle’s theory has problems as well. The two fragments of exposition preserved by Athenaeus seem strongly in favour of Alexander and generate humour from the prospect of Athens’ ruin (δλεθρος) and the city’s scarcity of food. This was an integral part of the nexus of pressures and dependencies that afforded gifts of grain their great impact. Furthermore, both speakers of the extant passage of dialogue are definitely non-Athenians, as indicated by their use of pronouns.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Athen. 13.586d; 596a-b. On Python see Berve 1926, II no. 339; Stoessl, Franz. S.v. “Python [5]”, in: *RE* XXIV (1963), 613-615; Snell, Bruno. *Szenen aus griechischen Dramen*. Göttingen 1971, 110-137; Sutton, Dana F. *The Greek Satyr Play*. Meisenheim 1980, 85-91; Cipolla, Paolo. *Poeti minori del dramma satiresco: testo critico, traduzione e commento*. Amsterdam 2003, 333-361, esp. 333f.; Heckel 2006, s.v. Python [1]. The alternative place of origin given by Athen. 2.50f (Byzantion) is probably due to confusion with another Python, an orator associated with Philipp II (Suda s.v. Πύθων (Adler Pi 3139); Heckel 2006, 240).

⁴² Athen. 13.595e-f.

⁴³ Athen. 13.596a-b. Snell 1971, 110-121, esp. 118f.; Tritle, Lawrence A. “Soldiers and Artists, Friends and Enemies”, in: Heckel and Tritle (eds.) 2009, 121-140, here 128.

⁴⁴ These reinforcements are attested at Curt. 9.3.21. Though Snell’s interpretation offers a good explanation for the first passage – and the setting may well be Babylon – I see no reason to assume that the action involving the *magoi* who summon the soul of Pythonike for the dejected Harpalos could not be a narrative about the past, designed to set the scene. Snell further makes the dialogue passages present tense, when they are past tense. The setting is thus between the death of Pythonike, the erection of the temple, and the arrival of Glykera. As Snell himself admits (p. 119 n. 39), there is no parallel for his interpretation of φυγή as self-imposed exile to a temple as a suppliant, making a reference to the flight to Athens far more likely. Cf. similarly Sutton 1980a, 78-80, who nevertheless accepts his translation.

⁴⁵ Athen. 13.596a-b; cf. similarly Snell 1971, 116. On the food shortages in the 320s see Oliver 2007, 48-64. Even if one accepts the arguments of Worthington (1994),

Note finally that Athenaeus calls the play a *σατυρικόν δράματιον* (“miniature satyr play”), which does not suggest to me a performance as part of the great Athenian festivals; the only useful parallel I could find is in Plutarch’s life of Demosthenes, where the context is a farcical personal attack, conceivably involving a sexual pun.⁴⁶ If the play was performed at Athens, this would therefore have to have occurred within a small-scale but strongly pro-Alexander environment at a time when Alexander was very distant, but Harpalos was somehow already a factor. This does not strike me as eminently likely.

While it remains impossible to fully and convincingly reconcile Athenaeus’ data with our other information, it nevertheless seems somewhat more likely to me that the play was performed in Alexander’s environment – possibly at Ekbatana in 324 BC – as this was the location that seemed plausible to Athenaeus, who may not only have had more of the text available, but was evidently aware of a tradition that made Alexander himself the text’s author – an argument that makes sense only if the play was indeed heavily in his favour and its performance located in his environs in Athenaeus’ source.⁴⁷ That said, it is of course possible to argue that Athenaeus made a mistake and that the play was performed at Athens and simply *set* either in Babylon or in Alexander’s camp – whatever the solution may be, the text strongly echoes other plays, suggesting that Python knew his drama – though I would not take this as an indicator that it was performed in Athens.⁴⁸

Now that the background has been established, what does the text actually do with Harpalos? As Dana Sutton noted, the appellation given to Har-παλ-ος in one of the fragments quoted by Athenaeus, Παλλιδης, is highly ambivalent, allowing

mocking the Athenians for bringing ruin upon themselves by accepting the gifts of traitors brokered by courtesans seems an unnecessarily dangerous thing to do in the heated climate of 324/3, even if this was put in the mouths of outsiders.

⁴⁶ Athen. 13.595e; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 4.4.

⁴⁷ Athen. 2.50f; 13.596e. On the celebrations at Ekbatana see Arr. *Anab.* 7.14.1; this location was advocated by Körte, Alfred. “Der Harpalische Prozess”, in: *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 53 (1924), 217–231, here 220f., and accepted by Worthington 1986, 64, and Heckel 2006, 130, who notes that Plut. *Alex.* 50.4–6 shows similar political lampooning, here in a symposium context. The geographical problem can potentially be solved by supposing that the name may refer to the *Medus Hydaspes* (Verg. *Georg.* 4.211), but Snell is right to criticise this as unlikely (1971, 120f.). Kingsley 1986, 168 plausibly suggests that Athenaeus never saw the original play, but was already using it as a fragment of evidently dubious authenticity. The rather imprecise language bears out her point, but from the explanatory notes it seems that he still had more information than we do today, otherwise he would not have been able to identify Pallides as Harpalos.

⁴⁸ Ogden 2011, 226, takes this to indicate an Athenian performance, but I feel that even an Athenian audience would be hard pressed to discern the intertextuality he traces.

for interpretation as a derivative of either *πάλλω*, *φαλλός*, *Παλλάς*, or *παλλακίς* (“to shake/sway, penis, Athena, or concubine”), while of course also playing on the man’s name.⁴⁹ The plurality of possible meanings draws on all these discourses about Harpalos’ behaviour as a transgressor of boundaries in terms of flightiness, physicality, money, and women, elegantly branding him as an outsider in physical, sexual, and economic terms and bringing his ‘impure’ dependency on a nexus of payment and sexuality together with the weakness of his body.⁵⁰ If this text was indeed performed before the extended court, so in a society narratively located within the distributed self of a monarch, Harpalos, as an individual who had, as we have seen, just conducted his own translation of such a collectivised individual ‘society’ on the payment code and was now engaged in transferring this society to another established narrative of power, that of Athens, obviously figured as a threat to the societal dynamics constructed, as did his alleged glorification of his courtesans as queens and goddesses.⁵¹ In his letter to Alexander, Theopompus is quite explicit in stating that Harpalos had violated the bond of friendship that tied him to Alexander and proceeds to write him out of the community of the king’s self, marked by *philia*, by branding him an emasculated individual engaging not with a respectable, free-born *hetaira*, but enthralled by a triple *pornē*, thus rendering him the slave of a slave, topping even the potential *pallakē* association of *Pallidēs*.⁵²

⁴⁹ Athen. 13.595f-596a. Sutton, Dana F. “Harpalus as Pallides”, in: *RhM* 123 (1980), 96. Accepted by Ogden 2011, 225f., but cf. his n. 37. Berve 1926, 2, 76 n. 3, probably regarded *πάλλω* as the origin of the appellation and linked it to Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.6, but the shaking can also be one of political allegiance: after all, Athen. 13.595f also uses *φύγη*. It is interesting to note that no play on *ἀρπαλέος* (“greedy, devouring”) is attested, which would have fit perfectly – too obvious, perhaps.

⁵⁰ Intercourse with women, especially out of wedlock, theoretically incurred pollution that could become situationally relevant. Evidence is provided for instance by the *lex sacra* of Kyrene (SEG IX 72:12-15) and the *lex sacra* of Metropolis (I.Ephesos 3401: 3-6), both dated to the late fourth century BC. See on this Dillon 2002, 193f.

⁵¹ Athen. 13.586c-d, 595c-f. See Ogden 2011, 224-227. On Hellenistic cults of queens cf. Caneva, Stefano G. “Queens and Ruler Cults in Early Hellenism: Festivals, Administration, and Ideology”, in: *Kernos* 25 (2012), 75-101, who shows for Arsinoe II Philadelphos (p. 80-84) that the official promotion of her cult and activity by private individuals went hand in hand, with the result that a purely one-sided, top-down dynamic need not be the whole truth also in the case of Harpalos, depending on the energetic activity actually exhibited by Pythonike and Glykera. The same is true of the cult instituted by Adeimantos at Athens (Athen. 6.254a, 255c).

⁵² Athen. 13.595c. On the wide social acceptance and concomitant agency and wealth of *hetairai* see Cohen, Edward. “Athenian Prostitution as a Liberal Profession”, in: Geoffrey W. Bakewell and James Sickinger (eds.). *Gestures. Essays in Ancient History, Literature, and Philosophy presented to Alan L. Boegehold*. Oxford 2003, 214-236, esp. 220, who emphasizes the conceptual distinction between *πέρηνμι* (“I sell”) and *εταίρω* (“I

The added element of Pallas Athena in the name further makes Harpalos a specifically Athenian marginal figure, i.e. the son of Athena, in a play that mocks the Athenians as nibbling on fennel and having to accept payments of grain in exchange for a *hetaira*, which will simultaneously be their death warrant.⁵³ Overall, the overwhelming impression is one of narrative marginalisation of Harpalos, who is ejected from the king's self despite and because of the immense agency he had demonstrated.⁵⁴

As we have seen, this marginalisation operates on civic codes. Harpalos is transformed into an Athenian, but therein becomes the anti-citizen, a limping, lecherous *doulos*, emasculated and deviant in his embodiment of the double civic formula for greed and decay, namely expensive fish and expensive sex, as traced by James Davidson.⁵⁵ His construction as an unfree non-male thus mirrors the cowardice the “flights” (φυγαί) already suggest – it is surely no coincidence that Arrian gives a list of *three* flights, although the motives behind them are in fact very different.⁵⁶ He therefore emerges as an anti-Alexander, destined to end his life stabbed in the back by his own friend and betrayed, like Eumenes, by the all too connective payment code he put his stock in to gain an army and the affection of others.⁵⁷ As an element of contested narrative discourse, Harpalos' agency is therefore reworked in the narrative of the satyr play and the wider tradition, and relegated to the margins through association with the civic and its old discourses of deviance.⁵⁸ This construction is performatively countered by hostile laughter

accompany”), which consists in the distinction between equality and subjection, but also notes that an individual's status in terms of *oikos* was crucial rather than the activities and jobs performed. Cf. also the very similar article idem. “Free and Unfree Sexual Work: An Economic Analysis of Athenian Prostitution”, in: Christopher A. Faraone and Laura K. McClure (eds.). *Prostitutes and Courtesans in the Ancient World*. Wisconsin 2006, 95-124, esp. 103. This was noted already by Mossé, Claude. *La Femme dans la Grèce antique*. Paris 1983, 63. On courtesans at the Hellenistic courts see fundamentally Ogden 1999, 215-269, who notes their high status by birth (p. 247). On triple slavery as particularly damning cf. Soph. *OT*. 1061f.

⁵³ Athen. 13.596b. This was the preferred interpretation of Sutton 1980b.

⁵⁴ The Athenian impression of the immense agency of Harpalos is an important minor point made by Badian 1961, 23 and 28, based on Hyp. 5.19, which is probably exaggerated but may have had a core of truth for a certain time. See also Jaschinski 1981, 38; Whitehead 2000, 418.

⁵⁵ Diodorus has him extravagantly import a great quantity of rare fish from the Red Sea: Diod. 17.108.4; cf. e.g. Athen. 8.339a, d-e, which combines Pythionike and other *hetairai* with fish. See Davidson 1997, 3-20, 112-120; Ogden 1999, 266-268; Wilkins, John. *The Boastful Chef. The Discourse of Food in Ancient Comedy*. Oxford 2000, 36-38.

⁵⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.6; Diod. 17.108.6.

⁵⁷ Diod. 17.108.6-8.

⁵⁸ Cf. also Sutton 1980a, 80, who similarly notes the real threat of Harpalos in 324 BC.

that reproduces the integrity of the king's collective self, possibly in an atmosphere that also emphasised Alexander's wealth, as it existed during the festival at Ekbatana.⁵⁹ Alternatively, however, this would work also in an Athenian context, as established civic discourses are used to marginalise an invader figure, whose sudden manifestation of agency in the form of troops and money had, due to the transgressive identity of naturalised citizenship, thoroughly threatened the city's harmony and even broken the alliance between Demosthenes and Hyperides.⁶⁰

Harpalos therefore wonderfully exemplifies how intermediary figures – whose immense deferred agency causes them to be constructed both as loci of contingency and its control that connect and grow networks of meaning – come to be coupled with narratives of marginalisation and othering that operate on similarly connective social codes. The societal effect, it would seem, is to assert the systemically integral collective structures of control on the inter-collective stage by obfuscating the faultlines and fissures within collective narrative cohesion that can be potentially deepened by such liminal figures. This is accomplished by producing a discursive doubling of these individuals that productively destabilises them and therein provides new avenues for control, while other value discourses allow for the maintenance of connectivity at the same time.⁶¹

⁵⁹ I therefore strongly agree with Daniel Ogden's (2011, 226) sentiment that these are "fantasies spun around the relationship between Harpalos and Pythionike, and have little to tell us of what actually passed between them."

⁶⁰ Hyp. 5.13-15, 20f., 25, casts Harpalos' money as being a bribe that invades the polis, contests friendship and causes μεταβολή ("transformative change"). See Whitehead 2000, 424f. and ad loc. See Herman 1987, 73-81, on the tension inherent between gifting and the construction of the polis. David Whitehead further conjectures that Harpalos may have used Demosthenes as a mediator into the institutional framework of the polis by lending or donating money to the theoric fund (Dem. 19.259-66; Din. 3.7-10), see Whitehead 2000, 401f.

⁶¹ Harpalos was clearly enmeshed in the Athenian elite. Badian 1961, 34 notes the entanglement of Demosthenes, Phocion and Demades in the court of Alexander via *philia* and the consequences of said entanglement within the polis. As for Harpalos, Charikles, a kinsman of Phocion, organised the construction of the tomb at the Kephisos and raised Harpalos' daughter after his departure and death (Plut. *Phoc.* 22.1f., Paus. 1.37.5). Comedy engaged with Harpalos (Athen. 13.595c-d) and Hyp. 5.19 remarks on the influence and attention Harpalos commanded; after all he had allegedly been able to enter the city contrary to the people's decree by greasing the palms of Philokles, *strategos* of the harbour (Din. 3.1f. with Worthington 1992, 43f., 315). Finally Pollux 10.159 mentions a defence of Harpalos by Hyperides, on which see Whitehead 2000, 356. For the theory see White 2008², 36f., 337.

5.3 Courtesans as city-takers

Before considering the evidence relating to other intermediary figures attested for the period of the Diadochi, it seems worth following up one of the themes introduced by Harpalos, namely that of the *hetairai*, who are prominently associated with Hellenistic kings, among the Diadochi especially with Demetrios Poliorketes.⁶² In the *Agên*, Glykera was linked to an exchange transaction between the starving Athenians and Harpalos, and is therein converted into a medium of exchange for grain, i.e. Athens appears as selling her to Harpalos and further paying with its own ruin.⁶³ Glykera is therefore painted as a medium between Athens and the monster, as one half of an exchange relationship, and thus as brokering valuable, existentially crucial contact.⁶⁴ As studies of the court have amply demonstrated, the construction of a society as operating within the collectivised self of an individual accords individuals with access to the person of that individual great control, based on their ability to position themselves as brokers within the network structure.⁶⁵ Just as the emergent queens accordingly gain almost unprecedented levels of prominence in the Diadoch period – with the exception of

⁶² On the early Hellenistic interplay between comedy and court see esp. Lape 2004, 59-67 and *passim*, who emphasises the sexual dimension of the parallelisation of Hellenistic king and impotent *miles gloriosus* type. On the *hetairai* see esp. Ogden 1999, esp. 221-223, 278-281; idem. “Courtesans and the Sacred in the Early Hellenistic Courts”, in: Martin Lindner and Tanja Scheer (eds.), *Tempelprostitution im Altertum. Fakten und Fiktionen*. Berlin 2009, 344-376, esp. 352-360; idem 2011. The prominence of *hetairai* in the record may be partly due to Klearchos of Soloi and his *Erotica*. Cf. further McClure, Laura. “Subversive Laughter: the Sayings of Courtesans in Book 13 of Athenaeus’ *Deipnosophistae*”, in: *AJPh* 124:2 (2003), 259-294, who highlights the discursive control exercised by *hetairai* in Athenaeus’ verbal imaginary and its relation to the construction of male agency in the Second Sophistic. On the use Athenaeus makes of these characters see Henry, Madeleine. “Athenaeus the Ur-Pornographer”, in: David Braund and John Wilkins (eds.), *Athenaeus and his World. Reading Greek Culture in the Roman Empire*. Exeter 2000, 503-510, who brings out the fake female point of view he adopts that casts women as objects of men’s sexual pleasure, to be consumed like food. Accordingly the *hetairai* are confined to a discourse that entangles sex and money, is veiled in puns, and makes them connective via both these media.

⁶³ Athen. 13.596b: Γλυκέρως ὁ σίτος οὗτος ἦν: ἔσται δ’ ἴσως/ / αὐτοῖσιν ὀλέθρου κοῦχ ἑταίρας ἀρραβῶν. “This grain was Glykera’s: but maybe it will be a down-payment on their (the Athenians’) destruction and not the hetaira’s (down-payment).” The term ἀρραβῶν denotes a bribe or money a purchaser pays down at his own risk (cf. Snell 1971, 115).

⁶⁴ For a queen being coveted as a patron by a powerful *philos* cf. Bing, Peter. “Posidippus and the Admiral: Kallikrates of Samos in the Milan Epigrams”, in: *GRBS* 2002:3, 243-266, here 246f. See further Strootman 2014, 109f.

⁶⁵ See e.g. Duindam 1994, 86; Strootman 2014, 150-152.

Herodotus,⁶⁶ who of course engages with similar non- and early polis dynamics – so do *hetairai*, as they provide the illusion of sexual control, but also distribute individual agency and accordingly broker contact. The potential multiplicity of roles and appellations a woman might bear at court as identified by Daniel Ogden thus parallels the impression one gains of the *philoí* – an observation that is hardly coincidental, but reveals a systemic dynamic and hence deserves analysis.⁶⁷

However, unlike queens, *hetairai* are strongly civic constructs that by definition ride a contested line between *eleutheria* and *douleia*, between *oikos* and *koimos*, rooted in a nexus of the body, money, and sex. All this potentially grants the most beautiful and most variously skilled enormous narrative agency and freedom of connectivity, but also productive ambivalence of status, which of course inspired a thorny thicket of narratives.⁶⁸ This tense configuration makes *hetairai* powerful systemic broker figures and channels of normative communication also in the Diadoch period, which is fundamentally characterised, as we have seen, by a struggle for control between individualisation and collectivisation, for accommodation of the individual. As narrative figures, these women embody this struggle in that they seem to represent a very simple logic of carnal conquest equals control, but are also both potentially attainable and contested, since they already conceptually exist between *oikoi* and operate on a reciprocal, meritocratic gifting code always in danger of slipping into a payment dynamic.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ See Blok 2002 for this observation. Her overall argument is that Herodotus uses women as markers of othering. On queens see Ramsey 2013, 20-37; cf. Strootman 2014, 108.

⁶⁷ On the difficulties of distinguishing between the two categories at court see Ogden 1999, 215-217, who notes the plurality of roles attested for some of the women at the Ptolemaic court (217f). On courtesans as queens see Ogden 1999, 231-237; idem 2011, where he highlights the flexibility of status and the difficulties of the source tradition in determining marital status.

⁶⁸ *Hetairai* could be described as being not slaves, but free women (Athen. 13.571c). See for discussion Davidson 1997, 109-136; Cohen 2003, 215-220, 228-231. See further Ogden 1999, 218f. for the extreme degree of fictionalisation and de-historicisation the tradition underwent. The fluidity of status is part of the spice of the matter. On the *oikos* boundary see Ael. *VH.* 12.17 where Lamia plays with Demetrios Poliorketes on its basis (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.10).

⁶⁹ Unlike *pornai* and *pallakai*, *hetairai* are sequentially bound to individuals based on *eunoia* and gifting, so a form of *philia* that is constantly under stress (Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.4-18; see Davidson 1997, 111-117, 275-277). As a rule, they do not engage with groups, as is illustrated by the only partial exception provided by the story of Phryne, who allegedly charmed the Areopagus into letting her off with her nakedness (Athen. 13.590d-591f). Ogden 1999, 232-236 traces the loyalty of these women, as well as a number of instances where *hetairai* seem to have switched lovers, supporting their sequential relations.

The best example of this discursive construction is Lamia, who occurs prominently as a *hetaira* of Demetrios Poliorketes and exemplifies the entanglement of monstrosity, sex, and money/gifting in the narrative figurations of these women.⁷⁰ The fourth-century construction of *hetairai* as monstrous is amply attested in Athenaeus, where they are likened to arrays of mythical monsters ranging from the Chimaera to Skylla and Karybdis; the transparent reason is that they devour and destroy men, both physically and as regards the content of their distributed self, impinging on marriage and wealth.⁷¹ Some of their nicknames also attest to this discursive construction of the *hetaira* as a monster: Lamia herself is named either for a fish that mated ‘doggy-style’, which would perfectly encapsulate the entangled discourse reconstructed by James Davidson, or for a vampiric and child-devouring female creature of mythological pedigree – or, perhaps most likely, both. Leaina (“the Lioness”), another courtesan of Demetrios, similarly echoes the discourse about the royal hunter vs. the wild.⁷² The discourse about Lamia and Demetrios Poliorketes accordingly constructs her as making him ‘wild’ in his disregard for norm, and as inflicting love-bites upon his body that compare but unfavourably to other warriors’ scars.⁷³ Daniel Ogden’s observation that several of the non-Attic courtesans attested for Hellenistic kings are said to come from Thessaly finally tentatively suggests a similar discursive construction of these

⁷⁰ The sources are Plut. *Demetr.* 16.3f., 24.1, 25.6, 27; Athen. 3.101e; Clem. Al. *Protr.* 4.48; Alci. 4.16; Diog. Laert. 5.76. She is discussed by Ogden 1999, 219-268 *passim*; Ogden 2011, 228-231, and especially by Wheatley 2003.

⁷¹ See e.g. Athen. 13.558a-e, where *hetairai* are compared to a whole range of mythical monsters in a fragment of the fourth century comic poet Anaxilas (*Neottis* F 22). Cf. Ogden 1999, 249f. and the list given by Schneider, Karl. S.v. “Hetairai”, in: *RE* 8 (1913), 1331-1372, here 1357-1371, esp. 1366f.

⁷² On nicknames see Ogden 1999, 219, 247-252. The fish is mentioned by Aristot. *Hist. Anim.* 540b18 and described as being unusual as it mates in this fashion (see Arata, Luigi. “Cleone e Lamia: un passo di Aristofane mal interpretato”, in: *Maia* 63:1 (2011), 43-49). On the mythical Lamia see esp. Diod. 20.41.2-6 and the full discussion of the name by Ogden 1999, 249f.; Wheatley 2003, 30f. with n. 8; Sommerstein, Alan H. *Talking about Laughter and Other Studies in Greek Comedy*. Oxford 2009, 155-175, here 155. Leaina is attested at Athen. 6.252f-253b, though Plut. *Demetr.* 27.3 would in fact fit Leaina better, as the ‘injuries’ inflicted by Lamia are being unfavourably compared to Lysimachos’ heroic scars inflicted by a lion (on the lion hunt see Seyer 2007, 106-108; on Leaina see Ogden 1999, 150). A third courtesan of Demetrios who exhibits a monstrous name is Mania (“madness”, attested at Plut. *Demetr.* 27.4, see Ogden 1999, 248f. for discussion).

⁷³ Plut. *Demetr.* 27.1-3. Cf. Wheatley 2003, 36, who links Demetrios’ behaviour after 307 to Lamia, but seems too prepared to accept that Plutarch is telling us ‘what actually happened’ even after his nuanced discussion of the problems with such an interpretation, such as the obvious parallel between Lamia and Antony’s Kleopatra (35).

women as Others, in this case as Thessalian witches, though I would not press the point.⁷⁴

The wealth of Hellenistic royal courtesans is similarly amply attested and operated (or struggled to operate) not on a payment code, so a subordinate and zero-sum relationship, but on the productive gifting code that implemented meritocratic order.⁷⁵ Plutarch explicitly attests this construction in a reported conversation about Lamia's virtues and gifting between Demetrios and Mania, where he has Demetrios remark on the gifts he receives.⁷⁶ Lamia herself is said to have donated a stoa to Sikyon, which was of course re-founded by Demetrios Poliorketes as Demetrias, and therefore renders her a benefactor of the Sikyonians.⁷⁷ The sums of money she disposes of in Plutarch's and Athenaeus' brief anecdotes are immense, including 250 talents allegedly extracted from Athens for the purchase of "unguent" (σμήγμα) and the sums required to host a legendary banquet recorded by Lynkeos of Samos, Duris' brother.⁷⁸ It seems unlikely that this kind of impactful banquet would have been a purely 'private' affair when hosted within a city currently housing an army, given the generous behaviour exhibited by the Antigonids and the construction of the king as nourishing his people.⁷⁹ In this context, Plutarch mentions that a comic poet, probably an Athenian, described Lamia as a "city-taker" (Ἐλέπολις), which echoes classic tragedy, evidently because she, like Helen, captures cities and extracts their wealth via her royal lover,

⁷⁴ E.g. Athen. 13.607c and see Ogden 1999, 243f.; 2011, 236, for more examples. Surprisingly, Ogden himself simply argues that the Macedonian kings may have had a predilection for courtesans from their Southern neighbours. The Thessalian witch theme is found prominently in Apul. *Met.* 2.21-30 and Luc. *Phars.* 6.507-830; see Ogden, Daniel. *Magic, Witchcraft, and Ghosts in the Greek and Roman Worlds: A Sourcebook.* Oxford 2002, 27, who notes that the discourse is older and possibly tangible in already Plato. I find it telling here that Plutarch encountered the absurd story of Lamia's soap as having been set in both Athens and Thessaly (Plut. *Demetr.* 27.2).

⁷⁵ Davidson 1997, 184-186, 194-200; Ogden 1999, 237f., 241f.

⁷⁶ Plut. *Demetr.* 27.4: 'ὄρας ὅσα μοι Λάμια πέμπει;' ("Do you see how much Lamia sends me (as gifts)?"). See LSJ s.v. A IV.

⁷⁷ Athen. 13.577c. See Wheatley 2003, 31 n. 12.

⁷⁸ Athen. 3.101e, 128b; Plut. *Demetr.* 27.2, 4. Echoed by Alci. 4.16.8, for the reliability of which see Wheatley 2003, 34.

⁷⁹ Antigonid generosity was crucial in allaying the worries about the food supply in the last decade of the fourth century, see Habicht 1995, 82-88; cf. for the context also Wheatley 2003, 33f. Throughout the first half of the Diadoch period, the Antigonids had a long-standing relationship of *charis* with Athens that ended only at Ipsos (see Bayliss 2011, 164f.). For banqueting and feasting people as a hallmark of royal behaviour see Strootman 2014, 188-191; cf. Briant 2002, 288-291 on the Achaemenids.

though the original context is woefully unclear.⁸⁰ Although the evidence is relatively limited, it therefore seems that the great wealth at her disposal and the attested benefactions of Lamia render her a figure that mediates the king's self and channels money into him, though here in purely consumptive manner.⁸¹ The important point is that Lamia seems to have operated via gifting, enhancing Demetrios' social surface within her home city through the elite social network she probably possessed there, making her a city-taker of a far more productive nature.⁸² In the contested but generally hostile record we are left with in scraps of comedy and invective, the whole thing then becomes a decadent, coercive relationship of extraction and waste:⁸³ in closing his discussion of her, Plutarch relates the judgement of Bocchoris, prompted by a dream of *hetaira* satisfying a man, whereupon the *hetaira* sues for payment.⁸⁴ The case is resolved by Bocchoris' decision that the *hetaira* should be paid with the shadows of money (*χρυσῶν*),

⁸⁰ Plut. *Demetr.* 27.2. This echoes Aeschyl. *Ag.* 689f. and Eur. *IA* 1476, see O'Sullivan 2009b, 68f. The motif recurs much later in Alci. 4.16.3, where Lamia is made to lay siege (*πολιορκεῖν*) to Poliorketes with her flute. The *Helepolis* was a siege tower (Diod. 20.48; Plut. *Demetr.* 21.1), so not a primarily destructive instrument of war; it took cities without requiring the walls to be breached.

⁸¹ Cf. Lape 2004, 62, who reads this as a benevolent anecdote.

⁸² On the mobility of courtesans see Ogden 1999, 241f. Lamia's story is again a special case, as she was clearly a free Athenian woman with prodigious skills (Athen. 13.577c-f) who moved to the court at Alexandria and then to Demetrios (Plut. *Demetr.* 16.3) out of her own free will. She could thus be considered a national traitor, which may be another level of meaning in the *Helepolis* simile.

⁸³ On the political dimension of New Comedy visible in the fragments of Philippides see Philipp, Günther B. "Philippides, ein politischer Komiker in hellenistischer Zeit", in: *Gymnasium* 80 (1973), 493-509, whose assessment of the events is out of date, but whose argument is convincing; cf. further Lape 2004, *passim*; Dixon, Michael D. "Menander's *Perikeiromene* and Demetrius Poliorketes", in: *CB* 81 (2005), 131-143, whose argument that Menander's character of Polemon is supposed to echo Demetrios Poliorketes is not implausible, but difficult to substantiate (cf. similarly Lape 2004, 66-68). Jon Mikalson (1998, 69) rightly cautioned that fragments of comedy only show that a character could say something, not that it was widely accepted or acknowledged, nor that the dramatist subscribed to this view. Cf. similarly Herman 2006, 126f.: "The imaginary world of drama is governed by forces altogether different from those that govern everyday social life. Social life is driven by the clash of individual wills in time and space, within a social system capable of imposing sanctions. The driving force of drama is the individual creative imagination. In drama the clash of individual wills takes place between fictitious persons in fictitious circumstances. Drama is thus neither the mirror-image nor an extension of social life. It interacts with social life at the most profound of levels, but ultimately the two are not the same."

⁸⁴ Plut. *Demetr.* 27.5-6.

equivalent to the shadow-like substance of the dream. Lamia judges this unsatisfactory, because the *hetaira* did not receive her desire, unlike the man. Plutarch's narrative thereby has the *hetaira* break down her own immensely productive ambivalent position and reduce it to one thing only, money, controlling the contingency of these figures for the reader.

The final theme is sexual, aesthetic, and religious. As we have seen, the sexuality of *hetairai*, their aesthetic and cultural appeal, as well as their existence in an extremely connective and conceptually flexible social limbo allowed for the development of agency through the king.⁸⁵ Already in the Classical period, this societal conceptualisation had been mirrored in the existence of cults of Aphrodite Hetairia and various variants.⁸⁶ Beginning with Harpalos, numerous cults from the period of the Diadochi now appear to have been modelled on these, focusing on courtesans such as Aphrodite Pythionike, Aphrodite Leaina, Aphrodite Lamia/Lamia Aphrodite, or Aphrodite Phila.⁸⁷ These cults were made physically manifest in civic space in “temples” (ἱερά and ναός), and the bodies of courtesans were

⁸⁵ On the sexual and cultural skills of courtesans see Ogden 1999, 259-261.

⁸⁶ Athen. 13.572d-574c. Alci. 4.16.3-4 further attests a connection between Lamia and the Aphrodisia, a festival of Aphrodite she celebrated every year. See Ogden 1999, 262-266; Ogden 2009, 367-371.

⁸⁷ Ogden 1999, 262-266; further examples in Wallace 2013, 145f. Harpalos as dedicating a *temenos*, temple and altar to Aphrodite Pythionike is attested by Athen. 13.595a-c (=Theopompus FGrH 115 F 253), where worship of Glykera is also mentioned. Athen. 6.253a (=Demochares FGrH 75 F 1) attests the worship of the *hetairai*, whereas Phila Aphrodite appears at Athen. 6.254a-b; 255c. Whether this latter occurrence refers to the wife of Demetrios Poliorketes or to his daughter by Lamia (Athen. 13.577c) has been debated. However, it seems unlikely that this Phila would be the daughter of Lamia, whom Plut. *Demetr.* 53.4 does not mention (Wheatley 2003, 35), as Demetrios Poliorketes only met her in 306 BC. Even in 302 BC, the latest possible context, the girl would have been little more than a baby, so hardly old enough to be likened to Aphrodite. Unlike Ogden 2009, 357, I therefore consider Demetrios' wife Phila more likely, especially since there is a fragment of Alexis (Athen. 6.254a) that has a toast to King Antigonos (placing it before 301), Demetrios, and Phila Aphrodite, and an inscription from Kos, Clara Rhodos 10 (1941) 27,1:23f., that also mentions a *temenos* of Phila at Samos, though not as Aphrodite. Cf. Wehrli, Claude. “Phila, fille d'Antipater et épouse de Démétrius, roi des macédoniens”, in: *Historia* 13 (1964), 140-146, here 141f. and recently Wallace 2013, 146, whose conclusion is similar. While I agree with his date of 306/5 (cf. also Lape 2004, 61), it remains odd that Demetrios Poliorketes is denied the royal title in Athen. 6.254a and described as “young” (νεανίσκος). This would mean that Phila received divine honours already briefly after the victory at Salamis. Paschidis 2008, 111f. attempted to explain a similar, though epigraphic attestation of such a denial by pointing to the intermediary position monopolised by Stratokles. Alternatively, Medeios may have been perceived as having greater prestige than Poliorketes, as he had fought with Alexander and saved Athenian citizens (Billows 1990, 400f. no. 68).

similarly made visible in works of art.⁸⁸ In Demochares' invective against Demetrios as recorded by Athenaeus, this is linked closely to the creation of shrines and hero cult for other *philoï*, including the influential and important Adeimantos of Lampsakos, whom we will revisit below.⁸⁹ Taken with the garbled story of Demetrios Poliorketes living in the Parthenon with various *hetairai*, which Daniel Ogden has plausibly but tentatively interpreted as the traces of a *hieros gamos* designed to bring prosperity and order back to Athens after Kassander's destructions, the overall impression is that the civic space of Athens, from the Parthenon to Eleusis, is here being discursively cast as being penetrated by the ambivalent bodies of *hetairai* and objects that closely associated them, as it was with similarly connoted, monumental records of honours awarded to Antigonid *philoï*.⁹⁰ I would argue that, much like the Athenian response to the various arrivals of Demetrios Poliorketes, this spatial monumentalisation is a recognition of perceived agency that parallels that accorded royal *philoï*, as *hetairai* were constructed as operating on a variation of the diffusely reciprocal *philia* code, but could impossibly be couched in the narrative of *timē* and *epainos* that accommodated the agency of the *philoï*.⁹¹ As with the *philoï*, the discourse hinges on the *hetaira* being constructed as being able to 'control' Demetrios, who was himself on occasion performatively conceptualised as a present, listening god, but nevertheless embodied both

⁸⁸ Athen. 6.253a-b; 13.574 c-d. This already occurs for Theodote at Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.1f. See Ogden 2009, 367f.

⁸⁹ Ogden 2009, 256f.; Wallace 2013, 146f.

⁹⁰ Ogden 1999, 263f., defended against Wheatley 2003, 33f., who reads this as profanation and decadence, in Ogden 2009, 358-361 and idem 2011, 229f. See also Ogden 2009, 356f. On polis space and portrait statues see Oliver 2007a; Ma 2013b, esp. 132-134 and *passim*. Cf. also Athen. 13.573a-b, where the space of Lydia is semanticised along the same lines and structured by a tomb of a courtesan allegedly built by the legendary figure of King Gyges. On the context of the Four Years War see Habicht 1995, 82-84. Despite his usually excellent analysis, Bayliss 2011, 167, seems to adhere to the story of Demetrios living in the Parthenon, citing IG XI,2 146A:76f. as evidence. To my mind that line simply seems to attest the cleaning of the sanctuary after a royal sacrifice and feast, evidently a substantial one, given the amount of fifty drachma the cleaning cost.

⁹¹ See Chaniotis 2003 and 2011, 179-181. On the *philia* code (Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.4f.) see Davidson 1997, 120-127, on the *philoï* and honour Paschidis 2008, 486-490. That *hetairai* could not be honoured by the civic community, at least in the normative construction of the early Hellenistic period, is apparent from the joke about Phryne rebuilding the walls of Thebes if only she could be honoured with a *Mauerbauinschrift* (Athen. 13.591d). The more malleable faith code provided a way of acknowledging their agency. On Phryne and her unusual statuary manifestation see Ogden 1999, 264f.; Keesling, Catherine. "Heavenly Bodies. Monuments to Prostitutes in Greek Sanctuaries", in: Christopher A. Faraone and Laura McClure (eds.). *Prostitutes and Courtesans in the Ancient World*. Madison and London 2006, 59-76, here 68-73.

contingency and control, as is visible from the garbled source record.⁹² It is only adequate then that actors constructed as controlling gods should be at least heroes themselves, made so by individuals, who like Adeimantos, were similarly located in between spheres of meaning.⁹³

Prefigured by their exchangeable literary names referring to monstrosity, the *hetairai* of the Diadoch period can therefore be read as a generalised medium of communication, embodied in women that are configured in a contested narrative between court and city on the basis of an already ambivalent and contingent civic imaginary.⁹⁴ Configured as monstrous gods operating on highly connective, but contested and individual codes of socio-political interaction, these social actors are an ideal vehicle of translation and conservative reassertion, as their existence in limbo between the semiospheres invites narratives of boundary-creation. They are particularly lucrative bearers of such narratives because their existence in socio-political limbo allows them a specific kind of *παρρησία* (“frankness of speech”), which also characterises the ideal *philos*, but is obviously always a difficult ideal.⁹⁵ In that, the *hetairai* have emerged as true narrative city-takers: they appear as a narrative figuration that was integral in controlling the contingency of the period between court and city by providing actors that were pre-configured as operating on extremely connective social codes, but could simultaneously be marginalised and narratively shaped to effect control.

⁹² Cf. Wallace 2013, 147. On brokerage at court see Strootman 2014, 151f.

⁹³ See Buraselis, Kostas. “Political Gods and Heroes or the Hierarchisation of Political Divinity in the Hellenistic World”, in: Alberto Barzanò et al. (eds.). *Modelli eroici dall'antichità alla cultura europea*. Rome 2003, 185-197; Chaniotis 2011, 186; Wallace 2013, 152-154. The chronology of these anecdotes is very unclear. Wheatley 2003, 33f. places all the anecdotes relating to Lamia in the period between 304-302, but the only contextualised evidence on her is from Plutarch, whose chronology of the honours granted Demetrios is garbled for effect (see Paschidis 2008, 131; Bayliss 2011, 157, 165f. for a disentanglement of the honours) and who concentrates the anecdotes relating to Lamia in one section. Ogden 2009, 356f. seems to assume that the temples were the result of polis decrees. There is no reliable evidence for that, as Demochares can simply have exaggerated his invective.

⁹⁴ As argued by Davidson 1997, 111-127 for the Classical period.

⁹⁵ This is apparent from their narrative construction as equal interlocutors with kings, e.g. Plut. *Demetr.* 27. On *parresia* in friendship see Konstan 1997, 47, 102-105; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 250-253.

5.4 *Philoî* as monsters

The argument that *betairai* are enmeshed in codes and narrative struggles comparable to those of the *philoî* conveniently leads directly into the discussion of the contested narrative that seeks to impose control over the latter. One of the most well-documented and accordingly prominent early Hellenistic *philoî* is Adeimantos of Lampsakos, who dedicated the Philaion mentioned above.⁹⁶ Athenaeus records a fragment of Demochares that accuses this man and other Antigonid *philoî* of being flatterers as part of an attack upon Athenian conduct:⁹⁷

Demochares, at any rate, the cousin of Demosthenes the orator, relates in the twentieth book of his Histories the flattery the Athenians displayed towards Demetrius Poliorketes, and that this was not what he wanted. He writes as follows: "Some of these things, it seems, also annoyed him, but other acts were downright disgraceful and humiliating, such as temples to Leaina and Lamia Aphrodite, and altars, heroa, and libations to Bourichos, Adeimantos, and Oxythemis, his flatterers. To every one of these, païans were also sung, so that even Demetrius himself was

⁹⁶ Athen. 6.255c. On him see most importantly Robert, Louis. "Adeimantos et la Ligue de Corinthe. Sur une inscription de Delphes", in: *Hellenica* 2 (1946), 15-33; Billows 1990, 362-364 no. 1; Landucci-Gattinoni, Franca. "Il ruolo di Adimanto di Lampsaco nella *basileia* de Demetrio Poliorkete", in: *Papyrologica Lupiensia* 9 (2000), 211-225; and Wallace 2013. He is most famous for his involvement in the foundation and running of the Hellenic League of Demetrius Poliorketes, on which see Ferguson, William S. "Demetrius Poliorketes and the Hellenic League", in: *Hesperia* 17 (1948), 112-136; Harter-Uibopuu, Kaja. "Der Hellenenbund des Antigonos I Monophthalmos und des Demetrius Poliorketes, 302/1 v. Chr.", in: Gerhard Thür and Francisco J. Fernández Nieto (eds.). *Symposion 1999. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Pazo de Mariñán, La Coruña, 6. - 9. September 1999)*. Cologne 2003, 315-337.

⁹⁷ Athen. 6.253a (=Demochares FGrH 75 F 1): Δημοχάρης γούν ὁ Δημοσθένους τοῦ ῥήτορος ἀνεπιτὸς ἐν τῇ εἰκοστῇ τῶν ἱστοριῶν διηγούμενος περὶ ἧς ἐποιούοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κολακείας πρὸς τὸν Πολιορκητὴν Δημήτριον καὶ οὗτοι οὗτ' οὐκ ἦν ἐκείνῳ βουλομένῳ, γράφει οὕτως· 'ἐλπεί μὲν καὶ τούτων ἕνα αὐτόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἄλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα γε παντελῶς αἰσχρὰ καὶ ταπεινά, Λεαίνης μὲν καὶ Λαμίας Ἀφροδίτης ἱερὰ καὶ Βουρίχου καὶ Ἀδειμάντου καὶ Ὀξυθέμιδος τῶν κολάκων αὐτοῦ καὶ βωμοὶ καὶ ἡρώα καὶ σπονδαί. τούτων ἐκάστῳ καὶ παιάνες ἤδοντο, ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν τὸν Δημήτριον θαυμάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς γνομένοις καὶ λέγειν ὅτι ἐπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδεὶς Ἀθηναίων γέγονε μέγας καὶ ἀδρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν.' On Bourichos and Oxythemis see Tarn 1913, 48; Billows 1990, 378 no. 26, 414 no. 86. Oxythemis left a far greater trace in the anecdotal tradition (Athen. 13.578a-b, 14.614f.). All three men were evidently prominent and are widely attested as such in the honorific discourse (Habicht 1970², 55-58, 255f.). Wallace 2013, 146f. speculates plausibly that they were all connected to the Hellenic League and received honours as such, but Bayliss 2011, 167 is correct in noting that nothing shows that these were actually civic honours.

amazed at these events, and said that to him not one of the Athenians had appeared great and fine in soul.”

Oxythemis of Larissa, one of the other two men mentioned by Demochares as flatterers of Demetrios Poliorketes, further occurs in a fragment of Phylarchus:⁹⁸

*Demetrios Poliorketes was also fond of laughter, according to Phylarchus in the sixth book of his Histories, for he said that Lysimachos’ palace differed in no respect from a comic theatre, all those coming on stage being disyllabic (jesting at Bithys and Paris, who were the most important with Lysimachos, and at some others of his friends), but that his friends were Peukestases, and Menelaoses, and even Oxythemises. Upon hearing this, however, Lysimachos said: “I, however, never saw a prostitute (πόρνη) appear on the tragic stage”, referring to the flute-player Lamia. And when this was reported back to Demetrios, he said: “But the prostitute (πόρνη) who is with me, lives in a more modest manner (σωφρονέστερος) than Penelope with him.”*⁹⁹

When these passages are read simply as ‘factual’ history, the negative elements are stripped away and the passages sanitised. One is left with the information that these individuals were men of impact, important enough to merit cult and to have their memories recorded.¹⁰⁰ Combined with the epigraphic data, this procedure reveals a cognitive network of appreciation in terms of *timē* and *eunoia* that functioned, again in Paschidis’ words, as a “melting pot that amalgamated outside and inside”, allowing for acceptance of the complexity of status these individuals embodied in their networks of intermediary interactions.¹⁰¹ The point I would like

⁹⁸ Athen. 14.614f. (=Phylarchos FGrrH 81 F 12): φιλόγελως δὲ ἦν καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Πολιορκητής, ὡς φησι Φύλαρχος ἐν τῇ ζ’ τῶν Ἱστοριῶν, ὅς γε καὶ τὴν Λυσιμάχου αὐλὴν κωμικῆς σκηνῆς οὐδὲν διαφέρειν ἔλεγεν· ἐξιέναι γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς πάντας δισυλλάβους (τόν τε Βίθυν χλευάζων καὶ τὸν Πάριν, μεγίστους ὄντας παρὰ τῷ Λυσιμάχῳ, καὶ τινὰς ἑτέρους τῶν φίλων), παρὰ δ’ αὐτοῦ Πευκέστας καὶ Μενελάου, ἔτι δὲ Ὀξυθέμιδας. ταῦτα δ’ ἀκούων ὁ Λυσιμάχος ἔγωγ τούτων, ἔφη, ἴπορνην ἐκ τραγικῆς σκηνῆς οὐχ ἑώρακα ἐξιούσαν, τὴν αὐλητρίδα Λάμιαν λέγων. ἀπαγγελθόντος δὲ καὶ τούτου πάλιν ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Δημήτριος ἔφη· ἄλλ’ ἢ παρ’ ἐμοὶ πόρνη σωφρονέστερον τῆς παρ’ ἐκεῖνῳ Πηνελόπης ζῆι.

⁹⁹ On the significance of *σωφροσύνη* in the context of *hetairai* see Ogden 1999, 267, who emphasises its meaning as sexual impulse control. On the passage see Lund 1992, 180f., who notes the potentially non-Greek names of Lysimachos’ courtiers. Bithys is further attested by an Athenian honorary decree, IG II² 808. See further Osborne 1981, D87; Paschidis 2008, 122 n. 6.

¹⁰⁰ This is the dominant mode of engagement, e.g. in Kingsley 1986, 168f.; Billows 1990, 387; Paschidis 2008, 40; Wallace 2013.

¹⁰¹ Paschidis 2008, 486–490, here a paraphrase of p. 490. See also Gauthier 1985, 169–175, who comments mainly on Antiochos III. The epigraphic evidence for Oxythemis of Larissa and Adeimantos of Lampsakos is IG II² 558 and Agora XVI 122; CID 4:11; SEG XLIII 27.

to add here is then that the negative discourse of the type presented in the two quotations is similarly societally productive, but in a very different way.

Let us begin by considering our two passages. Two different narrative imaginaries are in evidence here. The first passage illustrates a conflict within the socio-political network of the polis, i.e. the fault-line between subservience and freedom at a collective level, by constructing the Athenians as ‘flatterers once-removed’, so doubly subservient. The fault-line itself is easily visible in the biography of Demochares himself, who was repeatedly exiled, notably for his opposition to Demetrios in 303 BC.¹⁰² The second passage, crafted by Phylarchus or possibly Duris, shows an imaginary of inter-court communication and conflict, negotiated via the *philoi* and contested royal women, who necessarily exit the royal *σκήνη* (“tent/stage”), itself a spatial manifestation of the king’s distributed self,¹⁰³ and spin their web of interactions throughout the world, inviting evaluation either as buffoons or as men and women of *gravitas* and skill.¹⁰⁴ The contested discourse thus operates between all the semiospheres visible in the material, the different courts and the polis, epitomised by Athens.¹⁰⁵

The first interesting thing to note is that in both passages, the king is narratively translated to facilitate the interference with the network of relations. Both Demetrios and Lysimachos are made to speak and therein reinforce the value-normative construction that is being enacted, even though in both cases it is contrary to the ideal construction of court society: Demetrios cannot have been happy to be enlisted in chastising the honours granted his men for their mediating activity in extending his self, nor to be the one to help translate his distinguished *hetaira* into a *pornē* operating on a limitlessly connective payment code. The deferment strategy of translation observed in the construction of the court narratives above is thus apparent here too, only in its inversion:¹⁰⁶ here it dismantles the cohesion of translations by turning their OPP against them and redefining the collectivisation. In both cases the judgemental and unfocalised authorial voice emerges supreme, all other actors having been ridiculed. This ridicule attaches itself to the intermediary figures, the figures of both worlds, who neatly allow the centre of the other semiosphere to be translated by virtue of their brokering ability.

¹⁰² Plut. *Demetr.* 24.5. On Demochares see Paschidis 2008, A49, who highlights (p. 158) the tension apparent in his biography: his overt rejection of the kings is contrasted by his frenzied activity as an envoy in 286/5 BC.

¹⁰³ On the interplay between theatre and palace see Nielsen 1994, 19, 49, 134-136; Strootman 2014, 46-49, 54-57.

¹⁰⁴ On Duris as the originator of Phylarchus’ anecdotes see Sweet 1951, 177-181.

¹⁰⁵ On the Athenocentrism of the anecdotes see Ogden 2011, 236.

¹⁰⁶ See p. 288 below.

Other examples are easily found and shall serve to further contour this general impression for the *philoi*. In a notorious passage, Theopompus famously decried the courtiers (ἑταῖροι) of Philipp II as a bunch of uncultured ruffians.¹⁰⁷ One of the central themes this narrative draws upon is waste of resources, which applies both to the king himself and his *philoi*, marking a violation of the meritocratic principle of hierarchical balance in mediation outlined above. Money is accordingly cast as the central medium that structures the social figuration described: nothing is done to control this highly connective medium that comes in quickly and goes out even faster through drinking and gaming. The criterion for recruitment is accordingly not merit, but monstrosity: being a “hairy beast” (λάστανρος) or akin to a “pirate” (ληστής), the epitome of an individual configured as alien, disorderly and greedy. John Henderson notes that λάστανρος associates a hairy, predatory, and male homosexual, i.e. a sexual deviant, and the passage accordingly picks up that theme and runs with, accusing the *philoi* of both effeminacy and unrestrained homosexuality among grown men.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly the following section plays on “companions” (ἑταῖροι) and *hetairai*, further exploiting the theme of sexual deviance. The next passage then combines this theme with violence and murder by blending “man-killers” (ἀνδροφόνου) with “man-whores” (ἀνδρόπορνοι). Finally, the invective closes with a restatement of the monster theme: even the Centaurs and the giant cannibals of the *Odyssey*, the Laistrygones, were more cultured than the *philoi*.¹⁰⁹

The passage speaks for itself in that the transformation of the *philoi* into monsters on the margins of civilised society, the centre of semiosphere constructed here, is painfully obvious. It is further obvious that this marginalisation operates

¹⁰⁷ Athen. 4.167a-c; 6.260d-261a; Plb. 8.9.5-13 (=Theopompus FGrH 115 F 224 and F 225a-c). See on this composite passage Flower 1997, 185f. and the commentary by William Morison on Theopompus FGrH 115 F 224 (in Worthington, Ian (ed.). *Brill's New Jacoby*. Brill Online 2014). See for discussion in the context of the Hellenistic court Strootman 2014, 127.

¹⁰⁸ Henderson, John. *The Maculate Muse*. Oxford 1991, 202f. On the use made of homosexuality in comedy and tragedy see also Dover, Kenneth J. *Greek Homosexuality*. Cambridge, MA 1978, 135-153, esp. 144 and 148, who notes the likening of an effeminate youth to a *hetaira* and the coarse marginality of the homosexuality portrayed. For a more recent view of the societal significance of homosexuality see Davidson, James N. *The Greeks and Greek Love: A Radical Reappraisal of Homosexuality in Ancient Greece*. London 2007. On the *lastauros* see further Lape 2004, 226-231, who argues that Menander links the concept to μοιχός, the adulterer who threatens the inviolability of the *oikos*. Here too this discourse of marginalisation emerges as an anti-Macedonian one.

¹⁰⁹ Hom. *Od.* 10.80-132.

on the codes previously identified for the *hetairai*, while simultaneously incorporating monstrous traits, such as theriomorphism and cannibalism.¹¹⁰ The passage associates the *philoï* with the over-use of the payment code, transforms them into ungroomed, blood-spattered monsters akin to the very worst of the *Characters*, or into female prostitutes,¹¹¹ and finally sexualises and thus undermines the *philia* discourse that ideally structures the collective in the construction observed in the previous chapter: the marginalisation of the payment code and the mediation of a value order throughout the king's collectivised self.¹¹² While the latter conception is basically maintained, it is here made to translate the collective on deviant codes that spread from the rotten core, Philip, and pervert his distributed self, transforming the court into a comic stage populated by monsters dressed up in ridiculously decadent costumes – it is surely no coincidence that the comic stage is also the source of much of the relevant material.¹¹³

All these elements can also be traced in other anecdotes relating to the *philoï* of the Diadoch period. Physical deviance occurs in a completely isolated passage of Athenaeus on parasites, which describes a certain Euagoras as a parasite of Demetrios Poliorketes and qualifies him as a “hunchback” (κύρτος), the physical manifestation of servility and the non-normative body.¹¹⁴ As for moral faults and violence, another garbled anecdote says that the same Oxythemis we have already encountered was executed by Antigonos, probably Gonatas, because he had “shared the faults” (συνέξαμαρτάνειν) of Demetrios, probably Poliorketes, and killed the *hetaira* Demo's handmaidens by torturing or even strangling them (στρεβλῶν).¹¹⁵ The actual events are lost beyond hope of recovery, though some sort of trial or investigation seems plausible; what is crucial for our purposes,

¹¹⁰ On theriomorphism as monstrous see Moignard, Elizabeth. “How to Make a Monster”, in: Michel M. Austin, Jill Harries, and Christopher J. Smith. *Modus Operandi: Essays in Honour of Geoffrey Rickman*. London 1998, 209-217.

¹¹¹ The hairy beast is physically comparable to the Disgusting Man (Theophr. *Char.* 19.2-7).

¹¹² See p. 255 above.

¹¹³ Plb. 8.9.7 (=Theopompus FGrH 115 F 225a). The decadence of dress occurs for Alexander's courtiers: Plut. *Alex.* 40.1; *Mor.* 65c-d; Athen. 12.537d-539f. See Philipp 1973.

¹¹⁴ Athen. 6.244f (=Aristodemus FHG III 310 fr. 7). This man is not Billows 1990, 384f. no. 38, as he was probably already dead. On the parasite as worse than the flatterer and void of agency see Konstan 1997, 99f. A hunchback is considered the result of divine punishment at Plut. *Mor.* 633c-d; cf. also Parker 1990, 220.

¹¹⁵ Athen. 13.578a-b (=Heraclides Lembus FHG III 167-171 fr. 4). See Billows 1990, 414 no. 86.

however, is that a *philos* is once again associated with a *hetaira*, as well as with brutal violence and faults of character.¹¹⁶

In an anecdote found in Plutarch's *Moralia*, Theokritos of Chios, the Cynic philosopher, transforms Antigonos Monophthalmos, the "One-eyed", into a monster by calling him a cannibalistic cyclops.¹¹⁷ This alone already echoes a comic pattern, the transformation of the antagonist into a monster to be heroically slain.¹¹⁸ After Theokritos refuses to repent and renews his insults, his actions cause him to be executed by one of Antigonos' *philoi*, Eutropion, who is described as Antigonos' *ἀρχιμάγειρος*, his "chief butcher" or cook.¹¹⁹ One of Antigonos' most prominent *philoi*, Aristodemos of Miletos, is likewise labelled a *mageiros*.¹²⁰ When he advises the king to limit his "expenses and gifts" (*ἀναλώματα καὶ δωρεαί*), the linchpin of the king's redistributive societal imaginary and the cohesive force behind the network of his self, Antigonos himself is again made to censure him by associating his advice with the stink of the "apron" (*περίζωμα*). In combination with the Eutropion anecdote, this suggests that both these anecdotes play on the ambivalence of *mageiros*: besides its positive association in the context of cult, it could also associate butchery and the handling of raw meat, the smell and pollution of dried blood on the apron being the defining feature.¹²¹ In the context of the comic discourse that fuels this transformation of the *philoi*, these elements become yet more significant: the *mageiros* and other cooks were stock personnel of New Comedy, with comic relief being derived from their ambivalent status between honourable cult personnel, purveyors of pleasure, and paid labourers,

¹¹⁶ On the triangle *miles gloriosus* – *kolax* – *hetaira* see further Lape 2004, 63.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Plut. *Galb.* 1.4, where Demades is said to have likened Macedon after Alexander's death to a blundering, blinded Cyclops.

¹¹⁸ See Sommerstein 2009, 155-175, who traces a development from the metaphorical use of traditional heroes (p. 168f.) to the portrayal of the 'monsters within us all' (p. 173f.). On Euripides' satyr play *Cyclops*, which closely follows the Homeric narrative, but combines it with humour see Sutton 1980a, 95-133.

¹¹⁹ Plut. *Mor.* 11b, 88f, 633c. Billows 1990, 386 no. 42. This may also be a reflection of an Achaemenid court office or rank, given the clearly attested significance of cooks there, though the term used seems to be *ὄψοποιός* in Greek (Briant 2002, 290, 292).

¹²⁰ Plut. *Mor.* 182d. Billows 1990, 372-374 no. 16. Aristodemos was instrumental in the Antigonid assumption of kingship (Plut. *Demetr.* 17.1-5) and a very active ambassador. *Mageiroi* were ambivalent figures that gained prestige from their situational equivalence to priests in that they were required for the nexus of cult and banqueting, but were accordingly simultaneously associated with butchery and paid labour. See Berthiaume, Guy. *Les rôles du mageiros. Étude sur la boucherie, la cuisine et le sacrifice dans la Grèce ancienne*. Leiden 1982, 58f., 79f.

¹²¹ On blood as paradoxically both polluting and purifying see Parker 1990, 371-374.

between boastful pride and dependency.¹²² Treating *philoi* as cooks in story-telling therefore adds a layer of ambivalent doubling to their status along these very lines: Cooks on stage were intent on distinction, as they could exhibit significant skill and a near-magical power to create pleasure, but at the same time they were only cooks, hired servants of ambivalent status.¹²³

Taken together, this evidence attests traces of a discourse of narrative transformation of royal *philoi* into monstrous figures on the verges of society, portrayed as deviant in their servility, their interest in money, their violence, sexual depravity and physical deformity, all of which is in stark opposition to the construction of the ideal court imaginary.¹²⁴ Their transformation into comic actors as *kolakes* and other stock characters seems at first to stand incompatibly beside the strong discourse of honour, praise, and gratitude monumentalised within Greek cities in the Diadoch period, produced nothing but tension and conflict.¹²⁵ Combined with White's conception of boundaries as productive social action, however, Lotman's arguments now highlight that this kind of narrative double-think is societally productive in that it enhances the intermediary character of the discursive individuals it is attached to.¹²⁶ By making available a multiplicity of stories, both positive and negative, new meaning is provided to the networks they circulate in, reducing the contingency of the experience of brokered innovations. Rather than being simply irrelevant slander or later fantasies that the historian must surgically 'resect', these texts can therefore be considered a vital part of a multi-layered web of attempts at controlling the perceived contingency of the

¹²² See Krieter-Spiro, Martha. *Sklaven, Köche und Hetären. Das Dienstpersonal bei Menander* (=Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 93). Stuttgart 1997, 26-31, 162-166.

¹²³ Wilkins 2000, 369-373, 379-403, 408f.

¹²⁴ On greed as defining of royal friends cf. Plut. *Cleom.* 13.5, which may derive from Phylarchos.

¹²⁵ The *kolax* was a character in New Comedy, as attested by Menander's play of that name. See the recent discussion by Pernerstorfer, Matthias J. *Menanders "Kolax": ein Beitrag zu Rekonstruktion und Interpretation der Komödie. Mit Edition und Übersetzung der Fragmente und Testimonien sowie einem dramaturgischen Kommentar*. Berlin and New York 2009, 123-130, 151-166. The prevalence of dramatic elements is no coincidence, but mirrors the status of the theatre as a place of confrontation. The theatre was the stage of Athenian Empire and now becomes the stage of royal benefaction, i.e. of individual agency rather than collective reinforcement. This is apparent especially in the *Life* of Demetrios Poliorketes, who staged his agency in the Theatre of Dionysus, which was at this time both the political heart of the polis as the place of assembly (Hansen 1991, 125-160, esp. 128f., 152f.) and the locus of drama (Plut. *Demetr.* 34.3-5). On the comic discourse as negotiating between polis and court see further Lape 2004, 52-66, 68-109 and *passim*, who emphasises its insistence on key civic values surrounding sexuality and reproduction.

¹²⁶ Lotman 2006, 215-220; White 2008², 345f.

Diadoch period, an experience that was produced in part by the interaction with individual actors that possessed unprecedented agency, agency that was exercised, as always, in ways that seemed both good and bad, and therefore incalculable.

One can take these observations still further by considering them in network terms. The strength-of-weak-ties theorem holds that new information, such as the innovations emphasised by Lotman as being mediated by the marginal, predominantly spreads via low-intensity relationships rather than close ones, since the former connect social clusters and are less redundant.¹²⁷ The *philoi* were extremely mobile and flexible individuals with very powerful strong ties to the king that provided access to innovation, the source of which was the king's will.¹²⁸ Their periegetic traversal of the Greek and other worlds allowed them to acquire an enormous amount of weak ties that distributed this new information very efficiently, which in turn necessitates their marginalisation in accordance with Lotman's model.¹²⁹

These observations offer a double explanation for the narrative appropriation of the king in putting down the *philoi* that was observed in the anecdotes. On the one hand, this is a narrative twist that locates the *problématisation* within the king's self and *enrols* him to situationally sever his ties to the *philoi* and allow both the authorial voice and implied reader to discursively translate him into a new collectivisation directed against the *philoi*, creating a unity of city and king against the marginal intermediaries. This parallels the strategy identified in the narratives that discuss the competition between the Diadochi, but turns it against them. On the other hand, the narrative allows for the cognitive limitation of the socio-political connectivity of the *philoi*, maintaining them as holders of weak ties and thus as intermediary figures. As Ivana Savalli-Lestrade argued, this is also visible in the epigraphic record, as the *διατριβῶν* formula can function as an alterity marker that dissociates the individual described both from the civic collective actor performing the observation and from his original civic community, while also linking him to the king in an ostentatiously vague fashion.¹³⁰ The result then is a discursive doubling of the royal *philoi*, who control the systemic contingency of the period as a societal construct that is both extremely positive and extremely negative, that is central to both semiospheres, and marginal to both.

¹²⁷ For the theorem see Granovetter 1973.

¹²⁸ Billows 1990, 248-250; Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 355-368.

¹²⁹ Cf. also Ogden 2002, 11.

¹³⁰ Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 275.

5.5 Conclusion: Monsters in the city?

This discussion of fragmentary literary evidence has shown that a discourse of marginalisation is tangible for individuals connected to the Diadochi. This discourse draws on ‘civic’ themes, such as mythological monstrosity, sexual and monetary over-connectivity, and uncultured violence, in that they are implicitly opposed to the *polis* as a locus of cultural meaning and situated within the comic realm of Dionysos. Read with Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere, this discourse emerges as aiding in the construction of intermediary figures by societally doubling their identities beyond the multiplicity identified by both Wallace and Paschidis, among others.¹³¹

In sum, I would argue that this monstrous construction of the emergent Hellenistic *philos* and other transgressor figures is fundamentally related to the value of *philia* that could be made to serve as the primary connective concept both within the city, as was observed in the *Characters*, and within the emergent court.¹³² It is noteworthy that this value, tangible in the use of *philos* and *philia*, hardly ever occurs in the extant evidence of concrete negotiation between the two semiospheres, the honorary decree and the royal letter; on the few occasion it does appear, apparently from about 304/3 BC, it does so primarily in reports of the king’s usage, which to me suggests a tension inherent in the linguistic use of the concept itself.¹³³ This tension may be due to the fact that, as was discussed above, *philia* as a societal concept hinged on the creation of an equal second self, on the creation of a communal relationship of trust that culminates in identity.¹³⁴ The two previous case studies have observed the construction of this value as a highly connective medium of translation that would have been ideally suited for use in

¹³¹ Wallace 2013, 150-154; Paschidis 2008, 483-486.

¹³² See p. 152 and 233 above and generally Konstan 1997, 93-108; Mitchell 1997, 178-191.

¹³³ See Savalli-Lestrade 1998, 257, 261; cf. Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 202, 254f., who notes for the Classical period that *philos* is used only to express very close relations, especially towards *symmachoi*. In IG XII.9 199:6f. from Eretria, Kleocharēs, son of Pytheas, from Amphipolis is described both as a *philos* of the kings and as having demonstrated a relationship of *philia* with the city. A part of the Koan dossier IG XII 4, 1, 129A: 43 describes Nikomedes, son of Aristandros, of Kos as *philos* of an unknown city (Billows 1990, 411f. no. 82). In IG II² 646:19 (294 BC) *philia* is concluded between Demetrios Poliorketes and Athens, but this does not affect the negotiator, Herodoros (Billows 1990, 389f. no. 49; Osborne 1981, D68). The best example is Syll.³ 352:11 (=I.Ephesos 1448) for Apollonides, son of Charops, dated to 306 or 302 BC (Billows 1990, 369f. no. 12). In IG II² 486:13, an intradiegetic report of a letter by Demetrios Poliorketes to Athens describes Eupolis as his friend. In CID 4.11:3 Adeimantos of Lampsakos refers to the friends of Demetrios Poliorketes as a group.

¹³⁴ See above p. 141 n. 218 and p. 223 n. 180. Cf. Konstan 1997, 101, 120f.

inter-collective connections, had it not been for the emphatically produced incompatibilities in the semantic configuration of the value between the semiospheres.¹³⁵ The discourse of marginalisation now doubles the *philoí* on the even more connective but fundamentally antithetical media of money and *hetairai*, as well as the symptom of the break-down of power, coercive violence.¹³⁶ Rather than becoming second selves and establishing a community of the wealthy elite across the semiospheres, this results in their creation as a kind of *doppelgänger* figuration, so in their creation as relatable second selves that are fundamentally inverted and can accordingly be treated on the normative paradigm of *kolakeia*, while also being productively incorporated on the opposite discourses of *time* and *emoia* in other media and contexts.¹³⁷

Nevertheless, one question remains unanswered: what about those intermediaries who were located primarily within the city as citizens, but possessed contacts to the kings? Where are the ambassadors and prominent politicians of the *poleis* within this discourse of marginalisation? Unfortunately, the level of preservation of New and Middle Comedy, as well as the main combative genre of oratory, makes it very difficult to identify traces of a discourse of marginalisation attached to intermediaries within the *polis* – especially since the court perspective is completely lost, with the possible exception of Harpalos. Paschidis' survey of these individuals has revealed what can be said about their contested biographies, tracing the rapid succession of great political influence and periods of exile: Demades' characterisation by Plutarch, for instance, shows the importance of bribery and flattery as keywords in the discourse.¹³⁸

The two most prominent early Hellenistic politicians at the crucial time of contact between Athens and the Antigonids after 307 BC are Philippides of Kephale and Stratokles of Diomeia, both of whom bridged the gap between the semiospheres in different ways.¹³⁹ The evaluation of their historical interactions

¹³⁵ Mitchell 1997, esp. 178-191 traced this same conflict in the Classical period.

¹³⁶ On coercive violence as the collapse of power see Luhmann 1988², 9.

¹³⁷ The literature on the *doppelgänger* in philology and psychology is substantial, but focuses on the predominantly Christian themes of moral duality explored especially in Romantic literature. See here only Herdman, John. *The Double in Nineteenth-Century Fiction: The Shadow of Life*. New York 1991, and Frenzel, Elisabeth. S.v. "Doppelgänger", in: eadem. *Motive der Weltliteratur*. Stuttgart 1976, 94-114, here 94f. for a definition.

¹³⁸ Plut. *Phoc.* 30.1-6. See for a critical reconstruction of Demades' career and actions Paschidis 2008, A2. On bribery as endemic to the discourse of the late fourth century BC see also Wirth, Gerhard. "Philippides und seine Genossen: Zu den makabren Kriterien des Schrittes in eine neue Zeit", in: *AncSoc* 31 (2001), 67-105, here 72, 87.

¹³⁹ On Stratokles see Berve 1926, 2, no. 724; Worthington 1992, 125f.; Mikalson 1998, 77f.; Paschidis 2008, A19, esp. 302f. For his prominent family see Davies 1971, 494f.

has made much progress in recent years. As Andrew Bayliss has plausibly shown, historical accounts of these two men have been fundamentally tainted by Plutarch's criticism of Stratokles, the main Antigonid supporter in Athens. This criticism was based in part on Philippides' comic invectives against Stratokles, which in turn were tempered by the former's friendship with Lysimachos.¹⁴⁰ In the same vein, Monaco Mallory has recently argued that the set pieces containing the altercations between the two politicians in the *Life of Demetrius* are intended as a deeper reflection on the nature of civic politics, abstracted from history to serve a higher purpose.¹⁴¹ When this is stripped away, most of their attested actions and interactions can be plausibly explained as attempts to negotiate the involvement of the kings in ways acceptable to the citizen body.¹⁴² Bayliss accordingly concludes that Stratokles "was simply a politician who did his best for Athens and himself, albeit with an air of showmanship about him", and indeed he seems to have been less polarising than Demetrius of Phaleron before him.¹⁴³ Similarly, Paschidis elegantly concludes that Philippides "was exactly in the middle of the road leading from the city to the king and vice versa [...]," i.e. both courtier and citizen, attempting to do for his city what he could.¹⁴⁴

Considered with an eye for monstrosity, however, the discourse about Stratokles seems at first glance to carry elements that look promising: in an anecdote about his apparent madness, Demochares says: "μαίνοιτο μέντ' ἄν, [...] εἰ μὴ μαίνοιτο", "he would be mad not to be mad", thereby doubling his madness, and, in another fragment of comedy, probably by Philippides, he is described as consorting with a *hetaira* called Phylakion.¹⁴⁵ The same woman elsewhere appears as an unwilling lover and Stratokles is elsewhere associated with another courtesan, who seems to have borne the nickname Didrachma for her indiscriminate standards (for a *hetaira*).¹⁴⁶ The use of the themes of *hetairai* and penny-pinching brings

On Philippides see PCG VII, 1989, 333-352; Paschidis 2008, A40. The best source is the honorary decree IG II² 657.

¹⁴⁰ Bayliss 2011, 152-186; Paschidis 2008, 118-120.

¹⁴¹ On Plutarch's potential aims in telling their story in the *Life of Demetrius* see Mallory 2013, 115f. and *passim*.

¹⁴² Paschidis 2008, 118-120; O'Sullivan 2009a; Bayliss 2011, 152-186.

¹⁴³ Bayliss 2011, 185.

¹⁴⁴ Paschidis 2008, 118, 125.

¹⁴⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 11.2f.; 24.5. The fragment was identified as such by Frantz, Wilhelm. "Ein Fragment des Komikers Philippides", in: *Hermes* 35 (1900), 671. For the interpretation see Hartwig, Andrew. "Self-Censorship in Ancient Greek Comedy", in: Han Baltussen and Peter J. Davis (eds.). *The Art of Veiled Speech. Self-Censorship from Aristophanes to Hobbes*. Philadelphia 2015, 18-41, here 24-27.

¹⁴⁶ Plut. *Mor.* 750e-f. The text of Athen. 13.596f is corrupt, so the second claim cannot be corroborated.

him closer to the discourse of monstrosity and otherness we have observed, which is associated also with Hyperides and other Athenian politicians, including Demochares.¹⁴⁷ However, Phylakion may in fact well be a cipher for Demetrios Poliorketes, given her alleged fickleness in responding to Stratokles' affections, the fact that she delivers the spines and brains of the city to him to play with, and that she is allegedly easily won with money, probably a reference to the familiar tyrannical *topos*.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless even in his case, which is comparatively well illustrated, there is no evidence that he was ever transformed into a monster. Unfortunately, transforming this into an *argumentum ex silentio* is hardly borne out by the state of the evidence; nevertheless, it suggests that the discourse about civic intermediaries was conducted in traditional categories, as Plutarch notes in comparing Stratokles to Kleon, the most famous comic monster.¹⁴⁹ Naturally, this extension of traditional civic discourses in itself constitutes a form of contingency control, adding another, final level of significance to the doubling pattern observed above.

¹⁴⁷ See Lape 2004, 58f. On Archedikos, who attacked Demochares in comedy (Suda s.v. Ἀρχέδικος (Adler Alpha 4083) = PCG II, 1991, 533-536, T 2) and should be identified with the *anagrapheus* of IG II² 402, see Habicht, Christian. "The Comic Poet Archedikos", in: *Hesperia* 63:2 (1993), 253-256, who emphasises the analogies between Philipides' case and this pro-Macedonian politician.

¹⁴⁸ Plut. *Demetr.* 11.2. If it is not a cipher, however, this would reinforce my earlier point about *hetairai* as brokers. O'Sullivan 2009b, esp. 66, proposed to correct P.Oxy. 1235's reading of Lachares to Stratokles, arguing that part of the altercation between Philipides and Stratokles was due to Stratokles cancelling a comic competition of 302/1 BC, evidently by accusing a comedy presented within it of *katalysis tou demou*, which Philipides then criticised in a later play (Plut. *Demetr.* 12.4).

¹⁴⁹ Plut. *Demetr.* 11.2. On Kleon as a monster see Sommerstein 2009.

6. Rhodes in the networks of the Diadoch period

The aim of this final case study is to investigate the interpenetration of the value-correlated networks established in Chapters 3 and 4 in one specific historical situation characterised by the break-down and reassertion of narrative as a mode of interaction. This situation is the relatively well-documented and famous siege of Rhodes by Demetrios Poliorketes in 305/4 BC. This event emerges from the sources as an attempt at military coercion with a crucial impact on the narratives of the Diadoch period and is interesting at a societal level as a case study of the narrative embedding that is produced to accommodate a collectivised individual's agency. Before we can approach this event, it will first be necessary to map out Rhodian collective identity in the Diadoch period by looking at the socio-political network configuration of this island state. Doing so not only requires us to look at the interaction networks that shaped the society of the Rhodian republic, but also the networks of inter-state interactions this society was embedded in. Considering these structures will allow us to approximate the construction of the Rhodians as a collective actor and assess how this actor managed to weather the contingency of the siege at a societal level. The second part of the chapter accordingly investigates how this collective actor reproduced and adapted its configuration in and after the experience of coercion during the siege by mapping out its responses to the impact of individual agency.

6.1 Rhodian society before the siege

The following section attempts to reconstruct Rhodian identity as a network of connections to various sources of meaning. As in the previous chapters, the aim is to unearth the power configuration Rhodian actors were enmeshed in and that provided them with their specific sense of place and their capacity for control. A specific example of a narrative that helped structure such a power configuration was studied in detail in Chapter 3. The material for Rhodes is less detailed than the text considered in that case study, but one can compensate by drawing on the recent study of Rhodian identity in network terms by Irad Malkin, who has traced it through the Archaic and Classical periods.¹

¹ Malkin 2011, 65-95. On the relationship between agency and identity of polis citizens cf. Lape, Susan. *Race and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian Democracy*. Cambridge 2010, e.g. 280f.

6.1.1 Colonisation and identity

Malkin argues plausibly that the Archaic period resulted in a consolidation of Rhodian identity that was tied to the expansion of the Hellenic network of inter-state contacts during the great colonisation, which resulted in a very dense mesh of connections.² For Rhodes, this resulted in the tripartite division of the island into the three poleis Ialys(s)os, Kameiros, and Lindos receding into the background. It was replaced by a simply ‘Rhodian’ identity possessed by the citizens of these cities, especially in international relations.³ The colonies founded or co-founded by the Rhodians play an important part in this process as they were tied not to the individual cities, but to the composite island identity through additional interactions, such as the repeated addition of new settlers. The genealogically organised network of Hellenic identity thus contributed to this unification.⁴

The most interesting example here is Gela, founded in the early 7th century on Sicily under the leadership of the Rhodian Antiphemos and the Cretan Entimos. Thucydides mentions that the part of the city that was first fortified bore the name Lindioi.⁵ Besides the collaboration with Cretan settlers, the most interesting thing to note here is then that Thucydides speaks simply of “Antiphemos of Rhodes”, although the settlers themselves evidently considered Lindos a crucial reference point at the time. In Thucydides’ time, this process of pan-Rhodian identity formation was evidently well advanced, to the point that it replaced the individual polis affiliations at least in an outsider’s view.⁶ This is also visible in Herodotus, who gives Rhodes in a list of *poleis* long before Rhodes actually existed as a polis

² Malkin 2011, 66-81, esp. 70 with additional examples.

³ On the three *poleis* see fundamentally Gabrielsen, Vincent. “The Synoikized Polis of Rhodes”, in: Pernille Flensted-Jensen, Thomas Heine Nielsen and Lene Rubinstein (eds.), *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his sixtieth birthday, August 20, 2000*. Copenhagen 2000, 177-205, esp. 180-185; Nielsen, Thomas H. and Gabrielsen, Vincent. “Rhodos”, in: Hansen and Nielsen (eds.) 2004, 1196-1210, esp. 1198-1204 (nos. 995-997).

⁴ Malkin 2011, 81. Besides Gela, Phaselis too was considered a Rhodian colony and played a part in the trade network of the Eastern Mediterranean (see e.g. Thuc. 2.69.1). Strabo further mentions colonies in Campania and Apulia, as well as a settlement named Rhodos (Strab. 3.4.8; 14.2.10), which was then tied to Massalia. Despite Irad Malkin’s optimism, it is impossible to determine whether this second Rhodos was indeed founded by people from its namesake.

⁵ Thuc. 6.4.3-4. See Malkin 2011, 72-75.

⁶ Similarly Gabrielsen 2000, 180-187, who offers additional examples for the multiplicity of Rhodian identity.

– to outsiders, Rhodes thus appeared as a political unit, as a ‘state’.⁷ For the individual citizen, polis identity obviously persisted, intricately enmeshed with other ties ranging from familial and local ties, to pan-Rhodian, Doric, and finally Pan-Hellenic categories of affiliation.⁸ The feedback effects produced by this outside perspective within the interaction network that negotiates these categories of identity are difficult to quantify, but may well have played a part.⁹ These brief notes may suffice here to show that for the individual citizen of Lindos, Ialysos or Kameiros, locating their selves via a larger, consolidated collective construct evidently afforded greater contingency control in dealing with the Aegean world.

6.1.2 Myth

This process of identity consolidation goes hand in hand with myth, especially foundation myth, because the latter forges relations between identity components, providing legitimacy, meaning, and context.¹⁰ At the Hellenic macro-level, the result of these processes is a collectivised cognitive network of mytho-history that helps structure interaction and allows for the reduction of contingency. Strabo offers a comprehensive list of the mytho-historical connections possessed by the Rhodians, but also comments on the confusing nature of this network,

⁷ Hdt. 2.178.2. Malkin 2011, 82; Constantakopoulou, Christy. “Proud to Be an Islander: Island Identity in Multi-Polis Islands in the Classical and Hellenistic Aegean”, in: *MHR* 20 (2005), 1-34, esp. 5-8; Hansen, Mogens Herman. “Πόλις as the Generic Term for State”, in: Thomas Heine Nielsen (ed.). *Yet More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (=Historia Einzelschriften 117). Stuttgart 1997, 9-16, here 9f.

⁸ This level of identity, i.e. identity as group affiliation, is the only level accessible for this period. On the level of inter-collective interpenetration, group affiliations of this kind are also important, as they control the contingencies of these situations. On multiple tiers of identity cf. Gehrke 2003, 245-250.

⁹ Malkin 2011, 81-83.

¹⁰ On Rhodian foundation myths in the Doric context see in detail Craik, Elizabeth M. *The Dorian Aegean: States and Cities of Ancient Greece*. London 1980, 153-167, as well as the extensive study of the various sources by Hendrik van Gelder. *Geschichte der alten Rhodier*. Haag 1900, 14-62. Cult reality similarly plays a part in creating a sense of collective place, especially for the elite, who acted as priests. Of particular importance were the cult of Athena Lindia and the cults of Zeus Polieus and Athena Polias in Rhodos city, as well as the cult of Helios; see Constantakopoulou 2005, 15f.; Vedder, Ursula. “Das kolossale Weihgeschenk aus der Kriegsbeute und das Heiligtum des Helios in Rhodos”, in: Natascha Kreutz and Beat Schweizer (eds.). *Tekmeria. Archäologische Zeugnisse in ihrer kulturhistorischen und politischen Dimension. Beiträge für Werner Gauer*. Münster 2006, 361-370, here 363f.

which prompts him to attempt a reconciliation of its various overlapping elements.¹¹ These multiple, context-dependent levels of mytho-historical identity shall be briefly analysed here, although one must note that large parts of the mythical tradition are known only from later accounts that organised the material by imposing logical and chronological systematisation in Strabo's vein. The reliability of these accounts for the reconstruction of the more situational and, for the insider, non-contingently complex configuration of earlier periods is difficult to judge.

Already Homer mentions the three poleis of Rhodes as Doric cities, founded by Tlepolemos, son of Herakles, and blessed with wealth by Zeus.¹² After having been forced to flee Argos after murdering his great-uncle, Tlepolemos is said to have set out on his journey to Rhodes from Lerna in the Argolid.¹³ Within the web of Rhodian identity, Tlepolemos therefore functions as the source of a Heraklid identity component, while also providing a mytho-historical link to Argos, Tlepolemos' place of refuge. Once he arrived at Rhodes, he himself founds all three Rhodian poleis. In my view, the *Iliad* seems to indicate the existence of an emergent pan-Rhodian identity already before the colonisation, as Homer speaks of one people divided into three tribes.¹⁴ Mauro Moggi took this as evidence of pan-Rhodian identity in Homer's time, which then disintegrated in favour of a tripartite configuration focused on the individual cities, only to later reconsolidate. This seems quite unnecessarily complicated. It is more likely that Homer's outside perspective attests but one layer of a stratified network of identity with components that were reproduced in different contexts but existed at the same time.¹⁵

The second core element of Rhodian mytho-historical identity relates to Helios and provided the aetiology of the land itself. Its most prominent expression is its appearance in the fourth century BC as one of the main cults of the city of Rhodes.¹⁶ The oldest attestation is Pindar's seventh *Olympian Ode* for Diagoras, son of Damagetos, presented to a Rhodian audience on occasion of his victory in

¹¹ Strab. 14.2.6-7. One encounters such multi-layered aetiologies also in Pind. *Ol.* 7 and in the more detailed and chronologically systematised account by Diodorus (Diod. 5.55.1-59.6).

¹² Hom. *Il.* 2.653-670; Hdt. 1.144; Strab. 14.2.6.

¹³ Hom. *Il.* 2.653-67; Pind. *Ol.* 7.19-34. This was accepted by Thuc. 7.56.6.

¹⁴ Hom. *Il.* 2.668: τριχθαῖ δὲ ᾤκηθεν καταφυλαδόν [...] ("They were settled in three divisions by tribes").

¹⁵ Moggi, Mauro. *I sinecismi interstatali greci*. 2 vols. Pisa 1976, 220. Contrast Herodotus' note on the Doric pentapolis (Hdt. 1.144), where he locates himself as an insider capable of offering a differentiated and detailed account.

¹⁶ Pind. *Ol.* 7.55-77.

boxing at the Olympic games of 464 BC.¹⁷ Here we already find two versions of the foundation of Rhodian cities side by side, as Tlepolemos is described as *χθονὸς οἰκιστὴρ* (“coloniser of the earth”),¹⁸ while the Rhodians are also designated the children of Helios, whose grandsons, stemming from his liaison with the nymph Rhodos, in turn became the eponymous founders of the three Rhodian *poleis*.¹⁹ The crucial point is that these logically apparent inconsistencies are generously overlooked in this formulation of Rhodian identity. The story not only weaves these different strands together, but also ties them to the current, historical prestige claimed by Diagoras, reproducing them in a positive context. This plurality of identity is further made manifest in space in a durable, monumental fashion: as the scholiast notes, the ode was put up, written in golden letters, at the temple of Athena Lindia.²⁰ Mytho-history is thereby codified and reproduced, woven into the socio-spatial configuration of the island. These rare glimpses at such situational narratives of identity may thus serve to illustrate how the island of Rhodes itself was permeated – like any cultural space – by an ordering network of meaning that fed back into the cognitive self-location of every individual encountering it.

The myth of Danaos now provides a third, inverted foundation story that was also woven into this web and stabilised the link to Argos, but in the opposite direction, thereby reducing the significance of Argos as the Rhodian metropolis.²¹ Rather than developing a trajectory from Argos via Rhodes to Troy as was the case with Tlepolemos, this story links Egypt, Rhodes, and Argos – in both cases the position of Rhodes is in the middle of the line, profiting from both these mythical trajectories as an intermediary. This brokering role also explains Strabo’s attempt to harmonise this version with the story of Tlepolemos’ foundation: he reports that Danaos’ three daughters provided Tlepolemos with the names of the three cities.²² Links to Crete, which Diodorus treats as the earliest, also exist via the Telchines,²³ whom Diodorus considers the creators of various images of gods in the sanctuaries of the Rhodian *poleis*.²⁴ Again we encounter the multiple layers

¹⁷ The performance situation is apparent from Pind. *Ol.* 7.13-15.

¹⁸ Pind. *Ol.* 7.30.

¹⁹ Pind. *Ol.* 7.40, 71-76.

²⁰ Scholion on Pindar *Ol.* VII Drachmann 195, l. 13 (=Gorgon FGGrH 515 F 18).

²¹ Apollod. *Bib.* 2.1.4.

²² Strab. 14.2.8.

²³ Diod. 5.56.1; Lindos II 2, col. 2, l. 9-14 (=FGGrH 532 B). On the chronicle of Athena Lindia see extensively Higbie, Carolyn. *The Lindian Chronicle and the Greek Creation of their Past*. Oxford 2003; Massar, Natacha. “La ‘Chronique de Lindos’: un catalogue à la gloire du sanctuaire d’Athéna Lindia”, in: *Kernos* 19 (2006), 229-243.

²⁴ Diod. 5.56.2. If Diodorus took this information from Zeno of Rhodes, this applied already in the third to second century BC.

of this mytho-historical network being anchored to physical actors, whose permanence and durability contribute to the plausible reproduction of memory and insure identity.²⁵ Last but not least, Poseidon naturally also plays a part in Rhodian aetiology as the father of the eponymous nymph Rhodos.²⁶

This snapshot shows that a hypothetical Rhodian citizen could therefore draw on a dense network of ties to locate him- or herself at the inter-collective, Hellenic level. For the year 99 BC, the Lindian chronicle even offers a very extensive chronologically organised version of such a catalogue of ties, albeit with its ambiguity removed.²⁷ Herakles provided links not only to Argos and the Doric cities in general, but also to many other places, as this hero with his many children and deeds, as well as his omnipresent cult, was an extremely connective cultural construct and story. The solar strand contrasted this enormous connectivity by adding a highly exclusive, specifically Rhodian element that was periodically reproduced in games, festivals, and cult practice, especially while Rhodes flourished during the Hellenistic period. Like Tlepolemos, this layer of mytho-historical identity was therefore continuously celebrated to maintain relational footing and contributes to the enduring political relevance of these mythical ties.²⁸

6.1.3 The political relevance of myth

Myth gains this concrete political relevance from the diplomatic interaction mode of pointing to joint decent (*syngeneia*), or at least familiarity (*oikeiotēs*), to generate good will on the basis of an apparent mytho-historical continuity of mutual connectivity.²⁹ The cultural concept of *syngeneia* is rooted in a fundamental control

²⁵ On memory and forgetting as integral to identity cf. Halbwachs, Maurice. *Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen*. Frankfurt a.M. 1985, 121; Connerton, Paul. “Seven Types of Forgetting”, in: *Memory Studies* 1 (2008), 59-71.

²⁶ Diod. 5.56.4.

²⁷ Lindos II 2, cols. 2&3 (=FGrH 532 B&C).

²⁸ Vedder 2006, 363f. On the Tlepolemia and Herakleia, as well as the Halieia see the overview by Ringwood Arnold, Irene. “Festivals of Rhodes”, in: *AJA* 40 (1936), 432-436. The Tlepolemia occur already in Pindar (Pind. *Ol.* 7.79f.), whereas the Halieia first appear in epigraphic sources at the end of the fourth century BC (p. 435 with n. 4). On the prize amphorae see also Zervoudaki, Eos A. “Ἡλιος καὶ ἡ Ἀλιεῖα”, in: *Archaiologikon Deltion* 30 (1975), 1-20.

²⁹ See fundamentally Curty 1995; Jones, Christopher P. *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World*, Cambridge, MA. 1999; Lücke, Stephan. *Syngeneia: Epigraphisch-historische Studien zu einem Phänomen der antiken griechischen Diplomatie*. Munich 2000; Curty, Olivier. “Un usage fort controversé. La parenté dans le langage diplomatique de l'époque hellénistique”, in: *AncSoc* 35 (2005), 101-117. Two famous examples are the stele of the

regime that organises the world into diachronic, patriarchal segments and is apparent already in the Archaic period and earlier. This mode of organising the socio-political world was employed in more specifically political contexts already before the Hellenistic period,³⁰ but its practical utility, i.e. the transformation of myth into mythological capital to be cultivated and harnessed, emerges with particular clarity in the high Hellenistic period, beginning with the later third century BC. Since mythical genealogies, anchored to concrete cult practice and place, and the hierarchical connections forged by colonisation shaped and negotiated interstate identity, political relations could easily be embedded in their language and structures of meaning.³¹

Concrete epigraphic evidence for Rhodian actions on this interaction mode has been uncovered in Iasos and Argos.³² The Iasian dossier relates to the dispute with the dynast Olympichos (~220-214 BC), whereas the Argive example stems from the first half of the third century.³³ According to Polybius, the Iasians considered themselves an Argive colony that was later re-founded by Milesians.³⁴ Strabo adds that Miletus was originally a Cretan colony, founded by settlers under the leadership of Sarpedon.³⁵ A tie to Crete was also part of the Rhodian network

Kytenians from Xanthos (Bousquet, Jean. “La stèle des Kyténiens à Xanthos de Lycie”, in: *REG* 101 (1988), 12-53 = SEG XXXVIII 1476; XXXIX 475) with a detailed account of the arguments employed, and the Lampsakene efforts to make peace with Rome via Massalia (I.Lampsakos 4 = Syll.³ 591).

- ³⁰ On the origins see Jones 1999, 17-26. A Classical example is Thuc. 6.44.3, who describes how the Athenians attempted to persuade the inhabitants of Rhegion by pointing to their Chalcidian origins.
- ³¹ See e.g. Scheer 1993, 11f. and *passim*; Alcock, Susan. “The Heroic Past in a Hellenistic Present”, in: Cartledge, Garnsey and Gruen (eds.) 1997, 20-34; Jones 1999, 50-65; Higbie 2003, 243-288; Scheer, Tanja. “The Past in a Hellenistic Present: Myth and Local Tradition”, in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 216-231.
- ³² The Iasian dossier is published as I.Iasos 76 and 150. Cf. for a more detailed account and a history of the scholarship Wiemer 2002, 186-190; *editio princeps* of the Argive text is Vollgraff, Wilhelm. “Novae Inscriptiones Argivae”, in: *Mnemosyne* 44:2 (1916), 219-238 (=SEG XIX 317) with Curty 1995, 10-12 (no. 4). The epigraphic evidence from the city of Rhodes is bad and to my knowledge uninformative in this regard.
- ³³ Cf. Curty 1995, 10-12 (no. 4); 154-159 (nos. 63 and 64). On the date of the Argive inscription see Migeotte, Léopold. *L'emprunt public dans les cités grecques: recueil des documents et analyse critique*. Québec 1984, 81-84. On Olympichos see Behrwald, Ralf. S.v. “Olympichos”, in: *DNP* 8 (2000), 1186; Wiemer 2002, 185 with n. 45. In 227 BC, Olympichos contributed to the aid offered to Rhodes after the earthquake (Plb. 5.90.1). On the dates of the Iasian decrees see Wiemer 2002, 93 with n. 199.
- ³⁴ Plb. 16.12.2.
- ³⁵ Strab. 14.1.6. On the *syngeneia* between Miletus and Crete see SEG XXIX 1136. Although the clauses are, to my knowledge, all supplements, the argument here

of relational self-location, which makes it seem possible that the concrete performance of *syngeneia* by the Iasians in the Rhodian assembly may have pointed to this link, although of course their actual argument does not survive on the stone. Christopher Jones further noted that Herodotus treats dedications by the 6th century pharaoh Amasis to the sanctuary of Athena Lindia as cast in the interaction mode of *syngeneia*, operating via the connection forged by the Danaos myth.³⁶

This brief survey has attempted to show that a multi-layered and highly connective pan-Rhodian identity existed already in the Archaic period and was continuously reproduced and expanded upon by Rhodian actors, both inside and outside Rhodes. This identity was excellently embedded within the Hellenic mesh of mytho-historical relations, but also possessed exclusive elements, including a paradoxical claim to autochthony that proved challenging to later authors and their logical schemes of organisation.³⁷ Overall, it therefore provided a unique and specifically Rhodian sense of place to Rhodian individuals. The crucial point to note is then that this identity, as a dense and flexible cognitive mesh that was continuously reproduced, both individually and collectively, contributed to Rhodian contingency control also on the political stage, especially at the inter-state level.

6.1.4 The synoecism

At the historical level, the crucial political development in Rhodian identity formation is the synoecism concluded by the three Rhodian poleis, which led to the creation of the polis of Rhodes in 408/7 BC, during the Peloponnesian War.³⁸ As

evidently hinged on a *syngeneia* ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. According to Curty 1995, 139-141 (no. 56) the tie was constructed via Apollo Delphinios and not via colonisation.

³⁶ Hdt. 2.91.5; 2.182. See Jones 1999, 24.

³⁷ The layers of mythical colonisation were blended with an autochthonous element, visible under Augustus in Konon apud Phot. *Bibl.* 186.47 (=FGrH 26 F 1), and in the “autochthonous tribe” of the Lindian chronicle: Lindos II 2, col. B, l. 95.

³⁸ On the city of Rhodes see fundamentally Nielsen and Gabrielsen 2004, 1205-1208 (no. 1000). On the synoecism see Gabrielsen 2000, as well as the annotated collection of sources and literature by Moggi 1976, I, 213-226; cf. also Wiemer 2002, 53-55. For an analysis cf. Demand, Nancy H. *Urban Relocation in Archaic and Classical Greece*. Norman, OK and London 1990, 89-94; Constantakopoulou 2005, 12. The institutional consequences are covered by Gabrielsen 1997, 26-29; Papachristodoulou, Ioannis. “The Rhodian Demes within the Framework of the Function of the Rhodian State”, in: Vincent Gabrielsen (ed.). *Hellenistic Rhodes: Politics, Culture and Society*. Aarhus 1999, 27-44, esp. 29-32; Gabrielsen 2000, 190f. As so often, the synoecism in its original form is badly documented and the financial background, the intentions and procedures are in the dark. Thuc. 8.44.2, Diod. 14.79.6, and *Hell. Oxy.* 10.2 suggest that the public

so often with Rhodian history, the sources that cover this crucial event of identity-reification are very limited, consisting only in two short notes in Strabo and Diodorus.³⁹ Since the Rhodian voice is silent, the interpretation of this event must be based on the general political context and thus the mesh of interactions this action responded to, which is well documented by Thucydides and Xenophon.⁴⁰

While the three original poleis were maintained,⁴¹ they now concentrated their political and economic interactions, especially as a collective, in a single hub, ideally located on the maritime trade route between the South-Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean and the Black Sea. This action can be seen as the logical culmination of the gradual condensation of Rhodian identity, which was now made visible by collective action and given a spatial and institutional manifestation of its own.⁴² The establishment of the harbour of Vroulia on the island's southern coast in the 7th century BC may have functioned as a precursor here, since Vroulia appears to have been a planned settlement and thus may have been the result of collectively concerted action by the Rhodians.⁴³ Given the historical context of the synoecism, the concrete trigger behind it was probably at least in part a result of a search for collective security in a highly contingent situation: The vagaries of the Peloponnesian War make it seem likely that it was a reaction to concrete socio-political pressures, a targeted measure designed, whether consciously or not, to engage with Aegean power politics and cement the Rhodian position by bringing existing trajectories of socio-political identity development to their conclusion. As such, the synoecism may also have been informed by concrete elite contacts with outside powers.

buildings of the city, including the harbours, the agora, and a council hall, were built extremely quickly, possibly on the basis of a pre-existing settlement. Cf. Papachristodoulou, Ioannis. *Οι αρχαίοι ροδιακοί δήμοι. Ιστορική επισκόπηση – Η Ιαλυσία*. Athens 1989, 94 with ns. 432-436; Gabrielsen 2000, 188 with n. 55; Nielsen and Gabrielsen 2004, 1198f. and 1205. Epigraphic data sheds light on the politics of the city with their new three-year cycle only from 395 BC onwards; more detailed information is available only from the Hellenistic period onwards, see Gabrielsen 2000, 193f.; Fraser, Peter M. "The Tribal-Cycles of Eponymous Priests at Lindos and Camiros", in: *Eranos* 51 (1953), 23-47.

³⁹ Diod. 13.75.1; Strab. 14.2.9-11.

⁴⁰ Thuc. 8.44.1-4; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1; 1.6.3; 2.1.15, 17.

⁴¹ See Gabrielsen 2000, esp. 188f., 192-195.

⁴² See Constantakopoulou 2005, 12.

⁴³ Malkin 2011, 76f. On Vroulia (the settlement's modern name) see the literature collected in Nielsen and Gabrielsen 2004, 1198. The settlement was abandoned at the end of the sixth century BC and is only tangible in the archaeological record; its orientation towards the south-east may indicate an orientation of pan-Rhodian interests in that direction.

Before turning to the actual synoecism in a little more detail, it may be useful to briefly consider what little is known of Rhodian political agency in the 5th century BC in order to gain an understanding of the preconditions. The most prominent example is provided by the Diagorid family from Ialysos, who are generally considered dominant political actors on Rhodes in the period between 464 and 396/5 BC.⁴⁴ It seems beyond doubt that the generations of the Diagorid family known to us possessed the economic basis required for a successful streak of athletic victories that led not only to Diagoras' literary and performative heroisation by Pindar, but also contributed to the reproduction of pan-Rhodian identity for both insiders and outsiders.⁴⁵ The economic capacities tangible in the texts relating to the Diagorids and their positive occurrence in Pindar's ode further hint at the Diagorids' prominent political standing on Rhodes. The scholia on the ode, which seem to have originated in Aristotle's environment, show that the stories connected to the Diagorids were remembered even in the late fourth century BC. Pindar therefore affords us a rare glimpse at a Rhodian example of a successful elite strategy of translation, as the Diagorids employed the poet to tie themselves and their successes into the latent mytho-historical network by embedding their actions into it, for instance by linking themselves to Herakles.⁴⁶ By making the Diagorids part of the Rhodian world order, the economic and socio-political superiority of these elite actors is thus reaffirmed, marking out their function as loci of contingency control in Rhodian society as a whole.

The sources only begin providing more concrete information on Rhodian politics in the context of the struggles between the Delian league and the Peloponnesian league. The most notable individual actor here is the Diagorid Dorieus, who was particularly mercurial in his affiliations, since he was an exile residing in Thurioi.⁴⁷ While the Rhodian *poleis* were part of the Delian league,⁴⁸ the evidence

⁴⁴ Berthold 1984, 19-25; cf. the more extensively annotated version in Berthold, Richard M. "Fourth Century Rhodes", in: *Historia* 29:1 (1980), 32-49, here 33-37; Wiemer 2002, 53-55. The Olympic victories of Diagoras are well documented (see his victory inscription IvO 151; Pindar *Ol.* 7.1; Paus. 6.7.1-7 (Paus. 6.7.6f. = Androtion FGrH 324 F 46)), as is the eponymous priesthood of Helios held by a certain Diagoras, son of Damagetos, in 399/8 BC (SEG XII 360, col. I, l. 11; on the problems of dating the list see Gabrielsen 2000, 187 with n. 49. Even if the date is not secure, the list clearly shows the continuation of family names into the fourth century, as a certain Damagetos, son of Diagoras, also appears several decades later: col. II, l. 13).

⁴⁵ In their victory inscriptions at Olympia, the Diagorids call themselves Rhodians, not Ialysians: IvO 151-153.

⁴⁶ For the literary heroisation of Diagoras as a descendant of Hermes and as the first demigod since Herakles see the scholia: Aristoteles F 569 Rose, l. 8-13 and 15-18.

⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.19; Paus. 6.7.4. His exile is first attested for the year 424 BC.

⁴⁸ Hdt. 9.106.4.

thus seems to suggest some sort of internal conflict in Ialysos that led to Dorieus being exiled, probably together with his family and other members of the elite. His economic capital was clearly not impacted, as he was still able to act with ships of his own, for instance when he supported the Spartan side:⁴⁹ In January 411 BC, the close proximity and strength of the Spartan fleet triggered an anti-Athenian and therefore anti-democratic coalition within the elite of the Rhodian cities, probably with Dorieus' involvement, though the motives and main protagonists remain unclear.⁵⁰ It seems that this group invited the Spartan fleet, commanded by Astyocho, to land at Kameiros, which caused a panic. A popular assembly of all Rhodians from all three cities was called to change the allegiance of the cities from Athens to the Peloponnesians, and while the details are unclear, this is also what happened, with the Peloponnesian fleet wintering at Rhodes.⁵¹ During this winter season, the Rhodians were not only plagued by the Athenians, who were plundering in retaliation, but also had to pay large sums to the Peloponnesian league, roughly equivalent to the sums that appear on the Athenian tribute lists for the Rhodian poleis.⁵² These events will hardly have made either of the leagues more attractive partners and the continued unrest on Rhodes is hence hardly surprising: later the same year, the commander of the Spartan fleet, Mindaros, had to send Dorieus to Rhodes with ships from Miletus to suppress what Diodorus calls a democratic revolution. Unifying the critical mass of the elite

⁴⁹ Thuc. 8.35.1. Cf. Gehrke 1985, 135 with n. 5 and 6.

⁵⁰ Thuc. 8.39.1-44.2. Moggi 1976, 220f.; cf. Berthold 1984, 20. Moggi seems to overstretch the very limited source material when he postulates such a strong leadership role for the Diagorids. We simply only hear about them, because they were famous athletes. The other eponymous priests of Helios between the synoecism and 396/5 BC (SEG XII 360, col. I, l. 2-14; on the date cf. Gabrielsen 2000, 187 with n. 49) most probably belonged to a very similar socio-economic stratum, but we hear nothing of their activities. A self-reinforcing network of multiple actors seems to be far more likely, also in light of Thuc. 8.44.1 (*ἐπικηρυκευομένων ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν*). Generally speaking Moggi is too keen to deduce details, for instance about the relocation of population, from the cursory notes in the sources. On what is known of population movements see Gabrielsen 2000, 188f., although he too draws on numbers attested only for 305/4 BC (Diod. 20.84.2: 6000 combat-ready citizens) to reconstruct absolute numbers. This is obviously problematical, as these numbers may account for either part or even the entire island of Rhodes, given that people fled behind the city's walls during the famous siege. The census data deriving from this exceptional situation is thus hardly a good base for establishing the citizen body of the city of Rhodes at the time of its inception, especially since populations probably fluctuated due to the catastrophic tsunamis that hit the island regularly (cf. Berthold 1984, 54f.).

⁵¹ Thuc. 8.44.2, 4.

⁵² Thuc. 8.44.3f.; 8.55.1. On the Rhodian tribute see Constantakopoulou 2013, 31-34 with n. 35f.

in a single translation had evidently not succeeded, possibly because switching networks had not improved matters for the tribute-paying citizens.⁵³ Until 396 BC, Rhodes further periodically served as a Spartan naval base, which may well have put added economic pressure on the population.⁵⁴

The reasons behind the synoecism itself, which is placed by our sources in 408/7 BC, are similarly difficult to determine, as so many crucial pieces of information are missing.⁵⁵ Drawing on previous arguments, Nancy Demand argued that the synoecism was intended to concentrate the available military potential and channel it into a consolidated Rhodian navy, based in new, excellent harbours.⁵⁶ In part, her argument is convincing, especially if one considers the harrowing experience of being harassed from the sea by Spartan and Athenian ships alike. Diodorus, for instance, reports that Alkibiades plundered the island in 408 BC, immediately before the date of the synoecism, providing an event that might have been a potential trigger.⁵⁷ In opposition to Demand, Wiemer argued that economic interests will also have played a part, while observing that these will not have been formulated as a rational ‘economic policy’, i.e. maximisation of market access. He also rejects individual interests by members of the elite, such as the Diagorids, as the driving force.⁵⁸

Continuing Wiemer’s approach and moving towards considering the synoecism the result of a broader societal development does indeed seem the way forward. The actual trigger, potentially Alkibiades’ incursion, seems only to be obscuring the fact that a critical mass of the citizens evidently supported the instigating elite in fundamentally changing the socio-political *status quo* and the spatial organisation of the island – after all, embracing such a transition under such political stress was surely a highly contingent, though affirmative experience. Consider that in the hermeneutic perspective employed here, the synoecism is a translation, consisting in elite actors harnessing a collective identity that had grown over time to produce this fundamental reconfiguration of Rhodian society and combat an experience of contingency. Despite the scarcity of evidence, it

⁵³ Diod. 13.38.5. Dorieus seems to have been successful for the moment.

⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1; 1.6.3; 2.1.15, 17; 5.1.5; Diod. 14.79.4-5. Isoc. 4.142 explicitly notes the heavy-handed Spartan rule over the islands, but is hardly a neutral observer. See also Berthold 1984, 22f.

⁵⁵ Diod. 13.75.1; Strab. 14.2.9-11.

⁵⁶ Demand 1990, 89-94, esp. 92-94; Hornblower 1982, 79-81. Meiggs 1972, 210, only refers to the brief and heavily over-interpreted note by Diod. 13.75.1.

⁵⁷ Diod. 13.69.5.

⁵⁸ Wiemer 2002, 53f. Demand disregards trade interests (1990, 91), as she assumes that Rhodes was not an important trading port before the Hellenistic period. However, evidence for intermediary trade does exist, for instance in the exceptionally high tribute paid by the island in the fifth century and the exotic burial goods: Malkin 2011, 72-87.

seems possible to make some further inferences about this process. The fundamental elite interest that triggered the synoecism may well have run along the lines visible in the discussion of the Diagorids: an interest in preserving and increasing the individual *oikos*, paired with a competitive search for prestige achieved through distinction, will obviously have been crucial factors. Besides the reluctance to be plundered for reasons of *oikonomia*, the military aspect emphasised by Demand will therefore have played a part, as military activity, especially at sea, was an important source of prestige for the Rhodian elite.⁵⁹ At a broader societal level, the various incursions by the leagues will have made existential contingency heavily felt in the past years, possibly even leading to a collective sensation of agency panic, of being buffeted by forces beyond control.⁶⁰ Having a new, planned city with state of the art fortifications, good harbours, and better natural preconditions than those of the three original *poleis* would then have seemed not only attractive due to the physical safety it seemed to afford, but the collective action the foundation of such a communal Rhodian city required would also have combated fears about agency in itself, as it reproduced and reified the collective's self-determined capacity for action.⁶¹

The negotiations with the Peloponnesian and Delian leagues may also have offered opportunities to reproduce Rhodian mytho-historical identity to control these contingent situations.⁶² Besides the diplomatic significance of these interactions, which has left no trace, these hypothetical reproductions may also have

⁵⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.35 mentions a shrewd Rhodian captain, Melanippos, and of course the Diagorid Dorieus acted as admiral (Paus. 6.7.4). On the Rhodian navy in society see Gabrielsen 1997, esp. 15-36, whose evidence stems mainly from funerary reliefs and relates largely to the Hellenistic period.

⁶⁰ On agency panic see Melley, Timothy. "Agency Panic and the Culture of Conspiracy", in: Peter Knight (ed.). *Conspiracy Nation: The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America*. New York 2002, 57-84. Although his interest is very different, being directed at understanding a far more complex and self-reflective society, the post-modern US, the concept itself seems appropriate here, as agency panic is "intense anxiety about an apparent loss of autonomy or self-control – the conviction that one's actions are being controlled by someone else, that one has been 'constructed' by powerful external agents." (p. 62). The reaction outlined by Melley is conspiracy theory, a specific form of storytelling. While any situational story-telling lies in the dark here, the Rhodians certainly acted in a very specific way, thereby reaffirming their agency.

⁶¹ On the natural superiority, fortifications, and plan of Rhodes city see Berthold 1984, 56f.; Gabrielsen 1997, 71f.

⁶² There is no concrete evidence for such an exchange, which might conceivably have appealed to Doric ancestry, but the Melian dialogue does provide a parallel scenario and Thuc. 5.104-108 attests the use or at least plausibility of *syngeneia* arguments in this kind of situation, although the *syngeneia* noted there is based in colonisation. See also Jones 1999, 24-26.

contributed to a renewed awareness of specifically Rhodian communal identity, reinforcing the unique collective configuration that had been developing since the Archaic period. The experience of the intense vulnerability of the geographical space this collective was tied to, the clearly delimited island, and the factors behind agency panic were then countered by a particularly durable form of collective action, namely the physical and institutional manifestation of said collective.

Besides this aspect of contingency control through the reassertion of collective agency, it seems plausible that economic connectivity, especially in intermediary trade, was already a factor in the creation of the city of Rhodes. If the collective establishment of Vroulia was already related to an interest in the promotion of connectivity, then international trade may well have been a part of Rhodian every-day life in the late fifth century BC. Although not everyone will have been directly involved, the citizen body of all the Rhodian *poleis* was constantly face to face with traders and their actions, making mercantile considerations a latent cognitive category to every Rhodian through political assemblies.⁶³ Naturally, the relative weight of these factors in the Rhodian consciousness cannot be determined, as it depended on their reproduction in discourse, all of which is lost. It is finally important to note that the synoecism was only one step on a long trajectory of identity consolidation, as Rhodes continued to be part of an inter-state interaction network laden with political tension. When the synoecism was established, the consolidating internal dynamics were evidently not strong enough to allow Rhodes to either withdraw from this network, or translate it on its own terms.

The further development of Rhodian collective agency in the fourth century BC is similarly enmeshed in its interaction with this network of Aegean politics. The first important event is the democratic revolution in summer 395 BC, which is quite as obscure in its details as the synoecism, though the revolution obviously related to the interaction network between Athens, Sparta, and Persia after the Peloponnesian War.⁶⁴ After having defected from Sparta one or two years before the revolution,⁶⁵ part of the elite collaborated with Konon, the Athenian commander of the Persian fleet, and instigated a democratic conspiracy against the

⁶³ On the high density of intermediate traders in Rhodes at the end of the fourth century BC see Gabrielsen 1997, 72-74.

⁶⁴ Paus. 6.7.6 (=Androtion FGrH 324 F 46); Diod. 14.79.6-8. The most extensive account is found in *Hell. Oxy.* 10.1-4 (= P.Oxy. 842 = FGrH 66 F 1), which I. Bruce considered reliable (Bruce, Iain A. F. *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'*. Cambridge 1967, 5-11). See further Bruce, Iain. "The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes", in: *CQ* 55:2 (1961), 166-170, as well as his commentary ad loc.: Bruce 1967, 97-103.

⁶⁵ For the background see Funke, Peter. "Stasis und politischer Umsturz in Rhodos zu Beginn des IV. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.," in: Werner Eck, Hartmut Galsterer and Hartmut Wolff (eds.). *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte. Festschrift Friedrich Vittinghoff*. Cologne

dominant faction in the city of Rhodes ([... τῶν ἀρχόντων]), which evidently included members of the Diagorid family.⁶⁶ The leading actor of the democratic faction was a certain Dorimachos, about whom nothing else is known.⁶⁷ The name appears on inscriptions from Kameiros, but only in the mid-third century BC, though partly in notable offices.⁶⁸ This may not have any bearing on the political faultlines of the early fourth century, but as the name seems rare on Rhodes, it may indicate an internal rivalry between leading families of Ialysos and Kameiros, as well as their friendship networks, as part of the background of this conflict. Both the group of conspirators and the currently dominant faction seem to have been rather small: supported by the presence of Konon's troops, the conspirators assassinated eleven members of the dominant faction, and the Diagorids, before convening an ad hoc popular assembly and proclaiming Rhodes a democracy.⁶⁹ Besides the stunning effect the murders themselves undoubtedly had, opposition may have been further stemmed by exiling select individuals in an attempt to consolidate the elite social network in opposition to Sparta.⁷⁰ Despite the change in dominant elite faction, the synoecism was maintained and even institutionally reinforced by a reform of the demes and other structures of organisation.⁷¹ In the cognitive configuration of the Rhodian citizens, this new order surely reinforced a sense of pan-Rhodian community that would, in the long term, contribute to the collective societal control of individual elite interest, and

1980, 59-70, here 61-65; Funke, Peter. "Nochmals zu den Wechselfällen Rhodischer Politik zu Beginn des IV. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.," in: *Hermes* 112:1 (1984), 115-119; Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. *Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jh. v.Chr.* Munich 1985, 134-140.

⁶⁶ *Hell. Oxy.* 10.2. See Bruce 1961; Gehrke 1985, 136 with n. 16.

⁶⁷ *Hell. Oxy.* 10.2. He is the speaker of the only passage of direct speech in the extant fragments of *Hell. Oxy.* (Bruce 1967, 100), which may indicate autopsy.

⁶⁸ The name occurs, for example, in *Tit. Cam.* 18:4 as a son of Hagesidamos, but also in *Tit. Cam.* 21:6; 27, col I:16, as a son of Aristomachos.

⁶⁹ *Hell. Oxy.* 10.2.

⁷⁰ Bruce 1967, 101; 1961, 166 and 170 seems to place the exiled Rhodian oligarchs (οἱ ἐκπεπρωκότες Ῥοδίων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου), who appeared at Sparta in 391 BC (*Xen. Hell.* 4.8.20) in this context (cf. Gehrke 1985, 137f.), but the time-gap seems too large. Taking into account that Xenophon's version is at odds with the more stringent version given by Diod. 14.97.2-4, who portrays them as emissaries of the now dominant party seeking aid after their counter-revolution of 391 BC, rather than exiles seeking revenge for 395 BC, it seems unavoidable to prefer Diodorus over Xenophon here, as the latter's description presupposes either a counter-counter-revolution or very slow Rhodian exiles.

⁷¹ On the demes see Papachristodoulou 1989; Papachristodoulou 1999; Fraser, Peter M. and Bean, George E. *The Rhodian Peraea and Islands.* London 1954, 79-94. For an assessment see Gabrielsen 2000, 193.

thus to the reduction of contingency within the social network of the citizen body.⁷²

It is important to note then that the synoecism was not merely a political tool, designed simply to furnish a certain political faction with a denser and larger forum for their political interactions; after all, the synoecism was evidently never called into question.⁷³ Although it was triggered by situational elite interests, the synoecism was also a deeper, societal expression of contingency control, a manifestation of a communal Rhodian identity and agency that had long been germinating and encompassed a shared mytho-historical identity and their joint participation in a naturally bounded space.⁷⁴ This development reached the critical mass necessary for a fundamental change of spatial and political configuration due to a period of extreme socio-political contingency that may have bordered on an experience of agency panic.⁷⁵ The institutional and physical, and therefore semiotic manifestation of the synoecism therefore constitutes a watershed moment in the historical development not only of Rhodes as a polity, but also of the cognitive construction of the Rhodian collective.

Considered with a view to network dynamics, the synoecism was therefore in part a consequence of identity consolidation under the impression of the vulnerability of the island's internal socio-political structure, which was deeply embedded into a highly contingent macro-political interaction network. Network theory would suggest that the more de-centralised structure of the tri-polis system would have provided some protection from contingency by staggering its impact across the network.⁷⁶ The addition of a centralised level of political structure and a new forum of socio-political negotiation in the city of Rhodes, however, seems to have weakened this buffering effect. In combination with the shifts in the

⁷² Cf. also Papachristodoulou 1999, 29-39, which can be read as a survey of the factors of identity that structured Rhodian political existence.

⁷³ At the institutional level, the constitution may have been oligarchical, see Gehrke 1985, 136 with ns. 11 and 12. The only evidence, however, is a single proxeny decree from Lindos (Lindos II 16:1-3 =Syll.³ 110), mentioning a council directed by a prytanis as an apparently unconstrained political actor: [ἔδοξε ταῖς β]ολαῖς ἐπὶ π[ρ]ι/[πυτανίων τ]ῶν ἀμφὶ Δεῖ[ν]ι/[ἰών...]. Cf. also the critical discussion by Gabrielsen 2000, 179f.

⁷⁴ The symbolic communication of agency via the synoecism is noted also by Demand 1989, 93f. and Gabrielsen 2000, 189f., who also speculates about ambitions in Caria being a possible reason behind the defection from Athens.

⁷⁵ On the consequences of Athenian hegemony in the Aegean see Constantakopoulou, Christy. "Tribute, the Athenian Empire and Small States and Communities in the Aegean", in: Anja Slawisch (ed.). *Handels- und Finanzgebaren in der Ägäis im 5. Jh. v. Chr. - Trade and Finance in the Fifth Century BC Aegean World* (=BYZAS 18). Istanbul 2013, 25-42.

⁷⁶ See e.g. Barabási 2002, 144f. with fig. 11.1; Baran 1964, 1f.

macro-political network configuration, this process evidently contributed to exacerbating the existing faultlines within the elite, with conflict about the council of the city of Rhodes resulting in violent revolution.⁷⁷ The reaffirmation of collective Rhodian agency thus paradoxically reaffirmed the internal faultlines that would continue to constrain it throughout the fourth century BC, with the contingency of domestic politics among the elite mirroring the macro-political contingency of the Aegean area.⁷⁸ At the same time, however, this development established ideal preconditions for the further consolidation of collective Rhodian agency by providing a focal point of identity and an interface for exchange with the world, blessed with favourable environmental conditions and international connectivity.

6.1.5 The consolidation of Rhodian domestic politics

The next step is to briefly trace the further development of Rhodian collective agency through the fourth century, as it is crucial to the socio-political configuration of Rhodes in the Diadoch period. The main themes are the continued involvement of Rhodes in the interaction network of Aegean macro-politics, the emergence of the Carian dynasty of Hekatomnids as political players, and finally Alexander's reconfiguration of the island's entire macro-political cosmos.

6.1.5.1 The Hekatomnids and the Social War (357-355 BC)

The so-called Social War was fought among the confederates of the second Athenian league, among whose founding members Rhodes had been in 378 BC, once more under leadership of the democratic faction.⁷⁹ It was the result of the shifting dynamics within an economic and political network of interaction between a group of poleis in the Eastern Aegean and Athens, caused by the latter's increasing focus on Macedon, as well as the relative weakness of the Achaemenid imperial centre due to the old age of Artaxerxes II and the resulting change in

⁷⁷ *Hell. Oxy.* 10.2.

⁷⁸ Nielsen and Gabrielsen 2004, 1206; Gehrke 1985, 139f.; Hornblower 1982, 125f.

⁷⁹ Diod. 15.28.2-4 describes the Rhodians' preceding secession from Sparta; Diod. 15.29.7-30.2 provides a condensed narrative of the league's foundation. IG II² 43:82 (=SEG III 74; XXIV 80; XXXIV 60) lists Rhodes as a founding member of the league. See Gehrke 1985, 139 with n. 29; Cargill, Jack. *The Second Athenian League. Empire or Free Alliance?* Berkeley 1981, 32, 52.

ruler in 359/8 BC.⁸⁰ These contributing factors, paired with the continuous domestic contingency of Rhodes, eroded the ties to Athens and allowed for the creation of a new alliance between Byzantium, Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, who shared maritime interests and sought greater stability in dealing with other powerful actors, including the league itself, but also the Persian Empire, represented especially by its Western satraps.⁸¹ This configuration was further complicated by the increasing strength and proximity of one of those satrapies, Caria, held by the Hekatomnid dynast Maussolos: while previously the Rhodian ties to the Athenian league had restricted his interference, Athens was now focused elsewhere.⁸² In the 350s, Maussolos intensified his communication of power, providing money, mercenaries, and weapons to the elite factions within Rhodes, Kos, and Chios, translating them into a Hekatomnid network of control.⁸³ Of the four cities, only

⁸⁰ On the second Athenian league and the Social War see Radicke, Jan. *Die Rede des Demosthenes für die Freiheit der Rhodier*. Stuttgart 1995, 11-23; Cawkwell, George L. "The Foundation of the Athenian Confederacy", in: *CQ* 23:1 (1973), 47-60; *idem*. "Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy", in: *JHS* 101 (1981), 40-55, as well as the brief overview by Cargill 1981, 189-196, esp. 193f. Cf. the more cautious account by Dreher, Martin. *Hegemon und Symmachoi*. Berlin 1995, 276-292, esp. 287f. On the troubles in the Achaemenid Empire after the death of Artaxerxes II (Plut. *Art.* 26.1f.; 28.1; 29.1-30.5; Diod. 15.93.1), see Briant 2002, 680f.

⁸¹ Berthold 1984, 32. The perpetuation of internal contingency is visible in Dem. 15.14 and Aristot. *Pol.* 5.1302b21-33 and 1304b25-31, whose statements seem to refer to this revolution. See for the debate Radicke 1995, 192-197. Radicke himself assigns 1302b21-24 and 1304b25-31 to the Social War, while making 1302b25-33 refer to an early revolution, preferably that of 411 BC. This distinction seems unnecessarily complicated, especially since the passages are directly adjacent. It does not seem implausible to me that the Rhodian elite might be said to fear demagogues and simultaneously to look down upon (*καταφρονεῖν*) their current constitution: constitutional failure was obviously apparent to Aristotle precisely in the existence of demagogues.

⁸² Cargill 1981, 195f.; Berthold 1984, 31f. The general and unresolved confusion in Greece in the first half of the fourth century BC is one of the central themes of Xenophon's *Hellenika* (esp. 7.5.26f.); see Tuplin 1993, 39. On Caria see recently Henry, Olivier (ed.). *4th Century Karia. Defining a Karian Identity under the Hekatomnids*. Paris 2013.

⁸³ On the debated question of Maussolos' political line at both the micro- and the macro-level see the discussions by Hornblower, Simon. *Mausolus*. Oxford 1982, 137-182; Weiskopf 1989, 65-68; Briant 2002, 656-675. That perceived weakness of the Achaemenid centre was part of the Hekatomnid motivation is suggested by Dem. 15.11f., without providing conclusive proof. The intensification of political communication is visible for instance in the dynastic statues erected in Halikarnassos and in other cities (for instance in Kaunos, where some of the statue bases survive (I.Kaunos 47 and 48); see in more detail Hornblower 1982, 114 with ns. 69f.; Briant 2002, 668f.). In this context, the famous Mausoleion (Strab. 14.2.16; Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 36.30f.) appears as the culmination of a communicative strategy designed to reify political capital, a self-reinforcing spiral that shows "rich get richer" dynamics. Kallisthenes FGrH 124

Byzantion escaped his pull, obviously due to the much greater distances involved.⁸⁴

The interactions between Rhodes and the Hekatomnids between 355 and 351 BC are unfortunately illuminated only by scraps of information. The scholia on Demosthenes show that the pro-Athenian Rhodian faction fled into Athenian exile in 355 BC and was supplanted by the elite actors who had tied themselves to the Carian dynast.⁸⁵ A problematical passage of Vitruvius seems to provide evidence for a statue group that reproduced this Carian dominance in reified form. Together with Demosthenes' speech on behalf of the Rhodian democrats, who sought to grasp an opportunity to return to Rhodes after Maussolos' death, these hints show that the domestic contingency of Rhodes was constantly being renewed: Maussolos' sister and widow Artemisia may even have violently intervened on the island.⁸⁶ The domestic faultlines were further exacerbated by an additional factor. Demosthenes' argument drew on normative constructs of Athenian power discourse and imperial language, including the nexus of freedom and democracy.⁸⁷ This line of argument was fundamentally incompatible with the dynastic policy pursued by the Hekatomnids in the 350s, necessitating negative reinforcement and intensification of the conflict also at the domestic, societal level, as the terms of the translations themselves were so incompatible.⁸⁸

F 25:18f. further attests Maussolos' enlargement of Halikarnassos via synoecism and grants insight into the complex network of identity that characterized this city. Maussolos offering military support is attested by Dem. 15.3; see Radicke 1995, ad loc. (esp. 75f.).

⁸⁴ See Berthold 1984, 30-32, as well as the discussion of the individual islands by Hornblower 1982, 130-135. Byzantion was not granted respite for long, as the city was the key to Asia Minor and the Black Sea. In this highly contingent macro-political situation, the city was accordingly much sought after, as is clear from the attacks by Philip II in 340 BC, repulsed with Rhodian aid: Diod. 16.77.2; Front. *Strat.* 1.4.13a.

⁸⁵ Scholia ad Dem. 15,1-14; Gehrke 1985, 139 with n. 31.

⁸⁶ Vit. 2.8.14f.; Dem. 15.14. See Hornblower 1982, 129; Gehrke 1985, 139 with n. 35; Wiemer 2002, 60f. is cautious. On the passage of Vitruvius see the negative judgement by Berthold, Richard M. "A Historical Fiction in Vitruvius", in: *CPh* 73:2 (1978), 129-134. Berthold's interpretation of the passage as a later invention designed to provide an illustrating anecdote to accompany a group of statues on Rhodes seems plausible.

⁸⁷ Dem. 15.3, 9, 15f., 17f., and esp. 30. On the concept of freedom as an element of Greek power politics see Raaflaub, Kurt. *Die Entdeckung der Freiheit. Zur historischen Semantik und Gesellschaftsgeschichte eines politischen Grundbegriffes der Griechen*. Munich 1985, esp. 218-223; 231-248.

⁸⁸ Dem. 15.2-5, 15; Diod. 16.7. Particularly invasive was the imposition of a Hekatomnid garrison; see the extensive account by Hornblower 1982, 127-135.

6.1.5.2 Trade

Besides this web of political interaction, a second important aspect of the development of Rhodian agency in the fourth century BC consisted in the Eastern Mediterranean trade networks the port city was an integral part of.⁸⁹ Although the extent and character of these trade networks cannot be determined with any accuracy – only on occasion of the siege in 305/4 BC, for instance, does Polyaeus mention Syria, Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Pamphylia as common destinations of Rhodian trade – the sources do show that Rhodian prominence as a hub of trading activity in the Eastern Mediterranean was not limited to the third and second centuries BC.⁹⁰ Demosthenes' speech against Dionysodoros shows the importance of the route Egypt – Rhodes – Athens when Kleomenes was satrap of Egypt (331-322 BC), and also attests the city's role as a site of intermediate trading by individuals possessed of networks of contacts to determine the communities where grain was running low and prices were soaring.⁹¹ Demosthenes also mentions that the route between Egypt and Rhodes was open (and probably profitable) all year round, unlike the stormy Aegean, providing evidence for another of Rhodes' geographical advantages.⁹² In 330 BC, Lycurgus' speech against the trader Leokrates similarly treats Rhodes as a trading hub that circulated wares and collected information.⁹³ As Patrice Brun has shown, the evidence provided by SEG IX 2 is also relevant here, as it probably allows one to extrapolate that Rhodes was a hub of the grain trade with Cyrene in the 330s BC. Overall, this hard evidence shows that in the second half of the fourth century, Rhodes was an important broker in a complex network of grain redistribution, which also involved Crete.⁹⁴ All this activity created collective wealth, the basis of which was probably the usual 2% import tax, but numbers are available only for the year 165

⁸⁹ See for a discussion of their significance Hornblower 1982, 124f.; Gabrielsen 1997, 64-84.

⁹⁰ Plb. 4.6.16. See for more detail Berthold 1984, 47-49; on Egypt Fraser 1986³, 1, 164f. Cf. also Billows 1990, 165f. n. 54, who thinks little of trade with Egypt. It is worth considering, however, that trade with Egypt was obviously conducted via the areas listed by Polyainos.

⁹¹ Dem. 56.3, 5, 7, 9f.

⁹² Dem. 56.30.

⁹³ Lykur. 15, 18. See in detail Hornblower 1982, 124; Gabrielsen 1997, 71-74.

⁹⁴ Brun, Patrice. "La stèle des céréales de Cyrène et le commerce du grain en Égée au IV^e s. av. J. C.", in: *ZPE* 99 (1993), 185-196, esp. 191. Cf. for the Hellenistic period also Lund, John. "Rhodian Amphorae in Rhodes and Alexandria as Evidence of Trade", in: Vincent Gabrielsen et. al. (eds.). *Hellenistic Rhodes: Politics, Culture, and Society*. Aarhus 1999, 187-204.

BC.⁹⁵ This money fed back into the domestic network and made the port city even more attractive as it could be used to improve the infrastructure required. The persistence of the Rhodian coin standard similarly reinforces this impression of Rhodes as an economic network hub that was constantly reinforced by the dynamics of self-reinforcement produced by the import tax and other fees and transactions.⁹⁶ This impressive nexus of urban and infrastructural growth and economic activity probably had a significant effect on the Rhodian collective, especially since the wealth it provided was in theory an excellent safe-guard against contingency on the payment code, though of course Rhodes remained enmeshed in diffuse macro-political tensions, which the lack of sources prevents us from assessing.

6.1.5.3 Rhodes and Alexander

To a degree, this fortunately changes with Alexander's campaign, although information remains relatively scarce. Here this lack of material is especially frustrating since this phase appears to be crucial to the consolidation of the domestic network of Rhodes.⁹⁷ If the high status of the two famous Rhodian generals and brothers Mentor and Memnon is no crass exception,⁹⁸ their story would indicate that the majority of Rhodian actors adhered to the status quo as the dominant elite faction was embedded into the Hekatomnid and Achaemenid translations of power, while the democrats had lost a lot of ground due to the Hekatomnid interventions and the collapse of Athens as an actor of significance in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁹⁹ The loss of power network connectivity the Hekatomnids suffered due to the contingency that followed the death of the dynast Idrieus in 344 BC may also have had consequences for the Rhodians, although of course Achaemenid

⁹⁵ Plb. 30.31.12 with Walbank ad loc. (III, 459f.). Cf. Fraser 1986³, 1, 163. The wealth of the Rhodian community is apparent not only from the myths considered above and from the later glorification at Diod. 20.81.4, but also from the very concrete decrees proclaimed during the siege of 305/4 BC (Diod. 20.82.2; 20.84.3-6).

⁹⁶ Berthold 1984, 48f. with n. 38.

⁹⁷ Berthold 1984, 34.

⁹⁸ On Mentor and Memnon see fundamentally Berve 1926, 2, no. 497; Berthold 1984, 32f.; Wiemer 2002, 61 with ns. 55f. The Athenian honorary decree for Memnon (IG II² 356) explicitly thematises the brothers' ties to the famous satrap Artabazos (l. 23-35), as does Diod. 16.52.4.

⁹⁹ Wiemer 2002, 61; Berthold 1984, 34f.

power was the dominant force in the Eastern Mediterranean at the time.¹⁰⁰ This limited Rhodian collective agency, which was further constrained by the invasive presence of the Hekatomnid garrison, even though it is unclear how long the latter existed. As it stands, however, the only notably active individuals are Mentor and Memnon, who were integrated into the Achaemenid translation, but seem to have possessed great liberties.

The crucial observation is that after Alexander the internal contingency within Rhodian domestic society with its common confrontations between factions evidently gave way to new collective unity that allowed for the deployment of collective agency. This was reflected in the mixed democratic constitution, which seems to have institutionally reified this relative ‘harmony’.¹⁰¹ The perspective adopted here may be able to add a couple of qualifications to current research.¹⁰² The analysis so far has shown that collective Rhodian agency had so far been fractured by its translation into other network configurations. The contingency created by the interplay between the domestic network configuration and the macro-political network environment had hitherto prevented a specifically Rhodian collective agency capable of translating others. For a short period of time, the Macedonian expansion now dissolved (or obscured) the underlying problem, the distributed configuration of actors in the Eastern Mediterranean, replacing it with a centralised network of power focused on Alexander the Great.¹⁰³ This fundamental shift in configuration was a game changer in Asia Minor, as there

¹⁰⁰ This is suggested by the numbers Diodorus (16.40.6) gives for the fleet deployed by Artaxerxes III during his invasion of Egypt in 343 BC, on which see Briant 2002, 685-687.

¹⁰¹ Wiemer 2002, 63-65; Berthold 1984, 34-40. The proud performative presentation of the organisation of the *mastroi* at Kameiros, representatives of the poorly understood “townships” (κτοίνα; see Berthold 1984, 41) who were to communally conduct “all the religious and civic business of the Kameirians” (τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ Καμειρέων [τὰ δα]/[μο]τελή πάντα) seems to fall in this period (Tit. Cam. 109). SEG IX 2:11 further attests the distribution of 30000 medimnoi of grain to Rhodes, probably by Alexander as a subsidized fund designed to combat shortage (σιτοδεία), which may also have helped control contingency and reinforced the focus of external activity onto the king (Kingsley 1986, 169, 173f). On the inscription see recently Berthelot, Hugues. “La «stèle des céréales» de Cyrène”, in: *Cameuinae* 8 (2012), n. p. <http://www.paris-sorbonne.fr/IMG/pdf/BerthelotBAT.pdf> (Accessed 21.09.2017), who unfortunately cannot unravel it either.

¹⁰² See fundamentally Hauben, Hans. “Rhodes, Alexander and the Diadochi from 333/332 to 304 B.C.”, in: *Historia* 26:3 (1977), 307-339; cf. the hardly divergent and brief accounts of this phase of consolidation by Berthold 1984, 34-37 and Wiemer 2002, 63-66.

¹⁰³ On Alexander and the Greeks see recently Poddighe, Elisabetta. “Alexander and the Greeks: The Corinthian League”, in: Waldemar Heckel und Lawrence A. Tritle (eds.). *Alexander the Great: A New History*. London 2009, 99-120.

was now only one main agent to contend with in negotiating collective agency: one could only be pro-Macedonian or anti-Macedonian, no longer pro-Athenian, pro-Lakedaimonian, or pro-Persian. In other words, the centralisation and unification of this network of power interactions resulted in power interaction becoming a binary matter. Despite the contingency caused by such fundamental systemic change, the result was that the translated collectives were provided a very clear basis for self-location.

In this concrete scenario, Alexander declared the Greek cities of Asia Minor ‘sovereign’ and exempt from taxation, promoting changes of regime from oligarchy to democracy, though of course his proclamation of these rights was but one factor in a complex mesh of interactions with individual cities.¹⁰⁴ What happened to Rhodes in detail is unclear, but the city contributed to Alexander’s fleet at the siege of Tyre in 332 BC, suggesting it was freed at some point and interactions are definitely attested.¹⁰⁵ Alexander further seems to have stationed a garrison in Rhodes that is attested in both 331 and in 323 BC and obviously limited Rhodian agency.¹⁰⁶ The internal dynamics of this phase are likewise in the dark, as the sources are concerned almost exclusively with the Macedonians; as a consequence, the constitutional and personal consequences of Alexander’s actions are unknown. There is one indicator, however, that supports a dichotomisation of high-level power interactions along the lines just outlined, i.e. as a choice between centralisation and individualisation, between being translated and translating. Plutarch mentions two Rhodians, Demaratos and Sparton, who were arrested ἐπ’ αἰτίας τισί (“for some reasons”) and incarcerated in Sardis, the seat of the responsible satrap, effectively removing them from the interaction network of Rhodian domestic politics.¹⁰⁷ This already tentatively suggests political dissatisfaction with Alexander, or at least his empire, and seems to indicate anti-Macedonian sentiment at Rhodes in analogy to the better documented situation

¹⁰⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.2; Diod. 17.24.1. Cf. Miletà 2008, 22.

¹⁰⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 2.20.1f.; Curt. 4.5.9; 4.8.12; Iust. 11.11.1; Plut. *Alex.* 32. For his dedication at the temple of Athena at Lindos see Bringmann and von Steuben 1995, no. 194.

¹⁰⁶ Curt. 4.8.12; Diod. 18.8.1. In view of Rhodes’ potential as a naval base, wharf, and strategic maritime location (Arr. *Anab.* 2.20.1-3) Alexander’s action is hardly surprising. On the garrison see the discussion by Hauben 1977, 309f.

¹⁰⁷ Plut. *Phoc.* 18.4-5; Ael. *VH.* 1.25. Alexander was willing to release the two at Phokion’s request, which shows that Demaratos and Sparton were friends of Phokion, a moderate pro-Macedonian. Plutarch mentions them in the context of a negotiation of *philia* via favour-exchange; when the anecdote should be dated seems unclear, but the ample gift of 100 talents tentatively indicates 330 or, more likely, 325/4 BC (before the Harpalos affair), times of relative leisure and access to funds. In any case it is likely that the anecdote is after the ‘liberation’ of Rhodes. See in more detail Hauben 1977, 310 with n. 23.

at Athens.¹⁰⁸ The presence of a certain Demaratos (the same man?) in the year 321 BC as nauarch of the Rhodian fleet that fought the Perdikkan Attalos may now indicate that these anti-Macedonian tendencies intensified when Demaratos returned, finally allowing for the manifestation of self-sufficient Rhodian agency in the late fourth century, aided by the clear polarisation of possible actions.¹⁰⁹

6.1.5.4 Rhodes after Alexander's death

Once again, however, the finer details of this development towards a self-confident Rhodian collective actor escape us. The dynamics that shaped the domestic configuration of the island after Alexander's death are quite as unclear as those that shaped them during his reign.¹¹⁰ Diodorus tells us only very briefly of the pivotal actions with which the Rhodians responded to Alexander's death in 323 BC, ousting the garrison and proclaiming their own freedom. These risky moves

¹⁰⁸ The role of the exiles decree (Diod. 17.109.1; 18.8.1-7; Curt. 10.2.4-7; Plut. *Mor.* 221a; Iust. 13.5.1-7) for Rhodes is unclear, but may well have contributed to the development, especially if a pro-Achaemenid faction had been exiled when Alexander 'freed' Rhodes. As the decree affected Samos (Syll³ 312:11-16 (=IG XII,6 1:17); see Shipley 1987, 165-168) it will probably have applied to Rhodes as well, though it may have been subject to individual negotiation, as at Samos. While Diodorus does not mention Rhodes (Diod. 18.8.6f.), his report is very brief and of course concerned mainly with the Lamian War. Justin (13.5.3f.) attests a general sense of unrest that resulted from a fear of new domestic strife, again in the context of the Lamian War that left Rhodes unaffected (Berthold 1984, 59f.; Sch

mitt, Oliver. *Der Lamische Krieg*. Bonn 1992, 108). On the exiles decree as a tool of power see generally Badian 1961, 28-31; Zahrnt 2003, 431f. and *passim*, who argues that Alexander employed it to weaken the *poleis* by tying them up in internal matters, which acted as a kind of 'divide and conquer' strategy, as indeed Diodorus already notes. Dmitriev, Sviatoslav. "Alexander's Exiles Decree", in: *Klio* 86 (2004), 348-381, corroborated Schmitt 1992, 23-34, in doubting the character of the decree visible in the written sources by drawing on epigraphic evidence. In his view, Alexander uttered a recommendation that the cities could consider at their discretion. Despite this qualification, however, the decree would still have inaugurated a complex process of negotiation and accordingly potential unrest.

¹⁰⁹ Arr. *Ta met' Alex.* F1.39 Roos-Wirth (=FGrH 156 F 11.39). Obviously the identity of these two individuals cannot be proven. It is worth noting, however, that the name Damaratos is relatively rare in the epigraphic record. The corpus from Lindos (II, Sp. 1057) contains five individuals, only one of whom, Damaratos, son of Timaratos, from the Peraia (Lindos II no. 51, col. II.1, l. 18), falls into this period. The extensive involvement of Timaratos' family in the restoration of the Lindian temple of Athena further indicates socio-economic and thus political prominence.

¹¹⁰ See on this Wiemer 2002, 66-71, who provides a detailed history of the events, also for the following.

were probably instigated by the democratic faction, as Rhodes was certainly democratic during the siege of 305/4 BC, but without the ties to Athens this kind of regime had entailed in the fourth century: Rhodes did not participate in the Lamian War.¹¹¹ In view of the results so far, this development is not unexpected, especially given the fact that Caria was without a satrap.¹¹² Although factual changes in the domestic configuration the changes in the internal configuration are completely unclear beyond what is known of Demaratos, it seems plausible that the elite structures that had been enmeshed in the Achaemenid Empire were probably shaken by Alexander's campaign. The suggestion that actors from Alexander's environment and his garrison with its commander may have contributed to the change in constitution may also well be correct.¹¹³ I doubt, however, whether this supplied the reason behind the cult of Alexander that is attested only much later:¹¹⁴ as both Diodorus and the Alexander romance attest, Alexander was exalted and instrumentalised by the local traditions crafted on Rhodes in the context of the new distributed configuration of the third century BC.¹¹⁵ In my view, the garrison was regarded mainly as an imposition, a visual marker of translation, and therein contributed to the consolidation of the Rhodian collective as an actor in its own interest that developed through the interplay with Alexander's rule.¹¹⁶ The creation of this clear dichotomy between the Rhodians as a collective and Alexander finally resulted in the erstwhile end of constraining domestic unrest at Rhodes, a state that continued when Eastern Mediterranean politics once again devolved into a state of contingency.¹¹⁷ The collapse of political clarity caused by Alexander's death provided the final trigger required for a self-sufficient consolidation of the Rhodian collective and its emergence as an

¹¹¹ Diod. 18.8.1; 20.93.7. Diodorus treats the *demos* as the acting political body in 315 BC (19.58.5). The miracle recorded in the Lindian chronicle for the time of the siege of 305/4 BC gives a prytanis and the council as actors in negotiating the aid of Ptolemy (I.Lindos 2:100-104, 111-115). On the Lamian War see the study by Schmitt 1992, esp. 50-65, 108, and for Rhodes Berthold 1984, 59f.

¹¹² Wiemer, Hans-Ulrich. "Early Hellenistic Rhodes: The Struggle for Independence and the Dream of Hegemony", in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 123-146, here 125.

¹¹³ Wiemer 2002, 63; Berthold 1984, 34f.

¹¹⁴ Wiemer 2002, 64 with n. 82. On the cult of Alexander on Rhodes see Habicht 1970², 26-28; Dreyer 2009, 228 is similarly defensive.

¹¹⁵ Diod. 20.81.3; *Epit. Mett.* 106-109; 116; 118. Cf. Berthold 1984, 37 with n. 58.

¹¹⁶ The pressure of the garrison is clear from Iust. 4.8.12f.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Berthold 1984, 36. As was noted above, there is simply no information about the internal dynamics. I do not mean to say that Rhodes was a paradise void of conflict. It does seem, however, that the faultlines that undoubtedly existed no longer hampered collective Rhodian action on behalf of the Rhodians themselves.

actor.¹¹⁸ Fortunately, the sources make this step clearly visible in the declaration of freedom, the ousting of the garrison, and the military agency deployed in rebuking the Perdikkas admiral Attalos in 321 BC.¹¹⁹ The success of these actions reinforced the Rhodians' collective agency and rendered them a source of translation for others, i.e. free in the sense so prominently implemented by the Athenians. As Vincent Gabrielsen has shown, this increasingly becomes visible also in the self-representation of the island's political class, its "naval aristocracy".¹²⁰

6.2 Rhodes and the Antigonids in the Diadoch period

The following years saw the early development of the new distributed power configuration that was to structure the Eastern Mediterranean for much of the Hellenistic period. For the Rhodian collective, this raises the question as to how it managed to navigate this shifting and highly complex configuration and employ its agency to avoid and control contingency. Particular attention is due to the interaction triangle between the Rhodians, Ptolemy, and the Antigonids, as well as to the beginnings of a Rhodian 'policy of neutrality'.¹²¹

At first the Rhodians profited from the fact that after Perdikkas' death the lines of political interaction kept largely to the land, at least until the third Diadoch War (315-311 BC). Their geographical position thus kept them out of harm's way, unless of course the sources are failing us.¹²² Unfortunately, they were not spared another of the devastating floods that evidently plagued the city of Rhodes in antiquity. According to Diodorus, a hail storm severely affected the course of the city's politics in spring 316 BC, as the flood it caused claimed many victims and badly damaged crucial infrastructure – Diodorus explicitly mentions the defensive

¹¹⁸ Cf. Gehrke 1976, 80; Hauben 1977, 316; Berthold 1984, 36.

¹¹⁹ Arr. *Ta met' Alex.* F 1.39 Roos-Wirth (=FGrH 156 F 11.39).

¹²⁰ On the Rhodian elite as a "naval aristocracy" see Gabrielsen 1997, 15-17, 95f. and *passim*.

¹²¹ On Rhodes as a neutral trading republic in the Hellenistic period see e.g. Schmitt 1957, 54f.; Berthold 1984, 57f. Ager, Sheila L. "Rhodes: The Rise and Fall of a Neutral Diplomomat", in: *Historia* 40:1 (1991), 10-41, emphasises Rhodian diplomatic activity and prestige in the Hellenistic period as an arbitrator, mediator, and peacemaker. As she notes, this began already in the Diadoch period (SIG³ 363; I.Priene 16; I.Magnesia 50; Welles 1934, no. 6 and 8). Criticism of this view was most forcefully expressed by Wiemer 2001, 222-231.

¹²² Hauben 1977, 318, 321f. Hauben accepts Diod. 20.81, a passage to be treated with due caution, cf. Billows 1990, 165f. n. 5.

installations at the harbours.¹²³ It is at least conceivable that this had an impact on Rhodian collective agency, since in 315 BC the city agreed to build ships for Antigonos Monophthalmos, which he used against Ptolemy in his siege of Tyre.¹²⁴ In my view it seems more likely that this agreement was not a formal *symmachy*, meaning that the Rhodians insisted on their independence, but rather an economic interaction, performed by the Rhodian shipyards with Antigonid lumber and paid for with Antigonid money.¹²⁵ Obviously even such an arrangement could be construed as a hostile action directed against Ptolemy, especially since the matter may well have been discussed in the assembly,¹²⁶ but there is no positive evidence to suggest a conflict with Ptolemy at the time.¹²⁷ Rhodes itself at least

¹²³ Diod. 19.45.1-8. Allegedly 500 people died, houses and parts of the harbour wall collapsed. The information seems to derive from a local Rhodian historian and can thus be considered a reliable portrayal of the perceived contingency the event must have caused. A political significance of this natural catastrophe is also considered by Hauben 1977, 318; 335.

¹²⁴ Diod. 19.57.4; 58.5; 61.5; 62.7; 64.5-7. Cf. Berthold 1984, 61.

¹²⁵ Cf. similarly Berthold 1984, 63; Billows 1990, 112f. By contrast Hauben 1977, 325-327, attempts to show that the Rhodian fleet was involved as part of a *symmachy*, distinguishing various mentions of Rhodian ships operating in Antigonid fleets (Diod. 19.61.5 & 62.7 on the one hand, Diod. 19.64.5 on the other). Cf. similarly Wiemer 2002, 72-75. I see no compelling argument for an involvement of a Rhodian citizen fleet in the siege of Tyre in 315/4 BC under the terms of a military *symmachy*. 1) While Diod. 19.57.4 speaks of *symmachies* being concluded in general, he seems to specify the situation for Rhodes at 19.58.5, as the island was evidently important to Antigonos' plans and was accordingly visited by two select Greek emissaries, Idomeneus and Moschion (Billows 1990, 394, no. 56 and 406, no. 75), who may even have been islanders and certainly had prior contacts. Agesilaos' mission, on the other hand, the foundation of the Nesiotic League, was clearly political/military in scope (Diod. 19.59.1). Finally, in 312 BC Diodorus clearly speaks of a *symmachy* being concluded (Diod. 19.77.3) – if one had been made in 315 BC, this would not have been necessary. The fact that the fleet at the siege of Tyre was under Antigonid command is then irrelevant and in fact Rhodian personnel is never mentioned, only Carian (Diod. 19.62.7; 19.64.5). 2) Diod. 19.64.5; 19.61.5; 19.62.7 only prove that ships were delivered in (at least) two installments. The first was complete and equippable during the siege of Tyre in 314 BC, whereas the second was only ready in 313 BC. Reading Diod. 19.64.5 as attesting a differentiation between the navy of the Rhodian state and the ships built on commission does not seem acceptable: Antigonos sent for the ships commissioned and received those that were ready.

¹²⁶ Diod. 19.58.5: ἦν δὲ καὶ περὶ Ῥόδον ἄλλο, συγχωρήσαντος τοῦ δήμου κατασκευάζειν ναῦς ἀπὸ τῆς ἕλης τῆς εἰσκομιζομένης (“There was also another [shipyard] in Rhodes, the people having agreed to make ships from the imported timber”).

¹²⁷ The only action attested for Seleukos' fleet in the region is its attempted siege of the Ionian city of Erythraï, which was thwarted by Antigonid troops in the area (Diod. 19.60.2-4). The Ptolemaic fleet used Cyprus as a base (Diod. 19.62.4) and probably

seems to have remained unmolested – only the ships being delivered were destroyed by the Ptolemaic fleet.¹²⁸ As for the relationship between the Rhodians and the Antigonids, this interaction does seem to have established a potentially dangerous relational identity, even if Rhodes had avoided a formal symmarchy – the unfortunate increase of domestic contingency the Rhodians had suffered due to flood may well have played its part here.

In 314 BC, Rhodes was obviously among the addressees of Antigonos' proclamation of Tyre. Antigonos clearly communicated that he would respect the freedom and autonomy of the Greek cities and Ptolemy, who had also gained the allegiance of Asander, still satrap of Caria, soon responded with a similar proclamation.¹²⁹ In this situation we have access only to the bare bones of what must have been a very complex mesh of negotiations with competing partners, a contingency the Rhodians seem to have navigated successfully at least until the summer of 312 BC. The proclamations with their discursive emphasis on Greek freedom undoubtedly recalled a translation the Rhodians were well familiar with, since both Athens and Alexander had drawn on 'freedom' to establish their empires over Greeks. They will have been well aware that agency was essential to freedom,¹³⁰ whereas freedom guaranteed by the kings had to be reminiscent of the freedom offered by the Athenian leagues.

By 312 BC, however, the configuration of the network of power in South-Western Asia Minor had changed substantially. Despite Ptolemaic control over Cyprus, the Antigonids seem now to have dominated Caria and the Southern coast of Asia Minor, once again curtailing the Rhodians' exercise of agency in their own right.¹³¹ Since the only other option in this constellation was Kassander, the Rhodians were compelled – or possibly eager to – conclude a symmarchy with Antigonos, under the terms of which they provided ten fully equipped (and probably manned) ships. The negotiations again hinged on the struggle for Greek freedom in line with the proclamation of Tyre.¹³² In 311 BC this key concept of

contributed to the contingency of the region overall by plundering, without, however, molesting Rhodes, which was of course a very important port for the grain trade, which the Diadochi depended on to acquire money (cf. Welles 1934, no. 1:72-94).

¹²⁸ Diod. 19.62.7f.

¹²⁹ Diod. 19.61.1-4; 19.62.1-2.

¹³⁰ Wiemer 2011, 123f.

¹³¹ Ptolemaic control of Cyprus is attested by Diod. 19.21.1. Asander's 'capitulation' and the following demonstration of power by Antigonos in Caria 313/2 BC is described by Diod. 19.75.1-6 and included both naval and land-based operations. Diod. 19.69.3 mentions Antigonid naval operations in the area against Kassander, commanded by Medeios. See extensively Billows 1990, 119-121; 400f. no. 68.

¹³² Diod. 19.77.3. This may have been the Rhodian 'state fleet', either in part or in its entirety. There is no actual positive evidence pertaining to the personnel that manned

Antigonid power interaction was reproduced once more in the peace treaty that concluded the Third Diadoch War; it stands to reason that the arguments were again communicated throughout the Greek world.¹³³ The Antigonid successes in mainland Greece and finally against Ptolemy in the battle of Salamis in 306 BC cemented their dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean and further reinforced the configuration of power that limited Rhodian agency.¹³⁴ The details, especially regarding the domestic configuration of the island state, are once more unclear, though the continuous combat in the region may well have had its effects.¹³⁵ The only tentative indicator is the silence of the sources about Rhodes in particular, which may suggest that the republic succeeded in negotiating the network between the de-facto kings by harnessing its economic, military, and political identities to protect itself from direct negative interactions, while also profiting from the fact that its surroundings were weaker targets.¹³⁶ Without a doubt negotiations and exchanges of gifts and honours were extremely common during this period, for instance with Ptolemy when he was using the neighbouring island of Kos as a base in 309/8 BC.¹³⁷ Since the Rhodians were definitely contractually obligated to Ptolemy in 305 BC to the extent that war against him was prohibited,¹³⁸ I consider it plausible that in 309/8 BC the Rhodians concluded a symmachy for the purpose of propagating the freedom of the Greeks also with Ptolemy and that

the ships. Note that this fleet operated against Kassander, not against Ptolemy, therefore acting in line with the policy of proliferating Greek freedom. Cf. Hauben 1977, 323; Wiemer 2002, 75f.; Wiemer 2011, 126, both of whom, in my view, underestimate the weight the discourse of freedom carried. Though suspicious as a tool of domination, it was ideally suited to mobilizing collective agency without domination, which was prevented by a multiplicity of political interaction. On the Rhodian fleet see further Berthold 1984, 42-45, esp. Gabrielsen 1997, 85-111, and more recently Blackman, David J. "The Rhodian Fleet and the Karian Coast", in: Riet van Bremen and Jan-Mathieu Carbon (eds.), *Hellenistic Karia*, Paris 2010, 379-392.

¹³³ Welles 1934 no. 1:1-2; 53-61 (=OGIS 5); Diod. 19.105.1. Cf. Billows 1990, 132f.

¹³⁴ Diod. 20.46.5-47.4; 47.4-53.1. Plut. *Demetr.* 16.1-4. For details see Billows 1990, 151-155.

¹³⁵ The Ptolemaic successes in Cilicia, Caria and the Dodecanese in 310/9 BC, followed by operations in the Aegean, always reproduced the propagation of Greek freedom and are attested by Diod. 20.27.1-3; 37.1-2; I.Iasos 2:30f. The Antigonids were occupied by fighting unsuccessfully against Seleukos (Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.9.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 7.3), but Demetrios returned in 309 BC to rebuke Ptolemy. See extensively Huß, Werner. *Ägypten in hellenistischer Zeit*. Munich 2001, 173-176; Billows 1990, 143-147; Seibert 1969, 184-187.

¹³⁶ This silence is particularly conspicuous since Diodorus was clearly using a local Rhodian source in some capacity. See below p. 373.

¹³⁷ Diod. 20.27.2f. See extensively Huß 2001, 173-176, but cf. Billows 1990, 144; Hauben 1977, 336f.

¹³⁸ Diod. 20.46.6; 20.82.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 21.1; cf. Billows 1990, 165f.; 202f.; 207f.

this agreement stipulated mutual non-aggression.¹³⁹ This is suggested by the great discursive significance of ‘freedom’ in the network of power interactions in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as by the fact that the Rhodians seem not to have joined either of the two relevant hubs in the area any more closely than absolutely necessary.¹⁴⁰

This kind of policy would now seem to conform to Diodorus’ description of Rhodian ‘foreign policy’ as neutral and as the Rhodians as coveted partners of the kings. Viewed in terms of an interaction network, such a policy of ‘neutrality’, or better equalisation, would simply amount to a resistance to *enrolment* in translation.¹⁴¹ Three interrelated strategies can be plausibly identified:

1) Contingency is controlled not by accepting the terms of a translator, but by self-confident action that qualifies *enrolment*. In the interaction network this can be visible in the consistent reproduction of discursive interactions that refer either to an existing abstract concept of ‘neutrality’, or to abstract concepts that either create a community among *all* actors involved or limit translation conceptually, such as ‘freedom’; both options negotiate and limit capacities for translation. Since an explicit formal concept of neutrality seems not to have existed in Antiquity, the first option falls flat, though it is worth noting that discussion of such

¹³⁹ Diod. 20.37.2; Plut. *Demetr.* 21.1. A certain interest in peace and the concomitant economic functionality of the Rhodian harbours will have continued to play a part for many of the powers involved (Diod. 20.81.4; P.Col. 6, 247, col. III, ll. 23-30). It is further possible that Hauben 1977, 331-334; 336, is correct in assuming that treaties with all Diadochi were already established as part of the general peace of 311 BC. The only basis of this assumption are the vague and textually problematical statements made by Diod 20.46.6; 20.81.2, 4, which can hardly be used as hard evidence of such treaties. Cf. further Seibert 1969, 225-230, esp. 228f., who even disregards the explicit statement by Plutarch and denies any treaty with Ptolemy. On the apparent gap in Antigonid political action between 310 and 308 BC see Wheatley, Pat. “Three Missing Years in the Life of Demetrius the Besieger: 310-308 BC”, in: *JAC* 16 (2001), 9-19, who plausibly argues that they were spent reinforcing the Asian Empire.

¹⁴⁰ It is here necessary to consider the Suda s.v. Δημήτριος (Adler Delta 431), whose author claims that Demetrius und Ptolemy concluded a friendship for the purpose of freeing the Greeks at this time (considered authentic by Schmitt, Hatto. *Staatsverträge des Altertums*. Vol. 3. Munich 1969, 49f. no. 433, Hauben 1977, 336 with n. 127, and even declared “sicher” by Huß 2001, 176). Despite the – resolvable – difficulties of the entry (see Seibert 1969, 180-183), this would explain why we stop hearing of fighting between Demetrius and Ptolemy in the area and further supports my strong emphasis on the discourse of Greek freedom at the very end of the fourth century BC. Seibert 1969, 186f., first reconstructs the base for such a conclusion, but then rejects it fully by discarding the Suda’s evidence, while (over-)stressing the importance of Alexander’s sister Kleopatra in its place.

¹⁴¹ Diod. 20.81.2-4.

questions always operates, at least in part, at an etic level anyway.¹⁴² The second form of discursive procedure can, however, be tentatively identified for Rhodes in the discussion of the background of the siege of 305/4 BC by later sources.¹⁴³

2) Looking beyond explicit discursive arguments, the second complementary strategy one can identify is developing one's web of interactions in the network in such a way that the relational identities created are uniform, with the result that the actor is enmeshed in a plurality of translations that are mutually exclusive when it comes to *mobilisation* within the network, as without *mobilisation* translation is ineffective.¹⁴⁴ Wiemer has rejected this for the Diadoch period as a whole on the grounds that the relevant passage of Diodorus is biased in favour of the Rhodians.¹⁴⁵ Rather than denying this, I choose to believe the attestation of a detail, namely that multiple "treaties" (συνηκαί) with Ptolemy apparently forbade aggression in 305.¹⁴⁶ I agree that this was hardly already reflected upon as a conscious 'policy of neutrality', which is indeed most certainly a product of third-century oratory and historiography – however, reflection seems irrelevant in terms of de facto interaction, which, as Wiemer rightly observes, was purely interested in maintaining agency by establishing as much security as possible.¹⁴⁷

3) As a consequence, interactions aimed at the 'neutral' actor are responded to by intensifying not the reciprocal dyad, but interactions with third parties, so

¹⁴² See fundamentally Bauslaugh, Robert A. *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece*. Berkeley 1991, 242-251, esp. 248f., who concludes that a policy of neutrality can be detected in the Classical sources, but that it was hardly institutionalised and generally rendered in terms of plural *philia* relations. Unfortunately to my knowledge his long-awaited study of Hellenistic neutrality has yet to appear. Cf. Baltrusch, Ernst. *Außenpolitik, Bünde und Reichsbildung in der Antike*. Munich 2008, 34f.; Wiemer 2011, 124-126.

¹⁴³ Diod. 20.84.1. The Rhodians are said to have appealed to other powers for aid on the grounds that they were fighting on their behalf (προπολεμῆν), implying the discursive creation of community among the actors involved.

¹⁴⁴ See Callon 1986 for the concept of *mobilisation*, the act of realising a compound actor's agency. In the long term, this is suggested by the activity of the Rhodians as peace brokers in the late third century, causing Rhodes to be woven into the relational identities surrounding the concept of peace, which is a form of 'neutrality' that conforms to the first point (Plb. 5.24.11; 5.28.1; 5.63.46; 5.100.09). See Ager 1991; Giovannini 1993, 275f. A parallel case is provided by the behaviour of Athens after Ipsos and between 287 and 285 BC in an attempt to negotiate the impact of Demetrios Poliorketes, see Paschidis 2008, 115, 118, 154-157.

¹⁴⁵ Wiemer 2002, 71-77; idem 2011, 126, pointing to Plb. 16.14.1-10; 17.8-11, which criticizes Rhodian historians for their excessive patriotism and little regard for facts. This certainly holds true for Diod. 20.81.1-4, which is obviously a pro-Rhodian eulogy. I doubt, however, whether it applies to all the details, many of which are documentary.

¹⁴⁶ Diod. 20.82.2.

¹⁴⁷ Wiemer 2011, 127.

by distributing *eunoia*. In network terms, this equates to a normal distribution of ties within the network and is equivalent to the abstract structure identified for the citizen body in Theophrastus' *Characters*. This strategy can be traced in the symmachies that hinged on the pursuit of freedom and will emerge again in the discussion of the siege below. In practice, such strategies are always contingent upon the network configuration, as they depend on increasing contingency for the other hubs and can easily come to be perceived as resistance. Without a distributed configuration of the power interaction network, acting in defiance of *enrolment* can produce immense contingencies, as the genesis of the siege will now show. Given the perspective adopted here and the evidence available, however, speaking of a de facto Rhodian policy of equalisation seems to be justified already for the years between 315 and 306 BC.¹⁴⁸ This strategy served the purpose of maintaining independent collective agency.

6.2.1 The siege of 305/4 BC

This question having been addressed, the following section aims to analyse the siege of Rhodes, conducted by Demetrios Poliorketes on behalf of this father, as well as the subsequent construction of the Colossus of Rhodes, by applying the method developed here. The events are read in the context provided by the cognitive network configuration that underpinned Rhodian collective agency as it was reconstructed above. The events of the siege itself will not be narrated, as the interest is in the subtle network of agency-consolidating interactions that operated at the level of identity, rather than in the actual fighting that resulted from this network of identity.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Berthold 1984, 61-67, who conceptualises neutrality quite differently. On the creation of this kind of balance in macro-level power politics of the Diadoch period cf. Schuffert 2005, 360f. on the creation of negative alliances against dominant powers (such as the Antigonids on numerous occasions) and Habicht 1995, 54.

¹⁴⁹ On the siege of Rhodes see the overview of older research by Seibert 1983, 142-145; add Préaux 1978, 1, 329f.; Berthold 1984, 66-79 (with a description of the siege); Wiemer 2002, 84-92. Hauben 1977 does not discuss the siege itself. See more recently Faucherre, Nicolas and Pimouguet-Pédarros, Isabelle (eds.). *Les Sièges de Rhodes de l'Antiquité à la Période Moderne*. Rennes 2010; Pimouguet-Pédarros, Isabelle. *La cité à l'épreuve des rois. Le siège de Rhodes par Démétrios Poliorkète (305 - 304 av. J.-C.)*. Rennes 2011.

6.2.1.1 Source criticism

In approaching this episode of Rhodian history one is soon confronted with the difficulties that arise from the available sources, meriting a short excursus.¹⁵⁰ The literary sources for the siege of Rhodes, the extensive and famous passage of Diodorus, the relevant section of Plutarch's life of Demetrios, and the Berlin papyrus fragment, are all problematical as they at least in part draw on traditions that reshaped the events for rhetorical purposes, selectively embroidered them, or had specific moral and didactic aims.¹⁵¹ Chief among these are the traditions produced by the warring parties themselves.

Diodorus' main source for the history of the Diadoch period is the work of Hieronymus of Cardia, written at the court of Antigonos II Gonatas and based on autopsy, first-hand reports, chancellery documents, and diaries.¹⁵² In principle, this work is considered a reliable and accurate depiction of the events, though coloured by its focus on and sympathy for the Antigonids and Eumenes. For his description of the siege, Diodorus further incorporated material that clearly derives from a Rhodian source, probably a local historian, who has sometimes been identified as Zeno of Rhodes.¹⁵³ As Jane Hornblower already suggested with some justification, the latter may himself have drawn on other sources, such as the reliable Hieronymus, when writing the corresponding sections of his Rhodian history.¹⁵⁴ The problems with these sources therefore relate less to the basic facts

¹⁵⁰ For source criticism see Müller 1973, 4-16; Seibert 1983, 2-9; 27-36; 38-41; 43f.; Billows 1990, 329-333, 341-351. The problems relating to Rhodes are discussed by Hornblower 1982, 56-60; Wiemer 2001, 222-250; idem 2002, 37-52. Berthold (1984, 62 n. 7; 67 n. 17) devotes little space to the matter. Cf. more recently Durvyne, Cécile. "Historiographie antique du siège de Rhodes par Démétrios (305 - 304)", in: Faucherre and Pimouguet-Pédarros (eds.) 2010, 39-56.

¹⁵¹ Diod. 20.81.1-88.9; Plut. *Demetr.* 21.1-22.2; P.Berol. 11632 (=FGrH 533 F 2; dated to the 2nd century AD. *Editio princeps* by Hiller von Gaertringen, Friedrich. *Aus der Belagerung von Rhodos 304 v. Chr.: Griechischer Papyrus der Kgl. Museen zu Berlin*. Berlin 1918, 752-762 with plate III). Justin wasted no ink on the siege.

¹⁵² The fragments of Hieronymus of Cardia are collected in FGrH 154; on his method and reliability see Hornblower 1982, 107-153.

¹⁵³ The fragments of Zeno of Rhodes are edited as FGrH 523. See further Lehmann, Gustav A. "Das neue Kölner Historiker-Fragment (P. Köln Nr. 247) und die *Χρονική σύνταξις* des Zenon von Rhodes (FGrH 523)", in: *ZPE* 72 (1988), 1-17, esp. 11-14. The best account is Wiemer 2001, 241-250, esp. 248f.

¹⁵⁴ Based on the relatively high degree of homogeneity visible in Diodorus' descriptions and the wealth of detail provided about both sides of the conflict, Jane Hornblower has argued in favour of such a double use of Hieronymos (1982, 59). According to Paus. 1.9.8, Hieronymus' books on Antigonos II Gonatas were worryingly laudatory, but their content is lost beyond what survives in Justin. The double distortion caused

of the siege, which are fortunately described in great detail and from both sides of the conflict, and more to the ‘rhetorical’ strategies employed. These serve to direct the reader’s sympathies and include shifts in narrative focus and the selection and characterisation of individual actions. Attention is due therefore to the transformation of the events of the siege into a clash between the apparently indomitable machinery of Demetrios’ military might and the Rhodians’ virtuous struggle.¹⁵⁵

As is well-known, using Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives* as sources has its own problems.¹⁵⁶ The interest in abstracting a historical individual’s character in a condensed and parallelised fashion for the purpose of comparison pervades these texts and results in a fundamental shift of emphasis and in historical liberties. This is well illustrated by Plutarch’s account of the siege, which, besides one sentence of introduction and conclusion each, consists of only four anecdotes: the helepolis, the armour made by Zoilos, the capture of the gifts Phila sent her husband, and Demetrios’ respect for Protogenes’ painting of Ialysos.¹⁵⁷ As was noted above, anecdotes are difficult to evaluate, as they are living stories and texts, and therefore particularly susceptible to being reworked and instrumentalised.¹⁵⁸ In this capacity, however, they can provide insights into the social negotiation of contingency during the siege via story-telling.

Besides these main literary accounts, there are a couple of other pieces of evidence to consider. Since P.Berol. 11632 offers an event not found in Diodorus, Demetrios’ attempt to ransom captured siege engineers, it seems clear that the author drew on another text with more content, possibly Diodorus’ source.¹⁵⁹ That being said, the papyrus adds only very little new information. The same can be said of the only relevant passage of Polyaeus, whose value of course similarly depends on the sources he used. The information he provides for the Diadochi generally conforms to Diodorus and therefore probably derives from Hieronymus of Cardia.¹⁶⁰ Looking beyond the literary sources unfortunately does not produce much material. An inscribed lead slingshot that was found at Kameiros

by Trogus’ own reception process and by Justin’s selective and summary secondary use prevents a more detailed appraisal (see Justinus, Marcus Iunianus. *Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*. Translated by J.C. Yardley with Introduction and Explanatory Notes by R. Develin. Atlanta, GA 1994, 1-10).

¹⁵⁵ Wiemer 2001, 244-247.

¹⁵⁶ See e.g. Seibert 1983, 43f.; Billows 1990, 347f.; Bosworth 1992.

¹⁵⁷ Plut. *Demetr.* 21f.

¹⁵⁸ See above p. 98.

¹⁵⁹ P.Berol. 11632:4-7. See also Jacoby’s commentary on FGrH 533 F 2 (III b, p. 451f); Hiller von Gaertringen 1918, 761.

¹⁶⁰ Billows 1990, 347f.

and possibly originated in an auxiliary siege conducted in the same context has recently been analysed in depth by John Ma.¹⁶¹ Its text adds another layer to the complex web of interaction that embedded the siege in society and is accordingly worthy of consideration below. Other material evidence seems not to have survived; there are no extant coins that commemorate a victory at Rhodes, which may be due to the fact that the siege was more a draw than a victory for either party and that materialising the event in widely circulating currency might have resulted in problematic reactions.¹⁶² As we shall see below, however, the usual Rhodian coins bearing the image of Helios may well have acquired added identities due to the configuration of Rhodian agency after the siege.

6.2.2 Rhodes before the siege

The siege was preceded by Demetrios Poliorketes' liberation of Athens, followed by the battle of Salamis and the year of kings.¹⁶³ The loss of its fleet and of Cyprus as a base in the battle of Salamis forced Egypt into the defensive, but the Antigonid invasion that aimed to capitalise on this weakness failed, as had Perdikkas' previous attempt.¹⁶⁴ Nevertheless, these events meant that the Rhodian interest in equalisation now faced the dangers that were identified as potential threats above: one of the relevant networks of power operating in their area had sustained a severe blow, though it would soon be somewhat cushioned by the failure of the Egyptian campaign. Despite the crucial importance of these years, information about Rhodian actions is again scarce. What is available, however, does serve to illuminate how the Rhodian collective responded to the changes in the macro-political configuration, controlling the contingency they had infused into the network.

In 306 BC, the Rhodians rejected Antigonos' invitation to contribute to the war against Ptolemy, probably by emphasising their construction as a neutral

¹⁶¹ Ma, John. "Autour des balles de fronde 'camiréennes'", in: *Chiron* 40 (2010), 155-173; for their attribution to the context of Demetrios' siege see p. 164f. The slingshots found at Kameiros were published as Tit. Cam. 1921-s. On the evaluation and communicative situation see Weiß, Peter and Draskowski, Niels. "Neue griechische Schleuderbleie", in: *Chiron* 40 (2010), 123-154, here esp. 150-152, who also provide the literature.

¹⁶² On the significance of coins in Diadoch period politics see e.g. Mørkholm 1991; Lund 1992, 161-165; Stewart 1993, 93f., 158-161, 312-323; Strootman 2014, 157.

¹⁶³ See fundamentally Billows 1990, 151-160, and on the year of kings (Diod. 20.53.1f.; Iust. 15.2.10) the detailed study by Müller 1973, esp. 78-107.

¹⁶⁴ The consequences of Salamis are described by Diod. 20.52.4-53.1; cf. the higher numbers given by Plut. *Demetr.* 16.1-3. The Egyptian campaign is treated at Diod. 20.73.1-76.7; on Perdikkas' attempt cf. Diod. 18.33.1-36.7.

actor, encoded in treaties, and denying that an Antigonid conquest of Cyprus was justified by their references to the communal pursuit of Greek freedom.¹⁶⁵ It seems clear that the Antigonids were here translating their existing network, altering its configuration for the purpose of generating collective agency in a new configuration while attempting to derive it from established identities – in many cases this strategy seems to have been successful. The Rhodians, on the other hand, leveraged the structure of this network of translation against the Antigonids rather than accepting their change in its semantic configuration: in line with the argument pursued here, this would emerge as a result of the long-term consolidation of Rhodian collective agency that sought to control contingency by reference to itself. If the admittedly problematic, pro-Rhodian Cologne papyrus has a core of truth and is not purely a second century BC projection, this would also apply to the Rhodian support of Ptolemy's proclamation of kingship, which would have served, from a Rhodian point of view, to disturb the smooth Antigonid translation by infusing a new source of contingency into it.¹⁶⁶ If one accepts this interpretation, the Rhodians – alongside many other actors¹⁶⁷ – attempted to reassert their own agency to generate contingency within the Eastern Mediterranean power interaction network and thereby weaken the Antigonid attempts at establishing themselves as OPP of this web.

Antigonos' reaction was blunt and consisted in attempting to coerce the Rhodians into taking sides by isolating them in the network. An Antigonid fleet began interfering in trade and supply routes, attacking and intercepting ships from Egypt.¹⁶⁸ As the information offered by Polyaeus seems to stem from a period of muffled hostility, it too may in fact relate to this phase of the conflict. If that is so, the stratagem he preserves suggests that the fleet sent by Antigonos may have been intended only to supplement a more comprehensive, discursive strategy of isolation that operated via the translation the Antigonids were attempting at the time. This seems especially likely given the limitations of ancient war ships, which prevented them from being able to blockade a city effectively without

¹⁶⁵ Diod. 20.46.5f.; 20.82.1f.

¹⁶⁶ P.Col. 6, 247, col. II, ll. 5-19; 28-40. On palaeographical grounds, Klaus Maresch dated the papyrus to the late second or early first century BC. See Gronewald, Michael et al. (eds.). *Kölnner Papyri*. Vol. 6. Opladen 1987, 96-109 with plates 26-28, and for an interpretation Lehmann 1988, who also considers Zeno of Rhodes a potential author (p. 11-14), which would place the text in the early second century. I do not believe that the role of Rhodes in supporting Ptolemy was exceptional, but it is not impossible that it was a contributing factor to the war.

¹⁶⁷ P.Col. 6, 247, col. II, ll. 8f.; 28-30, attests several allies as supporters of Ptolemy's kingship.

¹⁶⁸ Diod. 20.82.2.

blocking the harbour with wreckage – a strategy the Antigonids obviously had no interest in.¹⁶⁹

According to Diodorus, the Rhodians responded with violence and drove out the Antigonid fleet.¹⁷⁰ As Wiemer argued, it seems plausible that the hostilities reached this new level because Rhodian ships were escorting Egyptian vessels.¹⁷¹ Antigonos threatened to lay siege to Rhodes, to which the Rhodians responded by decreeing him ample honours, but without abandoning the pursuit of their own aims.¹⁷² It is clear that this was taken as an affront that merited military action, but the details are largely in the dark. One can assume that the arguments offered by both sides were communicated internationally and Polyaeus' account of the stratagem suggests that the Antigonids adhered to the key component of their translation, namely the propagation of Greek freedom, in that they justified the siege by presenting Rhodes' resistance as non-fulfilment of an existing symmarchy for this purpose.¹⁷³ Faced with this threat, the Rhodians finally caved, offering to support the campaign against Ptolemy in exchange for the continued integrity of their agency and the network position it depended on.¹⁷⁴ The final scene in this first phase of the siege was Demetrios' demand that the Rhodians admit the Antigonid fleet and provide one hundred hostages from the elite – actions that would have resulted in a translation of Rhodes by force and would have fundamentally weakened the socio-political network of Rhodes in a very real sense by removing a significant amount of actors from it, making contingency acutely felt and debilitating the collective's agency.

¹⁶⁹ Polyaeus. *Strat.* 4.6.16: Antigonos guaranteed the safety of all merchants and traders, even Rhodian ones, as long as they did not land at Rhodes. That Polyaeus may have collated various events is suggested by the fact that Diod. 20.88.9 and 20.98.1 attest that Ptolemaic relief forces entered into the siege only at a later stage, whereas the blockade is already an early feature. On naval blockades in Antiquity see Gomme, Arnold W. "A Forgotten Factor of Greek Naval Strategy", in: *JHS* 53:1 (1933), 16-24, esp. 18f.; 23f. with the modifications offered by Harrison, Cynthia M. "Triremes at Rest: On the Beach or in the Water?", in: *JHS* 119 (1999), 168-171; cf. Wiemer 2002, 82.

¹⁷⁰ Diod. 20.82.2: τούτου [στρατηγού] δ' ἐκβληθέντος ὑπὸ τῶν Ῥοδίων [...] ("this [general] was cast out by the Rhodians").

¹⁷¹ See Wiemer 2002, 82 for further analysis.

¹⁷² Diod. 20.82.2. At this point honours alone were evidently no longer sufficient to stabilise the interaction network due to its lack of distribution. The extent of the honours is unknown beyond the attestation of the statues.

¹⁷³ Polyaeus. *Strat.* 4.6.16.

¹⁷⁴ Diod. 20.82.3. Demetrios had evidently assumed command of the operation, making him responsible for the negotiations.

6.2.3 Constructing agency during the siege

The Rhodians declined for precisely those reasons – ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐπιβουλεύειν αὐτὸν τῇ πόλει, τὰ πρὸς πόλεμον παρεσκευάζοντο (“assuming that he [Demetrius] wanted to take over the city, they prepared for war”) –, but nevertheless continued to negotiate in the face of the very real danger in store.¹⁷⁵ In this new situation we finally have more information about the ways in which the Rhodians mobilised their own network by drawing other actors into their own translation. They not only consolidated their own domestic network and began protecting it against incursion, both discursive and physical, but also requested aid from Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Kassander, which they provided in the shape of supplies and soldiers.¹⁷⁶ The measures adopted to protect the domestic network consisted mainly in consolidating the heterogeneous group of actors within the walls in order to prevent betrayal: the objective was to unify all these actors as a collective that acted in concert, in line with the translation effected within the city.¹⁷⁷ The long-term processes that had allowed Rhodian collective agency to be consolidated up to this point have already been elaborated – now this foundation had to be reasserted and extended to non-citizens: mercenaries, metics, slaves, visitors, and traders all had to be either integrated into the collective or excluded from the city. The Rhodian assembly passed a number of measures to this end: fallen citizens were to be buried at public expense and their families provided for. Non-citizens were invited to either join the fight or leave the city: allegedly around one thou-

¹⁷⁵ Diod. 20.84.1.

¹⁷⁶ Diod. 20.84.1. It is plausible to assume that the Rhodians communicated heavily with other cities, asking them to entreat the Antigonids, but there is no positive evidence at this point of the siege.

¹⁷⁷ Betrayal was always a real threat, as is shown e.g. by Diod. 20.94.3-5 (cf. also Diod. 20.103.1 for Demetrius' capture of Korinth via betrayal). Showing collective agency by reinforcing defensive structures was accordingly a good strategy of responding to the contingency both without and within: Diod. 20.85.4; 86.2. The conventional discourse is visible in Plut. *Phoc.* 11 where communities tremble in fear under siege, as well as Aen. *Tact.*, esp. 5, 9-11, 14, 17f., 22 where the emphasis is on creating *homonoia* at all cost and on obsessively maintaining walls and gates. While the situations Aeneas envisages relate to inter-polis combat and the faction-riddled conflicts of the mid-fourth century, the atmosphere of tension between suspicion and trust that characterized ancient sieges emerges very clearly from his text. Along with many other factors having to accept the rural population and their possessions, livestock, etc. into the city served to make the contingency of the situation acutely felt at all times. Cf. now also the detailed discussion by Pimouquet-Pédarros 2011, 139-231.

sand stayed, although Diodorus' figure may well include an unknown, but probably large, number of mercenaries.¹⁷⁸ Finally, the Rhodians integrated their slaves into their collective by offering them freedom in exchange for their agency in defending the collective. It stands to reason that the rhodophile source used by Diodorus took the terms of this translation from a civic decree, propagating a smooth image of Rhodian collective agency unmarred by domestic faultlines. That being said, these contingencies evidently did not prevent the successful deployment of agency by this collective: as far as we know, *homonoia* indeed prevailed in the face of contingency.¹⁷⁹

This need to consolidate a coordinated collective agency was, however, all the more pertinent to the network of actors Demetrios Poliorketes was bringing to bear on Rhodes in this situation, especially if one considers the macro-political context. Generating collective action capable of storming such a well-defended polis required wielding a very complex translation with heterogeneous *intérés-ements* and *enrolments*, as the network Demetrios assembled included a variety of groups, such as Macedonian and Greek soldiers, mercenaries, and 'pirates'.¹⁸⁰ The cohesion of this network hinged on satisfying the heterogeneous terms of the translation, which were encoded in relational identities that concerned combative zeal, discipline, and obedience on the one hand, and the provision of money,

¹⁷⁸ Diod. 20.84.2-4. Generally speaking, mercenaries probably formed a significant part of the Rhodian fighting force on land, see Berthold 1984, 44-47. Diodorus' account does not clearly show, however, whether mercenaries were in the city before the arrival of the Ptolemaic relief force – only these are explicitly mentioned, otherwise the Rhodian collective is presented as the relevant actor, along with select individuals.

¹⁷⁹ Diod. 20.84.4. Cf. Plb. 16.31, who reports a catalogue of similar measures on occasion of Philip V's siege of Abydos in 200 BC. It is therefore difficult to judge to what extent the catalogue of measures may or may not be stereotypical, rendering this a later narrative measure of reassurance in familiar patterns.

¹⁸⁰ The pirates mentioned by Diod. 20.82.4f. are probably a marker of characterisation, an othering device that played a part in Diodorus' Rhodian source, which also claimed the Rhodians kept the seas safe from pirates (Diod. 20.81.3, see Gabrielsen 1997, 90-92; Wiemer 2001, 247; idem 2002, 137f.). Destroying piracy is a marker of cultural heroism, exemplified for instance by Alexander the Great (Curt. 4.5.13-21; 4.8.15). Allying with pirates is accordingly indicative of othering in narrative, as is visible for instance at Plut. *Ant.* 32.1-5, where it highlights the ambivalence of Sextus Pompeius. On piracy as discourse see De Souza, Philip. *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*. Cambridge 1999, esp. 43-69 on the Hellenistic period, and idem. "Pirates and Politics in the Roman World", in: Volker Grieb and Sabine Todt (eds.). *Piraterie von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*. Stuttgart 2012, 47-73, esp. 51-54 on Rhodes, where he traces the adaptation and appropriation of Hellenistic models of narrative warfare by Roman narrative politics. The plurality of different groups was nevertheless most surely a reality in the Besieger's force.

supplies, effective leadership, and success on the other, all sanctioned via contracts and oaths.¹⁸¹ In this concrete context, the sources attest consolidating actions by the new king in the form of gifts along the redistributive code that was discussed above, but also a narrative emphasis on the visual magnificence of his person and his deeds, all of which surely fed back into collective agency through communication and theatrical exposition.¹⁸²

In the perspective adopted here, the actual events of the siege are interesting mainly in that they constitute a process of negotiation about the relational agency of two compound actors, honed to a point at which power relations are broken down and one attempts to coerce the other into changing configuration. Walls and blockades, siege engines and tunnels, missiles and sallies are all surface level reifications of this underlying negotiation process.¹⁸³ The inscribed slingshots used during this siege are especially interesting attestations of this process as they not only traverse the physical boundary between the networks with the aim of reproducing the contingency of the situation to break the agency of the other party, but in some cases seem also to reproduce the collective unity of the collective sending these messages: while some bear aggressive messages in text and image, others give what may be the names of makers and unit commanders.¹⁸⁴ The condensation of agency into audio-visual display, such as Demetrios' extreme and innovative siege machinery and the size of his parading fleet, as well as the rallying cries and trumpet calls similarly communicate agency and are designed to cascade perception of contingency through the opposing network.¹⁸⁵ At the textual level, Diodorus' Rhodian source was thus clearly intentionally emphasizing

¹⁸¹ Diod. 20.82.4f. On this see extensively Chaniotis 2005, 64-68, 78-88; cf. Austin 1986, 464f.; Baker, Patrick. "Warfare", in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 373-388, esp. 377-381; Trundle, Matthew. *Greek Mercenaries from the late Archaic Period to Alexander*. London 2004, 132-147. Oaths are attested at Curt. 10.7.9; Just. 14.1.10; 24.5.14; on oaths in the Macedonian military tradition see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 386f.; Hammond 1989, 65-67. Lund 1992, 161-165, and Strootman 2014, 157 note the possible significance of coinage in this context. Direct and punctual payment with coins bearing signs of legitimacy certainly served to reinforce bonds of specific loyalty and continuously reproduced the terms of translation that bound the recipients' situational agency to their leader (Trundle 2010).

¹⁸² Plut. *Demetr.* 21.1; 21.3f.; 22.2f.; Diod. 20.92.2f.

¹⁸³ Tunnels: 20.94.1-3; walls and their rebuilding: Diod. 20.85.3; 86.2; 87.4; 93.1; 97.4; sallies: Diod. 20.84.5f.; 88.3-9; 93.2-5; 97.5f.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Chaniotis 2005, 95; Ma 2010, 171-173. A narrative parallel for such banter during a siege is provided by Diod. 20.63.4, where Agathokles is mocked in graffiti, which leads to an exchange of taunts designed to poke holes in collective cohesion.

¹⁸⁵ Audiovisualisations of agency occur in narrative at Diod. 20.83.1f.; 92.1f.; 92.5; 95.1-4; Plut. *Demetr.* 21.1. Concerted battle-cries and trumpets: Diod. 20.86.2; 86.4; 87.2; 95.4.

the theatrical dimensions of this conflict, as was appropriate to its mythical proportions. The contingency is thus neatly accommodated also by this mode of reworking contingent experience.

In the historical situation, directly eliminating the actors behind the translation of collective agency was obviously the main interest, given the effects this had on the stability of the cognitive world organisation of the remaining actors. The death of Antigonos at Ipsos and the consequences of Corupedion both attest to the dire consequences the death of leaders could have for centralised networks.¹⁸⁶ But these consequences were not limited to network hubs: important components of collective agency also included ships, fortifications, and siege engines, the loss or repair of which could have significant consequences for the actors involved since these objects affected the degree of contingency perceived – think only of the very different effects Demetrios' order to withdraw the magnificent helepolis, which had come under heavy fire, had on the two parties involved.¹⁸⁷ The following will concentrate on the captures of individuals by both sides, i.e. the coercive extraction of elements from one network and their incorporation into another, since they strongly contributed to the end of the siege.

The sources outlined above mention numerous individuals and groups being captured during the siege. All these need to be considered in the context of the exchange agreement reported by Diodorus, which seems to have stipulated that free men could be ransomed for 1000 drachma, slaves for 500.¹⁸⁸ This agreement appears as a mutual negotiation of agency in three respects that go beyond the basic contingency control afforded by the transfer of the exchange into a contractual agreement on the clear-cut payment code. First, the payments directly enhanced the agency of the 'winning' network while further weakening the other.

¹⁸⁶ Diod. 21.1.1-6; Plut. *Demetr.* 28.3-29.5. See Billows 1990, 175-184. Memnon FGrH 434 F 1 5.7; 8.1-3; Iust. 17.1.9. See Lund 1992, 199-206. On the significance of victory to Hellenistic kingship see Gehrke 1982; on controlling the calamities of succession see Strootman 2014, 210-214.

¹⁸⁷ Ships being saved by the Rhodians: Diod. 20.88.3; siege equipment being withdrawn: 20.87.4; the helepolis being withdrawn: 20.96.7.

¹⁸⁸ The ransom agreement is given by Diod. 20.84.6. Such agreements were conventional to an extent and the ransoming of citizen hostages was always an important concern (Aen. Tact. 10.23-25; Chanotis 2005, 113). Diodorus further describes several instances of captured soldiers, though only by the Rhodians, which may well be the result of Rhodian source bias: Diod. 20.87.3 (soldiers and officers); 20.88.8 (400 Antigonid soldiers); 20.93.5 (crews and eleven engineers); 20.94.5 (Alexandros, friend of Demetrios). The Berlin papyrus adds Demetrios' failed attempt to ransom the engineers, which the Rhodians declined, claiming they needed the engineers themselves: P.Berol. 11632 (=FGrH 533 F 2), §2. See also Berthold 1984, 69.

Secondly, this measure harnessed the pressure of contingency within the negotiating networks: failure to ransom captives, to restore the integrity of the network could potentially contribute to their destabilisation, as it opened up a potential source of contingency for every individual who was contributing his agency. Demetrios' failure to secure the return of his engineers is a case in point.¹⁸⁹ At the same time, the strength of the networks involved, their constant struggle for integrity and collective agency, could thereby be turned into a weapon to enhance agency: the strategies employed by the Rhodians and by Demetrios forced both parties to ransom their affiliates, be they citizens or friends. Given the siege situation and the vastness of Demetrios' army, both parties finally had to contend with the problem that every ransomed individual – and every captive – was a mouth that had to be fed, although lack of food seems never to have become acute. The ransom arrangement was thus a double-edged narrative of exchange on the payment code, the very attestation of which shows its significance within this negotiation of agency. Both parties wanted to be seen acting towards preserving the integrity of their networks and the Rhodians in particular evidently derived great narrative cohesion from the captures they made, as they tied into key building blocks of their agency, freedom and wealth, causing them to be attested in Diodorus' Rhodian source. The case of Ptolemy's mercenary captain Athenagoras is particularly telling in this regard, who was amply rewarded for his loyalty in the face of seduction.¹⁹⁰ Both sides therefore show efforts to control contingency by attempting to restore socio-political network integrity on a zero-sum code of exchange, bounding their networks through the medium of money employed.

If we now consider the third-party interactions attested in the context of the siege, the macro-political embeddedness of this negotiation is easily apparent. After the initial fighting, the Rhodians were reinforced by 150 mercenaries from Knossos and more than 500 from Ptolemy, many of whom were evidently Rhodians themselves – the Rhodian narrative of cohesive identity was here taking effect to protect the collective.¹⁹¹ Unfortunately we cannot tell how the Rhodians managed to integrate these mercenaries into their network, especially considering that they later received another 1500 mercenary soldiers from Ptolemy, bringing

¹⁸⁹ P. Berol. 11632 (=FGrH 533 F 2), §2.

¹⁹⁰ Diod. 20.94.3-6. He was crowned in gold and awarded five talents of silver to incite others to loyalty; the codes of honour and payment are here blended to reinforce the desired outcome. Given the parallel formulae, this information may derive from a civic decree. Wiemer 2001, 241-250 rightly notes that Diodorus' Rhodian author evidently used Rhodian decrees.

¹⁹¹ Diod. 20.88.9.

their total up to over a third of the Rhodian citizen army.¹⁹² At any rate, the attempts at undermining Rhodian cohesion with bribery were evidently unsuccessful and the increasing number of troops available must have aided in controlling the contingency of the siege, as their arrival reproduced ties to third parties, combating a potential sensation of isolation.¹⁹³ The same applies to the extensive shipments of grain sent by the kings, especially by Ptolemy, as well as the evidently numerous negotiations and cease-fires instigated by ambassadors from various Greek cities.¹⁹⁴ In exchange, the Rhodians renewed their support of Ptolemy's kingship and sent him royal garments they had intercepted, a gift to Demetrios from his wife Phila, an episode of interference in the king's distributed self.¹⁹⁵ The continued policy of neutrality is tangible here, with the Rhodians seizing an opportunity to balance out the macro-political narrative of power.

The Greek attempts at pacifying intervention by Knidos, Athens, the Aetolian league and a number of other, unspecified poleis were evidently motivated largely by a desire for protection from Kassander, though they obviously also accorded prestige and reaffirmed collective agency.¹⁹⁶ They therefore thematised the increasing lack of distribution in the Antigonid activities, which they had come to expect due to the policy of Greek freedom: once more the configuration of the Antigonid narrative of power turned on its centre. Combined with the mounting

¹⁹² Diod. 20.98.1.

¹⁹³ Even the battle in the theatre shortly before the end of the siege seems not to have resulted in desertion (Diod. 20.98.8), although we hear of deserters from Demetrios' army on one occasion (20.94.1).

¹⁹⁴ Grain was sent by Ptolemy, Kassander, and Lysimachos (Diod. 20.96.1-3), and again by Ptolemy (20.98.1). The Knidian envoys arranged a cease-fire (20.95.4), which was followed by another, this time negotiated by more than fifty envoys from many different cities, including Athens (20.98.2). Cf. Wiemer 2002, 87f. with n. 163. The successful negotiations were arranged by the Aetolians (20.99.2f.), although Plut. *Demetr.* 22.4 singles out the Athenians, who may therefore have been involved as well. Plutarch's information is far less detailed, so Diodorus' account is to be preferred (cf. Wiemer 2002, 87, who simply denies Athenian involvement, but the accounts offered by Hieronymus and Diodorus' other source(s) were undoubtedly far more detailed). It may be not implausible that the Athenians sent an embassy given that they were still involved in the Four Years War, which required Demetrios' attention (see Bayliss 2011, 169).

¹⁹⁵ Diod. 20.93.2-4; Plut. *Demetr.* 22.1f. Cf. Ael. *VH* 12.17. See on this Wheatley 2003, 33 with n. 20. Note that Athen. 13.593d-e provides a similar narrative from Phylarchus in which the Rhodians free a captured and enslaved courtesan of Seleukos II and send her home to her king, again showing the use of Rhodian collective agency as restorers of distributed selves of kings (see Ogden 1999, 264).

¹⁹⁶ Wiemer 2002, 88. Ptolemy also allegedly urged the Rhodians to make peace (Diod. 20.99.2).

pressure of Kassander's movements in Greece and Seleukos' activities in the East, the configuration ultimately became untenable, forcing Demetrios to abort the siege in order to maintain his control over the sources of contingency that were impeaching on his agency, as directed by his father.¹⁹⁷ The end result of the negotiations reflected the ambiguity of the situation: the Rhodians maintained their autonomy, were neither garrisoned nor taxed, and only had to agree to a symmarchy that excluded Ptolemy as a target. The only real concession made was that they had to provide the one hundred citizens as hostages.¹⁹⁸

In keeping with the complexity of the initial situation, the results of the siege were thus a mixed bag for both parties. A clear victory, which would have been so essential, seems to have been neither achieved nor claimed, nor had the tension inherent in the initial situation – protectors of Greek freedom laying siege to Greeks – been resolved in any way and it is telling that Demetrios seems to have renewed this narrative immediately after the siege.¹⁹⁹ For Demetrios, the narrative plausibility the siege had cost was probably outweighed primarily by the booty gained from plundering the island, which appears to have been substantial, apparently outweighing the expenses incurred.²⁰⁰ At the macro-political level, however, the war had not been successful in constraining the ties Rhodes cultivated in the Eastern Mediterranean and had therefore failed to fully enrol Rhodes into the Antigonid world: the blockade had failed to constrain Rhodian interactions and Ptolemy was accordingly honoured as the city's saviour due to his successful deliveries of grain and mercenaries, a bond he further reinforced with dedications to Athena Lindia.²⁰¹ As Kassander and Lysimachos were also praised for their aid,

¹⁹⁷ Diod. 20.100.5f.; Plut. *Demetr.* 23.1.

¹⁹⁸ Diod. 20.99.3. Magistrates were exempt, a restriction that was surely the result of successful negotiation by the Rhodians. See on the agreement Schmitt 1969, no. 442 (p. 58f.).

¹⁹⁹ Diod. 20.100.5f.

²⁰⁰ This is suggested by Diod. 20.82.5 and the text of IG VII 2419:30-34, heavily emended by Holleaux in Syll.³ 337, which attests Demetrios' involvement in the restitution of Thebes with money from Rhodes. The wealth of the island at the time is clear from Diod. 20.94.5, where 5 talents of silver and a crown are awarded in gratitude to the mercenary captain Athenagoras, information that probably derives from a civic decree.

²⁰¹ On the question whether saving Rhodes resulted in Ptolemy's epithet *soter* see Hazzard, Richard A. "Did Ptolemy I get his Surname from the Rhodians in 304?", in: *ZPE* 93 (1992), 52-56, who concludes that this was not the case. It is plausible, however, that Ptolemy II drew on the existing narratives of his father's salvific activities to determine his choice of epithet. Such narratives are amply attested; see for in depth discussion Hazzard, Richard A. *Imagination of a Monarchy: Studies in Ptolemaic Propaganda*. Toronto 2000, 3-17, esp. 7 and 15-17, who concludes that Ptolemy II formalised the appellation, which was first developed upon his accession in 282, between 263/2 and 259 BC. Ptolemy I's dedications are attested by I.Lindos 2C:110-113 and show that he was once

albeit to a lesser extent, the Rhodian distribution of affection continued unbroken.²⁰² Although the taking of hostages certainly constrained Rhodian agency on Antigonid terms, these constraints turned out to be short-lived: only two years later, Lysimachos freed the Rhodian hostages held at Ephesos, which surely reinforced self-confident Rhodian agency, though for the time being Antigonid control was surely effective.²⁰³ For Demetrios' narrative of empire, on the other hand, which maintained contingency control within his translated collectives, the siege was an important building block: The 'Besieger' even derived his epithet, part of his distinguishing identity as an actor, from the sheer scope of his war efforts, his siege machinery, and his logistics.²⁰⁴ Despite their problems, Plutarch's siege-related anecdotes are a good measure of the siege's significance for this narrative: while the helepolis highlights the enormity of Demetrios' collectivised agency and its embodiment in leviathan machinery, the armour made by Zoilos and Demetrios' respect for Protogenes' painting of Ialysos show a similar appreciation of craftsmanship and objects, while also exemplifying his generosity vis-à-vis his friends and upright treatment of his enemies. Finally, the loyalty of his family likewise emerges in another object-focused scene from the gifts Phila attempted to send her husband.²⁰⁵ Despite the difficulty of the situation, which was not quite a victory, nor a defeat, the events nevertheless provided another mine of stories that could be – and evidently were – told and retold to normalise collective agency in contingent situations, providing both the Rhodians and members of Demetrios' collectives with relational place and footing. The emphasis on objects in these vignettes further highlights the fact that Demetrios' collective agency had of course left very real traces indeed: the war had inflicted deep scars on Rhodes, in the form of missiles, abandoned camps, earth works, cleared forests, the extensive damages of the siege(s), as well as the siege engines themselves.²⁰⁶ Just like the honours accorded the Antigonids by the Rhodians and the

more presenting himself as the bringer of Greek freedom in keeping with Alexander's tradition and the Diadoch discourse of power (see Squillace 2013, esp. 220).

²⁰² Diod. 20.100.2.

²⁰³ The hostages were freed by Lysimachos' general Prepelaos when he took Ephesos (Diod. 20.107.4). For an evaluation cf. Wiemer 2002, 91.

²⁰⁴ Diod. 20.92.1-3.

²⁰⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 21f.

²⁰⁶ Diod. 20.93.1; 94.1f.; 95.1; 97.1f., 4, 7. The siege engines were left behind, possibly as a gift to the new allies, as is clear from the tradition on the Colossus of Rhodes; see below p. 393. See Chaniotis 2005, 233-240 on battlefields as sites of memory, on which see also Zahrnt, Michael. "Marathon – das Schlachtfeld als Erinnerungsort, einst und jetzt", in: Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp and Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp (eds.). *Die griechische Welt: Erinnerungsorte der Antike*. Munich 2010, 114-127, esp. 121-125; Wallace, Shane. "The Significance of Plataia for Greek *eleutheria* in the Early Hellenistic Period", in:

statues put up within the city,²⁰⁷ these scars were reifications of the Antigonid narrative of empire in its translation into collective agency, lingering markers of contingency experiences that would have to be gradually accommodated in the following years.

This observation brings us to the ripple effects of the siege in the power interaction network of the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁰⁸ Demetrios' benefits and his fame as *poliorketes* have already been mentioned and certainly struck fear in the cities he laid siege to – the siege of Rhodes therefore provided him with a story that came to fundamentally characterise his network of relational identity both in Antiquity and today.²⁰⁹ Despite the absence of a hundred members of their relatively small elite, the Rhodians proceeded to re-consolidate their domestic network by implementing the decree that was to honour citizens and free slaves who had distinguished themselves, reasserting the “ontological primacy” of their collective.²¹⁰ After all, the non-citizens had already incorporated essential civic identities and clearly positioned themselves on the ‘right’ side of the *philos* – *echthros* dichotomy by having subjected their agency to the collective in the face of existential contingency that threatened the very integrity of this collective. This consolidation obviously also included removing or reconfiguring the traces of the siege, for instance by burying and honouring the dead and by reinforcing and rebuilding the city walls – all actions that reproduce collective agency and mark out boundaries of identity.²¹¹ From our point of view, this narrative consolidation of the Rhodian collective is further tangible in the extant historiographical accounts.²¹² Throughout the discussion of the siege, its theatrical dramatization – it culminates in a battle in the theatre – as well as the absence of any Rhodian desertions, of any hint of betrayal, or of unfavourable ransom exchanges have made clear that the available sources are coloured in favour of the Rhodians; as a whole, the narrative of the siege therefore also emerges as a clear example of a narrative of agency that

Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 147-176, esp. 164f. Cf. also Chaniotis 2005, 123-129 on the visual impact of the devastation of war. It is worth noting that in the Hellenistic period the sanctuary of Athena Lindia was transformed into a prime site of the memorisation of victory, as is apparent from its famous chronicle (I.Lindos 2; see also Higbie 2003, esp. 243-258 on how one dealt in narrative with the absence and loss of the object anchors that had originally memorialised victories).

²⁰⁷ Diod. 20.93.6.

²⁰⁸ On the consequences of the siege see Hauben 1977, 338f.; Berthold 1984, 77-80; Wiemer 2002, 88-94.

²⁰⁹ Diod. 20.92.5; Plut. *Demetr.* 20.1-5; 42.6.

²¹⁰ Diod. 20.100.1. Quotation from Ma 2013b, 62.

²¹¹ Diod. 20.100.1-4. On the restoration see Berthold 1984, 77f.; Wiemer 2002, 92f.; on the significance of walls in general cf. Chaniotis 2005, 26-29.

²¹² See Wiemer 2011. Cf. Chaniotis 2005, 217-227, on the commemoration of war.

was later shaped within the collective in response to the events it discusses, offering a specific, selective memory designed to reassert Rhodian agency in the face of the contingency collectively experienced and ultimately weathered.²¹³ The Rhodian collective's successful production of collective agency and narrative therefore not only served to accommodate the contingency that was Demetrios' agency, but also became an integral part of their network of relational identity and further served to integrate new actors into the very same network, thus producing growth.

6.3 The Colossus of Rhodes

The most interesting and easily the most famous action performed by the Rhodian collective to accommodate the siege experience was the construction of the Colossus of Rhodes, a 32m high bronze statue of Helios that was completed after twelve years of construction work, probably in 283/2 BC, but soon felled by an earthquake, likely in 228/7 BC.²¹⁴ An analysis of this statue as an object actor in the categories used throughout this study is the subject of the final part of this chapter, which serves to exemplify the agency of material objects within the interaction networks of the Diadoch period. The Colossus is particularly well suited to such a case study as there is a relative wealth of information about its agency, despite the numerous problems with the sources. Besides its important primary function as an actor in the reciprocal network of interaction between gods and men, the Colossus also widely and very visibly communicated the new and improved status of the island community. The Colossus is thus treated here as an

²¹³ Cf. Wiemer 2011, 126f.; Pimouguet-Pédarros 2011, 311-326. The third epiphany of Athena Lindia, who provided aid in negotiating with Ptolemy for protection (I.Lindos 2D:94-115), is a good example for such creative reordering of the past. Paschidis 2008, 127 with n. 33, also notes the lack of royal title for Demetrios Poliorketes (95), while Ptolemy has his (101), which seems a trace of early Hellenistic political discourse. In this strategy, it parallels the comic drinking song attested (Athen. 6.254a-b) from around the same time and therefore may reflect contested contemporary usage or even uncertainty. On its author Timachidas see Jacoby's commentary to FGrH 532.

²¹⁴ On calculating the height (70 cubits/105 feet) see Hoepfner 2003, 99; on the dates see Wiemer 2002, 94 with n. 212, and Vedder, Ursula. "Plinius der Ältere, die Zahl *LVI* und der Koloß von Rhodos", in: *AA* 2010, 39-45, esp. 40. *Terminus ante quem* for the collapse is the mention of Seleukos II Kallinikos among those who provided aid to Rhodes after the devastating earthquake (Plb. 5.89.8), as he died in 226 BC. Chron. Pasch. 1.331 Dindorf, further gives an absolute and fitting date in the second year of the 138th Olympiad (227 BC). Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 34.41 notes that the Colossus stood for 56 years, which provides the time frame for the construction. Since the political context is paramount, the dates are significant.

excellent example of a persistent, non-human actor, operating in the narrative network of power in both a directed and a diffuse fashion by acting as a narrator itself that anchored and told a specific story of Rhodian agency relating to the siege.²¹⁵ In order to be able to assess this story at both the domestic and the macro-political level it is necessary to first abstract the ensemble of image and text, or rather the lines of interaction that shape it,²¹⁶ from the extant sources and make an attempt to reconstruct the acts of translation that coalesce in this object in as differentiated a fashion as possible. Unfortunately, however, the third century BC is one of the worst-documented periods of ancient history, making this a particularly difficult task.

6.3.1 Image

Any analysis of the image itself is hampered by the fact that neither the appearance nor the location of the colossal bronze are forthcoming from our sources. To make matters worse, some of the late-antique sources, especially the lists of wonders, show suspicious contradictions and legendary elements that, while interesting, blur our picture of the third century BC.²¹⁷ While our knowledge of the physical presence of the monument is therefore fundamentally flawed, at least the Colossus' appearance can be approximated by pointing to other images of Helios: positing a youthful, largely nude man with a radiant crown is hardly daring, given the parallels provided by the depictions of Helios on Rhodian coins of the period.²¹⁸ Most of the potentially interesting elements, however, including the secondary attributes of Helios, his pose, and the statue's visual context, are unfortunately lost beyond recovery.

²¹⁵ The political significance of this dedication is occasionally touched upon, e.g. by Berthold 1984, 80; Vedder, Ursula. "Der Koloß von Rhodos – Mythos und Wirklichkeit eines Weltwunders", in: *NüBLA* 16 (1999/2000), 23-40, here 26f.; Wiemer 2002, 93f. and 2011; Gehrke 2003, 238; Chaniotis 2005, 236; Vedder 2006, 362-364; Piel, Thierry. "A propos du colosse de Rhodos: quelques considérations sur un monument commémoratif", in: Faucherre and Pimouguet-Pédarros (eds.) 2010, 135-156, but shall here be taken further by considering the Colossus an object actor.

²¹⁶ On the shaping of images by interaction cf. Mitchell, William J.T. "Was ist ein Bild?", in: Volker Bohn (ed.). *Bildlichkeit*. Frankfurt a.M. 1990, 17-68, here 30-39.

²¹⁷ See the sources collected by Kai Brodersen and Bernhard Hebert: Brodersen 1992; Hebert 1989, 16f.; cf. Zwingmann 2012, 112f.

²¹⁸ See Ashton, Richard H. J. "Rhodian Coinage and the Colossus", in: *RN* 6:30 (1988), 75-90, esp. 86f. with n. 27. As Ashton already noted, however, directly linking coins and the Colossus seems impossible, as types showing Helios with a radiant crown

What is known of the material presence of this monumental image is based largely on one somewhat extensive, but highly problematic source, not least because of its rhetorical style. The work in question bears the title *On the Seven Wonders* (περὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ θαυμάτων) and is attributed by the manuscripts to a certain Philon of Byzantion, who claims his descriptions will make arduous travel to the wonders quite unnecessary.²¹⁹ The identification and date of this author are unclear and although there are some indicators that suggest his text might be Hellenistic,²²⁰ the information the work actually provides mainly concerns the monument's internal construction. While this matter of technique has naturally commanded significant attention among archaeologists, it is of little immediate relevance to the interest pursued here, which is to determine the reification of Rhodian self-fashioning in the early third century BC.²²¹ It seems clear that if Philon saw the Colossus at all, it was only in its fallen state, as is suggested by his praise of book-learning and the fact that his description focuses on its inner structure – his words only make travelling to Rhodes unnecessary if a ruin was all

obviously occur already before its erection. Cf. also Piel 2010; Zwingmann 2012, 113 with n. 31.

²¹⁹ Philo *Spect.* pr. 2f.; 4.1.

²²⁰ On dating Philon see Brodersen 1992, 14f., who refrains from offering a final verdict. On the older research see Kroll, Wilhelm. S.v. "Philon [49]", in: *RE* XX,1 (1941), 54f. As the work assiduously avoids hiatus, far more so than the Philon of the *Belopoeika* and *Poliorketika*, the work is traditionally attributed to a late antique rhetorician, also because the time of Phidias is referred to as "the golden time of Hellas" (ὡ καὶρὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος [...]; Philo *Spect.* 3.4). However, even the Greek novelists avoid hiatus, though admittedly not on the same scale (Reeve, Michael D. "Hiatus in the Greek Novelists", in: *CQ* 21:2 (1971), 514-539, esp. 537f.). Furthermore, nothing prohibits the statement about Phidias, a fifth century sculptor, from being made at the turn of the second century BC, considering the canonising and backward-looking aspects of Hellenistic literature (see e.g. Hunter, Richard. "Literature and its Contexts", in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 477-493, here 477f.; 481; 484-486). The *theamata* further show a notable interest in technical and structural details (Philo *Spect.* pr. 2; 1.1-5; 5.1; 6.2) and their author is not a Christian (Philo *Spect.* 3.3). Finally, the seven wonders as they are given in the text were clearly a Hellenistic collection, as Rome and Christian elements are absent (Brodersen 1992, 59-61); the first real evidence of this canonisation is available in a potentially second century BC epigram (*Anth. Pal.* 9.58 by Antipater of Sidon (?)) and then in Diodorus (2.11.4-5). Although these considerations cannot of course fully resolve the issue of dating, the work might conceivably be Late Hellenistic in date or derive from the Second Sophistic, though the hiatus remains a problem.

²²¹ See the positions of Maryon 1956, 74-79; Haynes 1992, 121-128; Vedder 1999/2000, 32-37; Hoepfner 2000, 129-136 and 2003, 94-99. The authenticity of Philon's information is the fundamental bone of contention, as he describes pieces being cast *in situ* and in layers.

that was to be seen.²²² The reliability of the information he provides for our interest is thus subject to qualification, since it is at best the result of autopsy of the fallen statue in the 2nd century BC and at worst the product of conjecture and discourse of indeterminable date.²²³

So what can be said about the monument's site, context, and orientation? There have of course been many attempts at reconstructing the monument, including the imaginative misinterpretation that had the statue straddling one of the harbour mouths.²²⁴ Despite its charm, the latter is to be rejected, as it is a geographical, material, and structural impossibility.²²⁵ Besides Philon, other sources, including Pliny and Theophanes, also suggest that the Colossus was situated on land, as they all mention that its fragments were visible for centuries after the earthquake; they cannot therefore have been blocking a harbour.²²⁶ The phrase “<set up> not only over the sea, but also over the earth” that occurs in the dedicatory epigram and continues to inspire reconstructions at the harbour may then simply be taken as a reference to Helios' elevation above all, land and sea alike, which the monument mirrors; it is also conceivable that this was reflected in attributes, which Philon's description seems to hint at.²²⁷ In an attempt to further pinpoint the monument's location, Ursula Vedder showed that the archaeological remains on the acropolis of Rhodes, west of the city, allow for the

²²² Philo *Spect.* 4.2. By comparison with other sketches, e.g. of the pyramids (Philo *Spect.* 2.3-5), the information provided about the Colossus is extensive and detailed, which suggests a sufficiently detailed source, conceivably a first-hand account of a visit.

²²³ See p. 393 below on the possible significance of the work of Mucianus in this context.

²²⁴ See Vedder, Ursula. “Der Koloss von Rhodos als Wächter über dem Hafeneingang”, in: *Die Sieben Weltwunder der Antike. Wege der Wiedergewinnung aus sechs Jahrhunderten.* Ausstellung Winckelmann-Museum Stendal 2003. Mainz 2003, 131-149.

²²⁵ Maryon 1956, 79-81; Vedder 1999/2000, 31f.; Hoepfner 2003, 53; Zwingmann 2012, 113f.

²²⁶ Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 34.41 suggests access to the hands and the interior; Theophanes apud Constant. Porph. *de admin. imp.* 20-21; Philo *Spect.* 4.3-5. The scholion on Plat. *Phil.* 15c Greene of uncertain date further notes that the fall of the Colossus destroyed houses. On the visibility and attractiveness of the fallen giant to tourists see Zwingmann 2012, 117-119.

²²⁷ *Anth. Pal.* 6.171, l. 5: οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ πελάγους μόνον <ἄνθεσαν>, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν γῆ. Attributes are suggested by Philo *Spect.* 4.1, and may have gone beyond whip and radiant crown. Hoepfner 2003 is most prominently in favour of a location at the harbour mouth. To my mind this passage is more plausible as the origin of the straddling myth than Plut. *Ad Princ.* 780a-c, as Plutarch seems not to offer anything that could be interpreted in this way (as suggested by Vedder 1999/2000, 31f.). This was already argued by Bendorff, Otto. “Bemerkungen zur griechischen Kunstgeschichte”, in: *MDAI(A)* 1 (1876), 45-66, here 47.

reconstruction of a sanctuary large enough to be assigned to the main god of the Rhodians.

Within this area, a structure is visible that can be reconstructed as the foundation of a very large base (~17 x 15.6m) with a hole in the centre.²²⁸ Both size and shape of this structure could fit the Colossus. If this reconstruction is correct, the statue would simply have stood on the acropolis terrace in the sanctuary of Helios, fully in keeping with its character as an *anathema* and overlooking both the city and the sea to the East. As a consequence, it would have been well visible not only from the city below and its ports, but also from the main shipping route to the North-East.²²⁹ If there is any truth in the note in Theophanes' chronicle that the statue was gilded and gleamed in the sun, this would have further enhanced its visibility, though it seems more likely that only the crown was actually gilded, if anything.²³⁰ The monumentality of the image parallels the contemporary royal trend towards ostentatious sculpture and architecture, visible for instance in palace architecture or the dedication of the *neorion* on Delos.²³¹ In the late Diadoch

²²⁸ See generally Vedder 2006 and eadem. *Der Koloss von Rhodos. Archäologie, Herstellung und Rezeptionsgeschichte eines antiken Weltwunders*. Mainz 2015, esp. 29-39, whose analysis I consider more plausible. Hoepfner, Wolfram. "Der Koloß von Rhodos", in: *AA* 2000, 129-153, esp. 129-145; Hoepfner 2003, 34-42; 53-64, interprets these findings differently and locates the Colossus on a breakwater by the Mandraki harbour, although no ancient texts really support this. His objections to having the Colossus in the city are mainly aesthetic, as he claims it would look deformed up close, but this is obviously nonsense, as it precludes colossal statues in general. Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 34.42 already shows that Rhodes was full of colossal bronzes, which also makes the Rhodians masters of foreshortening. Furthermore, setting up a war monument in a sanctuary of the recipient god is simply the logical thing to do (Chaniotis 2005, 235-240). By contrast, erecting a colossal statue on an important strategic location right after narrowly escaping defeat would be irrational: Hoepfner's reconstruction of the Colossus prevents the breakwater's tower from bearing artillery. After the monument's collapse, the site would have been completely blocked.

²²⁹ As the acropolis is more than 70m high at this point, the radiant crown would have been more than 100m above sea level. From a ship's deck, the Colossus would thus have been visible for more than 40km, at least on a clear day. For a visualisation cf. Hoepfner 2003, 81f., though obviously it shows his reconstruction at the harbour, which would have been far less visible. The visibility of Rhodes city, in this case of its impressive city walls, is explicitly attested by Aelius Aristides in the 2nd century AD: Aristid. *Or.* 25.7; 25.48.

²³⁰ Theophanes apud Constant. Porph. *De admin. imp.* 21.58. It is conceivable that this otherwise unattested piece of information resulted from a misunderstanding of John Malalas' note (11.18) on the amount of gold Hadrian spent on the re-erection of the statue. On this possible re-erection project see Hoepfner 2000, 152f.

²³¹ On the monumentalisation of Hellenistic palaces see Nielsen 1994, 94-99; Strootman 2014, 88-90. The *neorion* is described by Paus. 1.29.1 and discussed by Bringmann and von Steuben (eds.) 1995, 193-196, no. 133.

period, Rhodes therefore emerges as operating on registers similar to those of the kings, ostentatiously displaying *tryphē* and thereby communicating agency in reified form – an aspect that was significant in the dense interaction networks of the early Hellenistic Eastern Mediterranean, and will have been aimed also at its immediate political environs, the neighbouring polities of the Dodecanese and what was later to become the *peraia*.²³²

Despite these uncertainties regarding the actual appearance and context of this monumental image, it is abundantly clear that the visual impact of the Colossus must have been enormous, though of course polysemous and dependent on the identities playing into each individual interaction with the object.²³³ Leaving its concrete physical appearance aside then, two fundamental aspects of this monument deserve attention: the act of its erection itself and the object's materiality.

Given the sheer amount of resources the construction of the Colossus required,²³⁴ the action itself, deriving from a reproduction of collective Rhodian agency, could be read as a final part, or possible even the finale, of the physical restoration Rhodes underwent after the siege, the pinnacle of the city's collective reconsolidation after the Antigonids' attempt at invasive reconfiguration. This action would then have marked the closing of wounds both physical and meta-physical. Secondly, since the statue was cast bronze and of colossal size, the object's materiality is significant in itself, as it contributed to making the monument specifically Rhodian: even before the Colossus, Rhodes had been famous for its cast bronze statuary, which was widely visible in the cityscape and contributed to specifically Rhodian identity.²³⁵ The Colossus was the epitome of

²³² On *tryphē* as an element of especially Ptolemaic self-fashioning see Tondriau, Julien L. "La tryphè: philosophie royale ptolémaïque", in: *REA* 50 (1948), 49-54; Huß 2001, 469; Grabowski, Tomasz. "The Good, The Bad and The Ugly. Three Cases in the House of Ptolemy", in: *Classica Cracoviensia* 15 (2012), 81-107. On the *peraia* see Fraser and Bean 1954.

²³³ On the polysemy of signs see Hahn, Hans P. "Dinge als Zeichen – eine unscharfe Bezeichnung", in: Ulrich Veit, Tobias L. Kienlin, Christoph Kümmel, and Sascha Schmidt (eds.). *Spuren und Botschaften: Interpretationen materieller Kultur* (=Tübinger Archäologische Taschenbücher 4). Münster 2003, 29-52, esp. 35.

²³⁴ Philo *Spect.* 4.6 speaks of 500 talents of bronze and 300 talents of iron. See Maryon 1956 for discussion of these figures.

²³⁵ Completing a project like the Colossus required extensive experience and self-confidence. The Rhodian tradition persisted: Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 34.36, 42; Plb. 1.18.6. Rhodes exhibited a relatively stable, integrative workshop culture in the Hellenistic period, as is visible in the consistent stream of immigrating Bronze sculptors (Goodlett, Virginia C. "Rhodian Sculpture Workshops", in: *AJA* 95:4 (1991), 669-681, esp. 672-681). Goodlett's results further imply that the Rhodian collective was able to integrate foreigners without difficulty, providing them with new, valuable identities in the form of

Rhodian craftsmanship, unparalleled until the Roman Empire.²³⁶ Depending on the viewer's predisposition in interacting with the monument, the image allowed for such specifically Rhodian associations to be re-produced to an even greater degree: as the attributes allowed Helios to be recognised, the image not only evoked the religious associations of this god, including his function as the all-seeing eye and protector from evil,²³⁷ but might even have recalled Pindar's aetiology of Helios' atypically prominent role on Rhodes.²³⁸ The extreme material presence of the monument, combined with the unique association between Rhodes and Helios, therefore undoubtedly specifically identified Rhodes city and the island as a whole to any observer, providing a strong identity that was to endure for centuries.²³⁹

Finally, the history of the Colossus' material provides a good example of the narrative assertion of control in the categories studied here. In Pliny's later narrative about the Colossus, which probably derived from a first century AD eyewitness account by C. Licinius Mucianus, who came into contact with the lingering stories that had originally served to re-organise this contingent period, the monument's construction is said to have drawn on resources that derived from the siege engines left by Demetrios Poliorketes.²⁴⁰ While it seems reasonable to assume that these objects were ceded to the Rhodians as a gift under the new,

naturalisation, while simultaneously translating their agency into part of the Rhodian collective.

²³⁶ On Nero's alleged Colossus see Suet. *Nero* 31; Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 34.46.

²³⁷ Helios appears as all-seeing already in Hom. *Il.* 14.344f.; *Od.* 8.302. See generally Gordon, Richard. S.v. "Sol", in: *DNP* 11 (2001), 692-695, here 693; Chaniotis, Angelos. "Under the Watchful Eyes of the Gods: Aspects of Divine Justice in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor", in: Stephen Colvin (ed.). *The Greco-Roman East. Politics, Culture, Society.* Cambridge 2004, 1-43, esp. 10.

²³⁸ Pind. *Ol.* 7.54-76; Diod. 5.56.3-5.

²³⁹ This is tangible in the difficult passages of Malalas – who has the Colossus erected in the seventh century BC (!) – and the Suda, though it is unclear how the Rhodians came to be called "Colossians" (Malalas 5.43; Suda s.v. *Κολοσσαεῖς* (Adler Kappa 1932) and *Ῥόδος* (Adler Rho 205)). On Malalas' confusion cf. Hebert 1989, 33f. It seems most likely to me that the confusion arose in a late-imperial, Christian context due to Paul's letter to the Colossians, whose city became insignificant after the earthquake of 61 AD (Strab. 12.8.13; Tac. *Ann.* 14.27). The Rhodians with their prestigious identity built around colossal statues readily filled the blank.

²⁴⁰ Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 34.41. C. Licinius Mucianus' *Mirabilia* is suggested as source for this information by 34.36. On Pliny and Mucianus' collection of marvels see Ash, Rhiannon. "The Wonderful World of Mucianus", in: *BICS* 50:S100 (2007), 1-17, esp. 7-9, noting his insistence on autopsy, whether reliable or not. Mucianus is also cited as having visited the temple of Athena Lindia and having admired Amasis' breastplate (19.12), which may further support his having actually been to Rhodes.

short-lived alliance, an expression of Antigonid magnanimity and thus an act of translation,²⁴¹ the Rhodians evidently later qualified this gift in a very subtle way. If Pliny's account contains a core of truth, the gifted siege-engines, double reifications of Antigonid agency that had caused others to be 'stunned' and 'taken',²⁴² were transformed on a payment code into another medium, namely money, which the Rhodians then spent on the Colossus: the institutionalised collective therefore expended this money on some of its members (the craftsmen) in order to erect a statue that was specifically Rhodian.²⁴³ What had been a royal gift that bore an obligation and functioned as an agent in translation had now been transformed on a code of zero-sum exchange,²⁴⁴ the output of which was further transformed by collective Rhodian agency into a monument that was probably placed in the *temenos* of the most specifically Rhodian deity.

As a semanticised space, such a sanctuary obviously operates on a belief code, harnessing the function of religion as a contingency-reducing system of meaning and its specific interaction codes to reassert agency in the face of existential contingency in general.²⁴⁵ Through this double translation process on two different codes, the Rhodians took these resources out of circulation and removed them from their Antigonid origins, performatively reverting the short-lived coercive translation of their agency by the Antigonids and also contrasting Demetrios' identity as the engineer king. The fact that later narrative reflections of the process of creating this specifically Rhodian bronze image out of the Antigonid gift preserve these complicated translations attests to the complexity of the negotiation that happened here. The history of the image's very material then shows

²⁴¹ Although Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 34.41 refers to an unspecified source that treated the siege engines as left behind after Demetrios tired of the siege (*[...] effectu cc talentis, quae contigerant ex apparatu regis Demetrii relicto morae taedio obsessa Rhodo*), this seems unlikely, given the clearly complex treaty that formally ended the fighting. The obvious parallel is the gift of grain and lumber given to Athens in 307 BC, which was part of the process of gaining the city's allegiance through negotiation (Plut. *Demetr.* 10.1). The lateness of the extant account is of course a serious, but unsolvable problem.

²⁴² Variants of *καταπλήσσω* are common in Diadoch period narratives, as is amply visible in Diodorus, e.g. 20.48.1; 49.6; 83; 92, and express an impact of reified agency on something or someone.

²⁴³ As colossal bronze-casting was a specifically Rhodian skill, the artist and other workers will probably have been Rhodian, born or naturalised (Goodlett 1991). This is also suggested by the anecdote concerning the artist's alleged miscalculation of the material required (Sex. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.107f.), which may derive from Ptolemaic engagement with the Colossus, as is suggested by an epigram by Poseidippos (see Wiemer 2011, 130).

²⁴⁴ Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 34.18. This complicates the royal legitimacy derived from such gifts as outlined by Schmidt-Dounas 2000, esp. 315.

²⁴⁵ See Lübke 1998, 40-47.

that in exerting its agency, the Rhodian collective had to navigate difficult terrain. It required that the story of the gift be kept alive, but be integrated into a reified re-configuration of control that hinged on their own active re-definition of the interaction codes the object was to operate on. Since the most central actor was the Rhodian collective itself, which had access to this information through the assembly, it was thereby able to assert control over the Colossus' significance as an image through the narratives attached to its materiality, thus supplementing the materials' original significance. Although so little is known about the statue's appearance, the monument's agency as an image can thus nevertheless be approximated by considering the narratives it anchored. These object-bound narratives were further supplemented by a text, to which the analysis will now turn.

6.3.2 Text

Any analysis of the textual narrative that accompanied the Colossus, however, faces pitfalls of its own, as the respective epigrams survive only in a number of literary variants. In principle, the visibility and communicative surface of any accompanying text was far smaller than that of the Colossus itself, though of course it is to be assumed that it was visible on its base, as was the custom. The fact that the epigrams survive at all – for instance in Strabo and Theophanes, as well as the *Anthologia Palatina* and the *Suda* – is undoubtedly in part due to the fact that they provided much needed information about the monument after its legendary collapse, helping to add meaning to the blank it left.

The two surviving epigrams have different metres and therefore never formed a unit. This does not necessarily mean, however, that they never both appeared on the statue.²⁴⁶ The first epigram, which is found in the Palatine Anthology as well as in Strabo and Theophanes, consists of two lines in iambic pentameter that amount in essence to an artist's signature, attributing the statue with its 70 spans to Chares of Lindos.²⁴⁷ This information is further confirmed by Pliny, with the

²⁴⁶ IG I² 529 (= *Anth. Pal.* 13.13) provides an important parallel for such a combination. The two epigrams, an artist's signature and a dedicatory epigram, survive both in the Palatine Anthology and on stone, but do not share a metre.

²⁴⁷ *Anth. Pal.* 16.82; Strabo 14.2.5; Theophanes apud Const. Porph. *De Admin. Imp.* 21.61f.; cf. Hebert 1989, 17-45, who traces the decaying quality of information about the Colossus through the centuries. Hebert (and others before him) rightly noted that the extant epigram speaks of the "Colossus in Rhodes". This fact and the numerous variants attested suggest that the deictic portion of the epigram was altered in the literary versions. Simultaneously, however, this also means that this information was prominently associated with the Colossus. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the actual artist's epigram on the statue was very similar, a conclusion now accepted

result that Theophanes' variant (80 spans and Laches of Lindos) can be confidently disregarded.²⁴⁸ For the present study, however, the second epigram provides far more interesting material, as it may have been the Colossus' dedicatory epigram. The text in question survives in the Palatine Anthology (6.171) and comprises four elegiac couplets.²⁴⁹ Its first half also appears in the Suda under the headword Κολασσαεῖς.²⁵⁰ Its importance to the argument merits giving the text in full:

αὐτῷ σοὶ πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ἑμακύναντο κολοσσὸν
τόνδε Ῥόδου ναέται Δωρίδος, Ἄελιε,²⁵¹
χάλκεον,²⁵² ἀνίκα κῦμα κατευνάσαντες Ἐνυοῦς
ἔστεψαν πάτραν δυσμενέων ἐνάροις.

even by Wiemer 2011, 129-132. Wiemer further contrasts it with the Posidippus papyrus (P.Mil. 8.309, edited by Austin, Colin and Bastianini, Guido (eds.). *Posidippi Pellaei quae supersunt omnia ediderunt*. Milan 2002, no. 68) and a comic line by Sopatros preserved at Athen. 4.158d, but mainly highlights the failure of Rhodian aspirations to hegemony in the third century BC, as well as their brief realisation in the second. Recently Jones, Kenneth R. "Alcaeus of Messene, Philip V and the Colossus of Rhodes: A Re-Examination of Anth. Pal. 6.171", in: *CQ* 64:1 (2014), 136-151, has placed the epigram in the 2nd century BC, to which I will refer below.

²⁴⁸ Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 34.41; cf. Hebert 1989, 18. Information about the statue's height shows considerable, even comical variation, cf. for instance the 127 spans given by Georg. Sync. *Chron.* 417.11.

²⁴⁹ The text is from Beckby, Hermann (ed.). *Anthologia Graeca* (Tusculum). Munich 1965². On the Greek Anthology and its text and manuscript history, see Schmidt, Leopold. S.v. "Anthologia [1]", in: *RE* I,2 (1894), 2380-2391, and Cameron, Alan. *The Greek Anthology from Meleager to Planudes*. Oxford 1993. Important editions are the Teubner by Hugo Stadtmüller, the Didot edition begun by Friedrich Dübner, and finally the Budé edition by Pierre Waltz, all of which have been consulted. Cf. also Hebert 1989, 17; Jones 2014, 136-140.

²⁵⁰ Suda s.v. Κολασσαεῖς (Adler Kappa 1932).

²⁵¹ Epic Doric Ἄελιος instead of the usual Rhodian Ἄλιος.

²⁵² In the manuscript, the comma was added by the hand of the corrector (C): Stadtmüller, Hugo (ed.). *Anthologia Graeca*. Leipzig 1894, 1, 312 ad loc. Dübner accepted this for poetic reasons: Dübner, Friedrich. *Epigrammatum Anthologia Palatina*. Paris 1871, 241 ad loc. Benndorf 1876, 47 prefers its removal. Both variants appear to be possible, although the τόνδε does seem to invite the comma. If it is kept, the Colossus' materiality receives greater emphasis, which would seem preferable to me. If this was indeed a stone epigram, the original left both variants open, which may have invited the ancient reader to analogise the Colossus' bronze and the bronze tide of violence the Rhodians had tamed. Given what was said above about the significance of the image's materiality, this may seem an adequate interpretation.

οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ πελάγους μόνον <ἄνθεσαν>,²⁵³ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν γᾶ (5)
 ἄβρῶν²⁵⁴ ἀδουλώτου φέγγος ἔλευθερίας²⁵⁵
 τοῖς γὰρ ἀφ' Ἡρακλῆος ἀέξηθεῖσι γενέθλας²⁵⁶
 πάτριος ἐν πόντῳ κῆν χθονὶ κοιρανία.

For you yourself to Olympus they have stretched the Colossus,
 the inhabitants of Doric Rhodes, oh Helios,
 the bronze one, when they had quieted Enyo's tide,
 and they crowned their homeland with the evil-wishers' arms.
 For not only over the sea did they erect, but also on land, (5)
 the delicate light of unenslaved freedom;
 For to those of Herakles' stock who flourish,²⁵⁷
 sovereignty over sea and land is hereditary.²⁵⁸

This text was presumably part of Meleager's *Stephanos* ("Garland") of the early first century BC and cannot be plausibly assigned to any author. Since the text itself is all one has to go on in evaluating the authenticity of this epigram, it seems

²⁵³ The verb was evidently corrupt already in the original manuscript. The corrector gives *κάτθεσαν*, and the manuscripts of the Planudes edition have *ἄνθεσαν*, but not without variation. Stadtmüller preferred *ἐκτισαν*, but the variations in meaning are not great.

²⁵⁴ Already Stadtmüller considered *ἄβρῶν*: Stadtmüller 1894, 1, 313 ad loc. Several editors followed him, see e.g. Waltz, Pierre. *Anthologie Grecque*. Paris 1931, part 1, vol. 3, book 6, p. 94, but arguments may be found for both variants – the emendation emphasises the strength and wealth of freedom, the other its delicacy and fragility. The manuscript has *ἄβρῶν* (cf. similarly Gow and Page 1965, 2, 588). Cf. further Walbank, Frank. "Alcaeus of Messene, Philip V, and Rome", in: *CQ* 36:3 (1942), 134-145, here 135, n. 4; Edson, Jr., Charles Farwell. "The Antigonids, Heracles, and Beroea", in: *HSCP* 45 (1934), 213-246, here 220.

²⁵⁵ Here all manuscripts give an Ionic *ἔλευθερίης* (cf. Hdt. 1.62.6) that Brunck emended to the Doric form. It cannot be determined whether the ending was corrected in error from an originally Doric form, or whether the error was present in the original version. Even the latter case would not necessarily call the text's authenticity into question, given the mixed language of epigrams (see Gow and Page 1965, 1, xlv-xlvii and 2, 588f. ad. loc.).

²⁵⁶ Epic *γενέθλης* (cf. Apoll. Rhod. 2.521) in all manuscripts, but the corrector (C) of the *Anth. Pal.* codex added a superscribed alpha. The emendation is again Brunck's.

²⁵⁷ In my view, this passage is ambivalent. One could translate "for to those, who grew from Herakles' line," but I believe that *ἀέξηθεῖσι* carries a glorifying element.

²⁵⁸ Cf. also the good translation in Hebert 1989, 17, who accepts *ἄβρῶν*, but translates freely.

necessary to briefly ponder the different scenarios of its genesis.²⁵⁹ Important textual indicators that support this text being the Colossus' actual dedicatory epigram are the Doric dialect, the glorification of Rhodes, as well as the direct reference to the Colossus and elements of Rhodian identity, all of which indicate a Rhodian perspective and locus.²⁶⁰

1) The text derives from an actual stone or bronze inscription that held the dedicatory epigram of the Colossus and was affixed to its base or a similar location.²⁶¹ A survey of the dedicatory epigrams of book 6 of the *Greek Anthology* shows that some of them were probably originally stone epigrams, or at least existed both in epigraphic and literary form.²⁶² Nothing in the text seems to prohibit this text from having been inscribed on a stone, also by comparison with extant Hellenistic stone epigrams.²⁶³

2) The text is not the dedicatory epigram, but a distinct literary epigram, probably written in the third century BC before the Colossus' fall, as its erection is

²⁵⁹ Gow and Page 1965, 2, 588f. The text suggests Rhodian origins and Meleager worked on Kos; see also Wiemer 2011, 130 with n. 43. On the development of the genre see Cameron 1993, 1-5; see further 49-56 (on dating Meleager) and 123 (for the ascription of the text to Meleager). Jones 2014 has dated the epigram to the time of Philip V (221-179 BC) and offers a very intricate argument that engages with Edson's classic (1934) study of Antigonid connections to Herakles, to which I will turn below (p. 404). My main counter to his argument is that such an ostentatious reference to the Colossus 30 years after it had fallen would steep the epigram in bitter irony and in no way reflect well on Rhodian hegemony. Nothing else, however, corroborates such a subversive reading, leading me to reject his date.

²⁶⁰ These aspects were identified already by Benndorf 1876, 47. While this kind of argument is necessarily circular, it does appear strongly consistent.

²⁶¹ Benndorf 1876, 47, preferred this scenario, a decision that proved influential in later scholarship.

²⁶² See for instance *Anth. Pal.* 6.50; 139; 143; 145; 150. The best example has already been mentioned above (*Anth. Pal.* 13.13 = IG I² 529). The great majority of dedicatory epigrams collected in the *Anthologia Palatina* thematise the dedication of small and large objects in elaborate literary form. The relationship between the epigram and reality is often intentionally obscure and probably largely non-existent.

²⁶³ Similarly Gow and Page 1965, 2, 588f. On the relationship between epigram and art object see generally Hebert 1989, 55f. with discussion of examples. On stone epigrams cf. the collection by Merkelbach, Reinhold and Stauber, Josef (eds.). *Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten*. 5 vols. Stuttgart and Leipzig 1998-2001; the proportion of funerary epigrams is naturally very high. The famous "Pride of Halikarnassos" is a fine second century BC example of a long city-glorifying epigram being prominently displayed in a city of the area (see Isager, Signe. "The Pride of Halikarnassos. Editio princeps of an inscription from Salmakis", in: *ZPE* 123 (1998), 1-23, esp. 6, 19, 21 for the date; cf. Lloyd-Jones, Hugh. "The Pride of Halicarnassus", in: *ZPE* 124 (1999), 1-14).

thematised.²⁶⁴ Although history on occasion exhibits great complexity, Occam's razor would make this scenario appear less likely, as this would surely presuppose the existence of two epigrams, the less authentic of which survived.²⁶⁵ The Colossus was clearly a dedication and its exceptional quality and size will undoubtedly have merited an inscription and probably an epigram. The extant epigram is further well-suited as a dedicatory text.

3) The third scenario is a literary epigram that emulates a Rhodian perspective by suggesting to its readers that it is indeed the dedicatory epigram that accompanied the famous Colossus.²⁶⁶ Identifying and dating such an epigram would be very difficult, though this scenario would of course have significant consequences for any interpretation. If the text was indeed the product of such a process, it was very successful in its emulation. The only errors in the manuscript's coherence that I can make out are the non-Doric forms *ἐλευθερίης* and *γενέθλης*, but these deviations are hardly telling, as such errors could have been introduced at any stage of the anthology's compilation process and transmission. Of the scenarios considered, the first therefore seems the most likely, though the third is impossible to exclude categorically.

The final preliminary problem that needs to be addressed is the difference in metre between the two texts. Why two separate texts? The anthology shows that dedicatory epigrams that were displayed in the context of art objects only rarely identify the object's maker.²⁶⁷ These objects would therefore have required a separate signatory inscription if the artist was to be identified. Since there is nothing to suggest that Chares of Lindos was also the author of the epigram, the current situation seems perfectly reasonable. In sum, this preliminary discussion has therefore returned no strong arguments against identifying *Anth. Pal.* 6.171 as the Colossus' dedicatory epigram. While some degree of doubt naturally remains, it accordingly seems legitimate to read this text as a rare piece of contemporary evidence for the translation processes going on in early third century BC Rhodes, situated in the spatial context of the monument itself.

Read in this way, the text becomes rich in references to relevant nodes of the discursive network of early Hellenistic politics and can therefore be said to engage with the dense web of discourse of its time, the 290s and 280s BC. The text serves to channel and direct the polysemous impact of the statue, rendering its meaning

²⁶⁴ *Anth. Pal.* 6.171, l. 1.

²⁶⁵ On the problems inherent in using Occam's razor as a historical tool cf. Whitehead 1993, 74f. In this case its application seems legitimate to exclude this particular scenario, though the third scenario remains a problematic alternative.

²⁶⁶ This scenario was suggested to me by Prof. Dr. Hans-Joachim Gehrke (Freiburg) and a concrete variant has been explored by Jones 2014.

²⁶⁷ On some occasions the artists are named, e.g. in *Anth. Pal.* 6.139; 13.13.

more concrete to anyone interacting with it up close. Since the narrative embedding of the statue, which grants it agency, was linked to the material and historical relationship between monument and the siege, the epigram would thus illuminate the contest for semantic and socio-political control and footing at a collective level as it was being conducted by the Rhodians at the end of the process of re-consolidation that followed the Antigonid invasion. Most telling in this regard is the selection process behind the information perpetuated on the monument, a process that involved not only the author, but also the Rhodian assembly that ultimately sanctioned the Colossus.²⁶⁸

The text unsurprisingly opens with the dedication to Helios and a reference to the object being dedicated, while also highlighting its extreme materiality. The first interesting aspect to note in the opening lines, however, is the choice of actor, of the text's I. From a covert outsider's perspective, the inhabitants of Rhodes are cast as a collective actor that gave rise to the Colossus and provided the occasion for its dedication through its agency. The text thereby very smoothly exhibits the consensus and self-confidence of the Rhodian collective, without ever mentioning any specific individual or sub-set, be it a god, an elite, or a general – not even those of citizen status are highlighted. The action performed by this very inclusive collective actor now looks very traditional: it apparently consists simply in the dedication of a portion of the booty to a relevant god out of gratitude for success in battle.²⁶⁹ As was noted above, this action equates to reified components of the opponents' distributed selves, the embodiments of the military agency brought to bear on the Rhodian collective, being translated in shape and semantics into an object endowed with agency capable of a fundamentally different thrust, of sanctioning the Rhodians' successful battle for control against existential contingency.²⁷⁰ This new object actor reaffirmed and perpetuated the protective agency imagined to have been exercised by Helios on behalf of his island, while also emphasising the distinctive or even unique connection between Rhodes and the sun god, a central component of specifically Rhodian collective identity. It may further have associated and implicitly rejected a contemporary discourse that

²⁶⁸ Nothing indicates that the Rhodian people did not act as dedicant and *Anth. Pal.* 6.171, l. 1f. and *Sex. Emp. Adv. Math.* 107.1 in fact suggest exactly that. Accordingly the council and popular assembly would have ultimately supervised the monument.

²⁶⁹ On the practice cf. Rice, Ellen. "The Glorious Dead: Commemoration of the Fallen and Portrayal of Victory in the Late Classical and Hellenistic World", in: John Rich and Graham Shipley (eds.). *War and Society in the Greek World*. London 1993, 224–257, here 236–239; Chaniotis 2005, 236f.; Vedder 2006, 362–364; Diod. 20.87.4 further attests the Rhodians acting in such a commemorative way already during the siege.

²⁷⁰ *Plin. Nat. Hist.* 34.41.

praised rulers with solar imagery by enlisting the sun for the Rhodian collective.²⁷¹ In this respect, the text potentially had consequences for any image of Helios, especially on Rhodes, as it added a new layer of meaning and history to them all, a new narrative that informed their agency.

While the specificity of the link to Helios is of course essential, the text is quick to add another layer by referencing the Doric heritage of the Rhodians and interacting with the network of mytho-historical blood relationships that structured Greek identity and was explored above.²⁷² Reproducing mytho-historical elements of collective Rhodian identity in the context of a very inclusively phrased collective actor, a collective that had existed in this configuration for less than a generation, not only serves to communicate the strength and ancient ‘Greekness’ of this new collective, but also seamlessly reproduces it for use in the cognitive networks of the present.²⁷³ The fact that this text in all likelihood passed through the Rhodian assembly should not be underestimated here, as it was sanctioned by the collective it was to represent, both old citizens and new.²⁷⁴ The semantic compound of image and text thereby became both expression and reproduction of collective footing after a period of contingency that resulted from the need for physical and metaphysical restoration and consolidation after the experience of the siege. This one-word reference to the Rhodians’ Doric heritage gains further momentum if one considers that it also served to distinguish them from the Diadochi, especially the Antigonids. If the epigram was written in 283/2 BC, so when the Colossus was complete, this would have coincided with a period during which the Antigonids were at their lowest, with Demetrios Poliorketes dead and Antigonos II Gonatas in control mainly of Demetrias, Megara, and Korinth.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ To modern eyes it is also striking that the ithyphallic hymn to Demetrios Poliorketes sung at Athens in 291/0 BC likens him to the sun surrounded by the stars, his *philoï* (Athen. 6.253 d-f = FGrH 76 F 13). Athenaeus further quotes Duris in applying this kind of imagery to Demetrios of Phaleron, calling him *ἡλιόμορφος* (Athen. 12.542d-e = FGrH 76 F 10). Since this may be another instance of confusion between the two contemporary and prominent Demetrioï by Athenaeus (as noted by Wheatley 2003, 31 n. 9), this occurrence may well have applied to Poliorketes as well. The Rhodian emphasis on Helios potentially acquired an added layer of meaning from this enrollment of solar imagery in the negotiation of relations between city and king, though its impact cannot be gauged. The Rhodian emphasis on the traditional civic formula of solar divinity may, however, have provided another element of distinction. On solar imagery in relation to rulers see Mikalson 1998, 96; O’Sullivan 2008; Chaniotis 2011, 170.

²⁷² See above p. 344.

²⁷³ Cf. Gehrke 2003, 238.

²⁷⁴ This is suggested by *Anth. Pal.* 6.171, l. 1f. and corroborated by the anecdote preserved by Sex. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 107.1, as well as by the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

²⁷⁵ For this troubled period the best account seems still to be that of Tarn 1913, 110-138.

Unlike the Rhodians, the Diadochi could not lay claim to an ancient, Greek heritage, potentially rendering this single word a marker of distinction and bearer of a complex discourse of inclusion and exclusion, which is referenced here in a very subtle, but potentially meaningful way.²⁷⁶ While the Rhodian collective was capable of exerting its agency to include new members into its ancient heritage, it could also deny this extension to its opponents, marking its control over its categories of collective self-fashioning, but in a subtle and immensely ambivalent way.

That the Diadochi and the macro-political configuration of the late fourth or early third century BC should indeed be read as the text's implicit foil stands out with greater clarity if one reads on. The following lines engage with a fundamental figuration of Hellenistic kingship, the victorious king.²⁷⁷ In a period in which the Greek cities had increasingly been incorporated into networks directed by individual actors, who subsumed the agency of the resulting collective into their own personal self, a collective now laid claim to a 'victory', or at least to successful military resistance to such a powerful actor, and thereby added a contrasting voice to a discourse that had become the monopoly and distinguishing characteristic of the most powerful actors of the Diadoch period. The strategy adopted for this engagement in the text is again very subtle, as no vanquished enemy, nor victory itself are explicitly named. Instead, the text is infused with a certain timelessness and the Rhodians' successful exercise of agency abstracted from the concrete historical conflict and shifted to the divine plane, where the collective pacifies military conflict itself in its figuration as Enyo, goddess of bloody melee (l. 3).²⁷⁸ In the interpretation of Rhodian policy advocated above, this fits nicely into a strategy of balanced non-involvement that entailed avoiding direct and provocative engagement with powerful actors. It also reflects the volatile nature of macro-political developments of the time and the text's primary focus on consolidating the domestic socio-political network: the Rhodians present themselves as a harmonious collective of peace-bringers rather than bloodied victors. This line in particular therefore stands out as an act of story-telling and selective memory:²⁷⁹

²⁷⁶ Despite the arguments of Edson 1934, a Diadoch period claim to Heraklid lineage is not positively attested for the Antigonids (cf. now Jones 2014). Such a claim would surely have appeared in the ithyphallic hymn to Demetrios Poliorketes (Athen. 7.253d-f = Duris FGrH 76 F 13). See also below p. 404.

²⁷⁷ Suda s.v. *Βασίλεια* (Adler Beta 147); see fundamentally e.g. Préaux 1978, 1, 183-186; Gehrke 1982; Chaniotis 2005, 57-62.

²⁷⁸ On Enyo see Gäis, Ruth M. S.v. "Enyo [1]", in: *LIMC* III,1 (1986), 746f. Her occurrence here echos her traditional use, e.g. at Hom. *Il.* 5.333 or Aisch. *Sept.* 45f.

²⁷⁹ On history as selective memory see Gehrke 2010. On Greek attitudes to negative collective memory see Meier, Christian. *Das Gebot zu Vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns. Vom öffentlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit.* Munich 2010, here esp. 36-40 on victory and defeat.

while mention of Enyo elegantly recalls the bloodshed and horrors of the siege, these disturbing memories are allowed only a single, highly abstract word, rendering the line an act of forgetting directed at the violent and invasive employment of agency during the siege. The events are discursively reconfigured and selectively perpetuated with the aim of consolidating Rhodian agency for the future and emphasising the value of peace for the collective actor, resolving the apparent tension between agency and peace inherent in the construct of the victorious king.²⁸⁰ This is achieved by relegating military agency outside the collective, which employs its cultivated collective agency to forge peace.²⁸¹ One needs to bear in mind, of course, that the Colossus' interactions with the network of Rhodian identity were contrasted and supplemented by other interactions, by objects and humans that underscored, modulated or even complicated its configuration. Explicitly attested, for instance, are the honours accorded the kings for their aid during the siege and the maintenance of the honours granted Antigonos and Demetrios, but the decades between the siege and the Colossus' construction may have seen a wide variety of other activity, which is largely in the dark.²⁸² It is worth noting, however, that these forms of expression also stem from collective Rhodian agency in the configuration outlined above, ostentatiously reproducing its balanced web of interactions with the kings in honorary formulae.²⁸³

When subjected to closer scrutiny, the closing lines of the epigram show similar engagements with the macro-political power network of the time, all serving to configure Rhodian agency in relation to some of its major strands. The Rhodian claim to the “light of unenslaved freedom” is a thinly veiled reference to the network of power interactions Antigonos Monophthalmos had been weaving in the years before the siege of Rhodes by drawing on the concept of Greek freedom with its history as a vehicle of translation, a word of power. The text now re-

²⁸⁰ On the significance of memory for the reproduction of identity in the context of war see Chaniotis, Angelos. “The Ritualised Commemoration of War in the Hellenistic City: Memory, Identity, Emotion”, in: Polly Low, Graham Oliver, and Peter J. Rhodes (eds.). *Cultures of Commemoration: War Memorials, Ancient and Modern*. Oxford 2012, 41-62, here 44. On the destructive element in the conception of Hellenistic royal agency see Austin 1986.

²⁸¹ The Rhodians did this on a relatively significant scale (see Ager 1991; Paschidis 2008, 491-493) and henceforth seem to have displayed their strength by acting as intermediaries at the macro-political level, rather than drawing on others.

²⁸² Diod. 20.93.6f.; 100.2-4. On what little is known of Rhodian history in the third century BC see Berthold 1984, 81-101; Wiemer 2002, 97-109; Pimouguet-Pédarros 2011, 350-355. The early third century BC probably saw the acquisition of the first part of the Rhodian *peraia*, see Fraser and Bean 1954, 99-101.

²⁸³ See recently Ma 2013b, esp. 298.

configures Rhodes as a beacon of Greek freedom built on the inclusive collective's agency, implicitly calling the validity of the Diadoch's interaction mode into question and hinting at the flexibility with which this policy had been employed in the Eastern Mediterranean. By qualifying 'freedom' with a telling adjective, this line thus reasserted self-assured Rhodian collective agency within this network of interactions.²⁸⁴

A similarly veiled slight can be tentatively identified in the phrase that claims sovereignty is due to the *flourishing* descendants of Herakles.²⁸⁵ The ambivalence of this wording can be read as a Rhodian power interaction if one considers that Alexander the Great had variously laid claim to Herakles and Zeus as prestigious ancestors without, however, being able to maintain his Empire or continue his dynasty.²⁸⁶ Antigonos, who was still minting Alexanders at the time of the siege, coins that continuously reproduced and reified the Heraklid claims of the Argeads and Antigonos' ambition to succeed them, and his son Demetrios, who imitated Alexander to an extent that exceeded that of any other Diadoch, are here potentially exposed in a very subtle fashion as mere imposters, as faux, second-degree Heraklids – quite unlike the Rhodians.²⁸⁷ At the same time, however, the line is so ambivalent that its underlying discourse could easily be transformed into an inclusive *syngeneia* argument that might build bridges to both the Antigonids and Ptolemy.²⁸⁸ Here, of course, this strand of discourse leads into a very explicitly Rhodian claim to sovereignty over land and sea (l. 8), which parallels Alexander's own. The time gap between the events of the siege and the Colossus' erection suggests that this claim was not born from short-lived euphoria, but communicates a confidence in self-sufficient agency in the terms of the time that flows

²⁸⁴ On understanding military strength as a source of true freedom cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.5.79. For a comparable example of potential ambivalence exhibited by Rhodian object actors see Günther, Linda-Marie. "Polis und Königin: zur Interpretation von Frauenköpfen auf hellenistischen Münzen", in: *JNG* 62 (2012), 35-53, who interprets the Rhodian bronze emissions after the catastrophic earthquake of 228/7 BC as a double reference to Demeter und Berenike II.

²⁸⁵ Cf. similarly Gehrke 2003, 238.

²⁸⁶ Hadley, Robert A. *Deified Kingship and Propaganda Coinage in the Early Hellenistic Age 323-280 B.C.* Ann Arbor 1989, 10-14; Dreyer, Boris. "Heroes, Cults, and Divinity", in: Waldemar Heckel and Lawrence A. Tritle (eds.). *Alexander the Great: A New History.* London 2009, 218-234, here 218-220.

²⁸⁷ On Diadoch coinage see Mørkholm 1991, 77-81; Hadley 1989, 1-28, and on Demetrios' coins see fundamentally Newell 1978 [1927], esp. 166-169 for a summary evaluation; Demetrios appears as an imitator of Alexander for instance in Plut. *Demetr.* 41.3f.

²⁸⁸ A similar reading of the final couplet was proposed already by Charles Edson, but with the aim of tracing an Antigonid claim to Heraklid lineage: Edson 1934, 220. Cf. Jones 2014, 145f.

directly from its de-facto display and diachronic, mytho-historical self-positioning. The epigram's culmination is therefore thoroughly in keeping not only with the overall development of Rhodian collective agency traced in this chapter, but is also corroborated in its projection of agency via an imperial narrative by an inscription from Delos, dated to the mid-third century BC.²⁸⁹ The parallels between the interactions employed by the kings as distributed individuals to stabilise their narratives of agency and this interaction by a collective actor are therefore quite striking, as the Rhodian collective is here engaging with the world in very similar categories to generate control by utilising a shared, but contested discourse.

Finally, this relatively complex cluster of textual references and actions is closely tied to the monumental image it supplements: the opening reference, the context of the text's probable performance and discussion, as well as the physical proximity between image and text therefore come together to forge a compound discursive actor. This actor consists of two parts that mutually perpetuate each other due to their complementary communicative qualities: diachronic semantic specificity meets awe-inducing size and material splendour. The text's reproductive potential and interactive surface is thereby massively enhanced, rendering it an associative locus of a specific construction of collective memory that will certainly have engaged with the other sites of memory in the Rhodian cityscape. It can therefore be considered part of a larger mnemotope of spatially correlated Rhodian mytho-history.²⁹⁰ As was mentioned above, the wider context of its agency is probably the altered configuration of the Antigonid network of power in 283/2 BC, though the date of the epigram is of course by no means secure, as was noted above. At a time, however, when Demetrios Poliorketes was either Seleukos' prisoner or already dead, while his son, Antigonos II Gonatas, was heavily under pressure from Lysimachos and Pyrrhos,²⁹¹ engaging with the older strands of the Antigonid imperial narrative was not immediately dangerous, nor did the compound actor interfere with a concrete constellation of power in any

²⁸⁹ The text details honours accorded Rhodian commanders by the Delian demos, praising the Rhodians as protectors of the isles and saviours of the Greeks (IG XI,4 596:4f.; 9). The inscription was exhibited in two copies, both in the *bouleuterion* and the sanctuary of Apollo.

²⁹⁰ I thank Janric van Rookhuijzen (Radboud University Nijmegen) for discussing with me the concept of the mnemotope. It describes the spatial anchoring of memory and narrative on a larger scale, and was popularized by Jan Assmann (1992, 59f.) on the basis of work by Maurice Halbwachs on the sacred topography of Palestine (cf. also Pethes, Nicolas. "Mnemotop", in: Jörg Dünne and Andreas Mahler (eds.). *Handbuch Literatur & Raum* (=Handbücher zur kulturwissenschaftlichen Philologie 3). Berlin and Boston 2015, 196-205, here 197f.).

²⁹¹ Plut. *Demetr.* 52.3; Iust. 17.1.9-12.

specific way. If Demetrios was indeed deceased, Antigonos II's naval exhibition of his accession in Greece, which seems to have incorporated his father's ash-urn as an object actor to lend greater impact to the action as a whole,²⁹² may even have granted additional significance to the Rhodian reproduction of their victory on different terms. Overall, however, the main thrust of this composite monumental actor seems to have been to perpetuate the consolidation of the domestic Rhodian socio-political network for the purpose of maintaining collective agency after the siege.²⁹³ This maintenance consisted in the reproduction of a specific configuration of the past that was probably collectively performed and conspicuously monumentalised to overlay other more negative or more aggressive versions, with the successful result that they have indeed faded from memory as was probably intended.²⁹⁴

The Colossus' significance as an amplifier and embodiment of the benevolent inter-state policy pursued by the Rhodian polity in the third century BC should hence not be underestimated. What little is known of this policy shows that the *demos* used its economic means in interaction modes shared with the kings, for instance by exhibiting inter-state euergetic generosity.²⁹⁵ A very similar epigram that praises a particularly impressive transport ship built by Hiero II of Syracuse, so a comparable reification of agency, accordingly shows unsurprising parallels: both texts root their praise of the object and the agency that produced it in mytho-

²⁹² Plut. *Demetr.* 53.1-3. See Tarn 1913, 122. The Antigonid navy probably had to pass by Rhodes on this progress.

²⁹³ The further development of Rhodian collective agency is not subject of this thesis. See Wiemer 2002, 97-109 and fundamentally still Schmitt, Hatto H. *Rom und Rhodos. Geschichte ihrer politischen Beziehungen seit der ersten Berührung bis zum Aufgehen des Inselstaates im römischen Weltreich*. Munich 1957. Paschalis Paschidis (2008, 491f.) noted that the strength of the Rhodian collective seems to be reflected in the lack of honorary decrees for non-citizens that negotiated with kings on their behalf. This may, however, simply be due to the dearth of evidence from the city of Rhodes itself.

²⁹⁴ Cf. Eco 1988, 254f.; 259f. and Meier 2010, 36-40.

²⁹⁵ On the Rhodian loan to Argos see Gabrielsen 1997, 82; Wiemer 2002, 93; Moretti, ISE I 40 = Migeotte 1984, 81-84 (no. 19). On the difficult nature of euergetism see e.g. Gauthier 1985, esp. 40-42; Bringmann 2000, esp. 151-153. It appears as a contingency-controlling interaction mode that blends payment code and friendship code by correlating the interaction with honour on both sides, thereby defusing the societal pressure this code blending entails by giving it social weight in the form of positive relational identity held by others. In its correlation, it thus holds coercive potential that depends on the configuration the interaction mode is employed in and its feedback effects on said configuration. Cf. also Aristot. *Rhet.* 1361a37-b2.

historical connectivity and link it with claims of sovereignty and grandeur.²⁹⁶ The reproducing effects of the Colossus on collective agency are apparent also in the well-documented international response to its destruction by the earthquake of 227 BC.²⁹⁷ The Colossus had evidently become an integral component of the self-reinforcing discursive network that structured the socio-political collective of Rhodes, which in turn induced a number of dynasts and kings, including Antigonos II Gonatas, to contribute to rebuilding the city, while Ptolemy IV even offered resources for the re-erection of the statue itself.²⁹⁸ The monument's incorporation into lists of world wonders and other texts further attests to its diachronic effectiveness as a marker of identity and abstract prestige, although its socio-political dimension increasingly diminishes.²⁹⁹ Even in Pliny, however, the association between the Colossus and Rhodian collective agency is still explicit – a situation that may well have been different if the Rhodians had accepted Ptolemy's help and allowed him to take control of the reified core of their identity.³⁰⁰

6.4. Conclusion

Applying the theoretical perspective devised in this study to the Classical history of Rhodes in general and the erection of the Colossus of Rhodes in particular has helped to approximate the negotiations of identity that underpinned Rhodian collective agency in the early Hellenistic period. I further argued that these in turn informed the island's ability to weather the macro-political contingencies of the time. The self-confident agency displayed by the Rhodians in the Diadoch period has here been painted as being shaped by a long-standing process of consolidation within the elite, which was crucial in allowing for the development of collective action and avoiding disintegration and translation by other actors. This process was considered linked to two major factors, the substantial shifts in the macro-politics of the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the later Classical period, and the extensive discursive and reified network of mytho-historical ties that informed Rhodian specificity in discourse. Alexander's campaign was identified as the trigger that allowed for the unification of the Rhodian socio-political network and resulted in the self-confident inter-collective agency it exhibited in the late fourth

²⁹⁶ Athen. 5.209d-e. References are made to Doric heritage, sovereignty over Sicily, and the generosity of Hiero, which is accomplished by connecting polities via the sea and the reified agency of the ship.

²⁹⁷ Plb. 5.88.1-90.4. See Bringmann 2000, 189-192.

²⁹⁸ Plb. 5.89.1-4.

²⁹⁹ This later evidence is collected in Hebert 1989, 17-45.

³⁰⁰ Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 34.41.

and third century BC, an agency directed by the elite but performatively reproduced as incorporating all inhabitants of the island.³⁰¹

This agency faced the task of having to negotiate between two semiospheres, two related fields of cultural meaning, with which it had to maintain balanced and distributed connectivity while also preserving its own distinctiveness. The existence of various growing socio-political networks that laid claim to extremely similar categories of identity, but were organised around very different narratives and societal mechanisms of contingency control, therefore led the Rhodians to produce a subtle strategy that walked the line between differentiation and connectivity. I argued that this negotiation can be described as a policy of balance already in this early phase of Rhodes' Hellenistic history on the grounds that in essence, neutrality amounts to a reactive policy in a distributed mesh of other interactions that aims to maintain the distribution of this mesh. Such a configuration was tangible in the events that led to the siege of Rhodes. This policy was probably not an explicitly formulated agenda, but instead appears as a modern diagnosis of Rhodes' organic role in the interaction network of the Eastern Mediterranean. The result was the maintenance and reproduction of self-confident Rhodian collective agency that rested on and was produced by action being conducted in equal measure and on the same codes vis-à-vis all *alteri* attempting translation.

From this perspective, the siege of Rhodes accordingly appeared as a consequence and failure of this interactive strategy based on a short-term change in the balance of power. The successful exertion of Rhodian collective agency during the siege demonstrated the success of the consolidating actions undertaken to control the contingency of the situation. While the immediate consequences of the contractual settlement after the conflict's conclusion are obscured by the lack of sources (and probably their biases), the later memorialisation of the event shows that it was employed to continuously reproduce the agency, self-confidence, and discursive density of the Rhodian collective as a socio-political network. The very existence of the Colossus of Rhodes already exemplifies this and a case study of this monument accordingly drew the chapter to a close. Treated as a non-human actor engaging with the early Hellenistic web of power narratives, the Colossus emerged as reconsolidating the Rhodian collective after the experiences of the siege, controlling the acutely felt contingency of the world by offering a new configuration of old and new discourses tailored to the period in its subtle timelessness and activation of mytho-history. Its widely visible monumental materiality, which was cast as the product of a subtle, but clever narrative of translation that retroactively re-configured Antigonid strategies of *enrolment* and

³⁰¹ On domestic conflict and possible solutions see further Gabrielsen 1997, 31-36, for the Hellenistic period proper, and Grieb 2008, 304-343, on the further development of the democracy at Rhodes.

strengthened Rhodian agency, was further specified by an epigram that walked a fine line between connectivity and distinction by referencing and subtly enrolling various discursive nodes of early Hellenistic politics, such as freedom and Heraclid heritage, into Rhodian collective self-fashioning. The resulting composite actor emerged as interacting especially with this collective and its agency, of which it was not only a direct product and expression, but also a constant amplifier through the narratives tied to its materiality.

What little information there is about Rhodes in the early third century BC further seemed to corroborate the narrative of power in evidence in the Colossus, although unfortunately information on its contemporary impact is lacking. Overall, epigram and monument therefore emerged as engaging with a complex discursive network that spanned the Eastern Mediterranean in a multitude of layers and configurations. The narrative spun by this composite actor subtly and elegantly took advantage of the complexity of this larger web of powerful stories, maintaining productive ambiguity while also generating and reproducing collective meaning, and therein providing an excellent example of the difficulties and opportunities that characterised the inter-collective struggle for narrative control of contingency in the Diadoch period. The physically manifest elements of the object actor anchored its narrative and thereby increased the impact of its world construction, rendering it a stronger and more reliable source of footing by embedding the narrative in a specific translation of tangible material and societal codes of interaction. Just as reified lists of those objects currently *not* on display in ancient sanctuaries were authenticated by what *was* visible,³⁰² the contested narrative was here maintained and authenticated by the physical presence of the object. This authenticity was crucial to agency and to the relational self-positioning of the collective the object actor was entangled with.

In sum, therefore, one can say that the Rhodian narratives analysed here recast Rhodian collective agency in the categories being established as areas of individual excellence, but do so with a twist. The analysis of the Colossus demonstrated that the responses of the Rhodians to early Hellenistic power dynamics encroach upon the power discourse being woven in court narrative and being played out on the civic stage. They do so by shrouding their narrative in ambiguity, enlisting the categories of individual distinction for collective distinction, successfully adapting to the complexity of the time. In so doing, however, they naturally also accommodate individual agency and the emerging narrative of its construction and validate the categories themselves.

³⁰² Scott 2011 highlights that such inscribed and exhibited texts engage in an intertextual network of references that was authenticated and anchored by what was actually tangible.

7. Summary and conclusions

This study has attempted to approach the fluctuations of socio-political power in times of macro-political change a little differently by investigating the sources relating to such a historical period in terms of their narrative constructions of uncertainty and the conceptions of society they formulate in response. My hope is that this has provided a fruitful, complementary perspective on the war-torn years of conflict that we call the period of Alexander's successors, capable of supplementing the important historiographical reconstruction of this period. The starting point of my argument was to understand the period in question as fundamentally characterised by an increased perception of macro-political contingency, which called for re-configuration and re-affirmation at a very fundamental level of society. By studying source texts as narratives operating within contested attempts at control over cognitive networks of meaning, I hope to have shown how long-standing semantic orders were subtly rewired and shifted to respond to these experiences of contingency.

The interest in approaching the period of the Diadochi in this way grew out of an engagement with sociological and narrative theory that was presented in Chapter 2 and led to the formulation of what I have described as a 'network-perspective'. The starting point of this perspective was the argument put forward by scholars of ANT that every text, and thus also every source, is an actor in a network that negotiates social meaning by forging strands of meaning into unified compounds, which are used to change the world. This perspective functioned as a heuristic lens that produced results primarily by changing the way in which texts and objects were read, transforming them from historical sources to be stripped of ideology into actors in networks of discourse that contributed to constituting reality. The main interest in applying this perspective lay in identifying a specific form of societal power that consists in the controls that determine the relational places of self for both individuals and collectives. These controls were in turn sought in narrative constructions of uncertainty or contingency and of the means of control developed to combat it. These narratives come together as network structures that regulate the situational pertinence of norms. With Harrison White these were described as stories and control (or value) regimes, which serve to structure social cohesiveness in socio-political networks by giving them boundaries. The most significant of the elements involved in the narrative creation of this second level of societal control were finally identified with the generalised media of communication studied by Niklas Luhmann and others, which include basic systemic codes of evaluation, such as self-identity/ difference, belief/non-belief, payment/non-payment, and true/false. The rivalling conceptualisations

and applications of these codes in story-telling, as well as the boundaries constructed between them, accordingly emerged as the main subject of this study, to be analysed at an individual, collective, and inter-collective level.

This method was applied across four case studies, the first two of which analysed the construction of individuals and their collectivisation in a text relating to the polis and a number of texts relating to the emergent Hellenistic court. Chapter 3 studied Theophrastus' *Characters* and attempted to show that they can be read as a textual actor engaged in creating a paradoxical, and therein productively incoherent and cohesive, 'mirror' of lived discursive reality in late fourth-century Athens, which constructs and counters a wide range of social contingencies. This allowed this enigmatic work to be read as the bones of an abstracted social project expounded not via exposition of the ideal but via close observation and control of variations on the deviant and inverted. This narrative society emerged as being highly specific to its time, the late 320s and 310s BC, in that it was entangled in a contemporary, epigonal discourse among the citizen elite about the nature of the 'democratic' Athenian collective, which was under tension due to a large number of political faultlines being exacerbated by external interference. Accordingly I argued that the text is concerned with subtle re-configuration of the socio-political network of a specifically constructed citizen elite, in order to maintain its cohesion and agency.

This re-configuration offered a very specific solution to these challenges as it focuses on the negotiation between male adult individuals and the collective generated by their relations. I argued that it consists in harnessing the inevitable societal tensions between the individual's construction of his own actions and the collective's construction of norm in order to develop and deploy collective agency. As a baseline, the text acknowledges individual contingency perception and agency, implicitly giving it substantial room by documenting it and thereby rendering it thinkable and even – to a certain extent – acceptable. It therefore reinforces cognitive categories and interaction modes for deviant behaviour, which, apparently paradoxically, facilitates social cohesion at an extradiegetic level in line with social theory. In that, the *Characters* gives shape to, and harnesses, a paradox of contingency-control: in controlling behaviour, they codify certain aspects also of negative behaviour, but also completely occlude other types of deviation, which are thus made unthinkable at the level of the text.

In addition to that, however, the work implements an inverted, but nevertheless clearly configured set of control regimes designed to translate individual and collective agency into a collectivist regime of meta-control. While the focus of the *Characters* appears at first blatantly individualist, the second part of the text's subtle project in fact consists in the construction of collective normative control, whereby a collectivist mind-set defines what is perceived as contingent and how.

To do so, the text establishes a socio-spatial locus at which this normative control takes effect. This spatial dimension derives from the text's construction of the individual as a distributed self rather than as a single, static person, with the result that relevant action takes place on the 'seams' between these spatially distributed individuals.

Within this sphere of action, the text asserts the primacy of a specific construction of *philia* by outlining a set of collective control regimes and interaction modes over which the prevalence of *philia* is implicitly asserted, particularly in relation to the economic interaction mode. The text implements this paradigm by introducing a range of sanctioning control mechanisms at various textual levels, while also presenting them in a purely implicit fashion, visible only in deviant application. This again emerged as being in line with social theory. In under-specified and thereby unobtrusive inversion, asserting collective agency via collective-conforming action is thus portrayed as the social playground on which the text's implicit ideal, the wealthy citizen, can adequately deploy his individual agency.

The text therefore paints a collective of the wealthy and consolidates it by levelling individual deviation of all kinds, thus ensuring relationships and connectivity, and implicitly bolstering the collective agency of the *eleutheroi* by insisting on how crucial it is that individual agency be employed in observing others. In this social imaginary, which seems reminiscent of earlier *patrios politeia* constructions and thus appears as a re-configuration rather than pure innovation, societal power and contingency control lie in the cohesive collective agency of this group. Its members are accorded space to act as individuals to define the world and its meaning within the confines of a value-correlated social network, but are simultaneously configured as being perpetually sanctioned by the embodiment of collective observation and sanction infused both into every individual and into civic space. Put in drastic terms, the text therefore appeared to deny that the exertion of semantic hegemony lies within the scope of the individual's agency by writing it out of the normative discourse and asserting the polis collective of friends as the ideal locus of self and source of control.

Chapter 3 closed by arguing that the *Characters* buttresses the power of the collective thus constructed by implementing resilient social network dynamics, as well as control regimes suited to their preservation. Rather than presenting these dynamics and regimes positively and opening them up to attack, the text offers narratives that reflect, embody, and communicate processes of contingency control and thereby subtly ensure through inversion that the constructed collective remains relatively stable. The text's non-formulation of positively defined norms is precisely what allows it to assert semantic meta-control over the socio-political imaginary it develops. Based on the scraps of evidence available in the text, one

can thus posit that this construction, viewed as an abstract, theoretical social network, is envisaged as dense and distributed, allowing for both resilience and cascades due to high connectivity and low centralisation. The result is a fantasy of a strong, self-contained elite society.

Chapter 4 applied the same perspective to narratives deriving from or thematising the emergent court societies of the Diadoch period, again with an eye towards their potential societal impact as story-telling in their potential original environment. Given the disjointed and fragmentary nature of the extant sources, a possible model for such a narrative was abstracted from Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. This model held that the king is narratively, and thus communally, constructed in response to likewise communally constructed contingency as a collectivised self that provides an agency-imbued, and thus attractive, relational sense of place for other individuals. By contrast with the *Characters*, society was therefore constructed *within* a distributed individual who becomes collective, rather than along the spatially manifest boundaries of a multitude of such selves.

It was further observed that this collectivised self is cast as a dynamically growing, redistributive socio-political network that operates on a principle of meritocratic redistribution, qualified by an element of circulation introduced by the fact that all its components are cast as mediators of the meritocratic value-order. It was further argued that this imaginary imperial society derived its validity from the fact that it organised the applicability of the fundamental social codes of complexity-reduction listed above. Their construction as central or marginal to social interaction and the creation of blends between them enabled the collectivised self to be transformed into an obligatory passage point (OPP) for all interaction in the minds of those who were part of this society. This dynamic provided all individuals within the network with effective control of contingency at a very basic level of societal organisation in that contingency itself was ultimately dissolved completely.

In the second part of Chapter 4, this model was then used to scrutinise a selection of the extant narratives relating to the period of the Diadochi. I argued that, in essence, the narratives show a very similar construction to the *Cyropaedia*. Accordingly, emergent Hellenistic court society is developed as a collectivised self joined in its experience of contingency and its exercise of control through narrative. The most interesting observation was that the plurality of competing stories and story-tellers implicitly made the collective(s) that process these narratives all the more crucial: contested narratives cannot simply be 'passively' reproduced but always constitute 'active' *enrolment* and *mobilisation* mechanics that interfere with and engender processes of collectivisation. The emergent court society thus appeared as a bounded social network structured by and consisting of storytelling, as a locus of identity production that stabilised individual agency

and resolved perceived contingency by being cast as operating always in terms of a collectivised, distributed individual who provides its components with a sense of place. Regarding the abstract network structure of this collectivised individual, it was finally tentatively posited that this narrative of control fundamentally responds to the pressure of contingency by a strategy of cascading deferment, which constructs a transcendental centre, tied to various value-bearing cultural systems, for which the collectivised self acts merely as an obligatory passage point, so as a mediator. This configuration of a pseudo-‘centralised’ network, it was argued, harnesses the obfuscation effect inherent in complex network structures, tying meaning to the collectivised OPP and the semi-translated transcendental elements, rather than to the components, which results in systemic control for the individuals within the system.

Chapter 5 attempted to add a new layer to the extensive body of work on the interrelations between city and court by taking the negative, even libellous discourse in evidence in the scattered literary sources seriously in its capacity to generate societal control over contingency. Read with Yuri M. Lotman’s theoretical observations on the intermediaries that negotiate between systems of meaning – such as those reconstructed in Chapters 3 and 4 – this evidence revealed traces of a discourse of narrative transformation of royal *philoï* into monstrous figures on the verges of society. This transformation hinged on their interest in money, their association with other marginal and contested figures, such as monsters and *hetairai*, their violence, and their physical deformity, all of which is in stark opposition to their construction both within the ideal court imaginary and within the laudatory epigraphic record. Lotman’s argument that discourses of marginalisation aid in the transfer of innovation served to emphasise that this kind of narrative double-think is in fact societally productive because it enhances the intermediary character of the individuals it is attached to. By making available a multiplicity of stories, both positive and negative, new meaning is provided to the networks of social interaction under stress. This new meaning, which consists in a paradoxical doubling of normative discourses of near-identity (honour) and familiar difference (monstrosity) provides reliable identities for such challenging intermediary figures, and thus serves to reduce the societal contingency caused by the interpenetration of incompatible societal constructs they embody. Rather than being simply irrelevant slander or later fantasies that the historian must cut away, these anecdotal texts therefore emerged as a vital part of a multi-layered web of attempts at controlling the perceived contingency of the Diadoch period, an experience that was produced in part by the interaction with actors that possessed unprecedented agency, agency that was exercised, as always, in ways that seemed both good and bad, and therefore incalculable.

In the final case-study conducted in Chapter 6, the theoretical perspective was applied to the Classical and early Hellenistic history of Rhodes in general and the erection of the Colossus of Rhodes in particular. The aim of this study was to approximate the negotiations of identity that underpinned Rhodian collective agency in the early Hellenistic period, which in turn informed its ability to weather the macro-political contingencies of the time and produce its cohesion as a collective. The self-confident agency displayed by the Rhodians in the Diadoch period was portrayed as emerging from a long process of consolidation, especially within the elite, which was crucial in allowing for collective action capable of resisting internal disintegration and take-overs by external actors. This process was correlated with two major factors, the substantial shifts in the macro-political configurations of the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the Classical period, and the extensive discursive and reified network of mytho-historical ties that informed Rhodian specificity in discourse. Alexander's campaign was identified as the crucial element that allowed for the unification of the Rhodian domestic network and resulted in the self-confident inter-collective agency the polity exhibited in the late fourth and early third century BC.

This agency faced the task of having to negotiate between two semiospheres, maintaining connectivity while marking out distinctiveness to maintain itself, so in other words, by maintaining a connective discursive boundary. The existence of multiple, expansive networks that laid claim to very similar categories of identity, but were organised around very different narratives and societal conceptualisations of contingency and control, produced a subtle strategy of balance between differentiation and inclusion. I argued that this negotiation can be described as a policy of balance already in this early phase of Rhodes' Hellenistic history on the grounds that in essence, neutrality amounts to a reactive policy in a mesh of other interactions, a policy that aims to maintain balance within this mesh. Such a configuration was identified in the events leading up to the siege of Rhodes. The result of this policy was the maintenance and reproduction of self-confident Rhodian collective agency that rested on collective action being conducted in equal measure and on the same codes vis-à-vis all other players on the macro-political stage.

From this perspective, the siege of Rhodes accordingly appeared as a consequence and failure of this interactive strategy based on a short-term change in macro-political configuration. The successes of the Rhodian collective during the siege further demonstrated the deep impact of the consolidating actions undertaken to control the contingency of the situation. While the immediate consequences of the contractual settlement after the conflict's conclusion are obscured by the lack of sources – and possibly intentionally so – the later memorialisation

of the event shows that it was employed to continuously reproduce the agency, self-confidence, and discursive density of the Rhodian polity.

The very existence of the Colossus of Rhodes already exemplifies this and a case study of this monument as a non-human actor engaging with early Hellenistic power narratives accordingly rounded out the chapter. On my reading, the Colossus emerged as a perpetuated and reproductive actor that aided in reconsolidating the Rhodian collective after the experiences of the siege, controlling the acutely felt complexity of the world by drawing on old and new discourses, and adapting them into a whole that was tailored specifically to the time. The statue's widely visible monumental materiality, the product of a subtle, but clever narrative of translation that retroactively re-configured Antigonid attempts at *enrolment* and strengthened Rhodian agency, was further specified by an epigram that walked a now familiar line between connectivity and distinction. Its narrative referenced and subtly enrolled various discursive nodes of early Hellenistic politics, such as freedom and Heraklid heritage, to provide meaning to Rhodian collective self-fashioning. The resulting compound actor emerged as interacting especially with the collective and its agency, of which it was not only a direct result and expression, but which it also constantly reproduced by associating the narratives woven around the colossal bronze statue. This narrative of collective Rhodian agency exercising control subtly and elegantly took advantage of the complexity of this wide narrative web, maintaining productive ambiguity while also generating and reproducing collective meaning. The physically manifest elements of the object actor, it was argued, anchor this ambiguous narrative and thereby reduce contingency of meaning, providing a more controllable and perpetuated agency by embedding it in a specific translation of gifting and dedication codes. The Colossus thus provides an excellent example of the difficulties and opportunities that characterised inter-collective narrative control of contingency in the Diadoch period.

What then, is the essence of this book? While answers to that question will obviously differ, let me briefly offer my own view. Methodologically speaking, this study has attempted to bring contingency and control into focus as relevant aspects of socio-political and cultural history, especially for periods of heavy macro-political change. Understanding texts and objects, especially contemporary ones, as narrative actors in a socio-political network of shifting selves that is structured by a plurality of world imaginaries opens up opportunities for fresh engagement with texts that have been repeatedly squeezed for most of the 'factual' information they can yield. It therefore responds to a key problem of Ancient History, the largely static corpus of good-quality narrative sources, and has further attempted to add heuristic value to network methodology outside big data

approaches by applying network theory at the level of discourse to assess and compare imaginary societies.

The studies conducted attempt to trace struggles for control in a highly connective and mobile socio-political world by looking at the contested creations of boundaries and multiplicities of discourse that come together to infuse networks and spaces of interaction with meaning that responds to the contingencies of the period. The individual chapters revealed a variety of such responses in texts that address contingency by showing ‘solutions’ implicitly rather than proscriptively telling their readers what to think. We observed the subtly updated creation of apparently stable, traditional ‘islands’ of narrative control. We saw how texts tried to limit the connectivity of social codes, occluded experiences of contingency by focusing on smaller, solvable problems, and harkened back to traditional narratives of societal order. And of course we also encountered openly conflicting, aggressive discourse, as well as some heavily bounded, tentative attempts at hybridisation. It is obvious that none of these responses could ever afford true control, and the fascinating beauty of the early Hellenistic political discourse of course lies precisely in the historical visibility of this lack of such a clear-cut narrative that has succeeded in absorbing all others. It has further emerged from this survey that these responses were all in some way woven from the fabric of the past, the strands of which were here treated in terms of systems of social organisation. Applied to new situations and new actors, these clearly had to be re-defended with new vigour or subtly adapted and extended. As such, the early Hellenistic period is indeed a period not of control, but of accommodation of both the new and the old.¹

More specifically, the interest in this book has thus been in evaluating how these responses accommodated the contingent, early Hellenistic experience of overwhelming individual agency at a variety of levels of societal organisation. I have here considered how this accommodation occurs through elite narrative responses, though it is of course in reality produced by the web of discourse as a whole. I would maintain, however, that elite narrative is particularly impactful. In sum, the close study of the subtleties of these narratives has revealed that the multiplicity of semantically incompatible social imaginaries that exist side by side, but are entangled with one another through story-telling, politics, and even down to their normative building blocks, fundamentally operates as a *productive paradox* that ultimately aided in the control of the period’s complexity at the societal level. I am convinced that this fact contributed to the societal stabilisation of what was to become the Hellenistic world.

¹ Cf. Bhabha 1994, 18.

The method used here has therefore provided a means of disentangling at least one aspect of the mess of interactions observed by Alfred Heuss by demonstrating how each of these imaginaries of society was productive both in its own way and, to an extent, in conjunction with others. The key point is that the multiplicity itself and the play with the building blocks of social action that takes place within these narratives was crucial in maintaining societal cohesion and providing agency in the period of the Diadochi, as it afforded the acting collectives the codes needed to respond to the pressures of the time. Within this narrative play, the individual is given greater space than before, but at the same time its individualist tendencies are narratively curbed in various, partly innovative ways: over the course of this book, we have seen them subjected to collectivist scrutiny, expanded to societal scale, tempered with social systems, shrouded in ambiguity and usurped by a collective, and even doubled and demonised. This remarkable discursive flexibility in formulating strategies of engagement with individual agency and its media, is key to understanding this period as a constructive period from which the specific landscape of power that was the Hellenistic kingdoms was able to emerge. Making use of theory helps us approach processes such as these, processes that characterise human existence through time in ever new permutations and configurations, and also helps build a bridge between Antiquity and the present. I hope here to have added at least a couple of bricks to such a bridge.

Glossary of terms

Action/Actor

In this thesis, actors are understood as sets of \rightarrow identities, i.e. interaction expectations. As such, they only become 'actors' when they act. Since action is here considered primarily in the context of power, 'acting' means changing others' outlook on the world to some degree, large or small. This means that action produces changes in the relation \rightarrow configuration of entities to one another, meaning that it influences \rightarrow identity. These changes are generally reactions to other changes in such configurations. As a result, all action can also be viewed as *re*-action, in an infinitely complex web of give and take that can be conceptualised and studied as a network.

As a result, all actors are theoretically understood as \rightarrow nodes in a \rightarrow network. All acting entities, which may be people, organisations, armies, animals, texts, objects (stones, ceramics), earthquakes, floods etc. – are thus fundamentally identical and, *in this respect*, conceptually undifferentiated. However, only people are subject to \rightarrow double contingency, which makes them different.

Code

In system theory, social codes are simple binary oppositions used to evaluate interaction. They constitute the most fundamental \rightarrow collectivised \rightarrow identities, which are difficult to \rightarrow translate and thus are often played with in \rightarrow stories rather than altered fundamentally. Examples of codes include that of love, of economics, of religion, and of truth. They operate in terms of binary dichotomies whose simplicity helps actors control situations. In the case of the examples listed, these binaries are love – hate, payment – no payment, belief – no belief, and true – false.

Collectivisation

\rightarrow Control over the experienced or threatened insecurity of the world consists in the generation of expectations for future interaction, but not merely on an individual level. Existing projects of control can also be abstracted and communicated in \rightarrow stories and therefore affect groups of individuals. The result is a collectivisation of acquired \rightarrow identities, transported by stories and norm, so in language. As such, collectivisation is crucial for society, as it prevents the use of social \rightarrow codes in a purely egotistical way. However, an individual can also become collectivised through its \rightarrow distribution of \rightarrow self.

Contingency

This concept refers to two things. The first is a fundamental dynamic that theoretically results in the creation of society (\rightarrow Double Contingency). Contingency

is defined as what is left over when necessary action and impossible action are excluded; it denotes all theoretically possible choices that are then open to an \rightarrow actor. The second form is 'perceived' contingency, also known as complexity. This is the conscious or subconscious awareness that things are complicated, which triggers attempts at control.

Control

The basic assumption of this thesis is that actors strive for control over the insecurity of world experience (\rightarrow contingency). Every social situation is therefore fundamentally competitive. Control is acquired through action, which aims to create 'safer' situations: Action generates \rightarrow social footing, which describes a generally short-lived sensation of control over a situation.

Control regime

If individuals strive for \rightarrow control, collectives strive for meta-control, i.e. control of the individual attempts at control. Control regimes are sets of \rightarrow stories that provide societal meta-control, which can be abstracted into \rightarrow codes.

Distribution

Distribution describes two related things in this study. The distributed \rightarrow self that is the result of \rightarrow translation, and the \rightarrow collectivisation effected by \rightarrow story. It is not to be confused with the distribution of connections across the nodes of a network (see \rightarrow normal distribution, \rightarrow scale-free network).

Double contingency

Before society, the experience of two human participants in interaction would be infinitely open: the potential choices or selections that can be made are infinite, but none are necessary. In this theoretical case, the situation is thus equally contingent, i.e. uncertain and incalculable, for all participants in this situation. This makes contingency double, meaning that the participants are both uncertain, since there is no common ground on which to base interaction. This purely hypothetical situation is resolved by the participants gradually and cautiously making contact, which generates expectations for the future and establishes orders that guide the selection of alternatives in situations of interaction.

Footing

This term describes a state of security in a situation. An \rightarrow actor achieves footing by feeling that the situation is in line with their expectations.

Hub

This term describes a particularly well-connected node in a network. It is characterised by the fact that it possesses significantly more connections than the ones it is connected to. Hubs are powerful redistributors and characteristic of centralised networks.

Identity

Identity describes an individual expectation for future interaction, which is the result of experience of \rightarrow contingency and its resolution, or of \rightarrow story. This expectation is an actor's *identity* in a specific interaction with specific others. The term does not denote an individual's more or less reflected awareness of alignment to a group – i.e. its identity with other members of said group. It follows that the concept of identity employed here is not only plural, i.e. individuals have innumerable such expectations, but are also relational and situational. This means that they are always expressed in interaction with others and never exist outside of it, and that they are tied to the situations they occur in.

The construction of the world order, which effectively reduces \rightarrow contingency, happens by switching from one social situation to the other. This process of transferring expectations into new situations creates an awareness of the experiences being remembered, establishing them as modes of interaction, which can be further reproduced in interaction with other actors. New interactions establish new links between these identities, generating changing configurations. In visual terms, this results in a constantly shifting hierarchical mesh inside the actor that can be conceived as a network of identities that lends meaning to the world.

Identities therefore reduce perceived \rightarrow contingency and configure agency.

Individualisation

This dynamic is the inverse of \rightarrow collectivisation. It describes the rejection of \rightarrow translation in favour of other \rightarrow identities, the configuration of which is determined by the \rightarrow self.

Mediation

A mediator extends interaction by transferring information or items from one node to another without affecting this transfer in a fashion that equates to a translation.

Narrative

\rightarrow Story

Network

A network is a set of elements that can be distinguished from the relationships between these elements. As such, the formulation of a network is a matter of perspective. It is the product of a conscious analytical process, a specific way of selecting material and interpreting it.

Networks can be described in structural terms as centralised, decentralised and distributed. Centralised networks are characterised by the existence of →hubs, nodes that are significantly better connected than the others (→Scale-free networks). Accordingly they show a hierarchy of connectivity in that hubs are far more connective than the other nodes. Decentralised networks possess many such hubs that are similarly well-connected. Distributed networks show an even spread of connections across the nodes available (→Normal distribution).

Power networks are narrative configurations that play with the boundaries between other social codes and thereby effect →translation at the level of →story.

Node

In visual terms, the entities of a network are called nodes. Their dot-like existence is merely a heuristic aid, as all nodes can theoretically be analysed as networks that construct their existence.

Normal distribution

For the purposes of this study, a normal distribution is treated as the distribution described by a bell curve. This kind of distribution is shown by a distributed network. Such a →network consists of a broad mass of equally well-connected nodes with no outliers.

OPP (obligatory passage-point)

→Translation

Power

Power is here understood as affecting the agency of others, i.e. changing how they can act. On a societal level, power therefore lies in structures of subliminal order, in →collectivised configurations of →identities. →Stories that define how the world works result in →translation by narratively defining contingency and thereby imposing semantic order and control that is attached to a specific network configuration.

Power-law distribution

The number of links possessed by →nodes in a network can be quantified. Graphing the resulting table of data produces a graph of the distribution of links

across nodes. If the distribution approximates the graph produced by an exponential function, such as $f(x) = 2^x$, the distribution follows a power-law. This is common in centralised networks and characteristic of \rightarrow scale-free networks.

Preferential attachment

It has been empirically observed that in a \rightarrow scale-free network new nodes prefer to attach themselves to the best-connected nodes already in the network. Nodes with more links are thus more attractive and connective than nodes with fewer. This dynamic reinforces the scale-free structure, as it produces networks that consist of a small number of nodes with many links and a much larger number of less well connected nodes.

Relational identity

\rightarrow Identity

Scale-free network

In quantifying network analysis, many real-world networks tend towards centralisation. In visual terms this means that the \rightarrow distribution of the number of links between the nodes of a network does not graph as a bell curve, but like an exponential function (\rightarrow power-law distribution). Networks that show such a distribution are termed scale-free, as their distribution does not vary with absolute size: the structural pattern remains consistent, irrespective of whether the network has 20 nodes or 10.000. When paired with a growth dynamic, so a tendency of the network to connect to establish new connections, scale-free networks generally exhibit the dynamic of \rightarrow preferential attachment.

Self

The self is here understood as a product of \rightarrow translation. Any individual \rightarrow actor is not understood as a deep, highly personal individual in the modern psychological sense, but as situational, composite mesh. In psychology, this conception is also known as the distributed self. This means that an individual does not simply consist of its body and consciousness but changes what it contains depending on the situation. This is most easily exemplified by pointing to the different attitudes one can exhibit towards one's possessions. Reactions will differ widely depending on whether the person taking them away is a thief, a friend, a mother, the police, etc. The self is therefore understood as a thread that ties objects, people, the body, consciousness, etc. together, but is constantly changing its shape.

Story

Fundamentally, a story is an act of communication that imparts a construction of the world (\rightarrow identity). It consists in a simplified version of the world that can be shared and thereby aids in \rightarrow collectivisation. Stories develop abstract, ideal network configurations and norms, but in their multiplicity simultaneously allow for choice. A story is therefore any act of communication that makes statements about the world and is communicated further.

Translation

\rightarrow Actors (cf. \rightarrow self) are here understood as being situationally created as compounds that allow for the creation of \rightarrow control that exceeds an individual's capacities. To create such compounds, hypothetical, neutral configurations of networks of individuals have to be modified. This process is here called translation. A translation changes or re-interprets the \rightarrow identities of the entities it involves and results in the creation of an \rightarrow obligatory passage-point (OPP) for a specific set of interactions. An obligatory passage point is the cognitive equivalent of the central node of a centralised network. In this capacity, it acts as a central point of reference and an instance of control capable of defining the significance of the world within this network.

A translation consists of four functional steps. The process begins with a *problématisation*, the identification of a problem or aim, as well as the actors related to the problem or aim. The second step of *intéressement* consists in the interaction processes this actor pursues in practice in order to construct this network. *Enrolment* describes the process whereby the actor constructs and communicates a value order so as to achieve his goal of *mobilisation*. This final step consists in the actor's deployment of the agency of the entities enrolled in accordance with the value system he has constructed. If these steps are successful, the actor establishes himself as the controlling instance for a specific set of interactions in relation to the other entities.

List of abbreviations

AA	Archäologischer Anzeiger
ABSA	The Annual of the British School at Athens
AHB	Ancient History Bulletin
AJA	American Journal of Archaeology
AJPh	American Journal of Philology
AKG	Archiv für Kulturgeschichte
AncSoc	Ancient Society
ASAA	Annuario della scuola archeologica di Atene e delle Missioni italiane in Oriente
AncW	The Ancient World
BCH	Bulletin de correspondance hellénique
BICS	Bulletin. Institute of Classical Studies, University of London
CAH	Cambridge Ancient History
CahArch	Cahiers archéologiques
CB	Classical Bulletin
CJ	The Classical Journal
CPh	Classical Philology
CQ	Classical Quarterly
CRAI	Comptes rendus de l'académie des inscriptions et belles lettres
CW	The Classical Weekly
DNP	Der Neue Pauly
GRBS	Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies
G&R	Greece and Rome
HSCPh	Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
ICS	Illinois Classical Studies
JAG	Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum
JNG	Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte
JHS	Journal of Hellenic Studies
LIMC	Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae
MDAI(A)	Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts (Athenische Abteilung)
MHR	Mediterranean Historical Review
NüBIA	Nürnberger Blätter zur Archäologie
PCPhS	Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society
PMLA	Publications of the Modern Language Association of America
P&P	Past & Present
RE	Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft
REA	Revue des études anciennes

REG	Revue des études grecques
Rev. Phil.	Revue philologique
RhM	Rheinisches Museum
RN	Revue numismatique
TAPhA	Transactions of the American Philological Association
WHB	Wiener Humanistische Blätter
YCS	Yale Classical Studies
ZAVA	Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und Vorderasiatische Archäologie
ZAW	Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
ZPE	Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

Bibliography

Literary sources

Unless explicitly stated otherwise, Greek and Latin texts have been used in their standard Teubner editions. Additional editions, as well as collections of fragments and scholia, are given below.

- Anth. Pal. Dübner, Friedrich (ed.). *Epigrammatum Anthologia Palatina*. Paris 1871.
Stadtmüller, Hugo (ed.). *Anthologia Graeca*. Leipzig 1894.
Waltz, Pierre (ed.). *Anthologie Grecque*. Paris 1931.
Gow, Andrew F. and Page, Denys L. (eds.). *The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams*. 2 vols. Cambridge 1965.
Beckby, Hermann (ed.). *Anthologia Graeca* (Tusculum). Munich 1965².
- Aristotle Fragments Rose, Valentin (ed.). *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta*. Leipzig 1886.
- Chron. Pasch. Dindorf, Ludwig (ed.). *Chronicon Paschale* (=Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae 11-12). 2 vols. Bonn 1832.
- FGrH Jacoby, Felix et al. (eds.). *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Berlin 1923-.
Worthington, Ian et al. (eds.). *Brill's New Jacoby*. Brill Online 2016: <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/brill-s-new-jacoby>.
- Fortenbaugh et al. Fortenbaugh, William W., Huby, Pamela M., Sharples, Robert W., and Gutas, Dimitri. *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*. 2 vols. Leiden and New York 1992-1993.
- PCG Kassel, Rudolf and Austin, Colin (eds.). *Poetae Comici Graeci*. 8 vols. Berlin 1983-2001.
- Hyp. Whitehead, David. *Hyperides. The Forensic Speeches. Introduction, Translation and Commentary by David Whitehead*. Oxford 2000.
Herrman, Judson. *Hyperides. Funeral Oration. Edited, translated and commented*. Oxford 2009.
- Iustin John C. Yardley, Waldemar Heckel (eds.). *Justin. Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus. Volume I, Books 11-12: Alexander the Great*. Oxford 1997.
John C. Yardley, Pat Wheatley, and Waldemar Heckel (eds.). *Justin. Epitome of the Philippic history of Pompeius Trogus. Volume II, Books 13-15: The Successors to Alexander the Great*. Oxford 2011.

- Klearchos *Erotica* Wehrli, Fritz. *Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentar. Heft III: Klearchos*. Basel 1948.
- Ktes. Stronk, Jan P. (ed.). *Ctesias' Persian History. Part I Introduction, Text, and Translation*. Düsseldorf 2010.
- Philodemos
Περὶ κακιῶν
Jensen, Christian (ed.). *Philodemi Περὶ κακιῶν liber decimus*. Leipzig 1911.
- Pindar Scholia Drachmann, Anders B. (ed.). *Scholias vetera in Pindari carmina*. Leipzig 1903.
- Plat. Scholia Greene, William C. (ed.). *Scholias Platonica*. Harvard 1938.
- Suda Whitehead, David et al. (eds.). *Suda Online*. Stoa Consortium Online: <http://www.stoa.org/sol/>.
- Teles Hense, Otto. *Teletis reliquiae*, 2nd ed. Tübingen 1909 (repr. Hildesheim 1969).
- Theophr. *Char.* Diggle, James (ed.). *Theophrastus, Characters, edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (=Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 43). Cambridge 2004.
- Bechert, Malwin et al. (eds.). *Theophrasts Charaktere. Herausgegeben, erklärt und übersetzt von der Philologischen Gesellschaft zu Leipzig*. Leipzig 1897.
- Jebb, Sir Richard C. (ed.). *Theophrastus Characters*. Cambridge, MA 1909².
- Rusten, Jeffrey and Cunningham, Ian C. (eds.). *Theophrastus Characters, Herodas Mimes, Sophron and other mime fragments*. Cambridge, MA 2002².
- Xen. Marchant, Edgar C. (ed.). *Xenophontis Opera Omnia*. Vol. IV. Oxford 1910.

Papyri

- P.Berol. Schubart, Wilhelm (ed.). *Papyri Graecae Berlinenses*. Bonn 1911.
- P.Col. Gronewald, Michael et al. (eds.). *Kölner Papyri*. vol. 6. Opladen 1987.
- P.Mil. Austin, Colin and Bastianini, Guido (eds.). *Posidippi Pellaei quae supersunt omnia ediderunt*. Milan 2002.
- P.Oxy. Grenfell, Bernard P. and Hunt, Arthur S. (eds.). *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*. vol. 6. London 1908.

Defixiones

- DTA Wünsch, Richard. *Defixionum Tabellae Atticae* (=Inscriptiones Graecae. Inscriptiones Atticae Aetatis Romanae 3.3). Berlin 1897.

- SGD Jordan, David R. "A Survey of Greek Defixiones Not Included in the Special Corpora", in: *GRBS* 26:2 (1985), 151-197.

Inscriptions

- Agora XVI Woodhead, A. Geoffrey (ed.). *Inscriptions. The Decrees.* (=The Athenian Agora 16). Princeton 1997.
- CID Rougement, Georges, Bousquet, Jean, Bélis, Annie, and Lefèvre, François (eds.). *Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes.* 4 vols. With contributions by Didier Laroche and Olivier Masson. Paris 1977-2002.
- Clara Rhodos *Clara Rhodos. Studi e materiali pubblicati a cura dell' Istituto storico-archeologico di Rodi.* 10 vols. Rhodes 1928-1941.
- FD III, 4 *Fouilles de Delphes, III. Épigraphie.* Fasc. 4, *Inscriptions de la terrasse du temple et la région nord du sanctuaire.* 4 vols. Paris 1930-1976. Vol. 1, ed. Gaston Colin (1930); vol. 2, ed. Robert Flacelière (1954); vol. 3, ed. André Plassart (1970); vol. 4, ed. Jean Pouilloux (1976).
- IC III Guarducci, Margherita (ed.). *Inscriptiones Creticae.* 4 vols. Rome 1935-1950.
- IG II² Kirchner, Johannes (ed.). *Inscriptiones Graecae II et III: Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno posteriores.* 2nd Edition. Parts I-III. Berlin 1913-1940.
- IG VII Dittenberger, Wilhelm (ed.). *Inscriptiones Graecae VII. Inscriptiones Megaridis, Oropiae, Boeotiae.* Berlin 1892.
- IG XI,2 Durrbach, Félix (ed.). *Inscriptiones Graecae XI. Inscriptiones Deli.* Fasc. 2. Berlin 1912.
- IG XI,4 Roussel, Pierre (ed.). *Inscriptiones Graecae XI. Inscriptiones Deli.* Fasc. 4. Berlin 1914.
- IG XII 4, 1 Hallof, Klaus (ed.). *Inscriptiones Coi, Calymnae, insularum Milesiarum.* Vol I: *Inscriptionum Coi insulae: Decreta, epistulae, edicta, tituli sacri.* Ed. by Dimitris Bosnakis, Klaus Hallof, and Kent Rigsby. Berlin 2010.
- IG XII,5 Hiller von Gaertringen, Friedrich (ed.). *Inscriptiones Graecae XII,5. Inscriptiones Cycladum.* 2 vols. Berlin 1903-1909.
- I.Ephesos Wankel, Hermann et al. (eds.). *Die Inschriften von Ephesos.* 8 vols (=Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 11,1-17,4). Bonn 1979-1984.
- I.Iasos Blümel, Wolfgang (ed.). *Die Inschriften von Iasos.* Mit einem Anhang von W. Weiser: Zur Münzprägung von Iasos und Bargylia. 2 vols (=Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 28). Bonn 1985.
- I.Ilion Frisch, Peter (ed.). *Die Inschriften von Ilion* (=Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 3). Bonn 1975.
- I.Kaunos Marek, Christian (ed.). *Die Inschriften von Kaunos* (=Vestigia 55). Munich 2006.
- I.Lampsakos Frisch, Peter (ed.). *Die Inschriften von Lampsakos* (=Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 6). Bonn 1978.

- I.Magnesia Kern, Otto (ed.). *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander*. Berlin 1900.
- I.Milet Kawerau, Georg and Rehm, Albert (eds.). *Das Delphinion in Milet (=Milet I 3)*. Berlin 1967².
- I.Priene Hiller von Gaertringen, Friedrich (ed.). *Inschriften von Priene*. Berlin 1906.
- IosPE I² Latyshev, Vasilii (ed.). *Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini graecae et latinae*. 3 vols. St. Petersburg 1885-1901. Vol. 1, 2nd edition: *Inscriptiones Tyriae, Olbiae, Chersonesi Tauricae*. St. Petersburg 1916.
- IvO Dittenberger, Wilhelm and Purgold, Karl (eds.). *Die Inschriften von Olympia (=Olympia 5)*. Berlin 1896.
- Lindos II Blinkenberg, Christian (ed.). *Lindos. Fouilles et recherches, 1902-1914. Vol. II: Inscriptions*. 2 vols. Copenhagen and Berlin 1941.
- Moretti, ISE Moretti, Luigi. *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche. Testo critico, traduzione e commento*. 3 vols. Florence 1967-2001.
- OGIS Dittenberger, Wilhelm. *Orientalis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae*. 2 vols. Leipzig 1903-1905.
- Schmitt Schmitt, Rüdiger (ed.). *Die altpersischen Inschriften der Achaimeniden. Editio minor mit deutscher Übersetzung*. Wiesbaden 2009.
- SEG *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*. Leiden and Amsterdam 1923-.
- Syll.³ Dittenberger, Wilhelm (ed.). *Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum*. 3rd Edition by Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen, Johannes Kirchner, Hans Rudolf Pomtow and Erich Ziebarth. 4 vols. Leipzig 1915-1924.
- Tit. Cam. Segre, Mario, and Pugliese Carratelli, Giovanni. "Tituli Camirenses", in: *ASAA* 27-29 (1949-1951), 141-318.

Secondary literature

- Abramenko, Andriik. "Der Fremde auf dem Thron. Die letzte Verschwörung gegen Alexander d. Gr.," in: *Klio* 82 (2000), 361-378.
- Adams, Winthrop L. "The Royal Macedonian Tomb at Vergina: An Historical Interpretation", in: *AncW* 3 (1980), 67-72.
- Adams, Winthrop L. "Cassander, Alexander IV and the Tombs at Vergina", in: *AncW* 22 (1991), 27-33.
- Ager, Sheila L. "Rhodes: The Rise and Fall of a Neutral Diplomat", in: *Historia* 40:1 (1991), 10-41.
- Ager, Sheila L. *Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World, 337-90 B.C.* (=Hellenistic Society and Culture 18). Berkeley and London 1996.
- Alexander, Michael C. and Danowski, James A. "Analysis of an Ancient Network: Personal Communication and the Study of Social Structure in a Past Society", in: *Social Networks* 12 (1990), 313-335.
- Alcock, Susan. "The Heroic Past in a Hellenistic Present", in: Cartledge, Garnsey, and Gruen (eds.) 1997, 20-34.
- Alonso Troncoso, Víctor. "Some Remarks on the Funerals of the Kings: From Philip II to the Diadochi", in: Waldemar Heckel and Robert Hannah (eds.). *Alexander & His Successors: Essays from the Antipodes*. Claremont, CA 2009, 276-298.
- Alonso Troncoso, Víctor and Anson, Edward M. (eds.). *After Alexander: The Time of the Diadochi (323-281 BC)*. Oxford 2013.
- Anderson, John K. *Hunting in the Ancient World*. Berkeley 1985.
- Anson, Edward M. "Discrimination and Eumenes of Cardia", in: *AncW* 3 (1980), 55-59.
- Anson, Edward M. *Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek among Macedonians*. Leiden 2004.
- Anson, Edward M. "Discrimination and Eumenes of Kardia Revisited", in: Hauben and Meeus (eds.) 2014, 539-558.
- Anter, Andreas. *Theorien der Macht zur Einführung*. Hamburg 2012.
- Aperghis, Makis. "Population – Production – Taxation – Coinage: A Model for the Seleukid Economy", in: Archibald et al. (eds.) 2001, 69-102.
- Aperghis, Makis. *The Seleukid Royal Economy. The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire*. Cambridge 2004.
- Arata, Luigi. "Cleone e Lamia: un passo di Aristofane mal interpretato", in: *Maia* 63:1 (2011), 43-49.
- Archibald, Zofia H., Davies, John K., Gabrielsen, Vincent, and Oliver, Graham J. (eds.). *Hellenistic Economies*. London 2001.
- Arendt, Hannah. *Macht und Gewalt*. Munich 1987.
- Ash, Rhiannon. "The Wonderful World of Mucianus", in: *BICS* 50:S100 (2007), 1-17.
- Ashton, Richard H. J. "Rhodian Coinage and the Colossus", in: *RN* 6:30 (1988), 75-90.
- Asper, Markus. "Group Laughter and Comic Affirmation: Aristophanes' Birds and the Political Function of Old Comedy", in: *Hyperboreus* 11 (2005), 5-29.

- Assmann, Jan. *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*. Munich 1992.
- Austin, John L. *How to Do Things With Words. The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955*. Oxford 1980.
- Austin, Michel M. "Hellenistic Kings, War and the Economy", in: *CQ* 36 (1986), 450-466.
- Azoulay, Vincent. "The Medo-Persian Ceremonial: Xenophon, Cyrus and the King's Body", in: Christopher Tuplin (ed.). *Xenophon and His World: Papers from a Conference held in Liverpool 1999*. Stuttgart 2004, 147-174 (=Azoulay 2004a).
- Azoulay, Vincent. *Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir: de la "charis" au charisme*. Paris 2004. (=Azoulay 2004b).
- Badian, Ernst. "The First Flight of Harpalus", in: *Historia* 9 (1960), 245-246.
- Badian, Ernst. "Harpalus", in: *JHS* 81 (1961), 16-43.
- Badian, Ernst. "Xenophon the Athenian", in: Christopher Tuplin (ed.). *Xenophon and His World: Papers from a Conference held in Liverpool 1999*. Stuttgart 2004, 33-54.
- Baines, John and Yoffee, Norman. "Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth in Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia", in: Gary Feinman and Joyce Marcus (eds.). *Archaic States*. Santa Fe 1998, 199-260.
- Baker, Patrick. "Warfare", in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 373-388.
- Bakhtin, Michail M. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Austin 1986.
- Balsdon, J.P.V. Dacre. "The 'Divinity' of Alexander", in: *Historia* 1 (1950), 363-388.
- Baltrusch, Ernst. *Außenpolitik, Bünde und Reichsbildung in der Antike*. Munich 2008.
- Barabási, Albert-László. *Linked. The New Science of Networks*. Cambridge, MA 2002.
- Barabási, Albert-László and Bonabeau, Eric. "Skalenfreie Netze", in: *Spektrum der Wissenschaft* (July 2004), 62-69.
- Barabási, Albert-László and Oltvai, Zoltan. "Network Biology: Understanding the Cell's Functional Organization", in: *Nature Reviews Genetics* 5 (2004), 101-113.
- Barabási, Albert-László and Albert, Réka. "Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks", in: *Science* 286 (1999), 509-512.
- Baran, Paul. *On distributed communications: Introduction to distributed communications networks*. 1964, 1f., https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM3420.pdf (Accessed 21.09.2017).
- Barnard, Chester I. *The Functions of the Executive*. Cambridge, MA 1953.
- Barthes, Roland. *S/Z*. Translated by Jürgen Hoch. Frankfurt a.M. 1994².
- Bauslaugh, Robert A. *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece*. Berkeley 1991.
- Bayliss, Andrew J. "A Decree Honouring Medeios of Larissa", in: *ZPE* 140 (2002), 89-92.
- Bayliss, Andrew J. "Curse-tablets as Evidence: Identifying the Elusive «Peiraikoi soldiers»", in: *ZPE* 144 (2003), 125-140.
- Bayliss, Andrew J. *After Demosthenes: The politics of early Hellenistic Athens*. London 2011.
- Baynham, Elizabeth. "Alexander's Argyraspids: Tough Old Fighters or Antigonid Myth?", in: Anson and Alonso Troncoso (eds.) 2013, 110-120.
- Becker, Gary S. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago 1976.

- Behrwald, Ralf. S.v. “Olympichos”, in: *DNP* 8 (2000), 1186.
- Belliger, Andréa and Krieger, David J. (eds.). *ANThology. Ein einführendes Handbuch zur Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie*. Bielefeld 2006.
- Bengtson, Hermann. *Herrschergestalten des Hellenismus*. Munich 1975.
- Benndorf, Otto. “Bemerkungen zur griechischen Kunstgeschichte”, in: *MDAI(A)* 1 (1876), 45-66.
- Bergemann, Johannes. *Demos und Thanatos. Untersuchungen zum Wertsystem der Polis im Spiegel der attischen Grabreliefs des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. und zur Funktion der gleichzeitigen Grabbauten*. Munich 1997.
- Berthelot, Hugues. “La «stèle des céréales» de Cyrène”, in: *Camenuiae* 8 (2012), n. p. <http://www.paris-sorbonne.fr/IMG/pdf/BerthelotBAT.pdf> (Accessed 21.09.2017).
- Berthiaume, Guy. *Les rôles du μάγειρος. Étude sur la boucherie, la cuisine et le sacrifice dans la Grèce ancienne*. Leiden 1982.
- Berthold, Richard M. “A Historical Fiction in Vitruvius”, in: *CPh* 73:2 (1978), 129-134.
- Berthold, Richard M. “Fourth Century Rhodes”, in: *Historia* 29:1 (1980), 32-49.
- Berthold, Richard M. *Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age*. Ithaca and London 1984.
- Berve, Helmut. *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*. 2 vols. Munich 1926.
- Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture*. London 1994.
- Bikerman, Elias. *Institutions des Séleucides*. Paris 1938.
- Bikerman, Elias. “La cité grecque dans les monarchies hellénistiques”, in: *Rev. Phil.* 13 (1939), 335-349.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil, Hirshleifer, David, and Welch, Ivo. “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades”, in: *Journal of Political Economy* 100:5 (1992), 992-1026.
- Billows, Richard A. *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*. Berkeley 1990.
- Billows, Richard A. *Kings and Colonists. Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism*. Leiden 1995.
- Billows, Richard A. “Cities”, in: Erskine 2003 (ed.), 196-215.
- Bing, Peter. “Posidippus and the Admiral: Kallikrates of Samos in the Milan Epigrams”, in: *GRBS* 2002:3, 243-266.
- Blackman, David J. “The Rhodian Fleet and the Karian Coast”, in: Riet van Bremen and Jan-Mathieu Carbon (eds.). *Hellenistic Karia*, Paris 2010, 379-392.
- Blackwell, Christopher W. *In the Absence of Alexander: Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority*. New York 1999.
- Bleicken, Jochen. *Die athenische Demokratie*. Paderborn 1995⁴.
- Blok, Josine H. “Women in Herodotus’ Histories”, in: Egbert J. Bakker, Irene J. F. de Jong, and Hans van Wees (eds.). *Brill’s Companion to Herodotus*. Leiden 2002, 225-242.
- Blok, Josine. “Recht und Ritus in der Polis. Zu Bürgerstatus und Geschlechterverhältnissen im klassischen Athen”, in: *HZ* 278:1 (2004), 1-26.
- Boiy, Tom. “Royal Titulature in Hellenistic Babylonia”, in: *ZAV* 92 (2002), 241-257.

- Boiy, Tom. *Late Achaemenid and Hellenistic Babylon*. Leuven 2004.
- Boiy, Tom. *Between High and Low: A Chronology of the Early Hellenistic Period*. Frankfurt a.M. 2007.
- Boiy, Tom. “The Diadochi History in Cuneiform Documentation”, in: Anson and Alonso Troncoso (eds.) 2013, 7-16.
- Borg, Barbara E. (ed.). *Paideia: the World of the Second Sophistic*. Berlin 2004.
- Bosworth, A. Brian. “History and Artifice in Plutarch’s Eumenes”, in: Philipp A. Stadter (ed.). *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition*. London and New York 1992, 56-89.
- Bosworth, A. Brian. *The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*. Oxford 2002.
- Bosworth, A. Brian. “Johann Gustav Droysen, Alexander the Great and the Creation of the Hellenistic Age”, in: Pat Wheatley and Robert Hannah (eds.). *Alexander & His Successors: Essays from the Antipodes*. Claremont, CA 2009, 1-27.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge 1977 (Original: *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique*. Geneva 1972).
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft*. Frankfurt a.M. 1982 (Original: *La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement*. Paris 1979).
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford 1992 (Original: *Le sens pratique*. Paris 1980).
- Bousquet, Jean. “La stèle des Kyténiens à Xanthos de Lycie”, in: REG 101 (1988), 12-53.
- Bovenschen, Silvia. “Über die Listen der Mode”, in: eadem (ed.). *Listen der Mode*. Frankfurt a.M. 1986, 10-30.
- Breebaart, Abraham B. “From Victory to Peace: Some Aspects of Cyrus’ State in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia”, in: *Mnemosyne* 36 (1983), 117-134.
- Breitenbach, Hans R. S.v. “Xenophon [6]”, in: RE IX A,2 (1967), 1569-2052.
- Briant, Pierre. *Antigone le Borgne. Les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'assemblée macédonienne*. Paris 1973.
- Briant, Pierre. “Prélèvements tributaires et échanges en Asie Mineure achéménide et hellénistique”, in: Jean Andraeu, Pierre Briant, and Raymond Descat (eds.). *Économie antique. Les échanges dans l'antiquité: le rôle de l'État*. Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges 1994, 69-81.
- Briant, Pierre. *From Cyrus to Alexander. A History of the Persian Empire*. Winona Lake 2002 (Original: *Histoire de l'Empire Perse de Cyrus à Alexandre*. Paris 1996).
- Bringmann, Klaus. “The King as Benefactor: Some Remarks on Ideal Kingship in the Age of Hellenism”, in: Bulloch et al. (eds.) 1993, 7-24.
- Bringmann, Klaus. “Königliche Ökonomie im Spiegel des Euergetismus der Seleukiden”, in: *Klio* 87 (2005), 102-115.
- Bringmann, Klaus and Ameling, Walter (eds.). *Schenkungen hellenistischer Herrscher an griechische Städte und Heiligtümer*. 3 vols. Berlin 1995-2000.
- Brinker, Klaus, Cölfen, Hermann, and Pappert, Steffen. *Linguistische Textanalyse. Eine Einführung in Grundbegriffe und Methoden*. Berlin 2014⁸.

- Brodersen, Kai. "Der liebeskranke Königssohn und die seleukidische Herrschaftsauffassung", in: *Athenaeum* 63 (1985), 459-469.
- Brosius, Maria. *Women in Ancient Persia (559-331 BC)*. Oxford 1996.
- Brosius, Maria. "New out of Old? Court and Court Ceremonies in Achaemenid Persia", in: Anthony J.S. Spawforth (ed.). *The Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies*. Cambridge 2007, 17-57.
- Bruce, Iain A. F. "The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes", in: *CQ* 55:2 (1961), 166-170.
- Bruce, Iain A. F. *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'*. Cambridge 1967.
- Bruchmüller, Ulrike. "Das Verhältnis von Vernunft und Gewalt im Krieg: Thukydides' tragische Gestaltung seines Geschichtswerkes", in: *WfHB* 51 (2009), 5-26.
- Brun, Patrice. "La stèle des céréales de Cyrène et le commerce du grain en Égée au IVe s. av. J. C.", in: *ZPE* 99 (1993), 185-196.
- Brunt, Peter. "On Historical Fragments and Epitomes", in: *CQ* 30 (1980), 477-494.
- Bulloch, Anthony et al. (eds.). *Images and Ideologies. Self-definition in the Hellenistic World*. Berkeley 1993.
- Buraselis, Kostas. "Political Gods and Heroes or the Hierarchisation of Political Divinity in the Hellenistic World", in: Alberto Barzanò et al. (eds.). *Modelli eroici dall'antichità alla cultura europea*. Rome 2003, 185-197.
- Burckhardt, Leonhard. "Die attische Ephebie in hellenistischer Zeit", in: Kah and Scholz (eds.) 2004, 193-206.
- de Callatay, François. "Royal Hellenistic Coinages: From Alexander to Mithridates", in: William E. Metcalf (ed.). *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage*. Oxford 2012, 175-190.
- Callon, Michel. "Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay", in: John Law (ed.). *Power, Action, and Belief. A New Sociology of Knowledge?* (=Sociological Review Monograph 32). London and Boston 1986, 196-232.
- Callon, Michel. "Techno-economic Networks and Irreversibility", in: John Law (ed.). *A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination* (=Sociological Review Monograph 38). London and Boston 1991, 132-161.
- Callon, Michel and Latour, Bruno. "Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearly", in: Andrew Pickering (ed.). *Science as Practice and Culture*. Chicago 1992, 343-368.
- Cameron, Alan. *The Greek Anthology from Meleager to Planudes*. Oxford 1993.
- Campbell, Colin. "Conspicuous Confusion? A Critique of Veblen's Theory of Conspicuous Consumption", in: *Sociological Theory* 13:1 (1995), 37-47.
- Caneva, Stefano G. "Queens and Ruler Cults in Early Hellenism: Festivals, Administration, and Ideology", in: *Kernos* 25 (2012), 75-101.
- Cannadine, David. "Introduction", in: idem and Simon Price (eds.). *Rituals of Royalty*. Cambridge 1987, 1-19.

- Cargill, Jack. *The Second Athenian League. Empire or Free Alliance?* Berkeley 1981.
- Carlà, Filippo and Gori, Maja. "Introduction", in: idem (eds.) 2014, 7-47.
- Carlà, Filippo and Gori, Maja (eds.). *Gift Giving and the 'Embedded' Economy in the Ancient World* (=Akademiekonferenzen 17). Heidelberg 2014.
- Carlier, Pierre. "The Idea of Imperial Monarchy in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*", in: Gray (ed.) 2010 [1978], 327-366.
- Carlsson, Susanne. *Hellenistic Democracies. Freedom, Independence and Political Procedure in some East Greek City-States* (=Historia Einzelschriften 206). Stuttgart 2010.
- Carney, Elizabeth D. "The First Flight of Harpalus Again", in: *CJ* 77 (1982), 9-11.
- Carney, Elizabeth D. "Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander", in: *CP* 91:1 (1996), 19-44.
- Carney, Elizabeth D. *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia*. Norman, OK 2000.
- Carney, Elisabeth D. "The trouble with Philip Arrhidaeus", in: *AHB* 15 (2001), 63-89.
- Carney, Elizabeth D. "Putting Women in Their Place: Women in Public under Philip II and Alexander III and the Last Argeads", in: eadem and Daniel Ogden (eds.). *Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives*. Oxford 2010, 43-53.
- Carney, Elizabeth D. "Being Royal and Female in the Early Hellenistic Period", in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 195-220.
- Carney, Elizabeth D. *King and Court in Ancient Macedonia: Rivalry, Treason and Conspiracy*. Swansea 2015.
- Cartledge, Paul. "Xenophon's Women: A Touch of the Other", in: Harry D. Jocelyn and Helena Hurt (eds.). *Tria Lustra: Essays and notes presented to John Pinsent founder and editor of "Liverpool classical monthly" by some of its contributors on the occasion of the 150th issue*. Liverpool 1993, 5-14.
- Cartledge, Paul. "Introduction", in: idem, Garnsey, and Gruen (eds.) 1997, 1-19.
- Cartledge, Paul. "The Economy (Economies) of Ancient Greece", in: Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden (eds.). *The Ancient Economy*. New York 2002, 11-32.
- Cartledge, Paul, Garnsey, Peter, and Gruen, Erich (eds.). *Hellenistic Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography*. Berkeley 1997.
- Cawkwell, George L. "The Foundation of the Athenian Confederacy", in: *CQ* 67 (1973), 47-60.
- Cawkwell, George L. "Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy", in: *JHS* 101 (1981), 40-55.
- Ceccarelli, Paola. *Ancient Greek Letter Writing: A Cultural History (600 BC - 150 BC)*. Oxford 2013.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. "Sich selbst feiern? Städtische Feste des Hellenismus im Spannungsfeld von Religion und Politik", in: Wörrle and Zanker (eds.) 1995, 147-172.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. *Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Poleis in der hellenistischen Zeit*. Stuttgart 1996.

- Chaniotis, Angelos. "Theatricality Beyond the Theater. Staging Public Life in the Hellenistic World", in: Brigitte Le Guen (ed.). *De la scène aux gradins. Théâtre et représentations dramatiques après Alexandre le Grand dans les cités hellénistiques*. Actes du Colloque, Toulouse 1997 (=Pallas 41). Toulouse 1997, 219-259.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. "Foreign Soldiers – Native girls? Constructing and Crossing Boundaries in Hellenistic Cities with Foreign Garrisons", in: idem and Pierre Ducrey (eds.) 2002, 99-113.
- Chaniotis, Angelos and Ducrey, Pierre (eds.). *Army and Power in the Ancient World*. Stuttgart 2002.
- Chaniotis, Angelos "The Divinity of Hellenistic Rulers", in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 431-445.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. "Under the Watchful Eyes of the Gods: Aspects of Divine Justice in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor", in: Stephen Colvin (ed.). *The Greco-Roman East. Politics, Culture, Society*. Cambridge 2004, 1-43.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. *War in the Hellenistic world. A Social and Cultural History*. Malden, MA 2005.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. "The Ithyphallic Hymn for Demetrios Poliorketes and Hellenistic Religious Mentality", in: Panagiotis P. Iossif, Andrzej S. Chankowski, and Catharine C. Lorber (eds.). *More than Men less than Gods. Studies on Royal Cult and Imperial Worship* (=Studia Hellenistica 51). Leuven 2011, 157-196.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. "The Ritualised Commemoration of War in the Hellenistic City: Memory, Identity, Emotion", in: Polly Low, Graham Oliver, and Peter J. Rhodes (eds.). *Cultures of Commemoration: War Memorials, Ancient and Modern*. Oxford 2012, 41-62.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. "Listening to Stones: Orality and Emotions in Ancient Inscriptions", in: John Davies and John J. Wilkes (eds.). *Epigraphy and the Historical Sciences*. Oxford 2012, 299-328.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. "Constructing the Fear of Gods: Epigraphic Evidence from Sanctuaries of Greece and Asia Minor", in: idem (ed.). *Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World*. Stuttgart 2012, 205-234.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. "Greek Ritual Purity: from Automatism to Moral Distinctions", in: Petra Rösch and Udo Simon (eds.). *How Purity is Made*. Wiesbaden 2012, 123-139.
- Chaniotis, Angelos. "Empathy, Emotional Display, Theatricality, and Illusion in Hellenistic Historiography", in: idem and Pierre Ducrey (eds.). *Unveiling Emotions II. Emotions in Greece and Rome: Texts, Images, Material Culture*. Stuttgart 2013, 53-84.
- Chrubasik, Boris. *Kings and Usurpers in the Selenkaid Empire. The Men who would be King*. Oxford 2016.
- Cipolla, Paolo. *Poeti minori del dramma satiresco: testo critico, traduzione e commento*. Amsterdam 2003.
- Cline, Diane Harris. "Six Degrees of Alexander: Social Network Analysis as a Tool for Ancient History", in: *AHB* 26 (2012), 59-70.
- Cohen, David. *Law, Sexuality, and Society*. Cambridge 1991.

- Cohen, Edward. *Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective*. Princeton 1992.
- Cohen, Edward. "Athenian Prostitution as a Liberal Profession", in: Geoffrey W. Bakewell and James Sickinger (eds.). *Gestures. Essays in Ancient History, Literature, and Philosophy presented to Alan L. Boegehold*. Oxford 2003, 214-236.
- Cohen, Edward. "Free and Unfree Sexual Work: An Economic Analysis of Athenian Prostitution", in: Christopher A. Faraone and Laura K. McClure (eds.). *Prostitutes and Courtesans in the Ancient World*. Wisconsin 2006, 95-124.
- Cohen, Ronald. "Ethnicity. Problem and Focus in Anthropology", in: *Annual Review of Anthropology* 7 (1978), 379-403.
- Collar, Anna. "Network Theory and Religious Innovation", in: *MHR* 22:1 (2007), 149-162.
- Collar, Anna. "Military Networks and the Cult of Jupiter Dolichenus", in: Engelbert Winter (ed.). *Von Kummuh nach Teloch. Historische und archäologische Untersuchungen in Kommagene. Dolichener und Kommagenische Forschungen IV* (=Asia Minor Studien 64). Bonn 2011, 217-245.
- Collins, Derek. *Magic in the Ancient World*. Malden, MA 2008.
- Connerton, Paul. "Seven Types of Forgetting", in: *Memory Studies* 1 (2008), 59-71.
- Connor, W. Robert. *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*. Princeton 1971.
- Constantakopoulou, Christy. "Proud to Be an Islander: Island Identity in Multi-Polis Islands in the Classical and Hellenistic Aegean", in: *MHR* 20 (2005), 1-34.
- Constantakopoulou, Christy. "Tribute, the Athenian Empire and Small States and Communities in the Aegean", in: Anja Slawisch (ed.). *Handels- und Finanzgebaren in der Ägäis im 5. Jh. v. Chr. - Trade and Finance in the fifth century BC Aegean World* (=BYZAS 18). Istanbul 2013, 25-42.
- Couvenhes, Jean-Christophe. "Mercenaires et soldats-citoyens dans le monde grec à l'époque hellénistique", in: Jean-Christophe Romer and Laurent Henninger (eds.), *Armées privées, armées d'état. Mercenaires et auxiliaires*. Paris 2010, 13-30.
- Craik, Elizabeth M. *The Dorian Aegean: States and Cities of Ancient Greece*. London 1980.
- Curty, Olivier. *Les parentés légendaires entre cités grecques: Catalogue raisonné des inscriptions contenant le terme syngeneia et analyse critique*. Geneva 1995.
- Curty, Olivier. "Un usage fort controversé. La parenté dans le langage diplomatique de l'époque hellénistique", in: *AncSoc* 35 (2005), 101-117.
- Danzig, Gabriel. "Big Boys And Little Boys: Justice and Law in Xenophon's Cyropaedia and Memorabilia", in: *Polis* 26:2 (2009), 271-295.
- Danzig, Gabriel. *Apologizing for Socrates: How Plato and Xenophon Created Our Socrates*. Lanham 2010.
- Danzig, Gabriel. "The Best of the Achaemenids: Benevolence, Self-interest and the 'Ironic' Reading of Cyropaedia", in: Hobden and Tuplin (eds.) 2012, 499-540.
- Darbo-Peschanski, Catherine. "The Origin of Greek Historiography", in: John Marincola (ed.). *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*. Malden, MA 2007, 27-38.

- Davidson, James N. *Courtesans & Fishcakes. The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens*. London 1997.
- Davidson, James N. *The Greeks and Greek Love: A Radical Reappraisal of Homosexuality in Ancient Greece*. London 2007.
- Davies, John K. *Athenian Propertied Families: 600 - 300 B.C.* Oxford 1971.
- Davies, John K. *Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens*. Salem 1984.
- Davies, John K. "Ancient Economies: Models and Muddles", in: Helen Parkins and Christopher Smith (eds.). *Trade, Traders, and the Ancient City*. London 1998, 225-256.
- Davies, John K. "Hellenistic Economies in the Post-Finley Era", in: Archibald et al. (eds.) 2001, 11-62.
- Davies, John K. "The Interpenetration of Hellenistic Sovereignties", in: Daniel Ogden (ed.). *The Hellenistic World: New Perspectives*. London 2002, 1-21 (=Davies 2002a).
- Davies, John K. "Greek History: A Discipline in Transformation", in: T. Peter Wiseman (ed.). *Classics in Progress. Essays in Ancient Greece and Rome*. Oxford 2002, 225-246 (=Davies 2002b).
- Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix. *Rizom*. Translated by Dagmar Berger. Berlin 1977.
- Demand, Nancy H. *Urban Relocation in Archaic and Classical Greece*. Norman, OK and London 1990.
- Derrida, Jacques. *Of Grammatology*. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore 2016 [1976] (Original: *De la grammatologie*. Paris 1967).
- De Souza, Philip. *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*. Cambridge 1999.
- De Souza, Philip. "Pirates and Politics in the Roman World", in: Volker Grieb and Sabine Todt (eds.). *Piraterie von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*. Stuttgart 2012, 47-73.
- Dillery, John. *Xenophon and the History of His Times*. London 1995.
- Dillon, Matthew. *Girls and Women in Classical Greek Religion*. London and New York 2002.
- Dillon, Sheila and Baltes, Elizabeth P. "Honorific Practices and the Politics of Space on Hellenistic Delos: Portrait Statue Monuments along the Dromos", in: *AJA* 117:2 (2013), 207-246.
- Dixon, Michael D. "Menander's *Perikeiromene* and Demetrius Poliorcetes", in: *CB* 81 (2005), 131-143.
- Dinsmoor, William B. *The Archons of Athens in the Hellenistic Age*. Cambridge, MA 1931.
- Dmitriev, Sviatoslav. "Alexander's Exiles Decree", in: *Klio* 86 (2004), 348-381.
- Dimitriev, Sviatoslav. *City Government in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor*. Oxford 2005.
- Dorion, Louis-André. "The Straussian Exegesis of Xenophon", in: Gray (ed.) 2010 [2001], 283-323.
- Dover, Kenneth J. *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*. Oxford 1974.
- Dover, Kenneth J. *Greek Homosexuality*. Cambridge, MA 1978.
- Dow, Sterling. "The Athenian Anagrapheis", in: *HSCPh* 67 (1963), 37-54.
- Dreher, Martin. *Hegemon und Symmachoi*. Berlin 1995.
- Dreyer, Boris. "Heroes, Cults, and Divinity", in: Heckel and Tritle (eds.) 2009, 218-234.

- Dreyer, Boris and Weber, Gregor. "Lokale Eliten griechischer Städte und königliche Herrschaft", in: Boris Dreyer and Peter Franz Mittag (ed.). *Lokale Eliten und hellenistische Könige. Zwischen Kooperation und Konfrontation*. Berlin 2011, 14-54.
- Droysen, Johann Gustav. *Geschichte des Hellenismus*. Edited by Erich Bayer. 3 vols. Reutlingen 1952 [1833-46].
- Du Boulay, Juliet. *Portrait of a Greek Mountain Village*. Oxford 1974.
- Due, Bodil. *The Cyropaedia: Xenophon's Aims and Methods*. Aarhus 1989.
- Düring, Marten and von Keyserlingk, Linda. "Netzwerkanalyse in den Geschichtswissenschaften: Historische Netzwerkanalyse als Methode für die Erforschung historischer Prozesse", in: Rainer Schützeichel and Stefan Jordan (eds.). *Prozesse: Formen, Dynamiken, Erklärungen*. Wiesbaden 2015, 337-350.
- Duff, Timothy E. *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice*. Oxford 1999.
- Duindam, Jeroen. *Norbert Elias and the Early Modern European Court*. Amsterdam 1994.
- Durvy, Cécile. "Historiographie antique du siège de Rhodes par Démétrios (305 - 304)", in: Faucherre and Pimouguet-Pédarros (eds.) 2010, 39-56.
- Eco, Umberto. "An Ars Oblivionalis? Forget It!", in: *PMLA* 103:3 (1988), 254-261 (translated by Marilyn Migiel).
- Edson, Jr., Charles F. "The Antigonids, Heracles, and Beroea", in: *HSCPb* 45 (1934), 213-246.
- Ehrenberg, Victor. "Thibron [2]", in: *RE* VI A,1 (1936), 275f.
- Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus. *Die Biologie des menschlichen Verhaltens: Grundriß der Humanethologie*. Vierkirchen-Pasenbach 2004⁵.
- Eidinow, Esther. *Oracles, Curses, & Risk among the Ancient Greeks*. Oxford 2007.
- Eidinow, Esther. "Networks and Narratives: A Model for Ancient Greek Religion", in: *Kernos* 24 (2011), 9-38.
- Elias, Norbert. *Die höfische Gesellschaft. Untersuchungen zur Soziologie des Königtums und der höfischen Aristokratie*. Frankfurt a.M. 1983.
- Ellis, Walter R. *Ptolemy of Egypt*. London and New York 1994.
- Engel, Rudolf. *Untersuchungen zum Machtaufstieg des Antigonos I Monophthalmos: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühen Diadochenzeit*. Kallmünz 1977.
- Erickson, Kyle. "Seleucus I, Zeus and Alexander", in: Mitchell and Melville (eds.) 2013, 109-127.
- Erikson, Erik H. *Identität und Lebenszyklus*. Frankfurt a.M. 1973.
- Erlhofer, Sebastian. "Missing Data in der Netzwerkanalyse", in: Christian Stegbauer (ed.). *Netzwerkanalyse und Netzwerktheorie. Ein neues Paradigma in den Sozialwissenschaften*. Wiesbaden 2010², 251-260.
- Errington, Malcolm. "Alexander in the Hellenistic World", in: Bosworth, A. Brian and Badian, Ernst (eds.). *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* (=Entretiens Hardt 22). Vandœuvres and Geneva 1976, 137-179.
- Errington, Malcolm. "The Date of the Mytilene Decree", in: *ZPE* 83 (1990), 194-214.

- Erskine, Andrew (ed.). *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Malden, MA 2003.
- Erskine, Andrew and Llewellyn-Jones, Lloyd (eds.). *Creating a Hellenistic World*. Swansea 2011.
- Erskine, Andrew. "Between Philosophy and the Court: the Life of Persaios of Kition", in: idem and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 177-194.
- Erskine, Andrew. "Ruler Cult and the Early Hellenistic City", in: Hauben and Meeus (eds.) 2014, 579-597.
- Estrada, Ernesto. *The Structure of Complex Networks: Theory and Applications*. Oxford 2011.
- Evans, Trevor V. "The Court Function of the Interpreter in Genesis 42.23 and Early Greek Papyri", in: Tessa Rajak et al. (eds.). *Jewish Perspectives on Hellenistic Rulers*. Berkeley 2007, 238-252.
- Faber, Joel. "The Cyropaedia and Hellenistic Kingship", in: *AJP* 100 (1979), 497-514.
- Fantuzzi, Marco and Hunter, Richard L. *Tradition and Innovation in Hellenistic Poetry*. Cambridge 2004.
- Ferguson, John. *Moral Values in the Ancient World*. New York 1979 [1958], 102-117.
- Ferguson, William S. "Demetrius Poliorcetes and the Hellenic League", in: *Hesperia* 17 (1948), 112-136.
- Ferguson, William S. *Hellenistic Athens. An Historical Essay*. New York 1969 [1911].
- Fenn, Nina and Römer-Strehl, Christiane (eds.). *Networks in the Hellenistic World: According to the Pottery in the Eastern Mediterranean and Beyond*. Oxford 2013.
- Finley, Moses I. *The Ancestral Constitution*. Cambridge 1973 (=Finley 1973a).
- Finley, Moses I. *The Ancient Economy*. Berkeley 1973 (=Finley 1973b).
- Flaig, Egon. *Die Mehrheitsentscheidung: Entstehung und kulturelle Dynamik*. Paderborn 2013.
- Flaig, Egon. "Wie relevant ist die Praxeologie für die Kulturwissenschaften?", in: Markus Bernhardt, Stefan Brakensiek and Benjamin Scheller (eds.). *Ermöglichen und Verbindern. Vom Umgang mit Kontingenzen*. Frankfurt and New York 2016, 23-48, here 33.
- Fornara, Charles W. *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome*. Berkeley 1983.
- Fortenbaugh, William und van Ophuijsen, Johannes M. S.v. "Theophrastus", in: *DNP* 12/1 (2002), 391f.
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality. An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. Harmondsworth 1984 (Original: *La volonté de savoir*, Paris 1976).
- Foucault, Michel. "Das Subjekt und die Macht", in: Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (eds.). *Michel Foucault. Jenseits von Strukturalismus und Hermeneutik*. Frankfurt a.M. 1987, 243-261.
- Foucault, Michel. *Das Wahrsprechen des Anderen. Zwei Vorlesungen 1983/84*. Frankfurt a.M. 1988.
- Foucault, Michel. *Dits et Écrits. Schriften*. 4 vols. Frankfurt a.M. 2003.
- Foucault, Michel. *Dispositive der Macht. Über Sexualität, Wissen und Wahrheit*. Berlin 2008 (Original: "Intervista a Michel Foucault", in: Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino (eds.). *Microfisica del Potere*. Turin 1977, 3-28).

- Faucherre, Nicolas and Pimouguet-Pédarros, Isabelle (eds.). *Les Sièges de Rhodes de l' Antiquité à la Période Moderne*. Rennes 2010.
- Fraser, Peter M. *Ptolemaic Alexandria*. 3 vols. Oxford 1986³.
- Fraser, Peter M. "The Tribal-Cycles of Eponymous Priests at Lindos and Camiros", in: *Eranos* 51 (1953), 23-47.
- Fraser, Peter M. and Bean, George E. *The Rhodian Peraea and Islands*. London 1954.
- Freeman, Linton. *The Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study in the Sociology of Science*. Vancouver 2004.
- Frenzel, Elisabeth. S.v. "Doppelgänger", in: eadem. *Motive der Weltliteratur*. Stuttgart 1976, 94-114.
- Fröhlich, Pierre. *Les cités grecques et le contrôle des magistrats IV^e-I^{er} siècle avant J.-C.* (=Hautes études du monde gréco-romain 33). Geneva 2004.
- Funke, Peter. "Stasis und politischer Umsturz in Rhodos zu Beginn des IV. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.", in: Werner Eck, Hartmut Galsterer, and Hartmut Wolff (eds.). *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte. Festschrift Friedrich Vittinghoff*. Cologne 1980, 59-70.
- Funke, Peter. "Nochmals zu den Wechselfällen Rhodischer Politik zu Beginn des IV. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.", in: *Hermes* 112:1 (1984), 115-119.
- Funke, Peter. "Rhodos und die hellenistische Staatenwelt an der Wende vom 4. zum 3. Jh. v. Chr.", in: Edward Dąbrowa (ed.). *Donum Amicitiae: Studies in Ancient History published on occasion of the 75th Anniversary of Foundation of the Department of Ancient History of the Jagiellonian University*. Krakow 1997, 35-42.
- Gabbert, Janice J. "The Career of Olympiodoros of Athens (ca. 340-270 BC)", in: *AncW* 27 (1996), 59-66.
- Gabrielsen, Vincent. *The Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes*. Aarhus 1997.
- Gabrielsen, Vincent. "The Synoikized Polis of Rhodes", in: Pernille Flensted-Jensen, Thomas Heine Nielsen and Lene Rubinstein (eds.). *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his sixtieth birthday, August 20, 2000*. Copenhagen 2000, 177-205.
- Gais, Ruth M. S.v. "Enyo [1]", in: *LIMC* III,1 (1986), 746f.
- Gallant, Thomas W. *Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece. Reconstructing the Rural Domestic Economy*. Cambridge 1991.
- Gardiner, Alan H. *Hieratic Papyri in the British Museum*. vol. 1. London 1935.
- Garland, Robert S. J. "Religious Authority in Archaic and Classical Athens", in: *ABSA* 79 (1984), 75-123.
- Garland, Robert S. J. "Mother and Child in the Greek World", in: *History Today* 36:3 (1986), 40-46.
- Garland, Robert S. J. *The Greek Way of Life: From Conception to Old Age*. London 1990.
- Gauthier, Phillipe. "La réunification d'Athènes en 281 et les deux archontes Nicias", in: *REG* 92 (1979), 348-399.

- Gauthier, Philippe. *Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (IV^e-I^{er} siècle avant J.-C.). Contribution à l'histoire des institutions*. Athens and Paris 1985.
- Gauthier, Philippe. "Les cités hellénistiques", in: Mogens H. Hansen (ed.). *The Ancient Greek City-state* (=Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre 1). Copenhagen 1993, 211-231.
- Geertz, Clifford. "Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power", in: Joseph Ben-David and Terry N. Clark (eds.). *Culture and Its Creators: Essays in Honor of E. Shils*. Chicago 1977, 13-38.
- Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. *Phokion. Studien zur Erfassung seiner historischen Gestalt*. Munich 1976.
- Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Das Verhältnis von Politik und Philosophie im Wirken des Demetrios von Phaleron", in: *Chiron* 8 (1978), 149-193.
- Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Der siegreiche König. Überlegungen zur hellenistischen Monarchie", in: *AKG* 64 (1982), 247-277.
- Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. *Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jh. v.Chr.* Munich 1985.
- Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Myth, History and Collective Identity: Uses of the Past in Antiquity and Beyond", in: Nino Luraghi (ed.). *The Historian's Craft in the Age of Herodotus*. Oxford 2001, 286-313.
- Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Bürgerliches Selbstverständnis und Polisidentität im Hellenismus", in: Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp et al. (eds.). *Sinn (in) der Antike. Orientierungssysteme, Leitbilder und Wertkonzepte im Altertum*. Mainz 2003, 225-254.
- Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Eine Bilanz: Die Entwicklung des Gymnasiums zur Institution der Sozialisierung in der Polis", in: Kah and Scholz (eds.) 2004, 413-419.
- Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. *Geschichte des Hellenismus*. Munich 2008⁴.
- Gehrke, Hans-Joachim. "Greek Representations of the Past", in: Lin Foxhall, Hans-Joachim Gehrke and Nino Luraghi (eds.). *Intentional History: Spinning Time in Ancient Greece*. Stuttgart 2010, 15-34.
- van Gelder, Hendrik. *Geschichte der alten Rhodier*. Haag 1900.
- Gell, Alfred. *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory*. Oxford 1998.
- Genette, Gérard. *Die Erzählung*. Munich 1998².
- Gera, Deborah L. *Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Style, Genre, and Literary Technique*. Oxford 1993.
- Gill, Christopher. "Peace of Mind and Being Yourself: Panaetius to Plutarch", in: *ANRW* II.36.7 (1994), 4599-4640.
- Gill, Christopher, Postlethwaite, Norman, and Seaford, Richard (eds.). *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*. Oxford 1998.
- Giovannini, Adalberto. "Greek Cities and Greek Commonwealth", in: Bulloch et al. 1993, 265-286.
- Glotz, Gustave. *La cité grecque*. Paris 1928.
- Goldenberg, Jacob, Libai, Barak, and Muller, Eitan. "Talk of the Network: A Complex Systems Look at the Underlying Process of Word-of-mouth", in: *Marketing Letters* 12:3 (2001), 211-223.

- Goldhill, Simon. "The Anecdote. Exploring the Boundaries between Oral and Literary Performance in the Second Sophistic", in: William Johnson and Hold Parker (eds.). *Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome*. Oxford 2009, 96-113.
- Gomme, Arnold W. "A Forgotten Factor of Greek Naval Strategy", in: *JHS* 53:1 (1933), 16-24.
- Goodenough, Erwin R. "The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship", in: *YCS* 1 (1928), 55-102.
- Goodlett, Virginia C. "Rhodian Sculpture Workshops", in: *AJA* 95:4 (1991), 669-681.
- Gordon, Richard. S.v. "Sol", in: *DNP* 11, 692-695.
- Gorman, Richard J. and Vanessa B. "The *Tryphê* of the Sybarites: A Historiographical Problem in Athenaeus", in: *JHS* 127 (2007), 38-60.
- Grabowski, Tomasz. "The Good, The Bad and The Ugly. Three Cases in the House of Ptolemy", in: *Classica Cracoviensia* 15 (2012), 81-107.
- Grainger, John D. *Selenkos Nikator. Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom*. London and New York 1990.
- Granovetter, Mark S. "The Strength of Weak Ties", in: *American Journal of Sociology* 78:6 (1973), 1360-1380.
- Granovetter, Mark S. "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior", in: *American Journal of Sociology* 83:6 (1978), 1420-1443.
- Gray, Benjamin D. *Stasis and Stability: Exile, the Polis, and Political Thought c. 404 - 146 BC*. Oxford 2015.
- Gray, Vivienne J. "Xenophon", in: Irene J.F. de Jong, René Nünlist, Angus M. Bowie, *Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative. Volume One* (=Mnemosyne Suppl. 257). Leiden 2004, 391-401.
- Gray, Vivienne J. (ed.). *Xenophon*. Oxford 2010.
- Gray, Vivienne J. *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes: Reading the Reflections*. Oxford 2011.
- Green, Peter. "Delivering the Go(o)ds: Demetrios Poliorketes and Hellenistic Divine Kingship", in: Geoffrey W. Bakewell and James Sickinger (eds.). *Gestures. Essays in Ancient History, Literature, and Philosophy presented to Alan L. Boegehold*. Oxford 2003, 258-277.
- Greenblatt, Stephen. *Shakespearean Negotiations. The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England*. Oxford 1988.
- Greenwalt, William S. "Macedonian Kings and the Political Usefulness of the Medical Arts", in: *Ancient Macedonia* 4 (1986), 213-222.
- Grieb, Volker. *Hellenistische Demokratie. Politische Organisation und Struktur in freien griechischen Poleis nach Alexander dem Großen* (=Historia Einzelschriften 199). Stuttgart 2008.
- Gruen, Erich. *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity*. Princeton 2011 (=Gruen 2011a).
- Gruen, Erich (ed.). *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean. Issues & Debates*. Los Angeles 2011 (=Gruen 2011b).

- Günther, Linda-Marie. "Polis und Königin: zur Interpretation von Frauenköpfen auf hellenistischen Münzen", in: *JNG* 62 (2012), 35-53.
- Gutzwiller, Kathryn. *A Guide to Hellenistic Literature*. Malden, MA 2007.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M. 1990.
- Habicht, Christian. "Die herrschende Gesellschaft in den hellenistischen Monarchien", in: *Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 45 (1958), 1-16.
- Habicht, Christian. "Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege", in: *Hermes* 89:1 (1961), 1-35.
- Habicht, Christian. *Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte*. Munich 1970² [1956].
- Habicht, Christian. *Untersuchungen zur politischen Geschichte Athens im 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Munich 1979.
- Habicht, Christian. "The Comic Poet Archedikos", in: *Hesperia* 63:2 (1993), 253-256.
- Habicht, Christian. "Ist ein Honoratiorenregime das Kennzeichen der Stadt im späteren Hellenismus?", in: Wörrle and Zanker (eds.) 1995, 87-92 (=Habicht 1995a).
- Habicht, Christian. *Athen: Geschichte der Stadt in hellenistischer Zeit*. Munich 1995 (=Habicht 1995b).
- Hadley, Robert A. "Royal Propaganda of Seleucus I and Lysimachus", in: *JHS* 94 (1974), 50-65.
- Hadley, Robert A. *Deified Kingship and Propaganda Coinage in the Early Hellenistic Age 323-280 B.C.* Ann Arbor 1989.
- Hahn, Hans P. "Dinge als Zeichen – eine unscharfe Bezeichnung", in: Ulrich Veit, Tobias L. Kienlin, Christoph Kümmel, and Sascha Schmidt (eds.). *Spuren und Botschaften: Interpretationen materieller Kultur* (=Tübinger Archäologische Taschenbücher 4). Münster 2003, 29-52.
- Halbwachs, Maurice. *Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen*. Frankfurt a.M. 1985 (Original: *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*. Paris 1925).
- Hall, Edith. *Inventing the Barbarian. Greek Self-definition through Tragedy*. Oxford 1989.
- Hall, Jonathan M. *Hellenicity between Ethnicity and Culture*. Chicago 2002.
- Hall, Stuart. "Encoding / Decoding", in: idem, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis (eds.). *Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79*. London 1980, 128-138.
- Halliwell, Stephen. *Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early Christianity*. Cambridge 2008.
- Hammond, Nicholas G.L. and Griffith, Guy T. *A History of Macedonia. Volume II: 550-336 B.C.* Oxford 1979.
- Hammond, Nicholas G.L. *The Macedonian State: Origins, Institutions, and History*. Oxford 1989.
- Hansen, Esther V. *The Attalids of Pergamon*. Ithaca, N.Y. 1947.

- Hansen, Mogens H. "Πόλις as the Generic Term for State", in: Thomas Heine Nielsen (ed.). *Yet More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (=Historia Einzelschriften 117). Stuttgart 1997, 9-16.
- Hansen, Mogens H. *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*. Oxford and Cambridge, MA 1999².
- Hansen, Mogens H. and Nielsen, Thomas H. (eds.). *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*. Oxford 2004.
- Harders, Ann-Cathrin. "Königinnen ohne König. Zur Rolle und Bedeutung der Witwen Alexanders im Zeitalter der Diadochen", in: Hauben and Meeus (eds.) 2014, 345-377.
- Harman, Rosie. "Viewing, Power and Interpretation in Xenophon's «Cyropaedia»", in: Jakub Pigoń (ed.). *The Children of Herodotus: Greek and Roman Historiography and Related Genres*. Newcastle 2008, 69-91.
- Harris, Edward M. "Demosthenes and the Theoric Fund", in: Robert W. Wallace and idem (eds.). *Transitions to Empire. Essays in Greco-Roman history, 360-146 B.C., in honor of E. Badian* (=Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture 21). Norman and London 1996, 57-76.
- Harris, William V. *Ancient Literacy*. Cambridge, MA 1989.
- Harris, William V. *Dreams and Experience in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge, MA 2009.
- Harrison, Alick R.W. *The Law of Athens*. Vol. 1. London 1968.
- Harrison, Cynthia M. "Triremes at Rest: On the Beach or in the Water?", in: *JHS* 119 (1999), 168-171.
- Harter-Uibopuu, Kaja. "Der Hellenenbund des Antigonos I Monophthalmos und des Demetrios Poliorketes, 302/1 v. Chr.", in: Gerhard Thür and Francisco J. Fernández Nieto (eds.). *Symposion 1999. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Pazo de Mariñán, La Coruña, 6. - 9. September 1999)*. Cologne 2003, 315-337.
- Hartwig, Andrew. "Self-Censorship in Ancient Greek Comedy", in: Han Baltussen and Peter J. Davis (eds.). *The Art of Veiled Speech. Self-Censorship from Aristophanes to Hobbes*. Philadelphia 2015, 18-41.
- Hauben, Hans. "Rhodes, Alexander and the Diadochi from 333/332 to 304 B.C.", in: *Historia* 26:3 (1977), 307-339 (transl. by Peter van Dessel).
- Hauben, Hans and Meeus, Alexander (eds.). *The Age of the Successors and the Creation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms (323-276 BC)*. Leuven 2014.
- Haynes, Denys. *The Technique of Greek Statuary*. Mainz 1992.
- Hazard, Richard A. "Did Ptolemy I get his Surname from the Rhodians in 304?", in: *ZPE* 93 (1992), 52-56.
- Hazard, Richard A. *Imagination of a Monarchy: Studies in Ptolemaic Propaganda*. Toronto 2000.
- Hebert, Bernhard. *Schriftquellen zur hellenistischen Kunst. Plastik, Malerei und Kunsthandwerk der Griechen vom vierten bis zum zweiten Jahrhundert* (=Grazer Beiträge Suppl. 4). Graz 1989.
- Heckel, Waldemar. "King and 'Companions': Observations on the Nature of Power in the Reign of Alexander", in: Joseph Roisman (ed.). *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*. Leiden 2003, 197-226.

- Heckel, Waldemar. *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great. Prosopography of Alexander's Empire*. Oxford 2006.
- Heckel, Waldemar and Tritle, Lawrence A. (eds.). *Alexander the Great: A New History*. London 2009.
- Hedrick, Charles W. "Democracy and the Athenian Epigraphical Habit", in: *Hesperia* 68 (1999), 387-439.
- Hénaff, Marcel. "Is there Such a Thing as a Gift Economy?", in: Carlà and Gori (eds.) 2014, 71-84.
- Henderson, John. *The Maculate Muse*. Oxford 1991.
- Henderson, John. "Pheraulas is the Answer, What was the Question? (You Cannot Be Cyrus)", in: Hobden and Tuplin (eds.) 2012, 541-562.
- Henry, Alan S. *Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees: The Principal Formulae of Athenian Honorary Decrees*. Hildesheim 1983.
- Henry, Madeleine. "Athenaeus the Ur-Pornographer", in: David Braund and John Wilkins (eds.). *Athenaeus and his World. Reading Greek Culture in the Roman Empire*. Exeter 2000, 503-510.
- Henry, Olivier (ed.). *4th Century Karia. Defining a Karian Identity under the Hekatomnids*. Paris 2013.
- Herdman, John. *The Double in Nineteenth-Century Fiction: The Shadow of Life*. New York 1991.
- Herman, Gabriel. "The 'Friends' of the Early Hellenistic Rulers: Servants or Officials?", in: *Talanta* 12-13 (1980-1981), 103-149.
- Herman, Gabriel. *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*. Cambridge 1987.
- Herman, Gabriel. "The Court Society of the Hellenistic Age", in: Cartledge, Garnsey, and Gruen (eds.) 1997, 199-224.
- Herman, Gabriel. *Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens*. Cambridge 2006.
- Herzog-Hauser, Gertrud. S.v. "τύχη", in: RE 7A, 2 (1943), 1643-1689.
- Heuss, Alfred. *Stadt und Herrscher des Hellenismus in ihren staats- und völkerrechtlichen Beziehungen*. Aalen 1963².
- Higbie, Carolyn. *The Lidian Chronicle and the Greek Creation of their Past*. Oxford 2003.
- Higgins, William E. *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis*. Albany, NY 1977.
- Hintzen-Bohlen, Brigitte. *Herrscherrepräsentation im Hellenismus*. Cologne 1992.
- Hirsch, Steven W. *The Friendship of the Barbarians: Xenophon and the Persian Empire*. Hanover 1985.
- Hobden, Fiona and Tuplin, Christopher J. (eds.). *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry*. Leiden 2012.
- Höghammar, Kerstin (ed.). *The Hellenistic Polis of Kos. State, Economy and Culture*. Uppsala 2004.
- Hoepfner, Wolfram. *Der Koloss von Rhodos und die Bauten des Helios. Neue Forschungen zu einem der Sieben Weltwunder*. Mainz 2003.

- von den Hoff, Ralf. "Hellenistische Gymnasia: Raumgestaltung und Raumfunktionen", in: Matthaei und Zimmermann 2009, 245-275.
- Holzer, Boris. *Netzwerke*. Bielefeld 2010².
- Hornblower, Jane. *Hieronymus of Cardia*. Oxford 1981.
- Hornblower, Simon. *Mausolus*. Oxford 1982.
- Hunter, Richard. "Literature and its Contexts", in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 477-493.
- Hunter, Virginia J. *Policing Athens: Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420-320 B.C.* Princeton 1994.
- Huß, Werner. *Ägypten in hellenistischer Zeit*. Munich 2001.
- Isager, Signe. "The Pride of Halikarnassos. Editio Princeps of an Inscription from Salmakis", in: *ZPE* 123 (1998), 1-23.
- Jansen, Dorothea and Diaz-Bone, Rainer. "Netzwerkstrukturen als soziales Kapital", in: Johannes Weyer (ed.). *Konzepte und Methoden der sozialwissenschaftlichen Netzwerkforschung*. Munich 2011², 71-108.
- Janischinski, Siegfried. *Alexander und Griechenland unter dem Eindruck der Flucht des Harpalos*. Bonn 1981.
- Johnson, David M. "Strauss on Xenophon", in: Hobden and Tuplin (eds.) 2012, 123-159.
- Johnson, David M. "Persians as Centaurs in Xenophon's Cyropaedia", in: *TAPhA* 135 (2005), 177-201.
- Jones, Christopher P. *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World*. Cambridge, MA 1999.
- Jones, Kenneth R. "Alcaeus of Messene, Philip V and the Colossus of Rhodes: A Re-Examination of Anth. Pal. 6.171", in: *CQ* 64:1 (2014), 136-151.
- Kah, Daniel and Scholz, Peter (eds.). *Das hellenistische Gymnasium*. Berlin 2004.
- Kebric, Robert B. *In the Shadow of Macedon: Duris of Samos*. Stuttgart 1976.
- Keesling, Catherine. "Heavenly Bodies. Monuments to Prostitutes in Greek Sanctuaries", in: Christopher A. Faraone and Laura McClure (eds.). *Prostitutes and Courtesans in the Ancient World*. Madison and London 2006, 59-76.
- Kertzer, David. *Ritual, Politics and Power*. New Haven and London 1988.
- von Kienlin, Andreas. "Das Stadtzentrum von Priene als Monument bürgerlicher Selbstdarstellung", in: Ernst-Ludwig Schwander and Klaus Rheidt (eds.). *Macht der Architektur: Architektur der Macht*. Mainz 2004, 114-120.
- Kindt, Julia. *Rethinking Greek Religion*. Cambridge 2012, 16-30.
- King, Carol J. "Plutarch, Alexander, and Dream Divination", in: *ICS* 38 (2013), 81-111.
- Kingsley, Bonnie M. "Harpalos in the Megarid and the Grain Shipments from Cyrene", in: *ZPE* 66 (1986), 165-177.
- Kleinfeld, Judith. "The Small World Problem", in: *Society* 39 (January-February 2002), 61-66.
- Klose, Peter. *Die völkerrechtliche Ordnung der hellenistischen Staatenwelt in der Zeit von 280-168 v. Chr.* Munich 1972.

- Knappett, Carl (ed.). *Network Analysis in Archaeology. New Approaches to Regional Interaction*. Oxford 2013.
- Körte, Alfred. "Der Harpalische Prozess", in: *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 53 (1924), 217-231.
- Konstan, David. *Friendship in the Classical World*. Cambridge 1997 (=Konstan 1997a).
- Konstan, David. "Conventional Values of the Hellenistic Greeks: The Evidence from Astrology", in: Per Bilde, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Lise Hannestad, and Jan Zahle (eds.). *Conventional Values of the Hellenistic Greeks*. Aarhus 1997, 159-176 (=Konstan 1997b).
- Konstan, David. "Reciprocity and Friendship", in: Christopher Gill, Norman Postlethwaite and Richard Seaford (eds.). *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*. Oxford 1998, 279-301.
- Konstan, David. "Are Fellow Citizens Friends? Aristotle versus Cicero on *Philia*, *Amicitia*, and Social Solidarity", in: Ralph M. Rosen and Ineke Sluiter (eds.). *Valuing Others in Classical Antiquity* (=Mnemosyne Suppl. 323). Leiden and Boston 2010, 233-248.
- Kosmin, Paul J. *The Land of the Elephant Kings: Space, Territory, and Ideology in the Seleucid Empire*. Cambridge 2014.
- Kotsidu, Haritini. *TIMH KAI ΔΟΞΑ. Ehrungen für hellenistische Herrscher im griechischen Mutterland und in Kleinasien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der archäologischen Denkmäler*. Frankfurt a.M. 2000.
- Krackhardt, David and Hanson, Jeffrey R. "Informal Networks. The Company behind the Chart", in: *Harvard Business Review* (July-August 1993), 104-111.
- Krieter-Spiro, Martha. *Skalven, Köche und Hetären. Das Dienstepersonal bei Menander* (=Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 93). Stuttgart 1997.
- Kroll, John H. "The Emergence of Ruler Portraiture on Early Hellenistic Coins: The Importance of Being Divine", in: von den Hoff and Schultz (eds.) 2007, 113-122.
- Kroll, Wilhelm. S.v. "Philon [49]", in: *RE* XX,1 (1941), 54f.
- Krumeich, Ralf and Witschel, Christian (eds.). *Die Akropolis von Athen im Hellenismus und in der römischen Kaiserzeit*. Wiesbaden 2010.
- Krumeich, Ralf and Witschel, Christian. "Hellenistische Statuen in ihrem räumlichen Kontext: Das Beispiel der Akropolis und der Agora von Athen", in: Matthaeci and Zimmermann (eds.) 2009, 173-226.
- Kümmel, Hans M. "Ersatzkönig und Sündenbock", in: *ZAW* 80 (1968), 289-318.
- Kuhn, Annika B. "Ritual Change During the Reign of Demetrius Poliorcetes", in: Eftychia Stavrianopoulou (ed.). *Ritual and Communication in the Graeco-Roman World*. Athens 2006, 265-281.
- Kuhn, Christina. "Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt: Einleitende Bemerkungen", in: eadem (ed.). *Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt*. Stuttgart 2012, 11-30.
- Labarre, Guy. "Phrourarques et phouroi des cités grecques d'Asie Mineure à l'époque hellénistique", in: Jean-Christophe Couvenhes and Henri-Louis Fernoux (eds.). *Les cités*

- grecques et la guerre en Asie Mineure à l'époque hellénistique. Actes de la journée d'études de Lyon, 10 octobre 2003.* Paris 2004, 221-248.
- Lachmann, Renate. "Die Unlösbarkeit der Zeichen: Das semiotische Unglück des Mnemonisten", in: Renate Lachmann and Anselm Haverkamp (eds.). *Gedächtniskunst. Raum – Bild – Schrift. Studien zur Mnemotechnik.* Frankfurt a.M. 1991, 111-141.
- Lambert, Stephen D. "IG II² 1471A and the Value of Gold at Athens in the 320s B.C.," in: *ZPE* 110 (1996), 84-86.
- Landucci-Gattinoni, Franca. "Il ruolo di Adimanto di Lampsaco nella *basileia* de Demetrio Poliorkete", in: *Papyrologica Lupiensia* 9 (2000), 211-225.
- Landucci Gattinoni, Franca. "Cassander and the Legacy of Philip II and Alexander III in Diodorus' *Library*", in: Elisabeth D. Carney and Daniel Ogden (eds.). *Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives.* Oxford 2010, 113-121.
- Lane Fox, Robin. "Theophrastus' *Characters* and the Historian", in: *PCPhS* 42 (1996), 127-170.
- Lane Fox, Robin. "The First Hellenistic Man", in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 1-30.
- Lape, Susan. *Reproducing Athens: Menander's Comedy, Democratic Culture, and the Hellenistic City.* Princeton 2004.
- Lape, Susan. *Race and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian Democracy.* Cambridge 2010.
- Latour, Bruno. *Eine neue Soziologie für eine neue Gesellschaft.* Frankfurt a.M. 2007.
- Launey, Marcel. *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques.* 2 vols. Paris 1950.
- Le Bohec, Sylvie. "Les *philoï* des rois Antigonides", in: *REG* 98 (1985), 93-124.
- Le Bohec, Sylvie. "L'entourage royal à la cour des Antigonides", in: Edmond Lévy (ed.). *Le Système palatial en Orient, en Grèce et à Rome. actes du Colloque de Strasbourg 19-22 Juin 1985.* Strasbourg 1987, 315-326.
- Lefèvre, Eckard. "The Question of the ΒΙΟΣ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ: The Encounter between Cyrus and Croesus in Xenophon", in: Gray (ed.) 2010, 401-417.
- Lehmann, Gustav A. "Das neue Kölner Historiker-Fragment (P. Köln Nr. 247) und die Χρονική σύνταξις des Zenon von Rhodes (FGrH 523)", in: *ZPE* 72 (1988), 1-17.
- Leppin, Hartmut. "Theophrasts "Charaktere" und die Bürgermentalität in Athen im Übergang zum Hellenismus", in: *Klio* 84 (2002), 37-56.
- Llewellyn-Jones, Lloyd (ed.). *King and Court in Ancient Persia 559 to 331 BCE.* Edinburgh 2013.
- Lloyd-Jones, Hugh. "The Pride of Halicarnassus", in: *ZPE* 124 (1999), 1-14.
- Lodge, David. *A Small World.* New York 1984.
- Lönnqvist, Kenneth. "Studies on the Hellenistic Coinage of Athens: The Impact of Macedonia on the Athenian Money Market in the 3rd Century B.C.," in: Jaakko Frösén (ed.). *Early Hellenistic Athens. Symptoms of a Change.* Helsinki 1997, 119-145.
- Lotman, Yuri M. "On the Semiosphere", in: *Σημειωτική - Sign Systems Studies* 1 (2005), 205-229.

- Low, Polly. *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece. Morality and Power*. Cambridge 2007.
- Lübbe, Hermann. "Kontingenzerfahrung und Kontingenzbewältigung", in: Gerhart von Graevenitz and Odo Marquard (eds.). *Kontingenzt*. Munich 1998, 35-47.
- Lücke, Stephan. *Syngeneia. Epigraphisch-historische Studien zu einem Phänomen der antiken griechischen Diplomatie*. Munich 2000.
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Legitimation durch Verfahren*. Frankfurt a.M. 1983.
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie*. Frankfurt a.M. 1984.
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M. 1988.
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Macht*. Stuttgart 1988².
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*. Stuttgart 1998.
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Politik der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M. 2000.
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Religion der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M. 2000.
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Einführung in die Systemtheorie*. Heidelberg 2011⁶.
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Vertrauen*. Stuttgart 2014⁵.
- Lund, Helen. *Lysimachus. A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*. London and New York 1992.
- Lund, John. "Rhodian Amphorae in Rhodes and Alexandria as Evidence of Trade", in: Vincent Gabrielsen et. al. (eds.). *Hellenistic Rhodes: Politics, Culture, and Society*. Aarhus 1999, 187-204.
- Ma, John. *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor*. Oxford 1999.
- Ma, John. "Fighting Poleis of the Hellenistic World", in: Hans van Wees (ed.). *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*. London 2000, 337-376.
- Ma, John. "Oversexed, Overpaid, Over Here: A Response to Angelos Chaniotis", in: Angelos Chaniotis and Pierre Ducrey (eds.) 2002, 115-122.
- Ma, John. "Peer Polity Interaction in the Hellenistic Age", in: *P&P* 180 (2003), 9-39 (=Ma 2003a).
- Ma, John. "Kings", in: Andrew Erskine (ed.) 2003, 177-195 (=Ma 2003b).
- Ma, John. "Une culture militaire en Asie Mineure hellénistique?", in: Couvenhes, Jean-Christophe and Fernoux, Henri-Louis (eds.). *Les cités grecques et la guerre en Asie Mineure à l'époque hellénistique. Actes de la journée d'études de Lyon, 10 octobre 2003*. Tours 2004, 199-220.
- Ma, John. "Autour des balles de fronde 'camiréennes'", in: *Chiron* 40 (2010), 155-173.
- Ma, John. "Court, King and Power in Antigonid Macedonia", in: Robin Lane Fox (ed.). *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon. Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC - 300 AD*. Leiden 2011, 521-544.
- Ma, John. "Hellenistic Empires", in: Peter Fibiger Bang and Walter Scheidel (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean*. Oxford 2013, 324-360 (=Ma 2013a).
- Ma, John. *Statues and Cities. Honorific Portraits and Civic Identity in the Hellenistic World*. Oxford 2013 (=Ma 2013b).
- MacDowell, Douglas M. *The Law in Classical Athens*. New York 1978.

- Macurdy, Grace H. *Hellenistic Queens: A Study of Woman-power in Macedonia, Seleucid Syria, and Ptolemaic Egypt*. Baltimore 1932.
- Maier, Franz G. *Griechische Mauerbauinschriften* (=Vestigia 1-2). 2 vols. Heidelberg 1959-1961.
- Malkin, Irad. *A Small Greek World. Networks in the Ancient Mediterranean*. Oxford 2011.
- Mann, Christian. "Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten in der hellenistischen Polis: Überlegungen zum Stand der Forschung", in: idem and Peter Scholz (eds.) 2012, 11-27.
- Mann, Christian and Scholz, Peter (eds.). *"Demokratie" im Hellenismus: von der Herrschaft des Volkes zur Herrschaft der Honoratioren?* Mainz 2012.
- Mann, Michael. *The Sources of Social Power*. vol. 1. Cambridge 1986.
- Manning, Joseph G. *The Last Pharaohs: Egypt under the Ptolemies, 305-30 BC*. Princeton 2010.
- Marincola, John. "Polybius, Phylarchus, and Tragic History: A Reconsideration", in: Bruce Gibson and Thomas Harrison (eds.). *Polybius and his World: Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank*. Oxford 2013, 73-90.
- Marincola, John. "The Persian Wars in Fourth-Century Oratory and Historiography", in: Emma Bridges, Edith Hall, and Peter J. Rhodes (eds.). *Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium*. Oxford 2007, 106-130.
- Marrou, Henri I. *Geschichte der Erziehung im klassischen Altertum*. Freiburg 1957.
- Matthaei, Albrecht. *Münzbild und Polisbild. Untersuchungen zur Selbstdarstellung kleinasiatischer Poleis im Hellenismus*. Munich 2013.
- Matthaei, Albrecht and Zimmermann, Martin (eds.). *Stadtbilder im Hellenismus*. Berlin 2009.
- Mauss, Marcel. *The Gift. Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*. Translated by Ian Cunnison. London 1966 (Original "Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques", in: *L'Année Sociologique* 1 (1923/4), 30-196).
- Massar, Natacha. "La 'Chronique de Lindos': un catalogue à la gloire du sanctuaire d'Athéna Lindia", in: *Kernos* 19 (2006), 229-243.
- McClure, Laura. "Subversive Laughter: the Sayings of Courtesans in Book 13 of Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae*", in: *AJPh* 124:2 (2003), 259-294.
- Meeus, Alexander. "Some Institutional Problems Concerning the Succession to Alexander the Great: Prostasia and Chiliarchy", in: *Historia* 58:3 (2009), 287-310.
- Mehl, Andreas. "*Doriketos Chora*. Kritische Bemerkungen zum "Speererwerb" in Politik und Völkerrecht der hellenistischen Epoche", in: *AncSoc* 11/12 (1980/81), 173-212.
- Mehl, Andreas. *Selenkos Nikator und sein Reich*. Leuven 1986.
- Meier, Christian. *Das Gebot zu Vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns. Vom öffentlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit*. Munich 2010.
- Meier, Ludwig. *Die Finanzierung öffentlicher Bauten in der hellenistischen Polis*. Mainz 2012.
- Meiggs, Russell. *The Athenian Empire*. Oxford 1972.
- Meikle, Scott. "Aristotle on Money", in: *Phronesis* 39:1 (1994), 26-44.

- Meißner, Burkhard. *Historiker zwischen Polis und Königshof. Studien zur Stellung der Geschichtsschreiber in der griechischen Gesellschaft in spätclassischer und frühhellenistischer Zeit* (=Hypomnemata 99). Göttingen 1992.
- Meißner, Burkhard. "Hofmann und Herrscher: Was es bei den Griechen hieß, Freund eines Königs zu sein", in: *AKG* 82 (2000), 1-36.
- Melley, Timothy. "Agency Panic and the Culture of Conspiracy", in: Peter Knight (ed.). *Conspiracy Nation: The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America*. New York 2002, 57-84.
- Meritt, Benjamin D. "Greek Inscriptions", in: *Hesperia* 30 (1961), 205-292.
- Merkelbach, Reinhold and Stauber, Josef (eds.). *Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten*. 5 vols. Stuttgart and Leipzig 1998-2001.
- Michels, Christoph. "The Spread of Polis Institutions in Hellenistic Cappadocia and the Peer Polity Interaction Model", in: Eftychia Stavrianopoulou (ed.). *Shifting Social Imaginaries in the Hellenistic Period: Narrations, Practices, and Images* (=Mnemosyne Suppl. 363). Leiden and Boston 2013, 283-307.
- Migeotte, Leopold. *L'Emprunt public dans les cités grecques: recueil des documents et analyse critique*. Quebec and Paris 1984.
- Migeotte, Leopold. *Les souscriptions publiques dans les cités grecques*. Quebec and Geneva 1992.
- Mikalson, Jon D. *Athenian Popular Religion*. Chapel Hill, NC 1983.
- Mikalson, Jon D. *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*. Berkeley 1998.
- Mileta, Christian. *Der König und sein Land. Untersuchungen zur Herrschaft der hellenistischen Monarchen über das königliche Gebiet Kleinasien und seine Bevölkerung*. Berlin 2008.
- Millett, Paul. *Lending and Borrowing*. Cambridge 1991.
- Millett, Paul. *Theophrastus and his World*. Oxford 2007.
- Mitchell, Lynette G. *Greeks Bearing Gifts: The Public Use of Private Relationships in the Greek World 435-323 BC*. Cambridge 1997.
- Mitchell, Lynette G. *Panhellenism and the Barbarian*. Swansea 2007.
- Mitchell, Lynette G. "Alexander the Great: Divinity and the Rule of Law", in: Mitchell and Melville (eds.) 2013, 91-108.
- Mitchell, Lynette G. and Melville, Charles (eds.). *Every Inch a King. Comparative Studies on Kings and Kingship in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds*. Leiden 2013.
- Mitchell, William J.T. "Was ist ein Bild?", in: Volker Bohn (ed.). *Bildlichkeit*. Frankfurt a.M. 1990, 17-68.
- Moggi, Mauro. *I sinecismi interstatali greci*. 2 vols. Pisa 1976.
- Mohr, John W. and White, Harrison C. "How to Model an Institution", in: *Theory and Society* 37:5 (2008), 485-512.
- Moignard, Elizabeth. "How to Make a Monster", in: Michel M. Austin, Jill Harries, and Christopher J. Smith. *Modus Operandi: Essays in Honour of Geoffrey Rickman*. London 1998, 209-217.
- Monaco, Mallory. "The 'Bema' and the Stage: Stratocles and Philippides in Plutarch's 'Demetrius'", in: *ICS* 38 (2013), 113-126.

- Mooren, Léon. *The Aulic Titulature in Ptolemaic Egypt: Introduction and Prosopography*. Brussels 1975.
- Mooren, Léon. *La hiérarchie de cour ptolémaïque*. Leuven 1977.
- Mooren, Léon. "Die diplomatische Funktion der hellenistischen Königsfreunde", in: Eckart Olshausen and Hildegard Biller (eds.). *Antike Diplomatie*. Darmstadt 1979, 256-290.
- Mooren, Léon. "The Nature of Hellenistic Monarchy", in: Edmond van't Dack, Peter van Dessel and Willem van Gucht (eds.). *Egypt and the Hellenistic World: Proceedings of the International Colloquium, Leuven, 24. - 26. May 1982*. Leuven 1983, 205-240.
- Mooren, Léon. "Kings and Courtiers: Political Decision-Making in the Hellenistic States", in: Wolfgang Schuller (ed.). *Politische Theorie und Praxis im Altertum*. Darmstadt 1998, 122-133.
- Morley, Neville. *Trade in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge 2007.
- Mørkholm, Otto. *Early Hellenistic Coinage from the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea (336 - 188 B.C.)*. Cambridge 1991.
- Morris, Ian. "The Athenian Economy Twenty Years After The Ancient Economy", in: *CPb* 89:4 (1994), 351-366.
- Mossé, Claude. *La Femme dans la Grèce antique*. Paris 1983.
- Moysey, Robert A. "Diodoros, the Satraps and the Decline of the Persian Empire", in: *AHB* 5 (1991), 113-122.
- Müller, Carl W. "Der König, der kranke Prinz und der kluge Arzt: eine hellenistische Novelle in kaiserzeitlicher Brechung", in: Clausen, Jens P. (ed.). *"Tubilet cum Bonna Rhenus": Festschrift zum 150jährigen Bestehen des Bonner Kreises*. Berlin 2004, 91-114.
- Müller, Helmut. "Bemerkungen zu Funktion und Bedeutung des Rats in den hellenistischen Städten", in: Wörrle and Zanker (eds.) 1995, 41-54.
- Müller, Olaf. *Antigonos Monophthalmos und das "Jahr der Könige"*. Bonn 1973.
- Müller, Sabine. *Maßnahmen der Herrschaftssicherung gegenüber der Makedonischen Opposition bei Alexander dem Großen*. Frankfurt a.M. 2003.
- Müller, Sabine. "Demetrios Poliorketes, Aphrodite und Athen", in: *Gymnasium* 117:6 (2010), 559-573.
- Müller, Sabine. "The Female Element of the Political Self-Fashioning of the Diadochi: Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and their Iranian Wives", in: Alonso Troncoso and Anson (eds.) 2013, 199-214.
- Mueller-Goldingen, Christian. *Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Kyrupädie*. Stuttgart 1995.
- Mueller-Goldingen, Christian. *Xenophon. Philosophie und Geschichte*. Darmstadt 2007.
- Musti, Domenico. "Syria and the East", in: *CAH* 7.1 (1984), 175-220.
- Nadon, Christopher. *Xenophon's Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia*. Berkeley 2001.
- Nevett, Lisa C. *House and Society in the Ancient Greek World*. Cambridge 1999.
- Newell, Edward Th. *The Coinages of Demetrius Poliorketes*. Chicago 1978 [1927].
- Newell, Walter R. "Tyranny and the Science of Ruling in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus", in: *Journal of Politics* 45 (1983), 889-906.

- Newell, Walter R. "Machiavelli and Xenophon on Princely Rule: A Double-edged Encounter", in: *Journal of Politics* 50 (1988), 108-130.
- Newell, Walter R. "Machiavelli and Xenophon's Cyrus. Searching for the Modern Conceptions of Monarchy", in: Mitchell and Melville (eds.) 2013, 129-155.
- Nielsen, Inge. *Hellenistic Palaces: Tradition and Renewal*. Aarhus 1994.
- Nielsen, Thomas H. and Gabrielsen, Vincent. "Rhodos", in: Hansen and Nielsen (eds.) 2004, 1196-1210.
- Nilsson, Martin P. *Geschichte der griechischen Religion. Zweiter Band: Die hellenistische und römische Zeit*. Munich 1961².
- Noël, Marie-Pierre. "*Symposion, philanthrôpia* et empire dans la *Cyropédie* de Xénophon", in: Pascale Brillet-Dubois and Edith Parmentier (eds.). *Φιλολογία. Mélanges offerts à Michel Caseritx*. Lyon 2006, 133-146.
- Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. *Öffentliche Meinung. Die Entdeckung der Schweigespirale*. Frankfurt a.M. and Berlin 1989.
- Ober, Josiah. *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*. Princeton 1989.
- Ogden, Daniel. *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death: the Hellenistic Dynasties*. London 1999.
- Ogden, Daniel. *Magic, Witchcraft, and Ghosts in the Greek and Roman Worlds: A Sourcebook*. Oxford 2002.
- Ogden, Daniel. "Courtesans and the Sacred in the Early Hellenistic Courts", in: Martin Lindner and Tanja Scheer (eds.). *Tempelprostitution im Altertum. Fakten und Fiktionen*. Berlin 2009, 344-376.
- Ogden, Daniel. "How to Marry a Courtesan in the Macedonian Courts", in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 221-246.
- Oliver, Graham J. "Space and the Visualization of Power in the Greek Polis. The Award of Portrait Statues in Decrees from Athens", in: Peter Schultz and Ralf von den Hoff (eds.). *Early Hellenistic Portraiture. Image, Style, Context*. Cambridge 2007, 181-204 (=Oliver 2007a).
- Oliver, Graham J. *War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens*. New York and Oxford 2007 (=Oliver 2007b).
- Olshausen, Eckart. *Prosopographie der hellenistischen Königsgesandten: Von Triparadeisos bis Pydna*. Leuven 1974.
- Orth, Wolfgang. *Königlicher Machtanspruch und städtische Freiheit*. Munich 1977.
- Osborne, Michael J. *Naturalization in Athens*. 4 vols. Brussels 1981-1983.
- Osborne, Michael J. "The Archonship of Níkias Hysteros", in: *ZPE* 58 (1985), 275-295.
- O'Sullivan, Lara. "Athenian Impiety Trials in the late fourth Century B.C.", in: *CQ* 47:1 (1997), 136-152.
- O'Sullivan, Lara. "Philochorus, Pollux and the νομοφύλακες of Demetrius of Phalerum", in: *JHS* 2001 (121), 51-62.

- O'Sullivan, Lara. "Le Roi Soleil": Demetrius Poliorcetes and the Dawn of the Sun-King", in: *Antichthon* 42 (2008), 78-99.
- O'Sullivan, Lara. *The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317-307 BCE. A Philosopher in Politics*. Leiden 2009 (=O'Sullivan 2009a).
- O'Sullivan, Lara. "History from Comic Hypotheses: Stratocles, Lachares, and P.Oxy. 1235", in: *GRBS* 49:1 (2009), 53-79 (=O'Sullivan 2009b).
- Palagia, Olga. "Hephaestion's Pyre and the Royal Hunt of Alexander", in: A. Brian Bosworth and Elizabeth J. Baynham (eds.). *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford 2000, 167-206.
- Papachristodoulou, Ioannis. *Οι αρχαίοι ροδιακοί δήμοι. Ιστορική επισκόπηση – Η Ιαλυσία*. Athens 1989.
- Papachristodoulou, Ioannis. "The Rhodian Demes within the Framework of the Function of the Rhodian State", in: Vincent Gabrielsen (ed.). *Hellenistic Rhodes: Politics, Culture and Society*. Aarhus 1999, 27-44.
- Papadopoulos, John K. "Money, Art, and the Construction of Value in the Ancient Mediterranean", in: idem and Gary Urton (eds.). *The Construction of Value in the Ancient World*. Los Angeles 2012, 261-287.
- Parker, Robert. *Athenian Religion. A History*. Oxford 1996.
- Parsons, Talcott. *The Structure of Social Action*. New York 1968.
- Paschidis, Paschalis. *Between City and King. Prosopographical Studies on the Intermediaries Between the Cities of the Greek Mainland and the Aegean and the Royal Courts in the Hellenistic Period (322-190 BC)* (=Meletemata 59). Athens 2008.
- Pédech, Paul. *Trois historiens méconnus: Théopompe – Duris – Phylarque*. Paris 1989.
- Pélékidis, Chrysis. *Histoire de l'éphébie attique des origines à 31 avant Jésus-Christ*. Paris 1962.
- Pelling, Christopher. "Fun with Fragments: Athenaeus and the Historians", in: David Braund and John Wilkins (eds.). *Athenaeus and his World. Reading Greek Culture in the Roman Empire*. Exeter 2000, 171-190.
- Pelling, Christopher. *Plutarch and History*. London 2002.
- Pernerstorfer, Matthias J. *Menanders "Kolax": ein Beitrag zur Rekonstruktion und Interpretation der Komödie. Mit Edition und Übersetzung der Fragmente und Testimonien sowie einem dramaturgischen Kommentar*. Berlin and New York 2009.
- Pethes, Nicolas. "Mnemotop", in: Jörg Dünne and Andreas Mahler (eds.). *Handbuch Literatur & Raum* (=Handbücher zur kulturwissenschaftlichen Philologie 3). Berlin and Boston 2015, 196-205.
- Philipp, Günther B. "Philippides, ein politischer Komiker in hellenistischer Zeit", in: *Gymnasium* 80 (1973), 493-509.
- Picard, Charles. "Le trône vide d'Alexandre dans la cérémonie de Cyinda et la culte du trône vide à travers le monde gréco-romain", in: *Cah.Arch* 7 (1954), 1-18.
- Piel, Thierry. "À propos du colosse de Rhodes: quelques considérations sur un monument commémoratif", in: Faucherre and Pimouguet-Pédarros (eds.) 2010, 135-156.

- Pimouguet-Pédarros, Isabelle. *La cité à l'épreuve des rois. Le siège de Rhodes par Démétrios Poliorète (305 - 304 av. J.-C.)*. Rennes 2011.
- Poddighe, Elisabetta. "Alexander and the Greeks: The Corinthian League", in: Heckel and Tritle (eds.) 2009, 99-120.
- Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation*. Boston 1944.
- Polanyi, Karl. *Ökonomie und Gesellschaft*. Stuttgart 1979.
- Pont, Anne-Valérie. "Aphrodisias, presque une île: la cité et ses réseaux d'Auguste à 249/250", in: *Chiron* 2012, 319-346.
- Préaux, Claire. *Le monde hellénistique: la Grèce et l'Orient de la mort d'Alexandre à la conquête romaine de la Grèce (323 - 146 av. J.-C.)*. 2 vols. Paris 1978.
- Puntel, L. Bruno. S.v. "Wahrheit", in: Hermann Krings, Hans M. Baumgartner, and Christoph Wild (eds.). *Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe*. 3 vols. Munich 1973/4, 1649-1668.
- Quass, Friedemann. "Zur Verfassung der griechischen Städte im Hellenismus", in: *Chiron* 9 (1979), 37-52.
- Quass, Friedemann. *Die Honoratiorenschicht in den Städten des griechischen Ostens Untersuchungen zur politischen und sozialen Entwicklung in hellenistischer und römischer Zeit*. Stuttgart 1993.
- Raaflaub, Kurt. *Die Entdeckung der Freiheit. Zur historischen Semantik und Gesellschaftsgeschichte eines politischen Grundbegriffes der Griechen*. Munich 1985.
- Radicke, Jan. *Die Rede des Demosthenes für die Freiheit der Rhodier*. Stuttgart 1995.
- Raeck, Wolfgang. "Der mehrfache Apollodoros: Zur Präsenz des Bürgers im hellenistischen Stadtbild am Beispiel von Priene", in: Wörrle and Zanker (eds.) 1995, 231-238.
- Raeck, Wolfgang. "Neue Forschungen zum spätclassischen und hellenistischen Priene", in: Fahri İsjk, Elmar Schwertheim, and Engelbert Winter (eds.). *Neue Forschungen zu Ionien* (=Asia Minor Studien 54). Bonn 2005, 147-163.
- Ramsey, Gillian. "The Queen and the City: Royal Female Intervention and Patronage in Hellenistic Civic Communities", in: Lin Foxhall and Gabriele Neher (eds.). *Gender and the City before Modernity*. Chichester 2013, 20-37.
- Ranocchia, Graziano. "Natura e fine dei «Caratteri» di Teofrasto: storia di un enigma", in: *Philologus* 155:1 (2011), 69-91.
- Rasmussen, Paul J. *Excellence Unleashed: Machiavelli's Critique of Xenophon and the Moral Foundation of Politics*. Lanham 2009.
- Rathmann, Michael. *Perdikkas zwischen 323 und 320. Nachlassverwalter des Alexanderreiches oder Autokrat?* Vienna 2005.
- Rathmann, Michael. "Diodor und seine Quellen", in: Hauben and Meeus (eds.) 2014, 49-113.
- Reames, Jeanne. "The Cult of Hephaestion", in: Paul Cartledge and Fiona Greenland (eds.). *Responses to Oliver Stone's Alexander: Film, History, and Cultural Studies*. Madison 2010, 183-216.
- von Reden, Sitta. "The Piraeus – A World Apart", in: *G&R* 42 (1995), 24-37.

- Reeve, Michael D. "Hiatus in the Greek Novelists", in: *CQ* 21:2 (1971), 514-539.
- Reger, Gary. "The Economy", in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 331-353.
- Reger, Gary. "Hellenistic Greece and Western Asia Minor", in: Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, and Richard Saller (eds.). *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*. Cambridge 2007, 460-483.
- Reichel, Michael. "Xenophon's Cyropaedia and the Hellenistic Novel", in: Gray (ed.) 2010 [1995], 418-438.
- Reisert, Joseph. "Ambition and Corruption in Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*", in: *Polis* 26:2 (2009), 296-315.
- Rice, Ellen. "The Glorious Dead: Commemoration of the Fallen and Portrayal of Victory in the Late Classical and Hellenistic World", in: John Rich and Graham Shipley (eds.). *War and Society in the Greek World*. London 1993, 224-257.
- Richards, Janet and Van Buren, Mary (eds.). *Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth in Ancient States*. Cambridge 2001.
- Ricoeur, Paul. *Gedächtnis, Geschichte, Vergessen*. Munich 2004.
- Rigsby, Kent J. *Asyilia. Territorial Imviolability in the Hellenistic World* (=Hellenistic Culture and Society 22). Berkeley and London 1996.
- Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith. "Ambiguity and Narrative Levels: Christine Brooke-Rose's *Thru*", in: *Poetics Today* 3:1 (1982), 21-32.
- Ringwood Arnold, Irene. "Festivals of Rhodes", in: *AJA* 40 (1936), 432-436.
- Robert, Louis. "Adeimantos et la Ligue de Corinthe. Sur une inscription de Delphes", in: *Hellenica* 2 (1946), 15-33.
- Robert, Louis. "Théophraste de Mytilène à Constantinople", in: *CRAI* 1969, 42-64.
- Roisman, Joseph. "The Silver Shields, Eumenes, and their Historian", in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 61-82.
- Roman, Yves and Dalaison, Julie (eds.). *L'économie antique, une économie de marché? Actes des deux tables rondes tenues à Lyon les 4 février et 30 novembre 2004*. Paris 2008.
- Rosen, Klaus. "Ehrendekrete, Biographie und Geschichtsschreibung. Zum Wandel der Polis im frühen Hellenismus", in: *Chiron* 17 (1987), 277-292.
- Rostovtzeff, Michael I. *The Social and Economic History of the Ancient World*. 3 vols. Oxford 1941.
- Sacks, Kenneth. *Polybius on the Writing of History*. Berkeley 1981.
- Sage, Paula W. "Dying in Style: Xenophon's Ideal Leader and the End of the 'Cyropaedia'", in: *CJ* 90:2 (1994), 161-174.
- Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Heleen. "The Death of Cyrus: Xenophon's Cyropaedia as a Source for Iranian History", in: Gray (ed.) 2010 [1985], 439-453.
- Sandridge, Norman B. *Loving Humanity, Learning and Being Honoured. The Foundations of Leadership in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus*. Cambridge, MA and London 2012.
- Savalli-Lestrade, Ivana. *Les "Philoi" royaux dans l'Asie hellénistique*. Geneva 1998.

- Savalli-Lestrade, Ivana. "La places des Reines à la cour et dans le royaume à l'époque hellénistique", in: Regula Frei-Stolba, Anne Biemann, and Olivier Bianchi (eds.). *Les femmes antiques entre sphère privée et sphère publique. Actes du diplôme d'Etudes Avancées, Université de Lausanne et Neuchâtel, 2000-2002* (=Echo 2). Bern 2003, 59-76.
- Savalli-Lestrade, Ivana. "Intitulés royaux et intitulés civiques dans les inscriptions de cités sujettes de Carie et de Lycie (Amyzon, Eurómos, Xanthos). Histoire politique et mutations institutionnelles", in: *Studi Ellenistici* 24 (2010), 127-148.
- Schäfer, Christoph. *Enmenes von Kardis und der Kampf um die Macht im Alexanderreich* (=Frankfurter althistorische Beiträge 9). Frankfurt a.M. 2002.
- Schalles, Hans-Joachim. *Untersuchungen zur Kulturpolitik der pergamenischen Herrscher im dritten Jahrhundert vor Christus* (=Istanbuler Forschungen 36). Tübingen 1985.
- Schaps, David M. *The Invention of Coinage and the Monetization of Ancient Greece*. Ann Arbor 2004.
- Scheer, Tanja. *Mythische Vornäter: zur Bedeutung griechischer Heroenmythen im Selbstverständnis kleinasiatischer Städte*. Munich 1993.
- Scheer, Tanja. "The Past in a Hellenistic Present: Myth and Local Tradition", in: Erskine (ed.) 2003, 216-231.
- Scheffold, Karl and Seidel, Max. *Der Alexander-Sarkophag*. Berlin 1968.
- Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard. "Introduction", in: idem (eds.). *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*. Cambridge 2007, 1-12.
- Schmidt, Leopold. S.v. "Anthologia [1]", in: *RE* I,2 (1894), 2380-2391.
- Schmitt, Hatto H. *Rom und Rhodos. Geschichte ihrer politischen Beziehungen seit der ersten Berührung bis zum Aufgeben des Inselstaates im römischen Weltreich*. Munich 1957.
- Schmitt, Hatto H. *Staatsverträge des Altertums*. vol. 3. Munich 1969.
- Schmitt, Oliver. *Der Lamische Krieg*. Bonn 1992.
- Schmitz, Thomas (ed.). *The Struggle for Identity. Greeks and their Past in the First Century BCE*. Stuttgart 2011.
- Schmitz, Winfried. "Der 'Knigge' der besseren Gesellschaft – Theophrasts Charaktere oder Noblesse oblige", in: Rüdiger Kinsky and Jan Timmer (eds.). *Fröhliche Altertumswissenschaft. Festbuch für Wolfgang Will zum 65. Geburtstag* (=Antiquitas Reihe 1 Abhandlungen zur Alten Geschichte 64). Bonn 2014, 1-26.
- Schofield, Malcolm. "Political Friendship and the Ideology of Reciprocity", in: Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett, and Sitta von Reden (eds.). *Kosmos. Essays in order, conflict and community in classical Athens*. Cambridge 1998, 37-51.
- Schuffert, Frank-Gernot. *Studien zu Krieg und Machtbildung im Frühhellenismus*. Diss. Gießen 2005.
- Schuler, Christof. "Die hellenistische Gymnasiarchie", in: Kah and Scholz (eds.) 2004, 163-192.

- Schulz-Schaeffer, Ingo. "Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie. Zur Ko-Konstitution von Gesellschaft, Natur und Technik", in: Johannes Weyer (ed.). *Soziale Netzwerke. Konzepte und Methoden der sozialwissenschaftlichen Netzwerkforschung*. Munich 2011², 277-300.
- Schumacher, Leonhard. *Sklaverei in der Antike. Alltag und Schicksal der Unfreien*. Munich 2001.
- Schwind, Klaus. "Komisch", in: Karlheinz Barck et al. (eds.). *Ästhetische Grundbegriffe*. 7 vols. Stuttgart 2000-2005, 3 (2000), 332-384.
- Scott, Michael C. "Displaying Lists of What is (not) on Display: the Uses of Inventories in Greek Sanctuaries", in: Matthew Haysom and Jenny E. Wallensten (eds.). *Current Approaches to Religion in Ancient Greece: Papers Presented at a Symposium at the Swedish Institute at Athens, 17-19 April 2008*. Stockholm 2011, 239-252.
- Seaford, Richard. "Tragic Money", in: *JHS* 118 (1998), 119-139.
- Seaford, Richard. *Money and the Early Greek Mind*. Cambridge 2004.
- Seibert, Jakob. *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I*. Munich 1969.
- Seibert, Jakob. *Das Zeitalter der Diadochen*. Munich 1983.
- Seibert, Jakob. "Zur Begründung von Herrschaftsanspruch und Herrschaftslegitimierung in der frühen Diadochenzeit", in: idem (ed.). *Hellenistische Studien. Gedenkschrift für Hermann Bengtson* (=Münchner Arbeiten zur Alten Geschichte 5). Munich 1991, 87-100.
- Seyer, Martin. *Der Herrscher als Jäger: Untersuchungen zur königlichen Jagd im persischen und makedonischen Reich vom 6.-4. Jahrhundert v.Chr. sowie unter den Diadochen Alexanders des Großen* (=Wiener Forschungen zur Archäologie 11). Vienna 2007.
- Shannon, Paul et al. "Cytoscape: A Software Environment for Integrated Models of Biomolecular Interaction Networks", in: *Genome Research* 13:11 (2003), 2498-2504.
- Shear, Julia L. "The Politics of the Past: Remembering Revolution at Athens", in: John Marincola, Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, and Calum A. Maciver (eds.). *Greek Notions of the Past in the Archaic and Classical Eras: History without Historians* (=Edinburgh Leventis Studies 6). Edinburgh 2012, 276-300.
- Shear, T. Leslie Jr. *Kallias of Sphektos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 B.C.* (=Hesperia Suppl. 17). Princeton 1978.
- Shipley, Graham. *A History of Samos 800 – 188 BC*. Oxford 1987.
- Shipley, Graham. "Recent Trends and New Directions", in: Glenn R. Bugh (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Cambridge 2006, 315-327.
- Shipton, Kirsty. *Leasing and Lending: The Cash Economy in fourth-century BC Athens*. London 2000.
- Sielhorst, Barbara M. A. "Hellenistic Agorai. Formation, Reception and Semantics of an Urban Space", in: Angelikē Gannikouri (ed.). *The Agora in the Mediterranean from Homeric to Roman times*. Athens 2011, 31-46.
- Snell, Bruno. *Szenen aus griechischen Dramen*. Göttingen 1971.
- Sokolowski, Franciszek. "The Athenian Law Concerning Silver Currency (375/4 B.C.)", in: *BCH* 100 (1976), 511-515.
- Sommerstein, Alan H. *Talking about Laughter and Other Studies in Greek Comedy*. Oxford 2009.

- Sourvinou-Inwood, Christine. "Männlich – weiblich, öffentlich – privat, antik – modern", in: Ellen E. Reeder (ed.). *Pandora*. Baltimore and Basel 1995-1996, 111-120.
- Spawforth, Anthony. "Introduction", in: idem (ed.) 2007, 1-16.
- Spawforth, Anthony J.S. (ed.). *Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies*. London 2007.
- Stadter, Philipp. "Fictional Narrative in the Cyropaedia", in: *AJP* 112:4 (1991), 461-491.
- Starbatty, Angelika. *Aussehen ist Ansichtssache. Kleidung in der Kommunikation der römischen Antike* (=Münchner Studien zur Alten Welt 7). Munich 2010.
- Stavrianopoulou, Eftychia. "Hellenistic World(s) and the Concept of 'Greekness'", in: eadem (ed.). *Shifting Social Imaginaries in the Hellenistic Period: Narrations, Practices, and Images* (=Mnemosyne Suppl. 363). Leiden and Boston 2013, 177-205.
- Stein, Markus. *Definition und Schilderung in Theophrasts Charakteren*. Stuttgart 1992.
- Stewart, Andrew F. *Faces of Power: Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics* (=Hellenistic Culture and Society 11). Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993.
- Strauss, Leo. *Thoughts on Machiavelli*. Glencoe 1958.
- Strauss, Leo. *On Tyranny. Revised and Expanded Edition, Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence*. Edited by Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth. Chicago 2000.
- Strogatz, Steven H. "Exploring Complex Networks", in: *Nature* 410:6825 (2001), 268-276.
- Strootman, Rolf. "Kings and Cities in the Hellenistic Age", in: Onno van Nijf, Richard Alston, and Christina Williamson (eds.). *Political Culture in the Greek City After the Classical Age*. Leuven 2011, 141-153.
- Strootman, Rolf. *Courts and Elites in the Hellenistic Empires. The Near East After the Achaemenids, c. 330 to 30 BCE*. Edinburgh 2014.
- Stroud, Robert S. "An Athenian Law on Silver Coinage", in: *Hesperia* 43:2 (1974), 158-188.
- Sutton, Dana F. *The Greek Satyr Play*. Meisenheim 1980 (=Sutton 1980a).
- Sutton, Dana F. "Harpalus as Pallides", in: *RhM* 123 (1980), 96 (=Sutton 1980b).
- Sweet, Waldo E. "Sources of Plutarch's Demetrius", in: *CW* 44 (1951), 177-181.
- Tarn, William W. *Antigonos Gonatas*. Oxford 1913.
- Tatum, James. *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction. On the Education of Cyrus*. Princeton, NJ 1989.
- Taylor, Claire. "Women's Social Networks and Female Friendship in the Ancient Greek City", in: Lin Foxhall and Gabriele Neher (eds.). *Gender and the City before Modernity*. Chichester 2013, 213-230.
- Thomas, Nicholas. *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific*. Cambridge, MA 1991.
- Thompson Wesley E. "The Date of the Athenian Gold Coinage", in: *AJPb* 86:2 (1965), 159-174.
- Thonemann, Peter. "Charias on the Acropolis", in: *ZPE* 144 (2003), 123-124.
- Thonemann, Peter. "The Tragic King: Demetrios Poliorketes and the City of Athens", in: Oliver Hekster and Robert Fowler (eds.). *Imaginary Kings. Royal Images in the Ancient Near East, Greece and Rome*. Stuttgart 2005, 63-86.

- Tondriau, Julien L. “La tryphè: philosophie royale ptolémaïque”, in: *REA* 50 (1948), 49-54.
- Tordoff, Robert. “Coins, Money, and Exchange in Aristophanes’ ‘Wealth’”, in: *TAPhA* 142:2 (2012), 257-293.
- Tracy, Stephen V. “Reflections on the Athenian Ephebeia in the Hellenistic Age”, in: Kah and Scholz (eds.) 2004, 207-210.
- Trampedach, Kai. *Politische Mantik. Die Kommunikation über Götterzeichen und Orakel im klassischen Griechenland* (=Studien zur Alten Geschichte 21). Heidelberg 2015.
- Trittle, Lawrence A. “Soldiers and Artists, Friends and Enemies”, in: Heckel and Trittle (eds.) 2009, 121-140.
- Trümper, Monika. “Gender and Space, ‘Public’ and ‘Private’”, in: Sharon L. James and Sheila Dillon (eds.). *A Companion to Women in the Ancient World*. Malden, MA 2012, 288-303.
- Trundle, Matthew. *Greek Mercenaries From the Late Archaic Period to Alexander*. London 2004.
- Trundle, Matthew F. “Coinage and the Transformation of Greek Warfare”, in: Garrett G. Fagan and idem (eds.). *New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare*. Leiden 2010, 227-252.
- Tuplin, Christopher J. “Xenophon, Sparta and the *Cyropaedia*”, in: Anton Powell and Stephen Hodkinson (eds.). *The Shadow of Sparta*. London 1994, 127-182.
- Tuplin, Christopher J. “Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*: Education and Fiction”, in: Alan H. Sommerstein and Catherine Atherton (eds.). *Education in Greek fiction*. Bari 1996, 65-162.
- Tuplin, Christopher J. “Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*: Fictive History, Political Analysis, and Thinking with Iranian Kings”, in: Mitchell and Melville (eds.) 2013, 67-90.
- Ulf, Christoph. “Rethinking Cultural Contacts”, in: *Ancient West & East* 8 (2009), 81-132.
- Veblen, Thorstein. *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions*. Introduction by Robert Lekachman. New York 1994 [1899].
- Vedder, Ursula. “Der Koloß von Rhodos – Mythos und Wirklichkeit eines Weltwunders”, in: *NüBLA* 16 (1999/2000), 23-40.
- Vedder, Ursula. “Der Koloss von Rhodos als Wächter über dem Hafeneingang”, in: *Die Sieben Weltwunder der Antike. Wege der Wiedergewinnung aus sechs Jahrhunderten. Ausstellung Winckelmann-Museum Stendal 2003*. Mainz 2003, 131-149.
- Vedder, Ursula. “Das kolossale Weihgeschenk aus der Kriegsbeute und das Heiligtum des Helios in Rhodos”, in: Natascha Kreutz and Beat Schweizer (eds.). *Tekmeria. Archäologische Zeugnisse in ihrer kulturhistorischen und politischen Dimension. Beiträge für Werner Gauer*. Münster 2006, 361-370.
- Vedder, Ursula. “Plinius der Ältere, die Zahl *LVI* und der Koloß von Rhodos”, in: *AA* 2010, 39-45.
- Vedder, Ursula. *Der Koloss von Rhodos. Archäologie, Herstellung und Rezeptionsgeschichte eines antiken Weltwunders*. Mainz 2015.
- Veligianni-Terzi, Chryssoula. *Wertbegriffe in den attischen Ehrendekreten der Klassischen Zeit*. Stuttgart 1997.

- Veyne, Paul. *Le pain et le cirque. Sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique*. Paris 1976.
- van der Vliet, Edward Ch. L. "Pride and Participation. Political Practice, Euergetism, and Oligarchisation in the Hellenistic Polis", in: Onno M. van Nijf und Richard Alston (eds.). *Political Culture in the Greek city after the Classical Age*. Leuven 2011, 155-184.
- Vössing, Kai. *Mensa Regia. Das Bankett beim hellenistischen König und beim römischen Kaiser*. Munich 2004.
- Volkman, Hans. "Die Basileia als ἐνδοξος δουλεία. Ein Beitrag zur Wortgeschichte der Duleia", in: *Historia* 16:2 (1967), 155-161.
- Vollgraff, Wilhelm. "Novae Inscriptiones Argivae", in: *Mnemosyne* 44:2 (1916), 219-238.
- Volt, Ivo. *Character Description and Invective: Peripatetics between Ethics, Comedy and Rhetoric*. Tartu 2007.
- Volt, Ivo. "Not Valuing Others: Reflections of Social Cohesion in the Characters of Theophrastus", in: Ralph M. Rosen and Ineke Sluiter (eds.). *Valuing Others in Classical Antiquity* (=Mnemosyne Suppl. 323). Leiden and Boston 2010, 303-322.
- Walbank, Frank W. "Alcaeus of Messene, Philip V, and Rome", in: *CQ* 36:3 (1942), 134-145.
- Walbank, Frank W. "Monarchies and Monarchic Ideas", in: *CAH* 7.1 (1984), 62-100.
- Walde, Christine. *Die Traumdarstellungen in der griechisch-römischen Dichtung*. Munich 2001.
- Wallace, Shane. "The Significance of Plataia for Greek *eleutheria* in the Early Hellenistic Period", in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 147-176.
- Wallace, Shane. "Adeimantus of Lampsacus and the Development of the Early Hellenistic Philoi", in: Alonso Troncoso and Anson (eds.) 2013, 142-158.
- Walser, Andreas V. *Bauern und Zinsnehmer. Politik, Recht und Wirtschaft im frühhellenistischen Ephesos* (=Vestigia 59). Munich 2008.
- Walser, Andreas V. "ΔΙΚΑΣΤΗΡΙΑ – Rechtsprechung und Demokratie in den hellenistischen Poleis", in: Mann and Scholz (eds.) 2012, 74-108.
- Wasserman, Stanley and Faust, Katherine. *Social Network Analysis. Methods and Applications*. Cambridge 1994.
- Weber, Gregor. "Interaktion, Repräsentation und Herrschaft. Der Königshof im Hellenismus", in: Winterling (ed.) 1997, 28-71.
- Weber, Gregor. "Hellenistic Rulers and Their Poets. Silencing Dangerous Critics?", in: *AncSoc* 29 (1998-99), 247-274.
- Weber, Gregor. "Herrscher und Traum in hellenistischer Zeit", in: *AKG* 81:1 (1999), 1-33.
- Weber, Gregor. "Der Hof Alexanders des Großen als soziales System", in: *Saeculum* 58:2 (2007), 229-264.
- Weber, Max. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Tübingen 1972⁵ [1922].
- van Wees, Hans. "Demetrius and Draco: Athens' Property Classes and Population in and before 317 BC", in: *JHS* 131 (2011), 95-114.
- Wehrli, Claude. "Phila, fille d'Antipater et épouse de Démétrius, roi des macédoniens", in: *Historia* 13 (1964), 140-146.

- Wehrli, Claude. *Antigone et Démétrios*. Geneva 1969.
- Weiner, Annette. *Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving*. Berkeley 1992.
- Weintraub, E. Roy. "Neoclassical Economics", in: David R. Henderson (ed.). *Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*. Online 2007. <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html> (Accessed 21.09.2017).
- Weiskopf, Michael. *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt," 366-360 B.C.: Concerning Local Instability in the Achaemenid Far West* (=Historia Einzelschriften 63). Stuttgart 1989.
- Weiß, Peter and Draskowski, Niels. "Neue griechische Schleuderbleie", in: *Chiron* 40 (2010), 123-154.
- Wetherell, Margaret and Maybin, Janet. "The Distributed Self: A Social Constructionist Perspective", in: Richard Stevens (ed.). *Understanding the Self*. London 1996, 219-280.
- Wheatley, Patrick. "Three Missing Years in the Life of Demetrius the Besieger: 310-308 BC", in: *JAC* 16 (2001), 9-19.
- Wheatley, Patrick. "Lamia and the Besieger: an Athenian Hetaerae and a Macedonian King", in: Olga Palagia and Stephen V. Tracy (eds.). *The Macedonians at Athens 322~229 B.C.* Oxford 2003, 30-36.
- Wheatley, Patrick. "The Besieger in Syria, 314-312 BC", in: idem and Robert Hannah (eds.). *Alexander & His Successors: Essays from the Antipodes*. Claremont, CA 2009, 323-333.
- Whidden, Christopher. "The Persian Regime and Cyrus's Persian Education in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*", in: *The Review of Politics* 69 (2007), 539-567 (=2007a).
- Whidden, Christopher. "Deception in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*", in: *Interpretation* 34:2 (2007), 129-156 (=2007b).
- Whidden, Christopher. "Cyrus's Imperial Household: An Aristotelian Reading of Xenophon's «*Cyropaedia*»", in: *Polis* 25:1 (2008), 31-62.
- White, Harrison. *Identity and Control. How Social Formations Emerge*. New York 2008².
- White, Hayden V. "The Structure of Historical Narrative", in: *Clio* 1:3 (1972), 5-20.
- White, Hayden V. *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*. Baltimore 1978.
- Whitehead, David. *The Ideology of the Athenian Metec*. Cambridge 1977.
- Whitehead, David. "Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: *Philotimia* in Democratic Athens", in: *Classica et Mediaevalia* 34 (1983), 55-74.
- Whitehead, David. *Demes of Attica*. Cambridge 1986.
- Whitehead, David. "Cardinal Virtues: The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens", in: *Classica et Mediaevalia* 44 (1993), 37-75.
- Wiemer, Hans-Ulrich. *Rhodische Traditionen in der hellenistischen Historiographie*. Frankfurt a.M. 2001.
- Wiemer, Hans-Ulrich. *Krieg, Handel und Piraterie. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des hellenistischen Rhodos*. Berlin 2002.
- Wiemer, Hans-Ulrich. "Early Hellenistic Rhodes: The Struggle for Independence and the Dream of Hegemony", in: Erskine and Llewellyn-Jones (eds.) 2011, 123-146.
- Wilkins, John. *The Boastful Chef. The Discourse of Food in Ancient Comedy*. Oxford 2000.

- Wilkins, John H. and Hill, Shaun. *Food in the Ancient World*. Malden, MA and Oxford 2006.
- Will, Édouard. *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique: De la mort d'Alexandre aux événements d'Antiochos III et de Philippe V*. Nancy 1979².
- Williams, James. "Ideology & the Constitution of Demetrius of Phalerum", in: Charles D. Hamilton and Peter Krentz (eds.). *Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics, War, and History in Honor of Donald Kagan*. Claremont, CA 1997, 327-346.
- Winterling, Aloys. "«Hof». Versuch einer idealtypischen Bestimmung anhand der mittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Geschichte", in: idem (ed.) 1997, 11-25.
- Winterling, Aloys. "Hof ohne 'Staat'. Die aula Caesaris im 1. und 2. Jahrhundert n. Chr.", in: idem (ed.) 1997, 91-112.
- Winterling, Aloys (ed.). *Zwischen "Hof" und "Staat". Antike Höfe im Vergleich* (=Historische Zeitschrift Beiheft 23). Munich 1997.
- Winterling, Aloys. *Aula Caesaris. Studien zur Institutionalisierung des römischen Kaiserhofes in der Zeit von Augustus bis Commodus (31 v. Chr. - 192 n. Chr.)*. Munich 1999.
- Wörle, Michael and Zanker, Paul (eds.). *Stadt und Bürgerbild im Hellenismus. Kolloquium, München, 24. bis 26. Juni 1993*. Munich 1995.
- Worthington, Ian. "The First Flight of Harpalus Reconsidered", in: *G&R* 31 (1984), 161-169.
- Worthington, Ian. "The Chronology of the Harpalus Affair", in: *Symbolae Osloenses* 61 (1986), 63-76.
- Worthington, Ian. *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus. Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth-Century Athens*. Ann Arbor 1992.
- Worthington, Ian. "Alexander and Athens in 324/3: On the Greek Attitude to the Macedonian Hegemony", in: *Mediterranean Archaeology* 7 (1994), 45-51.
- Wrenhaven, Kelly L. *Reconstructing the Slave: The Image of the Slave in Ancient Greece*. London 2011.
- Zahrnt, Michael. "Versöhnen oder Spalten? Überlegungen zu Alexanders Verbanntendekret", in: *Hermes* 131 (2003), 407-432.
- Zahrnt, Michael. "Marathon – das Schlachtfeld als Erinnerungsort, einst und jetzt", in: Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp and Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp (eds.). *Die griechische Welt: Erinnerungsorte der Antike*. Munich 2010, 114-127.
- Zervoudaki, Eos A. "Ἡλιος και ἡ Ἀλιεῖα", in: *Archaiologikon Deltion* 30 (1975), 1-20.
- Zimmermann, Martin. "Stadttraum, Architektur und öffentliches Leben in der hellenistischen Stadt", in: Matthaei and Zimmermann (eds.) 2009, 23-40.
- Zwingmann, Nicola. *Antiker Tourismus in Kleinasien und auf den vorgelagerten Inseln. Selbstvergewisserung in der Fremde* (=Antiquitas 59). Bonn 2012.

Indices

Index nominum et locorum

- Abradatas 200, 211f., 228, 236
Adeimantos of Lampsakos 93 n. 21, 306f., 313 n. 35, 317 n. 51, 326-329, 336 n. 133
Agathokles of Sicily 171, 272 n. 392, 275, 280 n. 414, 285, 301 n. 478, 381 n. 184
Alexander III the Great 13, 194f., 202 n. 77, 264, 268 n. 378, 274, 276 n. 403, 278, 284 n. 430, 285, 289, 291f., 295-298, 313-319, 332 n. 113, 333 n. 117, 362-365, 368, 379 n. 180, 384 n. 201, 404
Alexander IV Aigos 289f.
Alexander, son of Kassander 288 n. 438
Alkimos of Epeiros 276 n. 403
Antigonos I Monophthalmos 257 n. 334, 268 n. 380f., 272 n. 392., 273-283, 288 n. 438, 289-295, 301, 325 n. 87, 330, 367f., 375-378, 403-405
Antigonos II Gonatas 206 n. 93, 332, 407
Antiochos I 286f.
Antipater 101-103, 118, 145 n. 236, 241, 273, 290 n. 442, 314
Antipater of Sidon 389 n. 220
Antiphemos of Rhodes 342
Aphrodite 313 n. 35, 325
Araspas 211, 216, 217 n. 152, 247 n. 291
Aristodemos of Miletus 278, 333
Ariston of Chios 97 n. 33
Aristotle 130 n. 169, 138 n. 208, 143 n. 225, 154 n. 280, 160, 195 n. 47, 234 n. 220, 241-243, 256 n. 331, 261 n. 352
Arsinoe II Philadelphos 317 n. 52
Artabazus 200 n. 68, 213 n. 132, 215, 221, 230, 240, 243 n. 273
Asander, satrap of Caria 370
Assyria 199 n. 65, 200, 207, 211 n. 116, 214, 216 n. 136, 216, 219, 221, 222 n. 174, 227f., 229, 247 n. 291, 265, 267
Athena Lindia 28 n. 48, 345, 348, 363 n. 105, 364 n. 109, 384, 385 n. 206, 386 n. 213, 393 n. 240
Athena Polias 106 n. 74, 118 n. 120, 147, 317f.
Athenaenus 191 n. 39, 312, 315-318, 320 n. 62, 322f., 400 n. 271
Athens 20 n. 18, 33, 40, 89-95, 100-179, 201 n. 73, 214 n. 132, 249 n. 303, 255 n. 325
Attalos, general of Perdikkas 364, 366
Babylon 212, 221, n. 167, 228, n. 198, 229f., 264, 293 n. 451, 296, 310 n. 22, 313-316
Bocchoris 324
Byzantion 119 n. 122, 315 n. 41, 358f.
Caria 212 n. 167, 356 n. 74, 357-359, 365, 367 n. 125, 368, 369 n. 135
Chios 358
Chrysantas 200, 210 n. 114, 213 n. 131, 219, 221, 223, 240, 246 n. 288
Cilicia 300, 360, 369 n. 135
Crete 311, 345, 347, 360

- Croesus 211 n. 118, 213 n. 132, 217 n. 152, 218 n. 154, 220 n. 167, 229 n. 203, 251 n. 311, 253, 257f.
- Curtius Rufus, Q. 296
- Cyaxares 203, 211, 215f., 220 n. 165, 221, 222 n. 174, 226 n. 189, 228, 238, 257f., 260 n. 349, 263 n. 363, 267
- Cyprus 295 n. 456, 300, 367 n. 127, 368, 375f.
- Cyrus the Younger 197
- Cyrus II 199-201 (as focaliser), 201f. (as imaginary), 212-219 (values), 220-223 (as collective), 298 (as narrator)
- Daïphernes 221 n. 167, 223 n. 179, 232 n. 214, 237
- Danaos 345, 348
- Delos 28 n. 48, 292 n. 450, 391, 405
- Delphi 119
- Demades 112, 314, 319 n. 61, 333 n. 117, 337
- Demaratos and Sparton of Rhodes 363-365
- Demetrius see Sikyon
- Demetrios I Poliorketes 93 n. 21, 94f., 104-106, 109 n. 82, 183 n. 7, 191 n. 38, 268 n. 380, 272 n. 390 & 392, 275-281, 285 n. 432, 288 n. 438, 290 n. 441, 291 n. 447, 292 n. 450, 299f., 301 n. 479, 307 n. 7, 310 n. 21, 313 n. 35, 320-338, 371 n. 144, 372-387, 401, 403-405 engineer king 397f. ithyphallic hymn 400 n. 271
- Demetrios of Phaleron 103f., 107-109, 112 n. 97, 116 n. 108, 175 n. 378, 338
- Demochares 94, 105, 192, 305 n. 2, 326f., 328-330, 338
- Demosthenes 95, 102, 105, 119 n. 124, 214 n. 132, 311, 314, 316, 319, 359f.
- Diagorid family 344f., 350-355
- Diodorus of Sicily 16, 17 n. 10, 41, 183 n. 7, 192, 269 n. 382, 270, 272, 279 n. 412, 281, 283 n. 428, 285, 297, 301, 312, 314, 318 n. 55, 344 n. 11, 345, 349, 351f., 355 n. 70, 362 n. 100, 364-367, 369 n. 136, 370f., 373f., 377-383, 389 n. 220, 394 n. 242
- Diogenes Laertius 92-94, 98 n. 41, 104 n. 66, 107 n. 76, 196f.
- Duris of Samos 104 n. 66, 190 n. 36, 192f., 279 n. 412, 285 n. 433, 330, 400 n. 271
- Egypt 100 n. 51, 220 n. 167, 272 n. 392, 274, 279, 294, 345, 360, 362 n. 100, 375-377
- Eleusis 313, 326
- Ephesus 40
- Erasistratos, court physician 286f.
- Euagoras the Hunchback 332
- Euphron of Sikyon 103, 108 n. 81
- Eumenes of Cardia 14 n. 5, 192, 268 n. 380, 269 n. 382
- Eutropion, philos of Antigonos 333
- Gadatas 200, 221, 222 n. 171, 229 n. 200, 237, 249 n. 303, 273 n. 395, 274 n. 398, 276 n. 403 dissolution of 228 as broker 232f.
- Gaza 276, 281 (battle of)
- Gela 342
- Glykera 313, 315 n. 44, 317 n. 51, 321, 325 n. 87
- Gobryas 200, 218 n. 156, 221, 228 n. 197, 247 n. 291, 258 n. 342, 265
- Hagnonides of Pergase 108

- Harpalos 310-321, 325
 Hekatomnids 348-351, 353
 Helios 344f., 350 n. 44, 375, 387f.,
 390f., 393, 400f.
 priesthood of 351 n. 50
 Herakles, son of Barsine 289f.
 Herakles 344, 346, 350
 Herodorus 106, 336 n. 133
 Herodotus 86 n. 3, 198 n. 64, 201f.,
 205, 213 n. 128, 264 n. 368, 321,
 342, 344 n. 14, 348
 Hieronymus of Cardia 17 n. 10, 192,
 269 n. 380, 279 n. 412, 373f.
 Hydaspes 315f.
 Hyperides 319, 338
 Hyphasis 282
 Hystaspas 200 n. 72, 215 n. 139,
 221, 223 n. 180, 258 n. 342
 Ialysos 332f.
 Iasos 337
 Ipsos 323 n. 79, 380
 Isocrates 131, 160, 241-243, 352 n.
 54
 Justin 270, 284, 296, 373 n. 151
 Kameiros 342f., 351, 355, 362 n.
 101, 374f.
 Kassander 94 n. 25, 100, 105, 118,
 176, 273f., 289f., 326, 368f., 378,
 383f.
 Kleomenes, satrap of Egypt 360
 Kleon 339 n. 149
 Kleopatra, sister of Alexander 289f.,
 370 n. 140
 Kleopatra VII 322 n. 73
 Konon, Athenian commander 354f.
 Korinth 378 n. 177, 401
 Kos 349, 361
 Krateros 282
 Kyinda 297f.
 Kyrene 311, 317 n. 50 (lex sacra of)
 Kyzikos 119
 Lachares 105-107, 152 n. 273, 339 n.
 148
 Lamia, hetaira 183 n. 7, 321 n. 68,
 322-325, 327 n. 93, 328f.
 Leaina, hetaira 322, 325, 328
 Lindos 332f.
 Lycurgus 360
 Lynkeos of Samos 323
 Lysias 120
 Lysimachos 106, 108 n. 80, 272 n.
 392, 275, 277 n. 406, 280 n. 416,
 281, 284, 300 n. 474, 301 n. 479,
 312 n. 29, 322 n. 72, 329f., 337,
 378, 383 n. 194, 384f., 405
 Malta 118f.
 Mania, hetaira 322f.
 Medeios of Larissa 294
 Megara 301, 401
 Meleagros 287
 Memnon of Rhodes 361f.
 Mentor of Rhodes 361f.
 Miletus 40
 Mithridates I of Pontus 294 n. 453
 Mucianus, C. Licinius 393
 Olympias 289 n. 441, 290 n. 442,
 291 n. 447, 314
 Olympichos of Iasos 347
 Olympiodoros 93 n. 21, 106
 Ophellas, son of Seilenos 285f., 310
 Oxythemis of Larissa 328f., 332
 Pamphylia 360
 Pantheia 200, 228f., 240, 247 n. 291
 agency of 210-213
 as narrator 221
 dissolution of 237
 Peithon, son of Krateuas 273 n. 395,
 311

- Perdikkas 268 n. 380, 273f., 282 n. 423, 283, 289 n. 441, 292 n. 450, 294 n. 456, 296, 366, 375
- Persia 194-199, 201-209, 215, 217f., 221, 225, 229, 231 n. 207, 234, 236 n. 233, 260, 262, 263 n. 363, 265, 289 n. 441, 354, 358, 363
- Pheraulas 200, 217, 221, 227, 229-233, 238, 244f., 247f., 258 n. 342
- Phila, wife of Demetrios 279, 325, 374, 383, 385
- Philip II of Macedon 113 n. 101, 191 n. 38, 194, 273 n. 393, 281 n. 420, 285, 298 n. 468, 332f.
- Philip III Arrhidaios 289
- Philippides of Kephale 337f.
- Philon of Byzantium 389f.
- Philoxenos, *hyparchos* of the Asian coast 314
- Phoenicia 300, 360
- Phylakion, hetaira 338
- Phylarchus 192, 193 n. 41, 329f., 334 n. 124, 383 n. 195
- Pindar 344f., 350
- Plato 98 n. 36, 99, 160, 197 n. 57, 205, 206 n. 95, 216 n. 144, 218, 219 n. 157, 242 n. 266, 256 n. 331, 323 n. 74
- Plutarch 16f., 41, 97 n. 33, 98 n. 36, 109 n. 82, 183 n. 7, 190 n. 36, 192 n. 41, 269 n. 380, 270, 274 n. 398, 275, 277 n. 404, 278f., 281-283, 286 n. 435, 294f., 299-301, 316, 322 n. 73, 323-327, 333, 337-339, 363, 370 n. 139, 374, 383 n. 194, 385, 390 n. 227
- Polyaenus 270, 360, 374, 376f.
- Polyperchon 100, 103 n. 61, 118, 275 n. 401, 289 n. 441
- Protogenes, painter 374, 385
- Ptolemy I Soter 183 n. 7, 272, 274-279, 285, 291, 295 n. 456, 296-298, 300 n. 474, 312 n. 25, 365 n. 111, 366f., 375-378, 382-387, 404
- Ptolemy IV Philopator 407
- Ptolemy V Epiphanes 230 n. 203
- Pyrrhus 191 n. 38, 268 n. 380, 276 n. 403, 291 n. 446, 405
- Pythionike, hetaira 313, 315 n. 44, 317 n. 51, 318 n. 55, 319 n. 59, 325
- Python of Katane 312 n. 26, 315f.
- Rhodes 119, 279, 341-409, 416f.
- Rhodos (nymph) 345f.
- Rhosus 299f., 313 n. 32
- Sacian (the) 200, 217 n. 149, 227, 245 n. 281, 248 n. 296, 258 n. 342
- Salamis (Sicily) 114 n. 101, 183, n. 7, 278, 325 n. 87, 369, 375
- Samos 40, 103, 325 n. 87, 364 n. 108
- Samothrake 133
- Seleukos I Nikator 273 n. 393, 275f., 279, 286f., 293 n. 451, 295 n. 457, 299-301, 367 n. 127, 369 n. 135, 383, 405
- Seleukos II Kallinikos 387 n. 214
- Seleukos IV Philopator 230 n. 203
- Sikyon 323, 401
- Socrates 201 n. 73, 214 n. 132
- Sparta 119, 192 n. 41, 196, 202 n. 76, 203 n. 79, 205 n. 88, 351-357
- Strabo 333f.
- Stratokles of Diomeia 105, 108, 114 n. 104, 145 n. 236, 281 n. 419, 325 n. 87, 337-339
- Stratonike 280 n. 414, 286f., 299, 300 n. 474
- Susa 229, 271 n. 386 (wedding at), 301 n. 381
- Syria 300, 360
- Theokritos of Chios 333

- Theophrastus 91-95, 107 n. 76, 110
n. 88, 112 n. 94, 113 n. 101, 117,
143 n. 224, 144, 147, 160 n. 310,
177
- Theopompus 312, 317, 330
- Thessalonike, sister of Alexander
289
- Thessaly 322f.
- Thucydides 13, 126 n. 156, 191 n.
41, 197, 212 n. 129, 342, 349
- Thurioi 118f., 350
- Tigranes 211 n. 120, 221
- Timaeus of Tauromenion 285, 300
n. 478
- Tlepolemos 334
- Troy 345
- Tychê 109f., 249f., 279 n. 411
- Tyre (proclamation of) 291, 358,
360, 367
- Vroulia 349, 354
- Xenokrates, philosopher 278
- Xenophon 192 n. 41, 193-217, 240
n. 250, 244, 256, 265, 270f., 280,
284 n. 431, 302, 349, 355 n. 70,
358 n. 82, 414
- Zeno of Kition 98 n. 41, 206 n. 93
- Zeno of Rhodes 345 n. 24, 373, 376
n. 166
- Zoilos, armourer 374, 385

Index nominum modernorum

- Badian, Ernst 314
- Baines, John 281
- Barabási, Albert László 56-59, 82,
267
- Bourdieu, Pierre 34
- Bovenschen, Silvia 128
- Brun, Patrice 360
- Callon, Michel 50-56, 60, 62, 66f.,
72, 77, 79-81, 124, 174, 230, 233,
263, 310
- Carlier, Pierre 208
- Cichorius, Conrad 101
- Cohen, David 122
- Danzig, Gabriel 204, 238
- Davidson, James 318, 322
- Davies, John 26, 30, 32, 37, 151, 305
- Demand, Nancy 352f.
- Diggle, James 99, 160
- Dover, Kenneth 167
- Due, Bodil 208
- Eidinow, Esther 146
- Elias, Norbert 177f.
- Finley, Moses 149
- Foucault, Michel 46-51, 66f., 71, 79
- Freeman, Linton 45, 47
- Gabrielsen, Vincent 366
- Gallant, Thomas 165
- Gehrke, Hans-Joachim 24f., 34f.
- Gill, Christopher 123
- Granovetter, Mark 61
- Gray, Vivienne 204f.
- Goldhill, Simon 98
- Habicht, Christian 19, 116
- Henderson, John 331
- Herman, Gabriel 187
- Heuss, Alfred 14f., 23-26, 30, 418
- Hornblower, Jane 373
- Hunter, Virginia 122
- Jones, Christopher 348
- Kingsley, Bonnie 313
- Konstan, David 144
- Lane Fox, Robin 95, 97, 110, 117

- Leppin, Hartmut 111
 Lotman, Yuri M. 39, 308f., 314, 334f., 415
 Low, Polly 33
 Luhmann, Niklas 67-72, 79, 83, 140f., 153, 167, 239, 411
 Ma, John 17f., 30, 34, 155, 375
 Malkin, Irad 31, 56 n. 52, 57 n. 54, 341f., 349, 352
 Mann, Michael 47, 185
 Mauss, Marcel 257f.
 Meißner, Burkhard 188
 Milgram, Stanley 61
 Millett, Paul 134, 165-168
 Mikalson, Jon 109
 Moggi, Mauro 344
 Mooren, Léon 188
 Parsons, Talcott 47
 Paschidis, Paschalis 30, 306f., 329, 336-338
 Polanyi, Karl 149f.
 Ogden, Daniel 321f., 326
 Orwell, George 95
 Quass, Friedemann 21, 112, 115
- Ranocchia, Graziano 95
 Sage, Paula 204f.
 Savalli-Lestrade, Ivana 30, 37, 335
 Schmitz, Winfried 111-115
 Snell, Bruno 315
 Spawforth, Tony 185
 Stein, Markus 100
 Strauss, Leo 202
 Strootman, Rolf 30, 184, 186, 189
 Sutton, Dana 316
 Thomas, Nicholas 257
 Tilly, Charles 186
 Tritle, Lawrence 315
 Tuplin, Christopher 250, 264
 Veyne, Paul 21, 112, 114f.
 Wallace, Shane 306, 336
 Weber, Gregor 188, 293
 Weber, Max 24-26, 37, 45-47, 71, 112, 185, 288
 Wiemer, Hans-Ulrich 352, 371, 377
 White, Harrison 64-66, 83, 411
 Whitehead, David 90
 Yoffee, Norman 281

Index rerum

- Achaemenid Empire 186, 193f., 201, 202 n. 76f., 209, 210 n. 115, 212, 217 n. 149, 284 n. 431, 323 n. 79, 333 n. 119, 357f., 361-365
 economy of 257 n. 334
 Agency panic 353f., 356
 Ambiguity 199, 202, 204, 209, 212 ns. 126 & 128, 257 n. 337, 258 n. 342, 282, 288, 293 n. 450, 299, 346, 383, 409, 417, 419
anagrapheus 102-106
- Anecdote 91-93, 98, 190f., 229f. n. 203, 271-278, 283-286, 291, 294f.
 Army 13, 185, 195, 207, 215-218, 219 n. 158, 220 n. 166f., 222-224, 229, 232f., 238, 255, 273 n. 393, 275 n. 398 & 400, 277 n. 404 & 406, 282, 294, 297, 301, 315, 318, 323, 382
 Baggage 51, 279f., 301
 Body 46, 124 n. 148, 127-129, 235f.
 citizen body 105-111, 115f.
 Broker see mediation

- Centralisation 57-59, 82, 102, 179, 183f., 222-225, 233-246, 258f., 265f., 278, 302, 356, 363f., 381, 414f.
- Census 102-104, 111, 113 n. 98, 175, 351 n. 50
- Charisma 24, 26, 73 n. 125, 184 n. 10
- Clothing 127-129, 142 n. 220, 160 n. 311, 201 n. 76, 258, 277 n. 404, 279, 296
- Code Switching 64, 163, 230, 276 n. 403
- Coinage 41, 111 n. 91, 141f., 149 n. 260, 150-153, 253, 284 n. 431, 299, 361, 375, 380 n. 181, 388, 404
- Comedy 97 n. 33, 98, 109 n. 85, 320-324, 331 n. 108, 333, 334 n. 125, 337-339
- Cooking 138, 142, 333f.
- Contingency 64f., 68-70, 76, 177f., 266f., 301-303, 408f., and *passim*
- Costume see clothing
- Council see synhedrion
- Court Society 181-190, 208, 226, 231 n. 207, 233 n. 217, 244 n. 279, 248 n. 293, 254 n. 324, 266-270, 287, 294, 298 n. 471, 302, 314, 330, 414
- Deferment 238, 263 n. 363, 278-280, 288-302, 319, 330
- Democracy 22, 40, 93-116, 160, 195 n. 47, 196, 214 n. 132, 351, 355, 359, 363
- Distribution 166, 176, 179, 214, 217, 226 n. 189, 230f., 241-243, 249 n. 303, 252-255, 258-265, 271-273, 276 n. 403 & 404, 277-280, 286, 313, 383-385
- of networks 57-59, 174, 301f., 362, 372, 377 n. 172
- of self see self
- Doppelgänger see doubling
- Doubling 95, 123 n. 146, 273, 276 n. 403, 309, 334-337, 404 n. 284, 415
- Dreams 96 n. 32, 125, 133, 149, 292-298, 324
- Economics 69, 134, 149-158, 162-168, 244-247, 252-264, 266, 276 n. 403, 285, 300-302, 317, 349-354, 361, 367
- Equality 64, 104 n. 66, 111, 115 n. 105, 126, 138, 143 n. 224, 146, 160-165, 174-176, 225f., 241-243, 258-260, 280, 293 n. 451, 299
- as methodological principle 51f.
- Empire 197, 202, 207, 221-232, 246, 254f., 263-265, 368, 385f.
- Fashion see clothing
- Fear 132f., 138 n. 208, 197, 211 n. 116, 214, 219 n. 158, 231, 234 n. 223, 250f., 267, 283, 288 n. 438, 351, 353, 368 n. 81, 364 n. 108, 378, 386
- of the gods 148f., 226 n. 189
- fearlessness 14 n. 5
- Flattery see *kolakeia*
- Focalisation 111 n. 91, 121, 168, 170, 199-201, 211 n. 116, 218 n. 156, 286, 330
- Food 114 n. 101, 134, 226 n. 189, 235, 257-259, 315, 318-320, 382
- Footing see security
- Freedom 70, 126 n. 156, 210f., 219f., 233, 237f., 330, 359, 364f., 368-372, 376-379, 382, 403
- Friendship see *philia*
- Funeral 125 n. 154, 142 n. 223, 290

- Gifting 44, 145, 189, 222 n. 177, 230 n. 204, 243-247, 252 n. 316, 256-260, 264f., 274 n. 398, 275-281, 313-316, 319 n. 60, 321-324, 333, 369, 380-385, 393-395
- Healing/Mending 214 n. 136, 226f., 275f., 284f.
- Home 120, 229-232
- Honoratiorenregime* 25 n. 38, 91 n. 17, 112-115
- Honour 91 n. 17, 104 n. 66, 114 n. 101, 120 n. 127, 155, 160f., 166 n. 340, 167f., 214, 222 n. 177, 238, 245, 255, 314, 325-328, 333f., 377
- Hostages 143 n. 226, 247 n. 291, 301, 377, 381 n. 188, 384
- Hunger see food
- Hunting 14 n. 5, 220 n. 163, 238, 284, 310 n. 21, 312, 322
- Identity (definition) 32-39, 63-66, 73, 85 n. 3, 86 n. 4, 125f.
- Imaginary 83, 116-119, 165, 171, 179, 193, 201, 267, 312, 327, 330, 333f., 413-418
- Inscriptions as sources 29, as actors 75f.
- Insecurity see contingency
- Kolakeia* 189 n. 31, 194 n. 46, 306, 332, 334, 337
- Kyriëia/kyrios* 120-123, 135, 138, 148, 173, 198, 212, 225 n. 188, 227f.
- Lamian War 22, 102 n. 57, 103, 116f., 175 n. 377, 310f., 364f.
- Law 78f., 92, 104, 107, 111f., 116 n. 109, 119-121, 126, 131 n. 175, 141, 156, 161, 167 n. 344, 204-208, 215, 219, 224f., 234f., 248 n. 294 & 297, 251, 262f., 268
legal history 23-26
- Letters 32 n. 60, 75, 190, 206 n. 93, 241, 257 n. 334, 283, 291f., 299, 301 n. 481, 312 n. 26, 317, 336,
- Lion 284, 288 n. 438, 322
- Love see *philia*
- Machiavellianism 14, 202, 298
- Magic 258 n. 339, 323, 334
- Mediation 62f., 211, 215, 232f., 238 245, 248, 252, 258, 260, 265f., 271, 286, 290, 301, 305f., 320f., 331f., 345, 360
- Medium 69f. (definition of), 141, 153-156, 253-258, 278, 289 n. 41, 298f., 320, 327, 331, 336, 394
- Memory 65 n. 86, 73f., 77 n. 333, 101 n. 53, 116f., 126, 158, 167, 218, 259, 277, 290, 346, 385, 387, 402
- Mercenaries 105, 108 n. 80, 111 n. 90, 254 n. 323, 283 n. 426, 358, 378-382, 384
- Meritocracy 112, 160, 210 n. 114, 215, 217, 220 n. 167, 222, 226 n. 189, 229 n. 202, 231f., 242, 245, 254f., 258-260, 265f., 272 n. 392, 276f., 301, 321, 323, 331, 414
- Metaphysics 184 n. 10, 216 n. 144, 218, 292, 392
- Miasma* see pollution
- Money 69, 81, 134, 149-154, 214, 230 n. 203, 252-259, 276f., 298-300, 312-314, 319-325, 331, 334, 336, 339, 358, 361, 367f., 379, 394
- Bribery 166 n. 339, 214 n. 135, 299 n. 478, 314, 319 n. 60, 320 n. 53, 337, 383
Taxation 254f., 276 n. 404, 360f., 384
- Monstrosity 315, 320-322, 327f., 331-339

- Monumentality 264-266, 326, 334, 345, 388-395, 399f., 405f.
- Mutiny 274 n. 398, 276 n. 403, 282, 288 n. 438
- Narrative 15f., 37-42, 61-66, 72f., 80f., 100f., 121f., 139-141, 145f., 159, 168-170, 176-178, 185f., 191, 198-206, 221, 230, 236, 249 n. 303, 263, 270-302, 307f., 314-319, 321f., 326f., 330-335, 374, 379 n. 180, 380-388, 395, 405, 408f., 411-419
- Neutrality 79, 126 n. 156, 297, 366, 370-378, 409, 416
as methodological principle 50f., 61, 67 n. 95
- Network 45f., 174-176, 302, and *passim*
Growth 58, 82, 174-176, 179, 217, 220, 227, 233, 242, 246 n. 288, 255, 259, 267, 302, 307f., 387
Preferential attachment 58f., 82, 176, 267
- Myth/Mythohistory 18-20, 116 n. 109, 195 n. 47, 208, 284, 322, 335, 343-348, 350, 353, 356, 390 n. 227, 401, 404-407, 416
- Oikos* 109, 120-125, 136 n. 196, 138, 141, 143, 163, 173, 181 n. 1, 213 n. 128, 225-231, 265, 318 n. 52, 321, 331 n. 108, 353
- Obligatory passage point (OPP) 53f., 80, 174, 231-233, 235, 237, 241, 251-261, 261f., 266, 270, 287, 297, 301f., 330, 414f.
- Paian* 250, 328
- Paideia* 115 n. 106, 171, 193 n. 43, 205 n. 89, 213 n. 130, 217, 219f.
- Patrios politeia* 116, 165, 171, 178, 413
- Paradox (productive) 65, 70, 164, 173, 176f., 185, 187, 196 n. 53, 240, 250, 259, 273, 277, 293 n. 450, 294, 310, 333 n. 121, 348, 357, 412, 415, 418
- Peace 366, 369-371, 383, 402f.
- Philanthropia* 194 n. 44, 206, 213 n. 132, 214, 216, 220, 223-226, 236, 238, 243, 255 n. 325, 258, 283
- Philia* 125 n. 154, 141-147, 156-158, 162-166, 178, 189 n. 31, 239-246, 260-265, 305f., 317, 321 n. 69, 326, 332, 336, 371 n. 142, 413
- Philomatheia* 214-217, 220 n. 165, 224, 235, 238, 243, 280
- Philotimia* 113f., 214 n. 132 & 134, 216, 224f., 238, 245 n. 283, 258
- Polis society 89f., 123 n. 146, 307
- Pollution 124 n. 150, 333 n. 121
- Power (see also narrative & translation) 26, 35, 42-83, 88, 130, 155, 167f., 178f., 186-188, 194, 224, 250, 257, 261, 269f., 285-287, 290f., 298, 317, 321, 334-337, 359, 361-372, 380-383, 388, 402-404
- Public & Private 75 n. 131 (definition of public), 216f.
- Reciprocity 142-146, 150 n. 261, 158, 163-166, 212, 229f., 248, 256-258, 276-278, 282, 321, 326, 371, 387
- Regime of dignitaries see *Honoratiorenregime*
- Religion 69, 109, 123 n. 146, 133, 146-149, 158, 178, 184 n. 10, 247-252, 394
- Security 64-66, 77, 86, 138, 170, 190, 231, 237, 268-270, 283, 287, 292, 298, 346, 349, 385, 399, 401, 409

- Self (distributed) 124-126, 184 n. 8
and *passim*
friend as second s. 143 n. 225, 223
n. 180, 336
- Semisphere 308f., 314, 327, 330f.,
335-337, 408
- Sex 121, 141f., 240 n. 254, 316-322,
325, 329 n. 99, 331-334
- Siege 23 n. 31, 279f., 324 n. 80, 341,
363, 367, 372-387, 399-404, 408,
416
Siege engines 393f.
Helepolis 324
- Silver Shields 283 n. 428, 292
- Skēnē* 28 n. 48, 184, 232, 271 n. 386,
297f., 329f., 332f., 334 n. 125
- Slaves/Slavishness 110f., 122f.,
128f., 138, 146, 159-161, 240,
317f., 321 n. 68, 378f., 381, 386,
403
- Stage see *skēnē*
- Story see narrative
- Strength of weak ties 61, 174, 323f.,
335
- syngeneia* 346-348, 353, 404
- synbedrion* 182 n. 5, 188, 271
- symposium 110, 115 n. 106, 125f.,
136, 147, 226, 232, 243f., 271, 274,
288 n. 438, 297 n. 468, 316 n. 47
- Tent see *skēnē*
- Theatre 172, 278 n. 411, 292, 329,
330 n. 103, 334 n. 125, 386
- Throne (as object actor) 296f.
- Tombs 291, 313, 319 n. 61, 326 n.
90
- Tragedy see theatre
- Translation (Callonian) 52-56, 74-
79, 153, 233, 236-266, 296f., 299-
300, 314, 317, 327, 330, 336, 352,
359, 361f., 365f., 370f., 376-381,
394, 403, 407-409
- Treasurer/treasure 298 n. 472, 310
n. 22, 312f.
- Truth 73, 81-83, 145f., 148, 154-
172, 199 n. 67, 241-243, 247, 261-
266, 273, 275, 282-285, 297 n. 468
- Uncertainty see contingency
- Underspecification 98, 118, 139f.,
170-173, 271, 287, 292
- Utilitarianism (greater good) 205 n.
90, 207 n. 99, 215, 224, 237f.,
241f., 254f., 263-265, 286
- Utopia 267
- Vengeance 289, 355 n. 70
- Violence 14, 24, 47, 70-72, 186-188,
238 n. 245, 288 n. 438, 331-336,
376f.
- Women/Female agency 96 n. 32,
121-123, 205 n. 89, 210-212, 215
n. 137, 227 n. 192, 269 n. 382, 286,
313, 317, 320-323, 327, 330